

Military Review


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CHINESE COMPETITION IN AFRICA

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AFRICA has become a battlefield in the Chinese civil war. Only token artillery exchanges take place along the Fukien coast today. The major theater of conflict between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese nationalists has been transferred from Chinese soil onto foreign territory. The world now provides the arena in which these two contenders compete for supremacy. The Middle East, southeast Asia, Latin America, and other regions have all experienced Chinese competition, but nowhere has the rivalry become more intense than in Africa.

Admittedly, this competition has not been a struggle between equals. Nevertheless, each side has possessed both advantages and disadvantages. Peking has benefited generally from its size and military power. It has thus easily gained the upper hand in south-east Asia. But these factors are not an unmitigated advantage, nor have they

always been decisive. Taipei has been able to maintain its predominant position in Latin America, except for Cuba, at least on the formal diplomatic level. The influence of the United States and the dominance of Catholicism in this area have been factors aiding Taipei.

When one turns to Africa, however, many of the advantages encountered by Peking and Taipei elsewhere disappear. Prior to the late 1950's, neither Peking nor Taipei had extensive contacts with Africa. Nor did either



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government have a direct stake in the region. Moreover, Africa itself was *tabula rasa* with respect to the China issue. Most of the new African nations held no prior bias against either Peking or Taipei. Peking and Taipei could thus both approach Africa as virgin and uncommitted territory.

New Venture

It is precisely the newness of the venture that makes Chinese competition in Africa intriguing. Both contenders began their African assault *de novo*. Each has had to experiment and innovate according to the African response. At present, however, both Peking and Taipei are deeply involved in Africa. For Taipei, it is no less than a struggle for survival. Peking's self-styled role as the leader of the African-Asian-Latin American world is also at stake. Against this background, a study of the Chinese power struggle in Africa assumes great significance.

There is another reason for closely studying Chinese rivalry in Africa. There has been a tendency to assume that only major powers or Communist states utilize such instruments of foreign policy as foreign aid, good will missions, and similar programs to score political gains. However, we shall discover that today, big and small nations, Communists and non-Communis-

nists alike utilize a variety of foreign policy instruments to achieve their political objectives. The Peking-Taipei competition in Africa represents an excellent example.

The path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the path that should be taken by the peoples of the various colonial and semicolonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.

Liu Shao-chi's classic statement before the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries, held in November 1949 in Peking, constituted one of the earliest suggestions by the Chinese Communists that they intended to assume leadership in the African-Asian-Latin American world. While Liu Shao-chi made this statement in 1949, Peking did not try to exercise leadership of Africa until the mid-1950's.

The Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in April 1955 marks the beginning of Peking's active African drive. The Bandung meetings, according to Peking, resulted in the "greater unity of the Asian and African peoples" and support of "all the struggles of the Asian and African people against imperialism and colonialism." Kuo Mo-jo, delivering the main speech at an anniversary rally in 1960, pointed to Peking's participation at Bandung as proof of the fact that "the Chinese people have always given sympathy and support to the just struggles of the African people."

Primary Emphasis

Since Bandung, Peking's verbal appeal to Africa has been expressed in many forms. One main theme has been to establish a historical link between Peking and Africa. In building a link

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between Peking and Africa, however, the primary emphasis has been upon modern ties: the common experience of subjugation to and exploitation by imperialism and colonialism, past and present, European and American. Peking never tires of stating and restating what it considers the common experience shared with Africa and Peking's willingness to extend full support to the cause of Africa's struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

Peking's campaign to impose its leadership upon Africa represents a long-term goal. The Communists realize that success in Africa and the Asian-Latin American world cannot be expected overnight. Certain immediate objectives do exist, however. Indeed, at times short-term aims seem to overshadow long-term goals.

One crucial short-term factor is the current Sino-Soviet conflict. Peking now seeks to win support for its policies of gaining an equal voice in decision making within the Communist bloc and pursuing more militant tactics and policies toward the West. Clearly, it considers Khrushchev's "domineering" hand and "soft" approach a basic menace—thus the drive to secure greater support for its position internationally, both within and outside the Communist bloc.

Diplomatic Relations

Perhaps the most pressing short-term aim for Peking in Africa is to obtain greater international recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as the sole legitimate government of China. This means the establishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and the African nations and the latter's support of Peking in various international bodies.

Insofar as Peking is concerned, Africa's strength internationally lies in

numbers. No less than 33 African nations are now United Nations members, constituting 30 percent of the organization's membership. If Peking were to secure the full support of all African nations, Taipei would have great difficulty maintaining its seat as the representative of China in the UN. Peking has thus far enjoyed only moderate success in Africa in this respect, however. In the 1963 UN Chinese representation question vote, Peking received the support of only 12 African nations.

The United Arab Republic (then known as Egypt) was the first African nation to recognize Peking (in 1956). Since then, a total of 10 African nations have granted diplomatic recognition to Peking, followed by the exchange of diplomatic missions.

Other Activities

In addition to diplomatic recognition and the exchange of missions, a number of African nations have entered into "friendship treaties" with Peking. A Sino-Guinean Friendship Treaty was concluded in September 1960, while a Friendship Treaty with Ghana was signed during August 1961. Both treaties called upon the contracting parties "to take the five principles . . . laid down at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955 as the principles guiding the relations between the two parties." The treaties also included a provision whereby Peking and the African nations agreed "to develop the economic and cultural relations between the two countries. . . ."

The establishment of diplomatic relations and the signing of friendship treaties constitute only one phase of Peking's activities in Africa. Equally important are the contacts ensuing from the initial diplomatic relation-

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ship. These include exchange visits of Peking and African dignitaries, cultural exchanges, commercial relations, and economic and technical assistance projects.

Peking's breadth of activities is not confined to African nations with which it maintains diplomatic relations. Pe-

Somali) visit to Peking in August 1963.

Cultural Exchange

The cultural exchange technique of Communist China was well demonstrated at the Second Conference of Afro-Asian Writers held in Cairo in February 1962. Peking sent an active



A combine harvesting rice in the Republic of Niger

king extends itself wherever an invitation is extended. Cultural diplomacy or economic aid is used to win friends and to serve as an example of what African nations can expect if they maintain cordial relations with the Peking "benefactors."

Since the mid-1950's, an ever-increasing number of Chinese and African delegations have visited each other's country. These visits have ranged from a Peking delegation attending the enlarged meeting of the Bureau of the Women's International Democratic Federation at Bamako, Mali, in January 1962, to Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarche's (of

and outspoken 16-man delegation led by Mao Tun, Chairman of the Chinese Writers Union. Mao declared before the conference that both Asia and Africa were creators of "magnificent cultures," but that the "colonialist yoke" had restrained their creative power. There had been a cultural exchange among the Asian and African people from the earliest times, but this had met with "serious obstacles" after colonialism cast its dark shadows across Africa and Asia.

Mao also informed the gathering of Afro-Asian writers that the Chinese greatly cherished the literary works produced by Asians and Afri-

cans and that since the early 1950's over 400 works from Asian and African writers had been translated into Chinese. "Through such contacts and through such works," asserted Mao, "we feel more closely attached to the people of Asia and Africa. . . ."

To ensure that this feeling of close attachment is not entirely one-sided, Peking welcomes, nay, encourages, African visitors. In 1962 numerous African cultural delegations visited Peking, including delegations from Somali and Tanganyika. Other forms of cultural exchange include tuition-free scholarships to African students to study in Communist China.

Radio Broadcasts

Since 1956 radio broadcasts have assumed an increasingly important role in Peking's efforts to win Africa. These broadcasts began in September 1956, with only seven hours per week in English directed toward "Egypt and Central Africa." There was an abrupt termination of broadcasts in 1958, but in 1959 Peking suddenly resumed and expanded broadcasts to Africa with programs for west, south, and east Africa.

In 1961 Peking was broadcasting no less than 105 hours per week (opposed to 102 hours per week by the USSR) to Africa in English, Arabic, French, and Portuguese. In addition, Peking also broadcasted 15 hours per week of Mandarin plus seven hours per week of Cantonese directed to Africa. In 1962 it was reported, regretfully, that Radio Peking could be heard more clearly in Africa south of the Sahara than the Voice of America!

The general content of the broadcasts appears to be chiefly concerned with introducing life and developments in Communist China to the Africans. Peking's domestic and in-

ternational policies were also discussed. While one cannot ascertain exactly what effects these broadcasts have had, they, nevertheless, constitute another illustration of Peking's multidimensional efforts directed toward Africa.

Other Channels

Peking has utilized still other channels to facilitate its drive in Africa. Special attention has been given to Africa's hunger for knowledge and the appetite to learn. Peking has made use of several media, in addition to radio, to serve Africa's needs, as well as to shape and influence African attitudes.

The New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking's official news outlet, maintains offices in Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Morocco, and Tanganyika. NCNA correspondents from these offices are sent to "gather news" in other African countries. According to one student of African affairs, NCNA keeps up a constant flow of anti-imperialistic, pro-Peking propaganda, repetitious and monotonous enough "to make a normal Western reader all but scream with boredom" but which does not seem to disturb the Africans.

Peking also distributes numerous periodicals and booklets to the knowledge-hungry Africans. An example of Peking literature is *La Chine Populaire*, a French-language monthly published in Communist China. Each issue usually contains at least one picture of a gathering of Peking and African leaders, an essay on some aspect of Peking-African relations, an attack on "Tchiang Kaichek" and "l'imperialisme americain," and the latest "news" on developments in Communist China. In addition, a special section, entitled "La Chine et L'Afrique," reports specifically on Pe-

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king-African relations. To the African reading public who constitute the African elite, Peking spares no effort to influence attitudes.

If Peking has sought to influence the African elite, it has also attempted to win the African masses. One technique employed has been the extensive use of motion pictures. This has been achieved chiefly through the conclusion of a series of film contracts with the African countries which permit the showing of films from Peking by African distributors.

In addition to exporting films, Peking has also dispatched cinematographers to Africa. Peking's use of the motion picture media no doubt fills a need of the African masses in their search for knowledge.

Foreign Aid

A major instrument utilized by Peking to extend its influence over Africa has been that of foreign aid, comprising a mixture of such types as bribery, prestige, and economic development. Most African nations, giving high priority to economic development, have not hesitated to accept economic aid from Peking.

Perhaps the most significant development in connection with Peking's aid to the African nations took place in 1963. On 1 January 1963 the Communist Chinese vessel *Peace* sailed into Port Conakry, the first ship from Peking ever to sail to the west African coast, bringing "Chinese experts and material to help Guinea." Distance must always remain a problem between Peking and Africa. With the arrival of *Peace*, however, a direct line of communication has been established.

Trade has also played a role in Peking-African relations. However, the use of trade by Peking as an instru-

ment to extend its influence has an uneven record. Beginning with the Sino-Moroccan Trade Agreement of 1959, Peking has since concluded trade agreements with Guinea (1960), Ghana (1961), Mali (1961), and Sudan (1962). The period of the agreements runs from one to five years.

A detailed list of goods to be exchanged is usually specified in the agreements, and these goods are almost equal to a mail-order-house catalog in variety. The Sino-Ghanaian Trade Agreement, for example, called for an annual export volume of four million Ghana pounds each, and for Peking to export to Ghana everything from machine-forging and pressing equipment to ballpoint pens and brocade silk, while Ghana was to export coffee, raw cocoa, and other agricultural products to Peking.

Deterioration

In reality, however, Peking-African trade has not flourished. According to one report, as of the first five months of 1962, the agreed volume of trade between Peking and Ghana had not been reached. A similar situation was reported for the Sino-Guinean Trade Agreement of 1960 which provided for an annual exchange of nearly five million dollars each way—the exchange of Peking's manufactured and other goods for Guinea's agricultural products. In 1961 trade between Peking and Guinea failed even to reach one-third of the proposed value, and as of mid-1962 the agreed value of trade still had not been met.

Undoubtedly, the deterioration of the economic situation in Communist China during the period that has since become known as "the three hard years" (1959-61) has had an effect upon Peking's ability to fulfill its part of the trade bargain. Other reasons,



Aguégué, a village in the lagoon region of the Dahomey Republic

however, can also be offered. It has been reported that the Guineans have been disappointed with the quality of Peking's goods. Peking, on the other hand, has also been less than satisfied with some of the African products. Communist China has reportedly been forced to pay a high price for Guinean coffee for which there is no market in Communist China.

Trade appears to be Peking's weakest link with Africa, but it represents only one of many channels and instru-

ments being utilized by Peking. Taking into account all activities, Communist China's campaign to woo and win Africa must be rated as extremely intensive.

Political and Economic

The African adventures of Peking have not gone unnoticed and unchallenged by its rival, Taipei. On the contrary, Taipei has been engaged in a campaign of its own to win friends in Africa. It has come to regard Africa as "the chief communist battle-

ground" and has asserted that "the problem of mainland China is closely tied to that of Africa."

The immediate importance of Africa to Taipei is both political and economic in nature. Politically, the importance of the African nations to Taipei, as to Peking, lies in the international significance of their numbers. To ensure its seat on the Security Council and in the General Assembly as the representative of China, Taipei must court the new African nations. To Taipei, African support internationally has become a matter of political life and death.

In recent years, on the question of Chinese representation in the UN, the General Assembly has been divided generally into three major groups. First, there has been the group of nations which neither recognizes Peking nor favors its admission to the UN. This group includes the United States, all of Latin America, except Cuba, and a scattering of other nations. The number of nations in this group has remained generally stable; however, due to the increase of UN membership within the past few years, its percentage of total UN membership has declined. In the 1963 UN China vote, there were 40 nations in this group, representing 36 percent of the total UN membership.

Second, there has been the group of nations, including all UN members of the Communist bloc, some neutral nations, and a number of Western European nations, which recognizes Peking. For the most part, the number of nations in this group has also remained stable. In 1963 membership in this group included 29 nations representing 26 percent of the total UN membership.

The third major group consists of

the African nations which in the vast majority have just recently gained their independence and become UN members. During the initial period following their UN membership, the African nations tended to withhold their votes by abstaining on the China representation issue. In 1960, for example, 16 out of 27 African UN members abstained on the China vote. By 1963 African membership in the UN had reached 33, comprising 30 percent of the total membership. (About 10 percent of the UN membership has abstained each time on the China vote.)

Shift of Votes

Unless a major change occurs in the cold war, no great shift of votes on the China issue in groups one and two is likely. The importance of group three, the African nations, therefore, becomes clear. The China representation issue and the future of Taipei could easily hinge upon who gains the African vote. Taipei has not been slow to realize this point and since 1960 has conducted an active campaign to ensure African support for its cause.

Scarcely less important to the nationalists are certain economic considerations. To attain a degree of economic self-sufficiency and to meet future cuts in US economic assistance, Taipei has been actively seeking to promote and sell its products abroad. Africa, the emerging continent, looms large in nationalist eyes as a great potential market for its products.

Taipei presently maintains diplomatic relations with 19 African countries, all but one of which has had relations with Taipei since the late 1950's. Considering the concurrent campaign conducted by Peking, Taipei has achieved remarkable success in this respect.

A number of factors account for Taipei's success in Africa. No doubt the absence of an overt ideological campaign has been to Taipei's advantage. While it is strongly anti-Communist, Taipei does not emphasize the propagation of any ideology in Africa. Moreover, its activities carry no expansionist overtones. Taipei is too weak to engage in any empire building.

Political Factors

Still another factor relates to political factors within Africa. A number of the new African nations have followed closely the leadership of their former ruler in the field of foreign relations. This has been especially true of those African nations which were formerly French colonies. Most nations belonging to this category recognize Taipei. Peking's international behavior has also contributed to Taipei's success. The attack by Peking on India in 1962 made a deep impression upon many Africans. All these factors have played a role in Taipei's ability up to now to compete effectively with Peking in Africa.

While the above-mentioned considerations have influenced the Peking-Taipei competition, Taipei's success has been due chiefly to its own intensive drive to win friends in Africa. Taipei thus far has utilized with great effect two instruments of foreign policy: "personal diplomacy" and foreign aid. Taipei has carried on as active a campaign as Peking to win recognition from the new African nations. Upon the gaining of their independence, every African nation receives from Taipei a message of congratulations, the extension of diplomatic recognition, and an invitation to establish diplomatic relations.

However, Taipei does not rely solely

upon impersonal messages and invitations. Similarly to Peking, Taipei engages in a variety of programs to introduce itself to Africa directly. Indeed, Taipei has put a premium on direct contact, or personal diplomacy. Taipei has believed that, since the vast majority of the new African nations enter the family of nations with little or no predetermined views toward itself or Peking, "the newly independent (African) countries are likely to turn to those Chinese who first came to their attention."

Two Levels

The campaign to acquaint Africa with Taipei has been conducted on two levels. First, Taipei has dispatched numerous official missions to Africa. One of the first such missions visited 11 African countries in 1960. In 1962 the Director of the Western Asia Department (which until this year included Africa) of Taipei's Foreign Ministry visited 14 African countries. During the summer of 1963, Taipei's Foreign Minister visited a grand total of 16 African states.

Another level of Taipei's use of "personal diplomacy" has been to invite African leaders to Taiwan. Numerous Africans have taken the opportunity to visit the island. With Taipei receiving the Foreign Minister of Rwanda, the Agricultural Minister and the Foreign Minister of Dahomey, the Minister of Rural Economy of Niger, and various other African dignitaries, 1962 was an especially busy year.

Perhaps the high point of 1962 was the visit of President Philibert Tsiranana of Malagasy in April. Taipei spared no effort to impress President Tsiranana. He was personally received at the airport by President Chiang Kai-shek, given a 21-gun salute, wel-

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comed along a five-kilometer route by "some 100,000 flag-waving citizens," and given a tour of the island. President Hubert Maga of Dahomey was given an equally warm welcome when

conomic development. However, unlike Peking's program, which includes a huge variety of activities, Taipei's program of foreign aid has been highly selective. Since the initiation of its



The Port Gentil harbor in the Gabon Republic

he arrived in Taipei for a six-day state visit on 7 October 1963.

Taipei has not confined its brand of personal diplomacy only to those African countries with which it maintains relations. Like Peking, Taipei attempts to secure support for its cause wherever welcomed and receives African visitors whatever their position on the China issue. Without doubt, Taipei's success in Africa has in no small part been due to its ability to communicate with the Africans through the use of personal diplomacy.

Selective Aid

Foreign aid has been the other primary instrument utilized by Taipei in Africa. Taipei, too, extends such aid in the name of assisting Africa's eco-

nomic development. However, unlike Peking's program, which includes a huge variety of activities, Taipei's program of foreign aid has been highly selective. Since the initiation of its

program in 1961, Taipei has confined itself principally to rendering technical assistance in two fields: agriculture and fisheries. The fishery technical assistance program had its beginning in 1961 and has gone through two stages. In October 1961, as a result of an agreement concluded earlier in the year, Taipei's first team of fishery experts arrived in Liberia. They were given a fishing boat and made part of a commercial fishing fleet. The program, however, proved unsatisfactory, especially to Taipei. The fishery experts found that they were assigned a boat equipped with an engine and a compass but little else, lacking entirely the required fishing requisites. Without

the proper equipment, Taipei's experts found their mission greatly limited. Thus, after little over a year, Taipei's experts returned home, and the first fishery technical assistance program to Africa came to an end.

Upon the basis of the Liberian experience, a new program was formulated. It was decided that, in future fishery technical assistance programs, Taipei would furnish fully equipped fishing boats in addition to fishery experts and that the emphasis of such programs would not be to assist directly in local commercial ventures, but to instruct the Africans in fishery via demonstrations.

Under this new plan, in February 1963 two trawlers with a total of 67 crewmen "experts" set sail from Kaohsiung, Taiwan, for Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Nigeria, Cameroun, Togo, and the Congo (Brazzaville) "to help train African fishermen in modern techniques." During the same month, Taipei signed fishery cooperation agreements based upon the newly formulated plan with Dahomey and Malagasy. No doubt, such assistance benefits the African nations in their drive for economic development, in addition to winning friends for Taipei.

Agriculture

To date, Taipei's major efforts in the technical assistance program have been in the field of agriculture. This is perhaps understandable in view of both Taipei's available resources and experiences and Africa's needs. Many of the new African nations have yet to reach a level of agricultural self-sufficiency. Liberia, for example, imports rice, a basic food item. Taipei, on the other hand, through its land reform program, improved techniques, and maximum utilization of resources,

has made impressive gains agriculturally. This has made it possible for Taipei to present itself as a model for other nations who seek their own agricultural development. In short, more than in any other field, Taipei has been well equipped to provide technical assistance in agriculture.

Since 1961 an increasing number of African nations have sought agricultural assistance from Taipei, and a large program has developed. Taipei presently renders agricultural technical assistance of one type or another to no less than 19 African nations.

Two basic forms of assistance have been extended. Taipei's agricultural technical assistance to Africa began with the dispatching of a 14-man team of agricultural specialists to Liberia in the fall of 1961. Earlier in the year, as a result of a visit by the Minister of Agriculture of Liberia, an agreement was concluded whereby Taipei would send an Agricultural Survey Team to investigate and determine how it could best assist Liberia's agricultural needs.

Farm Techniques

On the basis of the survey, the Agricultural Survey Team recommended that Taipei could greatly assist Liberia in the development of a rice crop and even the growing of certain vegetables. It was also recommended that the best method of assistance would be through the use of model demonstration farms. Taipei would send a team of farm specialists who would experiment with rice and vegetable cultivation locally; if successful, their methods could then be adopted by the Liberians.

The use of the model demonstration farm technique to extend agricultural technical assistance has proved to be a great success. The Liberian team,

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after overcoming great natural and other obstacles (for example, 213 centimeters (84 inches) of rain annually with almost all of it in September), succeeded beyond expectations. Whereas the average Liberian farm produced 500 kilograms per hectare of rice, the first harvest of rice of Taipei's model demonstration farm yielded an average of 4,000 kilograms per hectare. The success of the Liberian experiment has prompted other African nations to seek Taipei's assistance.

Additional Teams

Since 1961 Taipei has concluded agricultural agreements with a number of other African nations and has dispatched additional model demonstration farm teams to Libya (1962), Dahomey (1963), and the Ivory Coast (1963). In an attempt to spread its agricultural assistance program still further, in December 1962 Taipei sent another survey team on a five-month mission to eight African nations. It has been reported that already other African nations have sought Taipei's assistance in agricultural and other fields.

The agricultural technical assistance program has also brought African farm specialists to Taipei for training. The Africans are given full scholarships and, for a six-month period, attend what is known as the Seminar on Agricultural Techniques for Africans. The Africans are taught rice cultivation, weeding, insect detection and control, fertilizer application, irrigation, and other subjects. They are given both classroom and practical training. Classes are divided into English and French sections.

Thus far, two seminars have been conducted. The first, held between April and October 1962, was attended

by 25 farm specialists from 11 African nations. In February 1963 a second seminar began on Taiwan with 48 farm specialists from 19 African nations. According to one report, the seminars have made a deep impression upon the African trainees—not only in terms of their agricultural training, but also the favorable image they gained of Taiwan. The trainee took both of these back with him to Africa.

Taipei has been highly pleased with the success of its technical assistance programs to Africa. Early in 1963 the government made public a draft of a general plan for the development of its African program. Among the many proposals, the plan called for the strengthening of technical cooperation in the various established fields, the establishment of permanent training classes for both those going to Africa and for the Africans who come to Taiwan, and for cooperation in the general field of education. Indeed, Taipei intends to build upon its success in Africa.

Vital Instruments

Important as the various technical assistance programs have been in their contribution to Africa's economic development, Taipei's programs constitute vital instruments in its competition with Peking. Indeed, Taipei has been quick to admit and recognize the role of its programs in Africa. Chou Shu-kiai, Taipei's delegate to the 17th UN General Assembly meeting in 1962 and Ambassador to Spain, stated without hesitation that "the good results of the technical assistance programs lead to the support of the African nations (for Taipei) in the United Nations." See the chart for a check of the General Assembly voting record of the African nations on the China

issue within the past several years which supports Chou's contention.

It is interesting to note that African nations began to vote in larger numbers for Taipei only in 1961, the year Taipei launched its technical assistance programs. While we cannot say that the technical assistance programs alone brought about the African vote change, neither can we dismiss their importance. Most African nations had no real reason to change

can nations involved. In the last three years, Taipei's biggest customers have been Morocco and Tanganyika, both of which recognize Peking. Morocco, for example, has been a prime importer of Taipei's green tea. With this beginning, Taipei has been anxious to expand its trade with Africa still further.

Notwithstanding the success of various undertakings, Taipei's efforts in Africa suffer from a limitation of fi-

<i>Year</i>	<i>For Taipei</i>	<i>For Peking</i>	<i>Abstaining</i>	<i>Absent</i>
1960	2	9	16	—
1961	9	9	11	—
1962	17	14	2	—
1963	17	12	3	1

their votes; they could have continued to abstain on the China issue. Yet larger numbers of African nations have voted in Taipei's favor. Libya, for example, which abstained in 1960, voted for Taipei in 1961 and 1962, after Taipei began rendering technical assistance. Other examples can also be cited, such as Dahomey which abstained in 1961 but voted for Taipei in 1962 after promises of assistance.

Exports to Africa

Trade has also entered into Taipei-African relations. In Taipei's search for new markets, Africa represents a new and unexplored land. In recent years, Africa has become a market primarily for three of Taipei's products: tea, sugar, and textiles. Since 1960 exports from Taipei to Africa have steadily increased. In 1961 exports to Africa amounted to six million dollars, representing 2.9 percent of Taipei's total exports.

One interesting feature of the Taipei-African trade has been the Afri-

financial resources. This limitation, readily admitted, forces Taipei to concentrate on a few programs to the neglect of others. While Taipei has achieved great success with its fishery and agricultural technical assistance programs, its financial limitation has not made possible the use of other instruments. Taipei has not even begun to utilize such instruments as broadcasts, films, exhibits, and the printed word. Even its successful technical assistance programs have had to be limited due to shortage of funds. Given its financial limitations, however, Taipei has done well in Africa.

Several conclusions may be reached on the basis of this brief survey of Chinese competition in Africa. First, it is apparent that, for political and other reasons, Africa occupies an important place in the foreign policies of both Peking and Taipei. Each has spared no effort to secure African support, employing a great variety of techniques.

Second, notwithstanding the success

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of Taipei in Africa, the Peking-Taipei competition is not between equals. Peking has far greater resources, financial and otherwise, at its command. This has enabled Peking to utilize every conceivable instrument to win African support. Even during "the three hard years" (1959-61), Peking continued to carry on its African campaign, albeit at a slower pace. With Peking's economic recovery, one can expect an even more vigorous effort.

Finally, the Peking-Taipei competition in Africa illustrates the interesting and important fact that both big

powers and small nations may utilize technical assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. Even with its limited resources, Taipei has been able to compete effectively with Peking by being selective. Taipei's success has been due largely to the fact that it is qualified to offer assistance in certain specific fields of great importance to most African nations. Herein lies Taipei's future hope. Taipei cannot attempt to compete with Peking on every level, but it can continue to concentrate on selected programs in the fields where it has special qualifications.

The emergence of modern Africa has posed a great challenge to the United States and the Western World. This new Africa has demanded of us new ideas and new techniques, and it has forced us to abandon much of the stereotyped thinking of the past.

G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs