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

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"SQUEEZE 'EM AN' BLAST 'EM"

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The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

THE once unusual, but now familiar, mushroom cloud arising from Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 was really a challenge to the Officer Corps of the United States Army. Had that cloud been able to speak it no doubt would have remarked, "Gentlemen of the Army, awake. A new era for your breed is at hand calling for completely new doctrine, tactics, techniques, and not a mere rehash of the old thinking." The cloud could have spoken no further for it was not Benning, Knox, Sill, Bliss, or Leavenworth trained. However, we must accept its challenge—"Not a mere rehash of the old thinking but new. . . ." Let us examine the challenge—objectively, subjectively, and critically.

Objectively, we can know more about the challenge than ever before if we so desire. Why? Because at last there is an excellent, unclassified reference available to the entire Officer Corps—Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-1, *Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons (Unclassified Military Effects)*, March 1955 which was prepared at the Command and General Staff College. This document covers such subjects as atomic weapon effects, assumed atomic weapons and delivery systems, effect radii for the assumed atomic weapons, residual radiation, casualty and damage estimation, troop safety, and selection of weapons and delivery means. While it is true that much of the information is assumed, it teaches procedures and principles. It enables us to reduce, materially, the amount of classified material that must be kept for reference. However, because of the problem of classification and multi and piecemeal documentation, the best means of obtaining a satisfactory intrinsic evaluation of atomic weapons quickly is to attend an orientation course at the Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center, Fort Bliss, Texas, or at Sandia Base, New Mexico.

In examining the challenge subjectively, we must apply the intrinsic knowledge against existing doctrine, tactics, and techniques and evolve an integrated new concept. The basic question before the reader is to satisfy himself whether this technique and doctrine is not merely an adaptation of a new—the atomic—weapon into preconceived concepts or have the authors shaken all the pieces up, poured them out, and evolved a completely new concept? We will find, by using the shaking up, pouring out, and evolving method, that many old truths remain, many others remain but must be modified—still others not only no longer apply, but are dangerous to retain. In making such an evaluation, we must consider such factors as the effect of special weapons upon the doctrine of fire and maneuver, upon the tactical principle of seizing key terrain to ensure the victory, and upon our basic battalion, regimental (combat command), division, corps, and field army concepts of tactical employment with their accompanying concepts of communication, control, and logistical support.

Fire and maneuver has been a factor in war since the appearance of the sling and stone. Until 6 August 1945, the emphasis was on using fire to facilitate maneuver. Since no special weapons were

employed in Korea, we can consider the Korean experience as an extension of World War II experience. During 1951, the "Van Fleet" day of fire became a term to compete with the more conservative expenditures shown in Field Manual 101-10, *Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data*, 8 July 1953. It signified the concept of stressing volume of fire to smother the enemy defenders while our maneuvering force closed on its objective. In World Wars I and II, the Germans maintained that the United States Army concentrated such overwhelming superiority of fire on them that it made an American defeat impossible. This is our military heritage and was initially conceived by General Ulysses S. Grant in front of Petersburg in 1864. As a result, we have stressed the "fire" aspect of "fire and maneuver" since 1864, in contrast to the Confederate and German Armies who won their victories by "maneuver and fire"—with maneuver predominating. Chancellorsville and Tannenberg contrasted to Cold Harbor, Petersburg, and the St. Lô breakthrough illustrate the difference in the two concepts.

An extension of the emphasis on fire by our Army is to modify the principle of "fire and maneuver" to "fire, maneuver and fire." This new principle would be designed to obtain the maximum benefit from special weapons. For ease of illustration, let us call it the principle of "fire one, maneuver, and fire two." We use "fire one" to express the concept of the "Van Fleet" day of fire which implies pulverizing the enemy with such a volume of fire that he is helpless to resist until this fire lifts. Under cover of this saturation fire, our maneuvering force can close on its objective with a minimum of casualties.

At Cannae, 216 B. C., Hannibal's objective was simple—to destroy the Roman Army under Varro. He accomplished it by maneuvering the Romans into a tight, compact, and surrounded mass—compact to the degree that the individual Romans were so crowded that they were unable to use their swords effectively. From that point on it became merely a matter of slaughtering the helpless Romans.

Our doctrine has always reflected Forrest's "get there furstest with the mostest." This doctrine implies a stronger concentration at the point of attack than the enemy. Today, we now are faced with the necessity of remaining widely dispersed to avoid excessive losses from enemy atomic weapons. How then can we "get there furstest with the mostest"? One means is by utilizing highly mobile forces. Yet, are these forces not subject to fire by enemy atomic weapons when they concentrate? A possible solution exists in the concentric concentration on the battlefield as contrasted to the concentration in an area prior to launching the attack. The Battle of Sadowa (Koeniggratz) in 1866 is an outstanding example of concentration on the battlefield rather than in an assembly area prior to the battle. It requires highly trained staffs, disciplined troops, and split second timing to avoid defeat in detail. However, this may be the pattern of the attack of tomorrow. The Battle of Sadowa should be carefully studied and evaluated by War College students.

A critical analysis of the challenge of the mushroom cloud reveals that we must change our old thinking and consider new doctrine, tactics, techniques, and strategy as a continuing operational process

The technique of maneuver must be modified. There will be no place in a 2-sided atomic war for the World War II "coil and strike" technique of fighting an armored division. It is ironic that the march column—the most vulnerable for-

mation to conventional air attack—is the safest formation for protection against atomic attack. The attack from multiple march columns will replace the former coil and strike concept. For infantry units, as well as armored units, the assembly area and attack position method of concentrating in the face of the enemy to co-ordinate an attack must be relegated to history. This will require infantry to be mobile and capable of the rapid reactions and close timing that have always characterized employment of armor. What was formerly considered to be a special operation—advance guard action from a march column—may well be the technique of maneuver in the future.

Decisive engagements will consist of a series of company and battalion size fights over a wide area—placing the responsibility for victory on the much harassed junior officer. Ground combat will be a captain's and, to a lesser extent, a lieutenant colonel's war. It would be a boon if these ranks were given an opportunity—and the lieutenants who will be in these ranks when it comes—to develop during normal peacetime duty and training, and were given an opportunity to act and think for themselves. Initiative in junior officers is not developed by breathing down their necks constantly during normal peacetime service. A captain's war is won by captains; not by inspectors from higher headquarters and by rigid adherence to fixed routines established by some senior commander. Much could be written on this point.

So far, we have considered "fire one," as illustrated by the "Van Fleet" day of fire, and "maneuver," as illustrated by Hannibal at Cannae and Moltke at Sadowa. The next part of the new principle to consider is "fire two." When Hannibal maneuvered the Romans into the compact, surrounded, unmaneuverable mass, he began the slaughter with swords, spears, and like weapons. When we have maneuvered and compressed our enemy into position for the kill, we can employ "fire two" by hitting him with a special weapon or a concentration of special weapons to complete the slaughter or to destroy his ability to continue the fight. Reducing the new concept to its lowest terms: "fire one" to enable us to maneuver; then "maneuver" to force the enemy into a small area or killing ground; and "fire two" to destroy him. The concept is illustrated on page 59. This can be termed the "squeeze and blast" concept. Like all principles, it must be applied flexibly. There will be situations where "fire one and maneuver" may accomplish the desired result; or we may be lucky enough to force the enemy to adopt formations or to concentrate where "fire two" alone will obtain our ends.

The "squeeze and blast" concept can be employed by any commander, regardless of the size of his unit. A low yield weapon may eliminate an enemy force opposing one of our battalions after the enemy has been squeezed. The higher the echelon the bigger is the boom or series of booms required to destroy the opposition. However, the principle remains constant. After that bodacious old man, General "Jube" A. Early, bearded the Yankees in their Washington den in July 1864, Grant sent Sheridan to the Valley of Virginia with very simple instructions: "Find Early and follow him to the death."

The principle of the objective naturally

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will remain constant, but, especially in a 2-sided atomic war, the factors considered in selecting this objective may require modification. This applies from the battalion on up through the field army level. We must select our objectives to enable us to follow our enemy to his death whether we use the "fire one and maneuver" or "fire one, maneuver, and fire two" system. Re-evaluation of our past use of the principle of the objective reveals a great desire to capture big name

too, can use capabilities to offset certain superior of our opponents.

Consider a uation in which the enemy has larg avily armored and mobile forces great utnumbering our mobile armored for If we and the enemy both possess a sl al weapons capability, our atomic capity will be the "Pass at Thermopyl which prevents the enemy from being le to mass his preponderance of me forces against us. If he does mass m, we can destroy them or



places, which many times meant absolutely nothing tactically.

Genghis, the Great Khan, stressed the principle of "divide and conquer." He taught his Noyons that it was far easier to gobble up a large enemy in small bites than all in one big bite. Genghis also stressed the principle of using the enemy's strength as a weapon against him. The highly mobile Mongols, under Subotai, slaughtered the more heavily armed and armored Europeans on the Sajo, in 1242, by using their mobility and deception to turn the enemy's superiority in armor and weapons into a Mongol advantage. We, whittle them down with our special weapons. This gives us the capability of reducing the size of the force that can be concentrated against us at any one time; but it does not remove the possibility of an enemy victory by attrition. In order to avoid defeat by attrition, we must develop the capability to launch effective offensives that will enable us to follow the enemy to his death, not ours. The "squeeze and blast" concept is a method.

A critical analysis of the challenge presented by the mushroom cloud can be extremely revealing. One of our scientists has stated that "the greatest hindrance

in developing a satisfactory doctrine for tactical employment of atomic weapons are the highly successful battalion commanders of World War II." This may sound like an indictment of some of our most brilliant officers—but is it? We can take a new second lieutenant with no experience whatsoever and instill in him any tactical concept that we desire since he has no experience to draw upon that would enable him to analyze those concepts extrinsically. What is the status of the highly successful battalion commander of World War II? This man has considerable tactical knowledge. As a brilliant individual, he evaluates new concepts and relates them to his experience. Furthermore, most of these World War II battalion commanders are now senior commanders or staff officers in key positions where they wield considerable influence over our doctrine. We cannot expect these men to fail to examine the challenge of the mushroom cloud extrinsically—woe unto us if they did not. However, we do expect this analysis to be of the type where their successful past is considered along with new developments to produce a completely new concept that considers all aspects of the problem and does not merely integrate each new development into an old—World War II—pattern on a shotgun or patchwork basis. Any brilliant World War II battalion commander will do this automatically. The pseudogreats may not.

Where are the weak spots in our doctrine. Certainly it would be inadvisable to air them for a potential enemy, but we can apply three factors against our current doctrine and see how it stacks up. First, *is it simple*? Is it so designed that there are simplified versions available at the various echelons of headquarters based on providing working guidance for each level commander on a "need-to-know"—really a "must know"—basis? Can the people who must implement it understand it? Will it work? Can a frontline battalion commander request and receive an atomic strike in a period of time which will not merely result in a lost opportunity? Is it sufficiently and simply documented so that officers can study it without having to become part of a school quota?

Second, *is it realistic*? Does it face all the facts and give an appropriate and workable solution? Is is based on antiquated principles with shotgun inserts of thought?

Third, *is it overclassified*? Have we kept so much of our doctrine in the higher classification levels that *Time* Magazine is a better source of information to the average officer than an accessible official manual? Is there any reason for not unclassifying certain portions of it? Will publication of an unclassified text provide a potential enemy with any information he does not already possess?

Utilizing the index numbers of General Semantics as an evaluation aid, we know that war 1955 would not be the same as war 1945 since weapons 1955 will not be the same as weapons 1945. We also know that enemy 1955 would not be enemy 1945. Since factors 1955 are considerably different from factors 1945, doctrine 1955 and tactics 1955 must be different from doctrine 1945 and tactics 1945. Strategy has often been referred to as an "art" and we teach "military science" in our colleges and universities. With the tempo of change in the atomic age we must change our thinking and consider tactics, technique, and strategy as a continuing "operational process" where process 1954 is not the same as process 1955 but is constantly being reviewed, revised, and adapted to keep pace with changes in weapons, national culture, political concepts, production means, and the myriads of other variables that affect both the delivery and use of weapons on a battlefield and the willingness of the public to permit the use of those weapons.