Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777

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Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Foreword

Army University Press is pleased to publish this staff ride handbook for the Saratoga campaign under the imprint of the Combat Studies Institute. The campaign culminated in one of the most significant battles in American history, as colonial forces trapped an entire British army in the uplands of New York state, compelling its surrender and earning the fledgling republic international recognition from France and eventually military assistance from French forces. With this support, the Continentals forced the surrender of a second British army at Yorktown four years later, earning the United States its independence from Great Britain.

In addition to the national significance, the campaign offers a wealth of lessons for students of military history. The Americans employed a Fabian strategy against Burgoyne’s army, whittling away his strength and threatening his logistics until he was defeated in battle and forced to surrender. The technique was duplicated two centuries later by the Vietnamese resistance against the French at Dien Bien Phu. By controlling key terrain, interdicting vital lines of communication, and using a remote and inaccessible locale with difficult terrain to their advantage, both revolutionary armies successfully defeated a much stronger and better-equipped opponent. Thus, the campaign continues to offer lessons, both for those fomenting rebellion and those charged with suppressing it.

This volume is labeled the “Saratoga Campaign” rather than the “Battle of Saratoga” because it includes stands and guidance for the peripheral battles at such locales as Bennington, Vermont, and Fort Schuyler (Stanwix), New York, that made significant contributions to the eventual outcome of the campaign. The staff ride can be executed as a single-day focusing exclusively on the battles around Saratoga, but the CSI staff strongly feels that Saratoga is best studied as an operational campaign, with the full context that it deserves. Traveling the varied terrain of upstate New York—from the shores of Lake Champlain to the Adirondack Mountains—will give the military professional a much better appreciation of the immense challenges the crown forces faced in attempting to seize and hold this difficult terrain.
Leadership remains a key component of military operations, and the Saratoga Campaign offers a wealth of lessons for military professionals on managing command relationships, the vital importance of unity of command, and the critical qualities of initiative and discipline for leaders at all levels. The American forces successfully leveraged Continental regulars and militia, with several important exceptions, in bringing combat power to bear, while Burgoyne’s army ultimately succumbed to the British high command’s inability to formulate and direct a coherent strategy for the 1777 campaign season among its subordinate commanders. Identifying capable leaders and assigning them tasks that best suit their talents and abilities remain important keys to success for military commanders of any era.

CSI hopes that military professionals through the region—from active-duty forces at Fort Drum to cadets at the various institutions of higher learning across the Mid-Atlantic and New England—will take advantage of the resources available in this volume to carefully study the Saratoga Campaign and apply the distilled wisdom in their own lives and careers. The study and knowledge of military history has been an essential component of any successful military career; military professionals of all ranks have improved themselves, their service, and their nation by devoting countless hours to studying and mastering past events. We publish this guide in hopes of facilitating those efforts. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge a number of people for their assistance with the creation and preparation of this staff ride handbook. The first of these individuals is Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Ebaugh (US Marine Corps, Retired), a former member of the Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride Team. Lieutenant Colonel Ebaugh did yeoman’s work on creating the original Saratoga walkbook for the team; much of his content was incorporated into this study. Also thank you to Lieutenant Colonel Gary Linhart (US Army, Retired) for his assistance on our reconnaissance trip in October 2015. The trip was undertaken to view the terrain and help develop a better understanding of this important campaign. Having conducted a number of earlier Saratoga staff rides, Lieutenant Colonel Linhart provided excellent insights as to where he thought various stands should or should not be located as well as recommendations on handbook structure. Mr. Eric Schnitzer, Park Ranger and Historian for the Saratoga National Historical Park, was also a tremendous help. Together with the author and Lieutenant Colonel Linhart, Mr. Schnitzer sat for several hours at the Saratoga battlefield to discuss key actions during the two battles fought there in 1777. He also gave liberally of his time to review and edit the Orders of Battle for this handbook to ensure that the often-confusing designations of both American and British units as well as notes details were accurate. In addition, Mr. Schnitzer subsequently answered numerous questions via e-mail to help clarify the author’s understanding of key campaign events and issues. Finally, the author would like to thank his staff ride mentor, Dr. William G. Robertson, former Chief of Staff Rides and former Director of the Combat Studies Institute. Dr. Robertson, who created the modern military staff ride in the early 1980s, took a great deal of time and effort to train the author and other staff riders on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of how to properly create and conduct a staff ride. Hopefully this work reflects the common sense and orderliness of his mentorship.
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Introduction

As a vehicle for the education of the military professional, the staff ride has long proven its efficacy. Analysis of a battle or a campaign through an examination of the actual terrain is a concept deeply rooted in military study. The term “staff ride” originated in Europe with the Prussian (later German) Army. Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke often took members of the General Staff on horseback (hence staff ride) to potential battlefields to conduct exercises based on possible future conflicts. The term also was used for mounted visits by General Staff students to historical battlefields—something more akin to the US Army’s modern staff rides. In the United States, Captain Arthur L. Wagner made an initial proposal for a staff ride, and Major Eben Swift brought the concept to fruition in 1906 at the General Service and Staff School, the forerunner of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The essential elements of Wagner and Swift’s staff ride concept included a detailed classroom study of a campaign followed by an in-depth visit to the sites associated with that campaign. Later pioneers of the staff ride added an integration phase in order to mesh the classroom and field study phases for further insights into the military profession. Thus, the classroom, field, and integration phases are the cornerstones of the modern staff ride.

Today, the US Army considers the staff ride an essential aspect of historical education for the modern military professional throughout its system of schools and a crucial facet of the continuing professional development of its officers and noncommissioned officers in line units. The CGSC, the Army War College, and institutions throughout the Army school system conduct staff rides with the extensive resources necessary to fully execute the preliminary study, field study, and integration methodology. Units outside of the schoolhouse environment also can benefit extensively from staff rides, but they also are more restricted regarding resources, particularly time. The staff ride handbook is a valuable tool to help the line unit prepare for a staff ride. It provides background to the campaign, a suggested list of sites to visit (called “stands”), material for discussion at the stands, and advice for staff ride logistics support. The
The intent of this handbook is not to replace the detailed study needed for the ride, but it does provide a starting point that should make the unit’s preparation easier.

This handbook is one in a series of works from the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) designed to facilitate staff rides for US Armed Forces personnel. The foundational document of this series is *The Staff Ride* by Dr. William Glenn Robertson (Washington, DC: Center of Military History Publication 70–21, 1987). *The Staff Ride* describes the staff ride methodology in detail and gives advice on how to build any staff ride. Other published handbooks focus on particular battles and campaigns and include works on Chickamauga, Cowpens, Shiloh, the Overland Campaign, and Vicksburg among others. (CSI staff ride handbooks can be obtained from the CSI website: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/combat-studies-institute). These publications are outstanding tools for the military professional or anyone interested in the detailed study of battles and campaigns. This work on the Saratoga Campaign has borrowed from all of its predecessors, and the author is grateful for the excellent efforts of other handbook authors. Although similar to many, the *Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign* differs from most staff ride handbooks. First, this is the first handbook that covers a Revolutionary War campaign. In addition, this Saratoga Campaign study is an operational-level staff ride and thus a departure from the more common tactical staff rides conducted on most battlefields. Like Overland and Vicksburg, the Saratoga Campaign consisted of multiple engagements with complex unit movements covering considerable distances and an extended period of time. These factors create unique challenges and opportunities for both staff ride instructors and participants.

One of these unique aspects is the nature of the “ride” itself. In short, the Saratoga Campaign requires more vehicular travel and less walking than most staff rides. Participants have the opportunity to explore unit march routes and gain commander insights for both sides—making full use of vehicle travel time to show unit route maps and orient the students before they arrive at each stand. Students also will benefit from using operational maps to analyze the movements while they are en route from stand to stand.
Another challenge for this staff ride is to relate each of the major battles within the campaign. The students need to understand the connection between the battles and how each engagement affected the next battle, even if the effect was unintended. The Saratoga Campaign consisted of ten key tactical actions: Fort Ticonderoga, Hubbardton, Fort Anne, Bennington, Oriskany, Fort Schuyler, the Pawlet Raids, Freeman’s Farm, Barber’s Wheatfield, and the siege at Saratoga. There are multiple stands at some of these battle sites, and others cover events between the major clashes that lacked dramatic battle actions but are crucial for understanding and linking the campaign.

To benefit more senior participants, staff ride leaders are encouraged to emphasize tactical details for brigade level and above, without becoming overly focused on small unit actions. Even so, they should help reinforce numerous lessons at the tactical level—concepts about leadership, doctrine, and the face of battle. For example, the Battle of Fort Anne provides a superb contrast in small unit leadership styles as well as challenges for leaders to think on their feet. Similarly, the ride should address the tragedy of war, such as the deaths of Jane McCrae and General Simon Fraser. Although this is generally laid out as an operational staff ride, leaders can choose tactical details and human-interest stories (vignettes) to illustrate key points. If the audience is composed primarily of participants such as Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets, enlisted personnel, or junior officers, the ride should be weighted to the tactical level. Staff ride leaders must ultimately tailor the stands to support the goals of the audience.

While this handbook is structured for a two-day ride with twenty-nine stands and sub-stands, staff ride leaders can modify the stands to fit their schedules. With one- or modified two-day rides, they should keep a sense of connection between stands so that students understand the context of the campaign. Staff ride leaders can pick selected stands that perhaps focus on only one or two battles as time permits—ensuring that students have an opportunity to conduct research and prepare before actually visiting the campaign locations.

*The Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign* systematically analyzes this strategically important Revolutionary War campaign. Part I describes American and British Army
organizations—detailing their weapons, tactics, logistics, engineer, communications, and medical support.

Part II consists of a campaign overview which establishes the context for individual actions to be studied in the field.

Part III provides a suggested itinerary of sites and a concrete view of the campaign in its several phases. Each stand description includes travel directions, an orientation to the battle site, discussion of the action that occurred there, vignettes from the campaign, and suggested discussion questions and topics.

Part IV addresses the final phase of the staff ride—when students integrate the classroom portion of the staff ride with the field phase and gain relevant insights and lessons.

Part V offers practical information on conducting a staff ride in the Saratoga Campaign area, including resources and logistical considerations.

Appendices A through F provide the orders of battle for the forces included in the various key actions. Appendix G gives biographical sketches of key participants, Appendix H shows a chronology of the campaign, and Appendix I explains military terms used in this handbook. Appendix J provides campaign and battle maps. Finally, the bibliography outlines source details.

In summary, the Saratoga Campaign provides a magnificent example of commanders locked in a classic military struggle, giving testimony to the grim ordeal of war and the price paid by the common Soldier. Lessons learned from this complex struggle can provide an unmatched tool for educating the modern military professional.
I. Revolutionary War Armies

Introduction

Before a staff ride covering a complex campaign such as Saratoga, staff ride leaders and participants need to understand the broader context of how and why the campaign was prosecuted. The following section covers the “how” by describing the organization, weapons, tactics, and support functions of the Revolutionary War’s primary opponents (for the “why” of this campaign, see Section II Campaign Overview). This account is detailed enough to help readers understand the organization and capabilities of campaign leaders and units as well as various military actions and decisions. For uniformity and clarity, this volume follows the outline of previous Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride handbooks—borrowing material and ideas from previous volumes while focusing on Revolutionary War and Saratoga Campaign command structures, organizations, military strategy, and tactics.

Organization

The State Militias and the Continental Army

From almost the beginning of efforts to colonize what is now the United States of America, European emigrants established military formations to provide for the common defense. These organizations, commonly referred to as “militia,” typically consisted of all able-bodied males in the colony between the ages of sixteen to sixty. On call from the colonial governor, each man was required to bring his own musket (later, his own rifle) along with powder horn, bullets, and other accoutrements for military field service or scheduled military training. Unless there was a grave threat from a massive Indian attack or foreign military power, regular troops typically did not assume security duties outside major population centers such as Boston, Philadelphia, or New York. Even in those locations, British regulars seldom provided security prior to the French and Indian War. Americans relied on local militia to provide for their safety and generally did not look to the British government.

This arrangement began to evolve during and after the French and Indian War (1754–63). A sideshow of the arguably worldwide
Seven Years’ War, the French and Indian War was waged largely between the British colonies in America and the people of New France (now Canada). A significant number of American colonists fought with British regular army troops against French regulars, militia, and Indian allies predominantly in areas of southern Canada, New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Among the colonists who served in the French and Indian War was a young officer from Virginia named George Washington.

Problems arose during the conflict when the British crown required Americans to pay for or provide the quartering and feeding of regular troops. Though most colonies grudgingly complied during the war, colonists resisted the requirement once the war ended. They argued that a standing regular force was no longer needed after the French were defeated; their existing militia formations could provide for this security and manage any extant Indian threats. Frustrated by colonialist resistance, Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, who commanded British forces in North America, turned to Parliament. Parliament passed the Quartering Act of 1765 which required the colonies to feed and quarter any British troops that could not be housed in barracks (which were paid for by Americans) or “publick houses” such as inns and ale houses. Although the law did not specify private homes could be occupied, British leaders assumed this power as well. This action and later requirements, collectively referred to as the “Intolerable Acts,” prompted many Americans to encourage breaking ties with Britain and contributed to their resistance to the idea of a colonial standing army and the rule of King George III.

At the beginning of the Revolutionary War in the spring of 1775, the colonists had no standing army other than British Army units. During a prior September–October 1774 First Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia, Virginia’s Richard Henry Lee and others proposed creating a “national militia,” but the Congress rejected the idea in favor of continued protest and civil disobedience. Six months later, Massachusetts began to raise a force of twenty-six county-based militia regiments. After the battles at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire quickly followed suit by forming additional active service militia consisting of Massachusetts troops besieging the British forces in Boston. On
14 July 1775, the Second Continental Congress authorized creation of the Continental Army and formally adopted the existing regiments outside Boston and New York City as its own army. The Congress appointed George Washington as the commander-in-chief the following day—creating the US Army and the first “regular” force raised in America by Americans for Americans.

Referred to initially as the “New England Army,” these regiments consisted of about 15,000 troops that were re-designated as Continental units and re-enlisted for a period of six months beginning 1 July 1775. Washington soon assumed overall command of these “Main Army” units. In addition, Congress authorized ten companies of Continental riflemen from Pennsylvania (six), Maryland (two), and Virginia (two)—later consolidated into the 1st Continental Regiment.

The formal organization of the remaining Continental Army proceeded into the fall of 1775 and the winter of 1776. Washington inherited the lion’s share of these units as part of the Main Army positioned before Boston, though Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler, newly appointed commander of the Department of New York, received a few Continental regiments from Connecticut as well. The commander-in-chief faced two major problems with raising and maintaining his force. First he needed to address the organizational structure of these regiments. The units under his command had been organized by the various states and all differed in size and composition, though units formed within a given state were uniform. Washington convened an officer team to study the problem. The committee developed a list of recommended organizational standards which Washington forwarded to the Continental Congress to consider. On 4 November, Congress approved the recommendations and the reorganization of all the Continental infantry into twenty-six uniformly organized regiments.

With regiments now standardized, Washington focused on the second problem: the terms of enlistment were about to expire on 31 December for most of his officers and men. Congress authorized him to begin reenlistments as soon as possible so that there would not be a major impact on military activities at the end of the year. The additional time also ensured that the general-in-chief could identify problems early if reenlistments went slower than expected. In fact, the reenlistment of officers for the new regiments proved
to be relatively smooth. A sufficient number of currently serving officers committed to reenlist, so achieving regimental quotas for commissioned leaders was fairly easy. Reenlisting experienced soldiers and new recruits, however, proved far more significant challenging. Some 17,000 men were needed to flesh out the ranks of the Continental regiments, but only about 9,600 had signed up by the end of the year. Recruiting and cajoling continued along with various incentives to entice reenlistment. In mid-January, the Congress even removed the restrictions on enlisting African-American freemen, but that step added only a handful of men to the ranks. By February, only another 2,800 men had enlisted and most regiments were still only between half and three-quarters full. Still, by March 1776, Washington’s forces had successfully recruited and reorganized to adequately form all twenty-seven Continental regiments (including the 1st Continental Regiment organized earlier). The Main Army now included more than 13,600 officers and men. Though not the numbers Washington had hoped for, the regiments represented a viable force facing the besieged British garrisons.

Like any professional force, the Continental Army required functional organization and structure beyond the regiment in order to be sustained and employed en masse. On 16 June 1775, the day after Washington’s appointment, the Continental Congress created a series of staff positions to support the new commanding general’s efforts to raise, equip, and sustain the force. These positions included an adjutant general, a commissary of musters, a paymaster general, a commissary general, and a quartermaster general. These officers and their assistants would become the forerunners of the various bureaus that would manage the US Army into the early twentieth century. Functionally, their mission was to assist Washington with the administration of the “grand army,” which included all field forces of the Continental Army and those under Schuyler in New York. Washington was also authorized a military secretary for correspondence, three aides, and six engineers (two for each of the main departments: Northern, Middle, and Southern). Eventually, the Continental Army added positions to manage other necessary requirements such as ordnance, medical, judge advocate, and chaplain. Given its importance to the overall Continental effort at
the time, the Northern Department commander was authorized a similarly organized staff to manage military affairs in that area.

In addition to providing staff officers to administer and sustain the Continental Army, the Continental Congress began to provide for much of the institutional structure needed to manage, equip, and sustain a standing military force. Unofficially, the Continental Congress established what would become the Northern Department by appointing Schuyler to command the Department of New York on 25 June 1775. This move was the genesis for the organization of later territorial departments established for the command, control, and support of troops in given geographical areas (see map 30, Appendix J, Territorial Departments 1777). Congress initially organized the Southern and Middle Departments in February 1776; these were followed by several others later that year, including the Northern Department on 14 April 1776. The Continental Congress appointed a major general as commander in each department consisting of one or more states. All military organizations—both Continental Army as well as militia units released by the governor for Continental service—were commanded by the department commander. Units moving into a department from another department also came under the jurisdiction of the receiving department commander. The department commander could function as field commander of troops engaged in tactical operations, or he could appoint another officer to command the troops if he felt he was unable to take to the field.

The department commander did not absolutely control all military forces in his area of responsibility. Though all Continental forces were his, respective governors had to release their state militia units. Governors also could exempt state troops from service under the department commander because they were required for the state’s own security needs. Typically militia units released to the department commander were enlisted or drafted as a group for a specified period, often as little as 30 days.

All forces under a department commander’s control were designated as an “army,” typically referred to by the department name. For example, troops in the Northern Department were called the “Northern Army.” This command, like all organizations in the Continental Army above regimental level, was considered to be a
temporary ad hoc organization and would function primarily when units were assembled for field operations. An army commander generally assembled a staff by drafting officers from various regiments under his command. The commander also could appoint certain key civilians who possessed special skills to staff positions. The commander and his staff functioned as the army headquarters as long as the army was in the field during active operations.

Depending on the size of the force in the field, an army commander could further divide his army into “wings,” or divisions, and brigades. These levels of command were intended to be temporary organizations, though once organized, army commanders maintained existing Continental brigades in active service throughout the war under one or more unit designations. As a result of this dynamic, the brigade rather than the regiment became the Continental Army’s basic tactical unit. Additionally, unlike British commands, the brigadier general rank was a permanent grade approved by the Continental Congress in 1775 (as was major general, the rank held by wing and division commanders).

Wings were typically composed of three or more brigades but could be as few as two. A wing commander could exercise adequate control over up to five brigades, if they were small. Brigades also were typically composed of two to five regiments. Brigadier generals generally commanded wings and brigades, though it was not uncommon for the senior regimental colonel to command a brigade.

The regiment was the largest permanent organization in the army. The Continental infantry regiment was commanded by a colonel who was assisted by two field officers—a lieutenant colonel and a major. The regiment’s fighting strength consisted of a single battalion (see Appendix I, Glossary for explanation of unit terminology) of eight companies divided into four squads for ease of control. Each company was commanded by a captain. Other authorized company officers included a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, and an ensign. The companies also included eight noncommissioned officers, two musicians, and seventy-six privates. A full-strength regiment totaled 728 officers and enlisted men and could place 640 musket-armed privates and corporals, or 88 percent of its assigned strength, in two ranks on the firing line.
As described earlier, the Continental Army initially consisted of twenty-six infantry regiments and a regiment of riflemen. However, the army organized a number of other Continental units during the year, including two regiments of Canadian infantry. Eventually, four artillery regiments, four cavalry regiments, and two regiments of artificers (men with specialized skills such as wheelwrights, blacksmiths, coopers, and carpenters) also were raised for Continental service.

Frequently, the Continental Line was supplemented by state militia regiments enlisted for varying terms of active service. The size, strength, and organization of these units varied from state to state though most states attempted to standardize their own units. Using militia organizations offered both advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the units generally arrived with their own equipment and arms and usually did not require much more than food, powder, and sometimes lead to make bullets. However, some arriving militia needed food and made other demands on the Continental’s provisions. Frequently shelter also had to be provided, especially during cold weather. These men were often very familiar with the surrounding countryside and knew the area residents who were patriots and loyalists. If well-led, they would stand for a time under heavy fire. However, even the best would break under threat of a bayonet charge since few of these men owned bayonets themselves. On the downside,
militia units were generally available for service during a campaign for relatively short periods due to enlistment agreements. Men who were farther from home were less reliable due to their concern about family and private property and also did not know the local area as well. Discipline in militia units ranged from very good to very bad. Most were adequate when times were good, but disciplinary infractions and desertions increased with a downturn in fortunes or harsh conditions. The same was true of course for Continentals, but not to the degree as for militiamen. Nevertheless, competent Continental commanders learned to maximize the strengths of their militia forces and minimize their weaknesses.

For both the Continental and British armies, the mounted combat arm—cavalry (light and heavy), dragoons, hussars, etc.—played only a minor role in the American Revolution. In fact, four regiments of light dragoons raised in the Continental Army were the only major American cavalry contribution to the war effort, though there were a few mounted militia units. Like the infantry regiments, the dragoon counterparts were authorized three field officers. They also possessed a staff of thirteen and six troops of forty-four officers and men. This gave the dragoon regiment a nominal strength of 280 officers and men. The four Continental units never reached full strength and usually numbered less than 150 men and usually even fewer horses.

During the Saratoga Campaign, only a single troop of the 2nd Regiment of Continental Light Dragoons served with the
Northern Army plus a small battalion of dragoons known as the 2nd Connecticut Light Horse Regiment that served with Gates’ command. Unfortunately, little is known about how these units contributed to the army’s efforts during the campaign.

Despite the technical nature of the artillery arm, which normally demanded strong industry and highly skilled specialists, the Continental Army fielded a fairly robust and effective artillery force. Initially organized as separate companies, by 1777 the Continental Army had formed several artillery regiments. The regiments were strictly administrative organizations and never functioned as such in the field. The basic element was the gun crew, but full companies could be, and were, employed as such in combat.

In November 1776, a separate artillery unit, known as Stevens’ Independent Continental Artillery Battalion commanded by Maj. Ebenezer Stevens, was formed in the Department of New York. The battalion consisted of three gun companies and an artificer company mostly with men from Massachusetts. The artificer company was formed at Albany to provide ordnance repair and other support to the battalion’s guns and carriages. The gun companies initially manned the big fixed guns at Fort Ticonderoga and later mobile artillery pieces at Bemis Heights. The battalion’s twenty-two guns eventually expanded to thirty-two guns by the...
end of the campaign. In 1778, Stevens’ command was consolidated with the 3rd Battalion of Continental Artillery.

The Continental Army also raised at least two regiments of artificers. The company formed by Ebenezer Stevens later became a component of the Regiment of Artillery Artificers organized by Col. Benjamin Flower for the Main Army. This command consisted of an artillery shop and a laboratory company which operated in a fixed location (probably in Philadelphia). Flower later organized a field company, an additional laboratory, and two depot companies as well. Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, engineer for the Northern Department, was authorized to raise a number of artificer companies for the Quartermaster Department. Several of these were in the Northern Department and, along with the artillery artificer company, supported the Northern Army during the Saratoga Campaign. All of the Quartermaster artificer companies also were consolidated into a regimental structure later in the war.

**Manning the Force—The Continental Army**

The rush to arms after the Battles of Lexington and Concord made recruiting and organizing the initial contingent of regiments a relatively easy task. As mentioned earlier, Massachusetts raised 26 militia regiments within a matter of weeks after the battles of Lexington and Concord. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut raised an additional three regiments each during roughly the same period. This rush to the colors was one of the outstanding features that differentiated American from British forces. While both armies were largely all-volunteer forces, the Continental Army and the various state militias were made up of men who strongly believed in their cause. No soldier was forcibly pressed into service although a small number were drafted by local state and local authorities in some states later in the conflict. Moreover, few joined the ranks as a life-long career or for the pay—which was neither good nor reliable anyway. Many joined to defend hearth and home, although others enlisted for reasons that men still enlist today: to join friends who enlisted, for comradeship or adventure, to prove themselves, or simply to get away from a humdrum life.
As described earlier, the largest problem for New England Army units was that their service officially ended in December 1775. When Congress formed the units in the spring of 1775, its members (as well as most people including the British) believed the conflict would be resolved by the end of the year, so longer enlistments were thought to be unnecessary. Therefore, in the middle of fighting a military campaign in the fall of 1775, Washington and his officers had to undertake a major reenlistment effort. The effort eventually raised the Continental Army’s total strength to just over 13,000 officers and men (of 20,000 authorized) by March 1776, but that was as good as it got. Washington had to rely heavily on short-term militia units for the remainder of 1776.

To avoid a repeat of the reenlistment distraction that the army experienced the previous autumn, American leaders discussed extending the term of enlistment. Washington proposed a three-year enlistment, but Congress initially demurred. American leaders understood that one-year enlistments would require Washington to go through the difficulties of recruiting and reenlisting an entirely new army once again in the fall of 1776 but feared that some Americans would view the three-year term as an effort to create a standing army. In 1777, Congress finally approved making enlistments for the duration of the war. However, the prospect of enlisting for what could be a very long period proved to be unpopular. New enlistments almost dried up altogether by the end of that year. Washington realized that the indefinite enlistment term was unrealistic and had depleted the Continental forces so much that he readily concurred when Congressional leaders changed the enlistment term to three years.

In the fall of 1776, Congress also expanded the Continental Army authorized force to eighty-eight battalions, which would require about 60,000 men to bring to full strength. That number was increased to 110 battalions in December 1776 following the expulsion of Washington’s army from New Jersey to Pennsylvania. Although higher numbers were authorized, the Continental Army never reached a peak strength of much more than 30,000 troops. Moreover, Washington could never muster more than about 15,000 men in the field at any one time. Since there was no national recruiting system, states were responsible for raising their own militia units as well as manning Continental units. They simply could not muster enough manpower.
The American Northern Army

On 23 June 1775, Washington departed Philadelphia to join the Main Army before Boston and was accompanied by Major General Schuyler who was en route to take command of the troops in New York. Before his departure from New York City on 25 June, Washington advised Schuyler to pay close attention to his command’s organization and developing an adequate logistics system to support them. Though Schuyler had limited combat experience, his administrative skills would hold him in good stead while he worked to create a smaller version of Washington’s Main Army in the New York Department. On 20 July, Congress notified Schuyler about the establishment of his department and instructed him to “dispose of and employ all the troops in the New York department in such manner as [you] may think best for the protection and defense of these colonies . . . subject to future orders of the commander in chief.”

For such an important geographical area, Schuyler’s ground component command (initially the “Separate Army,” later the “Northern Army”) was very small when compared to Washington’s main force. It initially consisted of only the 1st, 4th, and 5th Connecticut Regiments. On 27 June, New York’s Provincial Congress approved a plan to organize and recruit its quota of four regiments, but that process had not begun when Schuyler arrived at New York. Two subordinate brigadier generals assisted Schuyler with raising and commanding these units: Richard Montgomery, a former British Army officer from New York, and David Wooster of Connecticut. Both men would play key roles in the upcoming invasion of Canada but like Schuyler initially were busy creating an army.

Next the Northern Army organized four New York Continental regiments. These units began forming on 30 June with the appointment of regimental officers. Within a few weeks, all four New York regiments were close to full strength, with ten companies of seventy-five officers and men each for a grand total of about 3,000 men. New York also formed Lamb’s Artillery Company, a six-gun company organized along the same lines as those raised previously in Boston. Additionally, as a reward to Ethan Allen for his role in capturing Fort Ticonderoga from the British, Congress authorized
New York to raise a special unit of men with wilderness combat skills. Though the regiment was formed from Allen’s own Green Mountain Boys, the regiment members elected Seth Warner as their Continental Army commander. They mustered into Continental service as “Seth Warner’s Continental Battalion.” The colony of New Hampshire also raised three companies of New Hampshire Rangers commanded by Maj. Timothy Bedel that were added to Schuyler’s command that summer.

On 31 August 1776, Schuyler launched the ill-fated invasion of Canada (see Section II, Campaign Overview for a brief description of this campaign). During the campaign, Schuyler’s command grew slightly in strength as a new Continental unit was added to his order of battle. Canada organized the 1st Canadian Regiment commanded by Col. John Livingston during the late fall of 1775. Formed largely from French-Canadians who were unhappy with British rule in Canada, the regiment assisted with Northern Army operations in Quebec until it disbanded in 1781. The 1st Canadian Regiment was one of the longest-serving Continental units during the war. The remnants of almost all organizations that served in Canada during 1775–76 ultimately ended up at Crown Point in June 1776 after their expulsion from Quebec. Most of these units formed the basis of the Northern Army’s new field force for that year.

In January 1777, Schuyler’s command and the rest of the Continental Army underwent additional changes and redesignations when the Continental Congress adopted the 88/110 battalion plan. By the spring of that year Schuyler had three brigades of Continentals (see Appendix A, Order of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga) and a couple of Ranger companies concentrated at Fort Ticonderoga. He also posted the 3rd New York Regiment at Fort Schuyler (also known as Fort Stanwix) in the Mohawk Valley, and a few militia units arrived at both forts shortly before Burgoyne’s army landed at Crown Point in late June 1777. Those were only the forces that Schuyler had available to oppose the British invasion at the outset of the Saratoga Campaign. Over the next several months, however, the Northern Army grew dramatically as additional Continental and militia units made their way to Bemis Heights (see Appendix F, Order of Battle, Saratoga). At its height, the Northern Army consisted of 10 brigades
or brigade equivalents, at least fifty-six infantry regiments (not including those at Fort Schuyler), and more than 23,000 men.

One set of warriors made a notable contribution to the American order of battle. The Oneida Indians of central New York were the only tribe of the five nations of the Iroquois Confederation which supported the patriot cause during the war. As such, the Oneidas provided invaluable services to Schuyler and later Gates—performing scouting and intelligence missions against Brigadier Barry St. Leger’s British forces. A number of Oneidas fought beside Herkimer’s command at Oriskany and several others assisted in the deception operation to convince Leger that Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold’s relief force bound for Fort Schuyler was much larger than it was. Unlike most of the other Iroquois tribes, the military conduct of the Oneidas during the Saratoga Campaign was generally considered to be within the acceptable bounds of warfare contemporaneous with the times. This was likely due to the significant number of Oneidas converted to Christianity by the Presbyterian missionary Samuel Kirkland in the 1760s and 70s. There were instances, however, of some Oneidas operating for a brief period with Gates’ forces who committed what would be considered war crimes today.

The British Army and its Allies

There were many organizational similarities between the British Army (and its German allies) and the Continental Army. Likewise, loyalist units (pro-British Americans) and state militia units shared many common features. Early American military experience and traditions were clearly shaped by British practices. The organization and conditions under which early colonial militias organized and served were an almost direct result of perceived abuses by Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army in the mid-1600s. After the struggles of 1645–1660, the English relied predominantly on county-based militia units for the kingdom’s security rather than a standing army. By 1700, however, the British public was more amenable to a standing regular army due to continuing threats from France and other unfriendly nations on the European mainland. As described earlier, the American colonies continued to rely on local militias for security until the French and Indian War.
As with the Continental Army, regiments were the largest permanent force in the British Army during the Revolutionary War period. All field echelons above that command level were intended to be entirely temporary, usually dissolving after a given campaign or definitely after the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, those levels of command were only used outside of the United Kingdom. Within the realm, regimental commanders answered directly to the British Army general-in-chief. However, leaders understood that outside the kingdom, armies had to be prepared to take the field and oppose Britain’s foes and therefore needed to be organized for such operations.

In a given area of operations, the British Army would organize field armies to conduct operations. Commanded by a major general or lieutenant general, these armies typically consisted of multiple regiments organized into brigades which in turn might be grouped into divisions or “wings.” However, due to warfare experiences in Europe, the British field organization often modified their structures. For example, a commander might designate a division or brigade as an “advance guard” or “advance corps” and give it a specialized mission to precede the army and protect its advance. American units did this as well, though in a less formal way. The British advance corps commander usually received instructions and actions to take once his troops made contact with the enemy. Similarly, a rear guard or reserve corps could be organized to protect the army’s rear. Otherwise, division and brigade echelons looked very similar to their American counterparts. The brigadiers and major generals commanding these organizations, however, were commonly appointed to that rank on a temporary basis. They would command the formation until it was disbanded. At that point, the commander would revert to his regular army position and grade.

Although the standard permanent organization for British and American forces was a regiment, the British Army’s regular army regiment was different in several significant aspects. Unlike its Continental equivalent, the British regiment was more complex in its command structure and organization. As with most regiments of any nation at that time, the unit was commanded by a colonel who was assisted by a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a small staff. The regiment consisted of twelve companies. Two companies—
one in Great Britain and one in Ireland—essentially functioned as recruit depots. Five of the eight line companies were commanded by captains. The other three—termed “Field Officer’s Companies”—were nominally commanded by field officers but actually led by each company’s lieutenant. Two specialized companies rounded out the twelve. These units were the Light Infantry Company and the Grenadier Company. The men of the Light Infantry Company were athletically fit and agile. Their usual mission was to function as skirmishers before falling in as the left flank company on the line. Members of the Grenadier Company (a holdover designation from the days in which grenadiers were largely employed to hurl grenades in combat) typically were the largest men and were posted to the right of the line, that is, the place of honor. Though intended to protect the flanks of their regiment in battle, army commanders frequently pulled the light and grenadier companies from their regiments and formed two ad hoc battalions—one of grenadiers and one of light infantry.

Strength-wise, the British regiment appeared slightly stronger than the Continental regiment, consisting of 45 officers and 768 men. However, with depot companies, fifers, drummers, and contingent men removed, the British regiment could put only 514 men on the firing line of which 448 shouldered muskets. A full-strength Continental regiment by contrast could put 640 muskets on the line. During the Saratoga Campaign, however, neither side

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**Figure 4. British Infantry Regiment.**
fielded full-strength regiments. Typically, regiments were manned at about half-strength, though this varied from unit to unit. American units enjoyed a slight manpower, and thus firepower, advantage when opposing regiments met on the battlefield.

As with the rebel forces, the British Army in North America boasted only a small contingent of mounted soldiers. Only the 16th and 17th Light Dragoon Regiments deployed to America, serving primarily in the Boston and New York City areas and farther south. The United Kingdom also formed a few troops of loyalist cavalry, but none of these served in the Saratoga Campaign. The only mounted unit available to Burgoyne was the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig, and these troops fought almost exclusively as a dismounted unit.

During this period, the British Army’s artillery arm was encapsulated in what were termed the Royal Artillery Regiment and the Royal Regiment of Irish Artillery. These units were nominally organized into battalions, but like the regiment, the battalion was essentially an administrative echelon. The battery, or “company” as they were then termed, was the primary tactical echelon. These companies typically organized based on the weapons available to them locally. For the Saratoga Campaign, Royal Artillery units under Burgoyne’s command were tailored to the general’s plan of action for the campaign and modified as the situation required.

Finally, at the highest echelons of command, the entire area of operations actually was managed by one man. In the case of North America, that man was Lord George Germain, secretary of state for the American colonies. A former army general, Germain was responsible for managing the affairs of the colonies, including military operations. He was assisted by two commanders who had a defined geographical area of responsibility. Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, Governor-in-Chief of Quebec Province, was both the political and military head of operations in Quebec. As such, he was essentially equal to a combined colonial governor and department commander in America. He could raise militias and commanded all British regular troops in the province.

The second commander on whom Germain relied was initially Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief in North America and
governor general of Massachusetts. However, Maj. Gen. William Howe replaced Gage in September 1775 as the commander-in-chief in America. In his new post, Howe was responsible for all British troops from West Florida to Newfoundland, less Quebec Province. Assuming the post, Howe commanded British ground forces but only exercised political control over British-occupied areas as many colonies had been taken over politically by rebel “Committees of Safety.”

To help put down the growing rebellion in the colonies, Howe was assisted by two generals who arrived in America at the same time as he did the previous May, Brigadiers John Burgoyne and Henry Clinton. Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton would soon be promoted and all three would fill key roles with various actions in America over the next two and a half years.

*Manning the Force—The British Army and its Allies*

The British Army clearly had numerous advantages over the Continental Army. First and foremost, this well-established, organized, and disciplined military force had a long and proud tradition. The various regiments of the army had been rigorously trained and drilled in peacetime, and many of their officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had gained experience on the battlefields of Europe. Their men were professional soldiers, many of whom made the army their life’s work. From a practical standpoint, British commanders kept their men well-equipped, fed, and trained, not so much to prevent the spillage of blood in battle, but to win wars. This did not mean that the commanders did not care about their soldiers or about casualties. They did care, but primarily because they knew that they could not easily replace casualties. Thus, their efforts to train, discipline, and equip their troops ensured that the British Army’s regiments were generally effective on the battlefield. Indeed, the red-coated regulars of the British line were usually successful against their foes. The British Army of the 1770s could stand man-to-man with any other army and usually defeat it if the odds were not too great.

However, the British Army was small—in part because it was difficult to entice men in England to join the colors. This was true for a host of reasons, not the least of which was that a substantial
portion of the force was constantly deployed overseas to locations that most civilized Britons considered hellholes. The pay was not good, the risk of death was high, and the soldier experience was not what most men aspired to, especially among the merchant and upper classes. Often, countrymen scorned British soldiers. An old saying in England reflected both the higher status of the navy and the general public’s attitudes toward the army: “A messmate before a shipmate, a shipmate before a stranger, a stranger before a dog, and a dog before a soldier.”

Many men in England also did not relish the idea of fighting fellow countrymen. Indeed, scars from English civil wars during the previous century had not yet fully healed. But internecine fighting in a faraway place that was known to be relatively wild and dangerous further dampened ardor for military service among Britons. Thus, the Parliament resorted to a number of enticements to encourage young and old men to join the colors. At the time of the battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775, for example, a British soldier enlisted for “life.” What this meant realistically was that a soldier would serve in the army until he was no longer capable due to the infirmities of age, complications from illness, disabling combat wounds, or death. He could not expect to be discharged otherwise, though in reality the British army released men from this obligation for any number of reasons. The requirement to enlist for life was clearly an obstacle to manning an army, even a small one.

In December 1775, Parliament reduced the enlistment period to three years, or for the duration of the war if the king so desired. This temporary change, however, did not result in a rush to the recruiting offices. Other incentives and recruiting techniques were needed to increase the number of men in service. Additionally, the government increased its practice of pardoning criminals for their crimes if they agreed to join up and agreed to forgo punishment for deserters if they returned to their regiments. Under the “Press Acts” of 1778 and 1779, men arrested for disorderly conduct or found guilty of being out of work could be forcefully impressed into service by special army impressment teams. The teams were given strict processes for putting these men into the army. Politicians did not want to anger eligible voters by accidentally impress-
ing one into service. None of these practices, however, brought in enough men to fully flesh out the army’s regiments. These difficulties, however, were no worse than those faced by the Continental Army, which also was often understrength.

Typical for European armies, officers in the British Army were largely from the aristocracy and landed gentry. This was almost a prerequisite due to the need for money to purchase a commission. Men from the middle and lower classes could not afford to buy them.\(^4\) The higher the commission rank, the more money it cost. This system was open to corruption. Men with the most money or the best social connections were promoted rather than the most experienced or the most competent. Despite this shortcoming, most British officers advanced and gained experience at each level, and they were generally competent even though they had no formal military schooling. This did not apply to Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers officers. In those institutions, commissions were awarded to those who graduated from a course at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and subsequent promotion was by seniority.

In addition to aristocrats, many general officers were members of Parliament and thus were politically well-connected. Some received their appointments to military positions not so much due to their known abilities but because it was politically expedient to help them receive the appointment. Among the group of generals sent to put down the rebellion in America, none other than possibly Burgoyne were particularly happy to accept the task of making war on fellow countrymen. Howe—and to a lesser extent Clinton—was reluctant to make “hard war” against his American cousins. Officers sometimes broached diplomatic channels to seek a compromise peace. Nevertheless, all went overseas to fulfill their duties to king and country and win back the American colonies for Great Britain.

Unlike British Army officers and men, the German contingents contributing to the war effort in America were there solely to help fill the coffers of the prince they served.\(^5\) Because England was not able to raise enough troops for the task of subduing the rebels (it was indeed a large area the British Army needed to conquer), King George III hired troops from the continent. British envoys succeeded in arranging for a good number of “mercenary” units from several
German states, particularly from the principalities of Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Hanau, Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Waldeck, and Ansbach-Bayreuth. Hesse-Kassel provided about a third of these units and was the largest contributor to the British effort. Colonists referred to all German troops as “Hessians” whether they came from Hesse-Kassel or not.

The German troops were not mercenaries in the traditional sense of the word. These professional soldiers were organized, trained, disciplined, and equipped to fight conventional wars on the European mainland. They received no additional pay or incentives for fighting in America. They were there to do their prince’s bidding on behalf of Britain. The princes received the hard cash from the frequently exorbitant prices charged for their work. Nonetheless, Britain found it easier to pay for the extra manpower than to raise and equip their own troops.

The German regiments were organized differently than their British or American counterparts. The units varied somewhat between the various German states as well. Still, the German organizations had a distinctly European flavor. As with the other regiments, each German unit was authorized a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and a major plus a staff of about eighteen other officers and men. However, the structure of the German regiments was different. A typical regiment was composed of five or six companies,

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**Figure 5. German Infantry Regiment.**

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including one grenadier company. Each company was commanded by a captain with two or three lieutenants to assist him. The German companies tended to be about two or three times the size of British companies and possessed about 10 NCOs and between 114 and 165 other ranks. Thus a German regiment could typically put between 525 and 690 muskets on the firing line depending on how it was organized. In terms of brigade and higher organization, the German commands in America tended to be organized similar to those for the British Army.

**The British Army from Canada**

Moving south in late June 1777, Burgoyne’s Army from Canada (sometimes referred to as the “Northern Army” or the “Canadian Army”) appeared to be an unstoppable force. Composed of about 8,000 British and German troops (joined later by some 500 Iroquois warriors), Burgoyne organized his army into two wings and a few specialized commands (see Appendix A, Order of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga). The Right Wing was commanded by Maj. Gen. William Phillips and consisted of three brigade-size elements. The Right Wing’s 1st Brigade was commanded by Brig. Henry W. Powell, who was the lieutenant colonel of the 53rd Foot. The brigade was composed of the 9th, 47th, and 53rd Regiments of Foot, minus their light and grenadier companies as with all infantry regiments in the army. Brig. James Hamilton (colonel of the 21st Foot) commanded the 2nd Brigade, which included the 20th, 21st, and 62nd Regiments of Foot. The Right Wing’s Advanced Corps was commanded by Brig. Simon Fraser, lieutenant colonel of the 24th Foot, and consisted of Fraser’s own 24th Regiment, the ad hoc Grenadier Battalion with all the grenadier companies in Burgoyne’s army, and the ad hoc Light Infantry Battalion composed of the army’s light infantry companies.

Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall included the Braunschweiger Prinz Friedrich Regiment and the Erbprinz Regiment from Hesse-Hanau. The third element in the 2nd Brigade, the army’s Reserve Corps, was headed by Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann. The Reserve Corps was a fairly robust, diverse, and strong unit. Breymann’s command included the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig, a company of Braunschweiger Jägers (riflemen), and the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery. Like Fraser’s Advance Corps, Breymann also commanded a battalion of grenadiers and a battalion of light infantry composed of companies from the line regiments.

Burgoyne’s artillery park was impressive and significantly larger than typical for an army of this size. Under the command of Maj. Griffith Williams, the park consisted of three companies of Royal Artillery, a Royal Irish Regiment of Artillery detachment, a 33rd Foot infantry company, and several other artillery detachments. In all, the army artillery consisted of 139 guns of varying sizes (not including those later captured from the Americans at Forts Ticonderoga, Anne, and Edward). Burgoyne maintained an artillery reserve with the park and also detailed gun sections to his wings. Riedesel’s Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery generally remained with Breymann’s Reserve Corps but could be pulled in to support other army missions if needed.

In addition to these main force units, Burgoyne possessed a number of other organizations. These included the Loyalist Corps, an Indian Department detachment, and a small element composed of artificers and pioneers (engineers). The Loyalist Corps was made up of two small battalions and three companies of Canadians and American militiamen who remained loyal to the crown. Never more than about 400 men, the numbers rapidly shrank as the campaign proceeded. Burgoyne had hoped to have as many as 1,000 of these men to supplement his forces and was sorely disappointed in their actual numbers and performance during the campaign.

The Indian Department detachment under Maj. John Campbell would also prove to be a disappointment. The command was to be about 1,000 warriors from various Iroquois tribes, but only about 500 showed up at the Bouquet River camp in June. The Indian numbers fluctuated and quickly dwindled during the campaign. Meanwhile, the warriors committed many atrocities on American
troops and civilians (and even on a few British troops). To Burgoyne’s detriment, the Iroquois actions caused many fence sitters in New York and New England to join the patriot cause. Supplementing the Indian Department were two small companies of Canadian militia and the Company of Marksmen under Captain Alexander Fraser (Simon Fraser’s nephew).

The small Artificers and Engineers detachment was mainly composed of two Canadian militia units: an element of the Royal Highland Emigrants 1st Battalion, and the Pioneer Company. The Highland Emigrants functioned as artificers for the army. These men were trained as carpenters, gunsmiths, ironsmiths, coopers, shipwrights, and other journeyman trades which were militarily valuable. They could be employed in crafting certain defensive works, bridge building, weapons repair, and like efforts. Pioneers were men who performed general construction or destruction duties for the army. Typically they built or improved roads, built temporary bridges, and constructed basic defensive works. When Burgoyne’s army arrived at the Bouquet River in late June 1777, it consisted of about 4,000 British regulars, 3,600 German regulars, 500 Canadian or loyalist militiamen, 470 artillerists, and 500 Indians.

Burgoyne also owned another element which he sent on a separate mission to support the overall campaign. This was the Mohawk Valley Expedition under Brigadier St. Leger. St. Leger’s command consisted of two regiments, four companies, a mortar battery, and about 800 Iroquois Indians. St. Leger’s main force included the 34th Regiment of Foot (for which he was the lieutenant colonel), the 8th Regiment of Foot, and the King’s Regiment of New York comprised of American loyalists. The brigadier also had a German jäger company, Butler’s Ranger Company, the Quebec Canadian Militia Company, and approximately 400 bateaux-men. If they were successful in taking Fort Schuyler and advancing down the Mohawk Valley, St. Leger’s approximately 2,000 troops would reinforce Burgoyne on arrival in Albany.

**Revolutionary War Staffs**

Though small by today’s standards, the army staffs of the opposing Saratoga Campaign commanders were somewhat robust
for the time period and functioned adequately. Most American staff members were appointed to their positions by the Continental Congress based on recommendations from the commanders of the departments in which they would serve. The congress was not bound to honor commander recommendations and sometimes appointed whoever they wished—generally for some political reason. These occasional instances usually caused friction between the congress and the department commander.

Appointed staff officers were technically assigned as deputies to the senior Continental Army staff officer in their area of expertise. For example, Col. Morgan Lewis (who served both Schuyler and Gates) was appointed as a deputy quartermaster general to Maj. Gen. Thomas Mifflin, quartermaster general of the Continental Army. As such, Lewis was bound to follow Mifflin’s directions and guidance. His mission, however, was to work within those constraints to support the Northern Department and Northern Army. He served both as the deputy quartermaster general.

The Continental Army and British Army staffs during the Revolutionary War differed considerably from modern military staffs in terms of size, function of the staff as a whole, and the duties of individual staff officers. As is still the case, the primary staff function was to address routine administrative, operational, and logistical matters of importance that did not require the commander’s constant attention and to provide information the commander needed to make decisions and successfully accomplish an operation, mission, or task. However in the late 1700s, the staff did not provide the commander with routine access to processed intelligence or with planning capabilities for future or current operations. The commander had to think through and develop all likely courses of action for an operation, as well as analyze and filter all intelligence as it came into the headquarters. In short, there was no equivalent S2/G2 or S3/G3 capability on the staff. Also absent were more modern staff capabilities such as communications, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, etc. The Revolutionary War-era staffs were simple and comparatively small.

A 1770s army staff typically consisted of at least four key staff officers, including an adjutant, a quartermaster, a commissary
of subsistence, and at least one aide-de-camp. The adjutant had a large range of duties and was usually one of the commander’s most trusted officers. He typically prepared the commander’s correspondence; wrote and sent orders and instructions in the commander’s name even under combat conditions; and would help form the command for formations, drills, reviews, and parades. He would act as the commander’s assistant on the battlefield and, under dire circumstances, function as a commander’s messenger if no aides were present. The adjutant maintained the personnel rolls of the command and forwarded strength reports and any requests for replacements.

The quartermaster was arguably the most important man on the staff. Like the adjutant, the quartermaster had myriad duties many of which are no longer performed by modern quartermaster officers. As the name implies, the quartermaster was responsible for the quartering of troops. He would ride ahead to find suitable quarters for the army, or at least for key commanders. He would also scout out good locations for the army to encamp or bivouac, usually near a good water source. Given these duties, the quartermaster performed a rudimentary form of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering for the commander as well. Since he was frequently far forward, he would often be the first senior officer to gain intelligence from captured enemy stragglers or those captured in a skirmish as the army advanced. Some of the quartermaster’s additional responsibilities were similar to today’s S4/G4. If no commissary or ordnance officer was on the staff, he also equipped and resupplied the army in all classes of supply except food, ammunition, and weapons and managed most army transportation functions, including waterborne operations.

Commissaries were officers appointed to act for the commander in certain narrowly defined but important areas such as food, purchases, or contracts. Most common, the commissary of subsistence was charged with storing, transporting, and supplying the army with subsistence. In addition to food, he was responsible for acquiring other items to maintain the health and welfare of the soldiers, including candles, lamp oil, firewood, cooking utensils, and medical supplies. Another was the commissary of purchase, similar to the modern contracting officer. He was responsible for purchasing food and other subsistence items and could also execute contracts with
various businesses to support the army with wagons, boats, ships, etc. If the commissary of subsistence was given additional responsibility to purchase subsistence items, the quartermaster would typically function as the commissary of purchase for all other items. Because the commissary and quartermaster managed large sums of money for supply purchases, commanders took special care with these appointments. Even so, history is rife with examples of men who carried on corrupt practices in these positions.

Each aide-de-camp served only the commander and typically functioned as a personal messenger and as the commander’s “eyes and ears.” On the battlefield they would frequently circulate the area and keep subordinate commanders focused on the commander’s intent. They would often be empowered to speak for the commander and issue orders based on his intent. They would also personally relay messages between the commander and a subordinate commander to ensure that the junior officer understood the army commander’s intent. Aides needed to be articulate and capable of communicating exactly what was needed. Some commanders also gave these officers the right to issue written orders in their name and perform secretarial duties between battles. The senior aide was generally a personal friend of the general, and junior aides were often a son or other relative of the general.

Additional staff officers included the engineer, surgeon or medical director, judge advocate, paymaster, and additional commissaries. The engineer, of course, was usually a school-trained officer with skills needed for military engineering projects such as barracks, defensive works, bridge, signal tower, and road construction—and destruction. If an army needed to know how to build something, the opposing force needed to know how to destroy or at least make it ineffective. The engineer also needed to understand terrain and how it could be used to help the army and hinder the opposing army, as well as understanding topography and how to transfer that information onto a plat or map.

The army’s surgeon was often the general’s personal physician. He also looked out for the command’s overall health and advised the commander on topics such as reliability and cleanliness of camps, local water sources, and food. He provided guidance to junior
surgeons and medical orderlies (referred to as a surgeon’s mate) in subordinate commands as well. Physicians of the day were not knowledgeable about germs and other microscopic causes of disease and infection so did not take as much care regarding cleanliness as field hospitals starting at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Like today, the judge advocate was essentially the commander’s lawyer. He advised the commander on the legality of his decisions and actions, also functioning as the command’s prosecutor for court-martial proceedings. If the advocate was too busy or had to recuse himself, the commander could appoint a subordinate officer to fill the role. The appointed advocate would provide legal guidance to that officer for the length of the trial. Prosecutions were not carried out by the commander but instead conducted “in the name of the United States” in Continental commands or “in His Majesty’s Name” in the case of a British command.

The paymaster’s duty was simply to accept, account for, and properly disburse moneys allocated to an army for operations. His most common disbursal was paying the troops on muster day. This action was performed only periodically; paydays could take place as much as a year apart. In a garrison environment, troops were paid bi-monthly, but quarterly was the norm in the field. During an actual campaign, periods between paydays could be much longer.

Some Revolutionary War staffs included positions that required some technical knowledge or filled a critical need to manage army operations such as liaison officer, wagonmaster, and chief of artillery. Liaisons were typically officers attached from other services or coalition commands and often were foreign to the army’s main nationality. A wagonmaster managed the army’s wagon trains, which could be several miles long. In closed-in terrain like that of the Northern Department, the wagonmaster’s duties could be extremely taxing and difficult. The wagonmaster typically worked for the quartermaster, or with the quartermaster if the wagons were largely contracted.

The chief of artillery advised the commander on employing this highly technical combat arm. Interestingly, at the time of the Revolutionary War, the Royal Artillery served under royal warrant of the king and was managed by the British Board of Ordnance. Its
officers and men were promoted outside the standard army promotion system and were not allowed to hold commands in organizations possessing infantry or cavalry units. Artillery officers could only command artillery units. Officers of the Royal Engineers were likewise managed by the Board of Ordnance, but no standing engineer units existed in the British Army or under the board. Thus engineer, artificer, sapper, and pioneer-type units were generally formed on an ad hoc basis. On the other hand, American artillery and engineer officers and their units were part of the Continental Army and promoted in the same way as officers from other branches.

One staff officer with no direct counterpart among British commands operating in rebel areas was the Conductor (or Keeper) of Military Stores. This man was largely responsible for the storage, upkeep, and maintenance of ordnance materials, ammunition, and artillery kept in depot. He typically remained at the arsenal or depot where the materials awaited issue. The conductor was technically a department staff officer rather than on the army commander’s staff, even though the same person usually served as army commander and department commander. This position was also later added to brigade staffs.

Below the army level, staffs were much smaller until reaching the regiment. Oddly, a division or wing commander had the smallest staff—usually one or maybe two aides. These men usually served as the commander’s adjutant and performed secretarial duties. Early in the war, brigade commanders normally had two staff officers—a brigade-major and an aide. For both the British and Continental armies, the brigade-major functioned as a combination quartermaster and adjutant—forwarding orders and correspondence between the army’s adjutant and quartermaster general to the regimental adjutants and quartermasters. He also posted army and division general orders, issued and posted brigade orders to the regimental adjutants, compiled brigade personnel returns, and personally coordinated with the regimental commanders on a variety of issues and topics. Though titled as a “major,” the position was typically filled by a captain as a temporary grade in the British Army and by a permanent major in the Continental Army. After 1777, the brigade became the Continental Army’s basic unit of operation, and the number of
brigade staff positions grew as well. By 1779, the brigade staff was authorized a quartermaster, an inspector, a chaplain, and a conductor of military stores, in addition to the two original positions.

A Continental regiment staff was a more robust organization than for a division/ wing or brigade. Though it varied by regiment type—and also between American and British organizations—a regimental staff characteristically consisted of eight to ten personnel. In addition to an adjutant and quartermaster, each staff usually included a surgeon, paymaster, and chaplain who were considered officers. Several noncommissioned personnel such as a sergeant-major, drum-major, and fife-major rounded out the staff.

The staff of a British infantry regiment was smaller and typically included only an adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon, and chaplain. A Continental cavalry regiment included a riding master, saddler, and trumpet-major (instead of the sergeant-major), drum-major, and fife-major of the infantry regiment. Continental artillery regiment staffs mirrored the infantry but also included a number of cadets undergoing technical training to become artillery officers.

Of course the staffs described above all varied depending on numerous factors. Army commanders would organize their staff based on their specific situation, needs, and area of operation (see Appendix A for the organization of Schuyler’s and Burgoyne’s respective staffs, and Appendix F for Gates’ staff). Burgoyne, for example, had a naval liaison officer on his staff who assisted with the shipping requirements on Lake Champlain. Schuyler and Gates did not need such an officer, especially after the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. Regimental staffs grew and shrank based on the actual strength of the unit, casualties, and the availability of officers to fill positions. Regardless of organization and strength, all staffs were responsible to provide their commander with the critical assistance required to command his forces. Commands with strong staffs tended to function efficiently. Those with poor staffs did not.

**Weapons**

*Infantry*

During the American Revolution, the Continental Army’s standard firearm was initially the British Long Land Pattern musket
commonly referred to as the “Brown Bess.” This .75 caliber flintlock musket was fitted with a socket bayonet. The most common versions of the Brown Bess used in the War for Independence were the Long and Short Land Pattern muskets. The long version was 62.5 inches long (without bayonet) and weighed 10.4 pounds. The short version was manufactured after it was discovered that reducing the length of the barrel by about four inches had no effect on accuracy. It was 58.5 inches long, but oddly, weighed 10.5 pounds. The weapon possessed no sights as it was intended to be a mass fire (i.e., volley fire) weapon. Prior to 1775, the colonies issued the various Brown Bess versions for use by militia forces. Although the mixture of weapons for American units is unknown, a majority were likely armed with a version of the Brown Bess and a substantial number with the French Charleville musket.

With the new regimental structure adopted in 1776 and new tactical formations prescribed in 1777, the Continental Army adopted a new standard weapon—the French Army musket known as the “Charleville.” The army purchased and secretly imported at least 48,000 of the 1763 and 1766 models from France in the spring of 1777 and provided them to many Continental units, including many of the units in the Saratoga Campaign. The Charleville was fifty-seven inches long and fired a one-ounce, .69 caliber lead ball or “buck and ball” ammunition similar to a shotgun. This musket was more durable, reliable, and accurate than the Brown Bess. Its slightly longer range also fit well with the American preference for aimed shots versus massed musket fire.

British Army units used a different mix of weapons from their American counterparts. About half of British regiments involved in the Saratoga Campaign were armed with the Long Land Pattern Brown Bess and about half with the shorter version. The Braunschweiger musketeers, who were the largest German contingent with Burgoyne’s army, carried the Prussian Model 1740 Potsdam musket as well as an essentially identical weapon produced in Braunschweig. Like the British musket, these weapons had a .75 caliber bore, so interoperability of ammunition was no problem. The barrel was forty to forty-one inches long and the weapon weighed about 8.5 pounds—significantly lighter than the Brown Bess.
maximum effective range for all of these muskets was about 50 to 100 yards depending on environmental conditions.

The Braunschweiger Jäger Battalion used a short rifle referred to as the “Büchse.” It was originally developed as a hunting rifle in Germany, thus the designation “jäger,” which means “hunter” in German. Armed with the Büchse, the jägers were the only British coalition unit in the Saratoga Campaign exclusively armed with a rifle. The Büchse fired a .67 caliber ball and was accurate to about 175 yards, somewhat less effective than the American rifle. They were about forty-five inches long with a thirty-inch barrel and weighed about nine pounds. Like the American rifle, the weapon was hard to load. Each came with a mallet to pound the patched balls into place with a ramrod. The process took about a minute compared to the three rounds per minute a trained musketeer could fire. For faster loading, the ball could be placed in the barrel without the patch, but there was a corresponding loss of accuracy and range. The Büchse could not mount a bayonet, so a musketeer unit (usually a light infantry unit) usually employed the jägers, reducing the likelihood they would be overrun while reloading. In lieu of a bayonet, jägers were armed with a “Hirschfänger” short sword for secondary protection.

A few American units (the most notable of which was Morgan’s Rifle Regiment) and a number of individuals at Saratoga were also equipped with rifles rather than muskets. In contrast with issued weapons like the Brown Bess and Charleville muskets, these “Pennsylvania Rifles” were owned outright by their users—many custom-made by local gunsmiths.

Rifles were clearly superior to the musket in terms of accuracy and distance. American riflemen often engaged targets out to 250 and 300 yards. The rifles of this period, however, were somewhat difficult to load. Whereas a musket ball was slightly smaller than the musket bore and was easily pushed into place with the ramrod once the powder was loaded, the rifle ball had to be slightly larger than the rifle bore partly to ensure maximum compression. The snug fit ensured the ball would grip the rifling for greater accuracy. This process caused much friction and the rifleman used a fair amount of energy and took a longer time to load the weapon. Also the weapon would quickly foul after a few shots; carbon in the tight barrel would
make the weapon impossible to load. Still the casualty rates inflicted by troops using these weapons were much higher per shot than with muskets. One drawback: Like the Büsche, the Pennsylvania Rifle was not designed to carry a bayonet.

The bayonet was a critical item for line soldiers. After using firepower to reduce the strength of an enemy’s formation, the line would press forward with the bayonet. This weapon is credited with inflicting about a third of all casualties on the Revolutionary War battlefield. During the Saratoga Campaign, bayonets mounted on muskets were all similar in their basic design. Blades varied by manufacturer but were typically about fourteen to eighteen inches long. British and German troops carried muskets that were universally equipped with bayonets. Some Continental units were well-equipped with the weapon, but in militia units and some other regiments, only a few men possessed them.

In addition to bayonets, many Continentals and militiamen possessed a tomahawk. This small hatchet was a secondary weapon issued to some men in lieu of bayonets. American riflemen were known to be especially fond of them since they had no bayonets. The tomahawk was also extensively used by the Iroquois Indians on both sides, as well as a good number of loyalists and Canadians. With this close-quarters weapon, the ideal stroke was a head blow that generally killed the opponent instantly or at least immobilized him so that he was no longer an immediate threat. The weapon could be thrown with good accuracy for up to ten to fifteen yards or used to effectively parry the blows of other bladed weapons and even disarm a less skilled opponent.

Cavalry

The cavalry organizations on both sides in the Saratoga Campaign were light dragoon units rather than cavalry. In other words, these soldiers were essentially mounted infantrymen. A typical dragoon was equipped with a carbine, usually two flintlock pistols carried in a saddle holster, and a heavy bladed saber as a secondary weapon. The main problem was that dragoon-type weapons were in short supply, so units were issued or otherwise acquired a large variety of weapons. In most units there was little standardization.
The 2nd Connecticut Light Horse, a militia regiment, was apparently equipped with sabers, pistols, and muskets of unknown manufacture. Captain Jean de Vernejoux’s troop of the 2nd Continental Light Dragoons likely carried only pistols during most of the campaign, precluding these troops from fighting as dismounted infantry. While they apparently were not equipped with carbines, they may have possessed sabers, possibly including some acquired from the Braunschweiger Prinz Ludwig Dragoons captured at Bennington.

The Prinz Ludwig Dragoons were armed with a carbine and a German dragoon saber known as a “pallash.” The carbine was a relatively short weapon about four feet, three inches long. The Hessian version, which may be the same weapon carried by the Prinz Ludwig Regiment, was a rifle with a .75 caliber bore. Like jäger troops, the dragoon’s carbine did not mount a bayonet so they generally needed to operate in coordination with standard infantry formations. The pallash carried by the Prinz Ludwig Dragoons was a heavy, two-edged, straight broadsword that could be mounted to use in a standard cavalry charge. During this period, the regiment was almost entirely on foot. Only one troop was ever mounted and then only for a short time.

Artillery

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of artillery weapons in the Saratoga Campaign were of British manufacture. These guns, mortars, and howitzers had specific uses depending on the type of operation to be undertaken. All cannon were smoothbore, muzzle-loaded weapons cast in either iron or bronze. Iron cannon were stronger, could take a larger powder charge, and boasted a longer range. For example, a 6-pounder iron gun could throw a solid shot accurately about 1,500 yards versus 1,200 yards for a similar-size brass cannon. The iron pieces were, however, heavier and more difficult to move. They were also more susceptible to corrosion from the elements and metal fatigue from firing. Because of their lighter weight, smaller field pieces were more often cast in bronze and were the preferred choice for mobile artillery companies. Larger pieces were usually cast in iron and used for fixed positions.

These weapons fired various types of rounds, including shot, grape, canister, and shell. A solid shot round was simply an iron ball.
These rounds were fired against massed infantry and cavalry targets but were more effective when used to batter enemy fortifications and ships. Also used as counterbattery ammunition, solid shot could fire between 800 and 2,000 yards.

Grape shot was a naval round consisting of six to twelve softball-size balls fired from the larger guns found on ships or siege artillery. At sea, the round was elevated at close range against other ships to cut rigging, smash spars, and shred sails. To a lesser extent, grape shot was fired against the hulls and into the gun compartments of smaller, thin-skinned vessels in an anti-personnel mode.

Canister or analogous case shot was used in smaller field guns and howitzers. Similar to but much smaller than grape shot, canister shot consisted of a number of balls packed into a container usually made of tin straps. When fired, the container disintegrated and released the balls in a conical pattern at the target. With a range of 50 to 400 yards, canister shot was more effective than solid shot against infantry and cavalry formations as they closed. Both grape and canister shot acted much like a large shotgun blast.

Like its name implied, the shell round was a hollow sphere filled with explosives. These rounds were generally fired from howitzers and mortars at high angles to land inside fixed fortifications. The intent was to destroy positions and sympathetically explode stored ammunition and powder. The shell, which broke into several large pieces and produced a shrapnel-like effect, also could be used against troops. In those cases, shell rounds were predominantly used for demoralization purposes because the shell pieces were too few in number to cause many casualties.

The British system of nomenclature for the various sizes of guns which fired these rounds was based on the weight of the solid shot round used in the weapon. At different points in the Saratoga Campaign, for example, units fired 3-, 6-, 12-, 16-, and 24-pounder British cannon. The smaller pieces (3-, 6-, and 12-pounders) were used as mobile artillery against infantry, cavalry, and opposing artillery units on the battlefield. The 3-pounders were very mobile and could be relatively effective when firing canister rounds at close range. Iron and bronze 6-pounders were the most common guns in the light artillery companies—effective for supporting the infantry.
fight. While they possessed good firepower and range, the 12-pounders were considered “medium” guns because they were harder to maneuver in woodland fighting like that experienced during much of the campaign. Guns larger than 12-pounders were generally used in fixed positions such as Fort Ticonderoga, for siege artillery against a fortification, or on the ships of the Lake Champlain Squadron. These guns typically fired 1,000 yards for a brass 6-pounder to 2,000 yards for an iron 24-pounder.

Howitzers weighed less than guns and, therefore, could be moved more easily. Like mortars, their nomenclature was determined by the inch width of the bore. The most common howitzer in the campaign was a 5.5-inch model. Burgoyne possessed a number of 8-inch howitzers as well. Howitzers were high-angle weapons that had to be positioned closer to their targets, typically firing 800 to 1,000 yards. They used a smaller charge but threw a larger round than comparable-size guns. Though the shell round was its primary projectile, a howitzer also could fire canisters.

A variety of mortars were employed in the Saratoga Campaign, including 4.4-, 5.5-, 8-, 10-, and 13-inch mortars. Like the howitzer, mortars were high-angle weapons—though smaller in size and heavier in weight. Mortars were mounted on fixed blocks called “baulks” and were aimed by line-of-sight. Since the tube was mounted at a fixed 45-degree angle, throw distance was adjusted by smaller or larger amounts of powder. The various models listed here could lob a solid shot anywhere from 800 to 1,000 yards.

Unlike today, all types of artillery during the Revolutionary War period were direct fire weapons. In other words, gunners had to see what they were aiming at regardless of the angle of fire. This was generally simple for artillery pieces since they needed to see the target. The same was true for mortars, but the round’s actual strike might not be observed. Still, the target—usually some sort of fortification—had to be visible so that the gunners could estimate the range and determine if the rounds were falling in the desired area.

British cannon were not the only artillery used during the Saratoga Campaign. Though small in number, French, Spanish, and even Swedish guns were found in the artillery parks. At least 200 French cannon were imported in the spring of 1777 for use by the Ameri-
### American and British Coalition Guns

**Fort Ticonderoga July 1777**
- 1 x 2-pounders
- 13 x 6-pounders
- 6 x 9-pounders
- 5 x 12-pounders
- 2 x 18-pounders

**Fort Schuyler August 1777**
- 4 x 3-pounders
- 4 x 6-pounders
- 3 x 9-pounders

**Bemis Heights October 1777**
- 2 x 3-pounders
- 15 x 4-pounders
- 4 x 6-pounders
- 1 x 9-pounders

**Burgoyne's Army from Canada (British)**

**Advance Corps Artillery**
- 4 x light 6-pounders
- 4 x light 3-pounders
- 2 x 4.4-inch mortars

**Right Wing Artillery Brigade**
- 4 x 6-pounders

**Left Wing Artillery Brigade**
- 4 x 6-pounders

**Independent (Center) Brigade of Artillery**
- 4 x 6-pounders

**Reserve Corps Artillery**
- 2 x light 6-pounders
- 2 x light 3-pounders

**Artillery Park**
- 2 x light 24-pounders
- 4 x medium 12-pounders
- 2 x 8-inch howitzers
- 2 x 4.4-inch mortars

* This is a list of artillery pieces captured from the American forces at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on 6 July 1777. It may not be a complete list of all pieces that were actually in the defenses, but few if any additional guns were evacuated.

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Figure 6. American and British Coalition Guns.
can forces. The French de Vallière system of guns consisted of 4-, 8-, 12-, and 24-pounder field guns and 8- and 12-inch mortars. Ten of the 4-pounder weapons were delivered to Maj. Ebenezer Stevens, Gates’ chief of artillery, on 26 July 1777 and were among the twenty-two guns known to be employed by American artillerymen at Bemis Heights.

**Offensive Tactics**

*Infantry Tactical Doctrine in 1777*

By the early 1700s, the older system of pikemen and musketeers had been replaced by infantry armed with bayonet-tipped flintlock muskets who formed in linear formation to maximize the effect of musket volleys. The regiments of musketeers formed in a line three ranks deep and would fire volleys en masse or by lines in rapid succession. These organizations were the heart of what became known as “linear tactics.” The regiments that made up the bulk of these formations were the basis of any army—referred to as the “heavy infantry” or the “line infantry.” This reference later became shortened to the “line,” or for United States troops in America, the “Continental Line.” Additionally, state contingents of the Continental Line were referred to by state, as in the “Pennsylvania Line.” On the battlefield, every army’s goal was to break the enemy’s infantry line of battle. All efforts of the combined arms team of infantry, cavalry, and artillery were geared to achieve that end. The line that broke first was the most likely to be defeated and swept from the field.

The standard sequence of events in a European-style linear battle was for the armies to march to approach the vicinity of the other army. One commander or the other would choose a piece of ground—generally fairly open—and deploy his forces. Ideally there would be a natural obstacle, such as a river or a heavy forest, to protect the army’s flanks. If the other army commander chose to give battle, he would form his battle line, generally out of cannon shot, or at about 1,000 yards. One line or both would advance, under artillery fire, until they were 100 to 50 yards apart then commence firing volleys at the opposing line.

The massed volley fire by heavy infantry was intended to beat down the other opponent’s line and disorganize them so that at
an appropriate time, the army commander could order a bayonet charge against a weakened point in the line. The more effective and well-disciplined European armies spent much of their peacetime activities on the drill field practicing approach marches, linear battle formations, maneuvers, and musket-loading drills. A well-trained unit could load and fire weapons about three times a minute while under fire. A regiment of 300 men could launch 900 lead balls at their opponents, sometimes as close fifty yards, within one minute, and rapidly disable them with superior firepower while concurrently diminishing the enemy’s own firepower. Some units became so good that they could reload and fire four times a minute.

Under ideal open field fighting conditions, only about fifteen to twenty percent of volley rounds would strike an opposing soldier standing in a similar line of fire about fifty yards away. Using the twenty-percent figure as a guide for a volley fired by a 300-man regiment against an opposing 300-man regiment, about fifteen men would be killed or mortally wounded outright and another forty-five would be wounded. Of course, these figures would be lower at greater distances, in wooded environments, or if one side was behind defensive works. The eventual effect of the volleys would be that some part of the enemy line would suffer high casualties and show less effective fires. Then the side with the advantage would charge with bayonets, followed by fierce hand-to-hand fighting if the men in the weaker line stood and fought, or more likely, break and retreat by the weaker line. Few regiments, even well-trained ones, possessed the discipline to receive a bayonet charge and attempt to resist it. In the case of militia and those Continental units with few or no bayonets, the unit would likely retreat precipitously as soon as the enemy began its bayonet charge.

In addition to the line (heavy) infantry, other specialized organizations used different tactics or performed tasks other than manning the line. These included the previously mentioned light infantry, grenadiers, jägers, and American rifle units. British, German, and American regiments all possessed a light infantry company. Normally, these units would operate well ahead of the regimental line. Usually two to four men would move forward in open order known as a “skirmish line.” The small teams spread out to present
a reduced target to the enemy’s skirmishers and main battle line. Armed with muskets, these men were trained to take aimed shots. One or two men would aim and fire while the other team reloaded. The skirmishers would attrite, harass, and demoralize the opposing infantry. During the Saratoga Campaign, the American side generally used light infantry in this manner. Burgoyne chose instead to consolidate his light infantry companies into an ad hoc battalion and use them as elite shock troops.

The grenadiers, for which there was no American equivalent, were considered elite troops. Early manifestations of the grenadiers were men chosen for their size and strength. They were selected because they could throw grenades long distances so that they or their comrades were not injured by the explosion. They usually performed their task out front and under fire. As the use of grenades declined, these units evolved into elite assault troops—assigned difficult or desperate missions where only they could be expected to succeed. This usually meant attacking to destroy or capture a heavily held defensive position. By this time, the British army generally selected men based on their veteran status, past performance, and known courage under fire. It was an honor to be selected and transferred to the grenadier company. As with his light infantry companies, Burgoyne opted to consolidate his grenadiers into a single large battalion.

Jäger troops were similar to light infantry and generally used the same tactics. The major difference was that jägers carried a short rifle rather than a musket; they had a slower rate of fire than musket-equipped light infantry. At distances more than 100 yards, this tended to be less of a problem since, like the American riflemen, jägers could hit targets accurately from 175 to 200 yards away. Jägers carried no bayonets, so German commanders typically assigned regular infantry troops to operate with them to provide some level of protection as they closed in.

American rifle units operated far differently than other infantry units. Rather than placing the bayonet-less riflemen on or near the battle line, commanders kept these troops at a distance where the reach and accuracy of their weapons could be used to maximum effect and they had less fear of being caught in a bayonet attack.
Thus, they had less concern during the longer time it took to recharge their rifles. Nevertheless, these men remained vigilant since British commanders would always seek opportunities to charge with the bayonet when their enemies were vulnerable. The distance from the enemy also reduced the amount of bullets whizzing by to distract them as they took aim at their targets. The riflemen were encouraged to inflict casualties on enemy officers and artillery crews. At Saratoga, Morgan’s men were also employed to counter the Indian threat posed by Burgoyne’s fierce Iroquois warriors.

Another aspect of infantry tactics must be mentioned here. It is a myth that Americans only fought behind trees and stone walls while their bright red-coated adversaries stood in straight lines waiting to be shot down by keen marksmen. This image was reinforced by stories of Lexington and Concord where the Minutemen took advantage of the cover afforded by trees and rock walls along the British route.

Unlike the typical European battlefields of the time, many battles during the American War for Independence were indeed fought in heavily wooded and hilly terrain. While this was true during the Saratoga Campaign, most battles were fought using linear tactics. The reality is that both sides were led by men who had at least a modicum of training in military tactics, techniques, and procedures common to armies of the day. Even on the American side, many generals and colonels had some professional military experience serving with the British Army or during the French and Indian War. Most had the benefit of periodic militia training and excursions against Indian raiders. With the possible exception of the forays against the Indians, their experience and training generally focused on conventional operations and tactics of the period. Moreover, the British regiments did not always fight in “close order” formation, that is, shoulder-to-shoulder. In America, British units usually fought in “open order,” maintaining about an 18-inch distance between soldiers. Regiments also formed in two lines rather than three as one would see on a European battlefield. This was largely due to the relative ineffectiveness of the fires of the third line. Whether in relatively flat, open or heavily wooded and hilly terrain, both sides typically formed lines of battle in open order with line infantry screened by skirmishers. Both sides also used trees,
walls, earth, and defensive structures for cover and concealment. Even then, fighting was generally accomplished in a linear fashion.

_Cavalry Tactical Doctrine in 1777_

During the Revolutionary War period, most European armies used a variety of mounted organizations, including heavy and light cavalry, lancers, and dragoons. Of these, only dragoons were raised and employed in any appreciable numbers during the War for Independence. In reality, neither side employed many mounted units. This was particularly true of the Saratoga Campaign. Burgoyne’s army possessed only the Prinz Ludwig Dragoons Regiment, which had just over 300 men at the beginning of the campaign but no horses. The American Northern Army’s dragoons, on the other hand, were mounted but never consisted of more than about 250 troopers at any given time. As noted previously, these troops were also poorly armed and thus of limited utility.

Dragoons who participated in the Saratoga Campaign were organized and equipped to ride to their place of battle, dismount, and fight on foot with their rifles or carbines. Since this meant that the unit would usually have to move away from their horses to take up a firing position, every fourth man was detailed to hold the horses of three other men. This effectively reduced the firepower of a dragoon organization by a quarter.

Instead of being employed on the battle line, dragoons were typically sent to attack the flanks or rear of vulnerable infantry units. They also could engage or chase off light cavalry, conduct reconnaissance missions, and pursue broken infantry formations. When dismounted, the dragoon’s carbine was his most effective weapon. Like an infantry regiment, mounted or dismounted dragoons could volley fire to attack an enemy unit. On horseback, his weapon of choice was the short, heavy-bladed broadsword or saber (if one had been issued). The carbine and pistols were next to useless when fired from the back of a jostling horse. Rarely could a dragoon hit a target with a firearm while mounted, and pistols were only good out to about thirty yards at best. Moreover, a pistol or rifle was extremely difficult to reload on horseback. Still, many dragoons preferred a firearm over a saber.
In terms of employment, both infantry and cavalry organizations and their tactics were relatively simple and straightforward. Artillery, on the other hand, tended to be much more technical and difficult to employ properly. Each type of cannon had peculiarities and variables that could significantly impact its effectiveness—size of the powder charge, elevation, angles of attack, weather, and others. Understanding and mastering these variables took time. Thus, artillery units were not organized and trained as quickly or easily as the other two combat arms. Moreover, while virtually all infantrymen and cavalry troopers in a given unit performed functions like marching, loading, and firing concurrently, each man in a cannon crew had different functions to perform when moving, loading, and firing a cannon. Each man in the crew also needed to know how to perform the other men’s functions in case of casualties. The crews also needed to know how to function within the gun section or company as well.

Tactically, American field cannon were generally employed in a section of two or three guns. One section was assigned to each brigade to provide direct support. Thus, the brigade commander deployed the section and controlled its fires. When forming for battle, guns were set up about 1,000 yards from the enemy with the section placed on a flank so that the guns could engage in a cross fire of the enemy infantry as the lines closed. During an attack, the guns could be pushed forward by hand as the line advanced and start firing at the halt. The intent was to aim the round so it would bounce or ricochet through the enemy ranks to maximize casualties. As the infantry closed, the guns could sweep the line from the left or right. Canister was the preferred round. However, round shot was very effective when fired against the flank of a formation as the ball would bounce along the long axis of the formation—killing or maiming more soldiers. Once the infantry closed and there was the potential to hit friendly troops with canister, the section could be turned to protect the friendly flank from attack by other enemy infantry formations or cavalry charges. Those guns not serving with the brigades could be placed in the army artillery park. These guns were the army’s general support batteries. They could be dispatched
to bolster a weakened part of the line or concentrated to help beat down a weakened section of the enemy line.

In defensive positions, guns were placed on the line with their assigned brigade to prevent enemy infantry formations from reaching and penetrating the friendly works. Canister rounds also were the preferred ammunition in these situations once the enemy closed to canister range. Those guns in the artillery park could be employed to reinforce the most likely approaches for the main attack or other threatened sectors, while the larger pieces were used in a counterbattery role against enemy artillery attempting to batter the walls of the defense positions.

*Fortifications and Tactics*

During the Revolutionary War and particularly the Saratoga Campaign, both sides extensively used improved defensive positions to limit casualties for the defending force and increase casualties on the attacking force. In simple terms, improved defensive positions during this campaign tended to be: a permanent fortification such as Fort Ticonderoga; a semi-permanent structure such as a blockhouse fort or fortified building; or temporary field works such as those prepared by both sides near Bemis Heights. Each type of fort was built for specific defensive reasons.

Most permanent-type forts in the Saratoga Campaign were built similar to the “star” fort designs perfected by the great French engineer and soldier, Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban. Forts Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Schuyler, George, and Edward were all substantial permanent fortifications and the largest defensive structures in the campaign area. These American forts, however, were much simpler in design than those in Europe and were predominantly constructed of earth and wood rather than stone. Still, for an investing (besieging) commander, these were significant obstacles, especially if well-defended. Burgoyne’s train of 139 artillery pieces was so large because he calculated that Fort Ticonderoga would be more strongly defended than it was. Ticonderoga was a threat to his line of communications from Canada as it prevented naval (and thus resupply) traffic between Canada and points farther south on Lakes Champlain and Lake George. Each of the other star forts also
guarded some key point along various waterways. For example, Fort Schuyler secured the portage route between Wood Creek and the Mohawk River, Fort George protected the south end of Lake George and the entrance into the Hudson River, and Fort Edward controlled movement to the south on the Hudson.

Star forts were not easily subdued. A commander had to give much thought and prepare his army to defeat such a fortification, typically through starvation, siege operations, and direct assault. The former method was far too lengthy for a campaign on a relatively short timeline such as Burgoyne’s. If the enemy had stockpiled enough rations and ammunition, the process could take months or longer than a year. It might not even work at all if a relieving army reached the site. Aggressive siege operations generally lasted only a month or two but required significant effort to dig a series of saps and parallels (see Appendix I, Glossary for terminology related to fortifications and sieges). Interspersed throughout these lines were artillery positions to continuously batter the walls of the fort in an effort to breach them. The sappers or miners could also dig underground to create galleys reaching to locations beneath the fort walls. There, the sappers would emplace powder charges and tamp them in to cause the blast to go upward. Thus the exploded charges would normally blow a huge hole in the wall through which the assaulting enemy would attack. Even this process, however, took a great deal of time, resulted in friendly casualties, and physically and mentally wore out the troops. Direct assault against a star fort generally was not considered unless the garrison was so weak it could not defend portions of the walls. Even if a direct assault succeeded, an assault force was likely to incur heavy casualties.

Semi-permanent fortifications consisted primarily of blockhouses and stockade forts. Blockhouses typically were two-story log structures. The ground story was used as a storage and sleeping area and usually had no windows or loopholes (firing ports). The second story was usually larger, so the “house” appeared to be sitting on a block. The second story had several loopholes in each wall from which men could fire down on attackers. Stockade forts were little more than a wall of logs, driven or dug in to the round and often cut to form a point at the tips. The walls were anywhere from twelve to eighteen feet high. Dirt was
sloped behind the wall to reinforce it and form a flat sentry walk high enough for men to fire over the wall. If large enough, a stockade fort could have additional log structures inside such as barracks, kitchens, and storerooms. Some stockades included one or more blockhouses as well. Fort Anne may have been an example of such a combined structure (the fort’s actual structure in 1777 is not clear). Blockhouses and stockades were constructed primarily to protect local citizens against Indian attack and as protective way stations for supplies and equipment that were en route from one place to another. These types of forts could also be used to close down small rivers and creeks to navigation and deny the use of nearby key facilities to smaller bands of enemy troops. Neither type of fortification was much good against a larger body of well-trained troops, particularly if the attackers were equipped with some artillery.

Field works were constructed using many of the same techniques used for star forts and stockades, such as a basic trench line with a sloped earth curtain, redans, redoubts, lunettes, or traverses (see Appendix I, Glossary). All would be constructed and reinforced with gabions, fascines, abitis, chevaux-de-frise, and fraise. Each had a specific purpose but all were designed to protect troops and artillery and strengthen the defending army. Though most were integrated into a major defensive line, many were built as stand-alone positions. The stand-alone field works would be located to take advantage of the terrain and provide interlocking fires with other positions for mutual support. These fortifications could be reduced relatively quickly with artillery but, if constructed well, could withstand a significant amount of abuse. Because artillery round shot generally buried itself in earthen slopes rather than tearing holes in the walls and shell, it caused relatively little damage against field works. Conversely, a well dug-in force could inflict enormous casualties on an attacking infantry force. In short, the more time an enemy force spent preparing such defenses, the harder they were to overcome.

**Tactics in the Saratoga Campaign**

In the Revolutionary War, the tactical offense was the preferred form of operations over the tactical defense. This was especially true in an open field fight where both sides were generally equal
in strength. Commanders preferred to use the full strength of their infantry line at relatively close quarters to weaken the enemy. Artillery could be used in an offensive mode by wheeling the guns forward as the line advanced, and cavalry could attack the flanks and rear of enemy troops to help break the opposing line. Once the line was broken, commanders would use the cavalry charge and shock power to further destroy or route the opposing army. When necessary, one side would assume the defensive to protect a key facility or route of advance, or to husband the strength of the weaker force. Both sides in the Saratoga Campaign generally followed those tactics but also deviated somewhat because of terrain, training and discipline, equipment, and logistics, among others. In general, tactics in the campaign were characterized by the following:

- British coalition units tended to fight in “doctrinal” combined arms mode—adjusted for North America with infantry in two (not three) lines and more space between the soldiers. They employed field guns up front in the infantry line at every opportunity.
- American attacks were rarely supported by cannon. However, commanders utilized their various infantry to great advantage. This was especially true of riflemen used to attrite British leaders and artillery crews and an emphasis on aimed shots by men of the line.
- When on the deliberate defense, the American forces did not remain behind their fortifications but left the works with at least part of their strength to conduct a movement to contact. This tactic disrupted the enemy’s advance and forced them to fight at locations or times they were not expecting to engage and in ways they could not bring their full line to bear.
- Mounted forces played minor roles at best for both sides. The German dragoons were ineffective due to lack of horses, and the American dragoons lacked proper weapons.
- The need to fight in wooded and hilly terrain caused both sides to de-emphasize neatly ordered ranks, although they generally remained in a loose battle line even in open areas. Commanders opened the distance between individuals in the line, and all troops used cover when available. As a result, casualty rates were much lower in wooded areas but remained somewhat higher during combat in open areas.
• The “press of bayonets” by either side was rarely achieved because many, if not most, American soldiers lacked bayonets. The American troops would simply fall back when British or German troops pressed forward with bayonets.

• Both Burgoyne and Gates used Indians as “eyes and ears” in lieu of cavalry, but they were not effective in pitched battles. Burgoyne especially took advantage of the intelligence the Indians provided regarding troop positions and movements.

• Indian depredations against civilians and prisoners resulted in a major information operations and publicity problem for Burgoyne’s army. Their actions also prompted more Americans to rally to the Patriot cause.

• The wooded and hilly terrain complicated the pursuit of broken or retreating forces, especially when the retreating force emplaced obstacles on the route behind them.

• Both sides used engineer-type mobility-countermobility-survivability operations to greatly increase their offensive and defensive effectiveness.

In summary, the tactical conduct of the Saratoga Campaign largely followed the tactical doctrine of the day—with some modifications due to the somewhat unique American area of operation. Clearly, the British and German generals were more experienced in and knowledgeable of modern warfare than the American commanders. The coalition forces in the campaign were the better trained, equipped, and disciplined army. The Americans, however, were more familiar with the operational environment, especially the terrain, weather, and local population, and they used this knowledge to their advantage. Attacks by both sides were often piecemeal, frontal, and uncoordinated. Deliberate defenses were rarely tested and generally effective for both sides, with the exception of the defense of Fort Ticonderoga. Ultimately, the fighting qualities of one side or the other did not determine the fate of the Army from Canada. That fault can largely be laid at the feet of the British strategic planners (Lord George Germain and Gen. William Howe) and the operational commander, Gen. John Burgoyne. Why that is the case will be analyzed in Section II, Overview of the Saratoga Campaign.
Logistics Support

By almost any measure, the system of arming, equipping, and supplying the Army from Canada was superior to that of the Continental and state militia forces tasked with defeating it. This was particularly true, at least initially, of the Army from Canada that marched out of St. John’s in Quebec Province in June 1777. Though well-organized and effective at the start of the campaign, the British system’s advantage steadily degenerated as the army moved south. Burgoyne had miscalculated regarding needed resources and underestimated difficulties of operating in the New York wilderness as his final plans for the mission solidified. Some historians have argued that Burgoyne’s mission was doomed to failure from the beginning.

Given the key role played by logistics in this campaign it is particularly useful to review the logistical organizations and procedures of both sides and the corresponding advantages and disadvantages of both systems.

Strategic Logistics

The wartime logistical effort in America was at a severe disadvantage to the British, who had a longstanding, though somewhat byzantine, national logistical structure. Unlike the British, the Americans had to build a “system” almost from scratch without the benefit of a strong national government to provide central direction and reinforce priorities. The Second Continental Congress functioned somewhat as a central government but in reality had little power to impose its logistic decisions and priorities on state governments that possessed most of the governing power and authority.

For all intents and purposes, the American national logistic system began in 1775 when Congress created three key positions on George Washington’s Main Army staff: the Commissary General, Quartermaster General, and the Commissary of Artillery. Each of these positions developed, originally, into a department or bureau consisting of a principal and one deputy. The men initially appointed to these positions were John Trumbull (19 July), Thomas Mifflin (14 August), and Ezekiel Cheever (17 August). Charged with oversee-
ing the Main Army’s logistics requirements, these men also had the responsibility for the broader Continental Army and so functioned somewhat analogous to today’s Deputy Chief of Staff G4 on the Army Staff. They primarily accomplished the latter mission through coordinating with deputies assigned to the various geographical departments (e.g., the Northern Department) and armies (e.g., the Northern Army). Their duties with the Main Army left them little time to focus on supporting the larger Continental Army as a whole.

In terms of an industrial base in America, almost all businesses that produced goods of any military value were locally owned and operated by private entrepreneurs. Any controls or priorities placed on these businesses were imposed at the state level. State governments also were largely responsible for raising and equipping their own militia organizations as well as Continental Army regiments designated for their states. States that took seriously the ownership of their designated Continental units generally did at least an adequate job of equipping and providing supplies for “their” regiments. A state’s governor or legislative body was the real authority that guided and directed businesses regarding the production and issue of troop supplies. Food and various types of supply had to be purchased directly from the producer by a purchasing agent. Both the states and the commanders of the various geographical departments employed purchasing agents to acquire goods and materials to support their army units. These agents were often in competition for the same goods, which drove up prices.

Paying higher prices for military goods prompted problems like rampant speculation, fraud, and inflation. Leaders at the national and state levels devoted significant energy to curb these problems. Adding to the headaches, Continental paper money rapidly became next to worthless which made the challenge of acquiring supplies even more problematic. At times, due to the lack of confidence in the paper money, authorities were forced to “impress” supplies (i.e., forcibly acquire them and issue a receipt for later payment), particularly animals, from the owners. This practice could drive otherwise neutral citizens to support the loyalist cause.

Perhaps the most successful national procurement effort prior to the Saratoga Campaign was the surreptitious acquisition of mili-
tary materiel from France through Roderique Hortalez & Company. This was a front company created in 1776 by a Frenchman—with French and Spanish government support—to transfer arms and equipment to the American rebels. The company shipped more than 100,000 Model 1763 Charleville muskets and bayonets; more than 200 cannon; and many tons of powder, ammunition, uniforms and other items—purchased on credit by the Continental Congress—to America to support the revolution against Great Britain.

In contrast with the rudimentary American effort, the British logistical system was mature, though not necessarily efficient; government agency responsibilities and powers were delineated and understood. By almost any measure it was significantly better and more reliable than the American system.

The British system did have certain advantages but also some disadvantages. On the plus side, a significant number of industries in England and other parts of Great Britain had been in the business of making implements of war for a very long time. Much of what they produced was state-of-the-art weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other items. England boasted a virtual army of trained and skilled packers, coopers, blacksmiths, wagonsmiths, harness makers, wheelwrights, tent makers, and other laborers capable of producing large quantities of goods. Furthermore, the British Navy consistently moved supplies directly to the army’s overseas field forces or at least to overseas depots for distribution.

However, the British system had a very long supply line compared to the relatively short distances to move bulk supplies to Continental troops. Because its logistical needs in America were huge, the British army had to bring most of the things it would need in the field. This necessitated requirements for large purchase and supply production contracts in both England and America. Purchasing agents had to find, buy, and ship significant numbers of wagons and small boats to move the supplies once arrived, or arrange to purchase or produce those vehicles on site. Any foodstuffs shipped to US would spoil if not properly prepared, packed, and maintained while in shipment and storage. Agents had to contract for ships, shippers, and clerks to schedule movements, supervise the loading of supplies, and account for shipments. To ensure that supplies and
the ships that carried them were cared for, they also contracted for warehouses, docks, and ship maintenance at harbors in both England and America. Moreover, the fraud and speculation problems that haunted the American system riddled the British system as well.

**Operational Logistics**

At the operational level, the Continental Army’s Northern Department was fortunate that General Schuyler was department commander. Regardless of any shortcomings as a field commander, he provided top-notch logistical support to the field units in his department—as good as any in the Continental Army and far better than most. After assuming command in 1775, Schuyler identified men who could help him build and supply his army and appointed many of them to his staff. Over the next two years, he and his staff worked tirelessly to acquire all types of supplies to arm and sustain the troops under his command. Often Schuyler did much of the staff work and coordination himself.

Among his key logistical actions, Schuyler raised and equipped the Northern Army units that invaded Quebec during 1775–76. He also ordered construction and helped supply an American naval force at Skenesborough, New York, in the summer and fall of 1776. That fleet fought a battle on Lake Champlain that October and successfully delayed the British invasion of the Hudson River Valley until 1777. Additionally, Schuyler set up supply and support depots at Albany, Stillwater, and Bennington, all of which would play important roles in the Saratoga Campaign. Moreover, he acquired a significant portion of French weapons which came into Portsmouth, New Hampshire, that spring. Thanks to his efforts, the American forces at Saratoga were equipped on a par with the British in terms of capabilities and serviceability of firearms during the two final battles.

However, Schuyler’s substantial Northern Department efforts did not ensure that the Continental Army or its supporting militia units were in superlative condition during the entire campaign. Though the army typically received adequate weapons and ammunition, there were times—especially after the Battle of Freeman’s Farm—where the Americans were woefully short of ammunition in particular. Acquiring enough food for the troops was an even larg-
er problem at times. In both cases, Schuyler and other logisticians worked hard to ensure that any shortages were alleviated in due time.

As noted earlier, dealing with shortages was not always a simple process. Though food could be purchased locally, local civilians often refused to accept Continental dollars in payment for food, supplies, and animals as well. Unit commanders would impress the needed items, much to the disgust of the farmer or businessman. Also, some contracted teamsters pilfered supplies.

Schuyler’s operational equivalent on the British side was Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, governor general of Canada. Carleton provided logistical support for Burgoyne’s army during the Saratoga Campaign, though with less alacrity and interest than Schuyler showed for the Northern Department. Carleton’s support facilities at Quebec and Montreal functioned as the main depots for the campaign operation. However, these sites were basically inaccessible for about half the year due to winter ice. Once the ice cleared, additional sub-depots were established at St. John’s, Fort Ticonderoga, Fort George, and Diamond Island as Burgoyne’s army moved south. An additional complication: the farther Burgoyne moved south, the longer the distance to support the troops.

Both British and German regular troops assigned to Burgoyne’s army were initially well-equipped and uniformed. Their musket ammunition was the same caliber and powder charge, so ammo compatibility was not an issue. The non-regular forces generally arrived with their own weapons and most supplies, so their primary logistics requirement was food.

Prior to the Army from Canada’s departure, the biggest logistics problem facing Carleton and Burgoyne was the need for wagons and animals to pull them as the army traveled south. Initially, moving Burgoyne’s supplies was relatively easy. A small fleet of ships and bateaux carried the supplies until the troops reached the Fort Ticonderoga area. From there, the supplies could move south by water to Skenesborough and then be transloaded into wagons for further movement south. The other option was to shift the materiel to wagons at the Ticonderoga portage, cart it about four miles to the Lake George landing, then transload it back onto bateaux for the trip to Fort George. There, the supplies would again be reloaded onto wagons that would be shipped by bateaux then moved by land.
A standard four-wheeled British Army wagon with four horses could pull 4,000 pounds on a good, level road. In terrain similar to what the British Army would encounter between Fort Ticonderoga and Bemis Heights, however, the maximum haul capacity was more like 2,000 pounds—requiring at least twice the number of wagons for the move. Burgoyne had few four-wheeled wagons and, in any case, they were too heavy to use on the poor American roads and trails. Just before the start of the campaign, Burgoyne ordered 500 two-wheeled carts of a Canadian design that was useful in forested areas. These carts, however, could only carry about 800 pounds at best. Also, they were built of green wood, which was not as strong as dried, seasoned wood. As a result, many of the carts broke down early in the campaign. Consequently, only about half of the carts were usable at any given time once the army moved from the Skenesborough and Fort Ticonderoga areas. Additionally, at least thirty of the carts were used to carry the personal baggage and tentage for Burgoyne and his staff entourage.

Hundreds of horses or oxen were needed to pull the wagons and carts. Assuming that each cart required two horses, Burgoyne needed at least 1,000 head just for the wagon train. Additionally, Burgoyne believed he would need to take along about forty pieces of artillery to reduce Forts George and Edward as well as Continental field fortifications they would encounter later. The artillery train would add at least eighty more horses, with some of the artillery actually requiring more than two. Additionally, horses needed twenty pounds of hay and six pounds of oats per day, which further added to the total number of required carts.

Ultimately, Burgoyne and Carleton acquired only about a third of the horses needed for the campaign. These animals were mercilessly overworked especially when the army moved the bateaux, artillery pieces, and supplies over the portage between Fort Ticonderoga and the Lake George landing. Many died during the journey, adding to the difficulty of moving the army thereafter.

Burgoyne also lacked sufficient manpower to man the bateaux and repair many of the notoriously poor roads and trails in that part of New York, or create new ones. Though soldiers could do much of this work, the labor would wear them down rapidly at a time when
they needed their strength and energy for battle. To fill this void, Governor Carleton instituted the old French “corvée” law which was still on the books in Canada. This law required able-bodied males to provide free labor to the government on an “as needed” basis—in this case for projects such as roads, bridges, fortifications and transport. This enforcement of labor was legal but of indeterminate duration. The French typically only enforced the unpopular requirement for short periods of time. Burgoyne planned to use the corvées as bateaux men and road work crews, and to carry the supplies across portages for the duration of the campaign. He had hoped to acquire as many as 2,000 of these men. Eventually, only about 200 reported for duty and many of these deserted during the campaign leaving soldiers to fill the void anyway.

**Tactical Logistics**

Once the armies came into contact, logistics challenges shifted largely to the local and tactical realms. The loss of Fort Ticonderoga was a severe psychological blow to the American side, but the major military impact was actually the large loss of supplies left by the retreating Continental forces. A partial tally of the supplies that fell into British hands gives one an idea of the disastrous implications: significant amounts of ammunition and powder; 1,768 barrels of flour; 649 barrels of pork; 5 barrels of beef; 36 bushels of salt; 100 pounds of biscuits; 1,880 pounds of peas; and 120 gallons of rum (this was a particular source of sorrow for many of the American troops). Not only did the Continentals lose these supplies, Burgoyne’s troops would now receive their benefits.

Despite these losses and the calamity of losing Fort Ticonderoga, Schuyler looked for opportunities to both improve his position and wear down Burgoyne’s. The Northern Department commander’s subsequent decisions and actions detrimentally affected the British force, particularly related to logistics. Among them, Schuyler adopted a “scorched earth” policy for areas through which the British forces would advance. The general ordered his soldiers and asked local civilians to destroy or move animals, food, crops, wagons, and other militarily useful materials out of Burgoyne’s reach. Because of
these actions and other voluntary efforts by local civilians, British and German logisticians had difficulty foraging for needed supplies. Schuyler also stockpiled supplies at the depots he created and continued to support the Northern Army even after he was relieved by Gates in August. In September when Gates’ army was low on lead for ammunition after the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, Schuyler organized an effort to strip lead weights from window sashes in Albany homes, had them melted down and molded into bullets, and shipped the ammunition to Bemis Heights in time for the October fight. Schuyler also personally purchased the wood Gates’ men used to build a pontoon bridge across the Hudson River.

In addition to Schuyler’s efforts, Gates worked to supply his army that September and October. He asked Gen. Israel Putnam in the Highlands Department to replace foodstuffs that were running low. Though his own department was under attack during Clinton’s foray from New York City, Putnam sent the Northern Army 300 barrels of hard bread and 1,250 barrels of flour from his Fishkill Depot and another 300 each from depots at Esopus, New York, and Sharon, Connecticut. Additionally, he later sent 1,250 barrels of flour and another 300 of bread.

At the same time the Northern Department was successfully supporting a rapidly growing army in the Hudson River Valley, Burgoyne’s dwindling command was struggling to sustain itself in a largely static location. By the time Burgoyne crossed the Hudson River on 13 September, his line of communication stretched 330 miles through mostly enemy territory to Quebec. A several day journey under the best of conditions, by this time only a trickle of supplies from Canada was reaching him. Even though he had the windfall of foodstuffs and other supplies captured in early July at Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough, by mid-August Burgoyne was tempted to send a column under Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum to capture the American food depot at Bennington and forage for additional food and horses. After that expedition ended in disaster at the Battle of Bennington, the British army never again attempted anything similar.

The Bennington foraging fiasco was followed in mid-September by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln’s three-pronged attack against Burgoyne’s line of communication. During those successful
raids, Continental units seized Skenesborough and its port and storage facilities, the Lake George landing, Mount Defiance, and Mount Independence. Col. John Brown’s column also demonstrated against Fort Ticonderoga for several days then attempted to seize Burgoyne’s supply point at Diamond Island near Fort George. The latter efforts availed nothing, but overall the raids were a noteworthy success against the British line of communication. In addition to taking almost 300 British prisoners at Lake George landing, Brown’s men freed more than 100 American prisoners of war captured just after Fort Ticonderoga fell. They also captured 200 bateaux, a sloop, several gunboats, a number of cannon, and other supplies. Most of these items were destroyed or hauled away by Brown’s men. Additionally, the raiders captured an unspecified, but apparently large, number of draft horses and cattle. During the Skenesborough seizure, Col. Benjamin Woodbridge’s column burned all the port facilities, docks, and warehouses and removed or destroyed other items of military value. Though these raids did not sever Burgoyne’s supply lines, they clearly affected General Powell’s later actions. As Fort Ticonderoga commander, Powell essentially functioned as Burgoyne’s rear area commander. After losing 300 men, Powell resisted releasing St. Leger’s force to link up with Burgoyne once it arrived at the fort in late September. Additionally, losing 200 bateaux as well as draft horses made it much more problematic to move St. Leger and his supplies forward. Partially because of these actions, Burgoyne cut his men to one-third rations by 3 October.

Although logistical shortcomings did not ensure that Burgoyne’s army was destined to lose, the quality of logistics planning and support for both sides influenced the final outcome of the Saratoga Campaign. Several logistical factors contributed to the American victory and Burgoyne’s defeat. Despite a cumbersome logistical system that left the execution of national supply priorities and decisions in the hands of state officials, proactive logistical efforts by key American leaders and staff officers ensured the system worked at least adequately during the Saratoga Campaign. Thanks to leaders like Schuyler, Putnam, and Gates, the Continental Army’s Northern Army was adequately equipped prior to and during the campaign— with efforts improving as time went by. While some supply types were always
ample, others were at times perilously low but always sufficient in quantity to conduct active operations. Finally, the American line of communications was never seriously hindered even during General Clinton’s foray into the Highlands in September and October.

Conversely, the British logistics system increasingly operated on a wing and a prayer following the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. Even from the beginning of the operation, the British commander struggled to arrange adequate transportation assets and animals. Then after Fort Ticonderoga fell, both wagons and animals were strained by unnecessarily large amounts of baggage, cannon, and artillery ammunition carried forward—conditions that continued to deteriorate as the campaign progressed. Finally, when the corvée system failed to generate enough men for road renovation, portage duties, and bateaux crewmen, Burgoyne’s column slowed to a crawl and gave the Americans more time to recover and rebuild from the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. As historian James A. Huston noted:

Burgoyne allowed logistics to become his master rather than his servant. He was so concerned with getting everything up to meet all possible contingencies that he was too paralyzed to meet any contingency. In moving his heavy ordnance and stores he lost one of the most important elements in warfare—timing.7

Engineer Support

In many respects, engineer operations during the Saratoga Campaign were similar to a modern battlefield. Both sides conducted engineer tasks like road building, demolitions, fortification construction and reinforcement, bridge construction, materials fabrication, and vertical and horizontal construction.

As in most areas of military service, the British Army had a distinct advantage in terms of professionally trained engineers. America had few institutions of higher learning that offered academic training in the various engineering fields, so the few academically trained engineers were in high demand everywhere. Consequently, many engineers who served with the Continental Army were foreign born, mostly French with a smattering of other nationalities. Two
exceptionally capable examples were Col. Thaddeus Kościuszko from Poland and his boss and the chief engineer for the Northern Army, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, an extremely energetic and intelligent, though self-taught, engineer.

The army engineer for the Army from Canada was thirty-one-year-old Lt. William Twiss. An experienced engineer officer, Twiss was commissioned in the Ordnance Corps in 1760. He performed work at the British defenses at Gibraltar and helped direct the building of the British Lake Champlain fleet that defeated Benedict Arnold’s flotilla in October 1776. During the campaign, he determined it was possible to place cannon on Mount Defiance then led the expedition to move the guns up there. He later directed the clearing of the Fort Anne road to Fort Edward and the construction of British defenses at the Great Redoubt.

During the Saratoga Campaign, only a small number of units performed engineer-type tasks. The American Northern Army had several artificer companies made up of civilian or military mechanics and artisans employed by the Army to provide necessary services such as construction and fabrication. An artificer company included skilled workers such as blacksmiths, carpenters, coopers, harness makers, nailers, and wheelwrights. Several of these companies were extant in the Northern Department by the time of the campaign, all under Baldwin’s command and control. Some worked on various construction, renovation, and fabrication tasks at Fort Ticonderoga before Burgoyne’s arrival while others did similar work at the department supply depot in Albany and later at the Bemis Heights defenses. In addition to the previously mentioned corvée troops, Burgoyne’s army had two pioneer units—the closest thing to a modern engineer formation—a small element of the 1st Battalion, Royal Highland Emigrants (a Canadian provincial unit) and Wilcox’s Pioneer Company (a Canadian militia unit). These units primarily constructed field fortifications, military camps, bridges, and roads.

While all three modern military engineer disciplines—general engineering, combat engineering, and geospatial engineering—were utilized during the Saratoga Campaign, most efforts involved combat engineering. Simply put, combat engineering is capabilities and activities that closely support the maneuver of land combat forces: mobility, countermobility, and survivability.
Mobility

Mobility operations mitigate the effects of natural and manmade obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver. During the Saratoga Campaign, these engineer tasks included construction or improvement of roads, bridges, and waterways as well as reduction or penetration of enemy fortifications and obstacles through pioneering, sapping, and mining operations.

At Fort Ticonderoga, numerous engineer projects were initiated prior to the onset of combat operations. One of the most significant mobility efforts was construction of the footbridge from the fort across Lake Champlain to Mount Independence. Additionally, shipwrights, carpenters, and other artificers under Baldwin’s direction constructed a large number of bateaux at Skenesborough, even though that would technically be a quartermaster function. These vessels later helped ensure freedom of movement for St. Clair’s garrison as they escaped from the fort and some were subsequently used to help construct pontoon-type bridges on the Hudson River.

Arguably, the most significant mobility effort of the campaign was the road cleared and rebuilt by Burgoyne’s troops between Fort Anne and Fort Edward. Over a three-week period, the advancing British troops were forced to painstakingly clear trees felled by Schuyler’s troops while concurrently widening and improving the trail to handle heavy cart traffic. They also had to corduroy the road or, in some places, build several miles of raised causeway to make the swampy and flooded areas passable.

Countermobility

Countermobility operations use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to deny an adversary freedom of movement and maneuver such as siting, building, emplacing, and maintaining obstacles. Just after the American retreat from Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough in July, for example, Schuyler wanted to slow the advance of Burgoyne’s forces and buy more time to gather American forces and supplies. He ordered St. Clair to have his men thoroughly obstacle the already miserable track from Fort Anne to Fort Edward; they felled huge trees across the trail in such a way that the branches intertwined. Anyone clearing the trees
would need to cut through the branches and haul them away before reducing and removing the massive trunk. St. Clair’s men also felled trees in Wood Creek to prevent bateaux traffic and placed dams in areas where the creek would overflow and flood portions of the trail itself. The American countermobility operations on this road significantly slowed Burgoyne’s road improvement effort to three weeks, increasing the amount of supplies and energy consumed by the British.

Survivability

Survivability operations are military activities that alter the physical environment to provide or improve cover, concealment, and camouflage—used to enhance survivability when existing terrain offers insufficient cover and concealment. Generally speaking, this simply means construction of fortifications such as shelters and barracks, normally thought of as general construction projects.

The campaign’s major survivability project was the American effort to restore Fort Ticonderoga defenses so they could withstand a major assault if manned properly. Besides renovating Ticonderoga, the Continental Army also built or improved a number of fortifications immediately outside the fort, including blockhouses, fortified cabins, trench lines, and artillery positions forward of the fort and on Mount Independence. St. Clair, Baldwin, Kościuszko, and the men of the garrison also expended a great deal of effort in the months leading up to the initial confrontation, though all came to naught and the defenses were never truly tested.

American units also worked to renovate other forts such as Anne, Edward, and George during this time. However, these improvement efforts were lackluster and ultimately ineffective. Forts Anne and Edward were later largely destroyed to prevent British forces from using them without investing time, energy, and resources for renovation.

The most significant survivability efforts for both armies came near the end of the campaign. These were the American fortifications at Bemis Heights and the Great Redoubt and several smaller nearby fortifications constructed by Burgoyne’s men. Although these fortifications were not very far from each other, there were
no serious attempts to breach an opponent’s line through sapping or other engineer-type measures. Only the British positions at Balcarres Redoubt and Breymann Redoubt were tested by assault, on 7 October during the Battle of Bemis Heights. The fortifications generally faced west and were reinforced stockade walls designed to protect troops manning positions to the front and sides but open in the rear. The Balcarres Redoubt included several smaller outworks that provided interlocking fires with each other and the main position. The troops of Poor’s Brigade captured one small outwork, later known as “Bloody Knoll,” but the assault could go no further due to the heavy defensive fires. The Breymann Redoubt, just to the north of the Balcarres positions, also had a number of outworks manned by jägers and light infantry and a few reinforced cabins manned by the Canadians. The main position, however, was only manned by about 200 Braunschweiger troops under Breymann himself. Under the heroic leadership of Benedict Arnold, the troops of Poor’s and Learned’s Brigades captured the cabins and the main redoubt, prompting the remaining German troops to flee.

Communications Support

Communications operations in the Revolutionary War period were relatively unsophisticated, with no special signal units or personnel as one would see in later armies. Communications tended to be face-to-face meetings, written documents, and various audio and visual signals. Meetings and messages were used at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Audio and visual signals were used almost exclusively in the tactical realm.

Strategic Communications

Strategic communications between the Continental Congress and its armies tended to be much easier than for the British government. Continental armies operated on interior lines of communications over relatively short distances. Face-to-face meetings and courier messaging were much safer and also much faster. A courier traveling by horseback could deliver a message from the Northern Department to an intended Continental Congress recipient in about a week, even when having to bypass British forces
in the New York City area. Timing was similar for a commander going to a meeting personally. Schuyler, Gates, and others made such trips to Philadelphia before and during the campaign. If a relay of fresh horses was set up, a courier could reach Philadelphia in about three days.

In contrast, strategic communications between Germain and Howe—or Germain and Carleton or Burgoyne—only traveled as fast as Atlantic Ocean or St. Lawrence River weather and conditions allowed. Under the best of conditions a journey from London to New York took sixty to ninety days, although the trip was about two to three weeks shorter on the return voyage. In addition to letter traffic, Clinton and Burgoyne traveled to England for face-to-face meetings with Germain to discuss plans for the 1777 campaign season. They traveled between late fall and spring during a time when active operations were normally suspended.

The extended travel time forced Germain and his generals to communicate primarily through written messages. In these letters, however, the secretary only provided general guidance to his commanders in America, leaving the vast majority of operational decisions up to them. Conditions on the ground might change between the time a message left England and when it arrived in America. As will be discussed in the following overview, strategic communications between Germain and his commanders also were largely ineffective due to poorly thought-out plans and directives.

**Operational Communications**

At the operational level, both sides tended to use courier-delivered written messages; due to their interior lines, American leaders occasionally met face-to-face, and their courier messages arrived much sooner as well. At this level, someone selected to be a courier had to be a most trustworthy man. He was charged with getting the message to the recipient as quickly as possible, without risking compromise. That, of course, was easier said than done, especially for the British couriers. Because couriers frequently traveled through rebel-controlled areas, they needed to be familiar with the country and know locations to avoid. These men usually traveled in civilian clothes which put them in great danger because they could be executed as
spies if caught. For exceptionally important messages, more than one courier was dispatched to help ensure that at least one letter or verbal message would be delivered. Both sides also employed encoding systems for written messages to help ensure the information did not fall into enemy hands. For example, Clinton used a so-called “dumbbell code” to respond to Burgoyne’s request for assistance in July 1777.

**Tactical Communications**

Tactically, army field commanders generally employed couriers to communicate with their subordinate commanders—especially Gates, who did not leave the entrenchments at Bemis Heights on either 19 September or 7 October. Burgoyne, on the other hand, frequently was up front and near the line of battle—often speaking directly to subordinate commanders during the fighting. Similarly, wing/division commanders used both communication methods.

Commanders also used other tactical communication methods, including flags, signal guns, bugles, fifes, and drums. During the winter of 1777, Maj. Gen. Friedrich von Steuben, Washington’s inspector general and drillmaster, developed a system of signals to help direct and coordinate Continental units on the battlefield. Von Steuben’s system included a series of drum beats to tell troops when to assemble, advance, and retreat. How flag bearers carried the colors also signaled any changes in direction for troops and when to halt. The songs played by a band would indicate whether the rate of march for a regiment was to be a standard step or quick step while advancing. All of these could generally be seen or heard above the din of battle.

Sometimes signals could help the other side. On 16 September, Burgoyne was alerted to the rebel presence by the American morning bugle call. On 19 September during the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, British troops fired a signal gun to indicate their battalions were in position to begin the general advance. The signal reinforced to the American lines that an important British action was taking place. Col. Daniel Morgan developed a rather unorthodox signaling system, using a turkey call to assemble his regiment riflemen in the confusion of fighting at Freeman’s Farm. Though rudimentary, signal support was an important aspect of military operations during the Revolutionary War.
Medical Support

The Continental Army general employed three kinds of hospitals during the war: general hospitals, “flying” hospitals, and regimental hospitals. A general hospital was normally a sizable fixed structure located in a city that was central to or near an area of expected operations. These general and intensive-care facilities were established in public or private buildings. The structures themselves could be a single building or a series of buildings, including homes, barns, churches, and colleges. General hospitals and flying hospitals were run by doctors and medical directors who were members of the Continental Army. Flying hospitals were mobile and moved with the army. They were typically established in local houses, cabins, huts or tents, or a combination of these locations. The facilities had only a few beds and an area set aside for surgery. Regimental hospitals, which were established and run by regimental surgeons, were more like aid stations where first aid and immediate medical care were rendered on or near the battlefield. The patients were stabilized there then relocated to a flying hospital for further treatment or a general hospital for long-term care once they could be moved.

Medical support for both armies at Saratoga was generally poor, though not due to lack of effort. Medical knowledge and training among caregivers at the time made the hospitalization experience in 1777 less than ideal. Additionally, the mortality rate among wounded and sick soldiers tended to be high because of largely inadequate medical resources. Even so, by the spring of 1777, the medical system set up by Schuyler’s Medical Director General, Dr. Jonathan Potts, had significantly improved the health of Schuyler’s command compared with the preceding year. With Schuyler’s active support, Potts set up several medical facilities to care for department soldiers. The department’s main hospital was established at Albany, the department headquarters. Essentially a general hospital with the capability of taking care of about 200 or so patients, this facility had reasonably trained doctors and staff. Because it was away from the front, readily accessible businesses provided good food, some medical supplies, and other items useful for patient care. Schuyler also ordered construction of a sixty-bed facility at Mount Independence to care for troops who were near
the front lines but did not require long-term care—a hybrid between a department hospital and a regimental hospital. By the time Burgoyne’s expedition arrived, a number of patients were being cared for there even though it was not fully ready. The one bright spot was that Colonel Baldwin established a vegetable garden at the Mount Independence hospital, a move that helped prevent scurvy and other nutrition-related maladies within the garrison.

In June, Schuyler arranged to move patients who required more long-term care to a temporary hospital at Fort George and relieve some of the load on the yet-to-be-completed Mount Independence facility. Later when Fort Independence was evacuated, Dr. James Thacher moved Mount Independence medical supplies and patients by bateaux to Skenesborough. En route to Fort George, the British Navy intercepted the party at Skenesborough. Although the medical supplies were destroyed or captured, Thacher successfully moved the patients to Fort Anne. The wounded men remained there in tents until 25 July when they were moved to the general hospital at Albany over a three-day period. The patients from Fort George were apparently moved to Albany as well.

At about the same time as the temporary hospitals at Forts Anne and George were abandoned, another was set up at Bennington in what would become the state of Vermont. This facility would support the health care needs of the significant number of militia forces gathering there. However, the hospital was soon overwhelmed by casualties from the battle fought near there on 16 August. The overflow of American wounded were placed in local homes, barns, and tents. Captured British and German wounded were moved to a meetinghouse and cared for by captured German doctors. In addition to facility challenges, medical stores of any kind were in short supply in Bennington and cold weather was approaching.

To the southwest, Dr. John Bartlett, physician and surgeon general of the Northern Army, set up a flying hospital at Van Schaik’s Island on 18 August. This hospital faced numerous challenges, not the least of which was its location. Bartlett considered the island to be an unhealthy spot due to swampy areas and insects. His staff of thirty-two surgeon’s mates (a type of nurse) was nearly overtaxed by a patient load of about 335 men. Moreover, medical provisions were
in short supply. Regimental surgeons began to complain that Bartlett refused to provide them with items for their sick men. In reality, there was little to share. Bartlett countered that he needed the support of at least three additional regimental surgeons and surgeon’s mates. The regimental surgeons, in turn, refused to help Bartlett, indicating that Gates had forbidden them from helping the hospital. Fortunately, the patient load had been reduced to about 192 men by the beginning of September, easing logistical problems so that the hospital could be moved to Bemis Heights when Gates transferred the army there on 12 September. Bartlett set up a hospital at Bemis right next to Gates’ headquarters and south of the main defenses there.

Most American casualties from the Continental Army’s 19 September and 7 October fighting near Saratoga were initially treated at the flying hospital then evacuated to Albany, New York. By the end of October, the Albany department hospital was overwhelmed with almost a thousand casualties ensconced in churches, public buildings, private homes, and other locations around the city. To relieve the pressure on the hospital staff, some patients were transferred to a temporary hospital in Schenectady and others were furloughed to go home or return to their units. Albany also cared for the 250 or so British and German wounded abandoned by Burgoyne’s retreating army. With the transfers of American patients to Schenectady and recovering enemy wounded to Boston, the Continental Army reduced the number of patients at Albany to about 436 in mid-November and 297 by mid-December.

Like most everything military, the American military medicine system was largely a product of the British experience. The types of British military hospitals used in the Saratoga Campaign were essentially the same as those for the Continental Army. Burgoyne and his chief of medicine, Acting Physician John Wood, set up or utilized a series of treatment centers during the campaign that provided decent and perhaps better care than their American counterparts, although the evacuation distances were much farther and procedures were more difficult.

The primary British hospital in Quebec was generally equivalent to the department general hospital in Albany. Evacuation back to that location, however, was reserved for patients who would not
be able to recover to the point where they could return to duty. Those patients were initially sent to a hospital set up in the ruins of the fortress at Crown Point. After the Americans abandoned Mount Independence, the British used the former American hospital to treat their sick and wounded. From all of these locations, evacuating sick and wounded men to Canada was logistically relatively simple. Once they recovered enough to travel, invalids were loaded aboard a vessel and sailed north to Quebec via the Richelieu River.

Evacuating troops south of Skenesborough and Fort Ticonderoga was more problematic. During the Battle of Hubbardton on 7 July, about 60 men were killed and 140 wounded from Brigadier Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps and a follow-on detachment of General Riedesel’s command. The numbers were high enough that Fraser decided not to continue the pursuit of St. Clair’s troops. Instead he remained at the battlefield to tend to his wounded. Those men eventually had to walk or be carried 25 miles over poor, hilly roads to Mount Independence.

Some of the wounded captured at Bennington on 16 August were from Fraser’s command, though most were Riedesel’s Braunschweiger troops. They were taken to a meeting house at Bennington where they were cared for by German doctors who accompanied the column. Concerned about the health of the wounded men of his Advance Corps, Fraser wrote to General Gates and offered to provide the hospital at Bennington with medicines and more surgeons to support his troops. Gates responded to Fraser that the captured personnel were well supplied with doctors, medicines, and other comforts. This was not true, of course, as supplies were low even for treating American wounded. Exacerbating the problem was that the British and German troops quarreled frequently. Additionally, only two German physicians were assigned to care for the British and German wounded. To the American doctors, the two appeared to be poorly trained and careless about treating the wounded, regardless of nationality.

Similar to Bartlett’s flying hospital, Wood set up a field hospital for British and German troops at Saratoga in a hollow near the Great Redoubt. The wounded men were well-protected from artillery and rifle fire in the facility, which consisted of one large and several small barns interspersed with several tents. The hospital was near
the river road, so the men could be easily moved to the Hudson River to be placed on bateaux for evacuation northward. The journey from there to Fort Ticonderoga would be perilous as the entire route was by then under rebel control. This plan of evacuation was never implemented. When Burgoyne finally resolved to retreat from the Great Redoubt position, he made the painful decision to abandon his several hundred wounded to the Americans as discussed earlier in this chapter. To ensure they were cared for, he left a number of attending physicians and mates, along with medical supplies. All would eventually be evacuated by river to the American department hospital at Albany. There, the British wounded were temporary inmates along with Benedict Arnold and James Wilkinson, the former due to a leg wound suffered on 7 October and the latter due to illness. In Albany, the British doctors were once again gainfully employed treating their own wounded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle</th>
<th>British</th>
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<th>Continental</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>MIA/POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Ticonderoga</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubbardton</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Schuyler</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oriskany(^1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennington(^2)</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st &amp; 2nd Saratoga</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>6,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>717</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>6,963</td>
</tr>
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**Notes:**
1. British casualties at the Battle of Oriskany are combined with Fort Schuyler. Indian losses are not depicted.
2. Wounded for Bennington figures are included in MIA/POW.

Figure 7. Saratoga Campaign Casualties.
Notes


2. Fort Stanwix was originally named for British Gen. John Stanwix when it was built in 1758. When his troops reoccupied the post in 1776, Col. Elias Dayton renamed the post Fort Schuyler for the Northern Department commander. Though renamed, it was still often referred to as Fort Stanwix even during the revolution.


4. Indeed, the system was designed in part to prevent men of lesser social standing from becoming officers, thereby keeping the institution an aristocratic one.

5. It is incorrect to believe, however, that the only reason the German princes rented out their forces to serve the British crown was to become rich through the blood of their soldiers. Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig, for example, used the money he received to offset high taxes for his people.

6. In this handbook, the term “coalition” refers to the entire British, German, Canadian, loyalist, and Indian force composing Burgoyne’s Army from Canada.

II. Campaign Overview

Introduction

*The Rebellion Begins*

In February 1775, the Parliament declared that the colony of Massachusetts was in a state of rebellion against King George III. Long-festering issues over perceived unfair taxation, the nature of representation in Parliament, and the quartering of British troops in Boston had finally boiled over. In the event fighting should break out with the British Army, the rebels began to stockpile gunpowder and other military stores in earnest. On 18 April, Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America, ordered a 700-man detachment to seize a rebel ammunition depot at Concord. En route, fighting broke out at Lexington and later at Concord. By the end of the day, 120 British troops and American Minutemen lay dead and more than 200 were wounded. Massachusetts was now on a path to a war for independence and other colonies would soon follow.

*The Invasion of Canada 1775–1776*

In May, soon after the battles at Lexington and Concord, an expedition led by Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold and Col. Nathan Hale successfully captured the British forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain. The column then proceeded north to raid the British outpost at St. Johns on the Richelieu River in Quebec Province. The following month, there was much public outcry against the Second Continental Congress’s orders to abandon the recently seized forts along the Lake Champlain line. The tumult increased over the discovery that Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, British governor of Quebec, was now reinforcing Fort St. Johns and building ships there, ostensibly to prepare an invasion of the Lake Champlain-Hudson River region. Congress therefore authorized Maj. Gen. Phillip Schuyler to conduct an investigation to determine whether it was feasible to invade “Canada” (i.e., Quebec Province). They also wanted to know whether the Canadians, particularly French-Canadians, might join the effort. Schuyler soon determined
that it was indeed feasible and planned to lead a column up the Hudson River-Lake Champlain-Richelieu River line to capture Montreal and Quebec City.

After conducting his fact-gathering mission in July, Schuyler bolstered his efforts by hosting a conference at Albany in late August to convince the Oneida and Tuscarora Indian tribes of southern New York to remain neutral during a fight between the colonists and the mother country. During the conference, however, Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery, Schuyler’s second-in-command of the New York Department, received intelligence that Carleton’s fleet of ships being built at St. Johns was nearing completion. Instead of waiting for Schuyler to take command, Montgomery seized the initiative and began the campaign without the New York Department commander. Schuyler, who became ill during the conference, soon departed Albany and caught up with Montgomery’s forces near St. Johns in September. Too sick to continue, however, he turned over command of the expedition to Montgomery who went on to capture St. Johns and fight two sharp skirmishes as the American invasion force continued north. Montgomery’s troops occupied Montreal on 13 November and almost captured Governor Carleton in the process.

Meanwhile, Arnold convinced George Washington to allow him to lead a column of 1,100 men across Maine (then still a part of Massachusetts Colony) to capture Quebec. After an arduous journey through the wilds of Maine, Arnold arrived at Quebec the day after Montreal fell—with only 600 men left in his command. He demanded that the city surrender but to no avail. The city’s garrison commander knew his defenses were too strong for 600 men to overcome.

On 28 November, Montgomery departed Montreal to join Arnold at Quebec. Reinforced along the way by the newly formed 2nd Canadian Regiment, he merged his forces with Arnold before Quebec on 2 December. In a failed joint assault on 31 December, Montgomery was killed, and Arnold was wounded. Arnold attempted to continue the siege with a much-reduced command (known after 17 January as the “Canadian Department”). The pitiful siege continued until March 1776 when Arnold was ordered back to Montreal and replaced by Brig. Gen. David Wooster. The Continental Congress was unsure what to do next. Spring was coming and so were fresh
British reinforcements. To help determine its next course of action, Congress sent a delegation under Benjamin Franklin to Montreal to try to win the Canadians over to the American cause before British reinforcements arrived from England. The effort largely failed. While in Montreal, the delegation learned on 11 May that the Canadian Department forces had retired from Quebec City in some disorder when they heard that British ships were in the St. Lawrence River with fresh troops. After losing two minor skirmishes in the retreat, the Canadian Department forces, now under the command of Brig. Gen. John Sullivan, departed Quebec Province altogether by 18 June and arrived at Crown Point in early July.

*Reorganization and Carleton’s Counteroffensive 1776*

In June 1776, the Second Continental Congress appointed Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates to command the Canadian Department and its army. Shortly thereafter, Washington provided Gates orders to move north and relieve Sullivan at Crown Point. Gates’ new command, however, was now physically located in the New York Department and therefore technically under Schuyler’s overall command. When he arrived at Schuyler’s Albany headquarters en route to Crown Point and discovered this fact, Gates immediately objected to being placed under Schuyler’s command. Gates argued that the forces at Crown Point were his alone as the Canadian Department commander. Congress partially fixed this problem by abolishing the Canadian Department on 8 July 1776 but did not actually direct Gates to take his orders from Schuyler. It was a command relationship problem that would fester for a year; as a result, Schuyler, though senior to Gates, was unable to freely determine the best use of resources in his own command without some level of interference from Gates.

Gates’ (and therefore Schuyler’s) biggest problem was that the former Canadian Department command at Crown Point was in very bad shape. The troops were utterly demoralized from the terrible conditions they suffered in Canada the previous winter—especially the series of defeats and retreats they encountered after the embarrassing decision to withdrawal from Quebec. Pay problems, poor food and clothing, and poor living conditions further exacerbated the bad attitude displayed by Gates’ soldiers. Moreover, most regi-
ments were far understrength due to desertions, small pox and other
diseases, and expired enlistments. Over the remainder of the sum-
mer and fall of 1776, these issues were gradually resolved for the
most part, but Gates and Schuyler were fortunate that Carleton was
not an energetic field commander.

Now reinforced with a large contingent of fresh regular troops,
including some German units, Carleton’s command executed a de-
termined though slow counteroffensive that retook Montreal and
drove the American forces out of Canada. Once again in possession
of St. Johns, the British general began building another invasion
fleet. His plan was to sail down Lake Champlain and retake the forts
at Crown Point and Ticonderoga. But events that summer and au-
tumn would lay waste to that plan.

On 7 July, Schuyler, Gates, Arnold and Sullivan held a council
of war where they determined that Crown Point was untenable and
decided to drastically reduce the number of troops at the post. Gates
would move most of his forces to reinforce Fort Ticonderoga and take
command there. He also determined to build a new supporting posi-
tion at Rattlesnake Hill (later renamed Mount Independence) across
the lake from Ticonderoga. Meanwhile, Schuyler directed Arnold to
build a fleet of ships and gunboats at Skenesborough (now Whitehall,
New York) to oppose any naval advance southward by Carleton’s ves-
sels. The result of all this hurried shipbuilding was a significant naval
action on 11 October 1776 off Valcour Island on Lake Champlain.
In an all-day fight, Carleton’s fleet handily defeated Arnold’s flotilla.
Arnold’s remaining four vessels escaped to Crown Point. Once there,
Arnold quickly decided the fort should be totally abandoned and de-
stroyed. When Carleton’s troops reoccupied Crown Point on the 13th,
they found burned-out shells where barracks and other buildings once
stood. Therefore, the British commander felt compelled to abandon
the position on 4 November since there were no viable quarters re-
mainining to shelter his troops for the winter. Because of this decision,
Carleton lost the confidence of the Secretary of State for the Ameri-
can Colonies, Lord George Germain, and therefore command of any
further military operations against the colonies.

Meanwhile, Schuyler recovered from his illness during the Ca-
nadian campaign and busied himself with New York Department
tactical and logistical concerns. Schuyler’s efforts had focused on authorizations for new regiments, levying new troops, establishing supply depots, and reinforcing existing fortifications. After the American failure in Canada, his major concern was preventing the British from using the Lake Champlain-Hudson River line of advance to isolate the New England colonies. If Carleton’s forces could achieve that objective, he would likely separate New England from the rest of the country and defeat Schuyler’s forces in detail. British success in such an effort might effectively end the war.

The Strategic Overview of the Saratoga Campaign

Development of the 1777 Campaign Plan

On 30 November 1776, soon after Carleton’s return to Quebec, Maj. Gen. William Howe, British Commander-in-Chief in America, wrote a letter to Lord Germain. He proposed that the campaign for 1777 consist of a two-pronged operation. The main effort would be a heavy column sent north on the Hudson River to join with Carleton’s Army from Canada advancing south. The other prong would attack and seize Boston. Meanwhile, a demonstration in New Jersey would keep Washington’s Main Army occupied in Pennsylvania. Howe also requested another 15,000 troops to finish the rebellion in 1777. The letter was placed that day aboard a vessel bound for London.

Before Germain had even seen the first letter, Howe wrote him a 20 December letter proposing that the campaign for 1777 consist instead of an overland movement to capture Philadelphia, the American capital city. In this letter, his only reference to a Hudson River movement was that it would likely not reach Albany before the middle of September. He also said nothing about cooperating with the Army from Canada. While this letter was en route but before it arrived in London, the circumstances facing Howe radically changed. Six days after Howe sent the second letter, Washington successfully attacked Trenton, New Jersey, and captured about 1,000 Hessian troops on the day after Christmas. After Washington’s successful raid on Trenton, Howe wrote Germain once again stating that in addition to capturing Philadelphia, he wanted to destroy Washington’s
army. This belief was reinforced on 3 January 1777 when Washington’s Main Army defeated a British force at Princeton, New Jersey—another daring raid in which about 400 British troops were killed, wounded, or captured.

On 14 January, Germain responded to Howe’s 30 November letter saying that no course of action was yet agreed upon. Further, he approved 7,000 additional men instead of the 15,000 that Howe originally requested. Incensed when he received the Secretary’s reply about his troop request, Howe determined that he would readopt his 20 December plan to seize Philadelphia (see map 31, Appendix J, British Campaign Plan for 1777).

In the interim, Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne—known by his friends and soldiers as “Gentleman Johnny” for his flamboyant lifestyle—had returned from New York to his home in London. There he penned a document titled “Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada” and sent this communiqué to Germain on 28 February 1777. Burgoyne outlined three options for the 1777 campaign. The first was similar to Howe’s 30 November proposal and called for the Army from Canada, as Burgoyne’s command would be termed, to move south on the Lake Champlain-Hudson River line to Albany. He also included a diversionary column that would move southeast through the Mohawk River Valley via Lake Ontario and effect a junction with Burgoyne’s forces at Albany. He indicated that his force might join up with Howe’s army moving north to cut off the New England colonies from the rest of America. A second option was to capture Fort Ticonderoga, turn east along the Connecticut River and join forces with the British troops in Rhode Island. The third option was to move the Army from Canada by ship to join Howe’s command in New York for whatever operations Howe chose to pursue. After reading Burgoyne’s three courses of action, King George III opted for the first and designated Burgoyne to lead the Army from Canada (along with a promotion to lieutenant general) for the 1777 campaign.

On 3 March, Germain wrote Howe and authorized him to attack and seize Philadelphia. Incredibly, he made no mention of Burgoyne’s planned campaign to take Albany. Moreover, Germain wrote at least seven additional letters to Howe between that date and
19 April and failed to mention Burgoyne’s expedition (and Howe’s expected role in relation to it) in any of them. Howe wrote Germain again on 2 April to inform him that he (Howe) would move on Philadelphia by ship via the Chesapeake Bay or the Delaware River rather than overland. Now aware of Burgoyne’s plan, he also wrote that he could not send a detachment up the Hudson to link with the Army from Canada since he would have insufficient troops. When Germain received this letter on 8 May, he should have understood that the lion’s share of Howe’s command would be tied up with securing Philadelphia—reducing the likelihood he could join with Burgoyne in New York. The combined force would certainly not be capable of effectively cutting off and isolating New England. Yet, by this time, the Secretary and King George had approved Burgoyne’s plan and assumed that Howe would still move troops north to link up with Burgoyne at Albany.

Germain responded to Howe’s 2 April letter on 18 May by telling the general that the movement by sea to Philadelphia was approved. Germain went on to say, however, that he expected that Howe’s expedition to take the capital would be completed in time for the general to then turn north and link up with the Army from Canada at or near Albany. Lord George apparently failed to grasp the time-distance factors involved with Howe’s plan and the general’s ability to meet Germain’s expectations. Had Germain sent copies of his reply to Carleton or Burgoyne, either would have immediately understood the impossibility of the requirement. Howe and Burgoyne were now set on a course where each would focus on his own immediate campaign objectives, precluding achievement of the plan approved by the king.

The Campaign

Burgoyne’s Movement South

Burgoyne sailed from London for Canada on 27 March. After a difficult voyage up the ice-clogged St. Lawrence River, he arrived at Montreal on 12 May and presented Germain’s letter regarding the plan to seize Albany, New York, to Carleton. Carleton now was aware that Burgoyne would command the expedition while he, Carleton, would remain in Quebec to defend the province and provide logistical support. Despite the obvious rebuff by Germain (due to
Carleton’s decision the previous fall to abandon Crown Point), Carleton set about to assist Burgoyne with preparing the army for the coming campaign. By early June, all was largely in order. The major shortcoming was an insufficient number of carts to haul supplies and draft animals to pull those carts. Nevertheless, on 3 June, Burgoyne’s army—more than 9,000 strong—marched from its assembly point at Chambly, Quebec, to St. Johns, Quebec, on the Richelieu River (see Section I and Order of Battle appendices for details on the composition of the opposing armies).

After final preparations at St. Johns, the Army from Canada boarded ships there and sailed south for Lake Champlain on 13 June (see map 32, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves June–August 1777). That same day, Brig. Simon Fraser, commander of the army’s Advance Corps, arrived at a frequently used campsite on the Bouquet River to await the main body. After a brief stay at Cumberland Head, the army joined Fraser at the Bouquet River camp on 21 June. There, several hundred Iroquois Indians from various northern tribes had gathered, ostensibly to serve as part of Fraser’s Advanced Corps and as the army’s eyes and ears. Later that day, Burgoyne assembled the Indians and issued a proclamation intended to rally loyalists to side with the king’s men and to demoralize, and perhaps even terrorize, the rebel forces opposing him. He threatened the use of the Iroquois against anyone who resisted his advance. The proclamation did not specifically threaten that the Indians would attack families, other non-combatants, and settlements, but the Americans in New York and New England were well-acquainted with Iroquois Confederacy warrior tactics. Ultimately, Burgoyne’s proclamation backfired, steeling the resolve of many rebels and causing many formerly neutral observers to join the rebellion.

Due to stormy weather on Lake Champlain, Burgoyne’s command remained at the Bouquet River camp for over a week. In the interim, Brig. Barry St. Leger’s force left Montreal by boat on 24 June to begin the Mohawk River expedition to Lake Ontario. Despite the stormy weather, Fraser’s Advanced Corps also left Bouquet River to take Crown Point, which it successfully occupied the next day. On 30 June, the Army from Canada once again sailed south and joined Fraser’s Advanced Corps at Crown Point. Burgoyne’s command was
now poised to begin active operations against the rebels of Schuyler’s now renamed Northern Department. His army had already travelled two-thirds of the distance to Albany. The journey had all been relatively simple up to this point, but that was about to change.

Fort Ticonderoga

Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 12 June to take command of the rebel forces there. He had been appointed as Gates’ nominal deputy at Fort Ticonderoga in April but was placed in effective command on 5 June while Gates mulled over whether to continue to serve under Schuyler or return to the Main Army as Washington’s adjutant general. What St. Clair found on arrival depressed him. The garrison consisted of about 2,800 troops, mostly Continentals. That was the good news. The bad news was that it would take at least twice that number to adequately defend the fort. Indeed, St. Clair and his brigade commanders believed that the defenses required at least 10,000 men. The fort and its various outer defenses were in poor shape despite garrison efforts to improve them over the past year. A hard winter, disease, inadequate resources, and poor morale had prevented the troops from making sufficient improvements to withstand a determined attack by a professional army. St. Clair clearly understood the challenge before him but was determined to make the best of a less-than-ideal situation.

Six days after St. Clair’s arrival, Schuyler arrived from Albany to personally examine the fort and assess needs for additional troops, supplies, and skilled workers. He and St. Clair inspected the defenses; like St. Clair, Schuyler was dismayed at the lack of progress. That same day, 18 June, two British spies who were captured at Colchester, New York, arrived at the fort under guard. They provided Schuyler and St. Clair with the intelligence that Burgoyne was now advancing down Lake Champlain with Albany as his objective. This bit of news prompted the Northern Department commander to hold a meeting with his generals on 20 June. Schuyler and St. Clair were joined by the three Continental brigade commanders, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Poor, Brig. Gen. John Paterson, and Brig. Gen. Roche de Fermoy. At the end of the council, the consensus was that the garrison would defend the main fort as long as practicable. If the fort had
to be evacuated, the garrison and all stores would be moved across
the footbridge extending between Ticonderoga and Mount Indepen-
dence and the defense continued from there. If that location also had
to be abandoned, the garrison would retreat south to Skenesborough
in a fleet of bateaux. Satisfied that he had provided an appropriate
contingency plan, Schuyler departed for Albany leaving St. Clair to
continue preparations.

Three days after the council, one of St. Clair’s scouts arrived
with more news. He reported British ships anchored at Otter Creek
and Burgoyne’s sizable camp at Bouquet River. Furthermore, there
was a noticeable uptick in skirmishes between Indian scouting par-
ties and St. Clair’s patrols as they tried to gather information on the
British expedition. Indeed, bloody attacks against St. Clair’s sol-
diers and non-combatants outside the fort had become an almost
daily occurrence. Troops began to refuse to leave the safe confines
of the outer defenses. The signs were clear that the British invasion
force was approaching.

On 1 July, Burgoyne landed most of his army on the west bank
of Lake Champlain three miles north of Fort Ticonderoga and Maj.
Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel’s division of German troops on the
east bank (see map 34, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements
1–12 July 1777). From there, Fraser’s Advanced Corps headed
southwest toward Mount Hope to envelop the fort from the west.
Riedesel’s column moved south on the east side toward Mount In-
dependence in a pincers movement with Fraser’s effort. Burgoyne’s
main body headed down the river road toward the American fortifi-
cations. The following day, as Fraser’s troops advanced on the saw
mills near Mount Hope, the American defenders set fire to those
facilities and withdrew inside the “Old French Lines.” These were
a series of entrenchments and other positions which had originally
been dug by French troops during the French and Indian War. The
Ticonderoga garrison had been steadily improving the positions, but
there were still too few men to adequately defend them. Bringing on
a brief skirmish, Fraser tested the American defenses. The British
then pulled back out of rifle range as Fraser and Burgoyne pondered
their next move.

On the west side of the lake, the British continued intermit-
tent skirmishing and reconnaissance efforts for the next two days to feel out the rebel defenses. On the east side, Riedesel’s Braun-
schweigers struggled through a thick tangle of swampy forest and slogged through several murky water courses. The German advance was extremely slow and frustrating as the men also had to contend with oppressive heat and insects. On 4 July, St. Clair received a very welcome reinforcement of 700 New Hampshire militia led by Col. Seth Warner. In response to this good news as well as the fact that it was the first anniversary of Independence Day, St. Clair ordered a *feu de joie* to celebrate both events.²

That same day, General Fraser identified the potential importance of Mount Defiance as he conducted a visual reconnaissance of the area. He sent Lt. William Twiss, Burgoyne’s engineer, and a reconnaissance party up to the top of the promontory to see if cannon placed there could range the fort. Twiss determined that it was possible and soon another expedition was dispatched with two 12-pounder cannon and a corps of axemen to cut a road to the top. By the morning of 5 July, St. Clair learned that the British were cutting the road and that his sentries had spotted cannon being hauled up the slope. St. Clair once again called his generals together to determine what to do next. They knew that a battery on Mount Defiance could fire into the fort. Even if it could not quite range the position (which it could), British observers would know every move within the American lines. The generals initially decided to shift the entire garrison to Mount Independence that night under cover of darkness. However, the approaching German column would soon block any retreat and the American units would be forced to surrender their men and stores to the enemy. Instead, St. Clair decided to load the stores, non-combatants, and the wounded and sick on bateaux and move them by water to Skenesborough. From there they would go by land to Fort George. The remainder of the garrison would move on foot through Hubbardton and Castle Town (now Castleton, Vermont) to Fort George. The plan would go into effect that night as soon as darkness allowed movement.

At the same time these events were transpiring at Fort Ticonderoga, Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton arrived back in New York from England to take command of the New York City garrison. Like Burgoyne, he
had returned home to England to try to change the course of the war by offering Germain his thoughts on how to proceed. Clinton’s visit to London, however, had availed him little. When he learned of the plan to send an army south from Canada down the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route, he had hoped to win command of that invasion force. Burgoyne had received that appointment instead. Clinton was loath to return to New York as he did not care for his immediate superior, General Howe, and chafed under his command. Instead of an independent command, Germain simply reappointed Clinton to his position as second-in-command under the commander-in-chief of North America. Clinton had few alternatives other than to resume his duties as commander of British forces in New York. On his return to the city, Clinton met with his immediate superior and quickly discovered that Howe did not plan to move north into the Hudson River Valley and merge with Burgoyne’s forces as had been briefed in London. Instead, Howe planned to move southwest to capture Philadelphia. Clinton and Howe had a rather heated discussion regarding the latter’s intentions, but Clinton was unable to move Howe from his plan. Clinton would broach the subject several times over the next few days, all with the same result.

Over the next few days, both St. Clair’s and Burgoyne’s forces experienced a series of ups and downs. As darkness closed in on 5 July, rebel garrisons at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence sprang into a frantic flurry of activity. At the Ticonderoga docks, St. Clair’s quartermaster, Lt. Col. Udney Hay supervised the hurried loading of supplies, women and children, and sick and wounded soldiers on some 200 bateaux. Other soldiers moved supplies and equipment to the docks or across the footbridge leading from the Ticonderoga peninsula to Mount Independence. Others worked to move or spike guns and destroy or make useless other items they could not take. The same general actions took place on Mount Independence as well. Throughout these activities, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens’ artillerymen kept up a steady fire toward the British to cover the noises of an army preparing to retreat.

After midnight, Hay realized that significant amounts of supplies could not be hauled away. A great deal of food and other items were tossed into the lake so they could not be used by the British. As the night progressed, so did the level of confusion. Despite the activ-
ity and noise, however, the darkness successfully cloaked the retreat. British sentries, including those on Mount Defiance, remained ignorant of the American activities until at least 0200 on 6 July. That was when General Fermoy, apparently in a drunken stupor, set his quarters on fire and ordered other buildings torched as well. Soon, huge flames leapt into the night sky and sentries on Mount Defiance saw a massive bateaux fleet below the fort and a steady stream of soldiers flowing over the footbridge to Mount Independence. The sentries instantly recognized what was going on and sent runners to inform Burgoyne.

Fortunately it took some time for the runners to alert Burgoyne at the main British camp and even longer for his troops to assemble and start probing the American defenses. Despite Fermoy’s appalling actions, the bateaux fleet managed to escape with a large amount of weapons, supplies, and human passengers under the command of Col. Pierce Long, commander of a New Hampshire militia regiment. The foot column also barely evaded British probing efforts and proceeded off Mount Independence before dawn led by St. Clair himself. Burgoyne’s men gingerly crept into the now-abandoned defenses, proceeded through the fort, and followed the retreating rebels over the footbridge to the burning ruins of Mount Independence. Along the way they scooped up a number of prisoners and quantities of supplies that had not been destroyed in the American rush to get away. Burgoyne had easily captured the “Gibraltar of the Hudson” without the bloody losses he feared. The general ordered his naval forces, along with Brig. Henry W. Powell’s brigade, to chase down the bateaux fleet while Fraser’s Advanced Corps and Riedesel’s Reserve Corps pursued the retreating American foot column.

As part of Fort Ticonderoga’s defenses, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, the post’s engineer, had constructed a heavy log boom and chains to slow a pursuer and block the passage of a British fleet. The American bateaux flotilla commander, Long, and others believed the boom and chains would prevent any quick pursuit by Burgoyne’s ships, but the works proved ineffective. The British naval commander rapidly figured out how to cut the boom. Within a relatively short time, the enemy vessels were quickly pursuing the American boats.

Meanwhile, Long’s bateaux fleet was in no hurry to reach Skanesborough. As a result, the British ships caught Long’s flotilla at Skanesborough in the middle of unloading. Now in a panicked rush,
Long’s men raced to set the remaining four ships of Arnold’s Valcour Island fleet and all the bateaux on fire. They also burned the Skenesborough blockhouse as well as port facilities and then those who were able quickly made for Fort Anne to the south or scattered into the surrounding woods. Although the British were able to rescue substantial amounts of food from destruction, as well as some of the vessels, most other items were destroyed. Most of the Americans escaped capture, but the situation was another demoralizing defeat for the rebels.

The Battle of Hubbardton

The foot column led by St. Clair departed Mount Independence in the morning darkness of 6 July and headed for Castle Town. After an all-day march in the July heat, the head of the column passed through the little hamlet of Hubbardton. The rear guard of the command, consisting of two units under Col. Ebenezer Francis, had fallen far behind due to the need to police the many stragglers. As he passed through Hubbardton, St. Clair ordered Col. Seth Warner and his Continental Regiment to wait for Francis’ rear guard and bring them into Castle Town later that evening. On arrival at Hubbardton, however, Francis informed Warner that his command was too worn out to continue. The combined force remained there for the evening.

Unknown to the two colonels, Simon Fraser’s Advanced Corps was not far away. Fraser’s troops stopped for the evening only three miles from Hubbardton. After posting a few sentries along Sucker Creek and feeding their troops, the two American commanders bedded down their men for the night. The next morning as the first streaks of dawn broke over the mountains, Major Robert Grant’s 24th Regiment of Foot unexpectedly piled into the rebel sentries along the creek while much of the rest of the rebel force was cooking breakfast. The first British volley felled a number of men from Col. Nathan Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Battalion. Though surprised and confused, the rebels did not break. They grabbed their muskets, dashed to find cover behind trees and rocks, and returned fire. Grant was killed by the American return fire during the heavy musketry that followed. Francis, who had formed his 11th Massachusetts Bay Regiment for the march to Castle Town, quickly turned them into line and formed on Hale’s right. Warner
began assembling his force at the first volley and rushed his men downhill toward the sound of the guns to support Hale and Francis.

Given the volume of rebel gunfire, Fraser realized he had run into a sizable force, likely stronger in numbers than his own. He sent a courier back to urge Riedesel to send support, then turned to press his attack and take advantage of the initiative he had gained. Seeking to flank the rebel forces and cut off their retreat, Fraser sent the Grenadier Battalion under Major John D. Acland around the rebel left to seize a promontory called Zion Hill which overlooked the road to Castle Town. This move also put Hale’s left flank at risk of being rolled up by the grenadiers.

While the grenadiers scrambled up Zion Hill, the 24th Foot and the Light Infantry Battalion under Major Alexander Lindsay (6th Earl of Balcarres) pressed forward toward the American line in an attempt to get close enough for a bayonet charge. Their movement carried them toward another prominence which would later become known as Monument Hill. It was an excellent defensive position, and both Francis and Hale now raced back to get there before the British. Arriving there first, Francis’ men quickly reformed behind a low stone wall on the left. Somehow in the confused retreat, Hale’s men had crossed behind the 11th Massachusetts and now formed on the right. The rebels settled into position just in time to receive another charge by Fraser’s main effort. The volleys were effective on both sides. Numbers of men fell dead and wounded, including Colonel Hale. The effect was particularly heavy on the redcoats, however. The Americans were provided a modicum cover by the wall while the British had none. As a result of the heavy rebel volleys, the British line was compelled to retreat.

As Fraser’s main line pulled back to reform for another attack, Acland’s grenadiers—now reinforced with two of Lindsay’s light infantry companies—swept across Mount Zion and placed effective fire on the Castle Town Road. Warner’s men, who had fallen back to the vicinity of the Selleck cabin near the junction of the Castle Town Road and the road to Mount Independence, made a stand there to oppose any further advance by the grenadiers. They failed in this effort due to the weight of numbers and the aggressiveness of the British attack. Warner soon ordered his men back into positions across the Castle
Town Road, which was now effectively cut by Acland’s battalion.

At about the same time as Warner’s fight at the road junction, Francis’ 11th Massachusetts and the 2nd New Hampshire—now under Major Benjamin Titcomb—battled fiercely with Fraser’s main force on Monument Hill. The lines were generally only sixty to eighty yards apart. Though taking heavy casualties, Fraser’s line finally forced the Americans to abandon the stone wall. Francis’ and Titcomb’s men joined Warner’s regiment behind a stout log fence on the east side of the Castle Town Road. From this new defensive position, the rebels battled Fraser’s troops for about two more hours.

At about 1000, troops from both sides noticed a strange noise coming from the north. A military band was announcing the arrival of Riedesel’s jägers and a detachment of light infantry. The German general skillfully maneuvered his troops into the right flank of the American position, which broke under this new assault—hastened after Colonel Francis fell dead from an enemy bullet. The rebels now fled in an unorganized mob over Pittsford Ridge to the east of the battlefield, leaving about forty-one dead and ninety-one wounded behind. Roughly 230 men were captured, most of them the sick and wounded of the straggler brigade. Despite the defeat, most rebel troops reached Rutland, Vermont, a number of days later and reformed their units for additional operations.

As for Fraser, he opted not to pursue the broken Americans. Though he had won the field, the victory had cost him dearly. At least fifty of his soldiers were killed and 134 wounded. In the short time they were involved, ten of Riedesel’s troops were killed and fourteen wounded. Out of the roughly 1,000 men of Fraser’s command roughly one of five were killed or wounded—a twenty-percent casualty rate. Instead of pressing home his advantage, Fraser decided to turn his force around and return to Skenesborough with his many wounded men. The Battle of Hubbardton was the first indicator to the confident troops of the Army from Canada that the Americans would not be easily defeated.

From his bivouac near Hubbardton, St. Clair could hear sounds of the battle involving his rearguard. He sent word to two militia colonels whose units were slightly ahead of the rear guard and ordered them to march to Warner’s assistance. Their men chose instead
to continue the retreat away from the Hubbardton fight, so Warner received no help. Meanwhile, St. Clair continued his command’s march toward Fort Edward to make a junction with Schuyler.

The Battle of Fort Anne

Burgoyne arrived at Skenesborough on the morning of 6 July after the Americans were scattered by the British troops. Realizing that the main body of Long’s fugitives had headed south toward Fort Anne, Burgoyne directed a pursuit to catch them. Lt. Col. John Hill’s 9th Regiment of Foot conducted the chase by the land route, while two other regiments, the 20th and 21st, attempted to intercept the Yankee fugitives moving via Wood Creek in bateaux. Hill’s men set out the morning of 7 July and quickly discovered how poor the Fort Anne road was, especially when combined with the fact that the retreating rebels had destroyed all the bridges en route. Hill’s unit covered only ten miles the first day. Reaching a point less than a mile from Fort Anne that evening, Hill’s column ran into an American militia force of about 160 men. They immediately engaged in a sharp fight that lasted more than three hours until the rebels withdrew.

The next morning, an American “deserter” entered Hill’s camp and relayed that there were now about 1,000 men at Fort Anne. Hill immediately dispatched a courier to Burgoyne to request reinforcements. In the meantime, the deserter slipped away and reported back to Fort Anne with the news that Hill’s command was roughly 200 strong. Colonel Long and the remnants of his New Hampshire Militia Regiment, Col. Henry Van Rensselaer’s 4th New York Militia, and a mish-mash of various other militiamen streamed out of Fort Anne to attack Hill’s command about mid-morning. Realizing that the advancing Americans would soon surround him in the thick forest, Hill moved his regiment to the top of a craggy hill on the west side of the road. Heavy firing broke out as both sides began to volley. The Americans pressed their attack in an ever-smaller concentric ring around Hill’s 9th Foot. After some time, Hill’s command had taken significant casualties and the men were running out of ammunition. Fortunately for them, Long and Van Rensselaer’s men were running low as well. Just as it appeared that Hill might
have to surrender his command, Indian war whoops could be heard along the road from the direction of Skenesborough. It appeared that British reinforcements, along with some of their Indian allies, had arrived to save the day. Long reluctantly ordered a rebel retreat back to Fort Anne.

Unbeknownst to Long and Van Rensselaer—and even to Hill himself—the arriving reinforcements consisted of one man, Capt. John Money, deputy quartermaster of the Army from Canada. He had been leading a group of Iroquois to Hill’s rescue when the Indians suddenly deserted after they heard a general action taking place. Money had continued on without them and simply whooped like the Indians using psychological warfare that worked admirably. However, Hill had learned as Fraser discovered the day before that battles were often costly when engaging American troops, even militia forces. Of about 200 men involved in the fight, the 9th Foot suffered sixty-five casualties, or about thirty percent of Hill’s force.

Burgoyne’s Decision

On 8 July, the day after the fight at Hubbardton, Burgoyne moved his headquarters down to Skenesborough. At this point in the campaign, the British commander had to decide whether to take his command via Lake Champlain back north to Fort Ticonderoga, transport it over the four-mile portage to the Lake George landing, and proceed down that lake to Fort George (see map 36, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 12–30 July 1777). From there, he would move the army overland to the vicinity of Fort Edward where he could use the Hudson River as his logistical supply line. This route covered eighty-five miles and would entail hauling supplies, ammunition, cannon, bateaux, wagons, animals, and other impedimenta over two overland portages. The portages themselves represented twenty-three of the total miles to be traveled. His other option was to move eleven miles from Skenesborough via Wood Creek to Fort Anne, then improve the twenty-three-mile road from Fort Anne to Fort Edward.

Burgoyne saw problems with the first option: It was much longer, required two portages, and could demoralize the army because the retrograde to Fort Ticonderoga appeared to be a retreat. Addi-
tionally, a route west of Lake George would communicate to Schuyler that Burgoyne’s objective was Albany rather than New England. Ultimately, he decided to use both routes. The main army would advance to Fort Edward using the Fort Anne road, while most supplies, wagons, animals, ammunition, and cannon would move via the Lake George route.

Burgoyne set his plan in motion on 10 July. He ordered Powell to begin reconditioning the Fort Anne road and clearing obstacles and obstructions in Wood Creek. He also directed his second-in-command, Maj. Gen. William Phillips, to begin moving selected troops, equipment, and supplies via the Lake George route. Meanwhile, he sent a letter to General Carleton in Quebec asking for desperately needed horses and wagons. In due course, this request as well as Burgoyne’s later request for additional troops came to nothing.

As St. Clair’s column struggled toward Fort Edward and Burgoyne’s army began its movement toward the same objective, Schuyler used his time to greatly improve the American situation in the Northern Department. He ordered his assistant engineer, Col. Thaddeus Kościuszko, to take troops from Fort Edward and cut down huge trees to block both the Fort Anne Road and Wood Creek. They were also to build dams to block the flow of water so that the creek would overflow onto the road and into surrounding areas to create swamps and bogs to help make the trail impassable. When St. Clair’s command and Brig. Gen. John Nixon’s brigade of Continentals arrived at Fort Edward on 12 July, Schuyler assigned them to the same task. This tactic delayed Burgoyne’s advance over that route by almost three weeks while creating more time for Schuyler to gather additional reinforcements and supplies for the next major showdown.

As Burgoyne’s troops struggled in the humid July heat to clear the passages to Fort Edward, a number of key events took place that would directly and indirectly affect the course of the campaign. On 17 July, General Howe finally wrote to inform Burgoyne that his campaign objective was to seize Philadelphia rather than join the Army from Canada in Albany. Six days later—well before Burgoyne received the letter—Howe’s 15,000 troops boarded ships at New York City and sailed south for Chesapeake Bay. Before he departed, Howe gave General Clinton the option to assist Burgoyne if
he had the opportunity.

On the same day Howe wrote to Burgoyne, another large party of Iroquois joined the Army from Canada at Skenesborough. Thus far, Iroquois contributions to the campaign had been mixed. While they sometimes provided excellent intelligence on American troop locations and movements, their depredations greatly frustrated and concerned Burgoyne and his officers. The situation came to a boiling point with the death of Jane McCrae in late July.

Jane McCrae was the fiancée of a loyalist officer serving in Burgoyne’s command. On 27 July, McRae and another woman were captured by several Wyandot Indians on a mission for the British. While returning to Skenesborough with their captives, two of the Indians squabbled over the young woman. In a fit of rage, one of the men killed McRae and scalped her. When the war party arrived in the British camp, the captain to whom McRae had been betrothed immediately recognized the red haired scalp of his future wife tucked in the belt of the man who killed her. This incident created great tension in the camp. Burgoyne, disgusted by the barbarous act, demanded that the Indian be put to death. He only relented on his demand after learning the brave was a favored Mohawk chief. If he were executed, virtually all the army’s Indian allies would immediately desert. The incident had much greater psychological effects when the story was circulated in rebel areas and by newspapers throughout the states. Outrage over this incident, as well as the employment of the Iroquois braves against Americans in general, inspired greater turn out when militia units were called. Many Americans who had been neutral or ambivalent about the war moved to the Patriot cause. The incident also further dampened loyalist desires to openly support the king and his troops.

Well to the west of the main area of operations, the lead elements of St. Leger’s expedition arrived at Oswego, New York, on 23 July. On the 26th, St. Leger’s command—consisting of 280 British and German regulars, 470 Canadian militiamen and American loyalists, and 800 Indians—departed from Oswego headed inland for Fort Schuyler in the Mohawk River Valley. His mission was to capture the post that guarded and controlled the Oneida “Great Carrying Place” linking Lake Ontario to the Mohawk River. The portage
was vital to trade and military communications between the Hudson River (and therefore New York City) and the Great Lakes region. Once Fort Schuyler was in British hands, that source of trade would be cut off from the rebels and St. Leger could make his way south-east to link with Burgoyne at Albany. As with Burgoyne’s advance, St. Leger’s command appeared to have the upper hand. That would change as events unfolded before Fort Schuyler.

Far to the east of Fort Schuyler, a more positive development was taking place. In early July, the irascible John Stark was commissioned as brigadier general in the New Hampshire militia. Earlier in the war, Stark had served admirably at Bunker Hill, Trenton, and Princeton. Then a colonel, Stark had disgustedly resigned from United States service the previous March after the Continental Army awarded brigadier general promotions to other officers who he believed had inferior records of service. Now with his new commission, Stark set about raising an entire brigade of New Hampshire militia to fight against Burgoyne. Within a week, he successfully enlisted about 1,500 men. This substantial addition to the rebel cause came with a string attached. The New Hampshire legislature exempted Stark and his command from orders issued by anyone other than that body. Stark was to act independently against Burgoyne to protect his state, its people, and their interests. Naturally cantankerous, Stark would very soon demonstrate his independence.

On 24 July, Schuyler sent newly arrived Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln to command all rebel forces in the New England region. Lincoln, who had Washington’s greatest confidence, had been sent by the commander-in-chief to assist Schuyler in any way he could. Schuyler determined Lincoln (who was from Massachusetts and thus a fellow New Englander) should oversee the raising and equipping of newly formed New England area militia units and conduct operations against Burgoyne’s line of communication at the first opportunity. Lincoln set out for Manchester, New Hampshire, to set up his headquarters and begin efforts to help defeat Burgoyne.

While St. Leger advanced on Fort Schuyler and Lincoln made his way to Manchester, the Army from Canada worked to move massive amounts of materiel to the Lake George landing and clear obstacles along the route to Fort Edward via Fort Anne. By 27 July,
the road had been largely cleared. Two days later, the main body of the army departed Skenesborough and marched toward Fort Edward. As Burgoyne approached the fort, Schuyler decided to move his forces south again, this time to Stillwater. The roughly 4,000 men at his immediate disposal were too weak to oppose the British with any reasonable chance of success (see map 37, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 30 July–31 August 1777). As they moved, Schuyler’s men continued destroying bridges and anything else useful to a British advance. Almost as soon as his troops reached Stillwater on 1 August, Brig. Gen. John Glover’s brigade of Massachusetts Continentals also arrived.

At Stillwater, Schuyler initially directed Baldwin and Kościuszko to begin building defensive works to prepare for any further British advance but changed his mind within a few days. On 6 August, the Northern Army’s main force departed Stillwater and headed farther south to Van Schaik’s Island at the confluence of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. The army arrived two days later and began digging in once again. Schuyler’s plan was to defend this region of little islands known as “the Sprouts.” If successful, they would prevent any British army movement south of that point, because Burgoyne would be limited to supplying his army by land. Two days after arriving at the Sprouts, Schuyler learned that he had been relieved of command of the Northern Department and Gates appointed in his stead. St. Clair was concurrently relieved from the army.

Despite the bad news and since Gates was not yet present to assume command, Schuyler continued to set the conditions for the American Northern Army to succeed. He had received communiqués from Col. Peter Gansevoort, American commander at Fort Schuyler, about St. Leger’s actions and the defeat of a New York militia column attempting to reach the fort. On the 13th, Schuyler dispatched a Continental brigade under Benedict Arnold to reinforce Gansevoort’s command. On the 16th, Schuyler sent Baldwin and a work detail of artificers back to Stillwater to gather lumber and other construction materials and then destroy any remaining items of military value. The construction materials were later used to build the American lines at Bemis Heights. On 19 August, Gates arrived at Van Schaik’s Island and assumed command from Schuyler. Sorely disappointed by the action, Schuyler acted honorably and departed
for his home in Albany. This would not be the last that the Northern Department heard of Phillip Schuyler, however. From his home in Albany, he would continue to logistically support the army with his personal time and treasure—supporting the eventual triumph of American arms in this campaign.

Schuyler was not the only commander who received bad news during this time. On 3 August, Burgoyne received Howe’s letter of 17 July informing him that the commander-in-chief’s intentions were to seize Philadelphia rather than make junction with the Army from Canada at Albany. Burgoyne immediately understood that he would be receiving little or no support from that quarter. Confident as ever, however, “Gentleman Johnny” forged ahead with his plans to take Albany. He could not turn back. That kind of action was what sank Carleton’s fortunes with Germain the year before.

Burgoyne’s main problem with continuing the advance was sustaining his army. Fortunately, he had received reports that food, fodder, and animals were plentiful on the farms eastward in Vermont. If he could successfully seize a major food depot at Bennington, the stores would provide a great deal of sustenance for his army. Moreover, loyalists with Burgoyne convinced him that Americans faithful to the king’s regime would join with the British if a show of force entered the area. Burgoyne dispatched a foraging expedition toward Bennington to gather needed resources and, hopefully, gain more loyal auxiliaries for his army. The expedition was placed under the command of Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum, commander of the Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig. Consisting of about 723 officers and men, the expedition was composed of mostly German units and detachments, along with several small loyalist, Canadian, and Indian detachments. On 9 August, Baum’s expedition departed from its camp at Fort Miller and headed for Bennington.

**The Battle of Bennington**

On 8 August, the same day Baum departed from Fort Miller, John Stark made his way to Manchester where his units were assembling. He arrived in time to see that the brigade he had worked so hard to enlist and organize was drawn up in marching order as if to march away. Stark learned that General Lincoln had arrived earlier
and ordered the brigade to march to Stillwater to join the Northern Army assembled there. Stark became livid and quickly sought out the Continental general and informed Lincoln in no uncertain terms that the soldiers were under his command and his command only. Stark showed Lincoln the New Hampshire Legislature orders indicating that this independent command was not controlled by the Continental Congress. Therefore, he, Stark, would order these men to any location he chose—in this case the supply depot at Bennington.

When Stark arrived at Manchester, he also found the remnants of Seth Warner’s Continents. Following Hubbardton, Warner’s regiment had rested, refitted, and recruited, and now was almost ready for further service. With this addition, forces under or cooperating with Stark included one Continental and two small militia regiments under Warner, four regiments of New Hampshire militia, a small cavalry troop, and a small collection of unattached militia—about 2,300 men to defend the depot. Warner’s troops would remain in Manchester for the time being and would not depart for Bennington until 14 August.

Baum’s column, meanwhile, was sporadically under fire from rebel militia as it advanced toward Bennington. Even so, Baum was still able to collect some provisions and animals for the army along the way. Additionally, a number of loyalists made their way to Baum’s procession as well. Most of them were unarmed, however, and asked to be equipped with muskets. As the column approached a place called Van Schaik’s Mill (also known as Sancoick Mill) on the Walloomsac River on 14 August, the men encountered a detachment of about 200 militiamen which had been posted there the day before at Stark’s order. After a skirmish where Baum’s weight of numbers carried the day, the rebels withdrew but not before setting fire to the bridge there and losing several men to capture. The prisoners informed Baum about a large American force in Bennington that outnumbered his unit by at least a thousand men. The German colonel did not appear concerned and probably believed that the rebel militia would break and run when his regulars made a determined attack. Nevertheless, he dashed off a message to Burgoyne to report his findings and request reinforcements.

After rebuilding the bridge at the mill, Baum pushed on to an-
other bridge on the Walloomsac River where he once more scattered a small detachment of rebels. This time Baum’s men seized the bridge intact while the German commander developed plans to hold it until reinforcements arrived. Baum would need the bridge to haul the large quantity of provisions and other supplies he expected to seize at Bennington. He set up defensive positions on a hill immediately overlooking the stream. Baum also sent his 200 loyalists across the bridge to construct a redoubt (the “Tory Redoubt”) on a slight rise on the south side of the river as well as about 50 Canadians to defend several cabins located closer to the bridge. Together these troops would prevent a rebel approach from the southeast. He sent the majority of the Regiment von Ludwig dragoons, half of the Company of Marksmen under Capt. Alexander Fraser (General Fraser’s nephew), and one of his two 6-pounder cannon up to the hilltop where they constructed another large redoubt (the “Dragoon Redoubt”). Baum placed the other 6-pounder on a shelf on the hill that overlooked the bridge, his grenadier detachment to the east of this gun, and his light infantry to the west. He then settled in to await reinforcements.

Baum’s message arrived that evening at Burgoyne’s headquarters at the Duer House near Fort Miller—an astonishingly short time given the time it took Baum to get to Van Shaik’s Mill. Reading Baum’s report, Burgoyne sensed the danger facing Baum’s command (even if Baum himself did not) and quickly ordered reinforcements to join the expedition. On the morning of 15 August, about 650 additional German troops and two additional cannon under Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann set out to link up with Baum, who was only twenty-four miles away. Normally a long day’s march, Breymann’s column moved much more slowly because heavy rains turned the unimproved roads into quagmires. The men trudged along all day at about a half mile an hour, halting frequently to close up the lines of struggling men and losing time at one point because of a missed turn. As a result, Breymann was unable to reach Baum’s position that evening. His men bivouacked seven miles short of Cambridge and still sixteen miles from Baum.

Despite the rain on August 15, Stark’s men had not been dormant. A number posed as local inhabitants and passed freely through the German defenses. Patrols sent out by Stark probed the enemy
lines, noted locations of defenses, and skirmished with the German regulars. These bits and pieces of information gave Stark a clearer picture of what he was facing. Additionally as the day progressed, more militia detachments arrived at the rebel camp located only a mile or so east of Baum’s position. These additional troops gave Stark an even greater strength advantage.

Armed with fairly good intelligence about what he faced and possessing a numerically superior force, Stark developed a three-pronged attack plan for the next day. One prong consisting of 300 of Col. Samuel Herrick’s Vermonters, would move south of the Walloomsac River (out of sight of the Tory Redoubt), wade the stream at a location west of the German defenses, and enter the rear of Baum’s position at the Dragoon Redoubt on top of the hill. Another 250 New Hampshire men under Lt. Col. Moses Nichols would circle around the German left and approach the redoubt from the northeast. The third prong of New Hampshire men under Col. Thomas Stickney and Col. David Hobart would attack the Tory Redoubt east of the river. When he sensed that the time was right, Stark would personally lead his reserve force in a headlong frontal attack against the German main defenses. Most of Stark’s men were raw militia, although he had a few men who had fought in the French and Indian War or some earlier revolution battles. Though excellent, the plan was very complicated—difficult even for seasoned regulars. Stark expected these amateur soldiers to pull it off almost flawlessly.

Seth Warner’s Continentals had arrived at Bennington in the rain on 15 August. Warner himself had already joined Stark at the rebel camp, and so the Continentals were commanded by Lt. Col. Samuel Safford, Warner’s second-in-command. About noon on 16 August, in accordance with Warner’s summons, Safford put the Continentals on the road headed west for the Walloomsac River Bridge. Just about an hour before Safford began his march, Stark’s three columns and his reserve moved toward their attack assault positions. It took about three hours for Herrick’s troops to stealthily make their way past the Tory Redoubt, across the Walloomsac, and into position on the west side of the Dragoon Redoubt. By that time Nichols’ men were in place as well. At about 1500, Nichols gave the order to advance. To his west, Herrick gave a similar command.
Within a minute or so, Herrick’s men advanced into the open before the redoubt and fired a volley. Volleys from Nichols’ men and the Germans immediately followed. Stark, located on the south side of the river, recalled that the initial blasts sounded like “a continual clap of thunder.” The fight was on.

Just after the firing opened on the hill, Stickney and Hobart attacked the Tory Redoubt and the Canadians’ cabins. After a brief resistance, the loyalists folded and fled and the Canadians rapidly followed suit. The bridge was quickly in American hands. Stark now led his reserve across the fields from his camp past the Tory Redoubt and over the bridge. His men pitched into the enemy defenders on the north side of the bridge. Up on the hill the dragoons and Fraser’s men fared better, but only for a time. They prevented Nichols’ and Herrick’s men from overrunning their position but only until they began to run out of ammunition. Now desperate, the dragoons—personally led by Baum—began to try a breakout using their short swords until Baum fell mortally wounded. At that point, the dragoon defenses collapsed. The Indian allies and the loyalists and Canadian contingents had already scattered into the woods to escape the trap. They need not have been so concerned as Stark’s men soon turned to looting the German camp and baggage trains rather than pursuing the fugitives. By about 1630, the fight on the hill was over and Baum’s command ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

To the west, Breymann’s relief force was now bearing down on Stark’s disorganized and tired clusters of milling troops. Stark received word about Breymann’s approach and frantically began to collect any men he could find and push small detachments down the road to oppose the German advance. As the German column arrived at Van Schaik’s Mill, panicked troops from Baum’s forces began running down the road to get away. From these men, Breymann learned that a superior force of American militia had surrounded Baum. Not sure of Baum’s fate, Breymann quickly pushed on until he met resistance from the random collections of militia that Stark was urging forward. Fortunately for Stark, Warner’s Continentals were about to arrive. Continuing west on the road, they soon engaged the head of Breymann’s command. In short order, the fighting was once again general and heavy.

The weight of American firepower gradually began to tell
as more and more militiamen dropped what they were doing and marched toward the sound of the guns. Before long, the Braunschweigers were being attacked from at least three directions and began to run short of ammunition. Eventually the German commander realized he would suffer the same fate as Baum if he did not break contact. He ordered a fighting retreat and started back toward the Hudson River and safety. Though wounded in the leg, Breymann skillfully kept Stark’s and Warner’s troops at bay as he fought his way westward. Soon after dark, Stark and Warner broke off the fight, allowing the Germans to complete their withdrawal unmolested—but not before Breymann lost at least twenty-five percent of his troops as well as the two 6-pounder cannon that the Braunschweigers had brought along. Between the two German contingents, Burgoyne lost about fifteen percent of his fighting strength on 16 August. These were losses the British command could ill-afford.

**The Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany**

On 2 August, two weeks before the fighting at Bennington, St. Leger’s column arrived at Fort Schuyler (see map 32, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves June–August 1777). Col. Peter Gansevoort, Fort Schuyler’s American commander had learned of St. Leger’s advance on 25 July when it arrived at Oswego. The day after St. Leger arrived at the fort, he sent a message to Gansevoort and demanded that he surrender Fort Schuyler and its garrison. Having seen the small number of regular troops in St. Leger’s command and the large numbers of Iroquois (who were unlikely to participate in an organized assault of the fort), Gansevoort wisely demurred. St. Leger now had little choice but to lay siege to the American position.

Thirty miles away at Fort Dayton in Tryon County, Brig. Gen. Nicolas Herkimer had been assembling four small regiments of New York Militia since the end of July. Each regiment consisted of about 200 men, giving Herkimer a force of about 800 troops. On 4 August, Herkimer set out for Fort Schuyler to provide relief and reinforcement to Gansevoort and his command. St. Leger learned of Herkimer’s column the following day and dispatched a force of about 400 Iroquois and 150 loyalists to attack the Americans. On 6 August, the loyalist/Iroquois force ambushed Herkimer’s brigade
as it was moving through a deep ravine near the Indian village of Oriskany about six miles from the fort. Heavy fighting ensued as the attackers pressed their advantage. The militiamen sought cover on the wooded slopes and engaged their attackers while taking very heavy casualties. Herkimer was wounded in the leg (a wound that eventually proved to be mortal), but he gamely directed the defense of his command while propped against a tree and smoking a pipe. About noon, the fighting ended. By that time, more than half of the militia force was dead, wounded, or captured, with at least 100 or more loyalist and Indian casualties.

During the desperate fighting in the ravine, Gansevoort sent a raiding party from the fort into the Indian camp. The raiders basically stole or destroyed everything the Indians had with them. On their return from Oriskany, the Indians found they not only had nothing to show for their work with St. Leger but had now lost everything they brought with them. Enraged by the turn of events, most of the Iroquois quickly decided to leave. This event drastically reduced St. Leger’s command, which now faced an even greater challenge in its efforts to capture Fort Schuyler.

During most of the siege at Fort Schuyler, the post’s namesake, General Schuyler, still commanded the Northern Department. When he learned of the Oriskany defeat and that Herkimer had not been able to reinforce the fort, he dispatched another relief force consisting of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s 700-man Continental brigade. Schuyler assigned overall command of the relief force to Benedict Arnold, who left Stillwater for Fort Schuyler on 12 August. As he approached the beleaguered post, Arnold devised a stratagem that he would send a captured loyalist to convince St. Leger that Arnold’s relief force was much larger than it was. His ruse worked completely. St. Leger departed the Fort Schuyler vicinity on 22 August and headed by boat back around to Fort Ticonderoga. Arnold had lifted the siege without a fight. The following day he sent Learned’s Brigade back to Van Schaik’s Island where they would rejoin the Northern Army, now under Gates’ command, on 31 August.

*The Armies Move*

During the month of August, while St. Leger was attempting to
invest and overcome Fort Schuyler, Burgoyne’s Army from Canada remained largely dispersed and dormant at Forts Ticonderoga, Anne, George, Edward, and Miller. The army commander was forced to remain mostly inactive while waiting for additional supplies and reinforcements to catch up to him from Canada. Even so, several events of varying import affected the British situation beyond the tactical defeats at Bennington and Fort Schuyler. On 15 August, Brigadier Powell replaced Brig. James Hamilton as commander at Fort Ticonderoga. At about the same time, Hamilton’s 62nd Foot was replaced by Powell’s 47th Foot. Evidently, Burgoyne believed Hamilton was the more capable of the two brigadiers and wanted to have Hamilton with him for any impending actions.

Far to the south of Burgoyne, Howe finally debarked his command at Head of Elk, Maryland, on 25 August after more than a month at sea then headed overland toward Philadelphia to effect its capture. Five days later, the general finally received Germain’s 18 May letter that instructed Howe to link up with Burgoyne in Albany. Somewhat baffled by the instructions, Howe responded to Germain that he would not be able to accomplish that mission given that he had almost his entire army—save those with Clinton in New York and a few other minor detachments—engaged in operations south of Philadelphia.

As for Burgoyne and his army, the fortunes of war had turned. After defeats at Bennington and Fort Schuyler, Burgoyne experienced added distress as hundreds of Indian allies departed his service on 1 September. Combined with those of Bennington and now potentially St. Leger’s command, these added up to a substantial loss of combat power that the general would need to defeat the American Northern Army and capture Albany. Additionally, Howe would not be coming to Albany, which further increased the odds against Burgoyne’s army. Nevertheless, Gentleman Johnny remained confident of his eventual victory.

On 10 September, Burgoyne headed his army south once again, having gathered enough provisions for another move toward Albany (see map 42, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–26 September 1777). The troops at Forts George and Anne abandoned their posts and moved to join the main army at Fort Edward.
Concurrently, Burgoyne moved forces forward to the Batten Kill (a “kill” is a creek) where Twiss began constructing a pontoon bridge to cross to the west side of the Hudson. The engineer then took up the bridge after the last contingent crossed the Hudson on the 13th. In removing the bridge, Burgoyne had cut his line of communications to Canada. From here on out he would have to either forage for food or break through to Albany. Undeterred, Burgoyne continued south in search of Gates’ Northern Army—known to be nearby—and on 17 September, the leading elements of Burgoyne’s command arrived at Sword’s Farm. The Army from Canada was down to about 8,400 effective troops at this point.

During this same timeframe, the new Northern Army commander was also active. On the same day Burgoyne lost most of his Indian allies, Gates and Lincoln met at Van Schaik’s Island to develop a new plan. Given that Gates’ army had dramatically grown in strength in recent weeks, the American commander wanted to deal a blow that would not only logistically damage his opponent’s army but also deliver a severe psychological blow. Gates ordered Lincoln to go to Pawlet in Vermont and organize a raid against the British line of communications. Since Lincoln’s militia troops were already well to the northeast of the British coalition forces, they also could strike the British army if Burgoyne decided to retreat. Lincoln could attack Burgoyne’s head and flank while Gates snapped at his heels. In short, Lincoln was ordered to divide, divert, and harass enemy forces in the rear areas between Burgoyne and Fort Ticonderoga.

Meanwhile, Gates’ plan for the main portion of his army was to effectively block Burgoyne’s advance and force the British to attack him in fixed defenses. On 8 September, the same day that Lincoln arrived at Pawlet with the lead elements of his militia forces, Gates set the rebel army in motion northward on a collision course with Burgoyne’s Army from Canada. Departing from Van Schaik’s Island, the army initially traveled back to Stillwater. After a reconnaissance of that area, Gates determined the terrain was too wide and flat and would make the defenses vulnerable to attack by a well-trained army. Instead, Gates went to inspect another suggested site—some high ground known as Bemis Heights located about three miles to the north of Stillwater. The position was on a long, generally east-
west ridge that provided a relatively good vantage point over the direction from which the British would have to approach. On the right flank there was a 100-foot bluff above the river road. The road was on the flood plain which itself was relatively narrow, extending only about 200 to 300 yards east to the Hudson. A few well-placed cannon could effectively block any forces advancing south on the flood plain by boat or along the road by foot. Satisfied that the position would provide excellent defensive terrain, Gates’ his army moved north on 12 September then began digging in at Bemis Heights.

The Pawlet Expedition

When Gates and Lincoln met on 1 September at Van Schiak’s Island, the two generals developed an outline plan that required Lincoln to assemble about 2,000 militiamen and make a somewhat complex attack against Burgoyne’s line of communication. Lincoln departed that day and after arriving in Manchester began meetings with the various militia commanders to craft details of the operation. The final plan was for a 500-man composite regiment under Col. Benjamin R. Woodbridge of the 1st New Hampshire County Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, to move on Skenesborough from the west; attack and defeat any enemy troops found there; and remove or destroy any supplies, equipment, and machinery of military use. A second 500-man force under Col. Samuel Johnson, 4th Essex County Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, was to move via Hubbardton and seize Mount Independence as a diversion against Fort Ticonderoga. The main effort was a third 500-man column under Col. John Brown, Middle Berkshire Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, which would attack British forces at the landing on the north end of Lake George and perform similar tasks to Woodbridge at Skenesborough. At a later time, Lincoln and his 600 to 700 troops would move toward Skenesborough—approaching from the southwest—and link with Woodbridge there to reinforce that effort. Ultimately, all columns would link up at Skenesborough to present a sizable force in Burgoyne’s rear. The actions undertaken by these forces were intended to be raids rather than a pitched battle. The columns were to hit hard, gather supplies, move away as quickly as possible, then reassemble.
Lincoln’s command, which had assembled at Bennington, marched toward Pawlet on 6 September and arrived two days later. On arrival, the troops were short on food and Lincoln himself was short on intelligence about his three objectives. The general held in place at Pawlet for several days while some men were dispatched to retrieve flour and others to spy on the objective sites. Both necessities, flour and intelligence, had arrived back at Pawlet by 12 September. Though Lincoln was not fully aware of the location of the British main army or of Burgoyne’s intentions, Lincoln knew his planned objectives were all only lightly held by enemy troops, to include Fort Ticonderoga itself. He also learned of a significant number of American prisoners of war being held at the landing, as well as a large supply depot located there. Convinced that the opportunities were worth the risks, Lincoln assembled his three force commanders. He instructed Brown that he should only seize Fort Ticonderoga if he could succeed with little or no risk to his men. The general then ordered Brown to start his movement on the afternoon of the 12th and Johnson and Woodbridge to depart no later than the morning of the 13th.

Arriving at their objectives on 18 September, Johnson’s and Woodbridge’s columns were generally successful. Johnson’s men easily seized Mount Independence and provided a suitable distraction to Powell’s troops at Fort Ticonderoga. By occupying the position, Johnson helped ensure that the British garrison did not sally forth to attack Brown’s men at the landing. Farther south, Woodbridge’s troops found Skenesborough had been abandoned by the enemy, with nothing of military value left behind. Brown’s force, however, accomplished a great deal more.

Arriving at Lake George Landing on 18 September, Brown’s command rapidly overwhelmed the British force there. Brown’s men also freed 118 American prisoners who had been captured at Fort Ticonderoga, Skenesborough, and Hubbardton. They also seized a great deal of enemy stores including several hundred head of beeves and horses and burned about 200 bateaux and numerous wheeled carts and carriages. His men captured roughly 300 enemy prisoners of war who were sent to Skenesborough under the guard of the former American prisoners. Meanwhile, Brown’s column moved on
to capture Mount Defiance. After two days of demonstrations and demands to surrender Fort Ticonderoga (which Powell refused, of course), Brown put his men in the few remaining bateaux at the landing and set off southward on Lake George to seize Diamond Island, the next British supply depot. Unfortunately, the British garrison there was forewarned and the effort failed. Still, Brown’s raid caused significant damage to the Army from Canada. In addition to reducing Burgoyne’s already short supplies, he crippled the British ability to move supplies south to the main army. Furthermore, Powell—with his own forces significantly reduced as well—was now loath to send reinforcements to Burgoyne for fear of losing Ticonderoga itself. When St. Leger’s force from the Mohawk Valley arrived at the fort on 27 September, Powell refused to let St. Leger move south to join Burgoyne. Moreover, due to the destruction caused by Brown’s raid, Powell no longer possessed the transport capabilities to reach Burgoyne even if he was amenable to the idea.

With nothing more to gain after failing to take Diamond Island, Brown headed back to Pawlet via Skenesborough. Arriving at Pawlet in late September, Brown discovered that Lincoln had already departed to return to the Northern Army’s positions at Bemis Heights. He also received orders from Lincoln (as had Johnson and Woodbridge) directing him to proceed to Bemis Heights to join General Gates. The orders were urgent as there had already been a major engagement between the two opposing armies on 19 September at a place called Freeman’s Farm.

The Battle of Freeman’s Farm

Even as Brown’s men were demanding Fort Ticonderoga’s surrender on the morning of 19 September, Burgoyne’s army was on the move to attack Bemis Heights. The general’s decision to finally attack the American position was driven as much by circumstance as strategy. Since the action at Fort Anne during the second week of July, the Army from Canada’s situation in the Hudson River Valley had continually grown worse. Imperceptible at first, the state of affairs between the armies had clearly shifted in the five weeks since Burgoyne had launched Baum toward Bennington. The British army was continually low on supplies with little prospect for
any major improvement. Moreover, loyalist support promised by Phillip Skene and others had failed to materialize, and the army’s Indian allies were deserting in droves. The defeats of Baum and Breymann at Bennington had cost Burgoyne casualties and time he could ill-afford. Then on 28 August, Burgoyne received word of St. Leger’s rebuff at Fort Schuyler. Reinforcements from that quarter would not reach him for weeks, if at all. In addition, the first signs of autumn were setting in with leaves changing color and cooler weather. Burgoyne knew he could not stay where he was, yet retreat was abhorrent given how he came to command the expedition in the first place. In short, Burgoyne felt he had to continue forward even though he knew his enemy’s position had improved while his own had deteriorated.

America’s Northern Army now held a much stronger hand than just a month previous. Gates had tumbled to an excellent plan that required nothing of his command but to sit in place and let the enemy attack him in fortified positions. Meanwhile, reinforcements streaming in from George Washington and the various northeastern states had bolstered his army to something around 10,000 troops. Burgoyne would have to attack—against fortified positions held by troops who outnumbered him—or face a devastating retreat. Though rebel supplies were not great, they were sufficient for the moment and more was on the way. Moreover, American morale soared after the victories at Bennington and Fort Schuyler, and, as a result, American strength in numbers grew. Most troops knew a big fight was imminent and were itching to face the enemy.

But not all was well in the American camp. Gates, who took pains to maintain cordial relations with the impetuous Arnold, was now turning sour on his energetic subordinate. After Gates relieved Schuyler of command of the Northern Army, the latter officer released his staff to seek other assignments. Two of these men ended up on Arnold’s staff. Correctly believing these men to be Schuyler loyalists, Gates addressed his concern with Arnold. However, Arnold essentially ignored Gates’ apprehensions and took no action on the matter. Arnold’s indifference frustrated Gates and the tension reached a critical stage by mid-September.

Though Burgoyne was ignorant of the issues facing the American high command, he was keenly aware of the difficult situation
that now faced him. Determined to take the offensive, he had built up enough supplies by mid-September that he determined his army was ready to try to break through the American defenses. One course of action was to attack up the River Road into what were ostensibly the American main defenses. Even with a successful attack, Burgoyne knew he was likely to suffer heavy casualties. The option he chose was a flank attack against the American position, which would hopefully break the line and could be followed by a general British attack along the front to force the rebels out of position. The key terrain for Burgoyne’s main effort was a piece of unoccupied high ground to the west of the American position. Fraser’s Advanced Corps was to seize the ground then use it to make the main assault into the American flank defenses.

On the morning of 19 September, a heavy fog enveloped the entire area. Nevertheless, the Army from Canada, divided into three columns in preparation for a move against the American defenses. Fraser’s Advance Corps (the Right Wing), which consisted of the Grenadier and Light Infantry Battalions, the 24th Foot, and a few other smaller attachments traveled west along a small road that paralleled a large gorge, soon to become known as the “Great Ravine,” in search of a suitable site to cross the chasm. Initially, Fraser’s column was followed by Hamilton’s brigade (Burgoyne’s center), which consisted primarily of the 9th, 20th, 21st, and 62nd Foot and four 6-pounder cannon. This column turned south after a time onto a track that brought it down into the massive, tangled ravine and up the far side with much difficulty. The western column (the Left Wing), which consisted of the Riedesel, Specht, and von Rhetz Regiments and four 6-pounder cannon all under Riedesel, avoided the ravine by advancing generally southwest along the River Road. Their mission was to demonstrate against the right of the American line. The 47th Foot remained behind to guard baggage and the bateaux near the Sword House.

Around 1000 as the fog began to dissipate, the columns began to move. The terrain made for slow, rough going—especially for the center column and Right Wing as each negotiated the Great Ravine. Riedesel’s men on the left were slowed by various obstacles left behind by the Americans such as a downed trees and destroyed
bridges. Hamilton’s center column was the first to cross the ravine. As the column struggled up the far side, its lead elements turned west again and paralleled the ravine, pushing through heavy woods after regaining the top of the bluff. After moving about 200 yards, the column halted in the forest, faced south, and waited there for Fraser’s command to come up on Hamilton’s right in the west while Riedesel moved up the River Road, generally on line to the east. In the meantime, Hamilton sent an advanced guard company of the 9th Foot forward which soon encountered a large, open farm field. Major Gordon Forbes, the regimental commander, spied a few rebel troops in the distance around the cluster of small structures that constituted the Freeman farm. Hamilton quickly ordered Forbes to clear out the rebels. In open order, Forbes moved his reconnaissance forward while the rest of his regiment rested in the woods.

Shortly after the British movement began that morning, Gates began to receive reports from rebel scouts that the enemy was on the move. Although he wanted to remain in position and let Burgoyne break his army against the rock of his defenses, Gates reluctantly agreed to allow Arnold to move a force forward to more fully determine British intentions and harass the movement if possible. A short time later, Daniel Morgan’s riflemen and Dearborn’s light infantry moved northward out of the American lines to find the enemy. After pushing through the woods for a time, the lead elements of Morgan’s men also came upon the large, open field at Freeman’s Farm. Spreading out along the edge of the woods, Morgan’s men took positions behind trees or up in the branches, while a small number of men moved into the open toward the buildings. Once there, some of the men moved in or behind the buildings while others knelt or stood behind a rail fence in the yard. Within minutes, several men noticed about 100 British regulars advancing in open order toward their position. These men were Forbes’s advanced guard moving to clear out the rebels. Little did Forbes know that the main American line—located in the tree line to the south—vastly outnumbered his skirmishers. As the thin line of redcoats closed in on the buildings, hundreds of unseen riflemen and light infantry took aim and fired. The Battle of Freeman’s Farm had begun.

The sudden and unexpectedly intensity of the initial blast froze
the British troops in their tracks. Many were felled by the fire. Several officers were instantly killed or wounded as rebel riflemen specifically targeted them. Forbes himself was wounded but remained in command of the skirmish line. He quickly realized that it was useless for his men to advance or even remain where they were. He directed a general retreat to the wood line at the north end of the field. The sudden clatter of fire prompted commanders in Hamilton’s column to begin moving through the woods and take positions for a battle line. Once on line, however, the British troops were restrained from opening fire due to the fact that Forbes’ men were still forward.

On the British right, Fraser’s Advance Corps was just now coming out of the ravine and within a few minutes began forming another British battle line at the McBride Farm, the next open field to the west. Morgan and his men only saw the retreat of Forbes’ advanced guard and were unaware of that new line formation. Apparently thinking they had routed the enemy, a sizable number of Morgan’s troops jumped up and pursued Forbes’ men toward the location where Hamilton was forming his brigade. Moreover, a company of Fraser’s light infantry, attracted by the sounds of battle to the east, moved into a position which put them on the left flank of Morgan’s “charge,” and the British infantry opened fire. Now it was the Americans who were halted in their tracks and forced to retreat pell-mell. As fast as they could, they returned to the southern line of woods after suffering a number of casualties. Fortunately, Dearborn had stopped his men just short of the open field at a location where they could see Fraser’s command forming. The rebel light infantry soon engaged Fraser’s light troops on Morgan’s left, providing covering fire for the disorganized riflemen and their confused retreat. The men in Hamilton’s battle line chafed to return fire since some units were taking casualties without even seeing the enemy. Unexpectedly and without orders, a number of British troops began to fire wildly into Freeman’s field and other men followed suit. Before Hamilton’s officers could get their men to stop firing, several of Forbes’ men were killed or wounded by friendly fire as they retreated for the safety of the wood line. The heavier firing then tapered off to skirmishing and seesaw fighting over parts of the Freeman field.

Meanwhile on the main American defensive lines, the firing
attracted the attention of Gates and his officers. After a brief discussion with Arnold, Gates directed his subordinate to send additional troops to Morgan’s aid. Arnold initially sent the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd New Hampshire Regiments from Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor’s brigade. Poor soon formed his brigade to the left rear of Morgan’s reconstituting line. These units were followed by the rest of Poor’s Brigade (the 2nd and 4th New York Regiments and two battalions of Connecticut militia), which extended the American line even further west. With the additional troops on hand, the Americans briefly attempted to turn Hamilton’s flank, but the effort failed. Still more Americans troops arrived, now from Learned’s Brigade, and these went into the line facing Fraser’s Right Wing. Over the next two hours, British and American units made numerous advances and retreats across the Freeman and McBride fields. Each attack left a swath of dead bodies and wounded men in its wake. The rebel superior strength became more obvious as the fighting grew more intense through the afternoon. Although Fraser’s command was holding firm, Hamilton’s Brigade in the center was taking fearful casualties and on the brink of collapse. The 62nd Foot and the British artillery were in the most dire circumstances. Morgan’s expert shots targeted the artillermen, and the gun crews were becoming combat ineffective due to casualties. Several guns could not be manned as there were not enough gunners left to service them. Now taking action to prevent a disaster rather than looking to crush the American defenses, Burgoyne sent orders to Riedesel in the late afternoon to find and attack the American right flank.

Receiving this change in mission, Riedesel immediately selected his own regiment, two companies of the von Rhetz Regiment, and Capt. George Pausch’s two-gun 6-pounder battery and set out for the sound of the guns. Deftly picking his way through the forest, the German general successfully located the right of the rebel line and deployed his units for the attack. The Americans failed to detect the German approach and assault until it was too late. Around 1700, Riedesel launched the German line against the flank of Morgan’s line of riflemen who had shifted right during the day. Instead of breaking, Morgan’s men refused the right flank and were soon joined by some of the New Hampshire troops. However, the rebel line was
becoming untenable. The American troops—mostly Continental regulars—conducted a relatively disciplined fighting withdrawal to the south bank of a creek that ran parallel to the American defense line. The British commanders made little or no attempt to pursue the Americans. Instead, they were content to let the rebels leave and turned their attention to caring for their numerous wounded.

Though Burgoyne and his men could crow about holding the field at the end of the day, they had little to brag about. The British commander’s entire plan was thrown off balance early in the fight by unexpected American aggressiveness. Instead of advancing on the American works, he was forced to fight an essentially defensive battle just to keep his center from being overrun. By the end of the day, Burgoyne had lost more than 560 troops, including 160 men killed in action. Though the British believed that they must have punished the Americans severely, rebel losses of all categories were about 300 men. In short, though Burgoyne was slightly closer to Albany, he had made no dent in the main American defenses (indeed, he still did not know exactly where the rebel defensive line was located) and now had fewer troops to fight them. Meanwhile, rebel strength on Bemis Heights and in Burgoyne’s rear continued to grow.

An Operational Pause

Neither Gates nor his men believed that the 19 September battle would be the end of the matter. Indeed, most anticipated that Burgoyne would likely renew his attack on the 20th. When he did not, the Americans continued to dig in and improve their positions by felling more trees and constructing abatis (see Appendix I, Glossary of Terms). Meanwhile more troops from Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and New York continued to stream into the defenses over the next two weeks. Around 6,000 men arrived to add to Gates’ numbers, though not all were with the main army at Bemis Heights. The forces there increased to as many as 12,000 troops, clearly outnumbering the British force. Burgoyne, on the other hand, could only hope for a trickle of reinforcements. St. Leger’s command was the largest likely addition but only if he could get his troops through. Now that Howe was clearly not moving north, Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton might attempt to assist by advancing from
New York City into the Highlands region.

In fact, two days after the Freeman Farm fight, Burgoyne received a coded message from Clinton that in 10 days’ time he would make a foray with 3,000 men to attack the rebel post of Fort Montgomery, about 100 miles south of Albany. Clinton, however, did not mention whether he would push north to link up with Burgoyne if he was successful at Fort Montgomery. Still, Burgoyne welcomed news of any potential support. At the very least, Clinton’s offensive movement would likely draw away some of Gates’ command to weaken it. In any event, the message prompted Burgoyne to delay further action against Bemis Heights, dig in, and see what developed as a result of Clinton’s efforts.

Like the American troops now facing them, Burgoyne’s British and German troops began to prepare well-constructed defense positions to ward off any rebel attacks while they waited for Clinton to advance. The Army from Canada’s rearmost positions were situated on the bluffs above the River Road about a mile northeast of Bemis Heights. These three fortifications became known collectively as the “Great Redoubt.” In essence the position was the army’s logistics base. To the southwest were four additional small redoubts faced to the south for protection from that direction. Burgoyne’s headquarters was located near the eastern most of these four. Southwest of there was the main British line—a series of smaller redoubts facing toward the rebel lines. These positions were constructed on the high ground north of Mill Creek and presented a formidable obstacle for any American advance. The weakest portion of the British line was in the west at the Freeman and McBride farms where the fighting on the 19th had occurred. The relatively flat though slightly rolling terrain offered no significant barriers to an army’s advance. The water courses in the area generally flowed west to east and so posed no obstacle to a force attacking from the west. Still, the redoubts built in this area were well-positioned and, for the most part, mutually supporting. The two main positions, the Balcarres Redoubt on Freeman’s Farm and the Breymann Redoubt on McBride’s Farm to the northwest were not within supporting distance, but the smaller works in each of those two defensive complexes were mutually supporting of the main position as well as with the other smaller posi-
tions sprinkled about the landscape.

Despite the security of these positions, however, the troops of the Army from Canada had daily reminders that they were not safe. Rebel reconnaissance and harassment patrols harassed and sniped at the harried enemy troops every day and continually gathered intelligence to keep Gates apprised of British actions and intentions. Everything seemed to be going the Americans’ way—except the American command climate, which was reaching a low point at this time.

On 22 September, Gates prepared a report on the battle at Freeman’s Farm and sent it to the Continental Congress. The report, while generally accurate, failed to mention the role played by Arnold and the fact that Arnold’s men carried the weight of the battle on their shoulders. Moreover, Gates issued a general order the same day making Morgan’s command an independent unit under the direct command of Gates himself. Arnold was clearly a brave and aggressive leader, but he was also vain and sensitive to perceived slights. Arnold clearly believed that these were intentional slights against him by the American commander. Probably egged on by the two officers whom he had adopted from Schuyler’s staff, Arnold angrily confronted Gates about the report and the missing details. After a series of verbal and written confrontations over the next couple of days, Gates ostensibly removed Arnold from command and assigned the Northern Army’s Right Wing to Lincoln; Gates assumed direct command of the Left Wing, Arnold’s former division. Though incensed and insulted, Arnold remained in camp—creating an awkward situation for the various commanders and staff.

Over the next two weeks, Burgoyne’s situation became more grim, despite some potentially good news that Howe had succeeded in capturing Philadelphia on 26 September. Though a positive for the British, capturing the American capital failed to radically affect rebel attitudes about continuing their resistance. The following day, St. Leger’s command finally arrived at Fort Ticonderoga from the failed Mohawk Valley Expedition (see map 48, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 27 September–17 October 1777). However, because of the recent attack by Brown’s Pawlet raiders, no water transportation was available to move St. Leger’s troops
to Burgoyne in a timely manner. Additionally, no carts or animals were available to haul his supplies if St. Léger chose to travel overland. On 3 October, Clinton departed New York City en route to the Highlands with 3,000 British, German, and loyalist troops. Three days later, he successfully captured Forts Montgomery and Clinton, two rebel outposts which guarded the Hudson River. These actions effectively opened the water passage through the Highlands up to at least the fortifications at West Point. Unfortunately, neither Burgoyne nor his troops were aware of these positive developments. In fact, the very day Clinton departed New York City, the weather turned colder and Burgoyne announced that the daily food ration would be cut by one-third.

The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield (2nd Battle of Saratoga)

On 4 October, Burgoyne held a council of war with his generals. After reducing rations for his men, he knew he could not wait much longer to take action. The British general suggested to his commanders that the army should leave a small detachment to guard their supplies, make a roundabout march to the west, and attack the rebel defenses from the left rear. His generals balked at the idea, arguing that such a movement would take too long and that the detachment and supplies left behind would be quickly overwhelmed by the enemy. The council ended inconclusively. The following day, Riedesel suggested to Burgoyne that the army fall back to Batten Kill and reestablish communications with Fort Ticonderoga. That way if Clinton should fail, the army had a reasonable chance to retreat back to the fort and safety. Burgoyne refused the German’s plan. He felt such a move would be too disgraceful and would signal Burgoyne’s defeat to the Americans. Instead, he settled on a modification to his original plan. He decided to send Simon Fraser on a reconnaissance-in-force to the west to gather food supplies and scout the condition of American defenses there. If Fraser’s scout revealed that attacking the positions looked promising, Burgoyne would launch an all-out attack the following day. If not, he would retreat to Batten Kill as Riedesel recommended. Burgoyne scheduled the reconnaissance-in-force for the morning of 7 October.

For this mission, Fraser selected an elite brigade from across the
army. Consisting of about 1,700 hand-picked men from every unit except the 47th Foot, the command was formed and ready to move by late morning. The force consisted of British grenadiers, light infantry, and 24th Foot, as well as German grenadiers and jägers. Supporting the brigade was an unusually strong artillery battalion (for this size of force) of 10 guns manned by 100 artillerymen. The remainder of Burgoyne’s command remained at their posts to defend against an American foray. About noon, Fraser led his command westward out the Quaker Road—accompanied by Burgoyne, Phillips, and Riedesel.

After passing through the Coulter farm, the lead elements of the column entered the fields of the Barber farm. Around the collection of buildings near the center of the open area, the advanced guards spied a rebel picket and quickly drove them off. Discovering wheat standing in the abandoned fields, Fraser deployed his command to cover the field’s perimeter and sent for men from the camp to come forage the grain. Meanwhile, Burgoyne, Phillips, and Riedesel climbed on top of a cabin to look at the American lines but could see absolutely no sign of them. The reconnaissance force was still too far away to determine anything about the rebel defenses. The force would have to move closer to accomplish anything useful along those lines. In the meantime, the wheat needed to be cut and hauled away, so the troops settled into a hasty defense.

The British protective line ran generally from the wood line on the west flank of the Barber field along the southern fringe of woods and east back into the Freeman field. Unknown to the British generals, Gates had sent his adjutant general, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson, to the area to investigate reported British activity. Wilkinson watched the British deployment into the fields and other actions, then quickly rode back to Gates to inform him of the enemy dispositions.

Wilkinson found Gates, Arnold, and Lincoln at lunch and relayed what he had seen. Gates was initially reluctant to send more than Morgan’s regiment out to bolster the American pickets. Not long after Morgan had departed, however, sharp firing from the picket line informed Gates that more troops might be needed. Arnold and Lincoln rode out next to assess the situation themselves and within 30 minutes returned to report their impressions. Arnold
pushed for a major foray and so irritated Gates with his urgings that the commander dismissed his impetuous subordinate by telling him, “General, I have nothing for you to do. You have no business here.” (See endnote 4 at the end of this chapter). At that, Arnold apparently left for his headquarters. More circumspect, Lincoln gently advised Gates to send more troops. At that point, Gates agreed to send two additional brigades from the Left Wing.

Leading the American advance guard, Morgan spent some time maneuvering his force of riflemen and light infantry into a position to the west of the British battle line. Not long after, Poor’s Brigade came up on the British left (to the east). Learned’s Brigade, the reserve, moved into a position to attack the enemy center. Around 1500, Poor’s Brigade launched a determined attack against the front and left flank of Major John D. Acland’s Grenadier Battalion. Following an initial volley, Poor ordered a bayonet charge. After a period of heavy fighting, the grenadiers could not hold against the massive American tide and rapidly fell back, leaving many dead and wounded at their former position, including Acland who was shot through both legs. On the American left, Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen and Light Infantry had stealthily moved into position on some high ground that enfiladed the British right. Almost concurrent with Poor’s assault, Morgan’s men opened fire on Major Alexander Lindsay’s Light Infantry Battalion holding the right flank. While the British Light Infantry troops had difficulty acquiring targets that were largely concealed by heavy woods, the Americans were bringing very heavy and accurate fire on the redcoats standing in the open field. As with the grenadiers, the light infantry suffered galling casualties in relatively short order. Soon, Dearborn ordered his men to make a bayonet charge. The assault of Dearborn’s own light infantry forced Lindsay’s men to retreat behind the jägers on their left, where they formed a new line. Sensing that his men were shaken and to keep order in his command, Fraser rode forward to steady his light infantry. About the time he moved to their location and began rallying his troops, the British general was mortally wounded by an American rifleman. Lord Balcarres (Lindsay) assumed command of the forces on the British right at that point.

The British situation was becoming critical. Both flanks had
been forced out of position and now Learned’s Brigade, backed up by Brig. Gen. Abraham Ten Broeck’s brigade of New York militia, struck the German lines in the center. The Braunschweigers held for a time and even initially drove the American attack back. However, Benedict Arnold, mounted on a horse, appeared as if from nowhere and began to rally the rebel center. Technically a general without a command, Arnold had disregarded Gates’ admonition and—anxious to get into the fight—rode toward the firing. He immediately began riding down the line urging the two brigades forward. Inspired by the general’s leadership, the men charged ahead once again; within minutes the German line collapsed. The battle was becoming a rout. Only the safety of the redoubts could save what remained of Lindsay’s forces.

The retreating British and German troops fled east and northeast to seek the safety of the Balcarres and Breymann Redoubts. Not satisfied with “holding the field,” Arnold hailed Poor’s Brigade and headed them northeast toward Freeman’s farm where the Balcarres Redoubt barred the way. Waving his hat and sword and yelling orders wildly to the troops, the general led the brigade against a small outpost located on a slight rise forward of the main position. Poor’s men successfully seized the position, later known as “Bloody Knoll,” but only after suffering severe casualties. The intense fire from the large Balcarres Redoubt effectively ended any further American advance in that direction.

Sensing that the attack could go no further there, Arnold rode north and encountered Learned’s Brigade and Morgan’s men about to attack the Breymann Redoubt. That position was relatively strong in terms of construction but lightly held in terms of actual troops on hand. Breymann himself was in command of somewhere between 150 and 200 grenadiers and other assorted troops. As the rebels swept forward, Arnold joined them—once again yelling and urging them forward. The lightly defended redoubt stood no chance and resistance quickly folded. Breymann himself was killed, probably shot accidentally by his own troops (though some accounts say that one of his men purposely shot him for threatening to kill men attempting to desert from the position). The hero of the day, Benedict Arnold, was shot in the leg by a Braunschweiger grenadier but
survived his wound to fight another day. After the rebels repulsed a feeble German counterattack led by Lt. Col. Ernst von Speth, the fighting effectively ended as darkness fell over the battlefield.

This second battle of Saratoga (Barber’s Wheatfield) was an even greater debacle for Burgoyne than the first (Freeman’s Farm). His command suffered almost 900 casualties, including more than 270 killed. The casualty count was easily over 50 percent of all troops employed on the reconnaissance force. By comparison, the rebel units lost about 200 men, only 30 of whom were killed—out of more than 7,000 American troops who actually took part in the action. British and German commanders as well as their troops now understood that the enemy they faced was not a disorganized mob who refused to stand and fight and ran away at the sight of regular troops. Indeed, most of the rebel soldiers who participated in these actions were Continentals, many of whom had at least one year and several campaigns’ worth of experience. In short, the Continentals themselves had become regulars.

Realizing that his remaining positions south of the Great Ravine were now untenable, Burgoyne moved his entire command that night into the Great Redoubt positions. The following day the American troops closed in on the Great Redoubt to reconnoiter the remaining British defenses while also moving up artillery to further harass and demoralize the enemy. Burgoyne saw clearly that he had lost any chance to reach Albany. At this point, he really had only two viable options: retreat or surrender. Both were anathema to him.

Retreat and Surrender

Giving in to the inevitable conclusion, Burgoyne ordered the Army from Canada to retreat on 8 October. The movement, which began that afternoon, was slow, fraught with anxiety, and wet. Sporadic, but at times heavy, rain made the going difficult along the muddy River Road. The advanced guard was composed of the 47th and 9th Regiments of Foot under Lt. Col. Nicolas Sutherland, which led the army northward toward the village of Saratoga (today’s Schuylerville, New York). The last unit to leave the Great Redoubt was the Advance Corps, now under Phillips, which formed the rearguard. They left behind the hospital, which contained about 400
British and German casualties plus a number of doctors and medical orderlies to care for them. Burgoyne gave the doctor-in-charge a letter addressed to Gates that asked the American commander to take care of his wounded.

On the approach to Saratoga, Sutherland encountered the troops of Brig. Gen. John Fellows’ Massachusetts Militia Brigade dozing in their bivouac, but nevertheless blocking the way. Notwithstanding the fact that he only possessed about 250 men, far less than half that of Fellows, Sutherland sent word back to Burgoyne about the obstacle and requested permission to attack the rebel camp. Burgoyne decided against the move but kept his command moving north to close on Sutherland’s position. Fellows—soon warned about the approaching British by a messenger from Gates—did not wait to be attacked. He withdrew east of the Hudson River to occupy high ground there. Now with an open path, Burgoyne’s troops crossed Fish Kill and occupied a very defensible piece of high ground at Saratoga.

While Burgoyne’s army attempted its low-speed getaway northward, Gates made no initial effort to pursue. Instead, the main body of the Northern Army remained in camp trying to stay dry, rest, rearm, and eat on the 9th. The following day, Gates set his army in motion to follow Burgoyne. The Americans did not have to move too far. When they arrived at Fish Kill just after noon, Gates’ lead elements found the Army from Canada still in position at Saratoga. The rest of the army arrived throughout that afternoon. Ebenezer Stevens’ artillery took positions near Schuyler’s house, which had been burned by the retreating enemy to prevent its use as cover and concealment. The artillery opened fire on the British positions while Gates pondered his next move.

Reports that evening and into the next morning indicated that Burgoyne planned to continue his retreat. To prevent such a plan, Gates ordered Nixon’s and Glover’s Brigades to attack the British defenses from the south and east early on the following morning, 11 October. They would be supported by additional brigades to the west and northwest as the assault unfolded. Just as the rebel units moved into position to attack, a British deserter warned Glover that Burgoyne’s army was not retreating and was still in position. After probes by Morgan and Learned met stiff resistance, the American
forces moved to good firing positions around the British perimeter just as the fog lifted. As the haze cleared, the British and German infantry began heavy rifle fire on the American troops—confirming that Burgoyne’s forces still manned the defenses.

Burgoyne’s situation was worse than he knew. Down to about 3,500 effective troops, he was far outnumbered by Gates’ command of 12,000. Even more important than the immediate threat, the British commander was not aware of Fellow’s Brigade just across the Hudson which consisted of an additional 2,000 men. Farther north at Fort Edward was another brigade of about 2,000 Vermont Militia under Brig. Gen. Jacob Bailey. South of there near Batten Kill, Stark’s new brigade of 2,500 New Hampshire men was blocking that crossing point of the Hudson. In short, Gates now had command of more than 18,000 men to throw against the Army from Canada. The American commander held all the cards, save one—Clinton’s offensive into the Highlands. Burgoyne still held out hope that he could play it.

Two days after capturing Forts Montgomery and Clinton on 6 October, Clinton captured and destroyed the patriot fortifications on Constitution Island opposite West Point, New York. From there, he sent a 1,700-man detachment under Maj. Gen. John Vaughn up river to see if he might be able to make contact with Burgoyne. On 16 October, Vaughn captured and burned the town of Esopus, New York, then proceeded north again to Livingston Manor. There, Vaughn encountered more than 6,000 rebel militia and determined that he could go no farther. He was still almost 80 miles from the Army from Canada. Burgoyne was on his own.

On 14 October, Burgoyne called a council of war to learn what his more senior officers thought of surrender. To a man, his subordinates agreed that the army had fought a good fight and capitulating would be an honorable course of action. Reluctantly convinced, Burgoyne sent an officer to inform Gates that he wished to begin negotiations. To his surprise, Gates demanded immediate surrender. Instead, the two commanders agreed to an armistice that extended into the following afternoon. This was followed by a second message from Gates demanding that Burgoyne lay down his arms. Burgoyne began to detect some desperation in Gates’ actions and came
to believe that perhaps Clinton’s advance might be putting pressure on the American commander. Burgoyne responded with a letter demanding a series of stipulations to include the rendering of honors of war and safe return for the Army from Canada to England on the condition that no man take up arms against the United States again. To Burgoyne’s amazement, Gates immediately agreed to the conditions. Staff officers from the two armies drew up a treaty and presented it to Burgoyne that evening. Over the next twenty-four hours, a series of exchanges took place over details such as replacing the term “capitulation” with “convention” in the treaty. Meanwhile, Gates and Burgoyne both received new reports on Clinton’s actions. At one point Burgoyne determined he might forsake the agreement, but the British commander ultimately resigned himself to the inevitable and signed the document on 16 October.

At about 1000 the following day, Burgoyne and his general officers with their staffs, rode across the Fish Kill ford toward Gates’ headquarters. Drawn up along both sides of the road, were the troops of the American Northern Army. No man shouted taunts or showed any disrespect or indiscipline toward their recent foes. Despite the fact that most units possessed few or no uniforms, the British officers noted that the discipline and bearing of these soldiers would prompt pride in the heart of any European army commander. Arriving at Gates’ headquarters, Burgoyne offered his sword to the American commander, who held it briefly then returned the weapon to its owner. Meanwhile, north of Fish Kill and out of the eyes of the rebel troops, British and German soldiers stacked their arms and colors then marched the same route as their army commander across the creek and through the silent rows of Yankee warriors. They, too, noted the discipline—and great numbers—of their recent adversaries. Suddenly an American band broke the silence by playing “Yankee Doodle,” a ditty created by a British army surgeon during the French and Indian War to make fun of the rustic American soldiers serving with the professional soldiers of the crown. The tune and its origins were widely known, and the irony of the moment was likely not lost on those who heard it.

Burgoyne surrendered only 5,895 soldiers of the almost 10,000
who started on the campaign. About 1,300 continued to man Fort Ticonderoga under Powell’s command, and another 2,800 men were dead or had deserted. American losses were far less. Moreover, most of them could now be released to oppose Clinton’s venture in the Highlands or join Washington’s Main Army to the south, thereby increasing the difficulties for Howe in Pennsylvania. Gates sent some of his forces to escort what now became referred to as the “Convention Army” to Boston for extradition to England. That was not to be, however, because Burgoyne, Howe, the British government, and the Continental Congress could not agree on parole terms for the British and German forces. As a result, the vast majority of the Convention Army remained in the United States as prisoners until the end of the war, though Burgoyne and Riedesel were eventually exchanged and returned home much earlier. In addition, hundreds of Burgoyne’s surrendered troops, especially the Germans, escaped captivity and ended up settling in the United States.

The overall impact of the Saratoga Campaign was felt well beyond the battlefield, or even in the halls of Congress. Arguably, the most significant result of the campaign was the French belief that the Americans might just well win their independence. On 5 December 1777, word reached Paris of the American victory at Saratoga. King Louis XVI extended recognition to the United States the following day (though France had already been supporting the rebels with supplies for some time). On 6 February 1778, France went the next step and declared war on the United Kingdom, preparing to send ships and men to further support the rebel cause. Of course, France’s actions were not for altruistic reasons but borne of a desire to seek revenge on the country that humiliated her only fifteen years before. Still, the alliance was greatly welcomed and helped ensure that independence for the United States of America was eventually secured.
Notes

1. Some historians note that Burgoyne’s troops used this as a term of affection because of the way he treated them.

2. *A feu de joie* was a rifle salute fired by soldiers on a ceremonial occasion. Muskets were fired successively by each man in turn along a line and back again, making a continuous sound.


4. It is important to note here that there are no known copies of any general or special orders, personal accounts (save the original source of the story), or other documents verifying the claim that Arnold was ever relieved of command. In 2015, a letter was discovered from a staff officer written to his wife two days after the second battle at Saratoga. This letter lends credence to the idea that Gates’ actions to remove Arnold from command may not be accurate. This is discussed in further detail in Section III, Stand 15, The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield.
III. Suggested Routes and Stands

Introduction

As with most military campaigns, the Saratoga Campaign took place over a large area and several disparate battlefields. If one includes the Army from Canada’s assembly area as the start point for the campaign at St. John’s, Quebec, as well as Fort Montgomery, Fort Stanwix (later named Fort Schuyler) and the Bennington battlefields, the campaign area was roughly 312 miles long north to south and 130 miles east to west—a huge region. To adequately cover all important locations of the campaign in a single staff ride would likely take a week and require some doubling back over routes traveled before. No military unit, and few other organizations, could devote that much time to a staff ride for its members. Thus, this handbook is designed to provide a staff ride leader several options to cover the campaign in a one- or two-day ride and still include the most important locations and aspects of the campaign for maximum educational and training value. The leader can reduce and tailor these stands to best fit their time available and the education/training objectives for the event. Keep in mind, however, that the shorter the ride, the more it will focus on tactical actions and issues (i.e. battles and skirmishes) rather than the larger issues of the operational art such as campaign planning and logistics.

This staff ride involves significant bus or car travel and some walking—covering a wide variety of terrain with different sources of ownership and rules for access. The battlefield stands are located mostly on government-owned lands with easy public access, though some may be executed in parking lots or roadside pull-overs.

Most of the actual campaign battlefields are preserved in federal or state-owned military parks (see Section V for more details on the various battlefield parks). The main battlefield, Saratoga, is a unit of the National Park Service (NPS). The park is adequately interpreted with signs and monuments which help the staff ride leader in various ways, especially to orient students to the terrain. Most of the interpretive aids at the Saratoga National Historical Park refer to combat actions on 7 October 1777. Facilitators need to use care when discussing the 19 September fight at Freeman’s Farm. Crown
Point and the Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site are units of the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation. Both battlefields can be easily accessed by vehicle and on foot, though both include some steep stretches for walkers. These sites are lightly interpreted, and Crown Point’s interpretation mainly focuses on the French and Indian War era. Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Defiance are units of the Fort Ticonderoga Association, a private venture. Both are easily accessible by vehicle and neither is particularly strenuous for walking. These sites also require an entrance fee. Tickets for Mount Defiance may be purchased separately if the group will not be visiting the fort. The Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site—operated by the Vermont Department of Housing and Community Development—can be reached by vehicle, but the remainder of the battlefield beyond the visitors’ center is accessible only by walking. The only difficult area is walking toward Sucker Creek crossing, if time allows. This area also can be accessed by car or bus. All battlefields are relatively pristine in appearance and condition and close to their appearance at the time of the battle. Not surprisingly, some areas that were once open terrain are now grown over with trees and vice versa. Generally speaking however, the locations selected for stands in this handbook look similar to what they did at the time of the campaign. The only man-made structures from the campaign that still exist are primarily fortifications.

Prior to the event, staff ride leaders should coordinate with the points of contact listed in Section IV of this handbook to verify times and dates of operation for all parks as well as other locations and facilities.

Some of the stands between the battlefields—those portraying march routes, forts, headquarters sites, and smaller skirmishes—are on roadside pull-overs or in restaurant, bank, or storefront mall parking lots. Staff ride leaders must coordinate in advance to use some of these stands and exercise tact in cooperating with civilians in the area. Staff ride leaders should execute a reconnaissance just prior to the ride to ensure that all stands and routes are accessible—then develop alternative routes or stand locations as needed. As part of that reconnaissance, inform public and private property owners that you will be visiting the site.
The best starting point for the two-day Saratoga Campaign staff ride is the town of Ticonderoga, New York, which offers the best motel accommodations in the region. Your first stand will be Crown Point State Historic Site, 15 miles to the north, or Fort Ticonderoga itself can be used as an alternative. After the first day, Clifton Park, New York, provides the best close-by lodgings for Saratoga National Historic Park, which is the starting point for day two of the ride. For a one-day staff ride, Clifton Park is also the recommended location for overnight accommodations.

The following stands include a variety of quotations and vignettes for staff ride instructors to consider. Likewise, each stand has a series of analysis questions that could be used for the end of the stand. Choose the ones that help best achieve your group’s staff ride training objectives. Finally, a note of caution is provided to users of this handbook. Recordkeeping of personnel strengths and casualties during the Revolutionary War was notoriously poor for both sides—especially for American units, whether Continental or militia. The unit personnel strengths and casualties listed in this handbook are largely estimates. A search of available sources on the Saratoga Campaign reveals a variety of personnel and casualty estimates for the various battles which took place during the campaign. The statistics provided in this section are shown only to provide an idea of the approximate numbers for each side involved in a given action and the casualties sustained. They are not intended to be definitive.
Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride Stand List

Day 1: Campaign Day

Meet and remain overnight before day 1: Ticonderoga, New York
Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 1 Crown Point, The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan (sixty minutes)
Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 2 Mount Defiance-Ticonderoga (thirty minutes)
Movement: (forty minutes not including ferry time)

Stand 3 Battle of Hubbardton (thirty minutes)
Sub-stand 3A, Monument Hill
Sub-stand 3B, The Final Line
Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 4 Whitehall-Skenesborough (twenty minutes)
(lunch stop)
Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 5 Fort Anne (ten minutes)
(Note: can be conducted as a drive-by stand if pressed for time)
Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 6 Fort Edward (drive by stand)
Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 7 Fort Miller (drive by stand)
Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 8 Battle of Bennington (sixty minutes)
Sub-stand 8A, Baum’s Heights
Sub-stand 8B, Tory Redoubt
Sub-stand 8C, Breymann’s Defeat
Movement: sixty minutes to Clifton Park/hotel
Day 2: Saratoga Day

Note: Stands 9 and 10 can be done at the hotel on the evening of day 1 to save time on day 2, or first thing day 2 at the Saratoga National Historic Park Visitors Center or Freeman’s Farm Overlook stop.

Stand 9: Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany
(offsite) (ten minutes)
Movement: N/A

Stand 10: Pawlet Expedition (offsite) (ten minutes)
Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 11: Continental Positions at Bemis Heights (thirty minutes)
Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 12: First Battle of Saratoga-Freeman’s Farm
(ninety minutes)
Sub-stand 12A, The Advance
Sub-stand 12B, The Opening Fight
Sub-stand 12C, American Reinforcements Arrive
Sub-stand 12D, Advance and Retreat
Sub-stand 12E, Riedesel Saves the Day
Sub-stand 12F, The Results and Cost
Movement: ten minutes

Stand 13: Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign
(thirty minutes)
Movement: thirty minutes

Bag lunch at Visitors’ Center
Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 14: Leadership Friction in the Northern Army
(twenty minutes)
Movement: fifteen minutes
Stand 15: Second Battle of Saratoga-Barber’s Wheatfield
(thirty minutes)
Movement: ten minutes

Stand 16: Second Battle of Saratoga-Balcarres Redoubt
(twenty minutes)
Movement: ten minutes

Stand 17: Second Battle of Saratoga-Breymann Redoubt
(twenty minutes)
Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 18 (Stand S-8): The British Retreat, Surrender, and Impact of Saratoga (55 minutes)
Schuylerville, New York (Burgoyne Surrender Site)

Movement to hotel: thirty minutes

Saratoga Campaign One-Day Staff Ride

The Saratoga Campaign staff ride is best conducted as a two-day event. If, however, a one-day staff ride is required, Campaign Day topics can be compressed and covered in an overview class or presentation at home station before arriving at the campaign area. Another option is to conduct the class/presentation at the hotel the night before beginning day 2, Saratoga Day stands. As a less favorable alternative, day 1 could be covered in two separate Campaign Day overview stands at the Saratoga National Historic Park Visitors’ Center and the Freeman’s Farm Overlook stop, or a combination of the two. Splitting the overview stands between the two locations will help break up what would otherwise be a very long stand. The following outline offers a possible one-day ride solution that can be modified by eliminating specific stands or cutting the amount of material covered by topic.
Overview Stand 1 Topics (at Visitors’ Center):
The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan
Mount Defiance-Fort Ticonderoga
Battle of Hubbardton
Skenesborough
Fort Anne

Overview Stand 2 Topics (at Freeman’s Farm overlook):
Fort Edward
Fort Miller
Battle of Bennington
Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany
Pawlet Expedition
Note: From this point forward, conduct the stands in accordance with the instructions outlined in this handbook.
Stand 11, Northern Army Positions at Bemis Heights
Stand 12, First Battle of Saratoga-Freeman’s Farm
Stand 13, Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign
Stand 14, Leadership Friction in the Northern Army
Stand 15, Second Battle of Saratoga-Barber’s Wheatfield
Stand 16, Second Battle of Saratoga-Balcarres Redoubt
Stand 17, Second Battle of Saratoga-Breymann Redoubt
Stand 18, The British Retreat, Surrender, & Impact of Saratoga

**Saratoga Campaign Two-Day Staff Ride**

The full two-day Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride detailed in the following pages offers the best educational value. Each stand contains the directions (with maps), an orientation, description, vignettes, and analysis. For additional guidance on conducting a one-day Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride, see Section IV.
Map 1. Day 1 Overview Map.
Day 1

Strategic Setting through the Battle of Bennington

Stand 1, Crown Point-The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan
Stand 2, Mount Defiance-Fort Ticonderoga
Stand 3, Battle of Hubbardton
Sub-stand 3A, Monument Hill
Sub-stand 3B, The Final Line
Stand 4, Skenesborough (Whitehall)
Stand 5, Fort Anne
Stand 6, Fort Edward (drive-by stand)
Stand 7, Fort Miller (drive-by stand)
Stand 8, Battle of Bennington
Sub-stand 8A, Baum’s Heights
Sub-stand 8B, Tory Redoubt
Sub-stand 8C, Breymann’s Defeat

Day 1, Stand 1 Crown Point-The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan (Events up to 30 June 1777)

Directions: From the traffic circle in Ticonderoga, New York, drive north on Wicker Street/New York State Route 9N. Proceed north and turn right onto Lake Road/New York State Route 22 East. Drive north to New York State Route 185 and turn right onto Bridge Road/New York State Route 185. Proceed north to Adirondack Road and turn left at Crown Point State Historic Site. Proceed to the parking lot next to the Visitors’ Center/Museum. It is recommended to conduct the stand somewhere on the northeast bastion of Fort Crown Point (also known as Fort St. Frederic).

Orientation: You are currently standing on the northeast bastion of Fort Crown Point. The French, who originally established the post in the 1730s, destroyed and abandoned it in 1759 when the area passed to British control at the end of the French and Indian War. The British soon rebuilt the fortifications and renamed the post Fort Crown Point. At that point it was part of a chain of forts that
included Forts Ticonderoga, George, Edward, and Miller along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River line of communication—maintained by the British Army between 1759 and 1775. Seth Warner and the Green Mountain Boys captured Fort Crown Point in May 1775 from a skeletal British force. The patriots captured 111 cannon at the fort, some of which were later used in the siege of Boston.

Visible to the north of the fort is Lake Champlain. About 100 miles up the lake and the Richelieu River is Saint Jean-sur-Riche-

Map 2. Day 1 Route to Stand 1.
lieu, Quebec, formerly known as Fort St. John. Fort St. John was the next major post to the north in the chain and served as the staging area and port of embarkation for Burgoyne’s Army from Canada. To the east across the lake is the State of Vermont. At the time of Burgoyne’s departure from Fort Saint John, Vermont was known as the “Hampshire Grants.” The area was under dispute between the colonies of New York and New Hampshire until declaring itself as a separate republic in 1777. Though technically a separate nation, Vermont continued to support the Patriot cause with troops and treasure before becoming a state of the union in 1791. To the south about 15 miles is Fort Ticonderoga, the next fort in the chain in that direction.

Description [Campaign Overview]: On 10 May 1775, Benedict Arnold along with Ethan Allen and other members of the Green Mountain Boys captured Fort Ticonderoga in a much-celebrated victory. The day after, Capt. Seth Warner with a detachment of Green Mountain Boys captured Fort Crown Point from the British.

Map 3. Day 1 Stand 1.
It was not an impressive victory as the post was garrisoned by only nine British soldiers, but it did garner 111 pieces of much-needed artillery—29 pieces of which were later used by the Patriots in their siege of Boston. Soon after Fort Crown Point fell, Arnold’s troops seized a schooner and several bateaux farther south at Skenesborough (modern-day Whitehall, New York). Boarding those vessels, Arnold proceeded north with his men and captured Fort St. Jean in Quebec on 18 May. In addition to securing a great deal of useful military supplies during the bold attack, Arnold captured a 70-ton sloop, the HMS Royal George, which Arnold soon renamed the Enterprise. The Enterprise was considered to be the first commissioned vessel of the United States Navy.

The capture of Forts Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. Jean in May 1775 eventually set off a chain of events that resulted in the invasion of Canada by American forces that August. Launching north from Fort Crown Point, that failed venture eventually culminated with the arrival of the rag-tag remnants of that army back here at Crown Point on 7 July 1776. Although the American “Canadian Army” had been defeated, Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, governor general of Quebec, intended to complete its destruction by launching an invasion of his own into central New York. He needed to construct a fleet of ships and boats to transport his invading army south on Lake Champlain to recapture the lost forts there and proceed to cut off New England from the rest of the colonies (as the British still referred to them) to the south.

The news of Carleton’s shipbuilding efforts was not lost on Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler, commander of the Continental Army’s Northern Department. Schuyler ordered Arnold to construct a number of gunboats and equip them with some of the smaller cannon seized from the forts and acquired from various other sources. By October, both fleets were prepared for operations as best as they could be. To be successful that fall, Carleton had to move south before cold weather set in. However, Arnold’s vessels effectively challenged his move south. On 11 and 12 October, the two fleets met in battle off Valcour Island. Though decisively defeated, the American fleet inflicted a fair amount of damage to the British ships. Moreover, Arnold supervised a thorough destruction of Fort Crown Point
on 14 October before retreating south. When Carleton’s forces landed shortly after, the British general realized he could not adequately shelter his men here over the severe New York winter. He departed Crown Point on 4 November and returned to Canada. Although the Americans were defeated and lost the fort, they successfully turned back the British invasion of 1776. Carleton would later regret his decision to retreat.

On 30 November 1776, Maj. Gen. William Howe, British commander-in-chief, America, wrote the first of several letters to Lord George Germain, the British secretary of state for the American Colonies, proposing plans for the campaign of 1777. The first plan was a two-pronged operation that began with a column moving up the Hudson River to join with Carleton’s Northern Army. The other prong was to attack Boston (see Section II, Campaign Overview, Development of the 1777 Campaign Plan for an in-depth discussion of the letters and plans exchanged between Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne). A demonstration in New Jersey would keep Washington occupied in Pennsylvania. In a 20 December letter to Germain, Howe now proposed that the campaign consist of an overland movement to capture Philadelphia but made no mention of any cooperation with the Northern Army. Six days later on the day after Christmas, Washington successfully attacked Trenton, New Jersey, and captured about 1,000 of Howe’s Hessian troops. After Washington’s Trenton raid on 29 December, Howe wrote Germain yet again and proposed that in addition to capturing Philadelphia, it was critical for him to also destroy Washington’s army. This opinion was no doubt reinforced when Washington’s Main Army defeated a British force at Princeton, New Jersey on 3 January 1777—killing, wounding, or capturing about 400 enemy troops. Howe withdrew his forces from all New Jersey outposts except New Brunswick and Perth Amboy and ordered them into winter quarters in and around New York City.

Brig. John Burgoyne, Carleton’s deputy in Canada, also had some ideas on how to prosecute the 1777 campaign. After the moderately successful 1776 campaign, Burgoyne received permission to return home to England in the late fall ostensibly to take care of personal affairs. While there, however, he provided his ideas for the coming campaign to Germain in a document titled, “Thoughts
for Conducting the War on the Side of Canada.” His plan was very similar to Howe’s 30 November proposal, with an added detachment of troops sent west through Lake Ontario to advance southeast through the Mohawk River Valley. This column’s mission was to take Fort Schuyler and secure the Oneida “Great Carrying Place” then advance up the valley to link with Burgoyne at Albany. King George approved Burgoyne’s plan and its provisions for implementation. Carleton and Burgoyne believed that Howe would move north at some point in the 1777 campaign season and take control of the Army from Canada when it arrived in Albany, New York. Then the two forces under Howe would conduct operations into the rebellious New England states. If successful, that approach would remove those colonies from the war effort and effectively end the war. Despite various exchanges between Howe and German after Burgoyne’s plan was adopted, Burgoyne would follow his plan described above for all operations and decisions he made thereafter.

On 27 March 1777, Burgoyne set sail from Portsmouth harbor and arrived at Quebec City on 6 May. Six days later, he met with Carleton at Montreal and presented a letter from Germain to the Governor General. In the missive, Germain informed Carleton about the 1777 campaign plan and the fact that Burgoyne, not he, would command the Northern Army on its invasion of New York. Further, Germain ordered Carleton to remain in command in Canada and support Burgoyne’s efforts as far as possible. Carleton and Germain had not been on the best of terms for some time. Carleton realized that this slight was in retaliation for his decision to withdraw from Fort Crown Point the previous fall. Nevertheless, the Governor General, to his credit, initially attempted to support the junior officer to the best of his ability, though Carleton’s support would not be as forthcoming after the campaign started.

Burgoyne’s plan assumed—probably correctly—that the New England colonies were the center of the rebellion. He envisioned a three-pronged campaign design aimed at seizing Albany, the only inland city of any significance in New York. The campaign’s first axis of advance would be a movement down the Lake Champlain corridor and along the Hudson River, a time-tested avenue of approach dating back to the French and Indian War. This approach had
been used the previous year during Carleton’s unsuccessful attempt to penetrate deep into New York. The second axis of advance would penetrate from the west via Lake Ontario and the Mohawk River Valley. Presumably Howe would lead the third axis, a cooperating thrust up the Hudson River from New York City. The three columns would begin cooperating at or near Albany and from there—based on the military situation and colonial threat—Howe would assume command of all three. From there he would direct follow-on operations to isolate the New England states and force them out of the rebellion, prompting the remaining resistance to collapse. In concept it was an excellent plan.

At the start of the campaign, Burgoyne was to assemble about 8,300 troops. These included 3,700 British regulars as well as 3,000 German regulars plus 650 Canadian and Tory (i.e., “loyalist”) militiamen. About 400 to 500 Iroquois Indians would join them later to largely function as the army’s reconnaissance force. His principle subordinates for the campaign were Maj. Gen. William Phillips, deputy commander; Brig. Simon Fraser, Advance Corps commander; and Maj. Gen. Baron Friedrich Adolph von Riedesel, commander of German forces. Burgoyne also brought a large artillery train consisting of 138 artillery pieces of varying size to support a siege to reduce Fort Ticonderoga (see Appendix A, Fort Ticonderoga for more details on the initial order of battle for the Army from Canada).

As the machinations regarding the development of the campaign plan took place between Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne, American troops in the Northern Department were slowly attempting to renovate Fort Ticonderoga and build troop strength in the Hudson River Valley and in the Hampshire Grants (i.e. Vermont). Because of the harsh New York winter as well as setbacks the Continental Army had experienced the previous year, very little was accomplished. When Col. Jeduthan Baldwin arrived in February to serve as the post engineer, he quickly organized details to build additional facilities on Mount Independence. These included a bridge from that location to the Fort Ticonderoga peninsula, a log boom obstacle to prevent the passage of ships south of the fort, and blockhouses to defend key locations such as the Lake George Landing. He also renovated the old French defenses which protected the fort from ground attack.
along the western approaches. However, the garrison consisted of only about 3,000 troops and 10,000 were needed to adequately prepare and defend the location. Due to the manpower shortage, several commanders disregarded the need to place defenses on Mount Defiance.

In April, the commander of Fort Ticonderoga, Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne, departed the post to join Washington’s Main Army in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, he was not replaced with a permanent commander until the arrival of Maj. Gen. Arthur Sinclair on 12 June. Although Sinclair brought reinforcements, he was disturbed because the garrison was too small even with the additional troops and because the myriad efforts to improve post facilities and defenses had accomplished less than half of the work needed to properly defend the various positions. To add to his concerns, he soon met with two captured British spies who informed him that Burgoyne would soon advance down Lake Champlain with Albany as his objective. Six days after St. Clair reached Fort Ticonderoga, Schuyler arrived to inspect the progress and came away with the same concerns as St. Clair. They concluded that the existing garrison would need at least another six weeks of work (and good weather) to prepare Fort Ticonderoga and the surrounding defenses to withstand an attack. On 20 June, Schuyler held a council with St. Clair and the three Continental Army brigade commanders. The generals concluded they would defend Ticonderoga as long as practicable then retreat across the footbridge extending between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence to continue the defense from there. If St. Clair’s forces were driven from there, the garrison would retreat south to Skenesborough and move overland to Fort Edward where resistance would continue. Schuyler then returned to Albany to do what he could to find additional troops and resources for St. Clair.

As St. Clair struggled with preparing to ready Fort Ticonderoga, Burgoyne moved his forces from their assembly point at Chambly to St. John’s, Quebec, on the Richelieu River. On 17 June, Brig. Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps, the Army from Canada’s vanguard arrived at the mouth of the Bouquet River (now Gilliland Creek) on Lake Champlain. The day after, Burgoyne’s army departed Fort St. John in a large armada of ships and bateaux heading for the same location.
After a brief stop at Cumberland Head, the army arrived at Bouquet River on 21 June. On arrival, Burgoyne issued his directive to the “Congress of Indians”—basically welcoming the Indians into the fold and urging them to fight the enemies of the king and his laws. To his credit, Burgoyne cautioned them not to engage in barbarous acts such as scalping live persons (dead rebels were fair game) or killing non-combatants. The following day, however, in a bit of theater probably designed as psychological warfare and intimidation, the general issued his infamous proclamation to American colonists in which he essentially threatened to turn loose his Indians on those who refused to submit to the king’s will. Given past outrages conducted by Indians in the region, this announcement no doubt conjured up pictures of wanton slaughter. These statements would soon come to haunt Burgoyne and his army and have the opposite of the intended effect—especially after the Indians began to actually inflict outrages on both rebel and loyalist Americans in the campaign area.

Several key events took place on 23 June. First, St. Leger’s expedition departed Montreal by boat, traveling up the St. Lawrence River. The expedition would then turn south on Lake Ontario headed for Oswego, New York, and the Mohawk Valley. That same day, Sergeant Heath of an American scouting party notified Schuyler that Burgoyne’s troops and ships were at Bouquet River. Fortunately for the Americans, a series of storms which began that day prompted Burgoyne to remain at the Bouquet River camp for another week. Though Burgoyne remained, Fraser’s Advance Corps departed on the 24th and arrived at Crown Point on 26 June to begin preparing for Burgoyne’s main body. The Army from Canada finally departed Bouquet River on 30 June and arrived here at Crown Point that evening.

Vignette 1: General Burgoyne issued the following order of the day to his troops:

The Army embarks tomorrow, to approach the Enemy. We are to contend for the King, and the constitution of Great Britain, to vindicate Law, and to relieve the oppressed—a cause in which his Majesty’s Troops and those of the Princes his Allies, will feel equal excitement. The Services require of this particular expedition, are critical and
conspicuous. During our progress occasions may occur, in which, no difficulty, nor labour, nor Life, are to be regarded. This Army must not retreat. (Max M. Mintz, The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates, Binghamton, New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1990, 140.)

Vignette 2: An extract from Lord George Germain’s 26 March 1777 letter to General Carleton explains Carleton’s responsibilities for the upcoming campaign:

With a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become highly necessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected; and therefore, as the security and good government of Canada absolutely requires your presence there, it is the King’s determination to leave about 3,000 men under your command, for the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder of your army upon two expeditions, one under the command of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diversion on the Mohawk River. (The Scots Magazine 40, January 1778, 87.)

Vignette 3: Gen. Sir Henry Clinton’s assessment of the two impending campaigns (i.e. Howe’s and Burgoyne’s):

When the design of employing an army under General Burgoyne on the Upper Hudson was mentioned to me; I took the liberty of suggesting the Hazard of miscarriage unless it was supported from below; and the consequent propriety of directing an early cooperation of Sir William Howe’s whole force on the lower District of the River. For the attacking [of] Philadelphia (which I understand to be the object of that General Officer’s first operations in the ensuing campaign) could be undertaken only upon the principal [sic] of drawing on a general action with the Rebels; I humbly presumed that End (if anything could effect it) was more likely to be obtained by a vigorous ex-
eration of the two British Armies on the Hudson; the passes
of which must consequently fall under their power. (John
Campaign of the American Revolution*, New York: Savas
Beatie, 2008, 30.)

Vignette 4: Interestingly, Burgoyne was ordered to cooperate
with the Commander of the Department of Canada as he fielded
and supplied his expeditionary force. In so doing, Burgoyne spent
little time planning his own logistics and in some cases deployed on
the cheap in order to appease his higher leadership. Per Burgoyne,
“Your Excellency will observe, that, in order to save the public ex-
 pense as much as possible, I have reduced this requisition much
below what would be adequate for the service, and I mean to trust
to the resources of the expedition for the rest: 500 carts will barely
carry fourteen days provisions at a time, and Major General Phillips
means to demand as few horses as possible, subject to whatever fu-
ture augmentations future services may require: the present number
wanted will be about 400; there will then remain unprovided for (for
expeditious movement) the transport of bateaux from Lake George
to Hudson’s River, and the carriage of the tents of the army, and
many other contingencies that I need not trouble your Excellency
to point out to you.” As the Saratoga Campaign unfolds during this
staff ride, Burgoyne’s poor logistics planning will manifest itself
through significant logistical challenges that arise soon after the
capture of Fort Ticonderoga. (John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military
History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, New
York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 38.)

Vignette 5: Lord Germain advised Burgoyne to employ as
many loyalists and natives as possible to bolster his numbers. Bur-
goyne sought to recruit Americans into his army, even those now
serving in the militia/army against him:

It is known that there are many men in the rebel Army
who are well effected to the Cause of the King. Some
have been compelled into the Service, others engaged only
with a view of joining the King’s Troops. The Savages are
therefore cautioned against firing upon any single men or small parties that may be endeavoring to come over, and the Army in general will consider these men in a very different light from common Deserters, and treat them with all possible encouragement; and should it unfortunately happen that any Soldier of this Army should fall into the hands of the Enemy, it will be his Duty to let this order be known to the Enemy’s Army. (John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 54.)

Vignette 6: Enlisting the help of loyalists and Indians was one of the main reasons for the secondary effort advancing down the Mohawk River under Brigadier St. Leger. Recognizing the liability that an unrestrained Indian force might have upon the campaign, however, Burgoyne published the following guidance:

[The] necessity of restraint and their passions, and that they must be under control, in accordance with the religion, laws of warfare, principles and policy which belonged to Great Britain. . .positively forbidding bloodshed, when not opposed in arms, [declaring] aged men, women, children, and prisoners sacred from the knife, even in the time of conflict; . . .the war must not be made as when they went forth alone, but under the absolute will and control of the army of the king. (Henry B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution. 1775–1781. Historical and Military Criticism, with Topographical Illustration*, New York: A.S. Barnes, 1876, 306.)

*Analysis*

1. Germain had six months to develop and refine the 1777 campaign plan with his two key subordinate generals. Evaluate Germain’s efforts and that of his generals.
   a. What was Germain’s strategy?
   b. What is your evaluation of Germain’s strategy?
c. What was the apparent objective and end state of the 1777 campaign plan?
d. Who should have had responsibility for implementing the campaign plan?
e. What were Howe’s and Burgoyne’s perceptions of the plan?
f. Was the Burgoyne plan realistic in terms of the capabilities of the British forces available (including Howe’s)?
h. How could Germain have improved the planning process?

2. Schuyler had a year to prepare for a British invasion down Lake Champlain once the “Canadian Army” returned to Crown Point in July 1776. Evaluate Schuyler’s efforts and that of his subordinate generals over that period.
   a. What was Schuyler’s plan to defend the Lake Champlain/Hudson River approach in 1777?
   b. Were the American commanders more effective in their coordination for the 1777 campaign in central New York than the British? Why or why not?
   c. What were the major obstacles facing Schuyler in implementing his plans for the Northern Department?
   d. What would you have done differently than Schuyler in preparing for the British invasion?

3. What were the some of the key events during the last half of 1776 and the first half of 1777 that had an impact on the campaign, and why do you think each event was significant?

4. How did the area’s terrain affect British planning for the campaign?

5. How did the area’s terrain affect American planning for the campaign?
Day 1, Stand 2 Mount Defiance-Fort Ticonderoga (1–6 July 1777)

Directions: From the Crown Point State Historic Site, drive the previous route in reverse until you arrive at the traffic circle in the town of Ticonderoga. At the traffic circle, head east on Montcalm Street for 0.6 miles. Turn right onto Champlain Avenue and head south for 0.2 miles. Veer left onto The Portage (see Note 1 below) and proceed for 0.2 mile. Turn left on Defiance Street for 0.3 miles. Turn right to remain on Defiance Street (look for the sign). Place the entry ticket stub (see Note 3 below) in the slot at the gate station. When the gate arm raises, travel one mile to the top and park in the designated area. Conduct the stand at the outdoor shelter at the top.

Note 1: The portage is the route over which Burgoyne’s troops hauled bateaux, cannon, wagon carts, and supplies to load at Lake George Landing for the water journey to Fort George.

Map 4. Day 1 Route to Stand 2.
Note 2: The parking area on Mount Defiance is not ideal for busses. If a bus is used, offload participants at the graveled lower parking lot and turn around for ease of departure while the participants walk up to the outdoor shelter for the stand.

Note 3: The Mount Defiance Park entrance fee is $10 per vehicle. To avoid a delay, the recommendation is to send someone ahead from Stand 1 to the Fort Ticonderoga Visitors’ Center (see Fort Ticonderoga map below) to purchase tickets then link up with the group at the entry gate at the base of Mount Defiance. Each vehicle will need a ticket stub to activate the gate arm at the Mount Defiance Park.

Map 5. Day 1 Stand 2.
Note 4: As an alternative, the staff ride leader may want to consider using Fort Ticonderoga as the location for this stand. If time is an issue, stands 1 and 2 may be conducted there as well.

Orientation: You are standing on the summit of Mount Defiance (see map 33, Appendix J, Siege of Fort Ticonderoga 1–6 July 1777). Note the pair of cannons immediately north of the shelter which approximate the position of the two British cannons initially brought to the top of Mount Defiance. These cannons are reproductions and are not accurate as to the type of cannon that would have been placed at this location on 5–6 July 1777. The British hauled two 12-pounder cannon to the top of this hill. These reproductions are 18-pounder weapons. To the north of this location is Mount Hope, which typically cannot be seen when there are leaves on the trees. Crown Point is approximately ten miles due north in a direct line, or about fifteen miles by road. To the northeast of this position is Fort Ticonderoga, which is plainly visible below unless there is fog. Directly east is Lake Champlain, and on the other side of the lake, the low hill to the direct east is Mount Independence. On the east side of Mount Independence is East Creek, a marsh that delayed Riedesel’s German forces as they attempted to block St. Clair’s forces from leaving the Mount Independence defenses. Hubbardton, Vermont, is approximately sixteen miles to the southeast. Skenesborough (now Whitehall, New York) is approximately twelve miles due south of this location. To the west is the town of Ticonderoga (which did not exist during the campaign) and Lake George Landing on Lake George.

As you observe the various battlegrounds and other sites on the staff ride, keep in mind that the woods and other vegetation looked different in the late 1700s. At that time, America was a wood burning society. Much of the deadfall in forested areas, especially around settlements, would have been cleared and burned for heat and cooking. If forested areas were not cleared for farming, they would have been thinned by selective cutting for heat and cooking. Additionally, farm animals such as cattle, horses, and sheep as well as abundant wildlife like deer often roamed free through those woods and would have grazed on and thinned out secondary growth around settlements and farmsteads. The woods in those areas—often the scene of
Revolutionary War battles—would therefore have been more open and one could see longer distances.

Description: Fort Ticonderoga was built by the French in 1755 and originally named Fort Carillon. The fort was originally located to guard the southern approaches into the Lake Champlain region from a potential British invasion from the direction of the American colonies to the south. The fort had seen service during the French and Indian War; after the French lost that conflict to England, the fort—and Canada—became British possessions. As a result, Ticonderoga was now poorly sited to defend against invasion from the north since it was situated on the south side of the peninsula to defend in that direction. Moreover, with Canada also in British hands, the post later fell into disrepair since there was little fear of invasion from that quarter. At the start of the Revolutionary War, the fort suddenly regained its tactical importance. In May 1775, the forces of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold seized and subsequently occupied Fort Ticonderoga. Like Crown Point, the fort served as a staging and supply base to support the American expedition into Canada in 1775 and 1776.

As you can see, Fort Ticonderoga is surrounded by hills, most significantly by Mount Defiance itself, which rises 700 feet above both Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. In 1776, several Continental Army commanders and officers visited Mount Defiance and discussed using it to help defend the fort. They were also concerned that if left unguarded, Mount Defiance was accessible to the enemy. Ultimately they disregarded its value as a defensive position, deciding the promontory was out of mutually supporting rifle range of Fort Ticonderoga and inaccessible to artillery (though they knew that artillery rounds could range the fort from its heights if guns could be successfully placed there). St. Clair ultimately decided not to occupy Mount Defiance primarily because he did not have enough soldiers to adequately defend Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence as well as Mount Defiance.

On 1 July, Burgoyne landed most of his army on both sides of Lake Champlain about four miles north of Fort Ticonderoga. Fraser’s Advance Corps, which had landed earlier a mile south at
Three-Mile Point, initially remained in place as a vanguard but soon headed inland to envelop the fort from the west. Riedesel’s German Left Wing crossed to the east bank of the lake, debarked there, and headed for Mount Independence in a kind of pincers movement. Meanwhile, Burgoyne’s main body headed down the River Road toward Fort Ticonderoga.

The following day, General Phillips’ Right Wing with Fraser’s Advance Corps and Brig. James Hamilton’s brigade moved west toward an eminence named Mount Hope. The American forces there rapidly set fire to their works and retreated into the safety of the old French lines. Soon Phillips’ forces deployed on line and began engaging the American troops manning the northwestern perimeter of the French lines. Though there was much firing, the action resulted in very few casualties on either side before the shooting died down. Meanwhile Riedesel’s Braunschweigers slowly pushed forward through heavy forest and swampy ground. The Germans struggled through the difficult approach all day but failed to reach a point where they could take Mount Independence under fire.

On 3 July, the main action was an artillery duel between British and American gunners without much effect on either side, except the reduction of ammunition. The following day, Burgoyne recognized that Mount Defiance (also known as Sugar Loaf Hill) might be the key to Fort Ticonderoga’s demise. Burgoyne directed the engineer, Lt. William Twiss, to reconnoiter the heights to see if artillery might be placed there. After scouting the eminence that night, Twiss reported the next morning that it was indeed possible to get artillery on Mount Defiance. Burgoyne realized that even if cannon could not range the fort, they could command the line of communications to the south, thus effectively cutting off resupply from or retreat toward that direction. On 5 July, Twiss’ pioneers began clearing a road up the reverse slope to Mount Defiance trying to retain the element of tactical surprise. However, St. Clair learned about the efforts and quickly called for a council of his general officers to discuss their options.

After St. Clair laid out the facts and the options as he saw them, the other generals unanimously agreed to evacuate the fort during the hours of darkness on the night of 5–6 July. They would send
the wounded, sick, and supplies on ships, gunboats, and bateaux to Skenesborough via Lake Champlain. The able-bodied men of the Continental and militia units would evacuate to Mount Independence via the foot bridge, destroying it after the last man crossed. This column would head toward Castleton, Vermont and thence to Skenesborough or Fort Edward to join with Schuyler and any other forces the Northern Department commander could muster there. For deception, St. Clair ordered the firing of small arms and artillery throughout the night to indicate a sense of American resolve to the British attackers and cover the noises of the rebel movements. Also, no torches or fires were to be lit during the withdrawal process.

Though things started generally well, two problems arose during the night which made the operation go awry. The rebels were not able to move all the food, supplies, powder, ammunition, and wounded men onto the vessels. The process was slow, and it became evident that many supplies would have to be destroyed in place. The second problem was more serious. Around midnight, Brig. Gen. Matthias La Roche de Fermoy, one of St. Clair’s brigade commanders (and an incompetent, habitual drunk), ordered his troops to set fire to his quarters and other buildings despite St. Clair’s orders. These actions, of course, alerted the British that the fort was being abandoned when the flames revealed a long column of men moving over the foot bridge.

Despite the American difficulties, Burgoyne’s command took some time to organize a pursuit. In the meantime, St. Clair had successfully evacuated Fort Ticonderoga by the morning of 6 July and escaped with his men and most of the supplies. He ordered a small four-man detachment at Mount Independence to fire a cannon at the British if they attempted to cross the pontoon bridge in pursuit. Unfortunately, these men found some alcohol and were captured asleep and drunk at their posts. As a result, Burgoyne’s men quickly crossed the pontoon bridge on the trail of St. Clair’s column now headed for Hubbardton. Moreover, Burgoyne’s naval commander instructed his ships on how to easily knock down the boom blockade across the cross channel. In short order, those vessels were in hot pursuit of St. Clair’s bateaux fleet.
Vignette 1: General Schuyler wrote to Colonel Varick on 1 July before the fall of Fort Ticonderoga:

The insufficiency of the garrison at Ticonderoga, the imperfect state of the fortifications, and the want of discipline in the troops, give me great cause to apprehend that we shall lose that fortress, but as a reinforcement is coming up from Peekskill, with which I shall move up, I am in hopes that the enemy will be prevented from any farther progress. (Benson J. Lossing, *The Life and Times of Philip Schuyler* 2, Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 2009, 206.)

Vignette 2: Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates to Gen. George Washington regarding the problems with Fort Ticonderoga:

Time, & bad Construction of those Works, had completely effected that business long before General Schuyler came with me to Crown Point. The Ramparts are Tumbled down, the casemates are fallen in. The barracks burnt, and the whole so perfect a ruin, that it would take five times the number of our army for several summers, to put those works in defensible repair. Your excellency also mentions the troops expected to reinforce this army; it would be to the last degree improper, to order those troops to crown point, or even hither [Ticonderoga] until obliged by the most pressing emergency, as that would only be heaping one hospital upon another. . . . Everything about this army is infected, the clothes, the blankets, the air and the ground they walk upon.” (John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 159–60.)

Vignette 3: General Schuyler would later be relieved of command of the Department of the North due mainly to the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. Despite his relief by General Washington, Schuyler retained backers in Congress. On 2 October 1777, Congress issued the following declaration:

That the president be desired to write to General Schuyler, and inform him that the Congress cannot consent, during
the present situation of our affairs, to accept his resigna-
tion, but request, that he continue the command which he
now holds; that he be assured, that aspersion[sic] which
his enemies have thrown against his character, have had
no influence upon the minds of the members of this house,
who are fully satisfied of his attachment to the cause of
freedom, and are willing to bear testimony of the many
services which he has rendered to his country; and that,
in order effectually to put calumny to silence, they will,
at an early date, appoint a committee of their body, to en-
quire fully into his conduct; which, they trust, will estab-
lish his reputation in the opinion of all good men. (John
F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive
Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas
Beatie, 2008, 165.)

**Analysis**

1. Was a siege the only option available to Burgoyne to neu-
tralize or destroy Fort Ticonderoga? What other options could he
have considered?

2. How did terrain affect Burgoyne’s plans?

3. Given the defenses and ground for which he was responsible
and the resources he possessed, what options did St. Clair have to
defend the Fort Ticonderoga/Mount Independence complex? Which
of these options would you choose and why?

4. If you had St. Clair’s force at Fort Ticonderoga, how would
you delay a force the size of Burgoyne’s?

5. Was St. Clair’s decision to evacuate the right one? Why or
why not?

6. How would you evaluate the conduct of the evacuation?

7. How did the terrain affect St. Clair’s plans and actions?

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Figure 8. Casualties at Fort Ticonderoga.
Day 1, Stand 3 The Battle of Hubbardton (6–7 July 1777)

Directions: Head north on Defiance Street toward Mount Defiance Road for one mile. Turn left to stay on Defiance Street and proceed 0.1 miles. Turn right onto Cossey Street and proceed for 0.5 miles. Veer left then turn right to stay on Cossey Street for about 100 yards, then turn right onto Montcalm Street (NY-74 East). Proceed on NY-74 East (which will turn into Fort Ticonderoga Road) for 3.2 miles to the Ticonderoga-Larabees Ferry. (Note: The one-way ferry cost is $10 per vehicle. Service is seasonal, generally May to September. An off-season staff ride may require traveling to Hubbardton via Whitehall on NY-22 South and US 4 North). On the Vermont side, continue on VT-74 East for 0.5 miles. Turn right onto VT-73 East and remain on this road for 11 miles. Turn right onto VT-30 South for 6.5 miles. Turn left onto Monument Hill Road for 0.9 miles. Turn right onto Woods Road for 1.3 miles (portions of Woods Road are an improved dirt road). Woods Road turns into St. John Road. Remain on
St. John Road, turning sharp left onto Monument Hill Road. Travel 0.3 miles then turn left into the Hubbardton Battlefield State Park. Signs mark the battlefield park entrance. Move to the stone wall in open field to the west of the Visitors’ Center for Stand 3.

Note: If time permits, this stand can be divided between Monument Hill (Sub-stand 3A) and a second location (Sub-stand 3B) at the monument south of the parking lot. The second location will give participants a better view of the American second and final defense line. If time is short, conduct the entire stand at Sub-stand 3A. Another option for a shorter day or if traveling to Hubbardton by the Fort Ticonderoga ferry is not a timely option, this entire stand can be done at Stand 2 or 4.

Map 7. Day 1 Stand 3.
Orientation: You are standing on the summit of Monument Hill where the Americans initially established their main defense line (see map 35, Appendix J, Battle of Hubbardton 7 July 1777). To the west, in the valley below this ridge is Sucker Brook. The initial action of the battle took place there at the Military Road ford at the creek. To the south is Zion Hill over part of which the British Grenadier and Light Infantry Battalions advanced to gain the left flank of the American forces and cut the Castleton Road. Much of the straggler camp was located on the slope of the hill. To the northwest is Sergeant Hill through which the Military Road from Fort Ticonderoga passed. To the east is the Castleton Road which led south to that town and northwest to Crown Point. The American second and final defense line was established along the Castleton Road. Also to the northeast and east is Pittsford Ridge, the high ground where the American troops would eventually make their retreat. Fort Ticonderoga is approximately 16 miles northwest of the Hubbardton Battlefield. The town of Castleton is approximately seven miles south of this position.

Day 1, Sub-stand 3A Monument Hill

Description: Once St. Clair saw his waterborne column off safely to Skenesborough in the early dawn of 6 July, he led the land column southeast over the hilly Military Road between Mount Independence and Castleton, his initial destination. St. Clair had Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor’s Continental Brigade lead the march, and Fermoy’s Continentals brought up the rear. Various militia organizations were placed between the two regular formations. Generally unaccustomed to the hardships of war, lack of sleep, and long marches that were the lot of the regular soldier, the militia rapidly dissolved into little more than armed mobs. Moreover, the prescribed period of service for which they had been enlisted had expired for some of the units. These men were loud in their demands to leave and go home. Other commands were ill-disciplined simply due to poor leadership. All were negatively affected by the heat of the July sun and the mountainous terrain, and straggling quickly became a major problem.

Col. Ebenezer Francis, commander of the Continental 11th Massachusetts Bay Regiment, was assigned as rear guard for St.
Clair’s command. In addition to protecting the rear of the American column from attack, he was responsible for sweeping up the large number of stragglers who were lagging behind the column. The lead elements of St. Clair’s command marched to a location about two miles shy of Castleton before stopping that evening. As he paused at Hubbardton to rest his men, St. Clair tasked Col. Seth Warner, commander of the Continental Regiment that contained the remnants of the Green Mountain Boys, to bring the rear guard and stragglers to the main camp that evening. He also left behind Col. Nathan Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Battalion under Warner’s control, then St. Clair and the main body moved on. After a hot, miserable march, Francis’ regiment and more than one hundred stragglers arrived bit by bit at Hubbardton beginning about 1600. On his arrival, Francis informed Warner that he had no intention of driving his men, or the stragglers, farther that evening. They badly needed the rest. Though the action went against St. Clair’s orders, Warner acquiesced. Both officers were unaware that Fraser’s Advance Corps was on their trail and would camp only three miles from Hubbardton that evening.

On the following morning, 7 July, Warner was about to start his troops south for Castleton and Francis’ men were cooking breakfast when Maj. Robert Grant’s 24th Regiment of Foot leading the Advance Corps attacked the troops of 2nd New Hampshire Battalion posted along Sucker Brook. Although the British attack caught them by surprise, the American troops rapidly recovered, taking cover behind any available boulders and trees then opening a brisk fire against the advancing redcoats.

As Fraser surveyed the fighting and terrain before him, he identified Zion Hill to the south as the key to his plan. If he could move a column to take that high ground, he could then advance a force to cut the road south to Castleton and capture the ragged band of rebels. He sent orders to Maj. John Acland to have the Grenadier Battalion seize Zion Hill and cut the road. As the Grenadiers moved out on their mission, the rest of the Advance Corps swung east and began to advance on what would become known as Monument Hill. Meanwhile, Fraser sent word to Riedesel to hurry his men forward.

Warner, whose regiment had formed near the Selleck cabin, knew that his plan to march to Castleton was no longer an option.
Instead, he ordered his men to load their muskets and move down the slope to confront Acland’s advance. Fighting now centered on the American left as Warner attempted to keep the Grenadiers from flanking his command and, therefore, the entire American line. After his regiment was forced back to a fence line around the Selleck cabin, Warner refused his left (i.e., bent it back to form an angle) to conform with the terrain and thereby established a strong position—preventing the Grenadiers from eventually gaining the road.

Meanwhile on the American right, Francis rushed his regiment to a low stone wall on Monument Hill to prevent the naturally strong position from falling into the hands of the advancing 24th Foot and Balcarres’ Light Infantry. Forming on the left of the 2nd New Hampshire troops who had retreated to the location after being driven from the valley, the men of the 11th Massachusetts now added the weight of their fire against the British advance. The initial volleys of this new force, coupled with an unexpected counterattack by the rebels, initially halted and then drove back Fraser’s regulars with heavy losses.

Near the bottom of the hill, Balcarres and his officers rallied their shaken troops and reformed the lines to start up the hill once again. On the British right, Maj. John D. Acland’s Grenadiers had successfully skirted Warner’s Continentals and gained the road to Castleton. The rebel avenue of retreat was now cut off. Still, the Americans continued to fight with unexpected courage. Indeed, Francis now saw an opportunity to turn the tables on Fraser. The American right overlapped Fraser’s line on the British left, and Francis prepared to have the right of his line advance and flank Fraser—just as Fraser had done to the rebel left.

Unbeknownst to Francis, however, Riedesel’s column was approaching the rebel line from the north. As the New Hampshire men prepared to flank Fraser’s left, the sounds of German martial music echoed to the north. Soon after, a line of jägers advanced on the 2nd New Hampshire’s flank while Fraser’s line was concurrently coming up the west slope of Monument Hill. The American line was now forced to retreat eastward toward the Castleton Road.

Return by the walking path to the visitor’s center and proceed to the monument at the southwest corner of the parking lot.

Day 1, Sub-stand 3B The Final Line
Orientation: You are now located at the monument to Col. Ebenezer Francis, commander of the Continental 11th Massachusetts Bay Regiment. To the west is Monument Hill and the stone wall where the initial main defense was conducted. Riedesel’s troops advanced against the American right flank from the north. To the east is Castleton Road. Along the east side of the road, a log rail fence extended well to the north and south. To the north and south, several additional fences extended from the road eastward to create several boxed-in fields. Farther to the east is Pittsford Ridge over which the Americans would escape. To the south beyond the junction was where the Grenadiers cut the Castleton Road.

Description: The American troops retreated and successfully formed behind the log rail fence line along the east side of the Castleton Road, commencing a heavy fire against the advancing redcoats. Already severely wounded once in the arm, Francis, was struck again during the confused retreat and killed outright. Grenadiers on the Castleton Road to the south finally turned Warner’s flank and caused him to fall back to this location as well. It soon became evident that the Continentals would have to break contact and retreat if they wanted to fight another day. After Francis died, the Massachusetts troops and New Hampshire men lost their will to fight. After about thirty minutes of additional fighting, the rebel line began to dissolve, and the men headed for the various trails over Pittsford Ridge. Seeing that the militia on his right was disintegrating, Warner ordered his men to scatter and find their way to Manchester where he would meet them in a few days. As the rebels broke contact and made their way over the ridge, British troops attempted to pursue but found that the Americans excelled at conducting a delaying action in the woods. After suffering many casualties in the main battle and still more during the woods pursuit, the officers of the tired and decimated British formations soon called off the hunt and returned to Monument Hill. Fraser had paid a high cost to win the field. Instead of moving on toward Castleton to find St. Clair’s column, the general opted to stay at Hubbardton to lick his wounds and then return to Skenesborough. St. Clair’s command continued to move unimpeded.

The Results and Costs of the Battle
By remaining at Hubbardton, Francis and Warner purchased—at a heavy cost—time that St. Clair needed to escape. Although he won the tactical fight, Fraser did not pursue further and was unable to interdict St. Clair’s main body. As a result, the Americans eventually rejoined Schuyler’s command, which would soon gather at Fort Edward. These troops would face Burgoyne’s army again later.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of the decision by Warner and Francis to remain at Hubbardton on the night of 6 July? How do you think the decision affected the outcome of the battle?
2. What is your assessment of Fraser’s pursuit?
3. How did leadership play a role in the American actions? The British actions?
4. How did the terrain affect Fraser’s efforts to defeat the American rearguard? How did the terrain affect American actions to counter Fraser’s attack?
5. What is your assessment of the role that Riedesel and his Braunschweigers played in this action?
6. What do you see as the significance of this battle?
7. How did the outcome affect each commander’s (Burgoyne and Schuyler) operational options?
8. What are some branches and sequels to their original campaign plan that each commander should have considered at this point?

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<tr>
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Figure 9. Battle of Hubbardton Casualties.
Day 1, Stand 4 Skenesborough (Whitehall) (6 July 1777)

Directions: From the parking lot at Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site, head south on Monument Hill Road 1.3 miles toward St. John Road. The road will turn into East Hubbardton Road. Continue south 4.9 miles. Turn left to merge onto US-4 West. Follow US-4 West for 14 miles to Whitehall, NY (at Whitehall, US-4 West will become Poultney Street). Turn right onto Williams Street and continue straight about 500 feet to the bridge over the Champlain Canal. Once across the bridge, Williams Street becomes Saunders Street. Turn right onto Main Street and proceed about 500 feet to the paved parking area next to Lock 12 on the right.

Orientation: This is the town of Whitehall, New York. At the time of the Saratoga Campaign, it was known as Skenesborough—
named for Phillip Skene, a former British Army officer who had seen a significant amount of action in Britain’s various wars between 1739 and 1769. During his time as the commander of Crown Point in 1759–60, Skene developed an affinity for this region. He later sold his commission in 1769, acquired a royal patent for 25,000 acres in this area, and became a local entrepreneur and opportunist. When the war began, he remained a loyalist and would receive a colonel’s commission to serve with Burgoyne’s Northern Army during the Saratoga Campaign.

The town itself was the center of commerce in a largely uninhabited region. Because it was located at the south end of Lake Champlain and had access to Wood Creek which flowed to the Hudson River, the area was ideal for trade and shipbuilding. At the beginning of the Revolutionary War, the town boasted four boatyards, one or two saw mills, a forge, and a significant number of skilled laborers.
for such a small community. All of Skenesborough’s facilities and items of military value, including Philip Skene’s new schooner, soon fell into the hands of Benedict Arnold and Nathan Hale as they made their way north to seize Fort Ticonderoga in May 1775.

Over the next two years, because of its location and facilities, Skenesborough became a significant logistical hub for the Patriot cause in New York. Significantly, Arnold used its shipbuilding facilities to construct his fleet in the summer of 1776. Through yeoman’s efforts, Arnold built at least 12 row galleys and gondolas with which he opposed Carleton’s fleet at Valcour Island. Arnold also undertook additional work to upgrade Skenesborough’s defenses which included a small palisade fort and a blockhouse for protection.

The area where you stand was the location of the shipyards that built most of Benedict Arnold’s Lake Champlain fleet. The Champlain Canal (i.e., the locks and other canal facilities) did not exist then. The dock areas to the north that you now see on both sides of the canal are where many of the docks and slipways were located on Wood Creek at the time of the campaign. Farther north Wood Creek connects with South Bay. About 25 miles by water beyond that is Fort Ticonderoga. About 21 miles to the northeast is Hubbardton. US Highway 4 heads south out of Whitehall, generally following the old military road to Fort Anne. Fort Anne is about 11 miles to the south. To the west about two miles is South Bay and seven miles beyond that over the mountains is Lake George.

Description: (Note: The events of this stand go back in time one day to 6 July—the morning when the Americans evacuated Fort Ticonderoga and the day before the Battle of Hubbardton.)

In the early morning darkness of 6 July 1777, a fleet of approximately 200 bateaux and the five surviving vessels of Arnold’s Lake Champlain fleet departed the dock areas tucked under the south side of Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain. The vessels carried a large amount of supplies and other materials of military value, along with the wounded and sick men from the Fort Ticonderoga garrison. The fleet was under the command of Col. Pierce Long, commander of the New Hampshire Militia Regiment at Fort Ticonderoga. Long’s mission was to move the evacuated supplies and the wounded and
sick men by water to Skene’s Landing and from there move them overland through Fort Anne to Fort Edward.

Jeduthan Baldwin, the Northern Army’s engineer, had constructed a substantial log boom and chain barrier across the lake to prevent British ships from moving farther south. Confident that the obstacle would slow any pursuing forces, Long slowly moved his mass of tiny boats toward Skenesborough. Commodore Skeffington Lutwidge’s sailors broke through about thirty minutes after starting to batter the barrier with their naval cannon. In short order, Lutwidge directed his squadron through the hole in the opening and pursued the American fleet.

Because of his miscalculation, Long did not push his men to row the distance to Skenesborough as quickly as possible. Moreover, he made no effort to land men to set up what would have been an excellent defensive position at a chokepoint on the Wood Creek channel leading to Skenesborough. Such an action might not have stopped the British, but it certainly would have delayed them long enough for Long to at least get a large share of the supplies away before the enemy arrived at the town.

Long’s mélange of vessels began to arrive at Skenesborough around noon on 6 July. Some of his troops were sent to occupy some of the meager fortifications around the town, while others began the slow process of unloading the bateaux. To his credit, Long immediately sent the sick and wounded men off for Fort Anne. Not long after their departure and to everyone’s surprise, British vessels sailed up Wood Creek toward the town. Lutwidge’s gunners quickly opened fire. Within minutes, the whole landing area was a confused mass of sinking and burning bateaux. Most of them were fired by the Americans to prevent capture. The flaming boats soon set the docks and nearby structures on fire. While his gunners took the American vessels and burning fortifications, the commodore began landing troops of the 9th, 20th, and 21st Foot to cut the escape route across the Fort Anne Road, while the 47th Foot moved to attack the town. Meanwhile, American troops who were not already fleeing the area were setting fire to anything of military value in Skenesborough. Despite their efforts, a substantial amount of the supplies so painstakingly spirited away from Fort Ticonderoga fell into enemy hands.
Long and about 150 men were able to escape down the Fort Anne Road before it was cut. The remainder of his regiment fled to the hills or was captured.

Vignette: None

*Analysis*

1. What does US Army doctrine teach about the employment and defense of obstacles?

2. How would you compare and contrast the leadership of Long with that of Lutwidge?

3. What is your assessment of the British pursuit of Long?
Day 1, Stand 5 The Battle of Fort Anne (7–9 July 1777)

Directions: Head south on Main Street toward Division Street for 0.2 miles. Continue straight onto Skenesborough Drive and proceed 0.4 miles. Turn right onto Poultney Street and proceed 0.1 miles, then left onto Broadway for 0.6 miles. Broadway becomes NY-22 South/US-4 West. Proceed 8.7 miles to the Fort Anne Battlefield marker, which is located on a cliff face on the east side of Battle Hill which will loom on the right (west).

Note: Carefully watch for the marker as it is not readily observable until you are close, especially when foliage is present. There is a narrow pull-off on the left (east) side of the road.

Caution: While the pull-off is capable of parking a bus, the bus must cross oncoming traffic lane to park. There is no ideal location

Map 10. Day 1 Route to Stand 5.
for this stand due to the potential for heavy traffic and corresponding noise, which interferes with conducting the stand here. An alternative location is the Glen Falls (Fort Ann) Bank which is located about two miles farther south on US-4 West, on the left (east) side of the road just after crossing the Halfway Creek bridge. The bank is a replica blockhouse that sits on or near the site of old Fort Anne. If this site is chosen, a staff ride representative will need to coordinate with the bank or an adjacent business in advance to park a bus. If pressed for time, this stand may be conducted as a drive-by.

Primary Orientation: Battle Hill Location. You are standing below the hill on which Lt. Col. John Hill’s detachment of the 9th Regiment of Foot made its stand against the attacks of the American
forces from Fort Anne on 8 July 1777. The British forces would have defended near the top of the rise in front of you. Facing the hill, the American attacks would have approached from your left (south), the direction of Fort Anne. The foliage here in July would have been less than today because of grazing by farm animals and the gathering of wood for fires. Since this area was very sparsely settled at this time, the surrounding flatlands would have been under far less cultivation and not nearly as open as today. Due west about 13 miles was Fort George at the south end of Lake George. To the south-southwest 13 miles was Fort Edward on the Hudson River. Wood Creek is about 50 yards to your south, just beyond the railroad tracks.

Alternate Orientation: Glen Falls (Fort Ann) Bank Location. You are standing at the approximate location of the Fort Anne stockade. At the time of the campaign, Fort Anne consisted of a blockhouse and a relatively small stockade with wood palisade walls. The fort was largely rundown and not capable of withstanding a determined attack by a superior force, especially if the attacking force possessed any artillery. Due west about 13 miles was Fort George at the south end of Lake George. To the south-southwest 12 miles was Fort Edward on the Hudson River. Wood Creek is about 200 yards to the east. The creek flowed from Skenesborough (Whitehall) through Fort Anne and emptied into the Hudson River near Fort Edward.

Description: After the successful seizure of Skenesborough and unsuccessful attempt to capture the American commander Long and his men, Burgoyne was anxious to keep up the pressure on St. Clair’s retreating forces. In addition to Fraser’s column, which was marching rapidly toward Hubbardton to catch St. Clair’s rearguard, Burgoyne sent Lt. Col. John Hill’s 9th Regiment of Foot to pursue Long’s New Hampshire men down the Fort Anne Road. Concurrently, the 20th and 21st Regiments of Foot would move by bateaux via Wood Creek toward the same destination. The three regiments were to join forces near Fort Anne and destroy any rebel forces consolidating there.

Hill’s column departed early the morning of 7 July. Even under normal circumstances, traveling the small road was difficult as it was a barely discernable footpath in many places and crossed over
numerous ridges, creeks, and swampy areas where footing was often difficult. The journey was even more difficult with the July heat and stuffy, humid air under the canopy of thick trees and underbrush. In addition, the rebels had destroyed every foot bridge and boardwalk over the creeks and swamps, so the British column had to stop periodically and build makeshift crossings. As a result, the 9th Foot traveled only 10 miles by the end of the day, and the regiment was so strung out that Hill only had about 190 men with him when he made camp that afternoon.

On the American side, refugees from Long’s New Hampshire Regiment had gathered under the command of Capt. James Gray, combining with Gray’s company of the Continental 3rd New Hampshire Regiment as it made its way back to Fort Anne. All told, Gray had about 220 men, including about seventeen rangers, when he arrived at the fort. There he found another detachment of American troops and more refugees from Long’s regiment crowded into the fort’s small confines. Confusion and demoralization reigned. Gray decided to remove his men from the area to avoid bringing down their morale. He moved his company northward back up the Fort Anne Road, rangers in the lead. After moving a relatively short distance, the rangers bumped into the pickets from the 9th Foot, which was now camped only about a mile north of the fort. The rangers and pickets began sniping at one another—making Hill and Long aware of each other’s presence.

The good news for the Americans was that after Gray departed, a 400-man New York Militia Regiment under Col. Henry K. Van Rensselaer arrived at Fort Anne. Long and Van Rensselaer were discussing options when the gunfire erupted to the north. Both agreed that the New Yorkers—militia but at least a cohesive unit—should march toward the sound of the guns. Van Rensselaer led his men north and shortly arrived at the scene. The two American units—now outnumbering Hill by three to one—began pressing the small British command. The fight continued in a somewhat desultory manner for four hours until darkness set in. Hill realized that he had been lucky that the rebel troops, who clearly outnumbered him, did not overwhelm his command. He quickly sent runners to urge his other troops forward as well as the elements of his own regiment which were strung out far behind him. He would need reinforcements to
survive the fighting on the morrow.

The following morning an American “deserter” walked into camp and told Hill that the American force—depleted somewhat by casualties the day before—now consisted of about 1,000 troops. Unfortunately for Hill, the deserter left shortly thereafter, returning to the American camp to inform Colonel Long about the exact dispositions of Hill’s command as well as its strength. Armed with the new information, Colonel Long moved to attack the diminutive redcoat band. Around 1000, Long’s combined command pushed forward and engaged the skirmishers and then the main body of the 9th Foot. Hill realized he would have to move to a better defensive location to be able to hold long enough for reinforcements to arrive. He chose a heavily wooded hill on the west side of the road. Leaving behind his wounded from the day before, he urged his troops forward to form a circular perimeter on top of the hill just in time to fend off the initial rebel attack. Combined with the expenditure of ammunition from the day before and the ongoing fight, the British troops soon began to run low. The situation was becoming desperate, and Hill contemplated surrendering his command to prevent further bloodshed.

Hill was not aware that the American troops also were low on ammunition. Long and his men were uncertain whether they themselves still had enough bullets and powder to press their advantage. At about that time, both British and American troops heard the fast-approaching whoops of what sounded like an Indian war party. The sounds were actually coming from a single man, Capt. John Money, Burgoyne’s Deputy Quartermaster. Money had been traveling with a group of Iroquois warriors who deserted the officer soon after they heard the sounds of battle. Now alone, Money did his best to run through the woods and whoop like many Indians. The belief that the British were about to be reinforced by the Iroquois—coupled with his own men’s dwindling ammunition—caused Long to break off the fight.

Back at Fort Anne, Long conferred again with his subordinate leaders. The consensus was to withdraw to Fort Edward, particularly due to the shortage of ammunition as well as the news that Maj. Gen. William Phillips was about to arrive and reinforce Hill with some 2,000 troops. Accordingly, Long continued the American retreat south to Fort Edward, directing his men to destroy the road’s bridges and fell large trees across the trail as they went. Long need
not have worried so much. Once the fight broke off, Hill retreated farther north on the road to avoid what he thought might be a final American assault. The British pursuit on the Fort Anne Road was at an end. Like Fraser at Hubbardton, Hill learned first-hand at Fort Anne that even though the British might drive the American rebels from the battlefield, they would likely sustain heavy casualties in the process. Though Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough may have been rather easy and essentially bloodless victories, the “victors” came away from the two subsequent fights with a bloody nose and a much diminished desire to press the pursuit.

Vignette: None

Analysis

1. Assess Hill’s pursuit of the retreating American forces. How well did Hill react after contact? How did the terrain affect Hill’s decisions?

2. Why do you think the American forces were largely demoralized on the morning of 7 July but were able to decisively end the British pursuit by noon on July 8?

3. What are the key insights to be gained about the action at Fort Anne? How much can we take away from both sides lack of situational awareness and the effects of the fog of war?

4. What is the key significance of the battle as it pertains to the campaign?

5. Both sides seemed to have poor situational awareness at times in this battle. What aspects of intelligence (good and bad) can we learn from the battle that would still apply today?

Day 1, Stand 6 Fort Edward (Drive by) (Events 7–29 July)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Casualties from Battle of Fort Anne</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50–200¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Estimates of American casualties for this action vary wildly. The higher figure likely includes those captured and deserters.

Figure 10. Fort Anne Casualties.
Directions: From the blockhouse bank in Fort Ann, head south on US-4 West for 9.8 miles. As you enter the town of Fort Edward, US-4 West will also be named Main Street. Follow Main street to Juckett Park. At Juckett Park, US-4 West becomes Park Place. Follow Park Place to the right then turn left onto River Street/US-4 West (which turns into Main Street). Continue on Main Street to follow US-4 West for 2.5 miles. Note: The grave of Jane McCrae is located in Union Cemetery in Fort Edward. Union Cemetery is
located on your left about one mile from the turn). Watch for Bridge Street on your right.

Orientation: This is intended to be a “drive-by” stand. If you wish to stop, the best location is on Rogers Island. To get there, turn right on Bridge Street then the first left on Rogers Island Drive. Park in the parking lot of the Rogers Island Visitors Center. If no stop is desired, continue to head south on US-4 West while the stand is conducted on the bus. As you drive by the intersection of US 4 and State Highway 197, point out Bridge Street on the right. The bridge crosses over to Rogers Island where the barracks area for Fort Edward was located. The intersection itself is located where the fort’s north bastion stood. US-4 West cuts through the middle of the fort’s original location (on the east bank of the Hudson River) as it passes by Bridge Street. Fort Edward protected the local portage, which bypassed the falls on the Hudson River near here. Originally constructed in 1755 as Fort Lyman, it was renamed Fort Edward in 1756.
in honor of Prince Edward, the grandson of King George II. Edward was a younger brother of King George III.

Fort Edward itself was a log and earthen structure built in the star fort style with bastions, lunettes, and ramparts. The fortification, however, did not provide all-round protection since its west side was the Hudson River itself. Built to protect the area from French attack, its primary defenses were oriented to the north. A log pontoon-type bridge connected the fort with the barracks area on Rogers Island. At the time of the Revolutionary War, it was largely run-down. Much of the wood in the fort had been removed in 1767 to build houses and other structures in the area. Most of the remaining wood buttresses and walls had decayed and collapsed by 1777. The rebels frequently used the dilapidated barracks area for a cantonment but had done little to improve the fort’s defensive capabilities by the time Schuyler arrived here about 10 July.

Description: At 0500 on 7 July, a messenger arrived at Schuyler’s headquarters in Albany with the news that Ticonderoga and Mount Independence had fallen. Shocked by this news, Schuyler soon departed for Fort Edward, the most logical place to try and assemble his now-dispersed and retreating forces. En route, the Northern Department commander sent a series of messages to General Washington keeping him informed of events and requesting reinforcements. He also sent word to St. Clair and Brig. Gen. John Nixon (whose brigade was at Peekskill) to have them and their commands meet him at Fort Edward. At this point, Schuyler was uncertain whether St. Clair still had a command or if his subordinate was a prisoner of war. On arrival at Fort Edward, Schuyler found the remnants of Long’s command and the other troops the colonel had brought with him from Fort Anne.

Meanwhile, after the battle at Hubbardton, St. Clair received word that Burgoyne’s troops had taken Skanesborough. Realizing his help would not arrive in time, St. Clair wisely headed for Fort Edward instead. Moving on a more circuitous route, he marched his men from Castleton through Pawlet then to Dorset, where he paused briefly to rest his men and send a letter to Schuyler explaining his situation. He then proceeded through Manchester to Bennington.
The note that St. Clair sent from Dorset did not reach Schuyler until 10 July. Although relieved to receive word from his subordinate, Schuyler became concerned that St. Clair might remain at Bennington to rest and resupply his force rather than consolidating at Fort Edward. One element of good news in the letter: St. Clair explained that his command had gotten away in relatively good order then fought a battle (Hubbardton). He added that although many of his men were scattered, they were returning to the fold on a daily basis. Schuyler’s letter must have reached St. Clair as well since his column turned west, reaching the Hudson River at Batten Kill on 11 July and then moving north to Fort Edward, where it arrived the following day. By coincidence, Nixon’s 580-man Continental Army brigade arrived the same day. Brig. Gen. John Fellows’ militia brigade arrived a few days later, further strengthening Schuyler’s command and giving him enough troops to provide a credible threat to Burgoyne’s front. In short, the Northern Army was gradually gathering to block, or at least delay, its British counterpart. Schuyler was preparing to make the most of it.

The Northern Army commander issued orders to Nixon and Fellows to take their brigades north on the road toward Fort Anne and continue working to make the route impassable. Over the next several days, Continentals and militiamen went to great lengths to destroy all bridges and causeways over swampy areas. They also felled huge trees across the road to slow or block British progress. Sometimes the Americans cut two or three trees so the branches would interlock, causing a tangled mess that would take hours to chop away. They placed similar obstacles across navigable streams and dug trenches to divert streams so they would feed into low ground along the trail and create a morass that would require a bridge or at least a boardwalk to cross. The rebel soldiers did their work so well that British troops were later forced to build a causeway and corduroy (See Appendix I, Glossary of Terms) a two-mile-long stretch of trail.

Not content with simply slowing British progress, Schuyler also worked to improve other aspects of the Northern Army’s situation. In addition to asking Washington for more troops, he sent appeals to the governor of New York and the Vermont legislature for
more militiamen. He pulled other units in his department away from other assignments to converge on Fort Edward and made every effort to acquire ammunition, food, and other supplies his army would need. His efforts to build up men and supplies would continue over the next several weeks.

Having failed to capture the American garrison at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence—and drawn further inland and eastward by pursuits to Skenesborough and Hubbardton—Burgoyne now had to decide whether to continue moving south via the east or west side of the Hudson River. His original plan was to move his army on the La Chute River and over the portage between Fort Ticonderoga and Lake George Landing. From there they would float down Lake George to Fort George then portage to the Hudson River at Fort Edward. However, he quickly realized that the La Chute “River” was nothing more than a rocky creek that rapidly climbed some 200 feet to Lake George. All wagons and artillery, as well as the bateaux used to move the army south from St. John, would have to be pulled, pushed, and otherwise dragged over a three-mile route to the Lake George Landing. The land route itself posed a problem since the heavy equipment would have to ascend the same 200 feet in elevation before reaching the landing on Lake George.

There were two additional problems with this option. For one thing, the water route back to Fort Ticonderoga was almost thirty miles in the wrong direction—what might seem a retreat to the enemy as well as to Burgoyne’s troops. He feared that returning to Fort Ticonderoga might boost rebel soldier morale while demoralizing his own troops. Additionally, choosing the water route would end speculation that his ultimate objective might be to turn east and advance into New England. Staying the course on the west side of the Hudson telegraphed that his goal was indeed Albany.

Burgoyne discovered the eastern route when his army originally occupied Skenesborough. Though the route was primarily overland, the bateaux loaded with supplies, ammunition, and equipment could be floated down Wood Creek to its junction with the Hudson River. Wagons and artillery could go by land. In theory, this was the easiest route. In practice, road conditions and rebel-placed obstacles significantly complicated the movement forward from Skenesbor-
ough to Fort Edward. Ultimately Burgoyne decided to move by both routes. On 10 July, he directed Phillips to move the army’s artillery, and most of the wagons and bateaux, over the portage to Lake George Landing. Concurrently, he ordered Riedesel and Brig. Henry W. Powell to have their men clear and improve the road to Fort Edward. Both columns would meet at the fort. Burgoyne would decide his next steps once he arrived there.

Over the next 19 days, Burgoyne’s men labored to chop, dig, and build their way slowly southward toward Fort Edward, while others toiled across the portage to Lake George Landing and later from Fort George to Fort Edward. Other than the obstacles, the British advance was uncontested. Although he arranged for many impediments to bar Burgoyne’s path, Schuyler recognized that Fort Edward was no place to make a determined stand. On 14 July, he ordered his troops to retreat southward to Moses Kill. Two weeks later on 29 July, Burgoyne’s advance party arrived at Fort Edward, exhausted and hungry. Almost three grueling weeks had been spent to move only twenty-three miles. Phillips’ column and its lead elements arrived at Fort Edwards at nearly the same time via the water route. Burgoyne decided to take an operational pause to rest his tired men. The next major hurdle he faced—and it was a problem he would grapple with from this point forward—was how to adequately feed his soldiers. The Army from Canada was running out of food.

Vignette: Sergeant Roger Lamb, 23rd Regiment of Foot, kept a diary during his service in America and described the challenges of clearing the Fort Anne–Fort Edward Road:

The Americans, under the direction of General Schuyler, were constantly employed in cutting down trees on both sides of every road, which was in the line of march. The face of the country was likewise so broken with creeks and Marshes, that there was no less than forty bridges as to construct, one of which was over a morass two miles in extent. (John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 81.)

*Analysis*
Jan: It is difficult to conduct the analysis at drive-by stands (especially if the participants are on a full bus or multiple vehicles one van is doable). You may wish to consider holding the analysis questions until arriving at the next stand. Conduct the analysis of the drive-by stand there before doing the next on-the-ground stand.

1. Given the problems faced after the disasters at Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough, what is your analysis of Schuyler’s actions after those events?

2. What is your assessment of St. Clair’s actions?

3. Do you think Burgoyne’s decision to proceed on both routes was a good one? Why or why not?

4. How did the terrain affect Burgoyne’s and Schuyler’s decisions and actions at this point in the campaign?

5. One of the objectives of operational planners and their commanders is to make decisions and take actions that expand the options available to the commander. Whose options were expanding at this point and whose were diminishing (or both or neither) and why?
Day 1, Stand 7 Fort Miller (Drive-by) (Events 7–30 July 1777)

Directions: From Fort Edward, continue south 7.5 miles on US-4 West until reaching the town of Fort Miller. Looking across the Hudson River at the point where Fort Miller Road and the North River Road converge, one can still observe the remnants of the fortification’s glacis, a low-graded artificial slope of earth.

Orientation: The town of Fort Miller takes its name from an old fort positioned here on the west bank of the Hudson River. The

Map 14. Day 1 Route to Stand 7.
fortifications were originally constructed in 1709 and renovated in 1755 during the French and Indian War. The fort protected a portage known as the “Little Carrying Place,” which ran north of the mouth of the Batten Kill. The post was maintained as a supply link to Forts Edward and George. However, its fortifications fell into disuse when the area came under British control at the conclusion of the French and Indian War.

Description: Like Fort Edward, Fort Miller was an untenable position to hold against Burgoyne’s professional army, especially when the British were equipped with such a large amount of artillery. Thus, Schuyler’s command, having now grown to 4,000 men, simply passed by this area on the east side of the river on 30 July while moving from Moses Kill to Stillwater. Schuyler ordered his men to remove or destroy any livestock, food, or supplies that would

Map 15. Day 1 Stand 7.
be of value to the enemy as they made their way south. When he arrived at Batten Kill, Schuyler crossed the Northern Army over to the west bank of the Hudson and arrived at Stillwater on 1 August. There he developed plans to build defenses to block any further advance south by the British.

As Burgoyne’s ground column was hacking its way toward Fort Edward, Howe prepared to sail his expedition to seize the rebel capitol at Philadelphia. From his headquarters in New York, Howe wrote to Burgoyne on 17 July informing him he was about to depart on his quest. Howe also stated that he was not moving any troops toward the north at the moment, but assured Burgoyne that if Washington should move the rebel army northward, Howe would “soon be after him to relieve you.” On 21 July, a messenger from Burgoyne arrived in New York with the news that Fort Ticonderoga had been captured and the Army from Canada was building a road toward Fort Edward.

Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, Howe’s deputy and commander of British troops in New York City, had arrived back at New York from England on 5 July. He immediately petitioned Howe to move north and support Burgoyne’s advance—then repeated the request over the next two weeks. When the messenger arrived on the 21st with Burgoyne’s report, Clinton became more convinced than ever that Burgoyne’s foray needed to be supported by Howe’s command. That day Clinton made the argument directly to Howe, who disagreed. The Commander-in-Chief simply disregarded his subordinate’s recommendation. Two days later, Howe boarded a ship in New York Harbor (his whole command had previously embarked) and sailed for Chesapeake Bay and, ultimately, Philadelphia.

Arriving at Fort Edward, Burgoyne paused to assemble and rest his Army from Canada in preparation for the operation’s next phase. He also determined that he needed to reduce his reliance on supplies coming from Canada, especially food stocks. The farther south he went, the longer his line of communications stretched. He needed to carry as much ammunition, powder, and other purely military supplies as possible. He knew it was only a matter of time before the Americans would stand and fight. The less food he had to haul, the more other supplies he could bring with him. Additionally, just feed-
ing his troops was becoming problematic. Patrols around the Batten Kill reported the rebels had left the area bare of any useful supplies, especially food.

Earlier when the army had been concentrated in the Skenesborough area, Riedesel asked Burgoyne if he could conduct small raids to the east in Vermont to forage for food, and more importantly, secure badly needed horses for his dragoons. Though Burgoyne rejected the request during the previous visit, he reconsidered the concept upon returning to Fort Edward. Given the worsening logistics situation, he planned for a more ambitious effort.

In the first week of August, Burgoyne planned for a sizable raiding party to travel east from the Batten Kill area through Manchester to Rockingham in Vermont. From there, the column would descend the Connecticut River to Battleboro, then turn west again toward Albany and reconsolidate with Burgoyne’s army. The mission was to test the “affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount Riedesel’s dragoons, to complete Peter’s corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages.” In addition to animals, wagons, and food, Burgoyne wanted to see if the country harbored loyalists who would enlist and help increase the numerical strength in Lt. Col. John Peters’ Queen’s Loyal Rangers Battalion.

Though he originally proposed such a mission, Riedesel was not enthusiastic about the new plan given its much larger scale and broader objectives. Moreover, a number of British officers believed it was foolish to entrust the mission to Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum of the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig. Baum spoke no English, did not understand the Vermont culture, and was not familiar with the country in the Grants. Nevertheless, Baum departed Fort Edward on 9 August with almost 500 Braunschweigers, Canadians, and Iroquois warriors as well as two small 3-pounder cannon from the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery. His contingent arrived at Fort Miller later that day.

In the interim, Burgoyne received intelligence that the rebels had assembled a large food depot at Bennington, Vermont. Responding to the news, the British commander mounted his horse on the morning of the 10th and rode to Fort Miller to confer with Baum.
There he directed him to head to Bennington and the reported depot. Baum led his column out of Fort Miller about noon on 11 August 1777 bound for Bennington.

Vignette 1: Colonel Specht recorded his impressions of Fort Miller:

The so-called Fort Miller lies on that side of the river and had once consisted of two other buildings: a blockhouse, surrounded by palisades and a magazine. Some time ago, it served as a depot for victuals and war necessities when the Forts Edward and George had to be occupied by English Detachments to preserve these parts against an attack by the Savages. These forts have not been occupied for a long time. This post has gone almost completely to ruin and hardly any traces of its previous palisades can be seen.

Vignette 2: After Howe sailed toward the Chesapeake, a disgruntled Clinton expressed his views in a letter to his friend Lord Hugh Percy:

I fear it bears heavy on Burgoyne. If this campaign does not finish the war, I prophesy that there is an end of British domination in America. (Michael O. Logusz, *With Musket & Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777*, Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 160.)

Vignette 3: In a report to Germain referencing the battle at Bennington, Burgoyne explained his actions and rationale for the expedition:

It was soon found that in the situation of the transport-service at that time, the army could barely be victualled from day to day, and that there was no prospect of establishing a magazine in due time for pursuing present advantages. The idea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon this difficulty, combined with the intelligence report by General Riedesal, and with all I had otherwise received. I knew that Bennington was the great deposit of corn, flour, and store cattle, that it was only guarded by militia, and
every day’s account tended to confirm the persuasion of the loyalty of one description of inhabitants and the panic of the other. Those who knew the country best were the most sanguine in this persuasion. The German troops employed were of the best I had of that nation. The number of British was small, but it was the select light corps of the army, composed of chosen men from all the regiments, and commanded by Captain Fraser, one of the most distinguished officers in his line of service that I ever met with. (Henry B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution. 1775–1781. Historical and Military Criticism, with Topographical Illustration, New York: A.S. Barnes, 1876, 328.)

Analysis

None (Analysis items that could be addressed here are covered in other locations).

Note: As stated earlier, it is difficult to conduct an analysis at drive-by stands, especially if the participants are on a full bus or multiple vehicles (one van is doable). You may wish to consider holding the analysis questions until arrival at the next stand. Conduct the analysis of the drive-by stand there before doing the next on-the-ground stand.
Day 1, Stand 8 The Battle of Bennington (Events between 11 and 16 August 1777)

Directions: Head south on US-4 West for 0.8 mile. Turn left onto Bald Mountain Road/NY-77 South and travel four miles to junction with NY-40 South. Turn right onto NY-40 South. Travel 0.5 miles to traffic circle in Middle Falls and head east on NY-29 East from traffic circle 1.5 miles to junction with NY-372 East in Greenwich (NY-29 East becomes NY-372 in Greenwich). Travel southeast on NY-372 East for nine miles to the junction with NY-22 South in Cambridge. Turn right onto NY-22 South/South Park Street in Cambridge and travel 7.8 miles to North Hoosick. At North Hoosick, continue east on NY-67 East (NY-22 South turns to the right). Travel east on NY-67 East for 2.2 miles. Follow the signs to Bennington Battlefield and turn left onto the park access
road. Continue up this road to the parking lot. Walk uphill to the area near the flagpole.

Note 1: At the top of the hill above the parking lot, adjacent to the flagpole, is a raised block platform on which a bronze map of the battlefield and the surrounding terrain is located. This is an ideal location to conduct the initial stand. The platform map may also be used as a visual for orientation and briefing purposes.

Orientation: You are standing on what would have been about the center of the defenses that Lieutenant Colonel Baum’s Braunschweigers occupied on the morning of 16 August 1777 (see map 40, Appendix J, Battle of Bennington, Baum’s Heights 16 August 1777). To the open field in the north was the Dragoon Redoubt. To the southeast about eight miles is the town of Bennington, Baum’s initial objective. Stark’s militia camp was located along the Walloomsac River between here and Bennington. Just down the hill to the southeast is the Walloomsac River, the bridge, and the Tory Re-
doubt. To the west were the crossroads of Sancoick (now known as North Hoosick) through which Baum’s command moved to reach this location. The vegetation here is somewhat thicker than in 1777. Given the farmsteads in the area at the time, the secondary growth beneath the tree canopy would have been thinned somewhat by grazing farm animals, etc.

Note 2: If time permits, this stand is best conducted at three separate locations: Baum’s Heights, the Tory Redoubt, and Breymann’s Defeat. Otherwise, the entire stand can be conducted from Baum’s Heights.

Day 1, Sub-stand 8A Baum’s Heights

Description: On 18 July 1777, John Stark, formerly a colonel in the Continental Army, was commissioned a brigadier general in the New Hampshire militia. Earlier in the war, Stark had served admirably at Bunker Hill, Trenton, and Princeton, but Congress had not seen fit to promote him to brigadier general the previous March. Several other officers whom Stark viewed as less capable were promoted over him, so he soon resigned from United States service and was now in the service of his home state. Between the time he received his commission and the end of July (remarkably, less than two weeks), Stark raised a 1,500-man brigade of New Hampshire militia to serve against Burgoyne. The New Hampshire legislature exempted Stark and his command from orders issued by anyone other than that governing body. Stark was to act independently against Burgoyne to protect the state, its people, and their interests; and that suited John Stark fine.

By the end of July, Stark had concentrated his brigade at Charlestown, New Hampshire. He sent half of his brigade—about 700 men—on a forty-five-mile march west to Manchester, Vermont. The first contingent departed on 2 August and the remainder followed over the next several days. At Manchester, they were to link up with Seth Warner’s Continental Regiment, which now consisted of only 140 men. After splitting up and retreating from Hubbardton, Warner’s men travelled in small groups to Manchester, where the
colonel had ordered them to assemble. Though there were undoubtedly some deserters, the majority of the men who survived the battle at Hubbardton showed up in Manchester as ordered. They were rested, fed, and otherwise prepared for the next mission. Having collected most of his regiment, Warner was ready to lead them into action when Stark’s men began to arrive.

Unknown to Stark or Warner, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln was also en route to Manchester to take control of all Continental and militia units in the Vermont and New Hampshire areas. Washington had sent Lincoln, who hailed from Massachusetts, to assist Schuyler. A New Yorker and an antagonist to New Englanders regarding the struggle over the Grants (i.e., Vermont) between New York and New Hampshire, Schuyler was an unpopular commander in that region. Some felt that as a fellow New Englander, Lincoln would hold more sway
over the northeast militiamen. When Lincoln arrived at Manchester on 8 August, he immediately informed Warner and Stark’s deputy commander that he was now in charge and began issuing orders to march the men assembled there to join Schuyler at Stillwater.

That same day, Stark arrived to find his command lined up and prepared to move. When he discovered why, Stark brusquely informed Lincoln that his men were under his orders and that neither he nor they worked for the Continental Army. Stark then directed his command to march for Bennington and asked Warner to join him there when his Continentals were prepared to move. Lincoln diplomatically deferred to Stark then returned as rapidly as possible to inform Schuyler about the turn of events. Rather than challenge Stark, Schuyler instructed Lincoln to return to Vermont with a 500-man brigade, gather Warner’s regiment, and make plans to attack Burgoyne’s supply line at Skenesborough. Although that plan would not be put into effect until sometime later, the concept was the genesis of the later Pawlet Expedition. When Stark arrived at Bennington the following day, he found that additional militia units had already arrived and others were en route. Though he was not yet aware of it, Baum’s expedition was among those on their way.

After departing Fort Miller on 11 August, Baum’s movement toward Bennington experienced little resistance. On the 12th, his advance guard skirmished with some rebel militia near Cambridge and captured about 150 head of cattle and 1,000 bushels of wheat which Baum sent back to Fort Edward. Baum also captured several prisoners who informed him that between 1,000 and 1,800 militia men were at Bennington guarding the depot. Baum was further assured that the rebel forces planned to retreat, assuming that his column advanced that far. Despite the large number of enemy reported, Baum chose to move forward.

Stark received word the following day—probably from the Cambridge militia—that Baum’s column was en route to Bennington. Stark wisely sent a 200-man reconnaissance force under Lt. Col. William Gregg forward to make contact with Baum. Gregg moved to a bridge which crossed the Owl Kill at a place called Sancoick’s Mill (now named North Hoosick) about three miles west of where the impending battle would take place. There his troops made camp
to await developments. Baum’s column approached the mill about 0800 the morning of 14 August. Dressed in fringed hunting shirts and taking cover in the trees flanking the road, Gregg’s men fired a volley and began to withdraw eastward toward Bennington. Before escaping across the Owl Kill, Gregg’s men heavily damaged the bridge, failing to destroy it as they intended. Stopping to repair the bridge, Baum sent Burgoyne a message relaying the events and estimates of rebel troop numbers, as well as a request for reinforcements.

An hour or so after the skirmish at Sancoick, Stark received word of the action. He assembled his command and prepared to move west from camp. Before departing, he sent a messenger with a note to urge Warner to move his men forward at once. He then put his men on the road toward Sancoick.

Once the bridge over the Owl Kill was repaired, Baum’s force continued forward. Stark’s and Baum’s columns were now on a collision course. As Stark approached the bridge over the Walloomsac east of Sancoick, he saw Baum’s column in the distance. They had almost arrived at the crossing. At about the same time, Baum spied Stark’s command and received intelligence that the rebel forces at Bennington were expecting additional reinforcements at any moment. Noticing a hill on the north side of the road that dominated the eastern approach to the Walloomsac Bridge, Baum wisely began to deploy his forces into defensive positions there—knowing that his command now faced a significantly superior force in numbers, if not in quality. Observing Baum moving into position, Stark opted to withdraw to his camp and develop a plan of attack.

The remainder of 14 August and into the 15th, Baum’s men prepared a number of defensive positions on the high ground overlooking the Walloomsac Bridge and on the far side of the river. He placed his headquarters on top of the hill, with a commanding view toward Bennington. Baum positioned the dismounted dragoons of the Regiment von Ludwig generally to the north of his headquarters, where they built a fortified redoubt. On the left end of the dragoons, Capt. Alexander Fraser’s Company of Marksmen extended the position to the southwest a short distance. Down the slope to the southeast, the soldiers placed two 3-pounder cannon on a small shelf overlooking the bridge and established another redoubt on the
near side of the bridge (note: one of the 3-pounders was later moved up to the Dragoon Redoubt on the morning of 16 August). These positions were protected by about 60 German grenadiers and British light infantrymen. The “Tory Redoubt” (as it became known) across the river was manned by about 250 men of the Queen’s Loyal Rangers and other local loyalists under Lt. Col. John Peters and Lt. Col. Francis Pfister, respectively. Behind them, a small detachment of Canadian militia was clustered in a collection of three or four cabins near the bridge—positioned to support the redoubt and defend the crossing itself. The small collection of Indians made their camp on the hill to the west of Baum’s headquarters but still relatively close. Inexplicably, despite being substantially outnumbered and concerned enough about rebel intentions to request reinforcements from Burgoyne, Baum failed to post any skirmishers or outposts to help protect the main position.

August 15th was a miserably wet day, so little action took place on either side other than the efforts of American patrols to feel out the enemy positions on the hill and snipe at Baum’s Indian contingent (at which they had some success). On the hill, Baum possessed nearly 800 men to hold his position until reinforcements arrived. In theory, he would not have to wait too long since shortly after receiving Baum’s request, Burgoyne had dispatched a Reserve Corps detachment of more than 700 men under Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann. The problem was that the rainy day slowed Breymann’s column to a crawl. In dry conditions, he could have marched to Baum’s location in one day. As events transpired, Breymann was still seven miles from Cambridge when he stopped for the night on 15 August, and he would not arrive at Baum’s location until late the following day.

While Breymann’s men struggled along the muddy road from Fort Miller, Seth Warner’s Continentals were making a similar difficult trek from Manchester to Bennington. Warner himself had ridden ahead to learn the situation at Stark’s location and better understand how to best employ his regiment on its arrival. The regiment, marching under the direction of Maj. Samuel Safford, would not arrive at the town of Bennington until shortly before midnight—wet and exhausted.

Throughout the day, Baum’s men made leisurely progress
developing their defenses in the rain. In addition to failing to put out guards, Baum allowed a number of “civilians” to pass though his area during the day. At least one of them wandered unescorted through Baum’s positions on the hill. Some of these seemingly harmless non-combatants were from Stark’s command. It is highly likely that some of the civilians who passed through the German positions also sent their observations to Stark.

Stark also used the 15th to prepare a plan for engaging the enemy force. The plan itself, finalized on the morning of 16 August, called for a complex attack. Even experienced soldiers would find the complicated maneuvers difficult to execute—much more than would normally be expected of the amateur militiamen under Stark’s command. Stark’s concept called for a double envelopment of Baum’s main positions on the hill. One 300-man column under Lt. Col. Moses Nichols was to circle east and north of the hill to attack Baum’s redoubt from the north. The second equally sized column under Col. Samuel Herrick was to circle south and west and attack from the west. Two smaller elements under Colonels Thomas Stickney and David Hobar were to attack due west through the Tory Redoubt to seize the bridge on the Walloomsac River. Once the main position was fixed in place and the bridge in Patriot hands, Stark would conduct a frontal assault to attack the hill from the east and south, personally leading the remaining 1,200 militiamen.

Unlike the day before, the morning of 16 August dawned bright and sunny. Since Stark’s troops would execute this operation in daylight, the three columns worked much of the day to prepare. About 1100, the columns began to stealthily move into position for the attack. Once in position, the troops of the three columns went to ground. By pure luck, all three assaults began about 1500. Nichols’s men in the north and Herrick’s men from the west stood up, advanced a number of paces until the Dragoon Redoubt was in view, and let loose aimed volleys. From there, they advanced using trees and boulders for protection, loading and firing independently. The dragoons and nearby Indians dropped steadily under the assault. Within about twenty minutes of fighting, the Americans were in the redoubt and the Germans were fleeing south. Some surviving Indians somehow made their way between the two American assault
lines, and the remainder soon disappeared from the fight altogether.

**Day 1, Sub-stand 8B Tory Redoubt**

Directions: From the parking lot on Baum’s Heights, return downhill to NY-67. Turn left (east) on NY-67 East and proceed about 100 yards then turn right on Caretaker Road. Proceed about 100 yards on Caretaker Road and turn right (south) on Cottrell Road. Proceed about 300 yards south on Cottrell Road until you approach a “Y” junction. Veer to the left onto the gravel road and drive another 300 yards to a small gravel parking area on the left. Park there.

Orientation: The open field to the north and northwest is the approximate location of the Tory Redoubt, which was little more than a dirt embankment hurriedly thrown up toward the east and southeast. Also to the northwest is Baum’s Heights and the Walloomsac River Bridge. The cabins defended by the Canadians were located in the area around the bridge on both sides of the river. Due east is the town of Bennington and a bend southward of the Walloomsac River. It was generally along that bend where Stark’s militia units camped before the battle.

Description: Once the other rebels heard the initiation of Nichols’s and Herrick’s attacks, Stickney and Hobar ordered their men to advance toward the Tory Redoubt. The Americans plunged forward downhill into a gully and proceeded up the far side. As the rebels emerged, both sides seemed surprised at how close they were to each other. As at the Dragoon Redoubt, the attack carried the militiamen forward and over the rampart. Within minutes both sides were engaged in close-quarters fighting. The Tories quickly lost their nerve once the rebels were among them and soon broke headlong for the bridge. The pursuing Americans chased the loyalists over the river, drove out the Canadians, and captured the bridge itself.

About the time the Tory Redoubt fell, Stark and his remaining 1,200 men launched their final attack against Baum’s position on the hill. Baum’s dragoons, now collected around the headquarters, and an assortment of others from the command, stood their ground.
against this onslaught for a time until they began to run low on am
munition. With the steady advance of Nichols and Herricks from the
north, and now Stark’s new attack coming in from the east, however,
Baum was forced to grab his remaining men and fight his way off
the high ground in a southwesterly direction. Reaching a meadow
located between the hill and the Walloomsac, Baum and his men
started through the open field heading west but were almost imme-
diately fired on by the rebels in pursuit and others advancing from
the east down the road. Out in the open, Baum was struck in the
abdomen and went down. His injury took all the fight out of his dra-
goons. The remaining Braunschweigers joined the long line of other
Germans, Britons, Canadians, and Tories who had been swept up as
prisoners of war during the rout.

Day 1, Sub-Stand 8C Breymann’s Defeat

Directions: From the parking area at the Tory Redoubt, return
by the same route to NY-67. Turn right (west) on NY-67 West. Pro-
ceed 1.2 miles to the junction of NY-67 and Cottrell Road in North
Hoosick, New York. Turn left (south) onto Cottrell Road and park
near the Breymann Monument.

Orientation: This is where the major fighting took place between
Breymann’s relief column and Warner and Stark’s troops late the af-
fternoon and evening of 16 August (see map 41, Appendix J, Battle
of Bennington, Breymann’s Defeat 16 August 1777). The monument
marks the farthest advance of Breymann’s column. To the east two
miles is Baum Heights. To the northwest about twenty-four miles is
Fort Miller. Due west about twenty-five miles is Bemis Heights.

Description: On the morning of 16 August, Breymann’s col-
umn was still at least 18 miles from Baum’s location. Marching all
day on muddy but slowly drying roads, Breymann finally reached
the repaired bridge at Sancoick’s Mill about 1700. There he met
Phillip Skene, who informed Breymann about reports that a disaster
had befallen Baum’s command. Breymann weighed the information
and decided to proceed across Owl Kill to assist Baum. Within a
minute or two, the head of the column came under fire (at this loca-
tion) from a small rebel force that had taken up positions behind a rail fence ahead. These men from Herrick’s command had been pursuing Baum’s refugees and moving to secure the bridge on Owl Kill. Seeing the fresh column of German regulars, Herrick’s men began skirmishing to slow its movement while messengers raced east to inform Stark of the new menace.

During the initial volleys, Breymann’s horse was killed, although the German commander himself was unharmed. He quickly brought forward his two 6-pounders, which opened a brisk fire against the rebel skirmishers. Seeing they were outnumbered, Herrick’s men fell back toward the main battlefield. Meanwhile, one of Herrick’s messengers found Stark as he tried to identify the cause of the new firing to his west. Shocked at the news of another major German force approaching, Stark scrambled to assemble his scattered units. Some of his men had been consuming whiskey and other spirits that day. Many were now scattered through the woods rifling through discarded enemy equipment and captured baggage wagons. Others were tending to the wounded, guarding prisoners, or simply resting in the woods savoring what they believed to be a great victory. All of that was now in jeopardy unless Stark could pull enough of them together to oppose Breymann’s advance.

Luckily for Stark, Warner’s Continentals were approaching the scene. Unbeknownst to both Stark and Warner (who was nearby), a mounted Massachusetts dragoon troop under Maj. John Rand, a former and elderly British Army officer, was about to arrive. Warner recommended that Stark gather as many men as he could and form a skirmish line to check the German advance on the road. Encountering Rand, Warner directed the major to add his troop’s weight to the effort. As fast as Stark could find men, he sent them running to reinforce the skirmish line. Little by little the American line strengthened, and its fire increased. Apparently one of Rand’s men succeeded in shooting Breymann in the leg. Determined he would press forward, however, Breymann sent a detachment of Light Infantry under Maj. Ferdinand von Barner to turn Stark’s right flank.

As Barner moved to Stark’s flank, Warner dispatched part of his Continentals to counter that move while the remainder went to bolster Stark’s line. Soon, Barner was shot in the head and killed,
causing his troops to break apart. As dark closed in, Breymann’s troops began running low on ammunition so the German commander ordered a fighting retreat. The rebels pursued for a time, but Breymann escaped successfully. In the short battle, however, Breymann’s command suffered 160 men killed and captured. Additionally, all his cannon and part of his wagon train were captured.

Burgoyne’s losses sustained at Bennington were irrecoverable. There was no way he could make up the loss of German forces in the Bennington expedition. Compounding this significant loss in military manpower and equipment, Baum’s troops collected few supplies, horses, or foodstuffs, which was the primary purpose for conducting the expedition to begin with. Despite stiff encounters with the Americans at Fort Anne and Hubbardton, Burgoyne and his commanders still had supreme confidence in their soldiers’ ability to defeat what they still believed to be a rag-tag mob of militiamen. Initially, there was some truth to this opinion. After Bennington, they needed to reconsider, especially in light of their growing logistical problems and the fact that thus far even when the British did win on the battlefield, they won only pyrrhic victories.

Vignette: Bennington caused Burgoyne to question the campaign’s progress and perhaps begin to shift blame for its outcome. Shortly after the battle he wrote to Lord Germain:

Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think it my duty to wait in this position, or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communications with Lake George would be perfectly secure, till some event happened to assist my movement forward; but my orders being positive to “force a junction with Sir William Howe,” I apprehend I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer than shall be necessary to collect twenty-five day’s provision, and to receive the reinforcement of the additional companies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Lake Champlain. The awaiting of the arrival of this reinforcement is of indispensible [sic] necessity, because from the hour I pass the Hudson’s River
and proceed toward Albany, all safety of communication ceases. I must expect a large body of the enemy from my left will take post behind me. (William Digby, The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne, 1887 Reprint, London: Forgotten Books, 2013. 25–26.)

Analysis

Additionally, the German columns lost four brass field pieces: two 3-pounders and two 6-pounders.

1. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s decision to conduct the Bennington expedition? How did it fit into his overall operational design? Though in hindsight it failed, was Burgoyne right to order the expedition? Was it the best course of action to help his overall plan?

2. What is your assessment of Baum’s leadership?

3. What is your assessment of Baum’s defense plan? Was there a better way to conduct the defense of this area?

4. What is your assessment of Stark’s actions on 14–15 August?

5. What is your assessment of Stark’s plan for 16 August?

6. How did the terrain affect Stark’s plan?

7. How did leadership play either a positive or negative role in the American actions? The German actions?

8. What is your assessment of Breymann’s leadership in this action?

9. Why do you think this expedition was not more successful in rallying loyalist support to the crown’s efforts? What lessons can we learn today about assessing the opinions and motivations of the local populace? What are some of the difficulties in understanding human terrain in which an army campaigns?

10. What do you see as the significance of this battle?

11. What do you see as the impacts of this battle on the Army from Canada’s operational situation? The Northern Army’s situation?

This stand ends the Day 1 portion of the Saratoga Campaign
### Estimated Casualties from Siege of Fort Schuyler

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>907</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
</tr>
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**Notes:**

1. Includes wounded.

Figure 11. Battle of Bennington Casualties.
Day 2 Siege of Fort Schuyler to Surrender at Saratoga

Stand 9, Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany (Offsite Stand)
Stand 10, Pawlet Expedition (Offsite Stand)
Stand 11, Northern Army Positions at Bemis Heights
Stand 12, First Battle of Saratoga-Freeman’s Farm
Sub-stand 12A, The Advance
Sub-stand 12B, The Opening Fight
Sub-stand 12C, American Reinforcements Arrive
Sub-stand 12D, Advance and Retreat
Sub-stand 12E, Riedesel Saves the Day
Sub-stand 12F, The Results and Cost
Stand 13, Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign
Stand 14, Leadership Friction in the Northern Army
Stand 15, Second Battle of Saratoga-Barber’s Wheatfield
Stand 16, Second Battle of Saratoga-Balcarres Redoubt
Stand 17, Second Battle of Saratoga-Breymann Redoubt
Stand 18, The British Retreat, Surrender, & Impact of Saratoga

Map 19. Day 2 Overview.
Day 2, Stand 9 Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany (Offsite) (Events between 24 June and 23 August 1777)

Directions: Stand 9 is conducted offsite rather than at Fort Schuyler or the Oriskany Battlefield. The stand may be done the evening of day 1 at the hotel or can be covered at the hotel on the morning of day 2. A third option is to conduct the stand at the Saratoga National Historical Park somewhere near the Visitors’ Center (see directions to Saratoga National Historical Park at Stand 11).

Orientation: The use of handout maps showing the operational areas around Fort Schuyler, the Mohawk River Valley, and the Oriskany Battlefield is recommended to orient participants (see map 38, Appendix J, Siege of Fort Schuyler 2–23 August 1777, and map 39, Appendix J, Battle of Oriskany 6 August 1777).

Description: British Gen. John Stanwix built Fort Schuyler (known during the French and Indian War and today as Fort Stanwix) in 1758 at what is the present-day city of Rome, New York. The fort was built to guard the Oneida Carrying Place, a portage that connected Lake Ontario and Wood Creek with the Mohawk River. The portage was a trade and commerce crossroads between the Hudson River Valley and the Great Lakes region, making it a strategically important position.

After years of neglect, Fort Stanwix was reoccupied in July 1776 by the 3rd New Jersey Regiment, Continental Army, under Col. Elias Dayton. Dayton renamed the post as Fort Schuyler in honor of Gen. Philip Schuyler, the commander of the Northern Department. On 17 April 1777, Schuyler ordered Col. Peter Gansevoort to take command of the fort from Dayton. Gansevoort’s 3rd New York, also a Continental regiment, arrived piecemeal between 3 and 10 May. In addition to the 3rd New York, Gansevoort had several small detachments of Massachusetts Continentals as well as 2nd Continental Artillery troops who manned the fort’s cannon. Rounding out the garrison of about 750 troops was a handful of Oneida Indians who had pledged their service to the Patriot cause. The garrison’s mis-
sion was to prevent enemy incursions into the Mohawk River Valley and protect the Hudson River Valley.

The Mohawk River Valley played an important role in Burgoyne’s plan to capture Albany. The Army from Canada commander had entrusted Brig. Barry St. Leger with the mission to move through Lake Ontario and Wood Creek to seize Fort Schuyler from the rebels. From there, St. Leger was to advance down the Mohawk to the Hudson and link up with Burgoyne in the Albany area. The Mohawk Expedition consisted of about 750 regulars and militia from St. Leger’s 34th Regiment of Foot, the Kings Regiment of New York (a loyalist militia unit), a German jäger company, a company from the 8th Regiment of Foot, a Royal Artillery mortar company, Butler’s Ranger Company, the Quebec Canadian Militia Company, and about 800 Iroquois Indians largely under Chief Thayendanagea (Joseph Brant) (see Appendix D, Order of Battle, Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany). All told, St. Leger possessed about 1,700
troops of various types. As with Burgoyne, St. Leger hoped that loyalists flocking to the king’s colors would add to his numbers advancing toward Albany.

Well before St. Leger departed on his mission, the threat of Indian attack against the valley’s American residents increased dramatically. Actual physical attacks in the Fort Schuyler area increased in June and July—with vicious attacks against soldiers and family members taking place on 25 June, 3 July, and 27 July. The brutal nature of Indian warfare frequently involved grossly mutilating at least one victim. When attacking a small group, the Indians often allowed at least one person to escape so he or she could relate the horror to the troops in the fort. It was a kind of psychological warfare intended to demoralize garrison troops and weaken their will to fight. As often as not, the reports only served to enrage the soldiers, who vowed to take vengeance on the Indians at every opportunity.

This form of terror attack climaxed with the infamous murder of Jane McCrae near Fort Edward on 27 July 1777. The incident, which involved the killing and scalping of a loyalist officer’s fiancée, bolstered American claims that the Indians were not warriors serving a cause but only bloodthirsty savages who cared little for who they killed or robbed. Combined with Burgoyne’s earlier threats about using his Indians against those who opposed the king, the actions inflamed Americans everywhere and drove many fence sitters to the rebel cause.

Killings around Fort Schuyler prompted Gansevoort to order the garrison’s family members to move back to Fort Dayton. Additionally, repeated Indian attacks caused a number of soldiers to desert their posts. To prevent further desertions, Gansevoort withdrew the garrison’s pickets within the confines of the fort. Frustrated by his dwindling numbers, the post commander mustered his entire force and had the garrison pass by a mutilated body single file to see firsthand what the Indians were doing to those they captured. Gansevoort’s extreme measure to embolden his soldier’s courage seems to have worked as desertions dramatically slowed afterward.

On 24 June, St. Leger’s expedition departed Montreal and moved up the St. Lawrence River. Before departing, the expedition commander received positive but decidedly incorrect intelligence that Fort Schuyler was held by only about sixty troops. Sailing through Lake Ontario,
the expedition arrived at Oswego, New York, one month later. Moving down Wood Creek, St. Leger’s command encountered the same type of obstacles that Burgoyne’s troops had faced on the Fort Anne-Fort Edward Road. Rebels had felled large trees over Wood Creek, significantly delaying the advance and slowing the movement of St. Leger’s artillery in particular. Moving on foot, infantry elements of Schuyler’s command arrived before Fort Schuyler on 3 August. By now, St. Leger learned that Fort Schuyler was more strongly held than he was led to believe. Prior to beginning a siege of the fort, he sent a note to Gansevoort under flag of truce demanding that the rebel commander surrender the fort. Gansevoort refused.

That same day, St. Leger received word that additional rebel troops were en route to Fort Schuyler. On hearing reports that the British intended to attack Fort Schuyler, General Schuyler had ordered Brig. Gen. Nicolas Herkimer of the Tryon County militia to reinforce Gansevoort. Herkimer mustered about 800 men at Fort Dayton and departed for Fort Schuyler on 4 August. As he neared Fort Schuyler on the night of 5 August, Herkimer sent word to the fort commander that if St. Leger’s men attacked Herkimer’s column as it approached the fort, Gansevoort should launch a sortie to help fight off the British attack. Further, Herkimer requested that Gansevoort fire three rounds of artillery as Herkimer’s command approached the fort as a signal that Gansevoort received the message and agreed to cooperate in the plan to turn the tables on St. Leger.

However, the British commander initially got the upper hand. After learning about the reinforcing column, St. Leger sent Colonel Johnson’s Kings Regiment, Butler’s Ranger Company, the German jäger company, and about 400 Iroquois under Joseph Brant to attack Herkimer’s militiamen. Selecting an excellent ambush site along a deep ravine with steep banks, the British forces lay in wait. The light infantry troops and Tories positioned to attack the head of the column and flanks while the Indians were supposed to strike the remainder and rear guard.

On the morning of 6 August, the Tryon Count militia continued its march toward the fort. Herkimer’s column of four battalion groups stretching almost 2 miles from head to tail, passed near the Indian village of Oriskany as it slowly headed east along the mili-
tary road. The military road, approximately 16 feet wide and corduroyed in spots, followed the natural flow of the terrain over ridges and through high-walled ravines. Thick woods on either side of the road were choked with vines and deadfall, providing ideal hiding positions for an ambush force. Conversely the brush would be a substantial obstacle for a force trying to break out of an ambush.

Nearing the fort, Herkimer halted the column. He had not yet heard the signal and wanted to wait. His subordinate commanders (some of whom did not trust Herkimer) disagreed and wanted to continue the march. After a heated debate during which some officers accused Herkimer of being a secret Tory, the militia commander reluctantly resumed the movement. About 6 miles from the fort, the column entered the ravine around 1000. The head of the column was about to exit the far end of the ravine when the Indians at the east end of the ambush prematurely opened fire then rushed the troops on the road there. The rear guard battalion of about 200 men was still well back and outside the ambush zone. Instead of coming forward to help their comrades, the rear guard fled the field.

Meanwhile, the troops in the ravine were caught in a deadly crossfire. After the initial surprise, the militiamen fought back with a fury borne of desperation. Fighting in pairs, one man loaded while the other aimed and fired from trees and any other cover they could find. Using the technique, the pockets of surrounded rebels kept up a steady volume of fire. Their fire was particularly concentrated on the Indians, who took the heaviest casualties on the British side. The rebels, of course, suffered far worse. Many who attempted to flee were chased down and killed by Mohawk warriors. Down in the ravine, Herkimer himself was shot in the leg but continued to calmly command his troops while smoking his pipe. After a drenching cloudburst that wet gunpowder and thus slowed the rate of fire, a small detachment of British troops reversed their coats to deceive the rebels that reinforcements had arrived from the fort. The ruse was discovered and readily driven off.

The fighting at points devolved into hand-to-hand and close-quarter battle. The three battalions caught in the trap eventually contracted into small semi-circles to return fire against the attackers. The Indians had difficulty penetrating, isolating, and picking off in-
dividual targets. As they had at Bennington, the militiamen concentrated much of their fire on the Indians, and several Mohawk chiefs were killed or wounded. Believing he had done as much damage as was possible, Colonel Johnson, the loyalist commander, decided to break contact at about 1500. Realizing that his command was now too cut up to proceed, Herkimer ordered the column to return to Fort Dayton. There, the Tryon County militia commander died on 16 August due to complications after having his leg amputated.

During the Indian ambush on Herkimer’s force, Gansevoort tasked Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, the 3rd New York’s second-in-command, to link up with Herkimer’s force as planned. Willett took charge of a mixed force of about 250 New York and Massachusetts Continental soldiers and sallied forth from Fort Schuyler at about 1400. Along the way, however, Willett’s column encountered what appeared to be the Indian camp, including the King’s Regiment of Loyalists. The camp had been left virtually undefended as those elements had left to help ambush Herkimer at Oriskany. Willett immediately changed missions and raided the encampment. In this essentially unopposed raid, the rebels captured food and other supplies, six battle flags, and various written records, including some with the names of local loyalists on whom retribution was later meted out. After significantly damaging the encampment, Willett’s force returned to Fort Schuyler after a brief skirmish with British troops. None of the troops under Willett’s command suffered so much as a wound.

Word of the raid rapidly made its way to the Indians, who were still fighting against Herkimer’s militiamen at Oriskany. Many Indians left the field in the middle of the fight and rushed back to their camp, finding it destroyed and thoroughly looted. The Iroquois were furious at the British for failing to defend their camp and possessions. The raid, coupled with the loss of some of their chiefs, caused Indian morale to plummet. Moreover, they had not agreed to participate in siege warfare. A sizable number of Indians left that evening, disgusted they had nothing to show for their long trip and tribulations. The Indians who stayed—still the majority—vowed to take revenge on the rebels. The following day many returned to the Oriskany battlefield, where they killed and scalped any remaining
wounded Americans they found. Moreover, the Iroquois forced four captured rebel officers to run a gauntlet near the fort. These unfortunate were brutally mutilated and beaten to death under the watchful eyes of the American garrison.

The British losses sustained at Oriskany, though relatively light, and the departure of part of the Iroquois contingent somewhat lessened St. Leger’s chances to successfully wage a siege against Fort Schuyler. Two days later on 8 August, however, St. Leger’s cannon finally arrived at the fort. The British commander quickly sent another negotiation party forward that afternoon to demand the fort’s surrender, but Gansevoort once again refused. St. Leger opened fire on the fort with his artillery and mortars but soon learned they caused no visible damage; the earthen walls merely absorbed the impact of the rounds. Realizing that his cannon were almost useless against the fort, the British general decided to conduct a proper siege. He set his men to work digging saps toward the northeast bastion.

Meanwhile, back in Stillwater, General Schuyler was working to arrange relief for Gansevoort. Recognizing the seriousness of his situation due to Herkimer’s defeat, Gansevoort dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Willett to give Schuyler a situation report and request reinforcements to help break the siege. Even before Willett departed the fort on 6 August, Schuyler dispatched Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s brigade of Massachusetts Continentals to march to Fort Schuyler. A week later, he sent General Arnold to take command of the Mohawk Valley forces and break the siege. When he reached Albany, Arnold encountered Willett, who had been heading for Stillwater. Instead, the two traveled to Fort Dayton while Willett briefed Arnold on the happenings at Fort Schuyler during their journey. At Fort Dayton, Arnold assumed command of Learned’s Brigade and about 100 additional militiamen.

At this point, the characteristically aggressive Arnold appeared to have developed a case of cold feet. With the addition of Gansevoort’s command and Learned’s Brigade, Arnold essentially had parity of numbers with St. Leger. Rather than boldly move forward to Fort Schuyler’s aid, he sent Willett to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, who had by then replaced Schuyler as commander of the Northern Department, with a request for an additional 1,000 men. Nothing would come of Arnold’s request, but ultimately it mattered little. Ar-
nold soon stumbled on a masterful plan involving a superb example of culturally centric psychological warfare.

After Arnold arrived at Fort Dayton, rebel militia captured a loyalist militiaman near German Flats, New York, and brought him to the American commander. Hon Yost Schuyler was mentally deficient, but the Indians believed such people had a special relationship to the supernatural and thus put great stock in anything the man said. Threatened with execution for traitorous activities, Hon Yost agreed to go to St. Leger’s camp and inform the British general that Arnold was en route with 2,000 Continentals and artillery to bolster Fort Schuyler. Arnold held Yost’s brother Nicholas as a hostage at Fort Dayton for insurance. An allied Oneida Indian agreed to follow Yost at a respectable time interval and tell the same story, thus reinforcing what Yost was saying. The ruse worked marvelously. Swayed by the fact that his Indian allies were convinced of the news, St. Leger ordered a retreat to Oswego on 22 August. In the interim, Arnold ordered Learned’s Brigade to march for Fort Schuyler then pursue the British column after St. Leger had retreated. The chase did not catch the British column, however. Arnold and his men arrived at Oswego just as St. Leger’s force was sailing away. Still, the threat to the Mohawk Valley had been eliminated.

Vignette 1: The following is an account of Indian torture outside Fort Schuyler prior to St. Leger’s arrival:

Captain Robert Crouse of the [leading] 1st Battalion was resented less for his actions than for his intimidating size. A truly huge man, Crouse, a year and a half earlier, had led General Schuyler’s New Jersey Continentals over the ice of the Mohawk to arrest Sir John at Johnson Hall. During the crossing he found the strength to wave a streaming regimental flag in each hand; this remarkable feat was now remembered. His tormentors in their anger and spite amputated his legs at the knees with hatchets, and having cut him down to ‘human size,’ forced him to walk on the bleeding stumps until he collapsed [and later died]. Six others, forced to run a gauntlet of assembled Senecas, were clubbed to death in full view of the fort. (Richard

Vignette 2: Gansevoort refused to meet the two junior officers sent to the fort to deliver St. Leger’s second demand to surrender Fort Schuyler and its garrison:

It is with concern we are to acquaint you that this was the fatal day in which the succours, which were intended for your relief, have been attacked and defeated with great loss of numbers killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Our sincere advice to you is, if you will avoid inevitable ruin and destruction, to surrender the fort you pretend to defend . . . We are sorry to inform you that most of the principal officers are killed, to wit—Gen. Herkimer, Cols. Cox, Seeber, Isaac Paris, Captain Graves and many others too tedious to mention. The British army from Canada being now perhaps before Albany, the possession of which place of course includes the conquest of the Mohawk River and this fort. (Michael O. Logusz, *With Musket & Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777*, Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 169.)

Vignette 3: A day later, St. Leger sent another contingent of officers to appeal for surrender—with an added threat, ostensibly with St. Leger’s blessing:

The Indians were so exceedingly provoked and mortified by the losses they have sustained, in the recent actions, having had several of their favorite chiefs killed, that they threaten—and the Colonel [St. Leger], if the present arrangements should not be entered into, will not be able to prevent them from executing their threats—to march down the country, and destroy the settlement with its inhabitants. In this case, not only men, but women, and children will experience the sad effects of their vengeance, and he could not prevent it. (Michael O. Logusz, *With Musket & Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the*
Vignette 4: Lieutenant Colonel Willett delivered Gansevoort’s reply to St. Leger:

Do I understand you, Sir? I think you say, that you come from a British colonel, who is commander of the army that invests this fort; and by your uniform, you appear to be an officer in the British service. You have made a long speech on the occasion of your visit, which, stript [sic] of its superfluities, amounts to this, that you come from a British colonel, to the commandant of this garrison, to tell him, that if he does not deliver the garrison into the hands of your Colonel, he will send his Indians to murder our women and children. You will please to reflect, sir, that their blood will be on your head, not on ours. We are doing our duty: this garrison is committed to our charge, and we will take care of it. After you get out of it, you may turn around and look at its outside, but never expect to come in again, unless you come a prisoner. I consider the message you have brought, a degrading one for a British officer to send, and by no means reputable for a British officer to carry. For my part, I declare, before I would consent to deliver this garrison to such a murdering set as your army, by your own account, consists of, I would suffer my body to be filled with splinters and set on fire, as you know has at times been practiced, by such hordes of women and children killers, as belong to your army. (Max M. Mintz, *Seeds of Empire: The American Revolutionary Conquest of the Iroquois*, New York: NYU Press, 2002, 37–38).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Casualties from Siege of Fort Schuyler</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12. Battle of Schuyler Casualties.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of St. Leger’s plan to advance down the Mohawk River Valley?
2. Was it realistic for St. Leger to believe he could conduct a successful siege of Fort Schuyler? Why or why not?
3. If not, what additional resources do you think St. Leger needed to execute a successful siege?
4. What are some of the potential negative aspects of using indigenous forces in coalition warfare? What are some of the potential positive aspects of using indigenous forces in coalition warfare?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Casualties from Battle of Oriskany</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Indians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>65¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
¹ Includes wounded.

Figure 13. Battle of Oriskany Casualties.
Directions: Stand 10 is conducted offsite. As with Stand 9, the stand may be conducted the evening of day 1 at the hotel or can be covered at the hotel on the morning of day 2. A third option is to conduct the stand at the Saratoga National Historical Park somewhere near the Visitors’ Center just after Stand 9 (see directions to Saratoga National Historical Park at Stand 11).

Orientation: Using handout maps that show the area of operations between Pawlet, Fort Ticonderoga, Skenesborough, and Diamond Island will help orient the participants.

Description: After Burgoyne successfully captured Fort Ticonderoga, General Washington determined that he needed to send assistance to his Northern Department commander. Beyond a few regiments of continental troops, he also sent Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln to Schuyler’s aid. In addition to being very competent and efficient, Lincoln was from Massachusetts. Washington figured that Lincoln, who was very popular in Vermont and New Hampshire, could help Schuyler organize and control the various New England militia units that were assembling in southern Vermont. Lincoln arrived at Schuyler’s field headquarters at Moses Kill about 24 July. After several days getting acquainted with the overall situation in New York and New England and conferring with Schuyler, Lincoln was ready to begin his new mission. Schuyler had instructed Lincoln to proceed to Manchester, Vermont, where most of the militia units were assembling. Once there, Lincoln was to organize the militia (ostensibly forming brigades) and return with those forces to Stillwater, the new location where Schuyler would be moving his army.

On 3 August, Lincoln set off for Manchester, where he found several Massachusetts and Vermont militia units as well as the 700 or so troops from Stark’s newly raised New Hampshire Brigade. On 8 August, Lincoln and Stark had their confrontation (See Stand 8), after which Stark marched his men off to Bennington while Lincoln
remained at Manchester to continue organizing the remaining militia units to join the Northern Army now at Stillwater.

General Gates, who had replaced Schuyler in command of the Northern Army on the 19th of August, summoned Lincoln to Van Schaik’s Island about the third week of the month. The army had arrived the day before. On the 24th, the two generals met to discuss how to best utilize the militia forces now assembled at Manchester. They agreed that the militia would remain in Vermont and look for opportunities to act against Burgoyne, ideally against his line of communication. Gates and Lincoln also agreed to use Lincoln’s militia force for operations that might increase its distance from the main army and, in doing so, might prevent prompt mutual assistance in case of emergency.

Eight days later on 1 September, the two men met again at Van Schaik’s Island. This time, they developed the outline concept for what became known as the Pawlet Expedition. The plan was to move Lincoln’s troops northeast to the hamlet of Pawlet, a very defensible area well to the rear of Burgoyne’s main army at Fort Edward. When Burgoyne learned that Lincoln’s force had moved to Pawlet, he might detail strong security detachments from his army to guard supply convoys, thereby further weakening his army. Moreover, should Burgoyne decide to retreat rather than advance, Lincoln would be in a good position to move west to block or hinder the retrograde while Gates attacked the rear of Burgoyne’s command. In short, Gates’ guidance to Lincoln was to find opportunities to divide, divert, and harass the enemy.

After receiving Gates’ basic intent, Lincoln returned to Manchester to begin implementing the general plan of action. On 6 September, Lincoln marched about 2,000 men out of Manchester. They arrived at Pawlet two days later.

Over the preceding weeks, both Gates and Lincoln had received intelligence reports about the reduced garrison manning Fort Ticonderoga. They were also informed that a large number of American prisoners of war were held at Lake George Landing, as well as a sizable amount of food, ammunition, and other supplies. A successful raid at the fort would cut Burgoyne’s supply line and might force him to retreat and fight his way north to get out of the trap.
Lincoln met with his militia commanders at Pawlet and began to outline an ambitious raid operation. The main target was to be Fort Ticonderoga itself. On 12 September, General Lincoln met again with his militia commanders and finalized the scheme of maneuver which would consist of a three-pronged attack against Burgoyne’s supply line. Each raiding column would contain about 500 men. Col. John Brown would command the main effort to attack Lake George Landing and, if successful, attempt to convince the Fort Ticonderoga garrison to surrender. Meanwhile, a supporting effort under Col. Samuel Johnson would advance on Mount Independence and demonstrate from there to reinforce Brown’s efforts to take the fort. The third column under Col. Benjamin Woodbridge would move to seize Skenesborough then remove supplies and any other militarily significant materiel and send it back to supply dumps in Vermont. At some later point, Lincoln would bring his remaining militia forces to Skenesborough to join with Woodbridge and assist in withdrawing the two Fort Ticonderoga raiding columns in the event they were being pursued.

Once the plan was finalized, Lincoln wasted no time. The expeditions departed Pawlet on the 12th and 13th of September. Over the next five days, the raiders stealthily made their way toward their respective targets. On the 17th, Lincoln himself left Pawlet with about 600 men headed for Skenesborough to link up with Woodbridge before he seized his objective the following day. In the morning darkness of 18 September, Brown’s column arrived undetected at Lake George Landing. There, the raiders surprised and captured a sizable number of British troops without a fight as well as significant amounts of supplies, cattle, and horses. The latter included about 200 bateaux which had been used to help resupply Burgoyne’s army south of Lake George. The Americans burned almost all the bateaux but retained a few for future operations. Johnson also freed 118 American prisoners whom he armed and appointed as the guard force to escort about 300 British prisoners back to Skenesborough. The raiders then moved down the portage, captured Mount Defiance, and ultimately occupied positions in the Old French Lines. For two days, Brown’s and Johnson’s troops across the lake at Mount Independence conducted various demonstrations to convince Brig.
Henry W. Powell, the Fort Ticonderoga garrison commander, to surrender. Powell, however, refused—realizing that the Americans were too weak to take the fort (even though his own command had just been reduced dramatically).

Recognizing that any further efforts at bluff and bluster were a waste of time, Brown left in the few remaining bateaux and traveled south on Lake George to seize Diamond Island, the next British supply depot. However, the British garrison at Diamond Island had been warned of his approach, so the raider’s efforts there came to naught. Brown then headed back to Pawlet via Skenesborough.

On 18 September, the day after he arrived at Skenesborough, Lincoln received a message from Gates directing him to proceed with all his militia to Stillwater. The following day, Lincoln returned to Pawlet with the men under his direct command and sent messages to Brown and Johnson to join him at Stillwater at their first opportunity. On 21 September, Lincoln left for the Northern Army’s new location at Bemis Heights, leaving instructions for any arriving militia to follow him there. All, except Brown’s command, started for Bemis Heights the next day. When he arrived at Pawlet several days later, Brown received Lincoln’s instructions and set his men on the march to Bemis Heights as well.

The Pawlet Expedition—and Brown’s actions in particular—significantly hampered the Army from Canada’s logistics operations. The raids had not only reduced Burgoyne’s already short supplies; Brown’s actions had also crippled the British ability to move supplies south to the main army. Powell, with his own forces now significantly reduced, was loath to send any reinforcements to Burgoyne for fear of losing Ticonderoga itself. When St. Leger’s force from the Mohawk Valley arrived at the fort later on 27 September, Powell refused to let St. Leger continue the move south to join Burgoyne. Instead, Powell kept the regiment to help protect the fort. Even if Powell had wanted to send reinforcements to Burgoyne, he no longer possessed the water and wagon transport capabilities to do so.

Vignette: None
Analysis

1. What do you see as the major strengths and weaknesses of Burgoyne’s efforts to protect his extended line of communication?

2. What is your assessment of the Pawlet Expedition plan? What do you see as the major strengths and weaknesses of the plan?

3. What do you see as the most significant outcome of these raids? How did the raids affect the operational options now available to both Schuyler/Gates and Burgoyne?
Day 2, Stand 11 The Northern Army Positions at Bemis Heights (Events 10 August and 15 September 1777)

Directions: Starting at Clifton Park Center, New York, take Exit 9 on I-87 North and proceed north 3.5 miles to Ushers Road. Veer right from I-87 North onto the Exit 10 ramp. Turn right onto Ushers Road. Proceed 2.9 miles then right on NY-67 East. Proceed 1.3 miles then left on George Thompson Road/Meehan Road (note: George Thompson Road turns into Meehan Road after about half a mile). Proceed 3.7 miles then turn right onto Lake Road, then the first left onto County Road 75. Proceed about a mile then right onto County Road 423. Proceed about a mile then turn left onto County Road 32. Proceed about 2 miles to the Saratoga National Battlefield Park entrance on the right. Proceed to the Visitors’ Center. If stands 9 and 10 have already been conducted off-site, continue driving south along
the park access road. As you approach Saratoga Park Stop #2 (Neilson’s Farm), bring the vehicle(s) to a brief stop at the pull-out opposite the Neilson Farm and explain that this is the extreme left of the American line on Bemis Heights. Continue to Saratoga Park Stop #3 and turn into the parking lot. Dismount and walk to the interpretive marker to the east, overlooking the Hudson River.

Orientation: You are standing on what was the extreme right/eastern flank of General Gates’ Continental Army in early September 1777 during both Saratoga battles. To the east is the Hudson River. Approximately 3 miles north of this position is the Great Redoubt which is where the British situated their primary army encampment during the two Saratoga battles. About 11 miles north of this location was the town of Saratoga (known today as Schuylerville). The Northern Army defensive perimeter extended about a mile and half west of this location. The town of Albany, New York, which was the campaign objective of Burgoyne’s army, is approximately 35 miles south of this location. At the time of the battles, this immediate area would have been much less wooded. The trees would have been cut to use for building the various fortifications in the area and for firewood, or felled to create abatis and clear fields of fire for artillery. The flats below would have been clear and under cultivation, thus providing clear fields of fire against any enemy approach through the valley. This is about where the main redoubt was for this part of the line, protected by a redan to the north and another to the south. There was a large trench line in the trees to the southeast near the river to oppose ground attacks and block southward movement on the Hudson.

Description of the American situation: On 10 August 1777, General Schuyler received notice at his Stillwater field headquarters that he had been relieved of command of the Northern Department and its army. This was a bitter blow for the man who had worked tirelessly since the fall of Fort Ticonderoga to set the conditions for an American resurgence of fortunes in the Hudson River Valley. Much had happened since then. In addition to irreplaceable losses sustained by Burgoyne’s forces at Fort Anne and Hubbardton, Schuyler’s leadership of the Northern Army had significantly
delayed Burgoyne’s advance. This, in turn, provided time for the surrounding states to assemble their militia forces and move them within striking distance of the British invasion force. Additionally, more Continental forces were joining the Northern Army on a weekly basis. Finally, Schuyler had taken decisive action by sending Arnold and Learned to ensure Fort Schuyler’s survival, though that outcome would not be apparent for another two weeks.

Even Schuyler’s retreats made military sense. Each time he had retreated it was from what were essentially poor defensive locations or at least inadequate for the forces he had at hand. Additionally, he delayed Burgoyne’s movements where he could. Schuyler’s intent was to continue moving south—preserving his forces—until he found a battle position where he could stop the British advance or, ideally, build enough strength to assume the offensive.

Even after his official relief, Schuyler ordered an additional retreat to what he believed would be the Northern Army’s best location to make a stand. The army, now consisting of about 4,000 troops, reached Van Schaik’s Island on 18 August. General Gates arrived the following day and assumed command at that point. No doubt feeling dejected, Schuyler returned home to Albany, where he would remain an important player throughout the rest of the campaign despite his lack of an official position.

Over the next month, several events transpired (discussed at earlier stands) which increased the fortunes of Gates and the Northern Army. Even before Gates assumed command, Stark and Warner won the battle of Bennington on 16 August. One week later on 22 August, Arnold’s ruse succeeded in lifting the siege of Fort Schuyler. At the end of that month, Arnold with Learned’s Brigade as well as Col. Dan Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen transferred from Washington’s army arrived at Van Schaik’s Island to further reinforce Gates’ command. Gates now had about 7,000 troops under his direct control at Van Schaik’s. By the time he advanced the Northern Army from Van Schaik’s Island to Stillwater on 8 September, Gates had more than 10,000 troops under his command (due in large part to Schuyler’s calls for reinforcement) and still more were on the way.

On 10 September, Burgoyne’s Army moved south from Fort Edward toward Batten Kill where his engineers were building a
bridge to the west side of the Hudson River. At about the same time, British troops abandoned Forts George and Anne. Gates, who was dissatisfied with the Van Schaik’s location as well as the Stillwater site, was preparing to move his forces for the final time before the two armies met on the field of battle. Once at Stillwater, Gates sent his engineer, Col. Thaddeus Kosciuszko, and several other officers to look for a good position to build defenses which Burgoyne would be forced to attack if he wished to get to Albany. Kosciuszko found the ideal location several miles north of Stillwater—known locally as Bemis Heights.

Upon inspection, Gates approved the position, which was a long generally east-west ridge that provided a relatively good vantage over the direction from which the British would approach. A 100-foot bluff on the right flank overlooked any movement on both the river road and the Hudson River itself. The road was located on a relatively narrow flood plain that was only about 200 to 300 yards wide. On the east side of the plain, the Hudson River was unfordable anywhere nearby. In short, a few well-placed cannon could effectively block any troops advancing on foot or by boat south on the flood plain or along the road. Satisfied with the location and convinced it would provide the advantages he sought, Gates ordered the army to move farther north and began digging in on Bemis Heights on 12 September.

Though the position was strong, Gates and his officers soon discovered it was not perfect. The left of the American battle line had no natural terrain feature on which to anchor the western flank, at least not one that could be readily incorporated into the American line with the number of troops that were present. A small hill about half mile to the west was too far to be integrated into the line but would be an excellent position for placing artillery if the British wished to enfilade the American breastworks. The rebels would need to closely watch that location if the British attempted to circle in that direction.

John Paterson, left to right respectively. In theory, Lincoln would command the right wing. However, due to that general’s other duties, such as being sent to organize Vermont militia forces and conducting the Pawlet Raid, Gates typically maintained direct command over those troops. On the left, he placed Poor’s and Learned’s Continental brigades, right to left respectively. Brig. Gen. Abraham Ten Broeck’s New York Militia Brigade was positioned, most likely, on the far left or immediately behind Learned’s or Poor’s Brigade (sources are unclear on the specific location). Arnold would command these units, which composed the left wing. Between the two wings at a salient near the Neilson House, Gates positioned Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen and Light Infantry. Although an independent command, Arnold believed these troops were under his control. Interspersed between the various brigades and regiments along the front were 22 cannon of various sizes. On 15 September, about 150 mostly Oneida Indians arrived at Bemis Heights to serve with the Northern Army. The Indians were employed scouting the British lines and were the last significant reinforcements Gates received prior to the battle on 19 September. His immediate force now stood somewhere close to 11,000 men.

Vignette: On 4 October, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, Gates’ adjutant general, described the American defenses:

Gates’ right occupied the brow of the hill near the river, with which it was connected by a deep entrenchment; his camp, in the form of a segment of a great circle, the convex toward the enemy, extended rather obliquely to his rear, about three-fourths of a mile to a knoll occupied by his left; his front was covered from the right to the left of the centre, by a sharp ravine running parallel with his line and closely wooded: from thence to the knoll at his extreme left, the ground was partially cleared, some of the trees being felled and others girdled, beyond which in front of his left flank, and extending to the enemy’s right. . . . The extremities of this camp were defended by stoney batteries, and the interval was strengthened by breastwork without entrenchments, constructed of the bodies of felled trees,
logs, and rails with an additional battery at an opening left of the center. The right was almost impracticable; the left difficult of approach. (John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 249.)

Description of the British situation: During the same period that the fortunes of the American forces were waxing, those of the British were waning. The 16 August battle of Bennington dealt a major blow to Burgoyne’s efforts to resupply his army. He also lost a significant number of regular troops. St. Leger’s retreat from Fort Schuyler on 22 August further diminished the forces on which Burgoyne might rely and also released more American troops for use against the Army from Canada. Three days later, General Howe debarked his command at Head of Elk, Maryland, and headed overland toward Philadelphia, thus ensuring that no British forces would converge with Howe in the Hudson River Valley that fall (Burgoyne finally learned of this plan on 3 August). When Burgoyne departed from Fort Edward on 10 September, the forces under his direct control were down to slightly more than 6,000 troops.

Notwithstanding all the misfortunes that had plagued his command since 16 August, Burgoyne doggedly drove toward Albany. On 13 September, his army began crossing to the west bank of the Hudson River at Batten Kill on a makeshift pontoon bridge. Two days later he ordered the bridge pulled up behind him, effectively cutting off resupply from Powell at Fort Ticonderoga. On the 17th, Burgoyne led a scouting party that arrived at a place called Sword’s House—within four miles of Bemis Heights. Though his troops had skirmished with rebel forces over the past several days, Burgoyne was still unsure about the actual strength of the main American army opposing him. From deserters, whose information could be suspect, he had learned that Gates had upward of 10,000 men. Burgoyne was also certain that Gates’ army was now located nearby. Nevertheless, satisfied with the Sword House location as a defendable bivouac, Burgoyne sent orders for his troops to join him there. The army arrived the following day and set up camp. The stage was now set for the next clash between the American and British Northern Armies—the largest to date.
Analysis

1. Why do you think the 1777 British strategic plan failed to achieve synergy? Consider the actions of the key players: Germain, Howe, Clinton, Carleton, Burgoyne. Who was responsible and why?

2. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s operational plan up to this point in the campaign?

3. What are the reasons you think that Burgoyne’s decision to sever communications with Fort Ticonderoga was advantageous? What were the disadvantages?

4. What is your assessment of Gates’ plan to defend here at Bemis Heights?

5. How would you exploit any weaknesses in the American positions if you were commanding the British army here?

6. What options does Burgoyne have at this point? What are Gates’ options? Do both commanders need a battle here; either; neither? Explain how a tactical engagement here would fit (or not) into the operational goals of either side.
Day 2, Stand 12 The Battle of Freeman’s Farm
(Events of 19 September 1777)

Directions: From Stand 11, return to the park road and drive to Saratoga Park Stop #7 (Breymann Redoubt). Turn into the parking lot then dismount and walk alongside the road heading southeast to the intersection of the park road with the Wilkinson Trail. Turn right and walk the trail headed west into the woods. (Note: This path closely follows the path that Hamilton’s infantry brigade used on 19 September 1777.) At the intersection of the Wilkinson and Liaison trails (trail marker D), turn left (south) onto the Liaison Trail and follow that trail to the creek crossing (Stand 12A).

Orientation: You have just moved along a path that approximates the route used by the British army center column (Hamilton’s
Brigade) as it approached Freeman’s Farm on 19 September (see map 43, Appendix J, Battle of Freeman’s Farm 19 September 1777, First Contact 1300). The forest in those days would have looked about like it does today except that secondary growth at ground level would have been less apparent due to the grazing of loose livestock and more plentiful forest animals. To the east of here was the dirt farm road leading from the River Road adjacent to the Hudson River (running north/south) which brought Riedesel’s relief column to the Freeman’s Farm area in the late afternoon that day. Also to the east was the main British Army encampment at the Great Redoubt near the Hudson River. To the west was the McBride Farm, and the Freeman Farm to the south was the main battle area where the fighting took place. Bemis Heights is located about a mile and a half farther south of this location and was the tactical objective for the British Army.

Day 2, Sub-stand 12A The Advance
Description: Due to ongoing skirmishing and scouting on 16 and 17 September, Burgoyne slowly developed a general idea of the American location. He knew enough by the morning of 18 September that he did not want to continue the main advance down the River Road due to the now-visible American defenses there. He had a general idea of the extent of the American lines but not the exact locations of the rebel left flank. One prominent historian noted that Burgoyne was aware of a rise to the west of the American defenses on which he could place artillery to support an attack on the west end of the position. He correctly calculated that the American left would not be as strong as the positions along the road, so he decided to move a strong force to the west and then turn south to develop the situation and perhaps locate a weakness in the rebel lines there. Burgoyne’s plan was to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force by advancing in three columns. Fraser’s column would travel the farthest west. At some point during the march, he would turn south and, hopefully, come upon the rebel left and the desired artillery position. If the ground and the circumstances seemed favorable, Fraser’s command would make the main assault. The remainder of the army would turn south and advance, more or less on line, to keep the rebels’ attention
focused to their front and prevent reinforcements from moving to the threatened sector.

At about 1000 on the morning of 19 September, several cannon shots were fired in the British encampment as a signal for the Army from Canada to begin its movement. Brig. Simon Fraser’s 3,000-man Advance Corps of British, loyalists, Canadians, and Indians comprised the right column and moved on a dirt road headed west. Burgoyne and his aides accompanied the center column, which consisted of the 1,700 British regulars of Brig. James Hamilton’s brigade. Hamilton’s men followed Fraser for a short distance then turned south on a road leading into the Great Ravine. They would then cross the ravine, move on line, and advance toward the western face of the defenses. The left column, moving generally down the River Road, was composed of 2,500 German and British troops under Riedesel. This column was to generally perform the same mission as the center but would advance against the northern face of Gates’ position on the east end. All three columns were accompanied by artillery detachments. None of the columns were within visual range of each other and, therefore, none were mutually supporting. The logistics elements, hospital, bateaux company, and women and children remained behind under the guard of the 47th Foot in and near the Great Redoubt.

Moving south from the Great Redoubt, Riedesel discovered that the rebels had destroyed every bridge in the path of the German column along the River Road. Progress would be very slow on all fronts that morning. A major chasm, soon to be known as the Great Ravine, was situated between the British right and center columns and the American defenses. Both columns would need to cross that obstacle before they could close with the American positions on Bemis Heights. The head of Fraser’s column on the British right (west) reached the ravine first but was forced to march farther west to find a suitable crossing point. Hamilton’s Brigade arrived at the ravine at about the midway point of its length and crossed there. As the morning mist and fog began to clear, rebel scouts began sending reports that the British were crossing the ravine.

Back at Bemis Heights, Gates received the reports and ordered all units to strike tents, load wagons, and man the lines—
routine measures taken under the circumstances. Additionally, the aggressive Benedict Arnold began pressing Gates to take some kind of positive, offensive action. Initially Gates resisted but then he reluctantly authorized Arnold to send Daniel Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen and Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry (attached to Morgan) to discern the British intentions and conduct harassment attacks. Morgan’s men departed the defenses sometime after noon and headed north on a trail toward Freeman’s Farm. When Morgan’s men reached the clearing at the south edge of the farm, the riflemen dispersed behind rocks and in trees, and a number of them took positions in the Freeman house and outbuildings. They would not have to wait long for developments.

Move south to Stand 12B (see stand map).

**Day 2, Sub-stand 12B The Opening Fight**

Orientation: Sometime during 1766, John Freeman and wife, Effelina, moved onto “Great Lot 16” of the Saratoga Patent located here. On 2 January 1768, they paid six pence per acre to lease an additional 170 acres from the patentee, one Philip Schuyler. The Freemans lived in a farm house (likely a clapboard frame structure rather than log construction) that was located at the small clump of trees to the south. A barn and two other buildings were adjacent to the house on the farm. You are at the tree line where the skirmishers of the 9th Regiment of Foot of Hamilton’s brigade entered the open fields of Freeman’s Farm. (Note: Disregard the red-tipped white picket posts at this time. These posts mark fortifications that were integral to the 7 October battle but have no meaning for this battle.) To the far south is the woodline where most of Morgan’s men occupied positions. The open field to the east was partially planted in corn at the time of the battle.

Description: By mid-day, the lead regiment in Hamilton’s Brigade, the 9th Foot, had struggled its way through the Great Ravine and was about to arrive at the north side of the Freeman clearing. Fearing an ambush once they detected the clearing, Hamilton and Lt. Col. John Hill, commander of the 9th Foot, wisely deployed a skirmish force led by Maj. Gordon Forbes into the open fields be-
yond the tree line while the remainder of the brigade arrived. As the skirmishers moved south in open order, they began to see movement around the Freeman outbuildings. Almost immediately, Morgan’s men opened a fierce fire. In short order, the shooters wounded Forbes and killed or wounded all the remaining officers in the skirmish line. After several minutes of firing, the British line began to waver and Morgan’s men impetuously rushed forward to finish off their prey. However, Capt. Alexander Fraser’s Company of Marksmen, part of Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps, had rushed to the sound of the guns from the west. Supported by a light cannon, he quickly placed fire on Morgan’s left flank. Soon the rebel advance was in serious trouble. Realizing he might lose his entire command, Morgan began a series of turkey calls to recall his men. Before long they were all in headlong retreat.

During the initial fight, Hamilton rushed his remaining units forward into line and was ready to receive an attack. By about 1300, the four center column regiments were deployed with the 21st Foot on the right, the 20th Foot on the left, the 62nd Foot in the center, and Hill’s 9th in reserve. Hamilton moved the brigade out of the woods and into the clearing. Immediately rebel fire picked up and began dropping men in the ranks. The men in the battle line were unable to return fire at the unseen rebels across the field since some of Forbes’ skirmishers were still deployed to the front. Annoyingly, the brigade line was steadily taking casualties without being able to respond. In frustration, several men suddenly began to discharge their weapons at the invisible foes across Freeman’s field. Dozens of others began to follow suit. Before their officers could stop the shooting, several of Forbes’ men were killed or wounded by the friendly bullets. The firing soon tapered off to skirmishing and seesaw efforts to control small parts of the Freeman field. Then a lull descended on Freeman’s Farm, interspersed with desultory small arms bursts here and there.

By now, Gates was aware of Riedesel’s advance in the east and had detected both Hamilton’s Brigade in the center and the lead elements of Fraser’s Advance Corps in the west. Reports were also trickling in to Gates about the size of the enemy he faced, including one from Gates’ own deputy adjutant general. Without permis-
sion, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson had gone forward earlier to assess the situation. Based on the various information, Gates ordered Arnold to send additional troops to support Morgan’s efforts. Two regiments—the 1st and 3rd New Hampshire Continentals from Poor’s Brigade—were heading north, followed by the impulsive Arnold. Gates sent several additional regiments from the brigade, including the 2nd New Hampshire, 2nd New York, 4th New York, and two Connecticut militia battalions. In the meantime, some of Morgan’s Riflemen and Dearborn’s Light Infantry kept up a heavy skirmish fire that continued to inflict casualties on Hamilton’s redcoats.

Move south to Sub-stand 12C (see stand map).

**Day 2, Sub-stand 12C American Reinforcements Arrive**

Orientation: You are currently standing in the vicinity where the Freeman house and outbuildings stood (see map 44, Appendix J, Battle of Freeman’s Farm 19 September 1777, 1300-1500).

Description: During the lull, the 1st and 3rd New Hampshire Regiments quietly moved into positions at the south edge of the field where Morgan’s men had once been. Having largely regrouped, Morgan’s Riflemen moved to the extreme right of the American line near a heavily wooded ravine. There, the riflemen opened accurate harassing fire against the 20th Foot lined up in the open field across from the ravine. On the extreme left, Dearborn’s Light Infantry took up a position behind a small knoll that gave them cover from British return fire. The firing intensified as the new arrivals took up their positions around 1500.

Perceiving that the two New Hampshire regiments were not strong enough to move the British line, Arnold ordered Col. Thaddeus Cook’s Connecticut Militia Battalion and the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment to extend the line farther to the left (west). The American line was now positioned in a somewhat concave manner along the south edge of the field, with the two ends closest to the British line. By this time, Hamilton’s line had pushed forward to the vicinity of the Freeman house and held most of the open field. The
2nd New Hampshire now overlapped Hamilton’s right flank, and Cook’s Connecticut Militia pressed Hamilton’s left. In response to Cook’s threat, the 62nd Foot—in battle line just south of the Freeman house—refused its two left flank companies and posted two 6-pounders at the angle, and the 21st Foot was brought up to protect the 62nd Regiment’s right flank. All three regiments on Hamilton’s line were taking a beating, but the 62nd was sustaining the worst and was soon in danger of collapsing. The British line began giving ground back to the press of American infantrymen.

As the British line slowly fell back, Arnold sensed that he might have an opportunity to flank Hamilton’s line to the right of the 21st Foot. Arnold ordered the troops on the American left to press forward, but this attack was stopped short by the advance of the 24th Foot and some grenadiers from Fraser’s command to the west. Meanwhile, Fraser sent part of the 24th Foot into the woods to eliminate or disperse Dearborn’s Light Infantry, which was tasked with defending the American left wing. Like many British charges that day, that blow struck air when the light infantry simply fell back and advanced again as the British regiment withdrew.

Move south to Sub-stand 12D (see stand map).

**Day 2, Sub-stand 12D Advance and Retreat**

Orientation: You are currently standing between the British and American lines. The American forces would have been located in the tree line to your south, east, and west until advancing into the open area late in the battle (see map 45, Appendix J, Battle of Freeman’s Farm 19 September 1777, 1500–1700).

Description: From their hidden and naturally protected position in the woods, Morgan’s Riflemen on the far right of the line found a position from which they could shoot at the flank and even into the rear of the 62nd Regiment. As the grueling battle wore on, the two British cannon with the 62nd fell silent after thirty-six of the forty-eight gunners as well as other crew members were killed or wounded. These guns were charged and countercharged and traded
hands several times during the seesaw fighting at Freeman’s Farm that day. While experiencing significant losses, the 62nd Foot also was inflicting heavy casualties on Cook’s militia posted between Morgan’s Riflemen and the 1st New Hampshire Regiment. General Poor ordered the 8th Massachusetts Continentals commanded by Maj. William Hull to relieve the Connecticut militia. During the relief, the 62nd advanced to exploit the momentary weakness of the American line. However, Hull ordered a bayonet attack into the diminished British regiment, and the redcoats were checked and fell back. Sensing the danger of the 62nd’s condition, General Phillips sent the 20th Foot to bolster that regiment’s left flank. The 20th Regiment rushed into the woods to check Hull’s advance and prevent Morgan’s Riflemen from shooting at the backs of their retreating comrades. Once back in position, the 62nd Foot reorganized then conducted a counterattack—forcing Hull’s men to fall back all the way to their original position so that the 62nd regained its two guns.

As the 21st, 62nd, and 20th Regiments of Foot incurred casualties, Hamilton piecemealed his reserve, the 9th Foot, into the fight. Detachment by detachment, 9th troops were sent forward to replace fallen men from the other regiments. When they entered the line, of course, the 9th Foot troops also began taking significant casualties. By the end of the day, the regiment had sustained about as many casualties as either the 20th or 21st. The 62nd Foot, however, would be the most worn-down, with only sixty men of the regiment answering the roll call that evening.

To support Dearborn and bolster the left flank of the main battle line, Arnold sent Col. Jonathan Latimer’s Connecticut Militia Battalion and the last two regiments of Poor’s Brigade, the 2nd and 4th New York Continental Regiments. While Latimer’s Battalion and the 4th New York moved to support Dearborn, the 2nd New York collided with Maj. Alexander Lindsay’s Light Infantry Battalion. The New Yorkers were forced to pull back under pressure. Lacking specific orders, the four regiments of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s Brigade stumbled into the fight on the British far right flank and traded fire with German grenadiers and other troops of Fraser’s Advance Corps—to no real effect on either side.

Though fighting bravely, the British army took heavy casual-
ties during the bitter fighting at Freeman’s Field. Capt. John Money (Burgoyne’s deputy quartermaster general) related: “the 62nd Regiment charged four times . . . quitting their position each time . . . the rebels fled at every charge deeper still into the woods; but when the British troops returned to their position, they were slowly followed, and those who had been the most forward in the pursuit were the first to fall.”

Burgoyne later stressed the cost of this struggle: “Few actions have been characterized by more obstinacy in attack or defense. The British bayonet was repeatedly tried ineffectually. Eleven hundred British soldiers, foiled in these trials, bore incessant fire from a succession of fresh troops in superior numbers, for above four hours; and after a loss of above a third of their numbers (and in one of the regiments above, two thirds), forced the enemy at last. Of a detachment of a captain and forty-eight artillerymen, the captain and thirty-six were killed or wounded.”

Move northeast to Sub-stand 12E (see stand map). Ensure you can see the open field to the east of the Freeman house location.

Day 2, Sub-stand 12E Riedesel Saves the Day

Orientation: Looking due east, you are viewing the direction from which Riedesel’s relief column approached in the late afternoon to come to the aid of Hamilton’s brigade. You would have seen a stand of corn in the field in front of you. A dirt trail would have run along the edge of the tree line to the north and northeast about where the park road is now, then curved into the tree line to your east and southeast. That is the route from which Riedesel approached.

Description: For at least five hours that day, Riedesel’s men slowly toiled forward, rebuilding bridges and roads and skirmishing with rebel scouts as their column approached Gates’ eastern defenses along the River Road. Riedesel and his men had been listening to the sounds of firing off to the west all afternoon, and the German general wondered what was happening in that quarter. He had heard
almost nothing from Burgoyne since the operation began, so he sent a British aide to find the commanding general and inquire what actions he wanted Riedesel to take.

About 1630 or perhaps a little later, Riedesel received an order from Burgoyne to leave men to protect the artillery and baggage trains along the River Road and move west with all the troops he could spare to attack the American right flank. Wasting no time, Riedesel directed part of his command to protect the trains. He then assumed personal command of his own regiment (the Braunschweiger von Riedesel Regiment), two companies of the Regiment von Rhetz, and two 6-pounders from Capt. Georg Päusch’s Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery. After locating a dirt road heading west, he proceeded with this force toward the fighting.

Anxious, Riedesel moved ahead with the two companies of the von Rhetz Regiment. The Riedesel Regiment would have to catch up later. After moving about a mile and a half, Riedesel rested his troops briefly so that they would be fresh when they entered the fight. While they rested, he proceeded to a nearby hill (to your east-southeast but no longer visible due to the trees), where he discovered that he could see the American right flank in the woods and the British battle line in Freeman’s Field. He quickly directed Päusch’s artillery to move to a hill on the north side of the field where the entire British line was being pushed back. He then ordered the von Rhetz Regiment detachment to get up and marched them on line forward at the double quick toward the American right.

The sudden appearance of the German troops on the American flank had two immediate effects. It surprised and demoralized the advancing Americans and stopped them in their tracks while simultaneously causing British morale to soar. The British line quickly rallied and pressed forward as the balance of von Riedesel’s own regiment came up in the field to further extend the German line to the left (south). The weight of the German fire fell on Morgan’s Riflemen and the 1st New Hampshire. This new threat forced the rebel line to retreat. Even so, the Americans conducted a creditable fighting withdrawal back to their defenses as darkness descended on the battlefield. Burgoyne did not pursue.

Return northwest to Sub-stand 12C (location of Freeman’s Farm).
Day 2, Sub-stand 12F The Results and Costs

Description: The strain of the day was telling on both sides. The Northern Army sustained more than 300 dead and wounded (65 KIA/218 WIA/38 MIA). The Army from Canada suffered even greater casualties at more than 600 (245 KIA/444 WIA). Additionally, many of the British casualties were combat-experienced officers. Though a tactical victory for the British, who had remained on the field, it was once again pyrrhic in nature due to their tremendous losses. Operationally, however, the battle did not help the British. Burgoyne’s losses could not be replaced and his supplies would continue to dwindle. Gates, who already outnumbered Burgoyne, replaced his losses within a day or two as new troops continued to arrive. Moreover, Gates made excellent defensive use of the terrain to effectively block Burgoyne’s movement south. Meanwhile, the rebel defenses and strength would improve almost daily.

Vignette 1: Sergeant Roger Lamb, 23rd Regiment of Foot described the fighting at Freeman’s Farm:

The Americans being unable from the nature of the country, of perceiving the different combinations of march (as the country is thickly covered with woods, movements may be effected without a possibility of being discovered) advanced a strong column, with a view of turning the British right, here they met the grenadiers and light infantry, who gave them a tremendous fire. Finding it was impossible to penetrate the line at this point, they immediately counter-marched and directed their principal effort to the centre. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 238–40.)

Vignette 2: Lt. Joshua Pell Jr. (a loyalist volunteer) also related what he saw:

About two o’clock the 9th, 21st, and 62nd regiments were engaged by the Rebels near Freeman’s Farm, they were
strongly posted in a wood with a deep Ravine to their front, the fire was so hot upon the 20th, 21st, and 62nd, that they broke, but by the spirited behavior of their officers were immediately rallied, and drove them from there. Major Agnew with the 24th Regiment, advanced into the woods in order to flank them; on the first onset the Rebels retired in confusion, but the fire from the [Hamilton’s] line having abated considerably by this time, and the Rebels finding their left flank in danger, poured a strong force upon this regiment. Which caused them to retire about one hundred yards behind an inclosure [sic] in a grass field [McBride’s]; the rebels fought bravely in the woods but darst (sic) not. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 238–40.)

Vignette 3: Lt. James Hadden, Royal Artillery, later recorded the actions of the Royal Artillery:

The Enemy being in possession of the wood almost immediately attacked the Corps which took post behind two log huts on Freeman’s Farm. Capt. [Thomas] Jones’ Brigade [Company] was hasten’d to their support, I was advanced with two guns to the left of the 62nd Regiment. And ye two left companies being formed en potence I took post in the angle. Lieutenant [George] Reid remain’d with Capt. Jones and the other two [guns] was posted between the 9th and the 21st Regiments.” (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 238–40.)

Analysis

1. What do you think are the primary strengths and weaknesses of Burgoyne’s plan on this day?
2. Does Burgoyne’s plan reveal anything about his opinions regarding the American army facing him (especially after his defeat at Bennington)?
3. Gates and Arnold disagreed on the approach to this battle. Who, if either (or both), was right, and why? Their views reflect the typical conflict between aggressiveness and caution. What can we take away from this tension today? Clearly, aggressiveness and caution are not mutually exclusive. How should a planner balance the two?

4. Was Gates correct in not committing more forces to the battle at Freeman’s Farm? Why or why not?

5. Which side won this battle tactically? Which commander accomplished more to further his operational goals? Which army seems to be in better condition for the next battle and why?

6. How did each side use the terrain to its advantage?

7. How did the terrain affect Burgoyne’s plan and the conduct of the battle?

Return to the Breymann Redoubt parking lot by walking the same trail network in reverse when this stand series is complete.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Casualties from 1st Battle of Saratoga (19 September 1777)</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>42¹</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Missing, presumed captured or deserted.
2. American casualties are estimated

Figure 14. 1st Battle of Saratoga Casualties.
Day 2, Stand 13 Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign (Events between 20 September and 22 October 1777)

Directions: From Breymann Redoubt parking lot, return to the park road and head east to Park Stop #8, Burgoyne’s Headquarters. Turn into the parking lot and park. Walk the blacktop trail to the Park Stand #8 location, Burgoyne’s Headquarters.

Orientation: You are standing near the location where General Burgoyne established his headquarters after the battle at Freeman’s Farm. Just to the east are the British positions at the Great Redoubt and beyond that position is the Hudson River. Approximately 8 miles north of this location is the town of Saratoga (now Schuylerville, New York), toward which Burgoyne would eventually retreat (and ultimately surrender) in late October 1777. To the west are Balcarres Redoubt and Breymann Redoubt, which were the western-

most of the British positions established during the period between the two battles. Bemis Heights, the main Continental defensive encampment, is approximately a mile and a half south of this position.

Description of Burgoyne’s Dilemma: After the Battle of Freeman’s Farm on 19 September, Gates’ army blocked Burgoyne’s only feasible route to Albany. However, the left of the Continental line was weak on the day after the battle. The troops under Arnold’s command were exhausted from the previous day’s fight and largely out of ammunition. Unit quartermasters had generally failed to distribute powder to the regiments that night after the battle, and they had few bullets to distribute at all. Now back in Albany, Schuyler received word that much of the army was very low on bullets and powder. Ever the workhorse, he began gathering gunpowder and lead from any source he could find. He acquired the lead largely from the window weights in Albany homes. He forwarded the weights to Bemis Heights so the lead could be melted and formed into bullets. Though Schuyler’s efforts were admirable, the supplies were unlikely to get to Bemis Heights in a timely fashion. In short, Burgoyne would have had a great chance of success if he had repeated his plan the following morning.

Burgoyne was indeed planning to do just that on the morning of the 20th. Fraser and Phillips urged him to attack once again despite the losses on the previous day. In fact, a British deserter from the 62nd Foot came into Arnold’s lines and informed the Americans that an attack was imminent as soon as the morning fog lifted. The rebels stood behind their guns and waited, but the attack did not come. After reconsideration, Burgoyne decided against resuming offensive operations that day ostensibly because the hospitals were already full and he felt that the army’s supply trains were not adequately protected. He postponed the attack to the 21st. However, sometime before dawn the next day, Burgoyne received a coded letter from General Clinton in New York. Clinton’s message stated in part: “You know my good will, & are not ignorant of my poverty. If you think 2000 men can assist you effectually I will make a push at Montgomery in about ten days but ever jealous of my flanks; if they make a move in force on either of them, I must return to save this important post.
I expect reinforcements every day. Let me know what you would wish.” That force was supposed to leave New York on or about 22 September according to the letter. Burgoyne decided at that point to dig in and see how Clinton’s Highlands campaign developed. At the most, it would succeed in linking up with Burgoyne to help defeat Gates (which was never Clinton’s intent). At the worst, Burgoyne concluded, it would draw away substantial forces from Gates’ army, making it easier for him to destroy or at least defeat the Northern Army. Burgoyne decided to entrench and await developments.

In the end, the British did not attack on 21 September. That day the British troops heard great cheering and a thirteen-gun salute in the rebel camp as the Americans celebrated news of Lincoln’s attack on Fort Ticonderoga, Mount Independence, and Skenesborough. The fact that Burgoyne did not attack on the 20th or the 21st did not alleviate American concern about an imminent British attack. They continued to improve their defenses, receive reinforcements and supplies, and make bullets while the Army from Canada waited for the outcome of Clinton’s actions in the Highlands. As additional militia reinforcements from New York and New England arrived during the days following the battle at Freeman’s Farm, the size of Gates’ army eventually grew to about 12,500 officers and men under his immediate control. The longer Burgoyne waited, the stronger the Northern Army grew.

Description of the Highlands Campaign (Offsite) (see map 46, Appendix J, Clinton’s Highland Campaign, Attack on Forts Clinton and Montgomery 5–6 October 1777): When General Howe departed on his quest to capture Philadelphia in July, he left Clinton with a force of about 6,000 British and German soldiers and roughly 3,000 Tory loyalists to defend New York. Clinton felt that the force was not sufficient to defend the approaches to the big city and simultaneously move up the Hudson to conduct sustained operations in the face of the growing Continental force. Clinton’s concern for New York was more imagined than real, especially since Howe had defeated Washington at Brandywine on 16 September, three days before the battle of Freeman’s Farm. Then, in late September, an additional 2,000 troops arrived from Britain to bring Clinton’s forces up to almost
10,000 men. However, only 7,000 were considered capable of taking the field. The rest were sick or in detachments detailed to other duties. Still, with the new reinforcements on hand, Clinton opted to leave about 4,000 men to defend the city and embark about 3,000 men, mostly regulars, aboard three Royal Navy frigates and a collection of other small boats. On 3 October, Clinton departed for the Highlands to provide some assistance to Burgoyne’s stranded army.

Clinton’s two main tactical objectives were Forts Clinton and Montgomery. The Continental commander responsible for the area, Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, had been tapped numerous times by General Washington to supply troops elsewhere—mostly to the main army in New Jersey. Putnam now had only about 1,500 men under his immediate control at Peekskill. This did not include troops at the two forts, which were located on the west side of the Hudson River about forty miles north of New York. The forts were positioned at a narrow defile and provided cover for a chain barrier which blocked vessel traffic north and south on the river. In short, they commanded the river so that passage between them on the Hudson was essentially impossible unless one controlled the forts. The positions, however, were inadequately defended. Both garrisons totaled only about 600 men under another Clinton, Maj. Gen. George Clinton, who was also the Governor of New York. Additionally, the fortifications were built primarily to control movement on the river. They had not been constructed to adequately defend against ground attack like the one that Sir Henry Clinton planned.

Clinton employed a rather wise tactical move to keep Putnam’s mobile forces separated from the American defenders at Forts Clinton and Montgomery. On 5 October, the British general landed a force of about 1,000 men on the east side of the Hudson at Verplanck’s Point (opposite Stony Point) and sent a naval detachment farther north to demonstrate opposite Peekskill on the east bank. Putnam’s assumption was that this British force was advancing to fix him in place so that another British force could be landed north or west of him, thereby trapping Putman’s command in a classic hammer and anvil attack. Therefore, Putnam retreated east, away from the river—removing his support for the forts. Putnam’s retreat allowed Clinton to concentrate his entire force against Forts Clinton and Montgomery.
On the morning of 6 October, Clinton landed the remainder of his army at Stony Point and immediately marched north through a pass on Dunderberg Mountain toward Doodletown. At Doodletown, Clinton split his forces, sending 900 soldiers under Lt. Col. Mungo Campbell to the east around Bear Mountain to attack Fort Montgomery. Clinton personally led the remaining 1,200 troops west and north around Bear Mountain to attack Fort Clinton.

As the British expedition approached the forts, Gen. George Clinton, the American general in charge, was located in Esophus (now Kingston, New York) conducting state business in his capacity as governor. Learning of the British movements, the governor departed Esophus to assume direct command of the forts, reaching Fort Clinton before the British arrival. As the British columns were wending their way toward their respective objectives, the American general dispatched two companies of skirmishers to delay and force deployment of the British advance guard. One of the companies encountered the British column under Lieutenant Colonel Campbell (composed of the 52nd and 57th Regiments of Foot) before they reached the perimeter of Fort Montgomery. However, the rebels failed to stop the British advance. Both British columns arrived in the rear of their respective forts and demanded surrender which the Americans at both forts promptly rejected.

The British wasted no time assaulting the forts. Taking heavy casualties from accurate American musket fire, the British managed to quickly overwhelm the rebel defenses at Fort Montgomery. The British commander, Campbell, was killed in the assault, which enraged some of his soldiers. Many Americans were driven into the nearby forests by the attack. Others abandoned their weapons and deserted. Some of the Americans who stayed and fought at Fort Montgomery were massacred by the soldiers of the 52nd and 57th Regiments of Foot in retaliation for Campbell’s death. To the south of Popolopen Creek, which separated the two positions, Fort Clinton was assaulted by the 63rd and 23rd Foot and elements of three other regiments. Overwhelmed by the British attack, Fort Clinton capitulated after brief but heavy fighting. At the end of the attacks, American losses at both forts numbered about 75 men killed and wounded and 263 captured. Around 100 cannon were also lost. Brit-
ish losses numbered about 41 killed and 142 wounded.

After the forts were captured, Royal Navy crews cut through the chain and log barriers designed to block movement of vessels. Advancing north from there, the British ships engaged a small squadron of American ships, including two frigates and a few smaller vessels. The British captured a schooner, but the Americans set fire to the remainder of their fleet so the boats would not fall into British hands.

On 7 October (the same day as the second battle at Saratoga to be covered later), Clinton sent another small amphibious force north to Fort Constitution. As the British approached, the rebel garrison quickly burned and abandoned the fort and fled into the nearby forests without a fight. At this point, all barriers designed to block an enemy advance up the Hudson River were effectively removed. The river was now open to free navigation for at least another 40 miles north, though Albany itself was still another 60 miles beyond that. On 22 October, Clinton ordered a small force under Brig. Gen. John Vaughn to continue upriver to the vicinity of Esopus, located about halfway to Albany. Though Vaughn succeeded in capturing and burning the town, Burgoyne’s expedition was surrounded at Saratoga (now Schuylerville), so the event had little impact on the campaign.

Clinton’s expedition to the Highlands did not have the desired effects. Ultimately, neither Gates nor Washington released any of their forces to address Clinton’s incursion into southern New York. Burgoyne continued to face a significantly superior force, in numbers, throughout Clinton’s actions during the Highlands Campaign.

The impact of an unreliable supply line continued to take a toll on Burgoyne’s army during the period of waiting. While Clinton operated in the south and Burgoyne pondered his next move, the Army from Canada commander was forced to reduce his troops’ rations by one-third.

Vignette: Burgoyne attempted to keep up his men’s morale while concurrently reducing their rations. He told them:

There is reason to be assured, that other powerful Armies [i.e., Clinton’s force] are actually in cooperation with these troops; and although the present supply of provi-
sions is ample, it is highly desirable to be prepared for any circumstances in the field that the King’s service may require, without the delay of bringing forward further stores for those purposes; the ration of bread or flour is, for the present fixed at one pound. (John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 275.)

After almost three weeks of idle expectancy, Burgoyne finally realized he would not receive substantial assistance from any quarter. Therefore, on 4 October, Burgoyne called for a council of war with his subordinate leaders to discuss options for the army’s next move. The British commander was still offensively minded and wanted to force a decision with Gates. However, his subordinate commanders—Riedesel especially—were not as certain. They fully recognized the army’s unfavorable circumstances. Nevertheless, the council decided to conduct a reconnaissance in force to the west which, if successful in locating a weakness in the American defenses, could be quickly reinforced into a full-blown assault. If no weakness was apparent, Burgoyne agreed to retreat back to at least Fort Edward, where communications could be opened with the north. Subsequently, Burgoyne directed that the movement would begin on the morning of 7 October and the council ended. The British and German generals returned to their commands and began preparations for the operation.

*Analysis*

1. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s decisions and actions regarding Clinton’s offers to help?
2. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s decisions and actions during the period of Clinton’s Highlands Campaign?
3. Were Burgoyne’s expectations unrealistic about the results due to Clinton’s assistance?
4. Could Clinton have done more to help Burgoyne?
5. Operationally, what are Burgoyne’s options at this point?
6. Is it too late for Burgoyne to revive the campaign? Has his
army operationally culminated?

7. Tactically, what are Burgoyne’s options at this point?

8. How do you think Burgoyne could have made better use of the time during the period of Clinton’s Highlands Campaign?

9. What is your assessment of Gates’ use of time during Clinton’s Highlands Campaign?
Day 2, Stand 14 Leadership Friction in the Northern Army  
(Events between 22 September and 6 October 1777)

Directions: Return to your vehicle from Park Stop #8 then follow the park access road back toward the Visitors’ Center. You will cross a bridge over the Great Ravine and head toward the Great Redoubt. At the first stop sign, turn left. Head down a hill to a T-intersection where you will turn right and head west, staying on this road all the way to the Visitors’ Center intersection. At the four-way intersection near the Visitors’ Center, turn left and proceed to Stand #14 at Park Stop #2 (Neilson’s Farm). Turn into the parking lot and follow the walking trail depicted in the map below.

Orientation: You are standing near the Neilson House, which served as Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor’s headquarters. The house and the farm on which it stood were the property of John Neilson. There was also a barn located just to the north of the house which the Continen-
tal soldiers turned into a small fortification dubbed “Fort Neilson.” During the battles at Saratoga, John Neilson was a soldier serving in Benedict Arnold’s Left Wing and, in fact, was one of the soldiers manning Fort Neilson. Arnold would also use Neilson’s farmhouse as his headquarters between the two battles. The American defense perimeter extended east from here to the banks of the Hudson River. North of this position is Freeman’s Farm and to the northwest is Barber’s Wheatfield, site of the opening stages of the second battle of Saratoga. To the west is the small hill that some historians infer was the objective of the 7 October British reconnaissance in force. By then, Arnold had already established a picket post on the hill to provide an initial defense and early warning of the enemy’s approach. To the south of this point across New York Highway 32 is the Woodworth Farm where Gates’ headquarters and the American field hospital were located.

Description: While Burgoyne sat idle for almost three weeks awaiting good news and hoping for reinforcements, the Americans were having troubles of their own. A crisis arose between Horatio Gates and Benedict Arnold. As was customary, Gates drafted a report to send to the Continental Congress that detailed the fighting and results of the Freeman’s Farm battle. Gates, either by co-mission or omission, left out any mention of Arnold’s role in the battle. Moreover, Gates credited Morgan’s Riflemen and Light Infantry for the success, failing to mention all the other units involved (which belonged to Arnold’s command). When Arnold discovered these facts on 22 September, he believed that Gates had intentionally slighted him (which was certainly possible). He also learned that Gates issued an order that placed Morgan’s command directly under his (Gates’) control. Incensed, Arnold went to Gates’ headquarters and confronted the commanding general.

At the impromptu meeting, Arnold grew hotter and angrier as the discussion wore on, and he threatened to leave the Northern Department. Gates replied with sarcasm, chiding Arnold about submitting a resignation letter in July and then never withdrawing the letter (in fact Arnold had only threatened to resign). The commanding general then told Arnold that it was doubtful he held any official
position in the army. Gates said he was under no obligation to assign Arnold to a command. Indeed, Gates told him that he had ordered Lincoln to return to the army from Vermont upon which Gates would give him Arnold’s command. Furthermore, Gates stated, he would be happy to give Arnold a written pass to depart anytime he wished. Arnold then stormed out and sat down to write Gates a long letter airing his grievances and requesting a pass to go and see Washington. That led to a series of back and forth letters that only exacerbated the friction between the two.

As the animosity grew, the officers of the camp began to catch wind of the interpersonal squabble. Several officers who were loyal to one general or the other fanned the flames through rumormongering or writing letters of their own. When rumors started floating around in early October that Arnold planned to leave the army, a group of officers drew up a petition appealing to Arnold to stay. The petition was signed by all general officers except Gates and Lincoln who had now returned to find himself in the middle of all this command turmoil. Arnold relented and remained. As for Gates, he had technically relieved Arnold of command and replaced him with Lincoln, but Arnold had not been ordered away from the army. He simply no longer commanded any troops.

Vignette 1: On 22 September, Col. Richard Varick, the Northern Army’s commissary general of musters, wrote to General Schuyler regarding the quarrel earlier that day between Arnold and Gates:

Had Gates complied with Arnold’s repeated desires, he would have gained a general & complete victory over the enemy. But it is evident to me, he never intended to fight Burgoyne till Arnold urged, begged & entreated him to do it. Nay, he meant by moving the army to cast an [illegible] on your reputation, in hopes that Burgoyne would be frightened by his movement from the south & north. I apprehend much that a certain person, whose conduct much bespeaks the character of a sycophant, & who affects great friendship for you, has no small share in attempting to injure your reputation when set in competition with General Gates’ & is at bottom of the dispute between Ar-
nold and Gates. I apprehend if Arnold leave us, we shant move unless the enemy run up the river. He had the full confidence of the troops & they would fight gallantly under him. If he [Arnold] quits I shall not stay longer unless I can probably see Saratoga [Schuyler’s estate 10 miles north of the Bemis Heights]. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 265.)

Vignette 2: Col. Henry B. Livingston, commander of the 4th New York Continental Regiment, also wrote to Schuyler on 23 September:

He [Arnold] is the life and soul of the troops. Believe me sir, to him & him alone is due the honor of our late victory [Freeman’s Farm]. Whatever share his superiors may claim they are entitled to none. He enjoys the confidence & affection of officers & soldiers. They would, to a man, follow him to conquest or death. His absence will dishearten them to such a degree, as to render them of but little service. The difference between him & Mr. G[ates] has arisen to too great a height to admit a compromise. I have, for some time past observed the great coolness, & in many instances, even disrespect with which Gen. Arnold has been treated at Head Qr. His proposals have been rejected with marks of indignity. His own orders have frequently been contravened—and himself set in a ridiculous light by those of the Commander-in-Chief. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 266.)

Vignette 3: Benedict Arnold, still fuming over the way he felt Gates willfully mistreated him, wrote another letter to the Army commander on October 1:

Notwithstanding the repeated ill treatment I have met with, and continued daily to receive, treated only as a cipher in the army, never consulted or acquainted with one
occurrence in the army, which I know only by accident, while I have every reason to think your treatment proceeds from a spirit of jealousy, and that I have everything to fear from the malice of my enemies, conscious of my own innocency and integrity, I am determined to sacrifice my feelings, present peace and quiet, to the public good, and continue in the army at this critical juncture, when my country needs every support . . . I beg leave to say, that when Congress sent me into the department at the request of his excellency General Washington, they thought me of some consequence, and I believe expected the commander-in-chief, would consult with me, or at least would have taken my opinion on public matters. I think it my duty (which nothing shall deter me from doing) to acquaint you the army are clamorous for action. The militia who compose a great part of the army are already threatening to go home. One fortnight’s inaction will, I make no doubt, lessen your army by sickness and defection at least four thousand men, in which time the enemy may be reinforced to make good their retreat . . . I have reason to think, from intelligence since received, that had we improved the 20th of September it might have ruined the enemy, that is past, let me entreat you to improve the present time. . . . I hope you will not impute this hint to wish to command the army, or to outshine you, when I assure you it proceeds from my zeal for the cause of my country in which I expect to rise or fall. [Gates did not respond to this correspondence.]


Orientation (continued): Before leaving this stand, take a moment to view the low hill to the west. This hill was ostensibly the piece of ground which was the objective of Burgoyne’s 7 October advance. Should Burgoyne’s forces reach that location, the British general intended to post much of his artillery there to batter a hole in the American defenses. Once the defenses were pierced, he could
then send his disciplined regulars forward into the breach and complete the destruction, or rout, of the Northern Army.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of the American command climate in the interim between the two major battles at Saratoga? Who, if anyone, is at fault for the difficulties? How would you have handled such a leadership challenge, either as the commander or the subordinate? What can we learn about Mission Command from this challenge—especially about building a cohesive team?

2. What was the impact of this period of relative inactivity between the two battles? This was a classic operational pause. Who benefitted the most and why?
Day 2, Stand 15 The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield (Events of 7 October 1777)

Directions: From the Neilson Farm parking area, return to the one-way road and head east. At the stop sign, turn left heading northwest. Proceed to Park Stop #5 (Barber’s Wheatfield) and turn into the Barber’s Wheatfield parking lot. Walk on the footpath to the center of the field where the interpretive tablet is located.

Orientation: You are standing in the middle of Barber’s Wheatfield, site of the initial contact between Fraser’s Advance Corps and Poor’s Brigade during the second battle of Saratoga (see map 49, Appendix J, Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield 7 October 1777, 1300–1500). To the east is the Hudson River. To the northeast are the Balcarres Redoubt (Freeman’s Farm) and the Breymann Redoubt, the two main defensive positions that many of Burgoyne’s troops would
fall back to after their tactical repulse here at Barber’s Wheatfield. The initial British line would extend through here to the west beyond the woods across the park road. To the south is Bemis Heights. The Barber house stood in this vicinity. The British battle line was formed here generally west to east and facing south. The Americans would have assaulted from the south, with Morgan’s men coming up on the British right flank to the west.

Description: On 4 October, Burgoyne met with his three top generals, Phillips, Riedesel, and Fraser, in a council of war. He proposed leaving them 800 men to guard the trains and bateaux at the river and take the rest of the army on a wide swing to the west to attack the American lines there. Not knowing the actual strength and location of the enemy defenses, his subordinates all informed him that they felt the plan was too risky. Gentleman Johnny then proposed a modified approach. Instead, he would take his best troops, 1,500 of them, and push west on a reconnaissance in force. Captain Fraser and the remnants of his Company of Marksmen—supplemented by about 90 rangers and Indians—would push ahead of the column to seek out the American left flank and gather information about its location, strengths, and weaknesses. If the defenses appeared weak enough, Burgoyne would order his entire army (less the guard for the trains and bateaux) out of its lines to attack the following day. If the defenses were too strong, Burgoyne would wait for a few more days. If no changes developed in his favor, he would retreat to Batten Kill to reestablish communications with Fort Ticonderoga. That was the primary purpose of the foray. Since no foraging details had been through the area, a secondary purpose of the reconnaissance in force was to traverse and gather any foodstuffs and animal forage that could be found to help feed the army. Riedesel was still dubious, but since Burgoyne was now at least considering a retrograde (which Riedesel had already suggested), he agreed to the plan as did the other two generals.

On the morning of 7 October, Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps began forming to draw rations and ammunition and otherwise prepare to begin their movement toward the west. As planned, Captain Fraser’s reconnaissance force departed early to scout the paths
through the woods to the west and south for the army to follow, to seek the American defenses, and otherwise provide early warning. The inspections of the main column were completed by 1000, but for some reason, movement did not begin until about 1300.

For this mission, General Fraser’s Advance Corps consisted of only Balcarres’ Light Infantry Battalion and the 24th Foot. This group was followed by Riedesel’s force, which was composed of the Braunschweiger von Riedesel Regiment plus a mixture of troops from other regiments and the jäger company. Bringing up the rear was Acland’s Grenadier Battalion. All told, Burgoyne’s ad hoc force consisted of 1,700 men. The column marched past Freeman’s Farm then through the Marshall Farm. At about 1330, the column arrived at the wheatfield of Simeon Barber.

The field was about 300 yards square, full of standing wheat, and contained one small cabin. The British and German troops approached the field along what is now the walking trail from the direction of the Balcarres Redoubt to the northeast. The column filed into the field and halted. Noting the standing wheat and desirous of reaping it to feed the troops, Fraser began deploying his men on line to protect a harvesting effort. Burgoyne apparently agreed with Fraser’s action. Besides, the generals had not yet heard back from Fraser’s nephew as to what he had discovered on his reconnaissance of the American lines. While waiting, their troops could cut and haul the wheat. Fraser sent word back to the camp to bring foragers and wagons forward.

In the interim, Balcarres’ Light Infantry formed the right of the line, extending its line into the woods on the west. Next came the 24th Foot and the German troops who halted generally in the middle of the field. Bringing up the rear were the Grenadiers who extended into the woods to the east. All the units halted along the trail and faced left toward Bemis Heights. The Grenadiers were bent back slightly to the left to conform with the trace of the road. While the troops rested, the foragers arrived from the British camp began to harvest the much-needed grain. Meanwhile, Burgoyne, Riedesel, and Phillips climbed onto the cabin roof to observe the American lines. Once up there, they could see nothing but more trees.

What the generals did not realize was that the movement into
the field and their ascent onto the cabin roof were being closely watched. The British column’s arrival had forced several American soldiers on picket to fall back and report this large concentration of British troops at Barber’s wheatfield. On receiving the report, Gates sent his adjutant general, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson, to observe and report on the British activity. The foragers were already at work when Wilkinson arrived. He also watched as the enemy generals climbed onto the cabin roof. Wilkinson returned and informed Gates about everything he had seen. He also offered the opinion that the British were looking for battle and that they intended to turn the American left flank.

Gates decided to send Morgan’s rifle corps, including Dearborn’s Light Infantry, to investigate this threat more fully. Then as events unfolded, Gates also sent Poor’s and Learned’s Brigades to conduct an attack on the enemy lines. Morgan’s troops were to swing to the west to a small hill from which they could enfilade the right (west) of the enemy line. Poor’s Brigade was supposed to hit the enemy’s left (east) flank, and Learned would then attack the middle of the line. As planned, Morgan’s Riflemen and Dearborn’s Light Infantry moved quickly toward the wooded height commanding the British right flank but ran into elements of Captain Fraser’s Indians and the Company of Marksmen which held up the American advance briefly. Poor’s Brigade on the right marched to the Chatfield Farm clearing and proceeded toward the ditch of a wooded ravine opposite Acland’s Grenadiers. Just past 1600, the Grenadiers began to volley fire at the approaching rebel brigade. However, because of the higher ground on which the redcoats stood, their fire largely went high. Poor halted his troops and opened fire with a massive volley in which Acland, the Grenadier commander, fell with wounds in both legs. The volley was followed by the command, “Charge!” and suddenly, the Grenadiers were being subjected to something which they typically foisted on their own enemies—a bayonet charge. The surprised Grenadiers, their own commander down and faced with a howling mob of rebel troops with fixed bayonets, quickly folded and began to break for the rear.

After brushing off Fraser’s troops, Morgan’s men on the American left gained the small hill to Balcarres’ right. From there, Mor-
gan’s Riflemen began to extract a heavy toll on Balcarres’ men who attempted to trade fire with the Americans. Meanwhile, Dearborn had led his men farther north beyond the high ground and positioned them almost in the rear of Balcarres’ line. Because he believed some of the American troops were being driven back, Dearborn ordered a charge into the right rear of the British position. At just about this time, Learned’s Brigade in the center appeared before the 24th Foot and the Braunschweigers, and both sides began trading volleys. Capt. Georg Päusch, commander of the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery, kept Learned’s men from making an all-out assault against the line by expert employment of his two 6-pounders located at the German line. After finding that his own main line had fallen back, Päusch withdrew his guns to a small log wall in front of the little cabin. There the captain positioned the cannon—one at each end of the wall—so he could place fire at both Poor’s and Learned’s troops and help keep them at bay. He continued the battle while the German line supported him from the rear.

Meanwhile, Gates remained at his Bemis Heights headquarters throughout the day just as he had done during the battle at Freeman’s Farm. He depended solely on the reports of others rather than venturing forward to assess the situation himself. Arnold, however, became impatient listening to all the small arms and cannon fire north of Bemis Heights. Anxious to get into the battle, Benedict Arnold rode out of the defenses and headed toward the sounds of the guns. On arrival, he came upon Learned’s Brigade in action against the Braunschweigers. Technically, Arnold was a man without a command and had no authority to assume tactical control of any kind (see note on the next page). However, many of the Continental soldiers recognized Arnold riding by and cheered his presence on the battlefield. Undoubtedly this led Arnold to follow through on his desire to once again lead in battle. Caught up in the excitement of the moment, Arnold cheered the men forward, urging them to attack the enemy line. Three of Learned’s regiments moved forward against the British center but made no real headway. The Germans and the 24th Foot held steady against the American attack, at least for a time.

On the British right, Balcarres regained control of his Light In-
fantry after their shock of Dearborn’s men surprising them from the rear. Balcarres reformed his men on the right of the 24th Foot and continued the firefight with Morgan and Dearborn. The rebel fire and advance, however, soon caused the Light Infantry to falter again. General Fraser, noting the danger of collapse on his right, rode there to bolster their courage as well as those of the 24th Foot. In the process of this effort, Fraser was shot in the stomach by a rebel rifleman and mortally wounded as he attempted to rally his men.

Fraser’s mortal wound seemed to signal the final collapse of the remaining British line in Barber’s Field. Sensing his men were wavering on the verge of a rout, Burgoyne realized that he had to break off the engagement and try to get his remaining forces back under the cover of prepared defenses. He sent orders to retreat to the redoubts. On the left, the Grenadiers had already broken and fled. In the center, the Braunschweigers were also crumbling. At the fenceline near the Barber cabin, Päusch’s men continued to serve their guns. However, when the captain turned to signal the German line to cover his retreat, he discovered that the German and British infantry protecting the house and log wall had already fled. With the approach of overwhelming American forces, Päusch and his men successfully limbered their guns and got them to the wood line, but there they were nearly overrun by advancing rebels at the new location and eventually had to abandon their guns.

As the British and German troops fled for the safety of the prepared positions to the east, many of them saw Brig. Gen. Abraham Ten Broeck’s New York Militia Brigade—some 1,300 strong—march into view on the field. The militia played no major role in this part of the fight, but the appearance of a single fresh brigade which almost rivaled the size of the whole British force in this fight must have been a shock to the fleeing enemy troops.

Note: The standard historical account of Arnold’s relief and actions after the battle at Freeman’s Farm may be largely inaccurate. First, no official documentation (general orders, special orders, letters of relief, etc.) or personal accounts verify later claims that Gates relieved Arnold of his command. Moreover, the account of a second
quarrel with Arnold on the day of the second battle on 7 October seems unlikely as well as the following excerpt from a recently discovered letter that Capt. Nathaniel Bacheller wrote to his wife two days after the battle. Bacheller was the adjutant of a New Hampshire regiment in Arnold’s command. He overheard and observed several key conversations and actions at Arnold’s headquarters at the Neilson House on 7 October. The letter describes the two generals discussing an attack on approaching British forces, which is at odds with conventional stories of the men in conflict. It also seems to oppose the story of Arnold’s reportedly drunken, wild, and insubordinate behavior on the battlefield that day. Bacheller wrote (original misspellings corrected):

General Arnold soon went out into the woods on horseback with his aid-de-camp to view the enemy which then engaged with [Morgan’s] riflemen. The news was that he saw them marching towards us but could not give any account how many as they did not see their front nor rear. General Gates soon arrived to our lines and inquired for General Arnold and was told he was out of the lines to view the enemy. He soon ordered an officer on horseback to go to General Arnold to order him to give orders the riflemen not to fire on Colonel [Alexander] Scammell’s regiment [the 3rd New Hampshire]. . . . General Arnold soon returned and told General Gates that the enemy design was to take possession of a hill about a quarter of a mile to the west of our lines. . . . General Arnold says to General Gates, ‘It is late in the day but let me have men and we will have some fun with them before sunset,’ upon which the brigades began to march out the lower lines three quarters of a mile from us, but in plain sight of us. Soon a very heavy fire began with both cannon and small arms. (Nathaniel Bacheller, Nathaniel Bacheller to Susanna Bacheller letter, 9 October 1777, Ed. Eric Schnitzer, Nathaniel Bacheller file, Saratoga National Historical Park.)
Vignette: Capt. George Pausch, commander of the Hesse-Hanau Artillery, described the rout of the British center near the Barber house:

Seeing that all was irretrievably lost, and that it was impossible to save anything, I called to the few remaining men to save themselves. I myself took refuge through a fence, in a pick of dense underbrush on the right of the road, with the last ammunition wagon, which, with the help of a gunner, I saved with the horses. Here I met all the different nationalities of our division running pell mell—among them Capt. Schoel, with whom there was not a single man left of the Hanau Regiment. In this confused retreat all made for our camp and our lines. (George Paush, *Journal of Captain Pausch, Chief of the Hanau Artillery during the Burgoyne Campaign*, William Leete, annotator and translator, Albany, New York, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1886, 171–72.)

*Analysis*

1. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s plan for this operation? Was this the best tactical plan to further his operational aims? Why or why not?

2. What is your assessment of Gates’ plan for this operation? He seems to have a sound, if cautious, approach to the battle. Should he have been more aggressive?

3. How effective is Gates’ command over the American forces at this point?

4. What is your assessment of Gates’ tactical leadership thus far during this battle? Where should Gates position himself in such a battle to provide the best command and control? How do his actions support or violate the concept of Mission Command?
Day 2, Stand 16 Balcarres Redoubt (Events on 7 October 1777)

Directions: From Barber’s Wheatfield, return to the parking area. Follow the one-way park road to the north. Turn into Park Stop #6 (Balcarres Redoubt/Freeman Farm). Take the walking path to the south until you arrive at the Bloody Knoll.

Orientation: You are standing on a British defense position that was in the path of Poor’s Continental Brigade units as they pursued the British forces from Barber’s Wheatfield toward the Balcarres Redoubt (see map 50, Appendix J, Fighting at the Redoubts 7 October 1777, 1600–1900). The view here is similar to what the Continentals would have seen as they emerged from the woods near this knoll and came within visual and small arms range of the main re-
doubt. Visible to the east is the location of Balcarres Redoubt. To the north is the Breymann Redoubt (not in view). Barber’s Wheatfield is to the southwest. The Bemis Heights defenses are approximately a mile and a half south of this location.

Description: Once the British and German lines in Barber’s Field collapsed, the battle became a foot race between Burgoyne’s troops fleeing for the safety of their prepared positions and the Continentals and militiamen hell-bent on running their prey to ground. The Poor’s Brigade troops followed the retreating enemy through the woods and along a trail exiting Barber’s meadow at the northeast corner of the field. After pushing northeast for about 300 yards, Poor’s men trotted into the open in time to see many of the enemy troops scramble into and beyond a number of British earth and breastworks. Poor’s men hardly hesitated and charged the nearest work. This position, later known as “Bloody Knoll,” was located on a small rise and sported a short stockade wall. The position soon fell to Poor’s men, but they suffered heavy casualties in taking it. A number of the other small outposts around the large main position known as Balcarres Redoubt also fell to the advancing rebels of Paterson’s and Glover’s commands.

Arnold, who had arrived at about the time Bloody Knoll fell, sent an aide to direct Poor to organize his brigade for an attack on the main redoubt. It took the general a little time to form his ranks but then Poor ordered his men forward, cheered on by Arnold who was mounted on horseback and flailing the air with his sword. The brigade charged forward from the Bloody Knoll, picked their way through the abatis, and advanced toward the main position. Behind the redoubt’s stockade defenses, the once-panicked 24th Foot, interspersed with refugees from the Light Infantry and Grenadiers, had used the few precious moments to catch their breath and load their weapons. They now stood firm and poured a heavy fire on their attackers. Realizing that the position was too strong, Poor’s Brigade reeled back with heavy casualties. The troops retreated to the surrounding trees or other positions for cover and began trading shots with the enemy crouching behind the stockades.
Vignette: Col. Phillip van Cortlandt, commanding the 2nd New York Regiment of Poor’s Brigade, described some of the confusion and chaos that reigns in most combat situations:

I being yet with Poor’s brigade and advancing, the British retiring towards their battery, as the Hessians towards theirs. General Arnold, now on the field and in sight of the nine gun battery [Balcarres Redoubt] sent his aid [sic] to the right, ordering General Poor to bring his men into better order as we were pursuing. This order arrested our progress and prevented our taking the British battery in less than ten minutes; as we should have entered it almost as soon as the British, as Morgan did that of the Hessians, which Arnold discovered after sending the above order to General Poor, and as he had also sent another order by his aid, he now rode as fast as he could to counteract his own orders. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 287–88.)

**Analysis**

1. What factors allowed the Americans to gain the upper hand at Bloody Knoll?

2. What had changed by the time Poor attacked Balcarres Redoubt? Why did that attack fail?
Day 2, Stand 17 Breymann Redoubt (Events on 7 October 1777)

Directions: Return to parking lot at Park Stop #6. Proceed north to Park Stop #7 (Breymann Redoubt) parking lot. Follow the foot path to the stand location to your west.

Orientation: You are standing within the defensive perimeter of the Breymann Redoubt (see map 50, Appendix J, Fighting at the Redoubts 7 October 1777, 1600–1900). The British defensive line extended to the east from here toward the Great Redoubt adjacent to the western shore of the Hudson River. The town of Saratoga (now known as Schuylerville) is located about eight miles north of this position. A lone picket manned by German soldiers was located approximately 100 to 150 yards forward of this position. South of

Map 27. Day 2 Stand 17.
Description: As Poor’s Brigade was being repulsed, Arnold observed Learned’s Brigade and Morgan’s troops advancing on line in a northerly direction behind Poor’s Brigade. They appeared to be moving to attack another enemy position. This was the Breymann Redoubt, built to be defended by 500 soldiers but now held by only 200 jägers of Breymann’s command. To the south of the redoubt were three cabins manned by Canadian militia and fortified to provide defensive support to the redoubt. Spurring his horse forward, Arnold ordered several companies from Learned’s right hand regiments to attack the cabins. They did so with alacrity. Once the Canadian positions fell, the way was open to the rear of Breymann’s position. Arnold directed Lt. Col. John Brooks’ 8th Massachusetts Regiment to attack into the rear of the stockade. Concurrently, Morgan’s and Dearborn’s men attacked Breymann’s position frontally.

The final American assault was so quick and the distance to the redoubt so short that the Germans and loyalists inside could do little more than fire a volley or two before they stampeded toward the woods to the east and toward safety of the Great Redoubt. Lieutenant Colonel Breymann attempted to keep his men from retreating by threatening them and swatting some with the flat of his sword. He was shot and killed in the process, most likely by one of his own men desperate to get away (attested to by at least one eyewitness, though the evidence is not clear). In the few minutes of close-quarters fighting in and near the redoubt, General Arnold himself became a casualty. As Arnold rode into the rear of the position, a German soldier raised his weapon and fired at the general. The round struck Arnold’s leg, passed through, and killed his horse. The animal fell and pinned him beneath its carcass and broke the general’s already injured limb. A nearby American soldier was about to bayonet the German when Arnold intervened and ordered the man not to do any harm to the enemy soldier as he was only doing his duty.

As these actions were taking place, dusk settled on the battlefield. The Balcarres Redoubt and a number of smaller nearby supporting positions still held. The collective British efforts were too strong.
for the Americans to try another assault, and the position effectively
blocked any further direct advance toward the Great Redoubt. The en-
filade fire from the Breymann Redoubt and other locations, however,
soon made Balcarres’ position untenable. Once darkness descended,
Balcarres’ men kept up their fire and vigilance until slipping away to
the east into the murky woods and making their way to the Great Re-
doubt. The rebels failed to detect the move, or at least failed to pursue.

The last action of the day was performed by a small detachment
of about fifty men from the Braunschweiger von Riedesel Regiment
under Lt. Col. Ernst von Speth. Learning of the Breymann Redoubt’s
fall, Speth determined to recapture the position under cover of dark-
ness. As the patrol moved westward through the dark woods, the sol-
diers encountered a “loyalist” who offered to take Speth to the position.
Instead, the man abandoned the detachment even deeper in the woods.
Speth and his men stumbled around in the dark until they were sur-
rounded and captured by rebel skirmishers the following morning.

Speth’s capture capped a disastrous day for Burgoyne’s com-
mand. In all, the Army from Canada lost almost 900 men killed,
wounded, and missing (including loyalists, Canadians, and Indians).
Six of the command’s cannon were also lost to the Americans. Despite
the heavy fighting during the day, the rebels had only lost somewhere
between 150 and 200 men, of which just thirty were killed in action.

Vignette 1: Colonel Wilkinson described the defenses at the
Breymann Redoubt:

The right flank defense of the enemy occupied by the Ger-
man corps of Breymann, consisted of a breastwork of rails
piled horizontally between perpendicular pickets, driven
into the earth, formed en potence to the rest of his line, and
extended about 250 yards across an open field, and was cov-
ered on the right by a battery of two guns. The interval from
the left to the British light infantry was committed to the
defence of the provincials, who occupied a couple of log
cabins [of the McBride farm]. The Germans were encamped
behind the rail breast work, and the ground in front of it
inclined in a very gentle slope for about 120 yards, then it
sunk abruptly, our troops had formed a line under this de-
clivity, and covered breast high were warmly engaged with
the Germans. From this position, about sunset, I perceived

Vignette 2: Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, who was in the vicinity of Balcarres Redoubt when it fell, recorded Arnold’s actions there:

[Arnold] finding himself on our right, dashed to the left through the fire of the two lines and escaped unhurt; he then turned to the right of the enemy, as I was informed by that excellent officer, Colonel Butler [of Morgan’s Corps], and collecting 15 or 20 riflemen threw himself with his party into the rear of the enemy, just as they gave way, where his leg was broke, and his horse killed under him; but whether by our fire or that of the enemy, just as they fled from us, has never been ascertained. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 292.)

Analysis

1. Why did the assault against the Breymann Redoubt succeed when the attack against the Balcarres Redoubt failed?

2. Assess Benedict Arnold’s leadership on 7 October. Was Arnold exercising disciplined initiative (as in Mission Command), or was he a subordinate out of control? Define the difference.

3. To what do you attribute American success on 7 October? British failure?

4. What are Burgoyne’s options now? Gates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Casualties from 2nd Battle of Saratoga (7 October 1777 &amp; Final Surrender 17 October 1777)</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>6,222¹</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
¹. Includes some wounded listed above.

Figure 15. 2nd Battle of Saratoga Casualties.
Day 2, Stand 18 The British Retreat and Surrender: The Impact of Saratoga (Events between 7 and 17 October 1777)

Directions: From Park Stop #7 (Breymann Redoubt) parking lot, head east on the park battlefield road for 1.9 miles. You will cross over the Great Ravine. At the first stop sign, turn left and travel another 0.6 miles to the intersection of the park road and Phillips Road. Turn left heading east and proceed 0.7 miles. Phillips Road ends at a T-intersection with US-4. Turn left (north) onto US-4 East and proceed north 7.2 miles toward Schuylerville, New York. As you enter Schuylerville, you will cross over Fish Creek. Turn left onto Burgoyne Street and travel 0.6 miles to the Surrender Site, which is marked by a large obelisk monument on your left. Turn left

Map 28. Day 2 Route to Stand 18.
after the monument and immediately turn left into the parking lot. Walk to the stand location on the east side of the monument.

Note: General Schuyler’s home was on the south side of Fish Creek on the east side of the road just before you cross the creek. Burgoyne’s troops burned it during the fighting here after the retreat.

Orientation: You are standing near the location of Burgoyne’s headquarters after his army retreated north to Saratoga shortly after the second battle of Saratoga (see map 51, Appendix J, British Defenses at Saratoga 11–17 October 1777). To the east was the town of Saratoga (now known as Schuylerville). Beyond that is the Hudson River. Fort Miller is approximately 3 miles to the north on the east side of the Hudson. Fort Edward is approximately 20 miles north of this location also on the east side of the river. To the south about 8 miles is Bemis Heights. Albany is about 35 miles downriver from this location. At the

Map 29. Day 2 Stand 18.
time this hill was occupied, the British fortified this location similar to the redoubts at Freeman’s Farm (low stockade walls, abatis, etc.). In addition to this main position, three additional fortifications were located on high ground beginning about 500 yards to the northeast.

Description: On the evening of 7 October, Burgoyne ordered all his forces to withdraw into the confines of the Great Redoubt. Generally speaking, his troops successfully accomplished this directive overnight. The next day, the American forces moved up the river valley road with their newly captured artillery, as well as some of their own pieces, and began bombarding the British positions. Small arms fire was prevalent all day long as well. The persistent harassment interfered with the funeral services for General Fraser, who was buried within the confines of the Great Redoubt.

With so many men and weapons lost and the low levels of supply, Burgoyne’s options were now realistically down to one—retreat—and that was only if his army was able. Late on 8 October, the general made the inevitable decision and ordered the army to begin movement back to Fort Ticonderoga. That evening, the 47th Foot began the trek followed by the 9th Foot and Riedesel’s troops. Just as the march began, the heavens released a pouring rain. The British rearguard departed the redoubt about 0400, leaving about 300 wounded men and doctors behind for Gates to attend to. Due to destroyed bridges to the north, the column only made about 5 miles and one halt lasted ten hours.

On the 9th, Gates’ troops walked into Burgoyne’s old camp and assumed control of the British and German wounded. Clearly Burgoyne’s army was retreating but Gates made no attempt to pursue. Perhaps Gates felt the pursuit was not really necessary. He possessed eight brigades in his immediate command, and six others barred the way east across the river and north toward Fort Miller. Brig. Gen. John Fellows alone commanded about 3,000 men of his Massachusetts Militia Brigade. Other elements which were positioned across the Hudson River covering a ford just north of the village of Saratoga. John Stark’s newly raised militia command, located about three miles farther north, consisted of about 2,500 men. He was positioned to cover the ford at Batten Kill and the point where Burgoyne had built his bridge to cross the river earlier. Brig.
Gen. Jacob Bayley’s Vermont Militia Brigade, composed of more than 1,000 men, was still farther north at Fort Edward.

Despite the lack of a pursuit, or perhaps because of it, Burgoyne’s army did not reach Saratoga until the afternoon of the 9th and did not complete the Fish Kill crossing until the next morning. At Saratoga, Burgoyne halted his army and prepared strong positions on some high ground north of the creek—hoping that Gates might attack him. The same day, Gates left to follow the Army from Canada north. He arrived at Saratoga in the afternoon. On the foggy morning of 11 October, Gates ordered his brigades forward across Fish Kill, assuming that Burgoyne was still retreating. Once across, a British deserter warned General Glover that the British and German troops were in positions on the high ground. On receiving this information Gates stopped all movement. The fog soon lifted exposing Poor’s and Paterson’s Brigades on the slopes below the British positions. The British quickly opened fire with musketry and cannon, but fortunately the two American brigades were able to scramble to safety without heavy casualties.

With the British positions now visible, the rebel brigade commanders shifted their commands to effectively surround Burgoyne’s men. The rebels opened a heavy fire of their own with both small arms and artillery. This was the state of affairs until Burgoyne called a council of war on 14 October to discuss the idea of capitulation. His officers unanimously agreed that at this point surrender was honorable, especially since the Army from Canada was down to about 3,500 effective troops compared to more than 20,000 for Gates.

Burgoyne sent one of his officers to Gates with a proposal to negotiate the Army from Canada’s capitulation. The letter read in part:

After having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited some days, in his present position, determined to try a third conflict against any force you could bring to attack him. He is apprised of the superiority of your numbers, and the disposition of your troops to impede his supplies, and render his retreat a scene of carnage on both sides. In this situation he is impelled by humanity, and thinks himself justifiable by established principles and precedents of state, and of war, to spare the lives of brave
men upon honourable terms. Should Major-General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea, General Burgoyne would propose a cessation of arms during the times necessary to communicate the preliminary terms by which, in any extremity, he and his army mean to abide. (*The Scots Magazine* 39, Edinburgh: A. Murray and J. Cochran, December 1777, 658.)

To his surprise, Burgoyne received a response from Gates that in effect demanded total surrender. This incident began a series of communications between the two generals seeking conditions under which the British would surrender. After the next round of negotiations, Gates suddenly agreed to almost all of Burgoyne’s demands. This complicated the negotiations since Burgoyne believed that Gates’s sudden change of heart was due to the possibility that General Clinton’s expedition up the Hudson was achieving some success. Eventually learning that Clinton would not be able to rescue him, Burgoyne agreed to sign a “convention” rather than a surrender document. Almost a meaningless term in the long run, one article in the convention allowed Burgoyne’s army to return to Europe on the condition that they would not return to service in North America. Gates agreed to the article, which later caused him much grief with the Continental Congress.

The surrender of Burgoyne’s Army began about 1100 on 17 October at a place known known as the “Field of Grounded Arms” just north of Fish Kill, near the ruins of Fort Hardy (now Fort Hardy Park in Schuylerville) on the flood plain next to the Hudson River. Under the command of Burgoyne and his officers, and with only Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson and two other American officers observing, the British, German, Canadian, and American loyalist troops of the Army from Canada marched by and deposited their weapons. Once the arms were piled, Burgoyne asked Wilkinson to introduce him to General Gates. The two generals saluted and then Burgoyne, dressed in his best uniform, raised his hat and said, “The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner.” Gates magnanimously responded, “I shall always be ready to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your excellency.” At that point, Gates invited
Burgoyne and his staff to sit down for a meal.

Vignette: After laying down their weapons, Burgoyne’s troops were marched south over the Fish Kill south into what would be captivity. After crossing, the captives were awed to see the thousands of Continental and militia troops of the massive American army drawn up on both sides of the road. One of the German officers later wrote down his impressions of his erstwhile enemies:

Not one of them [the American troops] was properly uniformed, but each man had on the clothes in which he goes to field, to church or to the tavern, but they stood like soldiers, erect with a military bearing which was subject to little criticism. All their guns were provided with bayonets and the riflemen had rifles. The people stood so still that we were greatly amazed. Furthermore, nature had formed all the fellows who stood in rank and file, so slender, so handsome, so sinewy, that it was a pleasure to look at them and we were all surprised at the sight of such a finely built people. And their size! The officers wore very few uniforms and those they did wear were of their own invention. All colors of cloth are usable, e.g. brown coats with sea green facings, white linings and silver trimmings, and grey coats in abundance, with buff facings and cuffs, and gilt buttons; in short every variety of pattern. I must still say there was not a man among them who showed the slightest sign of mockery, malicious delight, hate, or other insult. It seemed rather as if they wished to do us honor. (Christopher Ward, *The War of the Revolution* 2, Albany, New York: Joel Musell, 1867. Translated by William L. Stone. Reprint New York: Arno Press, 1968, 538–39; and by Michael O. Logusz, *With Musket & Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777*, Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 305.)

Description (continued): On receiving the convention document from Gates, the Continental Congress quickly abrogated the article concerning returning Burgoyne’s army to Europe on the
condition they would never serve in North America again. Instead, Burgoyne’s men and most of his officers were imprisoned for the remainder of the war. Burgoyne himself was returned to England the following April. Most of the remaining officers and men were first incarcerated at a camp in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In November 1778, the “Convention Army” as it became known, moved to Charlottesville, Virginia, and then in 1781 moved a final time to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. By the time the men were released to go home, a large number had deserted from the camps and made their homes in America. Others, of course, died in captivity, mostly from disease. Ultimately, only about 3,000 of the 5,900 members of the Convention Army were shipped home in 1783.

Analysis

Campaign Results:

News of this major Continental victory was quite slow to reach the opposite side of the Atlantic Ocean; once it did, Benjamin Franklin’s delegation in France achieved a negotiation breakthrough resulting in an alliance with France which was signed in February 1778. Within six months, French military forces arrived in the United States to fight with the Continentals against their British rivals. The alliance would eventually combine to achieve victory at Yorktown in 1781 and complete American independence in 1783.

1. What is your assessment of Gates’ decision not to pursue once Burgoyne retreated?
2. Under what conditions should a pursuit be undertaken?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Continental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Ticonderoga</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubbardton</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Schuyler</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriskany¹</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennington²</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st &amp; 2nd Saratoga</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. British casualties at the Battle of Oriskany are combined with Fort Schuyler. Indian losses are not depicted.
2. Wounded for Bennington figures are included in MIA/POW.

Figure 16. Campaign Casualties.
3. What are the most effective ways to use militia/reserve forces in conjunction with regular forces?
4. What do you see as the key factors/events which allowed American forces to achieve victory in this campaign?
5. What are the reasons behind the British defeat?
6. Could Burgoyne have been successful in this campaign? Why?
7. If so, what should have been done differently on the part of the British?
8. What role did terrain play in the outcome of this campaign?
Notes


IV. Integration Phase

Introduction

As this handbook has previously emphasized, a staff ride consists of three phases. The “Preliminary Study Phase” is conducted before the visit to the battlefield and prepares the students for the visit. The “Field Study Phase” on the battlefield enables students to understand historical events through analyzing the actual terrain. The final “Integration Phase” is critical to help the students understand what happened, why it happened, and, most importantly, what can be learned from the study of the battle or campaign.

Staff ride leaders should consider several factors when planning for and conducting the integration phase. First, the leader must work with the participating organization to select a time and location for the integration session. Following the field study phase, preference is to give students at least one day for personal reflection and thought before the integration phase. If the extra time is not an option, the integration session should be conducted at a location different from the last stand—a comfortable and dry place that will encourage open discussion from all participants. For units that need to depart shortly after the last stand of the field phase, the staff ride leader can conduct the integration phase on the battlefield immediately after completing the field study phase.

The staff ride leader should organize the integration phase based on the unit, time available, and training objectives. The leader can conduct the integration phase in a format similar to an after action review (AAR), or may simply lead a discussion with participants on what they learned. One option is to ask specific students to brief particular items, or consider having an open discussion with minimal structure. Regardless of the format, keep in mind that the integration phase is not an AAR of the ride itself (i.e., ways to improve the ride). While constructive criticism about the conduct of the staff ride itself is valuable, this should be done at another time or perhaps through written AAR comments. Instead, the integration phase is an opportunity for the students to integrate their preliminary study with the fieldwork to gain insights that are relevant to their current duties and enhance their professional development.
The most important thing to remember is that the participants should do the majority of the talking.

One method that often produces a fruitful integration phase is to conduct the session in three parts based on three broad questions. Sometimes the leader will ask one general question and then let others carry the conversation, or more follow-up questions may be needed to prod the discussion. Each of the three questions is discussed below.

**What aspects of the campaign had you developed in the preliminary study phase that changed or were strongly reinforced because of your study of the ground/terrain?**

This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to a staff ride. Otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. Of course, students may develop a wide range of answers based on personal study and observations in the field. Some of the more popular aspects of the terrain discussion for the Saratoga Campaign include the large distances encompassed by the operational maneuver, the wooded and hilly nature of the region, how both sides used water routes for transportation and supply, Gates’ use of terrain to successfully block Burgoyne’s movement south, the effective use of terrain for engineer operations to slow British movement, and the Hudson River as both help and hindrance to movement. The staff ride leader can ask a related question, which may also generate good discussion: *Did seeing the terrain alter your opinion of any of the leaders?* A common response to this question is that Burgoyne failed to realize the difficulties he would encounter logistically and tactically in operating in the central New York area.

**What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have remained the same since the Saratoga Campaign?**

The answers to the “changed” aspects will probably seem more obvious to the modern military professional and often will be related to technology. This may include changes in weapons, transportation systems, communications, and numerous other pieces of equipment. The aspects that have “remained the same” may not seem as numerous at first, but the students will often build on some initial answers and find many good items. The role of personalities; command re-
relationships; the importance of proper logistics planning; the need for strong, positive leadership and an ability to motivate soldiers; and the importance of operational maneuver, determination, courage, and fear are just some of the items of warfare that seem to have changed little since 1777. Depending on the group, you may want to ask a few more focused questions. For example, if you are instructing a quartermaster unit, you can ask: *What aspects of logistics have changed, and what aspects have remained the same?*

**What insights can the modern military professional gain from the Saratoga Campaign that are relevant today?**

Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast number of arenas. Once again, the type of unit participating in the staff ride might help guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit might focus on the commander’s situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and the importance of reconnaissance. Keeping in mind that the Saratoga Campaign is as much an operational-level staff ride as it is tactical, it might be useful to prompt discussion by using the operational art elements as a framework for relevant lessons. In accordance with Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, these elements are:

- End state and conditions.
- Center of gravity.
- Decisive points.
- Lines of operations and lines of effort.
- Operational reach.
- Basing.
- Tempo.
- Phasing and transitions.
- Culmination.
- Risk.

These terms are provided as a tool. The staff ride leader may use some of these or another framework, or simply let students take the discussion in the direction they choose. The three suggested integration phase questions are to help spark discussion rather than provide hard and fast “rules” of warfare. Note that the handbook provides examples of possible answers to the questions but does not attempt to provide a list of “right” answers. The staff ride leader
should take time before the session to write down his or her answers to these questions and thus gain potential ideas to generate student discussion. More importantly, the staff ride leader should help participants develop their own answers. Be prepared to let the discussion roam many different paths, and encourage healthy debate.
V. Support

1. Information, Access, and Assistance.

a. The Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride Team, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted numerous Saratoga Campaign Staff Rides and can provide advice and assistance on almost every aspect of the staff ride. The Staff Ride Team also can provide facilitators to lead a Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride. Visit the Combat Studies Institute website for information on obtaining staff ride assistance and/or leadership. Staff Ride Team support includes background information, detailed knowledge of the battle and battlefield, and familiarity with the Saratoga Campaign area.

Address: The Army University Press
ATTN: Staff Ride Team
290 Stimson Avenue, Unit 1
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
Telephone: (913) 684-2131
Website: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Educational-Services/Staff-Ride-Team-Offerings/

b. Saratoga National Historic Park. The largest part of the Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride takes place on National Park Service (NPS) grounds. Be sure to contact the NPS staff before conducting a staff ride. Members of the US military can enter NPS parks free if conducting a staff ride, and the park staff at all locations are extremely helpful. The battlefield for the two Saratoga battles and the Saratoga Surrender Site belong to the Saratoga National Historic Park. The park’s Headquarters and Visitors’ Center is located near the Town of Stillwater, in eastern New York 40 miles north of Albany. Note that while the park Headquarters and Visitors’ Center are open year-round (except certain holidays), park roads generally are closed from November to May. The roads are not plowed for snow. Staff Rides conducted there during off-season months can only be conducted on foot.
Address: Saratoga National Historic Park  
648 NY Route 32  
Stillwater, NY 12170  
Telephone: (518) 664-9821  
Season/Hours: Open all year except some holidays, 0900 to 1700  
Cost: Free  
Website: https://www.nps.gov/sara/index.htm

c. Crown Point Battlefield State Historic Site. The Crown Point Battlefield State Historic Site is a unit of the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation. Although the site is open year-round, the Visitors’ Center and Museum have seasonal hours.

Address: Crown Point State Historic Site  
21 Grandview Drive  
Crown Point, NY 12928  
Telephone: (518) 597-4666  
Park: Season/Hours: Open all year, 0900 to 1800  
Museum: Season/Hours: May–October, Thursdays–Mondays, 0930–1700 (Closed Tuesdays & Wednesdays).  
Cost: Free  
Website: http://parks.ny.gov/historic-sites/34/details.aspx

d. Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site. The Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site is a unit of the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation. There is no visitors’ center, and park staff members are not always on site during operating hours. Like the Saratoga National Historic Park, the Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site is closed from November to May.

Address: Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site  
Route 67  
Walloomsac, NY 12090  
Mailing Address:  
c/o Grafton Lakes State Park  
PO Box 163  
Grafton, NY 12082
Telephone: (518) 860-9094 or (518) 279-1155
Season/Hours: 1 May–Veterans Day, 7 days a week 0800 to Sunset
Cost: Free
Website: http://nysparks.com/historic-sites/12/details.aspx

e. Fort Ticonderoga. Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Defiance are units of the Fort Ticonderoga Association, a private organization. Both sites require an entrance fee. Group tickets for Mount Defiance may be purchased separately at the park entrance or at the Visitors’ Center.

Address: Fort Ticonderoga
            30 Fort Ti Road
            Ticonderoga, NY 12883
Telephone: (518) 585-2821
Season/Hours: May–October, 0930–1700 daily. Hours for Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Defiance are subject to change. Call beforehand to verify available dates and hours.
Cost: $10 per person for Fort Ticonderoga. Mount Defiance car/bus pass $10
Website: http://www.fortticonderoga.org/

f. Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site. The Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site is operated by the Vermont Department of Housing and Community Development.

Address: Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site
            5696 Monument Hill Road
            Hubbardton, VT 05732
Telephone: (802) 273-2282 or (802) 759-2412
Season/Hours: May–October, Monday and Thursday–Sunday, 0930–1700. Specific opening and closing dates vary from year to year. Call beforehand to verify available dates and hours.
Cost: $3 per adult (fee may be waived for military staff rides)
Website: http://historicsites.vermont.gov/directory/hubbardton
2. Logistics.

a. Meals. Dining opportunities in and near Ticonderoga, New York, are limited. A few locations can handle a group of 20 to 30 people including at least one of the local hotel restaurants, which also serves breakfast. Many restaurants in Clifton Park, New York, are convenient to hotel locations and can provide breakfast (if the hotel doesn’t include it as part of the room rate) and dinner on the second night. Lunch on day 1 (Campaign Day) can be at Whitehall, New York. A number of local restaurants can handle staff ride-size groups. As with the battlefield visits themselves, call ahead and arrange for lunch with one of the restaurants beforehand. The second day (Saratoga Day) lunch will need to be consumed at the park—a pre-purchased bag lunch carried on the vehicles or sandwiches, pizzas, or other easily consumed/transported foods that students purchase at nearby establishments in Schuylerville or Stillwater. For both days, the stand description includes recommended times to pause for lunch. Bag meals need to be consumed at locations authorized by the Saratoga National Historic Park staff.

b. Lodging. Lodging in the Ticonderoga area is very limited, particularly during the high-peak tourist season. Unfortunately, no nearby larger towns provide a better selection. Lodging elsewhere will require thirty to sixty minutes of additional drive time to reach the first stand in the morning of day 1. Recommendation is to arrange for rooms as early as possible for the first night. Conversely, Clifton Park provides numerous lodging opportunities for staff ride groups.

c. Travel. If the group is flying to the area, the Albany airport is the most convenient to use. Once on the ground, larger groups will need to contract for a bus with a microphone and public address system as well as a restroom. For smaller groups (less than twenty-five), parking and maneuvering may be easier with rental vans or a small twenty-five-passenger “party” bus.
3. Other Considerations.

   a. A successful staff ride requires a reconnaissance of the stands and route just prior to execution of the ride. Check for conditions of planned routes, detours, availability of parking at or near planned stands, and access to required sites.

   b. Ensure that every member of the group has water. Also identify locations of restrooms along the route to maximize use of these facilities.

   c. Ensure that your group has proper clothing for inclement weather. Thunderstorms can occur in any season. Also, because some walking is required for each of the major battlefields, suggest that participants wear comfortable boots or hiking shoes and avoid sandals or running shoes.

   d. Mosquitoes, ants, chiggers, ticks, and other insects are prevalent from March to October, so insect repellent is advised. Poison ivy is also present in some of the more remote areas.

   e. Road traffic in campaign areas is generally light, or moderate during peak traffic periods when people are heading to work or coming home. Traffic in the Clifton Park area can be heavy. The most dangerous area for traffic in terms of stands is at Fort Anne. The staff ride instructor needs to weigh carefully whether he/she wants to conduct the stand at the roadside pull-off at Battle Hill or at the bank/blockhouse in town. Traffic passing Battle Hill along US Highway 4 can get heavy and loud. If the stand is conducted at Battle Hill, ensure that traffic guards are employed as necessary and stress that group members be observant when exiting or entering vehicles and when moving across or near roads.
Appendix A—Order of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga

1–7 July 1777

1. American Forces (3,000).

Commanding General, Northern Department & Northern Army
Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler

Aide-de-Camp, Lt. Col. Henry B. Livingston
Aide-de-Camp and Militia Liaison, Col. Cornelius Van Vechten
Deputy Adjutant General, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson
Deputy Quartermaster General, Col. Morgan Lewis
Engineer, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin
Deputy Commissary General of Musters & Military Secretary,
Lt. Col. Richard Varick
Deputy Commissary General of Stores, Walter Livingston
Deputy Commissary General of Purchases, Jacob Cuyler
Deputy Commissary General of Issues, Elisha Avery (before 6 Aug)
Deputy Paymaster General, Jonathan Trumbull
Deputy Commissioner for Indian Affairs, Timothy Edwards
Medical Director General, Dr. Jonathan Potts
Apothecary, Josiah Root
Chaplain, Reverend Enos Hitchcock

Commanding General, Forces Defending Fort Ticonderoga
Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair

Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Isaac Dunn
Chief of Artillery, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens
Chief of Scouts, Capt. Benjamin Whitcomb
Deputy Adjutant General, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson
Deputy Quartermaster General, Lt. Col. Udney Hay
Engineer, Col. Thaddeus Kościuszko
Surgeon, Dr. James Thacher
Chaplain, Reverend Enos Hitchcock
Poor’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor
   1st New Hampshire, Col. Joseph Cilley
   2nd New Hampshire, Col. Nathan Hale
   3rd New Hampshire, Col. Alexander Scammell

Paterson’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Paterson
   10th Massachusetts, Col. Thomas Marshall
   11th Massachusetts, Col. Ebenezer Francis
   12th Massachusetts, Col. Samuel Brewer
   14th Massachusetts, Col. Gamaliel Bradford

Roche de Fermoy’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Matthias La Roche de Fermoy
   Warner’s Continental Regiment, Col. Seth Warner
   8th Massachusetts, Col. Michael Jackson
   New Hampshire Militia Regiment, Col. Pierse Long
   Massachusetts Militia Regiment, Col. David Leonard
   Massachusetts Militia Regiment, Col. David Wells

Independent Units:
   Whitcomb’s Rangers, Capt. Benjamin Whitcomb
   Lee’s Rangers, Capt. Thomas Lee
American Naval Squadron

Squadron Commander
Commodore Jacobus Wynkoop

USS Enterprise (Sloop-of-War)³
Crew: 60
Displacement: 70 tons
Armament: 12 x 4-pounder guns, 10 swivel guns

USS Liberty (Schooner)⁴
Crew: 35
Armament: 4 x 4-pounder guns, 4 x 2-pounder guns, 8 swivel guns

USS Revenge (Schooner)⁵
Crew: 40
Length: 50 feet
Beam: 15 feet
Armament: 4 x 4-pounder guns, 4 x 2-pounder guns, 10 swivel guns

USS Gates (Row Galley)⁶
Crew: 40
Length: 63 feet
Beam: 18 feet

USS Trumbull (Row Galley)⁷
Crew: 24
Length: 63 feet
Beam: 18 feet
Armament: 1 x 18-pounder guns, 1 x 12-pounder guns, 2 x 9-pounder guns, 4 x 6-pounder guns
2. British Coalition Forces (9,500)\textsuperscript{8}

Commanding General, Army from Canada\textsuperscript{9}  
Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne

Staff  
Chief of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams  
Engineer, Lt. William Twiss  
Adjutant & Quartermaster General, Lt. Col. Thomas Carleton  
Deputy Quartermaster (British), Capt. John Money  
Deputy Quartermaster (German), Capt. Heinrich Gerlach  
Assistant Quartermaster, Capt. George Vallancay  
Wagonmaster, Robert Hoaksley  
Commissary & Loyalist Liaison, Col. Philip Skene  
Judge Advocate, Capt. James Craig  
Paymaster, David Geddes  
Surgeon, Acting Physician John Wood  
Royal Navy Liaison, Lt. John Schank  
Aides-de-Camp:  
Capt. Sir Francis Clerke  
Capt. Henry Gardner  
Capt. Lord Petersham  
Lt. Richard Wilford

Right Wing (British), Maj. Gen. William Phillips  
Advance Corps, Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser  
Grenadier Battalion (631),\textsuperscript{10} Maj. John D. Acland  
24th Regiment of Foot (391), Maj. Robert Grant\textsuperscript{11}  
Light Infantry Battalion (611), Maj. Alexander Lindsay\textsuperscript{12}

1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Powell  
9th Regiment of Foot (394), Lt. Col. John Hill  
47th Regiment of Foot (380), Lt. Col. Nicholas Sutherland\textsuperscript{13}  
53rd Regiment of Foot (-) (391), Maj. Paul Irving
2nd Brigade, Brig. Gen. James Hamilton
- 20th Regiment of Foot (-) (383), Lt. Col. John Lind
- 21st Regiment of Foot (393), Maj. George Forster
- 62nd Regiment of Foot (377), Lt. Col. John Anstruther

Left Wing (German), Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Baron Riedesel
1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. Johann Friedrich Specht
- Braunschweiger von Rhetz Regiment (535), Maj. Balthasar von Lucke
- Braunschweiger Riedesel Regiment (537), Lt. Col. Ernst Wilhelm von Speth
- Braunschweiger Specht Regiment (536), Maj. Carl Friedrich von Ehrenkrook

2nd Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall
- Braunschweiger Prinz Friedrich Regiment (533), Lt. Col. Christian Praetorius
- Hesse-Hanau Erbprinz Regiment (546), Lt. Col. Otto von Lentz

Reserve Corps, Lt. Col. Heinrich Christoph Breymann
- Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig (307), Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum
- Braunschweiger Grenadier Battalion (456), Maj. Otto von Mengen
- Braunschweiger Light Infantry Battalion (398), Maj. Ferdinand Albrecht von Bärner
- Braunschweiger Jäger Company (124), Capt. Carl von Geyso
- Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery (103), Capt. Georg Päusch

Loyalist Corps (American-Canadian)
- King’s Loyal American Battalion (150), Lt. Col. Ebenezer Jessup
- Queen’s Loyal Rangers Battalion (150), Lt. Col. John Peters
- Loyal Volunteers Company, Capt. Samuel MacKay
- McAlpin’s Company, Capt. Daniel McAlpin
- Adams’ Company, Capt. Adams
Indian Department, Maj. John Campbell
  Company of Marksmen (102), Capt. Alexander Fraser
  Quebec Militia Company (50), Capt. René Amable Boucherville
  Montreal Militia Company (50), Capt. David Monin
  Mohawk Indians (250), Chevalier St. Luc de la Corne
  Iroquois/Algonquin Indians (250), Capt. Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade

Artificers and Engineers, Lt. William Twiss
  1st Battalion, Royal Highland Emigrants, Capt. George Lawes
  Pioneer Company, Capt. Wilcox

Brigade of the Park of Artillery (422 including attached infantry),
  Maj. Griffith Williams
  8th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Major
    Griffith Williams
  5th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Captain John Carter
  7th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Captain Ellis Walker
  Detachment, Royal Irish Regiment of Artillery, Unknown Company, 33rd Regiment of Foot, Lieutenant George Anson Nutt
  Detachment (Right Division), 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery, Capt. Walter Mitchelson
  Detachment (Center Division), 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery, Capt. Thomas Blomefield
  Detachment (Left Division), 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery, Capt. Thomas Hosmer

**Totals**

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<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>German Regulars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian/Loyalist Militia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
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<td>Total for the Northern Army</td>
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British Lake Champlain Squadron

Squadron Commander
Commodore Skeffington Lutwidge
Capt. Samuel Graves

HMS *Royal George* (Square-rigged ship)
Displacement: 384 tons
Armament: 26 guns

HMS *Inflexible* (Square-rigged ship)
Displacement: 180 tons
Armament: 18 x 12-pounder guns

HMS *Maria* (Schooner)
Length: 66 feet
Beam: 21.6 feet
Armament: 14 x 6-pounder guns

HMS *Carleton* (Schooner)
Length: 59.2 feet
Beam: 20 feet
Armament: 12 x 6-pounder guns

HMS *Thunderer* (Radeau)
Length: 91.9 feet
Beam: 33.4 feet
Armament: 6 x 24-pounder guns, 6 x 12-pounder guns, 2 x 8 inch howitzers

HMS *Washington* (Row Galley)
Crew: 80
Armament: 1 x 18-pounder guns; 1 x 12-pounder guns; 2 x 9-pounder guns; 6 x 6-pounder guns

HMS *Lee* (Row Galley)
Crew: 65
Armament: 12 x 4-pounder guns, 10 swivel guns
HMS *New Jersey* (Gondola)
Crew: 45
Armament: 12 x 4-pounder guns, 8 swivel guns

HMS *Loyal Convert* (Gondola)
Crew:
Length: 62.10 feet
Beam: 20.3 feet
Armament: 1 x 24-pounder gun; 7 x 9-pounder guns, 6 swivel guns
Notes

1. Schuyler was not present at Fort Ticonderoga during the 1–7 July 1777 “siege.”
2. Warner’s Regiment arrived 4 July.
3. The USS Enterprise was the first of a long and prestigious line of US Navy ships to bear that name. Enterprise was originally a British topsail schooner named George, built at St. Johns in Quebec, Canada. It was captured at St. Johns on 18 May 1775 during an American forces raid led by Col. Benedict Arnold. On 28 August 1775, the Northern Department used the vessel to transport troops for another attack on St. Johns as a prelude to the later attacks on Montreal and Quebec that fall and winter. The Enterprise later participated in the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 October 1776 near Plattsburg, New York. Most of Arnold’s fleet was sunk, but five vessels including the Enterprise escaped. After the fall of Fort Ticonderoga, the Enterprise and the other four surviving vessels (the Trumbull, Liberty, Revenge, and Gates) were detailed on 7 July 1777 to protect Col. Pierse Long’s bateaux convoy to Skanesborough. Unfortunately, the British fleet caught up with the slow-moving convoy as it reached the town. No match for the British ships, the Enterprise’s crew ran her aground and burned her to prevent her capture.
4. USS Liberty was built at Skanesborough, New York, as the Katherine for Philip Skene. The Katherine was captured at Skanesborough on 11 May 1775 during an American forces raid under the command of Capt. Samuel Herrick. It was renamed the USS Liberty to honor the cause for which the American forces were fighting. The Liberty participated in Benedict Arnold’s 18 May 1775 raid on St. John when the British schooner George was captured and renamed USS Enterprise. The Liberty was absent on a supply run to Fort Ticonderoga during the battle of Valcour Island and thus survived to participate in the opening stages of the Saratoga campaign. The British captured the vessel at Skanesborough on 7 July 1777.
5. The USS Revenge was built in 1775 at Fort Ticonderoga, New York. Like the Enterprise, she participated in the Battle of Valcour Island that October. The Revenge was captured by British forces at Skanesborough on 7 July (although some sources indicate that she was burned to prevent her capture).
6. The Gates was launched on about 2 October 1776, too late to participate in the Battle of Valcour Island. On 7 July 1777, the USS Gate’s crew ran her aground at Skanesborough and burned her to prevent her capture.
7. The USS Trumbull was captured by the British at Skanesborough on 7 July 1777.
8. The strengths shown in this appendix for the British Coalition forces were derived from official returns compiled on 1 July 1777 by the British and German contingents.
9. Also sometimes referred to as the British “Northern Army” and “Canadian Army.”
10. The British Grenadier Battalion was composed of grenadier companies from the regiments under Burgoyne’s command, plus those from the 29th, 31st, and 34th Regiments of Foot, which remained in Canada.

11. Brigadier General Fraser was the lieutenant colonel of the 24th Foot.

12. Major Lindsay was the 6th Earl of Balcarres—often referred to simply as “Balcarres” or “Lord Balcarres.” The Light Infantry Battalion was composed of the light infantry companies from the regiments under Burgoyne’s command, plus those from the 29th, 31st, and 34th Regiments of Foot, which remained in Canada.

13. Major General Carleton was colonel of the 47th Foot.

14. After Fort Ticonderoga was captured, Hamilton remained in command there with the 62nd Regiment of Foot and the Erbprinz Regiment as the defense force. Hamilton and the 62nd would be replaced in August by Powell and the 53rd Foot.

15. The musketeer companies of this regiment were detailed as part of Hamilton’s forces to man the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga after its capture from the Americans.

16. The German Reserve Corps is sometimes referred to as the “Advance Corps” because it essentially functioned as such on at least two occasions.

17. The German Grenadier Battalion consisted of the Grenadier companies from each of the line regiments in Riedesel’s command.

18. The Loyalist Corps, or parts of it, frequently operated as part of Fraser’s Advance Corps.

19. Detailed as part of Hamilton’s forces to man the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga after its capture.

20. Lutwidge was commander of the squadron until 4 October 1777, after which Graves was in command.
Appendix B—Order of Battle, Hubbardton

7 July 1777

1. **American Forces** (1,300).
   American Force Commander
   Col. Ebenezer Francis

   Rear Guard, Col. Ebenezer Francis¹
   2nd New Hampshire Battalion, Col. Nathan Hale/Lt. Col. Winborn Adams²
   Francis’s (11th) Massachusetts Bay Regiment, Col. Ebenezer Francis/Lt. Col. Noah Littlefield³
   Warner’s Continental Regiment, Col. Seth Warner⁴
   Hampshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia Battalion, Col. David Leonard⁵
   Hampshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia Battalion, Col. David Wells⁶

2. **British Coalition Forces** (1,030).
   British Force Commander
   Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel

   Advanced Corps, Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser
   British Grenadier Battalion, Maj. John D. Acland
   24th Regiment of Foot, Maj. Robert Grant⁷
   British Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Alexander Lindsay

   Braunschweig Detachment, Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel
   Combined Grenadier and Light Infantry Detachment, Capt. Carl von Geyso
   Jäger Company, Capt. Maximillian Schotteliu⁸

   Grenadier Battalion, Lt. Col. Christoph Breymann⁹
   Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Ferdinand Albrecht von Bärner¹⁰
Notes

1. Colonel Francis was killed in action on 7 July. With his death, resistance at Hubbardton almost instantly dissolved.
2. Colonel Hale was wounded and captured at Hubbardton. His second-in-command, Lt. Col. Winborn Adams, assumed command of the regiment.
3. Colonel Francis was killed in action at Hubbardton. His second-in-command, Lt. Col. Noah Littlefield, assumed command of the regiment.
4. Warner’s Continental Regiment included the remnants of the “Green Mountain Boys.”
5. Present but not engaged at Hubbardton.
6. Present but not engaged at Hubbardton.
7. Five companies only. Major Grant was killed in action on 7 July.
8. The jäger company was part of the Braunschweig light infantry battalion von Bärner but during the battle operated separately from the combined grenadier and light infantry detachment.
9. The German Grenadier Battalion was present but not engaged at Hubbardton.
10. The German Light Infantry Battalion was present but not engaged at Hubbardton.
Appendix C—Order of Battle, Fort Anne

8 July 1777

1. American Forces (210-400).

   American Force Commander

   1st New Hampshire Battalion, Col. Pierse Long
   Albany County, New York Militia Battalion, Lt. Col. Henry K. Van Rensselaer
   1st New Hampshire Regiment (detachment), Capt. Nathaniel Hutchins
   3rd New Hampshire Regiment (detachment), Capt. James Gray

2. British Forces (160).

   British Force Commander
   Lt. Col. John Hill

   9th Regiment of Foot (detachment), Lt. Col. John Hill
   First Nations warriors, Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier
Notes

1. Colonel Long commanded the garrison but was not engaged. Lt. Col. Van Rensselaer commanded in the field.
3. Col. Van Rensselaer was wounded in action on 8 July.
4. Estimates of American casualties for this action vary wildly. The higher figure likely includes those captured and deserters.
Appendix D—Order of Battle, Fort Schuyler/Oriskany

1. **American Forces** (2,250).

   **American Force Commander**
   Col. Peter Gansevoort

   **Fort Schuyler Garrison Defenses (750)**
   3rd New York, Col. Peter Gansevoort
   Battalion, Massachusetts Detachments, Lt. Col. Marinus Willet
   Detachment, 2nd Continental Artillery
   Oneida Indians

   *First Relief Force, Tryon County Militia (800), Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer
   *1st Battalion, Col. Ebenezer Cox
   *2nd Battalion, Col. Jacob Klock
   *3rd Battalion, Col. Frederick Vissher
   *4th Battalion, Col. Peter Bellinger

   Second Relief Force (700), Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold
   Learned’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned
   2nd Massachusetts, Col. John Bailey
   8th Massachusetts, Col. Michael Jackson
   9th Massachusetts, Col. James Wesson

2. **British Coalition Forces** (1,550).

   **British Force Commander**
   Brig. Gen. Barry St. Leger

   Assistant Adjutant General, Capt. William Ancrum
   Assistant Adjutant, Lt. William Crofts
   Assistant Quartermaster General, Lt. James Lundy
   Bateaux Master, James Kusick
Commissary, John Farquharson  
Conductor of Artillery, Austin Piety  
Military Secretary, Lt. William O. Hamilton  
Military Secretary, Ensign George Clergis

Mohawk Valley Expedition  
34th Regiment of Foot (-), Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger  
*Kings Regiment of New York, Col. John Johnson  
Company, 8th Regiment of Foot, Capt. Richard B. Lernoult  
Company, Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Glennie  
  2 x 6-pounder guns  
  2 x 3-pounder guns  
  2 Coehorn mortars  
*Butler’s Ranger Company, Col. John Butler  
Quebec Canadian Militia Company, Capt. Hertel de Rouville  
*Jäger Company, Lieutenant Hildebrandt  
*Iroquois Indians, Thayendanagea (Joseph Brant)
Notes

1. Killed in action.
2. Arnold’s relief column was en route to Fort Schuyler when St. Leger decided to depart. The column returned to the main army soon thereafter.
   *Units engaged at the Battle of Oriskany.
Appendix E—Order of Battle, Bennington

16 August 1777

1. American Forces (2,350).

American Force Commander
Brig. Gen. John Stark

Continents and Massachusetts & Vermont Militia, Col. Seth Warner
Warner’s Continental Regiment, Lt. Col. Samuel Safford
Simonds’ Regiment of Massachusetts Militia, Col. Benjamin
Simonds
Herrick’s Vermont Militia Regiment, Col. Samuel Herrick
Additional Vermont Rangers

Brigade of New Hampshire Militia, Brig. Gen. John Stark
Gregg’s Regiment of Militia, Col. William Gregg
Hobart’s Regiment of Militia, Col. David Hobart
Nichols’ Regiment of Militia, Lt. Col. Moses Nichols
Stickney’s Regiment of Militia, Col. Thomas Stickney
Langdon’s Company of Light Horse Volunteers, Capt. John
Langdon¹
Additional New Hampshire Militia, Unknown

2. British Coalition Forces (1,400).

Coalition Force Commander
Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum²

Baum’s Detachment, Lt. Col Friedrich Baum
Braunschweig Dragoon Regiment Prinz Ludwig, Maj. Christoph von Meibom³
Detachment, Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, Lt. Heinrich Burghoff⁴
Company of Marksmen, Capt. Alexander Fraser
Detachment, Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, Capt. Friedrich Dommes
Detachment, Braunschweig musketeers, Ensign Conrad Andrée
Hessen-Hanau Artillery Battery, Lt. Johann Bach (2 light 3-pounder guns)
Queen’s Loyal Rangers, Lt. Col. Commandant John Peters
Loyal Volunteers, Lt. Col. Franz (“Francis”) Pfister
Québec Indian Department, Maj. John Campbell
Company of French Canadian militia draftees, Unknown

Breymann’s Detachment, Reserve Corps, Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann
Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, Capt. Daniel von Löhneisen
Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Ferdinand von Bärner
Hessen-Hanau Artillery Battery, Lt. Carl Spangenburg (2 light 6-pounder guns)

All four German artillery pieces were captured.
Notes

1. Langdon’s company functioned as dismounted infantry.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Baum was mortally wounded 16 August at Bennington and died 18 August. On arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Breymann assumed overall command of German forces.
3. Major von Meibom was captured 16 August.
4. Lieutenant Burghoff was captured 16 August.
5. Captain Dommes was captured 16 August.
6. This musketeer detachment was principally drawn from the Braunschweig musketeer regiments von Riedesel and Specht. Its commander, Ensign Andrée, was captured 16 August.
7. Lieutenant Bach was slightly wounded and captured 16 August.
8. Lieutenant Colonel Peters was slightly wounded in action 16 August at Bennington.
9. Lieutenant Colonel Pfister was mortally wounded 16 August and died 18 August.
11. Lieutenant Colonel Breymann was slightly wounded in action 16 August.
12. Major von Bärner was severely wounded in action 16 August.
13. Lieutenant Spangenburg was severely wounded in action and captured 16 August.
Appendix F—Order of Battle, Saratoga

19 September and 7 October 1777

1. American Forces (8,000/12,000)\(^1\).

Commanding General, Northern Department & Northern Army
Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates

Staff
Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Robert Troup
Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Isaac Pierce
Aide-de-Camp, Maj. John Armstrong
Aide-de-Camp, Maj. James Miles Hughes
Chief of Artillery, Northern Department, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens
Chief Engineer, Northern Department, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin
Deputy Adjutant General, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson
Deputy Quartermaster General, Col. Morgan Lewis
Deputy Commissary General of Purchases, Jacob Cuyler
Deputy Commissary General of Issues, Ebenezer Winship
Deputy Muster Master General Lt. Col. Richard Varick
Deputy Commissary General of Clothing Maj. George Measam
Deputy Commissary General of Prisoners Daniel Hale
Deputy Judge Advocate General, 2nd Lt. George Smith
Deputy Director General of Hospital, Jonathan Potts, MD

Left Wing, Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold\(^2\)
Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen & Light Infantry (700), Col. Daniel Morgan\(^3\)
*Morgan’s Rifle Corps, Lt. Col. Richard Butler\(^4\)
*Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Henry Dearborn\(^5\)

Poor’s Brigade (1292/1323), Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor
*1st New Hampshire Regiment, Col. Joseph Cilley
*3rd New Hampshire Regiment, Col. Alexander Scammell*
*2nd New York Regiment, Col. Phillip Van Cortlandt*
*4th New York Regiment, Col. Henry B. Livingston*
*Cook’s Connecticut Militia Battalion, Col. Thaddeus Cook*
*Latimer’s Connecticut Militia Battalion, Col. Jonathan Latimer*

Learned’s Brigade (1393/1801), Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned
2nd Massachusetts Regiment, Col. John Bailey
8th Massachusetts Regiment, Lt. Col. John Brooks
9th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. James Wesson
Livingston’s Battalion of Forces, Col. James Livingston
Evans’ New Hampshire Militia, Col. Stephan Evans
Drake’s New Hampshire Militia, Col. Abraham Drake

New York Militia Brigade (1,260), Brig. Gen. Abraham Ten Broeck
1st Regiment, Col. Jacob Lansing
3rd Regiment, Col. Francis Nichol
4th Regiment, Col. Robert Killian
5th Regiment, Col. Gerrit G. Ven Den Bergh
6th Regiment, Col. Stephen John Schuyler
7th Regiment, Col. Abraham Van Alstine
9th Regiment, Col. Peter Van Ness
10th Regiment, Col. Henry Livingston
11th Regiment, Col. Anthony Van Bergen
12th Regiment, Col. Jacobus Van Schonbeven
13th Regiment, Col. John McCrae
Knickerbocker’s Regiment, New York Militia, Col. John Knickerbocker
Van Woert’s Regiment, New York Militia, Col. Lewis Van Woert
Right Wing, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln

Glover’s Brigade (1555/2091), Brig. Gen. John Glover
1st Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Joseph Vose
4th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. William Shepard
13th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Edward Wigglesworth
15th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Timothy Bigelow
Battalion of Albany County, New York Militia, Col. Abraham Wemple
Battalion of Albany County, New York Militia, Col. William Whiting
Dutchess and Ulster County Militia Battalion (New York), Col. Morris Graham

Nixon’s Brigade (1270/1545), Brig. Gen. John Nixon
3rd Massachusetts Regiment, Col. John Greaton
5th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Rufus Putnam
6th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Thomas Nixon
7th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Ichabod Alden
2nd New Hampshire County Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, Col. Ezra May

Paterson’s Brigade (1243/1801), Brig. Gen. John Paterson
*10th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Thomas Marshall
11th Massachusetts Regiment, Lt. Col. Noah Littlefield
12th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Samuel Brewer
14th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Gamliel Bradford
*1st South Berkshire Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, Col. John Ashley Jr.
3rd York County Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, Lt. Col. Joseph Storer

Warner’s Brigade (1833), Brig. Gen. Jonathan Warner
Battalion of Berkshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, Col. John Brown
Battalion of Middlesex County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, Col. Samuel Bullard
Battalion of Suffolk County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, Col. Benjamin Gill
Battalion of Hampshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, Col. Benjamin Woodbridge
Battalion of Essex County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, Col. Samuel Johnson

Cavalry (200/326)
2nd Connecticut Light Horse Regiment, Maj. Elijah Hyde
Sheldon’s 2nd Regiment of Light Dragoons, Capt. Jean de Vernejoux/Lt. Thomas Seymour

Artillery (400), Maj. Ebenezer Stevens
Independent Corps of Artillery, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens

Engineers and Artificer companies, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin

Independent Commands
New Hampshire Militia Brigade (497), Brig. Gen. John Stark
New Hampshire Militia Brigade (388), Brig. Gen. William Whipple
Vermont Militia Brigade (1147), Brig. Gen. Jacob Bailey
Massachusetts Bay Militia Brigade (1019), Brig. Gen. James Brickett
Massachusetts Bay Militia Brigade (497), Brig. Gen. John Fellows
Battalion of Connecticut militia volunteers (250), Brig. Gen. Oliver Wolcott
Oneida and Tuscarora warriors, Hon Yerry Tewahangagahken & Louis Atayataronghta
Algonquian Mohican “Stockbridge” warriors, Capt. Abraham Nimham

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2. British Coalition Forces (7,200/6,600)

Commanding General, Army from Canada
Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne

Chief of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams
Chief Engineer and Comptroller, Lt. William Twiss
Deputy Adjutant General, Maj. Robert Kingston
Deputy Adjutant General (German), Capt. Julius von Pöllniz
Deputy Quartermaster General, Capt. John Money
Deputy Quartermaster General (German), Capt. Heinrich Gerlach
Wagon Master General, Robert Hoaksley
Assistant Commissary General, Jonathan Clarke
Commissioner of Supplies and Loyalty Oaths, Col. Philip Skene
Deputy Judge Advocate General, Capt. James Craig
Deputy Paymaster General, David Geddes
Contractor for Horses, Maj. James Hughes
Commissary of Forage, Ephraim Jones
Provost Martial, Lt. Phineas Atherton
Acting Physician, Surgeon John Wood
Royal Navy Liaison and Acting Commissioner, 1st Lt. John Schank
(Canceaux)
Chaplain to the staff, Rev. Edward Brudenell
Aides-de-Camp:
Capt. Sir Francis Carr-Clerke
Captain Charles
Lord Petersham
Lt. Richard Wilford

Left Wing (British), Maj. Gen. William Phillips
Advanced Corps, Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser
British Grenadier Battalion, Maj. John D. Acland
24th Regiment of Foot, Maj. William Agnew
British Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Alexander Lindsay
Company of Marksmen, Capt. Alexander Fraser
Quebec Militia Company, Capt. René Amable de Boucherville
Montreal Militia Company, Capt. David Monin/Lt. Jean-Baptiste Beaubien
7th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Capt. Ellis Walker
Indian Department, Maj. John Campbell
Fort Hunter Mohawk Indians, Chief John Canadagaia
Iroquois/Algonquin Seven Nations of Canada Indians, War Chief Tehoragwanegen (Thomas Williams)

Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment Prinz Friedrich, Lt. Col. Christian Prætorius
53rd Regiment of Foot, Capt. William Hughes
34th Regiment of Foot detachment, Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger
Hessen-Hanau Jägerbattalion, Lt. Col. Carl von Creutzbourg
Kings Royal Regiment of New York, Col. John Johnson
8th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Capt. William Borthwick
Royal Naval Detachment, 1st Lt. John Starke (Maria)

Hamilton’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James Hamilton
9th Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. John Hill
20th Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. John Lind
21st Regiment of Foot, Maj. George Forster
62nd Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. John Anstruther
Royal Regiment of Artillery (detachment), Capt. Thomas Jones

Right Wing (German), Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, Freiherr zu Eisenbach
Braunschweig Dragoon Regiment Prinz Ludwig, Rittmeister Carl von Schlagenteufel
Hessen-Hanau Artillery Company, Capt. Georg Päusch
1st Brigade, Brig. Johann Friedrich Specht
   Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment von Rhetz, Maj. Balthasar von Lucke
   Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment Riedesel, Lt. Col. Ernst von Speth
   Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment Specht, Maj. Carl von Ehrenkrook

2nd Brigade, Brig. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall
   Hessen-Hanau Regiment Erbprinz, Brig. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall

Reserve Corps, Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann
   Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, Capt. Albrecht Daniel von Löhneisen
   Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, Capt. Maximillian C. Schottelius
   Hessen-Hanau Artillery company detachment, Bombardier Conrad Wall

American Loyalist Corps
   The King’s Loyal Americans, Lt. Col. Commandant Ebenezer Jessup
   The Queen’s Loyal Rangers, Lt. Col. Commandant John Peters
   The Loyal Volunteers, Capt. Samuel MacKay
   McAlpin’s Company of Volunteers, Capt. Daniel McAlpin
   Adams’s Company of Rangers, Capt. Samuel Adams
   Bateaux Company, Capt. Peter Van Alstine

Artificers and Engineers, Lt. William Twiss
   Detachment, 1st Battalion, Royal Highland Emigrants, Capt.-Lt. George Lawes
   Pioneer Company, Capt. Hazard Wilcox

Brigade of the Park of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams
   8th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams
5th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Capt. John Carter
Additional company and German recruits, 33rd Regiment of Foot, Lt. George Anson Nutt\textsuperscript{40}

Not Brigaded
47th Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. Nicholas Sutherland\textsuperscript{41}
Notes

1. Personnel figures in this appendix are typically listed for two dates—19 September and 7 October—to correlate with the two major battles fought at Saratoga. The first figure is for the former date and the second is for the latter. Continental and militia forces under Gates’ command would swell to more than 17,000 by the time Burgoyne surrendered on 17 October.

2. Historians remain unclear whether Gates ever technically relieved Arnold of command for the Left Wing. There are no known documents that confirm the action.

3. Morgan’s command was relieved from the Left Wing on 22 September and placed directly under Gates’ command.

4. Morgan’s command arrived to join the Northern army on 3 September. It was formed from riflemen from the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Virginia Regiments and the 1st, 5th, 8th, and 12th Pennsylvania Regiment, all of whom were serving with Washington’s forces in New Jersey. Washington sent the Rifle Corps to assist Schuyler, then Gates, to counter the British Indian threat.

5. Dearborn was appointed on 10 September to command the recently formed Corps of Light Infantry. It was an ad hoc battalion formed with men drafted from all existing Continental regiments in the Northern Army other than the Rifle Corps.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Adams was killed in action. As the regiment’s colonel, Nathan Hale, and major, Benjamin Titcomb, were prior casualties of the Battle of Hubbardton (captured, severely wounded, and furloughed, respectively). Four other senior captains were casualties at Hubbardton or Freeman’s Farm. Captain Drew commanded the regiment through the rest of the campaign.

7. Cook’s battalion arrived 10 September and was attached to Poor’s Brigade.

8. Latimer’s battalion arrived 10 September and was attached to Poor’s Brigade.

9. Evans’ command arrived 7 October and was attached to Learned’s Brigade.

10. Drake’s command arrived 7 October and was attached to Learned’s Brigade.

11. Ten Broeck’s Brigade was called to duty by Governor Clinton on 18 September and had assembled its battalions at Bemis Heights by 4 October.

12. Lincoln was appointed commander of the Right Wing on 25 September.

13. This ad hoc unit was made up of Albany men drafted from various regiments for service until 15 November 1777. It was also known as the “First Regiment.” Wemple was normally the commander of the 2nd Albany County Regiment, New York Militia.

14. This ad hoc unit was made up of Albany men drafted from various regiments for service until 15 November 1777. It was also known as the “Second Regiment.” Whiting was normally the commander of the 17th Albany County Regiment, New York Militia.

15. This battalion was assigned to Nixon’s Brigade on 4 October.

16. This battalion was assigned to Paterson’s Brigade 3 October.
17. This battalion was assigned to Paterson’s Brigade 3 October.
19. Vernejoux remained “sick” at Albany and subsequently deserted, never having joined the Northern Army. In his stead, Seymour commanded the troop.
20. The militia brigades and battalions listed were all present with Gates’ Northern Army when Burgoyne surrendered on 16 October.
21. Arrived on, or sometime before, 4 October.
22. These Indians (about 150) arrived on 20 September and largely departed on 27 September.
23. Nimham commanded a small body of Mohican warriors from Stockbridge, MA, who served with the Rifle Corps as “scouts and spies.”
24. Captured 7 October.
25. Mortally wounded and captured in action 7 October.
26. Mortally wounded 7 October then died the following day.
27. Wounded and captured 7 October.
29. The large majority of Indian allies had departed Burgoyne’s army by late August.
30. Powell relieved Hamilton as Fort Ticonderoga commander on 15 August.
31. The 53rd Foot, less Grenadiers and Light Infantry companies, took over the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga from the 62nd Foot on 10 August. The 62nd Foot returned to Burgoyne’s main force at Saratoga. The 53rd lost seven officers and 130 other ranks, who were captured during Brown’s 18 September raid on Fort Ticonderoga.
32. Arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 27 September.
33. Arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 27 September.
34. Arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 27 September.
35. The 62nd Foot, less Grenadiers and Light Infantry companies, manned the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga until 10 August when it was relieved by the 53rd Foot and returned to Burgoyne’s main force at Saratoga.
36. Captured at night following the 7 October battle.
37. Killed in action 7 October.
38. Wounded in action 7 October.
39. Captured 7 October.
40. This company also included recruits for a number of different infantry regiments serving in Howe’s army.
41. Six companies only. One grand division was previously sent to Fort George. The 47th Foot was typically assigned to guard the army’s bateaux flotilla, supply points, landings, and artillery park. Two companies also protected the supply depot at Diamond Island on Lake George.
Appendix G—Biographies of Key Participants

One key aspect of the Combat Studies Institute’s approach to the Staff Ride is assigning roles to staff ride participants.

American Commanders and Staff

Maj. Gen. Philip John Schuyler. Schuyler was born 20 November 1733 in Albany, New York. He became a member of the New York Assembly in 1768 and served as an Assemblyman until 1775, when he became increasingly disenchanted with the colonial government. Around this time, New York Governor Henry Moore appointed Schuyler as the commander of the local Albany militia regiment due to his previous military experience.

That same year Schuyler was elected to the Continental Congress and served in that body until appointed as a major general in the Continental Army in June of that year. He was quickly appointed commander of the New York Department (later redesignated as the Northern Department). After American rebels seized several forts on Lake Champlain from the British in the spring of 1775, Schuyler planned an invasion of Canada that summer. However, health problems precluded him from directly leading the expedition. Instead, he directed Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery to take command of the expeditionary force while Schuyler remained in Albany to logistically and administratively support the invasion from there.

The “Canada Army,” as the expedition became known, returned to Crown Point in June 1776 after failing in its efforts to turn Canada to the side to the revolution. Schuyler next moved to prevent Lt. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton, British governor general of Canada and commander of British forces there, from invading New York along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River approach. Schuyler then gave the very capable Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold an assignment to construct a small fleet of naval vessels to counter Carleton’s growing fleet at St. John’s in Quebec. Meanwhile, Schuyler set about doing what he could to rebuild and resupply the Canada Army, which was now
integrated into the Northern Army since it was located in Schuyler’s jurisdiction. For the next year Schuyler supervised the building and reconstruction of fortifications on Lake Champlain, as well as on the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. Though Arnold’s small fleet was defeated at the Battle of Valcour Island that fall, the general-turned-admiral bought time for Schuyler to continue his defensive preparations into the 1777 campaign season.

Schuyler accurately determined that British forces in Canada would attempt a similar venture down Lake Champlain in the late spring or early summer that year. Placing Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair in charge of renovating Fort Ticonderoga—considered to be the key fortress along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route—Schuyler focused his attention on other fortifications such as Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix) on the Mohawk and Forts Clinton, Montgomery, Edward, George, and Putnam farther south on the Hudson River. His logistician skills notwithstanding, Schuyler was not able to ensure that the forts would be ready to effectively oppose a British attack. This was not due as much to supplies as a lack of available manpower to adequately prepare or reconstruct the defenses.

When Fort Ticonderoga fell to Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s Army from Canada on 6 July 1777, Schuyler was immediately attacked by his political enemies in the Continental Congress and elsewhere. He was even accused of being complicit in the disaster. Congressional pressure began to mount—especially among members from New Hampshire and other northeastern states—to remove Schuyler from command in favor of Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, who hailed from Massachusetts. Nevertheless, Schuyler immediately went to work finding ways to reassemble the ground forces that the British had dispersed in order to slow down and defeat the invaders. In retrospect, Schuyler’s efforts after the fall of the fort appeared to be the best course of action as later events demonstrated. These efforts included reassembly of the Fort Ticonderoga force and its reinforcement by various Continental and militia units, placement of obstacles along the Fort Anne to Fort Edward road, and Fort Schuyler’s reinforcement by militia and Continental forces. Despite his best efforts, the pressure became too much and by mid-August Congress relieved Schuyler of the Northern Department in favor
of General Gates. Nevertheless, Schuyler continued to support the Northern Army logistically in an unofficial capacity up to the British surrender at Saratoga.

After his relief from command, Schuyler petitioned the Continental Congress for a court martial to clear his name. The court convened in October 1778 and soon vindicated him based on his efforts, actions, and decisions. Even though he was cleared of all charges, Schuyler left the army on 19 April 1779 and returned to politics. He served in two more Continental Congress sessions in 1779 and 1780 before joining the New York State Senate from 1780 to 1784. Additionally, he served as New York state surveyor general. After a two-year absence, Schuyler served in the New York State Senate from 1786 to 1790—actively supporting adoption of the United States Constitution. Schuyler twice served as a US Senator from New York in 1789 to 1791 and 1797 to January 1798 when he resigned due to health issues. Schuyler died 18 November 1804 at the Schuyler Mansion in Albany.

**Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates.** Horatio Gates was born 26 July 1727 in Maldon, England. Early in his youth, Gates decided to pursue a military career. In 1745, he secured a lieutenant’s commission in the 20th Regiment of Foot and served in Germany during the War of the Austrian Succession. During that conflict, he proved himself to be an excellent staff officer but nevertheless found himself discharged from the army when the 20th Foot was disbanded.

Before the French and Indian War, Gates reentered the British Army and served in America under Col. Edward Cornwallis and Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock. In 1763, Gates’ career once again looked to be over when he was unable to obtain a lieutenant colonelcy. He left the army once again in 1769 and moved to America. He purchased land on the Potomac River near Shepherdstown, Virginia (now West Virginia) and soon developed an acquaintance with George Washington.

On hearing about rebel actions at Lexington and Concord in late May 1775, Gates travelled to Washington’s home at Mount Vernon and learned that Washington had been appointed as the commanding general of the Continental Army. Washington was
aware of Gates’ skills as a staff officer and recommended that the Continental Congress commission him as a brigadier general and appoint him as adjutant general for the Continental Army.

In May 1776, Gates was appointed to command the “Canada Army,” which was en route after being driven out of Canada. Soon after assuming command, Gates began quarreling with the commander of the Northern Department, Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler, who had command jurisdiction for the forces in the department including Gates’ command. Chafing under the requirement to work for Schuyler, Gates engineered orders so that he and part of his command would join Washington’s Main Army in Pennsylvania that fall. Claiming illness while Washington developed his plans to attack Howe’s forces at Trenton and Princeton, Gates instead traveled to Baltimore to urge the Continental Congress to give him command of the Main Army. With Washington’s twin victories at Trenton and Princeton, however, the Congress opted to keep Washington as commander rather than appointing Gates.

In the early spring of 1777, Gates nominally resumed command of Northern Department mobile troops under Schuyler. However, he spent time trying to politick his way into a different command rather than focusing on preparing to fight the British. Thus, he was away from New York making an appeal to General Washington when Fort Ticonderoga fell to Burgoyne’s invasion force. Loss of the fort and renewed political pressure from Gates’ friends and Schuyler’s enemies finally prompted the Continental Congress to relieve Schuyler and place Gates in command of the Northern Department.

On 19 August 1777, Gates assumed command of the Northern Department and its army at Van Schaik’s Island. Dissatisfied with the army’s position at Van Schaik’s, Gates began looking for another location where he could effectively block Burgoyne’s advance. In early September, Gates selected a place called Bemis Heights, a few miles south of the village of Saratoga. He moved the army there on 7 September and began digging in. Burgoyne’s army arrived 11 days later and then on the following day, 19 September, the British general attempted to flank the American position. During the ensuing battle at Freeman’s Farm, Gates issued orders but never ventured from the American defensive position well away from the actual field of battle.
Gates’s actions during the second battle of Saratoga on 7 October were not much different. Nevertheless, his Northern Army troops were once again victorious and placed Burgoyne in a predicament that was serious and eventually fatal for the British Army.

While accounts differ on Gates’ actions during the two days of fighting near Saratoga, one certainty is that his decision to defend at Bemis Heights left Burgoyne no options but to retreat or fight the American army there. Burgoyne chose to fight and lost. He surrendered his army to Gates on 17 October. That action proved to be the turning point of the American Revolution. The victory ensured France would come into the war on America’s side. In appreciation for his achievement, Gates received a gold medal from Congress, which later that fall appointed to him to head the Board of War.

In May 1780, the Continental Congress (against Washington’s recommendations) ordered Gates to take over the Southern Department. Arriving in the Carolinas, Gates almost immediately marched the American forces there against the British base at Camden, South Carolina. Against his subordinate commanders’ recommendations, he marched though a region largely devoid of people—and therefore food—so his troops would arrive quickly. As a result, Gate’s command was routed by troops under Lt. Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis. His military reputation was now in tatters.

In December 1778, Gates returned to his Virginia home. He was ordered to stand before a court of inquiry to examine his command of the Southern Department, but his supporters in Congress once again rallied to quash the action and save what was left of his reputation. In 1782, Gates was ordered to join the Main Army’s headquarters at Newburgh, New York. While there, members of his staff were involved in the 1783 Newburgh Conspiracy, though no clear evidence indicated that Gates was personally involved. After the war, Gates served a term in the New York State Legislature then died on 10 April 1806.

**Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair.** Arthur St. Clair was born in Thurso, Caithness, Scotland in 1737. St. Clair secured a commission in the British Army’s Royal American Regiment at the age of 20 and was sent with that regiment to America to participate in the
French and Indian War. He and his regiment were with Gen. Jeffrey Amherst when his army captured Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, in 1758. He later served with Gen. James Wolfe’s command in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, which resulted in the capture of Quebec City.

St. Clair decided to leave the army and resigned his commission on 16 April 1762. He moved to the Pennsylvania colony in 1764, where he built a successful milling operation. In 1774, St. Clair once again took up arms briefly during what was dubbed Lord Dunsmore’s War.

St. Clair opted to support the Patriot cause when the rebellion broke out in 1775. In January 1776, he accepted a commission as colonel of the 3rd Pennsylvania Regiment, a Continental Army unit. For his regiment’s service in Canada, St. Clair was appointed as brigadier general in August 1776. Shortly thereafter, Gen. George Washington ordered him to New Jersey to help organize the militia there. While in New Jersey, St. Clair crossed the Delaware River with Washington’s army on the night of 25–26 December 1776 and participated in the Battle of Trenton. St. Clair also helped plan Washington’s capture of Princeton, New Jersey, on 3 January 1777. Congress promoted him to major general the following month.

In April 1777, St. Clair assumed command of Fort Ticonderoga during Horatio Gates’ absence. He quickly learned that there were not enough troops or resources to adequately defend the fort and he was forced to abandon the location to General Burgoyne’s army on 6 July 1777. St. Clair was able to lead the bulk of his command out of Fort Ticonderoga and successfully deliver them to the commander of the American Northern Army, Maj. Gen. Phillip Schuyler, at Fort Edwards on 12 July. However, he was relieved of command on 10 August for his role in the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. The following year, St. Clair faced a court-martial for losing the fort, but the court exonerated him. He was returned to duty although never assigned to another battlefield command. Because George Washington had respect and a high opinion of the rebel leader, the commander-in-chief made St. Clair a personal aide and he was present at Yorktown when Lord Cornwallis’s army surrendered.

After the war, St. Clair served as the governor of the Northwest Territory and established his capital at what would become
Cincinnati, Ohio, (named by St. Clair himself after the Society of the Cincinnati). A US Army major general in March 1791, St. Clair succeeded Maj. Gen. Joshua Harmar as commander of the United States Army (due to seniority) after that officer’s poor showing in several battles with Indian forces in the Northwest Territories in what is now Ohio. However, St. Clair was no more successful than Harmar. On 4 November near the headwaters of the Wabash River, more than 600 soldiers and scores of women and children were killed in what has become known as “St. Clair’s Defeat” and the “Battle of the Wabash.” A court of inquiry later examined St. Clair’s actions then exonerated him. St. Clair resigned his army commission in March 1792 at the request of President Washington but continued to serve as Governor of the Northwest Territory. Removed as territorial governor by President Thomas Jefferson in 1803, St. Clair died in poverty in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, on 31 August 1818.

**Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold.** Benedict Arnold was born 14 January 1741 in Norwich, Connecticut. Originally from a well-to-do family, Arnold joined the Connecticut militia at the age of 15 and served with the colonial militia against the French during the French and Indian War. As troubles with England increased in 1775, Arnold was elected captain of the Governor’s 2nd Company of Connecticut Guards. After the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the 2nd Company opted to join the revolution. Arnold marched his unit to Boston, Massachusetts, to confront the British forces there. On the way, he developed the idea to capture Fort Ticonderoga and its cannon for the resource-poor Continental Army. Arriving in Boston, he went before the Massachusetts Committee of Safety and convinced them to fund the expedition. The Committee also appointed Arnold as a colonel in the Massachusetts militia and ordered him to lead the mission. On 10 May 1775, Arnold’s new command—joined by Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys—captured not only Fort Ticonderoga, but also Forts George and Crown Point.

Arnold followed up his actions at the central New York forts with a bold raid against Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu River in Quebec. After capturing several vessels and many supplies of military value, he returned to Fort Ticonderoga. In June, Arnold
resigned his Massachusetts commission and traveled to Philadelphia to lobby in the Continental Congress for an invasion of Canada. The invasion was authorized, but the Congress directed Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler to plan and execute the mission. Undeterred, Arnold convinced George Washington to let him lead a second expedition through Maine to Quebec. Washington liked the idea and arranged a colonel’s commission in the Continental Army for Arnold as leader of the expedition.

In September 1775, Arnold departed Cambridge, Massachusetts, with 1,100 men headed for Quebec City where he arrived in November. On 31 December 1775, Arnold’s force joined that of Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery and participated in the failed assault on Quebec City. During the attack, Montgomery was killed and Arnold received a severe wound to his left leg. Despite the failed attack, Arnold was promoted to brigadier general and took charge to maintain an ineffectual siege of the city until he was replaced by Maj. Gen. David Wooster in April 1776.

Arnold briefly served as the military commander of Montreal before advancing British reinforcements under Gen. Guy Carleton forced Arnold and his troops to retreat from Quebec in May. Arnold next arrived at Fort Ticonderoga, where Schuyler directed him to begin constructing a small naval fleet to defend Lake Champlain and prevent further encroachment southward by Carleton’s troops. Though he was an army general, Arnold led the small American naval flotilla in the Battle of Valcour Island in October 1776. The American fleet was overwhelmed and defeated, but Arnold successfully prevented British movement farther south than Crown Point.

After Valcour Island, Arnold resumed his duties as a ground commander but became increasingly frustrated with what he viewed as the army’s and the Continental Congress’ failure to properly recognize his leadership and successes. Arnold watched as other men who had far fewer achievements received promotion to major general while he did not. Then in April 1777 after the Battle of Ridgefield (Connecticut), Arnold was finally promoted to major general—a recognition that he considered to be long overdue.

Working initially under the command of General Schuyler of the Northern Department, Arnold remained frenetically busy
in summer 1777 operations against Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s Army from Canada in central New York. Sent by Schuyler to lift the siege of Fort Schuyler on 10 August, the American general successfully feinted the British commander, Brig. Barry St. Leger, into believing Arnold’s command had much greater strength than it did. The deception prompted St. Leger to end the siege and depart before American reinforcements arrived. Arnold—with Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s Brigade in tow—arrived back at Van Schiak’s Island on 31 August. There he met Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, who had taken charge of the Northern Department and its army. Soon after, Arnold assumed command of what would become the Left Wing of the Northern Army and its defenses at Bemis Heights.

The relationship between Arnold and his new commander soon took a turn for the worse. After Arnold demonstrated his courage and leadership during the American victory at the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, Gates—probably intentionally—did not report the key role that Arnold and the units under his command played in the battle. Indeed, Arnold and his units represented the majority of troops that were involved. Arnold confronted Gates and accused him of slighting him personally among other charges. Gates responded by ostensibly dismissing Arnold from command of the Left Wing (although there is no primary source evidence that this action ever took place).

On 7 October, Burgoyne led a reconnaissance force west to try and find the American left flank at Bemis Heights. Once again Arnold’s Left Wing troops bore the brunt of the fighting and once again Arnold’s leadership was conspicuous on the battlefield. Arnold was shot by a German soldier—unfortunately in the same leg that was wounded in Canada. The shot killed his horse, which fell on the leg as well. These injuries were serious enough to keep him out of active service for the next eight months.

When the British evacuated Philadelphia the following month in June 1778, Washington appointed Arnold as the city’s military commander. While there, he met and then married Peggy Shippen, the 18-year-old daughter of Judge Edward Shippen.

Peggy was a loyalist, and their marriage coupled with festering resentment of his superiors helped turn Arnold away from the Patriot
cause. In 1780, Arnold—now very bitter toward the Continental Congress—received a new command. He was placed in charge of the fortifications at West Point, New York. Arnold offered to hand the positions over to British forces for a large sum of money. However, his plan was eventually discovered, and Arnold quickly fled down the Hudson River to a British ship that took him to New York.

After his defection, Arnold went a step further. Swearing allegiance to the British, he took a commission as a brigadier in the British Army, then commanded British forces in several small battles. However, by 1783, the war was ended and America was free. Despised in his own country, Arnold sailed to London then died in 1801—virtually penniless and buried there without military honors.

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln. Benjamin Lincoln was born 24 January 1733, in Hingham, Massachusetts. In 1755, he became a member of the 3rd Regiment, Suffolk County Militia (of which his father was the colonel) and was appointed as the regimental adjutant. He and his regiment were called up for service in the French and Indian War but did not see any action. By 1763, Lincoln had been promoted to the rank of major, and he was made lieutenant colonel of the 3rd Regiment in 1772. In 1775, Lincoln was elected to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. His militia experience made him a logical choice for the Congress’ militia organization and supply committees. When the American Revolution began in April 1775, Lincoln became involved in ensuring that the Continental Army outside Boston was supported with appropriate supplies.

For his service in and around Boston, Massachusetts, the Massachusetts legislature approved promotion of Lincoln to major general in January 1776 and commander of the colony’s militia. With this promotion he became responsible for Boston’s coast defenses. After the British evacuated the city, Lincoln set about to improve Boston’s seaward fortifications and the state’s militia forces in case the British attempted to return. Due in part to his improvements effort, Lincoln and the militia drove out the last Royal Navy remnants from Boston Harbor in May.

Despite his lack of combat experience, Lincoln was placed in command of a short-term Massachusetts militia brigade sent to join General Washington’s Main Army at New York in September
1776. As the brigade was making its way through Connecticut to New York, Washington ordered Lincoln to prepare his brigade to raid British positions on Long Island. The mission was abruptly cancelled when Washington was forced to retreat from New York after the Battle of Long Island. Washington next ordered Lincoln to join the Main Army as it retreated northward. Lincoln’s brigade joined the army’s rearguard and secured the Continental Army’s line of retreat to White Plains, New York. After the inconclusive battle at White Plains on 28 October, Lincoln’s brigade and the rest of the Continental Army retreated northward following two more days of skirmishing but no major fighting.

Lincoln returned to Massachusetts and took command of a group of new recruits for the next year’s campaign season. His short service with the Main Army must have impressed Washington, because the commander-in-chief sent a recommendation to Congress that fall to commission Lincoln in the Continental Army. On 14 February 1777, Congress appointed Lincoln as a major general in the Continental Line.

Lincoln’s first command with the Main Army was a forward outpost line at Bound Brook, New Jersey. For the next six weeks or so, his men skirmished with British sentries about three miles away. In April 1777, a large force under Lord Cornwallis attacked Lincoln’s command and drove it from the field at the Battle of Bound Brook. His brigade was easily defeated and Lincoln himself was almost captured.

When Washington received word that Burgoyne’s Army from Canada had arrived at Fort Ticonderoga in early July, the commander-in-chief sent Lincoln north to assist General Schuyler, Commander of the Northern Department. Since Lincoln was from New England, Schuyler immediately sent him to Manchester, New Hampshire, to organize and coordinate the activities of New England militia units forming there. Schuyler further directed Lincoln and his militia forces to harass Burgoyne’s supply line as the British moved south from Fort Ticonderoga toward Albany. New Hampshire’s militia leader, Brig. Gen. John Stark, refused to put his forces under Lincoln’s command when the leader arrived at Manchester. Lincoln returned to Van Schaik’s Island to confer with Gates, the new commander of the American Northern Army. Gates
essentially confirmed Schuyler’s earlier directives about raiding Burgoyne’s lines of communication so Lincoln set out to return to Manchester to resume his mission.

By early September, Lincoln had at least 2,000 men under his command and the count was growing daily. On 12 September, Lincoln sent three 500-man detachments to attack Burgoyne’s supply line and otherwise wreak havoc. One of these columns successfully overran the British forces at Lake George landing and Mount Defiance. In the process, they freed more than 100 American prisoners and captured more than 200 British soldiers and a supply depot. Lincoln led another 700 or so men to Skenesborough several days later to support further actions behind Burgoyne. However, soon after arriving, he received new orders from General Gates. Gates directed Lincoln to bring his militia forces to Bemis Heights for what would undoubtedly be another—perhaps decisive—battle. Lincoln reached Bemis Heights on 22 September with most of his forces.

At Bemis Heights, Gates assigned Lincoln command of the Right Wing of the Northern Army. As such, his newly arrived militia—along with others already in position—were to hold the right half of the American line on the Heights. The location was largely positioned on the high ground facing north and the bluffs on the eastern bank of the Hudson River. As events evolved, Lincoln’s command saw little action and almost no role in the final battle on 7 October. Virtually all the action took place on the left of the American line in Arnold’s sector. In short, Burgoyne’s forces were defeated once again and took heavy losses.

Later that night, Gates held a war council during which Lincoln suggested the need to fortify the ford at Fort Edward against the possibility that Burgoyne might attempt to retreat during the night. Gates directed Lincoln to take appropriate actions to block the ford. Effecting the plan, Lincoln’s column bumped into a British force and in the confused fighting, Lincoln was struck in the right ankle by a musket ball. His ankle was shattered, which effectively removed Lincoln from any remaining actions at Saratoga. He was evacuated to a hospital in Albany, where he learned of Burgoyne’s surrender on 17 October.

After 10 months of rest and recuperation, Lincoln rejoined Washington and the Main Army near New York City in August
1778. Washington soon appointed him commander of the Southern Department and sent him south to oppose the British forces there. Lincoln, operating with the French navy and French colonial troops, departed Charleston, South Carolina, on 2 September with 2,000 American soldiers to help retake Savannah from the British. The siege lasted from 16 September to 18 October 1779 but failed to retake the town.

After the siege, Lincoln returned to Charleston. Five months later, he himself was under siege by some of the same British troops which had stopped him at Savannah. In March 1780, those forces and another British contingent dispatched from New York under the command of General Clinton surrounded the city. After six weeks of siege, Lincoln surrendered Charleston and about 5,000 men on 12 May 1780. Soon after, Lincoln was paroled and returned to Hingham to await formal exchange. In November, he was exchanged for Maj. Gen. William Phillips and Baron Friedrich von Riedesel, both of whom had been captured at Saratoga.

Soon after, Lincoln rejoined Washington’s Main Army. The following year, he led the march of a portion of the Main Army south to Yorktown where British troops under Lord Cornwallis were encamped. At Yorktown, Lincoln led the army’s 2nd Division. Besieging the British, the Franco-American army compelled Cornwallis to accept surrender terms on 17 October, the same date that Burgoyne capitulated to Gates in 1777. Washington designated Lincoln, his second-in-command, to accept the surrender which he did at noon on 19 October.

After Yorktown, Lincoln served as the first US Secretary of War from 1781 to 1783. In 1787, Lincoln was a member of the Massachusetts state convention that ratified the United States Constitution. Lincoln also helped put an end to Shays’ Rebellion, which ended when his militia forces attacked the rebels and forced them to surrender in February 1787. Lincoln retired from public life in 1809 and died in Hingham on 9 May that year.

**Brig. Gen. John Stark.** John Stark was born 28 August 1728 in Nutfield (now Londonderry), New Hampshire. In 1757, during the French and Indian War, Stark was commissioned as a first lieutenant in the famous Rogers’ Rangers and eventually rose to be
second-in-command. Stark gained formative military experience as a member of Rogers’ Rangers. By the end of the war, Stark had risen to the rank of captain and acquired a wealth of military experience. Because of his recognized knowledge and skill, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress unanimously appointed Stark as colonel of the 1st New Hampshire Regiment on 23 July 1775.

Commanding the 1st New Hampshire, Stark played significant roles in a number of early key actions during the revolution. At the siege of Boston, Stark’s New Hampshire Regiment was assigned to protect the northern flank of the American position. He had his men build a low stone barricade which formed a breastwork of sorts, perpendicular to the shore line below Breed’s Hill along the beach of the Mystic River. Stark himself then paced a distance stake out about 30 yards in front of the wall to mark the spot where his troops would open fire. As Stark predicted, about 350 British light troops with fixed bayonets pushed along the shore route before the main attack on Breed’s Hill. Firing by file sequence from behind the wall, Stark’s men killed at least 90 attackers and wounded twice that number. Nevertheless, Howe was able to seize Breed’s Hill and Stark’s regiment formed part of the rearguard when the Americans retreated.

After the retreat from Boston, Stark led his regiment to New York. As at Boston, they were eventually forced to retreat that fall with General Washington’s Main Army out of the city and across New Jersey. Washington, however, soon developed plans for two counterattacks. Stark competently led the 1st New Hampshire Regiment in the 25 December 1776 attack on Trenton, New Jersey, and a second on 3 January 1776 at Princeton, New Jersey, that resulted in the defeat of British forces there.

After the victories in New Jersey, Stark was forced to return to the New Hampshire to recruit replacements. While home, he learned that Congress selected certain officers for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Despite his own impressive performance, Stark was not on the list. However, a number of colonels he considered to be far less worthy were identified for promotion. Outraged at what he considered unjust and a personal slight, Stark resigned his commission on 23 March 1777 and remained at home.
By late June, it was well-known that Burgoyne’s Army from Canada had invaded central New York. In early July, the New Hampshire legislature offered Stark a commission as brigadier general of the New Hampshire Militia. Stark agreed to take the commission with the proviso that his orders would come from the state only, and not from Continental Army authorities. The government agreed and within a very short period, Stark had raised a brigade of almost 1,500 men. He sent most to Manchester, Vermont, and followed them there a short time later. At Manchester, he encountered Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln (one of the inexperienced Continental Army brigadiers for whom he had little regard), who was busy organizing the militia there. Rather than take orders from Lincoln, Stark departed with the comment that he was taking his men to Bennington to protect the depot there.

On 13 August, Stark learned of a German force moving to seize the supply depot at Bennington, Vermont. Three days later, Stark led a complex attack against the main German position on a hill near the Walloomsac River bridge about 10 miles northwest of Bennington. Stark’s command ultimately killed or captured the vast majority of the enemy troops, including the commander.

Stark’s victory at Bennington had a significant impact on both Burgoyne and the American Northern Army. The German expedition not only failed to gather much in the way of supplies, but Burgoyne lost more than 900 sorely needed men from his command. On the British side, the news dampened the morale of the British and their German allies while at the same time raising the spirits of the Americans who faced them. The achievement also brought Stark’s name back into the limelight with the Continental Congress, who appointed him as a Continental Army brigadier general on 4 October 1777.

After the victory at Bennington, Stark’s tone regarding cooperation with Continental commanders softened some, perhaps because of his new appointment. He soon moved his force to a position named Stark’s Knob near Fort Edward to cooperate with Gates in blocking Burgoyne from retreating to Fort Ticonderoga. In the 7 October Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield, militia units like Stark’s helped surround Burgoyne and cut his line of communications. He ultimately surrendered at Saratoga on 17 October 1777.
After Saratoga, Stark’s service in the Continental Army was varied but valuable. Between 1778 and 1781, he served as the commander of the Northern Department on three occasions. He also served as a judge in the court martial that found British Maj. John André guilty of spying and helping with Benedict Arnold’s conspiracy to surrender West Point to the British in September 1780. On 30 September 1783, Congress promoted him to major general in recognition of his services to the army and nation. In November, he resigned his commission after the war officially ended. Stark retired to his Manchester home and never held any further political or military positions. He remained content with his private life and lived to the age of 94, becoming the last surviving American general officer from the Revolutionary War.

**Col. Seth Warner.** Seth Warner was born on the western Connecticut frontier near Woodbury (now Roxbury). His extensive military service began as a teenager when he served two summers with the New Hampshire militia during the French and Indian War.

Warner’s next experience with things military was as the captain of the local militia company, which eventually formed part of what became known as the “Green Mountain Boys.” Warner’s militia company was incorporated into a regiment-size force commanded by Ethan Allen. The Green Mountain Boys’ basic mission was to defend the legitimacy—forcefully if necessary—of claims by settlers who held property in the New Hampshire Grants. Warner, who was Allen’s cousin, was named second-in-command.

After the Battles at Lexington and Concord, the Green Mountain Boys were dispatched to capture Fort Ticonderoga. Warner and his men remained on the east shore of Lake Champlain as a rearguard while Allen and the rest of the Green Mountain Boys—accompanied by newly arrived Col. Benedict Arnold and his men—surprised and captured the fort’s garrison on the morning of 10 May 1775. The following day, Warner and his men captured Fort Crown Point, 13 miles farther north, along with 111 cannon.

After capturing the two forts, Warner accompanied Arnold and Allen to attack Fort St. John, Quebec, on the Richelieu River north of Lake Champlain. Arnold’s troops captured the post and seized its
supplies, along with a large British ship. After loading all the supplies that would fit on the ship, they burned the rest and sailed south back to Fort Ticonderoga. Meanwhile, Allen, Warner, and the Green Mountain Boys attempted to hold Fort St. John but were forced to withdraw by British reinforcements sent by General Carleton.

Returning south, Allen and Warner traveled to Philadelphia to petition the Continental Congress to recognize the Green Mountain Boys as a Continental regiment. On 23 June 1775, Congress recommended to the Provincial Congress of New York that they recognize the unit as part of their allotment of troops. Most people assumed that Allen would be elected as the new regiment’s leader, but on 26 July, the men selected Warner to be the lieutenant colonel by a vote of 41 to 5.

The first mission for the new battalion was to join General Schuyler’s invasion of Canada in the fall of 1775. In mid-September, Warner’s battalion participated in the siege of Fort St. John. Afterward, Warner and his men returned home to the Grants to reequip and recruit, perhaps with the idea that the regiment would return to Canada in early 1776.

On 31 December 1775, Montgomery was killed during an ill-fated attack on Quebec City. Brig. Gen. David Wooster, who commanded American forces in Montreal, wrote a letter asking Warner to return and within a few days, Warner’s men were headed north. After marching about 400 miles in winter conditions, the column arrived at Quebec. Unfortunately, a smallpox epidemic soon decimated the American forces, including Warner’s men. By early April many in Warner’s Battalion were returning to health, but they would soon be engaged in retreating rather than fighting when British reinforcements arrived at Quebec in early May. Warner’s Battalion was employed as a rearguard in the retreat to Crown Point but he also had the challenge of moving his many still-ill troops. Through superb leadership and planning, he safely returned his men—losing only a few who either died en route or deserted.

Almost immediately after the battalion arrived at Crown Point, the men were released from service since their term of service was complete. On 5 July 1776, the Continental Congress authorized Warner to form a new regiment to be organized from the remnants
of those who served with him in Canada. Warner was appointed as colonel, and the new regiment was designated as Warner’s Continental Regiment. Meanwhile, Schuyler and Arnold were feverishly preparing to meet an expected incursion into central New York during the summer and fall of 1776. By January 1777, Warner had sent the initial elements of his new regiment to help defend Mount Independence. By mid-June, however, the regiment had grown to only 228 men—the small number with which Warner would fight the Saratoga Campaign.

After Fort Ticonderoga was abandoned on 6 July, Warner’s Regiment helped bring up the rear of the American column. Col. Ebenezer Francis, commander of the 11th Massachusetts Bay Regiment, had command of the rearguard while Warner’s Regiment was the next unit to the front. The rearguard reached Hubbardton in the late afternoon and instead of continuing to Castleton as ordered, Warner and Francis decided to remain at Hubbardton so that Francis’ tired men could recover.

The next morning on 7 July, Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps composed of more than 850 British and German troops attacked and drove the rearguard troops to a defensible hill (i.e., Monument Hill) on which Francis’ regiment began to form. To the south, Warner’s regiment attempted to block British Grenadiers attacking over Zion Hill and prevent them from cutting off the road to Castleton. Warner held back the Grenadiers for a time, but Francis and Warner ordered their men to fall back after Riedesel’s detachment of Germans attacked the American right. They took up new positions on the east side of the Castleton Road and held for about an hour. Francis had been killed in the retreat to the Castleton Road, so Warner took charge until Francis’ men on the right began to break. Warner then ordered his men to scatter and meet him in Manchester as soon as they could get there.

After his men reassembled at Manchester, Warner received orders from Schuyler to take command of any Vermont and Massachusetts militia he found there (less Stark’s New Hampshire militia brigade), as well as several small Vermont ranger companies. When Stark’s brigade departed Manchester for Bennington, Warner agreed to send the other militia along and bring his own regiment,
which was still resting and refitting, to Bennington a short time later.

On 16 August, Stark’s forces, along with other militia units that reported to Warner, engaged a 700-man detachment of Germans, loyalists, Canadians, and Indians. The unit under Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum was on a mission to raid the rebel supply depot at Bennington. The battle took place several miles west of the town and resulted in a devastating defeat for Baum, who was mortally wounded in the action. With the help of Warner and his men, Stark also soundly defeated a reinforcing column under Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann. Warner’s regiment had made a forced march from east of Bennington then launched directly into the battle with Breymann. Warner’s leadership was conspicuous on the battlefield that day.

Operating under orders from Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, Warner’s regiment and the Vermont ranger companies participated in the Pawlet raids the following month against Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. Part of Warner’s Continental Regiment and one Ranger company went with Col. John Brown’s column that attacked Lake George Landing and Mount Defiance. The rest of the regiment accompanied Col. Samuel Johnson’s movement on Mount Independence. Whether Warner participated in the actions is unclear, but the raids resulted in the capture of more than 200 British soldiers and the freeing of more than 110 American prisoners, most of whom had been captured at the Battle of Hubbardton.

After returning to Pawlet, Warner received the order for all units in the area to join Gates’ Northern Army near Saratoga. Warner moved his troops to Stark’s Knob on the Hudson River on 13 October to help block any retreat by Burgoyne’s Army. Four days later, Burgoyne surrendered his army at Saratoga.

Between 1778 and 1780, Warner’s Continental Regiment continued to serve along the upper Hudson River and at Fort George. On 6 September 1780, Warner, along with two of his officers, was returning to Fort George from an inspection trip to one of his outlying companies. Near a place called “Bloody Pond,” Indians sprang an ambush and killed Warner’s two companions straightaway. Warner himself was severely wounded and his horse was killed. Five weeks later, the portion of Warner’s regiment posted at Fort George was attacked and essentially destroyed. Still recuperating from his
wounds, Warner was not present at the demise of his command. The regiment was officially disbanded in December, and Warner soon retired from the service due to his failing health.

**Col. Daniel Morgan.** Daniel Morgan was born on 6 July 1735, probably in either Hunterdon County, New Jersey, or Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During the French and Indian War, Morgan worked as a teamster for the British Army and later was appointed as an ensign in a colonial ranger unit that was attached to the British forces. After that conflict, he served as a militia lieutenant during Pontiac’s Rebellion from 1763 to 1764 and once again during Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774.

After the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the Continental Congress authorized Virginia to form two companies of riflemen. Morgan was assigned to command one of them. After recruiting almost 100 skilled marksmen, Morgan and his unit left Winchester on 14 July 1775 and arrived at Boston on 6 August. Employing highly accurate and long-range weapons, Morgan’s expert marksmen soon began to make their presence known along the siege lines. Morgan’s company along with two other rifle companies placed under his command were selected to accompany Benedict Arnold’s brigade of 1,000 men on a trek that fall through Maine on an expedition to help American forces capture Quebec City in Canada. The column linked up with the American Canada Army and attacked Quebec City on 31 December. The attack was a failure. Morgan and many of his troops were captured when they became trapped in the city. They were held as prisoners of war until paroled September 1776.

Once paroled, Morgan returned to service with the Main Army and learned he had been promoted to full colonel for his service in Canada. After raising the 11th Virginia Regiment that spring, Morgan was tasked to raise a provisional 500-man regiment of riflemen designated as the “Corps of Riflemen.” During the summer of 1777, Morgan and his men conducted attacks against British forces in New Jersey until General Washington instructed him to support Gates’ Northern Army at Van Schaik’s Island. Arriving on 30 August, Morgan’s command was bolstered by the addition of Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry Battalion. Their combined
actions were key to the American victory at the 19 September Battle of Freeman’s Farm. Subsequently, the Corps of Riflemen conducted attacks on the British army’s right flank in the 7 October Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield and on the Breymann Redoubt.

Soon after Burgoyne’s 17 October surrender at Saratoga, Morgan and the Corps of Riflemen rejoined Washington’s Main Army near Philadelphia. Almost a year later on 14 September 1778, the Americans reorganized the Virginia Line and apparently disbanded the Corps of Riflemen. Morgan himself was appointed as colonel of the Continental Army’s 7th Virginia Regiment.

By this time, Morgan had repeatedly proven his abilities in battle and potential for higher command. Yet he was passed over for promotion to brigadier general several times in favor of less capable men. Due to his frustration at being ignored by Congress, coupled with injuries he had suffered during campaigns, he decided to leave the army. Morgan was placed on furlough 30 June 1779 and went to his home in Winchester.

After a one-year hiatus, Morgan received a letter from General Gates, who had now taken over the Southern Department. Gates asked him to rejoin the army. Morgan initially declined due to pain in his legs from sciatica and the fact that he would be outranked by a number of militia officers in Gates’ army down there. After Gates’ August defeat at Camden, however, Morgan reconsidered and departed home immediately. Rejoining Gates at Hillsborough, North Carolina, Morgan was given command of a 600-man corps of light infantry on 2 October. Eleven days later, he was promoted to brigadier general.

On 2 December, Gates was relieved of command of the Southern Department and Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene took over. Green now faced the forces of Cornwallis, which was the major British command operating in the Southern Department. Increasingly pressured by forces, Greene divided his army and gave Morgan instructions to move into South Carolina, while Greene and his men headed northwest. In South Carolina, Morgan was to draw forces away from Cornwallis’ main army and harass them without bringing on a general engagement. Greene hoped to gain breathing room to forage his main forces and rebuild them after the defeat at Camden.
Recognizing Greene’s plan, Cornwallis sent Col. Banastre Tarleton’s British Legion to track down Morgan. Morgan talked with many of the militia who had fought Tarleton before and became convinced that he could defeat Tarleton’s forces. After leading Tarleton on a three-week chase, Morgan decided to disobey orders and turned to counterattack Tarleton’s pursuit. On the morning of 17 January 1781, Morgan’s command met Tarleton’s forces at the Battle of Cowpens. Morgan’s command decisively defeated the British and sent Tarleton and his handful of survivors fleeing after suffering more than 80-percent casualties.

After the battle, Morgan’s sciatica returned and on 10 February, he was once again forced to leave the army and return to Winchester. Later that year, Morgan campaigned with the Marquis de Lafayette and Gen. Anthony Wayne against British forces in Virginia for a short time, but his medical problems soon precluded any further service to the Continental Army for the remainder of the war.

**Lt. Col. James Wilkinson.** James Wilkinson was born 24 March 1757 on a farm about three miles northeast of Benedict, Maryland. Prior to the Revolutionary War, he had no military experience. He enlisted in Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion in 1775 and was commissioned as a captain in September. After the battalion was sent to participate in the siege of Boston, Wilkinson became an aide to Brig. Gen. Nathanael Greene. When the guns seized from the British at Fort Ticonderoga arrived at Boston in March 1776, Wilkinson helped emplace the guns on Dorchester Heights which, in turn, precipitated General Howe’s abandonment of the city. Wilkinson next traveled with Greene and the rest of the Continental Army south to New York to oppose the British there. There he was reassigned to command an infantry company in Thompson’s battalion.

In January 1776, Wilkinson’s battalion, including his company, was ordered to Canada to reinforce Benedict Arnold’s troops laying siege to Quebec City. They arrived in March, but 8,000 British and German troops under Gen. John Burgoyne arrived less than two months later and forced the American Army from Canada to retreat. By this time, Wilkinson had become an aide to General Arnold and
assisted him in directing the final retreat. Wilkinson left Canada with Arnold on the very last boat out of St. John’s on 15 June 1776.

On August 1776, Wilkinson left Arnold’s service and became an aide to Gen. Horatio Gates, who commanded Northern Department forces at Fort Ticonderoga. He remained in Gates’ service for the next 19 months, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel and the position of deputy adjutant general of the Northern Army. Wilkinson functioned somewhat as a scout for Gates during the Saratoga Campaign’s battles of Freeman’s Farm and Barber’s Wheatfield. Gates also employed him as a negotiator and intermediary during negotiations for Burgoyne’s surrender. Following the surrender, Gates sent Wilkinson to deliver official dispatches concerning the battles and the results. However, Wilkinson first attended to a number of personal matters and kept Congress waiting until he decided to show up. Nevertheless, after Wilkinson delivered the reports—providing highly embellished accounts in which he extolled the virtues and actions of his own participation—Congress voted a brevet for him as a brigadier general. He was only 20 years old at this point.

Wilkinson’s promotion precipitated an outcry from many quarters, especially from colonels who had bravely led their men in combat on the field of battle. Moreover, Wilkinson was suspected of being involved in the so-called Conway Cabal, which was a conspiracy to replace George Washington with Horatio Gates as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army. Gates—either disenchanted with Wilkinson or wanting to distance himself—compelled Wilkinson to resign from the army in March 1778. With assistance from friends in Congress, Wilkinson secured a July 1779 appointment as clothier-general of the Army. The job apparently did not suit him and he resigned from the position in March 1781.

After his resignation from the Continental Army, Wilkinson would later reenter the US Army and eventually rise to be the army’s commanding general. His later life, however, was marked by a series of scandals. In the late 1780s, he was implicated (and later conclusively proven) to be involved in treasonous activities with the Spanish government. Wilkinson provided the Spanish with sensitive US intelligence and conspired to have Kentucky placed under the Spanish as a vassal protectorate. Involved in a personal battle with
the army general who preceded him, Maj. Gen. “Mad” Anthony Wayne, he narrowly avoided a court-martial due to Wayne’s untimely death. He became enmeshed in Aaron Burr’s plans to peel off part of the western United States and establish a separate nation. After Burr’s plans were exposed, Wilkinson quickly distanced himself and denounced Burr—narrowly avoiding indictment as part of the scheme. During the War of 1812, he mishandled the army in two battles. He was relieved from active duty then finally discharged from the army on 15 June 1815.

**British Coalition Commanders and Staff**

**Lt. Gen. William Howe.** Gen. William Howe, 5th Viscount Howe, was born 10 August 1729 in England. Before the American Revolution, Howe had served in the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War. During the latter conflict (known in North America as the French and Indian War), Howe led a British force that captured the cliffs at Anse-au-Foulon near Quebec City in 1759 and enabled Gen. James Wolfe to defeat the French in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham.

As trouble brewed in the North American colonies, Howe publicly advocated a light-handed approach to governing there. As tensions grew, he opposed the so-called Intolerable Acts and urged reconciliation with the colonies. Although he stated publicly that he had no desire to serve against the rebellious Americans, he nevertheless accepted the position as second-in-command of British forces in America under Gen. Thomas Gage. In March 1775, Howe sailed for Boston accompanied by Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton and Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, along with additional troops to help temper American actions. Arriving 15 May, after the battles of Lexington and Concord, he discovered that the American Revolution had already begun and the city was under siege.

When the rebels entrenched on Breed’s Hill on the Charlestown Peninsula, Gage ordered Howe to take the hill and defeat the upstart Americans. On 17 June, Howe conducted a frontal attack on the position and drove them off, sustaining more than 1,000 casualties in the process. The battle convinced Howe that the rebellion was
not just a small number of disaffected rebels but ran deeper among the Americans than most British leaders believed. Despite his misgivings about prosecuting further violence against his erstwhile countrymen, Howe accepted a 10 October appointment as temporary commander-in-chief in North America when Gage returned to England. Gage never returned to the colonies, and the appointment was made permanent in April 1776.

On 2 March 1776, Washington began bombarding Boston using some of the cannon hauled there from Fort Ticonderoga and emplaced on Dorchester Heights overlooking the harbor. By mid-month, 59 guns were in action and Howe decided to withdraw his forces from the city and move them to Halifax, Nova Scotia. At Halifax, Howe developed a new plan to seize New York. On 2 July, his army began landing on Staten Island and soon swelled to more than 30,000 men. Crossing over to Long Island, Howe engaged Washington’s army in the 26–27 August Battle of Long Island, defeating Washington and forcing his troops to retreat to Brooklyn Heights. There the Americans entrenched and waited for Howe to attack. Remembering the high casualties his command sustained at Breed’s Hill, Howe declined to attempt another frontal attack and opted instead to conduct a siege. Howe’s delay in attacking, however, allowed Washington’s army to escape to Manhattan. On 15 September, Howe’s forces drove Washington from the island as well. From Manhattan, the American army retreated to White Plains, New York, where once again Washington attempted a defense. Howe’s pursuit forced Washington to withdraw in defeat once again at the Battle of White Plains. Washington then marched his army into Pennsylvania to rest, refit, and recuperate.

Rather than pursue the rebel army and try to destroy it, Howe returned to New York City and sent his command into winter quarters. To ensure that the army in New York had a buffer against attacks from Washington’s forces, Howe directed Maj. Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis to create a robust outpost line in northern New Jersey. Washington, however, was not content to sit out the winter and was able to engineer notable victories at Trenton and Princeton in December and January. Howe’s response was to reduce his outpost line and develop a plan to attack Philadelphia during
the coming campaign season. Philadelphia was the seat of the Continental Congress government and thus the perceived center of the rebellion. In Howe’s estimation, attacking the city would force Washington to meet him in open field battle where British professionalism and discipline would defeat the Continental Army once and for all. In this, Howe miscalculated on several levels.

In England on personal business during the winter of 1777, Burgoyne proposed a campaign plan to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Americas. He would lead an army south through Lake Champlain to Albany while a second column advanced east from Lake Ontario. Meanwhile, Howe would advance north from New York and assume command of all further operations into New England, the hot bed of rebellion. While the plan received the blessings of King George III and Germain, the colonial secretary never issued direct orders to Howe to support or operate with Burgoyne until late in the season. As Burgoyne moved south, Howe instead proceeded with his campaign to capture Philadelphia. Because of this coordination and communications failure between key decision makers and commanders, Burgoyne’s incursion was a failure and he and his army were captured.

As Burgoyne marched south in the summer, Howe embarked his forces at New York. They landed at Head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay on 25 August 1777. Howe marched his command north from there then defeated Washington at the Battle of Brandywine on 11 September. Eleven days later, his army marched into Philadelphia without a fight, but the Continental Congress had simply left the city, moved to Baltimore, and continued operations there. Howe left a force to garrison Philadelphia and set out to engage Washington once again. Washington, learning that Howe had left about 3,000 men at Philadelphia, determined he would attack the now-smaller British force. On 4 October, the Continental Army attacked Howe’s command at Germantown. Initially the attack went well for Washington’s men, but several commanders made blunders due to the fog and confusion. Ultimately, Howe’s troops drove the Continental Army back, but the fight was close and the American soldiers and commanders realized they had generally performed well despite the confusion. Following yet another defeat,
Washington moved the army to Valley Forge, where it went into winter quarters.

After the Battle of Germantown, Howe came under severe criticism for his repeated failures to destroy the Continental Army. Believing that he had lost the confidence of King George III, Howe forwarded his letter of resignation on 22 October. After several meager attempts to lure Washington out in the fall, Howe sent his troops into winter quarters. On 14 April 1778, Howe was notified that his resignation had been accepted and he was superseded on 18 May by General Clinton. Howe returned to England, where he faced severe criticism and a court of inquiry on the handling of his duties in America. After he was acquitted, Howe remained in military service and later served in Parliament. He died at Twickenham in 1814 after a long illness.

**Lt. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton.** Guy Carleton was born 3 September 1724 in Ireland. In 1741 at the age of 17, he commissioned as an ensign in the 25th Regiment of Foot. In 1747, Carleton was sent to Flanders where his regiment fought the French at the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom. His regiment returned to England the following year after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle signing. In 1751, he transferred to the 1st Foot Guards and was promoted to captain the following year.

A lieutenant colonel by 1757, Carleton served with the German Army of Observation assigned to protect Hanover from French invasion then returned to Britain the following year. In 1758, he transferred to the newly formed 72nd Regiment of Foot and participated in the British attack on the French fortress of Louisbourg (in present-day Nova Scotia, Canada). He was selected as aide to Brig. James Wolfe, but King George denied his appointment (probably due to disparaging comments that Carleton reportedly made about Hanoverian soldiers). Left in assignment limbo by the denial, Carleton was finally appointed to serve as aide-de-camp to Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig.

In December 1758, Wolfe was appointed a major general and given command of the upcoming campaign against the city of Quebec and he selected Carleton as his quartermaster general, a duty
Carleton performed well throughout the campaign. Wounded during the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Carleton returned to England in October 1759. Returning to his regiment (72nd Regiment of Foot), Carleton was wounded again in the 29 March 1761 attack on Belle Île off the coast of France. He then took part in the British expedition against Cuba in 1762 and was wounded a third time on 22 July.

Carleton was named acting lieutenant governor and administrator of Quebec on 7 April 1766. He arrived the following September to assume his post. Two years later, he was appointed captain general and governor-in-chief of Quebec. From 1768 to 1775, Carleton’s duties were largely political and administrative. That began to change in May 1775 with the start of the American Revolution. He had sent two regiments to Boston before the rebellion began and was now down to only 800 regular troops to defend his province. Alarmed by news of the Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point seizures and Arnold’s raid on Fort St. John, Carleton began to raise militia units to supplement his defenses. The effort was largely unsuccessful initially because neither local Englishmen, nor the French who remained after Britain assumed control of Canada, had much desire to serve with the British Army. The Iroquois Indians in the area were willing, but Carleton dismissed the idea due to fears of what the Indians might do to non-combatants in the areas of operation.

After the American attacks on the British forts earlier that spring, Carleton began preparations to better defend the province. The first line of defense was Fort St. John, but that location fell in November to the invading rebel Canada Army under Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery. That loss led to the attack on Montreal, which prompted Carleton to move his seat of governance from Montreal to Quebec City. In doing so, he barely evaded capture himself. For the next six months, Carleton directed the British efforts to resist the American siege of Quebec. The siege was finally lifted in May 1776 when Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, Carleton’s newly appointed second-in-command, arrived with substantial reinforcements. With these new troops, Carleton pursued the now-retreating American army and defeated them at the Battle of Trois-Rivières. By June, all American forces had been driven out of Canada. For his victory, he was appointed a “Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath” that June.
At Fort St. John, Sir Guy set about building a fleet of mostly small gunboats and bateaux at a nearby boatyard. His intent was to build enough gunboats and transport boats to move an invasion force and supplies south into central New York along the lake Champlain-Hudson River route. It took several months, but by October his fleet was ready. The Americans under Benedict Arnold had also built a small gunboat fleet during the summer and fall and met Carlton’s flotilla off Valcour Island on Lake Champlain on 11 October 1776. The British, with a significantly superior fleet, won a decisive victory. The battle and Arnold’s thorough destruction of Fort Crown Point, however, delayed Carleton’s advance. The destruction of Crown Point also eliminated any place that Carleton could winter his troops over to the following spring, so he was compelled to return to Canada.

Because Carleton returned to Canada that fall rather than staying at Crown Point, Lord George Germain, secretary of state for the American Colonies, gave command of the 1777 expedition into central New York to Burgoyne, rather than Sir Guy. Despite the slight by Germain (and Burgoyne’s complicity in getting appointed as campaign commander at the expense of his boss), Carleton pitched in to do what he could to support Burgoyne’s preparations for the mission. Once Burgoyne departed south, however, Carleton’s willingness to provide troop and supply support decreased significantly. Ultimately, Burgoyne’s campaign came to naught due in large part to the lack of adequate supplies for the task at hand.

When he learned that Burgoyne was to lead the campaign, Carleton felt slighted and was distraught that he did not receive the command. He tendered his resignation that fall and in 1778 returned to England, where he continued to work at various government posts. In the aftermath of the 1781 surrender at Yorktown, Carleton was recalled in 1782 to replace Gen. Sir Henry Clinton in New York as commander-in-chief of British forces in North America. Carleton remained in command until the official end of the conflict in 1783 and returned to England in November.

In England, Carleton was appointed governor-in-chief of all provinces in British North America. He was concurrently appointed as governor for Quebec, New Braunschweig, Nova Scotia, and St.
John’s Island (present-day Prince Edward Island). He arrived back in Quebec on 23 October 1786 and served in this post for almost 10 years. On 9 July 1796, Carleton sailed from Canada on his final journey to Britain. He died suddenly on 10 November 1808 at his home at Stubbings House, Burchett’s Green, Berkshire, England.

**Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne.** John Burgoyne Jr. was born in Sutton, Bedfordshire, England on 24 February 1723. Burgoyne began his military career at the age of 15 when he purchased a commission in the Horse Guards Regiment in August 1737. Due to the fancy uniforms he favored and his penchant for gambling and the high life, his soldiers soon referred to him as “Gentleman Johnny.” In 1741, he was forced to sell his commission to satisfy his gambling debts. He was able to recover somewhat by securing a cornet’s commission in April 1745 with the newly raised 1st Royal Dragoons. He would serve in this role during the War of Austrian Succession. With the 1st Dragoons, he was quickly promoted to lieutenant and by year’s end had come up with enough money to purchase a captaincy. With the end of the war in 1748, Burgoyne’s active service came to an end.

Soon in debt again, Burgoyne sold his commission a second time to support himself and his new bride. In June 1756, he obtained another commission—this time as a captain in the 11th Dragoons. Burgoyne served with the dragoons during the Seven Years War until 1758 when he transferred to the Coldstream Guards. With his new regiment, he took part in raids on the French coast, participating in the seizure of Cherbourg and the failed attempt to take St. Malo.

Burgoyne’s next wartime service was in 1762, when he served as a brigadier general in the Anglo-Portuguese forces. He won distinction by leading his cavalry in capturing the towns of Valencia de Alcántara and of Vila Velha de Ródão—returning from Portugal as a successful war hero.

As trouble in the American colonies grew, Burgoyne as well as Generals Howe and Clinton were sent to Massachusetts to assist the governor general, Thomas Gage, with forestalling a rebellion. When he arrived in Boston in May 1775, Burgoyne learned the war had already begun. He participated in the siege of Boston for a time
but was not there when Howe attacked Breed’s Hill. As the junior general present—and frustrated by the lack of opportunity for his skills—he returned to England that fall.

In May 1776, Burgoyne arrived in Canada at the head of British reinforcements sent to help Governor General Sir Guy Carleton break the siege on Quebec by the American Continental Army. Under Carleton, he led forces in the counteroffensive that drove the Continental Army from Quebec Province. Carleton then led the British forces south in an offensive drive down Lake Champlain to Crown Point. Burgoyne was not impressed with Carleton’s efforts. He believed Carleton was too timid, especially as Carleton failed to even attempt the capture of Fort Ticonderoga after winning the naval Battle of Valcour Island in October.

Returning to England on 9 December 1776, Burgoyne persuaded King George III and Lord Germain to let him invade central New York from Canada for the campaign of 1777. He would send the main column south to capture Albany, New York, and a smaller column through Lake Ontario to clear the Mohawk River Valley and link up with him in Albany. From there, Burgoyne could operate under Howe’s command for further operations into New England. The king and secretary liked the daring plan and appointed Burgoyne as commander of the expedition (over Carleton, who was senior to him). They also provided him with additional regiments, including a sizable German contingent from Braunschweig.

Sailing down Lake Champlain in late June, Burgoyne was surprised how easily he captured Fort Ticonderoga. After that initial victory, however, things began to progressively worsen for Gentleman Johnny. He had to slow his campaign’s progress to build a road and move most of his artillery, wagons, and other supplies over a difficult water and land route to Fort Edward. By the end of July, he had his army consolidated at Fort Edward but was now running low on supplies. His army suffered two key defeats in August at Bennington, Vermont, and Fort Schuyler, New York, which reduced his combat forces significantly and failed to improve his worsening supply problems.

Continuing to push south on 10 September, Burgoyne’s army ran into Gates’s American Northern Army dug in at Bemis Heights
near Stillwater, New York. The American army was barring Burgoyne’s way south, so he attempted to move to the west and attack the Americans’ left flank on 19 September. A battle took place at Freeman’s Farm when rebel forces under Benedict Arnold and Daniel Morgan sallied forth from Bemis Heights to attack Burgoyne’s army. Burgoyne’s troops fought heroically (as did the Americans) and drove the Americans off at the end of the day. In doing so, however, Burgoyne’s army suffered heavy manpower losses.

Burgoyne decided to wait for Gen. Henry Clinton to arrive with additional supplies and reinforcements. Clinton did send a column up the Hudson from New York City to wreak havoc and try to draw away some of Gates’ forces facing Burgoyne. It was unrealistic, however, to think that Clinton’s forces could ever effect a junction with Burgoyne. On 3 October 1777, Burgoyne was forced to put his men on reduced rations and four days later he attempted another foray to find the American left flank. The Americans charged forth again, but this time soundly defeated Burgoyne’s professionals. Burgoyne was soon compelled to retreat north to the town of Saratoga, where his army was besieged by the Americans. On 17 October, Burgoyne was forced to surrender his entire army to General Gates and the American Northern Army.

Unlike most of his army, Burgoyne was exchanged in 1778 and returned home to England. There he faced a great deal of criticism about the defeat at Saratoga. He demanded an inquiry in the House of Commons, attempting to defend his actions and decisions. The inquiry largely found in his favor but never really cleared his name. He was deprived of the command of his regiment and the Fort William, Scotland, governorship he had held since 1769.

When his political allies returned to power in 1782, Burgoyne was eventually restored to his rank, given a colonelcy, and made commander-in-chief in Ireland and a privy councilor. He died unexpectedly on 4 August 1792 at his home in Mayfair and is buried in Westminster Abbey.

**Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton.** Henry Clinton was born 16 April 1730 in Newfoundland, Canada. Clinton began his long association with things military when he joined a local militia unit
in 1748. He sailed to England in 1751 and purchased a captain’s commission in the Coldstream Guards. Although he was clearly a competent officer, Clinton rapidly climbed through the ranks through family connections and by purchasing commissions rather than by reputation. By 1758, he was lieutenant colonel of the elite 1st Foot Guards. After the start of the Seven Years War, he was selected to be an aide-de-camp to Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig in 1760. Due to his exemplary performance during that conflict, Clinton was promoted to colonel in 1762 then appointed as colonel of the 12th Regiment of Foot in 1763 after the war ended.

Continuing to climb the ladder, Clinton was promoted to major general on 25 May 1772. In March 1775, he was ordered to go to Boston with Generals Howe and Burgoyne when troubles in the American colonies were coming to a head. Arriving in May, Clinton found that Boston was already under siege by the American rebels. After assessing the situation, he recommended to Gen. Thomas Gage that British troops land behind the rebel army and break the encirclement. Gage rejected his recommendations and on 17 June 1775, Clinton watched as British forces sustained more than 1,000 casualties in frontal attacks against the American positions at Bunker Hill.

Gage returned to England in October for what was to be a temporary visit and Howe replaced him as acting commander-in-chief of British troops in North America. In early 1776, Howe sent Clinton with a 2,500-man force to assess the opportunities for military action in the Carolinas. Initially delayed by stormy weather and problems with acquiring provisions, Clinton’s expedition reached the Cape Fear area on the coast of North Carolina in March. Finding that conditions there were unfavorable for their objectives, Clinton and Admiral Sir Peter Parker decided instead to seize Charleston, South Carolina. That expedition failed when Clinton discovered that his men could not wade across the channel between Long Island and Sullivan’s Island on which Fort Moultrie stood. The fort, safe from ground assault, withstood a naval bombardment in which the American garrison gave better than it received. After a day of the failed bombardment effort, Parker picked up Clinton’s men and sailed away.
The British ships moved Clinton’s expedition force to Staten Island near New York City to link up with other Howe forces who recently moved there from Boston and Halifax, Nova Scotia. After building supplies and a troop strength of 32,000 men, Howe directed Clinton and Cornwallis to cross a 4,000-man advance guard over to Long Island on the morning of 22 August, followed by another 15,000 men and artillery later in the day. Through intelligence acquired from local loyalists and personal reconnaissance of American positions in the area, Clinton developed a plan for a night march and flanking attack against the main American position on Brooklyn Heights. Because of Clinton’s plan and personal leadership on the battlefield, the British troops were victorious during the Battle of Long Island on 27 August. The battle was one in a series that ultimately drove Washington from the city and into Pennsylvania. The victory earned Clinton a knighthood and permanent promotion to lieutenant general.

Despite the recent victories, a great unease developed between Clinton and Howe during 1776. Clinton requested leave and returned to England—largely to petition for Howe’s job. Given a knighthood instead, Clinton returned to New York on 5 July 1777 to reassume his secondary position. He discovered on arrival that Howe planned to sail up Chesapeake Bay to capture the rebel capital at Philadelphia. Aware of Burgoyne’s mission to invade New York to capture Albany, Clinton argued to Howe that cooperating with Burgoyne would achieve more in defeating the rebellion than capturing Philadelphia. Howe disagreed and departed on his mission on 23 July.

While Howe sailed south to march on the rebel capital, he left Clinton with 7,000 men to defend New York. Clinton—needlessly as it turned out—feared that Washington might ignore Howe and attack to seize the city. As Burgoyne’s army moved south, he began sending messages to Clinton requesting his support with an advance up the Hudson River toward Albany. Soon after reinforcements arrived from England in early October, Clinton sent an expeditionary force north up the Hudson to support Burgoyne’s efforts. It was too little too late, however, and Burgoyne was forced to surrender at Saratoga on 17 October.

The defeat at Saratoga created much criticism about Howe’s conduct of the war. He subsequently tendered his resignation. On
21 March 1778, Clinton assumed the role of commander-in-chief of British forces in North America at Philadelphia—with Cornwallis as his second-in-command.

Frustrated by the perceived strength of the rebellion in the north, Clinton shifted his attention to the southern colonies, where he anticipated greater support from loyalists. He dispatched a 3,100-man force under Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell to seize Savannah, Georgia, which Campbell accomplished on 28 December 1778. Clinton’s next plan was to return to Charleston to capture that city and its harbor, then use the facilities to support operations farther up the coast. Due to a dearth of troops, however, Clinton had to bide his time through much of 1779 until enough reinforcements arrived to attempt the venture. In January 1780, Clinton sailed south with almost 14,000 men and arrived before his objective in March. Advancing on the city from James Island, Clinton began a siege of the city on 1 April. After almost six weeks of skirmishing, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, commander of the American Southern Department, surrendered the city on 12 May 1780.

When he learned that a French fleet was en route to New York, Clinton turned over command of the southern troops to Cornwallis and returned to the city. Unfortunately for Clinton (as it was for Howe), his relationship with his second-in-command was strained. Cornwallis did not respect his boss and, given the distance between them, Cornwallis increasingly functioned as an independent commander, especially while Clinton was distracted with Washington’s army at New York. Thus, when Cornwallis failed to effectively neutralize Greene’s Continentals and militia in the Carolinas and eventually became trapped by the combined forces of Washington and Lafayette, Clinton was unable to help extract him from his errors. By the time Clinton was able to send a relief force, Cornwallis had already surrendered to Washington. The disaster led to Clinton’s resignation in March 1782. He was replaced by Lt. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton.

**Maj. Gen. Henry W. Powell.** Henry W. Powell was born in England in 1733. He entered service with the British Army 10 March 1753 as a lieutenant with the 46th Regiment of Foot. Three
and a half years later he was promoted to captain and transferred to the 11th Regiment of Foot (later redesignated as the 64th Regiment of Foot). Powell served with the 64th in the French West Indies during the Seven Years War in 1759 and later served with the regiment in the Americas in 1768. Powell continued to receive promotions in various regiments until 1771, when he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned command of the 53rd Regiment of Foot.

Powell and the 53rd arrived in Canada in May 1776 and participated in Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne’s attacks on, and pursuit of, the American Canada Army which had been besieging Quebec City. On 10 June 1776, Sir Guy Carleton, governor general of Quebec Province, appointed Powell as a temporary brigadier general to take command of his 2nd Brigade.

In the spring of 1777, Burgoyne formed his Army from Canada to conduct his drive down the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route to seize Albany, New York. Burgoyne selected Powell to command his 1st Brigade which consisted, at least initially, of the 9th, 47th, and 53rd Regiments of Foot. Powell was apparently not one of Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne’s favorites. One of Burgoyne’s staff officers described Powell as “not very refined.” Perhaps as a result of that, Burgoyne sent Powell to replace Brig. John I. Hamilton as commander of Fort Ticonderoga, a post which he assumed on 15 August 1777 while the latter went to join Burgoyne at the front. In the switch, Powell’s command was reduced to his own regiment and the Braunschweiger Prinz Friedrich Regiment.

Powell’s command of Fort Ticonderoga was marked by setbacks and ineptitude. On 18 September, the Lake George Landing, Mount Defiance, and Mount Independence installations—all under Powell’s immediate command—were attacked by two 500-man militia forces. At Lake George Landing, Powell’s command lost 118 American prisoners (mostly captured at the Battle of Hubbardton) and a great deal of supplies, including several hundred head of beeves and horses plus about 200 bateau and numerous wheeled carts and carriages that were carried away, burned, or otherwise destroyed. Perhaps most importantly, about 225 of his professional soldiers were captured, a loss he could ill-afford. Additionally, Mounts Defiance and Independence were both captured by the Americans,
and Fort Ticonderoga itself was placed under an ineffectual siege, albeit for only two days. To his credit, Powell steadfastly refused to surrender the fort to Col. John Brown, the commander of the Lake George Landing/Mount Defiance raiding party.

Later, when St. Leger’s force arrived at the fort from the Mohawk Valley on 27 September, Powell refused to send St. Leger south to reinforce Burgoyne. This was no doubt due to his own diminished troop strength as well as the fact that all Powell’s transportation assets were lost during the raid. On 8 November, about three weeks after Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, Powell ordered the abandonment and destruction of Fort Ticonderoga and returned to Canada with his remaining troops.

Later during the war, Powell held commands at Montreal, Fort St. John, Fort Niagara, and Quebec. While stationed at Quebec in 1780, Powell purchased an estate on the banks of the St. Lawrence River, which he named Powell Place. Eventually purchased from his family and renamed Spencer Wood, the property was where the present Government House of the Province of Quebec was built. Powell returned to England after the war and was eventually promoted to lieutenant general on 3 May 1796 and full general on 1 January 1801. He died in July 1814 in Lyme, England.

**Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel.** Friedrich Adolf Riedesel was born 3 June 1738 in the city of Lauterbach in the German state of Hesse. In 1755 at the age of 17, Riedesel enlisted as an ensign in the Marburg Battalion. For his initial assignment, he was posted to England in 1755 near London where his battalion served with the British Army under King George II. Although Riedesel knew no French or English, he learned both during his brief sojourn in England. In 1756, his battalion was recalled to serve in the Seven Years War. Soon Riedesel was transferred to the staff of Ferdinand, Duke of Braunschweig. In that capacity, he distinguished himself at the 1759 Battle of Minden by undertaking numerous missions to carry messages for the duke under dangerous circumstances. Riedesel’s actions also caught the attention of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. After the battle, Riedesel was awarded a captaincy and a transfer to command a Braunschweiger hussar battalion squadron.
In 1761, the Landgrave of Hesse overlooked this remarkable young officer for further promotion and, Riedesel, upset, resigned. Ferdinand realized the error and immediately appointed Riedesel as lieutenant colonel and commander of the Black Hussars Regiment. Two months later, he also appointed Riedesel to command the Bauer Cavalry Regiment. At the age of 23, he commanded what in essence was a cavalry brigade. During May the following year, a French Chasseur shot Riedesel in the chest during a battle. He was sent home to recover from the wound, which was not too serious.

In 1767, Riedesel’s regiments were disbanded at the end of the Seven Year’s War. With no command, the duke transferred him to be the adjutant general of the Braunschweig Army. In 1772, however, he was appointed colonel of a carbineer regiment that soon became known as the Braunschweiger Riedesel Regiment.

In early 1776, Ferdinand signed an agreement with the British to provide 4,000 foot soldiers and 350 heavy dragoons to serve in North America. The duke then appointed Riedesel as the Braunschweig contingent’s commander and promoted him to major general. On 21 March 1776, Riedesel and his new command sailed for Quebec and, after a brief stop in England, they finally reached the city on 1 June. The timely advent enabled Riedesel and his troops to assist Governor General Carleton’s counteroffensive to expel the American rebels’ Canada Army (which had invaded Quebec the previous fall) from the province. Riedesel’s units were assigned to various posts around Quebec Province to conduct defensive operations during the fall and winter of 1776–1777.

In the late spring of 1777, most of Riedesel’s command was selected to accompany General Burgoyne’s incursion into central New York and what has become known as the Saratoga Campaign. Burgoyne appointed Riedesel as commander of the Left Wing in his Army from Canada. Riedesel reorganized his command with two brigades under Brig. Gen. Johann Friedrich Specht and Brig. Gen. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall plus a Reserve Corps under Lt. Col. Heinrich Christoph Breymann. In all, his force made up about half of Burgoyne’s army. Even though these troops were well-trained professionals, both Riedesel and Burgoyne would soon learn that fighting against the American
rebels in the American wilderness was far different than on a European battlefield.

The initial Left Wing operations came in early July 1777 when Riedesel’s units landed on the east bank of Lake Champlain to conduct an assault on Mount Independence located across the lake from Fort Ticonderoga. The jungle and swamp-like terrain caused the German commanders no end of trouble as they tried to maneuver their units for several days through the tangle toward Mount Independence. They never launched an assault because St. Clair, the American commander, ordered the fort and Mount Independence evacuated on the early morning of 6 July—before any major fighting took place.

Burgoyne ordered a pursuit after the retreating rebels. Riedesel and part of his Left Wing would support Brig. Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps in pursuing rebel troops who had taken the land route southeast from Mount Independence toward Castleton, Vermont. On the morning of 7 July 1777, Fraser’s Advance Corps caught up with the rebel rearguard at the village of Hubbardton. Fraser’s disciplined troops, including the elite British light infantry and the expedition’s grenadier companies, had a more difficult time than they expected with the attack. The Americans fought determinedly and were about to gain the upper hand against Fraser’s battle line when Riedesel led his troops into the rebel flank from the north. The surprise move caused the Americans to retreat to an alternate position and allowed the British to take the hill on which the rebels had anchored their line. By noon, the rebels had once again retreated, this time over the mountains and largely out of Fraser’s grasp. Thanks at least in part to Riedesel’s flank attack, the battle was a British victory, albeit a bloody one.

For the next five weeks, Burgoyne’s army was stuck in the vicinity of Skanesborough—struggling to build a road south to Fort Edward and move its artillery and trains via Lake George Landing to the same location. In the meantime, Burgoyne’s command began to run low on supplies. Riedesel suggested that Burgoyne send a raiding column into Vermont to forage for food, horses, and wagons. Initially reluctant, Burgoyne agreed to send out a detachment. Inexplicably, he selected Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum, commander of Riedesel’s Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig, a mounted unit which
possessed no horses. It made sense to send a cavalry commander since his unit desperately needed horses. On the other hand, Baum spoke no English and had absolutely no knowledge of the country in which he was expected to move. Though Riedesel was opposed to this version of the mission, Burgoyne insisted that it go forward. The raid, in short, came to naught at the Battle of Bennington on 16 August. Baum’s force was almost entirely killed or captured. A reinforcing column under Lieutenant Colonel Breymann was also severely defeated by the Americans and lost all its artillery and baggage trains. In one fell swoop, Riedesel’s command was reduced by almost 1,000 men.

Burgoyne finally restarted his move toward Albany on 10 September, arriving a week later near Bemis Heights. There he learned the rebel army’s defensive position south of the village of Saratoga was barring his way south. On 19 September, Burgoyne attempted a turning movement to the west of the defenses but was forced to fight an open field battle when a large contingent of the American forces under Benedict Arnold sallied forth to interdict him. The fight was bloody. Once again, Riedesel and part of his command arrived on the battlefield on the right flank of Arnold’s troops—just in time to help avert defeat for the British army. Riedesel’s role in the follow-on battle at Barber’s Wheatfield on 7 October was less glamorous, but this time, Burgoyne’s army was clearly defeated and driven from the field. As with the British forces, Riedesel’s troops lost heavily in the fighting, including Lieutenant Colonel Breymann who was killed defending his redoubt.

On 17 October at the village of Saratoga, Riedesel and his command surrendered along with the rest of Burgoyne’s Army from Canada to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, commander of the American Northern Army. Riedesel and his wife, who accompanied him on the campaign, were imprisoned initially in Cambridge, Massachusetts. They were later transferred to Charlottesville, Virginia, and subsequently to New York City, where he spent a year on parole before being exchanged for American Gen. Benjamin Lincoln.

Once paroled, Riedesel returned to duty to take charge of troops on Long Island. He held that command for the winter of 1780–1781 until the new governor of Quebec, Gen. Frederick Haldimand,
appointed him as the commander of the Sorel District in Quebec Province. Riedesel held that command until he left North America at the end of summer 1784. He returned to Braunschweig and assumed new duties under Ferdinand, who was by then the duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel. Later he was promoted to lieutenant general then in 1787 was given command of the Braunschweig troops in the southern provinces of Holland. In 1793, he retired from military service but was soon named as commandant for the city of Braunschweig. He remained at this duty until his death there in 1800.

Brig. James I. Hamilton. The early years of James Inglis Hamilton are sketchy. He was born into an aristocratic family in Scotland sometime before 1742 and entered the British army on 28 February 1755. His first duty assignment was at Portsmouth, England, but his stay there was short. His regiment, the 34th Foot, soon departed to serve in the Seven Years War. During that conflict, Hamilton first saw action in June 1756 fighting under the command of Gen. William Blakeney at Minorca Island during the Siege of Fort St. Philip. Unfortunately for Blakeney, 15,000 Frenchmen under the Duke de Richelieu and Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonière sailed to Fort St. Philip and forced the British to surrender on 29 June 1756. The French allowed Hamilton’s regiment to depart the island with their arms.

In June 1758, Hamilton and the 34th Foot participated in the St. Malo raid on the coast of Brittany, France, as part of a British amphibious/naval expedition led by the Duke of Marlborough to seize the town and close the port. Although they dropped the plan to take the town, the raiders destroyed a great deal of shipping and supplies before re-embarking a week later.

In 1761, Hamilton participated in yet another amphibious expedition to capture the French island of Belle Île off the Brittany coast. Led by Gen. Studholme Hodgson, the first British attempt to land was unsuccessful and they lost approximately 500 troops or ten percent of the whole force. With reinforcements, they succeeded in a second attempt on 7 June. After a six-week siege, Hodgson’s troops stormed the island’s main citadel at Le Palais, which effectively gave the British control of the island.
On 17 October 1761, while still a major, Hamilton was appointed as “major commandant” (i.e., colonel) of the recently formed 113th Regiment of Foot. The 113th Foot, however, was not a combat regiment because it served as the depot for sending drafts (i.e., replacements) to other Highland regiments serving overseas. The regiment was disbanded in 1763 and Hamilton was retired on half pay. On 25 May 1772, he became the lieutenant colonel of the 15th Foot, and two years later was given command of the 21st Regiment of Foot.

Hamilton and the 21st Foot were serving in Ireland in 1776 when the regiment received orders to go to Quebec, Canada, which was under siege by the American Canada Army. Sailing from Cork in 1776, the regiment arrived in May and participated in the British counteroffensive to relieve Quebec and drive the Americans from Canada. On 15 September 1776, Hamilton was appointed as the temporary commander of the 1st Brigade of Governor Carleton’s forces when the assigned commander, Brig. William Nesbit, fell ill and soon died. On Nesbit’s death, Hamilton was promoted to brigadier and assigned to command the 2nd Brigade, which consisted of the 34th, 53rd, 62nd, and 20th Regiments of Foot.

Hamilton played a key role in assisting General Burgoyne to prepare his newly formed Army from Canada for a campaign into central New York in the late spring of 1777. For the expedition, he was returned to command the 1st Brigade, now composed of the 9th, 47th, and 53rd Regiments of Foot. After the fall of Fort Ticonderoga, Burgoyne appointed Hamilton to command the fort and manage and secure the army’s lines of communication. He was replaced by Brig. Henry W. Powell on 16 August 1777 and rejoined Burgoyne in the field. There, his brigade assumed additional control of the 62nd Regiment (formerly of Powell’s brigade).

At the Battle of Freeman’s Farm on 19 September 1777, Hamilton commanded about 1,100 men of the center column, which essentially consisted of his four regiments. Hamilton’s troops fought valiantly and held the field at the end of the battle despite sustaining very high casualties (the highest ratio of any in Burgoyne’s command). During the Battle of Bemis Heights or Barber’s Wheatfield almost a month later, Hamilton’s troops were not engaged as heavily as at
the previous fight. The second battle, however, was a clear rout of the British and German forces. Ultimately, Hamilton and his brigade surrendered at Saratoga along with the rest of the Army from Canada on 19 October 1777.

The Convention Army, as Burgoyne’s command then became known, was marched to Cambridge, Massachusetts and arrived on 8 November 1777. Maj. Gen. William Phillips commanded the army until he was exchanged in 1780. Hamilton, the next in line in terms of seniority, assumed command. On 3 September 1781, Hamilton was released by his American captors under the provision that he not return to America until the war was officially over. Though the expedition ended in disaster for Hamilton and his men, Burgoyne later indicated the British leader was “the whole time engaged and acquitted himself with great honor, activity, and good conduct.”

Brig. Simon Fraser. Simon Fraser was born in Invernesshire, Scotland, on 26 May 1729. Rather than the British Army, Fraser’s military career began with the Dutch army. He was in service with the Earl of Drumlanrig’s regiment when he was wounded at the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747. He was then pensioned and joined the British army in 1755 as a lieutenant in the 62nd Royal American Regiment.

Fraser joined the 78th Highland Regiment of Foot during the French and Indian War. His new regiment was sent to Canada, where it participated in the Siege of Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, in June and July 1758. He was soon promoted to captain before taking part in the Battle of Quebec in 1759. He was in Gen. James Wolfe’s boat when it crossed the St Lawrence River and approached the French shore in fog. When French sentries challenged the approach, Fraser responded in fluent French and fooled the guards, enabling the British Army to land and proceed unopposed before ascending to the Plains of Abraham.

After the successful conclusion of that war, now Major Fraser was sent to Braunschweig to serve on the staff of Duke Ferdinand. While there, he no doubt became acquainted with Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, with whom he would serve again in the Saratoga Campaign. Promoted to lieutenant colonel of the
24th Regiment of Foot in 1768, he next served a stint of garrison duty in Gibraltar before being posted to Ireland as aide-de-camp to Gen. Jeffrey Townshend, lord lieutenant of Ireland. In 1770, Townshend appointed Fraser as quartermaster general for the Irish Establishment. When the 24th Foot received orders to go to Canada in 1776, Fraser transferred with his regiment to Quebec, where they arrived in May. Fraser led the 24th in the Battle at Trois Rivieres in June, helping to drive the American Canada Army out of the province. In recognition of his leadership skills, Gen. John Burgoyne promoted Fraser to brigadier general and put him in charge of the Army from Canada’s Advance Corps, which was composed of the army’s elite troops.

At the start of the Saratoga Campaign, Fraser’s Advance Corps was about 1,000 men strong. The corps was composed of the grenadier battalion, the light infantry battalion, and the Company of Marksmen commanded by his nephew Capt. Alexander Fraser. The command also included two companies of Canadian militia, a company of Royal Artillery, and the “Indian Department” of Iroquois warriors, as well as his own 24th Regiment of Foot. The Advance Corps was engaged briefly at Fort Ticonderoga on the day it arrived there.

Following the American retreat from Fort Ticonderoga, Fraser’s corps was dispatched to pursue the rebel ground column headed for Castleton, Vermont. He caught up with the American rearguard at the town of Hubbardton early on the morning of 7 July 1777. During the battle, Fraser sent the grenadier battalion south to cut the rebel retreat route to Castleton while concurrently making several frontal attacks against the main rebel line on what is now called Monument Hill. His corps succeeded in driving off the rearguard in disorder over the mountains but lost a good number of troops in doing so. The casualties were such that Fraser decided to return the Advance Corps and its many wounded to Skenesborough instead of continuing the pursuit.

After employing his troops for more than two weeks in building a road between Fort Anne and Fort Edward, Fraser led the Advance Corps south again until they reached a place called Sword’s Farm on 17 September. Two days later at Freeman’s Farm, he commanded the Army from Canada’s right flank units in an open field battle. Due
to his steady leadership, his men held firm against the attacks of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s Brigade and Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry at the nearby McBride Farm. The battle was a British victory, but General Hamilton’s troops at Freeman’s Farm sustained severe casualties.

After a two-and-a-half week standoff between the Army from Canada and the American Northern Army dug in on Bemis Heights, General Burgoyne sent a reconnaissance in force to the west to find the American left flank on 19 October. Fraser’s Advance Corps was the largest contingent of the reconnaissance and led the movement. As in the previous battle, American forces sortied from their defenses and conducted a meeting engagement with the British troops in Barber’s Wheatfield. This time, the British forces were swept from the field after Fraser was mortally wounded with a rifle shot to the abdomen. He was carried to the Taylor House in the rear of the British lines, where General Riedesel’s wife cared for him until he died that evening. At six o’clock on the evening of the following day, Fraser was buried on a hill within the Great Redoubt.

**Brig. Barry St. Leger.** Barry St. Leger was born in 1733 in County Kildare, Ireland. He joined the British Army in April 1756, serving initially as an ensign in the 28th Regiment of Foot. With that regiment, he served in the French and Indian War under the command of Gen. Jeffrey Amherst and was with Amherst at the siege of Louisbourg in 1758. The following year, the 28th transferred to the command of Gen. James Wolfe then served with him at the Siege of Quebec. For his performance of duties during the war, St. Leger was appointed brigade-major in July 1760 and served as a staff officer for Gen. James Murray in the campaign against Montreal. On 16 September 1762, St. Leger was promoted to permanent major in the 95th Regiment of Foot.

By the time of the American Revolution, St. Leger had advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the 34th Regiment of Foot. He commanded that regiment when it was ordered to Canada in the spring of 1776. After the regiment arrived in May, St. Leger led the 34th against the remnants of the American Canada Army and helped drive the rebels out of Canada.
In 1777, Gen. John Burgoyne selected St. Leger to lead a special mission and temporarily promoted him to the rank of brigadier. St. Leger would lead the western arm of a pincers movement during Burgoyne’s advance into central New York to seize Albany. St. Leger’s command consisted of a mixed force of British regulars, German jägers, Indians, Canadians, Loyalists, and Iroquois. The plan was to move this force up the Saint Lawrence River by boat, through Lake Ontario to Fort Oswego, and from there by foot and bateaux to Fort Schuyler (also commonly referred to as Fort Stanwix). The purpose of the mission was to open the Mohawk River Valley to use it as a line of communication for British troops, deny its use to the Americans, and descend on Albany from the west to link there with Burgoyne’s army.

When he arrived at Fort Schuyler, St. Leger was dismayed to discover that the fort was more strongly defended than spies had led him to believe. With no other choice, he laid siege to the post once his artillery arrived from Oswego. More trouble developed when he was made aware that a strong American militia column was en route from Fort Dayton to reinforce Fort Schuyler and break the siege. St. Leger sent a detachment composed mostly of his Indians and Loyalist troops to stop the column. On 6 August, the detachment ambushed Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer’s Tryon County militia brigade near the village of Oriskany. The battle went poorly for Herkimer’s command, which suffered numerous casualties. Herkimer himself was mortally wounded and his brigade was driven back to Fort Dayton in defeat. The attack at Oriskany, however, created a golden opportunity for the rebel garrison at Fort Schuyler. Some of the soldiers sortied from the fort to raid the Loyalist and Indian camps while they were away fighting Herkimer’s command. This action caused an immediate drop in morale for the Oriskany victors as they now had no supplies, extra clothes, or shelter from the weather. Moreover, the Loyalists and Indians blamed St. Leger for failing to protect their camp while they were gone.

New reports came to St. Leger that another relief column—this one composed of a brigade of Continental regulars under Benedict Arnold—was en route. The reports exaggerated Arnold’s strength, causing St. Leger’s Indian allies to abandon his cause, and St.
Leger felt compelled to abandon the siege as well. On 22 August, he withdrew back to Quebec. From Quebec, St. Leger led the rest of his force down Lake Champlain to Fort Ticonderoga to link up with Burgoyne from that direction. When he arrived at the fort on 27 September, St. Leger found that its commander had lost all his boat and wagon transportation assets to an American raiding party. General Powell no longer possessed the assets to support St. Leger’s move farther south to consolidate with Burgoyne.

After Burgoyne’s surrender in October 1777, St. Leger returned with Powell and his command to Quebec. For the next several years, St. Leger led the British frontier war against the Americans in upper New York then was promoted to colonel in 1780. In August 1781, he personally selected the men to accompany a loyalist-led attempt to kidnap Gen. Philip Schuyler at his home in Albany, but the plot failed. St. Leger was also involved in secret negotiations between Governor Gen. Frederick Haldimand of Quebec and Vermont Republic representatives concerning a proposal to readmit Vermont into the British camp as a separate province. When Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown and it became clear that the United States would win its independence, the negotiations collapsed.

After the revolution, St. Leger briefly remained in command of British forces in Canada until he was forced to resign due to ill health. He died in Quebec in 1789.

**Lt. Col. Heinrich Christoph Breymann.** Heinrich Christoph Breymann was born in 1733 near Wolfenbüttel in Lower Saxony. He was in command of the Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion when it received orders in the winter of 1776 to embark for Canada as part of Major General Riedesel’s command contracted to support the British army there. Sailing from Stade near Hamburg, Breymann and his grenadiers arrived at Quebec in late May 1776. When Burgoyne organized his Army from Canada expedition into northern New York in the spring of 1777, he appointed Breymann commander of the Reserve Corps consisting of his own grenadiers, the Braunschweiger Light Infantry Battalion under Maj. Ferdinand Albrecht von Bärner, the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig under Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum, a Braunschweiger Jäger Company under Captain

When Burgoyne’s army advanced on Fort Ticonderoga in early July 1777, Breymann’s Reserve Corps was put ashore on the east side of Lake Champlain north of Mount Independence. After struggling through jungles and swamps, the Braunschweigers approached the American defenses there, but there was no assault. The rebels instead retreated from Mount Independence on the night of 6 July and marched southeast for Castleton, Vermont. Meanwhile, Breymann’s command moved south to Skenesborough, where it camped for the next several weeks to conduct local security and help build the road to Fort Edward.

On 11 August, a large foraging party under the command of Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum departed Fort Miller on a mission to seize supplies at an American supply depot at Bennington, Vermont. West of Bennington, his column encountered a large militia force under Brig. Gen. John Stark. Due to the unexpected size of the rebel force, Baum sent for reinforcements and on 15 August Breymann led his 650-man reinforcing column toward Baum’s position 24 miles away. Due to the rain and muddy roads, Breymann’s troops were still 16 miles from Baum by the end of the day. Starting forward the next morning, Breymann’s force finally approached Baum’s last-known position in the afternoon, but it was too late. Baum’s command had been destroyed. All 700 men were killed or captured, save a few.

From the few escapees, Breymann learned of Baum’s disaster. Not sure that the seemingly wild tales of calamity were accurate, Breymann continued to move forward but soon ran into stiff resistance followed by concerted attacks by the American militia and Continental troops under Col. Seth Warner. By the time Breymann extracted his force from the fighting that night, he had lost at least another 200 troops killed, wounded, or captured, as well as the two 6-pounder cannon that had accompanied him. Breymann himself had been wounded in the leg.

During 19 September fighting at Freeman’s Field, Breymann’s Reserve Corps was moving with Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps on the far right of the British army. Initially,
Breymann posted his grenadiers on a small rise on the west side of the McBride Farm. Later in the fight, he moved his force south to support Fraser’s grenadiers near the Coulter Farm. There it briefly engaged with Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry and Learned’s Brigade of Continentals. The fighting in that vicinity was inconclusive but at the end of the day, Burgoyne’s troops held the field against the rebel forces.

After the battle at Freeman’s Farm, Breymann’s troops were assigned a sector at the extreme northwest corner of the British army’s defenses. There, Breymann had his men construct a substantial redoubt, large enough to hold about 500 men and two cannon from the Hesse-Hanau artillery. Supporting the redoubt were several cabins which were converted into block houses by Canadian and loyalist troops. On 7 October, Burgoyne sent a reconnaissance in force to find the American left flank at Bemis Heights. A major portion of Breymann’s Reserve Corps accompanied the reconnaissance, leaving only about 200 men to man the redoubt. Breymann, probably still suffering from his leg wound, did not accompany his troops west that morning. He remained with the redoubt and was present there when Learned and Morgan’s troops attacked it after the rout at Barber’s Wheatfield. Breymann was a strict disciplinarian and suffered no indiscipline or faltering from his soldiers. As the rebels attacked, a number of Breymann’s men abandoned their posts because of the force and size of the assaulting regiments. The tough German colonel began to beat some of the men back to their positions with the flat of his sword (by some accounts, he actually sabered them). The fighting at the redoubt was brief and concluded when the American troops swept into it from the south. Breymann was killed, ostensibly by one of his own soldiers desperate to get away.

**Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum.** Friedrich Baum was born near Braunschweig in 1727. During the Seven Years War, Baum served in several engagements as a young officer but received little battlefield command experience as a result. Still, he continued to advance and at some point in the early 1770s was appointed as lieutenant colonel of the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig. In
the winter of 1776, Baum received orders to embark the Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig without its horses at the port of Stade near Hamburg. His regiment had been selected to be part of Major General Riedesel’s command, which had been contracted to support the British army in Canada and would ostensibly receive mounts there. Baum’s regiment sailed in February and, after a brief stopover in England, arrived at Quebec in late May 1776. On arrival, however, Baum discovered there were no horses to be had for cavalry mounts in Quebec. The plan now apparently changed to acquiring mounts from the rebels in New York.

In the spring of 1777, Gen. John Burgoyne began to organize his Army from Canada expedition into northern New York. He assigned the Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig to Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann’s Reserve Corps, a brigade-size element of Riedesel’s “Left Wing” which formed part of Burgoyne’s Army from Canada for the 1777 campaign into central New York. In early July 1777, Baum’s regiment was put ashore along with the rest of Breymann’s Reserve Corps on the east side of Lake Champlain. Its initial objective was Mount Independence, an American defensive position across the lake from Fort Ticonderoga. Before the Reserve Corps could reach the American defenses and prepare to assault, the rebels retreated from Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on the night of 6 July. Meanwhile, Baum moved with the Reserve Corps south to Skenesborough, where it camped for the next several weeks to conduct local security and help build the road to Fort Edward.

Once at Fort Edward in late July, Burgoyne’s army would need to glean food and other supplies from the American countryside to supplement what it was receiving from Canada. When intelligence revealed the presence of an American supply depot at Bennington in Vermont, Burgoyne ordered Baum’s regiment to march there and seize supplies, acquire mounts for his dragoons, and secure loyalist reinforcements for Burgoyne’s army. Baum left Fort Miller on 11 August with more than 700 men en route to Bennington. His force included his own regiment and detachments of the Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, the Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, and the Company of Marksmen under Captain Alexander Fraser from Fraser’s Advance Corps. The force also included two
3-pounder cannon from the Hessen-Hanau Artillery Battery and three diminutive companies of Canadians, loyalists, and Indians.

On 14 August, Baum’s column bumped into a small detachment of militia sent out by General Stark, Bennington’s American commander. The militia unit was guarding a bridge over the Walloomsac River at a place called Sancoick’s Mill. After a brief but stiff skirmish there, the rebels burned the bridge. However, Baum’s troops drove them off and proceeded to repair the structure. Due to the determined resistance of the rebels and the intelligence that there was a force at Bennington that exceeded his own in strength, Baum sent a message to Burgoyne requesting reinforcements. The following day, Burgoyne put a 650-man force on the road under Lieutenant Colonel Breymann.

Meanwhile, late on the 14th, Baum moved forward and seized another bridge over the Walloomsac nearer to Bennington. He observed a nearby high hill and moved his troops there to provide defense for the bridge and a secure place for his command to stay while Baum waited for reinforcements. However, due to his lack of experience as a commander, Baum positioned his forces in such a way that they were too separated and unable to communicate easily. Nor could they adequately support each other by fire. The following day was very rainy, with very light and occasional skirmishing as Stark’s men gathered information on Baum’s defenses. Once again because of his inexperience, Baum allowed a number of locals (or more likely militiamen posing as such) to pass through his position, enabling them to gather intelligence on the German defenses. Moreover, due to the rain, Breymann’s reinforcing column traveled very slowly and was still 16 miles away at the end of the day.

About mid-afternoon on 16 August, Stark led a complex attack against Baum’s position by three separate columns that took the German commander and his troops by surprise. Within about an hour and a half, Stark’s troops had overrun Baum’s main position on the hill and recaptured the bridge. They had also captured most of Baum’s men and killed or wounded the rest after they ran low on ammunition. Baum and a small detachment of dragoons and grenadiers fought their way out of the encirclement on the hill and cut their way downhill close to the river. There the party was once
again decisively engaged by rebel troops. During the brief fighting, Baum was struck in the abdomen by a rebel bullet and mortally wounded. The rebels placed him in a cart and carried Baum to a house about two miles from where he was wounded. After two days of suffering, he passed away on 18 August and was buried near the battlefield on the north bank of the Walloomsac River. The precise spot of his burial is unknown today.
Appendix H—Saratoga Campaign Chronology

1776

4 July  The Second Continental Congress issues the Declaration of Independence.

5 July  Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates appointed to command the Canadian Department and army.

7 July  Canadian Army troops of the failed Canadian expedition arrive at Crown Point.


14 October  American Troops destroy the facilities at Crown Point and retreat south.

4 November  Carleton’s forces depart Crown Point to return to Canada.

30 November  Gen. William Howe writes Lord George Germain a letter proposing that the 1777 campaign consist of a two-pronged operation: a column up the Hudson River to join with Carleton’s Army from Canada and a second prong to attack Boston. A demonstration in New Jersey was to keep Washington occupied in Pennsylvania.


10 December  Burgoyne meets with Germain and the Cabinet.
20 December  Howe writes Germain a letter proposing that the 1777 campaign should be an overland movement to capture Philadelphia. He makes no mention of cooperating with the Army from Canada. With a British force approaching, the Continental Congress departs Philadelphia and moves to Baltimore.

26 December  Gen. George Washington attacks Trenton, New Jersey, and captures about 1,000 Hessian troops.

29 December  After Washington’s successful raid on Trenton, Howe writes Germain again stating his opinion about the need to not only capture Philadelphia but, just as important, to destroy Washington’s army.

1777

3 January  Washington defeats a British force at Princeton, New Jersey—killing, wounding, or capturing about 400 British troops.

6 January  Washington’s forces encamp for the winter at Morristown, New Jersey.

10 January  Howe withdraws his forces from all New Jersey outposts except Brunswick and Perth Amboy and orders them into winter quarters in and around New York City.

14 January  Germain responds to Howe’s 30 November letter and indicates that no course of action has been agreed upon.

28 February  Burgoyne submits his “Thoughts on Conducting the War from the Side of Canada” to Germain. Clinton arrives in England.

3 March  Germain writes Howe and authorizes him to attack and seize Philadelphia.
12 March  The Continental Congress returns from Baltimore and convenes in Philadelphia.

26 March  Germain gives Burgoyne a letter with the final approved plan to give to Carleton. The letter indicates Carleton will remain in Canada while Burgoyne leads the expedition down the Hudson to Albany then eventually operates with Howe. However, Germain sends no such instructions to Howe.

27 March  Burgoyne sails from Portsmouth toward Quebec.

2 April  In a letter to Germain, Howe describes his new plan to go to Philadelphia through Chesapeake Bay by ship rather than overland. He also says he cannot send a detachment up the Hudson to link with Burgoyne since he has insufficient troops. He sends a copy of the letter to Carleton.

6 May  Burgoyne arrives in Quebec.

12 May  Arriving in Montreal, Burgoyne meets with Carleton and presents Germain’s letter regarding the final approved plan to seize Albany, New York. Carleton is informed that Burgoyne will command the main body.

18 May  Germain receives Howe’s 2 April letter. He responds that he approves Howe’s planned movement on Philadelphia and expects that the Philadelphia capture will be completed in time so that Howe can link up with Burgoyne’s Army from Canada. However, a copy of this letter was not sent to Carleton or Burgoyne.

29 May  Washington moves his Continental Army forces from Morristown to positions near Philadelphia to oppose any moves Howe may make on the city.
3 June Burgoyne’s columns march from their assembly point at Chambly, New York, to St. John’s, New York, on the Richelieu River.


12 June St. Clair arrives at Fort Ticonderoga with reinforcements and assumes command.

13 June Burgoyne reviews most of his army at St. John’s then sets sail for Lake Champlain. Two British spies captured at Colchester, New York, provide St. Clair with intelligence that Burgoyne will advance down Lake Chaplain with Albany as his objective.

17 June Maj. Gen. Philip John Schuyler inspects Fort Ticonderoga defenses to assess needs for assistance, troops, and supplies. Fraser’s advance corps arrives at Bouquet River.

18 June Schuyler visits Fort Ticonderoga and is dismayed by the lack of progress toward completing the defenses. Burgoyne’s main body departs from St. John’s.

19 June Burgoyne’s main body arrives at Cumberland Head.

20 June Burgoyne’s main body departs Cumberland Head.

21 June Burgoyne’s main body arrives at Bouquet River (Gilliland Creek). Burgoyne issues his directive to the “Congress of Indians.”

22 June Burgoyne issues his proclamation at Bouquet River to colonists threatening that he will turn loose his Indians.
23 June  St. Leger departs Montreal for the Mohawk Valley. Sergeant Heath delivers a report to Schuyler regarding British ships at Otter Creek and the British camp at Bouquet River.

23–29 June  Storms prevent further movement south by Burgoyne’s main body.

24 June  Brig. Simon Fraser’s advanced corps departs Bouquet River.

26–27 June  Fraser’s advanced corps arrives at Crown Point.

30 June  Burgoyne’s main body departs Bouquet River then arrives at Crown Point.

1 July  Burgoyne lands his army three miles north of Fort Ticonderoga. Fraser heads west with the Advanced Corps to envelope the fort from the west. Germans cross to the east bank toward Mount Independence in a pincers movement. The main body heads down the river road.

2 July  Fraser makes initial gains against the “French Defenses” northwest of the fort.

3 July  Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel’s Brunswick troops struggle through the forest to approach Mount Independence.

4 July  Col. Seth Warner arrives at the fort with 700 additional troops. St. Clair orders a feu de joie to celebrate the 4th of July.

5 July  British troops pull guns up to Mount Defiance that will make defending Fort Ticonderoga all but impossible. St. Clair orders a retreat from the fort. Clinton arrives at New York from England.
and takes command of the garrison. He learns that Howe has no intention of supporting Burgoyne in New York.

6 July The American garrison withdraws from Fort Ticonderoga during the early morning, then British rear guard attacks it at Skenesborough. Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton confronts Howe about Howe’s refusal to assist Burgoyne. No resolution regarding assistance for the Army from Canada.

7 July Battle of Hubbardton (Warner versus Fraser and Riedesel). Schuyler moves troops to Fort Edward in hopes of linking up with St. Clair. Burgoyne moves his headquarters to Skenesborough.


9 July St. Clair’s column arrives at Dorset, Vermont. Fraser’s command arrives back at Skenesborough from Hubbardton.

10 July Burgoyne orders the trail between Fort Anne and Fort Edward to be improved in order to move his infantry to Fort Edward. All baggage and artillery trains are to be sent back to the portage between Fort Ticonderoga and Lake George then floated down to Fort Edward on bateaux. Concurrently Burgoyne sends a letter to Carleton appealing for more horses and wagons.


14 July Schuyler abandons Fort Edward and moves his forces to Moses Kill.
17 July  500 Indians arrive at Skenesborough to join Burgoyne’s Army. Howe writes Burgoyne that he is headed for Philadelphia, not Albany.


25 July  St. Leger and his main body arrive at Oswego. Much of Burgoyne’s army moves to Fort Anne.

26 July  St. Leger, with about 2,000 troops start from Oswego headed for Fort Schuyler in the Mohawk River Valley.

27 July  Burgoyne’s forces complete reconstruction/improvement of the road to Fort Edward. Jane McCrae murdered en route to Fort Anne.


29 July  Burgoyne’s army departs Fort Anne and arrives at Fort Edward.


2 August  St. Leger’s column arrives before Fort Schuyler.

3 August  Schuyler and the Headquarters, Northern Army arrive at Stillwater (Headquarters, Northern Department remained at Albany). About this time,
Lincoln departs Stillwater for Manchester to help organize New England militia forces in Vermont and bring them back to join the Northern Army. At Fort Schuyler, Col. Peter Gansevoort refuses St. Leger’s terms of surrender and St. Leger begins siege operations. At Fort Edward, Burgoyne receives Howe’s 17 July letter that informs him Howe is headed for Philadelphia, not Albany.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>6 August</td>
<td>Schuyler and Headquarters, Northern Army depart Stillwater for Van Schaik’s Island. Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer’s relief column to Fort Schuyler is attacked at Oriskany. Gansevoort’s men sally from Fort Schuyler then attack and loot St. Leger’s Loyalist camp.</td>
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<td>7 August</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. John Stark arrives at Manchester, refuses to cooperate with Lincoln.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>Schuyler with Headquarters, Northern Army and about 4,000 troops arrive at Van Schaik’s Island and begin building fortifications. Stark departs for Bennington.</td>
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<td>9 August</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum’s main body for the foraging expedition to Bennington departs Fort Edward for Fort Miller.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 August</td>
<td>Schuyler is relieved from command of the Northern Department and Gates appointed in his stead. St. Clair is also relieved. Schuyler sends Arnold with a brigade to relieve Fort Schuyler.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 August</td>
<td>Baum’s foraging expedition to Bennington departs from Fort Miller. Col. Jeduthan Baldwin and a work detail of artificers begin gathering lumber and other construction materials at Stillwater. These items will later be used to construct the American lines at Bemis Heights.</td>
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15 August  

16 August  
Battle of Bennington.

19 August  
Gates arrives at Van Schaik’s Island to take command of the Northern Department and Northern Army from Schuyler.

20 August  
Burgoyne writes Germain to apprise him of the Army from Canada’s situation.

22 August  
Siege of Fort Schuyler ends as a relief column under Arnold approaches the fort. St. Leger retreats and heads for Fort Ticonderoga via Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain.

23 August  
Arnold heads back from Fort Schuyler to rejoin Gates at Van Schaik’s Island.

25 August  
Howe debarks at Head of Elk, Maryland, and heads overland toward Philadelphia.

28 August  
Burgoyne learns that St. Leger was forced to lift the siege at Fort Schuyler.

30 August  
Howe receives Germain’s 18 May letter indicating Howe is supposed to link up with Burgoyne in Albany. Howe responds to Germain that he will not be able to accomplish that mission.

31 August  
Arnold with Learned’s Brigade and Col. Dan Morgan’s riflemen arrive at Van Schaik’s Island.

1 September  
Gates and Lincoln meet at Van Schaik’s Island and plan the Pawlet Expedition. Lincoln has orders to divide, divert and harass the enemy. Hundreds of Burgoyne’s Iroquois allies leave for home.
8 September Gates advances the Northern Army from Van Schaik’s Island to Stillwater. He now has more than 10,000 troops in the Albany area. Lincoln arrives at Pawlet from Bennington.

10 September Burgoyne’s Army moves south from Fort Edward. Forts George and Anne are abandoned. Burgoyne moves to Batten Kill and begins building a bridge to the west side of the Hudson River.

11 September Washington’s army defeats Howe along Brandywine Creek in Pennsylvania.


13 September Burgoyne’s army begins crossing to the west bank of the Hudson at Batten Kill on a makeshift pontoon bridge.

15 September After the army finishes crossing at Batten Kill, Burgoyne orders the bridge pulled up to cut communications with Fort Ticonderoga. About 150 mostly Oneida Indians arrive at Bemis Heights to be employed with scouting the British lines for the Northern Army.

17 September Burgoyne’s Army arrives at Sword’s Farm/House.

18 September American detachments conduct a raid near Fort Ticonderoga and capture about 300 of Burgoyne’s troops in an attack on the British line of communications. They also recover about 118 American prisoners of war. Stark’s Brigade arrives on the east side of the Hudson near Bemis Heights.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>19 September</td>
<td>Battle of Freeman’s Farm.</td>
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<td>21 September</td>
<td>Lincoln departs Pawlet to return to Stillwater in response to Gates’ summons. Burgoyne receives a letter from Clinton offering to send a column of 2,000 men into the Highlands to help distract Gates and draw away some of Gates’ forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 September</td>
<td>Howe captures Philadelphia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26–7 September</td>
<td>Pawlet Expedition troops return to Pawlet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>St. Leger’s column arrives at Fort Ticonderoga following the failed Mohawk Valley Expedition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>Burgoyne orders troop food rations cut by one-third. Clinton and 3,000 British, German, and loyalist troops depart New York City en route to the Highlands.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 October</td>
<td>Clinton captures Forts Clinton and Montgomery, which guard the entrance to the Hudson River passage through the Highlands. This diversionary move by Clinton is intended to relieve pressure on Burgoyne’s advance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>Battle of Bemis Heights (also known as Barber’s Wheatfield and 2nd Saratoga). Brig. Gen. Joseph Bayley deploys 2,000 militiamen across Burgoyne’s line of retreat just north of Fort Edward.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>Burgoyne begins retreat toward Fort Edward. Clinton captures and destroys patriot fortifications on Constitution Island opposite West Point, New York.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 October</td>
<td>Americans block Burgoyne’s line of retreat at Fish Kill. Burgoyne digs in.</td>
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</table>
11 October  Abortive American attack against Burgoyne’s defenses at Saratoga.

12 October  Sutherland begins movement toward Fort Edward. Burgoyne makes the decision to retreat, then countermands the order and orders Sutherland to return. The British Army is surrounded.

13 October  Burgoyne holds a council of war then drafts initial surrender document.

14 October  Burgoyne begins surrender negotiations with Gates.

16 October  Part of Clinton’s force attacks and burns Esopus (Kingston), New York. Clinton’s actions, while failing to extricate Burgoyne and his army, help persuade Gates to grant Burgoyne liberal terms of surrender.

17 October  Burgoyne surrenders his army. The British Army from Canada stacks its arms at the Field of Grounded Arms at Saratoga and begins its march into captivity.

6 November  The Convention Army arrives at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

8 November  Powell destroys Fort Ticonderoga and retreats toward Canada.

1778

6 February  France signs the agreement to enter the war on the side of the Americans.
Appendix I—Glossary of Terms

The Revolutionary War era was rife with many military terms which are no longer in use today or have changed somewhat in meaning. This glossary of terms is provided to give the staff ride participant a better understanding of the military tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Saratoga Campaign.

Abatis – A defense formed by placing felled trees lengthwise, one over the other, with the branches pointing toward the enemy.

Aide-de-camp – A confidential ex-officio officer that general officers appointed to their staffs. An aide-de-camp reported directly to his commander and took orders only from him. In this position of great responsibility, an aide would write orders; personally deliver them if necessary; and be thoroughly knowledgeable about troop positions, maneuvers, columns, routes, and officer quarters locations.

Bastion – A pointed projecting part of a fortification thrust out from the face of the main line or at an angle at its corners.

Bateaux – A shallow-draft, flat-bottomed riverboat generally used in eastern and central North America to transport trade goods and people. Most could carry 30 to 40 soldiers with equipment, but sizes varied.

Battalion – This basic tactical unit of 18th century warfare consisted of eight platoons and usually was commanded in combat by a lieutenant colonel. In both the British and Continental Armies, most regiments possessed only a single battalion, so the terms battalion and regiment were virtually synonymous. In the French Army, a regiment normally had two battalions.

Berm – The narrow space between the ditch and the base of the parapet of a fortification.

Bivouac – A sleep or rest area in the open, i.e., without tents.
**Bombardier** – An artillery rank given to privates who specialized in handling ammunition and firing mortars. During times of hazardous duty, bombardiers merited extra pay.

**Breastworks** – a hastily constructed barricade made of wood, stones, and dirt usually about breast high that shielded defenders from enemy fire.

**Case Shot** – Properly, case shot refers to all forms of grape, canister, or spherical case shot. This type of artillery round purposely breaks apart on firing and is used as an anti-ship (grape) or antipersonnel (canister) round. Depending on the cannon, its effective range was 500 to 1,500 yards.

**Chevaux-de-frise** – In army usage, a chevaux-de-frise was a portable barrier of spikes, sword blades, etc., used to obstruct the passage of cavalry. In naval usage, the term refers to a framework of heavy timbers fitted with iron spikes on top that were sunk into a channel to prevent the passage of ships.

**Commissary** – A staff officer who is appointed with specific powers by the general-in-chief of a field army. This individual typically has some form of logistical responsibility such a food, supplies, or clothing. However, the title can be for someone with other duties such as mustering new troops into the army.

**Corduroy** – A type of road made by placing logs or planks perpendicular to the direction of the road over a low or swampy area. Sand or gravel can be thrown over the surface to improve mobility. Used to improve impassable mud or dirt roads, the end result was still very rough under the best of conditions, and the shifting logs posed a hazard to horses and marching soldiers.

**Cornet** – Originally the third and lowest grade of commissioned officer in a British cavalry troop after captain and lieutenant. The rank—equivalent to today’s second lieutenant—was largely abolished in 1871.
Curtain – The part of a fortification’s wall that connects its bastions.

Embrasure – An opening in a parapet that permits the firing of a gun.

Enfilade – To fire along the length rather than the face of an enemy position or line. Enfilading an enemy allows a varying range of fire to find targets while minimizing the amount of fire the enemy can return.

Ensign – A military rank normally associated with naval forces (it can also refer to a naval flag). The British Army and American Continental and militia units used the term to refer to the junior officer in a company. This could also indicate a temporary rank for a junior officer who was waiting for an authorized lieutenant position to become available.

Envelopment – The object of this offensive tactic—directed against a flank of a fixed position—was to pour an enfilading fire along the enemy’s line. A double envelopment, usually a risky operation, involved a simultaneous attack against both flanks. A similar though longer-range operation was known as a Turning Movement, or Strategic Envelopment. The offensive was directed not against the enemy position itself but toward a point in its rear, compelling the enemy to leave his works and defend that point, making him more vulnerable.

Fascine – A long cylindrical bundle of brushwood or the like, firmly bound together, used to fill ditches, construct batteries, etc.

Fraise – A palisade of pointed timbers planted in an upward slanting position.

Gabion – A cylindrical wicker basket open at both ends to be filled with earth and stones and used in fortifying a position or erecting a battery.
**Gunner** – The term used for an artillery private responsible for loading and aiming the piece. He received higher pay than a matross.

**Kill** – This term refers to a creek and comes from the Middle Dutch “kille,” meaning “riverbed” or “water channel.” The term is commonly used in areas of Dutch influence in the Delaware and Hudson Valleys.

**Matross** – The term used for an artillery private who performed semi-skilled tasks related to firing a cannon, such as manhandling the piece into position and carrying ammunition forward.

**Mortar** – The barrel length of a mortar was smaller than a cannon, but its bore diameter was larger. Normally mounted on a flat bed, a mortar resembled a large block of wood. An elevating wedge raised the barrel, enabling the mortar to fire an exploding shell or “bomb” in a high trajectory. Fired properly, the bomb would fly over earthworks and explode while still airborne, raining shrapnel over the enemy.

**Parapet** – The wall of a fortification.

**Pioneer** – Troops responsible for repairing roads and occasionally preparing fortifications.

**Redoubt** – An independent earthwork that was usually square or polygonal and most of the time completely enclosed.

**Salient** – A salient is an area of a defensive line or fortification that protrudes beyond the main works. In the Revolutionary War, this area extended closest to an enemy’s position and usually invited an attack. Generals erected salients primarily to cover dominating ground beyond their entrenchments.

**Sally Port** – An opening in a fortification for the passage of troops.

**Sap** – A covered trench or tunnel for approaching or undermining a fortification.
Sapper – Special troops who dug the most exposed part of entrenchments ("saps") during sieges.

Skirmish – Of the various terms applied to Revolutionary War military actions, “skirmish” denoted a clash of the smallest scope. In general, a skirmish was limited combat involving troops other than those of the main body. When the latter participated, the fight was known as an engagement, affair, or battle, depending on its scale. More specifically, a skirmish denoted an encounter between opposing skirmish lines, composed of troops assigned to protect the front and/or flanks of a deployed unit.

Traverse – A barrier thrown across an approach to a fortification, usually from the flank, or across its interior to cut off a part.

Works – In military usage, standard terminology for fortifications.
Appendix J—Campaign and Battle Maps

The maps in this appendix serve two major purposes. First, the maps should aid the staff ride leader in following the unit movements while reading the text. Second, the maps will help the staff ride leader to prepare visual aids to use during the field phase of the staff ride. It is recommended that in making visual aids from the maps, the staff ride leader expand the maps to about twenty by thirty inches, mount the maps, and cover the maps with plastic or acetate to waterproof them.

The maps are generally in chronological order grouped into two sections for Day 1 and Day 2.
Map 30. Territorial Departments 1777.
Map 32. Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves Jun–Aug 1777.
Map 33. Siege of Fort Ticonderoga 1–6 Jul 1777.
Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–12 July 1777

Map 34. Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–12 Jul 1777.
Map 35. Battle of Hubbardton 7 Jul 1777.
Map 36. Saratoga Campaign Movements 12–30 Jul 1777.
Gates assumes command of the Northern Army from Schuyler at Van Schaik’s Island 19 August

Schuyler arrives at Stillwater 3 August; departs for Van Schaik’s Island 6 August

Schuyler retreats to Stillwater 30 July

Baum departs Fort Miller 11 August

Saratoga Campaign Movements
30 July–31 August 1777

Siege of Fort Schuyler
2–23 August 1777

Map 40. Battle of Bennington Baum’s Heights 16 Aug 1777.
Map 41. Battle of Bennington Breymann’s Defeat 16 Aug 1777.
Map 42. Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–26 Sep 1777.
Battle of Freeman’s Farm
19 September 1777
First Contact 1300

Map 43. Battle of Freeman’s Farm First Contact 19 Sep 1777.
Map 44. Battle of Freeman’s Farm 1300–1500 19 Sep 1777.
Map 45. Battle of Freeman’s Farm 1500–1700 19 Sep 1777.
5 Oct: Clinton lands a force at Verplanck's Point to feint Putnam out of position.

5 Oct: Putnam retreats north & northeast.

6 Oct: Clinton lands 2,100 men at Stoney Point 0600.

6 Oct: Forts Clinton & Montgomery are captured at dusk.

6 Oct: Naval gunfire supports attacks.

Night of 5–6 Oct: Naval demonstration off Peekskill.

5 Oct: Clinton lands a force at Verplanck's Point to feint Putnam out of position.

Map 46. Clinton’s Highland Campaign 5–6 Oct 1777.
British & German Forces withdraw to the Great Redoubt 7–8 October evening

Learned’s brigade overruns Breymann’s redoubt

Poor’s Brigade is repulsed at Balcarres redoubt

Map 50. Fighting at the Redoubts 7 Oct 1777.
Map 51. British Defenses at Saratoga.
Bibliography

The following bibliography is not meant to be comprehensive. Instead, it is intended to provide a list of sources consulted in preparing this handbook and a list of sources to aid the staff ride leader with research, augment the information in this handbook, and assist in the preparation of the staff ride.

**Campaign and Battle Studies.** These books generally cover the Saratoga Campaign or one of the individual battles or other actions which took place during the campaign. They also cover other campaigns or actions leading up to Saratoga that had a direct bearing on the conduct of the campaign.


**US Army Organizational and Branch Histories.** These books cover the creation and organization of the Continental Army, one of its branches, or various aspects of how the army operated during the Revolutionary War.


**British Army Histories.** The books cover the organization and operations of the British Army, or various aspects of how that army operated during the Revolutionary War.


**Other Sources.** This book provides excellent information which does not fit into the categories above.

About the Author

Lt. Col. Steven E. Clay was commissioned in the US Army in June 1979 from North Georgia College. He was assigned to the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth as an assistant professor and as the executive officer from 1997 to 2001. Then after a year’s tour in South Korea, he returned to CSI in 2002 as the chief of the Staff Ride Team. After a 27-year US Army career, Clay retired in September 2006 then continued to serve the US Army as team chief of CSI’s Contemporary Operations Study Team. As such, he and his team were charged with researching, documenting, and writing the history of US Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2002, Clay has authored or co-authored 15 manuscripts for the US Army, many of which detail the operations of US Army organizations in those two conflicts. Independently, he has authored a number of other books and articles, including Blood and Sacrifice: The History of the 16th Infantry Regiment from the Civil War through the Gulf War and the four-volume reference set, US Army Order of Battle 1919–1941. The latter work was selected for the Society of Military History’s 2012 Distinguished Book Award. He currently serves as the contractor team lead and as a staff ride instructor for the Staff Ride Team at CSI.