

Staff Ride Walk Book

Japanese Counterattacks on

Bougainville Island

8-25 March 1944



Combat Studies Institute
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Instructor Notes - Bougainville

Instructions: Instructors should read through the read-ahead documents before attempting to read these notes to fully understand the scenario.

These notes contain the detail / analysis of each stand to be used by the instructor. They describe both the talking points of the slides and those used during the virtual view.

Each stand is broken into a Description and Analysis section. The analysis can be done throughout the field phase of this staff ride, or it can be left until the end. It is only dependent on the instructor's preference.

Visuals. Some of the slides are animated. Each "Click" represents a build of the slide when it is viewed in the "slideshow" mode. These builds are activated by a click of the mouse or remote and are annotated in this document by a bold yellow lettering and highlighted in red "Click #". A quick description of what will happen when the click occurs follows.

Virtual View. Movement is important in the virtual view as it gives the students a three-dimensional perspective. Movement instructions are shown in **bold green text**. Pictures in this document are provided as an orientation (you do not necessarily have to duplicate these pictures). Movement instructions are minimal to allow the instructor the flexibility to move where / how he or she wants to go.

Suggestions. There may be some suggestions provided to the instructor within the notes. When there are, they will be in **bold orange text**. The instructor does not have to follow these suggestions, but they are there to assist.

Questions. There are questions throughout the staff ride you can ask the students. All the questions will be in **bold blue text and italicized**. There are some potential answers provided for some of the questions and they will be in *normal blue text and italicized*. You do not have to use any or all of these questions, the instructor can ask different questions depending on the training objective or the participation level of the students.

It is best to project the slides and the virtual view on separate screens, side by side. However, it is possible to teach on one screen and switch back and forth between the two views. It does not matter which side the slides or the virtual view is at, set it up however the instructor is comfortable with.

NOTE: Reference to Japanese personnel and/or units will be *italicized* within the text of this walk book.

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Virtual Staff Ride (VSR) Timeline Example				
Stand	Duration (minutes)	Time		Notes
		Start	Finish	
Link-Up with Unit Prior to the Start of the VSR	30	0830	0900	Verify audio, visuals, and virtual terrain are working
1. Operational Overview	15	0900	0915	
2. Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM	15	0915	0930	
3. Medical Support	10	0930	0940	
4. Japanese Counterattack Plans	10	0940	0950	
5. Hill 700	15	0950	1005	
6. Hill 260	15	1005	1020	
7. The Twin Creeks / Final Counterattack	15	1020	1035	
8. Follow-On Operations	5	1035	1040	
Optional Medical Module	~15	1040	1055	
Integration	~15	1055	UTC	

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Slide 1 - Introduction / Title Page

1. **This is where the instructor introduces himself / herself and provides a quick background of their experience for the students. If there is anyone else assisting with the staff ride, the instructor should introduce them as well.**
2. There are three phases to any staff ride: the preliminary study phase, the field study phase, and the integration phase.
 - You completed the preliminary study phase when you went through the read-ahead packet and if you did any additional research on this battle prior to today.
 - This is the field study phase where we will take you through what happened during the Bougainville campaign, we'll allow you to see the terrain, and we'll try to provide you with some additional information and potentially a different way to see how things happened.
 - At this end of this staff ride, we will go into the integration phase. That is the "so what" to the things that happened and how those things can be applied today.
3. As we go through this scenario, remember, you already know what happens and how this ends, so it can be easy to point out what someone did or didn't do right.
 - We are here to have a professional discussion on the insights gained from this experience. Keep in mind that you need to place yourselves in the various positions during the scenario knowing only what the participants knew at that point in time and from there, decide what decisions could have been made.
4. Our staff ride will be conducted using the O, D, A methodology; orient, discuss, and analyze. Of those, the discussion is the most important part. Ask questions, our time here today is your time. I will ask questions throughout as well, not to embarrass anyone, but to help spur thought and dialogue.
5. Any military engagement, if examined closely enough, will yield insights of potentially great values to serving soldiers as they go forward to meet the challenges of their era. The Bougainville Campaign is no exception.
6. Today we are going to look at the Japanese counterattacks on Bougainville from 9-24 March 1944. The Japanese goal was to destroy the Allied perimeter, which eventually accommodated three strategically important airfields. None of the three counterattacks was able to penetrate very far into the Allied perimeter. As a result of the fierce Allied response to these counterattacks, this turned out to be the last major Japanese offensive on Bougainville and in the overarching Solomon Islands Campaign.

Slide 2 - Agenda

1. Here is the agenda that we are going to follow today.
2. We will start out looking the operational campaign overview within the Pacific, the Operation CARTWHEEL campaign, Bougainville itself, and then we'll look at some of the differences in jungle operations vice urban or open country operations.
3. We will then quickly look at the supporting operations for Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM, the initial Marine landings, the expansion of the perimeter, and then the transition from the 3rd Marine Division to the Army's XIV Corps.
4. We will then look at some of the different components of the medical support system and the importance of what they provided.
5. From there we'll review the Japanese force array and their counterattack plans for pushing the Allies off Bougainville.
6. Finally, we will take a detailed look at each of the three counterattack battles, the final counterattack, and the follow-on operations before XIV Corps turned Bougainville over to the Australian II Corps.
7. So, are there any questions before we begin?

Stand 1: Operational Overview

Visuals: 1-1: Operational Overview
 1-2: Campaign Overview
 1-3: Bougainville Island
 1-4: Jungle Operations

Virtual Views: 1-1: Overview of Empress Augusta Bay
 1-2: Mount Balbi
 1-3: Mount Bagana
 1-4: Jungle Shot

Orientation:

- Operational Orientation will be done with Visuals 1-1 and 1-2.
- **Orientation to virtual terrain will occur just before going to it.**

Description:

Visual 1-1: Operational Overview

1. Here is a map of the Pacific and Far East. Let's look at the operational orientation of this theater.
2. We will start here at Pearl Harbor and go clockwise to Australia, the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, China, the USSR, and finally the Aleutian Islands.
3. The red box is the area that we are going to focus on during the staff ride.

CLICK 1: Text box and star for Guadalcanal and blinks twice.

4. First, we have the island of Guadalcanal.
5. The Allies were forced to act here when the Japanese began to build an airfield on Guadalcanal during the summer of 1942.
6. The Allies counterattack began in August 1942 and the battle on continued into early 1943.

CLICK 2: Text box and star for Munda Point and blinks twice.

7. After Guadalcanal was secured, the fight moved north to the island of New Georgia and the airfield at Munda Point.
8. The battle for New Georgia took place from 30 June-5 August 1943.

CLICK 3: Text box and star for Bougainville and blinks twice.

9. Then we have the island of Bougainville.
10. Japanese troops landed around Buka Passage on 30 March 1942, where they seized the airfield there as a useful satellite to the bases at Rabaul.

Q. What was the strategic importance of the Allies capturing Bougainville?

- *Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM (the invasion of Bougainville) was undertaken to isolate the main American target – the Japanese base at Rabaul.*
11. After determining that invading Rabaul would be very costly, Allied planners decided to bypass Rabaul and cutting it off from the rest of the Japanese Empire.
 12. This required the capture of air bases on or near Bougainville, from where American ground-based fighters could reach Rabaul.

CLICK 4: Text box and Japanese flag for Rabaul and blinks twice.

13. Finally, we have the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul located northwest of Bougainville.
14. Are there any questions regarding the operational overview before we continue?

Visual 1-2: Campaign Overview

1. The CARTWHEEL campaign would eventually consist of 13 major operations, most with their own code names.
2. Many of these operations were sequential, overlapping, or simultaneous.
3. They were terrain focused, and included:

CLICK 1: Multiple arrows appear on the screen.

- a. Operations CLEANSlate (the occupation of the Russell Islands), CHRONICLE (the invasion of the Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands), TOENAILS (the invasion of New Georgia Island), POSTERN (the capture of Lae), GOODTIME (the invasion of the Treasury Islands), BLISSFUL (the raid on Choiseul), CHERRYBLOSSOM

(the invasion of Bougainville), and DEXTERITY (the Allied invasion of western New Britain).

- b. There was also the capture of Vella Lavella Island, the Green Islands, the Admiralty Islands, and Emirau Island.

CLICK 2: Red circle appears around Rabaul.


4. All these operations were focused on the isolation of Rabaul.

CLICK 3: Only the arrows for CHERRYBLOSSOM and the circle around Rabaul remain.

5. The arrows remaining are the ones associated with Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM, the capture of Bougainville Island.

Visual 1-3: Bougainville Island

Virtual View 1-1: Overview of Empress Augusta Bay



1. This is an overhead shot of the western side of Bougainville, around Cape Torokina and the Empress Augusta Bay. This gives you an idea not only just how big Bougainville is, but how heavily vegetated it is.

CLICK 1: Arrows and distances appear.

2. Bougainville is the largest island in the Solomon Islands chain. It is about 130 miles long and 30 miles wide, with an overall area of about 3800 square miles.
3. The population at the time was about 54,000 natives that spoke approximately 18 different languages.

NOTE: Before the war about a hundred white missionaries, planters, traders, and government officials lived on the island. The majority of the natives worked on the plantations, with the missionaries, or as liaisons with the government officials.

CLICK 2: Arrows and distances fade out.

CLICK 3: Towns / villages appear, followed by population circles.


4. The main population areas were in the southeast, south, and southwest in wide flat country with high forest and dense undergrowth covering the rest of the island to the 4500-foot contour where a scantier moss forest began. There were also population areas in the north and northeast near Buka Passage.
5. Temperatures were generally hot and humid although the beaches were pleasantly cool at night.

CLICK 4: Population circles disappear.

CLICK 5: Circles and range names appear.


6. Bougainville is a mountainous island, dominated by the Emperor and Crown Prince ranges, with two active volcanoes.

Virtual View 1-2: Mount Balbi



7. The tallest of these (Mount Balbi) reaches to 10,171 feet in height. The lower slopes and coastal plains are covered in dense jungle.

Virtual View 1-3: Mount Bagana.



CLICK 6: Circles and range names fade out.

8. With an average annual precipitation of around 100 inches, the island was fairly wet year-round.
9. The southeastern winds brought slightly drier conditions during the winter than the northwestern winds of summer.
10. Malaria and other tropical diseases were prevalent.

CLICK 7: All airfields appear.

11. When Japanese troops landed at Buka Passage in March 1942, they seized and began improving the airfield at that location.
12. By late 1943 the Japanese had completed airfields at Kahili (**KA-HEE-LEE**), Ballale (**BAL-LAY-EL**), Kara, and Bonis.

Q: Why did the Japanese need to build these airfields on Bougainville?

- *It shortened the distance to Guadalcanal and Munda, which allowed their planes to remain on station for longer.*

CLICK 8: Both seaplane bases appear.

13. The Japanese also built two seaplane bases around Bougainville. The first was at Buka Passage and the second was at Faisi **(FI-ZEE)** Island, just off Shortland Island.

CLICK 9: Airfields, seabases, and text box fade.

14. At the opening of the Allied offensive in 1942, estimates of Japanese strength on Bougainville varied widely, ranging between 45,000 to 65,000 Army, Navy, and labor personnel.

15. Bougainville was headquarters for the *Japanese Northern Solomons Defense Force* with its main base at Buin located on the southeastern tip of the island, across from which were the Shortland Islands, Faisi, and Ballale.

CLICK 10: Japanese units appear.

16. However, by the end of October 1943, there were only 37,500 troops available to the *Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army Headquarters* and the *6th Division*.

17. This included 25,000 soldiers in southern Bougainville and the Shortland Islands, 5,000 along the east coast, 5,000 along the northern coast and Buka Island, and a small number around Empress Augusta Bay on the island's western coast.

18. The *Japanese Eighth Area Army* commander *Lieutenant General Imamura* **(EYE-MA-MURR-A)**, located in Rabaul, was determined to hold Bougainville.

Q: Why was Bougainville so important for the Japanese to hold?

- *There was nothing between it and Rabaul.*
- *If taken, Allied aircraft could more easily reach Rabaul and in less time.*
- *They wanted to use it as a staging base for future ops.*

19. After the loss of Guadalcanal and New Georgia and the evacuation of troops off Kolombangara and the other Central Solomon Islands, Bougainville was deemed the best (and last) option to protect Rabaul and was to become the staging area for renewed attacks to the south and east.

Q: *How were the Allies kept informed as to what Japanese efforts were on Bougainville?*

- *They were kept informed by a group of people called the coast watchers.*

Q: *Who were the coast watchers and what did they do?*

- *They were British, Australian, or New Zealand civil servants or planters commissioned into their armed forces just before the war. They eventually became part of the Australian Navy's Directorate of Intelligence.*
- *They radioed reports of enemy troop, ship, and plane movements from behind enemy lines and used the island natives to help them rescue downed airmen and stranded sailors.*
- *Since most of the South Pacific Islands were poorly mapped or not mapped at all, they were an invaluable source of information on terrain.*

Visual 1-4: Challenges with Jungle Operations.¹

Note to instructor: You do not have to discuss each of the points below, it will depend on time and how much discussion is being generated by the students.

This section has been broken down by an overall list followed by the list broken down within the different warfighting functions so you can either ask the question within certain warfighting functions or just in general. Not everything fits into just one warfighting function, some may have two or more components to them.

¹ US Army. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.98 *Jungle Operations*. Publication dated September 2020. Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 2020.

Virtual View 1-4: Jungle Shot



Q: What are some of the challenges you might face when conducting jungle operations?

- Impact on personnel and equipment, reduced mobility, limited line of sight, enemy fighting from fortified positions, higher potential for fratricide, offensive versus defensive engagements, communication and logistics challenges, interaction with the local population, limited mobility on trails or footpaths, CASEVAC challenges, conditioning / acclimation period, force protection, and Indigenous animals and insects.*

Mission Command

1. Jungles are harsh environments, characterized by intense heat, heavy precipitation, and thick vegetation that can adversely impact operations for unprepared forces.
2. Large distances between units, dense foliage, and potentially significant vertical terrain prevalent in many jungles, coupled with the power constraints of man-portable radios, impede radio communications in the jungle.
3. The effectiveness of radio communications can be reduced by 10 to 25 percent in the jungle.

Movement and Maneuver

1. Mobility in the jungle is restricted by thick vegetation, steep grades, and severe terrain. Vehicular mobility, whether wheeled or tracked, is almost completely restricted to roads and trails.
2. Restrictive terrain can limit mobility while excessive heat and humidity can fatigue troops.
3. Higher casualties occur among troops on the offense, where observed assaults are often the only tactical option.
4. Defenders generally can withdraw under cover and concealment.
5. Troops operating in the jungle should also watch out for snakes and if in the water, watch for leeches on the body.

Intelligence

1. The local populace is a valuable source of information. Whether hostile, friendly, or indifferent, the people can provide information that will help complete the intelligence picture.
2. The local populace may provide information on enemy timelines and patterns, their routes, and locations of weapons or equipment caches.
3. Overhead imagery should be less than four months old as trails and clearings can grow over or change dramatically during that time.
4. Dense vegetation and thick overhead cover afford enemy forces ample cover and concealment, making target detection difficult.

Fires

1. Lenses, dials, and gauges often become fogged with internal moisture.
2. Defenders suffer lower casualties from direct and indirect fire.
3. In low canopy jungles, airbursts can increase casualty causing effects by creating dangerous shrapnel from the destroyed canopy.
4. Ground observation in the jungle is limited by sharp terrain and dense vegetation. Which can impede ground observers' ability to locate and identify targets as well as their ability to positively identify adjacent friendly units or even their own location.

5. Poor weather, heavy vegetation, and limited observation ranges in the jungle hinders target identification, laser designation, and guidance for aerial and joint fires.

Sustainment

1. A unit's tactical effectiveness in the jungle depends on the availability of supplies. However, a formation's largest vulnerability lies in its exposed LOCs and the immobility of its bases of supply and support.
2. Lack of roads and limited helicopter landing zones will hinder resupply and casualty evacuation requiring forces to carry additional supplies and casualties extended distances.
3. Battery life is shorter than normal and electrical connections corrode quickly.
4. General guidelines for jungle repair:
 - a. Repair only what is necessary to make the equipment combat effective.
 - b. Recover disabled equipment to the nearest secure site and conduct on-the-spot repair.
5. Excessive heat and humidity can degrade equipment.
6. Canvas items rot and rubber deteriorates much faster than in more temperate areas.

Protection

1. Approximately one week of daily heat exposure is necessary for heat acclimatization; however, Soldiers who are unusually susceptible to heat injuries require additional time to fully acclimatize.
 - a. Heat acclimatization requires a minimum daily heat exposure of about two hours that may be conducted in two, one-hour exposures.
2. Active security measures include patrols, observation posts, and perimeter security; reduce the likelihood of a unit being ambushed or attacked by surprise. These work best when used with passive security measures. Camouflage, odor control, trash control, and noise and light discipline also help prevent enemy detection.
3. Fratricide may be caused by:
 - a. Ineffective or degraded communications equipment.

- b. The inability to recognize near and far recognition signals.
 - c. Short engagement ranges coupled with the need for quick reaction.
 - d. Location errors caused by challenging terrain and degraded or disrupted navigation devices.
- 4. Despite the obvious impact of heat and humidity, Soldiers must recognize that they will likely be exposed to cold as well. Temperatures in the jungle may drop 10 degrees or more at night. When coupled with high humidity and often rainy conditions.
 - 5. While the largest health threat posed by mosquitoes is malaria, mosquitos carry numerous other diseases such as dengue and yellow fever.
 - 6. Flies can also pose a health hazard to humans as they can carry and spread diseases if not controlled. Certain flies that feed on mammals and humans can cause lesions and infections. Soldiers should shake out sleep systems and ensure clothing and boots are free of insects before dressing.
 - 7. There was also jungle rot, which came about when Soldiers could not keep themselves dry.

Vignette: Colonel Frazer West, who at Bougainville commanded a company in the 9th Marines, still remembered painfully what constantly living in the slimy, swamp water did to the Marines: "With almost no change of clothing, sand rubbing against the skin, stifling heat, and constant immersion in water, jungle rot was a pervasive problem. Men got it on their scalps, under their arms, in their genital areas, just all over. It was a miserable affliction and in combat there was very little that could be done to alleviate it. The only thing you could do was with the jungle ulcers. I'd get the corpsman to light a match on a razor blade, split the ulcer open, and squeeze sulfanilamide powder in it. I must have had at one time 30 jungle ulcers on me. This was fairly typical."

Virtual: Go back to the Virtual View 1-1: Overview of Empress Augusta Bay

ANALYSIS:

- 1. What was the expected operational outcome for Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM?**
- 2. How do you think the weather and terrain would impact operations on Bougainville?**

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Stand 2: Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM

Visuals: 2-1: Supporting Operations
 2-2: Initial Landings
 2-3: Inland Operations
 2-4: Unit Transitions
 2-5: 37ID Order of Battle
 2-6: AMERICAL Order of Battle

Virtual Views: 2-1: Initial Landing Ships in Empress Augusta Bay
 2-2: Landing Craft
 2-3: 75mm Gun Overhead Shot
 2-4: View from Within the 75mm Pillbox
 2-5: Numa Numa Trail
 2-6: East-West Trail
 2-7: Unit Transitions and Airstrip

Orientation:

- We are looking at Bougainville, the northern-most island in the Solomons. Rabaul is off the map to the northwest.
- Choiseul Island is off to the southeast of Bougainville and the Treasury Islands are off the map but are southwest of Bougainville.
- **Orientation will be done just prior to using the virtual terrain.**

Description:

Visual 2-1: Supporting Operations

CLICK 1: Text and icons will appear on the bottom left of the slide.

1. Operation GOODTIME, the invasion of the Treasury Islands, was conducted by the 8th Brigade Group of the 3rd New Zealand Division.
2. That operation had a dual purpose: first, it served as a feint to distract the enemy from the main effort and second, it would neutralize a potential threat to the American lines of communication.

CLICK 2: Text and icons will appear on the bottom right of the slide.

3. Operation BLISSFUL was a diversionary raid on Choiseul (**CHOI-SOL**) Island conducted by the Marines' 2nd Parachute Battalion.
4. This was intended to distract the Japanese by having the Marines freely move around the island and engage the enemy whenever they found them.
5. There were about 3,500 transient enemy troops on Choiseul, waiting to be shipped to Buin, a major Japanese garrison on southern Bougainville.
6. The Marines went ashore and destroyed all enemy installations within reach. Thinking that a much larger force had landed, the Japanese counterattacked but were repulsed with numerous losses.

Q: Why were these two operations conducted?

- *The thinking was that the Japanese would be expecting an attack at one or both locations as the next logical step in the Allied island-hopping campaign, and therefore they would be thoroughly fooled by the feint, even though the islands themselves were relatively unimportant to the Americans.*
7. General Hyakutake (**HI-O-COE-TOC-KAY**), the commander of the 17th Japanese Army on Bougainville, determined that the Treasury Island landings were a preliminary action to a more systematic operation, and that the Allies would build an airfield on the Treasuries, take Choiseul, and after intensified air and surface operations, would land three divisions on southern Bougainville in late November.

Q: Why would General Hyakutake think that?

- *New Georgia had been a frontal attack and had supporting efforts from flanking island positions.*
- *He also thought the Allies might wait to launch their attack until December 7, the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack.*

CLICK 3: Text and icons appear on the bottom center of the slide followed by an arrow leading to Cape Torokina.

8. Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson was in charge of the entire amphibious expedition, whether afloat and ashore.
9. Wilkinson maintained overall command until Lieutenant General Vandegrift, the IMAC Commander, was ashore and indicated he was ready to take command, at which time Vandegrift would exercise command over all units ashore. This


arrangement established the doctrine that is still standard in modern amphibious operations.²

Q: Why do you think this command relationship would be put in place?

10. Wilkinson set H-Hour as 0730 on 1 November 1943, so that his transport ships could navigate the uncharted waters of Empress Augusta Bay in daylight.

Visual 2-2: Initial Landings

Virtual View 2-1: Initial Landing Ships in Empress Augusta Bay



1. Here you are looking from the west to the east at Empress Augusta Bay just as the transport ships were getting ready to land and put troops on the ground.
2. The reinforced 3rd Marine Division was not only designed to overcome the enemy troops initially located at Torokina Bay, but to also ensure that once a defensive perimeter was established, the Japanese would not be able to dislodge the Marines, even if all available Japanese forces were used.
3. A pre-invasion naval bombardment began at 0547, and at 0726 the landings began. A total of 7,000 men were scheduled to land in the first wave, using eleven beaches

² Fuquea, David C. "Bougainville: The Amphibious Assault Enters Maturity." *Naval War College Review*, WINTER 1997, Vol. 50, pg. 109. Accessed 25 May 2022 at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642941>.

on Bougainville and one on nearby Puruata (**POO-ROO-A-TA**) Island. The landings were also supported by naval gunfire and American torpedo bombers.

4. The main landing beach stretched approximately 8,000 yards while a final section was located on Puruata Island just offshore within the bay.
5. The 9th Marines were responsible for the beaches from the Koromokina River to the left while the 3rd Marines were to assault the beaches to the right of the Koromokina River.³
6. The 3rd Raider Battalion was responsible for Puruata Island and the 2nd Raider Regiment was responsible for the Buretoni Mission.
7. The four yellow beaches were designated locations for unloading cargo during the assault.
8. Other units going ashore included the 3rd Marine Division headquarters, 19th Engineer Regiment, 12th Artillery Regiment, and the 3rd Defense Battalion.
9. Most of the initial landing beaches were undefended, but the troops landing closest to Cape Torokina, at the southern end of the landing area, faced a hard fight.

Virtual View 2-2: Landing Craft



³ Haskew, Michael E. "The Fight for Bougainville." <https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2020/06/26/the-fight-for-bougainville/>. Accessed 6 June 2022.

10. This area was held by 270 or so men from the *Japanese 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment* who had built at least 25 pillboxes and were manning a single 75mm gun along with their personal small arms weapons.⁴
11. The 75mm gun continuously fired at the landing craft, sinking four and hitting ten others, resulting in a loss of 70 Marines.

Virtual View 2-3: 75mm Gun Overhead Shot



NOTE: Remind the audience that the airfield they see in this location is not built yet, so they need to imagine that it is also covered by many trees.

⁴ Chant, Christopher. "Operation Cherryblossom" Codenames: *Operations of World War II*. <https://codenames.info/operation/cherryblossom/>. Accessed 26 August 2022.

Virtual View 2-4: View from Inside the 75mm Pillbox



12. Sergeant Robert A. Owens saw the threat from the 75mm gun and acted.

Virtual View 2-3: 75mm Gun Overhead Shot. Move directly toward the pillbox, go through the gun port, and exit out the back.



13. Owens charged directly into the pillbox, dove through the firing port, and drove the gun crew out the back, where they were shot down. However, Owens was shot and killed as well.
14. Sergeant Owens was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. Major General Turnage, Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Division, said that no other single act had saved more lives or contributed so much to the successful landings.⁵
15. By 1100 Cape Torokina was cleared. Most of the Japanese soldiers were either dead or had fallen back into the inland jungle. By dark, all enemy pillboxes had been cleared, which secured the initial beachhead.
16. The Americans lost 78 dead and 104 wounded during the initial fighting.⁶
17. By the end of the day there were 14,000 men and 6,000 tons of supplies on the ground between the high tide mark and the swamp just behind the beach.
18. Japanese resistance ended on Puruata Island on 2 November and the main beachhead was extended. On 3 November, Torokina Island was also secure.

Q: *Why was it important that the Marines cleared both of those islands?*

- *To prevent rear and flank fire on the main landings.*


19. By 5 November, the Marines had secured a beachhead that was approximately 10,000 yards long and reached 5,000 yards inland. This allowed preliminary work to begin on an airstrip along the coast.
20. Captured documents suggested that if there was a follow-on Japanese threat, it would come from the south. Based on that information, the American right flank was strengthened.
21. However, bad weather and a lack of roads prevented *General Hyakutake* from sending reinforcements for an early counterattack.

⁵ Wikipedia. "Robert A. Owens." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_A._Owens#cite_ref-USMCbio_1-1. Accessed 27 June 2022.

⁶ History of War.Org. "Operation Cherryblossom – the Invasion of Bougainville (November 1943-March 1944)." http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/operation_cherryblossom_bougainville.html#7. Accessed 25 June 2021, pg. 4.

Visual 2-3: Inland Operations⁷

Virtual View 2-5: Numa Numa Trail. There will be no virtual movement on the terrain during this portion of the stand.



CLICK 1: Icons for 5-9 Nov appear.

1. On 5 November, the Japanese ran into a Marine roadblock, which they attacked on 7 and 8 November. The Marines counterattacked and the Japanese were driven off by mid-day, 9 November.

CLICK 2: Icons for 13-14 Nov appear.


2. On 13 November, the 2/21 Marines moved to north toward the Numa Numa and East-West trail junction. However, they were ambushed at a coconut grove. The next morning, 1/21 Marines provided reinforcements and after air strikes and a platoon of tanks arrived, the coconut grove was secured.

CLICK 3: Icons for 18 Nov appear.

3. On 18 November, the Japanese attacked a Marine roadblock, but were again defeated. Once the perimeter was secure, a small recon party, led by Commander William Painter with some Seebees and Marine infantry, went forward, marked, and cleared the ground for two 5,000-ft airstrips.

⁷ Chant, pgs. 16-21.

Virtual View 2-6: East-West Trail. There will be no virtual movement on the terrain during this portion of the stand.



CLICK 4: Icons for 20-24 Nov appear.

4. On 20 November, a 400-foot-high ridge was discovered that provided the Japanese observation of the Empress Augusta Bay area. The Marines occupied and held the ridge against numerous enemy attacks over three days.
5. Also on the 20th, 2/3 Marines conducted a recon in force and discovered the Japanese *23rd Regiment* in about 18–20 pillboxes. The Marines disengaged and moved back to safety.

CLICK 5: Icons for 21 Nov appear.

6. The next day, the Japanese attempted a double envelopment of the Marines position but were repulsed by heavy fire and suffered numerous casualties.

CLICK 6: Icons for 26 Nov appear.

7. On 24 November, 1/9 Marines attacked northeast toward Grenade Hill. But on 26 November, the Japanese had abandoned that location.


CLICK 7: Icons for 8-24 Dec appear.

- On 8 December, the Marines moved to Hellzapoppin Ridge, where they made multiple unsuccessful frontal attacks. On 18 December, an air attack finally broke the Japanese defenses there.

CLICK 8: Icons for 22-23 Dec appear.

- On 22 December, the Marines advanced on Hill 600A, but was driven back. But by 24 December, the Japanese had abandoned Hill 600A.
- The 23rd Regiment had been shattered and had almost 1,200 men killed. There were no more major Japanese attacks on the US perimeter until March 1944. Meanwhile the US perimeter was wired and roadblocks were established on all routes into the perimeter.

Virtual View 2-7: Unit Transitions and Airstrip.



Visual 2-4: Unit Transitions

NOTE: The 15 December LOA, the 37ID patch, the 3MAR DIV patch, and the fighter strip icon are already on the slide when it first comes up.

- By 15 December, the Marines' limit of advance had been extended and sectors were assigned to each Marine RCT. Also, the fighter strip near the coast opened on 9 December.

CLICK 1: The XIV Corps icon and patch appear.

2. Also on 15 December, the I Marine Amphibious Corps was replaced by the US Army's XIV Corps, led by Major General Oscar W. Griswold. Griswold was then in command of all Allied forces on Bougainville, which numbered more than 50,000 men.

CLICK 2: The 3 MAR DIV patch fades out and the AMERICAL patch fades in.

3. Major General John R. Hodge of the AMERICAL Division relieved Major General Turnage of command on 28 Dec.
4. The division came from the Fiji Islands where it had been defending the main island of Viti Levu and engaged in extensive training.⁸

CLICK 3: The 15 December LOA fades out and the new LOA fades in.

5. Here is what the new line of advance looked like after Marine and Army operations between 28 Dec and 16 January.
6. By 16 January, the 3rd Marine Division had been withdrawn altogether, but some Marine support units, like the 3rd Defense Battalion, remained on Bougainville.

CLICK 4: The PIVA UNCLE icon appears near the middle of the slide.

7. By 30 December, the Piva Uncle airstrip was completed.

CLICK 5: The PIVA YOKE icon appears just above the PIVA UNCLE icon.

8. By 9 January, the Piva Yoke airstrip was also completed. With that, the Allies now had three functional airstrips on Bougainville, which made it easier to continually attack Japanese fighters and naval ships at Rabaul.
9. Other than patrolling actions, little enemy resistance was encountered. But in late February, the locals began reporting rumors of a Japanese force building up outside the American perimeter.

NOTE: Conduct another terrain orientation now that the Army is in charge.

Visual 2-5: 37ID Order of Battle

1. The 37th Infantry Division arrived in Fiji in June 1942 to fortify the islands against a possible invasion. The division continued its training on the islands.

⁸ US Army Center of Military History. "AMERICAL (Infantry) Division."
<https://history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/cbtchron/cc/americal.html>. Accessed 11 May 2023.

2. With the end of ground fighting on Guadalcanal, the division moved to that island in April 1943, continued training, and staged for the New Georgia campaign.
3. Two battalions joined the Marine Raiders on New Georgia, 5 July 1943, while the remainder of the division landed on 22 July, and assisted the 43rd Infantry Division in taking Munda airfield in heavy fighting.
4. After consolidating on New Georgia, the division returned to Guadalcanal on 9 September 1943, for rest and rehabilitation.⁹
5. The 37ID had approximately 13,000 men assigned to it at the time of the Japanese counterattacks in March 1944.
6. The division had three infantry regiments under its control, the 129th, the 145th, and the 148th.
7. They also had the 37th DIVARTY with four firing battalions underneath it: the 6th, 135th, 136th, and the 140th Field Artillery Battalions.
8. The 37th also had the 117th Combat Engineer Battalion, the 112 Medical Battalion, and a company from the 37th Cavalry.
9. Finally, under the 37th Special Troops Battalion, there was the 37th HQs and HQs Battalion, the 737th Light Ordnance Company, the 37th Quartermaster Company, the 37th Signal Company, the 37th Band, as well as a detachment of MPs and a Counter-Intel Detachment.

Visual 2-6: AMERICAL Order of Battle

NOTE: The “Americal Division” was formed from three “orphaned” infantry regiments left over from the triangularization of all infantry divisions just prior to the war and shipped as reinforcements to New Caledonia, the division took its name as an abbreviation for the “*American-Caledonian Division*,” after the island where it had been officially formed.¹⁰

1. The Americal Division was the first US Army unit to be sent to Guadalcanal. Largely because of transport constraints, the division arrived piecemeal and was fed into combat alongside the battle-hardened and exhausted 1st Marine Division, which it eventually relieved.

⁹ Wikipedia. “37th Infantry Division (United States).” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/37th_Infantry_Division_\(United_States\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/37th_Infantry_Division_(United_States)), accessed 12 May 2023.

¹⁰ Rein, Christopher M. *Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II*. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 2017, pg. 45.

2. The 164th Infantry Regiment landed on Guadalcanal on 13 October 1942 ahead of the other regiments. The Regiment was the first US Army unit to engage in offensive action as part of the Battle of Guadalcanal. Between 24 and 27 October, elements of the regiment withstood repeated assaults from Japanese battalions and inflicted some two thousand enemy casualties.
3. In November the 164th took part in the offensive across the Matanikau **(MA-TA-NI-COW)** River. Other elements of the division arrived in the last few weeks of 1942.
4. In January 1943, the 132nd Infantry Regiment seized Hills 27 and 31 of the Mount Austen complex. The division later participated in offensives to sweep Guadalcanal of remaining Japanese resistance. After the last Japanese defenders were killed, captured, or evacuated the island, the division was relieved on 9 February 1943.
5. Historians describe the Americal Division as the most effective of all the US Army divisions in that campaign. Following the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division, the division continued its operations on Guadalcanal as part of the US XIV Corps with the 25th Infantry Division and the 2nd Marine Division until all of the Japanese resistance had ended.
6. The division next moved to the Fiji Islands beginning on 5 March 1943, to assume the defense of the main island of Viti Levu and to engage in extensive training..¹¹
7. The AMERICAL Division also had approximately 13,000 men assigned to at the time of the counterattacks in March 1944.
8. They had three infantry regiments under its control, the 132nd, the 164th, and the 182nd.
9. They did not have a DIVARTY assigned to it, but they had four organic firing battalions: the 221st, 245th, 246th, and the 247th Field Artillery Battalions.
10. The division also had the 57th Combat Engineer Battalion, the 121st (-) Medical Battalion, and a company from the 21st Cavalry.
11. Finally, under the AMERICAL Special Troops Battalion, there was the AMERICAL HQs and HQs Battalion, the 721st Light Ordnance Company, the 125th Quartermaster Company, the 26th Signal Company, and a Counter-Intel Detachment.

Q: How did the 37th Division's prior experience on New Georgia and the AMERICAL's 132nd and 164th Regiments' experience on Guadalcanal impact how they did things on Bougainville?

¹¹ Wikipedia. "AMERICAL Division"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Americal_Division, accessed 12 May 2023.

NOTE: The XIV Corps did not have its own corps artillery and the AMERICAL did not have its DIVARTY with it at Bougainville, so Brigadier General Leo Kreber, the 37th Division's senior artillery officer, was appointed to command all of the artillery units within the perimeter, including the eight battalions which formed part of the infantry divisions. Six of these units were equipped with 105mm howitzers and the other two operated short-range 155mm howitzers.

A provisional corps artillery unit was also formed comprised of two batteries of long-range 155 mm "Long Tom" guns from the Marines' 3rd Defense Battalion and eight batteries of 90mm anti-aircraft guns from the 251st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment and the Marine Defense Battalion. In February, the 2nd Battalion, 54th Coast Artillery Regiment, arrived to augment Kreber's artillery.

This was also the way that centralized and General Support (GS) artillery fire was conducted during the Army's portion of the Bougainville campaign..¹²

Analysis:

Q: What do you think the Army's mission was at this point?

- Maintain the beachhead and protect the airfields that were almost ready for use.*

Q: How much trust can you put into what is said by the local populace or enemy prisoners?

¹² Wikipedia. "Bougainville Counterattack." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bougainville_counterattack, accessed 25 June 2021.

Stand 3: Medical Support

Visuals: **3-1: Medical Support (1 of 2)**
 3-2: Medical Support (2 of 2)
 3-3: Army Medical Units
 3-4: 121 Evac Medical Facilities

Virtual Views: **3-1: Medical Overhead**
 3-2: Medical Ground Shot
 3-3: Ward Room
 3-4: Operating Room

Orientation:

- This shows the island of Bougainville with Buka Island to its north and the Shortland Islands to the south. On visual 3-3, we'll also see the Treasury Islands and the island of Choiseul.
- **Orientation will be done just prior to using the virtual terrain.**

NOTE: Medical Support falls under the Sustainment warfighting function.

Description:

- This stand looks at the how the Japanese forces were arrayed on Bougainville and Buka, the initial Allied planning for the battle of Bougainville, and the supporting (deception) operations that were undertaken to support the main effort.

Visual 3-1: Medical Support (1 of 2)

1. Daytime temperatures routinely reached 100 degrees, and the men were forced to live in swampy areas where it was impossible to keep feet and legs dry. In conditions like these it was to be expected that men would get trench foot and other fungus diseases..¹³
2. The Marines carried a variety of pills essential to stay in fighting shape in their oppressive, bug-infested environment: salt tablets, sulfa powder, aspirin, iodine,

¹³ Gailey, Harry A. Bougainville 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1991, pg. 123.

vitamins, atabrine (**ATA-BREEN**) tablets (for suppressing malaria), and insect repellent.¹⁴

3. Diarrhea and dysentery, ailments aided by improper field sanitation, were prevalent, putting men on the sick list for several days at a time.
4. Skin fungus infected about one quarter of the men and there was always the threat of malaria. In addition to road and airfield construction, large-scale swamp drainage began as soon as D+9; and within two months the Navy's Seabees drained more than four million square yards of swamp.¹⁵
5. Bougainville was the first time in combat for the corpsmen assigned to the 3rd Marine Division. Two surgeons were with each battalion and, as in all other battles, a corpsman was with each platoon. Aid stations were as close as 30-50 yards behind the front lines and the men from the division band became litter bearers.

Visual 3-2: Medical Support (2 of 2)

1. Company E of the 3rd Medical Battalion was located about a thousand yards to the rear of the 3rd Marines in case of any Japanese counterattacks.¹⁶
2. This positioning ensured that the wounded received plasma and emergency care at the aid stations and then would be sent back to the field hospitals for more thorough care.
3. It also minimized the trauma of carrying the wounded on stretchers for long distances. Even under the best conditions, moving the wounded was a long, traumatic experience as a single casualty typically required twelve men.¹⁷
4. Early on, amphibious tracked vehicles, better known as amtracs, were used to bring the wounded back over the otherwise nearly impassible semi-trails.
5. Evacuation was sped up as the engineers' cut roads through the jungle and swamps, which enabled jeep ambulances to move closer to the front. Within two months, there were twenty-five miles of high-speed roads across the Cape Torokina area.¹⁸
6. Field hospitals were set up as close to the front as was deemed relatively safe. Here the less seriously wounded were treated and put into hospital tents for

¹⁴ Chapin, John C., Captain, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret). "Top of the Ladder: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons." https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extcontent/usmc/pcn-190-003141-00/index.htm. Accessed 21 December 2021, pg. 26.

¹⁵ Fuquea, pg. 118.

¹⁶ Gailey, pg. 121.

¹⁷ Fuquea, pg. 117.

¹⁸ Ibid.

recovery. The more grievously injured, once their conditions were stabilized, were evacuated by ship to the more extensive facilities at Vella Lavella.¹⁹

7. **An important fact here is that less than one percent of battle casualties on Bougainville died of wounds after being brought to a field hospital.**²⁰

Visual 3-3: Army Medical Units ²¹

1. Following the example of what the Marines did, the Army also ensured that their medical units were as close to the front as they safely could; “safely” being a relatively undefined term at the time.

CLICK 1: Six units will appear.

2. Both the 37th and the Americal Divisions had their own medical units. The 37th had four medical companies and the Americal had two.
 - a. The company medics performed first aid and moved the wounded to the aid station, often under fire.

CLICK 2: Two units will appear.

3. The 37th also had the 112th Medical Battalion for support while the Americal had the 121st Medical BN (-) supporting them.
 - a. The battalion aid station was about one mile from front. Here, the physicians and medics adjusted splints and dressings and administered plasma and morphine. Soldiers also reported here for treatment of minor illnesses or mild combat fatigue.

CLICK 3: One unit will appear.

4. The 52nd Field Hospital was utilized for the care of troops and functioned chiefly as the station hospital for the island.²²

NOTE: Field Hospitals were the last and largest divisional unit of the Medical Department in the chain of evacuation.

¹⁹ Gailey, pg. 120.

²⁰ Chapin, pg. 28.

²¹ Sundin, Sarah. “Hospitalization in World War II – Chain of Evacuation.”

<https://www.sarahsundin.com/hospitalization-in-world-war-ii-chain-of-evacuation/>. Accessed 23 September 2022.

²² Oughterson, Ashley W., M.D., Harry C. Hull, M.D., Francis A. Sutherland, M.D., and Daniel J. Greiner, M.D. “Study on Wound Ballistics – Bougainville Campaign.” Chapter 5. Accessed 25 June 2021, pg. 287.

These hospitals received casualties from the dressing station, and utilized all measures possible, under varying conditions, to best fit them for continued evacuation, usually to Evacuation Hospitals.

Field Hospitals were usually located from 3 to 8 miles from the front line, depending upon factors such as the enemy range of fire, the roads, the fuel, the water, the presence of buildings, and the location of Evacuation Hospitals.

Whenever possible, they were grouped in a village or at the confluence of roads within the sector served, both for the convenience in the interchange of patients and for the ambulances.

Distinctive features were their mobility and ability to operate three separate hospital units (or platoons), if necessary, at widely separated places. When operating separately, these platoons each formed a complete small hospital.²³

CLICK 4: One unit will appear.

Virtual View 3-1: Medical Overhead



5. Since the 21st Evacuation Hospital was only 4,000 yards behind the front lines (and forward of some artillery batteries), all combat casualties were cared for here. Most of the seriously wounded patients were sent there directly to avoid delays.²⁴

²³ WW2 US Medical Research Centre. "WW2 Military Hospitals: General Introduction." <https://www.med-dept.com/articles/ww2-military-hospitals-general-introduction/#:~:text=Evacuation%20Hospitals%20were%20mobile%20units,Corps%2C%20and%20Army%20Clearing%20Stations>. Accessed 10 May 2023.

²⁴ Sundin. "Hospitalization in World War II – Chain of Evacuation."

NOTE: Evacuation Hospitals were mobile units designed to provide, near the front, and had the facilities for major medical and surgical treatment of casualties, received from Division, Corps, and Army Clearing Stations.

Their task was to combine and concentrate the evacuees in numbers and location so that a mass evacuation could be undertaken economically.

They also provided the opportunity and facilities for the beginning of a definitive treatment, the sorting of casualties, the return of those men that were soon fit for duty, and for extended evacuation of certain patients to General Hospitals located some distance to the rear.

Patients were supposed to be retained in the hospital from a few hours to a few weeks depending on the rate of admission, necessity for movement, available bed-capacity, and the overall tactical situation. There were two types of Evacuation Hospitals: 400-bed semi-mobile and 750-bed mobile.²⁵

Visual 3-4: 21st Evac Medical Facilities

CLICK 1: Picture will appear.

Virtual View 3-2: Medical Ground Shot



1. This photo shows the area of the 21st Evac Hospital.

²⁵ WW2 US Medical Research Centre. "WW2 Military Hospitals: General Introduction."

NOTE: There are no red crosses on the tents. We believe that this was because they were relatively close to the front lines and since the Japanese weren't too worried about whether an American soldier was a medic or not, the hospital commanders didn't bother with the markings as the Japanese likely wouldn't have heeded them anyway.

CLICK 2: Ward room picture will appear.

Virtual View 3-3: Ward Room.



2. This photo shows the underground ward of the 21st Evac. There was enough space here for 120 litter patients. There was a similar wardroom above ground as well.

CLICK 3: Operating room picture will appear.

Virtual View 3-4: Operating Room.




3. This photo shows the underground operating room of the 21st Evac. There was also a similar operating room above ground with space enough for eight operating tables.

Q: Why are some of these facilities both above and below ground?

- *Enemy threat, protection from artillery.*
- *It's also possible that the temperatures are cooler underground, but not certain how deep you would have to dig. Units would also need to be aware of hitting the water table or potential flooding problems from the tropical rains.*

Virtual View: Go back to an overhead view of the American perimeter.



ANALYSIS:

- 1. How would you expect the medical services plan to work?**
- 2. How does it work today?**
- 3. What is the impact of the wounded on overall manpower (from point of injury to the aid station)?**

NOTE: Path from Point of Injury ²⁶

- **Aidman:** The aidman, although assigned to the battalion medical section, served with the line companies, and gave first aid to the injured.
- **Aid Station:** The battalion aid station, the first medical installation reached by a casualty because of its location near the front line, treated shock and provided minor surgery, dressing for wounds, and relief from pain. The battalion surgeon, aid station personnel, and company aidmen together formed one of the three battalion sections of the regimental medical detachment. A separate battalion, however, had its own medical detachment.
- **Collecting Company/Collecting Station:** In World War II the division surgeon commanded the division's medical battalion. Each of the battalion's three collecting companies was designed to support one regiment or regimental combat team. A collecting company evacuated casualties from forward aid stations, and a collecting station, which the company ran, provided additional first aid, plus oxygen and whole blood, and formed a regimental holding unit for casualties until they could be taken to the rear. Sometimes a collecting station and a portable surgical hospital worked together, with the hospital stabilizing the seriously wounded for evacuation.
- **Clearing Company / Clearing Station:** Also part of the medical battalion was the clearing company. The clearing station that it operated was, in effect, a small forward hospital, providing fairly complex treatment and informed prognosis, on which further disposition of the casualty was based. In the Pacific clearing companies often functioned as small field hospitals, because most battles were small and hospital units might be absent from the task force or remote from the fighting line. Here again, a portable surgical hospital might work nearby.

²⁶ Condon-Rall, Mary Ellen, and Albert E. Cowdrey. "The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan (Center of Military History Publication 10-24)." Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1998, pgs. 78-79.

- **Portable Surgical Hospital:** With a capacity of 25 beds, this small unit was developed in Australia and later adapted to provide skilled surgical care in jungle fighting during the Papuan campaign. Still later, it was attached to task forces to provide early frontline surgical care in amphibious operations. In theory, hospital equipment and supplies were to be carried on the backs of the thirty-three soldiers and four officers who formed the unit. This portable hospital might be attached to a regiment, a division, or an army, depending on circumstances.
- **Field Hospital:** Attached to a division or corps, the 380-bed (later 400-bed) field hospital was intended to be highly mobile and to concentrate on the early care of casualties. Located whenever possible within a few miles of the front line, the field hospital was a highly flexible unit that could be broken down into its component platoons, each of which, if strengthened with surgical teams, might operate as an independent small hospital.
- **Medical Group:** A headquarters that organized field army medical units — separate medical battalions and field hospitals, in the main — for operational and administrative purposes, a medical group controlled the evacuation to the rear of the divisions and all evacuation of non-divisional units serving under a field army.
- **Evacuation Hospital (Semi-mobile):** Larger and more difficult to move than the field hospital and intended to care for 250–400 casualties (though some held up to 2,000 when fighting was heavy and/or evacuation failed), this unit was primarily utilized for the care of the seriously injured or ill designated for evacuation to large hospitals in the rear. There was also a 750-bed hospital, but it was not semi-mobile.
- **Station Hospital:** A fixed hospital of 25–900 beds, corresponding to a post hospital in the United States, it provided highly skilled care in medicine and surgery both to casualties evacuated from the combat zone and to garrison troops stationed in its vicinity. The great variation in size reflected the fact that a station hospital might serve anywhere from a small islet to a major base.
- **General Hospital:** The last stop in the chain of evacuation, this large, fixed installation of 500–1,000 beds provided the best available care and specialized treatment for all types and classes of casualties. The general hospital was authorized to evacuate patients to the United States for additional care or discharge.
- **Hospital Center:** Indefinitely expandable, the hospital center was a collection of general hospitals operating under a single headquarters. Component hospitals normally specialized in the care of one or more types of disease or injury.

- **Convalescent Hospital:** This unit was either a station or general hospital devoted to preparing for duty soldiers who had recovered from illness or wounds but were unready to resume full duty status. Those who reached a convalescent hospital were already on their way back to a line or support unit; normally, their next stop would be a replacement depot, outside the medical system.

Additional Instructor Notes: ²⁷

- **Role 1 – Combat medics and Battalion Aid Station (BAS)**
- **Role 2 – Brigade Support Medical Company (BSMC) or Medical Company Area Support (MCAS)**
- **Role 3 – Field Hospital, Combat Support Hospital (CSH), or Hospital Center**
- **Role 4 – CONUS Based Hospitals / Safe Havens**

Tactical Level:

The Medical Company provides and synchronizes medical support to the BCT. First responder capability and tactical combat casualty care occurs during a combat mission. It focuses on immediate threats, injuries, and conditions encountered in combat (limited capability and capacity).

Operational Level:

The Medical Brigade (SPT) provides scalable command and control of theater medical units providing Army Health System support for BCTs, Divisions / Corps / Field Army, and joint / multinational forces.

The Multifunctional Medical Brigade (MMB) provides scalable, flexible, and modular medical command and control, administrative assistance, logistical support, and technical supervision capability for assigned / attached units.

Strategic Level:

The MEDCOM (DS) serves as the senior medical command element within the theater of support of the ASCC. It provides medical command and control of the MEDBDE (SPT) and subordinate medical units providing Army Health System support in a theater of operations.

²⁷ US Army. *Field Manual 4-02 Army Health System*, dated November 2020. Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 2020, pgs. 1-5.

Stand 4: Japanese Counterattack Plans

Visuals: 4-1: Japanese Force Array
4-2: Counterattack Plan

Virtual View: 4-1: Japanese Plan Overview

Orientation:

- We are now looking at the 37ID and AMERICAL perimeter and the planned counterattacks to be conducted by the Japanese.
- First, we will look at the *Iwasa Unit* near Hill 700, the *Muda Unit* around Hill 260, and finally we will look at the *Magata Unit* around the Twin Creeks.
- **The is no virtual terrain movement used during this stand.**

Description:

Visual 4-1: Japanese Force Array

1. The Americans were fortunate that the Japanese had not reacted very quickly to their November landings as it gave the Marines and the Army an opportunity to build up its defenses.
2. For many days after the landings, *Hyakutake* believed it was only a feint and that a bigger landing would come later, likely somewhere around Buka. With that, he decided not to weaken his other garrisons by moving troops to Empress Augusta Bay.
3. But by the start of 1944, *General Hyakutake* finally had to admit that the November landings were not the diversionary attacks he thought they were.
4. He also believed that the Americans only had 20,000 combat troops and 10,000 support troops on the ground within their beachhead and decided to launch a large-scale counterattack.

Q: How did Hyakutake receive his intel on the Americans?

- *Although we cannot know for certain, we believe that this was General Hyakutake's own estimate of American forces around Empress Augusta Bay,*

though he may have had some additional input from Japanese pilots flying over Bougainville.

5. Unfortunately for *Hyakutake*, he severely underestimated the number of Americans - who had almost 62,000 men from two divisions as well as support troops.
6. *Hyakutake's* objective was to penetrate the American perimeter, destroy the three airfields there, and push the American defenders into the sea.
7. *Hyakutake* was the commander of the *Imperial Japanese 17th Army*.
8. The *Japanese 17th Army* formed on 18 May 1942, under the *Japanese Eighth Area Army of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group* for the specific task of opposing the landings by Allied forces in the Japanese-occupied Solomon Islands.
9. It was initially headquartered on Rabaul and participated in the Guadalcanal and New Guinea campaigns of the Southwest Pacific theatre of World War II.
10. The overall commander for this attack would be *Lieutenant General Masatane (MAAS-SA-TAAN-NEE) Kanda (CAAN-DA)*, commander of the *6th Division*. *Kanda* also controlled two battalions from the *53rd Regiment* and part of the *81st Regiment*. He had approximately 15-19,000 men assigned to the *6th Division*.
11. When the Second Sino-Japanese War started on 27 July 1937, the *6th Division* was assigned to the *Japanese China Garrison Army* and took part in the ongoing Battle of Beiping (**BI-PING**) –Tianjin (**TA-AHN-GIN**), followed by the Beiping–Hankou (**HAHN-COO**) Railway Operation.
12. On 20 October 1937, the division was reassigned to the *Japanese 10th Army* and attacked Chinese troop concentrations at Hangzhou (**HANG-ZHOW**) Bay.
13. By December 1937, it participated along with the *18th Division and 114th Division* in the Battle of Nanking and ultimately in the Nanking Massacre.
14. On 14 February 1938, the *6th Division* was again reassigned, this time to the *Central China Expeditionary Army* and in May 1938 took part in the Battle of Xuzhou (**ZOO-ZHOW**). By June 1938, the division was withdrawn back to Japan.
15. In November 1942, the *6th Division* was reassigned to the *17th Army* on Bougainville. Although initially used for the Guadalcanal Campaign, in 1943 it was transferred to the southern part of the Bougainville Island.
16. The *13th, 23rd, and the 45th Infantry Regiments* were attached to the *6th Infantry Brigade of the 6th Division* and participated during the Second Sino-Japanese War. These regiments fought in the later stages of World War II, assigned to the *Japanese Seventeenth Army* on Bougainville.

17. *Kanda* organized his force into three units, each named for their commanders - *Iwasa* (E-WAS-SA), *Muda* (MEW-DA), and *Magata* (MA-GA-TA).
18. The first force, the *Iwasa Unit*, was commanded by *Major General Shun* (SH-OON) *Iwasa* and consisted of the *23rd Infantry Regiment*, the *2nd Battalion of the 13th Infantry*, attached *engineering troops*, and *two batteries of light field artillery and a mortar battalion* – in all, approximately 4,150 men..²⁸
19. The smallest of the units, the *Muda Unit*, was commanded by *Colonel Toyohorei* (TOY-YO-HO-RAY) *Muda* and consisted of two battalions from the *13th Regiment* and an *engineering company* – a total of 1,350 men..²⁹
20. The *Magata Unit* was commanded by *Colonel Isashi* (E-SA-SHE) *Magata* and was made up of most of the *45th Infantry Regiment*, with *artillery*, *mortar battalions*, and *attached engineers* – a total of approximately 4,300 men..³⁰
21. Supporting those attacks was an *artillery group* commanded by *Colonel Saito*. That group consisted of *four 150mm howitzers*, *two 105mm howitzers*, and *several smaller pieces*.
22. There was also a reserve that was made up of part of the *1st and 3rd Battalions of the 53rd Infantry Regiment* as well as *some parts of the 81st Infantry Regiment*.

Visual 4-2: Counterattack Plan

Virtual View 4-1: Japanese Plan Overview



²⁸ Gailey, pg. 144.

²⁹ Gailey, pg. 145.

³⁰ Ibid.

1. *General Hyakutake* and *General Kanda* developed an intricate plan designed to defeat the Americans in ten days.
2. According to that plan, the three units would approach the American perimeter during the night of 7 March, cut defensive wires, and prepare for their assault.

Q: While we know the general Japanese plan, we do not know the specifics of it. Further, the Japanese still need to recon potential breach sites. Would this be considered a deliberate or a hasty attack?

3. On 8 March, Japanese artillery would fire on the airstrips. This would be fired by the *6th Artillery Regiment* located near the Blue Ridge (with mountain guns) and the medium field artillery (10 and 15 cm. field pieces).
4. The three infantry regiments were to leave their respective lines of departure following the artillery barrage, which was scheduled to start at 0430.

CLICK 1: Arrow appears and goes to Hill 700, a circle goes around the expected area of fighting, and one “explosion” occurs and fades out.

NOTE: Show this movement on the virtual terrain.

NOTE: Reiterate the dates as the builds continue.

5. During the night, the objective for *Iwasa*’s forces was Hill 700. The *23rd Infantry* was to launch its attack northeast of Hill 700 with the 3rd Battalion on the left; 2nd Battalion on the right; and the 1st Battalion in reserve.

CLICK 2: Arrow appears and goes to Hill 260, a circle goes around the expected area of fighting, and one explosion occurs and fades out.

NOTE: Also show this movement on the virtual terrain.

NOTE: Reiterate the dates as the builds continue.

6. Beginning early morning on 10 March, *Muda*’s forces were to capture Hill 260. The *13th Infantry* would attack Hill 260 and then join with elements of the *23rd Infantry* to proceed in the general direction of the Piva airstrips.³¹
7. Assuming success at those two locations, *Hyakutake* believed that the Americans would send their reserves to reinforce those areas.

CLICK 3: Arrow appears and goes to the two creeks, a circle goes around the expected area of fighting, one explosion occurs and fades out.

³¹ Oughterson, pg. 294.

NOTE: Also show this movement on the virtual terrain.

NOTE: Reiterate the dates as the builds continue.

8. Then, at dawn on March 11, the 4,300-man *Magata Unit* would attack down a logging trail and attack the 129th Infantry Regiment's sector of the perimeter west of Hill 700..³²

- CLICK 4:**
- a. All three attack arrows fade out.
 - b. The *Iwasa* icon moves to the Piva airfields, followed by the *Muda* and *Magata* icons.
 - c. All three circles fade out.

CLICK 5: Arrows from each Japanese unit would fade and move to the fighter strip near Cape Torokina and one explosion would occur and stay on screen.

9. *Hyakutake's* plan then called for the convergence of all three units after their respective breakthroughs, to capture the two Piva airfields. Then, the units would align and drive south to the capture the coastal fighter strip by 17 March..³³
10. Japanese confidence in this plan could be seen by the fact that their infantrymen only carried two weeks of rations with them since they believed that the Americans would be defeated before then.

Analysis:

- 1. *What do you think about Hyakutake's plan? What could be done better?*
- 2. *What if the attacks went beyond the anticipated two-week timeframe? Why was there no planning done for that contingency?*
- 3. *Why do you think Hyakutake did not send a recon element out to verify the number of troops and the strength of their locations before initiating this attack?*

³² Diamond, Jon. "Battling for Bougainville." <https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2019/01/13/battling-for-bougainville/>. Accessed 6 June 2022, pg. 20.

³³ Ibid.

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Stand 5: Hill 700

Visuals:

- 5-1: Engagement Area Prep**
- 5-2: Hill 700: 9-13 March**
- 5-3: Hill 700: 8-9 March (Artillery)**
- 5-4: Hill 700: 7-8 March (Infantry)**
- 5-5: Hill 700: 9 March – 0001 to 0130**
- 5-6: Hill 700: 9 March – 0230 to 1730**
- 5-7: Hill 700: 10 March – 1700 to Dark**
- 5-8: Hill 700: 11 March – 1115 to Dark**
- 5-9: Hill 700: 12 March – 0800 to 1530**

Virtual Views:

- 5-1: Hill 700 Overview**
- 5-2: Friendly Pillbox**
- 5-3: Japanese View of Hill 700**
- 5-4: Overview of Road on Hill 700**
- 5-5: Hill 700 Road Closeup 1**
- 5-6: Hill 700 End of the Road**
- 5-7: US Side of Hill 700 Looking at Japanese Advance**
- 5-8: Apron Wire Closeup**
- 5-9: View from Road on Hill 700**

Orientation:

- This is the American perimeter on 15 December 1943.
- **Orientation will be done just prior to using the virtual terrain.**

Description:


Visual 5-1: Engagement Area Preparation

There are four total pictures on the visual. Each will fade after 5 seconds and the next one will appear. After the last slide is up, it will stay on screen until Visual 5-2 comes up.

Virtual View 5-1: Hill 700 Overview



Virtual View 5-2: Friendly Pillbox



1. Here we are overlooking at a position within the 145th perimeter near Hill 700. As you can see, most of the trees and vegetation have been cut down so the soldiers have a mostly unobstructed view of where the enemy forces may attack them from.

Virtual Movement: Go down to the pillbox and look through the front of it.

2. This is what the terrain looked like from inside an actual foxhole.
3. Based on captured Japanese plans, General Griswold was able to understand and visualize the Japanese plan. He decided to let the Japanese occupy and hold those initial ridges as opposed to over-extending his own lines by occupying them himself.
4. Having copies of the Japanese plans gave the corps and division commanders a chance to prepare for the Japanese offensive, denying the enemy the advantage of surprise.
5. It also helped them avoid depleting their troop strength by understanding the proposed Japanese scheme of maneuver.
6. Knowing Japanese artillery locations also greatly aided the accuracy of XIV Corps' own artillery fire.

Q: What are some of the things that you would do to prepare your perimeter for an upcoming enemy attack?

- *American soldiers carefully prepared their perimeter while they continued to patrol outside of their lines. Soldiers built extensive chains of pillboxes and other fortifications, laid out barbed and apron wire along with booby-traps, and installed searchlights.*
- *In front of the wire were minefields. Trees and undergrowth in front of the main line of resistance was cut down so that an approaching enemy could be seen at least fifty yards or more out. That also prevented the Japanese from using the terrain as cover to throw grenades.³⁴*
- *Other devices were used to help with illumination at night: flares tied to trees and set off by trip wires; flashlights; thermite grenades; and cans full of sand and gasoline.*
- *Grenades, with wires attached, were set up as booby traps along obvious approach routes and oil drums that contained bangalore torpedoes surrounded with scrap metal provided additional obstacles for the Japanese.*

³⁴ Gailey, pg. 134.

Q: This is not necessarily normal field craft. Where do you think the units picked up these TTPs prior to the Japanese counterattacks?

Visual 5-2: Hill 700: 9-13 March

Virtual View 5-3: Japanese View of Hill 700. Want to be able to show the steepness of the angle to get up to the top.



1. Iwasa (**E-WAS-SA**) assembled behind a hilly terrain feature and his objective was to take Hill 700.

Visual 5-3: Hill 700: 8-9 March (Artillery)

1. On the night of 7 March, sharp firefights occurred between the Japanese wire cutting teams and American outposts.

CLICK 1: Red circle envelopes Japanese artillery icons.

2. The Japanese artillery was located on or around Hills 250, 600, and 1111.

CLICK 2: Explosions on both Piva airfields and then a blue circle envelopes the American artillery icons.

3. At 0545, shortly after daybreak of 8 March, the battle opened with an artillery duel in which the Japanese fired on the Piva airfields as well as the beachhead.

CLICK 3: Two explosions fade in and out on the Japanese artillery locations.

4. Three aircraft were destroyed and 19 damaged, but Allied artillery quickly located the Japanese guns and knocked them out with accurate direct and counter-battery fire.³⁵

CLICK 4: A plane icon flies from the bottom left to the upper right, followed by three explosions on the Japanese artillery locations.


5. They were also assisted by 36 aircraft from the 1st Marine Air Wing who dropped 14 tons of bombs on Hills 250 and 600 and by another 92 aircraft that dropped 100- and 1000-pound bombs on Hill 1111.

CLICK 5: Explosion on the Fighter Strip by Cape Torokina.

6. Early the next day, the remaining enemy artillery turned and fired at the fighter strip located near Torokina Bay

Visual 5-4: Hill 700: 7-8 March (Infantry)

Virtual View 5-4: Overview of Road on Hill 700. Do not drive the entire road, pick a position about halfway up and start there.



³⁵ Miller, Jr., John. "The War in the Pacific: Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul." Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1959, pg. 358.

1. Hill 700 consisted of two high points separated by a saddle, with the approaches from almost every direction having a slope of 65 to 70 degrees.

Virtual View 5-5: Hill 700 Road Closeup 1



Vignette: The 145th Infantry Regimental historian explained it like this: “One trail led to the area. It traversed slopes so steep that crags and roots became safety stirrups, often saving a man from a disastrous fall. Engineers were at first perplexed by the problem of building a supply road to follow the perimeter. Until they accomplished this mission, every round of ammunition, every bit of food, every drop of water had to be carried through the jungle rains and heat to the top of the highest ridge.”

Virtual View 5-6: Hill 700 End of the Road



2. Even though the Americans had copies of the Japanese plan, American intelligence estimates did not discount an enemy attack here, but as the defensive plan continued to be refined, they did not think the Japanese would attack such a commanding position, so the hill was held by just two infantry companies and a heavy weapons company from the 2/145 Regiment, although they were very well dug in.

CLICK 1: The 81mm mortar icon fades in.

3. How Company had its 81mm mortars grouped together on the reverse or south slope of Hill 700.

CLICK 2: The 105mm howitzer icon fades in.

4. In direct support of this position were the 105mm howitzers of the 135th Field Artillery Battalion.

CLICK 3: The Dog Company, 82nd Chem BN icon fades in.

5. And on 8 March, the 4.2-inch mortars of Dog Company, 82nd Chemical Battalion were also in direct support.

CLICK 4: A dotted line goes out, followed by an explosion. Then a second dotted line goes out, also followed by another explosion.

6. Throughout the day on the 8th, patrols from the 145th engaged the enemy in firefights and skirmishes.
7. Japanese orders called for an attack on the 8th, but none occurred. The *23rd Infantry* spent most of that day moving into positions in front of the 145th; while the *2nd and 3rd Battalions* reconned the area but did not assault.

Visual 5-5: Hill 700: 9 March – 0001 to 0130

Virtual View 5-7: US Side of Hill 700 Looking at a Japanese Advance



1. Shortly after midnight on 9 March, almost *two full companies of the 23rd Infantry* attacked up the north slope of Hill 700.
2. The Japanese Army had a strong partiality for night attacks. Such attacks were generally made on a narrow front and had a limited, well-defined objective..³⁶
3. Where possible the Japanese attacked uphill. That prevented them from being silhouetted on the skyline, and the hill itself helped them maintain their direction..³⁷

CLICK 1: Arrow wipes down toward 1st Platoon, George Company, followed by an explosion.

4. *This reinforced company* went up against 1st Platoon of George Company, which held a saddle between the top of Hill 700 and another hill to the west.

CLICK 2: Arrow wipes right toward Easy Company, followed by an explosion.

5. Another enemy company put pressure on Easy Company around the highest point of Hill 700.
6. However, both attacks were repulsed.

³⁶ War Department. “*Technical Manual TM-E 30-480: Handbook on Japanese Military Forces.*” United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1 October 1944, pg. 97, 123.

³⁷ Ibid, pg. 123.

Visual 5-6: Hill 700: 9 March – 0230 to 1730

CLICK 1: The 2/23 icon appears along with two axes of advance into the 145th area. Then the 3/23 icon appears.

1. About 0230 on 9 March, the *23rd Infantry* attacked George Company's 1st Platoon. This time, they attacked in battalion formations.

CLICK 2: Red area of Japanese advance appears and the two axes of advance fade out. 2/23 icon then moves forward.

Virtual View 5-8: Apron Wire Closeup



2. The *2nd Battalion*, in the lead, blew up the barbed wire, knocked out a pillbox, got through the gap with its forward elements, moved onto the saddle and set up their machine guns.³⁸

Virtual: Move forward toward Hill 700, and once there, start climbing toward the top.

CLICK 3: Four explosions appear and fade from on top of the 3/23 icon.

3. American mortars and artillery began firing at the Japanese. While *2nd Battalion*, *23rd Regiment* seemed to have made it through, the follow-on unit, *3rd Battalion*, *23rd Regiment* was destroyed by American artillery.
4. By dawn, the Americans were not clear about the extent of the Japanese penetration into their perimeter due to a heavy mist in the area as well as enemy fire. There were some local counterattacks, but they were mostly uncoordinated and all failed.

³⁸ Miller, Jr., pg. 361.

5. Soldiers from the 145th attacked up the southern slopes of Hill 700 but were repeatedly driven back by grenades the Japanese were simply rolling down the hill due to the steep incline.
6. Around noon, it was determined that the Japanese had created a penetration 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep, which they continued to expand until noon. In all, they had captured seven pillboxes and brought their heavy weapons online to interdict the American supply route south of the hill.³⁹ Several local, uncoordinated counterattacks failed to dislodge them.

CLICK 4: Six total explosions on McClellan Road, each appears and fades out.

Virtual View 5-9: View from Road on Hill 700



7. Throughout the day, the Japanese used their position on the saddle to put mortar and machine gun fire on McClellan Road, a supply road west of the hill. This fire halted all vehicle use on the road and forced work parties to take ammo forward and bring the wounded back out all while under fire.

CLICK 5:

- a. Charlie Company icon and a forward arrow appear at the bottom of the slide.
- b. Two other lines, one from the right and the other from the bottom, will both go above McClellan Road.
- c. Two platoon icons will appear.
- d. There will be an explosion in front of Charlie Company, which will fade with the arrow and the Charlie Company icon.

³⁹ The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia. "Bougainville."
<http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/B/o/Bougainville.htm>. Accessed 25 June 2021, pg. 12.

8. Also, about this time, Charlie Company, 145th, started up toward the saddle in a frontal assault while two platoons from Fox Company attacked the saddle from the left and right.
9. By 1530, the second platoon from Fox Company had made some progress in recovering some of the lost ground, but Charlie Company was stopped before it reached its assigned objective.

CLICK 6: Two new ovals will appear around both the Fox Company platoons, followed by an adjustment to the main line of resistance.

10. The two Fox Company platoons attacked forward and by 1730 had recaptured five of the lost pillboxes. By dark, they had established a solid line of resistance in front of the Japanese.

CLICK 7: Fox Company icons fade; Baker and Charlie Company icons appear.

11. Baker and Charlie Companies came forward and took over the new positions from the two Fox Company platoons.
12. Neither the Americans nor the Japanese made any aggressive moves over the next 24 hours.

Visual 5-7: Hill 700: 10 March – 1700 to Dark

1. Due to the intermingling of its units over the last 48 hours, the 145th took most of the day on the 10th to sort out and reorganize themselves.
2. By approximately 1700, elements of both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 145th Regiment launched a well-coordinated attack.

CLICK 1: Four different attack arrows will appear one at a time, each with an explosion that will fade before the next one appears.

3. The units used bangalore torpedoes, rocket launchers, and pole charges. The fighting was difficult as several pillboxes were recaptured and then lost again.

CLICK 2: The Japanese salient is reduced, the MLR adjusted, and the Charlie Company area moves up next to the adjusted MLR.

4. As the day ended, the Americans had achieved some success. The Japanese salient had been reduced by more than half and by 1930, George, Fox, Able, Charlie, Baker, and Easy Companies held the line, adjusted their MLR, and Charlie Company moved their position up next to the new MLR.

Visual 5-8: Hill 700: 11 March – 1115 to Dark

1. Before dawn on 11 March, General Beightler ordered the 2nd Battalion, 148th Infantry Regiment, to reposition from its regimental reserve positions over to the 145th's sector.
2. Throughout the morning, *Iwasa* made several attempts to push more troops into the saddle area. Charging forward in a banzai style attack, the Japanese suffered horrendous losses as they attempted to storm over the piles of their own dead on a narrow front.
3. Everywhere else except on the saddle, the Japanese were repulsed by 0800. Both sides fought vigorously, but in the end, the Japanese failed to strengthen the saddle or to move the Americans back.

CLICK 1: The 2/148th icon appears at the bottom of the slide with a dotted line around its area.

4. The 2/148th finally reached its assembly area behind the 145th around 1115.

CLICK 2: Four explosions appear in the Japanese salient, each will appear and fade before the next appears.

5. Mortars, howitzers, and chemical mortars took part in the pre-assault fire from 1320 until 1330.

CLICK 3: Six smoke explosions will appear in the same area.

6. Then as the assault forces were ready to begin their task, the entire target area was covered by artillery smoke shells.

CLICK 4: The 2/148th icon moves forward with a sweeping arrow toward the same location. Another arrow moves from the left side of the slide to the same location.

7. Both units gained some ground, but the attack was halted around 1900 and the Americans dug in where they were at.

Visual 5-9: Hill 700: 12 March – 0800-1530

CLICK 1: Easy Company moves to the Japanese salient, followed by Fox Company.

1. Easy Company continued its attack on 12 March while Fox Company attacked from the top of Hill 700.

2. Using grenades, flame throwers, and rocket launchers, they methodically reduced the Japanese held pillboxes one by one.

CLICK 2: The red Japanese salient fades out.

3. By 1300, the Japanese held one last pillbox and by 1317, it had been recaptured. By 1530, consolidation operations in the entire area were complete.

CLICK 3: A portion of the MLR fades and re-appears as part of the original MLR.

4. Except for two wounded Japanese soldiers, the rest of the Japanese soldiers at that location were dead and the 145th's main line of resistance was restored.
5. The next day, 13 March, the *Iwasa Unit*, which had suffered tremendously over the past days, withdrew two miles from the battlefield behind a screen of combat patrols.
6. *Iwasa* lost an estimated 1,500 killed in the effort to take Hill 700, while the Americans only lost 78 men killed and approximately 400 wounded.

Analysis:

1. Are the airfields really secure if the enemy can still reach them with their artillery?

2. How would you synchronize your units to attack the airfields if each unit was coming from a different direction and your radios were not working?

3. What else could the 145th have done to better prepare for a possible attack on Hill 700?

- *Coordinate with the 164th of the AMERICAL.*
- *More pre-planned artillery on and around the hill.*

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Stand 6: Hill 260

Visuals: 6-1: Hill 260: 10-15 March
6-2: Hill 260: 9-10 March
6-3: Hill 260: 10 March
6-4: Hill 260: 10 March – 1420 to 1900
6-5: Hill 260: 11 March – 0600 to 1400
6-6: Hill 260: 11 March – 1500 to 2000
6-7: Hill 260: 13 March – 1500 to 2000

Virtual Views: 6-1: Overhead View of Hill 260
6-2: Knobs of Hill 260
6-3: Japanese Movement to Hill 260
6-4: View of Initial Japanese Envelopment of Hill 260
6-5: Initial Japanese Envelopment around North Knob
6-6: Japanese ME Moving onto Hill 260
6-7: CP on North Knob
6-8: CP on North Knob 1
6-9: CP on North Knob 2
6-10: South CP, Foot Bridge, and South Knob
6-11: CP on South Knob 1
6-12: South Knob Battle
6-13: Japanese Counterattack on Hill 260
6-14: Hill 260 Trail Cut
6-15: Muda Movement from Hill 260

Orientation:


- Show the MLR.
- Show the Eagle River running north and south.
- The single vehicle bridge over the Eagle River.
- Show Hill 260 being out in front of both the MLR and the cleared area.

Description:

Visual 6-1: Hill 260: 10-15 March


1. *Muda* was assembled at Peko, a village on the East-West Trail located east-northeast of Hill 260.

Virtual View 6-1: Overhead View of Hill 260




Visual 6-2: Hill 260: 9-10 March

Virtual View 6-2: Knobs of Hill 260



1. One of the first things you may notice is that while this is called Hill 260, it is not the highest point of the two knobs.
2. Hill 260 was shaped like an hourglass and the two ends were referred to as the “North Knob” and the “South Knob”.
3. Each knob was about the size of half a football field, and they were so close together that when one knob was hit with artillery or mortar fire, the other received fragments as well.
4. The 182nd Infantry Regiment oversaw this sector, and had a 78-man detachment from George Company, plus artillery and mortar observers, that maintained an outpost on Hill 260.
5. *Muda’s Unit*, basically one battalion and two companies from the *13th Infantry*, completed its assembly at Peko and prepared to move forward.

Virtual View 6-3: Japanese Movement to Hill 260




- CLICK 1:**
- a. Two enemy attack arrows envelop Hill 260.
 - b. Two enemy icons appear and then attack arrows fade out.

Virtual View 6-4: View of Initial Japanese Envelopment of Hill 260



6. During the overnight of 9-10 March, a small number of Japanese troops managed to get between the hill and the main lines.

Virtual View 6-5: Initial Japanese Envelopment around North Knob. Point out on the virtual terrain how each unit got in between the MLR and Hill 260.



Virtual Movement: Move to the south side Hill 260 and the MLR.

CLICK 2: Muda icon and main effort attack arrow come in from the right side of the slide and go onto Hill 260.

Virtual View 6-6: Japanese main effort moving onto Hill 260



7. Simultaneously, an assault force assembled east of Hill 260 and prepared to attack.

CLICK 3: Red shows Japanese held area; blue shows American held area on Hill 260.

8. A few minutes before 0600 on 10 March, during the 182nd's normal stand-to timeframe, the Japanese fired mortars, machine guns, and small arms which signaled the start of their assault on Hill 260.
9. Shortly after 0600, the Japanese advanced up the southeastern corner of the hill, throwing themselves across the apron wire when necessary..⁴⁰

Virtual Movement: Move from the South Knob up to the apron wire; look across at the North Knob.

⁴⁰ Colamaria, Dave. "Bougainville – The Battle for Hill 260, 1944." <http://www.182ndinfantry.org/bougainville-the-battle-for-hill-260-1944/>. Accessed on 6 June 2022.

10. The attack, made by all or most of the *3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry*, overran most of the American positions on the South Knob and drove the survivors to the North Knob.

Visual 6-3: Hill 260: 10 March

CLICK 1: Japanese held area expands left and left blue area fades out.


1. A six-man group from the artillery and mortar observation teams took refuge in two pillboxes and fought back against the Japanese, even though the Japanese had them surrounded.

CLICK 2: Larger blue area encompassing the originally held area along with the North Knob of Hill 260.

2. When General Griswold heard about this attack, he immediately ordered General Hodge, the AMERICAL Commander, to hold Hill 260 at all costs.

CLICK 3: Fox Company, 182nd icon moves forward, followed by the Easy Company, 182nd icon.

Virtual View 6-7: CP Northern Knob



3. Here is an alternate view from the CP on the North Knob.

Virtual View 6-8: CP on North Knob 1



4. And here is a third view from the same area.

Virtual View 6-9: CP on North Knob 2



5. Colonel William Long, commander of the 182nd, immediately released Easy and Fox Companies from his regimental reserve and placed them under 2nd Battalion.
6. Fox Company left the perimeter, crossed the Eagle River, and then pushed through the heavy jungle to the North Knob to make contact with the George Company soldiers there and to establish a perimeter.

Virtual View 6-10: South CP, Foot Bridge, and South Knob



7. Easy Company advanced over the trail to attack the South Knob from the southwest in conjunction with a southward move by a platoon from Fox Company.

CLICK 4: Attack arrows from both unit icons followed by one explosion each and attack by fire icons fade out.

8. The attack began immediately when Easy Company arrived. One Easy Company platoon started up the steep slope as the Fox Company platoon attempted to move south.

CLICK 5: Both attack arrows and the two explosions fade out.

9. After about a 35-yard gain by both platoons, they came into some cleared areas and were subsequently halted by enemy fire.

Visual 6-4: Hill 260: 10 March – 1420 to 1900

1. By 1420, 2nd Battalion was ready to attack once again. This time the plan was to conduct a double envelopment.

CLICK 1: Platoon from Easy Company, 182nd moves to North Knob and disappears.

2. One of the Easy Company platoons moved north and made radio contact with the Fox Company platoon advancing south.

CLICK 2: Attack arrow from Fox Company, 182nd on North Knob followed by an explosion. After a two second delay, both the arrow and explosion will fade out.

3. The two platoons started south again and began their attack at approximately 1445, which the Japanese quickly repelled.

CLICK 3: Platoon icon from Easy Company, 182nd moves east and attacks north into the South Knob.

Virtual View 6-11: CP South Knob 1



Move forward to the lower South Knob.

4. The other Easy Company platoon started its advance up to the South Knob from the south. Using flame throwers and grenades, the platoon advanced until they reached

a shelf on the southern edge of the South Knob that was protected from small arms fire. However, there was no more fighting in this area and so the soldiers stayed where they were.

Virtual View 6-12: South Knob Battle



CLICK 4: Japanese flag comes in from the bottom of the slide and goes to the right side of Hill 260.

5. However, around 1800, the Japanese executed a bayonet assault against the Fox Company platoon attacking from the North Knob.

CLICK 5: Attack arrow and an explosion come from the Japanese flag toward the North Knob; then the flag, attack arrow, and explosion all fade out.

6. That bayonet charge was successfully repulsed by the Fox platoon but by 1900, active operations for the day were over.

Visual 6-5: Hill 260: 11 March – 0600 to 1400

1. After a fairly quiet night, the Japanese attacked early morning on the 11th.

CLICK 1: Attack arrow and explosion come from the enemy icon, then both fade out.

2. The Japanese position was strengthened overnight with additional manpower, and they quickly attacked Easy Company's position. However, Easy Company turned the Japanese back.

CLICK 2: George Company, 182nd (-) icon appears above Easy Company, 182nd. Baker Company icon then appears to the south of both.

3. Due to inadequate manpower, the regimental commander ordered George Company to move out of the main perimeter and relieve Easy Company.
4. As George Company was moving forward to conduct its relief in place, they ran into enemy troops. Those Japanese troops also began driving Easy Company out of its position near the South Knob.

Virtual View 6-13: Japanese Counterattack on Hill 260



CLICK 3: Both George Company, 182 (-) and Easy Company, 182 move back to the Eagle River.

5. It was then decided to pull both Easy and George Companies off of the South Knob. To help break contact, Baker Company was sent forward, and all three companies fell back across the Eagle River.

Virtual Movement: Move down the trail from Hill 260 back across the foot bridge and to the Southern CP.

CLICK 4: Trail goes from Baker Company, 182nd up to the North Knob.

6. At this point, Baker Company cut a new trail that started at the old southern trail and paralleled Hill 260.

Virtual View 6-14: Hill 260 Trail Cut



CLICK 5: Baker Company, 182nd icon moves up to the northwest corner of the North Knob.

Virtual Movement: Follow the trail cut to the North Knob.

7. Baker Company then made its way to the North Knob.

Virtual Movement: Move up to the top of the North Knob.

Visual 6-6: Hill 260: 11 March – 1500 to 2000

1. Late in the afternoon, Baker and Fox Companies, reinforced by a provisional flame thrower platoon from the 132nd Infantry, attacked the Japanese position again.

Virtual Movement: Go to the left side of the North Knob and move forward.

CLICK 1: Attack arrow and explosion coming from Fox Company, 182nd.

2. Fox Company pushed forward in a frontal attack.

CLICK 2: Attack arrow and explosion coming from Baker Company, 182nd.

Virtual Movement: Go to the right side of the North Knob and move forward.

3. While Baker Company attempted a flanking movement.

CLICK 3: Attack arrows and explosions fade out.

4. Around 1915, both companies withdrew back to the North Knob.

Virtual Movement: Go back to the original start point on the North Knob.

CLICK 4: Red and blue area on the South Knob fade out and are replaced by a larger red area.

5. At the end of the day the situation was largely unchanged; the North Knob was still in American hands and the South Knob was held by the Japanese.

Visual 6-7: Hill 260: 13 March – 1500 to 2000

CLICK 1: Baker Company, 182nd moves north of the North Knob and established a perimeter.

1. Baker Company, 182nd was pulled off the line on the morning of the 13th and moved north to establish a perimeter there.

CLICK 2: The Able Company, 182nd icon appears inside the MLR and moves to the North Knob.

Virtual View 6-9: CP North Knob 2



2. Able Company, 182nd was called forward to the MLR and then at approximately 1000, they took over for Baker Company.

CLICK 3: Baker Company, 132nd moves up to the MLR from the left side of the slide.

3. Baker Company, 132nd was then called forward to the MRL.

CLICK 4: There is an attack arrow from Baker Company, 132nd to the South Knob, then the icon moves up and there is an explosion.

Virtual View 6-10 (South CP, Foot Bridge, and South Knob)



- At 1400, Baker Company, 132nd moved forward of their MLR and attacked up the southwest slope of the South Knob. Able Company, 182nd provided supporting fires from the North Knob.

CLICK 5: The explosion disappears, and an attack arrow comes from the red area toward Baker Company, 132, then there is another explosion.

- The initial attack was successful but was finally halted by grenades and small arms fire.

Virtual View 6-13 (Japanese Counterattack on Hill 260)



- The Japanese then counterattacked against Baker Company, 132's left flank. Able Company, 182nd moved forward to assist but were quickly stopped.

CLICK 6: The attack arrow and explosion fade out, Baker Company, 132nd moves back inside the MLR.

Virtual View 6-11: (CP South Knob 1)



7. Baker Company's reserve platoon drove the Japanese off and allowed the company to withdraw back to the MRL.
8. The next day, 14 March, the Americans decided that they would not attempt any further direct attacks on the hill based on the severe losses they had suffered utilizing that attack technique.

CLICK 7: Muda's main force departs, leaving only a screening force on the South Knob.

9. On 15 March the Japanese high command decided to move most of *Muda's* men from Hill 260 to reinforce *Magata*, who had made little progress against the 129th Infantry Regiment.

Q: How was *Muda* able to depart the area with the majority of his troops while the Americans on Hill 260 were unaware of his movement?

Virtual View 6-15: (Muda Movement from Hill 260)



10. The Japanese detachment left at Hill 260 made two more attempts to penetrate the American perimeter, on 15 and 17 March, but were driven back both times.

Q: Why do you think attacks were made on these two dates?

11. Hill 260 was eventually abandoned by the Japanese on 27 March, which coincided with the start of the overall Japanese retreat.⁴¹
12. On 28 March, American forces advanced back up the hill once again only to discover that the Japanese had abandoned it and disappeared back into the jungle.
13. In the end, there were 98 U.S. soldiers dead, 24 missing, and 581 wounded. A total of 560 Japanese dead were found on top of the South Knob when the U.S. forces reoccupied it.

Analysis:

1. Muda had the smallest number of soldiers, but he had more success than Iwasa did at Hill 700 and Magata did at the Twin Creeks. What do you attribute that to?

⁴¹ History of War.Org, pg. 10.

2. Why do most of the American attacks appear to be made by only one company? Why not send more than one company (mass) to hit a specific point on the enemy perimeter (concentration)?

Stand 7: Twin Creeks / Final Counterattack

Visuals: 7-1: Twin Creeks: 11-17 March
7-2: Twin Creeks: 11 March – 1600 to Dark
7-3: Twin Creeks: 12 March – Dawn to 1405
7-4: Twin Creeks: 13 March – 0400 to 1405
7-5: Twin Creeks: 15 March – 0400 to 1635
7-6: Final Japanese Counterattack: 23 March – 0400 to 1400

Virtual Views: 7-1: Overhead View of Twin Creeks
7-2: Closer View of Mount Nampi
7-3: Magata Initial Attack
7-4: Tank Position on the Little Hand
7-5: 129th Command Post
7-6: Consolidation Routes
7-7: Consolidation Behind Mount Nampi
7-8: Attack on the 129th
7-9: Movement Forward to Fortifications
7-10: Tank Counterattack at the Big Hand
7-11: Final Japanese Retreat

Orientation:

- Highlight both of the creeks.
- Show Mount Nampi.
- **Orientation will be done just prior to using the virtual terrain.**

Description:

Visual 7-1: Twin Creeks: 11-17 March

1. *Magata* was located behind Mount Nampei.

Virtual View 7-1: Overhead View of Twin Creeks



Visual 7-2: Twin Creeks: 11 March – 1600 to Dark

1. While *Iwasa* was attacking Hill 700 and *Muda* was attacking Hill 260, *Magata* limited his actions to local area patrolling hoping that *Iwasa's* and *Muda's* attacks would compel General Beightler to send units from the 129th Infantry area to assist the 145th at Hill 700.
2. The Americans had captured documents revealing *Magata's* intentions, and the 129th Regiment had spent the previous two months building a formidable defensive line, with mutually supporting pillboxes protected by double apron barbed wire barriers and minefields while also being equipped with numerous machine guns, 75mm pack howitzers, and 37mm antitank guns.

Virtual View 7-2: Closer View of Mount Nampi. Move from behind Mount Nampei toward the 129th, stop short of coming out of the wood line.



3. On 11 March, *Colonel Magata* moved from his Mount Nampei assembly area and began his attack designed to penetrate the 129th Infantry Regiment's perimeter and then capture the Piva airfields located in that sector.

CLICK 1: a. Explosion and arrow near the top right of the slide.
b. After a two second delay, both fade out.

4. When an anti-personnel mine exploded in front of the Easy Company perimeter around 1600, the Regimental Commander ordered all his unit's outposts and patrols back inside the wire.

CLICK 2: Dashed line goes up near the convergence of three trails near the top right, followed by an explosion.

5. After the DIVARTY and mortars fired a 10-minute concentration, a patrol from George Company went out and examined the impact area.

CLICK 3: Dashed line and explosion both fade out.

6. The patrol quickly came under Japanese fire and returned to report that it had found at least 14 enemy machine guns.
7. Around 2100, General Beightler warned Colonel Frederick, the 129th commander, to expect a general attack the next day.

CLICK 4: Charlie Company, 82nd Chemical Company moves onto the slide from the bottom right.

8. About this same time, Charlie Company, 82nd Chemical Battalion was attached to the 129th Infantry Regiment.

Visual 7-3: Twin Creeks: 12 March – Dawn to 1405

Virtual View 7-3: Magata's Initial Attack



1. As dawn broke, the 129th discovered that the Japanese had been successful in cutting through the George Company apron wire and had achieved two minor penetrations.
 - CLICK 1:** a. Five attack arrows move down from the two enemy icons to various locations along the 129th sector.
 - b. Two Japanese salient appear at the end of the right two arrows.
 - c. Then all attack arrows fade out.
2. *Magata* delivered the first of his major attacks with two battalions, *the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 45th Infantry Regiment*. *The 1st of the 45th*, was centered on a hundred-yard front straddling the Logging Trail, the sector held by George Company.
3. Although suffering very heavy casualties, the Japanese penetrated the first line of the American defenses by sheer weight of numbers and captured seven US pillboxes. The first two pillboxes were in the left salient and the remaining five were in the right one.
4. The Japanese tried to exploit their penetrations, but were held in check by American artillery, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire.

CLICK 2: Charlie Company, 129th icon fades in near the center of the slide.

5. Charlie Company, 129th was called forward from the regimental reserve to support George Company.

CLICK 3: Charlie Company, 129th icon moves up to the left-most Japanese salient.

6. By 0810, one of the two pillboxes had been retaken. The second pillbox took longer to be retaken.

CLICK 4: The leftmost Japanese salient fades out.

7. After a mortar barrage, three rifle platoons and two flame throwers attacked and the second pillbox was taken back by 1405.
8. The Japanese attempted a counterattack, but it was quickly repulsed. Even though the left salient was recovered, the Japanese still occupied the five pillboxes within the right salient.

Visual 7-4: Twin Creeks: 13 March – 0400 to 1405

CLICK 1: a. One attack arrow moves down from the right Japanese icon.
b. A small salient forms.
c. The attack arrow fades out.

1. The Japanese struck the 129th again at 0400 on the 13th and were able to gain one more pillbox before they were finally stopped.

CLICK 2: Baker Company, 129th and Charlie Company, 754th TB unit icons appear.

2. At 0815, the Corps headquarters released 1st Platoon, Charlie Company, 754th Tank Battalion. At approximately this same time, Baker Company, 129th moved up to assist as well.

CLICK 3: Attack arrows from Charlie, George, and Baker Companies and Charlie Company, 754th TB move to both salients.

Virtual View 7-4: Tank Positions on the “Little Hand”



3. Four tanks and elements of Baker, Charlie, and George Companies attacked at 1000 after a ten-minute artillery prep.
4. Due to the uneven terrain, the tanks could not effectively bring their guns into the fight, so after the first two pillboxes were recaptured, the attack was paused.
5. The attack renewed at 1315 and after about an hour, the tanks were nearly out of fuel and ammunition, so a different tank platoon was sent forward so the attacks could continue.
6. The units re-started their attack at 1715, and by 1930, all the Japanese pillboxes were demolished, and the original line was almost restored.
7. The 14th was a fairly quiet day except for some small arms firing and occasional artillery and mortar fire.

Visual 7-5: Twin Creeks: 15 March – 0400 to 1635

- CLICK 1:**
- a. Attack arrows move down from all three enemy icons.
 - b. Three explosions follow from right to left. Each explosion fades before the next occurs.

1. At 0400 on 15 March, *1st and 3rd Battalions of the 45th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 81st Infantry* assaulted the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry area once again.

- CLICK 2:**
- a. Two right enemy attack arrows fade.
 - b. Salient forms at the end of the left-most attack arrow.
 - c. Attack arrow fades out.

2. The Japanese again achieved a small local success in a sector held by 2nd Platoon, Fox Company. By dawn they had seized one pillbox and penetrated to a depth of about one hundred yards.

Virtual View 7-5: 129th Command Post



CLICK 3: Platoon icons from Fox Company, 129th, Charlie Company, 754th TB, and Charlie Company, 129th appear.

3. Platoons from Fox Company, 129th, Charlie Company, 754th TB, and Charlie Company, 129th were brought together to plan a coordinated attack on the salient.

CLICK 4: Attack arrows from those three icons move to the salient.

4. Those three units began their counterattack at 1153 with flame throwers and bazookas. But the enemy still held the salient and had even dug fighting positions down within the roots of some banyan trees.
5. A tank-infantry attack began at 1500 but made only small gains.

CLICK 5: Salient, attack arrows, and platoon icons fade.

6. At 1635, a second tank-infantry attack killed or drove off all the enemy and the salient was eliminated.
7. So here on 15 March, *the Japanese* are seeing very limited success against the 129th in the Twin Creeks area and this is when the decision was made to start pulling supporting effort troops from *Iwasa* and *Muda* to support *Magata*.

8. There were no Japanese attacks on 16 March, but they attacked again on 17 March, effected a small penetration in the Fox Company sector, but another tank-infantry counterattack quickly eliminated that effort.

Q: At this point, Kanda made his decision to support Magata and the main effort. Why would he not reinforce success with Muda at Hill 260?

Virtual View 7-6: Consolidation Routes



9. Having failed to carry out their initial plan, *Generals Hyakutake* and *Kanda* withdrew most of their forces from Hills 700 and 260 (minus the screening force left at Hill 260) and moved them north to consolidate them with *Magata's* forces in order to prepare for one final attempt to break through to the Piva airfields.

Orientation:

- We are currently near the logging trail that was used during *Magata's* previous attacks on the 129th's sector of the perimeter.
- By this time, *Magata* had been reinforced with the majority of soldiers from *Iwasa* (from Hill 700) and *Muda* (from Hill 260).
- **Pull back for an overhead view of the entire 129th perimeter at Twin Creeks.**

Visual 7-6: Final Counterattack: 23 March – 0400-1400

1. By not conducting any assaults from March 18-22, *Magata* was able to put together a new force of almost 5,000 infantrymen by combining the soldiers from *Iwasa* and *Muda* along with the remainder of his own.

Q: However, what did that provide to the American force?

2. During this same time, the Americans rebuilt their damaged positions and buried the Japanese dead.
3. Captured documents and constant reconnaissance enabled the Americans to figure out Japanese intentions. Allied code breakers also intercepted and decoded a message from *Hyakutake* to *Imperial General Headquarters* informing them of the impending attack on 23 March.

CLICK 1: Japanese attack arrows move down toward the MLR followed by five explosions, each fades before the next one occurs.

Virtual View 7-7: Consolidation Behind Mount Nampi



4. After dark on 23 March, the Japanese launched an artillery bombardment, followed by sporadic firefights that lasted most of the night. Like previous attacks, the Japanese units attacked through the ravines.

Virtual View 7-8: Attack on the 129th. Stop short of coming out of the woodline.




5. The Americans responded with heavy artillery and mortar fire. Most of the advancing Japanese units were stopped with heavy casualties.

CLICK 2: Japanese attack arrows fade out, but a larger attack arrow comes from the unit on the far left.

6. The enemy was once again successful against 1st Platoon of Fox Company in the Cox Creek area, a little farther west of the earlier penetration against this unit.

CLICK 3: Attack arrows fade, two areas of enemy concentration appear near the 2nd Battalion HQs, and the *13th Regimental* icon also appears in that area.

Virtual View 7-9: Movement Forward to Fortifications: Move to the open ground and then rush across and get into the American fortifications.



7. About one hundred Japanese troops captured four pillboxes and pushed forward to a low ridge about twenty-five yards from the 2nd Battalion command post.
8. After dawn broke, the Americans poured small arms and machine gun fire into the Japanese and kept them from successfully trying to expand their lodgment.

CLICK 4: An anti-tank platoon from 3rd platoon, Able Company, 754th TB, and a platoon from King Company, 129th move up near the 2nd Battalion CP.

9. General Beightler and his commanders quickly responded to that threat. Two platoons from the anti-tank company, 3rd platoon from Able Company, 754th Tank Battalion, and a platoon from King Company, 129th Infantry Regiment assembled near the 2nd Battalion CP.

CLICK 5: Two companies of the 148th infantry Regiment were then dispatched to positions behind the Battalion CP.

10. General Beightler then moved two companies from the 148th Infantry Regiment up behind the 2nd Battalion CP.

CLICK 6: Attack arrows appear as the four platoons attack to the northwest, the two areas of concentration fade out, and the *Magata* icon moves back toward the MLR.

Visual Movement: Move up to counterattack area.

11. The anti-tank, infantry, and tank platoons then attacked the Japanese at 0725 and by 0745, they had broken the Japanese resistance there and recaptured the disputed ridge.

CLICK 7: The 4.2-inch chemical mortar icon appears, there are three explosions, each appearing and fading before the next, and then the *Magata* icon disappears.

12. By 0930, the Americans reorganized and drove into the Japanese again, but this time they were also supported by the 37th DIVARTY, three battalions of artillery from the AMERICAL Division, the 129th Cannon Company, and twenty-four 4.2-inch mortars, which fired into the ravines.
13. The Americans burned and blasted the Japanese out of the ravines, trenches, foxholes, and pillboxes where they were found. The seven artillery battalions, augmented by heavy mortars, shelled enemy concentrations in front of the American lines.

Virtual View 7-10: Tank Counterattack at the “Big Hand”. Show the tanks.



CLICK 8: The four remaining Japanese unit icons fly off the screen toward the top of the screen.

14. Shortly after noon the Japanese assembly areas opposite the 129th Regiment were hit by the most massive artillery barrage of the Pacific War to that point, a concentration of 14,882 shells. The Japanese counteroffensive was defeated.
15. The four remaining Japanese units quickly dispersed and left the area. By 1400, *Hyakutake's* counteroffensive was over.
16. *Hyakutake* was told by *Imamura* to then resort to guerrilla warfare.

Virtual View 7-11: Final Japanese Retreat. Simulate the Japanese withdrawal to Nampai.



17. *Iwasa* and *Muda* withdrew south to Buin, while *Magata's* 1,500 survivors went north via the Numa Numa Trail.⁴²

18. The Japanese left a large amount of material behind. The captured equipment included nine 75mm mountain guns, three 37mm guns, five 90mm mortars, two 20mm anti-aircraft guns, ninety light and fifty-one heavy machine guns, fifty-two grenade launchers, hundreds of rifles, and even seventy-three officer sabers.⁴³

19. The failed counterattack cost the Japanese 5,000 dead and 3,000 wounded, while the Americans only lost 263 dead.⁴⁴

Q: Besides the fighting that had taken place, what else do you think contributed to the defeat of the Japanese counterattacks?

20. One of the reasons for the crushing defeat suffered by the Japanese was the poor condition of their troops. The morbidity rate among the 30,000 Japanese on the Islands was terrific; 13,000 died. Of those, 3,000 were killed in action and the rest died because of illness.⁴⁵

21. American medical personnel who examined Japanese prisoners of war and Japanese dead concluded that 90% of the Japanese troops were already suffering from malnutrition, malaria, beri-beri, or other debilitating illnesses.⁴⁶

22. **This shows how effective the use of preventative medicine and actions by the US was as compared to the Japanese who did not have any of those measures available or in place.**

Analysis:

1. Why do you think that the Japanese failed in this last major offensive in the Solomons?

- Perhaps the most important reason was the incompetence of General Hyakutake and Kanda as they launched the assault without adequate knowledge of the ground strength of their enemy.*
- The assault plan dispersed the units and called for unsupported attacks to be conducted within an unrealistic timeframe.*

⁴² Diamond, pg. 21.

⁴³ Gailey, pg. 166.

⁴⁴ History of War.Org, pg. 10.

⁴⁵ Schwartz, Joseph L., Captain (MC) USN (Retired) "Experiences in Battle of the Medical Department of the Navy in World War II." <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Medical/I/USN-Medical-2.html#Solomons>. Chapter II, The Solomons Campaign, pages 79-80. Accessed 6 June 2022, pg. 80.

⁴⁶ The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia, pg. 17.

- *They depended on the loyalty, bravery, and fanatical devotion of the Japanese soldier.*
- *They had not learned the power of American massed artillery, which eventually caused so much havoc.*
- *They never massed their own artillery on a single point or area in support of their assaulting troops.*
- *There was no flexibility of the plans. It was only after the Iwasa and Muda forces had been defeated that the remaining units of the 6th Division were concentrated against the 129th. Until then, they were three uncoordinated, piecemeal attacks.*
- *A final reason may be the fact that the American forces were fully aware of the plan.*

2. How do you employ tanks in a jungle environment?⁴⁷

- *Restrictive terrain and the lack of LOCs can limit armored forces' mobility in the jungle.*
- *Armored forces primarily provide support by fire for infantry in jungle operations.*

***Armored forces are best suited to the following tactical tasks in the jungle.*

- *Support by fire.*
 - *A tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire to support of another maneuvering force.*
- *Retain key terrain.*
 - *A tactical mission task in which the commander ensures that a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use.*
- *Destroy or defeat enemy armor.*
- *Reduce encircled or isolated enemy forces.*
 - *A tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an encircled or bypassed enemy force.*

⁴⁷ US Army. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.98 *Jungle Operations*, pgs. 2-12 – 2-14.

- *Secure critical facilities or infrastructure.*
 - *A tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.*
- *Suppress.*
 - *A tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission.*

***Use of armor in the jungle is restricted by:*

- *Vegetation.*
 - *Densely forested areas, where tree trunks grow close and heavy above-ground root systems exist, limit armored forces' mobility. Thick stands of bamboo may slow or even stop tanks.*
- *Topography.*
 - *Many jungles exist in rugged mountainous areas that impede armored forces' mobility. Swamps, coastal river basins, and other areas with high water tables and multiple water ways pose obstacles to tanks because of their soft soil and frequent deep channels.*
- *Weather.*
 - *Heavy rain and monsoons cause rivers and streams to rise and become unfordable. They also saturate the soil and damage roads, leaving both improved and unimproved LOCs impassable for armor.*

***Although limited, tanks are not precluded from jungle operations, and restrictions can be mitigated by adhering to the following principles:*

- *Know the terrain.*
 - *Know where tanks can travel and avoid areas obviously impassable.*
- *Know the weather.*
 - *Know the recent conditions. Know the forecast. Know the effects these conditions have on armored vehicles.*

- *Move dismounted infantry in front of armored forces through unfamiliar and densely forested terrain. They can check and verify conditions, act as guides, and provide security.*

***Some movement tips that apply to most jungle areas:*

- *Red silt soils tend to break down quickly when wet. They may support a single tracked vehicle but become impassible with heavy use.*
- *Streams and creeks that appear fordable but contain yellowish reeds and cloudy water usually have bottoms too soft to support tanks.*
- *Rice paddies in the dry season are usually trafficable to tanks and personnel carriers. However, during the rainy season, they often become impassable. Fields with standing water in the wet season may have a bottom too soft to move on; those containing clear water and green vegetation are usually firm enough for armored vehicles.*
- *River and stream bottoms are usually impassible. The armored vehicle launched bridge can span 57 feet and the rapidly emplaced bridge system used by Strykers can span a 42 foot unprepared gap. Both are more than adequate for most streams encountered in the jungle.*
 - *Troops should ensure that the bank shoulders can support the bridge while tanks cross.*
 - *When units do not have a bridge, they can use perforated steel planks to provide a firm surface on which tanks can ford small streams.*

Stand 8: Follow-On Operations

Visuals: 8-1: Follow-On Operations – March / April 1944

Virtual View: 8-1: Overhead View of the Entire Perimeter

Orientation:

- We are currently near the logging trail that was used during *Magata*'s previous attacks on the 129th's sector of the perimeter.
- By this time, *Magata* had been reinforced with the majority of soldiers from *Iwasa* (from Hill 700) and *Muda* (from Hill 260).
- **Virtual View 8-1: Overhead View of the Entire Perimeter**



Description:

Visual 8-1: Follow-On Operations

1. The AMERICAL Division went on the offensive in late March 1944, and drove the Japanese east of Mavavia River.

CLICK 1: Arrows and a LOA line appear to the right.

2. In April patrols from the 37th Division cleared the Laruma Valley area of remaining enemy units.

CLICK 2: Arrows and a LOA line appear to the left.

3. The failure of the March 1944 Japanese offensive ended the main fighting during the American period on Bougainville. With Japanese morale at rock bottom, and the Americans disinclined to stir up trouble pointlessly, a sort of unspoken truce settled over the perimeter (quoted by Gailey 1995).

Vignette: "One night some captured Japanese film of the sinking of the USS Lexington, an aircraft carrier, was being shown along with the regular Hollywood movie at the 37th Division theater, possibly at "Loewe's Bougainville." As the Jap planes laid bomb after bomb and torpedo after torpedo into the listing Lexington, there suddenly came shouts of "Banzai! Banzai!" from the tangled but huge branches of a banyan tree on a near side of the rows of seats. A Jap had hidden himself to watch the movie but was overcome with patriotism at the sight of his comrades in the airforce [sic] sending an enemy ship to the bottom! He was pulled from the tree with no trouble and entered the POW compound." ⁴⁸

4. Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM, the invasion of Bougainville (1 November 1943-March 1944) was the last major operation in the Solomon Islands campaign and saw the Americans occupy and secure a bridgehead on an island that the Japanese had decided to make a bastion of their defensive line.
5. Starting in December, when the first Allied airfield on Bougainville became operational, Air Solomons or AIRSOLS, the Allied air units in the Solomon Islands campaign, mounted the main onslaught against Rabaul. It ended shortly after American fast carriers devastated the main Japanese Central Pacific base at Truk on 17 February.
6. Actual loss figures remain elusive. Total Japanese losses in the air and on the ground ran somewhere above 300 aircraft. AIRSOLS listed losses of 136 planes in "daylight missions" from November 1943 to March 1944.

⁴⁸ The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia, pg. 14.

7. Like the Marines previously, XIV Corps was needed elsewhere, specifically to help with retaking the Philippines
8. The AMERICAL division continued training and long-range patrol activity until 30 November 1944 when they were relieved. The division later took part in the Southern Philippines Campaign from 27 Feb-4 Jul 45.⁴⁹
9. The 37th Division remained on Bougainville and trained for the Luzon campaign which they participated in from 15 Dec 44-4 Jul 45.⁵⁰
10. Bougainville was turned over to the 7th, 15th and 29th Brigades of the 3rd Australian Division and the 11th Brigade of the 3rd Australian Infantry Division, part of Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savage's (SAV-ODD-GA) II Australian Corps.⁵¹
11. All were militia brigades that had seen heavy fighting in New Guinea.
12. The Australians assumed command on 22 November, and by 12 December all US units had been pulled out of the line.
13. General Sir Thomas Blamey, the commander of the Australian Land Forces, and Savage elected to take the war to the Japanese rather than sit idly in the perimeter.⁵²
14. Allied intelligence estimates of the remaining Japanese strength on the island varied, although it was believed that there were around 17,500 Japanese on Bougainville. Although later that was proved to be a major underestimate, the Australians nevertheless believed that the Japanese, while understrength and almost totally devoid of heavier weapons (or at least the ammunition for them), were still capable of carrying out effective combat operations.
15. By the time Savage ordered a general offensive on 23 December, the Australians had already made several strong probes into Japanese-held territory. Although likely outnumbered, Savage was counting on poor morale and dismal physical condition of the Japanese to tip the balance. By this time, in fact, the Japanese were dying of illness and starvation at the rate of some 3,000 men every month.
16. Savage's (SAV-ODD-GA'S) forces engaged the Japanese across the entire island of Bougainville. In September 1945, he accepted the Japanese surrender on Bougainville.

⁴⁹ US Army Center of Military History. "23rd Infantry Division – AMERICAL." <http://www.history.army.mil/> Various divisional histories. Accessed 7 June 2022.

<https://history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/cbtchron/cc/americal.html>

⁵⁰ US Army Center of Military History. "37th Infantry Division – Buckeyes." <http://www.history.army.mil/> Various divisional histories. Accessed 7 June 2022.

⁵¹ Prefer, Nathan N. "Savage Fight for Hill 700 on Bougainville."

<https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2021/09/17/savage-fight-for-hill-700-on-bougainville/>. Accessed 6 June 2022, pg. 15.

⁵² Chant, pgs. 25-27.

Analysis:

1. What principles of the defense did you see that helped the US defeat the Japanese counterattacks?

- *Disruption*
- *Flexibility*
- *Mass and concentration*
- *Preparation*
- *and Security*

Field Sanitation Medical Module

Visuals: M-1: Field Sanitation
M-2: Diseases from Poor Sanitation (1 of 2)
M-3: Diseases from Poor Sanitation (2 of 2)
M-4: Other Common Diseases (1 of 2)
M-5: Other Common Diseases (2 of 2)
M-6: Combat Operational Stress Control (1 of 2)
M-7: Combat Operational Stress Control (1 of 2)
M-8: Preventative Measures to Combat COSC

Virtual View: **None**

Orientation:

- None.
- **No virtual terrain used during this stand.**

Visual M-1: Field Sanitation

1. In every armed conflict more soldiers become mission incapable by disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) than by combat-inflicted wounds.⁵³
2. Armies in the early 20th century faced a variety of communicable diseases. By the 1930's, however, medical advances and simple hygiene had begun to turn the tide.
3. Outbreaks such as the 1898 typhoid fever epidemic—which decimated the army, accounted for 15 percent of casualties, and resulted in over 2,000 deaths during the Spanish American War - and the 1917-1918 influenza that killed over 30,000 soldiers during World War I, were becoming less common with proper sanitation and isolation.
4. In 1942, the U.S. military vaccinated all active-duty personnel against tetanus, typhoid, smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever, curbing or eliminating these diseases during WWII.⁵⁴

⁵³ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook, "Field Sanitation in Contingency Operations", <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456204>, Accessed 27 June 2022. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, 2005, forward page.

⁵⁴ Brinson, Freda, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific", <https://www.aapc.com/blog/26557-wwii-military-health-in-the-pacific/>. Accessed 27 June 2022.

5. In OIF from 19 March 03 to 30 Apr 04, 6,475 Soldiers were evacuated; 3,773 were evacuated for non-battle injuries and 1,182 were wounded-in-action (WIA).⁵⁵
6. Despite medical advances, for every two men lost to battle in the Southwest Pacific theater (which included the Solomon Islands), five men were lost to disease.⁵⁶

Visual M-2: Diseases from Poor Sanitation (1 of 2)

1. In battlefield conditions, proper sanitation is often sacrificed. As a result, WWII soldiers suffered from several prominent diseases.
2. Dysentery was typically the result of unsanitary water that contained micro-organisms, which damaged the intestinal lining.
3. To purify water, soldiers were given halazone tablets. It took several tablets added to one canteen to purify questionable water.
4. Canvas water bags – also known as Lister bags – were hung around camps and used for dispensing water in which a dose of chlorine was added for purification.⁵⁷
 - a. Prevention: If you visit a tropical or less developed country where dysentery spreads:
 - 1) Drink and brush your teeth with bottled or canned water only, not tap water.
 - 2) Only eat raw fruits and vegetables that have a peel.
 - 3) Cook any produce that you can't peel.

When someone close to you has dysentery:

- 1) Wash your hands often with soap and warm water.
 - 2) Do not share towels, cups, or other personal items with someone that has dysentery.
 - 3) Wash your hands before you cook or eat.
- b. Diagnosis: Dysentery symptoms look like a lot of other intestinal illnesses, including a common stomach virus.

⁵⁵ CALL Handbook, pg. vii.

⁵⁶ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

⁵⁷ Ibid.

- c. Treatment: Most people with bacillary dysentery do not need prescription medicine. The infection usually passes on its own within a week. Drink plenty of water to replace the fluid lost through diarrhea.
 - 1) If you have amoebic dysentery with symptoms, you can take medicine to kill the parasites in your blood, intestines, and liver. The normal time for this treatment is about 10 days.

Vignette: Mentioning food, the squadron had a mess tent. We would take our mess kits in, and they'd plop down the fare of the day—usually something green, something gray, and something else. It was important to keep your kit clean. I learned the hard way that if you didn't wash the little corners and crevasses of your kit, you could get sick. I didn't and I did. — Buck Brinson, 46th Troop Carrier Squadron.⁵⁸

Visual M-3: Diseases from Poor Sanitation (2 of 2)

- 1. Cholera, which causes severe diarrhea and dehydration, is a bacterial disease usually spread through contaminated water. Cholera vaccines and lectures were given, and the disease was limited among American troops during WWII.⁵⁹
 - a. Prevention: There is a vaccine for cholera. You can protect yourself by using only water that has been boiled, chemically disinfected, or that is bottled.
 - b. Diagnosis: If not treated, dehydration could lead to shock and death in a matter of hours.
 - c. Treatment: If you develop severe, watery diarrhea and vomiting -- particularly after eating raw shellfish or traveling to a country where cholera is epidemic -- seek medical help immediately.
 - 1) Cholera is highly treatable, but because dehydration can happen quickly, it is important to get treatment right away.
 - 2) Hydration is the main treatment for cholera. Depending on how severe the diarrhea is, oral or intravenous solutions may be used to replace lost fluids.
 - 3) Antibiotics, which kill the bacteria, are not used for mild cases, but can reduce the duration of diarrhea by half and also reduce the excretion of the bacteria, thus helping to prevent the spread of the disease.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Dunkin, Mary Anne. "Cholera" <https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/cholera-faq>. Accessed 27 June 2022.

2. More common was hepatitis A epidemics from contaminated food or water.
3. Most reported cases of hepatitis B were due to infected inoculations (Yellow Fever vaccine) from tainted blood supplies.
4. From March-April 1942, approximately 330,000 soldiers were injected, which resulted in 50,000 hospitalizations.⁶¹
 - a. Prevention: Good personal hygiene can help prevent the spread of hepatitis A.
 - 1) Reduce the risk of hepatitis B by not sharing personal care items that may be contaminated with blood (e.g., razors, toothbrushes).
 - b. Diagnosis: Both hepatitis A and B are diagnosed with a blood sample. Liver enzyme and function tests may also be administered.
 - 1) For hepatitis B, the lab will also examine whether your blood contains any hepatitis B antigens (proteins on the surface of the virus that help your immune system recognize infections).
 - c. Treatment: Most people with hepatitis A or B will recover without treatment within 4 to 8 weeks after symptoms start.
 - 1) There are vaccines against both hepatitis A and B that have been shown effective at preventing infection.
 - 2) Immune globulin, which contains antibodies that may help prevent and decrease the severity of hepatitis A or B infections is most effective if given as soon as possible after exposure.⁶²
5. Even today, malaria is a common problem. A mosquito transmits the blood-borne, microscopic malaria parasites from host to host.
6. The treatment for malaria during WWII was quinine. Quinine tablets did not cure malaria but only masked the effects. Quinine use could create ringing in the ears and a dulling of all senses, which caused additional problems in combat situations.
7. Quinine was unreliable in more ways than one: it was grown only on the island of Java, which fell to the Japanese in January 1942. Quinine shortages proved disastrous for troops engaged in the early months of the war.⁶³

⁶¹ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

⁶² MedBroadcast. "Hepatitis A and B" <https://medbroadcast.com/condition/getcondition/hepatitis-a-and-b>. Accessed 27 June 2022.

⁶³ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

a. Prevention:

- 1) Use the DOD Insect Repellent System and permethrin treated bed nets.
- 2) Limit outdoor activity at dusk and evening, when possible, when mosquitos are most active. Although generally nocturnal, mosquitoes frequently feed during the day.

b. Diagnosis: Diagnosis is based on seeing the parasite in blood smears.

- 1) Malaria MUST be considered in all Soldiers with fever in a malaria region. Disease can occur before parasites are detectable by blood smear, but critically ill patients will have a detectable parasitemia at some time in their illness.

c. Treatment: Seek medical attention. Treatment is with antiparasitic drugs. These are usually higher doses of the same drugs used for prevention.⁶⁴

Visual M-4: Other Common Diseases (1 of 2)

1. Common problems for troops in the Southwest Pacific theatre included beriberi, dengue fever, scrub typhus, leishmaniasis, and "jungle rot."⁶⁵
2. Beriberi is a severe vitamin B1 (thiamine) deficiency. Symptoms include pain, loss of sensation in the hands and feet, vomiting, strange eye movement, mental confusion, difficulty walking, coma, and death.⁶⁶
 - a. Prevention: Lack of thiamin, or vitamin B1, in the diet will lead to beriberi, no matter where you live in the world.
 - 1) While your body stores thiamin in the liver, it doesn't hold enough to prevent a deficiency.
 - b. Diagnosis: If symptoms are not attended to when they first appear, beriberi may progress into Korsakoff syndrome, a kind of encephalopathy, which refers to damage or disease that affects the brain.
 - 1) Extensive damage to parts of the brain, particularly the thalamus and hypothalamus, may cause severe confusion and memory loss, one of the main signs of Korsakoff syndrome.

⁶⁴ CALL Handbook, pg. 19.

⁶⁵ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

⁶⁶ Ibid.

c. Treatment:

- 1) Assuming it is not too advanced, doctors will try to correct the deficiency by recommending a thiamin-rich diet.
 - 2) Advanced cases of beriberi need more than a diet change. Certain types of medication will be prescribed. Daily thiamin infusions, delivered either orally or intravenously as many as three times daily, have been successful in treating beriberi.⁶⁷
3. Dengue fever is also known as breakbone fever because it is said to feel like your bones and joints are breaking. It is carried by mosquitos (the same breed that causes yellow fever).
4. Symptoms include a high fever, severe headache, backache, joint pains, nausea and vomiting, eye pain and a rash.⁶⁸
- a. Prevention: Use the DOD Insect Repellent System and permethrin treated bed nets.
 - b. Diagnosis: Dengue is diagnosed by a blood test.
 - c. Treatment: There is no specific treatment for dengue. Persons with dengue should rest and drink plenty of fluids.
 - 1) They should be kept away from mosquitoes for the protection of others. Supportive care for dengue hemorrhagic fever includes replacing lost fluids.
 - 2) Some patients need transfusions to control bleeding.
 - 3) Most dengue infections result in relatively mild illness, but some can progress to dengue hemorrhagic fever, where blood vessels start to leak, causing bleeding from the nose, mouth, and gums.
 - 4) Without prompt treatment, the blood vessels can collapse, causing shock (dengue shock syndrome). Dengue hemorrhagic fever is fatal in about 5 percent of cases, mostly among children and young adults.⁶⁹
5. Scrub typhus, left untreated, is often fatal.
6. Marked by high fevers, hallucinations, and severe (sometimes fatal) hemorrhaging, the disease is carried a tiny chigger or mite.

⁶⁷ <https://www.webmd.com/brain/what-is-beriberi>

⁶⁸ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

⁶⁹ CALL Handbook, pg. 25.

7. Ten to twelve days after being bitten, a reddish/pinkish lesion appears at the bite site, and symptoms of headache, fever, chills, general pains, and swollen lymph glands began.
8. A week after the fever, a pinkish rash develops over the skin of the trunk, and sometimes of the arms and legs. This could last as long as four weeks.
9. Long-term effects such as heart function and circulatory failure are common.
10. Insecticide powder was used in WWII to prevent the spread of the mites..⁷⁰
 - a. Prevention: There's no vaccine that can protect you from typhus.
 - 1) Bathing at least once a week and changing clothes on a regular basis.
 - 2) Use an insect repellent that contains 20% to 30% DEET.
 - b. Diagnosis:
 - 1) A blood test will check for typhus bacteria.
 - 2) You may be started on an antibiotic treatment right away to be safe.
 - c. Treatment: The most effective therapy for typhus is the antibiotic doxycycline.
 - 1) A single dose of doxycycline has proved effective against epidemic typhus, and it works quickly on other strains of the disease.
 - 2) For the best results, you should take it as soon as possible after your symptoms start..⁷¹

Visual M-5: Other Common Diseases (2 of 2)

1. Leishmaniasis is caused by protozoan and transmitted by the bite of a certain sand fly species.
2. There are cutaneous (characterized by one or more skin sores, which could start out as bumps and end up as ulcers) and visceral (characterized by fever, weight loss, and enlarged spleen and liver) varieties..⁷²

⁷⁰ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

⁷¹ Svoboda, Elizabeth. "Typhus" <https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/what-is-typhus>. Accessed 27 June 2022.

⁷² Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

a. Prevention:

- 1) Use the DOD Insect Repellent System and permethrin treated bed nets.
- 2) When possible, limit outdoor activity at dusk and during the evening when the sand fly is most active. Sand flies, although generally nocturnal, frequently feed during the day.

b. Diagnosis:

- 1) May be determined by a blood test or from a culture in stained smears from bone marrow, the spleen, the liver, lymph nodes, or blood.
- 2) Acute visceral leishmaniasis will frequently present as a severe fever that is often confused with malaria.

c. Treatment: If you have a bite that will not heal, seek medical attention..⁷³

3. “Jungle rot” was a term used to describe conditions from an inability to stay dry.
4. This can be similar to aggravated athletes’ foot—a fungus infection on the trunk, thighs, face, and scalp.
5. Treatments for soldiers were to clean the area, paint it with silver nitrate, dress it, and avoid sweating (easier said than done)..⁷⁴
6. Trench foot is probably the most well-known result of jungle rot.
 - a. Description: Trench foot is a very serious injury that may result in permanent nerve or tissue damage.
 - 1) Constant dampness softens skin, causes blistering or bleeding, and may lead to infection.
 - 2) Untreated, trench foot may require amputation.
 - b. Symptoms: Early signs of trench foot include itching, numbness, or tingling pain.
 - 1) Later the feet may appear swollen and the skin mildly red, blue, or black resulting from prolonged exposure to wet, cold conditions or the outright immersion of the feet in water with a temperature usually below 50°F but above freezing.
 - 2) Trench foot is usually associated with immobilization of the feet.

⁷³ CALL Handbook, pg. 16.

⁷⁴ Brinson, “WWII Military Health in the Pacific”.

- c. Treatment: Treatment is required for all stages of immersion syndrome injury.
 - 1) Warm the injured part gradually by exposing it to warm air.
 - 2) DO NOT massage it, moisten the skin, apply heat or ice, pop blisters, apply lotions, or cream, or allow the victim to walk on injury.
 - 3) Protect it from trauma and secondary infections.
 - 4) Dry, loose clothing or several layers of warm coverings are preferable to extreme heat.
 - 5) Under no circumstances should the injured part be exposed to an open fire.
 - 6) Elevate the injured part to relieve the swelling.
 - 7) Evacuate the casualty to a medical treatment facility as soon as possible.
- d. Prevention: Immersion syndrome can be prevented by good hygienic care of the feet and avoiding moist conditions for prolonged periods.
 - 1) Changing socks at least daily (depending on environmental conditions) is also a preventive measure.
 - 2) Wet socks can be air dried and then can be placed inside the shirt to warm them prior to putting them on..⁷⁵

Visual M-6: Combat Operational Stress Control

- 1. Battlefield fatigue and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were common for WWII soldiers (just as it is for the veterans leaving the battlefield today).
- 2. Long days, weeks, and months in combat, separation from family, the loss of friends and companions, diseases, heat, rain, lack of food and clean water—all contributed to everyday problems of WWII soldiers..⁷⁶

⁷⁵ CALL Handbook, pg. 37.

⁷⁶ Brinson, "WWII Military Health in the Pacific".

3. MILD Combat Operational Stress Control⁷⁷

a. Physical Signs

- 1) Trembling, tearful, jumpiness, nervousness, cold sweat, dry mouth, pounding heart, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, fatigue, or a “thousand-yard stare”.

b. Emotional Signs

- 1) Anxious, indecisive, irritable, complaining, forgetful, unable to concentrate, insomnia, nightmares, easily startled by noises or movement, grief, tearful, anger, beginning to lose confidence in self and unit, difficulty thinking, speaking, and communicating.

NOTE: This section is not on the slide, can discuss this at your own discretion.

c. Self and Buddy Aid

- 1) Continue mission performance, focus on immediate mission.
- 2) Expect Soldier to perform assigned duties.
- 3) Remain calm at all times; be directive and in control.
- 4) Let Soldier know his reaction is normal and that there is nothing seriously wrong with him.
- 5) Keep Soldier informed of the situation, objectives, expectations, and support, control rumors.
- 6) Build Soldier's confidence; talk about succeeding.
- 7) Keep Soldier productive (when not resting) through recreational activities and equipment maintenance.
- 8) Ensure Soldier maintains good personal hygiene.
- 9) Ensure Soldier eats, drinks, and sleeps as soon as possible.
- 10) Let Soldier talk about his feelings. DO NOT “put down” his feelings of grief or worry. Give practical advice and put emotions into perspective.

⁷⁷ CALL Handbook, pg. 149

Visual M-7: Combat Operational Stress Control⁷⁸

1. MORE SERIOUS Combat Operational Stress Control

a. Physical Signs

- 1) Constantly moves around, flinching or ducking at sudden sounds and movement, shaking, trembling (whole body or arms), cannot use part of body for no physical reason (hand, arm, legs), cannot see, hear, or feel (partial or complete loss), physical exhaustion, crying, freezing under fire or total immobility, vacant stares, staggers, sways when stands, panic or running under fire.

b. Emotional Signs

- 1) Rapid and/or inappropriate talking, argumentative, reckless actions, inattentive to personal hygiene, indifferent to danger, memory loss, severe stuttering, mumbling, or cannot speak at all, insomnia, nightmares, seeing or hearing things that do not exist, rapid emotional shifts, social withdrawal, apathetic, hysterical outbursts, or frantic or strange behavior.

NOTE: This section is not on the slide, can discuss this at your own discretion.

c. Management procedures

- 1) If Soldier's behavior endangers the mission, self, or others, do whatever necessary to control Soldier.
- 2) If Soldier is upset, calmly talk him into cooperating.
- 3) If concerned about Soldier's reliability:
 - a) Unload Soldier's weapon.
 - b) Take weapon if seriously concerned.
 - c) Physically restrain Soldier only when necessary for safety or transportation.
- 4) Reassure everyone that the signs are probably just COS and will quickly improve.
- 5) If COS signs continue:
 - a) Get Soldier to a safer place.

⁷⁸ CALL Handbook, pg. 150.

- b) DO NOT leave Soldier alone, keep someone he knows with him.
- c) Notify senior NCO or officer.
- d) Have Soldier examined by medical personnel.
- 6) Give Soldier tasks to do when not sleeping, eating, or resting.
- 7) Assure Soldier he will return to full duty in 24 hours and return Soldier to normal duties as soon as he is ready.

Visual M-8: Preventative Measures to Combat COS.⁷⁹

1. Preventative Measures to Combat COS

- a. Welcome new members into your team; get to know them quickly. If you are new, be active in making friends.
- b. Be physically fit (strength, endurance, and agility).
- c. Know and practice life-saving self and buddy aid.
- d. Practice rapid relaxation techniques (FM 6-22.5 and FM 22-51).
- e. Help each other out when things are tough at home or in the unit.
- f. Keep informed; ask your leader questions; ignore rumors.
- g. Work together to give everyone food, water, shelter, hygiene, and sanitation.
- h. Sleep when mission and safety permit, let everyone get time to sleep.
 - 1) Sleep only in safe places and by SOP.
 - 2) If possible, sleep 6 to 9 hours per day, but try to get at least 4 hours.
 - 3) Get good sleep before going on sustained operations.
 - 4) Catnap when you can but allow time to wake up fully.
 - 5) Catch up on sleep after going without.

⁷⁹ CALL Handbook, pg. 151.

Integration

Visuals: I-1: Integration

Virtual View: None

Orientation:

- None.
- No virtual terrain used during this stand.

Description:

- None

Visual I-1: INTEGRATION

Q: So, what are your takeaways from this staff ride? What really got you thinking as we went through this?

Q: Did using the virtual terrain help you better visualize what happened? Did it change the way you looked at this action?

Q: How often are units today training to fight in a jungle environment?

Q: What would the strategic implications have been if this mission was not the success it turned out to be?

Q: With all of the digital systems used within the Army today, how important is it to continue to train on and maintain proficiency using analog systems?

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