










Military Review



1922

February

1972



Every profession needs a good professional journal. The *Military Review* meets this need. For fifty years it has been held in the highest esteem by our own Army and in military circles throughout the world. The Spanish and Portuguese language editions have provided a very important channel of professional communication and enrichment between the military forces of North and South America.


I commend the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Editor and Staff of *Military Review* as the *Review* enters its second half-century of publication.

Bob Froehlke

Robert F. Froehlke
Secretary of the Army



MESSAGES FOR THE MILITARY REVIEW



For the past half century, the *Military Review* has chronicled an era in which the United States Army met unprecedented challenges with matchless achievements. When the first issue appeared in 1922, the Army was undergoing a trying period of postwar adjustment, further complicated by the years of the Great Depression that followed. Then came the all-out drive to victory in World War II, a rapid demobilization, the memorable response to aggression in Korea, and finally the difficult defense of freedom in Southeast Asia. For nearly half of those 60 years, a major portion of our strength has been on guard in Europe and the Far East, contributing in large measure to international stability.

Throughout these events and times of trial and triumph, the *Military Review* has provided a forum for military thought, history, and commentary. Ideas, proposals, analyses, and arguments appearing in the *Review* have had an immeasurable impact upon two generations of Army leaders. I am confident that this professional journal will continue to provide intellectual nourishment and stimulation to its host of readers.

W. C. Westmoreland

W. C. Westmoreland
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

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VOL LII FEB 1972 NO 2

Library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 Rev

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.



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The Thrust of the Nixon Doctrine

Colonel Richard M. Jennings, *United States Army*

The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or its agencies. —Editor.

THE President outlined the first elements of the Nixon doctrine at Guam in 1969, expanded them in theory and action in 1970, and, in 1971, further updated and clarified the long-range guidelines for US foreign policy. These guidelines, along with his previous statements, frame a doctrine that skillfully adjusts US policy to historical change. However, a challenge remains in carrying it out.

The Nixon doctrine recognizes the increased capabilities of Free World nations, the diversity within the Communist camp, and the national interests and domestic mood of Americans. It seeks peace. Yet it recognizes that, realistically, peace and stability are best achieved not by appeasement, but by keeping international forces in equilibrium and moderation. It blends these factors into a flexible foreign policy of neither overcommitment nor isolation.

The doctrine is based on partnership and a gradual assumption of greater responsibility by US allies and regional and international organizations. One may view it as the relinquishing of US power by degrees. It probably more accurately fosters the redistribution of responsibility among the Free World nations in a way that encourages their initiatives and development. It accepts the idea of an international system of more multipolarity and diversity. It is a policy stressing diplomacy and negotiations between Free World countries and their Communist competitors yet designed to prevent a destabilizing collapse of the balance of power in Europe and Asia.

NIXON DOCTRINE

Realistic Deterrence

The administration plans to back up the doctrine of partnership and negotiations with strength-not power as an end in itself, but power adequate for the purpose of moving toward peace. This strength will be provided by a defense policy of “realistic deterrence” of all levels of conflict, relying on both US and allied strategic and general purpose forces.

Devising supporting programs to carry out the Nixon doctrine calls for closely integrated planning among the US Government agencies and departments that deal with foreign affairs and national security. Under the policy guidance of the President and the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Defense Department, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Agency for International Development or the proposed International Development Corporation and International Development Institute must carry out a well-balanced program, its component elements being mutually supporting. This latter point “would seem to be a key one.”



Colonel Richard M. Jennings is a graduate of the German General Staff College and the US Army War College and is now completing a Ph. D. in International Relations at Georgetown University. He has

held various field artillery command positions in Europe and Asia, including a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 9th Infantry Division Artillery in Vietnam. A recent assignment was with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Alternatives


However, there has been a trend, perhaps influenced by the weariness of the American public with war and foreign commitments, to see the key point of the doctrine as US withdrawal from overseas involvement. Granted, the US withdrawal from Vietnam is a salient feature of the doctrine, but is that its general thrust?

There are also persons outside the Government who would prefer to see, instead of a gradual redistribution of power and a balanced military program, an immediate pullout of all US troops now assisting the defense of our allies in Western Europe and east Asia. Others say we could find a cheap solution by heavy reliance on strategic nuclear weapons. Others assert our “strategy for tomorrow” should be one of ships. Admittedly, in view of the mood of the American people, any strategy which might keep down the risk of spilling American blood overseas has attractive features.

We might then ask whether the United States should retain its present program of balanced elements or shift more toward one of these alluring alternatives. Why has the administration taken the harder course? To answer these questions, let us take a closer look at the Nixon doctrine and “realistic deterrence.”

The Nixon doctrine plans to contribute to a stable, peaceful world first by recognizing the legitimate national interests of all countries and competing forces and trends. Through negotiations, it would attempt to reduce tensions and problems. In working toward this objective, the United States will operate as much as possible with its allies as a team in the economic, diplomatic, and security areas, and yet diverse interests would be respected.

Foreign policy actions will be more multilateral. The United States will pass on

*US Navy*

Strong strategic nuclear retaliatory forces are integral to the total force concept.

to other states some of the responsibilities that it had to assume during the more desperate years of the cold war. The key to the doctrine is not US withdrawal from foreign affairs, but, rather, the keeping of commitments. The doctrine outlines a long-range approach for sustained US participation in international affairs.

The Nixon doctrine stresses the increased importance of multilateral political and economic actions. However, it recognizes that military power is not obsolete, and defense measures will not be ignored.

The partnership of the United States and its allies will be supported by realistic deterrence based on a “total force” concept. The “total force” concept means combining US and allied military and related resources in a way to capitalize on available assets. These Free World resources would include Active and Reserve forces and an appropriate security assistance program.

Under this policy, the United States will keep enough retaliatory strategic nuclear forces to deter a nuclear attack by an aggressor. If a nuclear power threatened nuclear blackmail or a conventional attack backed by nuclear weapons on a US ally or a country whose survival was considered vital to the US national interest—such as West Germany or Japan—the United States would provide a shield of nuclear and conventional power to support that country.

The US strategic nuclear deterrence will consist of the “triad” of land-based missiles, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Added to these will be civil defense measures, a limited antiballistic missile defense, and tactical nuclear weapons.

General Purpose Forces

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has explained that the United States will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces

NIXON DOCTRINE

with our allies for meeting simultaneously a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.¹ President Richard M. Nixon has stated, viewing the strategic impact of approximate nuclear parity, that general purpose forces “now play a greater role in deterring attacks than at any time since the nuclear era began.”²

Concerning the precepts upon which general purpose forces will be built, the President has stated that: “Our capabilities must rest on our Allies’ strength, strong US forces overseas, and the availability of credible reinforcement.” He brings out that weakness in conventional forces could invite conventional attack. Also, in case of conventional attack, the United States should have more than one option to use. President Nixon stated further: “We must not be in the position of being able to employ only strategic weapons to meet challenges to our interests.”

Regarding a Free World country’s internal defense, however, the President’s message is clear. “Future guerrilla and subversive threats should be dealt with primarily by the indigenous forces of our allies.” Such allies may receive economic and military assistance from the United States, but they must show that they are doing everything in their power to combat both the causes and effects of the insurgency.

On the other hand, the United States would not sit by passively while internal minorities,

aided by foreign powers and using the guise of wars of “national liberation,” take over Free World countries by force. The United States will assist Free World governments who are working for the welfare and defense of their people, but the United States will critically appraise the situation and the potential effectiveness of US aid.

Flexibility

The strategy does not dictate that the contributions of our allies will always be ground forces. Many of our allies are highly industrialized, maritime nations. For example, our allies together have sizable naval strength and about five times the merchant marine tonnage of the Soviet Union. The buildup of Japanese air and naval strength to defend against the Soviet Pacific Fleet, for example, is a logical contribution from that skilled, technical country. Similarly keyed to our allies’ capabilities will be our security assistance program, part military sales and part grant aid.

The doctrine keeps enough flexibility of action to prevent its easy circumvention by a potential enemy. It obviously applies to various areas differently. It speaks of acting when US “interests” or the survival of a state “vital” to the US security are threatened, but leaves these definitions vague. It raises the threshold for the commitment of US ground troops in subtheater wars or insurgencies, but does not rule out that course of action. It speaks of having the options to meet aggression with measured force, but not necessarily limited to the level chosen by our enemy. Reports from Moscow indicate that the doctrine’s flexibility has left our competitors guessing.

Planners Challenged

Implementing the Nixon doctrine has challenged the planners of US Government

1 *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1972-1976 Program and the 1972 Defense Budget*, 9 March 1971, “Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,” Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1971.

2 President Richard M. Nixon’s statements are from his *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building for Peace*, 25 February 1971.

agencies and departments, for, clearly, political, economic, and military programs must be well coordinated.

The doctrine stresses the role of the State Department in using diplomacy to negotiate solutions for complex issues and to encourage a more productive international dialogue. The Department of State has the hard job of bringing the interests of the Free World allies into coordinated policies and representing our views in regional and international organizations. Also, it faces the problem of devising means to better spread the advantages of technology throughout the world.

The United States must increase foreign aid in order to assist our allies in shouldering their responsibilities with less direct US involvement abroad. The State Department will still have the main responsibility for coordinating economic, security, and humanitarian aid. Depending on Congress' action on the President's aid reform measures, we may have a new International Development Corporation and International Development Institute to replace the Agency for International Development in administering our international economic actions.

In carrying out the Department of Defense strategy of preventing wars by backing political and economic measures with "realistic deterrence," each military department has an indispensable role.

Service Roles

The Navy Department's role will be vital. It will add to deterrence by providing submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It has the further missions of maintaining the capability to destroy an enemy's naval forces, raid an enemy's coast, and keep our wartime sealanes open. In the naval area, the Secretary of Defense's budget report

stresses the need for increased cooperation with allied naval forces and for additional sealift. The Marine Corps will emphasize a naval role and the readiness of small combat units afloat.

The Air Force's contribution should be a major one in the future. It will continue to provide intercontinental ballistic missiles and manned bombers for the nuclear deterrent. It must maintain its ability to obtain air superiority, to interdict, to conduct long-range reconnaissance, and to support US and allied ground troops with tactical air support. Stressing more use of "bare-base kits," it can provide the mobility for combat-ready Air Force and Army teams to move rapidly wherever required.

The Army will add realism to deterrence, particularly against takeover of land areas by force. It will provide, in Western Europe, the mainstay of US deterrence of Communist invasion and be a visible reassurance to our allies during this era of critical negotiations. In addition to adding deterrence worldwide, it will bear the main burden of advising and training allied military forces. It may have the job of supporting them with helicopter mobility, helicopter and artillery firepower, and logistic support. Further, the Army may contribute to international peace-keeping forces if requested by international organizations.

Thus, the Nixon doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence, as now conceived, call for strong political and economic programs backed by balanced armed forces. How does this plan differ from the concepts of withdrawal to "Fortress America" or of relying on nuclear weapons or on a maritime strategy? Why not shift to one of these strategies which seem to require less US effort?

A precipitous unilateral withdrawal of US forces from the Eurasian landmass

NIXON DOCTRINE

could seriously upset the world balance of power. Studies conducted by Government planners in 1970 on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and strategy showed, in particular, how important Western Europe is for US security. Unilateral withdrawals there could lead to a lack of confidence of European NATO in US resolve and could torpedo ongoing negotiations such as those on mutual and balanced force reductions.

Total reliance on nuclear weapons or a “tripwire” strategy would fail to insure deterrence at all levels as outlined by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The possible results of beginning nuclear warfare make their use credible only in desperate situations. The utility of strategic forces to deter lower levels of aggression and to discourage destabilizing political pressure can be expected to decrease in the future. We cannot return to the outmoded strategy of massive retaliation,

Relying on a maritime strategy would have serious defects. Surface naval

power has eroded in favor of aircraft and submarines. As more sophisticated aircraft, aerospace detection devices, submarines, missiles, and other lethal weapons develop, the vulnerability of surface ships will further increase. That this has not yet been fully realized by the American public attests to the enthusiasm of ship proponents. (The British realized it several years ago.)

While Soviet cruisers and destroyers, lacking air cover, are little military threat outside their close-in waters, they do halve the ability, in cold war-type situations, of interposing themselves and blocking the operations of Western warships or amphibious landings. Thus, surface navies have partially neutralized each other's ability to exert political pressure on the seas' littorals. The United States would be unwise to return to a 19th-century-type strategy of surface ships at a time when they are more vulnerable and less effective.

Nor is reliance on a combination of naval and airpower, while it may appear



Highly industrialized allies like Japan might contribute airpower to a strategy of realistic deterrence.

like an antiseptic solution, a workable long-term strategy. The demonstrated ability and willingness to use air and naval forces to support a partner, while useful, has yet to prove decisive and ranks lower on the scale of effectiveness than a demonstrated ability and willingness to use ground forces supported by naval and airpower.

Most scholars of international relations believe that the likelihood of forms of conflict in the coming decades appear to be, in order:

- Low-intensity conflict, particularly in developing areas.
- Nonnuclear, subtheater conflict.
- Nonnuclear theater warfare (involving the existence of a major power).
- Tactical nuclear theater warfare.
- Strategic nuclear exchange.

It is apparent that, in the most likely forms of conflict, ground forces will still be the decisive element.


If, as some theorists believe, the psychological use of military power will be more important in the future than its actual use, it further behooves us to maintain balanced military forces. Unbalanced defense forces which could not actually halt aggression against land areas will not fool a

potential aggressor for long. Deterrence must be realistic.

In the psychological arena, it would probably also be wise to expose propaganda voyages by small Soviet flotillas to Hawaiian, Alaskan, or Indian Ocean waters for what they are, rather than blowing them up as real military threats.

Thus, the alternate strategies, despite their surface attractiveness, have serious weaknesses. Neither the "Fortress America," the nuclear, the maritime, nor the air-naval power strategies can properly support US foreign policy and national security goals.

The acid test for strategy and its implementing program is whether it can provide adequate support for national policy and the goals that policy pursues. The United States has pledged to keep its commitments. Accomplishing this while carrying out the delicate process of redistributing responsibility and initiative among the Free World nations, without imperiling world stability, will not be easy. The program that supports it must be well conceived and skillfully executed. The political process must be protected by a credible deterrence against all levels of threat. This is the thrust of the Nixon doctrine and its balanced supporting program.



THE DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMY

Morris Janowitz

THE mass army based on conscription with extensive reserves is being phased out of existence in Western industrialized countries. During the 1970's, the force structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be altered with profound implications for international relations and domestic civil-military relations. The decline of the mass armed force takes place under conditions of advanced industrialism, but reflects both technological and socio-political factors. In NATO countries, the movement is toward shorter length of conscript service and toward a militia with six months' active duty service and greater reliance on an all-volunteer system. In the United States, the termination of conscription was one issue on which antiwar Congressmen and pressure groups could unite with the Nixon administration. The result was the political decision not to extend Selective Service legislation beyond 1 July 1973, and the initiation of planning by military officials to reach a "zero draft" call by 1 January 1973 so that there would be a six-month period for trial and transition.

The ending of the draft in the United States will have a deep impact on military manpower systems in Western Europe. It will not work to maintain existing conscript systems. The impact will be the reverse in that it will push NATO nations toward an all-volunteer system or toward new forms of militia systems.

Great Britain introduced an all volunteer system in 1960, over a decade ago, and the 1970's will see further over-all reductions in its man power because of economic pressure and the sheer difficulties of recruitment. Since 1968, NATO countries have reduced, or are debating the reduction of, the length of conscript service. More radical measures are certain to be examined after the end of the draft in the United States.

The Netherlands, with its powerful commitment to NATO principles and



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US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and is Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, a nationwide group of social scientists and educators engaged in research on military institutions, war, revolution, arms control, and peacekeeping. He is author of the book, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.

A version of this article was presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 18-20 November 1971.

strategy, is openly debating and planning for the conditions under which it will institute an all-volunteer system. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, Socialist Minister of Defense, has advocated an all-volunteer 'cadre augmented by a short-term, six-month conscript militia.

In Italy, and to a lesser extent France, similar debate is in course. In these two countries, the size and type of manpower systems are not only related to international relations, but to internal security so that the consequences of the debate on the shift toward a more volunteer force has been retarded.

Historical Transformation

In any historical period, the military establishment is both a reflection of the larger society and an institution with a distinctive environment and ethos. Thus, the end of the US draft represents a dramatic historical transformation in contemporary American society. It is truly the end of a historical epoch in the rise and decline of the mass armed force.

The mass armed force has its origins in both technological and socio-political factors. The technology of the mass army was rooted in an organizational system created by increased firepower of the infantry and artillery, plus improved means of transportation of military personnel and supplies. Historical epochs do not start or conclude on a specific text book date. The technological basis of the mass army was in operation during the Civil War and in the Franco Prussian conflict, but essential prototype elements, especially organizational elements, could already be found in the Napoleonic Wars.

However, there are strong reasons to ground the origin of the mass armed force in the socio-political struggle of the American

and French Revolutions and the emergent forms of modern nationalism which they produced. These armed rebellions marked the end of the post-feudal armies as the revolutionary leaders armed the rank and file.

Citizenship Factor

The idea that citizenship involved the right and the duty to bear arms—truly a revolutionary notion—came into being. In fact, military service was an essential element in establishing and expanding the scope of modern citizenship. To be a citizen of the nation-state was to have the right to bear arms in defense of the state. (It is striking to recall that, during World Wars I and II, elements in the black community in the United States demanded the right to serve in combat units as an expression of their aspirations for full citizenship.)

In Europe, after the French Revolution, the mass armed force developed professional cadres which were augmented by a conscript and mobilization system. The professional officers were highly distinct from the rest of society although the institution rested on an ethos of citizenship participation. But this was not the first time in the history of political and institutional change that the outcome of political protest movements produced unanticipated consequences. In the United States, the professional cadres were smaller, and the development of the mass armed force was not institutionalized until the turn of the century.

However, professional cadres did serve the political and ideological cause of nationalism since the officer corps of Western Europe had no difficulty in transferring its feudal-based allegiance to the modern bureaucratic nation-state. A corresponding process took place in the United States, in that the small cadres of military officers accepted civilian supremacy as a desirable format. In both Western Eu-

rope and the United States, mass armies supplied the opportunity for lower classes to participate directly in the development of national polity in a manner they could readily manage and appreciate.

Political Affirmation

Service in the conscript forces in the 19th and 20th centuries for a significant segment of the population—even after the slaughters of World War I and up through World War II—was an act of political affirmation. In Europe, it undercut internationalism and Socialist political tendencies, and, in the United States, it was an equally strong expression of popular nationalism. The right to participate in the conscript armed force, as much as the extension of the franchise, was at the core of the political emergence of modern nationalism.

The emergence of a distinctive and professional officer corps, with its strong sense of separation from civilian society, brought with it its own elements of transformation. Its sheer increase required changes in organization. In Europe since the close of the Franco-Prussian War, and in the United States since the Root reforms and the mobilization of World War I, a dominant trend in the mass armed force and in civil-military relations until 1945 has been the “civilianization” of the armed forces.

Preparation for war and war-making gives the military its particular institutional climate. However, the boundary between military forces and civilian society weakens as total mobilization requires that a larger and larger segment of the population become part of the war apparatus. Air warfare has meant that entire populations are targets for military action. Military leaders must share authority with civilian scientists as technology becomes more and more complex and the influx of civilians into the

officer corps during periods of mobilization undermined traditional forms of authority and command.

Within the professional military, the source of social recruitment into the officer corps broadens, the concentration of personnel with civilian-type skills increases, and the patterns of military authority shift from authoritarian command to organizational decision making.

Equalitarian Ideology

The process of civilianization of the mass military is not only an outgrowth of technology and organizational control, but the vast resources required for military operations and the need for justification of prolonged hostilities and massive destruction require an equalitarian ideology, both in democratic and totalitarian societies. Progressively, men are no longer prepared to fight for nationalist sentiments alone, but the cause must be seen as morally justified. For their legitimacy, military institutions require direct civilian control. Although the expanded resources of the military permit it to operate as a very powerful pressure group, the threat of old fashioned military dictatorship seems remote.

Again, both technological and socio political factors associated with World War II started the decline of mass armies in the affluent nation-states of the West although it has taken 25 years for the process to become fully self-evident. The deployment of nuclear weapons marked the technological transformation of the armed forces of NATO nations as the sheer destructive power of these instruments altered the scope of war-making. But the introduction of nuclear weapons per se did not dictate the gradual erosion of mass armies; it was only a precondition.

In advanced industrialized societies, both the purpose of military institutions



Mitteilungen fuer den Soldaten

Helmut Schmidt, West German Defense Minister, has advocated an all-volunteer cadre augmented by a short-term, six-month conscript militia.

has been subjected to massive criticism, and the moral worth of conscript service has been shaken. Hedonism, personal expression, opposition to the style of life of the military establishment, resistance to military authority, plus a new, diffuse, moral criticism have become paramount among young people.

The destructive potential of nuclear weapons serves not only to produce new forms of pacifism and moral opposition to violence, but to heighten the realistic understanding of the effective interdependence of national societies. The use of force has traditionally operated within circumscribed limits; the new moral and political definitions serve to generate a powerful sense of neutralism. Literacy, patterns of mass consumption, and political rhetoric have emerged as more important than military service as hallmarks of citizenship.

The performance of US forces in Southeast Asia, of course, has supplied an emotional basis to emerging popular pacifism. These

THE MASS ARMY

trends are concentrated among an important minority of young people, but can be found in varying degrees in all parts of the social structure. Nationalism itself is muted and mixed with diffused but powerful feelings of trans nationalism. Thus, in West Germany, reluctance to serve in the armed force under a broad definition of conscientious objection has meant, in recent years, that up to 10 percent of each age cohort are exempted from service. The notion of a pluralistic society weakens the very foundation of popular military service.

Comparable trends are at work in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but in vastly different cultural and political settings. Totalitarian control eliminates political and moral debate about conscription. Thus, published opinion polls from Poland indicate that young people, while they profess “appropriate” answers to general questions about military service, on specific details reveal strongly negative attitudes toward the

realities of conscript service. Only a small minority were positively attracted. Youth discontent is widely acknowledged in the Soviet Union, and it has its implications on conscript service.

In the Soviet military, authorities have to deal with their forms of social turbulence. They have reduced the term of Soviet conscripts, emphasized volunteer recruitment wherever possible, and closed important branches of the armed forces to all but volunteer personnel. The military has been downgraded as a locus of citizenship training; this function has been transferred to premilitary training in high school and involves military personnel assigned to this task. The military forces of the Soviet Union serve as an integral element of the internal security forces, both at home and in the Warsaw Pact nations.

Political Decisions

These political realities, plus the validity given to the Chinese threat, mean that



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The technological basis of the mass army was in operation during the Civil War.

personal, moral, and even political opposition to military service has no, or little, direct immediate impact on manpower policy. But one should not underestimate the extent to which Soviet authorities are concerned and must take into consideration the attitudes of indifferent youth. In the United States and in NATO, the equivalent problems exercise strong weight in influencing the balance of political decisions.

The introduction of the all-volunteer armed force in the United States means that available manpower—as much or even more than technology—will influence military strategy in the decade of the 1970's. The President's Commission projected an all-volunteer force of approximately 2.6 million or slightly less than that of the pre-Vietnam buildup. At the time, that projection already appeared to be a major miscalculation or self-deception.

In the spring of 1971, civilian officials in the Department of Defense were indicating publicly that the post Selective Service force would be approximately 2.26 million, while privately they indicated a more realistic level of two million. However, the prospect of a force of 1.6 to 1.76 million cannot be ruled out if not by 1976, in the late 1970's. The major reduction will, of course, be concentrated in the ground forces.

Economic Pressure

The rundown in over-all manpower in part reflects deliberate national policy. US policy requires a smaller force. But sheer economic pressure will be equally decisive. Political necessities will press for a reduction of military expenditures below the 1971-72 figures of acknowledged nine percent of the gross national product although any such reduction will be slow and most difficult to achieve. In particular, at any given level of expenditure under an

all-volunteer force, personnel costs will rise as a percent age of the military budget.

Drawing on the British experience, US personnel costs can be expected to rise from above 40 percent to close to 60 percent during this decade. Like wise, unless there is a drastic alteration in weapons procurement policy, the cost of the armaments to be procured will rise.

Thus, there are two essential questions: How can US forces be redeployed and professionally reorganized so as to articulate with a meaningful and politically responsible foreign policy? How can the military as it moves to an all-volunteer force be recruited, educated, compensated, and organized so as to prevent it from becoming isolated from the main current of civilian society?

While there is an element of risk, a military force of 1.75 million men with eight percent of the gross national product, and with this percentage declining gradually, could 'Support a meaningful military policy of effective and minimum deterrence rather than a strategy of a delicate balance of terror. An effective all-volunteer armed force will require basic professional and organizational changes.* Such a military force would undertake a variety of national emergency tasks which cannot be performed by civilian organizations, and the pursuit of which tasks would enhance its military effectiveness.

The all-volunteer armed force represents the end of the historical phase of the mass armed force. The rise of the mass armed force was not purely a military development, but reflected the socio-political trends of nationalism. The internal tensions and crisis in legitimacy within the Armed Forces has

* For an analysis of the elements of required change, see Morris Janowitz "Adapting the Armed Forces to an All-Volunteer System," in *The Public Interest*, March 1972, forthcoming.

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meant that the decline of mass conscription, although delayed by the war in Vietnam, will take place rapidly and without significant resistance in American society.

The form and character of the all volunteer force will not be a purely military phenomenon, but will reflect the character of the larger society. The all-volunteer armed force will be associated especially in those elements of American society which continue to be the carriers of traditional nationalism. But the military can both reflect and

incorporate new forms of transnationalism which are already in being, both in its own ranks and in civilian society.

Under these circumstances, it will be the duty of civilian society to assume an active role in directing the military to redefine its professional perspective and to help it to understand that peacekeeping through a military presence, deterrence, and participation in the control of national emergencies is the modern definition of the heroic role.

In looking to the future, the Army must preserve the values and traditions which have made our Army great, while accepting the challenge to build an even better Army. The truth of the matter is that the Army is more skilled and capable of dealing with social change ... while still preserving worthwhile traditional values ... than most institutions.

General William C. Westmoreland

Genesis to Revelation

**Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall,
*United States Army Reserve, Retired***

TO BEGIN with, the simple statement that the Golden Anniversary of the Military Review coincides with the 50th year of my launch into military writing should at least give me a theme. I do not imply, however, that a man wears as well as a magazine.

At the semi-centennial party, this journal understandably is looking backward a bit. At the same time, I am doing my own military review of how I got this way.

My foundation for what came to be the major part of my life's work was hard field soldiering—two years in Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces—during which I commanded two rifle companies and one casual company, this despite the fact that I had first gone to the front as a line sergeant.

I was 19 when I returned home in late

1919. Prior to enlistment, I had moved up through sophomore English in high school, while taking no history. That was as far as my formal education ever extended in these two subjects. If it was enough, it was only so because my father had perfect command of the language and his sons listened.

Still, I cannot imagine any circumstances by which I might have entered upon professional writing, much less would I have matured as a military writer, had it not been for experience in war.

What I learned mainly was what I saw right before my nose. Furthermore, in managing several companies, I had an unlimited opportunity to experiment with some of my own ideas about how to bring people along. These did not always agree with the book. Nonetheless, the greatest

GENESIS TO REVELATION

value of my war service, especially the combat portion, was that it stirred my curiosity immeasurably.

With my black company, I shipped for home from Brest in September 1919. We sailed on the transport *Koningen der Nederlander*. We were 15 days at sea, with every day a misery and all hands being seasick. My only personal experience at quelling a mutiny was during that voyage.

An Education

A more significant contribution to my education came about as six of us officers sat every night in a poker game, and five of us went broke before we passed the Statue of Liberty. We learned too late that the sixth, a major, was a professional gambler from French Lick Springs dealing from a marked deck. We knew we had been “took,” but, since the five suckers were about to be dropped from the Army, squawking would be vain as there would be no charges preferred. As a result, after the company was demobilized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, I arrived at my hometown, El Paso, Texas, \$1.50 ahead of bankruptcy. The streetcar fare to the family



Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, US Army Reserve, Retired, served in World Wars I and II and was with the 8th Army during the Korean War. A columnist and war correspondent, he

*was an editorial writer and military critic for the Detroit News for many years. His two new books, *Crimsoned Prairie, the wars with the Plains Indians, 1860-1890, and Bringing Up the Rear*, his personal memoirs, are soon to be published.*

bungalow was 10 cents. Walking to the loop to catch the trolley, I passed a bookstore. In the window was a copy of John Masefield's Gallipoli for \$1.50. Thinking that I might as well go bust as stay the way I was, I bought the book and walked the five miles home.

Military Library

That volume was the beginning of my military library. There are now 4,200 books in it. The growth was painfully slow at first, for Jasper Gaunt stayed right on my tail. I cannot account for this buying of things which I could not afford apart from idle curiosity whetted by my AEF years. I was not working toward a planned, or even vaguely foreseen, future.

The one favor done the returned man after that war was that, if he lacked a high school diploma and had so far matured that it would be infra dig to join a bunch of kids in a classroom, he could enter college without the ticket. There was no GI Bill, and all costs had to be met by the party of the first part.

This was a bit of a problem, but it was eased for my duration at Texas College of Mines by two gimmicks. By putting a five-dollar gold piece on a punchboard and selling chances for a dime each, I could clear \$17. Equally profitable was my debauching of the freshman English class. Engineers abhor writing, or so they did in those days. There were 18 men in the class, half of them ex-officers. The professor required one essay each week. So, I wrote 18 and sold 17 for one dollar apiece. Everybody knew it. Professor Taylor would say: “You read that well, Mr. Broderick, but it's not up to your best style, Mr. Marshall.” What that might be, he never told me, nor did he ever suggest that I might ponder becoming a writer by trade.

My duration at Texas College of Mines was four months, and I quitted without a single credit. My downfall came of a

flying tackle by Major Bill Neyland, one of football's most shining figures. I normally played end. We had lost quarterbacks two Saturdays running, one with a broken leg, the other shot through the heart with a rifle while stealing melons for a lark. So, on a Monday, I was made quarterback with no understudy.

Departs College

On the first play of the game, I ran back Neyland's kickoff; he hit me, spun me in the air, and I somersaulted, coming down on my right shoulder. The scapula broke in two places. Having no substitute, I played more than 59 minutes in that condition. We won, but I lost any prospect of playing football again. When basketball season opened, I attempted a comeback at running guard, and, in , my first second of play in our first game, I was again crippled badly, at which point I said: "To hell with college forevermore."

Thereafter, I tried brickmaking, working in the mines, prospecting, selling, and cowpunching, only to dud out on everything to which I laid my hand. I had lost the confidence in self that my Army service had given me, and my phosgened throat was again misbehaving and souring my stomach. Such were not the causes of my failures, but their consequence. I wore down stumbling from rut to rut. There have been other black periods in my life although none for the same reason and none concerning which I have such a blessed blotting out of memory. Evenings I continued to read my few military books, more than all else as an escape from reality.

In these years, the 1st Cavalry Division had formed at Fort Bliss, Texas. In 1922, when I took the examination for recommission in the Army, I was \$2,700 in debt with a family to support. Misery


does love company, nothing else making it tolerable. My fears would have been greater had I not found the company of lieutenants in worse financial straits than myself.

General Robert L. Howze (whose sons Robert and Hamilton were themselves later to become generals) then commanded the division. I had written two pieces about him for a local veterans' paper, and he was very kind to me. So was Brigadier General Joe Castner, the Assistant Division Commander, whom I had met in Europe. An expert with a 12-gauge shotgun, he took me shooting. Old Joe was the man to discover that there were snipes in the Rio Grande Valley. I was briefly Assistant G2 under Major Earl Landreth, a very gentle boss who knew I had plenty of trouble.

Proposition

The De la Huerta Revolution was then going in Mexico, and Juarez seethed with unrest. The situation wholly preoccupied the time of the G3, Major Adna Chaffee, that noble spirit who died much too soon after founding the modern Armored Force. Chaffee was a quiet, introspective man possessed of that warm quality that the Scots call innerliness. One day, he came to our office, sat on the edge of my desk and asked, "Marshall, can you write?" I said, "No Sir." He said, "I think you can; you have the phraseology of a writer." I asked if that really meant anything, and he said that he believed so.

Then, he came up with the proposition. He was already polo representative of the division. This required some writing. The Army had just saddled him with another writing task, dealing with the press. This may have been the birth of the public information officer idea. He had time for neither task. If I would take over both chores, he would let me work his ponies.



US Army

**Major General Claire Chennault in 1944.
Painting by Tom Lea.**

I was not an active player ; my health did not permit, but I loved to hack about. Since he was paying for the hay, I had not one thing to lose.

About how to handle the PIO job, I had no doubt from the beginning. There were two controlling ideas: To do it well, I would have to know as much about the division as did its commander, and I would cultivate the press on a person-to-person basis, seeking friendship before asking a favor. Fifty years later, I have no better advice than that to give a young officer in this line of work. The ideal way to operate, it is too seldom done.

As to composition, I held with the few rules of thumb which practice had convinced me were sound. Knowing almost nothing of the rules of English grammar, then or later, I would still add nothing to the basic prescription:

- Every sentence must express at least one idea clearly.
- Economy of words is the correct principle, so shy at adjectives.

- There is always the right word, the strong word, so keep thinking and do not settle for a weaker one.

Above and beyond these reflections on the bounds within which one composes is the absolute conviction that writing is not an art or a special talent, but strictly a discipline. To achieve a style finally, one must do some writing every day, no matter how much it hurts. Forget the hangover. One's physical feelings have nothing to do with what may come forth when sitting at the mill. I have tried on days when everything seemed like peaches down in Georgia only to draw a blank, and there were times when I felt wretched from bourbon or tequila, and the stuff just flowed with never a letup. Do not ask me why.

Before I separated from the 1st Cavalry Division, to my utter astonishment, I had sold three stories to national magazines. However, I still was not, in Winston Churchill's phrases, trying "to build a small literary house for myself." Solidly on

my feet again, I felt I might make a better living elsewhere.

The trifling victories and the brief fling at writing had not caused my changed outlook. My salvation had come from the company I kept. These good comrades made me feel useful again. They included Al Gruenther, later to command Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe; Claire Chennault of Flying Tigers fame; Alex Surles, one of our first information chiefs whose son and namesake is now a lieutenant general; Terry Allen who commanded two World War II combat divisions; and many others.

Several weeks after ending my bobtailed cavalry service, and just 48 hours after becoming a cub reporter, I had become so deeply entrenched in the wonderland of journalism that a GI can loaded with satchel charges could not have blasted me out. The fast firming of the new base came of happy accident, combined with fortune unbelievable. To this was added some initiative born of the new confidence. The

story is too long for this article, besides being unbelievable. Suffice to say, once in, I was happy to be stuck there.

As I moved along, I began to add a few new rules of my own:

- Being awkward at the typewriter, I decided it was best to concentrate and say it right the first time.
- Never waste sweat trying for a clever lead, and avoid the dull, allinclusive lead whenever possible.
- Every piece of writing has a natural length to beget understanding, and giving it more, or less, is bad practice.
- The art of interviewing lies in distinguishing between the trivial and the important. Good listening does it.
- Take your time. Hurry, hurry is the death of fair exchange between the writer and the other person. Too many reporters dash away from the real story.

General Alfred M. Gruenther in 1953 when he was Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe



Army News Features

GENESIS TO REVELATION

About 60 days after I embarked on this slightly adventurous new sea, Arthur M. Lockhart, a well-bankrolled oilman and intimate of the Fort Bliss crowd who had taken an interest in me, popped into my office. He handed me a clipping the sense of which was that a newsman to be worth his salt should be able to write on any subject and in any style, although for breadth, he should also be a specialist. "I think that's it," said Art.



US Army

I have often said in talks at Fort Leavenworth that the best ideas by which we live are usually fixed because one person said a certain thing in the right way in a moment when the mind was receptive. Here is a case in point. Within one hour of our talk, I had worked out a plan for my future, this at age 22, from which I never later deviated although two years later I was the editor:

- Whereas most writers on foreign affairs looked to Asia or Europe,

I would take Mexico and the Caribbean as my field.

- Despite being an all-around athlete, I would eschew the familiar topics and try for excellence in the sports of the horse--polo, steeplechasing, and horse showing.
- Having been a professional singer and actor with some talent for painting, I would put all of that aside and strive to be a military critic, of which the country had none.

Major General Terry Allen in Sicily during World War II

There was no need to rebuild my fences at Fort Bliss. They had never come down. I continued as secretary of the polo committee. Ordered to duty with the 7th Cavalry, I rode out a 600-mile maneuver with the division in the Texas Big Bend and, in that exercise, completely recovered my health.

My intimates included Lucian Truscott, who commanded a World War II corps with distinction and flair, and Terry Allen. While I learned much from such contacts, more

important still, I had the whole division behind me. I was their boy who was slightly making good.

Once, the newspaper offered a \$250 prize to the employee who would sign on the most subscribers in one month. I went to the 7th Cavalry. Sergeant Major Smythe and First Sergeant Ed Carey (who was the best military teacher I ever had) rallied the troops. I came away with 157 signatures on the line in one afternoon. This was more than enough.

Using Military Works

As I worked out of debt and more money came to me, the military library kept growing. Empirically, I had learned how to use it to serve my purposes.

Some thoughts on using military works come to mind:

- Read and re-read the books that seem important, the ones that stimulated thought.
- Do not bother with books just because they are the fad. To Mao Tsetung and Clausewitz I say nuts. They are too cloudy.
- On getting your teeth into something meaty, note what is important, to agree or disagree. Make marginal notes. If disagreeing, write a memo saying why. Of this comes original thinking.
- Do not read omnivorously of military writers. Too many have too little to say. Stay with the few who really grab your attention.

Becoming sports editor, city editor, and then boss man on the news side, I continued to do pieces about the military. Here, it seems germane to state that there was, and is, practically no outlet in the American press for anyone qualified to write on military policy and related subjects. This taboo never

having hurt me personally, I can speak of it, I hope, without prejudice.

A military critic is not a “commentator” or “analyst.” As J. F. C. Fuller pointed out, the critic must have the added qualification of approved experience afield in war, and Fuller’s credentials were certainly higher than any writer in this century.

Essential Studies

When I set forth on my own, more by instinct than by trial and error, I arrived at the essential studies. These are military history, military geography, and logistics, or call it timelag.

My finest mentor in this last subject was the late Frank A. Ross, World War II Chief of Transportation in Africa and in Europe, whom I had known from boyhood. As brilliant a text as is to be found on the other two subjects is Johnson’s *Topography and Strategy in War*. When I took command of the European Theater of Operations’ Historical Division, I bought enough copies of the book to supply all of my officers.

In my reading of the literature, I sought to understand the correlating on these three subjects. It was like playing chess or bridge although I shine at neither.

I believed that, to justify himself, the critic had to work things out like a one-man general staff.

Yet there was no anticipation that, apart from the fun, any rewards to me would result from this playing military critic. In fact, I had resigned my commission lest it interfere with my concentration on the higher management of war.

Curiously, in 1927, when I moved from El Paso to Detroit, at lowered income, but in search of a greener pasture, I was hired as a humorist. I was already writing for national publications on the horse and Latin-American affairs and could not imagine that my military studies would be more than

love's labor lost. Not surprisingly, my new employer wanted none of the distillation of military wisdom.

The move broke contact with the military save for a few individuals—C. P. Summerall, a World War I hero and one of our distinguished Chiefs of Staff, and Iron Mike O'Daniel of Korean War fame, being among them. Their fellowship encouraged me to keep going. I stayed with polo because, better than any other sport, it stimulated my thinking about maneuver in war. As an avocation, I judged horse shows.

For *The Infantry Journal*, I wrote some articles on the theory of armored operations. Shortly thereafter came a letter from Fuller asking where I got my ideas. I replied that I had none and knew nothing about armor, but that I had written after reading his texts, either to agree or disagree. He answered:

My dear boy, I think you are the only person in Britain or America who takes me seriously. So I will take you seriously, as the oak to the acorn. When I can help you, let me know.

Such was the beginning of an inspiring friendship; my debt to this grand Englishman is great indeed.


But for a world catastrophe, it might have ended there. The second great war gave me an unparalleled opportunity to work out

my own ideas. Furthermore, the years and wars that followed were no less generous and productive. They made me one of those base exploiters who profits by war. The Army never handed me a bad assignment. That may be luck extraordinary, but having always believed that, within the military, a man must be a doer and fighter first and a writer second, I do not face the east and bow three times when I congratulate myself.

There is no moral to the story. I had it good; if I made any sacrifice, I was unaware of it. Nonetheless, I came out smelling like a rose.

In closing, I say to young Army writers:

Keep toiling at the mill. If you aspire mainly to command (and you should) remember it can only be done with words and one must practice, practice. The idea that the military looks askance at the writer is sheer bunk. Any army functions well mainly through clear writing. Your operations area is all of mankind. People are your playfellows. So stay gentle. Never let a man of rank hitch you to his chariot because he is either so lazy or inarticulate that he must have another brain do his essential work. Strike forth, keep your eye on the plow to cut a clean furrow, but lift your gaze at the turn to catch another glimpse of the stars.



A Historian Looks at the Army

Russell F. Weigley

THE golden anniversary issue of the *Military Review* obviously presents a suitable occasion for a historian's retrospection. Unhappily, the 50th anniversary year of the *Military Review* also finds the US Army fallen upon a time of troubles. The troubles cannot help but color the retrospection although they scarcely need to be cataloged again here.

To approach the Army's current troubles from the historian's view, it is enough to say by way of beginning that the war in Vietnam has more than confirmed all the

misgivings about unconventional war that Sir B. H. Liddell Hart expressed in his chapter on "Guerrilla War" appended to the 1967 edition of his book *Strategy*. There, Liddell Hart warned against the West's involving itself in unconventional wars, fearing that, in "replying to our opponents' 'camouflaged war' activities by counter-offensive moves of the same kind," any possible gains would be "outweighed by the political and moral ill effects on the future. The disease has continued to spread."

A LOOK AT THE ARMY

The disease to which Liddell Hart referred was the moral disease that he found in unconventional war because such war teaches men "to defy authority and break the rules of civic morality" and tempts troops in foreign lands to the indiscriminating "violent action that is always a relief to the nerves of a garrison in an unfriendly country." "Violence," he said, "takes much deeper root in irregular warfare than it does in regular warfare."¹

Unfortunately, at the time of this journal's commemorative occasion, the Vietnam war has brought in its train ills of the kind Liddell Hart foresaw, embittering the US Army's relations with the society that it defends, but on whose support it must also depend, and obliging the Army to doubt even its, own moral integrity.

In such a time of troubles, the historian can bring only small consolations. The one small

consolation that he can offer now is that, for the US Army, the times have almost always been troubled, yet the Army has always survived. The ills brought in train by the Vietnam war may be especially aggravated troubles, but they may also only seem to be especially bad because of their contrast with the brief honeymoon between Army and Nation which immediately preceded them—the time in the early 1960's when the John F. Kennedy administration agreed with the Army that greater ground combat strength was required for the Nation's safety, and Army and administration cooperated in a rebuilding and readying of the Army.

The honeymoon of the early 1960's may have been tentative and less than fully trustful, as well as brief, but, in terms of the Army's usual relations with the civil government and civilian society throughout American history, it was a honeymoon indeed. Historically, in the US democracy, the Army and its values have tended consistently to seem so alien to the rest of society that, for the Army, the times have almost always been troubled. The tensions between Army and society have been great enough that, for American soldiers attempting faithful service to the values of both, even dilemmas of moral integrity are not altogether new or merely related to Vietnam.

Throughout American history, the consistency of the Army's feeling itself a neglected stepchild is impressive. Evidence of the feeling runs through all periods of our past except for the occasional spasms of major warfare. With the society at large usually preoccupied with other problems rather than military defense, the feeling has usually reflected reality, and the Army usually has been, rightly or wrongly, in fact, a neglected stepchild. The time when the Army was neglected in favor of an almost exclusive reliance on the doctrine of nuclear massive retaliation is of recent memory.

1 B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, Second Revised Edition, Praeger Publishers, N. Y., 1967, pp 380-82.



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Reading, Pennsylvania, he holds a Ph. D. in History from the University of Pennsylvania. He has taught at that university and also at Drexel University and Dartmouth College. In addition to various articles in historical journals, he is the author of the History of the United States Army. In 1969-70, he held a Guggenheim Fellowship for his current research project, a History of American Strategic Thought.

Between the World Wars, the National Defense Act of 1920, which was supposed to permit profiting from the experiences of World War I and to hold the Army in reasonable readiness for another mobilization on the scale of World War I, became through neglect an instrument of little utility.

Mobilization Plans

During the 1920's and 1930's, the Army prepared industrial and manpower mobilization plans for another continental war on the scale of 1917-18 with its efforts dogged by a national policy that practically denied any possibility of the United States waging such a war again. The principal strategic contingency plan of the interwar era—the Orange plans for war with Japan—held out to the Army the lugubrious prospect of the sacrifice of the Philippine Islands garrison at the outset of the war, with no real hope of rescue.

Still earlier, before World War I, the US Army was so tiny a force compared with the armies of the other great powers that officers writing in service journals lamented the inability of the United States to “maintain an organization or discipline comparable to that of little Japan.”² When, in 1911, the neglected Army attempted to assemble its first modern tactical division, the “maneuver division,” the task proved almost beyond its capacities; to concentrate 13,000 troops required 90 days and yielded an understrength division full of organizational anomalies.³

2 Lieutenant Colonel James S. Pettit, 8th Infantry, “How Far Does Democracy Affect the Organization and Discipline of Our Armies, and How Can Its Influence Be Most Effectually Utilized?,” *Journal of the United States Military Service Institution*, XXXVIII, 1906, p 9. For examples of similar views, see Russell F. Weigley, *Towards an American Army: Military Thought From Washington to Marshall*, Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1962, Chapter IX.

3 William A. Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, Appleton-Century, N. Y., 1936, pp 439-40; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History*, G.

The assembly of the maneuver division resembled all too much the earlier chaotic mobilization for the Spanish-American War. It showed that, despite the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root prompted by the Army's difficulties in the war with Spain, the Army had, by 1911, received little of the means to improve its operations in the field.

Guard the Frontier

Before the Spanish War, the 19th century Army had enjoyed at least the advantage of serving a clear purpose generally understood and accepted by the American public, and directly related to national policy and to the fulfillment of the national destiny: to guard the frontier against the Indian tribes. Never, except in the two World Wars, has the Army, since 1890, been able to benefit from so general a popular understanding and approval of its principal function, or from the self-esteem of so clear a role in the service of national policy, as it did before the Indian wars ended with the action at Wounded Knee Creek.

Except in the World Wars, the Army's subsequent services to national policy have been less obviously necessary and direct than in the Indian wars, and less readily understood and accepted by the voters. Even in the long era when the Army could enjoy the assurance of purpose and usefulness implicit in assuring the westward march of the United States across the continent, tensions still plagued its relations with the society at large; the means given it were almost never proportionate to the magnitude of its responsibilities; and, if we are to judge from the desertion rates, the morale of its enlisted soldiers could hardly have been worse.

P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y., 1956, pp 202-3; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939*, The Viking Press, Inc., N. Y., 1963, pp 112-14.

A LOOK AT THE ARMY

In 1889, the average enlisted strength of the Army for the year was 24,110. There were 9,599 enlistments and 2,814 desertions during the year; the desertions represented 11.6 percent of the total enlisted strength of the Army and 29.3 percent of new enlistments. The desertion rate might have been assumed to be high partly because of the isolation and drabness of life on scattered Army posts across the western plains. However, location and climate seemed to have nothing to do with it, the rate being about the same east or west of the Mississippi, at cold or warm posts, in healthy ones or unhealthy ones.

Reduce Desertions

In words that will sound familiar to present-day readers, the Secretary of War recommended that, to attempt to reduce desertions, “Unnecessary restraint should be removed and the soldier’s life in post be made as comfortable and pleasant as possible.” But writing thus in 1889, the Secretary at least was encouraged that desertions had shown a downward curve since 1883 when the average strength of the Army had been 23,335, enlistments had numbered 8,990, and there had been 3,578 desertions—15.3 percent of the total strength of the Army and 39.7 percent of the enlistments.⁴

In the 19th-century Army, improvements in this problem were always slight, and the desertion problem had been with the Army from the beginning. Before the Civil War, in 1853, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis had reported that the normal annual turnover in the then existing Army of about 10,000 could be expected to include 1,290 discharges at the end of enlistment, 726 discharges for disability, 330 deaths, and 1,465 desertions. In 1826, there were more than half as many desertions as enlistments.

The morale of officers in the Old Army of the Indian-fighting years often seemed hardly better than that of the enlisted men. Officers resigned while enlisted men deserted, but the problem of replacing the legally departed officers was, of course, even greater than that of filling the places of the illegally departed deserters.

In 1835-36, when there were from 680 to 857 officers in the Army, 117 resigned their commissions. In 1847, during the Mexican War, of 1,330 graduates of West Point from 1802 to 1846, there were 597 still serving in the Regular Army, with a few others in the 10 new regiments just being raised and some in the volunteer regiments. Through most of the 19th century, promotion was slow and held in the lockstep of seniority, with no retirement system to relieve the service of superannuated officers and encourage the young.⁵

Internal Feuds

The small, constricted, often discontented officer corps became notorious for its internal feuds and quarrels which often erupted into court-martial proceedings. Captain Winfield Scott set an unhappy pattern for himself and for too much of the Army by getting himself court-martialed soon after he was first commissioned. He was sentenced to loss of rank, pay, and emoluments for a year after he called Brigadier General James Wilkinson, the senior officer of the Army, a traitor, liar, and scoundrel. (There was merit in at least the latter two epithets which itself says something about the condition of the service.) Scott went on to a long career distinguished almost as much for the frequency of his appearances before

⁴ Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861*, The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1964, pp 197-200, 202-3.

⁵ *Report of the Secretary of War, 1889*, pp 7-9.

military tribunals as for the outstanding leadership ability he showed between quarrels.⁶

Outside Society

The officers might squabble among themselves, but the conditions that made them quarrelsome and hastened the resignations of many were largely those imposed on the Army by the society outside. Much worse than boredom were the hypocrisies in which the Nation expected the Army to participate. The overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that most of the Army attempted to perform faithfully its duty on the Indian frontier, not only to protect whites from marauding Indians, but to guard the lands reserved for Indians against encroachments by unauthorized white settlers and traders.

At the same time that it tried to protect the Indians, the Army did not make Indian policy, and it found itself having to carry into effect policies that it was sure would have disastrous results for both Indians and whites, and to assist Indian Bureau agents whose very honesty it distrusted.⁷

Major H. Clay Wood, Assistant Adjutant General of the Department of the Columbia, would insist in a report to Washington that the Nez Perce Indians of Chief Joseph had never signed away their tribal homeland in the Wallowa Valley, that attempts to claim they had done so in a treaty of 1863 were fraudulent, and Wood's department



Emory Upton blamed an inadequate Army on excessive and misguided civilian control of military policy.

commander, Brigadier General Oliver O. Howard, could endorse the report.

Both Wood and Howard soon found themselves members of a five-man commission to negotiate with the Nez Perces, obliged to deny their own recent conclusions and to insist that the tribe abandon the Wallowa country for a much smaller area on the Lapwai Reservation. An incident of the consequent forced migration precipitated the Nez Perce War of 1877.

After suffering defeats at the Indians' hands, General Howard, in October, found himself again negotiating with Chief Joseph whose people the troops of General Howard and Colonel Nelson A. Miles had at length trapped. Once more, Howard tried to deal as fairly as he could with the Nez Perces, assuring them that, if they surrendered, he would treat them with honor; see that they were subsisted through the winter; and move them to the Lapwai Reservation in the spring.

6 Charles W. Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man*, The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1937, pp 30-36.

7 On the Army and Indian policy before the Civil War, see Francis P. Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1788-1846*, The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1969, and Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848- 1865*, The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1967, especially Chapter XVI of the latter for the problems of policy. On the post-Civil War period, see Robert G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1966.

A LOOK AT THE ARMY

Chief Joseph surrendered, but the Government again ignored Howard's judgments and this time his promises. The Nez Perces were removed to a malarial tract in the Indian Territory far to the south. Brigadier General George A. Crook, who tried similarly to deal honorably with Crazy Horse and later with Geronimo only to have his assurances ignored by Washington, and other officers as well, would have found Howard's experience familiar.⁸

Indian Country

A still deeper moral dilemma lay behind the Army's inability to sustain the honor of its officers' promises. This dilemma lay rooted in the question of the ultimate purpose of the post-Civil War Indian campaigns. Before the Civil War, Government policy toward the Indians had settled upon the goal of creating an Indian Country in the western part of the Great Plains, an area then deemed unsuitable to the white man's uses.

After assisting in the forced removal of the eastern tribes westward, the Army found its task along the border of the Indian Country to be that of patrolling a quasi-international frontier- a relatively simple or at least straightforward mission albeit the Army's manpower resources were never equal to the extent of territory to be patrolled.

After the Civil War, however, the pressure of westward settlement, mineral strikes in the Indian Country, and the building of the transcontinental railroads destroyed all possibility of a permanent Indian Country closed to white settlement. Henceforth, if the Indians were to live at all, they must live among the whites; no place remained

to which to remove them. If they were to live among the whites, their military power must be totally subdued. Given the tenacity of the Indians' determination to retain their historic way of life and the fierce military prowess of the Plains tribes, the method of breaking their military power least costly in white lives was likely to approach being that of exterminating them as a people.

Extermination Policy

As early as 1868, General Ulysses S. Grant, Commanding General of the Army and about to become President of the United States, was driven by Indian ferocity to exclaim that westering emigrants would be protected "even if the extermination of every Indian tribe was necessary to secure such a result."⁹ The frustration of trying to keep open the Bozeman Trail had already driven Lieutenant General William T. Sherman, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, to threaten: We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children. Nothing else will reach the root of this case.¹⁰

Such sentiments found their not surprising counterparts in action in Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer's slaughter of Black Kettle's Cheyenne on the Washita River in 1868, the 6th Cavalry's massacre of fugitive Cheyenne at the Sappa River in Kansas near the end of the Red River War in 1875, and the mowing down of the men, women, and children of Big Foot's band of Sioux by the 7th Cavalry in the "battle" of Wounded Knee in 1890.

9 Athearn, op. cit., p 228, quoted from *The New York Times*, 16 October 1868.


10 Lieutenant General William T. Sherman to General Ulysses S. Grant, 28 December 1866, quoted in 39th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Executive Documents, II (Serial 1277), Number 16, p 4; also in 40: 1 Senate Executive Documents (Serial 1308), Number 13, p 27.

8 Ralph K. Andrist, *The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indian*, The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1964, pp 298-300, 302-17; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of American Indian Leadership*, The Viking Press, Inc., N. Y., 1961, pp 305-40.

How could Grant's and Sherman's extermination policy be reconciled with the laws of war? And what was the soldier of scruple to do in the face of such a policy and its sometimes literal execution? As early as the Seminole and Mexican Wars, Colonel Ethan A. Hitchcock had thought of resigning in revulsion at similar violations of what he, a scholarly officer, interpreted the laws of war to mean, but Hitchcock had decided that his dedication to his profession as a soldier required him to swallow his scruples and continue in the Army. Other officers' diaries might reveal thoughts similar to Hitchcock's.¹¹

Yet, if a soldier of conscience such as Colonel Hitchcock suffered a sense of guilt over the Army's conduct of its wars against peoples deemed inferior and over his own part in it, a more ruthless soldier such as General Sherman might well have responded

¹¹ Ethan A. Hitchcock, *Fifty Years in Camp and Field*, Edited By W. A. Croffut, G. P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y., 1909.



Despite the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root, the Army received little of the means to improve its field operations

to any challenge of his military policies with the observation that the overriding national policies left him and the Army little choice as to how they would handle the Indians.

The Nation demanded that its continental domain be made safe for white settlement. To open the whole continent to settlement as completely and quickly as the Nation wanted required the destruction of the Indians' military power and of their way of life, for the two were so closely related, and the way of life, especially of the Great Plains tribes, was so incompatible with proximity to the white man's agriculture that the Indians' warmaking lances and their culture had to be broken simultaneously. To accomplish this breaking against a proud people's resistance may well have been impossible without ruthlessness beyond the usual boundaries of civilized war. At any rate, the Government and public seem to have thought so.

In the Seminole War, Winfield Scott tried to fight much as he would have against a European foe, but did not make progress rapidly enough and was transferred from the theater. Major General Thomas S. Jesup transformed a conciliatory policy toward the Seminole into a harsh "no quarter" policy under pressure from Washington. Lieutenant Colonel William J. Worth was sustained in command and promoted to brigadier general as his reward for the harsh campaign which finally concluded the war by burning the Indians' villages and crops to give them no alternative except peace or starvation.¹² In the later wars against the western tribes, it was the civil government in Washington that assured the nullification of the conciliatory efforts of generals such as Howard and Crook.

¹² Elliott, op. cit., pp 288-310, 322-31; John K. Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842*, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, Fla., 1967; Prucha, op. cit., Chapter XIV.

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That angry military critic of the US civil government and its policies, Colonel Emory Upton, blamed the civil government's misguided military policies for the necessity to resort in crisis to "criminal disregard for

prompted departures from the proper code of war. AB he said in his discussion of the War of the Revolution:

The army could point with pride to its subordination to civil authority and to its



During the 1920's, Army plans to fight a World War I-type campaign were nullified by national policy which made them impossible to carry out

the rules of civilized warfare.”¹³ Upton used this phrase in another context than that of the Indian wars; he was writing specifically about the use in the War of 1812 of militia who amounted to nothing more than armed civilians whose efforts to resist the British could be cited by the enemy as justification for attacks on property.

However, his book *The Military Policy of the United States*, implies that, in general, the desperation induced in wartime by the lack of adequate preparation for war

devotion to liberty. More than this, it could justly claim that the dictatorial powers conferred upon its commander—arbitrary arrests, summary executions without trial, forced impressment of provisions, and other dangerous precedents of the Revolution—were the legitimate fruits of the defective military legislation of our inexperienced statesmen.¹⁴

Faulty Policies

The belief that faulty policies on the part of the civil government drove the

¹³ Brevet Major General Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States*, Third Impression, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1912, p 116.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp 61-62.

soldier into moral dilemmas thus became another part of Upton's broad indictment of a Government under which:

*[When soldiers'] mistakes are summed up and their deficiencies considered, it will be found that the underlying causes were inherent in a military system which was a creature of law.*¹⁵

Bad law resulted because:

*Military legislation was thus largely made to depend upon the combined wisdom of a body of citizens [Congress] who, in their individual experience, were totally ignorant of military affairs.*¹⁶

Colonel Upton pessimistically implied that the faults of the US military system were not likely to be corrected, and the major prescriptions for change that he recommended were not likely to be adopted because the roots of the US military troubles lay deep in the US Government and society: in excessive and misguided civilian control of military conduct and policy and in a public opinion that insisted on it.

Uptonian military commentators at the turn of the 19th into the 20th century stated their pessimistic conclusions about the fate of the military in the US democracy still more explicitly than did their mentor. Captain Matthew F. Steele, the later historian of American Campaigns, said that the influence of democracy could not be utilized to create a good Army. The Military Service Institution of the United States in 1905 awarded the first prize in the annual essay competition for its Journal to a paper that concluded:

National characteristics, which become governmental ones in a democracy like ours, make it impossible to organize and

discipline an effective army from the point of view of military experts.¹⁷

Conclusion Unfounded

The World Wars were to prove that this utterly bleak conclusion was unfounded. After the World Wars, the bitterest critic of the Influence of the US Government and society on the Army could hardly say any longer that it is impossible for the United States to organize and discipline an effective Army.

Yet the unstinting support that people and Government gave the war effort and the Army in the two World Wars and the relatively generous military appropriations of the cold war may have blurred the perception that, judging matters from the soldier's viewpoint and taking into account the evidence of the entire span of American history, Upton and his followers were not altogether wrong to be pessimistic about the prospects for the Army's relationship with democratic America.

The history of the United States suggests that this relationship is bound to be, except in the occasional moments of general war or of generally acknowledged crisis such as the cold war, one at best of public and governmental indifference to the Army and to military needs beyond the most obvious ones, and frequently of indifference expanded and hardened into suspicion. Even at our present distance in time from the founding of the American Republic, it is still not for nothing that the Founding Fathers came out of a tradition of deep hostility to the military, a tradition which held that:

*...unhappy nations have lost that precious jewel liberty ... [because] their necessities or indiscretion have permitted a standing army to be kept amongst them.*¹⁸

17 Letter from Captain Matthew F. Steele to *Journal of the, United States Military Service Institution*, XXXVIII, 1906, p 358; Pettit, op. cit., p 38.

18 Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American*

15 *Ibid.*, pp 256-57.

16 *Ibid.*, pp 4.



*Oregon Historical Society
Painting by Frederic Remington*

Promises made to Chief Joseph on his surrender were ignored by the Government

The American people continued to pride themselves on the tradition of peaceful policies they supposed they represented and, through most of their history, on the smallness of their armaments. The half-forgotten convictions of the fathers of the Republic often influence present-day attitudes and policies all the more stubbornly because, while they have deeply marked our national institutions and beliefs, being half-forgotten, they cannot be faced directly and dealt with in open debate like the headlines in today's newspaper.

What of the cries, heard so loudly and frequently in public discussion today, that there is an excessive military influence in

the Government and has been since World War II, and that, consequently, the country has abandoned its antimilitary heritage? It is true enough that, under the impact of World War II and the cold war, the attitudes of American civilian statesmen were, in a sense, militarized.

Our involvement in Vietnam demonstrates that the cold war developed an inclination among American civilian leaders to seek military solutions to international problems, the principal early impetus toward the Vietnam involvement having come from civilian leaders over considerable military reluctance.

If the tendency to rely on military solutions was in truth excessive in US national policy during much of the quarter century after World War II, it was still

Revolution, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p 62.

also true that civilian statesmen remained thoroughly in control of US policymaking during that quarter century. The often-heard accusations that the Pentagon made US policy have found no confirmation in hard evidence and are unlikely to, and, if there has been an American militarism, it has been, at its highest and most influential levels, a civilian militarism.

If national policy has been militarized, furthermore, the phenomenon has not been one from which military men can necessarily take much comfort. A militarized national policy has not been supported consistently with balanced military forces of strength appropriate to the responsibilities implied by the policy. In the context of US politics, any militarization of the attitudes of civilian statesmen seems almost certain to be a temporary occurrence. Under the impact of disillusionment over Vietnam, the phenomenon is now fading fast, and the attitudes of the young hardly encourage its perpetuation.

All in all, for the health of the Nation, it is clearly a good thing that the latter sentence can still be written. If we appear to be returning to the historically customary American situation in which the civilian government and population both regard the military with distrust, then, for the Army, the times immediately ahead are not likely to be much happier than the present. Nor, given the evidence of the past, are any times in the United States likely to offer a prolonged period of respite for the Army, from the prevailing social attitudes of indifference toward the military at best and suspicion or even hostility at worst.

For the American military man, the primary utility of the study of history is probably not the search for "lessons" of tactics and strategy in the increasingly distant campaigns of the past. Rather, the

chief utility may well lie in the aid which history can give toward an understanding of the place of the military in American society. When military men lament that they find themselves in an inhospitable society, they will draw from American history only the small consolation that, for the Army, it has always been thus.

If they search history in pursuit of understanding, they may find in it the comprehension and the wisdom to become still better soldiers than that greatest American soldier-historian, Emory Upton. They may find in history, as Upton did, the conviction that, in an inhospitable world, the American soldier can still remain faithful to his first duty, to maintain at least the integrity of his own institution, the Army, and its values:


Wherever the Regular Army has met the enemy [said Upton], the conduct of the officers and men has merited and received the applause of their countrymen. It has rendered the country vastly more important service than by merely sustaining the national honor in battle. It has preserved, and still preserves, to us the military art; has formed the standard of discipline for the vast number of volunteers of our late wars, and, while averting disaster and bloodshed, has furnished us with military commanders to lead armies of citizen soldiers, whose exploits are now famous in the history of the world.¹⁹

It can be hoped that modern military men may also find in a critical view of the Army's, as well as the country's, history that sympathy for the values of civilian society which Emory Upton never discovered, and the consequent possibility of improving the Army and its relationship with the rest of the United States.

¹⁹ Upton, *op. cit.*, p 145.

We are today, psychologically at least, in a postwar period. Our job is to rebuild the dignity, pride, and motivation of all components of our Army. After every war there has been a tendency toward a drop in morale, esprit, and prestige for the man in uniform. We must work to overcome this tendency, because of its deleterious effect on both the man in uniform and the public. The dedication of the soldier and the confidence of the people in him are principal ingredients of our national strength. The Nation will be the loser if, over the long term, the dignity and pride of the soldier are undermined.

General Ralph E. Haines, Jr.



Where Does the Navy Go From Here?

Arnold M. Kuzmak

IT IS not generally realized, least of all by the Navy itself, but the Navy has been doing fantastically well in the annual competition for budget dollars. At a time when the total defense budget has been going down, particularly after allowing for inflation and pay raises, the Navy budget has been increasing.

Let us look at the figures. Consider, first, the period when the Vietnam war was building up to its peak, say, from Fiscal

Year 1965 through Fiscal Year 1969. During this period, of course, the defense budget and the budgets of all the services rose substantially. However, when we remove those costs that would not have been incurred without the war (the "incremental cost" of the war) and consider only the non-Vietnam portions of the service budgets, an interesting pattern develops.

Figure 1 shows these calculations, based on official Defense Department estimates

Changes in Non-Vietnam Outlays by Service, Fiscal Year 1965-69 (In Billions of Current Dollars)				
	<i>Fiscal Year 1965</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1969</i>		
		<i>Vietnam</i>	<i>Non-Vietnam</i>	<i>Percent Change, Non-Vietnam</i>
Army	\$11.6	\$11.3	\$13.8	+19 Percent
Navy	13.4	4.5	18.0	+34 Percent
(Excluding Marine Corps)	(12.3)	(3.1)	(16.7)	(+36 Percent)
Air Force	18.2	5.6	20.3	+12 Percent
Other	3.0	0.1	4.4	
Total	\$46.2	\$21.5	\$56.5	+22 Percent

Figure 1.

of the incremental cost of the war in Vietnam. The figure shows that the Navy’s outlays, excluding the Marine Corps, for its non-Vietnam forces increased 36 percent from Fiscal Year 1965 to Fiscal Year 1969, substantially more than the other services and substantially more than inflation and pay raises would account for (which would be about 19 percent). Thus, it is not true that spending for the Navy’s non-Vietnam programs was reduced below prewar levels during the Vietnam buildup. In fact, in real terms, it increased about 13 percent.

Looking at the period of “winding down” the war in Vietnam, we find an equally striking pattern. Figure 2 compares the total service budgets for Fiscal Years 1969 and 1972. Since we do not have official estimates of the cost of the war in Fiscal Year 1972, we cannot determine the non-Vietnam portion of the budget as we did for the earlier period. We do know, however, that the Navy has been ahead of the other services in Vietnamizing its operations in Vietnam, so the remaining incremental war costs in the Navy’s Fiscal

Year 1972 budget are quite small, probably less than one billion dollars.

Figure 2 shows that, as the Navy’s involvement in the Vietnam war has decreased, its total budget, excluding the Marine Corps, has increased 13 percent, while the budgets of the other services have decreased by substantial amounts. In his March 1971 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., stated that the Navy total obligational authority, not counting the Marine Corps, has increased 16 percent in real terms, after allowing for pay and price increases, between Fiscal Years 1964 and 1972. This figure understates the increase in the Navy budget for general purpose forces since funding for Navy strategic nuclear forces in Fiscal Year 1964 was very high because of the *Polaris* buildup.

Another conclusion can be drawn from this budget data. Since the budget for non-Vietnam naval forces increased, in real terms, during both the Vietnam war buildup and its winding down, there is

no evidence, contrary to popular opinion, that the non-Vietnam portion of the Navy budget was reduced below prewar levels during the war.

In spite of the Navy's success in recent years in increasing its budget, there are several large clouds on the horizon. First, chances are that the Navy budget will not continue to increase, in real terms, as it has in the past. Continuing demands for new domestic programs make it likely that future defense budgets will be roughly constant in actual purchasing power. Admiral Zumwalt, in the testimony cited above, refers to "the austere outlook for the future" and emphasizes the need for reducing costs and increasing efficiency.

Second, a constant, or even moderately increased, real budget level will exacerbate the Navy's problems in trying to maintain its force levels and, at the same time to modernize with highly sophisticated and expensive ships and aircraft. Consider, for

example, the *F-14* fighter. In the Fiscal Year 1972 budget, *F-14*'s will cost 17 million dollars each, not counting research and development costs, compared to four million dollars for the *F-4*'s.

Although the Navy is counting on a reduced unit price as production proceeds, when the *F-111* was at the stage of development that the *F-14* is at now, it appeared to be the greatest aircraft ever. One need not predict a comparable disaster to believe that the Navy will be lucky if it can, in fact, achieve the 17-million-dollar unit price for the production run. At this price, the 722 aircraft planned for procurement will cost over 12 billion dollars, and operating costs will also be correspondingly higher.

Moreover, much the same story could be told about carriers, destroyers, submarines, antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and even support ships. Something will have to give—force levels, the rate of

**Changes in Total Obligational Authority
by Service, Fiscal Year 1969-72
(In Millions of Current Dollars)**

	<i>Fiscal Year 1969</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1972*</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>
Army	\$26,180	\$21,468	-18 Percent
Navy	21,795	23,347	+7 Percent
(Excluding Marine Corps)	(19,120)	(21,534)	(+13 Percent)
Air Force	26,126	22,827	-13 Percent
Other	4,642	6,586	
Total	\$78,743	\$74,228	-6 Percent

* Excludes January 1971 and January 1972 pay raises.

Figure 2 presents the budget in terms of total obligational authority (TOA) rather than actual outlays. TOA represents, roughly speaking, the rate at which the Government commits itself to additional expenditures even though the money may not actually be paid out for several years, and is, therefore, a better measure of the size of our effort. Figure 1 shows outlays because the data on incremental war costs are presented in those terms.

Figure 2.

modernization, or the level of sophistication of new weapons systems. An omen for the future may be seen in the fact that the Fiscal Year 1972 buy of *F-14*s is only 48 aircraft, half the “baseline” number in the contract and the lowest number allowed without renegotiation of the contract.

Force Levels Down

Third, although the budget for general purpose naval forces has been going up, force levels have been going down. Between Fiscal Years 1964 and 1972, the number of active ships in the Navy has dropped from 917 to 658. During the same period, the number of aircraft carriers (*CVA* and *CVS*) decreased from 24 to 16, and the number of tactical air wings from 15 to 11.

Fourth it is almost certain that carrier force levels will be reduced further over the next decade. By 1978, the force of 16 total carriers will include three nuclear-powered carriers, eight conventionally powered carriers of post-World War II design, and five overage World War II carriers.

Since it takes about six years from the decision to start a carrier before it is completed, maintaining the Fiscal Year 1972 force level of 16 past 1980 would require starting five new carriers in Fiscal Years 1972-74, at a probable cost of more than four billion dollars. There is every indication that the administration is not willing to make a commitment of this magnitude. In fact, the 1972 budget, as submitted to Congress, does not provide for starting a fourth nuclear-powered carrier, the *CVAN 70*, which has been rejected twice by Congress. The Secretary of Defense has stated that US responsibilities:

...will require construction of an additional nuclear powered carrier for

the Navy to insure adequate attack carrier capabilities for the 1980s and beyond.¹

This will provide 12 post-World War II aircraft carriers by 1980.

Navy Policy Problems

Since the Navy will be facing many hard choices over the next several years, a review of some of the basic assumptions of naval force planning seems to be in order. The discussion which follows will center around the role of the aircraft carrier since so much of the Navy's operations and its budget revolves around the carriers, their aircraft, and the forces and activities needed to defend and supply them.

Some historical perspective may be helpful. During World War II, we discovered that the aircraft carrier, rather than the battleship, was the key to defeating the enemy's surface fleet. In the aftermath of the war, the Navy found itself in the position where no potential enemy had a surface fleet close to ours in size or capability. The Navy, and particularly the aircraft carriers, had lost their principal mission. What was left was attack of land targets, and it required great effort for the Navy to establish this as one of its roles and missions. This change has substantial implications for our present subject. Most important, it makes carrier-based aircraft much more directly competitive with land-based tactical aircraft.

Aircraft Carrier Vulnerability

In the period since World War II, carriers have seen extensive combat in Korea and Vietnam. They have also been used on numerous occasions to “show the flag,”

1. *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1972-1976 Program and the 1972 Defense Budget*, 9 March 1971, “Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,” Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1971, PP 95-96.

provide air cover for evacuation of US civilians, and the like. In none of these situations have the carriers been attacked by enemy submarines, aircraft, or surface ships. Although our experience has been in more limited wars, US defense planning continues to be dominated, and rightfully so, by large-scale conventional wars in which the Soviet Union is heavily involved. It is therefore, crucial that we evaluate the vulnerability of aircraft carriers in such wars, both in absolute terms and relative to land-based tactical aircraft which perform many of the same missions. Perhaps the most important disadvantage of the aircraft carrier is its greater vulnerability to air and submarine attack than the land-based air wing. On the one hand, we have learned, in recent years, how to build aircraft shelters, how to protect fuel and maintenance facilities, and how to repair runways rapidly so that losses of aircraft on the ground to air attack using conventional weapons can be reduced to very low levels and disruption of operations can be minimized.

On the other hand, technology and other developments have made the aircraft carriers more, rather than less, vulnerable. First, the development by the Soviet Union of large air-to-surface missiles with conventional warheads and terminal guidance has made it possible to launch the equivalent of World War II kamikaze attacks without sacrificing pilots and aircraft.

Reconnaissance Development

Second, the development of satellite and long-range aircraft reconnaissance has radically reduced the ability of naval task forces to hide in the broad expanses of the oceans. Further, because the carriers will generally be involved in strikes against land targets, they will have to remain in the same general area for long periods of time to have much effect.

Third, these developments, as well as more sensitive submarine sonars and higher speed submarines, make it much easier for submarines to find and attack the carriers. Finally, both anti-air and antisubmarine defense, while they can exact high attrition over a long period of time, remain so unreliable in any particular engagement that they cannot guarantee that no more than a few attackers will penetrate. As a result of these developments, a strong case can be made that the carriers could not remain on station in any situation where the Soviets could concentrate their land-based aircraft or their submarines against them.

Although it is difficult to sink an aircraft carrier—and no modern carrier (*Essex* class or later) was sunk in World War II—it is much easier to damage it enough that flight operations are impossible and to force it to return to port for an extended period of time for repairs. Particularly in the context of current planning for, a conventional war with the Soviets lasting not much longer than 90 days, forcing the carrier out of action for three months or more is almost as good, from the enemy's point of view, as sinking it.

Figure 3 summarizes the results of *kamikaze* attacks on US carriers (*CV's*) in World War II. We can see that 60 percent of those taking one hit by a *kamikaze*, and all those taking more than one hit, were forced to return to port for repair; and that the improved damage control features of the *Essex* class and later carriers did not improve these figures.

Based on this evidence and making ample allowance for improvements in damage control since World War II, it appears that four or five hits by Soviet air-to-surface missiles would be enough to force a carrier to retire. Similarly, four or five hits on the carrier's screws by submarine-launched acoustic homing torpedoes can reasonably be

Results of World War II Kamikaze Attacks on Aircraft Carriers		
<i>Number of Hits</i>	<i>Number of Cases</i>	<i>Number Forced to Return to Port</i>
All Aircraft Carriers		
1	10	6
2 or More	4	4
Essex Class or Later		
1	8	5
2 or More	3	3
Source: Samuel E. Morison, <i>History of the United States Naval Operations in World War Two</i> , Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1968-62, Volumes 12 to 16, passim.		

Figure 3.

expected to cause enough loss of propulsion power to make normal flight operations impossible and to reduce greatly the carrier’s ability to avoid further damage.

Because there would only be a small number of carriers deployed, perhaps 10 or 12, and because only a few hits on each, whether by air-to-surface missiles or torpedoes, are needed to force it to retire, it seems unlikely that the carriers could be successfully defended against a concentrated attack by sophisticated land-based aircraft or submarines, regardless of foreseeable technological advances and regardless of the funds, within reasonable limits, devoted to defenses.

No feasible defense will be able to prevent four or five air-to-surface missiles or torpedoes from getting through and hitting the carrier. In fact, both air defenses and antisubmarine defenses typically have a low probability of success on any given engagement, so that, if the enemy needs only a few successful penetrations to accomplish his objective, he will be able to do so. Some purely illustrative calculations using a simplified model will elucidate the structure of the problem.

Suppose the Soviets are willing to use 25 bombers, each capable of carrying one air-to-surface missile, and perhaps their fighter escorts, to disable a carrier. This is not unreasonable since the Soviets have some 300 air-to-surface missile-capable bombers in their naval aviation force. We assume the air-to-surface missiles have 80-percent reliability and, optimistically, that our fighter defense would have a 40-percent chance of shooting down a given bomber in a single engagement, that all of the bomber losses occur prior to air-to-surface missile launch, and that our surface-to-air missile systems have an 80-percent probability of shooting down an incoming air-to-surface missile.

Electronic Devices

With these assumptions, the bombers would get six hits on the carrier, more than enough to force it to retire. If we are less optimistic and assume that the fighters have a 20-percent kill probability and the missile defenses a 60-percent kill probability, then the expected number of hits would be 32, and a much smaller bomber force would be enough. Thus, even with optimistic

assumptions, the carrier cannot be successfully defended against air attack. If the performance of defensive systems does not reach these high expectations, then the level of damage increases rapidly. Of course, it is possible that some kind of electronic countermeasure—jamming, decoys, or others—will make the enemy air-to-surface missiles largely ineffective. While it appears sensible to devote substantial resources to developing and testing such devices, there is no way of knowing in advance of their use in actual combat whether the enemy has a successful counter-countermeasure. Electronic countermeasure devices, therefore, do not significantly increase our level of confidence that we could defend the carrier. Similar arguments to the above apply to defense of the carrier against concentrated submarine attack.

Land Targets

The conclusion of the above arguments is that we should not plan to use our aircraft carriers for strikes against land targets in situations where the Soviets can concentrate their land-based aircraft or their submarines against them. Thus, any use of the aircraft carriers for strikes against land targets, where they would be constrained by aircraft range to operate in a restricted area, seems unsustainable in any war in which the Soviets are fully involved.

On the other hand, the Soviets are the only potential enemy with the large and sophisticated air and submarine forces needed to mount an intensive attack on the aircraft carriers. China does not have such forces, nor do the smaller powers against whom we might intervene. Against such smaller forces, it should be possible to defend adequately the carriers although the possibility of substantial damage even here cannot be ruled out. Of course, there are

many contingencies in which the carriers would be able to operate from sanctuaries.

There is also a spectrum of other issues which have implications for carrier force levels. These deal with the particular advantages and disadvantages of putting larger or smaller portions of our tactical air forces on sea bases (carriers) rather than land bases and with the unique characteristics of each. The particular advantages of sea basing “include the ability to provide a US presence without commitment, to operate where land bases are not available, and to attack surface ships at sea beyond the range of land-based aircraft. Its disadvantages include greater cost and greater vulnerability than a comparable land-based air wing.

Unique Capabilities

Aircraft carriers, and naval forces more generally, have the unique and the useful property that they can be deployed to a crisis area and held offshore in international waters, thus signaling our ability and perhaps intention to intervene, without actually committing us and without the need for political clearances to land troops or even for overflight rights. Neither Army nor Air Force units can do this. Similarly, continuous deployment of naval forces in potential crisis areas provides continuous evidence of our ability to intervene.

The second unique capability of aircraft carriers is their ability to operate without the use of nearby land bases. Of course, this does not have much significance in areas like central Europe where we have numerous prepared bases, but, in other areas, it could be extremely important.

During a crisis, or the resulting fighting, we cannot count on being able to use existing nearby airbases if the host country is not directly involved and if it wishes to remain neutral. For example, existing land bases

Comparison of Annual Cost of Average Navy and Air Force Air Wings, Fiscal Year 1964 (Total Obligational Authority in Millions of Current Dollars)			
<i>Number of Hits</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1963</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1964</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1965</i>
Navy			
Carriers and Aircraft ¹	\$3,070	\$2,620	\$3,030
Antiair Warfare Escort Ships	790	890	610
60 Percent of Antisubma- rine Warfare Escort Ships ²	900	1,050	1,180
70 Percent of Logistic and Support Ships ²	630	670	850
Total	\$5,390	\$5,230	\$5,670
Number of Air Wings	15	15	15
Average Cost Per Air Wing	\$360	\$350	\$380
Air Force			
Tactical Air Costs	\$4,400	\$4,200	\$5,000
Additional Overhead Allocation ³	1,470	1,600	1,980
Total	\$5,870	\$5,800	\$6,980
Number of Air Wings	20	21	22
Average Cost Per Air Wing	\$290	\$280	\$317
¹ Excludes Marine Corps costs. ² Percentaires are those associated with carriers in Admiral Thomas H. Moorer's statement. ³ Air Force mission breakout did not allocate all overhead. Sources: "Abstract, Analysis of the Relative Cost of Sea-Based and Land-Based Tactical Air" in <i>CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier</i> , Joint Hearings Before the Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on <i>CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier</i> , 91st Congress, Second Session, 1970, pp 41-46; Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer in <i>Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength</i> , Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 91st Congress, First Session, 1969, p 667.			

Figure 4.

in Greece and Turkey would probably be available in case of a war in NATO Europe, but probably not in case of US involvement in an Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, if we decided to intervene in an area where we had

not previously made plans for it, the carriers would be able to begin flight operations as soon as they reach the area.

The Air Force has developed a “bare-base kit” which is designed to enable land-

based aircraft to deploy to an unprepared airport—of which there appears to be an ample number—and begin operations in a short time. However, this is as yet an unapproved capability and adds considerably to required airlift forces. In addition, in some situations, the necessary airfields might have been overrun by enemy ground troops. Thus, deployability without prepared land bases remains a substantial advantage of the sea-based tactical air forces.

Aircraft carriers can also attack enemy surface ships that are farther from shore than the range of land-based tactical aircraft—for instance, 600 nautical miles or more. This was, in fact, the major use of attack aircraft carriers during World War II. A further discussion of this mission is deferred until the threat of the Soviet surface fleet is considered.

Disadvantages

Among the disadvantages aircraft carriers, we consider, in addition to vulnerability, greater cost than a comparable land-based air wing. A valid cost comparison is difficult to construct since it is not obvious just what costs should be charged against the two alternatives, which costs are fixed and which are variable, and how to define comparable air wings. No such cost comparison is available in detail on the public record. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the sea-based air wing did not pay a premium for its mobility and relative freedom from land bases, for its expensive movable airbase, for its sea-based logistic support, and for its need for protection against submarines.

A rough attempt to judge the size of the premium is shown in Figure 4 which compares the average cost per air wing for the Navy and Air Force in Fiscal Year

1963-65 as derived by the author from published analyses of their budgets by mission. It is necessary to go back that far in time to eliminate the distorting effect of the war in Vietnam. The figure indicates that the average sea-based wing, which is about the same size as the land-based wing, costs about 20 to 25 percent more.

We also know that classified studies by analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense derived a premium of 40 percent for the sea-based wing.² This premium might be well worth paying, but it is substantial, so that we should tend to emphasize land-based tactical aircraft except in cases where the particular advantages of the carriers, as discussed above, seem to be controlling.

Until recently, the Soviet Fleet of surface warships did not play a large role in US defense planning. Their surface fleet was much smaller than ours and did not have any aircraft carriers, so it was assumed that it could easily be destroyed by carrier-based aircraft. However, after the sinking of an Israeli destroyer in 1967 by an Egyptian Soviet-built patrol boat with surface-to-surface cruise missiles, the realization has spread that these ships with their surface-to-surface cruise missiles could pose a substantial offensive threat to the US Fleet.

The Soviets have some 18 cruisers and destroyers, 150 patrol boats, and 47 submarines which can fire surface-to-surface cruise missiles, and have given substantial numbers of the surface-to-surface cruise missile patrol boats to their allies. When we consider ways in which the Soviet surface fleet might be used

2 *CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier*, Joint Hearings Before the Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on CV AN-70 Aircraft Carrier, 91st Congress, Second Session, 1970, p 630.



Much of the Navy's operations and budget revolves around the carriers, their aircraft, and the forces and activities needed to defend and supply them

against the US Fleet, and particularly the aircraft carrier task forces, one of the first that comes to mind is a situation in which the United States and Soviet Fleets are in continuous contact during a crisis leading to war, as they would be in the Mediterranean, for example. If the Soviets struck first, they could launch a coordinated volley of surface-to-surface cruise missiles with no tactical warning. By assumption, we would not be able to take any action against the enemy launching platforms—the ships—until their missiles had already been launched. The Navy is working on several programs and tactics to improve its ability to deal with this situation, including development of its own surface-to-surface cruise missile (*Harpoon*), helicopters to improve warning, and increased emphasis on jamming and other electronic countermeasures to deflect

the incoming missiles.³ However, none of these can prevent the initial volley of missiles from being launched, and only a handful of missiles for a large, coordinated attack need penetrate the defenses to do a great deal of damage. Therefore, the threat of a Soviet first strike against the US Fleet is not likely to be eliminated in the foreseeable future.

If the US carrier task forces survive the initial attack, or if the war develops in such a way that such an attack does not occur, then the outcome depends strongly on whether the Soviet surface ships have land-based air cover. If the Soviets do not have air cover, then the US aircraft carriers could remain

3 "CNO Zumwalt Presses to Retain 15 Carrier s, Plans to Reorder Navy Mission Priorities," *Armed Forces Journal*, 7 December 1970, pp 26-27; Brooke Nihart, "Harpoon: Navy's Answer to Soviet Missile Boats," *Armed Forces Journal*, 16 November 1970, PP 22-23.

outside missile range of the Soviet surface fleet and still attack it with carrier-based aircraft. Although some US aircraft would be lost, there is little doubt that most of the Soviet surface ships would be sunk.

Different Situation

On the other hand, if the battle occurs in an area where the Soviet surface fleet does have air cover then the situation is quite different. The Soviet land-based aircraft could be used in two ways: to provide an area, defense for their ships or to attack the carriers directly. As we have seen above, if they attack the aircraft carriers directly, they can probably force them to retire from the battle area although they might have to expend a substantial number of aircraft to do so.

From our point of view, we would not be able to operate our carriers in these areas if the Soviets were directly involved, even without their surface fleet because of the air and submarine threat. In this sense, their surface fleet is not, in this situation, an additional threat.

The Soviet surface fleet might also be used against merchant ship convoys carrying logistic support for our armies overseas and economic goods required by our allies' economies. The surface ships involved would be their cruisers and destroyers since their surface-to-surface cruise missile patrol boats would not have the range, endurance, and sea-keeping ability to engage in these operations.

In such operations, the Soviet surface ships would be operating outside land-based



US Navy Photos

In World War II, all US carriers taking more than one hit, and 60 percent of those taking one hit, by a *kamikaze* were forced to return to port for repairs; improved damage control features did not improve the figures

air cover and would, therefore, be vulnerable to strikes by carrier-based aircraft, while the carriers themselves remained outside missile range. The carriers would face Soviet submarine opposition, but would be less vulnerable than when launching strikes against land targets—the situation described earlier—since they would not be constrained to operate in a restricted area. They could, therefore, use their speed and mobility to limit the ability of enemy submarines to get close enough to attack.

The carriers would have a reasonable chance of being able to carry out this mission. If not, we could stop shipping, while antisubmarine warfare aircraft wear down the deployed enemy submarine force or use our own attack submarines against the Soviet surface ships. The implications of this mission for aircraft carrier force levels will be discussed later.

In summary, the Soviet surface fleet reinforces their ability to deny us the use of our aircraft carriers for strikes against land targets in any war in which they are heavily involved, but they would be able to do so even without it. They could use their surface fleet against merchant ship convoys, but this use could be countered.

Adequacy of Forces

An evaluation of the ability of planned antisubmarine warfare forces to defeat the Soviet submarine force would be subject to considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, some important qualitative observations can be made.

First, if we accept the arguments above that aircraft carriers used against land targets cannot be adequately protected against concentrations of Soviet submarines at reasonable cost, then the need for antisubmarine warfare forces is greatly reduced. It is inherently harder to protect

a small number of high-value targets than a large number of low-value targets, as in the protection of merchant shipping.

If one or two submarines penetrate a carrier's defenses and get, say, five hits on the carrier's screws, they will disable the task force. The same submarines penetrating a convoy would damage perhaps five to 10 merchant ships. In order to have an effect on the land war by sinking merchant ships, the Soviet submarines must sink a large number of them which is easier to prevent than the small number of successful attacks necessary to force aircraft carriers to withdraw.

Substantial Investment

Second, we have a substantial investment in antisubmarine warfare platforms—ships, aircraft, and submarines—which are expensive to procure and operate. Their would appear to be a much greater payoff for measures which would improve the performance of existing forces than for increases in force levels. Such measures would include not only development of new and more effective sensors—such as sonars and sonobuoys—and weapons—such as torpedoes and mines—but also improvements in the operator proficiency and maintenance provided in the operating forces. Similarly, at a time when budgets are being reduced, these measures should be protected at the expense, if need be, of force levels.

In considering the implications of these arguments for force levels, we take, as a starting point, the validity of the argument are useful for providing a presence during peacetime or during a crisis. The requirements for this function set a minimum for carrier force levels. This minimum level is taken here as nine carriers.

Using the rule of thumb that three carriers are needed in the force to maintain one carrier continuously deployed in a forward area, the force level of nine would make possible one carrier continuously on station in the Mediterranean and two in the western Pacific or vice versa, depending on one's political judgment. Each of the deployed carriers could be reinforced during a crisis by one or two more, making possible a display of willingness to commit ourselves.

Rotation Policies

In addition, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has stated that, if we again become involved in a war as large as Vietnam, we would have to rely on mobilization and a callup of the Reserves which suggests that wartime rotation policies should be assumed. A force of nine carriers could then provide four or five on station for the war-particularly during the early period when land-based aircraft might not be fully operational-and also one or two on station elsewhere for presence and crisis control, with six carriers on station and with two out of three deployed forward instead of one out of three in peacetime.

The question is, then, how many additional carriers, over and above these nine, we should have. Here, three alternative answers are outlined.

The first alternative takes, at face value, the arguments that the carriers would be vulnerable in any war with the Soviets if used for strikes against land targets. Therefore, no carriers are bought for this purpose, and land-based aircraft are relied on for our tactical air needs in such wars.

In a major war in Asia with the Chinese, but not the Soviets involved carriers would be used in addition to land-based aircraft, but the nine provided should be adequate

for this purpose. Since these nine would not be used against land targets in a war with the Soviets, they would be available for use against the Soviet surface fleet in the event the latter were used against merchant ship convoys in the open ocean. Considering the small number of surface-to-surface missile cruisers and destroyers that the Soviets have, the nine carriers should be enough to handle them although several might be severely damaged by Soviet submarines.

Substantial antisubmarine warfare forces would have to be maintained under this alternative, but sizable reductions could be made because we no longer attempt to use the aircraft carriers under the conditions where they would be most vulnerable.

Improve Performance

Efforts to improve the performance of existing antisubmarine warfare forces would be maintained with high priority. The new *F-14* fighter is designed to protect the carriers from an advanced Soviet air threat and would lose its *raison d'être*. A replacement for the existing *F-4* fighter, probably a much less expensive design than the *F-14*, might still be needed. The air and cruise missile defenses we provide the carriers should be designed for high reliability against a threat of low or medium sophistication which would be presented by potential enemies other than the Soviets.

A variation of this approach may be attractive over the long term. An aircraft carrier task force designed for more limited wars would probably have a much lighter escort ship screen. The carrier itself might be smaller and less expensive, and its aircraft might be designed against a less sophisticated threat and more so with a close air-support mission in mind.

If these changes are made, the cost advantage of land-based aircraft would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, and additional carriers might be attractive to meet our needs for tactical air in situations where the Soviets are not involved, including a Chinese and North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea.

Partial Acceptance

The second alternative approach might be characterized as a partial acceptance of the argument on carrier vulnerability. It neither counts on the carriers for airstrikes in a major war with the Soviets nor writes them off in this situation. It recognizes that it may well be impossible to maintain carriers in the eastern Mediterranean during such a war, but it argues that some combination of improved defenses, successful electronic countermeasures, enemy mistakes, and luck may make the survival of the carriers sufficiently likely that it is worth gambling on. We would, therefore, be willing to operate a greater number of aircraft carriers than the minimum of nine.

At the same time, they would be less attractive than we had previously thought, so a reduction, perhaps to about 12, from the force level of 15 maintained in recent years' would seem to be in order. Because of the need to defend the aircraft carriers against enemy submarines, any reduction in antisubmarine warfare forces would be small at most. Measures for defense against cruise missiles would be emphasized, including electronic countermeasures, the new *Harpoon* anti-ship missile, and helicopter-borne early warning sensors.

According to this view, the Soviet surface fleet is a disturbing threat to our carriers and might make a crucial difference in our ability to maintain them

on station, in contrast to the first approach which saw the Soviet surface fleet as simply reinforcing the Soviets' ability to deny us such use of our carriers. Actions to counter it are particularly important in the second approach.

The third approach described here rejects the arguments concerning carrier vulnerability and cost. With respect to vulnerability, this view was expressed by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as follows:

I certainly don't accept the allegations that the carrier is vulnerable to the degree that often has been mentioned ... I don't believe surface ships are vulnerable. I believe in the next war we will perhaps suffer greater losses than we have in the past, but I am confident that we can stay out there and operate.⁴

This approach would essentially continue the force levels maintained in Fiscal Year 1971. The current relative priorities in and among tactical air, antisubmarine warfare and other forces would also be maintained. In particular, defense against the Soviet surface fleet would be considered important, but it would not have the same degree of urgency as under the second approach.

The Navy would do well to confront the issues raised here and to sort them out collectively and come to some tentative conclusions about them. There is a bureaucratic incentive to do so since the issues have been and will continue to be raised by many outside the Navy. Congressional opposition to construction of new aircraft carriers has been successful,

⁴ *Authorization for Military Procurement Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1971, and Reserve Strength*, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 91st Congress, Second Session, Part 2, 1970, p 1,308.

for example. More important, however, national security is best served by realistic estimates of our military capabilities. If the arguments presented here are anywhere near the mark, our reliance on aircraft carriers must be reevaluated in the light of the changed conditions we now face.

Writing of such changes, and of our reluctance to recognize them, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan observed:

It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the

*new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage....*⁵

Efforts to overcome this tendency now seem to be required.

⁵ Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History*, Hill & Wang, N. Y., 1957, p 8.



Military Review

1922-1972

Colonel Forrest R. Blackburn, *United States Army Reserve*

The Instructors' Summary of Military Articles makes its first appearance with the present number. It is contemplated to issue this document the 10th of each month. The publication will be printed to uniform size, 6 by 9 inches prepared for convenient filing.

WITH this introductory note, the *Military Review* came into being 50 years ago. Although different in title and only vaguely similar in content, the *Instructors' Summary of Military Articles* would, after several changes in name, format, and content, become the *Military Review* of today.

The first number of the new publication was dated January 1922. The date of issue, 10 February 1922, also appeared on the cover, a practice followed in the early numbers.

Across the top of the cover page was the name of the publishing institution, "The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas." The history of the Fort Leavenworth schools goes back to 1881 when, by order of General William T. Sherman, the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry was established. After experiencing several changes of name, the school was reorganized under the National Security Act of 1920, and, by 1922, it had become the General Service Schools, "a true post-graduate institution with the mission of preparing its students for higher command and staff positions."¹

The General Service Schools consisted of the Command and General Staff School and the Command and General Staff Correspondence School. The publication

1 Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. McGregor, "The Leavenworth Story," *Military Review*, May 1956, pp 62-76.



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section of the correspondence school was charged with the publication of the *Instructors' Summary of Military Articles*.²

Also appearing on the front cover of the January issue were the "Contents." Listed under this heading were the titles of the five sections of the *Summary*:

- Review of New Books Received in the Library.
- Digests of Selected Articles and Documents.
- Documents Received in Instructors' File Room.
- Magazines Received in Library During Month.
- Index of Selected Magazine Articles, Documents and Books.

Sections Added

These five sections continued in the *Summary* for the three and a half years the publication retained its original name. Two other sections were added in 1923: "Late Books Received in the Library," and "Important Articles of Military Interest That Have Appeared in Magazines."

Eight to 10 books were reviewed in each of the early issues although the first one had only five reviews. The first item to appear in the new magazine was a review of an 82-page book, *The Battle of the Piave, June 15-23, 1918*, published by the Royal Italian Army. By 1925, there were 20 or 25 brief book reviews printed in each issue.

Books for review and articles and documents to be digested were referred to chiefs of sections and instructors in the General Service Schools who delegated the work as necessary to officers in their sections. Officers assigned to write reviews and digests were instructed to be brief and

2 Instruction Circular Number 1, Series 1923-24, The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 June 1923, p 39.

concise, to limit their comments to matters of concern to all instructors and to information pertaining to the doctrine and policies of the schools.³ Often, a review or digest closed with a statement to the effect that the principles set forth in the book or article were sound and in accordance with doctrine taught in the schools.

It is noteworthy that, in the early years, a substantial share of the books reviewed and articles digested were of European authorship and publication. Many of the magazines received by the Leavenworth schools and magazine articles listed in the Summary also were of foreign origin. Perhaps this is an indication of the extent of the influence of European military doctrine in the US Army in the 1920's.

The documents received were principally from other service schools—the Army War College and the branch schools. Primarily, they gave information about courses taught at the respective schools.

³ *Ibid.*



The *Summary* kept its monthly schedule through May 1922. It was not published that summer, appearing again in September. Thereafter, it was published quarterly, in March, June, September, and December.

The January 1922 issue had 31 pages. The early issues averaged about 35. With the addition of two sections in 1923, the average was about 55 although the issues varied.

Circulation figures for the *Summary* can only be assumed from the number of copies printed. The General Service Schools' Printing Press was ordered to print 500 copies. Distribution was made to instructors and students at the General Service Schools, other service schools, and National Guard and Reserve units. Distribution was free; there were no subscriptions.

A new title appeared on the April-June 1925 issue which was published July 10: *Review of Current Military Writings*. Added to this, in smaller print, but actually a part of the title, was *for the Use of Instructors of the General Service Schools, Fort*

Colonel Paul R. Davison began the use of illustrations with the March 1938 issue

Major General Charles A. Willoughby was the first editor whose name appeared on the masthead in 1932



Leavenworth, Kansas. This latter portion was dropped from the title with the October-December 1927 number.

The *Summary* had begun without a volume number, only an issue number, January 1922 being I. S. M. A. No. 1. In September 1928, a volume number appeared for the first time. The issue was designated Volume 8, Number 1, RCMW Whole Number 30.

A change was made in September 1929 when the table of contents was moved from the front cover to an inside page. A further change took place in September 1931 with the use of a heavy stock cover, yellow in color at first. Previous covers had been of the same paper as the inside of the magazine.

Title changes occurred in December 1931 when it became *Review of Current Military Literature* and again in September 1932 when the title became *Quarterly Review of Military Literature*. With this latter issue, the table of contents was back

on the front cover. On the inside of the front cover was printed the following note: "Published Quarterly by the Command and General Staff School Library," and a library committee of five officers was listed. On the fourth page of the magazine was a list of 19 officers who had contributed to that issue. In addition, on that page, the editor's name appeared for the first time. He was Major Charles A. Willoughby who was also the school librarian and an instructor in military history and intelligence.

For the first 12 years of its existence, the *Military Review* contented itself with reviews of books, digests of articles, and lists of articles and documents that might be of interest and value to the officers. At the end of the 12th year, in the December 1933 issue, the *Review* published its first original article. The title was "Conduct of a Holding Attack" by Major J. Lawton Collins. The section of the magazine created for original articles was called "Original Military Studies." For several years, only one or two articles

appeared in this section of each issue. A favorite subject for original articles in the early years of their appearance was World War I tactics and operations.

Circulation of the *Review* was on the increase in the 1930's. By 1936, it had reached 2,000, and, in 1939, it was up to 4,200. Circulation by subscription had been put into effect in September 1934, allowing for wider distribution. The rate was one dollar a year.

During the 1930's, the *Review* increased in number of pages, averaging over 100 per issue. By the late 1930's and early 1940's, each issue included well over 200 pages.

In March 1935, Major Fred During, who had been associate editor, became editor of the magazine. Captain G. B. Guenther became the associate editor.

Beginning in 1936, *Review* authors turned their attention largely to current problems in tactics and logistics. Gradually, articles on current war situations began to appear. The December 1938 number included an article entitled "Behind China's Battle Lines" by Major J. W. Coffey and Lieutenant J. W. Rudolph. This was followed in March 1939 by "Employment of Supporting Arms in the Spanish Civil War" by Captain Wendell G. Johnson.

Use of Disclaimer

The first use of a disclaimer was in the June 1936 issue wherein the magazine stated that the article did not necessarily convey the views of the school, but was the expression of the opinions of the author. The article was "Field Service Regulations of the Future" by Major E. S. Johnson.

A new editorial staff arrived on the scene in September 1937. Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Davison became the editor and Major E. M. Benitez associate editor. A picture appeared on the cover for the first time in

the December 1937 issue. A representation of several mounted officers, including Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, in the full-dress uniform of 1888, the illustration was used on three issues.

Illustrations began appearing with original articles in the March 1938 magazine. A picture of Marshal Paul von Hindenburg was the first of these. From this time, illustrations appeared in increasing number. Maps had previously been used extensively in the magazine.

Cover and Title Change

A further change was made in September 1938 when the magazine was enlarged to 9 by 12 inches. A photograph of an armored car appeared on the cover of this issue. From this time on, the cover illustration was changed on each issue. The changes brought a congratulatory letter to the editor, Colonel Davison, from Army Chief of Staff General Malin Craig.

Colonel Benitez became editor of the publication with the June 1939 issue. This brought another change in title. It became *The Command and General Staff School Military Review*, using, for the first time, the title *Military Review*. The old title, *Quarterly Review of Military Literature*, continued as a subtitle for some time.

Colonel Benitez was succeeded in December 1940 by Captain M. R. Kammerer. A few months later, Colonel F. M. Barrows became the editor with Kammerer, now a major, as assistant editor. Articles on the war in Europe and Africa began to appear in 1941. The March issue of that year started a section entitled "World War II." It included brief summaries of the war on various fronts. By 1942, several articles were being published in each number on World War II. Notice the use of the term World War II in the magazine early

in 1941. This designation was not generally used until after the entry of the United States into the war late in 1941.

With the issue of April 1943, Volume 23, Number 1, the *Military Review* became a

service commands, river crossings, weather, logistics, and training. In addition, the same issue carried an extract from a lecture at the Command and General Staff School on the destruction of German dams.

Colonel Rodger R. Bankson, editor from 1957 to 1959



monthly magazine, having been published quarterly except for the first six months of its existence. For three times as many magazines, the subscriber now had to pay three times as much money—three dollars a year. Just over a year later, June 1944, it became necessary because of wartime economic pressures to decrease the magazine's dimensions to 6 by 8 inches.

It was during the early World War II period that original articles became the dominant part of the *Military Review*. The magazine was publishing original US Army doctrine, not just calling attention to that developed by other armies. A typical issue, December 1943, for instance, printed 14 original articles on such subjects as leadership, battle experience, motor marches, night combat,

At the request of Latin-American countries, the Department of the Army authorized publication of a Spanish-American edition and a Brazilian edition of the *Military Review*, the first issues of which appeared in April 1945. Colonel Andres Lopez of the US Army was the first editor of the Spanish-American edition, and Major Severino Sombra of the Brazilian Army was editor of the Brazilian edition. These editions contain translations of all articles and features appearing in the English edition. They are distributed to Latin-American countries through arrangements with the governments concerned.

The new editions required the assignment of several more officers to the editorial staff, and a production manager and business

manager were added. Also, about this time, the *Military Review* acquired a Washington representative. He acted as liaison officer between the staff of the magazine and the various Army agencies. Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Van Dine of the Pentagon was the first officer assigned to this position. In January 1946, Colonel Lopez, the Spanish-American editor, was named editor in chief to be succeeded in August of that year by Colonel Ramon A. Nadal. The magazine now had three full editors, the Spanish-American, Brazilian, and North American, all under the editor in chief. Another event of interest in 1946 was the redesignation of the Command and General Staff School as the Command and General Staff College. The August number of the magazine carried the new name.

Succession of Editors

Colonel Harold R. Emery succeeded Colonel Nadal in April 1949, who, in turn, was followed by Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Durfee in March 1952. Lieutenant Colonel William D. McDowell replaced Colonel Durfee in September 1955. He was followed by Colonel Rodger R. Bankson in July 1957. Colonel Kenneth E. Lay was the next editor in chief replacing Bankson in January 1960. In October 1964, Colonel Lay was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Delaney.

The North American editor was dropped in April 1956 and replaced by the managing editor. With the August 1960 number, the managing editor became the assistant editor. From 1944 to 1961, the general appearance of the magazine was relatively unchanged. It remained a 6 by 8 inch, closely printed publication with virtually no margins or other unused space on the pages. The cover design remained the same until September 1949, changing only in color. The college

building appeared in the background with a line of military weapons and vehicles across the foreground and an airplane overhead. The design used from 1949 to 1961 shows the globe in the background with several types of military equipment in the foreground.

The content of the magazine consisted of 12 to 14 original articles, a section entitled "Military Notes Around the World," and "Foreign Military Digests." Following World War II, many of the original articles discussed various subjects relating to the war.

Subjects Covered

A typical issue in 1946 included these titles: "Breaching the Siegfried Line," "PTs in the Pacific," "Sixth Army Quartermaster Operations in the Luzon Campaign," and "The Twentieth Air Force." In fact, a study of the *Consolidated Index* indicates as many or more articles on the war appeared after the war ended than during it. They continued to appear in diminishing numbers into the early 1950's. Another subject covered extensively during the postwar period was the occupation of Germany and Japan.

During the late 1940's and the 1950's, the foreign military digests appeared in about the same number as original articles, occupying almost as much space in the magazine. This was a swingback to more digests after using mostly original articles during the war.

A section devoted to book reviews entitled "Books for the Military Reader," later becoming "Books of Interest to the Military Reader," began appearing in the June 1949 magazine. Book reviews, of course, had been one of the features of the magazine in its early years, but had been dropped in 1943. The Korean Conflict brought only minor changes in the subject

matter. The number of original articles devoted to Korea changed little with the beginning of the war. In 1949, before the invasion, two articles appeared, and, in 1951, the first full year following the start of the war, three articles were printed. However, those before the war dealt with occupation themes, while those published after the war began had to do with the conflict itself.

Since the Korean War, several crisis periods have occurred which involved the United States. There was little response in

progress there were appearing. As might be expected, however, US involvement signaled a definite upturn in material on Vietnam. Eight original articles pertaining to the Vietnam war were published in the magazine in 1965. This increased to 11 in 1966, then peaked in 1967 and 1968 with 19 and 18 articles respectively, leveling off with 13 in 1969 and 15 in 1970.

At the beginning of 1961, a restyled *Military Review* made its appearance.



Colonel Donald J. Delaney, editor since 1964, completes his tour with this issue

the *Military Review* to the first three, the Lebanon, Congo, and Berlin crises. An article or two on each of them appeared, sometimes several years after the trouble was over. The Cuban affair brought more response, however, as nearly a dozen articles were printed, scattered throughout the 1960's.

US involvement in Vietnam had a decided effect on the content of the magazine. Even before the US buildup in Vietnam began in 1965, articles relating to the warfare in

A study had been made during 1960 to determine what changes should be made. With the January issue, the magazine was increased to 6 by 9 inches in size. The crowded appearance of the pages gave way to a more eye-appealing design with slightly larger type and wider margins. The cover had a new design, simple but attractive.

Beginning at this time, the original articles and military digests were no longer separated into sections, but were intermingled. In fact, from the table of contents, it is not possible

to distinguish them. The mission of the magazine was changed to read:

To present modern military thought and current Army doctrine concerning command and staff procedures of the division and higher echelons and to provide a forum for articles which stimulate military thinking.

Sources of Material

As is true of any magazine, much of the success enjoyed by the *Military Review*, much of the service the publication has been able to offer, and much of the esteem in which it has been held has been due to the efforts of its authors. Every publication must have its writers or contributors, its source of material. Fortunately, the *Military Review* has had available a substantial source of original material in the faculty, staff, and students of the US Army Command and General Staff College. In fact, in the early days of original articles in the magazine, they were sometimes prepared by the editorial staff itself.

From 1955 to 1960, it was a college policy to require faculty members below the grade of colonel to prepare one article for the *Military Review* during a three-year tour. Also, departments of the college prepared articles on specific subjects upon request. In the 1950's, it was reported that up to 25 percent of the original articles published had been submitted by college personnel.

The source of original articles, however, has been much broader than the college. It has been worldwide, with authors from a number of foreign countries contributing to the magazine. Authors include, in addition to school personnel, Active Army officers, Reserve and National Guard officers, retired officers, and civilians.

One important source in recent years has been the US Army War College at

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In 1961, the position of associate editor was set up at that college, one of the faculty members being designated for the job. This editor reviews material originating at the college and recommends that which he considers suitable for publication in the *Military Review*.

In one recent year, 1969, sources of the 111 original articles fell into the following categories: US Army Command and General Staff College seven, US Army War College 19, other active military 22, US Retired, Reserve, and National Guard 16, US civilian 30, and foreign 17. Authorship of the articles digested for the same year was US personnel 13, and foreign 12.

Annual Awards

To provide incentive for high-quality articles, the magazine in the 1950's began a program of awards for the best article in each issue and for the best article of the year. The annual awards were as high as \$350. These awards applied to military personnel on active duty. Civilians and military personnel not on active duty were given honorariums for their articles published. This program was discontinued in 1960, but a similar plan was again put into effect in 1964.

No attempt can be made to name even the most outstanding authors, but a glance at the *Consolidated Index* reveals many familiar names. One author who made several contributions to the *Military Review* was the late Dr. Bernard B. Fall. A citizen of France, Fall came to the United States in 1950 where he earned Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees at Syracuse University.

In 1953, he accompanied French troops in combat operations in Indochina. Resulting from this experience were several articles

which appeared in the *Military Review*. He was the author of many other articles and one book on political and military affairs. His article, “Indochina—The Seven Year Dilemma,” published October 1953 in the *Military Review*, is believed to have been his first article published in this country.⁴

Editors’ Comments

Another group sharing the credit for the *Military Review*’s steady development into the outstanding magazine it is today were its editors. It was their initiative, imagination, and energy that brought it to the high position it now occupies. As pioneers in any field have found, there were many obstacles to overcome. Even in recent years, the correspondence files are filled with communications resulting from the efforts of the editors to improve the magazine.

In anticipation of the 50th Anniversary of the *Military Review*, letters were sent to as many former editors as could be located, inviting them to share some of their experiences in that position and the effect the assignment had on their military and civilian careers. The response was good and interesting. Unfortunately, space allows only brief thoughts from each.

The first editor whose name appeared on the masthead was Major Willoughby. In 1971, Willoughby, a retired major general living in Florida, recalled his principal accomplishments as the new title, new format, and the utilization of foreign students in the Fort Leavenworth schools in the preparation of digests of articles from foreign publications for use in the *Quarterly Review*. After leaving the magazine, General Willoughby served as General Douglas

MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence and has had an outstanding career as writer, lecturer, publisher, and editor.

Colonel Davison, US Army, Retired, who occupied the editorial chair from September 1937 to March 1939, recalls his assignment at Fort Leavenworth as a “very rewarding and happy service.” Colonel Davison speaks of three goals he successfully strove for: to build up the circulation, to get the *Review* on a self-supporting foundation, and to make it interesting to professional military students.

Following retirement from the service in 1945, Colonel Davison went into the producing, directing, and writing fields of the motion picture industry. He now lives in California.

The lowest ranking editor the *Military Review* ever had was Captain Kammerer. After serving about eight months as assistant editor, Kammerer became editor when most of the school faculty, including the editor, left the post. Captain Kammerer served as editor for about five months. He now recalls his *Military Review* duty as the “most pleasant and most unusual” of his 30 years of service. Now, a retired colonel, he lives in North Carolina.

Two Assignments

Colonel Durfee had two assignments on the *Military Review*. The first was in 1946 when he was made editor of the English edition. After two years, he was assigned elsewhere, returning to the magazine in 1952 as editor in chief. Colonel Durfee remembers getting the magazine settled in its present quarters in Funston Hall as perhaps his greatest achievement. He is now retired and makes his home in Florida.

Colonel Bankson became managing editor of the *Military Review* in 1956. A year later, he became editor and in another year was promoted to colonel. Colonel Bankson

⁴ Letter from Fall’s widow, Dorothy Fall, to Colonel O. W. Martin, Jr., 7 September 1971.

writes that among his achievements were a more aggressive program of soliciting articles, increased use of photos and artwork, a new cover design, and the beginning of negotiations with the US Army War College to get some of the best student theses for publication. Colonel Bankson retired from the Army in 1970 and is now Director of Information for the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Incorporated, Washington, D. C., a position in which he finds his experience as editor of the *Military Review* “extremely valuable.”

In addition to the responses from some of the editors, one assistant editor, Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, US Army, Retired, provided the story of his *Military Review* experience in considerable detail. Garland was assigned to the magazine from 1962 to 1965, serving as acting editor in chief three months in 1964.

Colonel Garland's comments, which deserve more attention than can be given here, tell of the relationships among members of the magazine staff and of the mechanics of getting the editing and publishing accomplished. Looking back, he says, “the three years at the *Military Review* were good years, some of the best.”

Colonel Delaney has been editor in chief since 1964, the longest tenure of any editor. He retires from active service this month and will be succeeded by Colonel O. W. Martin, Jr., former editor of *Armor* magazine. Beginning with the January 1972 issue, the *Military Review* has returned to a pictorial cover. Perhaps the area of 62 greatest improvement in the past several years is

in the scholastic quality of the original articles printed. Another change has been the addition of the “Reader Forum” section, thereby giving readers the opportunity to comment on articles published.

Today, at 50, the *Military Review* is one of the world's leading military journals. It is published in three languages, with a total circulation of 22,000, in over 80 countries. The magazine's influence is even broader than the circulation figures indicate as it is widely reprinted in foreign military journals.

The US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College continue to be important sources of original articles, as are active, retired, and Reserve military personnel, and civilians. Efforts are made to get recognized authorities in military fields to contribute feature articles on topics of current interest. The great majority of the articles received, however, are unsolicited. Of these, approximately one out of six is chosen for publication.

The magazine continues to publish articles on a wide range of military subjects. Vietnam is no longer as popular as a few years ago. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the military activities of the Soviet Union, Communist China, the Middle East, and Latin America, and nuclear weapons and warfare are among the current favorite subjects. Thus, for 50 years, the *Military Review* has provided a forum for the expression of military thought and a medium for the dissemination of military doctrine. Having taken a look back, we now look ahead to the next 50 years.



US Tactics in Vietnam

Lieutenant Colonel Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., *United States Army*

THE long-term results of our efforts in Vietnam are not yet discernible, and the conduct of the war is a subject of dispute. This may cause all of us to learn the wrong lessons from that difficult conflict and to ignore some of the things we have done reasonably well. There is a tendency on the part of many to feel that we in the Army have gone about the whole thing wrong, even at the tactical level. While we have certainly made many mistakes, a knowledgeable appraisal will result in a more valid judgment.

A rather common and important criticism is that we should have attempted to defeat the enemy in Vietnam on his own terms as a guerrilla. A leading exponent of this school of thought, and a distinguished soldier, is Colonel David H. Hackworth:

...the most important lesson to be drawn from the war in Vietnam is that a lightly equipped, poorly supplied guerrilla army cannot easily be defeated by the world's most powerful and sophisticated army, using conventional tactics. To defeat the guerrilla, we must become guerrillas. Every insurgent tactic must be copied and employed against the insurgent

...American forces must enter the guerrilla's lair as hunters, employing skill, stealth, enterprise and cunning....¹

This strong indictment of our approach to the war bears a striking resemblance to the opinion expressed by Bernard B. Fall as to why the French lost to the Vietminh:

¹ Colonel David H. Hackworth, "A Distant Challenge," Birmingham Publishing Co., Birmingham, Ala., 1968.



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In the monsoon jungles of Southeast Asia, there is no cheap substitute for the most expensive commodity of them all—the well-trained combat infantryman; not the mass-produce item of the 'divisional training camps so dear to the Korean war, but the patiently trained jungle fighter who will stay in the jungle—not on the edges of it—and who will out-stay the enemy, if need be. The French have finally recognized this and their commando groups, once developed, showed surprising staying and hitting ability. But when the showdown came, there were too few of them—and they were too late.²

There is undoubtedly some validity to this point of view. We need to think carefully, however, before we accept large-scale unconventional warfare as a preferable alternative to the methods of fighting which largely characterized our efforts in Vietnam.

Tactics Employed

On the contrary, the Army, albeit imperfectly, employed tactics in a way which was generally appropriate to the situation—especially during the periods of large-unit combat—and suited to our own characteristics and assets. Indeed, in the process of doing this, the Army developed a new and significant form of warfare. We would be wrong to attempt to redesign the Army, or even a significant part of it, in an effort to compensate for assumed deficiencies in "counter-guerrilla" capabilities based on our Vietnam experience.

From the point of view of the enemy, success in conventional battle was essential to winning the war in the Republic of Vietnam. The Communists, at least initially, did not believe that success in guerrilla war

² Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy*, The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1964, p 243.

*Department of Defense*

French vehicles became major encumbrances and highly vulnerable when stopped and exposed to a concealed enemy

could by itself lead to victory. They entered the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam with a formula for victory which had been tried and tested successfully against the French and had resulted in a stunning victory on the battlefield, culminating in the fall of the French fortress of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. This formula identified three main phases of conflict: guerrilla war, local war, and mobile war.

Theoretically, these phases run sequentially with each phase paving the way for the one to follow. Actually, all of these phases have existed concurrently within the Republic of Vietnam, varying from place to place. The geographic compartmentalization and the primitive communications of Vietnam have contributed to this. The result has been a conflict in Vietnam which was a virtual

kaleidoscope of apparently unrelated actions and bewildering to many observers.

There is an enduring interdependence between these phases which remains throughout the course of a struggle. The organizational apparatus necessary for each phase is a key fixture of the succeeding one as well. For example, the local infrastructure constructed in the guerrilla war stage of the movement is needed to secure and maintain lines of communication and provide logistics support for the local war and mobile war operations which occur later. In fact, a unique feature of Communist operations in Vietnam has been that military lines of communications are placed in front of the attacking main force—laid out in advance by the guerrilla war infrastructure and local war guerrilla forces.

Also to be noted is the fact that, because of this organizational depth, the theoretically sequential phases are, to some extent, reversible. Conflict can be deescalated to a lower and perhaps less risky phase by the insurgent high command when necessary, provided the struggle has not seriously weakened the political apparatus. This helps to explain the resilience and persistence of the insurgent movement in Vietnam.

Classical Doctrine

According to classical doctrine, reversion to a lower profile is a temporary expedient to the insurgents. Final victory requires successful progression to mobile warfare. Seizure of political power lies beyond the grasp of a movement which cannot prosecute conventional battle as a prelude to seizure of the reins of government. All activities which go before are necessary but insufficient ingredients. The willingness of Hanoi to suffer repeated disasters on the conventional battlefield against US main force units cannot be explained without reference to this doctrine.

A succinct description of the Vietminh scenario for victory over the French and of the enduring philosophy motivating the Communist forces was given by General Vo Nguyen Giap in early 1950:

Our strategy early in the course of the third stage is that of a general counter-offensive. We shall attack without cease until final victory, until we have swept the enemy forces from Indochina. During the first and second stage, we have gnawed away at enemy forces; now we must destroy them. All military activities of the third stage must tend to the same simple aim—the total destruction of French forces.

When we shall have reached the third stage, the following tactical principle will be applied: mobile warfare will become the

principal activity, positional warfare and guerrilla warfare will become secondary.³

The large conventional component of the war is shown in Figure 1 which makes a comparison over time of opposing maneuver battalions. While there were always important features of guerrilla warfare present, from the time the United States entered in force in 1965 until the aftermath of the 1968 Tet offensive, the war in the Republic of Vietnam was primarily one of big units fighting each other.

Prior to the intervention of US ground combat forces in 1965, the Communist High Command clearly sensed victory in the Republic of Vietnam. A long period of Communist preparation and chronic South Vietnamese political instability was now to be culminated with a straightforward defeat of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

Final Stages

To execute the final stages of the campaign, Hanoi deployed a great number of large units into the Republic of Vietnam beginning in late 1964. Some eight regiments were infiltrated into the south in 1965, joining a large number of Viet Cong units already present or being formed within the Republic of Vietnam. By mid-1965, the Communists could field considerably more maneuver battalions than could the ARVN. It was at this point that the United States entered in force. The conflict had, therefore, already reached its final stages, as far as Hanoi was concerned, when the United States intervened and began its buildup of regular forces.


The ARVN was at the point of collapse, losing a battalion a week in the early months of 1965. As Figure 1 clearly

3 *Ibid.*, pp 34-35.

illustrates, our escalation of forces was matched by Hanoi for an extended period. In 1966, approximately 15 more Communist regiments were infiltrated into, or formed within, the Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, contrary to widespread American public misconceptions about the nature of the war,

base areas within the Republic of Vietnam. However, by the spring of 1966, this was possible; large unit warfare continued, but with the US forces on the offensive. After having taken heavy losses, the enemy was forced to reassess his entire approach to the war. He could not get at the vitals of

MANEUVER BATTALIONS ESTIMATED IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM*



*Commander in Chief, Pacific; and Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, *Report on the War in Vietnam as of 30 June 1968*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Action Officer's Data Book on Vietnamizing the War*.

Figure 1.

the task faced by US forces upon arriving in Vietnam was not one mainly of tracking down guerrillas, but of defeating an enemy field army on the threshold of victory.

Our units initially used more or less conventional tactics because they had to in order to hold off disaster. In the spring and summer of 1965, our forces served chiefly in a reaction role to assist South Vietnamese units being attacked. It was some time before we could move against the enemy in his own

the Republic of Vietnam—the populated areas—without exposing his large units to disastrous defeat by US firepower. Yet, if he stayed in his secure sanctuaries, his local forces and infrastructure could neither be reinforced nor protected from increasingly active Vietnamese forces.

By the end of 1966, the enemy had withdrawn most of his main force units into relatively secure base areas or cross-border sanctuaries, and the war within the

Republic of Vietnam reverted to a lower level of conflict, mostly involving small-scale fighting. Both United States and South Vietnamese forces were relatively free during this period to devote their attention to attempting to neutralize local forces and the Communist infrastructure. The summer and fall of 1967 were comparatively quiet in the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy had virtually vanished from the battlefield. This was the calm before the storm of the Tet offensive of 1968.

The military objectives of Tet were not achieved. While it was a historic turning point in the war and may, in the perspective of history, be viewed as a psychological success for the Communists, it did not produce what they planned and hoped it would in the short run—a general uprising of the people, large-scale disintegration of ARVN, and dramatic defeat of US units. Instead, staggering losses were suffered by both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units and by the political infrastructure which had surfaced to support them in taking the cities.

Beginning of Wisdom

The Tet offensive may well have been the beginning of wisdom for both the United States and Hanoi with regard to the nature of the war and their own respective limitations. Certainly, we had not envisioned such ambition and capability by an enemy who had virtually none of the technical resources of modern war. On his part, the enemy apparently put aside his hopes for victory on the pattern of Dien Bien Phu.

Since the aftermath of the Tet offensive, the war changed in character. It has become increasingly that of small-unit actions and has devolved, to a far greater extent, to South Vietnamese local forces. We may

correctly say then that the large-unit stage of the war was over after mid-1968—at least as far as the US forces are concerned—and that the United States innovated tactical means which successfully thwarted the original phase III military goals of the enemy during that period. The scope of this analysis is limited to that earlier period.

Comparison of Engagements

We succeeded against Communist main force units in a tactical arena where the French had failed. The reasons for our success can best be illustrated by comparing two engagements which occurred in different eras of the Vietnam conflict. One is drawn from the closing days of the French campaign against the Vietminh, and the other from the US experience in the Republic of Vietnam against the Viet Cong. The actions contain enough basic similarities to permit an analysis of some of their details. In both, the opposing forces were attempting to exploit their inherent advantages, and both sides were seeking combat.

The first action, remembered as the Battle of Mang Yang Pass, occurred near Pleiku in the Central Highlands in the early part of 1954. In an effort to gain tactical superiority over the Vietminh, the French had reorganized many of their best combat units into *Groupes Mobiles*. These elite task forces were designed to maximize mobility and heavy firepower to offset the advantages of cross-country mobility and flexibility possessed in abundance by the guerrilla forces.

The force in this action was *Group Mobile 100*, formed in November 1953 and dispatched to the Highlands in December to prevent Communist control of the area. Farther north, the historic Battle of Dien Bien Phu was beginning to take shape.

History has, therefore, cast the men of *Group Mobile 100* and their opponents into the shadows of the greater battle.

For the first few months of 1954, *Group Mobile 100* was in almost continuous movement throughout the Highlands, attempting to counter Vietminh attacks on widely dispersed French strongholds. On 1 April, it was ordered to An Khe to assume the defense of this vital sector endangered by Communist reinforcements.

The task force had already suffered 25-percent casualties from repeated contacts with the enemy by late June when it was ordered to evacuate An Khe and fall back to Pleiku—the key center in the Highlands. Dien Bien Phu had fallen on 8 May. *Group Mobile 100* started on the 50-mile road march on 24 June. As a viable combat unit, the force never completed the move.

Forces

Group Mobile 100 consisted of about 2,600 men at the time of the battle. Its basic combat units were three veteran French infantry battalions. These were the famed 1st and 2d Korean Battalions which had served under the United Nations flag with great distinction prior to coming to Indochina, and the Bataillon de Marche of the 43d Colonial Infantry. A Vietnamese infantry battalion, the 520th, was attached.

Accompanying these units was a formidable array of combat power in support—three battalions of 105-millimeter artillery of the 10th Colonial Artillery Regiment, the 3d Squadron of the 5th Armored Cavalry, an armored car platoon, and limited air support on call from the French field at Nha Trang. *Group Mobile 100* was fully mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles—no one had to walk.

The enemy this potent force was destined to oppose was the 803d Vietminh Regiment

manned at about the same strength. It was made up of four light infantry battalions, and its fire support consisted only of 60 and 81- millimeter mortars and an unknown number of hand-held rockets. It had no vehicles of any type, either tracked or wheeled, no artillery support, and, needless to say, no air support. One would assume from comparing these forces in terms of equipment and weaponry that any engagement would be heavily in favor of the French. Yet *Group Mobile 100* was virtually annihilated by the 803d Regiment on its 50-mile road march in the Highlands.

Ambush

As the French task force moved along Highway 19 from An Khe toward Pleiku in late June, it was ambushed by elements of the 803d only 10 miles outside of An Khe. Pinned down on the road, and trapped amidst the wreckage of its own burning vehicles, *Group Mobile 100* lost all of its artillery, almost all of its vehicles, and half of its men. The Vietminh had attacked the column from the front and rear, making movement impossible for the French. They then destroyed the force trapped on the road. The survivors lived by abandoning their equipment and taking to the jungle in small groups. A diagram of the disaster is shown in Figure 2.

The best that military technology could then provide had not been enough for the French. The mobility and firepower marshaled at such great effort had been rendered impotent in the face of a skillful but lightly armed foe. All that remains today of *Group Mobile 100* is a simple marker in the Mang Yang Pass. The 803d Vietminh Regiment had turned the tide in the Highlands. In the words of Fall:

This was the moment they had been waiting for, the battle which was going to




Figure 2.

repay them for hundreds of their own dead, and which was going to give them control of the plateau area.⁴

More will be said about this tragic vignette from the earlier stage of the Indochina war after a brief look at another operation which took place some 12 years later—the Battle of Minh Thanh Road in the Republic of Vietnam. This action took place in the dense jungle area north of Saigon several miles northeast of the vast Michelin rubber plantation. The opposing forces this time were US and Viet Cong.

On the US side was the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. Their enemy was the 272d Viet Cong Regiment. Employed eventually by the 1st Division were four infantry battalions and an armored cavalry squadron. These units were supported by five batteries of artillery and, significantly, by some 60 troop lift assault helicopters and

massive air support both from helicopter gunships and fighter bombers.

In this action, a successful effort was made by the US forces to entice the enemy into ambushing a US convoy—to lure him into attacking our forces in a situation which, on the surface, appeared similar to that which had spelled the end of *Group Mobile 100*. This was done by the simple expedient of preparing a bogus convoy plan and insuring that it was leaked to the Viet Cong. At 0700, on the morning of 9 July 1966, an armored column departed Quan Loi bound for Minh Thanh, approximately 15 miles away, along a narrow dirt road through the jungles of War Zone C. This column was comprised of most of an armored cavalry squadron—1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry—with its tanks and heavy firepower. At 1110, the 272d Viet Cong Regiment attacked, immediately inflicting a substantial number of casualties on the US column. Here, the similarity with the Mang Yang Pass affair ended.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p 213.

Within minutes, reinforcing battalions of infantry were en route by helicopter from 1st Division bases to attack the Viet Cong from his flanks and rear, and to block his escape. The commander of the 1st Division air lifted four airmobile infantry battalions from bases from six to 12 miles distant from the scene of initial combat and maneuvered them to encircle the enemy.

Counterambush

What had begun—as far as the Viet Cong were concerned—as a carefully prepared ambush turned into a larger scale counterambush—a “vertical ambush” by air. Once pinpointed and fixed in position, the 272d Regiment was hit by nearly 100 airstrikes over a period of several hours, as well as continuous ground and artillery fire. It is estimated that about half of the 272d Regiment died in this holocaust, as compared to some 24 Americans. A sketch of the battle is in Figure 3.

These two engagements are taken as examples, not because they had a large impact on the outcome of the war, but because they are typical of the type of combat which had evolved during the French campaign in Indochina in the 1950's and of that developed in the Republic of Vietnam more than a decade later. In the interim, a key factor had been altered by technology for which Communist military doctrine had no answer—the rate of reinforcement of committed forces.

In the Battle of Mang Yang Pass, the French entered the fight with a given force. That force had to be sufficient to prevail against the enemy on its own, for it could not be assisted once committed deep in guerrilla-dominated terrain. The enemy selected and prepared the battlefield. Once the battle was joined, the initiative remained with the more lightly armed Vietminh troops

who could traverse the jungle battle area with speed and safety. The French vehicles, which gave them high-speed mobility on the roads, became major encumbrances and highly vulnerable when stopped and exposed to a concealed enemy.

Technology

Group Mobile 100 represented the ultimate in technology for its day. Its failure, therefore, led Fall and others to conclude that only a guerrilla could defeat a guerrilla—and then only before phase III was reached.

This may have been a proper conclusion for 1954. It is not today. Technology has radically changed the dynamics of the battlefield. With the helicopters available to him, given the distances of his bases from the battle, the US commander at Minh Thanh Road could reinforce at a rate of about 20 men every minute, or, with the combat elements of almost an entire battalion, every 30 minutes. Furthermore, these reinforcements did not have to stay in one place. Throughout the battle, units were frequently moved by air to block enemy escape routes and to complete his encirclement. There was no intention of conducting the battle with initially committed forces. Those were used only as the “price of admission.”

This operation also illustrates a remarkable alteration in the traditional relationships between assault forces, particularly the infantry, and the supporting forces or weapons, especially the artillery. The traditional form of ground combat has required that infantry troops actually close with and destroy the enemy in direct fighting—wresting key terrain from him. Artillery and airstrikes were clearly secondary in this effort, being used to soften up an enemy for the assaulting troops.

This relationship came to be reversed in Vietnam. To a large degree, the role of

the infantry became primarily to locate and pin down the enemy in order that the *coup de grâce* might be delivered by massive application of firepower from aircraft and artillery. This was the case in the Minh Thanh Road battle.

employment. In terms of our values and resources, these role transformations were logical and sensible developments, for they reduced the exposure of our troops to the enemy. The last 50 yards to the enemy positions have been the grim province of the




Figure 3.

The role of armor as a mobile striking force was also altered in battles such as this one. Here, the armor was used as a holding force, while the more mobile infantry moved to outflank the enemy. This is a marked change from traditional

assaulting infantryman since the beginning of military history, and, all too frequently, the scene of his death. Air-mobile tactics combined with heavy firepower have meant that the last 50 yards frequently did not have to be crossed. From a purely technical

standpoint, frontal assault by the infantry fails to exploit our own assets. Our great wealth and production capacity have enabled us to provide an almost incredible amount of fire support to the foot soldier in Vietnam.

Casualties

This has meant that our casualties in most large engagements in Vietnam have been substantially lighter than those suffered by the enemy. While obviously the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have been willing to expend manpower, and may have a large reservoir of able-bodied men, raw manpower alone does not constitute an army. It takes far longer to build an effective rifle battalion than to train a rifleman. Losses of the magnitude sustained by the Communists during the periods of phase III battles must inevitably affect the quality of the enemy forces a whole.

The alteration in the roles of supporting and assault forces constituted a serious derogation of enemy capability—one which he had not been able to foresee. The backbone of the insurgent movement in Vietnam has, from the beginning, been the superbly trained and motivated infantryman. But the air-mobile warfare we have developed did not often permit him to be brought to bear in a direct contest with his opposite numbers—the American GI—on a conventional battlefield. There is an ironic similarity here. Many Western military leaders have decried the difficulty at getting at the enemy. Yet the enemy has found it even more difficult to get at our soldiers.

It is possible that Hanoi and the Viet Cong were wrong about the prerequisites for ultimate political success. It may be that, on their part, they have overestimated the requirement for a military prelude to victory and underestimated the social and political

momentum generated by a sustained level of violence. Certainly, both sides entered the war with serious misconceptions. However, it is fair to say that we have contrived a means of coping with the enemy when he seeks a conventional victory. We have done this in a way which, while very expensive in materiel, has compensated for some of the inherent defects of a largely nonprofessional Western army.

Future Development

If our costly involvement in Vietnam is to be more than a painful memory, we must learn from it as we go about the task of building for the future. A significant conclusion to be drawn from Vietnam concerns the capabilities we developed to operate effectively at the near-conventional stage. It is in this area that we should look for guidelines for future development of Army programs and doctrine, not in attempting to build a better counter-guerrilla capability as some would suggest.

Large-scale guerrilla or counter-guerrilla operations are poor options for our use in the future because of characteristics inherent in both insurgency warfare and in ourselves—no matter how much we would wish it otherwise. As the previous discussion should indicate, the contest in phases I and II is at least as much social and political as it is military.

At issue is political power—at the local as well as the national level. It is extremely difficult, or even impossible, for outsiders, especially foreigners, to operate with facility in this milieu. Precise and deep knowledge of local customs is essential. Acceptance by the local population is required, as is the ability virtually to “go native” in order to defeat the guerrilla on his own terms and in his own territory. This is, in effect, what Fall and Hackworth believe is essential.

VIETNAM

It seems obvious that the US Army is inherently ill-suited for producing substantial numbers of soldiers with these attributes. As an Army, we are broadly representative of the general population—technically inclined, conditioned to a high standard of living, and, of greater significance, Western, largely white, and English-speaking. Only with great difficulty can many of our soldiers who are drawn from that population be given more than superficial training of the type needed to make them effective.

Certainly, our Special Forces personnel performed magnificently in Vietnam; but their example merely illustrates the point that much time and effort are needed to produce a competent guerrilla leader. It is, of course, true that, while the Montagnard efforts were important, they were decidedly subsidiary to the overall main force effort.

This is no reflection on our competence, merely an honest appraisal of our characteristics as an Army. There is no doubt that our citizens would themselves make superb guerrilla fighters if they were faced with a foreign force occupying the United States. However, assisting someone else, of a different culture, to conduct internal politico-military battles among the population is an entirely different affair.

Policy Dilemmas

Added to these problems are thorny policy dilemmas caused by the dynamics of a revolutionary movement. A long period of phase I and phase II activity precedes the escalation to conventional conflict. In order to be employed at an appropriately early point in a given insurgency situation, counter-guerrilla



US Army

US forces often used artillery and aircraft to deliver the killing blow after infantry had located and fixed the enemy.

forces should be introduced long before overt hostilities develop.

As a policy problem, this presents immense difficulties. Assuming that we would wish to help defeat an insurgency in its early stages, how do we know which incipient movement, of many throughout the world, carries within it the germ of growth and potential ultimate victory? Would we not be faced with the prospect of almost always being either too late in the right place, or in the wrong place altogether? Even if we could correctly identify a truly dangerous movement, would it be possible to mobilize domestic support for an active US role prior to the outbreak of highly visible phase III operation?

Finally, there is the problem of uniqueness. If there is anything students of revolutionary conflict agree upon—and there is not much—it is that generalization is dangerous. Each insurgency builds upon local issues and retains unique local characteristics. How, then, is one to prepare a counter-guerrilla force for effective general employment? Would we have a group specifically targeted on each country or locale where a movement might develop?

The alternative would be equally impractical—a group or a small number of groups trained for use in many areas, for this again confronts the problem of uniqueness. It would assume that general doctrine concerning counter-guerrilla operations can be developed to train large numbers of people for use in a variety of places.

Counterinsurgency

There is another even more complex problem associated with developing a significant counterinsurgency capability. This is the appropriateness of counterinsurgency as a major mission for the US Army itself. The great strength of US fighting forces

historically has been precisely that they have exploited their peculiarly American qualities and attributes. Highly mechanized and technical warfare reinforces our tendencies and talents and serves as a vehicle for evolutionary advance—counterinsurgency goes against the grain. We are a rich, industrial, urban country. Highly technical forces are compatible with our characteristics and resources.

Finally, technical conventional forces are likely to be most easily adaptable for general and rapid employment in an advanced conflict. This is important because we will, in all likelihood, be committed at the 11th hour in any future conflicts, as we have been in the past. Therefore, we should design forces which can be committed with some chance of being effective in a mobile situation on short notice.

The United States is not likely to get involved in a conflict at its inception, however much the counter-guerrilla school believes it necessary. We are most likely going to be called upon as a fire brigade—placed in action after a fire is in its advanced stages as we were in Vietnam. At that point, units designed for fighting guerrillas would be too little and too late, as they would have been in 1954 and 1965. This is one of the things we should learn—not that we must condition ourselves to become guerrillas.

It can be argued—and has—that what has been described here as a major tactical innovation in Vietnam merely illustrates the futility of the entire effort in Southeast Asia. It is pointed out, with some justification, that concentrating on defeating phase III concedes the perhaps more important earlier phases to the insurgents. However, in a sense, all military operations are *in extremis*—conducted as a last resort of the policymaker.

In Vietnam, as elsewhere, we did and, indeed, must place primary reliance in the early stages upon indigenous forces. If they cannot deal effectively with these activities, then probably we cannot either. This does not negate our capability of blunting the victory in its mobile war stages. In other words, there is a residual capability of “not losing” if the enemy pursues phase III doctrine. There is thus a dilemma for both ourselves and an insurgent force in a Vietnam-type situation—there is a ceiling on his effectiveness; there is a floor on ours. He cannot win fighting our way; we cannot defeat him fighting his way.

Can he win ultimately if he limits his efforts to those activities associated with phases I and II? We cannot answer this question from the Vietnam experience for, in the early years of our involvement, the

enemy chose not to conduct the war in that way, and, of course, the full judgment of history must wait until all the returns are in.

This analysis is by no means an attempt to argue that what we have gained or learned in Vietnam has been worth its cost in lives, dollars, and domestic discord. Indeed, it is clear that many Americans at this time do not believe that it has been. We must be careful that the perspectives of our future decision makers are not formed by the wrong or incomplete conclusions about Vietnam. We cannot tell what the future holds for us. Vietnam did more than demonstrate to us dramatically the limitations of our policies; it also revealed rather clearly some of our inherent military weaknesses and strengths. We must know ourselves well enough to build upon our strengths in the future.

From *Dialog* (Federal Republic of Germany)



Title photo courtesy L'Armee.

Mobile Defense

Paul Carell

A CAMPAIGN has started in the Federal Republic against the defense concept of the Bundeswehr. The procurement of modern Leopard battle tanks is claimed to be too expensive and, what is more, unnecessary. The battle tank is said to be the classical offensive weapon system—a favorite of the former proponents of a strategy against the USSR. True defensive concepts, it is said, do not require offensive weapons: Reequipping the *Bundeswehr* with tanks makes Bonn's doctrine of detente dubious.



Army News Features

Only a battle tank is capable of conducting a counterattack



Rheinatahl Sonderfertigung

90-millimeter gun tank destroyer

The *Bundeswehr* has been organized to defend us right at the border. The 1970 white paper on the security of the Federal Republic states that:

The security of the population of the Federal Republic can only be safeguarded by a defense starting at the border. That is why no Federal Government could ever abandon the principle of forward defense.

Defensive Doctrine

The former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Albert Schnez, explained the defensive doctrine:

The mission of the German Army within the strategy of flexible response is obvious: To, defend the Federal Republic and to protect the Federal territory from enemy penetration.

This is a clear-cut strategic concept of defense. The unrestrictedly defensive character of the *Bundeswehr* is not only militarily relevant, but has internal and external political significance. The defensive doctrine is an important element of the policy of detente. No one should be suspicious of us and think that we want to attack anyone.

The white paper continues:

Though capable of launching tactical counter-attacks, the Federal Armed Forces are unable to carry out largescale offensive operations. Both their combat units and their logistics organization are devised for defense.

This article was translated and condensed from the original, published in DIALOG (Federal Republic of Germany) January 1971, under the title "Verteidigung mit offensiven Waffensystemen?" Copyright © 1971 by DIALOG.

The defensive doctrine is continued in the strategy of controlled, graduated, and flexible response. As General Schnez has stated: "The fundamental idea of a strategy of adequate response is to meet possible aggression with only that force required to control the crisis."

This should serve to eliminate any doubt about roles and missions of the *Bundeswehr*. Nevertheless, again and again, investigations are undertaken in order to make quite sure that no one—not even a villainous general or politician—violates this vow to abstain from the offensive. One of the most recent contributions in this respect is the discussion now underway about battle tanks for the *Bundeswehr*. Does an army which purports to be defensive in nature still require battle tanks which are commonly considered offensive weapon systems? The argument runs:

Battle tanks are the classical weapons of modern offense. Why should we have offensive weapon systems if we want to be defensive? Let us reduce the number of battle tanks.

Gun Tank Destroyers

As an alternative, the demand is made that larger numbers of the specifically defensive gun tank destroyers be procured for the *Bundeswehr*—more gun tank destroyers and fewer battle tanks because of the principle and because it is much cheaper.

A weekly magazine had this to say in November 1970:

The army has a total of 3,300 battle tanks which are better suited for attack than for defense—1,838 Leopards costing \$300,000 each and 1,462 Pattons of U.S. origin which are to be replaced by Leopard II beginning in 1975. This follow-on model is to cost \$525,000 each. However, the army has only 1,086 tank destroyers which are the core

MOBILE DEFENSE

of effective anti-tank operations and cost only \$175,000 to \$200,000 each. Anti-tank specialists feel that this expensive offensive-defensive mix at a ratio of 3: 1 serves only to satisfy prestige which the armored strategists in their World War II nostalgia feel they require, but not our security.

Where does that leave the defensive doctrine, and what about economy? If

price, whereas the \$525,000 for the *Leopard II* is the 1972 price. A 1972 tank destroyer would have to incorporate a number of product improvements and would also cost between \$230,000 and \$260,000.

What is offensive, and what is defensive? A weapon or a weapon system by itself alone cannot be classified as either offensive or defensive. Only the structure of large units



Wehr und Wirtschaft

TOW antitank missile used by rifle units

the *Bundeswehr* had, instead, 3,000 tank destroyers costing \$175,000 each, but only 1,000 *Leopard* battle tanks costing \$525,000 each, this would mean a saving of 700 million dollars, and that would be exactly the sum which the government in Bonn so urgently needs for its educational reform plans. Very impressive, indeed, but a miscalculation in every respect. For one thing, \$175,000 is the 1965 procurement

and their number and deployment will show whether they are geared for attack or for defense.

What is the answer as far as we are concerned? The Warsaw Pact has concentrated 13,500 battle tanks on the glaxis of the Federal Republic. They are organized in major armored units and could attack us without noticeable initial redeployment. Due to their

superiority in numbers, these tank armies could form strong concentrations and thrust through our defense system, penetrate deep into our rear, and cause the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's defensive front to collapse. There is no remedy against such concentrated operations. Any defense—even if deeply echeloned—would be without effect, however plentiful area fire weapons and tank destroyers might be. There is only one remedy: The employment of mobile armored units which, advancing in counterattacks under a strong fire screen, can destroy enemy tank units wherever they might have penetrated.

Counterattacks

Counterattacks are essential. They are the focal element of a defensive battle against enemy armor. Only a battle tank with its fire control, day-and-night optics, and its balanced combination of firepower, mobility, and endurance is capable of conducting such a fight. Its capability of quickly changing the direction of fire by simply rotating the turret makes it vastly superior to the tank destroyer.

Defending our territory and recapturing lost terrain are unthinkable without counterattack, and counterattacks without battle tanks are impossible. There is only one alternative to a counterattack by battle tanks against a large enemy armored unit advancing deeply into our territory—the massive use of nuclear weapons. No arguments are needed to show that this alternative of detonating nuclear weapons on our own territory is completely unacceptable.

The battle tank used as a casemate vehicle is more expensive than a tank destroyer. The cheaper, agile, and accurate tank destroyer is as effective in a purely

defensive role as a tank, as long as it can operate from defilade and in terrain suitable for defense. It is an excellent weapon system, which is why, in the new army structure, those major units primarily geared for defense, such as rifle brigades and home defense units, will be equipped with tank destroyers instead of battle tanks.

But it is a dangerous error to assume that such units, however many gun tank destroyers they might have, would have a chance of success where the enemy has the advantage of terrain which favors mobility as does the North German Plain. Static area defense against major enemy armored units would require efforts in personnel, equipment, and weapons that are impossible for a nation of our size to realize. It would require a continuous defensive system of more than 1,200 miles in length, deeply echeloned and backed by heavily fortified strongholds. It would require human sacrifices which are out of proportion to a possible success.

No Substitute

At the moment, there are no indications in either East or West of a follow-on weapon system for the battle tank. It is true that the limits of its effectiveness are becoming more and more obvious, at least in central Europe. The increasing density of buildings which limits intervisibility, the resultant decrease in combat ranges in spite of longer range artillery, the increased effectiveness of antitank weapons, and many other considerations make it necessary to look for new technological variants and new armor battle tactics.

The third dimension seems to offer the obvious solution. Armored helicopter gunships could be a way out. But this will be an evolutionary, not revolutionary,

MOBILE DEFENSE

development. As of today, the battle tank is still the focal element of the defensive battle, the very heart of defense itself.

But defensive strategy is more than mere belief in the miraculous qualities of a type of combat or a weapon system.

Defensive strategy is, as General Schnez said:

Overcoming military aggression without disproportionate escalation; the only

strategic concept, indeed the only way out of the infamous deadend road of major war: capitulation of nuclear annihilation.

There is no ideal solution. But the words of Clausewitz, taught at military academies throughout the world, are still true: “The defense is the strongest form of war if it is a shield formed of skillfully delivered blows.”

Such blows can only be dealt by armored units—at least as of today.

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A Volunteer Draft

An Alternative to the Draft Lottery

Captain Daniel H. Newlon, United States Army

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—Editor.

HOW SHOULD the Army meet its future manpower requirements?

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Present discussion of this question focuses on the lottery draft and the Volunteer Army. There is, however, another possibility: the volunteer draft.

The volunteer draft proposal is a new idea. It is called volunteer because 18-year-olds would be allowed to choose among three alternatives: enlistment, exemption by paying their share of the cost of eliminating

A VOLUNTEER DRAFT

the draft, and remaining subject to the draft. The volunteer draft is a draft because it retains the lottery draft for those who are unwilling to pay their share of the cost of a Volunteer Army.

The volunteer draft would increase the collective lifetime incomes of those who enlist by billions of dollars, improve the quality and morale of soldiers, and allow young men to avoid the risk of disrupted plans at no cost to anyone else.

Implementing Draft

The volunteer draft would offer each 18-year-old eligible for military service three options:

- *Enlistment.* The 18-year-old could enlist for two years in the Army or for longer periods in the other services or Reserve components. In addition to his salary as a volunteer, he would receive a lifetime tax reduction. He would continue to receive this tax break as a veteran or a career soldier once his military obligation is satisfactorily completed.
- *Exemption.* The 18-year-old could request an exemption from the draft. He would be guaranteed that, short of a national emergency, he would

not have to serve in the Army. In exchange, he would have to pay a surtax as long as he remains a civilian. Should he enlist at some future date, he would receive a tax reduction.

- *Draft.* The 18-year-old who does not request an exemption or does not enlist would be subject to the lottery draft. The lottery draft would function exactly like the present system. Everyone in the draft pool would have the same chance of being conscripted. If drafted, a 19-year-old would have to serve two years without a tax reduction. If not drafted, he would remain a civilian without any surtax.

Lesser Chance

The Selective Service System would continue to draft 19-year-olds, but there would be a lesser chance of being drafted under the draft option than under the present system. The Selective Service System would set the tax reduction at a level sufficient to attract enough volunteers to satisfy the difference between military requirements and the number to be drafted. The Internal Revenue Service would calculate the cost of the different tax reductions and adjust the surtaxes so that the tax revenues gained from those who have elected to remain civilians would equal the tax revenues lost to volunteer soldiers and veterans.

If the volunteer draft had been adopted in 1970, tax forms would need one additional table for surcharges and reductions similar to the one in Figure 1.

A 20-year-old who enlisted in 1970 would receive a 17-percent tax reduction financed by a seven-percent increase in the income tax of 20-year-olds who requested an exemption in 1970 and did not later

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1972 Tax Surcharge and Tax Reduction Schedules		
AGE	TABLE A	TABLE B
	Percent Decrease in Income Tax for Volunteer Soldiers and Veterans*	Percent Increase in Income Tax for Service Exempted Civilians
19	8	5
20	17	7
21 or over	0	0
* If you volunteered at an age older than 18, compare the tax reduction next to your age and the tax reduction next to the age of those who were 19 when you volunteered. Your exemption is the smaller of the two.		

Figure 1.

volunteer. The surcharge column would be revised annually so that the cost of tax reductions would be paid entirely by those who benefited from them.

Figure 1 shows that the decision made at the age of 18 need not be irreversible. A 20-year-old who postponed his military service one year would receive the same eight-percent tax reduction as 19-year-olds who volunteered in 1971 on registering with the Selective Service System. The tax break of these late volunteers could not be larger than 17 percent or else there would be an incentive to delay military service.

Who would benefit and who would lose if the volunteer draft replaced the lottery draft?

Nineteen-year-olds enlisting under the volunteer draft would have higher after-tax incomes because of the tax reduction. For example, a 17-percent tax reduction in 1971 would increase the incomes of volunteers by over two billion dollars over their lifetimes.

The 19-year-old requesting an exemption from the draft should also prefer the volunteer draft. The benefit of being exempted from the draft is greater than the cost of the surtax otherwise he would select the draft option.

Even the 19-year-old selecting the draft option should prefer the volunteer draft. His chance of being drafted would be less

under the volunteer draft than under the lottery draft only. Should he later decide to enlist, the volunteer draft provides him an enlistment bonus of a tax reduction which the present system does not offer.

Everyone else would be unaffected by a change from lottery to volunteer draft. Those ineligible because of age, health, ability, or sex under the present draft system would also be ineligible under the volunteer draft. They would not qualify for a tax reduction, but they would not pay a surtax under the volunteer draft because they cannot serve.

In short, changing from a lottery draft to a volunteer draft is desirable because it benefits those now subject to the draft at no cost to anyone else.

Certain objections and criticisms have been raised when I have previously discussed the volunteer draft. I will attempt to answer them here:

- *Is this not a bounty system? The rich buy their way out of their military obligation. The poor will be unable to pay the bounty and be forced to fill the obligation of the rich.*

This objection can be broken down into a question of fact and a question of values.

As a question of fact, the poor will not be forced by economic necessity to serve in

A VOLUNTEER DRAFT

the Army. The financial obligation of those exempted depends on their income tax. Assuming a seven-percent surtax, Figure 2 illustrates how the cost of remaining a civilian reflects ability to pay by contrasting the income taxes of three different 20-year-olds who requested an exemption.

Richard Rich pays 3.2 percent of his income, or \$1,620; Morris Median pays 1.6 percent of his income, or \$157; and Peter Poor pays only 1.1 percent of his income, or \$22, in order to remain a civilian.

The question of values is more difficult. Perhaps the best answer is that the volunteer draft would be no more an immoral bounty system than the Volunteer Army.

Under the Volunteer Army, the military obligation is eliminated. The “bounty” or cost of eliminating the draft is paid by the entire community. The volunteer draft would also eliminate the military obligation, but it would place the cost on those who benefit. If the 19-year-old should feel that the benefits of a Volunteer Army are greater than the costs, he would exempt himself from the draft by paying his share of the costs. If he should consider the benefits less than the costs, he would choose the draft.

- *Why should the Army support a volunteer draft?*

The Army should actively support replacing the lottery draft with the volunteer

draft because the Army would be one of the major institutional beneficiaries from such a change.

The surtax and the tax reduction combine to make military service more attractive to those who anticipate higher incomes after the two-year tour of duty has been completed. In the example in Figure 2, if Richard Rich had enlisted under the volunteer draft instead of choosing an exemption, his tax as a veteran would have been reduced by 17 percent instead of being increased by seven percent—a savings of 25 percent of his after-tax income, or \$5,500, in 1972.

In Peter Poor’s case, his savings would have come to only three percent of his after-tax income, or \$53. Richard Rich would find it worthwhile to spend two years in the Army at a salary substantially below his civilian salary in exchange for future tax advantages. On the other hand, Peter Poor would be attracted to the Army by the fact that the military salary would be higher than his salary as a civilian.

Thus, the volunteer draft would tend to produce the same type of citizens’ Army that is supposedly the hallmark of the present system.

Armed Forces Morale

The critical difference for the military between the present system and the volunteer draft lies in the morale of the Armed Forces.

1972 Tax Surcharge and Tax Reduction Schedules			
Name	Taxable Income	Income Tax	Seven-Percent Surtax
Richard Rich	\$50,000	8	5
Morris Median	10,000	17	7
Peter Poor	2,000	0	0

Figure 2.

Those who object to military service are often compelled to serve two years under the present system. Their attitudes affect the performance of the Army. Under the volunteer draft, those with negative attitudes would choose taxation. Disciplinary problems among volunteers would be further discouraged because the tax advantage would be offered only upon completion of two years' satisfactory service.

The taxes paid by those who do not, under any circumstance, want to serve in the Armed Forces would help improve the quality of military service in another way. Above-average skill, initiative, and creativity are usually rewarded with higher than average incomes. Therefore, at no cost to the military, the surtax and tax exemption provide additional encouragement to potential officers, medical doctors, and lawyers to enlist in the Armed Forces in order to avoid both the draft and the surtax and to receive the tax reduction.

The volunteer draft avoids a major objection lodged against changing the present system. The turnover rate in a Volunteer Army is very low in comparison with a draftee Army. This lower turnover rate produces savings in training expenses, but at the cost of decreasing the influx of civilians into the Armed Forces and the number of civilians with military experience outside the Armed Forces.

Some authorities are afraid that a small percentage of veterans would mean uninformed decisions about defense expenditures by voters. Since these veterans are the mainstay of the Reserves, they argue that there would be little backup for the professional soldier.

Other critics focus on the civilian control of the military. Isolation of the

soldier from the rest of the citizenry could lead him to challenge civilian decisions and to intervene directly in politics.

Volunteer Turnover

Under the volunteer draft, there would be a turnover of volunteers who had completed two years' service. As veterans, they would then contribute information about defense to the democratic decision-making process and help support the Army Reserves. During their two years as soldiers, they would force the career soldier to adapt to an annual infusion of large numbers of civilians.

- *This is a discriminatory proposal. If the volunteer draft were adopted, those presently serving in the Army would not qualify for the tax reduction being received by recruits. A person ineligible for military service would not qualify for the tax reduction.*

The present system discriminates by selecting one and one-half million individuals from a population of over 200 million for a lottery in which the losers serve two years in the Armed Forces. The volunteer draft would not increase the discrimination of the present system, but would allow those in the draft lottery additional options which benefit them and do no harm to anyone else.

Assuming such an attitude, the tax reduction could be extended to those presently serving in the Army by financing the reduction with an increase in the Government debt. A slight increase in the surtaxes for exemptions for successive generations of 19-year-olds would eventually redeem this increase in Government debt at no cost to the general taxpayer.

Would not the volunteer draft break down in case of war when military requirements were larger than the pool of 19-year-olds?

A VOLUNTEER DRAFT

National Emergency

The guarantee of exemption from military service does not apply to a national emergency. Then, financial incentives would not be used and hopefully would not be needed as everyone was mobilized. The volunteer draft provides a means of defining a national emergency. If the surtax paid by those exempted from military service were to rise above, for example, 15 percent, then the tax imposed on 19-year-olds for the defense of the community could be considered inequitably large. Military salaries would need to be increased in order to attract additional volunteers, or the draft extended to other ages.

Although the United States was still fighting in Vietnam in 1971, the estimate of the surtax is seven percent. If limited wars, such as Korea and Vietnam, are not considered “emergencies,” then the volunteer draft would have offered a viable alternative in all but five of the past 71 years.

- *The promise of a lifetime tax reduction based on a doubtful, premise. The majority of the community who did not serve must continue to pay the minority who did serve. Will not the majority vote to stop payment to the minority?*

The difficulty tax reformers have in eliminating tax loopholes that favor special interest groups at the expense of the majority of taxpayers supports the opposite view. Special interest groups are informed and lobby intensely for or against legislation. Veterans are no exception.

Veterans' Reductions

In the case of the veterans' tax reductions, the general taxpayer would not pay the cost. Only those who were eligible

for military service in the years in which a draft was necessary would finance the tax reduction. It seems unlikely that the general public would respond with sympathy to a campaign to take money away from those who defended their country and give it to those who did not.

- *Will enough 18-year-olds respond to the offer of a tax reduction or the threat of a surtax to meet military requirements? Eighteen-year-olds are concerned with money now as opposed to money in the future. Parents will also intervene, offering to pay the tax in order to keep their children from joining the military. Finally, social pressures against buying your way out of military service will cause 18-year-olds who do not want to serve to choose the draft option.*

Social attitudes change. Choosing a lifetime financial obligation which directly benefits veterans does not seem more reprehensible than trying to escape military obligation by a game of chance. But even if no one requested an exemption, the only result would be no one paying the surtax and no one receiving a tax reduction. Therefore, a tendency to avoid the exemption option will not make the volunteer draft less viable than the present draft.

Social pressures could also function in a way that would reduce the size of the tax reduction necessary to attract enough volunteers. A tax reduction would identify the volunteer 19-year-old in the future as someone who served his country directly. The social and business rewards of this identification would attract volunteers.

A volunteer draft could function even if 18-year-olds totally disregarded their future tax positions. As those eligible for military service grew older and began to

notice the difference between their after-tax incomes and the after-tax incomes of veterans their own age, and, as those with bountiful parents realized that father would not continue to pay him hundreds to thousands of dollars a year for the rest of his life, increasing numbers would enlist in the Armed Forces. The number of volunteers older than 19 could offset the short time horizon of the 18-year-old.

The time preference of 18-year-olds would create difficulties only in the period of transition from the present system to a volunteer draft. But this problem could


be eased by applying the volunteer draft initially to a larger age group. The volunteer draft would result in these benefits:

- An increase in after-tax incomes for soldiers eventually totaling billions of dollars.
- Improved discipline and morale in the Army.
- A tax bonus for those with skills and initiative.
- A lifetime reenlistment bonus for draftees.

These should be incentive enough to consider a new idea.

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The Armed Services Associate Degree Program: A Proposal

Captain Abbott A. Brayton, Army National Guard

ONE of the major problems facing the armed services in the post-Vietnam era is the attainment of prescribed levels of education for military personnel. Because of adherence to the fairly strict provisions imposed by Army Regulation 601-100, Appointment of Commissioned Officers in the Regular Army, the required educational standards of the commissioned officer corps essentially are attainable. Those officers who fail to meet these standards, and who are to be retained as career officers, may acquire the necessary education either at full Government expense through the Officer Undergraduate Degree Program (Army Regulation 350-200, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions) or under the highly successful Project Bootstrap (Department of the Army Circular 351-5, Officer Undergraduate Degree Civil Schooling Program).

Similarly, as enlisted personnel assignment patterns stabilize after Vietnam, enlisted personnel educational levels will also improve. Those persons enlisting in the Army without a secondary education will have the opportunity and encouragement to pursue the high school equivalency certificate through the General Education Development Program (GEDP) (Army Regulation 621-5, *General Educational Development*).

The Problem

The primary area of concern, therefore, is that portion of "middle management" occupied by warrant officers and certain senior noncommissioned officers. Paragraph 12, Army Regulation 601-101, *Appointment of Warrant Officers in the Regular Army*, establishes the requisite educational standard for warrant officers as two years of college. Neither the warrant officer corps nor the senior noncommissioned officer corps, however, recruits its members from college-educated groups -most come

up "through the ranks," as, indeed, most should, with only a secondary education.

As the Selective Service Program is reduced or phased out after Vietnam, it will be increasingly difficult to obtain career-motivated enlisted men with any college experience. Rather than attempting to recruit college educated enlistees, therefore, the Army would be more successful in providing some college education for those career soldiers designated for "middle-management" positions.

A partial solution in the past has been to recognize the efforts of individuals toward self-improvement by awarding one and two-year college equivalencies through the GEDP. This is inadequate. While it recognizes and rewards self-improvement, it fails to give the individual the educational tools which will enable him to perform more effectively in an increasingly complex and demanding military environment. The solution to this problem is to devise a program which would provide two years of college education for those persons assigned to, or to be assigned to, warrant officer and designated senior noncommissioned officer positions.



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D. from the University of Arizona. He has been a member of Army National Guard units in Vermont and Arizona, and has served on active duty with the 385th Military Police Battalion in Europe and with the 158th Military Police Battalion. His area of specialization is in national security policy, international relations, and foreign policy.

Alternatives

One alternative would be to provide a Government-funded program similar to the Officer Undergraduate Degree Program which would assign an individual to an accredited civilian junior college, during which time he could earn the two-year Associate of Arts or the Associate of Sciences degree. The drawbacks to this alternative are considerable.

First, it would be expensive for the services to support this program. Second, the individual would be a loss to the service for two full years. Third, the quality of education offered at civilian junior colleges varies considerably and, more often than not,

ASSOCIATE DEGREE PROGRAM

is regrettably low. Too many junior colleges suffer from watered-down curricula designed to provide the adolescent youth with some exposure to a college education. Finally, many of the courses offered—and often required—at these institutions are of little value to the professional soldier.

A second alternative would be to encourage individual participation in a civilian junior college program under the GI Bill without full pay and allowances. Although the cost to the Government would be reduced by reducing the pay and allowances to the student, the other drawbacks noted in the first alternative would remain. This alternative would be further impaired by the inability of most enlisted men or noncommissioned officers to suffer loss of income for two years in order to pursue this program.

A Solution

A third alternative provides a practical solution to the problem: the establishment of an Armed Services Associate Degree Program. This program can provide its students with a solid, two-year Associate degree education. The full program, however, can be completed in a single year of resident study if the program is designed to do so and if the students are mature, motivated individuals. Reducing the program to a single year of resident study would provide a substantial reduction in program costs.

The Associate Degree Institution should employ primarily a civilian faculty with top professional degrees and the ability to teach effectively. It should award an accredited degree of Associate of Arts or Associate of Sciences. Most important, it should provide its graduates with the mental capabilities which will allow them to cope with the expanding management 92 requirements of the increasingly complex military system.

There are two likely alternatives for the location of the Associate Degree Institution, both with advantages and disadvantages. First, the school could be established in a location remote from existing Army population centers, possibly at a recently deactivated military facility or one scheduled for future deactivation. The location could then be selected from an almost unlimited number of possible sites and could be designed to provide an environment highly conducive to study. This alternative, however, would be costly because of the need to establish and maintain the additional military facility. Without a nearby troop population, there would be the added cost of recurring permanent changes of station for all students.

Military Facility

The second alternative would be to establish the school on or near an existing military facility. This would avoid the cost of activating and maintaining a separate facility and would reduce the number of student permanent changes of station. The main disadvantage to this alternative is that attendance at the school may be restricted to those persons normally assigned to that military facility. Further, it is questionable whether or not an on-base facility would provide the most desirable educational environment.

It would be inappropriate to suggest which of these two alternatives should be pursued without a complete cost analysis of the entire program. The ultimate decision as to the location of the school would, of course, be further influenced by a number of political considerations beyond the realm of the Department of the Army.

In order to minimize the length of time spent in residence at the institution, the three-semester-per-year or “trimester”

Hypothetical Curriculum for the Associate Degree Program

Preparatory Readings: Six Credit Hours

First Trimester

English I—Composition and Grammar	3
Mathematics—College/Business	3
History I—Western Civilization	3
Political Science I—Introduction	3
Speech—Public Speaking	3
Elective	3

Credit Hours 18

Second Trimester

English—Literature	3
History—US History	3
Political Science II—American Government	3
World Geography	3
Business Administration	3
Elective	3

Credit Hours 18

Third Trimester

Political Science III—US in World Affairs	3
Sociology	3
Psychology	3
Principles of Economics	3
Principles of Management	3
Elective	3

Credit Hours 18

Electives

International Relations
Typing
Computer Science
Statistics
Laboratory Sciences
Education
Philosophy
Advanced courses in all fields
Others as required

system of approximately 15 weeks each in length is proposed. This program would allow the student to take the civilian school equivalent of one and one-half years' work in a single year, or 45 weeks of classroom instruction. By making the fullest use of available time, the entire two-year program could be readily accomplished in a single year of resident study.

A hypothetical curriculum is suggested in the chart. The preparatory readings administered by correspondence would be designed to provide some common background of relevant material for

all incoming students. This would also serve to eliminate the unmotivated applicants before they enter the program. The preparatory readings could be accomplished any time before the start of classes.

The student would carry a course load of six courses each "trimester" for a total of 18 credit hours. The six credit hours for preparatory readings plus 54 credit hours earned in the three "trimesters" of resident study would total 60 credit hours, or the equivalent of the civilian two-year junior college. This would fulfill the Associate

ASSOCIATE DEGREE PROGRAM

degree requirement for accreditation and would be an unusual, but effective, program of study.

Hard work for the student? Yes, but rewarding both for the student and the services. Expensive? The benefits to the services will far outweigh the limited costs of establishing and administering the program. A residual return on the investment would probably be a somewhat higher reenlistment rate by those attracted to a vastly improved educational opportunity within the service.

A further byproduct of this program would be the opportunity to upgrade the educational standards of the Reserve components. Many career Reserve officers, especially those serving as full-time technicians, do not have a college education. They could be allowed to enroll at the institution at little Government expense—perhaps something like Project *Bootstrap*, or with a state subsidy for National Guard officers—and acquire the Associate degree. This would provide a substantial

improvement in officer education levels within the Reserve program and subsequent improvements in unit management.

The ultimate question is, of course, will Congress appropriate sufficient funds during a period of reduced military spending? No one can answer that question with assurance, but this much is certain: In the opinion of influential members of the House Armed Services Committee, the proposal would receive a favorable reception by the committee and whole House.

Congress, over the past 25 years, has acted consistently to support higher educational standards for the armed services. Even in the present period of economic austerity for the armed services, military education ranks high with all elements of the political spectrum.

The goal is better armed services. One means is through better education. The Armed Services Associate Degree Program will significantly advance military education in a neglected area.

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- Award articles are announced after publication, in subsequent issues of the Military Review.



MILITARY NOTES

UNITED STATES

'Maverick' Missile

The *Maverick* missile developed for use against ground targets is now entering production. Deliveries will start in late 1972.

The *Maverick*'s "shoot and scoot" capability is provided by a miniature television camera in the missile's nosecone that homes in on a target.

The missile's nose camera is focused on a target by the pilot and locked on by the press of a button. After launch, the camera remains fixed on the target, automatically guiding the missile to impact on the precise spot at which the television camera is looking. Meanwhile, the pilot is free to attack other targets or scoot away from the air vicinity.

Tests show that the *Maverick* will be particularly effective in ground support missions. The missile is expected to provide a dramatic increase in the strike capability of aircraft against such hard point targets as field fortifications, radar sites, buildings, tanks, and armored vehicles.

During flight tests using *F-4 Phantom* and *A-7D Corsair II* jets, the *Maverick* has been launched from slant ranges of a few thousand feet to many miles, and from high altitudes down to treetop level.

The *Maverick*, designated the *AGM- 65A*, is 97 inches long and 12 inches in diameter, has a 28-inch wingspan, and weighs less than 500 pounds. It carries a warhead designed for high penetration.—News release.

'UTTAS'

In June 1972, the Army expects to select two contractors to develop the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (*UTTAS*). Each of the contractors will build six helicopters to be used in a lengthy competitive flyoff which will last through the mid- 1970's.

The *UTTAS* will replace the *UH-1* series of helicopters now in service. The Army envisions a requirement in the 1980's for a transport helicopter capable of carrying an 11-man squad at high altitudes and in hot, tropical environments. Designed to meet these performance specifications, the *UTTAS* will feature twin engines, controls which will not be shattered by small arms fire, armor protection for critical components, and a protected fuel system.

Maintenance should also be much easier. Periodic maintenance inspections will be required after 300 flight hours as opposed to only 100 hours for the *UH-1* series.

Eventually, the Army plans to buy 1,100 of the new helicopters at an estimated cost of 1.4 million dollars each. The comparable cost of a *UH-1* helicopter is about \$400,000.—News item.

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FMC Corporation

A high-mobility utility vehicle, designed for severe off-road use, as well as high-speed highway travel, has been introduced. With an operating range of 300 miles, and capable of speeds of up to 80 miles per hour, the XR311 has about the same exterior dimensions as the M155 ¾-ton truck now in use. Large, low-pressure tires enable the XR311 to climb 60-percent grades and 20-inch obstacles. The vehicle can ford 30 inches of water. It is powered with a 215-horsepower gasoline engine and features a three-speed automatic transmission and four-wheel drive. The low silhouette, quiet operation, and minimum smoke signature of the XR311 make it difficult to detect.

Several versions are available, including a reconnaissance version with a .50-caliber machine gun, an anti-armor version mounting a TOW missile system, and a command and control version with radio communications Equipment.—News release.

‘SuperScout’

The first prototype of an all-weather light observation helicopter, engineered for mid-intensity combat environments, has been unveiled.

The project was inspired by the requirement for an advanced scout in the Army’s New Initiatives Program. The helicopter, called the OH-6C SuperScout, is a second-generation growth version of the Army OH-6A Cayuse.

The helicopter has more than two and a half times the payload of the OH-6A and is

up to one-third faster. It uses the same five-bladed main rotor and four-bladed tail rotor as “The Quiet One.”


Future scout helicopters will require all-weather instrumentation, night vision displays for terrain avoidance and target acquisition, added armor for helicopter and crew protection, and defensive armament. The addition of these features creates a requirement for a greater payload. —News release.

Army Generals

Official figures show the Army has 564 general officers, including colonels on the promotion list. Of these, 269 are US Military Academy graduates. There are 125 generals from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps,

112 from Officer Candidate Schools, 25 from the Army Reserve, five from the National Guard, and 28 received direct commissions.—News item.

Air-Launched 'Redeye'




General Dynamics World

A new version of the *Redeye* heat-seeking missile has been proposed for helicopter use. The new system is called the Multi-Mission *Redeye* Air-Launched Missile (*MRAM*). Two of the new missiles would be carried in pods mounted on each side of a helicopter. When launched, the heat-seeking missiles would guide themselves to a ground target, such as a tank, while the attacking helicopter took evasive maneuvers.

Proponents claim *MRAM* would greatly enhance the combat survivability of helicopters. Only minor modifications would be required to mount the system on existing aircraft. Existing target acquisition and sighting equipment could be used to launch the missiles. The basic *Redeye*, a one-man, shoulder-fired, antiaircraft weapon, is operational with the Army and the Marine Corps.—News release.

Laser Rangefinders

A contract for production of laser rangefinders for the US Army's *M551 Sheridan* armored reconnaissance vehicle has been awarded. Prototype rangefinder systems are now completing field evaluation by the Army. The rangefinder consists of a ruby laser, telescope-like optics, and associated panels and electronics. In operation, the rangefinder is aimed at the target, utilizing self-contained



Hughes Aircraft Corporation

Laser rangefinder (window, right of center) on turret of US Army's *M551 Sheridan* armored reconnaissance vehicle

pointing optics, and the laser is fired. The light beam reflects off the target and back into a receiver telescope. The system automatically registers the elapsed time for the laser beam's round trip, computes the distance in meters, and displays the range on a readout.

With this information, tank crewmen can fire conventional armament with an improved probability of scoring a first-round hit.—News release.

Tank Gun Lasers

A contract for developing a ruby laser rangefinder for the *M60A1* tank has been awarded. The laser will be integrated into a new fire control system which features a ballistic computer now under development.

The laser and computer will enable the crew to fire its first round more quickly and will increase the probability of scoring a first-round hit.

The computer receives inputs from the laser system and several other sensors which provide it with information about target range, windage, tracking rates, gun wear, propellant temperature, and the tank's cant angle. It also accepts inputs of air density and air temperature. With this information, the computer can provide split-second instructions to the tank crew on precisely where to aim the gun.

The range to the target, a critical factor in firing accuracy, is provided by the laser rangefinder. In operation, the telescope-like optics of the rangefinder are aimed at a target, and the laser is fired. The light beam, traveling at 186,000 miles per second, reflects off the target and back into a receiver telescope.

The system registers the elapsed time for the laser beam's round trip and computes the precise range, producing a numerical readout in the tank commander's eyepiece and feeding a signal to the computer. The rangefinder being developed for the *M60A1* tank equipped with a 105-millimeter gun will utilize hardware and technology derived from laser rangefinders developed earlier for the Army's *M60A1E2* tank and *M551 Sheridan* armored reconnaissance airborne assault vehicle, both of which carry 152-millimeter gunlauncher systems.—News release.

'M60A1E2'



US Army Photos

The *M60A1E2* main battle tank is undergoing service testing at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The tank is an updated version of the Army's standard main battle tank. An all new, fully stabilized compact turret is mounted on the proved chassis of the *M60A1*. The modified tank features a 152-millimeter gun launcher capable of firing either conventional ammunition or *Shillelagh* missiles. The turret design offers significant improvements in night vision, ballistic protection, and command capabilities. The *M60A1E2* weighs 57 tons and has a cruising range of about 280 miles.—US Army release.



SWEDEN

Mobilization Strength



International Defense Review

Swedish armored brigade on an exercise using S tanks and FV-302 armored personnel carriers

According to recently released figures, Sweden could mobilize 700,000 men in 30 army brigades plus 600 combat aircraft and 110 warships in two to three days. Of the 700,000 men mobilized, about 600,000 would be in the army; the rest would belong to the air force and the navy. The army brigades would have a strength of 5,000 to 6,000 men supported by staff, communications, and maintenance units. Territorial and local defense forces would provide an additional 100 battalions plus about 400 to 500 independent companies.

The 30 brigades of the army are of three types: infantry, armored, and Norrland brigades. The latter are similar to infantry brigades, but are especially equipped with amphibious tracked vehicles for operation in the northern parts of the country during both winter and summer. One Swedish brigade, with supporting elements, is expected to be able to repel a landing operation on a front of approximately five to 20 miles.

Swedish divisions are made up of one or more brigades and usually have a strength of about 15,000 men. The composition varies according to the mission, and territorial forces may be included. Special divisional supporting units include battalions of 155-millimeter, self-propelled guns with a range of 24 kilometers; radar-controlled 57-millimeter and 40-millimeter anti-aircraft gun units; and army light aircraft and helicopter squadrons.

Military service is compulsory in Sweden for all men between the ages of 18 and 47. When called, conscripts serve 10 months' active duty for basic training, followed by three weeks of training every four years. Officer conscripts receive considerably longer training. In peacetime, the Swedish Army consists of 18,000 regular officers and noncommissioned officers, 36,500 conscript trainees, and 100,000 reservists in training for 14 to 40 days.—News item.

CANADA

Tilt-Wing Aircraft

The *CL-84-1* tilt-wing vertical and short takeoff and landing evaluation aircraft recently demonstrated its gun-firing capabilities.

Since the firing trials, using a 7.62-millimeter mini-gun pod, were conducted to assess gun-firing effects on flight characteristics and not to obtain high target scores, the simplest form of reflector sight was used. Nevertheless, a high degree of accuracy was recorded in three configurations:

- At 40 knots, with the wing at a 40-degree tilt (short takeoff and landing mode), the score was 84 percent of possible hits on target.
- At hover, with wings at 90 degrees, hits were 71 percent.
- At 200 knots, with wing down and locked, the score was 30 percent.

In the conventional configuration, the first target was engaged at a range of 1,000 feet with the *CL-84-1* flying at 200 knots in a shallow dive. Later, in the same configuration, two passes were made on second and third targets with the aircraft weaving to assess the steadiness of the splash pattern.

Over land, the aircraft was hovered 1,000 feet from the target, and, in the first sortie, the fire was held steadily on the target during each burst. In the second, fire 'was initially aimed off to the right, then swung rapidly onto the target by yawing the aircraft.

The final hover sortie was probably the most significant, the results suggesting that adequate suppressive fire during hover rescues could be provided without the need of a turret.

The ability to select and hold a fuselage angle while remaining stationary in hover gives the *CL-84-1* an advantage over the helicopter which is committed to move fore or aft when the nose is depressed or raised. Finally, the aircraft was aimed at a point between the targets, and, by lowering and raising the nose, fire was raked back and forth between a 500 and 1,000-foot range.—News item.



General Dynamics World

GREAT BRITAIN

Military Capability Increased

In October, Great Britain announced that it was increasing the size of its regular military forces. Recruiting, up last year to 42,000 from a low of 28,000 in 1968, will allow four infantry battalions which had been reduced to company size to be restored to full strength. One is the famous Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

The Royal Navy will receive two Sheffield class destroyers and four

Amazon class frigates. Two additional squadrons of Buccaneer low-level strike aircraft have been ordered for the Royal Air Force.

These increases follow the decision to increase British military capability as the nation enters the European Common Market. It will partially alleviate the shortage of regular infantry caused by the violence in Northern Ireland.—News item.

Royal Navy




Royal Marine commando embarked on HMS *Albion*

Royal Marines

With the departure of major British naval units from Singapore, there are now three Royal Navy commands at sea. The first flotilla consists of guided-missile destroyers and frigate squadrons. The second flotilla includes cruisers, and guided-missile destroyers and frigates. The third flotilla is an amphibious force built around the carriers HMS *Ark Royal* and HMS *Eagle*. The force includes the two commando carriers, *Albion* and *Bulwark*, each carrying Royal Marines, supporting assault ships, and other amphibious vessels.—News item.

MRCA



Interavia

VAK 191B MRCA test bed

The British Ministry of Defense announced in September that development work being carried out on the multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) being developed jointly by Britain, West Germany, and Italy will continue on the same cost and work-sharing basis as during the past year.

The MRCA is a twin-engined, two-seat supersonic aircraft. Estimated cost of the development phase is 600 million dollars.

The aircraft, each of which will cost an estimated 3.6 million dollars, will be capable of more than twice the speed of sound, yet will land and take off at a very slow speed. The swing-wing design will also permit prolonged high-speed flight at very low altitude.

All three governments require reconnaissance and trainer versions. In addition, specifications call for air-to-surface capabilities during low visibility and interceptor and strike roles.

Seven prototypes will be built—three in Britain, three in Germany, and one in Italy.—News release.

DENMARK

Force Reductions

Denmark plans to reduce its standing army by almost half. The current strength of the Danish Army would be cut from 13,000 to about 7,000. The population of the nation is about five million. Draftees would serve six months in local defense units and then transfer to the reserves. The Danes claim that they would still be able to


mobilize a force of 70,000 men. The plan would also reduce the size of the Danish Air Force and Navy. The new organization is based upon the assumption that the major challenges to Denmark's security in the future are likely to be on the level of political pressure and threats rather than outright invasion.—News item.

THE NETHERLANDS

Radio Systems

In 1965, the Royal Netherlands Army requested development of very high frequency and frequency modulated combat area radio equipment. Basically, this equipment consists of transceivers in both man-pack and vehicular versions having a


- An intercommunications system for use in tanks and armored cars.
- An inter-vehicular communication system in which separate transceivers, each having its own frequency, are used to communicate at various levels.



A "stacked" system consisting of two 30-kilometer and one eight-kilometer transceivers

range of five miles which can be extended by using an RF amplifier for a range of 20 miles. It is compatible with the equipment in present use.

Special design has resulted in a system which is economical yet reliable and easy to maintain. The basic unit of the various communication systems is the transceiver which can provide:



*Philips Telecommunication Photos,
the Netherlands*

A system consisting of one 30-kilometer and one eight-kilometer transceivers with an intercommunication system for vehicular use

The individual units can be stacked to provide increased capabilities. When this arrangement is adopted, a central control unit and a loudspeaker control unit are used. Two or three stacks can be used alongside each other. A system can contain up to three transceivers. The intercommunication and control system makes use of a cable which runs through all compartments of the vehicle. The advantage of this system is that it is not necessary for the stacks to be arranged side by side; any arrangement of the stacks and control boxes is possible. The transceivers provide 880 channels in the 26 to 70 frequency range.—News release.



MILITARY BOOKS

ZHUKOV. By Otto Preston Chaney, Jr. Foreword by Malcolm Mackintosh. 512 Pages. The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 1971. \$9.95.

BY COL CHARLES STOCKELL, *USA*

Khrushchev once described Zhukov as “blunt, bold, direct and non-diplomatic—as a soldier should be.” It was an apt description of the Soviet Union’s greatest military leader of this century.

The author is a graduate of the Army’s Russian area and language study program. He holds a Ph. D. in Russian studies and has served as a US liaison officer with the Soviet forces in East Germany and in the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is well qualified to write Zhukov’s biography.

Zhukov was a ruthless, demanding commander who drove his men to any excess in order to achieve victory. Zhukov’s first test as a major commander is well described. In the 1929 battle against the Japanese in Mongolia, Zhukov showed himself to be bold, innovative, and able. Biding his time to build a superior force in men and firepower, he crushed the Japanese, inflicting 55,000 casualties on their best Kwangtung forces.

Zhukov’s wartime exploits against Hitler’s forces are given in detail. Here, Chaney has leaned heavily on Soviet sources and gives the campaigns from the Soviet point of view. Some of his Western sources, Alexander Werth for example, have a decided pro-Russian

bias. Nevertheless, Chaney’s account is interesting and informative, but decidedly one-sided.

The primary value of the book is the coverage of the battle of Khalkhin- Gol in 1939 and in the well-done description of Zhukov’s postwar career when he was repeatedly in and out of favor with the Soviet political rulers. Zhukov’s personal vendetta with his military colleagues, Konev and Chuikov, and his role in placing Khrushchev in power are most interesting. For his assistance to Khrushchev, Zhukov became Minister of Defense and was the only military man ever to become a member of the party’s Politburo. But Zhukov, although a good party man, did not believe in party domination and direction of purely military affairs.

He reduced the power of the Main Political Directorate within the military forces and sought to restrain the influence and use of political officers in units below regimental level. This brought about his downfall in 1957. He had previously been downgraded and virtually exiled by Stalin prior to his rehabilitation by Khrushchev.

After his second removal from power, Zhukov remained in seclusion until 1967 when he again emerged as the only man besides Lenin who in recent decades fully captured the minds and hearts of the Russian people. While in exile, Zhukov wrote his autobiography on which Chaney has drawn heavily. However, Chaney’s book is far more objective and complete.

MILITARY BOOKS

SINGAPORE: The Chain of Disaster. By Major General S. Woodburn Kirby. 270 Pages. The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1971. \$8.95.

BY COL PHILIP S. NEWTON, *British Army*

Throughout its history, the British Army has become used to withdrawing at the beginning of a campaign, but in doing so it has usually maintained an element of dignity and order. The withdrawal through Malaya and the surrender of Singapore in February 1942 is a regrettable exception as shown by this succinct account of the campaign.

General Kirby, who was the official historian of the war against Japan, brings a clear and analytical mind to the years of confusion which lead up to this disaster. He considers that the responsibility for the disaster lay squarely on the shoulders of successive British Governments. Churchill comes in for his share of criticism, mainly in his failure to understand that Singapore was not a "fortress with all-round defense capable of withstanding a siege" or that its defense depended mainly on the defense of Malaya as a whole. But, General Kirby concludes, the fate of Singapore was finally decided early in 1942 when the Prime Minister gave the Middle East priority over the Far East.

It is ironic that this book should have been published in the year when Britain finally surrendered its responsibilities for the defense of Singapore and that the last unified commander should have been an airman. It was the dispute whether naval or airpower could provide the defense of the base which had caused so much prevarication and delay in the two decades before its capture.

"SMOKED YANKEES" AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE: Letters From Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902. By Willard B. Gatewood, Jr. 328 Pages. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1971. \$9.50.

BY COL E. LLOYD MURPHY, *USA*

This well-edited collection of 114 letters written by some 50 black soldiers during their service in the Spanish-American War and the Filipino insurrection, and appearing in some 17 Negro newspapers, should be read by anyone who still believes that black soldiers 70 to 75 years ago served docilely or obsequiously, with unquestioned patriotism, unconscious of racial pride, or forgiving of racial discrimination.

Called "Smoked Yankees" by the Spaniards, the black regulars and volunteers wrote eloquently with mixtures of despair, pride, disillusionment, and optimism. They wrote of their disappointment, "No officers, no fight," when the excellent performance of the four regular black regiments (9th and 10th Cavalry and 24th and 25th Infantry) in Cuba, at San Juan, and El Caney did not result in black officers for those regiments even though the temporary volunteer units did have a few. Also recorded is the anomalous position of the blacks in participating in the "struggle for empire" against other racial minorities in Cuba and the Philippines.

Collectively, these letters constitute a remarkable record of the black role during this period. Introductory chapter lead-ins combined with an introductory summary of each letter aid in making this book easy and interesting reading. The section of photographs could have been supplemented with basic maps showing war service areas of the black units.

NATIONAL LIBERATION: Revolution in the Third World. Edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya. With an Introduction by Eric R. Wolf. 307 Pages. The Free Press, N. Y., 1971. \$6.95 clothbound. \$3.95 paperbound.

BY LTC DONALD B. VOUGHT, *USA*

The editors set the tone for this collection of eight essays when they state that, "revolution is the essential shape of social life in the world today." All contributors are devotees of revolution. Therefore, it is no surprise that there is much overlap with other works by practitioners, observers, students, and victims of those social trauma we euphemistically term wars of "national liberation."

There are some unusually valuable passages either because of originality of thought or clarity of statement. For example, Manfred Halpern postulates that revolutions result from the breakdown of social linkages and not simply the old liberal catchall of social imbalance. Lacking adequate theories of system-transforming change, most societies have polarized where "the right has taken refuge in hardware; the left, in spontaneity." He further states that current ideologies are inadequate to explain the deeper issues of liberation resulting from extensive and deliberate transformation of man and society.

The essay of most interest to the military professional is that by Egbal Ahmad on *Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency*. He provides a clear review and analysis of the contestant's performances in mid-20th century revolutions. He also resurrects a postulate that deserves periodic restatement—guerrillas win by outadministering not outfighting the incumbent government.

Mr. Richard Pfeffer closes the works with a concise and coherent statement of the position assumed in the last several years by many leftist scholars concerning the value of China's Great Cultural Revolution. The gist of this position is that revolution in perpetuity is essential if one is to avoid the institutionalization and atrophy of a Stalinist episode. Typically, little is said of the social cost attendant upon perfecting Socialist man.

FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY: A History of the Character, Causes and Consequences of Military Stupidity, From Crassus to Johnson and Westmoreland. By Charles Fair. 445 Pages. Simon & Schuster, Inc., N. Y., 1971. \$8.95.

BY COL O. W. MARTIN, JR., *USA*

In an age when the American military professional is hardly the hero of the times, one is quite used to being shouted at, railed against, and even threatened. Nonetheless, it is quite another thing possibly to be laughed into oblivion. The volume at hand seems characterized more by the rapier of wit than by the blunderbuss of invective.

The author is well versed in military history which he has no qualms about bending to his purpose—be it insidious or other. Perhaps he essays to entertain; perhaps to make antiwar propaganda. In any case, this is a work not to be passed up. Try a chapter or two. Chances are that one will return again to some of the cleverest prose to pass this way for some time. Moreover, it seems a safe bet that one will reread some of the straight military histories to determine just what did happen on numerous occasions.

DISASTER AT BARI. By Glenn B. Infield. 301 Pages.
The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1971. \$6.95.

BY COL LEROY STRONG, USA

Here is one of the first authoritative examinations of the second worst Allied shipping disaster of World War II—the bombing of 17 merchant ships in the harbor at Bari, Italy. The loss of life as a result of the bombing was well over 1,000, but the real horror resulted from the discharge into the air and water of the top secret cargo of the US freighter, *John Harvey*.

To that point in the war, 2 December 1943, both sides had avoided the use of poison gas. A study of documents and plans obtained from the Germans by clandestine means had indicated that many high-ranking German officers excluded the use of poison gas from their strategic thinking. But on the other hand, the memory persisted that the Germans had introduced poison gas on a large scale on the Western Front during World War I. Some people thought they were capable of doing it again. This speculation was reinforced by ominous reports reaching Washington and London indicating that Hitler was, in fact, planning a desperation move to resort to the use of poison gas to repel any attempted invasion of southern Europe.

Allied agents had verified a quarter of a million tons of toxic munitions east of the Rhine, including Tabun. As a consequence of this alleged hazard, in August 1943, President Roosevelt issued a policy statement on the use of poison gas warning that any use by any Axis Power would be followed by retaliation throughout the whole extent of the territory of the Axis

country. Accordingly, permission 108 was granted to ship a supply of chemical bombs containing mustard to the depot at Bari, to be used if retaliation became necessary.

The *John Harvey* was the ship selected to carry the cargo under maximum security. At the time of the bombing, the secret of the *John Harvey* was intact. It was assumed, therefore, once the presence of mustard gas was confirmed, that the Luftwaffe's bombs had delivered the mustard gas. Poor communications between British port authorities and US military forces aided and abetted the rumor. Consequently, it was widely supposed that a huge retaliatory raid by US bombers was being planned. Although the news of the bombing was quickly reported by the press, the mustard gas aspect of the story largely remained a secret until after World War II had ended.

The documentation of the story is remarkably thorough with much of it based upon eye-witness accounts from survivors in Bari. The version of events that emerges presents an unusual and somewhat unique opportunity for the study of mass trauma.

Terrible as it was, the disaster at Bari had at least one bright side. Medical observations and experiments revealed what appeared to be definite indications that nitrogen mustards were of value in treatment of cancer. But the dark side of the incident is presented as dark indeed. For example, at least in the author's view, Prime Minister Churchill's decision that no mention of the mustard be made, and that all deaths be attributed to "burns due to enemy action," prevented Italian doctors from administering proper treatment. Consequently, a larger percentage of those who could possibly have been saved were not.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

GUNS: An Illustrated History of Artillery. Edited by Joseph Jobe. 216 Pages. New York Graphic Society Publishers, Ltd., Greenwich, Conn., 1971. \$30.00.

EGYPT UNDER NASIR: A Study in Political Dynamics. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. 368 Pages. State University of New York Press, Albany, N. Y., 1971. \$10.00.

CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE UNITED STATES. By Philip W. Bonsal, Former US Ambassador to Cuba. 318 Pages. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1971. \$9.95.

THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT. By Roger D. Hansen. 267 Pages. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1971. \$11.00.

LEGACY OF GLORY: The Bonaparte Kingdom of Spain. By Michael Glover. 353 Pages. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1971. \$10.00.

THE FORBIDDEN SKY: Inside the Hungarian Revolution. By Endre Marton. 306 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1971. \$8.95.

MARTIAL JUSTICE: The Last Mass Execution in the United States. By Richard Whittingham. 281 Pages. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, Ill., 1971. \$6.95.

HANDBOOK OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. Edited by Roger W. Little. 607 Pages. Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills, Calif., 1971. \$25.00.

DESIGNING WITH TYPE: A Basic Course in Typography. By James Craig. Edited by Susan E. Meyer. 175 Pages. Watson-Guptill Publications, N. Y., 1971. \$10.95.

CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM. By Earl Schenck Miers. 290 Pages. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N. J., 1971. \$9.00.

THE JUNKS & SAMPANS OF THE YANGTZE. By G. R. G. Worcester, River Inspector, Retired, Chinese Maritime Customs. 626 Pages. United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 1971. \$45.00.

VISION ACCOMPLISHED?: The Enigma of Ho Chi Minh. By N. Khac Huyen. 377 Pages. The Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1971. \$8.95.

I HAVE SPOKEN: American History Through the Voices of the Indians. Compiled by Virginia Irving Armstrong. Introduction by Frederick W. Turner III. 206 Pages. The Swallow Press, Inc., Chicago, Ill., 1971. \$6.00 clothbound. \$2.95 paperbound.

THE NATIONAL GUARD: A Compact History. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, US Army, Retired. 194 Pages. Hawthorne Books, Inc., N. Y., 1971. \$7.95.

HOW THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKS. By H. Duane Hampton. 246 Pages. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1971. \$8.95.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PACIFIC, 1909-1922. By William Reynolds Braisted. 741 Pages. University of Texas Press, Austin, Tex., 1971. \$15.00.

ON THE BORDER WITH CROOK. By Captain John G. Bourke, US Army. 491 Pages. A Bison Book. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebr. First Bison Book Printing: September 1971. The Preface and Text of the Bison Book Edition Are Reproduced From the 1891 Edition, Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.45 paperbound.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT JOURNAL: Normandy to Berlin. By Major General John J. Maginnis. Edited by Robert A. Hart. 351 Pages. The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, Mass., 1971. \$9.50.



READER FORUM

The Specter of Military Writing

There is a specter overshadowing communication in the military—the specter of poor writing. Most military writing falls short of its intended goal of effective communication. One basic reason for the generally poor level of military writing is an overwhelming concern on the part of the military writer, reviewer, and reader for the form of the correspondence rather than its content.

Military writing employs a formulaic style. It is that simple. Generally, formulaic writing is poor writing. It is a lesser form of communication. The point of this discussion is not to bring out the dilemma of an organization that unknowingly encourages poor writing practices; rather, it is to contend that the current military style of writing has a detrimental effect on the professionalism of the officer corps. It is the nature of this less obvious degradation that is of concern.

Prior to considering how the shortcomings of the current military writing system affect its members, it would be beneficial to examine the concept of formulaic writing and be aware of at least two assumptions underlying this approach. The idea of formulaic writing is more than drafting a letter to be sent to several people in whom the organization has a common interest; more than devising an all-purpose form with appropriate blocks to be checked which correspond to all possible responses; it is the concept that there exists a “standardization” of words, phrases, and ideas, in addition to form, that is available and must be used in order to communicate clearly.

This system produces writing that is geared toward the common, more general comments that fall about an intended meaning rather than convey a specific, definitive thought. There is little doubt, however, that this form of writing has an advantage when one’s thoughts are not clearly formulated or the writer has little knowledge of the subject.

The assumptions underlying the formulaic style need to be considered. First is the idea that the form was the best available, and, second, that the condition that existed when the choice of form was selected has not significantly changed. While the first assumption may be accepted with mild trepidation, the second cries out to be questioned. Armed with this brief background of the concept of the formulaic style and inherent assumptions, let us continue.

A major result of the formulaic style is that it tends to perpetuate itself. Most organizations determine their mode of operation in major functional areas. Included in the communications mode of operation are guidelines stating what the organization considers good writing. The organization insures successful implementation of this mode of operation by rewarding desirable practices and punishing undesirable ones in this area. This gets the idea of adhering to the organization’s viewpoint across to all employees in a most effective manner; thus, each organization continues to perpetuate those practices it considers desirable.

The danger inherent in this practice is that it discourages change, even when needed, and, over a period of time, the system tends to perpetuate itself. If change does not occur when conditions warrant it, the organization and its members are not operating in the most efficient manner. At least since 1956 when I became associated with the military, this style of writing has prevailed; what, then, are the consequences on its members.

Contributions to the Reader Forum should be addressed to: Editor in Chief, Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

The very nature of this style of writing lulls the users into poor writing habits. Once the writer learns the appropriate "standardized jargon" and the correct format, he has the key to "GOOD" military correspondence at least for that assignment. But in utilizing the key, he has forfeited the opportunity to fully develop his ability to express himself. The more this easier road is followed and the longer it is traveled, the greater is the writer's loss.

A common example is the use of the term "outstanding." Several years ago, this word had a reasonably definitive meaning; however, now in the military, it is an overused word that connotes, at best, all degrees of things that are good. Currently, it can be used in any situation to describe any degree of good. As a result, when it is used, the writer is granted the privilege of getting by without clearly expressing himself. In this manner, talent for good writing will quickly fade away through a lack of use.

Recent studies of the Army school system point out that the typical Army officer needs to improve his writing ability. In the Haines Board Study, this point was brought out by the comments of senior officers subjectively evaluating the writing ability of their subordinates. The same theme is illustrated in a more objective manner at Fort Leavenworth where the general writing ability of the incoming 1971-72 Command and General Staff College's regular class was evaluated by means of a nationally recognized standard testing device. The results indicated that, even among the "above the Army average" CGSC officers, there is a recognized need for a significant portion of the class to improve their writing skill.

It is a fair contention that the officers that scored low on the CGSC writing evaluation are considered highly qualified by the Army to perform all normal duty assignments to include the associated writing. This is a strong indication that the current writing system in the Army does not demand or develop a high level of writing proficiency. From this same line of reasoning, it can be concluded that writing is not necessarily a significant part of the professional development of the Army officer. The specter of poor writing overshadows the military. There is strong evidence that military writing which emphasizes a formulaic style is responsible for development of bad writing habits, maintaining the writing status quo, and retarding a significant area in the

professional development of the officer corps. When one considers the scope and mission of the Army and the resulting impact of a lesser form of writing, there is no choice but to improve written communications.

MAJ David L. Pinson, USA

Strategic "Superiority"

Colin S. Gray ("Strategic 'Superiority' in Superpower Relations," December 1971) has, I believe, got just about everything wrong.

His article is essentially a plea to the United States to accept in a gentlemanly fashion a permanent slippage in its defense capability or, to say it differently, to accept Soviet ascendancy.

Mr. Gray not only argues for a sophisticated appeasement of the USSR, but also for a blind refusal to consider Soviet aims in its buildup of strategic power.

He colors his polemic with emotional and biased statements about his opponents. For instance, anyone who attempts to make a case for strategic superiority is damned as a member of the "radical right" or a "more traditional" military thinker. He ridicules the idea that a Schlieffen plan of the nuclear age may be acceptable to some power. He cites the discredited (by operational research specialists) critic, Dr. Jerome B. Weisner. He harps on Kahn's rung 44 as if it were the only possible scenario for a power with strategic superiority. And he calls plans for modern war "strategic theology."

It is clear that Mr. Gray is not an objective analyst, but, rather, a partisan of a particular view. He cannot, for instance, find any reason for the drive by the Soviet Union for strategic superiority which might include damage to, or destruction of, the United States. He cannot bring himself even to consider the vast and repeated statements about the upsurge in the antiimperialist movement by Soviet leaders.

Mr. Gray looks at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) through Western liberal eyes and assigns Western arguments to Soviet leaders. Even then, however, he is unable to conceive that the Soviet leadership may view SALT as a means, certainly not an end, by which Soviet superiority—and Western inferiority—will be enhanced. SALT may thus prove to be "of enormous value" not to the stability of the strategic relations of the superpowers, but, rather, to the Soviet drive for augmented superiority.

READER FORUM

One must agree with Mr. Gray that we should all view Soviet arms buildups in terms of foreign policy capabilities. That is just what Mr. Gray fails to do.

He gives us an argument for looking at Soviet power and possible Soviet strategic superiority as if these were really desirable from the Western viewpoint. It is one thing to be forced into becoming a second-rate power. It is something else to clasp the concept to one's bosom and call it good.

As Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, and many others have stressed, if the current trend on both sides continues ... the time may not be far off when the Armed Forces of the United States may not be able to guarantee the security of this country. This is the situation that Mr. Gray asks us to view as improving strategic stability and as providing light and encouragement through parity.

The task of our military planners in providing minimum security in these times is difficult enough. If we were to follow Mr. Gray's advice, it would be impossible.

Walter Darnell Jacobs
College Park, Maryland

Irresistible Weapon

Major Theodore Vander Els ("The Irresistible Weapon," August 1971) has at long last vindicated the conclusions of the Drum and Baker Boards reports of the 1930's. He has proved that "autostrategic interdiction" (meaning, airstrikes on targets selected by air generals) achieved only "superficial results" in three wars. Thus, as these reports so sagaciously

predicted and subsequent wars proved, when air generals are given control of weapons and targets, they invariably place first emphasis on bomber aircraft which they then diddle around in behind the lines thinking to inflict "casualties and destruction" on the enemy when, in truth, all they accomplish is to "reap hatred abroad." Consequently, if we are not to "condemn ourselves to repeat [these] valuable lessons [sic]" of history, we must reshuffle Air Force priorities for war readiness.

Current Air Force belief that surprise attacks on America with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft constitute the primary threat and require retaliation in kind obviously perpetuates the myth of the "irresistible weapon." And since Major Vander Els has convinced us that "massive strategic interdiction" if it does come cannot "ever [be] a successful one" anyway, resolution of the problem is equally obvious.

What we should do is plan to simply absorb nuclear air attacks without offensive response, and, then, much later, when the enemy thinks us dead of explosion and radiation and tries to come ashore, destroy him on the beaches with the help of our world's finest tactical air force. This is the way the antiheavy bombardment officials visualized it in the 1930's, and if they, instead of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, had got the chance they so clearly deserved to run things in World War II, our Air Force might have done a better job of it these many years hence.

Thomas A. Sturm
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D. C.

MILITARY REVIEW—Published monthly by the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 24 May 1971.

Second-class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: \$5.00 (US currency) a year in the United States and US military post offices; \$5.25 a year for those countries which are members of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain; \$6.00 a year in all other countries; single copy price, 50 cents in the United States, and 60 cents in all foreign countries. Address subscription mail to Military Review Subscription Service, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.




A LOOK AHEAD

As the articles in this Anniversary Issue of the *Military Review* fully attest, the Army faces serious problems of manpower, morale, strategy and leadership. It has entered a period of searching inquiry, of readjustment and redirection. This time can become one of renaissance, as well, if we combine the best thoughts and efforts of us all. Now more than ever before it is essential that the members of our profession share their ideas, not only with each other, but also with the larger community whose stake in the Army is no less important than our own.

To provide a forum for this essential communication is the principal purpose of the *Military Review*. Not in its first 50 years has this mission been so important. With your participation—our authors and readers—we will continue to strive to provide a provocative and informative vehicle for the exchange of military thought. We urge you to help us in this effort by expressing your thoughts in our pages.

This is the last issue to be published under the direction of Colonel Donald J. Delaney who has been editor in chief for the past seven and a half years. He retires from military service this month. To the editor and his staff I extend my congratulations and appreciation; to Colonel Delaney our best wishes for the years ahead.


JOHN J. HENNESSEY
Major General, USA
Commandant



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