

THE ENGAGEMENT AT LONGUYON—NOËRS, 24 AUGUST 1914.
A MILITARY HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY.
(DAS GEFECHT BEI LONGUYON—NOËRS AM 24 AUGUST
1914)

By Ernst Reinhardt, Lieut. General German Army, Ret. German text, 57 pages. (Leipzig: Vaterland-Verlag, 1925.) Library No. 940.41123.

Since Meckel's "Summernight's Dream," in which he described what he saw as a company commander at W rth in 1870, there has been no such detailed account of experiences in action as in this book. Wounded as a battalion commander in this early fight, he had opportunity of discussing it with other wounded and thinking it over, and next year was able to visit the field whilst his memories were still fresh. The narrative thus compiled is a most valuable picture of fighting in open warfare and its extraordinary difficulties.

The author's command consisted of "the 5th and two-thirds of the 7th, 11th and 12th Companies of the 121st Infantry Regiment, and the 9th, 10th and 12 h Companies of the 122d, under its own major."

They belonged to the 51st Brigade of the 26th Division in the Fifth Army.

On the night of the 23d of August, after another battalion in the advance guard had had a small skirmish with French stragglers, his men reached Longuyon in the deep valley of the Chiers south of Longwy. After six march days, including three fighting days and five bivouacs, they were dead tired.

"Thus it happened that, there being large quantities of wine in Longuyon, it did not fail to have effect on our people."

The advance guard had gone on to Noërs, the next village, three kilometres ahead, but had cleared out of it when fired on, and spent the night deployed for action. Reinhardt's men were ordered to assist it to drive the enemy off, joining them at 5 a.m. It was a foggy morning, and a few shots falling in Longuyon, whilst the men were falling in, there was a panic. Encouraged, however, by receipt of a divisional order, that the enemy was in "retreat that resembled flight," they did not expect serious resistance, still less that the French would attack, as they did before continuing their retreat. "Very instructive" such information paragraphs of higher commanders, says the author. Orders were now given by the map: his companies were to advance against Hill 296.

"As it was dark, it was rather difficult to settle which hill this was." However, the first thing the battalion knew was that it was under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire.

The long story of the fight cannot be followed here. It will be sufficient to quote some phrases and incidents:—

"There was no question of a purposeful conduct of the fight. No higher staffs were at first on the battlefield, not even a liaison officer: as the troops came on the field, they came into the fight."

Four regiments are mentioned, so over a division was engaged. The artillery hung back, unwilling, apparently, to come across the valley of the Chiers; so, in spite of reiterated appeals, the infantry got no support from the guns, and knew only that it was under enemy shrapnel fire, with a concealed enemy in the woods in front of it, 800 to 1,000 metres away.

There is almost a refrain in the narrative "our artillery did not fire," "our artillery was silent." Losses increased, and the men began to come back. "On one shelled reverse slope were men of nearly twenty companies." Some parties, led by officers, worked ahead, but they did not go far.

"The officers, almost without exception, took part in the course of the fight with rifle in hand, in order to encourage the wavering, partly retiring sections that had pressed on too boldly."

As a result, the major of the 122d was killed, every company commander, the battalion adjutant, and two-thirds of the other officers fell. Major Reinhardt found himself alone; his adjutant he had sent to bring up medical assistance, his sergeant-major to get more ammunition. No information came back from the firing line and he had no one to send to collect it. Picking up a rifle, he went himself to the front line, found all officers near were casualties, and the men lying still under cover. By his example, he was able to lead the line a little farther, but was knocked over by machine-gun fire whilst firing, kneeling in the high grass. In the confusion and difficulty of keeping direction, some Germans, according to the author, fired on each other. One party, under a lieutenant, on being fired on at 80-100 metres range by a dozen Frenchmen, lost all control of themselves; some bolted, the rest crept into a ditch, and could not be persuaded to go on. In spite of having to pass a shrapnel-swept zone, "a stream of stragglers of all arms rolled across the water meadows back to Longuyon."

It was safer to go forward, as some found. Towards 2.30 p.m., nine hours after the fighting had begun, the divisional commander and his staff appeared on the field, and shortly after the divisional artillery arrived, in time to help to repulse a French counter-attack. Then the Germans dug in and waited until night for another counter-attack, but "contrary to expectations, the enemy had departed."

Short service infantry seem to be of little use once their officers have fallen.

(Reprint of review on pp. 407, 408, 409, July, 1926 number, *British Army Quarterly*.)

Of interest to all officers and of special value to the G-2 Section.

MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL GALLIENI. THE DEFENSE OF PARIS.
(25 AUG. TO 11 SEPT. 1914.) (MÉMOIRES DU MARÉCHAL
GALLIENI. DÉFENSE DE PARIS. 25 AOÛT-11 SEPTEMBRE
1914)

By Gallieni, Marshal of France. French text, 253 pages, 7 maps.
(Paris: Payot & Cie., 1926.) Library No. 940.41139.

These memoirs were written by General Gallieni in 1915 and, according to a preface note were published after the author's death exactly as they were written, without alteration or editing. The book presents a vivid account of the days from August 25 to September 11, 1914, when Paris was threatened by von Kluck's Army.

On the 26th of August, with the defenses of the city entirely incomplete and unready to meet the siege that seemed inevitable, General Gallieni, retired the previous April, was appointed military governor of Paris and commander of the Army of Paris, reporting directly to the minister of war.

The first three chapters describe the author's efforts to complete the defenses, the struggle, only partially successful, to obtain sufficient forces, and the organizing and placing of these forces, covering the events of each day up to September 4.

On September 4, General Gallieni ordered the advance of the Sixth Army against the German First Army, then east of Paris, in conjunction with the attack of the British force and Joffre's Fifth and Ninth Armies from the south. The author devotes two chapters to the conception and carrying out of this plan, which resulted in the German withdrawal and the "race to the sea." He claims it as his own and endeavors to show that General Joffre, far from initiating the maneuver, was forced to give up his own plan of a further withdrawal and defense south of Paris, as a result of Gallieni's independent action. The author further believes that had he been furnished the troops for which he asked and had the maneuver been