

Army University Press – Combat Studies Institute

Okinawa 1945 – Operation ICEBERG

Staff Ride Team VSR Walkbook



Stephen Wuensche
2023

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Version Control

V1.0 2020 Base Document

V1.1 2021

1. Stand 5 adjusted:
 - A. 27 ID Description is contiguous from 18 APR thru 25 MAY.
 - B. 96 ID Description now follows 27 ID Description.
 - C. 7 ID Description is now optional to save time.

V1.2 2021

1. Updated visuals and captions with slide numbers.
2. Updated Medals of Honor awarded during the campaign.

V2.0 2023

1. Updated movement directions with terrain database screenshots.

Stand 1: Operation ICEBERG

| Visuals |
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| 1A. Strategic Situation |
| 1B. The Ryukyu Islands |
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| 1J. Tenth Army Plan of Attack |
| 1L. OPLAN ICEBERG Objective Lines |
| 1K. Forces Deploy |

About the cover slide: This aerial photo (taken many years after the battle) shows the landscape of southern Okinawa. Image courtesy of 18th Wing Archives Kadena AB, Okinawa.

Instructor Note: Stand 1 uses two separate PowerPoint files for landscape and portrait visuals. Load each and place each in presentation mode, then use “ALT-tab” to move between them.

ORIENTATION: NA

DESCRIPTION:

Visual 1A. Strategic Situation

I. Strategic Situation.

A. Operation CAUSEWAY.

1. **[1A-1]** In the summer of 1944, Nimitz’s planning staff was focused on the invasion of Formosa (known today as Taiwan).
 - a) It would be seized after MacArthur established positions on Mindanao and Leyte in the Philippines.
 - b) Formosa was needed for additional air bases to increase strategic bombing on Japanese home islands.
 - c) **[1A-2]** After Nimitz took Formosa, subsequent invasions were forecast against either the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, or against the Chinese coast.
 - d) The Formosa plan was called Operation CAUSEWAY.
2. **[1A-3]** But on 15 SEP 1944, the JCS ordered MacArthur to bypass Mindanao and start the offensive on Leyte two months ahead of schedule.
 - a) When the Leyte offensive was ordered to start earlier than planned, Nimitz reconsidered Operation CAUSEWAY.



Landscape Slide 3

- b) Based on the analysis and opinions of his senior leaders, he recommended delaying CAUSEWAY to the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Ernest J. King.
3. [1A-4] ADM King brought the recommendation to the JCS on 2 OCT 1944, and the next day the JCS ordered Nimitz to “seize one or more positions in the Ryukyu Islands by 1 MAR 1945.”¹

Why did the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) select the Ryukyu Islands for the next major campaign in the Pacific Theater?


- B. The Ryukyus plan was called **Operation ICEBERG**, and it achieved the same objectives as CAUSEWAY with greater flexibility for future offensives.
 1. It put as many as 780 medium bombers in range of targets on the Japanese home islands.
 2. It allowed the US to invade the Chinese coast or the Japanese home islands.

Visual 1B. The Ryukyu Islands

Quickly examine the Ryukyus with respect to the Operational Variables (PMESII-PT).

II. The Ryukyu Islands.

- A. The chain of islands “stretch in an arc about 790 miles long between Kyushu and Formosa and form a boundary between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.”²



Landscape Slide 4

- B. Over 140 islands are organized in four major groups.
 1. The largest number is in the Okinawa Group, which includes the largest – Okinawa Island.
 2. [1B-1] To the west are the Kerama Islands.
 3. [1B-2] To the north are the Iheya Islands.
 4. [1B-3] A collection of small islands to the east are known as the Eastern Islands.

Portrait Slide 1

Visual 1C. Okinawa Island

- C. Okinawa Island is the largest in the Ryukyus.
 1. “Running generally north and south, it is 60 miles long and from 2 to 18 miles wide, with an area of 485 square miles [about the size of Los Angeles].”³
 2. Japan annexed Okinawa in 1879.
 - a) Native Japanese assumed all government positions, forcing out Okinawans whom they regarded as “inferior rustics”.
 - b) Japan made no effort to raise the Okinawan standard of living.⁴



¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 4)

² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 7)

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 7, 9)

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 9)

D. The Okinawan People.

1. They are racially similar to the Japanese.
2. Their culture bears extensive Chinese influence. The name “Ryukyu” has Chinese origins.
3. Their language is unique to their culture.
4. Veneration of ancestors is an aspect of their native religion and is reflected in the large burial tombs containing the remains of multiple generations.
5. Their existence and subsistence are based almost entirely on agriculture – not fishing.
6. In 1940 the population was estimated to be 435,000.

E. Terrain. The Ishikawa Isthmus divides Okinawa into distinct northern and southern regions.

1. Northern Okinawa is extremely rugged and mountainous.
 - a) Elevations reach 1000 feet above sea level or higher.
 - b) Most of it is covered in pine forests with areas of dense undergrowth.
2. Southern Okinawa is almost entirely under cultivation and is home to about 75% of the civilian population.
 - a) It is rolling, hilly country broken by escarpments and ravines.
 - b) There are numerous roads, but only a few are suitable for heavy motorized traffic.

Visual 1D: Southern Okinawa

3. The key natural terrain features on southern Okinawa include:

a) **[1D-1]** Hagushi Beaches.

- 1) Just south of the isthmus are 9000 yards of beach on the west coast, bisected by the Bishi River.
- 2) The beach is sectioned off into 27 areas by cliffs or coral outcroppings.
- 3) Each area is 100 to 900 yards wide.
- 4) The beach is coral sand and most have at least one road exit; some have stone seawalls about ten feet high.
- 5) Yontan and Kadena Airfields are less than a mile to the east.

b) **[1D-2]** Sunabe Hills.

- 1) This 400-foot-high hill mass stretches across Okinawa and overlooks the beaches.
- 2) “Composed of innumerable sharp ridges and deep ravines, it is a major obstacle to rapid troop movements and can be used effectively for a strong delaying action.”⁵

c) Katchin, Chinen, and Oroku Peninsulas.

- 1) Katchin and Chinen are on the east coast and enclose Nakagusuku Bay.
- 2) Oroku is just south of Naha, Okinawa’s capitol, and holds Naha Airfield.

d) **[1D-3]** Shuri and the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment.

- 1) Shuri was the Ryukyu capitol before Japanese annexation, and the area around it is the most rugged terrain on southern Okinawa.



Portrait Slide 2

From the high ground near Shuri...observation is excellent to the north and south and over the coastal region. At the highest point the hills rise about 575 feet, but

⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 10)

the lack of pattern, the escarpments, steep slopes, and narrow valleys. . . make the major hill masses ideal territory for defense. Many of the escarpments are sheer cliffs without topsoil or vegetation. The low ground is filled with twisting ridges and spotted with small irregular knolls, rendering observation difficult and providing excellent locations for minor infantry and antitank positions. The most prominent features. . . are the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. . . running 4500 yards across the island in a southeasterly direction, and the chain of hills through Tanabaru and Minami-Uebaru to the east coast south of Tsuwa.”⁶

- 2) Immediately south of Shuri the terrain is rough, but there are few large escarpments and there is an extensive road network good for troop movements.
- e) A large, limestone plateau is the major terrain feature south of Shuri, ending in cliffs on the southern coast.
 - 1) The north side is a 300-foot-high escarpment composed of jagged coral rocks.
 - 2) [1D-4] Two major peaks, Yuza-Dake and Yaeju-Dake, dominate all approaches from the north, east, and west.
4. The key military terrain features are the airfields.
 - a) They determined Okinawa’s value for both US offensive strategy and Japanese defensive strategy.
 - b) [1D-5] Of eighteen airfields under construction in the Ryukyus, six were in the Okinawa Group, and five of those six were on southern Okinawa:
 - 1) Yontan.
 - 2) Kadena.
 - 3) Machinato.
 - 4) Yonabaru (still under construction).
 - 5) Naha (the largest and most developed).
 - 6) The sixth is on the island of Ie Shima, about twenty miles north of Zampa Point but only one mile off the west coast in northern Okinawa.


F. Weather. “The climate is subtropical, the temperature ranging from about 60°-83°F. Rainfall is heavy, and the high humidity makes the summer heat oppressive. The prevailing winds are monsoonal in character, and between May and November each year the islands are visited by destructive typhoons.”⁷

Visual 1E. Japanese Forces on Okinawa

32nd Army Small Group: What Japanese forces defend Okinawa, and how did they plan to defend it?

III. Japanese Forces on Okinawa.

A. LTG Mitsuru Ushijima commanded the Japanese forces on Okinawa.



Landscape Slide 5

⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 13)

⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 7)

B. Strength. Approximately 99,461 personnel defended the island.⁸


1. *Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)*: 66,636.
2. *Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)*: 8825.
3. Okinawans: 24,000.

C. Composition.

1. *32nd Army*.
 - a) Its main combat units were the *24th* and *62nd Divisions*, and the *44th Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB)*.
 - 1) *24th Division* was a modern, triangular unit organized for fighting similar Soviet combat formations.
 - 2) *62nd Division* was a linear organization with 10 infantry battalions organized for counter-guerrilla warfare in China.
 - 3) *44th Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB)* was rebuilt around two infantry units after losing most of its personnel to US submarine attacks while en route to Okinawa.
 - b) Other major units in *32nd Army*.
 - 1) *5th Artillery Command* was the first centralized fires organization in the Japanese Army⁹ and employed mortars, field guns, and howitzers.
 - 2) *11th Shipping Group* was a combination of transportation units and sea raiding units that Ushijima converted to serve as infantry battalions.¹⁰
 - 3) *19th Air Sector Command* provided units to maintain and operate the Japanese airfields and aviation units. Ushijima also converted these to fight as infantry.¹¹
 - 4) *27th Tank Regiment* was battalion-sized, but was one of few to fight as a regiment in the Pacific.
2. The *Okinawa Naval Base Force* was attached to *32nd Army*.
 - a) One motor torpedo boat squadron.
 - b) One midget submarine unit.
 - c) Various coast defense, engineer, signal, supply, and transportation units normally used to support naval vessels in and around Okinawa.
3. Okinawans.
 - a) At least three battalions of conscripts were designated "*Special Engineer Guard Units*".
 - b) Male students aged fourteen and older were organized into "*Blood and Iron for the Emperor Duty Units*" and trained for guerrilla warfare.¹²
 - c) "*Boeitai*" were civilians conscripted for non-combat roles in Japanese units.

Visual 1F. Japanese Defensive Positions

D. Disposition.



⁸ (Nichols and Shaw 1955, 302-4)

⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 87)

¹⁰ (Huber 1990, 19-21)


¹¹ (Huber 1990, 20)

¹² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 89)

1. Most of 32nd Army was positioned on southern Okinawa, with token forces in the north and on outlying islands.
 - a) [1F-1] 32nd Army Headquarters operated out of a tunnel complex under the old Shuri Castle.
 - b) [1F-2] One Boeitai regiment was positioned behind the Hagushi beaches for a defense to delay and to destroy the Yontan and Kadena airfields.
 - c) [1F-3] 62nd Division, 32nd Army's Main Effort, poised for an area defense in strongpoints and three successive lines between Futema and Kuba to the north, and between Naha and Yonabaru to the south.
 - 1) [1F-4] Its 63rd Brigade manned the strongpoints and the first defensive line to delay and destroy advancing US forces.
 - 2) [1F-5] The 64th Brigade, 62nd Division's Main Effort, was dug in on reverse slopes of the remaining defensive lines to destroy remaining US forces.
 - d) [1F-6] 24th Division was in defensive positions covering potential landing sites on the south coast of Okinawa.
 - e) [1F-7] 44th IMB was south of Yonabaru and on the Chinen Peninsula.
2. [1F-8] The Okinawa Naval Base Force occupied defensive positions on the Oroku Peninsula.

Visual 1G. Tenth Army/Task Force 56 – Assault Echelon

Tenth Army Small Group: What US forces are tasked with invading Okinawa, how were they organized, and what was the plan of attack?



Landscape Slide 6

IV. Tenth Army/Task Force 56.

- A. LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commanded Tenth Army and the air and naval components attached to it for Operation ICEBERG (also known as Task Force 56).
- B. Tenth Army had 183,000 troops organized in two “echelons” that correspond with ICEBERG’s different phases.¹³
 1. The Assault Echelon had the forces required for Phase I – landings on outlying islands and the main landing on Okinawa.¹⁴
 - a) III Amphibious Corps and XXIV Corps had two divisions each to land on Okinawa.
 - b) 77th Infantry Division (ID) was a supporting effort for seizing the Kerama Islands.
 - c) 2nd Marine Division (MARDIV) was a supporting effort for feint landings to deceive Japanese defenders during the main landings.
 - d) 27 ID was the reserve.
 - e) Island Command (ISCOM) was a supporting effort to oversee base development on Okinawa and manage the civilian population in US custody during the campaign. Only its advance party is part of the Assault Echelon.

¹³ (Tenth Army 1944, 12-14)

¹⁴ (Tenth Army 1944, 1-10)

- ### Visual 1H. Tenth Army/Task Force 56 – Subsequent Echelon

- [illegible]

Landscape Slide 7

V. Tenth Army's plan for Operation ICEBERG was issued as OPLAN 1-45 in JAN 1945.

- [illegible]

Landscape Slide 8

- ### Visual 1K. OPLAN ICEBERG Objective Lines

¹⁶ (Tenth Army 1944, 10a-10l)

B. Phase II tasks secured northern and southern Okinawa and prepared the island to support future operational and strategic objectives.

1. Objective Lines were established based on planning estimates for the offensive operations on Okinawa.¹⁷
2. Tenth Army expected to have Okinawa secured within 40-45 days after the landings.
3. The timeline was based on previous experiences with determined Japanese opposition on landing beaches.
4. Tenth Army assumed the Japanese would oppose their landing in force on the beaches, and when the defending force was destroyed the rest of Okinawa would be secured quickly.



Portrait Slide 4

Visual 1L. Forces Deploy

VI. Forces Deploy.

- A. On 20 FEB 1945, the first cargo ships supporting Operation ICEBERG left ports on the US Pacific Coast.
- B. [1L-1] Tenth Army Headquarters embarked at Pearl Harbor.
- C. [1L-2] III Amphibious Corps assembled on Guadalcanal and sailed for Okinawa on 12 MAR.
 1. It paused briefly at Ulithi to load additional supplies and transfer Marines onto landing ships.
 2. It resumed movement on 25 MAR and 2 MARDIV sailed directly from Saipan on the same day.
- D. XXIV Corps and its divisions were still engaged in combat on Leyte when OPLAN 1-45 was issued, and they were not released for ICEBERG until 10 FEB.
 1. The assault divisions started assembling on 18 FEB, and 77 ID embarked for their assault on the Kerama Islands.
 2. [1L-3] XXIV Corps embarked for Okinawa on 25 MAR.
- E. L-Day was less than one week away.



Landscape Slide 9

VIGNETTE: NA

ANALYSIS:

1. ADP 3-0, Operations, states that the Army's operational concept is unified land operations: decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation's wars as part of unified action.
 - How is Tenth Army conducting offense, defense, and stability tasks in OPLAN 1-45?

¹⁷ (Tenth Army 1944, 16)

- Are they presenting the enemy multiple dilemmas across multiple domains to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative? In which domains are they exerting pressure?
 - How will Tenth Army consolidate gains? Has the concept been adequately addressed in OPLAN 1-45?
2. FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, “describes the Army hierarchy within a geographic combatant command and goes into detail about the theater army, the senior echelon in each geographic combatant command.” But for Operation ICEBERG, the senior army echelon is a field army, not a theater army.
- Is there any real difference between a theater army and a field army?
 - Is there a gap in current Army doctrine that should address field army operations?
 - In recent years has the Army organized and operated a field army headquarters equivalent?

Stand 2: Phase I and XXIV Corps

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2A. Okinawa Islands | |
| 2B. Kerama Retto: 77th Division | |
| 2C. Shaping Operations – Fires | |
| 2D. XXIV Corps | |
| 2E. XXIV Corps Phase I | 2A. Purple 2 Beach Release Line |
| | 2B. Purple 2 Beach |
| | 2C. Kadena Airfield (West Side) |
| | 2D. Kadena Airfield (East Side) |
| | 2E. Koza Village |
| | 2F. Nakagusuku Bay |
| | 2G. Kuba Village |
| | 2H. Castle Hill |
| 2F. Sustainment Operations | |
| 2G. Stability Operations | |

About the cover slide: This photo was taken on or about L-Day in XXIV Corps' AO. I am not sure which division is shown, but I suspect from the terrain that it is 96 ID advancing south through the Sunabe Hills. I believe the Kadena AB golf course is around those hills. Signal Corps image in the public domain.

ORIENTATION: Conducted later in the stand.


DESCRIPTION:

Visual 2A. Okinawa Islands

I. L-6, 24-29 MAR: Shaping Operations.

A. The day before Tenth Army/Task Force 56's last elements embarked, US Navy minesweepers started clearing the seas around Okinawa.¹

1. They were protected by naval and air operations ahead of the invasion force.
2. "On the evening of 25 March a 7-mile wide lane had been cleared to Kerama south of the objective area and a slightly larger one from the southwest."²
3. They would eventually clear about 3000 square miles of water offshore.³



Slide 2

Visual 2B. Kerama Retto: 77th Division

¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 63-4)


² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 51)

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 64)

77 ID Small Group: Describe how the Kerama Islands were seized and the operational effects achieved for Operation ICEBERG.

B. [2B-1] On 26 MAR, 77 ID started seizing the Kerama Islands for the two sheltered anchorages to keep naval vessel sustainment out of range of Okinawa's coast defense guns.⁴

1. MG Andrew D. Bruce commands 77 ID.
2. 26 MAR.
 - a) [2B-2] Aka, Geruma, and Hokaji Islands were seized with little or no enemy resistance.
 - b) [2B-3] There was a company-sized enemy force on Zamami Island.
 - c) [2B-4] Because enemy resistance was light or non-existent, MG Bruce ordered an additional landing on Yakabi Island with the division reserve. It was also secured quickly.
 - d) East of the Kerama Islands, an attached Marine Reconnaissance Battalion seized Kiese Shima. XXIV Corps started placing two battalions of 155mm howitzers there to support the main landings on L-Day.
3. 27 MAR. [2B-5] Two battalions landed on Tokashiki Island, the remaining objective and the largest island in the Keramas.
4. 29 MAR. The Kerama Islands and their 44 deep-water berths were secured.




Slide 3

Visual 2C. Shaping Operations – Fires

Tenth Army Small Group: Describe how naval gunfire and air attack supported shaping operations on Okinawa Island before L-Day.

C. Naval Gunfire.⁵

1. [2C-1] 25 MAR. Long-range fires engaged targets on the southeast coast as the minesweepers finished clearing the transit lanes to the assault position areas.
2. [2C-2] 26-28 MAR. Fires continued as the minesweepers worked closer to shore, allowing the fire support ships to close their range.
3. 29-31 MAR. Close-range fires achieve operational effects:
 - a) [2C-3] Naha and the Oroku Peninsula were bombarded.
 - b) [2C-4] Seawalls were breached on the west coast to improve beach exits for the assault troops on L-Day.
4. All known Japanese coast defense guns were destroyed or severely damaged by 13,000 large-caliber projectiles (6" and larger).⁶



Slide 4

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 51-63)

⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 63-4)

⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 64)

D. Air Attack.⁷

1. [2C-5] 25 MAR. Bomb, napalm, and rocket attacks were made on Tokashiki Island in the Keramas and on Okinawa's airfields.
2. [2C-6] 26-28 MAR. Attacks were made on suicide boats, midget submarine bases, airfields, barracks areas, and artillery positions beyond range of naval gunfire.
3. [2C-7] 28-31 MAR. Preparatory strikes were made on targets planned by Tenth Army/Task Force 56 to support the coming amphibious assault.
4. Up to 131 enemy planes were destroyed or damaged on Okinawa's airfields, and up to eight midget submarine pens were demolished.⁸


Visual 2D. XXIV Corps

XXIV Corps Small Group: In Joint Operations, Shaping Operations are followed by actions to Seize the Initiative. What were your assigned tasks for Phase I?

II. L-Day, 1 APR: Seize the Initiative.⁹

A. [2D-1] MG John R. Hodge commanded XXIV Corps. Its Phase I tasks were:¹⁰

1. Land at H-Hour on L-Day on Beaches Purple, Orange, White, and Brown south of Hagushi on Okinawa Island.
2. Secure Kadena Airfield.
3. Coordinate its advance with III Amphibious Corps on the indicated Objective Lines along the boundary between corps.
4. Secure the L+10 Objective Line as early as possible.
5. Protect the right (south) flank of the operation.
6. On order, continue the advance to successive Objective Lines.



Slide 5


XXIV Corps Small Group: Describe how XXIV Corps executed its Phase I tasks to Seize the Initiative.

Visual 2E. XXIV Corps Phase I

Virtual View 2A. Purple 2 Beach Release Line

ORIENTATION: This is 2-17 IN Battalion Landing Team's (BLT) view as it approached Purple 2 Beach. You are located between PC463 and PCS1452, the two Navy patrol craft used to mark the boundaries of the Purple 2 Beach landing area.

B. 1 APR. The first assaulting infantry made landfall.




Slide 6

⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 64-5)

⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 65)

⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 69-79)

¹⁰ (Tenth Army 1944, 13)



2A. Purple 2 Beach Release Line

Ground hug movement to VP 2B.

Virtual View 2B. Purple 2 Beach



2B. Purple 2 Beach

Lift up about 4m in altitude.

Rotate left to scan the beaches north of the Bishi River. III Amphibious Corps Marines are landing in that area.

Rotate right to scan the beaches toward Sunabe Village. 96 ID landed on the other side of the large rock outcropping. Return to original orientation.

ORIENTATION: In this view, the first wave is exiting the beach and moving inland, the second wave has landed on the beach and lowered their ramps to discharge their infantry. The breach in the seawall has been widened and improved by combat engineers.

1. **[2E-1]** @0930. Four BLTs from 7 ID, the XXIV Corps Main Effort, were ashore. They were followed by Sherman tanks fitted with deep wading kits to cross the reef.

Ground hug movement to VP 2C. Follow the road until you reach the single hut on the right side of the road.



Take a slight right after the hut and continue until you reach the anti-tank ditches. Continue until you reach the aircraft revetments.

Virtual View 2C. Kadena Airfield (West Side)


2. **[2E-2]** 1000. Patrols from 7 ID's 17th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) reached the near side of Kadena Airfield.

Ground hug movement to VP 2D. Cross the airfield, move past the 3 "Kiska Barracks" and move to the machine gun bunker. Step into the bunker to view the Japanese field of fire over the airfield.

ORIENTATION: In this view, you can see an example of enemy fields of fire. Had these defenses been manned, the landings would have been much different.



2C. Kadena Airfield (West Side)



2D. Kadena Airfield (East Side)

Step out of the bunker, turn around, and continue until you reach the concrete shelters with the “Baka Bombs”.


Virtual View 2D. Kadena Airfield (East Side)

3. **[2E-3]** 1030. 17 RCT crossed the runway and continued its advance. In a short time, they cleared the airfield, cleared abandoned defensive positions, and secured several “Baka Bomb” rocket-powered suicide planes in various stages of assembly.

4. **[2E-4]** By the end of the day:
 - a) All Division Artillery from 7 ID and 96 ID was ashore.
 - b) Kadena Airfield was available for emergency landings.
 - c) 7 ID was three miles inland.
 - d) 96 ID established a front line from Chatan to the high ground northwest of Futema, the outskirts of Momobaru, and the hills around Shido.

C. 2 APR.

1. **[2E-5]** 17 RCT secured terrain overlooking Nakagusuku Bay and sent out patrols as far as the shoreline.



Baka Bomb Shelters

Ground hug movement to VP 2E. Follow the road just south of the shelters until you reach Koza Village.



2E. Koza Village

Virtual View 2E. Koza Village

Lift up about 4m in altitude.

ORIENTATION: In this view, you can see the eastern shore and Nakagusuku Bay. On the right is Hill 165, also known as “Castle Hill” and the location of the L+10 Objective Line.

2. [2E-6] 32 RCT reached Koza Village and reduced a nearby strongpoint – one of few locations with actual enemy resistance.
3. [2E-7] 96 ID made slow progress between Momobaru and Shimombuku, hampered by terrain and enemy resistance.

D. 3 APR.

1. [2E-8] 32 RCT advanced south across the 96 ID boundary, occupied Kuba and established its next front line below Hill 165.

Ground hug movement to VP 2F. Follow the road until you reach the coast.



2F. Nakagusuku Bay

Virtual View 2F. Nakagusuku Bay

Ground hug movement to VP 2G. Follow the shoreline until you reach Kuba.




2G. Kuba Village

Virtual View 2G. Kuba Village

2. [2E-9] 96 ID moved toward Hill 165, Unjo, Kishaba, Attaniya, and Nodake.

Ground hug movement to VP 2H. Climb the hill to your right and look south-southwest.



2H. Castle Hill

Virtual View 2H. Castle Hill


- E. [2E-10] 4 APR. XXIV Corps completed its Phase I tasks and held positions on or forward of the L+10 Objective Line.

Logisticians: Describe how you sustained combat operations on Okinawa throughout the campaign.

Visual 2F. Sustainment Operations

III. Sustainment Operations.

- A. Amphibious vehicles that normally carried troops (LVTs and DUKWs) were preloaded with ammunition and supplies and followed the first assault wave.¹¹
1. Those vehicles, however, could not offload cargo from the landing ships in sufficient quantities to sustain combat operations.
 2. However, landing ships (LSTs/LSMs) that carried LVTs and DUKWs could beach themselves and offload directly onto the sand.
 - a) But beach widths restricted the number of ships offloading at any given time.
 - b) Beaching a landing ship and getting it off the sand again is a time-consuming process.
 - c) Each division had 26 landing ships assigned to transport its assault elements.
 3. The assault transports (APAs/AKAs) carried the remaining ammunition and supplies, but they could not beach and had to use LVTs, DUKWs, and other small boats to offload their cargo.



Slide 7

¹¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 79)

- a) At low tide, unloading is restricted to LVTs than can cross the reef without risking damage.
- b) DUKWs and other hulled boats could only transfer cargo at high tide.
- c) Each division had sixteen assigned assault transports for the remained of their assault elements, ammunition, and supplies.

B. Therefore, supplying Tenth Army's 183,000 troops became as much an engineering effort as it was a sustainment effort for the campaign.¹²

1. **[2F-1]** On XXIV Corps' beaches, ISCOM engineer units made the following improvements for offloading cargo:¹³
 - a) By L+1, 2 APR, logisticians started unloading landing craft at night under floodlights.
 - b) By L+4, 5 APR, four pontoon causeways were erected on the Orange beaches, and the Purple beaches had two pontoon causeways erected and two sand causeways constructed. Up to nine additional landing ships could offload without beaching.
 - c) By L+5, 6 APR, White 1 Beach had a sand causeway long enough for 2 landing ships. Now 11 additional landing ships could offload without beaching.
 - d) Channels were blown through the coral reef to allow DUKWs and landing boats to cross at low tide without risking damage.
 - e) By L+10, 11 APR, while those improvements were being made, 25 transfer barges with cranes started unloading landing ships and transferring cargo directly onto vehicles on the beaches.
 - f) Additional unloading points were established at Awase and Kuba on the east coast.
 - g) By L+14, 16 APR, all the assault cargo was unloaded – ahead of schedule and on pace with operations.

Logisticians: Were there challenges to sustaining the pace of combat operations? If so, how did you mitigate them?

2. But after 6 MAY, unloading was disrupted by operational delays, bad weather, enemy threats, and did not keep pace with earlier projections.
 - a) **[2F-2]** Supplemental unloading points were established as the advance continued south.
 - b) **[2F-3]** By 25 MAY, new unloading points were developed on the west coast between Machinato and Naha.
 - c) **[2F-4]** On 1 JUN, supplies started coming off ships on the east coast at Yonabaru.
 - d) **[2F-5]** On 7 JUN, the port of Naha was available to offload cargo.
 - e) **[2F-6]** On 9 JUN, in the last stages of the campaign, Minatoga was opened on the southeast coast.
3. By the end of the campaign, over 2 million tons of cargo was unloaded on Okinawa.¹⁴

Engineers: Did you have a role to play in the overall sustainment plan? What was it?

C. Getting the supplies from the offloading points to the troops was another massive engineer effort.¹⁵

¹² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 405-6)

¹³ (Heavey 1947, 68)

¹⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 496)

¹⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 81)

1. First, beach exits and roads to unit supply and ammunition dumps were widened and improved.
2. As supply and ammunition dumps moved forward to follow the front lines, Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and connecting routes were improved.
3. Weak or narrow bridges were reinforced or replaced to allow heavy truck and tank traffic.

D. Kadena Airfield, an operational objective, was continuously improved by engineers as soon as it was secured on L-Day.¹⁶


1. On L+1, 2 APR, 19 artillery spotter planes landed there and started their sorties the next day.
2. On L+7, 8 APR, the runway was strengthened enough to allow heavier four-engine aircraft to make emergency landings or short stays for casualty evacuation.
3. On L+8, 9 APR, the Tenth Army's Tactical Air Force started operations with one of its fighter groups from Kadena, "improving local control of the air and making more aircraft available for support."¹⁷

Visual 2G. Stability Operations

IV. Stability Operations.

A. Tenth Army estimates assumed that by the time XXIV Corps reached the L+10 Objective Line, it would have "uncovered" and processed up to 13,000 civilians in its area of operations.¹⁸

1. On 3 APR, 7 ID reported 3000 civilians in custody, of which 1500 were transferred to collection camps.¹⁹ 96 ID reported 2000 in custody; 5000 in all for XXIV Corps.
2. Based on these numbers, there was a discrepancy between the planning estimates and the number of civilians encountered during Phase I.
 - a) Previous amphibious assaults had encountered a deeply indoctrinated civilian population under the strict control of Japanese occupation forces – who often forcibly employed them in irregular warfare tactics.
 - b) Okinawan civilians were no less indoctrinated, but they were Japanese citizens. Many of those encountered were displaced persons from southern Okinawa, mostly old people and children.
 - c) Most male Okinawans (and some female) of fighting age were conscripted early on for labor, then for non-combat roles; and in the last stages of the campaign, as poorly trained/armed replacements for depleted combat units.



B. Military Government Plan. Four types of Military Government Detachments take control of Okinawan civilians and move them away from the fighting to relative safety in the Consolidation Area.²⁰

1. **[2G-1]** Type A followed the combat divisions for reconnaissance to describe the size of the civilian presence at the front.
2. **[2G-2]** Type B organized military government activities (collection points, medical assessments, etc.) behind the fighting front.
3. **[2G-3]** Type C moved them from the collection points into dedicated camps and medical facilities.
4. Type D provided the administrative functions to oversee and sustain the entire Military Government Plan.

Tenth Army Small Group/Civil Affairs: Describe the plan to cope with 435,000 civilians on Okinawa.

C. The Military Government Plan became “a disaster relief operation, involving supplying the bare essentials of existence – food, water, clothing, shelter, medical care, and sanitation – and evacuation of civilians with speed from the fighting front to rear areas, so as not to hamper military operations.”²¹

1. Every division was required to stock 70,000 civilian rations (86.5 tons) consisting of rice, soybeans, cooking oil or fat, canned fish, sugar, and salt.
2. An additional 30 days’ rations for 100,000 civilians was prepositioned in the Marianas Islands.²²
3. Clothing, trade goods, agricultural supplies, and fishing equipment were assembled for distribution.²³
4. **[2G-4]** Twelve camps and six hospitals dedicated to the treatment of Okinawan civilians were planned for southern Okinawa.²⁴

VIGNETTES:

1. One of the best descriptions of the Okinawa landings comes from the recollections of COL Hiromichi Yahara, the Operations Officer for *32nd Army*, as LTG Ushijima and his staff observed Tenth Army on the Hagushi beaches to the north on 1 APR:

Contrary to their expectations, the enemy meets no resistance from Japanese troops. They will complete their landing unchallenged. Advancing with such ease, they must be thinking gleefully that they have passed through a breach in the Japanese defense. They will be wrong. In that eerie atmosphere, are they not suspicious that the Japanese army has withdrawn and concealed itself in the heights surrounding Kadena, with plans to draw the Americans into a trap? What a surprise it must all be. It is amusing to watch the American army so desperately intent in its attack on an almost undefended coast, like a blind man who has lost his cane, groping on hands and knees to cross a ditch. Observe the huge amount of firepower directed at Kadena...from the viewpoint of the defenders it is exceedingly pleasurable to see this all wasted.

²⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 417)

²¹ (Tenth Army 1945, 11-XXVII-3)

²² (Tenth Army 1944, Annex 15, 5)

²³ (Tenth Army 1944, Annex 15, 4)

²⁴ (Tenth Army 1944, Annex 15, Appendix 1, 1-2)

The stillness of the Japanese 32nd Army, against the movement of the American 10th, makes a truly impressive contrast.

Yet now, as they gaze casually at the American planes cutting across the sky, these high Japanese officers are suddenly seized by a gnawing sense of unease. Not one Japanese airplane has appeared over the battlefield.²⁵

2. The contrast COL Yahara describes is echoed in the sentiments of a 7 ID soldier near the Bishi River after landing with the first assault wave: “I’ve already lived longer than I thought I would.”²⁶

ANALYSIS:

1. In nearly every previous amphibious assault in the Pacific Theater, the landings are heavily and violently opposed by Japanese forces. This is not the case on Okinawa. For military intelligence officers, is there a discrepancy in the SITTEMP, or does this answer the most important CCIR – is this the most likely or most dangerous enemy course of action?
2. Joint publication 3-02, Amphibious Operations, would govern XXIV Corps’ assault on Okinawa if the Army provided a land component to execute the landings today. It states that

The formulation of the LF (Landing Force) scheme of maneuver is based on the same fundamentals of warfare normally associated with all military operations. However, there are a few conditions and considerations that may require particular attention.

(1) The fundamental objective is to rapidly build combat power to establish the LF ashore and accomplish the assigned mission.

(2) The scheme of maneuver may support the rapid buildup of combat power ashore vice the immediate seizure of AF [amphibious force] objectives.

(3) The landing of the force at separate locations can create problems in the achievement of mass, with attendant difficulties in C2, fire support, and other functional areas.

- Did XXIV Corps adequately address these considerations for an amphibious assault?
3. FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, specifies that “the US military maintains three primary forcible entry capabilities or options: amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault”, and that “Army forces may conduct parachute assault, air assault, or amphibious operations as part of a joint forcible entry operation.”
 - Is the Army better prepared to conduct an amphibious operation as an assault echelon or a reinforcing echelon?
 - When was the last time the Army conducted an amphibious operation?
 - When was the last time the Army trained for an amphibious operation as the assault or the reinforcing echelon?

Instructor Note: Take a 10-minute break and load the Phase II West terrain database.

²⁵ (Yahara 1995, xii-xiii)

²⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 74)

Stand 3: Phase II and 62nd Division's Defense

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 3A. XXIV Corps Advance, 4-12 APR | |
| 3B. Kakazu Ridge, 9 APR | 3A. Cactus Ridge |
| | 3B. Line of Departure |
| | 3C. Kakazu Ridge |
| | 3D. Kakazu West |
| 3C. Kakazu Ridge, 10 APR | |

About the cover slide: This retouched photo is of 96 ID as they advanced through Mashiki Village on or about 4 APR.

ORIENTATION: Conducted later in the stand.


DESCRIPTION:

62nd Division Small Group: Describe the defensive plan in terms of the Disruption Zone and the Main Battle Zone.

Visual 3A. 62nd Division's Defenses

I. 62nd Division's Defensive Scheme of Maneuver.

- A. LTG Takeo Fujioka commanded the 62nd Division and the first line of Japanese defenses.
- B. 62nd Division "manned the defensive belt across the island north of the Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru Line."¹
 1. [3A-1] 63rd Brigade "was to absorb the shock of the American attack southward at the narrow waist of the Island between Chatan and Toguchi, while the main line of resistance was established from Uchitomari to Tsuwa. . ."²
 2. Behind it, 64th Brigade was "dug in to fight in the successive positions around Shuri."³



Slide 2

XXIV Corps Small Group: What was the Scheme of Maneuver for XXIV Corps?

II. XXIV Corps' Scheme of Maneuver.⁴

- A. [3A-2] Two divisions will attack south to seize the terrain IVO the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment, Tanabaru Village, Hill 178, and Ouki Village.

¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 94)

² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 94)

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 94)

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 104)

B. The Corps' Line of Departure is IVO the Tenth Army's L+10 Objective Line.

C. The Corps' objectives are just south of the Tenth Army's L+15 Objective Line.

XXIV Corps, 7 ID and 96 ID Small Groups: Describe the combat operations in your AOs from 4-8 APR.

III. XXIV Corps' Advance Through the Strongpoints.⁵

A. [3A-3] 4 APR.

1. 7 ID advanced through an abandoned strongpoint on "Castle Hill", just beyond their LD, then destroyed a series of small strongpoints before it cleared Arakachi Village.
2. 96 ID advanced about two miles through minimal resistance.
3. Enemy contact resembles what they encountered after the landings.

B. [3A-4] 5-7 APR.

1. 7 ID cleared a company-sized enemy strongpoint just south of Arakachi Village called "The Pinnacle", and advanced into a second one two days later.
2. 96 ID made contact with an even larger strongpoint they labelled "Cactus Ridge". The Japanese on Cactus Ridge denied their advance for two days.

C. 8-12 APR.

1. [3A-5] 7 ID continued to clear more strongpoints, (Red Hill, Triangulation Hill, Tomb Hill, and Ouki Village).
 - a) But as they got closer to Hill 178 the strongpoints were closer together and therefore better positioned mutual support.
 - b) On 12 April, the Japanese on Hill 178 and in Ouki Village denied 7 ID's advance.
2. [3A-6] 96 ID secured Cactus Ridge.
 - a) They also made contact with another large strongpoint called "Tombstone Ridge".
 - b) But they also made contact with the first Shuri Defensive line at Kakazu Ridge.

96 ID Small Group: Describe the fighting on Kakazu Ridge on 9 APR.


Visual 3B. Kakazu Ridge 9 APR

IV. Into the Shuri Defensive Lines.

A. Kakazu Ridge, 9-12 APR.⁶

1. Most of 96 ID focused on the ridgeline immediately north of Kakazu Village.


Virtual View 3A. Cactus Ridge



Slide 3

⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 104-13, 125-6)

⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 113-25, 126-7)



3A. Cactus Ridge

ORIENTATION: In this view, you are standing on top of Cactus Ridge. To the south is Kakazu Ridge, and the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment is about a mile farther to the south.

Between the Americans and Kakazu lay a deep gorge, half hidden by trees and brush, which could be crossed only with difficulty. The . . . hill mass itself, on the other side of this gorge, stretched northwest-southeast for 1000 yards, sloping on the west toward the coastal flat and ending on the east at Highway 5. On the east was the larger of the two hills, about 500 yards long and topped by a fairly level strip of land averaging 25 yards in width. . . at the western end of this ridge was a north-south saddle, sloping gently up toward the south. This saddle was dotted with tombs, as were the sides of [the larger hill]. West of the saddle was another portion of the Kakazu hill mass. . . stretching north-south for about 250 yards. . . it came to be known as "Kakazu West". On the north slope of Kakazu west the ground fell away sharply in a steep cliff pockmarked with caves; on the east it was steep but not precipitous.⁷


Fly to VP 3B.

Virtual View 3B. Line of Departure

ORIENTATION: In this view, you are standing on the near side of the gorge. This gorge does not appear on any of the topographic maps issued for Okinawa.


2. 9 APR. Two battalions from 383 IN pushed down toward the ridge.
 - a) **[3B-1]** Just before dawn, companies A and C from the 1st Battalion crossed the gorge undetected and made their way up to Kakazu Ridge.

⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 114-5)



3B. Line of Departure

Ground hug movement to VP 3C.



3C. Kakazu Ridge


Virtual View 3C. Kakazu Ridge

ORIENTATION: In this view, you are on top of Kakazu Ridge. Kakazu Village is visible just to the south.

- b) [3B-2] Third Battalion's Company L killed a few defenders on their way up Kakazu West, but Company I crossed its LD late and was on open ground at sunrise.

- c) **[3B-3]** Around 0600, a Japanese defender in a pillbox spotted Company A and opened fire. Soon after, mortar fire concentrated on the gorge and on the forward slope as machine gun fire covered the ridge.
- d) **[3B-4]** These four companies separated during their movement and had not regained contact with each other when the firing started.
 - 1) Company I was fixed on the north side of the gorge.
 - 2) Lead elements of Companies A and C, and especially L, were isolated as the rest of their troops scrambled to join them.
 - 3) **[3B-5]** The Japanese attacked A and C through their own mortar fire and hand-to-hand fighting lasted almost two hours. Company B was ordered to reinforce them but could not cross the gorge through the intense Japanese mortar and machine gun fire.
 - 4) **[3B-6]** Unable to reinforce them, 1st Battalion withdrew A and C under cover of smoke at 1000.

Ground hug movement to VP 3D.



3D. Kakazu West

Virtual View 3D. Kakazu West


ORIENTATION: In this view, you are on top of Kakazu West with Company L. The saddle and Kakazu Ridge are to your left.

- e) Only Company L was able to hold its position on Kakazu West.
 - 1) **[3B-7]** The Japanese made repeated attacks on Kakazu West.
 - 2) Fires on the gorge denied efforts to reinforce it.
 - 3) Of 89 men in the company, fifteen were dead and all but three were wounded. They were almost out of ammunition.
 - 4) **[3B-8]** In the afternoon, they withdrew with their wounded under cover of smoke and high explosive artillery.

- f) These company-sized attacks on Kakazu Ridge, made without preparatory fires to achieve surprise, failed with heavy losses.

96 ID Small Group: Describe the fighting on Kakazu Ridge from 10-12 APR.

Visual 3C. Kakazu Ridge 10 APR



Slide 4

3. 10 APR. Two regiments, 381 IN and 383 IN, were now tasked to seize Kakazu Ridge.
 - a) Tanks could not support their attacks because the terrain was too restrictive for them. But the infantry attack was preceded by fifteen minutes of artillery fire.
 - b) When the desired effects were not achieved, the artillery fires were repeated.
 - c) [3C-1] After fighting through intense enemy fire to cross the gorge, 2-381 IN moved up the slopes on Kakazu west and seized the top.
 - d) [3C-2] But 383 IN was not making much progress on the left (east). First and 3rd Battalions were stopped by enemy fire just short of the gorge.
 - e) [3C-3] Attempts at flank attacks only succeeded in consolidating gains on Kakazu West in the saddle.
 - f) [3C-4] Early in the afternoon, 1-381 IN was ordered to relieve 3-383 in the saddle between Kakazu Ridge and Kakazu West. After 90 minutes of movement through enemy fires, 1-381 IN reached the saddle only to be repulsed by Japanese defenders.
4. [3C-5] 11-12 APR. In the face of concentrated Japanese counterattacks and artillery fire, repeated attempts on Kakazu Ridge failed, even when supported by joint fires. 96 ID advanced no farther than the northeast slopes.
5. "The Americans were facing a situation that was to be repeated many times on Okinawa: the enemy had more strength on the reverse slope of the hill than on the crest or forward slope, since on the reverse slope he had considerable more concealment and cover from hostile fire."⁸

B. XXIV Corps' Phase II Offensive was stalled and would not advance for another 8 days.

VIGNETTE:

Paul Westman, a rifleman with K/382 IN who joined the regiment just before it left Leyte for Okinawa, recalled his "baptism of fire" on 6 APR 1945:

When I first hear the cracks of rifle bullets going past, I thought, 'Man, you can get hurt! You don't have a target pit to hide in now.' Close rounds of artillery scared me worse. My mouth would get dry, my legs would go rubbery. I found they would still function one morning when two shells came very close. The squad leader said, 'Let's get the hell outa here!' – and we did. Two others didn't. Three more shells hit and when we came back, one of the new replacements was lying outside the hole and his clothes were smoking. The other was still in the hole with a shattered leg and other wounds. Litter

⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 123)

bearers took them away. I don't think either of them got to fire his M-1 even once. That was the time I learned that if I paid close attention to S.Sgt. Jeff Brooks, I'd probably last longer..⁹

ANALYSIS:

1. ADRP 3-0, Offense and Defense, lists the characteristics of the defense. Analyze and critique the Japanese defensive plan according to those characteristics.
 - Disruption: Defenders disrupt the attackers' tempo and synchronization with actions designed to prevent them from massing combat power.
 - Flexibility: The conduct of the defense requires a flexible plan.
 - Maneuver: Maneuver allows the defender to take full advantage of the area of operations and to mass and concentrate when desirable.
 - Mass and Concentration: Defenders seek to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power where they choose and shift it to support the decisive operation. Commanders accept risk in some areas to mass effects elsewhere.
 - Operations in Depth: Simultaneous application of combat power throughout the area of operations improves the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties.
 - Preparation: The defender arrives in the area of operations before the attacker and uses the available time to prepare.
 - Security: Commanders secure their forces principally through protection, military deception, inform and influence activities, and cyber electromagnetic activities.
2. FM 3.90-1, Offense and Defense, names five steps for executing an area defense: gain and maintain contact, disrupt the enemy, fix the enemy, maneuver, and follow through (counterattack).
 - Did the Japanese defensive plan employ these steps, or does it appear that some of these steps have been skipped or omitted?

7-62. This does not mean that these steps occur sequentially, they may occur simultaneously. The first three of these steps are almost always shaping operations. Depending on the circumstances, either of the last two steps may be the echelon's decisive operation.

The employment of strongpoints indicates an emphasis on fixing the enemy. Paragraph 7-75 says "combat outposts and strongpoints can also deny enemy movement to or through a given location."

- Is *62nd Division's* employment of strongpoints in the disruption zone only intended to fix the enemy, or does it also accomplish the tasks of gain and maintain contact and disrupt the enemy?
- How might it prepare the *62nd Division* to execute the remaining two tasks of maneuver and follow through (counterattack)?
- Did the *62nd Division* fully exploit the opportunities created when it fixed XXIV Corps?

Instructor Note: Take a 5-minute break. Have the terrain tech move to VP 4A and change the VBS time setting to 1850.

⁹ (Astor 1995, 194-5)

Stand 4: The First Japanese Counterattack

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| 4A. Japanese Plan of Attack | 4A. 272 ATK POS |
| 4B. Japanese Counterattack | 4B. The Saddle. |

About the cover slide: This photo was taken on Yontan Airfield on the night of 12-13 APR. The F4U Corsairs belong to Tenth Army's Tactical Air Force, and the thick anti-aircraft tracer fire demonstrates how real and potent the Japanese air threat from the main islands was during the first counterattack.

ORIENTATION:



4A. 272 IN Attack Position

Virtual View 4A. 272 ATK POS


In this view, you are in the *272nd Independent Infantry Battalion's* approximate attack position. Even in the dark, you can make out the major terrain features from left to right:

1. Kakazu West on the left and at a greater distance was where 2-381 IN had defensive positions.
2. The saddle between Kakazu West and Kakazu Ridge.
3. Kakazu Village directly to your front.
4. Kakazu Ridge.

DESCRIPTION:

Visual 4A. Japanese Plan of Attack.

32nd Army Small Group: Describe what was happening in the 32nd Army staff from the time the Americans landed until they made contact with the first Shuri defensive line.



Slide 2

I. The Push for an Attack.¹

A. Aggressive members of 32nd Army's staff advocated for an attack to destroy US forces on Okinawa.

1. This aggressive element was led by LTG Isamu Cho, 32nd Army Chief of Staff.
2. [4A-1] They proposed an attack as early as 6 APR, just as XXIV Corps made contact with the strongpoints.
 - a) The 24th Division would counterattack up the east coast.
 - b) 44th IMB would be the reserve.²
3. They were opposed by COL Hiromichi Yahara, the 32nd Army Operations Officer, for the following reasons:
 - a) Initial success would be wasted to bombardment because 24th Division's advance had no prepared sites for protection.
 - b) The 44th IMB was not strong enough to oppose a US amphibious landing in the south.
4. Yahara's views prevailed at the 6 APR conference.

B. [4A-2] But on 9 or 10 APR, just as XXIV Corps' attack stalled at Kakazu Ridge, Cho and like-minded staff officers pressed again for a large-scale attack.

1. This time, Yahara's objections were overruled:
 - a) First, because none of the defensive positions in 62nd Division's area had fallen after almost a full week of constant fighting.
 - b) Second, because "American forces had suffered heavy casualties, and reinforcements were not yet in line."³
 - c) Third, because 32nd Army's higher headquarters on Formosa issued orders directing a counterattack.

II. Scheme of Maneuver.⁴

A. The overmatch of US naval gunfire and air attacks were mitigated as much as possible.

1. Attacking units will make mass night infiltrations through the American lines.
2. Artillery bombardment will precede the infiltration of six battalions.
 - a) [4A-3] Three battalions from the 62nd Division will attack in the west.
 - b) [4A-4] Three battalions from the 24th Division will pass through 62nd Division and attack in the east.
3. [4A-5] Dispersed in small groups, they will hide in caves and tombs until 13 APR, when they will attack Tenth Army rear areas.
4. Engagements will be hand-to-hand combat or at close range to keep the Americans from employing artillery or air strikes.

¹ (Huber 1990, 29-32)

² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 130)

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 131)

⁴ (Huber 1990, 32-4)

B. Objectives.

1. The 22nd Regiment, 24th Division will advance as far as Kishaba.
2. The 63rd Brigade's attacking battalions will recapture previous defensive positions and strongpoints.
3. The 272nd Independent Infantry Battalion will force the Americans from their gains in the Kakazu area.

C. But Yahara engineered last-minute changes to the scheme of maneuver.

1. He considered the six-battalion scheme too risky.
2. The Americans threatened an amphibious landing at Yonabaru, and he wanted a larger reserve to prevent it.
3. He successfully convinced LTG Ushijima to reduce the number of attacking battalions from six to four.


32nd Army Small Group: Describe the overall counterattack.

Visual 4B. Japanese Counterattack

III. 12-14 APR: The Counterattack.⁵

A. After dark on 12 APR, and with 0% illumination under overcast skies, the 32nd Army started its counterattack.

1. Signal flares preceded an intense artillery bombardment.
 - a) Thousands of shells impacted behind American front-line positions on command posts and artillery.
 - b) 96 ID estimated that 2200 shells fell on their two forward regiments in 30 minutes, but their defensive positions had effective overhead cover.
 - c) In 7 ID's AO, one company received 200 rounds in five minutes, but took no casualties.
2. **[4B-1]** On the Japanese left (west), the 272nd Battalion made the strongest attack against Kakazu Ridge.
 - a) Originally positioned in the Shuri area, it was a fresh unit of three rifle companies and one machine gun company.
 - b) The preparatory bombardment severed the wire communications between command posts in 1-381 IN's area.
 - c) 0300: The bombardment intensified just before the 272nd started its movement from attack positions in Kakazu Village.



Slide 3

Ground hug movement to VP 4B. Pass through Kakazu Village and over the saddle between Kakazu West and Kakazu Ridge. Stop at the base of the ridge when you see the tombs on your right.

- d) They advanced up through the saddle between Kakazu West and Kakazu Ridge while small groups tried the west flank.

⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 132-7)



4D. The Saddle

Virtual View 4B. The Saddle

- e) [4B-2] Once they were over the saddle, they infiltrated many of the US forward positions.

96 ID Small Group: How did your forward units respond to the Japanese infiltrations on Kakazu?

- 1) On the northwest slope of Kakazu Ridge, SSG Beauford Anderson of D/381 IN stopped a platoon-sized force with hand grenades. When he ran out of grenades, he banged 60mm mortar rounds against a tomb wall to arm them and threw them like footballs at the Japanese.
- 2) On the other side of the saddle on Kakazu West, 31 Japanese were killed after their officer made the mistake of asking an American if he was Japanese.
- 3) A heavy machine gunner on the west slope of Kakazu West killed 23 Japanese.
- 4) Naval illumination fires, initially denied because of an air raid warning, finally exposed the attackers.
- 5) The two US infantry battalions on Kakazu brought their 81mm mortars and supporting Marine artillery to bear within 15 feet of their positions. Over 800 rounds ended the 272nd's attempt on Kakazu.

96 ID Small Group: How did your forward units respond to the Japanese infiltration in the center near Nishibaru?

3. [4B-3] In the center, 63rd Brigade made the most effective attack in the Nishibaru area.
 - a) When the artillery bombardment lifted, platoon and company-sized groups started moving through the thinly defended gap between Kakazu Ridge and Tombstone Ridge.
 - 1) [4B-4] The Japanese focused on contact with US troops that were strung out along Highway 5, and US troops west of the road.

- 2) Sixty Japanese moved down the highway in a column of twos. The Americans let twenty through the lines before they realized it was a Japanese infiltration and killed the rest.
- 3) [4B-5] Some of *63rd Brigade's* infiltrators got as far north as Ginowan Village, a quarter mile behind the US front line.

7 ID Small Group: How did your forward units respond to the Japanese counterattack in your AO?

4. [4B-6] In the east, the *22nd Regiment*, which had come from out of sector, was the least successful.
 - a) [4B-7] Most infiltration attempts were made by squad-sized elements and easily repulsed.
 - b) [4B-8] The largest attack, platoon-sized, went against G/184 IN. Exposed by flares, they were driven off by machine gun fire.

B. [4B-9] On 13 APR, XXIV Corps contained the remaining infiltrations and eliminated them.

C. Between 12-14 APR, the counterattack cost the Japanese 1691 killed and four captured.⁶

VIGNETTES:

1. A Japanese soldier in the *272nd Independent Infantry Battalion* recorded his memories of the counterattack in his diary:

We started to move again at 0800, and entered the shelter on Hill 70, after advancing individually under enemy aerial attack. The other side of the hill is enemy territory. . . Two platoons were organized, including the wounded, etc., for infiltration. Before we crossed the hill, the master sergeant was killed and two others were wounded. I was leader of the first team of the platoon and started out with four other men. Since the company commander got lost on the way, we were pinned down by concentrated mortar fire before we could cross the hill. Continuous mortar and machine-gun fire lasted until dawn, when we, having suffered heavy casualties, withdrew, taking heavy punishment from concussions. . . Only four of us . . . were left. . . The Akiyama Tai (1st Company, 272d) was wiped out while infiltrating. The Shimuzu Tai (2d Company) also suffered heavy losses. The company fell apart during withdrawal.⁷

2. SSG Beauford Anderson's Medal of Honor citation also describes the desperate fighting in the dark:

He displayed conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty. When a powerfully conducted predawn Japanese counterattack struck his unit's flank, he ordered his men to take cover in an old tomb, and then, armed only with a carbine, faced the onslaught alone. After emptying 1 magazine at pointblank range into the screaming attackers, he seized an enemy mortar dud and threw it back among the charging Japs, killing several as it burst. Securing a box of mortar shells, he extracted the safety pins, banged the bases upon a rock to arm them and proceeded alternately to hurl shells and fire his piece among the fanatical foe, finally forcing them to withdraw. Despite the protests of his comrades, and bleeding profusely from a severe shrapnel

⁶ (XXIV Corps 1945, Nos. 13, 14)

⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 136-7)

wound, he made his way to his company commander to report the action. T/Sgt. Anderson's intrepid conduct in the face of overwhelming odds accounted for 25 enemy killed and several machineguns and knee mortars destroyed, thus single-handedly removing a serious threat to the company's flank.⁸

ANALYSIS:

1. What are the considerations for planning an infiltration? Discuss them regarding the Japanese counterattack.
 - Availability of supporting fires, including rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and non-lethal fires—especially electronic warfare, throughout the operation, during infiltration and the attack on the objective.
 - Linkup or extraction of the infiltrating unit after mission completion.
 - Sustainment of the infiltrating force during the operation, to include casualty evacuation.
 - Military deception operations, such as actions by other units designed to divert enemy attention from the area selected for the infiltration.
 - Linkup of the various infiltrating elements.
 - Mission command or control procedures, to include recognition signals.
 - Positioning of combat vehicles to support the infiltrating elements.
 - Using limited visibility and rough terrain to mask movement and reduce the chance of detection.
 - Infiltration of the largest elements possible to maintain control.
 - Rehearsals.
 - Specially required preparations, such as modifying the unit's SOP regarding the Soldier's combat load for the mission. When infiltrating on foot, units carry only required equipment. For example, in close terrain and in the absence of an armor threat, heavy anti-armor missile systems may be a liability.
 - Abort criteria.
 - Critical friendly zones.
2. Were XXIV Corps' defenses during the Japanese counterattack hasty or deliberate? For transition to defensive operations, ADP 3-90 says:

3-121. It is difficult to transition to the defense without prior planning. Defensive preparations which are not deliberately prepared are hasty and almost always initially characterized by severe time and resource constraints. Forces establishing a hasty defense may be dispersed and lacking combat power due to losses. Moreover, the shift to the defense requires a psychological adjustment. Soldiers who have become accustomed to advancing must now halt and fight defensively on often unfavorable terms.

Instructor Note: Take a 5-minute break. Have the terrain tech move to VP 5A.

⁸ (Congressional Medal of Honor Society 2020, Anderson, Beauford T.)

Stand 5: XXIV Corps Resumes the Offensive

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 5A. XXIV Corps Attack, 18 APR | |
| 5B. 27 ID Attack, 18 APR | 5A. 27 ID LD |
| | 5B. Machinato Bluffs |
| | 5C. Machinato Village |
| | 5D. The Road Cut |
| 5C1. 27 ID Attack, 19 APR | 5E. 193rd Tank Battalion |
| | 5F. Kakazu Pocket/Pinnacles |
| 5C2. 27 ID Attack, 20 APR | |
| 5C3. 27 ID Attack, 21 APR | |
| 5C4. 27 ID Attack, 22 APR | |
| 5D1. 27 ID Item Pocket, 20 APR | |
| 5D2. 27 ID Item Pocket, 21 APR | |
| 5D3. 27 ID Item Pocket, 22-23 APR | |
| 5D4. 27 ID Item Pocket, 25-27 APR | |
| 5E1. 96 ID Attack, 19 APR | 5G. Nishibaru Ridge |
| 5E2. 96 ID Attack, 20 APR | |
| 5E3. 96 ID Attack, 21-23 APR | |
| 5F. 7 ID Attack, 19-24 APR | |
| 5G. XXIV Corps Attack, 24 APR | |

About the cover slide: This photograph shows 27 ID Soldiers working to clear out Japanese fighting positions in the Item Pocket. Through the window of an Okinawan home, you can see two men cautiously approaching a line of three cave/tunnel entrances. Signal corps photo in the public domain.

ORIENTATION: Conducted later in the stand.

XXIV Corps Small Group: What was XXIV Corps doing behind the front lines during the Japanese counterattack?


DESCRIPTION:

Visual 5A. XXIV Corps Attack, 18 APR

I. XXIV Corps was Reinforced to Resume the Offensive.

A. The LD was on the L+15 Objective Line – the forward edge of the Japanese Main Battle Area.

1. It took XXIV Corps fifteen days to seize terrain projected to take only five days.
2. But because the landings and Phase I progressed quickly, at this point they were only three days behind their earlier projection.



Slide 2

- 1200 replacements were sent to 7 ID and 96 ID,¹ but they filled less than half the combined losses (3377 KIA/WIA/MIA)² to date in both divisions.

B. Tenth Army gave XXIV Corps 27 ID to reinforce them.

- It had been the Tenth Army reserve, but it came ashore on the Hagushi beaches on 9 APR.
- MG George W. Griner commanded the division, and it assumed the western part of 96 ID's front line.
- XXIV Corps now had three divisions engaged instead of two.

XXIV Corps Small Group: Describe the Scheme of Maneuver now that you have three divisions for an attack.

II. Scheme of Maneuver. "Hodge's plan was to break through the enemy's intricate defense system around Shuri and to seize the low valley and highway extending across the island between Yonabaru and Naha."³

- [5A-1]** 27 ID (Supporting Effort) will attack into Machinato on 18 APR, then delay its advance for 50 minutes before seizing Kakazu Ridge and the ground beyond towards the Naha-Yonabaru road.
- [5A-2]** 7 ID (Supporting Effort) will seize Hill 178, then advance down to the Naha-Yonabaru Road.
- [5A-3]** 96 ID (Main Effort) will advance straight into the Shuri defenses, seizing Shuri village and the Naha-Yonabaru Road beyond it.
- Forty minutes of preparatory fires from 27 artillery battalions will precede the attack.
- Joint fires will attack targets in rear areas and C2 installations around Shuri.
- The deception plan is a feint landing on the southeast coast with 307 IN (detached from 77 ID).


27 ID Small Group: XXIV Corps directed you to make an attack on 18 APR. Why did the division decide on a night attack?

III. 27 ID Preliminary Attack, 18 APR.

Visual 5B. 27 ID Attack, 18 APR

Virtual View 5A. 27 ID LD

ORIENTATION: In this view, you are standing on the north side of Machinato Inlet, which is the LD for 27




Slide 3

¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 189)

² (XXIV Corps 1945, No. 18)

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 184)



5A. 27 ID Line of Departure

ID's preliminary attack on 18 APR. On the other side of the inlet are bluffs that conceal Machinato Village just on the other side. At a greater distance is the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment which continues east to a pair of outcroppings known as the "The Pinnacles". At a lesser distance between the escarpment is "Buzz Bomb Bowl". To the left is Kakazu West, and at a lesser distance is the Highway 1 bridge over Machinato Inlet.

A. The terrain in front of 27 ID favored the defender.

Holding the sector on the northern side of Machinato Inlet, this division. . . was wholly under the observation of the enemy on the other side of the inlet. Any movement by the Americans, or even preparation for movement, could be clearly observed from the Japanese positions on a bluff overlooking the inlet and on the escarpment about a mile farther back. The success of any attack depended on its being prepared and executed in complete secrecy from the enemy..⁴


1. 27 ID learned from captured *62nd Division* documents that Japanese soldiers were aware the Americans generally relied on artillery at night and attacked during the day.
 - a) The division had trained in night maneuvers before embarking for Okinawa.
 - b) The terrain made a night attack advantageous to negate enemy observation and employment of planned defensive fires.
2. Assault bridging was used to increase the number of approaches over the inlet.
 - a) A footbridge would be erected for the initial assault.
 - b) Two Bailey Bridges and one pontoon bridge would be erected later for supporting weapons and supply trucks.
 - c) Bridge sections just large enough to be moved by truck were pre-assembled in the attack positions to decrease the amount of time needed to get them over the water.

B. 18 APR.

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 190)

1. **[5B-1]** Concealed by artillery smoke, G/106 IN crossed the estuary in engineer assault boats.⁵ They scaled the cliffs on the other side and started clearing out Japanese fighting positions.
2. **[5B-2]** Assault bridging started at 1930.
 - a) By midnight, the 128-yard footbridge was complete.

Ground hug movement across the footbridge to VP 5B.




5B. Machinato Bluffs

Virtual View 5B. Machinato Bluffs

- b) The Bailey Bridges over destroyed highway bridge spans on the west side of the inlet were completed at 0300.
- c) **[5B-3]** The pontoon bridge was delayed when the receding tide almost pushed a section out to sea and was not completed until noon the next day.

Ground hug movement over the bluffs and through Machinato Village to VP 5C.

⁵ The CMH "Green Book" says that G/106 IN crossed the estuary by sprinting along a pipeline to the other side under cover of artillery smoke. But 27 ID's Action Report says they crossed in assault boats. Here we have opted for the source in 27 ID.



5C. Machinato Village

Virtual View 5C. Machinato Village

3. Company G cleared Machinato Village without being detected and the rest of 2-106 IN started across the inlet.

Ground hug movement down Highway 1 to VP 5D.



5D. Road Cut

Virtual View 5D. The Road Cut

4. **[5B-4]** Just before dawn, 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced onto the cut for Highway 1 in the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment.
 - a) They remained undetected for 30 more minutes until they surprised a group of Japanese soldiers cooking breakfast.
 - b) In half an hour, they secured the cut and the rest of the regiment started consolidating and expanding its position on the escarpment.

Ground hug movement along the trench line to where it stops and look northeast toward Kakazu Village.



- c) **[5B-5]** Their objective was to continue clearing the escarpment east and link up with 105 IN, who was to attack through Kakazu on their left.


IV. 19-24 APR: XXIV Corps' Main Attack. The main attack echeloned sequentially from east to west by division.

Instructor Note: Have the terrain tech change the VBS time back to its original setting. Inform the students that the discussion does not follow the chronological order of the divisions' attacks, but focuses instead on the tactical


27 ID Small Group: Describe the 19 APR attack on Kakazu Ridge.

Visual 5C1. 27 ID Attack, 19-23 APR

Fly to VP 5E.



Slide 4



5E. 193rd Tank Battalion

Virtual View 5E. 193rd Tank Battalion

A. Kakazu Ridge.

1. 105 IN's attack positions were along the gorge below Kakazu Ridge. They would be supported by tanks making a flank attack from the west.
 - a) [5C1-1] First battalion was fixed by enemy fires after it crossed the gorge.
 - b) Second Battalion was ordered to advance on Kakazu along the division left (east) flank.
 - c) Third Battalion was ordered to attack onto Kakazu West.
 - d) [5C1-2] About 30 tanks of the 193rd Tank Battalion started for the gap between Kakazu Ridge and Nishibaru Ridge.

Ground hug movement to the lone tank down Highway 5.

- 1) Three tanks were immediately lost to mines, and a concealed 47mm anti-tank gun on Nishibaru Ridge destroyed four more.
- 2) [5C1-3] They missed their turn into Kakazu Village, lost another tank, and took a wrong turn when they retraced their route.

Turn around and face back toward VP 5E.

Ground hug movement to where the road turns left into Kakazu. Follow the road and stop at the tank just before the village.



- 3) [5C1-4] After retracing their route a second time, the tanks finally entered Kakazu Village. For the next three hours they blasted and burned it, but lost fourteen more tanks in the process.
- e) [5C1-5] In the early afternoon, Second Battalion started its attack after several delays.
- f) [5C1-6] Third Battalion seized Kakazu West, and was ordered to attack into Kakazu Village.
- g) [5C1-7] After it was obvious the infantry would not reach them, the tanks were ordered back. Only eight returned.

Lift up in altitude to view VP 5F.



5F. Kakazu Pocket

Virtual View 5F. Kakazu Pocket/Pinnacles

- h) [5C1-8] Late in the afternoon, Third Battalion bypassed Kakazu Village and maneuvered to the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment into an area called “The Pinnacles”.
- i) [5C1-9] Second Battalion, which by this time had lost two battalion commanders in succession, was given permission to bypass Kakazu and link up with Third Battalion.
- j) [5C1-10] First Battalion was ordered into reserve in front of Kakazu Village, but “front” somehow put them on the west side.
- k) 105 IN’s bypass of Kakazu Ridge created a large gap between 27 ID and 96 ID, but in its action report after the campaign, 27 ID blamed the gap on “the inability of the 381st Inf, 96th Div, on the left to advance, exposing the 105th Inf left flank.”⁶

27 ID Small Group: Why did your division bypass Kakazu Ridge?

XXIV Corps Small Group: What was the corps’ objective when the attack started on 18-19 APR? Are you still focused on those objectives? If not, then where is your attention focused?

27 ID Small Group: Where is your fight focused, and how did it affect XXIV Corps’ Operations?


V. 27 ID had three engagements to contend with: Kakazu Ridge, The Pinnacles on the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment, and Item Pocket, but struggled to apply its resources to all three simultaneously.

⁶ (27th Infantry Division 1945, 38)

Visual 5C2. 27 ID Attack, 20 APR

A. 20-24 APR: Kakazu Pocket and the Pinnacles.

1. After it was bypassed, Kakazu Ridge was known as the Kakazu Pocket.
2. The Pinnacles, on the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment, consisted of two outcroppings on the ridgeline.
 - a) [5C2-1] East Pinnacle was “hollowed out with burial vaults, most of which had courtyards in which the Japanese had carefully placed machine guns interdicting all approaches.”⁷
 - b) [5C2-2] West Pinnacle, “studded with caves, crevasses, and scores of little nooks and crannies. . . difficult to approach from any direction and. . . impervious to artillery and mortar fire. Tunnels branched out from it in all directions; some emerged in Iso, others as far away as 200 yards to the west.”⁸
3. 20 APR. Two of 105 IN’s battalions continued attacks south against the Pinnacles, but “The 96th Division had complained about the bypassed Japanese stronghold on its right flank, and General Hodge. . . ordered General Griner to have Kakazu Ridge cleared by nightfall.”⁹
 - a) [5C2-3] First Battalion started its attack to clear the Kakazu Pocket.
 - b) [5C2-4] On the regimental right (west), 3-105 IN advanced through Iso with two battalions from 106 IN.
 - c) [5C2-5] Second Battalion was forced off East Pinnacle, and Japanese soldiers pursued them as they withdrew.
 - d) [5C2-6] By 1635, 1st Battalion [105 IN] had fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu Village and had swept Kakazu Ridge almost to its eastern tip, but it was suddenly ordered out of Kakazu Pocket to prevent a penetration in 2nd Battalion.
 - e) During the night, the Japanese reinforced Kakazu Pocket in large numbers.




Slide 5

27 ID Small Group: The division did not clear Kakazu Pocket as MG Hodge ordered. What was the plan to clear it on 21 APR?

Visual 5C3. 27 ID Attack, 21 APR

4. 21 APR.
 - a) [5C3-1] Because all of 27 ID’s infantry battalions were committed, the division’s recon troop was tasked to clear Kakazu Pocket.
 - 1) By 1145 they fought their way to the edge of Kakazu Village but were fixed by enemy fires.
 - 2) A platoon of tanks was sent in support, but three hours later the troop only gained another 50 yards. They withdrew and massed artillery on the village at 1600.



Slide 6

⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 236)

⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 236)

⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 241)

- 3) [5C3-2] When they attempted to re-enter the village after the fires lifted, they were repulsed when the Japanese emerged from underground cover.
- 4) [5C3-3] Then 3-106 IN, which was supposed to go into division reserve out of the Pinnacles area, was ordered into position on Kakazu West and hold it.
- b) Over on the Pinnacles, 105 IN and one battalion from 106 IN were only able to reduce the mines and obstacles on the road in the saddle.

27 ID Small Group: Describe the division's situation at the end of the day. What did you report to MG Hodge regarding Kakazu Pocket?


- c) 27 ID status on 21 APR.
 - 1) 27 ID now had no infantry in reserve.
 - 2) The Japanese were behind their lines.
 - 3) They still had not closed the gap between them and 96 ID.

XXIV Corps Small Group: How did XXIV Corps respond?

- d) That evening, MG Hodge ordered BG William Bradford, 27 ID Assistant Division Commander, to personally take command of operations to clear the Kakazu Pocket with authority to coordinate directly with 96 ID.

Visual 5C4. 27 ID Attack, 22 APR

5. 22 APR.
 - a) In the afternoon, MG Griner worked to mitigate his division's difficulties.
 - 1) [5C4-1] He requested an infantry battalion from the XXIV Corps reserve. MG Hodge sent 3-17 IN from 7 ID.
 - 2) Griner designated his engineer battalion as division reserve and prepared them to fight as infantry.
 - b) By nightfall, the gap between 27 ID and 96 ID closed to 1200 yards, but other gaps opened between battalions on the right (west) of Kakazu Pocket.
 - c) [5C4-2] After dark, Griner pulled 2-165 IN (minus one company) out of the Item Pocket area and put it on the division left (east) flank.
 - 1) The gap between battalions there was closed about an hour later.
 - 2) But every rifle company in the division was on the defensive line from Kakazu Pocket to the west coast.
 - 3) And the order to detach a battalion minus from 165 IN negatively affected operations in the Item Pocket.
 - d) [5C4-3] From 22-23 APR, the Pinnacles were finally cleared and secured.



Slide 7


Instructor Note: The Item Pocket discussion may be omitted for time.

27 ID Small Group: While your division was struggling to secure the Pinnacles and comply with XXIV Corps' orders to clear the Kakazu Pocket, what was happening in your third major engagement?

Visual 5D1. 27 ID Item Pocket, 20 APR

B. 20-27 APR: Item Pocket.


1. [5D1-1] 20 APR: 2-165 IN cleared the southeast end of Potter's Ridge and advanced as far as Fox Ridge.
- a) [5D1-2] When they attempted to pivot left to link up with 1-165 IN, they came under intense flanking fire and mortar fires from Ryan Ridge.
- b) [5D1-3] The Fox Ridge positions were held, but the rest of the battalion withdrew to the cleared positions on Potter's Ridge.



Slide 8

Visual 5D2. 27 ID Item Pocket, 21 APR

2. 21 APR: 165 IN and Item Pocket became 27 ID's Main Effort.¹⁰
 - a) [5D2-1] At 0630, 2nd Battalion tried again. Within ten minutes it was fixed by enemy fires.
 - b) [5D2-2] First Battalion attempted to attack southwest into Gusukuma Village, but also failed.
 - c) [5D2-3] Third Battalion, the regimental reserve, attacked northwest into Dead Horse Gulch to fill the gap between the other battalions. Over several hours, it was fixed, counterattacked, and forced to withdraw.




Slide 9

27 ID Small Group: MG Hodge ordered you to clear out the Kakazu Pocket the day before and your first effort failed. Why is 165 IN and Item Pocket your Main Effort?

Visual 5D3. 27 ID Item Pocket, 22-23 APR

3. 22 APR.
 - a) [5D3-1] Patrols finished clearing Japanese defenders from Potter Ridge and Charlie Ridge.
 - b) [5D3-2] That evening, MG Griner ordered 2-165 IN, minus Company G, to the Kakazu Pocket. Third Battalion had to extend its line around Company G in the dark to fill in the gaps.
4. 23 APR: 165 IN attempted two attacks with company-sized elements from its remaining battalions.
 - a) [5D3-3] Third Battalion's Company I attacked Ryan Ridge.
 - 1) They infiltrated a heavily armed squad down Potter's Ridge to set conditions for a continued assault onto Ryan Ridge.



Slide 10

¹⁰ (27th Infantry Division 1945, 40)

2. [5D4-5] It took two more days and high casualties to clear out the remaining defenders, “but weeks later [the Japanese] were still emerging from the deep caves and tunnels.”¹²
3. MG Griner was critical of 165 IN’s performance in Item Pocket.
 - a) It had become disorganized as battalions were split up and companies employed piecemeal for various missions. It was perceived that COL Kelley had micromanaged companies and mismanaged his fight.
 - b) With MG Hodge’s approval, Griner relieved Kelley of command.¹³

Descend to VP 5G. Nishibaru Ridge. It is right behind the tanks on Highway 5. Focus on the left side of the highway.



5G. Nishibaru Ridge


96 ID Small Group: Quickly describe the friendly situation in the units to your left and right, then describe your attack from 19-24 APR as XXIV Corps’ Main Effort.

Visual 5E1. 96 ID Attack, 19 APR

Slide 12

VII. 19-23 APR: 96 ID’s Main Effort was directed at Nishibaru Ridge, although problems with the adjacent Tombstone Ridge required a near-equal effort to reduce..

- A. Nishibaru Ridge was “an extension of Kakazu Ridge, separated from it by only a wide, shallow saddle,



¹² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 118)

¹³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 208-19)

through which passed Route 5, the Ginowan-Shuri road.”¹⁴

1. On the left (east), 7ID was fighting for Skyline Ridge and clearing out a ridge called the Rocky Crags that held enemy positions overlooking 96 ID.
2. On the right, (west), 27 ID was fighting to establish a foothold on Kakazu Ridge with tanks and infantry.


B. The first day: 19 APR.

1. **[5E1-1]** Nishibaru Ridge.
 - a) On the division right (west), Japanese fires from Kakazu Ridge in 27 ID's AO disrupted 96 ID's attempt to seize the ridge.
 - b) Then, 27 ID bypassed Kakazu Ridge, opening a large gap between 27 ID and 96 ID, and left 96 ID's right (west) flank exposed.
 - c) The enemy fires from the gap denied their attack to seize Nishibaru Ridge.
2. **[5E1-2]** Tombstone Ridge.
 - a) On the division left (east), attacks to clear Tombstone Ridge were disrupted by Japanese fires from the "Rocky Crags" in 7 ID's AO.
 - b) 96 ID was only able to seize the north end of Tombstone Ridge and a portion of the western slope.

Visual 5E2. 96 ID Attack, 20 APR

C. The second day: 20 APR.

1. Nishibaru Ridge.
 - a) **[5E2-1]** One battalion seized a part of the forward slope, but the battalion on the left (east) was fixed by enemy fires from Tombstone Ridge, and the battalion on the right (west) could not advance at all because of enemy fires from the gap on Kakazu Ridge.
 - b) **[5E2-2]** A fourth battalion was ordered to attack and extend the hold on Nishibaru Ridge farther to the right (west), but enemy fires from the gap on Kakazu Ridge killed half the attacking men before they reached the objective.
2. **[5E2-3]** Tombstone Ridge was cleared except for stubborn defenses on the south end and a nearby strongpoint to the east.




Slide 13

Visual 5E3. 96 ID Attack, 21-23 APR

D. **[5E3-1]** For the next three days (21-23 APR), unable to advance on the division right (west) until 27 ID cleared the Kakazu Pocket, 96 ID focused its attacks on the Tanabaru Escarpment on the division left (east).

1. **[5E3-2]** They extended their front line on Nishibaru Ridge on the left (east) and advanced toward the Tanabaru Escarpment.



Slide 14

¹⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 198)

2. [5E3-3] When they were able to get tanks across the gorge to support the attacking infantry, they secured the saddle between Nishibaru Ridge and the forward slope of Tanabaru Escarpment.

E. 96 ID now had five battalions in a contiguous line on the forward slopes of Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment.


1. They were poised to assault the Japanese defenses on the reverse slope.
2. But they had to wait for 27 ID to clear Kakazu Ridge.¹⁵

96 ID Small Group: What prevented your division from seizing Nishibaru Ridge?

7 ID Small Group: Describe your attack from 19-23 APR.

Visual 5F. 7 ID Attack, 19-23 APR

VIII. 19-23 APR: Skyline Ridge. 7 ID's Main Effort was focused on this extension of Hill 178, which stretched from Ouki Hill on the right (west) to the coastal highway on the left (east).



Slide 15

- A. [5F-1] 19 APR. There was little enemy resistance for the first 500 yards, but on the division left (east), 32 IN was fixed by enemy fires and forced to withdraw from Skyline Ridge.
- B. [5F-2] 20 APR: battalion commanders on the regimental boundary coordinated for obscuration fires on their objectives.
 1. Two companies were on Ouki Hill at the end of the day.
 2. They survived an enemy bombardment and counterattack during the night.
- C. 21 APR.
 1. [5F-3] Around 0900, F/32 IN started an attack east down Skyline Ridge, and E/32 IN started an advance from the west side of Ishin Village.
 2. When they reached a cut in the ridge where a trail crossed over the crest, both companies were fixed by enemy fires.
 3. At 1230, MG Arnold conferred with COL John Finn, the 32nd Infantry Regiment's commander, and they decided to delay assaulting the rest of Skyline Ridge until the division seized Hill 178. But Arnold's orders were nullified by one determined soldier.
 - a) SGT Theodore MacDonnell, a forward observer with the 91st Chemical Mortar Company, was tired of watching the infantry get killed.
 - b) He ran through enemy machine gun fire with a handful of grenades to the other side of the cut.
 - c) MacDonnell lobbed them at every Japanese fighting position he could find. When he ran out of grenades, he went back twice to find more.
 - d) On his third sprint across the cut, he found the machine gun that fixed Company E and went back to find a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).

¹⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 197-202, 230-5)

- e) Back over the cut the BAR jammed, and MacDonnell went back again and found a carbine, then used it to kill the machine gun crew. He threw the gun down the slope.
- f) E/32 IN immediately reinforced him, and F/32 IN continued the attack down Skyline Ridge.
- g) By 1800 the forward slope on Skyline Ridge and most of the geographic crest was secured.


D. 22-24 APR. For the next three days, only patrols moved onto the reverse slope to root out remaining defenders, and 7 ID continued its attacks on Hill 178.¹⁶

IX. 62nd Division Withdrew from the First Shuri Defensive Line.

Visual 5G. XXIV Corps Attack, 24 APR

XXIV Corps Small Group: What is the Corps Main Effort on the evening of 23 APR? Are your divisions still focused on the original objectives you specified for this attack?

27 ID Small Group: Describe TF Bradford's attack into the Kakazu Pocket.



Slide 16

- A. [5G-1] 24 APR: At 0730 BG Bradford's force attacked into Kakazu Pocket.**
 - 1. But there was no enemy resistance when they advanced.
 - 2. They secured their objectives in just two hours.¹⁷

96 ID Small Group: What happened in your AO on 24 APR?

- B. [5G-2] 96 ID: "... the only Japanese found were stragglers and those behind the lines."¹⁸**

7 ID Small Group: What happened in your AO on 24 APR?

- C. [5G-3] 7 ID "walked up to the top of Hill 178 with only a few scattered, random rounds of artillery dropping in the area. There was no small-arms or automatic fire."¹⁹**

62nd Division Small Group: What happened to your troops in the first Shuri Defensive Line?

- D. During the night of 23-24 APR, under a heavy fog and cover of artillery fires, 62nd Division withdrew 63rd Brigade from remaining positions on Hill 178, the Tanabaru Escarpment, and Kakazu Pocket.**

The Japanese had fought doggedly for five days after the American attack of 19 April was launched, limiting gains to yards daily and in some places, such as Kakazu, denying any gain. But on the evening of 23 April his positions had been penetrated at so many places, and the

¹⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 196-7, 220-30)

¹⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 241-7)

¹⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 247)

¹⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 247)

remaining strong points were so badly battered and were so rapidly becoming untenable, that it was unprofitable to fight longer in these positions.²⁰

- E. The XXIV Corps objectives on the L+15 Objective Line were secured eleven days behind the original estimates.

VIGNETTES: NA

ANALYSIS:

1. ATP 3-92, Corps Operations, discusses the role of a corps as a tactical headquarters on the attack in Chapter 6, paragraph 90:

A corps conducts an attack when it is opposed by a well-organized enemy force occupying defensive belts in depth. The attack employs forces attacking in a fixed relationship to each other to destroy the continuity of enemy defenses. Attack is an offensive task that a corps conducts most frequently from initial contact with major enemy forces until conditions are created that favor the conduct of exploitation or pursuit.

- Were the divisions in XXIV Corps “attacking in a fixed relationship to each other?”
 - Is the “fixed relationship” between 27 ID and 96 ID more or less likely to create conditions “that favor the conduct of exploitation or pursuit”?
 - What about the “fixed relationship” between 96 ID and 7 ID?
2. SGT Theodore MacDonnell earned a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on Skyline Ridge. He also altered 7 ID’s scheme of maneuver before MG Arnold could delay continued operations there in favor of attacks on Hill 178. Did SGT MacDonnell demonstrate disciplined initiative or emotional recklessness? Is the latter acceptable if it achieves a division-level objective?

Instructor Note: Take a 10-minute break.

²⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 248)

Stand 6: The Second Japanese Counterattack

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 6A. XXIV Corps Attack, 25-27 APR | 6A. Hill 152 |
| 6B. Hacksaw Ridge, 26-29 APR | 6B. East Pinnacle |
| 6C. Hacksaw Ridge, 1-3 MAY | |
| 6D. Kochi Ridge, 25 APR-3 MAY | |
| 6E. Japanese Plan of Attack | |
| 6F. Japanese Counterattack, 4-5 MAY | |
| 6G. Hacksaw Ridge, 4-5 MAY | 6C. Cargo Nets |
| 6H. Tenth Army Prepares to Attack | |

About the cover slide: This photograph shows the 1st Marine Division shortly after its attachment to XXIV Corps. The photo is dated 11 May 1945, which is actually not in the time period for this stand. But based on that date, the large hill in the background is probably Dakeshi Ridge. Shuri is to the south about 1000 yards beyond the crest. Navy Department photo in the public domain.

ORIENTATION: Conducted later in the stand.

DESCRIPTION:

XXIV Corps Small Group: After seven days of continuous attacks, what was the condition of your three divisions?


Visual 6A. XXIV Corps Attack, 25-27 APR

I. XXIV Corps, 25 APR-3 MAY.

A. LTG Hodge ordered aggressive patrols to determine the next enemy dispositions and relieved some of his exhausted divisions as 27 ID finished reducing Item Pocket.¹

B. Following the costly reduction of Item Pocket, 27 ID could not make any major offensive efforts.

1. 165 IN was able to send patrols as far south as the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato Airfield.
2. 106 IN engaged in hard fighting around Yafusu Village, but only to maintain a contiguous line in the division center.
3. 105 IN regrouped after the Pinnacles fight and advanced to the northern edge of Nakama Village.²



Slide 2

¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 265)

² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 267)

- C. In just three days after receiving 1200 replacements for the 19 APR attack, 96 ID and 7 ID took a combined 1442 casualties – losses were greater than replacements.³
1. 96 ID and 7 ID had both been in combat for 25 consecutive days.
 2. They will need to reconstitute and reorganize soon before they are exhausted.

XXIV Corps Small Group: What other divisions were available that might enable an operational pause for either 96 ID or 7 ID?

- D. 77 ID had secured Ie Shima, and was coming ashore on the Hagushi beaches on 24 APR.

Tenth Army Small Group: What was the status of III Amphibious Corps? Could you reinforce the attack on Southern Okinawa with the Marines?

- E. III Amphibious Corps had been securing northern Okinawa IAW OPORD 1-45.
1. Major combat was limited to a much smaller Japanese force that was finally defeated when XXIV Corps started their attack on 19 APR.
 2. Remaining Japanese resistance was limited to small guerrilla groups.⁴
- F. ADM Nimitz ordered LTG Buckner to be prepared to employ III Amphibious Corps for Phase III of Operation ICEBERG (the invasion of the Ryukyu's Sakishima Group nearest to Formosa).
1. While Buckner waited for the order, on 26 APR the JCS decided against invading the Sakishima Group and postponed Phase III indefinitely.
 2. This released III Amphibious Corps to join the offensive on southern Okinawa.⁵
- G. Tenth Army assigned 77 ID to XXIV Corps to relieve 96 ID, and attached 1 MARDIV to XXIV Corps to relieve 27 ID.

Tenth Army Small Group: Now that III Amphibious Corps was available, what could Tenth Army do with two corps on Southern Okinawa?

XXIV Corps Small Group: How did you regain contact with the Japanese after they abandoned their prepared defensive positions on Kakazu Ridge, Nishibaru Ridge, Tanabaru Escarpment, Hill 178, and Skyline Ridge?

- H. 1 MARDIV.
1. [6A-1] On 30 APR, it started relieving 27 ID.
 2. [6A-2] The north bank of the Asa River was the division's first objective.
 3. The 1st Marines advanced down the coast, but for two days it made no further advances.
 4. On 2 MAY, 1 MARDIV put a second regiment into line.
 - a) [6A-3] The 5th Marines attempted to cross the draw south of Nakama Village but was repulsed.
 - b) First Marines got three companies to the south end of Machinato Airfield, but enfilading fires from terrain to the east denied any further movement.


³ (XXIV Corps 1945, Nos. 19-22)

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 148)


⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 260)

5. [6A-4] The next day, 1 MARDIV changed its objective and Main Effort to reducing the enemy positions there, and 96 ID started its attack on the Maeda Escarpment.

96 ID Small Group: Describe the attack on Hacksaw Ridge before 77 ID relieved you.



Follow Highway 5 to the saddle between Hill 150 and Hill 152. Then move to VP 6 and face southwest.




6A. Hill 152

Virtual View 6A. Hill 152

Visual 6B. Hacksaw Ridge, 26-29 APR

I. Maeda Escarpment.

1. On 25 APR, 96 ID continued its advance south after securing Nishibaru Ridge, Tanabaru Ridge, Hill 143, and Tanabaru Village.
 - a) But it stopped to assess the forbidding terrain feature to its front.
 - b) The Maeda Escarpment, known later as “Hacksaw Ridge”, is a long, sheer cliff.



Slide 3

At its eastern end the escarpment terminates abruptly in a gigantic sentinel-like monolith, called "Needle Rock." To the left (east) of Needle Rock a 200-yard saddle dips toward Hill 150, and 400 yards east of Hill 150 across another saddle is Hill 152, which marks the corner where the high ground of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment formation turns at right angles to the southwest. The Ginowan-Shuri road (Route 5) bends around the corner of Hill 152 and then heads southwest toward Shuri, following the slope of the high ground on the west..⁶

2. 26 APR.
 - a) **[6B-1]** On the west near Needle Rock, 2-381 IN secured the forward face, but machine gun fire and heavy casualties denied attempts to get over the crest.
 - b) On the left (east), however, 383 IN climbed between Hill 150 and Hill 152 and found about 600 Japanese in an inexplicably exposed position.
 - 1) Supported by tanks and armored flamethrowers, they advanced to the edge of Maeda Village.
 - 2) Hundreds of those exposed Japanese defenders were cut down by direct fire and driven from caves by the flamethrowers.
 - c) In response, 32nd Army ordered its units there to “cooperate regardless of division boundary”⁷ to contain 96 ID’s penetration.
3. **[6B-2]** 27 APR: 383 IN expanded its attack around the corner of the ridge created by Hill 152.
 - a) Tank-infantry teams repeated the previous day’s carnage and deepened their penetration to the south side of Maeda Village.
 - b) Enemy fires halted them there. Hundreds of Japanese defenders were killed, but at most only 500 yards were gained.
4. **[6B-3]** 28 APR: 381 IN crossed the boundary with 27 ID (then being relieved by 1 MARDIV) and attempted to flank the Japanese on the division right (west) flank. They were repulsed after hand-to-hand fighting with heavy losses.
5. 29 APR: The Japanese made a local counterattack, and 77 ID started relieving 96 ID.
 - a) The counterattack occurred in the morning by an enemy armed with grenades and spears. Four-hundred sixty-five Japanese died in the attempt.
 - b) **[6B-4]** On the division left (east), 383 IN advanced to Hill 138. When tanks worked their way up to reinforce the infantry, they placed Shuri under direct fire – 28 days after the landings.

⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 274)

⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 275)

Fly to VP 6B.

Virtual View 6B. East Pinnacle



6B. East Pinnacle


Instructor Note: if the optional Ie Shima stand is not conducted, provide the following information on 77 ID's actions prior to their attack on Hacksaw Ridge.

- After 77 ID secured the Kerama Islands before L-Day, it left a battalion-sized force there and moved on to its next objective, Ie Shima.
- From 16-21 APR, 77 ID eliminated 4500 Japanese defenders on Ie Shima and secured its large airfield. A second battalion-sized force was also left on that island.
- The division took 1120 casualties on Ie Shima, so it was understrength two battalions in addition to its combat losses in men and vehicles when ordered to relieve 96 ID on Hacksaw Ridge.

Visual 6C. Hacksaw Ridge, 1-3 MAY

77 ID Small Group: Describe the division's attack on 30 APR-3 MAY.

6. 30 APR: 77 ID was ready to assume the attack on Hacksaw Ridge, and the Japanese greeted them with 1200 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on their front-line positions.
7. 1 MAY: At 1000, 307 IN on the division right started its attack on Hacksaw.




Slide 4

- a) [6C-1] 2nd Battalion successfully seized its portion of the ridge to the left of East Pinnacle.

- b) One the north face of Hacksaw, 307 IN destroyed a three-story concrete blockhouse.
- c) After dark, artillery and mortar fire was about half its volume compared to the previous night.
- 8. 2 MAY: At 0900, 307 IN resumed its attack.
 - a) First and 3rd Battalions fought to finish clearing the north face of enemy defenses.

Ground hug movement through Nakama Village until you can see the “Apartment Building” barracks.



- b) [6C-2] Second Battalion attacked through Nakama Village and turned to seize the ridge on its far side, where the remains of a Japanese barracks still stood.
- 9. [6C-3] 3 MAY: The entire division attacked with two regiments across its entire front.
 - a) 307 IN shifted its battalions to the right and brought its 2nd Battalion onto the regimental left (west).
 - b) Third Battalion now worked up the draw near the barracks (called the “Apartment House”).
 - c) Second and 1st Battalion scaled the bluffs and reached the top of the escarpment but were counterattacked by 150 Japanese that emerged from a nearby tunnel.
 - d) An hour and half later, the counterattack was defeated and 307 IN had a tenuous hold on top of Hacksaw Ridge.⁸ But the fight for it was not over.

Instructor Note: The Kochi Ridge section may be omitted for time.


7 ID Small Group: Describe your attack on Kochi Ridge from 25 APR-3 MAY.

⁸ (XXIV Corps 1945, Nos. 29-35)

Visual 6D. Kochi Ridge, 25 APR-3 MAY

J. 7 ID: Kochi Ridge.

1. [6D-1] 25 APR: 17 IN advanced 600 yards and occupied the forward slope of Horseshoe Ridge.
2. [6D-2] 26 APR. Two battalions tried to advance down the east and west side of Kochi Ridge, but failed.
3. [6D-3] 28 APR. Now two battalions attempt to flank Kochi Ridge and seize the gap between it and Zebra Hill to the south. That attack also failed, and it failed again the next day.
4. 29 APR. On the division left 32 IN was repulsed at Kuhazu Village even though they were supported by armored flamethrowers.
5. 30 APR.
 - a) On what might have been their worst day on Okinawa, 17 IN's attacks were stymied by losses from enemy fires, counterattacks, ineffective smoke, and blundered close air support that killed six and wounded nineteen.
 - b) [6D-4] 1-32 IN succeeded in establishing two positions on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu.
6. 1-2 MAY.
 - a) [6D-5] 17 IN finished consolidating possession of Onaga Village, but still made no gains on Kochi Ridge.
 - b) 184 IN got troops onto Gaja Ridge, but that gain was lost when the unit disobeyed orders to hold it.
7. 3 MAY.
 - a) [6D-6] 17 IN attempted a coordinated attack on Kochi Ridge with two battalions and a supporting attack on the adjacent How Hill.
 - b) But again, massed Japanese fires forced them to abort..⁹



Slide 5

32nd Army Small Group: Describe the enemy and friendly situation on the second Shuri Defensive Line from 25 APR-3 MAY.


Visual 6E. Japanese Plan of Attack

II. 2 MAY: Decision Under Shuri Castle.

A. XXIV Corps' attack on 32nd Army's second defensive line was stalled.

1. 1 MARDIV had pivoted east to face the fighting positions on the western side.
2. 77 ID could barely hold its meager position on Hacksaw Ridge in the center.
3. 7 ID's attacks on Kochi Ridge were stalemated on the eastern side.

B. 32nd Army's second defensive line.



Slide 6

⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 269-74)

1. *62nd Division* was at half strength, and only had enough forces to defend the west side of the second defensive line.
2. Portions of *24th Division* took over the positions on the east side of the second defensive line.
3. The rest of *24th Division* and *44th IMB* moved north into the defenses behind the second Shuri line..¹⁰

32nd Army Small Group: Based on that assessment of the enemy situation, what courses of action did you consider at this point in the battle?

C. LTG Ushijima's commanders and staff held a second meeting to decide on their available courses of action.

1. LTG Cho advocated for a large-scale counterattack.
2. COL Yahara insisted on defensive attrition.
3. The division commanders insisted on taking the offensive.
4. Ushijima overruled Yahara a second time..¹¹

D. Scheme of Maneuver.

1. The 12 APR counterattack was limited mostly to land forces in *32nd Army*. This counterattack would employ supporting air attacks and amphibious assaults.
2. The goal is "to destroy the XXIV Corps on Okinawa and to disable the Allied fleet offshore in a series of heavy, coordinated blows."¹²
 - a) The *24th Division* is the Main Effort, commanded by LTC Tatsumi Amamiya.
 - 1) It was 15,000 men strong and still largely intact except for its *22nd Regiment*.
 - 2) [6E-1] The division will penetrate the American line in the center and right through 77 ID and 7 ID with two regiments and destroy XXIV Corps.
 - 3) The immediate objective is Tanabaru, two miles from the planned penetrations.
 - 4) [6E-2] The ultimate objective is to establish a new line at Futema, which *32nd Army* believed was the site of Tenth Army headquarters.
 - b) [6E-3] The *27th Tank Regiment*, previously uncommitted, will follow and support the *32nd Regiment* of the *24th Division*.
 - c) [6E-4] The *44th IMB* will protect the Japanese left (west) flank, then isolate 1 MARDIV after *24th Division's* penetration.
 - d) Artillery units regrouped and repositioned for a 30-minute preparatory barrage.
 - e) [6E-5] Amphibious assaults by sea raiding units, one on each coast, will conduct raids to destroy tanks and artillery.
 - f) Kamikaze attacks and suicide boats will attack the supply ships supporting XXIV Corps' operations on Okinawa..¹³

32nd Army Small Group: Describe the air and amphibious counterattacks on 4-5 MAY.

¹⁰ (Huber 1990, 38-9)

¹¹ (Huber 1990, 82-3)

¹² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 283)


¹³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 283-6)

Visual 6F. Japanese Counterattack, 4-5 MAY

III. 32nd Army Counterattacks.

A. Kamikaze and air attacks on US forces began at dusk on 3 MAY.

1. Over the next two days, which was an extension of the concerted air campaign against the US Navy's supporting fleet, Japanese forces sank or damaged 17 ships and inflicted 681 naval casualties.
2. Shore installations and Yontan Airfield were bombed.
3. It cost the Japanese 131 aircraft.¹⁴



Slide 7

B. Amphibious Assaults.

1. Two units made landings, the *23rd* and *26th Engineer Shipping Regiments*.
 - a) Normally, those units “are used for getting troops and supplies ashore, particularly in landing operations. They operate barges, speed boats, armored craft, etc. and man the craft on coastal and inter-island runs.”¹⁵
 - b) Their deep raiding mission on tanks and artillery was overtly non-standard.
2. [6F-1] Early morning on 4 MAY the *26th* was supposed to land below Yontan and Kadena airfields but turned inland too soon and into 1 MARDIV at Kuwan. A smaller group kept going and made its way to Isa.
 - a) At 0200 the marines at Kuwan engaged the Japanese with machine guns and mortars. All the landing boats were destroyed and most of the attackers were killed or captured.
 - b) [6F-2] At Isa, the smaller group was contained and destroyed the next day.
3. [6F-3] The *23rd* was even less successful. They were destroyed by US ships in Nakagusuku Bay or by 7 ID.
4. “The amphibious attack was a complete fiasco. The enemy lost from 500 to 800 men and almost all their landing craft.”¹⁶

24th Division Small Group: Describe your attack on 4-5 MAY.

C. 24th Division.

1. The *89th Regiment* was tasked to penetrate through the Onaga area.
 - a) Their ground attack started at 0500 on 4 MAY.
 - 1) Surprise attacks reached the 7 ID outposts of several forward companies but made few penetrations.
 - 2) [6F-4] Two hours later, though, they made successful infiltrations north of Kuhazu Village, the ridges east of Onaga Village, and the deepest behind Unaha Village.
 - b) [6F-5] Above Unaha, 200 enemy were repulsed, and they withdrew into the village. Four successive Japanese attacks from there were defeated.
 - c) [6F-6] Sunrise exposed 2000 Japanese in the flats above Kuhazu. They were destroyed by US artillery.

¹⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 287, 296)

¹⁵

¹⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 289)

- d) The remainder were driven back along the 7 ID front, but the *89th Regiment* seemed to have lost cohesion that morning. "They made the mistake of milling about in the exposed flatland, where they became perfect targets; they neither pressed the attack nor essayed an organized withdrawal. American heavy weapons fenced off avenues of retreat in order to contain the enemy in open areas."¹⁷
- 2. The *32nd Regiment* was *24th Division's* Main Effort, tasked to penetrate near Hacksaw Ridge supported by the *27th Tank Regiment*.
 - a) 4 MAY:
 - 1) The movement to their attack positions was disrupted by US artillery fires.
 - (i) [6F-7] Just before dawn, the *32nd Regiment's 3rd Battalion* and nine light tanks assaulted 77 ID's 306 IN where Highway 5 bends around Hill 152. The attack was disrupted by automatic weapons fire.
 - (ii) By 0730 the attacks were defeated, and the Japanese commander ordered a withdrawal at 0800.¹⁸
 - 2) [6F-8] But just west of Kochi, a battalion from the *22nd Regiment* (originally tasked to screen ahead of the other two regiments) infiltrated 1000 yards into the American rear undetected. LTG Amamiya ordered it back and subsequently issued orders for the *32nd Regiment's 1st Battalion* to penetrate in the same area at night.
 - b) 5 MAY:
 - 1) [6F-9] After another preparatory bombardment, at 0200 another attack was made on 306 IN where it straddled Highway 5. It was repulsed, but three hours later there was a battalion-sized enemy attack supported by tanks.
 - 2) [6F-10] The second attack covered the *1st Battalion's* infiltration between Route 5 and Kochi, almost along the boundary between 77 ID and 7 ID.
 - (i) Four-hundred fifty Japanese made their way to the Tanabaru area, where they re-occupied their abandoned defenses and cut 7 ID's supply line to 17 IN.
 - (ii) They cut the communication lines between 17 IN's headquarters and its battalions, and nearly destroyed the adjacent supply dumps.
 - (iii) It took a full day for 17 IN to fully understand the scope of the infiltration, contain, and destroy it.
 - (iv) 17 IN did not finish eliminating the enemy on Tanabaru until 7 MAY.¹⁹

32nd Army Small Group: Did the counterattack succeed or fail? What were the operational consequences?

D. Cost and Culmination.

- 1. [6F-11] By 5 MAY, despite the success at Tanabaru, LTG Ushijima realized the second counterattack had failed.
 - a) It cost *32nd Army* four times the losses it took in the April counterattack.
 - 1) Five thousand were dead, many of them the last battle-hardened first-rate troops.
 - 2) The *32nd Regiment* suffered 60% casualties.
 - 3) The *27th Tank Regiment* was reduced to six remaining medium tanks.

¹⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 291)

¹⁸ XXIV Corps' G3 report from 77 ID on this date says the enemy attack was company-sized with 3 tanks. 77 ID's Operation Report after the campaign is less detailed, but the cited "Green Book" times agree with the G3 reports.

¹⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 291-301)

- 4) The *5th Artillery Group*, though repositioned next to anti-aircraft guns to discourage US spotter planes, lost 59 pieces to counterbattery fire.
2. US casualties during this period were comparable to those during the fighting around Kakazu Ridge (734 combined in 77 ID and 7 ID), “but in general, suffered less from Cho’s aggressive tactics than Yahara’s defensive methods.”²⁰
3. At this point, *32nd Army* could no longer conduct operational-level offensive operations.

77 ID Small Group: What affect did the Japanese counterattack have on your operations?

- E. Despite disruptions caused by the Japanese counterattack, many areas on XXIV Corps’ front line were unaffected.


Fly to VP 6C and stand at the bottom of the cargo nets.



Virtual View 6C. Cargo Nets

Visual 6G. Hacksaw Ridge, 4-5 MAY

1. 77 ID.
 - a) On 4 MAY as the Japanese attacked 306 IN on the division left (east), 307 IN continued the struggle for Hacksaw Ridge.
 - 1) Japanese platoon-sized counterattacks emerged from the “Apartment House” and the innumerable tunnel openings on the south side of the ridge.



Slide 8

²⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 302)

- 2) As the 307 IN's defenders on the crest contended with those counterattacks, the 1st Battalion unrolled the now famous cargo nets over the north face of Hacksaw Ridge.

Climb the cargo nets and walk over Hacksaw Ridge until you can see the barracks on the right.


- 3) [6G-1] Now, with more men coming up the nets, 1st Battalion cleared the complicated cave-tunnel-pillbox networks at the east end of the ridge and held their ground against counterattacks.
- 4) An estimated 600 Japanese were killed.
- b) On 5 MAY, the reverse slope was secured and the caves were sealed.
 - 1) But 3rd Battalion, on the division right (east), still dealt with fierce counterattacks.
 - 2) They killed another 250 in hand-to-hand fighting.
 - 3) [6G-2] But the prolonged engagement for Hacksaw Ridge was over..²¹
2. In contrast, 1 MARDIV's operations on XXIV Corps' right (west) were unaffected.

Tenth Army Small Group: Were conditions suitable for an attack with both III Amphibious Corps and XXIV Corps?

Visual 6H. Tenth Army Prepares to Attack

IV. Tenth Army Prepares for the Offensive.

- A. LTG Buckner's staff assessed that 32nd Army expended most of their reserves in the counterattack, and Buckner looked to committing all of Tenth Army against the next Shuri defensive line.



Slide 9

XXIV Corps Small Group: How did LTG Hodge try to set advantageous conditions for Tenth Army's planned attack?

- B. To that end, LTG Hodge ordered XXIV Corps to extend its front line to set advantageous conditions for Tenth Army.
 1. [6H-1] 77 ID. For the next three days, the division slowly crept forward.
 2. [6H-2] After pivoting to face the east, 1 MARDIV made its attacks in the Asa-Dakeshi area.
 3. 7 ID continued its efforts to secure Kochi Ridge, and like the other divisions in XXIV Corps, learned that "defenses here could not be overrun in a single attack but required a tedious, methodical destruction of individual enemy soldiers and positions."²²
 4. [6H-3] 9 MAY: 96 ID, which had been in the rear to rest and refit, started relieving 7 ID so it could do the same.
 - a) Except for a single stubborn cave position overlooking the road cut between Zebra Hill and Kochi Ridge, 7 ID had an unbroken line from Kochi Village down the ridge to How Hill.
 - b) Zebra Hill remained in enemy hands.

²¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 281)

²² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 307)

C. The Americans were now on the edge of the L+20 Objective Line – 20 days later than they originally expected to be there.

XXIV Corps, though still far from the minimum line set by General Hodge, had eliminated many Japanese positions in preparation for the full-scale attack that was to follow. The week of 3-10 May had been one of general consolidation of the line that ran from Ouki on the east coast to Asa-Kawa on the west coast. At the expense of more than 20,000 casualties, including nonbattle, the American forces on the Shuri line had extended their line at Maeda, Kochi, and Awacha, thus making their lines of communication more secure and gaining more favorable terrain for the Tenth Army attack scheduled for 11 MAY.²³

VIGNETTES:

1. Non-Battle Injury (NBI) rates doubled in Tenth Army on 4 May.²⁴ Combat fatigue was starting to show, as illustrated by 1-307 IN on Hacksaw Ridge. "Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment on the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. 'Yet,' observed one platoon leader, 'in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins.'"²⁵

The greatest total number of NBI cases in the Battle of Okinawa occurs in 7 ID (26,211 in Tenth Army).²⁶

2. The ferocity of the Japanese defense on Hacksaw Ridge was dramatized by the movie of the same name, and depicts the actions of PFC Desmond Doss of 1-307 IN. Doss was a conscientious objector who believed he could still serve his country as a combat medic without betraying his beliefs. The portion of his Medal of Honor citation for Hacksaw Ridge reads:

He was a company aid man when the 1st Battalion assaulted a jagged escarpment 400 feet high. As our troops gained the summit, a heavy concentration of artillery, mortar and machinegun fire crashed into them, inflicting approximately 75 casualties and driving the others back. Pfc. Doss refused to seek cover and remained in the fire-swept area with the many stricken, carrying them 1 by 1 to the edge of the escarpment and there lowering them on a rope-supported litter down the face of a cliff to friendly hands. On 2 May, he exposed himself to heavy rifle and mortar fire in rescuing a wounded man 200 yards forward of the lines on the same escarpment; and 2 days later he treated 4 men who had been cut down while assaulting a strongly defended cave, advancing through a shower of grenades to within 8 yards of enemy forces in a cave's mouth, where he dressed his comrades' wounds before making 4 separate trips under fire to evacuate them to safety. On 5 May, he unhesitatingly braved enemy shelling and small arms fire to assist an artillery officer. He applied bandages, moved his patient to a spot that offered protection from small arms fire and, while artillery and mortar shells fell close by, painstakingly administered plasma. Later that day, when an American was severely wounded by fire from a cave, Pfc. Doss crawled to him where he had fallen 25 feet from the enemy position, rendered aid, and carried him 100 yards to safety while continually exposed to enemy fire.²⁷

²³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 310)

²⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 491)

²⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 281)

²⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 490)

²⁷ (Congressional Medal of Honor Society 2020, Doss, Desmond T.)

3. In 7 ID's AO, the very real danger, and the yet-unknown severity of the Japanese *89th Regiment's* infiltrations were evidenced when daylight revealed their presence north of Kuhazu:

At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy – a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post.

"Oh no," Maybury said. "That's a patrol from Company K down there."

"I don't know who the hell it is," McCracken said, "but there's a lot of them and they've got two field pieces that are pointed right at your OP."²⁸

4. On 5 MAY, as the Japanese counterattack culminated, word reached the front line of Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allies – within *hours* after it occurred.

Lt. Col. Albert V. Hartl, executive of the 17th Infantry, could plainly see several Japanese soldiers 600 yards away on Tanabaru Escarpment. The Japanese were in turn watching American activity. Lying on his stomach, Colonel Hartl fired some shots from an M1 at the Japanese to "neutralize" them. While he was so engaged, a soldier ran up with a radio report that the German armies had surrendered.

"Well now," Hartl said, "if we just had the Japs off the escarpment we'd be all right, wouldn't we?"²⁹

5. In the tunnels beneath Shuri Castle, COL Yahara's defensive framework was finally recognized for its superior effectiveness:

At six o'clock in the evening of 5 May I was sitting quietly at my desk when Lieutenant General Ushijima, our commanding officer, sent for me. I walked woodenly as far as the adjoining office of the chief of staff [LTG Cho] and stopped, with a silent salute. When Ushijima spotted me, he shouted, "Come on in, Colonel Yahara, senior staff officer!" Entering his office I was tense, dreading what he might say. Would he order a final charge? Would this be the end?

As usual, the commander in chief was sitting cross-legged on the worn tatami floor. I stood at attention. He looked pensively at me and then spoke softly:

Colonel Yahara, as you predicted, this offensive has been a total failure. Your judgement was correct. You must have been frustrated from the start of this battle because I did not use your talents and skills wisely. Now I am determined to stop this offensive. Meaningless suicide is not what I want. . . Now our main force is largely spent, but some fighting strength is left, and we are getting support from the islanders [Okinawans]. With these we will fight to the southernmost hill, to the last square inch of land, and to the last man. I am ready to fight, but from now on I leave everything up to you. My instructions to you are to do whatever you feel is necessary.³⁰

²⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 290)

²⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 300)

³⁰ (Yahara 1995, 41-2)

According to COL Yahara, LTG Cho heard every word of the conversation.

ANALYSIS:

1. ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, states that “prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when a commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost. . . Gambling, in contrast to taking prudent risk, is staking the success of an entire action on a single event without considering the hazard to the force should the event not unfold as envisioned.”
 - Which did the Japanese choose for the second counterattack – a calculated risk or a gamble?
 - Did the counterattack’s failure hasten *32nd Army*’s overall defeat?
2. 96 ID had about ten days to reconstitute before it relieved 7 ID to do the same. How long does it take to reconstitute a division? Today, could the Army do it in ten days?

Instructor Note: Take a 10-minute break and load the Phase II East database.

Stand 7: Tenth Army Attacks

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 7A. Tenth Army Attacks | 7A. Tenth Army Attacks |
| 7B. 77 ID AO | 7B. 77 ID Attacks |
| | 7C. Chocolate Drop Hill |
| | 7D. Ishimmi Ridge |
| 7C. 96 ID AO | 7E. 96 ID Attacks |
| 7D1. Dick Hills, 11-12 MAY | |
| 7D2. Dick Hills, 13-14 MAY | |
| 7D3. Dick Hills, 17-20 MAY | |
| 7E1. Conical Hill, 11-17 MAY | 7F. Gaja Ridge |
| | 7G. East Ridge |
| 7E2. Conical Hill, 18-20 MAY | |
| 7F. Seizing Shuri | 7H. Shuri Outskirts |

About the cover slide: The Soldiers in the foreground are rummaging around what is left of Shuri Village. The Methodist Church in the background was one of the few structures to survive near-constant bombardment for almost two weeks. You are looking west in the photograph. Shuri Castle is out of the frame on the left, but almost nothing remains of the old royal residence. The church was restored to its original configuration and is still there today. Signal Corps photograph in the public domain.

ORIENTATION: Conducted later in the stand.

DESCRIPTION:

Tenth Army Small Group: Describe the Scheme of Maneuver for Tenth Army's attack.

Virtual View 7A. Tenth Army Attacks




7A. Tenth Army Attacks

Visual 7A. Tenth Army Attacks

I. Scheme of Maneuver.

A. Tenth Army. Two corps and four divisions now comprised Tenth Army's front line: 6 MARDIV and 1 MARDIV of III Amphibious Corps, and 77 ID and 96 ID of XXIV Corps.¹

1. LTG Buckner planned a double envelopment of Shuri.
 - a) [7A-1] III Amphibious Corps was the Main Effort.
 - 1) The defenses on the Army's right (west) were assessed as weaker than those on the left (east).
 - 2) The Marines were still relatively fresh, and it was determined they had a better chance of penetrating the Shuri defensive line.
 - b) XXIV Corps was the Supporting Effort.
 - 1) [7A-2] 77 ID attacked to fix defending enemy units in Shuri.
 - 2) [7A-3] 96 ID attacked to envelop Shuri from the east.
2. Tenth Army also made its first major change to the operational framework.
 - a) Tactics were adjusted to apply the lessons learned from the first and second defensive rings.
 - 1) They quickly learned to use heavy weapons to suppress or neutralize small areas, then push a small salient into the Japanese lines.
 - 2) Then they used that salient to support repeating the process on adjacent targets.



Slide 2

¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 311-2)

- 3) It was a methodical and effective technique, but slow.
- b) This time, preparatory artillery would use point fires instead of area fires.
 - 1) The area fires used by XXIV Corps on 19 APR were considered a failure.
 - 2) The intricate Japanese defensive positions required targets on tombs, cave entrances, tunnel entrances, and identified concealed firing positions.

32nd Army Small Group: How did you prepare to defend the last Shuri Defensive Line?


- B. [7A-4] 32nd Army. LTG Ushijima committed almost all his remaining reserves into the last Shuri defensive line.

In preparation for a renewed American attack the Japanese bolstered their Shuri defenses. Ready at last to commit almost all his reserves to action, General Ushijima ordered that "the Army will immediately move its main strength into the Shuri area." He established a central defense zone with his front lines running from a point north of Asato on the west coast, through Wana and the high ground near Ishimmi, to the east coast just north of Conical Hill. Aware of the entrance of the 6th Marine Division on the west, he shifted his forces for an iron defense on both his flanks..²

Visual 7B. 77 ID AO


Ground hug movement to VP 7B.

Virtual View 7B. 77 ID Attacks



Slide 3

² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 312-3)



7B. 77ID Area of Operations

II. 77 ID Attacks on the XXIV Corps Right (West)

ORIENTATION: In this view, you can see the major terrain features in 77 ID's AO.

Manipulate the virtual view to observe each of the following terrain features:

A. There are four major terrain features in front of 77 ID.

1. In front of 305 IN west of Highway 5, "the enemy held tenaciously to his positions on the finger ridges. . . The network of small hills and ridges afforded the Japanese almost complete interlocking fire; many positions were covered by five or six others."³
2. Chocolate Drop Hill, "undoubtedly the most insignificant in appearance. . . resemble[s] a chocolate drop on a slightly tilted saucer."⁴
 - a) There was almost no cover on its approaches.
 - b) Marshy terrain on the west was very restrictive terrain for tanks.
 - c) One of the largest minefields found on Okinawa was nearby.
 - d) It was covered by fires from Ishimmi Ridge on the southwest, Flattop Hill to the south, and a knob called Wart Hill to the southeast.
3. Flattop Hill was on the extreme left (east) flank of 77 ID, and a small portion rested on the extreme right (west) flank of 96 ID.
 - a) It dominated the Kochi valley in 96 ID's AO, 1300 yards to the north, and the adjacent Dick Hills.
 - b) It had a steep reverse slope congested with the usual enemy defensive positions.

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 338)

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 338-9)

4. Ishimmi Ridge, in the center of 77 ID's AO, was another coral escarpment, and it concealed mortar positions on the reverse slope. Its forward slopes were covered by fires from the reverse slope of Chocolate Drop Hill.

77 ID Small Group: Describe your attack to fix the Japanese in Shuri.

B. The second major shift in operational framework occurs at division level: every maneuver required the same deliberate, methodical, and time-consuming process that became the norm on Okinawa.⁵


1. **[7B-1]** 11 MAY: 77 ID attacked, and their progress was determined by close coordination with the adjacent divisions.
 - a) Movement toward Chocolate Drop Hill was disrupted 200 yards beyond the LD by artillery and mortar fires.
 - b) The attacking battalion withdrew at the end of the day.
2. **[7B-2]** 12 MAY: Tanks and infantry attacked Flattop Hill's forward slope but were repulsed.
3. **[7B-3]** 13 MAY.
 - a) A simultaneous attack was made on Chocolate Drop and Flattop Hill.
 - 1) 2-306 IN reached part of Chocolate Drop's northern slope, but eventually withdrew 300 yards to the north.
 - 2) A small force held the base of Wart Hill and defeated a counterattack with their grenades, bayonets, and entrenching tools.
 - b) For the second day, no gains were made on Flattop Hill.
4. **[7B-4]** 14 MAY.
 - a) "306 IN was so depleted in strength that the remaining riflemen were grouped into one battalion."⁶
 - 1) This battalion tried to advance past Chocolate Drop and Wart Hill.
 - 2) The attack failed and 307 IN moved up to attack the next day.
 - b) For the third day, no gains were made on Flattop Hill.

Ground hug movement to VP 7C.

Virtual View 7C. Chocolate Drop Hill

⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 332-44, 347-51)

⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 341)




7C. Chocolate Drop Hill

5. **[7B-5]** 15 MAY.
 - a) K/307 IN reached Chocolate Drop's base on the north side.
 - 1) An attempt to maneuver around the right (west) was repulsed.
 - 2) But they held their positions at the base and fought off two counterattacks that night.
 - b) L/307 attacked Flattop Hill and seized the forward slope.
6. 16 MAY.
 - a) Chocolate Drop was probed along the sides to find a way over the top and onto the reverse slope, and a few new positions were taken.
 - b) On Flattop Hill, a platoon was forced off the crest by mortar fire.

Ground hug movement to VP 7D.

Virtual View 7D. Ishimmi Ridge



7D. Ishimmi Ridge

7. **[7B-6]** 17 MAY.
 - a) Between 0300 and dawn, E/306 IN, a reinforced rifle company, infiltrated onto Ishimmi Ridge.
 - 1) They used machine guns to cut down counterattacking Japanese in the valley below.
 - 2) By midday, most of the company's heavy weapons were destroyed and two platoons were down to half-strength.
 - 3) They shrank their perimeter that night to improve their defenses.

Rotate left to observe Chocolate Drop Hill

- b) Chocolate Drop Hill was seized in its entirety but took three more days to secure.



Rotate right to observe Flattop Hill

- c) On Flattop Hill, the infantry were still getting forced off the crest.
 - 1) Tanks that might have provided much-needed support could not maneuver around to the left (east) because of a large minefield in the road cut separating Flattop Hill and the Dick Hills in 96 ID's AO.
 - 2) 96 ID cleared those mines, a decisive point for both 77 ID and 96 ID.
- 8. **[7B-7]** 18 MAY.
 - a) The battered force in Ishimmi Ridge was told to "stay at all costs", even though they had used up most of their ammunition and were out of water.
 - 1) Despite several previous attempts to reinforce them, only a company commander and five men reached the ridge.
 - 2) When enemy fire slackened that night, litter bearers snuck in with water and ammunition and snuck out with many of the wounded.
 - b) 77 ID's tanks moved through the cleared road cut between Flattop Hill and the Dick Hills and put direct fire on Flattop's reverse slope.
- 9. **[7B-8]** 19 MAY.
 - a) Several enemy attacks on Ishimmi Ridge were repulsed with great difficulty.
 - 1) Supporting indirect fires kept the Japanese from massing on the defenders.
 - 2) At 2200, they were finally relieved by L/306 IN.

Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance


toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi..⁷

10. [7B-9] 20 MAY. Flattop Hill was secured at 1545.


Visual 7C. 96 ID AO

Fly to VP 7E.

Virtual View 7E. 96 ID Attacks



Slide 4



7E. 96 ID Attacks

III. 96 ID Attacks in the East. The “Deadeyes” continued the attacks they were already conducting when the Tenth Army offensive started.

A. Discussion of 96 ID’s actions focus on two distinct but interrelated areas and actions that occur simultaneously:

1. [7C-1] The Dick Hills area.
2. [7C-2] The Conical Hill area.

ORIENTATION: In this view, standing on Kochi Ridge looking south, you can see the major terrain features in the Dick Hills area.


⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 338)

Manipulate the virtual view to observe each of the following terrain features:

Visual 7D1. Dick Hills, 11-12 MAY

B. The Dick Hills are actually a series of high points on a ridge that marks the eastern edge of the Shuri Hills.⁸ From right to left they are:

1. Dick Baker.
2. Dick Able.
3. Dick Right.
 - a) This is the most heavily fortified of the Japanese positions on this ridge.
 - b) Flattop Hill, in 96 ID's AO to the west, is just on the other side and the road between them is covered with mines.
4. Dick Left.
5. Below the Dick Hills, but controlling the approaches to them, are a collection of small hills around of Kochi Ridge.
 - a) Zebra Hill.
 - b) Harriet Hill is at the end of the spur stretching southeast from the top of Zebra Hill.
 - c) The small knob south of Harriet Hill is Baker Hill.
 - d) On the near side of Harriet Hill is Item Hill, which is at the end of a spur stretching southeast from the saddle between Kochi Ridge and Zebra Hill.
 - e) Directly to the east is How Hill, and on the other side of the valley is the terrain in the Conical Hill area.




Slide 5

96 ID Small Group: Describe your attack in the Dick Hills area.

- C. 10-11 MAY: 382 IN defeated a series of determined counterattacks to force them off Zebra Hill.**
- D. 12 MAY.**
 1. **[7D1-1]** In the morning, 1-382 IN, supported by tanks, reached Dick Baker's crest. But heavy enemy fires forced them to withdraw.
 2. **[7D1-2]** Baker Hill, south of Harriet Hill, was secured.

Visual 7D2. Dick Hills, 13-14 MAY

- E. 13 MAY.**
 1. **[7D2-1]** Coordinated with 77 ID's attack on Flattop Hill, one company seized and held Dick Baker.
 2. **[7D2-2]** A second company was repulsed on Dick Able.
 3. **[7D2-3]** The Japanese reinforced the Dick Hills during the night.



Slide 6

⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 344-7, 349)

F. **14 MAY:** Again coordinated with 77 ID's attack on Flattop Hill, attacks were made on Dick Able and Dick Right.


1. [7D2-4] Dick Able was secured without much difficulty.
2. [7D2-5] Dick Right was attacked from the new positions on Dick Able, and from Baker Hill to the east.
3. [7D2-6] Two companies assaulted Dick Center, secured it, and then secured the forward slope of Dick Left.

Visual 7D3. Dick Hills, 15-20 MAY

G. [7D3-1] 15-16 MAY. For the next two days, continued attacks to secure the reverse slopes in the Dick Hills were repulsed by enemy fires from Flattop Hill and Oboe Hill to the south.

H. **17-20 MAY.**


1. [7D3-2] 96 ID reached the mines in the road cut between Flattop Hill and the Dick Hills.
2. They detonated 7 tons of Bangalore torpedoes (equivalent to 9.5 Mine Clearing Line Charges) to clear the minefield, and the Japanese defenses here finally broke.
3. [7D3-3] Tanks from two divisions moved through the cut and put direct fires on the reverse slopes of their objectives.



Slide 7

Fly to VP 7F.

Virtual View 7F. Gaha Ridge




7F. Gaha Ridge

ORIENTATION: In this view, standing on Gaha Ridge looking west, you can see the major terrain features in the Conical Hill area.

Manipulate the virtual view to observe each of the following terrain features:

Visual 7E1. Conical Hill, 11-17 MAY

- I. **Conical Hill is the dominant terrain feature on the east coast and is surrounded by a series of smaller hills that are almost indistinguishable from the ones below the Dick Hills.⁹ From right to left they are:**
 1. Baker Hill (from the Dick Hills engagement).
 2. Fox Hill.
 3. Charlie Hill, which stretches away to the southwest.
 4. Following the Charlie Hill ridgeline there is Love Hill and Mike Hill.
 5. King Hill is on the other side of Charlie Hill, directly to the south.
 6. Following the ridgeline up from King Hill is Conical Hill's peak.
 7. Gaja Ridge.



Slide 8


96 ID Small Group: Describe your attack in the Conical Hill area.

- J. **[7E1-1] 11 MAY. Fox Hill and the forward slope of Charlie Hill were seized from assault positions on Easy Hill.**
- K. **[7E1-2] 12 MAY. Between Easy Hill and Gaja Ridge, one company seized a foothold on the north end of a spur sloping away from Conical Hill.**
- L. **13 MAY.**
 1. **[7E1-3]** 1-383 IN made an attack on the summit and reverse slope of Charlie Hill from Fox Hill, but it was defeated by enemy supporting fires from King Hill, Conical Hill, and Love Hill.
 2. But Gaja Ridge, north of Conical Hill, served as an assault position for attacks on Conical Hill from the north and northeast.
 - a) At 1100, LTG Buckner was with 96 ID observing the attacks on Charlie Hill. He decided it was time to seize Conical Hill.
 - b) Attacks from the north against Conical's west slopes were repulsed by reverse slope fires from Charlie Hill.
 - c) **[7E1-4]** A second attack came from Gaja Ridge, and two platoons reached the ridge crest sloping away from the peak at 1300.

Move up to the crest of the east ridge below Conical Hill.

VP 7G. East Ridge

⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 351-9)



7G. East Ridge

- d) Those platoons were counterattacked at 1525, but well-timed artillery and mortar fires directed by a spotter plane repulsed the Japanese.
- e) [7E1-5] The platoons were reinforced by a second company on their right just 50 yards from the peak.
- f) [7E1-6] At dusk, a third company dug in on the spur just north of the peak.

The Japanese, having surmised correctly that the main effort against Conical Hill would be down the Charlie-King ridge line, had disposed their forces to meet the threat from that quarter. But the 383d Infantry had discovered and used a naturally stronger but less heavily defended avenue of approach; two American platoon leaders had taken the initiative and led their men up the hill at a moment of precious opportunity.¹⁰

- M. [7E1-7] 14 MAY: Yard-by-yard progress continued for Charlie Hill, and the forward slope and crest of King Hill were seized.
- N. [7E1-8] 15 MAY: On Conical Hill, two platoons made another courageous maneuver onto the northwest spur from King Hill where the reverse slope was still held by the Japanese.
- O. 16 MAY.
 - 1. [7E1-9] An attack on Love Hill failed.
 - 2. [7E1-10] Tanks put direct fire on Conical Hill's eastern slopes and advanced as far south as Yonabaru.
- P. 17 MAY: After 96 ID cleared the mines from the road cut and started securing the Dick Hills, the Main Effort was changed to focus on Conical Hill's eastern slopes as far south as Sugar Hill.

¹⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 357)

1. If this attack succeeded, 7 ID could be taken out of reserve and committed to penetrate down the coast and turn Shuri's defenses from behind.
2. Sugar Hill is

... at the southern end of the 800-yard hogback that extended south from Conical's peak, was the objective of the 381st Infantry. On the eastern face of the hogback a number of finger ridges ran down into the Yonabaru coastal flats. Reducing the Japanese emplacements which covered the finger ridges from the west would be difficult, for the crest of the hogback would continue to be untenable because of fire from Love, Mike, and other hills to the west. It would be necessary to deny the crest to the enemy and to guard every inch of the military crest as soon as it was captured, to ward off Japanese attempts to establish positions on the skyline.

Climb to the top of Conical Hill. Look east at the road below leading into Yonabaru


Visual 7E2. Conical Hill, 18-20 MAY

Q. [7E2-1] 18 MAY: A platoon probed the finger ridges east of the Hogback but held only an outpost line on the first finger through the night.

R. 19 MAY.

1. [7E2-2] Attacks on the west end of King Hill were defeated by fires from Charlie Hill and Love Hill.
2. [7E2-3] During the night, a small party established a position below the Hogback that overlooked Japanese positions on Conical Hill's reverse slope, Charlie Hill, King Hill, and Love Hill.

S. [7E2-4] 20 MAY: A battalion-sized attack advanced to within 200 yards of Cutaway Hill (between the Hogback and Sugar Hill) and secured the second and third finger ridges east of the Hogback.



Slide 9

96 ID Small Group: Which engagement was more advantageous to XXIV Corps – the Dick Hills/Flattop fight, or the Conical Hill fight? Defend your answer.


XXIV Corps Small Group: Did those engagements set conditions for you to envelope Shuri from the east IAW Tenth Army's Scheme of Maneuver?

Visual 7F. Seizing Shuri, 22-31 MAY

IV. Converging on Shuri. A steady period of rain and overcast skies began and lasted until the end of May.

What effect did that rain have on operations and tactics as Tenth Army converged on Shuri?

Go back to Flattop Hill.



Slide 10

ORIENTATION: In this view, standing on Flattop Hill looking south-southwest, you can see the major terrain features and last objectives around Shuri.

- A. The ground falls away from Ishimmi/Flattop/Dick Hills into a draw that drains west (right), then ascends in yet another series of hills, knobs, and ridges that control or parallel the axis of advance in XXIV Corps.¹¹ From right to left they are:**
1. Ishimmi Ridge.
 2. Beyond Ishimmi Ridge and about 600 yards farther west is 100-Meter Hill. III Amphibious Corps is just on the other side.
- B. 96 ID's Main Effort continued to clear Conical Hill and its surrounding terrain, but a regiment-sized Supporting Effort continued the advance on Shuri.¹²**
1. **[7F-1]** On 22 MAY 382 IN secured the Oboe Hill's crest before the rain made further advance all but impossible.
 2. **[7F-2]** It wasn't until 30 MAY that they were able to advance across the regimental front to seize Peter Hill, directly west of Oboe Hill.
 3. **[7F-3]** The next day 382 IN advanced from Peter Hill onto Tom Hill (originally in 77 ID's AO), and 96 ID sent 383 IN to continue the advance into Shuri on their left (south).
 4. 383 IN reached the east side of the now demolished Shuri Castle, where it linked up with Marines who had advanced from the west and seized the Castle grounds.

Follow the road to the outskirts of Shuri Village.

VP 7H. Shuri Outskirts

¹¹ There are major discrepancies in hill names between the "Green Book", 77 ID's after action report, and 96 ID's after action report. The CMH narrative describing the events in front of Shuri from 21-31 MAY also has discrepancies from the primary source material, therefore the actions are described in very general terms and limited to terrain features whose names are not in question.

¹² (96th Infantry Division 1945)



7H. Shuri Outskirts

C. It took a full week for 77 ID to fight across 400 yards of muddy ground and flooded ravines.¹³

1. Weeks of artillery fires and air strikes had churned the soil in front of the infantry. Rain turned the churned soil into mud.
 - a) Mud prevented tanks and other tracked vehicles from supporting the infantry.
 - b) Engineers, who had been sealing enemy caves and fighting positions, were now overtasked to keep roads and supply routes open.
 - c) Infantry attacks were often made without the advantages of tanks and armored flamethrowers, engineers, and supported by indirect fires that made terrain conditions worse.
2. **[7F-4]** As late as 29 MAY 77 ID was still trying to seize Jane Hill on its left (east), and learned the Marines had entered their AO at Shuri Castle (just in time to cancel a planned air strike on their position).
3. **[7F-5]** On 30 May they finally secured Jane Hill on their left, Dorothy Hill to their front, but still had to contend with fierce Japanese resistance in Shuri below the castle.

Move to the Methodist Church Ruins

¹³ (77th Infantry Division 1945, 56-63)



D. III Amphibious Corps' 1 MARDIV, focused on supporting Tenth Army's double envelopment of Shuri, moved out of sector, and seized what remained of the castle.

1. On 28 MAY, patrols from 1 MARDIV found evidence of recently evacuated enemy positions west of Shuri.¹⁴
2. [7F-6] "At 0730 on 29 May the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, left its lines and started forward toward Shuri Ridge, where patrol action the previous day had indicated a possible weakness in the enemy's lines. At 1015 Shuri Castle was occupied. . . "¹⁵
3. [7F-7] "As a result of the unexpected entrance into Shuri, the 1st Marine Division at 0930 ordered the 1st Marines to bypass Wana Draw, leaving its position in the line next to the 77th Division, and to move around to the southwest to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in Shuri. . . by night the two battalions had established a perimeter in the south of Shuri."¹⁶
4. [7F-8] On 30 MAY "The entrances to the caves under Shuri Castle were still held by the enemy, and no additional ground had been taken in Shuri itself."¹⁷
5. ". . . the Marine units at Shuri Castle and south of Shuri did not move, except for small patrols that were turned back by heavy machine-gun and 47-mm. antitank fire a few hundred yards north of the castle."¹⁸

E. 31 MAY: The Marines coordinated their attacks with 77 ID and secured the rest of Shuri. Now they could clear 32nd Army's tunnel complex under the old castle.

Enter the 32nd Army Headquarters tunnels under Shuri and follow them to the exit. Spaces are labelled for additional exploration.

¹⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 392)

¹⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 396)

¹⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 396)

¹⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 397)

¹⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 396-7)

The tunnels and defenses in Shuri were minimally manned or abandoned. Where is the Japanese 32nd Army?

VIGNETTES:

1. Buckner Creel, commanding Company G, 306th Infantry in 77 ID, recalled a close call with Japanese mortar fire during a very vulnerable moment while fighting around Wart Hill, Chocolate Drop Hill, and Flattop Hill:

During one mortar exchange I was sitting in my slit trench/foxhole in the company CP about twenty or so yards to the rear. I was sitting with my back to the 'front', with my knees spread, my legs drawn out. We heard the incoming rounds. Most landed harmlessly and exploded. But one landed base down between my legs. I sat there looking at it. Since it hadn't exploded, I carefully grasped it with both hands, figuring it was a dud. I flung it out of the hole, and when it landed, it exploded. It was not a dud!¹⁹

2. Paul Westman, now a BAR man in a squad that eventually dwindled to just three men from casualties in 96 ID's fighting in the Dick Hills. He described one night where hand-to-hand combat in one foxhole put his whole company on edge.

During this period, along towards midnight the sounds of a life and death struggle brought the entire company to a high state of readiness. About four holes away from mine, a desperate battle was underway and flares started to light up the area. You could plainly hear the GI, "Die, you blankety, blankety blank! Damn you, aren't you ever going to die!" There were squeals mixed in with the curses, the sound of something heavy hitting flesh and bone again and again. Finally, the noise stopped and I heard a few more heartfelt curses, then I thought someone sobbing. I felt sick to my stomach and it was a while before I could quit shaking. It was all so unreal and eerie; no wonder it made people crack up.

At daybreak, a big redhead from M Company stood up outside his hole and announced to the whole world, "Hey guys, look what I got last night." He had a big grin on his face. He got a big hand from everyone near. But I'll bet he hated to face each night from then on.

ANALYSIS:

When the offensive resumed in May, did Tenth Army transition from a Joint Force Headquarters conducting a campaign to a Joint Force directing a major operation? What might be the implications of that transition?

JP 3-0 states that:

... campaigns are the most extensive of joint operations, in terms of the amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration of operations. In the context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003

¹⁹ (Astor 1995, 377)

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). Campaign planning is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

Instructor Note: Take a 10-minute break and load the Phase III database.

Stand 8: End of Resistance and Surrender

| Visuals | Virtual Views |
|--|----------------|
| 8A. 7 ID, 21-31 MAY | |
| 8B. Tenth Army Pursuit, 1- JUN | |
| 8C. Hill 95, Yaeju-Dake, and Yuza-Dake | 8A. Hill 95 |
| | 8B. Tomui Lion |
| | 8C. Hill 115 |
| | 8D. Hill 89 |

About the cover slide: This is Hill 89; you are looking south at where the Japanese *32nd Army Headquarters* was located during the last days of the Okinawa Campaign. Signal Corps photo in the public domain.

Instructor Note: This stand begins on or about the time 77 ID secured Chocolate Drop Hill and Flattop Hill. 96 ID has taken the Dick Hills and secured Conical Hill. 7 ID is poised to break through at Yonabaru and try to turn the Japanese *32nd Army* defending at Shuri.

ORIENTATION: Conducted later in the stand.


Where is the Japanese *32nd Army*?

DESCRIPTION:

Visual 8A. 7ID, 21-31 MAY

I. Situation on 21-22 MAY.

- A. When 96 ID secured the east side of Conical Hill on 20-21 MAY, it created an opportunity for 7 ID to attack, get behind Shuri, and trap *32nd Army*.
- B. "In a staff meeting at Tenth Army on 19 May Col. Louis B. Ely, intelligence officer of the Tenth Army, said it looked as though the Japanese would fight at Shuri to the death."²⁰
- C. However, in *32nd Army* headquarters under Shuri, the senior leaders assessed their situation during the night of 20-21 MAY.
 1. "The three major enemy combat units—the 62d Division, the 24th Division, and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade—had all been committed to the line and had all wasted away as a result of the incessant naval gunfire, artillery fire, air attacks, and the tank and infantry combat."²¹
 2. In the center, they held 77 ID to tiny gains, but the reduction of Chocolate Drop Hill threatened the last Japanese position there before they, too, entered Shuri. According to COL Yahara,



Slide 2

²⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 387)

²¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 383)

“The key piece of our domino game was Chocolate Drop Hill. After it fell, the chain of strongholds in front of Shuri toppled one by one.”²²

3. On the right, 96 ID had taken the Dick Hills, reduced much of the Charlie Hill pocket, and secured the east face of Conical Hill almost to Sugar Hill.
4. The men under Shuri were most likely aware that the Americans had at least one division (7 ID) in reserve to exploit the inevitable penetration of the last Shuri defensive line.

D. Commanders and staff considered three courses of action (COAs):

1. Make their final defense at Shuri.
 - a) *62nd Division*, which had been fighting the Americans since they landed, favored this COA.
 - b) LTG Fujioka believed the large stores at Shuri could support it, and withdrawal did not honor Japanese military tradition.
2. Withdraw east and defend in the Chinen Peninsula. But this COA was considered logistically unfeasible.
 - a) Withdraw to the south and defend there.
 - b) It would prolong the battle, which bought time and continued the attrition of American forces.
 - c) *24th Division* had some prepared defensive positions in the area.
 - d) There were considerable supplies there that would not require transportation.

E. The decision criteria rested completely on how long the Japanese could draw out the battle, and they chose withdrawal to the south.

1. But 96 ID's success on the east face of Conical Hill, called Untamamui Hill by the Japanese, threatened their withdrawal routes. In COL Yahara's words, it “was the control tower for our rear area. If we lost the Untamamui-Yonabaru-Amagoiumi hill line, the enemy would rush into the Tsukazan area. We had to hold that line long enough for our troops to withdraw. . . .”²³
2. A spoiling attack would be conducted toward Yonabaru to preserve their freedom of movement.²⁴

II. 32nd Army Withdrawal/7 ID Breakthrough.

A. 22 MAY: Torrential rains began that turned Okinawa's low ground into lakes and its roads into knee-deep mud. Overcast skies limited Tenth Army's ability to observe the battlefield from the air.

1. During the night, *32nd Army's* wounded and supplies started leaving Shuri. Signal units started the process of establishing the new headquarters.
2. **[8A-1]** 7 ID, however, crossed their LD at 0200.
 - a) Despite the rain, the lead elements of 32 IN moved through Yonabaru and seized Spruce Hill directly to the south.
 - b) The lead elements of 184 IN passed behind Spruce Hill to the left (east), and at daylight seized the crest of Chestnut Hill. They surprised the Japanese soldiers ascending the reverse slope to establish defensive positions.²⁵

²² (Yahara 1995, 67)

²³ (Yahara 1995, 76)

²⁴ (Yahara 1995, 80)

²⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 378)

3. Groups of people wearing white cloth were seen moving south from Kamizato Village – well south of Shuri.
 - a) US propaganda leaflets had encouraged Okinawan civilians to wear white to avoid being attacked.
 - b) Therefore, these groups were not assessed to be Japanese soldiers.²⁶

. . . Colonel Ely, in commenting on the passage of the 7th Division down the Conical corridor, noted the absence of strong resistance to the move and interpreted this as supporting the view that the "Japs will hole up in Shuri." At the same time General Buckner remarked: "I think all Jap first line troops are in the Shuri position. They don't appear to be falling back."²⁷

B. 23 MAY.

1. [8A-2] In the first moves of 32nd Army's spoiling attack, elements of the 24th Division were dispatched from Shuri to retake Yonabaru and delay a potential thrust at Shuri.²⁸
2. [8A-3] At 1045, 2-32 IN passed through Yonabaru and turned right (west).
 - a) Its objective was the string of hills west of Yonabaru and south of the Naha-Yonabaru Road, centered on Oak Hill just below Yonawa Village.
 - b) By nightfall 32 IN had two battalions deployed a mile southwest of Yonabaru, ready to strike behind Shuri.²⁹
3. [8A-4] At the end of the day, 184 IN had won a solid line that stretched from the coast across the southern slope of Chestnut Hill, Juniper Hill and Bamboo Hill.

C. [8A-5] 24 MAY.

1. 32nd Army issued formal orders for withdrawal.
2. 32 IN made initial contact with Japanese defenders southeast of Shuri.
3. [8A-6] 184 IN expanded its line to footholds on Locust Hill and Hemlock Hill.
4. "On 24 May. . . aerial observation noted continued movement southward. . ." ³⁰

D. 25 MAY.

1. [8A-7] A few hours after midnight, elements of the 24th Division started their spoiling attack south of Yonabaru between Ella Hill and June Hill against 32 IN, and against 184 IN on Hemlock Hill.
 - a) The fighting continued until dawn when the Japanese withdrew.³¹
 - b) "The main body of the enfeebled 62nd Division left Shuri and made a circuitous march to the southeast to join the fight against the 184th Infantry below Yonabaru."³²
2. ". . . aerial observation noted continued movement southward, but the impression persisted that it was civilian."³³

²⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 389)

²⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 387)

²⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 379)

²⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 379)

³⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 389)

³¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 381)

³² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 381)

³³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 389)

3. "... the Tenth Army periodic intelligence report stated that 'evidence of captured documents, POW [Prisoners of War] statements, and air photographs tends to indicate that the enemy intends to defend the Shuri area to the last.'" ³⁴

E. [8A-8] 26 MAY.

1. The main movement of *32nd Army* combat units out of the Shuri defense zone began. Some of the units were fighting as they went. ³⁵
2. "*62d Division*. . . began moving out of Shuri. . . two days ahead of the original schedule, fighting delaying actions in the zone of the 7th Division. . . " ³⁶
3. "The Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment area was cleared of the enemy. . . and thereafter the 184th Infantry met no serious opposition as it pressed south to the vicinity of Karadera." ³⁷
 - a) [8A-9] "Decisive action in the Japanese holding battle took place in the vicinity of Duck and Mabel Hills, east of Chan. Here. . . the 32d Infantry tried to break the enemy resistance, but in a fierce encounter on Duck Hill it was thrown back with heavy casualties." ³⁸
 - b) [8A-10] "The bright promise of enveloping Shuri faded rapidly as the fighting of 23-26 May brought the 32d Infantry practically to a standstill in front of the Japanese defense line across the Yonabaru valley." ³⁹
4. After four days of unending rain, the overcast lifted long enough to examine the south end of Okinawa, and the extent of *32nd Army's* movements were exposed:
 - a) About 2000 troops were seen moving between the Oroku Peninsula and the area just south of the Naha-Yonabaru valley.
 - b) About 3000-4000 were seen moving south below Shuri.
 - c) One hundred trucks were on the roads in front of Yaeju-Dake, and later three artillery pieces were seen in the same place, followed by three tanks.
 - d) Just before dark, a column of Japanese were seen heading *north*, near Ozato, and fifteen minutes later 5000 yards of road were congested to a point just above Makabe.
 - e) Air strikes and naval gunfire were used to kill as many as 500 Japanese south of Tsukazan and destroyed one artillery piece and five tanks. ⁴⁰
5. After these reports, Buckner issued instructions to "initiate without delay strong and unrelenting pressure to ascertain probable intentions and keep him [the Japanese] off balance. Enemy must not be permitted to establish himself securely on new positions with only nominal interference." ⁴¹

F. [8A-11] 27 MAY:

1. The Japanese mortar battalions supporting the Shuri front started their movement south. ⁴²

³⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 387)

³⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 393)

³⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 393)

³⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 381)

³⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 382)

³⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 381)

⁴⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 389)

⁴¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 391)

⁴² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 393)

2. "... little movement was noted behind the enemy's lines in the morning, but in the afternoon from 2,000 to 3,000 troops were seen moving in both directions at the southern end of the island."⁴³

G. 28 MAY:

1. [8A-12] "In front of the 184th Infantry to the southeast, the enemy fought a delaying action on 28-29 May at Hill 69, commonly called Karadera Hill, just north of the village of the same name."⁴⁴
2. "... the Tenth Army intelligence officer observed in a staff meeting that it 'now looks as though the Japanese thinks holding the line around north of Shuri is his best bet. . . It is probable that we will gradually surround the Shuri position.'"⁴⁵

H. [8A-13] 29 MAY:

1. Only a handful of Japanese units remained in front of Shuri to cover the last of the withdrawal and defend what is left of the village:
 - a) *3rd Independent Antitank Battalion.*
 - b) *What was left of 24th Division's 22nd Regiment.*
 - c) *Part of the 17th Independent Machine Gun Battalion.*
2. "... General Buckner said it looked as though the Japanese were trying to pull south but that they had made the decision too late."⁴⁶

I. [8A-14] 30 MAY:

1. "... the 32d had taken Oak, Ella, and June Hills; the advance brought the regiment directly up against Mabel and Hetty Hills and the defenses of Chan. . . On the last day of the month the 32d Infantry seized Duck Hill, consolidated positions on Turkey Hill, north of Mabel, and occupied the forward face of Mabel itself."⁴⁷
2. "After a meeting with III Amphibious Corps and XXIV Army Corps intelligence officers the Tenth Army intelligence officer reported at a staff meeting on the evening of 30 May that they had reached a consensus that the 'enemy was holding the Shuri lines with a shell, and that the bulk of the troops were elsewhere.'"⁴⁸

J. [8A-15] 31 MAY.

"At a staff meeting held on the evening of 31 May, it was suggested that the enemy would make his next line the high ground from Naha-Ko and the Oroku Peninsula on the west to Baten-Ko below Yonabaru on the east. At this meeting General Buckner stated that 'he [General Ushijima] made his decision to withdraw from Shuri two days too late.'"⁴⁹

Who had better situational awareness from 20-31 MAY?

⁴³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 391)

⁴⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 382)

⁴⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 391)

⁴⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 391-2)

⁴⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 382)

⁴⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 392)


⁴⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 392)

Visual 8B. Tenth Army Pursuit, 1-11 JUN

III. It was Time for Tenth Army to Pursue and Destroy 32nd Army.

A. Scheme of Maneuver.

1. At the end of May, LTG Buckner ordered Tenth Army to complete its encirclement of Shuri and separate the enemy formations still fighting on southern Okinawa.
2. The boundary between III Amphibious Corps and XXIV Corps was extended south along the road from Chan, through Iwa, to Gushichan on the south coast.
3. Both corps would link up at Chan to isolate what was believed to be a large portion of 32nd Army still defending Shuri.
 - a) III Amphibious Corps would then secure Naha and its airfield.
 - b) XXIV Corps would advance southeast to deny 32nd Army defensive terrain on the Chinen Peninsula.



Slide 3

B. Buckner “expected the Japanese, without skilled men or adequate transportation or communications, and hindered by boggy roads, to experience trouble and disorder during their mass retreat.”⁵⁰

1. But the rain and mud negatively affected Tenth’s Army’s offensive, and probably to a greater degree than it affected 32nd Army’s withdrawal.
 - a) Almost twelve inches of rain fell on Okinawa in the last ten days of May; more rain was expected in June.
 - b) Four-hundred truckloads of coral rock and rubble could not keep Highway 5 and other MSRs passable, so supply trucks could only move as fast as winches or bulldozers could drag them.
 - c) Units on the flanks attempted to alleviate the problem by landing supplies on the coasts, but it still had to be moved beyond the beaches on muddy roads.
2. Over the next two days the combat reports from XXIV Corps revealed just how much of LTG Ushijima’s army had escaped.
 - a) On 31 MAY, 77 ID killed 865 Japanese. The next day only six Japanese were killed.
 - b) 96 ID reported 189 Japanese killed on 31 MAY, but only nineteen on 1 JUN.
 - c) Only in 7 ID’s AO, where the breakthrough continued to gain ground, were Japanese casualties still relatively high: a two-day total of 647 killed and one POW.⁵¹
3. Tenth Army altered the scheme of maneuver to try and retain its momentum.
 - a) The Marines would attack down the west coast.
 - b) XXIV Corps would continue to deepen its penetration toward the south coast.⁵²

32nd Army Small Group: How did you successfully conceal an operational level withdrawal from Tenth Army?

⁵⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 422)

⁵¹

⁵² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 424)

Tenth Army Small Group: Why did you fail to detect 32nd Army's withdrawal from Shuri?

IV. Hill 95, Yaeju-Dake, and Yuza-Dake.

A. XXIV Corps faced the last of the large coral escarpments on southern Okinawa.

1. The Yaeju-Dake and Yuza-Dake peaks were four miles from the front line and have been visible since the start of the Ryukyus Campaign.
2. The terrain between Shuri and the peaks “. . . consisted of a series of comparatively small, rounded hills and uneven low ridges. . . .”⁵³
3. [8B-1] For the first three days in June, XXIV Corps made only modest gains on its right (west) but swept quickly through the Chinen Peninsula on the left (east).
 - a) 96 ID faced determined Japanese defenders near Chan Village, the northern anchor of the boundary between Tenth Army's corps.
 - b) 7 ID encountered only sporadic resistance that delayed or annoyed them.
 - 1) The noticeable lack of skilled enemy fighters indicated the 32nd Army had no intention of defending the Chinen Peninsula with anything more than a token force.
 - 2) 184 IN reached Hyakuna Village on 3 JUN and secured 7 ID's first objective.
 - c) “With the elimination of possible defensive terrain on Chinen Peninsula and in central southern Okinawa, it was becoming evident by the evening of 3 June that General Ushijima intended to stage his final stand on the southern tip of the island, almost certainly on the Yaeju-Dake Escarpment, which lay within the zone of the III Amphibious Corps.”⁵⁴

The highest point of this 4-mile-long cliff was the Yaeju-Dake Peak, which rose 290 feet above the adjoining valley floor. Because of its shape the troops who fought up its slopes named it the "Big Apple." The Yuza-Dake stood at the west end of the line and then tapered off into Kunishi Ridge, which extended across the III Amphibious Corps' sector. Hill 95, which paralleled rather than crossed the direction of attack, formed the eastern anchor. On the seaward side of Hill 95 there was a 300-foot drop to the water; on the side next to Hanagusuku village there was another sheer drop of about 170 feet to the valley floor. The only break in this defensive wall was in the 7th Division's sector, where a narrow valley pointed south through Nakaza. This approach to the high tableland beyond the escarpment cliff was subject to fire and observation from both flanks.⁵⁵

4. The poor weather and overextended supply lines were more detrimental to XXIV Corps' progress than the retreating Japanese.
 - a) But they had advanced 3000 yards farther than the Marines, who were busy clearing the Oroku Peninsula.
 - b) LTG Hodge pulled a regiment from 77 ID (then in reserve) to fill the gap between corps.
 - c) But

“. . . if the XXIV Corps maintained its pace for one or two days longer, as seemed likely, it would have secured its portion of southern Okinawa. In order to deny the enemy a breathing spell before the final period of combat, General Buckner shifted the Corps'

⁵³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 424)

⁵⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 425, 427)

⁵⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 434)

boundary to the west so that the entire escarpment fell within the zone of the XXIV Corps.”⁵⁶

5. **[8B-2]** On 4 JUN, the XXIV Corps line reached the east bank of the Minatoga River from Iwa Village to the southern coast.⁵⁷

B. [8B-3] Ushijima’s 32nd Army braced for its final defense.

1. After successfully eluding Buckner at Shuri, 11,000 uniformed and an estimated 22,000 non-uniformed defenders were disposed in every cave and crevasse on the Yaeju-Dake/Yuza-Dake Escarpment.
 - a) *24th Division* was now Ushijima’s strongest unit, with about 8000 remaining men, and defended a line from Itoman Village on the west coast through Yuza-Dake to Yaeju-Dake.
 - b) Only 1000-2000 men remained in the *44th IMB* to extend the line from Yaeju-Dake southeast to Hill 95 on the south coast.
 - c) *62nd Division*, once the cornerstone of *32nd Army*’s defense but now only 2000-3000 men, was in reserve near Makabe Village.
2. “Around these three original major combat units General Ushijima grouped the remaining service and labor troops, scattered naval personnel, and Okinawan conscripts. Thus, with a heterogenous army lacking in adequate training, artillery support, communications, and equipment and supplies, General Ushijima waited for the final battle.”⁵⁸

C. [8B-4] 6 JUN: XXIV Corps attacked.

1. 7 ID.
 - a) 184 IN advanced toward Hill 95, 800 yards long and “a jumbled mass of coral that was as porous as sponge and as brittle and sharp as glass.”⁵⁹ For two days they made little progress.
 - b) On the division right, 17 IN advanced through small hills that were not heavily defended. They reached the foothills below the escarpment two days later.⁶⁰
2. 96 ID. 381 IN attempted to enter the saddle between Yaeju-Dake and Yuza-Dake.
 - a) Two companies were repulsed after they reached a flat shelf between the base and the crest of the saddle.
 - b) They withdrew under a smokescreen but put the saddle under a four-day bombardment before they tried again.⁶¹

D. [8B-5] 8 JUN: 32 IN relieved 184 IN below Hill 95 after they finished transferring 10,000 civilians to ISCOM custody.⁶²

Virtual View 8A. Hill 95

⁵⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 427)

⁵⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 427)


⁵⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 436)

⁵⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 439)

⁶⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 439)

⁶¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 438-9)

⁶² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 439)



8A. Hill 95

E. 9 JUN.

1. On Hill 95, 32 IN sent Company C to patrol the forward slope.
 - a) When enemy fire fixed it, the company commander ordered artillery and mortar fire onto his objective.
 - b) Only one of his platoons managed to reduce a few defensive positions before it was recalled.⁶³
2. 17 IN attempted to secure a lodgment below Yaeju-Dake just north of Asato Village.
 - a) Lack of cover and concealment required the assaulting companies to use extensive personal camouflage to hide their movements. Enemy fire forced them to low crawl to their objectives.
 - b) By early afternoon, one company held a position on the southeastern end of Yaeju-Dake and defeated three small counterattacks during the night.⁶⁴

F. 10 JUN: Buckner dispatched a letter to Ushijima encouraging his surrender; it is dropped from a spotter plane behind enemy lines.

1. 7 ID: Indirect fires continued the attack on Hill 95.
 - a) Naval gunfire concentrated on the seaward slope; artillery and tanks fired on the crest and landward slope.
 - b) 2-32 IN made a supporting attack into Hanagusuku Village.
 - c) C/32 IN assaulted again, moving cautiously over the coral rocks, killing Japanese defenders position by position. By late afternoon, Company C's battalion commander decided to speed things up with armored flamethrowers.

⁶³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 439-40)


⁶⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 440-1)

- d) A 200-foot hose connected to the tank sprayed napalm on the remaining defensive positions. The infantry then used their rifles and BARs to kill 35-40 defenders forced out by the flames.⁶⁵
2. 96 ID: 381 IN sent two companies back into the saddle below Yaeju-Dake and Yuza-Dake, this time supported by tanks.
 - a) In the morning, enemy fire fixed them a second time.
 - b) Later in the afternoon, a smokescreen obscured the movement of their trailing platoons, and they consolidated in a defensive position on the shelf.
 - c) The Japanese believed the smoke covered a second withdrawal and were caught assembling for a night infiltration. Artillery killed most of them.⁶⁶

Visual 8C. Hill 95, Yaeju-Dake, and Yuza-Dake

G. 11 JUN.

1. [8C-1] 7 ID: Infantry-flamethrower tank teams now focused on the northeast corner of Hill 95.
 - a) B/32 IN burned a path onto the slope for their advance from Hanagusuku Village and eliminated the threat from caves there.
 - b) Then a hose was dragged up the vertical face and burned out defenders cave-by-cave until they could spray the napalm over the crest.
 - c) They fanned out behind the napalm and pushed south.
 - d) By day's end, they destroyed the enemy on the northeast end of Hill 95 and secured their foothold.⁶⁷




Slide 4

Advance up to the crest of Hill 95.


⁶⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 441-2)

⁶⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 443)

⁶⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 442)




Rotate right to look north towards Yaeju Dake and Tomui Village.



Fly to the lion statue in Tomui Village. Look south-southwest from the lion and match the view below:

Virtual View 8B. Tomui Lion



8B. Tomui Lion

2. [8C-2] 96 ID.
 - a) 381 IN defeated early morning counterattacks and reinforced its hold on the shelf to battalion strength. One of its battalions cleared Tomori Village below Yaeju-Dake.⁶⁸
 - b) 383 IN was forced to call off its attack in Yuza Village because of enemy fires from Yuza-Dake.⁶⁹

H. 12 JUN.

1. [8C-3] 7 ID: 17 IN made a night attack with two battalions against the south side of Yaeju-Dake adjacent to the division boundary with 96 ID.
 - a) At 0400, three assault companies advanced on different routes through heavy fog.
 - b) By 0530, two companies were on their objectives 100 to 200 yards beyond the ridgeline without firing a shot.
 - c) By 0800, the contest for all three objectives was over; remaining Japanese defenders were killed as they tried to emerge from their underground positions.⁷⁰

Move to the "Shelf" and face south.

2. [8C-4] 96 ID: At 0600 381 IN tried to advance two battalions over the saddle from the shelf, but despite the previous day's fires it could not move.
 - a) The battalion in Tomui Village started to clear the base of Yaeju-Dake and sent a company across the division boundary with 7 ID to the east to use their gains to reach the peak.


⁶⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 449)

⁶⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 443)

⁷⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 445-7)

- b) From their converging positions above and below Yaeju-Dake, the battalion started the slow process of clearing out the defenders on the steepest part of the escarpment.
3. [8C-5] By nightfall, 44th IMB's defenders were forced completely out of their defensive line.⁷¹

Advance from the "Shelf to the top of Yaeju Dake and face south.



V. The End of Organized Resistance.

A. The 44th IMB's collapse opened 32nd Army's rear areas to exploitation.

1. However, 24th Division continued to stall the Marines and 96 ID in the west and center for several more days.
2. 7 ID maintained its momentum as it advanced southwest.
 - a) The terrain beyond Hill 95 and Yaeju-Dake is generally level. Only two hills, Hill 115, and Hill 153, stood between LTG Ushijima and defeat.
 - b) The fighting after 12 JUN was described "as much like hunting as fighting."⁷² Tanks and armored flamethrowers flushed out Japanese defenders from caves and rocky crags, and the infantry cut them down as they scattered.
 - c) Over the next five days, the flamethrowers sprayed more than 37,000 gallons of burning jellied gasoline at pockets of increasingly disorganized resistance.

B. [8C-6] 14 JUN: 96 ID's 381 IN seized the last contested position on Yaeju-Dake, but still had to fight off a counterattack that night.

C. [8C-7] 16 JUN.

⁷¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 449)

⁷² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 456)

1. 7 ID reached the base of Hills 115 and 153.
2. 96 ID secured Yuza-Dake on their right (west) flank..⁷³

Fly to Hill 115.

Virtual View 8C. Hill 115



8C. Hill 115

D. [8C-8] 17 JUN: Ushijima finally received Buckner's exhortation to surrender; it was laughed off..⁷⁴

1. 7 ID cleared the forward slopes and crests of Hills 115 and 153..⁷⁵
2. At the end of the day, Tenth Army had contained what was left of 32nd Army to an area of only eight square miles.
3. 44th IMB was destroyed. Only a few stragglers escaped.

E. 18 JUN.

1. LTG Ushijima issued his last official orders.
 - a) He appointed an officer to lead the "*Blood and Iron for the Emperor*" organization, the collection of Okinawan schoolboys trained for guerrilla warfare.
 - b) Remaining troops were to escape to northern Okinawa to join guerrillas operating there..⁷⁶
2. Unfortunately, LTG Buckner was killed observing the Marines near Kamesu Village.

⁷³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 456)

⁷⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 463)

⁷⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 456)

⁷⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 458-9)

- a) At 1315 a shell exploded over or near his OP, and embedded coral fragments into Buckner's chest.
 - b) He collapsed and died of his wounds in just ten minutes.
 - c) MG Roy Geiger, the senior flag officer in Tenth Army and a personal friend of Buckner, assumed command of Tenth Army until GEN Joseph Stilwell was named to the post.
- F. 19 JUN: Two divisions in Tenth Army accepted the surrender of 343 Japanese soldiers, the first mass surrender of that size.⁷⁷**
- G. [8C-9] 20 JUN. 7 ID's 32 IN seized the east end of Hill 89, just yards away from the caves holding 32nd Army headquarters.**
- H. 21 JUN: Enemy resistance was isolated in three remaining enclaves: Hill 89, Medeera Village, and a small pocket at the extreme end of southern Okinawa.**

VI. 32nd Army Surrenders.

- A. Though the numbers of surrenders appeared to increase exponentially after 19 JUN, the truth was more than two-thirds of remaining Japanese defenders chose to die by combat or suicide.**
- 1. At the beginning of June, Japanese casualties averaged 1000 per day.
 - 2. By 19 JUN that number had grown to 2000 per day, then 3000 on 20 JUN, and 4000 on 21 JUN.⁷⁸
 - 3. Death by combat was usually accomplished by hiding "among the brush and rocks until the Americans were almost upon them. Then they would suddenly jump up, throw a grenade or fire a few aimless shots, and wait to be killed."⁷⁹
 - 4. The method of ritual suicide often depended on one's social status.
 - a) For the poor or among the enlisted men, the preferred method was to detonate a grenade against the stomach.⁸⁰
 - b) For the upper class and officers, the method was traditional seppuku: the belly was cut open with a knife as the subject was decapitated by a swordsman.
 - c) Okinawans too old or too young to die fighting threw themselves off the seaside cliffs onto the rocks below.

Fly to VP 8D.


Virtual View 8D. Hill 89

⁷⁷ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 465)

⁷⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 466-7)

⁷⁹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 467)

⁸⁰ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 467)



8D. Hill 89

B. [8C-10] In the early morning of 22 JUN, LTG Ushijima and his senior officers committed seppuku outside a cave on the south side of Hill 89 that faced the sea.

1. Ushijima was first, followed by LTG Cho.
2. Ironically, COL Yahara, the architect of Okinawa's defenses, was ordered not to commit suicide.
 - a) Ushijima wanted him to escape and make his way to Imperial Headquarters to tell them how they defended Okinawa.
 - b) Yahara managed to evade capture for several days but was later identified by another POW and taken into custody.

C. "Mop-up" operations on Okinawa began on 23 JUN, 84 days after the landings on the Hagushi beaches.

1. It took seven more days to clear out the last Japanese defenders.
2. On 2 JUL, those operations were complete, and Okinawa was declared secure – 48 days longer than estimates predicted.

VIGNETTE:

Sometimes the conditions under which the Japanese met defeat were less tragic. A small landing craft idled along the southern coast one or two hundred yards from shore and, through a loudspeaker mounted on its deck, a "converted" prisoner of war shouted appeals for surrender to other Japanese soldiers who had retreated to the water's edge and now lurked among the boulders at the foot of the cliff or in caves in its face. The prisoner, a sergeant in the Japanese Army, was a persuasive speaker who was convinced of good treatment in the hands of Americans and tried to save his comrades from needless death.

Sometimes he would order the soldiers to leave their hiding places, strip to their loin cloths, and follow the coast north to the American lines; as a sergeant, he was often obeyed.⁸¹

ANALYSIS: NA

⁸¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 467)

Stand 9: Okinawa and Operation DOWNFALL

| Visuals |
|------------------------|
| 9A. Operation DOWNFALL |
| 9B. Okinawa's Cost |

About the cover slide: After the end of World War II, as Okinawa was rebuilt there was a Peace Park constructed on the south end of the island on Hill 89. Hill 89 has monuments to Japanese Soldiers from each prefecture, similar to our state monuments on the Gettysburg battlefield. The structure pictured, however, is not a monument but a mausoleum. As human remains were recovered over several decades, they were cremated and interred here. Over 185,000 Japanese and Okinawans are resting within its walls, buried together in a quiet place overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Photo by the author.

ORIENTATION: NA

DESCRIPTION:

I. What Was the Strategic Objective?

A. One of the main strategic objectives in the Ryukyus Campaign was the seizure of airfields to support the air war against Japan.¹

1. Tactical fighters started flying from Ie Shima against targets on the Japanese home islands on 17 MAY, while Tenth Army was trying to break the last Shuri defensive line.
2. On 1 JUL, the day before Okinawa was declared secure, B-24 Liberator heavy bombers made their first strikes in Japan from the Ryukyus to support Operation DOWNFALL.
3. On 9 JUL, B-25 medium bombers joined the B-24s on strikes in those shaping operations for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

B. On 12 JUL Seventh Air Force was declared operational on Okinawa.

1. Operations continued until 15 AUG 1945, when Japan agreed to unconditional surrender one week after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.²
2. On 2 SEP, Japan's Instrument of Surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Okinawa was America's last and bloodiest battle of World War II.



Visual 9A. Operation DOWNFALL

¹ (Center for Air Force History 1991)

² This information from the Center for Air Force History contradicts the "Green Book", which is the main secondary source used for the VSR. CAFH cites 15 AUG 1945 as the date when sustained strategic bombing from Okinawa airfields began. CAFH's document is also a secondary source, but relies on Army Air Forces primary sources regarding air operations from the Ryukyus. As the authors of the "Green Book" may not have had access to those records when it was first written in 1948-49 (when the US Air Force was established as a separate service), the discrepancy is understandable.

II. Effects of Operation ICEBERG on Operation DOWNFALL.

A. The objectives for Operation DOWNFALL, the invasion of the Japanese home islands, were decided two months before the landings on Okinawa.

1. DOWNFALL consisted of two campaign-sized operations: OLYMPIC (the preliminary assault on Kyushu Island), and CORONET (the main assault on Honshu Island).
 - a) [9A-1] OLYMPIC was scheduled for 1 DEC 1945. This date was changed later to 1 NOV 1945 after the JCS conferred with GEN MacArthur and ADM Nimitz.
 - b) CORONET was scheduled for 1 MAR 1946.
2. Okinawa was the last of four required staging bases for OLYMPIC.
 - a) Its anchorages provided shelter for the naval vessels needed to invade Japan.
 - b) Up to four of the fourteen assigned divisions could stage there and embark on their transports.
 - c) But most important were the airfields that brought the Japanese home islands within range of all aircraft types. Up to 2700 land-based aircraft are required to support OLYMPIC.
3. "For the purposes of planning, it was presumed that the Japanese would continue the war to the limit of their capabilities, bending every effort to defend the Homeland with their full strength. Such a defense would include not only opposition by their organized military forces but also fierce and active resistance by the entire population."³
4. A simple extrapolation of Operation ICEBERG's casualty statistics forewarned of DOWNFALL's potential human cost:
 - a) Of the 6,000,000 projected US and Allied participants, over 410,000 would be killed in action.
 - b) The wounded would amount to almost 1.2 million.
 - c) Non-Battle Injury cases could be expected to reach 860,000.
 - d) Japanese deaths were estimated to reach 39.5 million.


Visual 9B. Okinawa's Cost

III. Okinawa's Cost. When Operation ICEBERG was declared complete on 2 JUL 1945, the cost of taking the Ryukyus was enormous.

A. Japanese Casualties.

1. Approximately 110,000 were killed defending Okinawa. This number includes Okinawan conscripts.
2. 7400 Japanese soldiers and 3400 Okinawan *Boeitai* were taken prisoner.
3. 7800 aircraft were lost contesting American air and naval operations.
4. Sixteen ships were sunk, including one of the two largest battleships in the world, the IJN Yamato.
5. Japan lost 640 square miles of territory, and the Americans were now just 350 miles from the home islands.

B. US Casualties.



³ (Reports of General MacArthur 1994, Chapter XIII)

1. 12,520 Americans were dead or missing, and three times that number were wounded (36,631).
 - a) Army casualties were 4582 killed, 93 missing, and 18,099 wounded.
 - b) Marine casualties were 2938 killed or missing, and X wounded.
 - c) Navy casualties were 4907 killed or missing, and 4824 wounded.
2. Non-Battle Injuries such as combat fatigue totaled 26,201 – two thirds the number of dead, missing, and wounded.
 - a) There were 15,613 NBI cases in the Army, almost the number of men assigned to a division.
 - b) Marines accounted for 10,598 cases.
3. Materiel losses.
 - a) 485 aircraft were lost in combat, and 310 more to operational accidents.
 - b) 36 ships were sunk, including 15 amphibious ships and 12 destroyers.
 - c) 368 ships were damaged, and almost a third of those (120) were amphibious ships.

C. Twenty-four Medals of Honor were awarded for heroism on Okinawa (23 for ground combat and one at sea.)

1. None were awarded in 7 ID.
2. 27 ID awarded one.
3. 77 ID awarded four; one was posthumous.
4. 96 ID awarded eight; three were posthumous.
5. 1 MARDIV awarded 12; five were posthumous and included a Navy corpsman.
6. 6 MARDIV awarded nine; three were posthumous.

Optional Stand: 77 ID and Ie Shima

| Visuals |
|-------------------------------|
| O1. Ie Shima |
| O2. Ie Shima Landings, 16 APR |
| O3. 77 ID Attack, 17 APR |
| O4. 77 ID Attack , 18 APR |
| O5. 77 ID Attack, 19 APR |
| O6. 77 ID Attack, 20-21 APR |

Instructor Note: This stand may be omitted for time.

About the cover slide:

ORIENTATION: NA

DESCRIPTION:

Visual O1. Ie Shima

I. Tenth Army OPORD 4-45.¹

- A. Tenth Army directed 77 ID to seize Ie Shima on 16 APR.**
- B. "The main purpose of the operation was the acquisition of additional airfields to support the assault on Okinawa and the strikes against the Japanese homeland."**²

II. Ie Shima.

It is oval in shape, about five miles long and two miles wide, the longer dimension lying east and west. Coral reefs fringe the entire island. Along the north and northwest coasts the land rises abruptly in steep sea cliffs containing hundreds of caves, but along the southern shores are numerous beaches from which the terrain slopes gently upward.

The island is spotted with small clumps of scrub trees, sparse areas of knee-high grass, and a few cultivated fields and patches of sugar cane. Almost its entire interior is occupied by a plateau approximately 165 feet in altitude, broken on the east by [O1-1] Iegusugu Mountain, which rises abruptly for about 600 feet above the level terrain and was appropriately called "the Pinnacle" by the soldiers. South of the Pinnacle lies the town of [O1-2] Ie, consisting of about 300 houses. Together, the plateau and the Pinnacle were the distinctive terrain features of Ie Shima and also the most important from a military point of view. Iegusugu was surrounded by clear fields of fire, and from it one could see the entire island. [O1-3] On the plateau the Japanese had established three landing strips, which together formed the pattern of the Roman numeral XI. No obstructions interfered with the approaches to these mile-long strips; aircraft had unlimited expanses of open

¹ (Appleman, et al. 1993, Chapter VII)

² (Appleman, et al. 1993, 149)

water over which to gain altitude. With its pinnacle and oval plateau, Ie Shima resembled a huge, immovable aircraft carrier..³

III. Enemy Plans and Preparations.

A. Approximately 2000 Japanese troops, aided by hundreds of civilians, spent the first three months of 1945 fortifying Ie Shima.

1. The *50th Airfield Battalion*, which had been on Ie Shima in November 1944, returned to begin preparing the defenses.
 - a) *32nd Army* converted it into combat troops, and renamed it the *50th Specially Established Infantry Battalion*.
 - b) This former airfield battalion was largely composed of Manchuria veterans.
2. A labor battalion of Okinawan conscripts joined them in February.
3. When US air attacks destroyed most of the shipping in the Okinawa Island Group, the *50th Battalion*, the conscript labor battalion, and 5000 of Ie Shima's 8000 inhabitants were stranded when the invasion began.

B. In March, the 32nd Army ordered the airfields destroyed, and Ie Shima's defensive plan relied heavily on military deception.

1. The runways were ditched and cratered, and the surrounding areas were seeded with mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against a possible airborne assault.
2. Defensive positions were concentrated in the town and on Iegusugu.
3. The best landing beaches were on the southeast end of the island and were commanded by the towns' defenses and Iegusugu.
 - a) Attempts were made to trick the Americans into believing those beaches were undefended while poorer beaches were heavily defended.
 - 1) Reconnaissance on the southeastern beaches was unmolested.
 - 2) Reconnaissance on the other beaches was met with considerable small arms fire.
 - b) The deception ultimately failed.
 - 1) 77 ID used photo interpretation and map study to track the development of defensive preparations.
 - 2) By 15 MAR, 77 ID's G2 declared landing on the southeast beaches unacceptable for the assault and recommended landings on the poorer beaches.

77 ID Small Group: Describe the Scheme of Maneuver for seizing Ie Shima. Is the division under any limitations or constraints?

IV. 77 ID Plan of Attack.

A. [O1-5] Two RCTs land on the south and southwest of Ie Shima.

1. [O1-6] 305 IN will seize additional landing beaches, including the heavily defended southeast beaches.
2. 306 IN will seize the airfield.
3. Afterwards, both RCTs move east to reduce enemy defensive strongpoints.
4. This order was approved over the objections of the G4, who correctly assessed risk to feasibility for sustainment from the restrictive terrain on the poorer beaches.

³ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 149-50)

B. 77 ID did not assault Ie Shima as a full division.

1. It was constrained by a requirement to garrison the Kerama islands with one of 305 IN's battalions.
2. 307 RCT was under Tenth Army control for a feint landing on Okinawa scheduled for 19 APR.

77 ID Small Group: Describe the landings on 16-17 APR and initial contact with Japanese Defenders.

Visual O2. Ie Shima Landings, 16 APR

V. 16-17 APR: The Landing.

A. The amphibious assault used the same techniques perfected in the Pacific Theater.

1. At dawn, two battleships, four cruisers, seven destroyers and other fire support ships started the preparatory bombardment. Aircraft attacked with bombs, rockets, and napalm.
2. 305 IN landed two BLTs on the Red 1 and Red 2 Beach, advanced inland and turned east toward Ie.
 - a) Their advance is delayed by extensive minefields.
 - b) They eventually halt from rifle and machine gun fire.
3. 306 IN landed on Green Beach, secured the airfield within hours, and finally halted for the night 5500 yards inland – almost two-thirds the length of the island.
4. During the night, 3-305 IN endured a coordinated attack made with suicidal recklessness. After hours of fanatical assaults, the Japanese withdrew and left 152 dead around 3rd Battalion's positions.

B. When 305 IN's advance met increasing resistance on 16 APR, MG Bruce asked for the 307 IN (then tasked for a feint landing in three days).

1. Continued enemy resistance could delay seizure of the Red 3 and Red 4 beaches, where the logisticians needed to offload supplies in quantities to sustain operations.
2. Early seizure of the airfields dictated that heavy construction equipment get onto Ie Shima to start base development supporting ICEBERG's operational and strategic objectives.
3. Bruce wanted to capture the island as quickly as possible, and after 19 APR there would be no additional forces available to help his division.
4. LTG Buckner approved the request but only released two battalions from 307 IN to 77 ID, and only until 18 APR.

77 ID Small Group: Describe the division's advance into Ie on 17 APR.

Visual O3. 77 ID Attack, 17 APR

C. 17 APR.

1. 305 IN continued its effort to secure the adjacent beaches.
2. 306 IN remained in position to allow 305 IN to come on line with its forward line of troops and probed the enemy defenses on Iegusugu.
3. 307 IN landed on the secure Red 1 and Red 2 beaches.
 - a) It passed through 1-305 IN, then moved across 3-305 IN's front, but gained only 400 yards in two hours.

- b) In Ie Town, 307 IN made contact with wire and mine obstacles and was forced into house-to-house fighting without support from tanks or self-propelled guns.
 - 1) Narrow, debris-clogged streets prevented tracked vehicles from supporting the infantry.
 - 2) Enemy machine gun fire prevented the engineers from clearing paths for the tracked vehicles.
- c) By late afternoon, 307 IN received heavy mortar and small arms fire on the high ground about 700 yards south of Iegusugu.
 - 1) A prominent ridge and a small rise topped with a large concrete building were known as "Bloody Ridge" and "Government House Hill".
 - 2) 307 IN fought to within 600 yards of these two densely defended areas but were forced to withdraw when they could not secure their positions.
- 4. The Japanese had established a defense in depth in Ie Town, anchored on Iegusugu.

77 ID Small Group: How did MG Bruce contend with determined Japanese resistance in Ie? Describe the division's combat over the next 48 hours.

VI. 18-19 APR: Bloody Ridge.

- A. LTG Buckner allowed MG Bruce to retain the two battalions from 307 IN for the remainder of operations on Ie Shima.

Visual O4. 77 ID Attack , 18 APR

B. Scheme of Maneuver.

- 1. 307 IN, the Main Effort, will continue its attack to destroy the Japanese defenses in Ie Town.
- 2. 305 IN will support 307 IN's attack.
- 3. 306 IN will pivot on its right and attack toward Iegusugu from the west and north.

C. 18 APR.

- 1. 306 IN started the pivot toward Iegusugu.
 - a) They made good progress despite near-continuous mortar fire from Iegusugu where the Japanese observed their movements.
 - b) At the end of the day 2nd Battalion was within 300 yards of the mountain's base on the northwest side.
 - c) 306 IN's line now extended from the base of Iegusugu to the northeast coast of Ie Shima.
- 2. 307 IN resumed its attack toward Bloody Ridge.
 - a) 2-307 IN, with 3-305 IN to follow and assume, encountered resistance so strong that 3-305 IN was redirected to attack Iegusugu on 2-307 IN's left and make contact with 306 IN.
 - 1) 3-305 assumed the attack and was forced into house-to-house fighting on cluttered streets.
 - 2) They got about halfway through town but withdrew to more defensible ground with their right flank 500 yards west of Government House Hill and their left flank 700 yards west of Iegusugu (a net gain of only 350 yards).
- 3. 3-307 IN was ordered to attack on its sister battalion's right toward the northeast.
 - a) Resistance there was less severe, and the battalion advanced to a point 300 yards north of Agarii-mae Village.

- b) Unlike in Ie Town, medium tanks and self-propelled guns were able to support the infantry by firing on caves, pillboxes, and enemy gun positions, but had to remain behind their attacking infantry.
- 4. 307 IN was given tactical control of 1-305 IN, and they deployed it on the regiment's right to protect the flank.
 - a) They attacked north to cover the zone between the flank and the beach.
 - b) By the end of the day, they advanced 1000 yards against little more than sniper fire.
 - c) But to protect 307 IN more effectively, it withdrew to positions 600 yards east of Agarii-mae.

Visual O5. 77 ID Attack, 19 APR

D. 19 APR.

- 1. The Main Effort continued against Bloody Ridge, supported by naval gunfire.
 - a) It had to be taken to secure the dangerously exposed Red 3 and Red 4 beaches just a few hundred yards to the south, needed to unload airfield construction troops and equipment.
 - b) MG Bruce could have adjusted his scheme of maneuver to attack Bloody Ridge and legusugu along better avenues of approach, but "believed the enemy might stage a banzai attack on the vital beach area if only a holding force were left south of Bloody Ridge while the main thrust was delivered against the Japanese from a different direction."⁴
- 2. 3-305 IN attacked east into the northern section of Ie Town.
- 3. 307 IN's two battalions attacked north from their positions south of Bloody Ridge.
 - a) All three battalions' 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns massed to establish the base of fire against Bloody Ridge and Government House Hill. But:

The controlling factors on the 19th were the same as on the 17th and 18th – heavy and accurate enemy fire from all the high ground and especially from Bloody Ridge; the ineffectiveness of artillery against many of the Japanese positions; and the restricted use of self-propelled artillery because of the rough terrain, the narrow roads, and numerous mines.⁵

- b) 3-307 IN managed to advance 800 yards, but bypassed a main enemy position on its left and opened a gap between battalions.
- c) On the west flank, 3-305 IN advanced through heavy fire from pillboxes and the ruins of Ie Town.
 - 1) Constrained by orders to maintain contact with 307 IN on its right and 306 IN on its left, 3-305 IN was forced to extend its line in both directions.
 - 2) Stretched to its limit, the battalion could not mass its combat power and only advanced 250 yards. It had to give up 100 of those yards to consolidate into more secure positions for the night.
- d) 2-307 IN was able to reach the forward slope of Government House Hill in a frontal assault but did not seize their objective.
- 4. In the afternoon, 1-305 IN attacked through heavy fire into the gap between 307 IN's two battalions.

⁴ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 171)

⁵ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 171)

- a) They seized high ground 300 yards east of Government House Hill.
- b) At the same time, two companies from 2-307 IN fought through a path around the Japanese right to assault the larger buildings.
- 5. But an enemy counterattack prevented the infantry from holding their objectives.

77 ID Small Group: How does MG Bruce finally secure Ie Shima? How did he change the scheme of maneuver for his division to be more successful?

Visual O6. 77 ID Attack, 20-21 APR

VII. 20-21 APR: legusugu.

A. MG Bruce was determined to break the stalemate.

On 19 April he reconnoitered the eastern approaches to legusugu by sailing around the eastern end of Ie Shima in a Navy control boat. Aerial reconnaissance had failed to give an accurate picture of the terrain, but from his floating observation post General Bruce was able to study the terrain as it would appear to attacking infantrymen. He concluded that the most promising direction for the attack on legusugu would be across the favorable terrain north and east of the Pinnacle.⁶

- 1. The Main Effort shifts to 306 IN north of legusugu.
 - a) They had extended their front line northeast to the coast and patrolled extensively beyond it.
 - b) They will assault from the northeast.
- 2. The rest of the division supports by advancing to complete the encirclement of the big hill.

B. 20 APR.

- 1. 0850: Preparatory fires started on enemy positions.
- 2. 306 IN received intense mortar and small arms fire after crossing their LD 600 yards northeast of legusugu.
 - a) First Battalion led the assault, supported by tanks and combat engineers.
 - 1) Two companies on the flank attacked straight into enemy positions below legusugu in what was described as “a perfect Fort Benning demonstration problem as one could expect to see in actual combat.”⁷
 - 2) The infantry and engineers advanced deliberately and methodically, opening lanes through minefields under covering fire from machine guns, self-propelled guns, and tanks.
 - 3) Light anti-tank guns suppressed pillboxes on the slopes, using tracers to designate targets for more powerful guns on tank destroyers.
 - 4) When the minefield lanes were opened, successive waves of tanks and infantry poured through them to reduce the Japanese defenses.
 - b) Third Battalion echeloned left to protect the left flank.
 - 1) Under covering fire from medium tanks, the infantry crept up on a series of tombs converted into fighting positions.

⁶ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 173)

⁷ (77th Infantry Division 1945, 32)

- 2) The infantry destroyed them with satchel charges.
 - c) The attack secured all the ground up to within 200 yards of legusugu, but 306 IN had to pause, consolidate, and reorganize.
- 3. 2-307 IN recaptured the buildings on Government House Hill, and 1-305 IN reclaimed its former position to the east.
 - a) Immediate improvements were made to defend the gains.
 - b) The improvements helped defeat two small counterattacks.
- 4. 3-307 IN attacked into Ie Town from the east. After fighting through the terrain and multiple enemy positions, they established their front line from Bloody Ridge that stretched north along the base of legusugu.
- 5. 3-305 IN attacked into Ie Town from the west but made only small advances while staying connected to the adjacent battalions.
- 6. 1430: 306 IN resumed its attack on the slopes of legusugu.
 - a) Within twenty minutes, one company was halfway up the northeast side and continued the methodical clearance of enemy positions.
 - b) Where slopes were too steep, infantrymen trained in mountain climbing scaled the cliffs and hauled up man-portable flamethrowers and explosives to destroy the enemy.
 - c) At the end of the day, 306 IN had control of the northern slopes on legusugu.

C. 21 APR.

- 1. 0430: A Japanese counterattack focused on Bloody Ridge.
 - a) Mortars bombarded the Americans for an hour, followed by an assault of 300-400 Japanese in three columns.
 - b) G/2-307 IN bore the brunt of the counterattack, and when its left platoon broke the Japanese almost overran the battalion command post (CP).
 - 1) The battalion commander, staff, clerks, cooks, and drivers formed a hasty defense and worked feverishly to kill their attackers with small arms and grenades.
 - 2) PFC Martin May, a lone machine gunner who had been fighting here for three days straight, used his weapon to support them. But he was mortally wounded.
 - 3) After an hour of close-quarters battle, their attackers were defeated.
 - c) At dawn, the counterattack's overall intensity decreased. Most of the Japanese inside the American lines were dead.
 - 1) There were 280 enemy dead just in Company G's sector. Eighty-four more were found in the rest of the battalion perimeter.
 - 2) Company G was reduced to just 36 effectives; Company E had 57; Company H, the weapons company, only 49 and two machine guns out of the eight assigned; the whole battalion had lost 30 officers – almost all of them.
 - d) 3-307 relieved its sister battalion that morning, and Bloody Ridge was finally secured.
- 2. legusugu was now surrounded, and 306 IN attacked to finish clearing it.
 - a) Third Battalion attacked on the east at 0830 as First and Second Battalions reduced caves and pillboxes on the north and northwest.
 - b) At 1025 a First Battalion soldier raised the American flag on the peak.
 - c) As the battalions converged on an ever-shrinking Japanese perimeter, careful coordination slowed the momentum to prevent fratricide.
 - d) At noon, 3-307 IN and 1-305 IN advanced from Bloody Ridge and started their attack. By 1300 they were on the southern slopes of the mountain.
 - e) Forty-five minutes later there was no more organized resistance on legusugu.
 - f) At 1445 all remaining objectives had been seized.

3. At 1730 MG Bruce reported Ie Shima secured.

VIII. The Price for Ie Shima.

A. Japanese casualties were 4706 killed and 149 taken prisoner.

1. Many of the dead were civilians and it was difficult to distinguish them from the soldiers.
2. As many as 1500 civilians were armed and supplied with Japanese uniforms.
3. The destroyed or captured enemy materiel included 34 mortars, 44 light machine guns, eight heavy machine guns, four anti-tank guns, five anti-aircraft guns, and more than 5000 mines.

B. 77 ID.

1. Total casualties amounted to 1120: 172 killed, 902 wounded, and 46 missing.
2. Sixty-six armored vehicles were destroyed or damaged by mines, satchel charges, and anti-tank guns. Tanks and self-propelled guns fired over 7500 rounds of main gun ammunition.
3. 77 ID artillery fired 16,023 rounds.
4. According to the G3, 77 ID had “gained in relatively low cost in men, materials, and time what will soon be the most valuable eleven square miles in the far western Pacific.”⁸

VIGNETTE: NA

ANALYSIS: Where does Ie Shima fit within the strategic/operational context of Operation ICEBERG?

⁸ (Appleman, et al. 1993, 182)

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