**Instructors Notes for the Ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company 23 March 2003**



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Ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company 23 March 2003

Stand List

1. The Plan and Preparation

2. Convoy Movement to Attack Position Lizard

3. Movement from Attack Position Lizard to the outskirts of Nasiriyah

4. Movement through Nasiriyah and the Decision to Turn Around

5. Final Movement through Nasiriyah

Integration

**Stand 1: The Plan and Preparation**

**Directions:**

Refer to the 507th Maintenance VSR Operators Instructions, beginning with the start view of Nasiriyah.

**Visuals:**

Slide 1: Cover slide

Slide 2: Agenda

Visual 3: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Concept of the Operation

Visual 4: Movement Concept to OBJ Rams

Visual 5: OIF TIMELINE

**Orientation:**

1. Have Operator Instruction slide 1: Beginning view for 507th Maintenance up on the terrain computer.
2. Slide 1: Cover slide Slide 1 is a cover slide for staff ride team lead introduction
3. Slide 2: Agenda Slide 2 covers the agenda of the staff ride, and is a list of stands dividing up the material of the staff ride.
4. Visual 3: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Concept of the Operationst
   1. OIF Mission: Effect Regime change in Iraq by seizing Baghdad and Tikrit, if necessary, to establishe a free, democratic, prosperous, and nonthreatening Iraqi state (*On Point*, 86).
   2. For the 2003 invasion, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq had been divided into two areas of operation:
   3. Western Half: Army V Corps
   4. Eastern Half: 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) which included the 1st UK Armored Division
   5. The plan called for an attack along two axis from Kuwait into Iraq. The 1st MEF’s initial objective was to seize the oil fields to the west of Al Basrah, while also creating an avenue of advance for the 1st UK AR Division to seize Al Basrah.
   6. The 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) of the V Corps and 1st Marine Division (1MARDIV) of the 1st MEF would then conduct rapid movements to the northwest and seize intermediate objectives just short of Baghdad.
   7. The V Corps was the Main Effort and rapidly moved toward Baghdad through the western deserts.
   8. The 1st MEF was to be the supporting effort and draw forces away from the V Corps by attacking up the more populated and fertile area between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.
   9. However, due to the difficult/marshy terrain to the north of the 1MARDIV initial objective, they were to move directly west into the V Corps AO, then back into their own area via two crossing points across the Euphrates River in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah. An Nasiriyah is in the I MEF AO.
   10. After the long drive through the country, V Corps and 1st MEF would consolidate and establish supply bases in preparation for a final attack into the Iraqi capital. The 3ID would attack from the west and the 1MARDIV would attack from the East.
   11. The 507th Maintenance Company was initially positioned at Camp Virginia and tasked to support (repair and maintain) the vehicles and equipment of the 5th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment (Patriot). 5-52 ADA was OPCON to V Corps which supported CENTCOM.
   12. V Corps planned to displace Patriot units north to expand ADA coverage as the corps advanced to Baghdad.
   13. Objective RAMS was the designated area where the corps would refuel, rearm, and refit for the final advance on Baghdad.

**Description:**

1. Visual 4: Movement Concept to OBJ Rams
   1. The 507th Maint Co was ordered to move to OBJ RAMS under the tactical control (TACON) of the 3rd FSB (which supported the 1st BCT, 3 ID).
   2. The designated route was to pass through intermediate attack positions DAWSON, BULL, and LIZARD to ROUTE BLUE (Highway 8) to ROUTE JACKSON (Highway 1), then back on ROUTE BLUE. This would bypass An Nasiriyah.
   3. A Traffic Control Point (TCP) would direct convoys from BLUE to JACKSON where the two highways crossed.
   4. The 507th Maint Co was last in the order of march in a column of over 600 vehicles.
   5. OBJ RAMS was over 350 km (over 217 miles) from Camp Virginia.
   6. The Movement Order (It is unknown when it was issued):
      1. The FSB S3 handed CPT Troy King, the commander of the 507th, a CD-ROM of the orders brief and route information with annotated large-scale maps **Instructors notes:** It’s unknown when exactly the movement order was issued, if their were hard copy maps, or what was on them. Note that the map in the 15-6 is a 1:50,000 scale map.
      2. CPT King did not attend an orders brief or participate in any backbriefs or rehearsals. It is unkown if the FSB held any.
      3. The unit had 1:100,000 maps of the area of operation (the theater standard) and civilian GPS (Garmin etrex).
   7. The 507 Maint Co arrived in Kuwait from Fort Bliss on 20 Feb with a unit strength of 82 personnel.
   8. 22 Feb – 20 March: prepared for its mission at Camp Virginia:
      1. Weapons qualification: individual and crew-served wpns, tactical communications, land navigation, NBC, First Aid
      2. Equipment maintenance
      3. Training on ROE
      4. Unit Rehearsals: movement, react to contact/ambush
      5. Issue of Class V basic load (210 rds of 5.56; 1000 rds of 5.56 linked per M249 SAW; 45 rounds of 9mm) and unspecified amount of .50 cal and 40mm linked for crew-served weapons
2. Visual 5: OIF TIMELINE
   1. D-Day to D+1. All major ground forces prepared for combat while deep air strikes began (aimed at command/control), ‘Shock and Awe’.
   2. The ground war began on the night of 20/21 March, earlier than planned due to a perceived threat to the oil fields in Southern Iraq.
   3. According to plan, 1MARDIV seized the Rumaylah Oil fields on 21 March while the 3ID seized the Tallil air base just Southwest of Al Nasiriyah.
   4. While the 3rd ID moved to the northwest and attacked to As Samawah, TF Tarawa of the 1st MEF moved to seize An Nasiriyah.
   5. However, before the TF Tarawa could begin its attack on Nasiriyah, the 507th Maint Co had strayed into the city. We will now examine the details as to how this chain of events occurred.

**Analysis:**

1. Culturally, how did maintenance units view combat movement prior to the invasion of Iraq?
   1. How well trained were they to conduct movement in a contested environment?
   2. "No support battalion commander was ever going to be relieved if he or she didn't conduct a training event. They would get relieved if they didn't provide adequate support to the combat commander." Anonymous staff officer
   3. Where to separate companies and logistics unit fall in the priority of in theater training?
2. Did the invasion plan adequately address communications and logistical along the length of the planned invasion route?
   1. Impact of the success of the campaign: Was the operation too fast for the proper operation of the LOCs. Should LOCs ever dictate the movement of maneuver forces?
   2. Corps and Division Planners – could the plan have been altered to prevent this occurrence? (Were the rear units too close to an unsecure area, especially with the lack of a robust communications net).
3. How well do units contingency plan for starting earlier than the planned date/time?

**Stand 2: Convoy Movement to Attack Position Lizard**

**Directions:**

Operator Instruction slide 1: Beginning view for 507th Maintenance

**Visuals:**

Visual 6: Convoy Movement

Visual 7: 507th Maintenance Convoy Serial 2

**Orientation:**

N/A

**Dscription:**

1. Visual 6: Convoy Movement
   1. 507th movement from Virginia to Dawson.
   2. Departed Camp Virginia at about 1400 on 20 March with 64 soldiers and 33 Vehicles. (The other 18 soldiers of the company, maint contact team and medics, were attached to other units).
   3. Arrived at Attack Position Dawson at 2100, 20 March (7-hour movement).
   4. At Dawson they refueled, serviced their vehicles, and ate. Most of the soldiers were able to get some sleep in the 10 hours spent at this location.
   5. Movement from Dawson to Link-up w/ 3d FSB at the Line of Departure, to Attack Position Bull
   6. Departed Attack Position Dawson at 0700, 21 March (17 hours into the mission) for the 35 kilometer movement to Bull.
   7. Linked up with 3 FSB at the LD (the Kuwait/Iraq border) and crossed into Iraq at 1000, 21 March.
   8. Arrived Attack Position Bull at 1200, 21 March (5-hour movement, 22 hours into the mission).
   9. Commanders coordinated, but what exactly was discussed is not explained in the 15-6.
   10. Movement from Bull to Lizard.
   11. The company stayed at Bull for 6 hours.
   12. It departed Attack Position Bull at 1800 on 21 March (28 hours into the mission).
   13. Attack Position Lizard was 80 kilometers to the northwest.
   14. En route, the Company began to fragment into two separate groups, or serials. There were several reasons:
       1. Mechanical breakdowns
       2. Heavy wheeled vehicles bogged down in the sand.
       3. Confusion in the darkness (even though the unit was operating in service drive)
   15. The second half of the movement to Lizard.
       1. CPT King led the first group of the vehicles that could keep up with the movement of the 3 FSB.
       2. This group reached Lizard at 0530, 22 March (6.5-hour movement, over night; 34.5 hours into the mission).
       3. 1SG Dowdy led serial two. He recovered all the vehicles that were experiencing problems, to include one from the 3d FSB, and led them to Lizard.
       4. This movement took the the rest of the night and most of the next day.
       5. Group 2 finally arrived at Lizard at 1600 on 22 March, 22-hours after leaving Bull (50 hours into the mission).
   16. CPT King’s decision point at Attack Position Lizard
       1. While awaiting the arrival of serial 2, King informed the commander of 5-52 ADA (LTC Joseph Fischetti) of his situation, who acknowledged the report.
       2. King consulted with the 3 FSB staff, but it is unclear exactly who on the staff he spoke to.
       3. King reported his unit status and confirmed that the overall situation and route was unchanged
       4. The 3 FSB confirmed that the convoy departure time from Lizard remain unchanged at 1400 on 22 March.
       5. King put his XO, LT Jeff Shearin, in charge of Serial 1, which was to move with the 3 FSB as scheduled.
       6. Serial 1 was composed of 32 Soldiers and 17 vehicles
       7. After an 8.5 hour halt at Lizard it departed on time at 1400, 22 March (43 hours into the mission).
       8. CPT King remained at Attack Position Lizard and awaited the arrival of Serial 2. When 1SG Dowdy arrived (at 1600 on 22 March), he had 17 total vehicles, two of which were being towed.
   17. During the night, 1SG Dowdy appropriated a 3d FSB 10-ton wrecker that had been separated from the main column while it was recovering stuck fuel trucks. This wrecker was now towing a disabled 507th 5-ton truck.
   18. King organized Serial 2 into a new march unit (now 18 vehicles, including his HMMWV) and departed Lizard at 1930, 22 March.
   19. The Soldiers in Serial 2 only had a 3.5 hour halt at Lizard, after moving for 22 hours. They were now 53.5 hours into the mission and on their second straight night movement.
   20. CPT King was unable to communicate with 3 FSB at this point, and decided to take a straight line azimuth from Lizard to Hwy 8 (Route Blue) in an attempt to catch up.
   21. The terrain over this straight path was far more difficult than expected and it took Serial 2 five hours to reach Hwy 8, about 15 kilometers away, at about 0030, 23 March.
2. Visual 7: 507th Maintenance Convoy Serial 2
   1. Review the composition of the convoy: 16 vehicles and 2 under tow. Note that eight of the vehicles are tractor-trailers – making any U-turns very difficult for the Serial. Also, acceleration and top speed of these vehicles varied.
   2. 5 x SINCGARS Radios. All vehicles had commercial hand-held radios, but all had run out of batteries. Communications beyond these 5 vehicles had to be accomplished by shouting or hand signals.
   3. 6 x GPS (Civilian type – Garmin, ETREX VISTA). These GPSs gave the leaders display arrows that indicated direction and distance to the next waypoint, not necessarily following the roads. CPT King relied on this device to navigate.
   4. 1 x M2 .50 Cal Machine Gun

**Analysis:**

1. Does the composition of Serial #2 raise concerns about the units ability to defend itself?
   1. Vehicle Radios
   2. GPS reliance
   3. Weapons - only one heavy MG
2. Does a/your unit’s Modified Table of Organization & Equipment appropriately address your anticipated combat mission?

**Stand 3: Movement from Attack Position Lizard to the outskirts of Nasiriyah**

**Directions:**

Operator Instruction slide 1: Beginning view for 507th Maintenance.

**Visuals:**

Visual 8: The Missed Turns: TCP 1

Visual 9: The Missed Turns: Nasiriyah

**Orientation:**

1. Nasiriyah is flanked by the Euphrates River to the South and a series of manmade canals (Saddam Canal) to the north.
2. The buildings are no larger than 4-5 stories high, with many narrow streets and alleyways. Building construction is rebar concrete for the load bearing pillars with the walls made of soft brick covered in plaster.
3. The areas surrounding the town are partially-drained marshland, to include the road that Serial 2 took.

**Description:**

1. Visual 8: The Missed Turns: TCP 1
   1. Serial 2 arrived at TCP1 (Traffic Control Point 1) at about 0100, 23 March.
   2. This was one of the GPS waypoints that CPT King had programmed.
   3. He had another GPS waypoint programmed for the intersection of Rtes Blue and Jackson west of Nasiryah.
   4. According to the 3FSB OPORD, the convoy was supposed to travel on Route Blue, turn on to Route Jackson at this intersection, and then return to Route Blue west of Nasiriyah.
   5. CPT King was under the impression that Route Blue was the designated route all the way to OBJ Rams (he was not aware of the Route Jackson bypass: He had only highlighted Route Blue on his annotated map).
   6. Also according to the order, there was to be a manned TCP here to direct the convoys on to Route Jackson.
   7. US Personnel were present at this time, but the TCP had ceased to function. According to CPT King, these personnel confirmed that Route Blue continued north.
   8. It’s unclear who was manning the TCP and what these personnel and CPT King discussed. It’s unknown if anyone informed CPT King to diveret to Route Jackson or if CPT King just confirm that Route Blue continued north and walked away.
   9. CPT King continued north along Route Blue toward the waypoint west of Nasiriyah. At this point CPT King unintentionally diverged from the movement plan, in effect ‘missing the turn’.
   10. Since Routes Blue and Jackson closely paralleled each other at this point, CPT King’s GPS readout gave no indication he was off the designated route.
2. Visual 9: The Missed Turns: Nasiriyah
   1. The convoy continued north until about 0530. Seeing lights ahead, King stopped Serial 2 at about 0530 and conferred with the 1SG.
   2. The 15-6 does not discuss the reason for this halt. It may have been a map check since the movement up Route Blue was a long one to the next waypoint. At some point, King likely became concerned that his GPS waypoint was way to the west. Thinking the lights were an oil refinery, they continued on.
   3. Serial 2 moved to the next intersection where Route Blue turned left.
   4. CPT King did not identify this turn and continued north onto Route 7/8 into Nasiriyah. If he had recognized the turn and continued along his intended path on Route Blue the 507th may have avoided combat.
   5. Serial 2 had been on the move for almost 47 hours since leaving their last official rest stop at Dawson.

**Analysis:**

1. How do commanders balance rapid movement pace (maintaining initiative) and the friction that develops from breakdowns, accident and potential consequences of lack of sleep on decision making?
2. What steps can commanders take to ensure all personel understand their mission and orders?

**Stand 4: Movement through Nasiriyah and the Decision to Turn Around**

**Directions:**

Drop down to Operator Instruction slide 2: Ground level start point and follow the path illustrated in Operator Instruction slide 3: Initial route to Euphrates River bridge when directed to do so.

**Visuals:**

Visual 10: Movement Through Nasiriyah

Visual 11: Situation when realized off route

**Orientation:**

N/A

**Description:**

1. Visual 10: Movement Through Nasiriyah
   1. After missing the turn to remain on Route Blue, CPT King led Serial 2 through the eastern portion of An Nasiriyah. Direct operator to follow the path on Operator Instruction slide 3: Initial route to Euphrates River bridge.
   2. The convoy moved through several areas that should have concerned King:
      1. Bridge across Euphrates. Stop as indicated on Operator Instruction slide 4: Euphrates River bridge and then direct the operator to pivot 90 degrees and match the view on Operator Instruction slide 5: Euphrates River. After highlighting the Euphrates, follow the instructions on Operator Instruction slide 6: Route from Euphrates River bridge in to Nasiriyah
      2. Urban area – the 507th Soldiers observed armed civilians and what appeared to be armed Iraqi soldiers at two checkpoints on each end of the city. However:
      3. None of these people fired or indicated hostile intent
      4. The Iraqis at the checkpoint waved at the convoy
      5. One or more civilian trucks with armed civilians and mounted machine guns drove past the convoy several times.
      6. According to the ROE, uniformed or civilian personnel carrying weapons did not constitue hostile intent
      7. Follow Operator Instruction slide 7: Nasiriyah Terrain the proceed as per Operator Instruction slide 8: Nasiriyah to Saddam Canal bridge
      8. Second Bridge across the Saddam Canal stop as per Operator Instruction slide 9: Saddam Canal Bridge pivot 90 degrees left as per Operator Instruction slide 10: Saddam Canal and then follow Operator Instruction slide 11: Saddam Canal bridge to HWY 16 intersection
   3. The convoy next turned left down Route 16 (a T-intersection). **Instructors note:** it is possible the company believed they were making the turn along Route Blue shown at the initial start point. Stop at Operator Instruction slide 12: Euphrates River then follow Operator Instruction slide 13: Route along HWY 16 to HWY 7 turn
   4. CPT King reached another T-intersection Operator Instruction slide 14: HWY 7 turn and turned north on Route 7. Operator Instruction slide 15: Route along HWY 7
   5. After traveling 2 km, CPT King stopped the convoy after realizing for the first time that he was no longer on Route Blue. Operator Instruction slide 16: Turn around point River
2. Visual 11: Situation when realized off route
   1. Decision Point: After conferring with 1SG Dowdy, CPT King decided to turn the convoy around and retrace their steps through Nasiriyah to find Route Blue.
   2. CPT King next ordered his soldiers to be vigilant and to “lock and load” their weapons.
   3. As the convoy turned around, SGT Bugg’s vehicle (from 3rd FSB) ran out of fuel.
   4. CPT King stopped the convoy and refueled the wrecker using 5 gallon cans since the fuel truck was empty.
   5. After the convoy resumed movement, 1SG Dowdy moved to the rear of the convoy. Operator Instruction slide 17: Route along HWY 7 to HWY 16 past Nasiriyah

**Analysis:**

1. What Intelligence aspect contributed to this incident? (The Intelligence estimate said that An Nasiriya would be relatively friendly, which impacted the ROE, and the enemy certainly were not operating as expected – The Iraqi military seemed to melt away, to be replaced by civilian clad ambushes)
2. When CPT King recognized he was not where he intended to be, what were his options?
   1. Remain in place?
   2. Find another route/shortcut to Route Blue?
   3. Retrace his route?
3. If combat does start, what concerns does the nature of the city of Nasiriyah present?

**Stand 5: Final Movement Through Nisiriyah**

**Directions:**

Integrated in to description

**Visuals:**

Visual 12: 507th Maintenance Company An Nasiriyah

Visual 13: 507th Maintenance Company An Nasiriyah

Visual 14: Destruction of the 507th

Visual 15: Final Dispostions

**Orientation:**

N/A

**Description:**

1. Visual 12: 507th Maintenance Company An Nasiriyah
   1. The convoy took a left onto Rt. 16 at about 0700. As it moved east it began to receive sporadic small arms fire from an undetermined direction.
   2. 1SG Dowdy radioed CPT King to increase speed to get away from this fire. Spacing between the vehicles began to increase due to differences in vehicle size and acceleration rates.
   3. As Serial 2 moved east it continued to receive fire. 1SG Dowdy reported to CPT King that he had missed the right hand turn to travel back through Nasiriyah. Operator Instruction slide 18: Second turn around point
   4. CPT King decided to turn around to find the turn through Naisiryah. By the time that King could find an adequate spot to turn the big vehicles around for a second time, the convoy had gone 3 km past the intersection.
   5. SFC Pierce claimed that he knew where the missed turn was and sped to the front of the column to lead them back to the turn south onto Route 7/8.
   6. At this point, SGT Walters’ truck became disabled.
      1. SGT Riley’s truck picked up PV2 Sloan as they pass, but somehow missed SGT Walters.
      2. The details of SGT Walters’ actions are unknown. It is speculated that after he was left behind he tried to fight his way south.
      3. He was eventually captured and evidence strongly suggests that he was executed while in captivity.
      4. He was later awarded the Silver Star for his actions.
   7. Also during the U-turn, SGT Buggs wrecker became stuck in the soft sand.
   8. 1SG Dowdy picked up both Buggs and SPC Anguiano.
      1. PVT Jessica Lynch was already traveling in this HMMWV because her truck was the one being towed by SGT Buggs.
      2. There were now five personnel in the 1SG’s vehicle.
      3. 1SG Dowdy reported the status of SGT Buggs’ vehicle to CPT King and told him that they needed to get the convoy out of the city as quickly as possible.
2. Visual 13: 507th Maintenance Company An Nasiriyah
   1. Meanwhile, the rest of the convoy continued its movement. **Instructors note:** conver the material in points b through h while following Operator Instruction slide 19: Route from second turn around point in to Nasiriyah, Operator Instruction slide 20: Route through Nasiriyah and Operator Instruction slide 21: Route to Group 3 final point
   2. Due to the difficult U-turn and the different speeds of the vehicles, the convoy began to separate into 3 distinct elements:
   3. Group 1 - three vehicles. CPT King led this group and took over as the lead vehicle at the southerly turn on Route 7/8.
   4. Group 2 – five vehicles. CW3 Nash (in a HMMWV, vehicle #6 on the visual) took charge of this group. SGT Campbell’s vehicle was in the lead.
   5. Group 3 – six vehicles. 1SG Dowdy (vehicle # 15) led this group. PFC Howard Johnson’s vehicle (#8) was in the lead.
   6. All three groups were under small arms and RPG fire from all directions, but primarily from the West.
   7. Iraqis attempted to block the road with vehicles and debris that the vehicles of the 507th had to swerve around to avoid.
   8. The 507th soldiers attempted to return fire on the move, but most experienced malfunctions, primarily due to inadequate maintenance in a desert environment.
3. Visual 14: Destruction of the 507th
   1. Position the virtual terrain as per Operator Instruction slide 22: Final dispositions
   2. GROUP 1
      1. This group moved rapidly and pulled away from the other two groups.
      2. As his group exited Nasiriyah, CPT King still did not have any communication with friendly units.
      3. It eventually linked up with the lead elements of TF Tarawa about 10 km south of the Hwy 8 and 7/8 intersection.
      4. TF Tarawa was preparing its attack to seize Nasiryah and the two bridges.
      5. Elements of the 8th Marine Tank Bn immediately moved north to rescue the remainder of the 507th convoy.
   3. GROUP 2
      1. SGT Campbell’s truck, in the lead (vehicle #2), was hit several times and was finally became inoperable about 5 km south of the city.
      2. CPL Luten (vehicle #5) picked up SPC Zhang (from SGT Campbell’s truck) as they passed. CPL Luten had attempted to fire the convoy’s only heavy weapon, but the weapon failed.
      3. CW3 Nash (vehicle #6) picked up SGT Campbell, but his vehicle was also disabled shortly after passing. CPL Luten’s truck turned around and returned to the disabled HMWWV.
      4. SPC Grubb (vehicle # 7) and SGT Rose (vehicle #10) closed on this group of vehicles just over 5 km south of the city.
      5. They formed a defensive perimeter while four combat lifesavers (Carista, Elliot, Rose, Zhang) tended to the five wounded Soldiers (Campbell, Carista, Grubb, Jackson, and Luten).
      6. The Marines eventually rescued this group of 10 Soldiers.
   4. GROUP 3
      1. Group 3 came to a halt as a series of individual vehicles over the space of about 1000 meters around the Highway 8 (Route Blue) turn. Many of the actions associated with vehicles are unknown. The order of movement for these vehicles is unclear. **Instructors note:** The following material is a summary of the more detailed information that follows and can be used to save time as necessary. If used, skip the rest of the details in this section.
      2. Out of the six vehicles (excluding the vehicle under tow) in this segment, all were destroyed.
      3. Out of the 16 personnel, 9 were KIA, the remaining 7 were captured. One of the PoWs died of her injuries in captivity (PFC Piestawa).
      4. At about 0720, SPC Hernandez’s truck (vehicle #16) was under heavy fire. While trying to avoid hitting an Iraqi vehicle blocking the road, he lost control and came to a stop on the side of the road.
      5. 1SG Dowdy (vehicle #15) in his HMMWV was yelling to the 5-ton wrecker (vehicle #12) to increase its speed.
      6. While also avoiding the Iraqi truck blocking the road, Dowdy’s HMMWV was hit by Iraqi fire and crashed into Hernandez’s stopped truck.
      7. 1SG Dowdy was killed in this collision. PFC Piestawa was badly injured and died in captivity of her injuries. PFC Lynch was taken captive, while the two 3d FSB soldiers (Buggs, Anguino) were killed under mysterious circumstances (evidence suggests that they may have been executed on the side of the road when taken prisoner).
      8. The 5-ton wrecker (vehicle #12), disabled by enemy fire, came to a halt about 400 meters north of 1SG Dowdy’s vehicle.
      9. PVT Sloan had been killed prior the vehicle stopping.
      10. SGT Riley and PFC Miller moved to the location of Dowdy’s HMMWV and Hernandez’s tractor trailer.
      11. SGT Riley took charge of the survivors and attempted to defend the crash site. Without any working weapons, Riley eventually surrendered himself, SPC Johnson, and SPC Hernandez, both of whom were also wounded.
      12. PFC Miller moved south on his own and fought until he too was taken prisoner. He may have killed as many as 9 x Iraqi combatants and was later awarded the Silver Star.
      13. SPC Hudson and CW2 Mata were in the HEMTT wrecker (vehicle #13), which was towing a 5-ton tractor-trailer (vehicle #18). It made it to the southern edge of the city, avoiding an Iraqi tank in the process, before it was disabled by fire. Mata was killed and Hudson was wounded and taken captive.
      14. The remaining two vehicles (#8 and #9) almost made it completely out of the built up area. Both vehicles were stopped in the vicinity of the Highway 8-7/8 intersection with all four soldiers killed in action (Johnson, Estrella-Soto, Addison, and Kiehl). The details surrounding their deaths are unknown.
      15. Vehicle 8 may have hit the barrel of an Iraqi tank.
      16. Vehicle 9 was found overturned at the intersection.

Visual 15: Final Dispostions

1. Conclusion
   1. The 507th Maint Co convoy consisted of 33 Soldiers and 18 vehicles when it departed Attack Position Lizard on the evening of 22 March. Less than 12 hours later, it sustained:
   2. 11 killed (to include the PW who died in captivity)
   3. 9 wounded (according to the Army’s official report, but 11 Purple Hearts were awarded)
   4. 7 PoWs
   5. Only 8 vehicles were still operational
2. SOF elements rescued PFC Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital on 1 April.
   1. Less than two weeks later, the remaining 507 captives (along with two Apache pilots) were rescued.
   2. The ambush of the 507 Maint Co had a profound impact on the Army in the conduct of convoy operations, operations in a non-contiguous battlefield, and in the training and equipping of support personnel.

**Analysis:**

1. What callenges did the company leadership face in trying to maintain a cohesive combat element?
2. When CPT King’s group exited Nasiriyah, what options did CPT King have to aid the remainder of his company? Should CPT King have remained with Serial #2?

**INTEGRATION**

**Directions:**

N/A

**Visuals:**

N/A

**Orientation:**

N/A

**Description:**

N/A

**Analysis:**

1. How did the terrain help you understand the battle?
2. How will you apply the history studied today to be a better leader in the future?

Killed in action

The following soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company were killed in action (chart taken from Wikipedia, accessed on 14 Jan 22):

| Name | Rank | Age | Hometown | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Jamaal R. Addison | SPC | 22 | Roswell, Georgia |  |
| Robert J. Dowdy | 1SG | 38 | Cleveland, Ohio |  |
| Ruben Estrella-Soto | PV2 | 18 | El Paso, Texas |  |
| Howard Johnson II | PFC | 21 | Mobile, Alabama | The first combat death from Alabama during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Posthumously awarded the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart. |
| James M. Kiehl | SPC | 22 | Comfort, Texas |  |
| Johnny Villareal Mata | CW3 | 35 | Pecos, Texas |  |
| Lori Piestewa | PFC | 23 | Tuba City, Arizona | Captured alive, but succumbed to her injuries. The first Native American woman in history to die in combat while serving with the U.S. military. Posthumously awarded a Purple Heart and a Prisoner of War Medal. |
| Brandon Sloan | PV2 | 19 | Bedford Heights, Ohio |  |
| Donald Walters | SGT | 33 | Kansas City, Missouri | Captured alive, but later summarily executed. Posthumously awarded the Purple Heart and the Silver Star. Buried at Ft Leavenworth. |
| Edward J. Anguiano | SPC | 24 | Brownsville, TX | 3d FSB |
| George E. Buggs | SGT | 31 | Barnwell, SC | 3d FSB |

Wounded in action:

| Name | Rank | Hometown | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Curtis Campbell | Sergeant | Brooklyn, New York | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal and the Purple Heart. |
| Francis Carista | Corporal |  | Awarded the Purple Heart. |
| James Grubb | Specialist | Manchester, Kentucky | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal and the Purple Heart. |
| Tarik Jackson | Staff sergeant | Miami, Florida | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal and the Purple Heart. |
| Damien Luten | Corporal |  | Awarded the Purple Heart. |

Prisoners of war:

| Name | Rank | Age | Hometown | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Edgar Hernandez | Specialist | 21 | Mission, Texas | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, and Prisoner of War Medal. |
| Joseph Hudson | Specialist | 23 | Alamogordo, New Mexico | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, and Prisoner of War Medal. |
| Shoshana Johnson | Specialist | 30 | El Paso, Texas | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, and Prisoner of War Medal. |
| Jessica Lynch | Private first class | 19 | Palestine, West Virginia | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, and Prisoner of War Medal. |
| Patrick Miller | Private first class | 23 | Wichita, Kansas | Awarded the Silver Star, Purple Heart, and Prisoner of War Medal. |
| James Riley | Sergeant | 31 | Pennsauken, New Jersey | Awarded the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, and Prisoner of War Medal. |