Army University Press Staff Ride Team

Munda Point

Virtual Staff Ride

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Key to Colors and Codes:

Bold purple font is used to indicate which Visual is in use and Instructor Notes to facilitate discussion. If needed, the slide number is labelled below the thumbnail to change to that visual during the presentation (type the slide number and hit enter to change to the desired visual.)

[1A-1] Animation cues for the visual on display. The number/letter combination is the visual; the dashed number is the animation click number in PowerPoint.

Bold green font is used to describe virtual terrain movements. Screenshots are included with arrows and movement instructions for the instructor and the VBS terrain operator.

Bold red font is used for questions posed to the training audience or role players/groups in the training audience.

Version Control

V0.1 First Draft 211208

V0.2 Moved Rendova Landings to Stand 1 220809

- V0.3 Second draft with revisions from gov't review 220818
- V1.0 First Edition 220914

Stand 1. Strategic/Operational Situation.

Visuals	Virtual Views
1A. Pacific Theater of Operations	
1B. Operation CARTWHEEL	
1C. New Georgia Islands [MCOO]	
1D. 43 rd Infantry Division & New Georgia	
Occupation Force (NGOF)	
1E. Operation TOENAILS	
1F. Rendova Harbor 30 JUN-2 JUL	1. Rendova Advance Unit
	2. Beach Head
	3. Japanese Fighting Positions
	4. Marine Howitzer Battery

DESCRIPTION:

Why were the Allies in the Pacific focused on the Japanese base at Rabaul?

Visual 1A. Pacific Theater of Operations. Point to the islands described in the narrative.

I) Operation CARTWHEEL.

- A) Rabaul, New Britain Island, Bismarck Archipelago.
 - Between 1942 and 1944, the large Japanese air and naval base at Rabaul stood between General Douglas McArthur and his promised return to the Philippine Islands.



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- 2) It also threatened Allied positions in Papua/New Guinea.
 - (i) Australia's north coast was within range of Japanese bombers based there.
 - (ii) The American Line of Communication (LOC) from the US West Coast to Australia was also in range of the Japanese bombers.
- 3) After Japanese defeats in the naval battles of the Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942), strategic initiative shifted to the Allies.
- 4) **[1A-1]** In July 1942, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) ordered an offensive against Rabaul to set conditions for securing the LOC to Australia, securing Papua/New Guinea, and set the conditions for liberating the Philippines. The offensive had three tasks:
 - (i) Task I: Seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, and the Santa Cruz Islands.
 - (ii) Task II: Capture the remainder of the Solomon Islands, and Lae and Salamaua harbors on New Guinea.
 - (iii) Task III: Seize and occupy Rabaul and the surrounding areas.¹
- B) Guadalcanal/Operation WATCHTOWER (7 AUG 42-9 FEB 43).

¹ Miller Jr., John. *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1959), 1-5.

- 1) Task I of the JCS-directed offensive issued in JUL 1942.
- 2) The first offensive campaign in the Pacific Theater to seize Japanese-held territory.
 - (i) Three major land battles.
 - (ii) Seven major naval battles; five at night between surface ships and two between aircraft carrier task forces.
 - (iii) Almost daily aerial engagements.
- 3) After five months of combat, the Japanese withdrew under pressure over a two-month period.²

How do the Allies plan to eliminate the Japanese threat from Rabaul?

Visual 1B. Operation CARTWHEEL

- C) CARTWHEEL would eventually consist of 13 major operations, many with their own code names.
 - 1) Many of these operations were sequential, overlapping, or simultaneous.
 - 2) They were terrain focused, and included:
 - (i) [1B-1] Operation CLEANSLATE (Russell Islands): 21 FEB 1943.
 - (ii) [1B-2] Operation CHRONICLE (Kiriwina Island and Woodlark Island): 23-30 JUN 1943.
 - (iii) [1B-3] Operation TOENAILS (New Georgia Island): 20 JUN-25 AUG 1943.
 - (iv) [1B-4] Vella Lavella Island: 15 AUG-9 OCT 1943.
 - (v) [1B-5] Operation POSTERN (Lae and Salamaua on Papua/New Guinea): 4-16 SEP 1943.
 - (vi) [1B-6] Operation GOODTIME (Treasury Islands): 27 OCT-12 NOV 1943.



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- (vii) [1B-7] Operation BLISSFUL (Choiseul Island Raid): 28 OCT-3 NOV 1943.
- (viii) [1B-8] Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM (Bougainville Island): 1 NOV 1943-21 AUG 1945.
- (ix) [1B-9] Operation DEXTERITY (New Britain Islands): 15 DEC 1943-22 APR 1944.
- (x) [1B-10] Green Islands: 29 JAN-27 FEB 1944.
- (xi) [1B-11] Admiralty Islands: 29 FEB-18 MAY 1944.
- (xii) [1B-12] Emirau Island: 20 MAR 1944.³

What did the Allies learn from the Guadalcanal Campaign?

- II) Operational Lessons Learned from Guadalcanal/WATCHTOWER.
 - A) Direct ship-to-shore sustainment of ground combat was unfeasible.
 - 1) Supplies needed to be stockpiled on a land base as far forward as possible, as early as possible.

² —. *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*. (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1949).

³ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, Chapter III.

- 2) Port infrastructure in the South Pacific Area and the Southwest Pacific Area was poor or non-existent; more time and personnel were needed to unload supplies than expected.
- 3) Amphibian vehicles such as the DUKW were critical to getting supplies from a transport onto the beach and inland to the dumps.⁴
- B) Air support needed better command and control.
 - 1) Once aircraft took off from their bases or aircraft carries for sorties, they were still controlled by the providing element.
 - 2) Guadalcanal lacked a common "air picture" managed by a single headquarters.
 - The next operation needed better unity of command planes in the air would be managed by a single headquarters.⁵

Visual 1C. New Georgia Islands [MCOO]

III) Operation TOENAILS.

Describe the terrain and weather on the New Georgia Islands.

- A) Terrain and Weather.
 - 1) Terrain.⁶
 - (i) Land features.
 - (a) The New Georgia Islands are a large group in the central Solomon Islands; there are fourteen large islands but also many small islands and reefs.
 - (b) The cluster is about 125 miles long at its longest point.
 - (ii) Water features.⁷
 - (a) Several large bodies of water allow the movement of deep-draft vessels.
 - (1) The Slot (on the north side of the island group)
 - (2) Morovo Lagoon on the northeast side of New Georgia Island.
 - (3) Vella Gulf between Vella Lavella and Kolombangara.
 - (4) Kula Gulf between Kolombangara and New Georgia Island.
 - (5) Blanche Channel between New Georgia Island and Rendova and Tetipari Islands.
 - (b) Most of the smaller channels, narrows, and passages are only deep enough for shallow-draft vessels.
 - 2) New Georgia Island.⁸
 - (i) At 786 square miles, New Georgia is slightly larger than the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex (733 square miles).
 - (a) The interior is mountainous; the lowlands are rough and covered in dense tropical vegetation.



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⁴ Miller, Jr., 72-3.

⁵ Ibid. 75.

⁶ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 70.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid, 70-1.

- (b) There were few roads and fewer maps available in 1943.
- (ii) [1C-1] Avenues of Approach.
 - (a) Kula Gulf is the best deep water Avenue of Approach (AoA) from the north.
 - (b) Blanche Channel is the best deep water AoA from the south.
- (iii) [1C-2] Key Terrain.
 - (a) Protected anchorages (not ports) for deep-draft ships are found at Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor, and Rendova Harbor.
 - (b) The Japanese airfield at Munda Point gave the Japanese a land base for air attacks against Guadalcanal.
- (iv) [1C-3] Obstacles and Movement.
 - (a) Reefs and barrier islands limits the avenues of approach for deep-draft ships.
 - (b) The majority of the coastline is dense mangrove swamp, which limits the number of potential landing sites.
 - (c) Inland vegetation can vary from dense jungle canopies, isolated tropical grassland, or scattered trees on the lower elevations to thinner evergreen forests at higher elevations.
- 3) Weather.
 - (i) The average temperature is about 80°F and high humidity with little variation throughout the year. June through August are considered the cooler months.
 - (ii) Rainfall is frequent, with cyclones occurring between November and April. Average annual rainfall is 120 inches per year.

What is the intelligence estimate for Japanese forces on the New Georgia Islands?

- 1) Enemy.⁹
 - (i) Strength. The Allied estimate was 10,550 Japanese defenders in the New Georgia Islands.
 - (ii) As of 30 June 1943, Allied intelligence had determined the composition of Japanese forces.
 - (a) Land Component Forces. *Southeast Detached Force* under the command of Major General Noboru Sasaki.
 - (1) 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF). A SNLF is the Japanese equivalent of the US Marines; they are sailors with special training in amphibious landings and infantry tactics.¹⁰
 - (2) 229th Infantry Regiment. A triangular infantry regiment with three battalions and capabilities similar to its US counterpart.¹¹
 - (b) Naval Component Forces. The Allied estimate was ten or eleven ships and five submarines available for defending the Solomons.
 - (c) Air Component Forces.
 - (1) The Allied estimate was 461 planes spread out across six airfields with four more under construction.
 - (2) The Japanese airfield at Munda Point was a direct threat to consolidating the gains on Guadalcanal and its airfield.

⁹ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 47 and Rentz, *Marines in the Central Solomons*. 1952, 21-5.

¹⁰ US War Department. TM-E 30-480 Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, 1944, Chapter V.

¹¹ Ibid., 28-36.

- (iii) Disposition.
 - (a) [1C-4] *Southeast Detached Force Headquarters* was established on Munda Point.
 - (b) [1C-5] 8th Combined SNLF Headquarters under Rear Admiral Minoru Ota was co-located with MG Sasaki.
 - (1) *Kure 6th SNLF* defended Bairoko Harbor to the north of Munda Point, but had detachments posted on Rendova, Viru Harbor, Wickham Anchorage, and other points.
 - (2) The rest of Ota's force, *Yokosuka 7th SNLF*, defended Kolombangara, but one of its companies augmented the defenses at Bairoko Harbor.
 - (c) [1C-6] 229th Infantry Regiment Headquarters under Colonel Genjiro Hirata was also co-located with MG Sasaki.
 - (1) 7th Company defended Rendova.
 - (2) 3rd Company defended Viru Harbor.
 - (3) The remainder of the 229th was spread out between Munda Point, Lambeti Plantation, and along the Bairoko-Munda Trail. Its authorized strength was 3843 but effective strength was less than that.¹²
 - (d) **[1C-7]** *15th Field Defense Unit* under Colonel Sanichi Shiroto was co-located on Munda and controlled all the air defense units for Munda Point.
 - (e) **[1C-8]** 13th Infantry Regiment from the 6th Division was found on Kolombangara, and one of its companies augmenting the defenses at Bairoko Harbor.

Instructor Note: The questions on MLCOA and MDCOA are to create discussion among the US role players. The Japanese role players will provide more information on both in Stand 3.

What do you think is the Japanese Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA)?

(iv) MLCOA.


What do you think is the Japanese Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA)?

(v) MDCOA.

Visual 1D. 43rd Infantry Division & New Georgia Occupation Force (NGOF). Describe the color scheme used for joint forces: green for Land Component, dark blue for Naval Component, and light blue for Air Component.

Describe the joint task force organization for Operation TOENAILS. Is there anything unique about it?

- B) Task Organization.¹³
 - Task Force (TF) 31, tasked to seize the New Georgia Islands, fell under the command of Admiral William Halsey, Commander, South Pacific (COMSOPAC).



¹² (US War Department 1944, 28)

¹³ Miller Jr., Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, 73-8.

- (i) TF 31 was commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner.¹⁴
 - (a) TG 31.1 Western Force RADM Turner also commanded this element of TF 31.
 - (b) TG 31.2. Screening Force.
 - (c) New Georgia Occupation Force (NGOF) Major General John Hester (USA).
 - (d) TG 31-3 Eastern Force Rear Admiral George Fort.
 - (e) TG 31.4 Reserve Motor Torpedo Boat Group
 - (f) Assault Flotillas.
- (ii) 43 ID and NGOF.
 - (a) **[1E-1]** 43 ID provided the majority of the combat power in the NGOF.
 - (1) A typical Army infantry division assigned to the Pacific Theater in 1942-43 was composed of:
 - 1. A mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop.
 - 2. Three infantry regiments with a total of nine infantry battalions.
 - 3. Division artillery group with four battalions.
 - 4. One combat engineer battalion.
 - 5. One medical battalion.
 - 6. One special troops battalion:
 - a. Division headquarters and headquarters company.
 - b. A light maintenance company.
 - c. A quartermaster company.
 - d. A signal company.
 - e. A military police platoon.
 - f. Division band.
 - 7. A counterintelligence detachment.
 - (2) Typical strength was about 16,000.
 - (b) [1D-2] Western Landing Force MG John Hester, who also commanded the 43rd Infantry Division. Hester's division headquarters divided its command and staff resources for both the NGOF and 43 ID.
 - (1) Northern Landing Group Col. H.B. Liversedge (USMC).
 - (2) Southern Landing Group BG Leonard F. Wing, assistant division commander of 43 ID.
 - (c) Eastern Landing Force COL D.H. Hundley (USA).
 - (d) New Georgia Air Force Brig. Gen. Francis Mulcahy (USMC).
- (iii) [1D-3] Southern Landing Group.
 - (a) 43 ID(±). Two battalions from the 103rd Infantry were attached to the Eastern Landing Force.
 - (b) 3-103 IN.
 - (c) [1D-4] 136 FA BN (detached from 37 ID, 155mm howitzers).
 - (d) 9th Marine Defense Battalion.
 - (e) 1st Company, 1st Commando, Fiji Guerillas.
 - (f) Naval Base detachments.
 - (g) 24th "Sea-Bees" (Naval Construction Battalion).

¹⁴ Rentz, John N. *Marines in the Central Solomons*. (Washington DC: USMC Historical Branch, 1952), 26-7.

- (iv) [1D-5] 9th Marine Defense Battalion.¹⁵ Marine Defense Battalions were organized in 1939 to defend the US Navy's forward bases (Wake Island, Midway, etc.) against the growing threat of war with Japan.
 - (a) Called battalions, they were more like small regiments commanded by Marine colonels with a regiment's worth of anti-aircraft, field artillery, and machine gun companies.
 - (b) Later tables of organization added tank platoons and radar units. The 9th Marine Defense Battalion was organized along those lines with:¹⁶
 - (1) A Headquarters and Service Battery with a tank platoon, an amphibious tractor (amtrac) platoon, and an air search radar for early warning.
 - (2) A 155mm Artillery Group with two four-gun 155mm towed artillery batteries.
 - (3) A Special Weapons Group with three batteries of anti-aircraft machine guns (16X 40mm, 28X 20mm, and 35X .50 cal).
 - (4) A 90mm Anti-Aircraft Group with three four-gun 90mm anti-aircraft batteries, a searchlight battery, and two fire control radar sets.

What was one of the main sources of intelligence for the Estimate of the Enemy Situation? Describe who they were and what they did.

- 2) Coastwatchers.¹⁷
 - (i) These were British, Australian, or New Zealand civil servants or planters commissioned into their armed forces just before the war as part of the Australian Navy's Directorate of Intelligence. They were later absorbed into the Allied Intelligence Bureau of the General Headquarters (GHQ) G-2.
 - (ii) They regularly radioed reports of enemy troop, ship, and plane movements from behind enemy lines.
 - (iii) Coastwatchers also used island natives to help them rescue downed airmen, stranded sailors, and worked as guides, porters, and laborers. Natives also provided them protection from Japanese patrols.
 - (iv) Since the interior of most south Pacific islands were poorly mapped or not mapped at all, they were an invaluable source of information on terrain.

Visual 1E. Operation TOENAILS

Describe the plan for seizing New Georgia.

- C) Concept of the Operation.¹⁸
 - 1) Shaping Operations.



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¹⁵ Melson, Charles D., *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II*. (Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington DC, 1996).

¹⁶ Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons. 1952, 30.

¹⁷ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 24-5.

¹⁸ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 73 and Rentz, *Marines in the Central Solomons*. 1952, 34-6.

- (i) Joint fires from land and carrier based aircraft would sustain a daily bombardment of the Munda Point airfield to deny the Japanese use of the base.
- (ii) **[1E-1]** Supporting efforts would make simultaneous landings to seize key terrain on Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor, Rendova, and Rice Anchorage.
- (iii) An airfield would be constructed on Segi Point to facilitate achieving air dominance in the New Georgia Area of Operations (AO) and protect Guadalcanal from Japanese air attack.
- (iv) Munda Point would be constantly harassed by artillery fire from Rendova and air attack from Guadalcanal and aircraft carriers. When sufficient combat power had built up on Rendova Island, the decisive operation would begin (planned for D+4).
- 2) **[1E-2]** Decisive Operation. Southern Landing Group/43 ID(±) would land east of Munda Point with two infantry regiments and seize the Japanese airfield.

Visual 1F. Rendova Harbor 30 JUN-2 JUL

What is operationally significant about Rendova Harbor?

IV) Southern Landing Group/43 ID(±), 30 JUN-3 JUL.

- A) Operational Significance.
 - Rendova Harbor was large enough and deep enough to serve as a suitable attack position for the landing force needed to secure Zanana Beach and the follow-on forces for seizing Munda Point.¹⁹
 - It also provided a suitable location for supporting artillery to range targets in support of the decisive operation to seize Munda Point.



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- B) MG Hester planned to seize Rendova with most of the 172nd Infantry.²⁰
 - 1) **[1F-1]** Coastwatchers would guide two companies, C/172 and G/172, onto the beaches on the east and west side of the harbor.
 - 2) Then both companies, called the Rendova Advance Unit, would cover the main landing as it moved through the straight between Bau and Kokarana Islands.
 - 3) Then Hester's Southern Landing Group would seize Rendova Harbor and secure it.

Describe the landing on Rendova.

ORIENTATION: This is the view the Rendova Advance Unit had after landing in the wrong place and correcting their mistake. Renard Entrance is to the NNE where the main landing force passed between Bau Island (left) and Kokarana Island (right). Rendova Harbor is to your right, obscured by the land on the west side of the anchorage.

Virtual View 1. Rendova Advance Unit.

¹⁹ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 71-2

²⁰ Ibid., 85-87

Move around the land to your right and into Rendova Harbor. Stop on the beachhead on the east side where C/172 IN landed.

- C) Rendova Landing.
 - 1) **[1F-2]** Mist and rain obscured the markers set up by earlier reconnaissance parties, and the Rendova Advance Unit landed in the wrong place several miles away from their objectives.
 - (i) They were scheduled to hit the beaches around 0540 on 30 JUN.

Virtual View 2. Beach Head

- (ii) Instead, they arrived either just as or just after the first wave from the transports on the other side of the straight.
- (iii) Around 0700 the first wave landing craft dropped their ramps and the infantry established the beach head.
- (iv) The Rendova Advance Unit consolidated with the first wave and started advancing inland on the Lever Brothers' 584-acre coconut palm plantation.

Describe what happened to your defenses on the Lever Brothers' plantation.

- 2) Lever Brothers Plantation.
 - (i) There were about 120-200 total Japanese defenders spread out on Rendova from 2nd Company, 6th SNLF and 7th Company, 229th Infantry. Both units were understrength.
 - (ii) [1F-3] They were caught off-guard and did not know the Americans were landing on Rendova until they heard the landing craft in the harbor, so they were unable to man their prepared defensive positions on the beaches.
 - (a) Instead, they established hasty defensive positions in the plantation about 100 yards from the east beach.
 - (b) The first wave of US infantry made first contact with the Japanese about 75 yards from the beach.

Advance from the beachhead to the Japanese hasty fighting positions.

Virtual View 3. Japanese Fighting Positions

- (c) In one of the first exchanges of fire, Lieutenant Funada, commanding 2/6 SNLF, was shot in the face.
- (d) Not long after, Japanese resistance became disorganized.
- (e) After taking 50-60 casualties, the Japanese withdrew into the jungle.
- (f) The Rendova Harbor landing cost the Americans just four killed and five wounded.
- 3) **[1F-4]** By the end of the day, 172nd Infantry expanded their perimeter 1000 yards inland, and subsequent landings brought in more forces and supplies for the main attack against Munda Point.

- (i) But the Japanese were able to make three air attacks against Rendova.²¹
 - (a) The first was at 1100 with 27 fighter planes, but most were shot down by US air cover.
 - (b) The second was around 1500 with 25 bombers and 24 fighters from Rabaul; again, most were shot down.,
 - (c) The third attacked at 1715 with eight bombers, but they focused on ships off Rendova and did not attack targets on the island.

Continue forward until you reach the plantation road. Turn left and follow the road north to the Marine Howitzer Battery. Take up the view from behind the guns looking down the azimuth of fire.

Virtual View 4. Marine Howitzer Battery

- 4) **[1F-5]** The hold on Rendova expanded the next day.
 - (i) 43 ID's 155mm howitzer battalion emplaced on Kokarana Island and began firing on Munda Point.
 - (ii) Just over half of the Marines' anti-aircraft weapons were emplaced, one of its 155mm howitzers emplaced and was also firing on Munda Point, and the other completed emplacement.
 - (iii) The Japanese only made one air attack against Rendova with fighters on 31 JUN, and it was ineffective.
 - (iv) Six thousand Americans were positioned on Rendova from 43 ID, 9th Marine Defense Battalion, and the 24th Naval Construction Battalion.
- 5) But bad weather, bad luck, and enemy activity caused problems on 2 JUL.
 - (i) Bad weather kept Allied air cover from flying over New Georgia.
 - (ii) One of the Marines' air defense radars broke down, and the second was not yet set up the anti-aircraft weapons had no early warning against air attack.
 - (iii) In the afternoon a Japanese air attack caused considerable damage and casualties.
 - (a) At least 30 men were killed and over 200 were wounded.
 - (b) Three of the Marines' eight 155mm howitzers were damaged, but two were quickly put back into action.
 - (c) But most significant was the loss of 125 beds in the 118th Medical Battalion's clearing company it reduced medical capacity on Rendova, and some wounded had to wait 24 hours or more before they could be sent to Guadalcanal for treatment.

VIGNETTE: The Japanese are regarded as some of the best camouflage artists in World War II. Consider this example of airfield construction right under the eyes of Allied reconnaissance:

The Japanese exhibited skill and cunning in concealing their activities at Munda. Even though the Allies had long known that Munda Point was being used as a staging area, they were not sure that an airfield was under construction until 3 December [1942]. The Japanese had rigged cables to the tops of the trees, then cut the trunks away and left the cables holding up the treetops. Thus hidden from aerial observation, they built their runway

²¹ Rentz cites differing numbers of planes for these attacks; the differences are immaterial to the staff ride and the author has decided to use Miller's numbers.

and then cut down the camouflage. The day they completed the runway, 15 December 1942, the Japanese decided to build a second airfield at Vila on nearby Kolombangara. The airfields at Munda and Vila, only 180 nautical miles from Henderson Field [on Guadalcanal], presented a serious threat to the Allied positions in the Solomons and New Hebrides.²²

ANALYSIS:

- 1. The Allies are about to start their second offensive campaign against the Japanese in the South Pacific without accurate maps or knowledge of the terrain. Could we conduct operations without those tools today? Do we have other tools at our disposal that might mitigate the lack of maps or mapping?
- 2. What effects would the terrain and weather on New Georgia have on our current technology?

Take a 5 minute break and have the terrain tech load the Munda Point database.

²² Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 11.

Stand 2. 43 ID's Drive on Munda Point.

Visuals	Virtual Views
2A. Japanese Defense Plans	1. Kokengolo Hill
2B. Zanana 30 JUN-4 JUL	2. Onavaisi Entrance
2C. The Drive on Munda 5-9 JUL	3. Zanana Landing
	4. Munda Trail
	5. The Roadblock
	6. Line of Departure
	7. 169 IN Advance
2D. Terrain Effects and Attacks on New Georgia	
2E. The Drive on Munda 10-14 JUL	8. Reincke Right
	9. Reincke Left
	10. Kelley Hill
	11. Laiana Beach
	12. 172 IN and Marine Tanks

ORIENTATION: Conducted in the stand.

Virtual View 1. Kokengolo Hill

This is the view from MG Sasaki's Headquarters on top of Kokengolo Hill on Munda Airfield looking east toward Roviana Lagoon. Rendova Island is not visible in this terrain database, but it would have been visible to the right side of the screen. 43 ID's landings on New Georgia Island will occur on the left side of the screen at Zanana.

DESCRIPTION:

Visual 2A. Japanese Defense Plans

MG Sasaki: We discussed the US estimate of your force strength and disposition on New Georgia, your MLCOA and MDCOA. Describe your actual defensive plans.

- I) Japanese Defensive Plans for New Georgia.
 - A) The American estimate of enemy strength on New Georgia (10,550) was surprisingly accurate.
 - B) After the Japanese withdrew from Guadalcanal, they revised their defensive strategy to maintain their hold on the southeast Pacific.²³
 - "Active defense" was the term they used to describe the framework in the Solomon Islands, and it was a supporting effort for the "aggressive defense" of New Guinea.



²³ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 34.

- 2) The purpose was preventing the US from capturing territory needed to liberate the Philippines.
- C) Operationally, the Army and Navy disagreed about exactly where to defend in the Solomon Islands.
 - 1) The Army wanted to defend on Bougainville because it was easier to supply.
 - 2) The Navy wanted to defenses on New Georgia and Santa Isabel Island.
 - 3) In an odd arrangement each service got what they wanted, but the Army augmented the Navy's SNLF on New Georgia and Santa Isabel and those forces were controlled by an Army headquarters (Southeast Detached Force).
 - 4) The arrangement provided the flexibility to:
 - (i) Protect Rabaul, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.
 - (ii) Support offensives to the south and offensive action on New Guinea.²⁴
- D) Tactically, MG Sasaki decided on an area defense for Munda Point.²⁵
 - [2A-1] The tactical disposition of the 229th Infantry in prepared defensive positions seems to indicate adherence to the Japanese doctrine of making the decisive effort against the enemy on their landing beaches – a defense to deny or destroy.
 - (i) Sasaki established his main defensive line in what was either a flat, U-shaped line of positions to cover the expecting beachhead locations, or a contiguous rectangular perimeter encompassing Munda Airfield and Lambeti Plantation.²⁶
 - (ii) [2A-2] In a testament to the Japanese excellence at camouflage and deception, the American SITTEMP plotted the eastern side of the "U", or the box was 900 yards (just over half a mile) closer to the mouth of the Barike River than it really was.²⁷
 - (iii) This may have been the reason for locating the LD where it was the close proximity minimizes the time to reach the Probable Line of Deployment (PLD).

How might this miscalculation affect 43 ID's rate of advance through terrain that is already restricting it?

(iv) Tactically, then, Sasaki's opponents are expecting to deploy into their assault formations earlier than they need to (which may have worsened the already slow movement rate through the jungle.)

Virtual View 2. Onavaisi Entrance

This is Onavaisi Entrance. Directly to your front in the distance is Zanana Beach on New Georgia Island. To your left (SW) is Onavaisi Island.

²⁴ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 35-6.

²⁵ Ibid., 97-8.

²⁶ A complete diagram of the Japanese defenses of Munda Point was not available; maps in the cited sources show an enclosed fortified area *and* a line of defensive positions that are open on the north side. There may or may not have been defensive positions there (contact was made with prepared positions later in the Bibilo Hills) and it's not unreasonable to conclude that they could have been missed during the battle due to the jungle's thick vegetation.

²⁷ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 112.

Visual 2B. Zanana 30 JUN-4 JUL

Describe the forces used to secure Onavaisi Inlet and the operation that secured them.

- II) Fighting the Plan.
 - A) Onavaisi Occupation Unit.²⁸
 - On 30 JUN, while the Japanese were focused on Rendova, a much smaller force took advantage of the distraction to secure key terrain for subsequent landings to attack Munda Point.



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- [2B-1] During their earlier reconnaissance, Coastwatchers and Marine Raiders discovered that Zanana Beach, about 200 yards long and about one mile from the Japanese airfield at Munda Point, was accessible by small boats through Onaiavisi Inlet.
 - RADM Turner retained control of elements detached from MG Hester's NGOF/Southern Landing Group/43 ID(±) to secure Onaiavisi Inlet while Hester's Southern Landing Group seized Rendova Harbor.
 - (ii) Companies A and B from the 169th Infantry were tasked to land on Sasavele and Baraulu Islands to deny Japanese interference with subsequent allied movement through Onaiavisi Inlet to Zanana Beach.
 - (iii) **[2B-2]** A/169 IN landed on Baraulu Island around 29 0330 JUN and quickly destroyed the few Japanese defenders manning an observation post before they could warn their headquarters on Munda Point.²⁹
 - (iv) [2B-3] B/169 IN landed on Sasavele Island at the same time and also destroyed the Japanese observation post there.
 - (v) Later in the morning on 30 JUN, B/169 IN sent its 2nd Platoon over onto Roviana Island and destroyed a third Japanese observation post.
- In less than a day the Onaiavisi Occupation Unit secured the avenue of approach to Zanana Beach and deprived the Japanese of their early warning for the subsequent landings.

Describe the effort to secure Zanana Beach. Did it go according to plan or according to the enemy (the enemy being terrain)?

Move forward from Onaiavisi Entrance to Zanana Beach.

- B) Zanana Landing. Setting conditions for landing on Zanana didn't end with Onaiavisi Inlet.³⁰
 - 1) 172 IN was supposed establish a patrol base west of Zanana and start inland reconnaissance the night of 30 JUN-1 JUL.
 - (i) But their landing boats could not find the beach in the dark.
 - (ii) The following night the regimental commander, COL David Ross, accompanied his 1st Battalion to Zanana Beach but it also got lost.

²⁸ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 78.

²⁹ Ibid., 85.

³⁰ Ibid., 92.

Virtual View 3. Zanana Landing

- (iii) [2B-4] Finally, with the help of A/169 IN on Baraulu Island and native guides in canoes, 2-172 IN established the beachhead at Zanana on 2 JUL.
- (iv) 1-172 IN soon followed and expanded the perimeter 400 yards farther inland..³¹
- (v) By 3 JUL the Assistant Division Commander for the 43 ID, Brigadier General Leonard Wing, had the expanded perimeter wired in, reinforced with machine guns, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, and established the division command post.
- (vi) Conditions were finally set to land the remaining forces tasked to seize Munda Point.
- C) Zanana Beach was now a tactical assembly area (TAA); the Line of Departure for Munda Point was actually the Barike River.³²
 - 1) The Barike River was about 2.5-3 miles west of the beach.

Visual 2C: The Drive on Munda 5-9 JUL

Move through the jungle to where Munda Trail starts. This is a representation of how thick and

impassable the vegetation could be on New Georgia Island. Units as large as a regiment have to move tactically through this terrain, deploy into attack or assault formations, bring supplies forward, and evacuate casualties to the rear.

Lift up from ground level and point out the distance from Zanana to the Barike River, and the Barike River to Munda Airfield. The straight line distance from Zanana to Munda is just over a mile, but the route through the jungle is about 4-5 miles.



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What might a reasonable rate of movement be through this terrain? What might improve a unit's rate of movement?

Virtual View 4. Munda Trail

- 2) A short distance from the perimeter was Munda Trail, "a narrow foot track that hit the coast at Lambeti Plantation."³³
 - (i) A usable trail improved 43 ID's tactical mobility on New Georgia.
 - (ii) That improvement would be significantly increased when the engineers widened it for truck traffic.
 - (iii) But 43 ID was still limited to one line of communication until another could be established.
- 3) [2C-1] Once on the LD on 7 JUL, 172 IN would attack on the left of Munda Trail and 169 IN would attack on the right. The right flank would be screened by South Pacific Scouts,

³¹ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 94.

³² Ibid., 106-10.

³³ Ibid.

and two days after the attack started a third force would be landed directly on Munda Point.

- D) [2C-2] While 43 ID assembled forces inside the Zanana perimeter, 1-172 IN conducted patrols outside the wire.
 - 1) They were not supposed to move beyond the perimeter and remain concealed.
 - 2) [2C-3] But on 4 JUL they moved to the LD on the Barike River and made at least visual contact with Japanese patrols during their advance.

It is assumed that 1-172 IN did not receive the orders to stay within the perimeter. But what risks does 43 ID face now that they have had contact with the Japanese? What information does MG Sasaki now possess? How can he use it to his advantage?

Move forward over the Munda Trail to the Roadblock.

- 3) [2C-4] On 5 JUL a combined US/native patrol set out to find a patrol base that could facilitate radio communications with the division command post.
 - (i) They would normally have moved cross-country, but because they were carrying radio equipment they set out on Munda Trail.
 - (ii) About two miles outside the TAA perimeter they were engaged by a Japanese machine gun on a small rise ahead of them.
 - (iii) The patrol traded small arms fire with the enemy position until dusk when it diverted south and joined 1-172 IN in their bivouac at the mouth of the Barike River.
- 4) The next day a company-sized patrol from 1-172 IN scouted for the enemy position and confirmed the presence of two defensive emplacements astride Munda Trail.
 - (i) Even so, it did not prevent 172 IN from assuming its LD positions on the Barike River for the attack.
 - (ii) But it would cause problems for 169 IN's movement to the LD.

169 IN Small Group: Describe your attacks on the Roadblock/Bloody Hill and its effects on the regiment.

- E) The Roadblock (AKA Bloody Hill) on Munda Trail.
 - [2C-5] COL John D. Eason's 169th Infantry started its movement to the LD on 6 JUL.
 (i) Two companies from 1st Battalion moved ahead of the regiment and tried to force the Japanese to withdraw but were unsuccessful.

Virtual View 5. The Roadblock.

Explore the area around the Roadblock as you see fit. There is a doctrinal Japanese infantry platoon defensive position with three pillboxes and supporting trenches on the other side of the creek.

- (ii) Around noon Eason ordered his 3rd Battalion, under LTC William A. Stebbins, to destroy the roadblock; but it did not reach the Japanese position that day and went into bivouac for the night.
- (iii) The Japanese psychologically harassed 169 IN all night, even calling out its officers by name and daring the Americans to fight.

- 2) [2C-6] The next day, 3rd Battalion attacked and came under enemy machine gun fire around 1055.
 - (i) Attempts to maneuver and employ heavy machine guns and mortars were hampered by thick vegetation on both sides of the trail.
 - (ii) Two companies attempted failed frontal assaults against a Japanese defensive position with excellent cover, concealment, and fields of fire.
 - (iii) Once 3rd Battalion had felled enough trees to employ their 81mm mortars, the enemy started to give way but not before nightfall suspended the engagement.
 - (iv) The Japanese continued their nighttime psychological harassment along the battalion's front line.

Move to the Line of Departure on the Barike River.

- The fight against the roadblock continued on 8 JUL, but BG Wing seemed more interested in getting his regiments to the LD than reducing a troublesome Japanese fighting position.
 - (i) [2C-7] 1-169 IN was ordered to bypass the 3rd Battalion and move into attack position.
 - (ii) But BG Wing now had three of his four attacking battalions on the Barike River, and the fourth would be in place to start the general attack on 9 JUL.

Virtual View 6. Line of Departure.

Hover over the Barike River and look east southeast toward Munda Point. 172 IN's AO is on the left side of the trail; 169 IN's AO is on the right side of the trail.

- (iii) Third Battalion finally overran the roadblock, but at a cost of six killed, thirty wounded, and one case of "war neurosis" – a new term to describe what was called "shell shock" in the previous war.
- F) Crossing the LD.³⁴
 - 1) After extensive preparatory fires from 0500-0630, 43 ID crossed the LD.
 - (i) But three hours later BG Wing was told that none of his units had passed over the Barike River.
 - (ii) Wing sent his artillery commander, BG Barker, to investigate.
 - 2) Wing returned an hour later.
 - (i) 172 IN had advanced just 100 yards beyond the river.
 - (ii) 169 IN had not advanced at all, delayed by what it thought was sniper fire.
 - 3) [2C-8] By the end of the day 43 ID's advance was lopsided.
 - (i) 172 IN had advanced a total of 1100 yards from the river.
 - (ii) In 169 IN only one battalion advanced no more than 100 yards; the other was still behind the LD.

Follow 169 IN's advance over the trees but stop short of the trail intersection ahead of you. Hover just above the trees to show the ridgeline.

G) [2C-9] On 10 JUL 43 ID's lopsided progress continued.

³⁴ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 110-4.

1) 172 IN advanced a considerable distance against light opposition.

Virtual View 7. 169 IN Advance

- 2) 169 IN continued to advance along the Munda Trail but made contact with more Japanese defenses.
 - (i) It was stopped by machine gun fire from a ridge overlooking an intersection of the Munda Trail with another trail that led north.³⁵
 - (ii) COL Eason withdrew a short distance to engage the new target with artillery but achieved little more than stripping the vegetation off the trees and making impact craters.
 - (iii) At day's end 169 IN remained in place below the ridgeline and bivouacked on swampy ground.

VIGNETTE: After enduring some very effective psychological harassment in their area from 6-9 July, soldiers in the 169th Infantry finally found an outlet for the nervous tension that made them overly cautious and trigger-happy at night.

The 3rd Battalion, 169th, faced another bad night near Bloody Hill. As with nearby units, the troops were jumpy, ready to crack. Someone fired at a shadow or a faint sound, or nothing at all. Instantly, other scared men joined in. But then the entire battalion was stopped by a loud, ear-piercing Tarzan call. A little group from K Company's weapons platoon started laughing as Sergeant Ernie Squatarito jumped to his feet, thumped his chest, and let out another mighty jungle call. The laughter soon spread through the bivouac, and the panic ended – forever. Soon, scores of men found their voices and issued Tarzan calls at the lurking rain forest.³⁶

Visual 2D. Terrain Effects and Attacks on New Georgia

III) Fighting the Enemy.


Why is 43 ID experiencing so much difficulty maneuvering on New Georgia Island?

Instructor Note: Here it may be helpful to poll the training audience for Ranger School graduates or Jungle School graduates from 25 ID. Ask them to describe the difficulties in moving through swamps and/or mountainous terrain, and what reasonable movement rates are in those conditions. Also ask them to describe the effect on how long it takes to deploy troops into support by fire and assault positions to seize an objective.

³⁵ Miller's account states this was "where the Munda Trail was intersected by a trail which ran southeast to the beach, then circled to the southwest to the native villages of Laiana and Ilangana." (pg. 113) and depicted as such on Map 10. The author believes this is in error after examining the 1942 1:20K Hasty Terrain maps and the current topographic imagery of that area on New Georgia Island. On the 1:20K map there is a trail intersection below a ridgeline leading north and the trail leading southwest is behind that ridgeline. That ridgeline is later known as Reincke Ridge, and its location as depicted on Map 10 makes less sense than where it would be on the 1:20K map.

³⁶ Hammel, Eric M., *Munda Trail: The New Georgia Campaign*. (New York: Orion, 1989), 98.

- A) Terrain Effects.
 - In the original scheme of maneuver, the four attacking battalions had areas of operation (AOs) that were 300 yards wide.
 - "Battalions would advance in a column of companies; each rifle company would put two platoons in line.".³⁷
 - (ii) "The Occupation Force Intelligence Officer had estimated that the main Japanese Defenses lay 1600 yards from the Barike, anchored on Roviana Lagoon and extending inland to the northwest.".³⁸



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- (iii) Based on estimated enemy locations and the "enemy use of complex terrain, such as jungle, urban, and extensive forests...".³⁹ the battalions could not attack, but instead had to conduct a movement to contact.
- (iv) [2D-1] This is the current doctrinal depiction of a movement to contact.
- (v) [2D-2] This the situational depiction of a battalion movement to contact on 9 JUL.
- (vi) [2D-3] This is the movement formation lead companies had to adopt on New Georgia if they were the advance guard.

Based on the terrain conditions you have observed up to this point, does the doctrinal or the situational formations for movement to contact seem suitable or acceptable?

- 2) On the first day of the attack, 172 IN moved far ahead of 169 IN who was stopped by enemy small arms fire on the LD.
- 3) ATP 3-90.98, Jungle Operations, states "Offensive operations in the jungle orient on the enemy, not the terrain. Whenever units find the enemy, they destroy it or defeat it in that location.".⁴⁰

Does 43 ID appear to be adhering to the doctrinal principles written many decades later?

- 4) Sustainment is also quickly becoming an operational limitation for 43 ID.
 - (i) The engineers cannot improve the trail from Zanana to the front line fast enough to keep pace with the attack.
 - (ii) Supplies moving forward particularly ammunition have to be hand carried at a certain point and combat power has to be diverted to augment the sustainment capacity.
 - (iii) Likewise, casualty evacuation requires diverted combat power to augment the evacuation capacity.
 - (a) Terrain conditions on New Georgia are so challenging, that litter teams of up to eight men are needed to move one casualty.
 - (b) In practical terms, that means one casualty renders an entire squad combat ineffective moving the wounded until it returns from the battalion aid station.

³⁷ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 110.

³⁸ Ibid., 112.

³⁹ FM 3-90-1 Offense and Defense, 22 MAR 2013, 2-1.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 4-1.

So what warfighting functions are driving Hester's and Wing's decisions – Maneuver and Fires, or Protection and Sustainment?

Visual 2E. The Drive on Munda 10-14 JUL

- B) On 10 JUL Wing changed his scheme of maneuver.
 - 1) The plan to land 3-103 IN and Marine tanks directly onto Munda Point was scrapped.
 - [2E-1] Instead, 172 IN would turn south to secure a beachhead at Laiana, where 3-103 IN and supplies could be landed a shorter distance from the front.
 - 3) 169 IN would continue its advance over Munda Trail towards the airfield.
- C) Reincke Ridge.
 - 1) The 169th started its attack against the ridgeline astride the trail on 11 JUL.⁴¹
 - (i) The trail passed through a draw between two hills, and the Japanese controlled all three.
 - (ii) But just after the attack started, COL Eason (who had been wounded on 9 JUL) was temporarily replaced by COL Temple G. Holland, and Holland ordered a 24-hour delay to issue his own plan of attack. Holland was previously in command of the 145th Infantry in 37 ID.⁴²

Follow the treetops until you can see the Japanese defensive position in front of the trail and below you on the right side of the intersection.

Virtual View 8. Reincke Right

- 2) On 12 JUL Holland attempted a flanking attack to the right with two battalions.
 - (i) 1st Battalion was able to advance about 300 yards, but 2nd Battalion halted when it made contact with prepared defenses.
 - (ii) A localized Japanese counterattack or spoiling attack forced him to commit the 3rd battalion to defeat it.
 - (iii) In spite of its advance, 1st Battalion was more exposed and vulnerable. It withdrew and the regiment went into a hasty defense for the night.
- 3) [2E-2] Holland tried again the next day with all three battalions.

Lift up above the trees and cross over to the south side of Munda Trail. Advance over the Laiana Trail and descend onto the Japanese fighting positions.

(i) [2E-3] 3rd Battalion seized their objective on the south side of the trail and named it "Reincke Ridge" after their commander, LTC Frederick D. Reincke.



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⁴¹ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 118-20.

⁴² At the time, 145 IN was being moved to Rendova Island. See US Army Infantry School, *Conference by Col. Temple G. Holland on the New Georgia Campaign and Interviews with Col. Holland by Members of the Academic Sections, The Infantry School.* 1947, 4-5.

Lift up above the trees and look northwest at the other side of Reincke Ridge.

Virtual View 9. Reincke Left

- (ii) But the battalion in the cut and on the north side of the trial were not successful.
- (iii) He again rearranged the regiment into a hasty defense.
- 4) That night the Japanese were observed moving in reinforcements and attempted to retake the ground they had lost.
 - (i) Artillery and mortar fire on the avenues of approach denied the enemy any penetrations in the defensive line.
 - (ii) By morning their efforts were defeated, and 169 IN counted 99 dead Japanese within 300 yards of their perimeter.
- D) Kelley Hill and 169 IN.⁴³
 - 1) [2E-4] COL Holland worked to exploit the regiment's success on Reincke Ridge into adjacent enemy positions.
 - (i) They had secured the hill on the north side of the trail cut.
 - (ii) Now they looked southwest to the next objective that would be called Kelley Hill.

Move forward toward the top of Kelley Hill.

- 2) [2E-5] After preparatory artillery fires on 16 July, 1st Battalion made a forward passage of lines through 3rd Battalion and started their attack.
 - (i) Their supporting effort advanced up the east side of Kelley Hill to cover the main effort's envelopment from the south.
 - (ii) But the Japanese had abandoned the position and Kelley Hill was secured by 1530.

Virtual View 10. Kelley Hill

- 3) The ridge was an excellent defensive position.
 - (i) Observation and fields of fire to the west were excellent because the natives had used the ridge for yam gardens.
 - (ii) Intact pillboxes were repurposed for 1st Battalion's defenses.
 - (iii) The only contact with the Japanese was with a nearby patrol at 1630 and indirect fire that killed 14 men.

Look west toward Horseshoe Hill.

- 4) After midnight the enemy assaulted from Horseshoe Hill to the west. Three attempts, each from a different direction *to include the low ground between Reincke Ridge and Kelley Hill*, were defeated.
- 5) On 17 July 1st Battalion was still in position, but the 2nd Battalion's attack into the draw between Reincke Ridge and Kelley Hill was defeated by the Japanese *just as they had been defeated earlier that morning*.
- 6) At this point the 169th had culminated.
 - (i) 1st Battalion was isolated but still held its ground and 3rd Battalion still held Reincke Ridge.

⁴³ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 134-5.

(ii) But supplies were running low, made worse by the terrain limitations on sustainment.

Instructor Note: The following section returns to 11 JUL to follow 172 IN's attack to secure Laiana Beach.

Return to Virtual View 9. Reincke Left. Lift up to treetop level, look south-southeast and fly over the jungle until you reach Laiana Beach.

- E) Laiana Beach. On 11 JUL 172 IN disengaged from the fight on Munda Trail and turned south for their new objective.⁴⁴
 - 1) 2-172 IN led the way as the other battalions waited for 169 IN to assume their former positions.
 - 2) Movement through the terrain was difficult and made worse by Japanese mortar fire.
 - [2E-6] After advancing about 450 yards 2nd Battalion reported contact with pillboxes and halted for the night.
 - 4) 172 IN continued the next day, but was now on its second day without resupply.
 - (i) Now that it was off the trail, what supplies could be delivered were hand-carried cross-country and consumed almost a battalion's worth of men to move it.
 - (ii) [2E-7] They advanced another 500 yards and were stopped by enemy machine gun fire.
 - (iii) 172 IN had discovered the coastal anchor of the main Japanese defensive line near Ilangana village.
 - 5) COL Ross needed to secure Laiana on 13 JUL.
 - (i) He had not been resupplied in three days, was out of food and water, was handcarrying his casualties, and worried about Japanese patrols in his rear.
 - (ii) **[2E-8]** With artillery to cover his right flank and disrupt enemy fires from the nearby pillboxes, they made slow but deliberate progress through the last 500 yards of mangrove swamp and secured Laiana Beach.

Virtual View 11. Laiana Beach

Return to ground level after pointing out the LCVPs.

(iii) Conditions were set to land 3-103 IN and the Marines' light tanks and open a second supply line.

Based on the earlier discussion about warfighting functions driving decisions, who was the main effort after Hester changed his orders, 169 IN or 172 IN?

- IV) Decision to Commit XIV Corps.
 - A) 43 ID was in contact with the Japanese main defensive line, but faced serious challenges maintaining the combat power to face them.
 - 1) Even with a second beachhead, the sustainment mission could not keep pace with the rate of advance, and the rate of advance was slow by any standard.

⁴⁴ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 115-8 and 122-6.

- 2) Engineers could not build roads or improve trails fast enough, and the second beachhead just doubled their mission requirements.
- 3) Supplies had to be hand carried forward of where the engineers were working, siphoning off combat power needed for the Japanese defenses.
- 4) Casualties had to be hand-carried back to aid stations and clearing stations, also siphoning off the combat power needed to attack prepared defenses.
- 5) Terrain was severely restrictive and forced units to adapt doctrine to the terrain with unusual results.

Does 43 ID have the resources it needs to fight the Japanese on this terrain? If not, is it a failure to plan or a failure to adapt? Is it a failure at all?

- B) Hester and Wing were dissatisfied with the division's performance.
 - 1) Hester's staff had to function as both a division and an occupation force headquarters. It did not have the resources for both in spite of their best efforts.
 - 2) In spite of their training on Guadalcanal, New Georgia's terrain was as much of an enemy as the Japanese they were fighting.
 - 3) Even after requesting and receiving the 145th Infantry (the Area reserve), moving it from Guadalcanal to New Georgia required several days, forcing Hester and Wing to continue operations with what they had.
- C) Even ADM Halsey and LTG Harmon were concerned about Hester's overburdened command responsibilities.
 - 1) As early as 5 JUL, when 43 ID was struggling to array on its LD, Harmon recommended augmenting Hester's staff with staff elements from MG Oscar Griswold's XIV Corps.
 - 2) Griswold received his first Warning Order (WARNO) for that augmentation on 8 JUL, while the 169th Infantry was engaging the roadblock on Bloody Hill.
 - 3) Griswold received formal orders to assume command on the same day Hester and Wing altered 43 ID's scheme of maneuver to establish the second beachhead at Laiana.

What was Griswold's assessment and what did he recommend to Harmon?

- D) Griswold reported, "From an observer point of view things are going badly."⁴⁵
 - 1) He recommended Harmon commit the rest of 37 ID and 25 ID to seizing Munda Point.
 - 2) Harmon provided the rest of 37 ID, but allowed only one regimental combat team from 25 ID and only if specifically requested by Griswold.
- E) Griswold and XIV Corps formally assumed command of the ground forces on New Georgia on 16 JUL.

V) Fighting Continues during the Transition.

- A) 43 ID continued its attacks where it could to set favorable conditions for XIV Corps.⁴⁶
 - The Laiana beachhead allowed 43 ID to bring in the light tanks from the 9th Marine Defense Battalion to provide supporting fires against the Japanese pillboxes.
 - 2) Usable trails near the beachhead were favorable to employ the M3 Stuarts in 172 IN's AO.

⁴⁵ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 124.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 132-4.

During the narration, move down the road below Laiana Beach to the first set of tanks on the right. Move forward of the tanks until you can see the Japanese fighting positions.

- B) Tanks and 172 IN.
 - 1) On 16 July 2nd and 3rd Battalions were allotted three tanks each, and "six riflemen were ordered to advance with and cover each tank." ⁴⁷
 - 2) In 2nd Battalion's AO near the shoreline, the tanks had to move slowly through ground broken by shell craters and felled trees.
 - (i) But about 75 yards beyond the FLOT the felled trees had improved observation and the tanks found the pillboxes slowing the infantry.
 - (ii) Deployed in a wedge formation, high explosive shells from their 37mm guns cleared more undergrowth and exposed more Japanese positions.
 - (iii) When enemy machine gunners in the pillboxes fired on the tanks, the Marines responded with canister.
 - (iv) The enemy rate of fire increased but only forced the tankers to close their hatches.
 - (v) The three tanks converged their fires on the pillbox causing them the most trouble, killing the gunner and every replacement that came up to put the machine gun back into action.
 - (vi) Eventually that machine gun was destroyed; the tanks closed their range and destroyed three more pillboxes.
 - (vii) Supporting infantry then moved forward to finish clearing the Japanese positions.

Virtual View 12. 172 IN and Marine Tanks

- 3) In 3rd Battalion's AO the terrain was too steep to effectively engage targets within the tanks' gun depression and elevation limits.
- 4) In spite of this early success, there were problems with tank-infantry cooperation that still had to be worked out.
 - (i) The Marines and the Army had not trained together before this first employment.
 - (ii) There was no way for the foot soldiers to communicate with the tank commander if the hatches were closed.
 - (iii) Tank crews could see very little when they were buttoned up and needed the infantry to help guide them across the terrain.
- 5) After two tanks were knocked out between 17-18 July, MG Griswold took positive control of the emerging tank-infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
 - (i) All tanks were temporarily withdrawn for repairs.
 - (ii) The 9th Marine Defense Battalion's tank platoon commander was tasked to make a terrain reconnaissance for best use of his assets.
 - (iii) Griswold requested the 10th Marine Defense Battalion's tank platoon from the Russell Islands for use on New Georgia.

ANALYSIS:

1. At what point did 43 ID decide on fighting the enemy instead of fighting the plan? Who made the decision? Who or what, exactly, *was* the enemy?

⁴⁷ Ibid. Author's note: TO&E for Marine Defense Battalions is fluid. Early tables list five tanks in the platoon, other sources such as Melson's *Condition Red* states on page 5 that there could be as many as eight.

2. From WARNO to assuming command on location, XIV Corps took over the New Georgia offensive in just 11 days. 37 ID did the same in 12 days. How long does it take to commit and deploy a corps headquarters and a division today? Could we do it with a division for short-notice deployment?

Stand 3. The Japanese Defense and Counterattack.

Visuals	Virtual Views
3A. Japanese Defense Plans	12. 172 IN and Marine Tanks
3B. 13 th Infantry Counterattack 17-18 JUL	13. 13 th Infantry Attack Position

ORIENTATION: Conducted in the stand.

DESCRIPTION:

Visual 3A. Japanese Defense Plans

MG Sasaki: Was there any flexibility in your defensive plan?

- I) Japanese Defensive Plans for New Georgia.
 - A) Sasaki's course of action was flexible enough to adjust if the Americans did not land where he expected.
 - B) The Americans did not land where he expected.
 - C) Losing Rendova was significant, because he proposed a counter-landing there to deny the Americans their attack position and base of operations. His request was denied.
 - D) In spite of losing his observation posts on Sasavele, Baraulu, and Roviana, he could still observe the American landing ships moving between Rendova and New Georgia Island from Kokengolo Hill, and his outposts had made contact with his enemy moving out of their TAA at Zanana.



- E) It was just two platoons that had disrupted 43 ID's advance.
 - 1) One platoon had delayed 169 IN's movement to its position on the LD (and psychologically harassed it for three consecutive nights).
 - 2) A different platoon had also delayed the 169th's advance down the Munda Trail over Reincke Ridge.
- F) 43 ID did not start engaging positions on the main defensive line until around the time it established the second beachhead at Laiana.

Visual 3B. 13th Infantry Counterattack

MG Sasaki: Describe your counterattack on 17-18 JUL.

II) Counterattack, 17-18 JUL.



- A) Prior to the American offensive, most of the *13th Infantry* had been placed on Kolombangara Island just northwest of New Georgia.⁴⁸
 - 1) But it was transferred to New Georgia sometime before 15 JUL to reinforce Sasaki's forces there.
 - 2) [3B-1] On 15 JUL it was assembled on the upper Barike River and ready to support a counterattack.

Fly to the 13th Infantry's Attack Position near the Roadblock from Stand 2. Hover over the trees and look east toward Zanana Beach. Re-emphasize the difficult terrain 43 ID advanced through to reach their LD.

Virtual View 13. 13th Infantry Attack Position

- B) Scheme of Maneuver.
 - [3B-2] The 13th Infantry, as the main effort, would execute an infiltration around 43 ID's right (north) flank to destroy the enemy in the TAA at Zanana Beach and the line of communication to its regiments.
 - [3B-3] The 229th Infantry, as the supporting effort, would execute attacks against 43 ID's Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) to fix the enemy and prevent disruption or destruction of the 13th's Infiltration.
- C) [3B-4] From available accounts, the 229th's attacks focused on two locations.
 - 1) The first was right after midnight on the contested ground around Kelley Hill just southwest of Reincke Ridge.
 - 2) The second was a pre-dawn attack on 3-103 IN, which had just landed at the new Laiana beachhead on 14 July. It was "readily repulsed."⁴⁹
- D) [3B-5] The 13th Infantry's attack amounted to little more than ineffective raids, even though they penetrated into 43 ID's consolidation area.
 - 1) One of the first attacks was an ambush against a litter party carrying wounded near one of the Barike River bridges. The litter party formed a hasty defensive perimeter and survived the ambush, but several of the wounded were killed.
 - 2) The principal targets were the engineer support area, the medical support area, and the division command post.
 - (i) The engineer and medical bivouacs defeated their attackers.
 - (ii) At the CP, however, the first wave damaged the communications network before the Japanese were forced to withdraw.
 - (iii) Indirect fire was used on suspected Japanese mortar positions, and a group of targets established around the CP protected it the rest of the night.
 - 3) Shortly after these attacks, the artillery battalion on Kokarana Island and 1-148 IN was ordered to Zanana to improve the defenses there.
 - 4) [3B-6] The 13th Infantry then withdrew. "It had caused a few casualties but accomplished very little, certainly not enough to justify its trip from Kolombangara. As might be expected, General Sasaki was disappointed. Reincke Ridge, Kelley Hill, and Laiana beachhead remained in American hands.".⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 135-7.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 136.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 136-7. Author's note: Miller Jr. offers no explanation for the *13th Infantry*'s failure to destroy the enemy at Zanana, however, the attack occurred as XIV corps was moving reinforcements to New Georgia, and

VIGNETTE: Leadership at every level contributed to the successful defense of 43 ID's forward CP:

In an amazing burst of foresight, someone had rung up the fire direction center of the 136th Field Artillery Battalion about three hours before the division command post came under attack... When the Japanese threatened the forward command post, a single platoon of A Battery – two howitzers – was set to fire.

As usual, Brigadier General Harold Barker, the force field artillery commander, was at the division command forward post. Barker joined a forward-observer team – Captain James Ruhlin and a Private Chamberlain – and began directing the fire of his sole supporting howitzer platoon. It was impossible to relight on sight detection of targets, so Captain Ruhlin expertly corrected the guns by sound alone – a dubious method except under the most extreme circumstances. He cooly and rapidly shifted fires to bring them in as close as he dared. The gunners on Baraulu fired as fast as they could juggle the heavy shells and powder charges into the hot breeches. One by one, more...heavy howitzers were turned to lay on the target. Captain Ruhlin fired at all possible staging areas on all flanks, then slowly walked the fire back to the tiny headquarters perimeter...

In the morning, twenty Japanese corpses were recovered from cleared areas on or beside the trail leading to and from the command-post perimeter.⁵¹

ANALYSIS:

- 1. General Sasaki ordered an infiltration into 43 ID's consolidation area, but the 13th Infantry conducted raids which have limited objectives and a planned withdrawal.
 - a. Why might the 13th have conducted raids?
 - b. Do you think raids were what Sasaki visualized, described, and directed to the 13th Infantry?
- 2. Did terrain effects influence the decision to raid instead of destroy enemy forces and seize terrain?

two battalions from the 145th Infantry were landing at Zanana around that time. The failure may have been due to 1) unfamiliarity with the terrain, 2) not all of the 13th was in place to conduct the attack, 3) the presence of a larger US infantry presence at Zanana, or 4) a combination of all three. ⁵¹ Hammel, 142-3.

Stand 4. XIV Corps and the Capture of Munda Point.

Visuals	Virtual Views
4A. XIV Corps Sustainment	
4B. XIV Corps 17-22 JUL '43	
4C. XIV Corps 25 JUL-1 AUG '43	14. 148 Infantry
4D. Bartley Pocket 25-31 JUL	15. "The Knob"
	16. 161 IN and Marine Tanks
	17. Horseshoe Hill
4E. XIV Corps 25 JUL-1 AUG '43	12. 172 IN and Marine Tanks
	18. Ilangana Village
	19. Terere Village
4F. XIV Corps 2 AUG '43	20. Lambeti Plantation
	21. Munda Airfield
4G. Bibilo Hills	22. Bibilo Hills
4H. XIV Corps 2-5 AUG	23. Kokengolo Hill
Jungle Warfare Concepts Compared	

ORIENTATION: Conducted in the stand.

DESCRIPTION:

Visual 4A. XIV Corps Sustainment

MG Griswold: New Georgia doesn't have the roads or infrastructure to sustain one division in the offense. What improvements did you order to ensure you could sustain two divisions?

- I) Improving Sustainment.⁵²
 - A) [4A-1] Instead of a single supply dump for two divisions, 43 ID and 37 ID would have separate, dedicated dumps.
 - 1) 43 ID's dump was moved off Rendova Island and onto nearby Barabuni Island.
 - 2) The adjacent Kokarana Island was designated for 37 ID.
 - 3) Larger transport ships would offload onto these islands and ferry the supplies to Zanana, Laiana, or other barrier islands closer to New Georgia.
 - B) [4A-2] The 17th Field Hospital arrived from Guadalcanal, alleviating the 125-bed shortage created when the Japanese bombed Rendova on 2 July.
 - Lessons learned from treating 43 ID's war neurosis casualties were applied and rest camps established to separate those with combat fatigue from the true neurosis cases.



⁵² Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 139-40.

- 2) The Navy provided doctors to accompany patients transferred to Guadalcanal on LSTs, which freed up more bed space on Rendova.
- C) The engineers had started work on the road from Laiana to the Munda Trail and 600 yards were complete by 17 July.
 - 1) Three days later it connected to the trail and a usable road lay close to the front line.
 - 2) Regiments no longer needed emergency air resupply.
 - 3) Bulldozers continued to break branching trails off the road to reach forward positions.

Visual 4B. XIV Corps 17-22 JUL '43

- II) From a Division Fight to a Corps Fight.
 - A) MG Griswold started deploying XIV Corps units onto New Georgia while MG Sasaki launched his failed counterattack.⁵³
 - 1) The unit in greatest need of rest and reorganization in 43 ID was the 169th Infantry.
 - (i) On 18 July two battalions from the 145th Infantry moved west from Zanana.
 - (ii) They were delayed by Japanese patrols around the Barike River, but finished relieving the 169th in place on 21 Jul.
 - 2) Most of 37 ID was on New Georgia and available for combat by 23 July.
 - B) 37 ID assumed the corps center and right (north).
 - [4B-1] The two battalions of the 145th Infantry assumed the narrow frontage formerly controlled by the 169th from Kelley Hill to Reincke Ridge.
 - [4B-2] Two battalions from the 161st Infantry (the 3rd Battalion in corps reserve), taken from 25 ID, assumed the rest of Reincke Ridge on the right (north) flank of the FLOT.



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- [4B-3] The 148th Infantry and its two battalions was not assigned to a contiguous front but protected the corps right flank and rear.
- C) [4B-4] 43 ID assumed the corps left (south) half of its former AO.
 - The 172nd Infantry and its three battalions shifted right (north) to make room for the two battalions from the 103rd, and established contact with 37 ID for a contiguous forward line of troops (FLOT).
 - 2) The 103rd Infantry and its two battalions was on the extreme left flank.

MG Griswold: Describe your concept of the operation.

- III) XIV Corps Concept of the Operation.
 - A) The scheme of maneuver was frontal assault with two divisions..⁵⁴
 - 1) [4B-5] 37 ID, the main effort, had two tasks.
 - (i) First, its main effort would envelop the Bibilo Hills and destroy the Japanese.
 - (ii) Second, its supporting effort, was to cover/guard the corps right flank and rear.
 - 2) [4B-6] 43 ID, the supporting effort, would seize Lambeti Plantation and Munda Airfield.
 - 3) 9th Marine Defense Battalion's tank platoon remained under corps control (OPCON).

⁵³ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 137-8.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 143-4.

- B) Scheme of Fires. Thirty minutes of air and naval bombardment would precede the attack.
 - 1) Naval gunfire would commence at 0610.
 - 2) Air attack would start at 0635.
- C) Engineers would follow the advance closely to continue improving the road network needed for sustainment.
- D) Coordinating instructions from Griswold specified that, "Centers of resistance will be contained, by-passed, and reduced without impeding the impetus of the attack. Attack briskly.".⁵⁵

Visual 4C. XIV Corps 25-29 JUL '43

IV) Into the Japanese Main Defensive Line.

Move back to the Trail Intersection. Look down the west branch of the trail at 148 IN's AO.

Virtual View 14. 148 Infantry

MG Beightler: Describe your division's attack on the right, center, and left in your AO.

- A) 37 ID.
 - 1) The Right Flank and 148 IN.⁵⁶
 - (i) Colonel Stuart A. Baxter's two battalions advanced west against very little opposition.
 - (ii) Baxter was to maintain contact with 161
 IN on his left, but had to delay his attack until 1003 and allow the 161st time to



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finish getting into its attack positions on the LD. According to Baxter, they never did. $^{\rm 57}$

- (iii) The 2nd Battalion led the advance for the first three days, and the 1st Battalion followed to the right rear – and still tried to make contact with the 161st who was by then behind the regimental CP..⁵⁸
 - (a) **[4C-1]** On 25 July a patrol sent to find the 161st destroyed a Japanese position found just 200 yards southwest of the CP.
 - (b) **[4C-2]** Forward elements were unsuccessfully attacked on the morning of 26 July.
 - (1) The Japanese reoccupied the position behind the CP during the night and was cleared a second time.
 - (2) After that Baxter left it to the 161st to control (it was supposedly in the adjacent AO.)

⁵⁵ Baxter, Stuart A. *Operations of the 148th Infantry (-3d BN) in New Georgia July 18-August 5, 1943*. Undated, Ohio Army National Guard Archives, 8.

⁵⁶ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 154-8.

⁵⁷ Baxter, 8.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 9.


- (c) **[4C-3]** By 27 July the 148th was supposedly 1200 yards beyond the LD, but distances were regularly overestimated by all units on New Georgia.
 - (1) Patrols reported no enemy presence to the west or northwest.
 - (2) But there were still problems with the Japanese getting between the 148 $^{\rm th}$ and the 161 $^{\rm st}$. 59
- (iv) [4C-4] The 1st Battalion passed through the 2nd Battalion on 28 July and assumed the advance.
 - (a) The gap between the 148th and the 161st only worsened when engineers clearing the path for a supply route were ambushed.
 - (b) Baxter's ration and ammunition dump was attacked by the *13th Infantry* but successfully repulsed.
- (v) Ultimately, the problem was the 148th's disposition.
 - (a) Its mission was to guard the right flank and rear of the corps.
 - (b) But most of its forces were too far forward.
 - (c) [4C-5] On 29 July, MG Beightler ordered Baxter to withdraw that part of his regiment that was too far forward, make physical contact with the 161st, and reorient to better support the main effort.
 - (d) Beightler was focused on setting conditions for the 161st to seize Bartley Ridge in its AO.
- (vi) The 148th's withdrawal took the better part of three days to execute.
- 2) Bartley Ridge and 161 IN.⁶⁰
 - (i) [4C-6] On 25 July Colonel James L. Dalton attempted a double envelopment of Bartley Ridge directly to his front. The 161st was 37 ID's main effort.

Move to "The Knob" for the attack on Bartley Ridge.

Virtual View 15. "The Knob"

Visual 4D. Bartley Pocket 25-31 JUL

- (a) [4D-1] Company I attacked to fix the enemy, but was denied their advance onto the forward slope. The avenue of approach to the base of the ridge was adequately covered and concealed, but thinned vegetation on the slope exposed them to effective enemy fire from the crest.
- (b) [4D-2] Third Battalion, attempting its envelopment around the south end of the ridge, was also denied its advance.
- (c) [4D-3] First Battalion was more successful. They found the north flank of the Japanese position and started their envelopment from the north.



 ⁵⁹ Baxter, 10. Author's note: Colonel Baxter's account should be regarded with some skepticism; it has some self-serving elements in it that are made at the expense of the adjacent regiment, the 161st Infantry.
 ⁶⁰ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 150-3.

- (d) Then Beightler and Dalton conferred and adjusted the 161st's scheme of maneuver.
 - (1) [4D-4] Third Battalion would contain the Japanese defenders on the ridge.
 - (2) First Battalion would make a reconnaissance in force to determine the extent of Japanese defenses on adjacent terrain.
 - (3) 10th Marine Defense Battalion's tank platoon had arrived on New Georgia. Its commander was ordered to make terrain reconnaissance for supporting 3rd Battalion the next day.
 - (4) 37 ID could not advance until the Japanese contained by 3rd Battalion were cleared off the ridge.

Move to the tanks attacking Bartley Ridge.

Virtual View 16. 161 IN and Marine Tanks

- (ii) [4D-5] Tanks and flamethrowers supported the Bartley Ridge attack on 26 July.
 - (a) Two companies started the attack at 0900, each company advancing in column behind three tanks.
 - (b) Broken terrain slowed their movement and the enemy wasn't engaged until 0925.
 - (1) Tank-infantry cooperation was clumsy; the infantry had to relay instructions to the tanks via a radio car to the tank platoon commander.
 - (2) Some infantrymen were injured by the tanks when they turned to accommodate the terrain.
 - (3) Several flamethrower operators were killed when they weren't covered by their escorting riflemen.
 - (4) One tank was disabled by a magnetic mine and a second disabled by a ruptured fuel line.
 - (c) But after about two hours' fighting, about a dozen pillboxes were reduced.
 - (1) The infantry was ordered to occupy the cleared positions to deny Japanese infiltration back into the pillboxes that night.
 - (2) The remaining four operational tanks withdrew to reorganize.
 - (d) [4D-6] By then end of the day 14 pillboxes were reduced and 3rd Battalion had advanced about 200 yards onto Bartley Ridge.
 - (1) But Japanese fire from the ridge crest and the adjacent Horseshoe Hill was too heavy to secure their positions.
 - (2) The disabled tanks could not be recovered for repairs.
 - (3) The attack uncovered the presence of many more Japanese fighting positions, so many in fact that Dalton was given permission to use both his battalions for a continued reconnaissance in force.
 - (e) Defeating the Japanese on Bartley Ridge would have to be closely coordinated with a simultaneous attack on Horseshoe Hill.
- 3) [4D-7] Horseshoe Hill, Bartley Ridge, 145 IN and 161 IN.
 - (i) Japanese fire from Horseshoe Hill had denied 3-161 IN from enveloping Bartley Ridge on 25 July and helped force their withdrawal on 26 July.
 - (ii) MG Beightler issued orders to the 145th Infantry to support the 161st's attack.

- (iii) COL Holland had returned to command of the 145th Infantry and remained in position on Kelley Hill and part of Reincke Ridge when 161 IN attacked west on 25 and 26 July.
 - (a) Because 3-161 IN had been unable to move around the south end of Bartley Hill, attacking on that avenue of approach was considered unfeasible.
 - (b) [4D-8] Instead, on 27 July Holland sent his 2nd Battalion north behind and around 3-161 IN but between 3-161 IN and 1-161 IN past the north end of Bartley Ridge to attack Horseshoe Ridge from the northeast.
 - (c) Simultaneously, 3-161 IN sent reconnaissance patrols around Bartley Ridge to develop a better understanding of the Japanese disposition on that hill.
 - (1) They spotted pillboxes on the right flank of 1-145 IN on Kelley Hill.
 - (2) [4D-9] Even though 2-145 IN was making slow progress on a knoll between Bartley Ridge and Horseshoe Hill, this new information led Beightler to delay the next major attack until 29 July.
- (iv) 28 July was spent on more reconnaissance and patrols to maintain contact with the Japanese defenses.
 - (a) In a strange turn of events, one patrol from 3-161 IN ascended the north side of Bartley Ridge unmolested.
 - (1) They found several abandoned pillboxes and occupied them.
 - (2) From there they infiltrated to clear the remaining emplacements.
 - (3) The infiltration intermixed US attackers and Japanese defenders, precluding the future use of indirect supporting fires.
 - (4) The Japanese appeared to be withdrawing from Bartley Ridge.
 - (b) **[4D-10]** 3-161 IN was ordered to continue securing the ridge, which lasted into the next day. They were replaced by 2-161 IN and sent into reserve.
- (v) **[4D-11]** On 30 July, with Bartley Ridge now sufficiently reduced (but not completely secured), Beightler shifted his lines to widen the AO for the adjacent 43 ID.
 - (a) First Battalion, 145th Infantry, kept Kelley Hill and was given the southern end of Bartley Ridge.
 - (b) Second Battalion, 145th Infantry, was attached to that regiment for attacking Horseshoe Hill.
 - (c) In a strange task organization, 161 IN was the main effort against Horseshoe Hill, but the attacking battalions were 2-145 IN and 2-161 IN.⁶¹
 - (1) There was very little resistance for 2-161 IN when it finished clearing Bartley Ridge.
 - (2) But 2-145 IN encountered stiff resistance when it attacked west toward Horseshoe Hill.
- (vi) By the next day Bartley Ridge was finally secured and both battalions were on line attacking west.
 - (a) This small piece of ground had 46 log and coral pillboxes on it supported by 36 smaller fighting positions.
 - (b) It had taken seven days to clear.

⁶¹ Though not explicitly stated in Miller, Jr., this was probably due to 1) the problems with 148 IN's overextension on the division right flank and the effect it had on 1-161 IN, and 2) 1-145 IN's employment as a base of fire and its location on the 37 ID left flank. Though unusual, the decision to attach 2-145 IN to 161 IN probably saved time and maintained the momentum XIV Corps had achieved.

(vii) Second Battalion, 145th Infantry continued its assault on Horseshoe Hill and captured it on 1 August without "firing a shot or losing a man.".⁶²

Return to Virtual View 12. 172 IN and Marine Tanks

Visual 4E. XIV Corps 23 JUL-1 AUG '43

MG Hester: Describe your division's attacks through the Japanese Main Defensive Line.

- B) 43 ID.⁶³
 - 1) Shimizu Hill, 172 IN and 169 IN.
 - (i) **[4E-1]** On 25 July COL Ross' 172nd Infantry attacked west with two battalions.
 - (a) As 37 ID's attack on Bartley Ridge stalled, the 172nd made contact with the pillboxes on the Japanese main defensive line near Shimizu Hill and halted to request tank support.
 - (b) The tanks arrived and the attack continued, but by 1430 three tanks were disabled.
 - (c) The attack was suspended for the rest of the day.
 - (ii) The next day 172 IN remained in place to provide supporting fires to 103 IN on their left.
 - (iii) [4E-2, 3, 4] For the next three days Ross gained ground and slowly reduced Shimizu Hill.
 - (a) But the regiment had been in sustained combat longer than any other on New Georgia, and it needed to rest, consolidate, and reorganize.
 - (b) [4E-5] On 29 July, 1-169 IN was moved into the line from Rendova and 3-169 was deployed out of division reserve.
 - (c) Slowly, 172 IN was "pinched out" of its AO by a reinvigorated 169 IN.

Follow the coast road for the attack to Ilangana Village.

Virtual View 18. Ilangana Village

- 2) Coastal Villages and 103 IN.⁶⁴
 - (i) Colonel Howard F. Brown's two battalions from the 103rd Infantry advanced after a substantial preparatory bombardment on 25 July.
 - (a) Preparatory fires.
 - (1) Seven destroyers fired 4000 5-inch projectiles at Lambeti Plantation.
 - (2) Then 254 aircraft dropped 250 tons of fragmentation and high explosive bombs on the target area.



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⁶² Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 153.

⁶³ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, Ibid., 146-9.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 146-9.

- (3) At 0700 43 ID DIVARTY fired on the first of 100 planned targets ahead of the infantry; by the end of the day they fired over 2150 105mm rounds and 1182 155mm rounds at the Japanese.
- (4) Theoretically, these barrages saturated the target area with 70 projectiles per 100 square yards.
- (b) The infantry crossed the LD at 0700 as the artillery shifted west.
 - (1) Third Battalion (on the left) made contact with the main defensive line. Their advance was denied even after attempting to move around the Japanese pillboxes.
 - (2) Second Battalion (on the right) was more successful, advancing quickly through light opposition until its E Company reached Terere Village at noon and established hasty defensive positions.
 - (3) But E Company was too far forward; the Japanese infiltrated through the gaps and cut the communication wires behind them.
- (c) MG Hester tried to salvage the breakthrough by committing 3-169 IN out of division reserve, but it became fixed by enfilading fire from the south end of Shimizu Hill and the pillboxes in front of 3-103 IN.
 - (1) After Marine tanks could not get 3-169 IN moving again, E Company withdrew back into line with its adjacent companies.
 - (2) 3-169 IN went back into reserve.

Follow the coast road for the second attack to Terere Village

- (ii) On 26 July Hester decided to advance 103 IN on the division left and hold 172 IN in place to straighten and shorten his line.
 - (a) The 103rd would attack to seize Terere Village where E/103 IN had stopped the day before.
 - (b) This attack was preceded by extensive patrols to facilitate point fires on individual pillboxes.
 - (1) The patrols returned and the artillery began firing at 1115.
 - (2) About an hour later the fires lifted and 103 IN attacked, led by Marine tanks and six flamethrowers accompanying the riflemen.
 - (3) When the infantry found a pillbox, they halted about 20 yards to suppress it with small arms fire.
 - (4) The flamethrowers crawled forward under the covering fire and burned off the vegetation around the target.
 - (5) Then the infantry and tanks reduced the pillbox and killed its defenders.
 - (c) The 103rd reduced 74 pillboxes that afternoon between Ilangana and Kia Village, still short of Terere but Hester's line was much straighter than it had been.

Virtual View 19. Terere VIllage

- (iii) For the next three days 103 IN continued 43 ID's slow grind toward Munda Airfield.
- C) On 29 July Hester was replaced by Major General John R. Hodge, who formerly commanded the Americal Division.
 - (i) Hester had been suffering with a stomach ulcer before the New Georgia offensive began.

- (ii) LTG Harmon, who had also burdened Hester with the split command structure between NGOF and 43 ID, felt the division commander was exhausted.
- (iii) But some accounts also state Hester requested his replacement.
- (iv) Hester needed two months to recover before returning to command of training centers in the United States.

MG Griswold: Describe the XIV Corps situation on 1 AUG.

- V) The Breakthrough.
 - A) [4E-6] On 30 JUL, "Generals Hodge and Wing, accompanied by Colonel Ross, had visited the command and observation posts of the 145th Infantry, from where they could see part of Munda airfield. They detected evidence of a Japanese withdrawal, which seemed to be covered by fire from the enemy still on Horseshoe Hill.".⁶⁵
 - B) [4E-7] By 1 AUG XIV Corps had control of advantageous terrain and its units were in better positions to continue the offensive.⁶⁶
 - 1) 43 ID was nearing Lambeti Plantation and had taken Shimizu Hill.
 - 2) 37 ID had secured Bartley Ridge, Horseshoe Hill was almost secure, and 148 IN was finishing its withdrawal to come on line with the rest of the division.
 - C) Griswold's original orders were still in effect; but at 1500 he ordered his divisions to send out patrols and confirm whether the Japanese were withdrawing.

Visual 4F. XIV Corps 2 AUG '43

MG Hodge: Describe 43 ID's actions at Lambeti Plantation.



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D) 43 ID and Lambeti Plantation.⁶⁷

Advance on the coastal road to Lambeti Plantation.

 [4F-1] On the left flank, 103 IN attacked at 1100 and encountered almost no opposition. By the end of the day they had crossed Lambeti Plantation and were on the east side of Munda airfield.

Virtual View 20. Lambeti Plantation

Advance on the coastal road to the east side of Munda Airfield.

 The 169th Infantry assumed the division's right flank, and after crossing Lambeti Plantation was just below the forward slope of the Bibilo Hills.

⁶⁵ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 158.

⁶⁶ Ibid.


⁶⁷ Ibid., 158, 159.

Virtual View 21. Munda Airfield

Visual 4G. Bibilo Hills

MG Beightler: Describe the action at Bibilo Hills.

- E) 37 ID and Bibilo Hills..68
 - Horseshoe Hill was secured after the patrol orders were received, and the division advanced almost 700 yards before the end of the day.



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Move to Virtual View 18. Bibilo Hills

Take a position above "Fourth Hill" and point out Right Hill, Center Hill, and Left Hill.

- The Bibilo Hills (sometimes called Bibilo Hill) were the last fortified enemy positions in front of 37 ID in 145th Infantry's AO.
 - (i) According to the 145th Infantry's terrain sketch in its reports, there are three or four distinct hilltops.
 - (ii) The one farthest south actually fell in the 169th Infantry's AO and was labelled "Left Hill".
 - (iii) Northwest of Left Hill was "Center Hill", in the 145th's AO.
 - (iv) Northwest of Center Hill was "Right Hill", which had two knobs oriented on an eastwest line, one behind the other. The larger knob was on the east facing the 145th.
 - (v) Northeast of Center and Right Hill was the fourth hill, unnamed but key terrain for attacking the other two hills in zone.⁶⁹
- 3) **[4G-1]** Second Battalion had been returned to the 145th, and led the attack on 2 AUG.
 - (i) Here a Japanese dual-purpose gun killed the battalion S-2, a forward observer, and wounded several others.
 - (ii) Two companies continued attacking the fourth hill before withdrawing back to secured terrain.
- 4) On 3 AUG two companies assaulted again and destroyed five pillboxes, then established hasty defensive positions for the night.
- 5) **[4G-2]** On 4 AUG 2nd Battalion attacked again with two companies.
 - (i) Left Hill had been secured by the 169th Infantry.
 - (a) E/145 IN assaulted Right Hill.
 - (1) Enemy pillboxes disrupted their maneuver.
 - (2) An additional platoon from F/145 IN tried the right flank in support but was unsuccessful.
 - (b) F/145 assaulted Center Hill and secured it with two platoons but with heavy losses. An enemy-held ridge to the southwest denied further advance.

⁶⁸ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 159, 163-4, and 37th Infantry Division, *Report After Action, New Georgia (B.S.I) Campaign, 12 July 1943 to 25 September 1943, Volume II*. Undated, Ohio Army National Guard Archives, 4-6.

⁶⁹ This is probably the "high ridge" referenced in 37 ID's report on page 4.

- (ii) **[4G-3]** G/145 was committed in the center to support E/145 on the south side of Right Hill but was also fixed by enemy fire.
- (iii) All three companies withdrew about 40 yards to put artillery fire on the Japanese positions.
- (iv) At 1540 the attack resumed after the artillery fires lifted.

Advance to the top of "Right Hill".

- (v) [4G-4] Two hours later, with additional support from 2nd Battalion's weapons company, the top of Right Hill was secured and remaining enemy positions were partially enveloped on both flanks.
- (vi) By 1810 the Japanese had abandoned the remaining positions, but 2nd Battalion withdrew a short distance again to secured positions and a hasty defense for the night.
- 6) [4G-5] A mortar barrage on Right Hill preceded the attack on 5 AUG, and it was declared secure at 1100.
- 7) From here, the 145th Infantry continued their attack unopposed all the way to the beach above Munda Point.

Move to Kokengolo Hill.

Visual 4H. XIV Corps 2-5 AUG


MG Hodge: Describe how Munda Airfield was secured.

Virtual View 23. Kokengolo Hill

- F) [4H-1] 43 ID and Munda Airfield.⁷⁰
 - 1) From 2-5 August, the 103rd and 169th Infantry *Slid* made full use of all combat assets to attack across Munda Airfield.
 - 2) Kokengolo Hill in the 169th's AO and Bibilo Hill in 37 ID's AO were the only Japanese positions to delay the advance.
 - 3) The infantry, supported by tanks and mortars, forced the enemy from the complex of tunnels, bunkers, and pillboxes on Kokengolo Hill.
 - 4) The west side of the airfield was reached in the early afternoon on 5 AUG, and Munda Point was declared secure.

Visual Jungle Warfare Concepts Compared

VIGNETTE: CPT Scott Roberts wrote about his experiences on New Georgia when he attended the Advanced Infantry Officer's Course in 1948-49. He listed eleven lessons learned considered critical for jungle warfare (underline retained from the source):



⁷⁰ Miller Jr., Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, 158-9,



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- 1. Reconnaissance must be continuous and complete.
- 2. <u>Where a fortified position is encountered, a penetration offers more chance of success that</u> <u>a frontal attack of the entire position and is less costly in casualties</u>.
- 3. Three or four aggressive men within an enemy fortified position can fix most of the enemy within their emplacements.
- 4. <u>Security is vital and must be maintained constantly</u>.
- 5. <u>Sometimes surprise can be achieved in jungle fighting by foregoing an artillery and mortar</u> <u>preparation</u>.
- 6. <u>Control is very difficult in jungle terrain</u> where visibility is often limited and restricted to two or three yards.
- 7. <u>In jungle terrain the tendency for men to bunch up must be combatted constantly</u>.
- 8. The tactics and principles of combat as set forth in Army field manuals apply in jungle terrain as elsewhere, though modifications may be necessary.
- 9. <u>The success of a battalion and regiment depends upon the ability of small unit action above all else</u>.
- 10. <u>Nothing can take the place of extensive small unit training</u>, specially[sic] in jungle terrain where direction, control and communications are exceedingly difficult.
- 11. <u>Commanders should extend themselves to provide hot meals for front line units</u> and whenever the situation permits, commanders should relieve the men long enough to permit bathing..⁷¹

ANALYSIS:

1. [1] ATP 3-90.98 Jungle Operations states:

Because jungle operations focus on the enemy and are less concerned with terrain, they are often non-linear in nature. Characterized by a combination of dispersion and concentration, jungle operations often consist of small units conducting reconnaissance operations and movements to locate and fix the enemy. Forces are then concentrated at decisive points to destroy the enemy and exploit initial success. In non-linear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Non-linear operations typically focus on creating specific effects on multiple decisive points. Non-linear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along multiple lines of effort/Lines of operation from selected bases.

Does the offensive to seize and secure Munda Point validate this concept? Are there examples from Munda Point that do not follow these principles?

2. How does this compare to CPT Scott's lessons learned?

⁷¹ US Army Infantry School. *The Operations of the 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 17snd Infantry (43rd Infantry Division) at Morrison-Johnson Hill, Approaching Munda Airstrip, New Georgia Island, British Solomon Islands, 28 July 1943 (Northern Solomons Campaign) (Personal Experience of a Platoon Leader)*. Captain Robert W. Scott, Advanced Infantry Officers Course 1948-49 Class II, undated.

Stand 5. After Munda Point.

Visuals

After Munda Point

ORIENTATION: NA

DESCRIPTION:

Visual: After Munda Point

- I) Other Engagements on New Georgia.
 - A) After Munda Point was secured, US forces still had to clear the island of Japanese defenders.
 - 1) The 25th Infantry Division joined XIV Corps to consolidate the gains on New Georgia.
 - 2) Munda Point became the TAA for advances north to secure the last objectives.
 - B) Casualties and disease in 37 ID and 43 ID reduced their effective strength and 25 ID was needed to make up the difference.⁷²
 - The three infantry regiments in 37 ID had a combined effective strength of about 7000 men.
 - 2) 43 ID had 4536 effective infantrymen out of an MTOE strength of 8000.
 - 25 ID was reluctantly committed with its 27th Infantry Regiment, and the 161st Infantry Regiment was returned to its control.
 - C) MG Griswold deployed 25 ID on the corps right flank.



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- 1) [1] 161 IN was sent north with 1-27 IN to clear the jungle of Japanese defenders and link up with the Marines at Bairoko.
- 2) [2] The rest of 27 IN attacked north from the Bibilo Hills to Zieta Village, but had no contact with the Japanese.
- 3) After that, 25 ID advanced west through the jungle and intermittent resistance until 25 August.
- 4) By the time 25 ID reached the shorelines on the other side of New Georgia, they were able to observe the Japanese evacuating their remaining defenders.
- D) [3] 43 ID continued west with what it had into adjacent islands, and secured Baanga on 21 August.
- E) [4] The Japanese consolidated their withdrawing forces onto Kolombangara, but at that point they were isolated enough to warrant a bypass for the next operational objective: Vella Lavella.
- II) <u>The Cost.</u>
 - A) Casualties.⁷³

⁷² Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 167-8.

⁷³ Ibid., 187.

- 1) US casualties amounted to 1094 KIA/DOW, 3873 WIA, and 23 MIA.
 - (i) 25 ID: 141 KIA/DOW, 550 WIA, 1 MIA.
 - (ii) 37 ID: 220 KIA/DOW, 887 WIA, 5 MIA.
 - (iii) 43 ID: 538 KIA/DOW, 1942 WIA, 17 MIA.
- 2) XIV Corps counted 2483 Japanese dead on New Georgia.
- 3) But in spite of their losses, MG Sasaki successfully evacuated 9400 men who would fight the Americans on other islands.
- B) Sustainment.
 - 1) By 31 July joint sustainment had transported:
 - (i) 4800 tons of rations.
 - (ii) 17,431 drums of fuel (3486 tons).
 - (iii) 6895 tons of vehicles.
 - (iv) 9961 tons of ammunition.
 - (v) 5323 tons of other material.
 - 2) Most of this material eventually found its way onto the two beachheads at Zanana and Laiana.
- III) <u>Reduction of Rabaul.</u>
 - A) The Allies now had the airfield on Munda Point to support subsequent operations, and three others on New Georgia: Barakoma, Ondonga, and Segi.
 - B) Most of the sorties against Bougainville, the next major offensive after Vella Lavella, would take off from Munda Point.

VIGNETTE: In an unusual tribute found in an official Army history of the New Georgia Campaign, author John Miller Jr. had this to say about our enemies:

No account of the operations should be brought to a close without praising the skill, tenacity, and valor of the heavily outnumbered Japanese who stood off nearly four Allied divisions in the course of the action, and then successfully evacuated 9,400 fighting men to fight again. The obstinate General Sasaki... deserved his country's gratitude for his gallant and able conduct of the defense..⁷⁴

ANALYSIS: NA

⁷⁴ Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul.* 1959, 188.

Medical Module: Munda Point Casualty Evacuation and Treatment.

Visuals	Virtual Views
Common Conditions and Diseases on New	
Georgia	
Chain of Evacuation on New Georgia	M1. Battalion Aid Station
	M2. Clearing Station
Typical Field Hospital Layout	M3. Field Hospital

ORIENTATION: Conducted in the stand.

DESCRIPTION:

Prior to World War Two, what killed more soldiers than anything else?

- I) Sanitation and Disease.⁷⁵
 - A) "Some of the ills faced by Army men and women were familiar communicable diseases, under control in civilian life in the United States but newly dangerous under combat conditions. Others were exotics unfamiliar to most American doctors, spread by vectors little studied by entomologists."⁷⁶

What are some key components of sanitation?

- B) Sanitation.
 - 1) Water Supply. Current environmental health programs require:⁷⁷
 - (i) Surveillance.
 - (ii) Inspection.
 - (iii) Records and reports.
 - 2) Waste Disposal. Includes solid waste, hazardous waste, medical waste, and wastewater.
 - (i) Proper disposal to reduce pest and vector breeding.
 - (ii) Spillage control for toxic industrial materials.
 - (iii) Hazardous contaminants released into groundwater and subsurface water.
 - 3) Sanitation and Hygiene. Some current activities include:
 - (i) Housing sanitation.
 - (ii) Barber services.
 - (iii) Laundry operations.
 - (iv) Food service sanitation.

What were the typical diseases found in the South Pacific?


⁷⁵ Condon-Rail, Mary E. and Cowdrey, Albert F., *Medical Services in the War Against Japan*. (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), 45-7.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 45.

⁷⁷ US Army. ATP 4-02.8 Force Health Protection, 2016, 2-9.

Visual: Common Conditions and Diseases on New Georgia

- C) Disease.⁷⁸
 - Sexually Transmitted Diseases. These are largely self-inflicted conditions, so no discussion here!
 - 2) Dysentery.
 - (i) Bacterial infection.
 - (ii) The most common symptom is bloody diarrhea.



- Slide 33
- (iii) Usually caused by contaminated food and water from poor sanitation.
- 3) Schistosomiasis.
 - (i) Parasitic infection.
 - (ii) Symptoms include abdominal pain, diarrhea, bloody stool, or blood in the urine.
 - (iii) Spread by infected freshwater snails.
 - (iv) Infection results from skin contact with contaminated water.
- 4) Hookworm.
 - (i) Parasitic infection.
 - (ii) Symptoms are as minimal as itching and skin rash, or as severe as abdominal pain, loss of appetite, weight loss, fatigue, and anemia.
 - (iii) Spread by hookworm larvae.
 - (iv) Infection results from skin contact with contaminated soil.
- 5) Dengue Fever.
 - (i) Viral infection.
 - (ii) Symptoms are high fever, headache, vomiting, muscle and joint pain, and skin rash.
 - (iii) Spread my mosquitos.
 - (iv) Infection results from getting bitten by mosquitos carrying the virus.
- 6) Filariasis.
 - (i) Parasitic infection.
 - (ii) Symptoms include elephantiasis edema with thickening skin and tissue of the infected area.
 - (iii) Spread by black flies and mosquitos.
 - (iv) Infection results from getting bitten by flies or mosquitos carrying the microfilariae (live offspring not eggs) that develop into larvae in the host.
- 7) Scrub Typhus.
 - (i) Parasitic infection.
 - (ii) Symptoms include fever, headache, muscle pain, cough, and gastrointestinal symptoms.
 - (iii) Spread by mites, aka "chiggers" that feed on infected rodents.
 - (iv) Infection results from getting bitten.
- 8) Malaria.
 - (i) Parasitic infection.
 - (ii) Symptoms include chills, fever, fatigue, vomiting, and headache lasting hours or days.
 - (iii) Spread by mosquitos.

⁷⁸ Condon-Rail, 45-7.

(iv) Infection results from getting bitten by mosquitos carrying the live parasite called a "sporozite".

How does current Force Health Protection manage prevention of these diseases?

- II) <u>Challenges in Medical Support on New Georgia</u>.⁷⁹
 - A) Even in 1943 medical branch personnel were not always prepared for the physical demands of fighting in the Pacific.
 - 1) Some medical personnel became exhaustion casualties after just one or two days of providing medical treatment without rest.
 - Doctors with surgical experience were at a premium and filled critical positions; nonclinical positions were often filled with Dental, Veterinary, and Medical Administrative Corps personnel to manage evacuation tasks.
 - B) Medical supply was insufficient compared to demand.
 - 1) 43 ID had left the bulk of its medical supplies in the Russell islands or on Guadalcanal.
 - 2) Poor or indistinct markings made it hard for borrowed manpower to get it onto the ships for transportation.
 - 3) Shortage of cargo space on ships often meant medical supplies were intermixed with other classes of supply.
 - C) Medical units were short of personnel when the campaign started.⁸⁰
 - Other theaters had adopted the use of "portable surgical hospitals" that placed surgical teams closer to the front line, but XIV Corps had not implemented those changes in June 1943.
 - 2) 43 ID's Medical Battalion was 30-35% understrength.
 - (i) The original medical evacuation plan required the battalion's clearing company to act as the division hospital.
 - (ii) This plan was "dead in the water" when Japanese aircraft bombed the clearing company on 2 July.
 - (iii) "Of all deaths by enemy action sustained during the campaign, 50 percent occurred in the first two weeks.".⁸¹
 - D) Diarrhea, dysentery, skin infections, and malaria were still problems in spite of efforts to control them.
 - 1) Many soldiers were already infected with malaria when they came ashore, and the stress of combat produced symptoms or relapses.
 - For comparison of severity, by 17 July 43 ID had taken 90 KIA and 636 WIA. But over 1000 men were evacuated for disease..⁸²
- III) War Neurosis.
 - A) On Guadalcanal the strangeness of jungle environments and the Japanese penchant for night infiltration created mental demands on top of the already-extreme physical demands..⁸³

⁷⁹ Condon-Rail, 186.

⁸⁰ Condon-Rail, 184.

⁸¹ Ibid., 184.

⁸² Miller Jr., *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. 1959, 120.

⁸³ Condon-Rail, 125-6.

- 1) Early measures to treat war neurosis cases included practices from World War One, which was to keep those with symptoms close to the front line.
- 2) Medical personnel tried to be proactive and screen for symptoms before personnel had a "psychological break" and became a danger to themselves or others.
- 3) One difficulty that had to be overcome was line officers' resistance to the idea that war neurosis was a genuine medical problem.
- B) New Georgia had a higher incidence of combat-fatigue casualties, dubbed "war neurosis" during Operation Toenails.⁸⁴

Even veterans were subject to strange delusions: "In their minds, the phosphorescence of rotten logs became Japanese signals. The smell of the jungle became poison gas... The slithering of the many land crabs was interpreted as the sound of approaching Japanese.".⁸⁵

- 1) The 169th Infantry was the most effected: there were 700 war neurosis cases by 31 July after 25 days of combat an average of 28 per day; almost an entire rifle platoon.
- 2) Even after XIV Corps assumed command of the offensive, 80% of war neurosis cases originated in 43 ID.
- C) But treatment improved after XIV Corps brought more medical units onto the island, especially the 17th Field Hospital on Rendova.
 - 1) The first treatment measures had simply been evacuation to the sustainment area, which stressed an under-resourced system also contending with combat wounds.
 - 2) But better evaluation and treatment practices emerged.
 - (i) Removing potential cases from the front line to an area where they could rest, focus on personal hygiene, and eat better rations allowed most to recover and return to their units.
 - (ii) Learning from 43 ID's difficult lessons, 37 ID and later 25 ID established dedicated rest camps "salvaging, in Hallam's [the XIV Corps Surgeon] opinion, about 2000 who might otherwise have been evacuated.".⁸⁶
- D) In November 1943 the War Department finally responded by putting an MTOE psychiatrist in every division.

VIGNETTE: Some men in the 169th could not dispel their fears of the night with Tarzan calls bellowed from behind the defensive positions in their bivouac.

The battalion [2-169 IN] had had three terrible nights in a row in the forest, had sustained casualties from gunshots, slashings, and "combat nerves." That morning [PFC] LaMagna had recommended to his sergeant that Joe, his nerve-shattered foxhole buddy of the night before, be evacuated, but the sergeant had declined. This night, Joe was stuffed into an oversized foxhole between two sergeants. After a few quiet hours, LaMagna hear Joe begin to yell. Then shots were fired. Then one of the sergeants yelled, "Stop him! He'll kill us all!" Then there were more shots, and the sound of a scuffle. Before LaMagna could fit it all together, bullets were flying right over his head, hand grenades were exploding, and a

⁸⁴ Condon-Rail, 184-9.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 184-9.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 190.

large explosion engulfed his foxhole. Private First Class Sam LaMagna felt a sharp pain in his right shin, then his whole right side went numb and he passed out.

Much later, when LaMagna came to in a hospital on Guadalcanal, he found that the man in the next bed was one of the sergeants who had taken in Joe, the scared soldier. According to the sergeant, Joe went out of his head and grabbed the sergeant's .45-caliber pistol. As he yelled, "They're coming into the hole," he shot the sergeant in the chest and leg. The other sergeant had pulled out his own .45 caliber pistol and had shot the berserk soldier dead.

For some reason, that was the last bad night in the 2nd Battalion, 169th, had in the rain forest. There was no more panic within the battalion lines at night.⁸⁷

Visual: Chain of Evacuation on New Georgia

- IV) Chain of Evacuation on New Georgia.⁸⁸
 - A) [1] Aidman. The aidman, although assigned to the battalion medical section, served with the line companies and gave first aid to the injured.

Virtual View M1. Battalion Aid Station

- B) [2] Aid Station.
 - The battalion aid station, the first medical installation reached by a casualty because of its location near the front line, treated shock and provided minor surgery, dressing for wounds, and relief from pain.
 - The battalion surgeon, aid station personnel, and company aidmen together formed one of the three battalion sections of the regimental medical detachment.



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Does the virtual terrain have the aid station in a suitable site according to the doctrinal illustration?

Follow the road from the Aid Station to the Collecting/Clearing Station near Laiana Beach.

Virtual View M2. Clearing Station

- C) [3] Collecting Company/Collecting Station.
 - 1) In World War II the division surgeon commanded the division's medical battalion.
 - 2) Each of the battalion's three collecting companies was designed to support one regiment or regimental combat team.
 - 3) A collecting company evacuated casualties from forward aid stations, and a collecting station, which the company ran, provided additional first aid, plus oxygen and whole blood, and formed a regimental holding unit for casualties until they could be taken to the rear.

⁸⁷ Hammel, 102.

⁸⁸ Condon-Rail, 78-9.


- 4) Sometimes a collecting station and a portable surgical hospital worked together, with the hospital stabilizing the seriously wounded for evacuation.
- D) [4] Clearing Company/Clearing Station.
 - 1) Also part of the medical battalion was the clearing company.
 - 2) The clearing station that it operated was, in effect, a small forward hospital, providing fairly complex treatment and informed prognosis, on which further disposition of the casualty was based.
 - 3) In the Pacific clearing companies often functioned as small field hospitals, because most battles were small and hospital units might be absent from the task force or remote from the fighting line.

Cross the water from the Clearing Station to the 17th Field Hospital on Kokarana Island. Walk through the triage and treatment process from location to location.

Visual: Typical Field Hospital Layout

Virtual View M3. Field Hospital

- E) [5] Field Hospital.
 - Attached to a division or corps, the 380-bed (later 400-bed) field hospital was intended to be highly mobile and to concentrate on the early care of casualties.
 - 2) Located whenever possible within a few miles of the front line, the field hospital was a highly flexible unit that could be broken down into its component platoons, each of which, if strengthened with surgical teams, might operate as an independent small hospital.



17th Field Hospital deployed two of its Slide 35
 companies to Kokarana Island to make up for the bed loss in 43 ID after its Medical Battalion was bombed earlier in the battle.

Move from the beach to Tent 1. Look inside from the doorway.

- 4) The Operations Tent was not a triage location, but was the operations center for the medical personnel.
 - (i) This side of the tent was essentially a command post.
 - (ii) Behind the curtain screen were the dental treatment area, the hospital lab, and pharmacy stores.

Move from Tent 1 to Tent 2. Step inside the tent and continue with the description.

- 5) The Receiving Tent was the first stop in the triage process.
 - (i) Litter bearers brought their patients here, dropped them off, and exchanged the litters and blankets brought with the patient for replacements before returning to the ship that would take them back to the Clearing Station.

(ii) Inside the tent hospital personnel could examine up to 25 patients and classify them for treatment according to their wounds or injuries. Patients were walking wounded, needed shock treatment, or needed surgery.

Leave through the back of Tent 2 and move to the doorway of Tent 6. Step inside the tent and continue with the description.

6) The Shock Tent treated shock cases and stabilized them or prepared them for surgery.

Leave through the back of Tent 6. Turn right to look at Tent 11 and Tent 4.

- 7) The tent on the right was for the Walking Wounded.
 - (i) When their treatment was finished, they moved to the Evacuation Tent on the left.
 - (ii) Shock cases that did not require treatment were also moved there if they did not require surgery and were stable.

Turn left and move into the underground operating room.

- 8) Shock cases requiring surgery normally went to the Surgical Tent, but the Japanese air threat during Operation Toenails dictated a higher level of protection for surgical teams and their patients.
 - (i) 17 Field Hospital constructed underground operating rooms to provide cover against Japanese bombs or strafing attacks.
 - (ii) The easiest surgical procedures were completed first; the most difficult or resourceconsuming procedures were brought in last.

Step out of the underground operating room, turn left, and move into Tent 11.


- 9) The last stop for all patients was the Evacuation Tent.
 - (i) Up to 20 litter patients could be kept here temporarily.
 - (ii) Patients marked for duty would wait here until they could be transported back to New Georgia Island and return to their units.
 - (iii) Patients requiring additional treatment beyond the 17th Field Hospital's capabilities, or patients requiring extended recovery time waited here until a Navy LST(H) arrived to move them to Guadalcanal.
- V) Contributions of Medical Personnel on New Georgia.
 - A) In spite of the problems in medical care during Operation TOENAILS created by poor planning, enemy action, and the terrain itself – the medical personnel in 43 ID's 118th Medical Battalion distinguished themselves.
 - 1) PFC Frank J. Petrarca was awarded the Medal of Honor.
 - 2) Medics earned 21 Purple Hearts, 1 Legion of Merit, and three Silver Stars.
 - B) "To the theater's credit, learning was swift. It was New Georgia, not Guadalcanal, that compelled USAFISPA [United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area] headquarters to face up to the medical realities of jungle warfare, and the theater's last major fight, at Bougainville, was conducted in a far more competent style.".⁸⁹


⁸⁹ Condon-Rail, 190.

ANALYSIS:

- 1. How can medical planners build flexibility into the concept of medical support for operations in challenging terrain like the Solomon Islands?
- 2. What ethical considerations conflict when medical personnel learn about incidents like those with "Joe" and the sergeant who shot and killed him?

Virtual Terrain Movements







4. Marine Howitzer Battery

When you reach the Marine howitzer battery, take up a position behind and above the guns looking down the azimuth of fire.









































































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