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# THE UNITED STATES ARMY

## Its Doctrine and Influence on US Military Strategy

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*On 11 December 1957 General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General, United States Continental Army Command, made a presentation to the Air War College. The MILITARY REVIEW is pleased to present this unclassified version of General Wyman's lucid analysis of the United States Army doctrine and its influence on US military strategy as contained in that presentation. A more complete version of the speech has been published in a classified medium.—Editor.*

**P**HILOLOGISTS agree that all that has been written about all of the subjects of human thought since the dawn of history would not suffice to completely explain what is meant by a single word. So do not expect a complete explanation of Army doctrine in the next 50 minutes. At best I can only "X in" the major bench marks, indicate some of the more significant contour lines, and trust that you already know by heart "the uses of a hill."

In a recent article on our national strategy and military doctrine, Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff used the following thumbnail definition to establish his initial frame of reference: "Strategy relates to the attain-

ment of objectives and doctrine relates to the employment of means."

While too narrow for the scope of our discussion, his definition illuminates a much broader frame of reference if we apply it to the statement in your study circular which sets forth the purpose of this lecture: "To provide an understanding of US Army doctrine and an appreciation of its influence on US military strategy."

### Fundamental Principle

In the light of Dr. Garthoff's definition, a fundamental principle of Army doctrine is at once apparent here. It is the principle that the determining influence between the employment of means and the attainment of objectives in war travels on a two-way, three-dimensional street. The universal truth that the means determines the ends as well as vice versa is the roadbed of this two-way street. Its three dimensions are air, sea, and land.

Failure to appreciate the workings of this principle has sent many a nation to the morgue and the autopsy tables of history. For example, consider the prewar objectives of Nazi Germany, the means employed by Hitler to attain them, and the end results. Would the end have been different had Hitler not employed geno-

***Army doctrine is not restricted to a uniservice concept, but is based upon a triservice approach to the conduct of future warfare recognizing the manifold possibilities under which such warfare may be conducted***

cide and wanton force as he did at Rotterdam, Coventry, Lidice, and in the Ukraine? On the other hand, consider the prewar objectives of France, the imbalance of her military means, the rigidity of her doctrine for employing them, and the consequent disaster of military defeat and occupation.

May historians of the future never have reason to attribute our Nation's fate to either wantonness or rigidity. May we never stake our national existence upon a "Megaton" or a "Maginot Line" anywhere—on land, at sea, in the air, or in the mind.

On the azimuth of this aspiration, we arrive at the first bench mark to understanding Army doctrine. Neither absolute

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nor rigid, Army doctrine predicates no single solution, no set pattern for national defense. It harbors no narcissistic illusion that land forces alone can enforce our national policy in the teeth of the multidimensional threat posed by our obvious enemy.

Army doctrine is TRISERVICE.

Our triservice doctrine recognizes the entire spectrum of possibilities in warfare—not only as they stem from our own military capabilities and national objectives, but as they stem from the enemy's capabilities and national objectives. Red Russia now has military means of great numerical and technological strength covering the entire gamut of known military force by land, sea, and air.

This full scale of military means enables Soviet planners to exercise great flexibility in their grand strategy. It provides them with a very high potential for accommodation to our own capabilities and responses. Hence the possible characteristics of an armed conflict with the Communist bloc are manifold.

#### Possibilities Affecting Doctrine

In broad outline, here are three major possibilities that condition our TRISERVICE doctrine. And I take them in order of gravity—not their order of probability.

##### *First Possibility*

First, there is the possibility that the enemy might try for a nuclear knockout. This possibility would seem remote. Or does it? That it would be dangerous to rule out such a miscalculation is evinced by the pages of recent history.

In this event it is obvious that our national existence would depend initially upon the performance of our strategic retaliatory forces. But what then? With airbases, ports, factories, and cities on both sides of the Iron Curtain pulverized, do both sides surrender to each other? Or does victory go to the side which can con-



tinue to fight most effectively with the means remaining?

Since it is axiomatic that the first objective of airpower is the destruction of the enemy's airpower, we must not be astigmatic to the possible effect of nuclear parity upon airpower, itself, at the very outset of such a war. *How many planes, missiles, and facilities for their production would be left on both sides after the first few days of an all-out effort?* While this question is as impossible to answer exactly as it is dangerous to ignore, it has one facet of which we may be sure. If there is anything left, there will be *people*. And among the peoples of the world, there will be jackals—like Mussolini when France was reeling in 1940—eager for the spoils. In this situation our national survival would obviously depend upon the loyalty of our allies and the preparedness of our Army to fight with whatever air and naval support remained.

To fulfill the demands posed by this first possibility, broad Army doctrine would require: an Army force in being with a strong training base on which to build and rebuild.

### **Second Possibility**

*Second*, there is the possibility of a general or global war in which tacit or announced limitations in weaponry and targetry are mutually observed. Such restraint in a future war is neither unprecedented nor irrational—unless we deem mankind to have been irrational ever since the day Cain spared Abel's mother. The entire history of warfare is one continuous precedent of restraint in exercising force. Without it mankind would have been reduced to nonentity long ago. The job of mutual extermination could have been accomplished just as surely with clubs and swords, and just as quickly—just as cheaply as it could with nuclear fission and fusion. Even the Nazis chose military defeat in preference to mutual extermination and refrained from loosing the

products of their bacteriological and chemical laboratories on the world.

Assuming that any restraint is observed in a global war, it appears logical that it would be a limitation in weapons employed against the civil populace. The strategic nuclear weapons on both sides might still be used against purely military targets or not at all.

This possibility in no way mitigates the grim necessity of maintaining a clear-cut superiority in our nuclear retaliatory capability before and during such hostilities. While history indicates that moral law imposes stiff penalties upon nations that violate it in war, it rarely does so in time to save the victims. So our best insurance that mutual restraints will not be broken by the enemy is the obvious ability to make the crime instantly unprofitable. By clear-cut superiority in our nuclear retaliatory capability, I mean a delivery system that cannot be thwarted plus sufficient destructive power to administer a *coup de grâce*. I do not mean, however, that we must be able to destroy our enemy a hundred times or even 10. Once will do.

But even in this second possibility of so many variables in degree, a broad Army doctrine will require: an Army force in being with a strong training base on which to build.

To win another global war waged with mutual restraints in weaponry and targetry against the Communist bloc would require the maximum effort by land, sea, and air that we and our allies could produce. Which of the three services would strike the decisive blow is impossible to predict or even to know after the fact. For example, who could say that winning the undersea struggle would be any more or any less decisive than mastering the enemy in the stratosphere? Without control of vital sealanes, it would be impossible to sustain our embattled allies and forces overseas. Without control in the air, it is doubtful that we could control sea ap-

proaches—let alone land areas—critical to military operations.

But of this we can be sure: The conclusive role in such a conflict would be performed by MAN on the ground with weapons in his hand. Only when he is in a position to enforce any decision at arms upon enemy peoples where they live can any conflict be victoriously concluded. That he will be opposed in great numbers by the enemy's MAN on the ground goes without saying. But numbers alone do not win wars. Otherwise the American people long ago would have been on a diet of black bread and borsch. Nevertheless, the American soldier will need better training, better tools, and stronger air and naval support than ever before to cut his goliath down to size.

### *Third Possibility*

The *third* possibility is a localized war—a conflict limited in geography, although not necessarily in weaponry. Such a war would be the product of our response to another act of limited Communist aggression like the invasion of South Korea. The localizing factor in the conflict would be the value of the limited objective at stake and the risk to both sides of triggering a thermonuclear holocaust by expanding hostilities.

Far from being remote, the possibility of another localized war could materialize with the next tick of the clock. The Soviet strategy to activate it has been in successful operation ever since Lenin adopted the strategy of limited objectives set forth in the last will and testament of Peter the Great, Czar of Russia. And if you haven't read that document, I suggest that you do so as part of your professional education. Whether penned by Peter or by Napoleon (as some historians claim), there can be no doubt that it is an authentic work of a clever but devious mind. You will find it quoted by Sykes in Volume II of his authoritative book, *A History of Persia*, printed in 1905.

If you thought that *Mein Kampf* was an amazing blueprint for world conquest, you should see how faithfully Peter's heirs have followed *his* blueprint. In addition to specifying the limited objectives to be taken in sequence, Peter advised his descendants to adopt a priestly dogma, a fanatic approach, which could serve as an ideological tool for subversion. Beginning with the adoption of communism in 1917 and continuing step by step with the annexation of the Baltic States on the north flank, the satellization of the Balkan States on the south flank, the division of Poland, Germany, and China, the pincering of India, right up to more recent events in Syria, the Kremlin's fidelity to Peter's blueprint is at least a remarkable coincidence.

### *Communist Strategy*

Far from being outdated by the atom bomb, the Communist strategy of expansion by limited objectives has proved a highly successful accommodation to our nuclear deterrent. So successful, that the cartographers have been hard put to keep up to date with it. Since 1945 we have seen the successive fall of central Europe, China, and North Indochina, and we have been confronted with aggressive actions against Iran, Greece, Korea, Formosa, Malaya, North Africa, and other areas—all under conditions less than would warrant massive retaliation or general war.

Today—and I use the word literally—Red Russia is continuing to pursue its goal of world domination by a strategy of limited objectives. The value to us of each objective is carefully calculated in advance to be well below the high level of mutual risk posed by the strategic nuclear threat. With a complete scale of military capabilities, Soviet planners can employ the means most appropriate to the *objective and our opposition* in accordance with the timeless principle of war: "Economy of force."

Having selected a limited objective, they



cannot be deterred by threats of force which are so disproportionate in mutual risk as to be implausible on the face of it. In fact, they can flash aces of their own and "beep beep" across our horizon—not only to remind us that the risk of annihilation is mutual, but to assist them in softening up their prospective victims psychologically.

As the level of mutual risk has risen since 1950 with increasing parity and power of the strategic nuclear threat, so have the value and scope of the limited objectives that Soviet planners may deem it safe to select. In this regard, recent events in the Near East menacing the free world's vital oil supply speak for themselves.

#### Local War Doctrine

To win a localized war—and here is our doctrine—we must have ready military means as flexible, as controllable, and as usable as our opponents, but more efficient. We must be able to impose a price upon the enemy for limited aggression that exceeds the cost to ourselves, but does not exceed restraints appropriate to the limited objective involved. While we must be able to defeat the enemy tactically, we must be able to leave him an avenue of strategic and political withdrawal that will make it possible for him to accept a limited defeat. In this connection it is interesting to note that the concept of the ancient Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, of building a "Golden Bridge" behind the enemy cropped up in a figure of speech used by our country's foremost member of the profession of arms at a press conference recently. His inference that it is a good idea, under certain conditions, to leave a back door open for our enemy to retreat from a strategic position is not without significance at a time when absolute concepts in war are so readily realizable.

So I repeat, broad Army doctrine for meeting the possibility of localized war requires: a strong Army force in being with

the ability to move to any part of the globe in minimum time.

Failure to tailor our defense capabilities to the obvious strategy of the enemy is every bit as critical for the Navy and Air Force today as it is for the Army. Unless the Army is provided with the strategic mobility, the modern tools, and the trained men to deter or defeat limited aggression, the United States, in due course, may find herself isolated in a fortress America with her freedom of action to defend herself dangerously restricted.

#### Tactical Doctrine

Turning now to tactical doctrine, the most important bench mark to remember is this: Our tactical concepts of future operations presume neither the use nor the nonuse of tactical atomic weapons. The very existence of tactical atomic weapons in the hands of the enemy has already conditioned the battle area of the future regardless of *when* or *whether* the weapons are employed. In addition, the lethality of conventional weapons has so increased since World War II that the troop formations employed in Korea, for example, might well invite disaster today, even without the presence of the atomic weapon.

However, it would be naive to assume that the aggressor will always refrain from using one tactical weapon to do the work of a hundred against troops and military targets in the field of operations. Risking tactical retaliation against units in the field poses an acceptable danger quite different from that of risking a retaliatory exchange of strategic nuclear blows which could destroy mankind.

Regardless of the tactical weapons that the enemy employs, moreover, we can never afford to meet the masses of Eurasia on a man-to-man, life-for-life basis.

While we recognize that the destruction of enemy units can often be achieved by capturing, bypassing, or dispersing them, we must always have sufficient tactical

firepower to reduce the enemy to manageable proportions. While we should continue to strive to attain our objectives by superior mobility and schemes of maneuver, we must never forget that the enemy's manpower exceeds ours by eight to one. A series of Pyrrhic victories which imposed a disproportionate drain upon American manpower would be just as disastrous to our country as Napoleon's victories ultimately were to France.

One of the most immediate problems—the reduction of fallout and radiation—has already been solved by science. Tests have shown that nuclear explosives can be "sanitized" to produce negligible fallout effects. While the announcement was coldly received by laymen of the press who thought of it only in terms of strategic bombing against cities—"how dead can we get" some of them said—its tactical importance can scarcely be overstated. Not only does this development make atomic weapons adaptive to a much wider variety of situations on the battlefield, but it renders their tactical use more likely in view of the reduced danger to the civilian populations of the areas involved.

#### Combat Surveillance

Another, more complex, problem of the atomic battlefield which currently confronts us is that of improving our combat surveillance capability.

The elements for extending our target acquisition and combat surveillance capability must be instantly responsive to the combat commander who has the immediate responsibility of acting upon the information obtained. In the fluidity of situations which we must anticipate in atomic battle, we cannot wait until a target has completely formed to identify, locate, or even detect it. We must be able to detect hostile targets deep in the enemy-dominated portion of the battle area while they are forming. We cannot wait until a tactical situation has crystallized to act upon it. We must be able to deduce from

the information furnished by our combat surveillance system the nature of events before they happen.

Our ground commanders must also have a surveillance capability to cover the area between and behind their units as well as the vastly increased distance in front of their units.

To meet these requirements, a great deal of effort has been devoted to the development of electronic and other sensory devices for indicating enemy installations and activity. While they are readily employable from and within our own area, they are somewhat limited in range by terrain, fog, snow, haze, and ground clutter. As matters now stand the only way we can extend their range to the minimum depth of perception required is by using air platforms to fly the sensory devices into and over suspect areas of enemy activity.

#### Vertical Mobility

No less important for successful adaptation to the conditions of atomic battle is our requirement for vertical mobility. Without the capability to use the third dimension tactically, it would be impossible for us to cope with a numerically superior enemy who already has this capability to a degree that is just as advanced as the capability for strategic weapon delivery he recently unveiled. Like our enemy's land forces, we must have tactical aerial vehicles that will permit us to:

1. Move patrols and assault forces up to battle group size to seize critical terrain and exploit tactical atomic blows.
2. Move reinforcing elements in depth or laterally to meet or counter an enemy threat or to create one of our own.
3. Effect rapid shifting of weapons with crews and other combat equipment within the battle area—particularly across natural or manmade obstacles.

Please note that I am talking about tactical movement within the battle area. The United States Army has no intention whatsoever of competing with our own



teammates—only with the Red Army. There is no conflict of role or doctrine here—save in the minds of those who mistake the means for the mission. It is no more and no less logical that the Army have flying gun platforms and other tactical vehicles for our purposes *above the ground* than it is for the Air Force and Navy to have jeeps and trucks for their own purposes *on the ground*.

As those of you who have visited our US Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, well know, we have not been idle in our efforts to provide ourselves with the eyes and vertical mobility we need to stay alive on the atomic battlefield. Craft to meet our tactical requirements are being developed as fast as the stringent limitations of our budget will permit. We are moving ahead with what we have on hand and on the way, changing our tactics and organizations to fit the conditions of atomic battle as they could materialize tomorrow.

### Mobile Forces Concept

By next summer all of our divisions will be streamlined. With their new pentagonal organization, the ratio of fighter to administrative personnel is increased and the chain of command shortened. Rockets capable of atomic fires have replaced much of the conventional artillery in the fire support group of the division. Air transportability has been given the high priority that its importance to strategic mobility deserves.

Looming in the background of our transitional scene is a very real danger. To catch an enemy while he is crossing a stream is the classic equivalent of crossing the naval "T." Alert to the possibility that the enemy might come at us in mid-stream, we have been working for three years now with what we call a mobile forces concept which provides our tactical units with combat readiness today, even in this transitional period.

Within the framework of its organic

means, each infantry division has organized and trained mobile forces of combined arms teams having a much higher fire-power-manpower ratio than provided by transitional tables of organization. In the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, for instance, each battle group is prepared to field a mobile force with more firepower than an infantry regiment of World War II days but with fewer men than an infantry company.

By integrating tank artillery, automatic weapon, rifle, communication, engineer, and other support elements into tight-knit mobile teams of great tactical self-sufficiency, we are preparing our divisions in advance for the dispersion and fluidity of atomic operations. After experimenting in atomic maneuvers with a mobile force—comparable numerically to a battalion—one division commander voiced the opinion that three such mobile forces could have accomplished the mission in the given situation as effectively as his entire division employed conventionally.

To gear our mobile forces for the rapid responses demanded by atomic battle, cumbersome troop-leading procedures are being eliminated. Instead of formal field orders, simple code signals are being used to set rehearsed tactical plays into motion and to control them.

Work with mobile forces has stimulated the entire Army's response to the requirements of atomic battle and helped us to "break the crust of custom." Especially important is the effect it is producing upon the ability of young troop leaders to THINK in new terms and to handle combined arms decisively.

### Joint Doctrine

Our measures of adaptation for atomic battle with the means already available to us have not been confined to Army doctrine alone. We have been working closely with our tactical air teammates to produce a new *Joint Air-Ground Operations Manual*, published in September 1957



which revises and modernizes an earlier, now obsolete text.

Among its other advantages, our new joint doctrine will help us to implement the "Army Operations Center"—a new concept which ties together in one coordinated agency all the means now available to assist the Army commander to place his firepower and keep his maneuvering elements of infantry and armor where he wants them. It is a modernized version of the former fire support coordination center, but with air defense, Army aviation, and electronic warfare added. This concept will be implemented both at corps and field army levels under G3 supervision. Concurrently the old unwieldy joint operations center is discarded and the Air Force will establish small mobile air support operations centers (ASOC's) to work with the Army.

During the coming year [1958] we hope that we will achieve a comparable measure of agreed joint doctrine for airborne and amphibious operations. Certainly, there is a need for us to bring all our joint tactical doctrine up to date. Every day we waste in resistance to change now may be paid for with the blood of blunders in future battle.

#### Development of Future Requirements

In all our past wars the United States has been forced to develop tactics and tools that could meet the *enemy's* standards *after* hostilities were initiated. This must never happen again. In the future we must ensure that it is the enemy who has the disadvantage.

A highly important step in this direction was taken with the establishment last year [1956] of a field laboratory at Fort Ord, California, where academic theory pointing to new doctrine can be validated. The name of our field laboratory is the "United States Army Combat Development Experimentation Center"—or CDEC in verbal shorthand. CDEC has approximately 50 officers, 20 topflight sci-

entists, and 3,000 experimentation troops devoted solely to the task of producing realistic and unbiased results upon which we can base our tactical doctrine of the future.

Already we are beginning to receive valuable thoughts in many areas that I have mentioned. For example, realistic field tests show that offensive and defensive tactics of the future tend to merge into one with but a single goal: *Fix the enemy for the kill!* Often, tactical firepower alone can accomplish the purpose of maneuver. As a corollary, fire support capabilities will often determine plans of rapid maneuver to a degree never known before.

In future battle, portrayed at Fort Ord with all of the realism that modern scientific technology can produce, it has been clearly demonstrated that cumbersome troop-leading procedures, detailed orders, and improvised tactical groupments of the past can be dangerous. Experiment confirms the necessity and practicability of rehearsed tactical plays by combined arms teams such as we are employing in our Mobile Forces Program.

In addition to refining and testing operational concepts resulting from deductive analysis, CDEC experimentation is beginning to provide valid ideas for the development of methodology for testing future combat formation. At the moment, we do not know what the composition of the Army's basic fighting element will be in 1977; but CDEC's field explorations to date indicate that the need to increase our firepower-manpower ratio will continue to accelerate. More and more as time and technology advance, operations will consist of the coordinated efforts of small, powerful, self-contained units with vastly increased ground and air mobility.

#### Future Ground Operations

In summary, here are some of the tactical characteristics of future ground operations as they now appear to us:

We see no lines of entrenchment as we

have known them in previous wars. No masses of men waiting in reserve. No roads jammed with trucks moving to the front. In fact, we see no front. Only a battle area.

Within the battle area, to a depth of as much as a hundred miles or more, we see small mobile units deployed at intervals measured in miles instead of yards. While their numerical strength per unit may or may not be much greater than a reinforced company of World War II days, their firepower can exceed that of our old regiments and include all of the trajectories of divisional artillery. With this firepower they dominate the unoccupied ground between them. When the units move, they are guarded against radiation and blast by a protective skin. At rest they are dug in for all-around protection and camouflaged.

Even the language of operations employed here differs from that of the past. New concepts call for new definitions of old terms—even new words to convey our thoughts. For instance, the word “defend” no longer means what it did in World War II parlance. In some situations an order to “defend” actually calls for aggressive action to knock out an enemy unit before it can launch a coordinated attack. Under the conditions of atomic battle, taking and holding the initiative is more important than taking and holding a hill.

#### Offensive and Defensive Operations

In offensive operations, combat units move rapidly and operate in widely dispersed formations. When necessary, units concentrate sufficiently to accomplish the mission, then quickly disperse. Aggressive offensive action is continuous whether by fire or maneuver or both. As in the past, tactically important terrain must be fought for and controlled, but it is selected carefully and used as a means to control the battle, destroy enemy forces, create favorable opportunities for use of our own atomic weapons, for line of

sight electronic devices, and to deny the enemy similar advantages.

The tactical defense is fluid with units shifting their positions frequently according to an over-all plan. The entire front is screened by covering forces whose elements may resist fiercely, withdraw without resistance, counterattack violently, or even attack in apparently illogical patterns. The purpose of these deceptive operations is to confuse the enemy, induce him to commit his forces prematurely, create attractive atomic targets, and provide the opportunity for offensive action to destroy him by fire and maneuver.

#### The Battle Area

Long-range fires—atomic or nonatomic—can be placed instantly anywhere in the battle area necessary to influence the course of operations by guided missile batteries which are located deep in the rear. The exact distance to the rear that these supporting weapons must be located to accomplish their mission depends upon so many variables of situation and geography that it is impossible for anyone to predict today. Consequently, I consider it dangerous to fetter our development now with arbitrary limitations of ranges and rigid definitions of the future battle area which the enemy land forces may choose to ignore. It is the uncertain depth of the battle position that prompts my concern—not an ambition to stamp “US Army” on the moon! I just hope that our united efforts will put us there first as well as safeguard our way of life here on this earth.

Another aspect of our concepts for future battle that has been misinterpreted by the press is that of “depopulation.” Decreasing the average number of men per square mile in no way decreases the total number of men that will be needed within a vastly deeper battle area. On the contrary, the casualty-inflicting potential of modern weapons renders it much more probable that we will need more trained



men for future ground combat than ever before.

### Effect of Nuclear Weapons

Familiar as you are with the maximum destructive capacity of *strategic* nuclear weapons, and schooled as you are in the current doctrine for their employment, some of you may question their effect upon the feasibility of these tactical concepts. "Of what avail," you may ask, "is ground dispersion, flexible organization, and improved mobility in the battle area of the future against the threat of thermonuclear weapons which even now could obliterate or contaminate an entire theater of operations in a matter of hours? Upon what assumptions regarding the enemy's restraint in the application of nuclear firepower to the battle area are these tactical concepts based? And what assurance is there that the enemy's restraint will hold under the stress of tactical reverse and impending defeat?"

The basic question posed by this line of inquiry is neither new nor nuclear. Nor is it posed to the Army alone. The problem of where the line will be drawn between the *absolute* and the *discriminating* application of force in war has always been with the profession of arms. And never has the final solution been known in advance.

As Chesterton once said, "*ART consists in drawing the line somewhere!*" But even the artist cannot predetermine precisely where he will draw it. He can only provide himself with all of the means to draw it well.

So it is with the ART OF WAR.

### Assumptions

While Army doctrine recognizes that there are probable limitations to the force which people will apply—particularly at a time when unlimited force could so swiftly destroy mankind—we draw no lines in advance for the enemy to circumvent or ignore. Our tactical concepts for future land operations make only these assumptions:

1. That our enemies have no more intention of bequeathing the world to the oyster-boring sea worm than we have.

2. That our teammates in the Armed Forces will work in close unison with us and will continue to develop the tools and men to perform their roles in support of our common effort.

3. That the American people will never sell their sons, their freedom, and their national honor down the river.

So assuming, the United States Army is going ahead in its own area of responsibility planning and developing the means to play our part on the TRISERVICE TEAM, to enforce our national policy, and to ensure our national survival.

### No Conflict in Doctrine

When I accepted the invitation to address you today, one of the points that I was asked to discuss was the *basic* conflict, if any, between US Army doctrine and the doctrine of the other services. I have saved it to climax my remarks because it is THE point I wish most to leave with you.

In my opinion, there is NO *basic* conflict in doctrine whatsoever between the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Despite what I sometimes read in the pages of our service journals and the staff studies of our word-bird Indians, I refuse to believe that the doctrine of any service is chained to the obsolete concepts of the gunpowder age. I refuse to believe that the fundamental doctrine of any member of our TRISERVICE team was dictated once and forever by an Italian staff officer named Douhet and a Prussian staff officer named Clausewitz. What could be more absurd in our nuclear age than the precept of Clausewitz that any attempt to limit the application of force in war is an "absurdity"? What could be more suicidal than to rely solely upon Douhet's shortcut to victory in an age when his shortcut is a two-way street to total destruction?

I believe that the Army is not alone in

recognizing that a dynamic change has taken place in our military environment during the last decade—not alone in realizing that we must think anew if we are to respond anew. I believe that professional thought throughout the services is moving rapidly in the same direction—toward the concept of a full scale of flexible and usable force for a flexible national strategy. I believe that the American people are moving toward the realization that they must sacrifice much of the frosting on our standard of living in order to keep the cake.

I believe that we are moving toward all of this in our public and professional thinking, but I am equally convinced that American minds and hearts and hands must move faster now than ever before. As always the race is to the swift and laggards die ignominiously.

#### Surface Friction

It is true that there are some points of surface friction between the three services as we move in the same direction—particularly where our roles, missions, and means overlap. But whoever heard of a good suit of armor that did not overlap at vital points? How safe would our national armor be without some overlap? Who cares if it rubs a bit now and then if it makes our country safer?

Some of our surface friction even produces creative sparks which illuminate the path for all of the services to follow—particularly in the field of research and development. It is imperative, however, that all services receive the benefit of these creative ideas. They should never be hoarded, snuffed out, or dampened by bureaucracy or false economy.

There is one kind of surface friction between the three services that we certainly *can* do without: public bickering and parochial ballyhoo. For a member of one service to knock the legitimate needs of another service in order to promote public esteem for his own is a disservice to all. We should unite our public informa-

tion efforts and show the American people why we need more dollars for their tridimensional defense.

#### Unity of Command Imperative

There remains a final bench mark that I must “X in.” It is the apex of all military doctrine—the timeless principle of Unity of Command. Sometimes I call it the “I” factor in war to distinguish it from the “Committee” concept of command. Executive committees may work very well for running an industry or business corporation, but not in battle—the big business of our profession. I have yet to see a committee that could vote a battle group up a hill or a bomber over a target. It takes one man who is not afraid to say “I” and face the consequences. One man with the professional competence to know what to do, the guts to decide to do it, and the dynamic leadership to inspire other men to do it with him.

In Europe, right now, Army troops are commanded by an Air Force general; in the Pacific by an admiral. That suits our TRISERVICE doctrine to a “T.” Regardless of the mission or composition of the joint forces involved, we believe that individual capacity for TRISERVICE command should be the decisive factor in selection. Military command requires the best man for the job and the absolute loyalty of subordinates.

#### Conclusion

Doubtless some of our key commanders for joint operations of the future are here in this room. Someday one of my grandsons in Army Green may have the privilege of serving under one of you in Air Force Blue. If so, I trust that he will be commanded by a man who is more than a scientist—more than a tactician. For our country’s sake, I hope that he will be commanded by a man who knows by heart the art of war and what Stephen Vincent Benet with poetic insight called: “The uses of a hill!”