From the Editor

We offer as this month's focus for the journal—history. The reasonable question that some might ask is, "why?" With all of the challenges we face in our Army, certainly there are more pressing issues that should demand our attention. Moreover, our time is so limited, why should we be bothered cluttering up our days reading historical articles?

Colonel Roger H. Nye, US Army, Retired, in his recently released book, The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence, reviewed in the Books section of this issue, offers three general reasons why when looking at the matter from a command viewpoint. First, he suggests that reading history will help ensure a pool of potential commanders in case of a large-scale war. Second, professionals will perform better in their staff and specialist roles if they can see their work through the eyes of past commanders. Finally, the common historical study of command serves as a cohesive force in an officer corps that is being fragmented by specialization.

We at the journal sense that these are all excellent reasons but would add that there is one more compelling reason why reading history is an absolute necessity. That reason is the pursuit of professional perspective—the arbiter that provides balance regardless of circumstance.

The profession of arms has been a continuing subject of study. Hundreds of years before the birth of Christ, Sun Tzu put down his thoughts on war that remain applicable today. The Romans and Greeks provided a rich legacy of knowledge pertaining to the actions of leaders, soldiers and units. Karl von Clausewitz recorded a theoretical framework for the conduct of war in his 19th-century work, On War. Ardant du Picq later added the direct human linkages to tactical actions on the battlefield. Finally, during this century, numerous thinkers have enlarged on classical writings to provide rich sources for developing comprehensive professional perspectives.

Knowing and reading history provides all professionals with a core of background knowledge. From this can flow certainty of purpose, moral strength, analytical skills and calmness in the face of uncertainty as we work to form and refine our visions of what must be done. Weapons and conditions may change, but principles, relationships, patterns and images remain relatively constant. But, most important, the wide selection of fiction and nonfiction historical offerings allows professionals to tailor what is read to their own needs.

There is no need to relearn the lessons of history when history itself is an open book. All it takes is the energy and discipline needed to read it. Moreover, we might discover that reading history can be fun and refreshing and can provide us with renewed energy as we go about our daily duties.

FWT JR
Lessons Learned Center Formed

The Center for Army Lessons Learned, known as CALL, has been formed at Fort Leavenworth to serve as the focal point for the Army Lessons Learned System. CALL collects combat lessons from a wide variety of sources, serves as a repository for these and disseminates them to the Total Army. The organization also operates an automated information system to assist commanders in preparing operations plans and uses lessons learned to improve doctrine, training, organization and material. For further information, call AUTOVON 552-CALL or commercial (913) 684-CALL, or write Commander, CATA, ATTN: ATZL-TAL, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-7000.

Call for Papers

The publication MINERVA: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military has issued a call for manuscripts dealing with women's military and paramilitary activities anywhere in the world during any time. Also of interest to the publication are papers concerning the activities of female civilian support personnel, such as Red Cross workers, and of military wives. Address correspondence to Dr. Linda Grant De Pauw, Editor and Publisher, MINERVA, 1101 South Arlington Ridge Road, #210, Arlington, VA 22202, or call (703) 892-4388

Leavenworth Paper Number 12 Available

The Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, has announced the publication of its 12th Leavenworth Paper. This latest military history study is titled, Seek, Strike and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II. For information on obtaining this publication, call AUTOVON 552-3414/3831 or commercial (913) 684-3414/3831. Address written requests to: Director, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900.

NOTICE: Send announcements of interest to: Military Review, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910
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Cover art by Charles A. Martinson III
The Mentor:
More Than a Teacher,
More Than a Coach

Major General Kenneth A. Jolemore, US Army

Mentoring is one of the many current terms being glibly used by many leaders in the US Army. It appears, though, that the term means different things to different people. What does it really mean, and how should it be used in the Army? Here is one view.

AFTER the guns of war had quieted, General Douglas MacArthur penned these lines:

My memories of him sustained and strengthened me during many a lonely and bitter moment of the Pacific and Korean Wars. I could almost feel his warm hand on my back. He was indeed the beau sabreur. A first captain in every sense of the term.

MacArthur's subject was his mentor, General John J. Pershing. In a letter to Pershing, written in May 1939, General George S. Patton Jr. had this to say:

Whatever ability I have shown or shall show as a soldier is a result of a studious endeavor to copy the greatest American soldier, namely yourself. I consider it a priceless privilege to have served with you in Mexico and France.

In 1924, after arriving at a new post at the end of his tour as Pershing's aide, General George C. Marshall wrote to him:

I have a hard time realizing that everything I do is not being done directly for you. My five years with you will always remain the unique experience of my career. Not until I took up these new duties did I realize how much my long association with you was going to mean to me and how deeply I will miss it.

If you look at Marshall's career, it is not difficult to find many of the mentors who taught and supported him from his days as a young lieutenant to his tenure as Army chief of staff.

When Lieutenant Marshall attended the old 'School of the Line' at Leavenworth in 1906-07, he was exposed to a 'remarkable teacher,' Major John F. Morrison who at the age of 50 had just begun an instructorship in tactics that was to leave a mark on the American Army.

Marshall said of him:

... his problems were short and always contained a knockout—if you failed to recognize the principle involved in meeting...
the situation. Simplicity and dispersion became fixed quantities in my mind, never to be forgotten. . . . He spoke tactical language I had never heard from any other officer. He was self-educating, reading constantly and creating and solving problems for himself. He taught me all I have ever known of tactics.

Marshall graduated at the top of his class and, importantly, his:

. . . performance caught the eye of General [J. Franklin] Bell who came from Washington to address the graduates. The General was at Leavenworth when a request came from the Pennsylvania National Guard for a regular Army officer to instruct the citizen soldiers during the summer. Bell recommended they be assigned several instructors and that George C. Marshall be one of them.

Marshall was a teacher with the National Guard for several summers.

His success also indicated General Bell's faith in him and advertised the virtues of Bell's old school. The young Lieutenant's stock stood high with the Chief of Staff.

In 1910, Marshall completed four years at Fort Leavenworth. He had come to know well a:

. . . much older officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hunter Liggett, who commanded a battalion of the 13th Infantry stationed at Leavenworth. After class, Colonel Liggett would frequently work through some of the lessons with the lieutenant, of whom he became very fond.

Six years later, Marshall was his aide in the Philippines. Ten years later, he was his chief of operations in the First Army in France.

When Marshall returned home from the Philippines in May 1916, he was assigned as aide to Bell who now commanded the Western Department. On 14 August 1916, Marshall was promoted to captain, 14 years after entering the Army. When the 1st Division was formed in June 1917, General Siebert, who was picked to command the division, wrote Bell:

. . . to ask whether his Aide could be released for duty as a general staff officer on . . . [his] divisional staff and for immediate service abroad. General Bell was keenly aware of how much such an assignment would mean to Marshall, and he was too interested in Marshall's career to stand in the way. It was, besides a step forward, just the kind of post for which he himself thought Marshall best fitted. In the event of war he wrote of his aide (he was) especially well qualified to perform the duty of Chief of Staff in Army or to command same.

The transfer was arranged. In April 1919, Pershing "announced that [Colonel] Marshall had just consented to be his aide." This was the beginning of one of Marshall's:

. . . longest tours of his Army career. For more than five years—to within three months of Pershing's retirement in October 1924—Marshall would stand at his right hand as a kind of personal chief of staff. These five years were important ones for Marshall exposing him to politics and the personalities of politics and business. . . ."

He also sat in on a number of important discussions between President Warren G. Harding and Pershing.

The only reason Marshall did not receive command of Operation Overlord is because President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not think he could endure with Marshall out of the country. The top field command was given to General Dwight D. Eisenhower who became supreme commander in Europe. Why did Eisenhower get the job? It was because Marshall was Eisenhower's mentor.

The term mentor is an old one which first appeared in Homer's Odyssey. Athena, the goddess of war and wisdom, disguises herself as Odysseus' friend, the
old man Mentor. In such guise, she advises and teaches Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, during Odysseus’ 10-year odyssey. As Mentor, Athena represents the epitome of wisdom and the marshal spirit and also serves as the personification of the consciences and developing intellects of both Odysseus and his son.

Supernatural guides were not peculiar to Greek epic poetry. We also find such mentors in folklore. For example, Merlin is more to King Arthur than a teacher, counselor and coach; he is also a magician. In this role, he sponsors and sustains the ”boy king” in numerous trials and adventures.

The dictionary defines mentoring as guiding, counseling, tutoring and coaching. If one considers how “mentoring” is used in practice today and how it has been treated historically, that definition is quite narrow. The Army chief of staff’s White Paper, 1985: Leadership, defines mentoring as teaching and coaching. Equally narrow is a 1985 article, ”Leaders as Mentors,” written by Lieutenant General Charles W. Bagnal, Earl C. Pence and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Meriwether. The authors discuss mentor behaviors that have historically been the norm.

These behaviors have also been the subject of recent research done on industry executives. However, little has been done to identify the behaviors of mentors in the military. Bagnal and his co-authors recognize that the mythological Mentor was a father figure, teacher, trusted adviser and protector. However, they see the need for mentoring in the Army to include only teaching and coaching. They write that mentors:

... may have a profound effect on the careers of their proteges when they intervene to ensure that their proteges obtain desirable assignments. However, such a sponsorship role is not a desirable aspect of Army mentorship because it results in perceptions of favoritism, elitism and promotion by riding the coattails of influential senior officers. This type of mentorship cannot be condoned in the Army.13

I disagree with Bagnal and his co-authors. I believe that sponsoring has
proven valuable in helping to move exceptionally talented people to the top of their fields. I believe this view can be soundly supported by examples from US World War II history. Also, because mentoring is a natural interpersonal human activity, it cannot be ordered away.

It is natural that human beings try to assist those with whom they have established relationships of confidence and respect. We all speak well of those we think well of, and we are prone to help them achieve success in their lives and careers. Often, we mention to our contemporaries and seniors those working for us who stand out among their peers, even if this is done only when giving credit where credit is due.

This simple act is de facto sponsoring. I believe that, if the Army were to order it not to be done, the decision would create a barrier to ethical behavior. Surely sponsoring will continue, and those practicing it will be inclined to deny their actions for fear of harming their own careers.

It is important to understand that sponsoring is more prevalent among those at the top of an organization than among those in the middle or at the bottom of an organization. The most thorough quantitative study on mentoring was done by the consulting firm Hedrick and Struggles. They focused on 1,200 executives whose names turned up in "Who's New in the News" in The Wall Street Journal. These were absolutely top-level executives, those being appointed as leaders in Fortune 500 companies.

The study asked these people if anyone had been their mentor in the sense that the mentor had guided them, had an interest in their careers or had sponsored them for other jobs. Fully two-thirds said yes. From this, industry concluded that about two-thirds of all managers had mentors. This assumption proved to be false when Michael G. Zey published The Mentor Connection in 1984. His research found that, in the mid and junior executive levels, less than one-third of the managers had a mentor.16

One exclusively military survey of mentoring comes from a portion of the Army Professional Development of Officers Study. It determined that less than one-half of the company grade officers recognized they had a mentor. It is important to note that mentor was defined only as a teacher and coach. Less than one-third of the field grade officers felt they had been mentored. Eleven percent of company and field grade officers thought that a mentor's action was probably the most important thing in their career development.17

It is important to define specific behaviors of mentors. Mentor was a father figure, teacher, trusted adviser and protector. Bagnal and his co-authors limit mentoring to teaching and coaching. For Zey, a mentor behaves as a teacher, counselor, promoter and sponsor.18 Perhaps the best article on the mentor behaviors was published in Supervisory Magazine in April 1983. The article, titled "A Mentor: Would You Know One if You Saw One?," identified 10 behaviors in mentoring:19

- Teaching includes teaching specific skills, learning what is needed for job per-
formance and providing assets to the individual for career development and growth. This teaching can be accomplished in a formal or informal setting by using a directive or a subtle approach.

- **Guiding** provides the prodigy with the unwritten rules of the organization, information on who the important people in the organization are, the desired behavior of the organization, the psychological makeup of the organization and the social behavior that is the norm to the senior group.

- **Advising** usually results from the mentee’s coming to the mentor to ask for advice. A pertinent point to be made about advising concerns the quality of the wisdom of the mentor. It is understood that the mentor is usually not an individual who is just a few years older than the mentee. Traditionally, we find mentors are eight to 15 and more years older. Consequently, they have a great deal more experience than their mentees, and this generally improves the quality of advice.

- **Sponsoring** behavior is the mentor’s use of clout to provide growth opportunities for the mentee. When we think about sponsoring, we cannot help but think about prestige, jobs and appointments. Examples of such appointments can be seen in Marshall’s career. Reading military history points out that most of our great leaders in World War II held prestige jobs working for senior officers on a personal, day-to-day basis.

- **Role modeling behavior** of a mentor is considerably different from the role model who is not personally and closely associated with a protégé. If we look at MacArthur, Patton and Marshall, we see reflected in their behavior the common role model—Pershing.

- **Validating** identifies a mentor’s behavior that is much like advising and counseling.

- **Counseling**, advising and validating deal with goal setting and goal validation and provide the mentee emotional support in stressful times.

- **Motivating** as an outgrowth of counseling is the use of techniques designed to give the mentee the motivation to move on to accomplish his goals. When Brigadier General Edward W. Nichols was the commandant of the Virginia Military Institute in 1907-24, he received a letter from Marshall. Marshall poured out his heart about his dissatisfaction with the Army promotion system and announced his serious intention to leave the Army at the conclusion of his assignment. Nichols, being an old hand and an old friend, wrote back and told Marshall what he already knew. He wrote about the recognition Marshall had achieved in a relatively short career as a junior officer and suggested that Marshall had an exceedingly bright future and would rise to prominence if he remained in service. We know the outcome.

Finally, the behaviors of protecting and communicating a mentee are cited.

- **Protecting** a mentee is providing an environment in which the mentee can take risks without fear of failure. A protector provides a buffer for risk-taking where failure can be experienced without the loss of self-confidence.
Communicating is vital. It cuts across all of the other behaviors.

What can a mentor do for a protégé? Succinctly stated, a mentor can do all of the things outlined. That includes helping a mentee to develop self-confidence and grow, sharing his ideas and his values with the mentee, making the mentee visible to top-level leadership and giving the mentee an opportunity to share invaluable contacts.

We have seen in Marshall's career and also in Patton's life that an individual can have many mentors, each displaying some if not all of the mentor behaviors. When Patton graduated from West Point, he was assigned to Troop K, 15th Cavalry, at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. He was lucky enough to have as his troop commander an officer named Frederick C. Marshall.

Patton wrote in his memoirs that "he accompanied the troop commander, Frederick C. Marshall to the Troop K Barracks, he drank a cup of coffee while he was there in the mess hall [and then] we inspected the mess hall." Martin Blumen-

son, author of the Patton Papers, adds that "no doubt, Marshall inspected the kitchen and in the process instructed Patton on how to do it." Here, we see a teaching mentor who is also a role model.

Important, Patton and Frederick Marshall became friends. As a mentor, it is clear that Frederick Marshall taught Patton more than essential job knowledge. In September 1909, Patton wrote to his father, "I am certainly glad that I got into Captain Marshall's troop, he teaches me things that the other two, [two other officers in the squadron] never hear about." Although it is not made clear exactly what he was taught, it is probable that Frederick Marshall was teaching him the unwritten rules of the organization, the politics of the organization, the personalities in the larger organization and the social behaviors that are important to success. According to Zey, this is akin to transferring state secrets to the prodigy.

Importantly, Patton was taught things that the other two were not taught. This is what mentoring can mean. Frederick Marshall was to continue to be one of Patton's sponsors, protecting him and even teaching Patton how to use influence.

Another of Patton's mentors was Samuel D. Rockenbach. Patton worked for him during the development, buildup and training of the tank corps in Europe during World War I. Rockenbach commanded all of the US Tank Forces that were being organized, trained and employed with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Patton commanded the tank school under Rockenbach. In an example of promoting and sponsoring, Patton went to Rockenbach for assistance after he had seen action leading tanks and had been recommended for a Distinguished Service Cross which had been disapproved. Patton wrote to many senior people to get them to use their influence to overturn the disapproval of the award. In a letter to Rockenbach in December 1918, Rockenbach's influence in supporting Patton is obvious. Patton wrote:

Please accept my sincere thanks for the trouble you took in my behalf with reference to the Distinguished Service Cross. I
shall always pride it more than anything I could have gotten in the war. My gratitude to you is based on the fact that without your earnest effort, I should not have gotten it.

Patton accompanied Pershing on the punitive expeditions in Mexico in early 1916 as a member of Pershing's personal staff, performing duties similar to those of a headquarters commandant. He traveled extensively with Pershing and even acted as Pershing's personal messenger, on occasion delivering messages through enemy lines. Between them there existed a unique relationship for a young captain and a general officer. Patton accompanied Pershing when the AEF went to Europe in World War I. As a result of the close mentor-mentee relationship that existed between them, Patton probably had more extensive combat experience than any of the other famous World War II generals, with the possible exception of MacArthur.

Unfortunately, like many friendly, lifetime relationships between a mentor and protégé, the Pershing-Patton relationship failed. It failed because of Patton's infamous slapping incident during the 1943 Sicily Campaign. Pershing went public with his criticism of Patton. Patton, infuriated by this, never wrote or talked to Pershing again, thus ending a close and cordial relationship that had existed for almost 30 years.

The mentor's role in teaching can be exceptionally time-consuming, even when the mentor is the mentee's direct supervisor. This behavior as a teaching mentor can divert the time allotted for other duties, or it can take time that may previously have been reserved for the family or recreation.

While at Fort Meade, Maryland, from 1920 to 1921, Eisenhower had met and established a close personal and profes-
Fox Conner (front row next to General Pershing)

In this relationship, I think we can see the truth of a mentor-mentee relationship as described by Zey who wrote:

*The mentor-protégé relationship entails a degree of interaction of greater breadth and intensity than is usually present in the superior-subordinate interaction*. While the supervisor teaches the subordinate’s job, the mentor teaches the protégé to do the mentor’s job.

Another of my favorite teaching mentors is a Navy man, Samuel S. Robison. As a lieutenant commander in August 1917, Chester W. Nimitz reported to duty as the engineering aide to Captain Robison, commander of the Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force. This was probably the most fortunate early assignment in Nimitz’s career, for:

*in Robison he acquired a sage advisor, an influential patron and a lifelong friend. Through the older man’s influence, Nimitz’s shifted the direction of his career away from engineering which could prove a dead end and set his feet on the rungs of the ladder to high command*.

Robison continued to help Nimitz throughout his career. In June 1932, Robison hoisted his flag on the USS California, relieving Admiral E. W. Erberly. Robison appointed Nimitz his aide, assistant chief of staff and tactical officer. If you read Nimitz’s career, you will find that he was considered the greatest of the navy’s tacticians in World War II. How did he acquire...
this skill? It is my view that Robison played a key role in Nimitz's development, assignments and final success.

Nimitz learned from Robison how to provide an environment for learning where mistakes and even failure would not result in a destroyed career. As a ship's captain when Nimitz was returning to port, he would call an unsuspecting ensign "to the bridge" to berth the ship. It was the ensign and Nimitz sitting on the bridge, Nimitz saying not a word, and the young officer bringing the ship in or at times taking it out.

In one case, a young officer was in the process of charging the dock at full steam ahead. Nimitz was biting his tongue because he could see the impact coming. At the last critical second, the ensign, realizing he had a problem, commanded full reverse and docked the ship beautifully. Had he come in and had a collision, I am convinced Nimitz would have taken full responsibility, blaming himself and not the ensign.

I have identified the mentor's investment in the teaching role time. In the advising and counseling roles, the mentor's primary investment is emotion since, as I have indicated, these roles entail involvement in the protégé's personal life. That involvement can often mean trauma to one degree or another—life and death issues, divorce, child rearing, clarifying and changing goals, and often providing unappreciated advice.

In performing the functions of promoting and sponsoring, the mentor can assume considerable risk since his judgment concerning his protégé is on the line among his fellow seniors. The greatest risk Zey tells us is in sponsorship where the mentor, in some cases, can move the protégé into positions of responsibility. The risk, of course, centers on the possible failure of the protégé.

When the Rainbow Division, the 82d, was being put together in 1917, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker discussed with MacArthur then a major on the War Department General Staff, the issue of how to implement the president's decision on having a division comprised of individuals from all the states of the union. In that discussion, MacArthur said he believed the division commander should have the best colonel of the general staff as his divisional chief of staff. The secretary at once replied, "I have made my
selection for that post." Then, putting his hand on MacArthur's shoulder, added, "It's you." MacArthur writes, "I was flabbergasted but managed to stammer out that however grateful I felt, being only a major I was not eligible." "You are wrong," he said, "you are now a colonel."*"* 

Omar N. Bradley, a lieutenant colonel in 1941, was working for Marshall, then Army chief of staff, and was offered a job as the commandant of troops at West Point. Marshall indicated to Bradley that he did not think much of that idea. Instead, Marshall offered him the opportunity to become the assistant commandant at the Infantry School, a brigadier general's position. Three months later, Bradley was promoted to brigadier general, never having been a colonel.

The MacArthur and Bradley examples reflect what a mentor can do to promote his mentee. I know these cases are unique. However, a mentor can also promote a mentee by providing him a high-visibility job within the mentor's organization. An example could be selecting a major or lieutenant colonel within a command to become the operations officer.

In the January-February 1979 Harvard Business Review article, "Much Ado About Mentors," we learn that... with rare exceptions... most executives view the first fifteen years of their careers as the learning and growing period. That is the time when they seek mentors. By about the age of 40 those destined for the highest ranks are achieving positions of power themselves and the need of a career sponsor fades.**

This does not seem to be the case for military leaders. Although those discussed here had been recognized and mentioned favorably fairly early in their careers, they continued to be mentored throughout their careers. Marshall's role as a sponsoring, promoting mentor demonstrates this truth.

It is well known that Marshall kept a black book in which time to time he crossed off a name and moved up or added that of another. The black book was a little needed crutch to a well charged memory that still contained the names of classmates from Fort Leavenworth, colleagues in France, instructors and students at Fort Benning, dozens of men whom he saw on every visit to maneuvers, the names advisors and old friends counselled him to remember, men of good report whose achievements were chronicled again and again in the mail. Names like Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, [Bruce C.] Clarke and [Courtney H.] Hodges.

One historian has counted over 50 faculty and 150 students who passed through Fort Benning, Georgia, when Marshall was assistant commandant there in 1929-32, who later became general officers.

But Marshall was merciless to those who could not handle the new challenges made possible in an Army preparing for and at war. He saw many of his old chums make general only to falter, and he removed them. He did not promote many other lifelong friends into the general officer ranks because they were too old, too tired or not bright enough, and he was hated for it. But those younger officers he...
moved ahead of their seniors and contemporaries won World War II for the United States and its Allies.

Most studies of mentoring find the mentor usually eight to 15 years and beyond the age of the mentee. If it is decided to have a formal mentor-mentee relationship in the Army, the experience of the mentor is the key to teaching a mentee a job two to three levels above his current position. We learn from Zey's work that what most reflects the difference between a supervisor's training and a mentor's is the extent to which mentors involve the protégé in the decision-making process—actual participation not available from a nonmentor role model. If the Army is talking about teaching the mentee the mentee's job, then the word supervisor seems to be more appropriate for this role than mentor. In that case, the age and experience difference between mentor and protégé are not critical.

One thing more about mentoring that seems historically consistent is that prestige jobs are important. Sitting near the
seat of power provides an opportunity to learn in a short time what the mentor might have learned over 25 to 30 years or more. According to Zey, this method produces results that transcend those obtainable by mere verbal teaching.\(^\text{35}\)

There are three cautions associated with formalizing the process. The first is to insist that participation in a mentoring program is voluntary. Second, to prevent mentoring from becoming a burdening commitment, six months is a good length for the first mentor-mentee relationship. If the first six months is a success, then a second can be started. The final caution is to select and match mentors and mentees carefully. Most formal mentoring programs require a nominating procedure. Then, the directors or coordinators of the program match mentors and mentees.

It is clear that formalized mentoring programs and the organizations conducting those that are successful recognize the elements of traditional mentoring. It is usually not found in first-line supervisor and employee relationships. This is probably so because of the need for a mentor to teach the mentee to do a higher level job. Mentor-mentee relationships cannot be made to happen since they require a willingness to share experiences, successes and failures. Finally, effective mentoring requires time and often a great deal of it. Mentoring can become a significant burden to the mentor.

The literature on mentoring covers the techniques of mentoring, the choice of a mentor or a mentee, the desirable characteristics of each, the means of attracting a mentor, the problems which result from weak mentors or failed protégés and cross-gender mentoring. I encourage each of you to read more on this important topic. If you yourself wish to attract a mentor, give heed to Blumenson's description of Patton in the Patton Papers:

*He attracted his superiors by his enthusiasm, his devotion to his profession, his willingness to learn, his serious application, his loyalty to his seniors, his concern for the welfare of his subordinates, his meticulous attention to orders and the job, his neatness in dress and appearance, his military bearing and good looks, his pleasant personality and his adaptability.*\(^\text{36}\)

Without a proper understanding of the full spectrum of mentor functions, one can easily fall to discussing something other than mentoring. Sponsoring and promoting have been as important to our Army as have been teaching, coaching and counseling. The traditional mentor system has identified big winners early—there are few who will qualify—and allowed them to train early for the highest responsibilities.

I agree with General John A. Wickham Jr. that every leader should be a teacher and coach. I do not think all leaders are
qualified to be mentors in the traditional, historical sense. I do not intend to convey the impression that mentoring is largely a selection of protégés and sponsorship. Marshall was not a protégé of his Leavenworth instructor, nor can we conclude that all of the junior naval officers who were taught by Nimitz were his protégés. I believe it is through the mentor behaviors of teaching, guiding, advising and counseling that a mentor will identify several subordinates who in his or her opinion deserve special attention and, therefore, might become protégés who will benefit from the additional mentor behaviors of promoting and sponsoring.

The overall health of the military will benefit more from leaders who are teachers and coaches than from the selection of individuals under a mentoring approach that is predominantly sponsoring. It should be clear, however, that I support the need for "traditional" mentoring in the military.

NOTES

2 Martin Blumenthal The Patton Papers 1885-1945. Saugus Massachusetts 1972 Volume 1 p 796
4 Ibid op cit p 98-99
5 Ibid
6 Ibid op cit 199-200
7 Ibid
8 Ibid p 127
9 Ibid op cit 141-43
10 Ibid p 197
11 Ibid
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
17 Results of the Professional Development Survey. Report to the Chief of the Army Staff.
18 Zey op cit p 7
20 Pogue George C. Marshall: Education of a General 1939-1942. op cit p 129
21 Blumenthal op cit p 155
22 Ibid p 186
23 Zey op cit p 114
24 Blumenthal op cit p 658
25 Ibid
26 Ibid op cit 325
27 Ibid op cit p 382
29 Dwight D. Eisenhower At Ease Stories I Told to Friends. Doubleday & Company Garden City New York 1967 p 77
30 Ibid p 195-96
31 Ibid
32 Ibid
33 Zey op cit p 15
34 Ibid
35 Elmer B. Potter: Nimitz Naval Institute Press Annapolis Maryland 1976 p 129
36 Ibid p 138
37 Ibid p 158
38 Zey op cit p 93
39 MacArthur op cit p 45
43 Ibid op cit p 92-93
44 Ibid
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48 Blumenthal The Patton Papers 1985-1945 op cit p 3

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Genghis Khan and 13th-Century AirLand Battle

Captain Dana J. H. Pittard, US Army

There is significant debate over what individual or military organization first developed and used maneuver warfare. This article nominates another candidate and asserts that Genghis Khan and his 13th-century Mongol army were the first successful practitioners of what we know today as AirLand Battle.

An Army’s Operational Concept is the core of its doctrine. It is the way the Army fights its battles and campaigns, including tactics, procedures, and organizations. . . . The concept must be broad enough to describe the operations in all anticipated circumstances. Yet it must allow sufficient freedom for tactical variations in any situation. It must also be uniformly known and understood.'

The German blitzkrieg of World War II is often noted as the prototype of much of the US Army’s current doctrine—AirLand Battle. The German blitzkrieg, though seemingly revolutionary at its outset, was really nothing new. Its maneuver warfare fundamentals had been followed over 700 years earlier by Genghis Khan and his Mongol “hordes.” Genghis Khan and his armies accomplished feats that would be hard, if not impossible, for modern armies to duplicate.

The Mongol armies, like the number of tanks in General Heinz Guderian's World
War II panzer divisions, actually were modest compared to the ends achieved—and the stories told by their victims. Not only were the Mongol hordes often outnumbered but, man for man, the Mongol soldier’s enemy was usually larger and stronger and considered himself better armed. The potential threat of being faced by a numerically superior enemy was one of the principal reasons behind the development of the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine—a doctrine designed for mobile warfare anywhere in the world.

AirLand Battle doctrine teaches that, at both the tactical and operational level, success on the modern battlefield will depend on four concepts: initiative, depth, agility and synchronization. As a doctrine, AirLand Battle is a guide to action. One objective is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by subordinate commanders according to the intentions of the senior commander. Doctrine develops from principles. In the case of AirLand Battle doctrine, these principles are the “principles of war” drawn from the work of British Major General J. F. C. Fuller.

Genghis Khan and his immediate successors used all four AirLand Battle operational concepts with phenomenal skill. Unlike most other great captains in history, Genghis Khan did not have a formal education. He was an illiterate man. At the age of 9, he was left fatherless and deserted by all but his immediate family. He never read a book, was never a student of any war lord, was never tutored by scholars. But the operational concepts, developed from experience and military common sense, were applied by Genghis Khan and the Mongol commanders in every campaign. In so doing, they forged an empire which spread from Korea to Persia (Iran). It was later extended into Eastern Europe by his descendants and the Mongol general Subotai using the operational concepts the Great Khan developed.

Genghis Khan’s use of initiative is legendary. No other commander in history has been more acutely aware of the fundamental importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative—of always attacking, even when the strategic mission was defensive. The Mongols attempted to retain the initiative by constantly keeping their enemies off balance.

Prior to the beginning of an invasion, numerous spies and scouts would be dispatched to the target country. The spies would attempt to sow seeds of dissension, while the scouts watched the enemy. Scouts also screened the movements of the Mongol army. As the time for the invasion approached, the spies and scouts created a veritable “war of nerves” among the enemy. They appeared as small armed parties of men at different entrances to
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the country, and within the country, causing consternation and confusion.

Every encounter with the enemy, large or small, helped Mongol army commanders to seize and retain freedom of maneuver. Subordinate commanders, supported by higher commanders, were encouraged to take risks. A Mongol mng-khan, or commander of 100 men, might appear suddenly in a district and force its surrender because the enemy defensive force had no means of knowing how many thousands might or might not be at the heels of the 100.

At the outset of every invasion, the main Mongol army of normally three to five tournans (division-size forces of about 10,000 men each) would rapidly advance behind a screen of light horsemen in several roughly parallel columns on a broad front. Contact was constantly maintained through mounted couriers and a system of signaling. This formation permitted flexibility, particularly if the enemy was stronger than the Mongols or if his exact location was unknown. The column encountering the enemy forces would then either fix the enemy or retire, depending on the situation.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the army would continue to advance, occupying the enemy's flanks or rear areas. This would force the enemy to fall back to protect his lines of communication. The Mongols would then quickly close in to take advantage of any confusion or disorder in the enemy's withdrawal. This was usually rapidly followed up by eventual encirclement, a headlong merciless pursuit and the enemy's utter destruction. The rapidity of the Mongol movements invariably gave them superiority of force at the decisive point—the ultimate aim of mobile warfare. By aggressively seizing the initiative, the Mongol commanders, rather than their foes, almost always selected the point of decision.

The Mongols ingeniously used the elements of depth—time, space and resources—to make enemy forces needlessly waste combat power. They thus prepared the enemy for defeat prior to the start of the main Mongol attack. The Mongols followed the advice of the great war theorist Sun Tzu:

In war the successful strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.2

It was not a disgrace for a Mongol general to avoid battle. It was a disgrace for a Mongol general to engage in battle that "cost many Mongol lives," even though the general won, when a similar victory could have been obtained at a lesser cost.3

The Mongols were very successful in using depth to avoid costly set-piece battles. Their knowledge of the time required to move forces—both their own and the enemy's—helped them to consistently stay one step ahead of their enemies.
Their use of mobility kept enemy forces in movement, either forward or backward. They knew by experience that a courageous and unbroken civilized army would almost always advance against them, and a broken army would seek safety in flight away from them. Their maneuver prior to general engagement was specifically intended to prevent the decisive battle. This was an interesting goal, to say the least.

Most successful armies in history, such as Napoleon Bonaparte's, maneuvered their forces prior to an engagement to seek the decisive battle. The Mongols used the entire depth of the battlefield to keep enemy forces from gathering in strength to make a stand on favorable ground. Once enemy forces gathered in sufficient strength, the Mongols normally refused to engage them directly. They, in turn, used the deep attack by merely fixing the enemy force with one touman and using the bulk of the Mongol army to terrorize the civilian population centers and destroy uncommitted forces and enemy support facilities.

The Mongols also used depth of resources to prevent enemy forces from decisively engaging them. Europeans were, man for man, much larger and better armed for close-in, hand-to-hand combat than the individual Mongol soldier. The Mongols, therefore, used their arrows as long-range weapons which added depth and normally inflicted disastrous casualties upon their enemies.

The Mongols often used great numbers of enemy captives to cover their advances—ruthlessly forcing enemy forces to kill their own countrymen in order to engage the Mongols in hand-to-hand combat. The Mongols added to the confusion by continuing to fire arrows at the enemy behind their reluctant human shields. In addition to their long-range arrows, the Mongols used different weapon systems such as catapults, ballistae, rudimentary artillery and even rockets to destroy or confuse their enemies. In siegecraft, Genghis Khan's engineer corps was at least as efficient as those of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. All of these resources combined to provide the Mongol army commander with added depth and increased flexibility.

Agility, which embraces the need to accomplish necessary tasks rapidly and react quickly to changes in the situation, is closely linked to mobility. The Mongols were masters of mobility. They instinctively realized that "force is the product of mass and the square of velocity." Mongol armies consisted almost entirely of cavalry, and each trooper had one or more spare horses. Thus provided, Genghis Khan's army, in its pursuit of Mohammed Shah in 1221, covered 130 miles in two days. In 1241, Subotai's army traveled 180 miles in three days through deep snow and bitter winter cold to attack the Russian principalities. This extraordinary mobility gave rise to the stories of the Mongols using vast numbers of men.
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In actuality, however, the Mongol army was usually much smaller than those of its principal opponents. The largest force Genghis Khan ever assembled was that with which he conquered the Khwarizmian Empire (Persia): less than 240,000 men. The Mongol armies which conquered Russia and all of Eastern and Central Europe never exceeded 150,000 men. Quality, not quantity, and simplicity of organization was a key to the Mongol army's superior agility.

The organization was based on the decimal system. The largest independent unit was the touman. Three toumans normally constituted an army or an army corps commanded by an orlok (Mongol field marshal). The touman, in turn, was composed of 10 regiments of 1,000 men, each commanded by a noyan (Mongol baron). The regiment consisted of 10 squadrons, each comprising 10 troops of 10 men. Forty percent of a typical Mongol army consisted of heavy armored cavalry which was used for shock action. The remaining 60 percent consisted of arrow-carrying light cavalry used for reconnaissance, screening, support to the heavy cavalry, mopping-up operations and pursuit.

Detailed, imaginative planning was an integral part in the Mongols' achievement of superior agility. The Mongols never worked out their plan of operation until they had a clear picture of the enemy's territory, armament, routes of communication and probable place of mobilization. But they managed to keep their own preparations well hidden. The Mongol intelligence network was spread throughout the known world. After careful evaluation of intelligence reports, the Mongols would draw specific objectives along general axes of advance for each of their toumans. Subordinate commanders were given considerable scope in accomplishing their missions. Prior to a general engagement and within the context of the overall plan, a touman commander was at liberty to maneuver and meet the enemy at his discretion.

When an enemy force was found, it became the objective of all nearby Mongol units. Complete information regarding enemy location, strength and direction of movement was immediately sent to central headquarters. Synchronization of effort occurred rapidly. Once his forces were concentrated, the Mongol army commander would coordinate his various weapon systems in an intensive firepower preparation which, at worse, shook the enemy's nerves and, at best, caused him to scatter without need for an attack. Once the enemy was sufficiently confused, synchronized signals would start the heavy cavalry on its charge. In addition to combining fire and movement, the Mongols achieved synchronization by also emphasizing coordination at all tactical levels and in all phases of combat.
Within the overall context of their operational concepts, the Mongols used sound and innovative tactics. A favorite tactic was the tulughma, or standard sweep, in which one flank of an enemy would be turned and the main thrust delivered to his side or rear. Another favorite was the feigned retreat followed, after a suitable time, by a strong counterattack. The enemy pursuing the "retreating" force would find itself confronted on either flank by the other Mongol elements. If the enemy fought well in such a situation, the Mongols would allow him to withdraw. They would then attack the enemy force on the march, easily overcoming and destroying his strung-out forces.

Knowing the desire of their opponents for the acquisition of booty was the impetus behind still another favorite Mongol tactic. The Mongols would sometimes seemingly abandon their baggage trains as bait for the enemy. While the enemy looted the baggage, the Mongols would swoop back and destroy him.

The superior generalship of the Mongols certainly played no small part in their military dominance of the 13th century. The Mongols were blessed with an array of absolutely brilliant leaders. Foremost among them, of course, are Genghis Khan and his great subordinate Subotai. According to British war theorist B. H. Liddell Hart, "the strategical ability of these two leaders is matched in history only by that of Napoleon." The great field commanders—Makhuli who crushed North China; Batu Khan, conquerer of Russia; Jebe Noyan, conquerer of Kara Khitai; and Bayan who broke the power of the Sung Empire in southern China—were nearly the equals of Genghis Khan and Subotai as strategists.

The Great Khan's schools of military leadership were the far-flung battlefields of his armies. Capable subordinate leaders were never lacking in the Mongol ranks. The promotion system was based strictly on merit, and some of the ranking orloks were quite young. Subotai and Jebe both reached high rank before their 25th birthdays. Genghis Khan made it a point to amply reward and publicly praise his subordinates when they did well. On the other hand, failure to carry out orders was one of the quickest possible ways for a leader to commit suicide.

All Mongol army commanders, nevertheless, had two significant traits in common—they courageously led by example, and they all had a uniform understanding of the Mongol operational concepts. The latter allowed them to act independently while always maintaining conformance with the overall plan.

Though nearly every successful Mongol military operation can be used to show their general adherence to present-day AirLand Battle doctrine, one in particular comes to mind. Genghis Khan's invasion of the Khwarizmian Empire, 1218-24, illustrates the use of AirLand Battle operational concepts at the theater level.

In 1218, following the mistreatment of Mongol ambassadors by Mohammed Shah, ruler of the Khwarizmian Empire, Genghis Khan mobilized his army. The Khwarizmian Empire spread across Turkestan, Persia and northern India. Like all Mongol campaigns, the invasion was preceded by a considerable effort on the part of the intelligence network. As he gathered information and made detailed invasion preparations, Genghis Khan concentrated his main forces east of Lake Balkhash on the Irtish River in 1219.

In the summer of 1219, to cover his intentions and preparations, Genghis Khan sent one of his sons, Juji, with a force of three toumans across the Chu River between the Ak Kum Desert and the Kara Tau-Ala Tau Mountains toward the...
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lower portions of the Syr Darya River. The plan was to have Juji lay waste to everything in his zone. This he did with ferocious efficiency.

Mohammed Shah responded by sending his son, Jalal-ad-Din, and 200,000 men to repel the assumed invasion. By the time Jalal-ad-Din arrived, Juji had accomplished his mission. The Mongols sent back all the horses and forage they needed and withdrew. Jalal-ad-Din counterattacked, but the Mongols quickly disengaged by setting fire to the grassy plain and disappearing behind the smoke. No effort was made to pursue them.

For several months, Genghis Khan made no further move. Mohammed Shah, having mustered a force of well over 400,000 hardened Turkish/Muslim troops, felt reasonably assured that he could quickly halt any Mongol invasion. But, like Napoleon’s opponents in the 19th century, he adopted the fatal cordon defense system along the line of a wide river, the Syr Darya, facing north. A chain of walled towns strengthened this defensive line. Behind it lay Samarkand and Bukhara, two centers of Khwarizmian power, lying west and south of the headwaters of the Syr Darya River.

In July 1219, Genghis Khan and the main body of the Mongol army left the Irtish River. He divided his force into four separate armies of four or five toumans each. Two of these armies, commanded by Juji and Jebe, were sent south to the upper Amu Darya River. The third army, commanded by the Great Khan’s two sons Ogadai and Jagatai, was to march west toward the fortified town of Otrar. The fourth army, led by Genghis Khan himself and Subotai, was to make a wide westward swing and attempt to advance against Bukhara from the west. Genghis Khan hoped to confuse and surprise the Khwarizmians by conducting widespread attacks from four different directions.

In the fall of 1219, while Ogadai and Jagatai attacked Otrar, Genghis Khan and Subotai turned north and disappeared. In the south, Jebe and Juji divided their forces. Jebe led 20,000 men into Khorasan below the Amu Darya River with orders to draw out any major force that might be lying in reserve and advance into Transoxiana from the south. Juji rode west. Juji was ordered to operate along a 400-mile front, along with Ogadai and Jagatai in the north, to destroy major fortifications and keep the rest of the cordon occupied. Genghis Khan and Jebe worked their way around either flank.

As planned, after taking Otrar, Ogadai and Jagatai wheeled south to start clearing the Syr Darya riverline. After seizing Khojend (Leninabad), Juji’s army turned north. The two forces worked toward each other, reducing Mohammed Shah’s strongpoints along the Syr Darya River. The shah was in Bukhara when he
learned that Khojend had fallen and that another army (led by Jebel) was advancing into Transoxiana from the south. Moving to his capital, Samarkand, he assembled his last 50,000 reserves to stop Jebel. Jebel's Mongol army completely routed the larger Khwarizmian army.

Mohammed Shah began to panic. He could not turn to flank and face Jebel's advance since his entire front, the cordon along Syr Darya, was pinned down and crumbling under Juji's superior mobility. The strongholds at either end of it had already fallen. He also could not commit more men without leaving his capital defenseless. His officers were advising him to evacuate Transoxiana altogether when the news came that Genghis Khan and Subotai had appeared outside the gates of Bukhara nearly 400 miles behind the Khwarizmian lines! Genghis Khan reached Bukhara by crossing the Kyzyl Kum Desert which the Khwarizmians believed to be impenetrable. The surprise was complete. Mohammed Shah's line was turned, and the lines of communication were completely disrupted. He fled, leaving the Bukhara garrison to the Mongols.

On 11 April 1220, the Great Khan took Bukhara and then turned back east toward Samarkand. Meanwhile, the armies of Ogadai and Jagatai converged on Samarkand from the north, Juji from the east and Jebel from the south. Caught in these crushing pincers, Samarkand, Mohammed Shah's last stronghold, was soon taken.

In the brief space of five months, Genghis Khan had wiped out an army of 400,000 men, overthrown the mighty...
Khwarizmian Empire and opened the gateway to the west toward Europe. He did this through a masterful use of the AirLand Battle operational concepts. Every move had been made in a calculated, orderly sequence toward the achievement of the ultimate objective. Juji's early probe down the Ak Kum trough in the north to the Syr Darya River gained the initiative, forestalled the danger of an early enemy offensive while Genghis Khan was staging, and put Mohammed Shah on the defensive. Genghis Khan retained the initiative by fixing the Khwarizmians with the two Mongol armies on the Syr Darya River, while his army in the north and Jebe's army in the south maneuvered around the Khwarizmian flanks.

The distance covered reveals the use of depth of the entire battlefield to strike Mohammed Shah and prevent the Khwarizmians from concentrating their forces. Genghis Khan's use of the deep attack by moving 400 miles behind enemy lines through the Kyzyl Kum Desert enabled him to achieve a maneuver which Liddell Hart describes as "one of the most dramatic surprises in the history of war." The agility displayed by the two Mongol armies operating along the Syr Darya riverline was remarkable. Their fluidity made the Khwarizmians believe they were faced by a Mongol army twice their size. Detailed, imaginative planning also played a role in the Mongols' achievement of superior agility. The initial routes of march and axes of advance of all four Mongol armies were very specific. However, the army commanders were given considerable latitude once they made enemy contact to accomplish their missions.

Perhaps most notable was the synchronization between the four armies. Instead of pushing on to Samarkand, immediately after taking Khojend, Juji wheeled his army north to support and link up with Ogadai and Jagatai's army in order to synchronize their advance on the Khwarizmian capital. The convergence of the four armies, which completely overwhelmed Samarkand, is a clear illustration of synchronization at its finest. The Khwarizmian Campaign was the last great campaign of Genghis Khan. The Great Khan died en route to Mongolia in 1227. However, his method of warfare was carried on with extraordinary skill by his successors.

Unfortunately, gaps and distortions mar the rich military history of the 13th-century Mongol army. Most of the pages were recorded by its enemies, and the Mongols' enemies could hardly be expected to maintain objectivity when describing the devastating wave of fury that washed over them. But enough pages are intact to carry important lessons across the centuries. It was only when the business of war had become a profession...
and the professional soldier had begun to extract the principles of war from the experiences of history that the campaigns of the Mongol army came to be re-examined. Their tactics and maneuver-oriented operational concepts were studied by Gustavus Adolphus and Napoleon and were still being taught to Russian cavalry officers at the beginning of the 20th century.  

The mobile-minded Mongol army conclusively demonstrated that a military force could consistently win decisive battles in spite of its inferiority in numbers—and, for that matter, in spite of an inferiority in element-to-element quality. The key was found in the successful application of maneuver-oriented operational concepts. Coupled with sound tactics, good organization and superior generalship, these operational concepts made up for disparity of numbers and completely confounded qualitative statistics and force ratios.

In 1927, Liddell Hart wrote that "the tank and the airplane were natural heirs and successors to the Mongol horsemen." With the modern concept of vertical envelopment by airborne or air-transported troops, still another dimension is added to the Mongols' method of warfare.

It is easy to see how the Mongol method relates to the modern battlefield. The need for mobility, the coordinated, rapid concentration for a violent strike and a rapid dispersal are well accepted. The employment of rapidly moving, deeply penetrating or flanking forces is also accepted. Two of the leading exponents of mobile warfare in World War II—German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and American General George S. Patton—were both well-read students and admirers of the great Mongol commander, Subotai.

Bow and arrow, signal flags and the Mongol horse and rider belong to another century. But the operational concepts—initiative, depth, agility and synchronization—are ageless qualities. Superiority in the use of these operational concepts enabled Genghis Khan's 13th-century Mongol army to defeat every nation that stood in its path. In doing so, it became the first successful practitioner of the modern AirLand Battle doctrine.

NOTES

1 Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Department of the Army, Washington, D C 20 August 1982 p 21
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4 Ibid
5 Dupuy op cit, p 342
7 James Chambers, The Devil's Horsemen, Atheneum Publishers, N Y, 1979, p 96
8 Dupuy op cit, p 21
9 Basil H Liddell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled, Little, Brown & Co Boston, Mass 1927, p 3
10 Judson J Conner, Genghis Khan, Emperor of Men, Master of Mobility, Armor, March—April 1964, p 47
11 Liddell Hart op cit, p 16
12 Ibid, p 15
13 Chambers op cit, p 66
14 Liddell Hart op cit, p 33

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Militarism in Russia: From Imperial Roots to the Soviet Union

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The communism of Karl Marx and Vladimir I. Lenin describes a classless society. According to this article, however, the military forces of the Soviet Union enjoy a special place in Soviet society. This has partially evolved due to historical tradition and heritage.
Russian monarchs traditionally considered the military, that is, the army, the closest to their heart among all branches of the administration. It is precisely there they considered themselves the most competent and consequently interfered in all spheres of its life.

P. A. Zayonchkovskiy

The predilection for the military that pervaded the Romanov emperors of Imperial Russia signified an attitude of mind and pattern of conduct that characterized the personality of their reigns. Although the military tradition in Russia reaches back to conflicts with the Mongol invaders, the predominance of the military organization can be personified by the militaristic style of the 19th-century Russian czars. The tradition of militarism during this period can be viewed as an important influence on the success of Bolshevism and the proliferation of the Soviet state. Even today the military holds special status in the Soviet Union.

To understand the impact of militarism on Russia during this era, one must recognize its distinctive nature. Militarism must not be viewed as an ability to wage war or engage in aspects of warfighting. It goes beyond the military rationale for armies to conduct war and enters into the aura of the military mystique—the culture and authority of an army within the society. Alfred Vagts says that two distinct aspects exist in the use of men and material by an army—the military way and the militaristic way. He also says this distinction is fundamental and fateful:

The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It is limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential qualities.

Militarism presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions and thoughts associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. Indeed, militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the purposes of the military way. Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts. Rejecting the scientific character of the military way, militarism displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief.

In establishing the distinction between the military way and militarism, Vagts has described two forces coexisting in a state. The former becomes a tool of the state, and the latter becomes a personality of the state. The militaristic personality can become so pervasive that, in effect, it dominates civilian society. Emphasis is then placed on the military spirit and values to the detriment of the people's welfare and culture. The resources of the state become coveted in a nonproductive utilization of the military, not for the conduct and preparation for war but to satisfy peacetime desires of the ruling class under the auspices of tradition.

A Russian grand duke expressed this idea when he remarked that he hated war "because it spoils the armies." In fact, the militaristic approach has spoiled armies and invariably has detrimental effects on a state's ability to conduct war. The pursuit of war militaristically and not militarily is not in consonance with the pursuit of a military victory. Campaigns based solely upon the glorification of the leaders and traditions of the army greatly reduce their strength and effectiveness in battle.

Thus, it is in times of peace that militarism takes hold and flourishes. It is not
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pacifism, nor is it bellicosity. It covers every system of thinking and valuing which ranks military institutions. It carries military mentality and modes of acting and decision into the civilian sphere.¹

The Romantic Age set the stage for the ushering in of militarism on a mass scale. The glory of "romance" was overtaking the drab realities of war, and the historic events of the time assumed poetic dimensions. The military profession was elevated to a position of high social stature and moral value. Armies became employed in ceremomial functions and as instruments of monarchs. The military developed as a source of identity, inspiration and structure for all of society. The prolonged existence of army militarism became guaranteed in part by the rise of civilian militarism as Vagts explains:

... civilan militarism, which sees in armies the embodiment of certain, usually conservative, desires of its own: the desire for survival, at least impersonally, and security; the desire for discipline and command, for employs not immediately concerned with material profit, and the corresponding forms of organization—a hierarchy, coupled with the desire for comradeship. Moreover, where the hope for individual happiness becomes dubious to great numbers, where they become tired of peace and comfort, or of living safely in poverty, where their place in society seems wrong and private endeavor to lead nowhere, where the party strife seems senseless and literary production anarchic, then life with and within military bodies appears to offer a desirable pattern, at least for a time.²

In the 16th century, with the development of Russia as a great military empire, a confluence of the military and civilian sectors into a state of monarchial militarism appeared in the person of the autocrat—one who subjected Russian society to a rigid hierarchy of command. The degree of control and influence exercised by these rulers, albeit firmly entrenched in militaristic tendencies, was quite impressive considering the backwardness of the culture and economy.

Militarism and the Romanovs (1796-1855)

It is significant to note that, perhaps due to the long history of a militarized Russian society, it becomes difficult to identify a specific military influence in Russian government. The army had always been an obedient instrument of the ruler, and the relationships of Russians to each other were essentially those of mili-
tary command and obedience. The authority of the czar was never challenged. Noble status in Russia held a different connotation than in other parts of Europe. As Peter the Great had done, Nicholas I allowed anyone in the czar's service to acquire noble status. However, higher ranks of service such as colonel and above were reserved for those of hereditary nobility.

Although the Russian nobility obtained social privilege and vast powers over their serfs, they were not a politically active social stratum. Obedience to the autocracy was more important to the Russian officers than the status of nobility in the society. Even during the 18th century and repeated palace uprisings, the military leaders were not anxious to seize power for themselves nor to put forward constitutional demands. They acted solely to replace a weak monarch, not to reject the principle of autocracy. In the 19th century, the army continued to be the securing force of the autocracy inextricably fused with the style of the czars.

The influence of the military on the Romanov czars was quite unique. They developed a preoccupation with the regalia and minutia of military life that could be translated as an obsession with the "paraphernalia of soldiering." This obsession seemingly appears to transcend the educational process to one characteristically hereditary in nature. In quoting Richard Wortman's writings of the 19th-century czars, John Keep noted that:

The emperor appeared above all as an embodiment of military power. He was an officer with the appropriate tastes, values and mannerisms. The primacy of the military would be emphasized throughout the childhood and youth of the heir. . . . He watched his father and uncles participate in endless parades, wear military uniforms and speak of military exploits and plans. . . . For the heir to be a man was to be martial.

The militaristic atmosphere in which the Romanovs grew up was personified by Paul I (1796-1801) in that all grand dukes were automatically given command of a guards regiment. At age three, Nicholas donned the uniform of the Horse Guards—a unit of which he was later to receive command. His brothers Alexander I and Constantine received the Semenovsky and Izmaylovsky foot guards respectively. Additionally, all grand dukes received designated medals upon baptism.

Militaristic values had been instilled in Paul prior to his assumption of the throne that significantly influenced the character of his reign. His mother, Catherine II, gave him the town of Gatchina in 1783 to celebrate his daughter's birth. Paul viewed it as a miniempire and tested his ideas about the military while commanding his Gatchina soldiers. Sadly, it was the Prussian Baron Steinwehr (thoroughly schooled in the parade ground techniques of Frederick the Great's army) who taught him how to command.

Paul's confidence in these techniques, though outdated and concentrated on parade drill and Prussian discipline, formed the basis of his approach to the military as well as organizational structure when he assumed the crown. His coronation, reflecting his militaristic style,
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appeared more as a change-of-command ceremony than a regal assumption of the throne. The trivia of parade drill—from uniforms to formation size to parade step—influenced every Romanov ruler to follow.

Paul's accession to the throne had opened the way for the imposition of a new military order in Russia. He remodeled the army in the Prussian style he had learned at Gatchina. It was a step backward in the progression of the military art in Russia. He reduced the army's strength and incorporated Prussian tactics and training by reintroducing linear formations with obsessive reliance on the manual of arms and dismounted drill. Minor infractions of his regulations, particularly on the parade ground, were punishable by arrest and, on occasion, exile.

Alexander (1801-25) had been schooled in the Gatchina spirit as well. On parade, he was known to have personally checked the men's socks for regulation height and, in 1816, had three colonels of the Semenovsky Guards Regiment put under arrest because their men were out of step.

Nicholas (1825-55) exhibited the same militaristic tendencies and passion for the legacies of Gatchina as his forebears. When he was 21, Nicholas had undertaken an inspection tour of the provinces. Almost all the notes he made pertained solely to the externals of military service—clothing, bearing, marching, and so forth. They did not touch any essential aspect of military organization, administration or morale. Nicholas developed a military style that stressed unthinking obedience and basics of drill rather than a system of training in tactics and maneuver. This produced ineffective commanders who were ill-prepared for war.

The Romanovs had, in effect, prepared their armies in areas least likely to affect battlefield performance. Keep explains their style in cogent terms:

They valued traditional forms for their own sake and insisted pedantically on absolute adherence to orders as if this alone could ensure efficiency. To such leaders the best proof of a unit's soundness was its precision and elegance on the parade ground.

At the time a distinction was drawn between maneuvers and exercises. The tendency was toward the latter, which took less account of natural landscape features and did not involve any attempt to simulate battlefield performance. In conventional drill neither officers nor NCO's were expected to display any initiative: The whole object was to keep to predetermined positions and to obey commands unthinkingly.

The profound effect the "military heritage" had on the Romanovs extended to the bureaucracy. Paul's militarization of the bureaucracy included appointing military governors in certain cities. Many civilian postings during his reign were simply facades since those jobs were held by army officers under a civilian title. He governed with a rigid, tyrannical hand. He filtered this attitude down to his governors who, out of fear of reprisals, exercised their powers in a police-like fashion. Alexander tried to avoid the tyrannical excesses of his father by granting certain latitudes and concessions to his officers. However, not much is in evidence of gov-
ernmental reform. In fact, the military continued to exercise a strong presence in local government which may be due in part to the wartime environment.

Nicholas' army became his favorite agency. He surrounded himself with military men, staffing most of his ministries with generals. In the 1840s, military men held 10 of the 13 ministerial positions. There is reason to believe that Nicholas would have filled the ministries of justice, education and foreign affairs with generals if he had had any qualified. The army also performed many tasks that, in other countries, the police or civilian officials performed. For example, 180,000 of the army formed the Internal Defense Force (old soldiers unfit for regular duty) garrisoned in cities all over Russia. They guarded banks and state institutions, including prisons. Nicholas further instilled his militaristic values by tightening regulations requiring civilian officials to wear uniforms.

Nicholas developed a military style that stressed unthinking obedience and basics of drill rather than a system of training in tactics and maneuver. This produced ineffective commanders who were ill-prepared for war.

Military justice and the lack of any substantial legislative reform, particularly under Alexander, generally followed precedents that had been established within the empire as in the mitigation of sentences for lesser offenses. However, in many instances, Nicholas followed his father's practice of increasing penalties to seemingly severe levels upon review. Crimes of desertion and cruelty by an officer toward his men fell into this category. Nicholas performed as a true autocrat without regard to precedent or current legislation in cases such as these. The autocratic powers exercised by the Romanovs as the final reviewer of court cases severely limited the development of a modern judicial system in Russia.

Although the concept of militarism was not unique to Russia during this period, that exhibited by the Romanovs was unique. It permeated all of Russian society, and its effect reached into the early 20th century. It helps to explain why, in 1915, Nicholas II felt it was his duty to assume the office of supreme commander in chief—an act which spelled the doom of the monarchy and the empire.

**Militarism in the Soviet Union**

As a caveat to any discussion of militarism in the Soviet Union and its historical heritage, it is important, if not crucial, to identify the Soviets' ideological repudia-
tion of militarism in their society. They attribute militarism as a social entity, with the emergence of a class society and the appearance of the exploiting class. As such it becomes a tool of the ruling class to preserve its rule:

The militarized state-apparatus is the weapon of the whole monopoly bourgeoisie. Although it is only a small group of monopoly capitalists that is deriving direct benefit from militarization, the scale and scope of militarization, the state arms programme and military policy are dictated by the political and military strategy interests of the whole of monopoly capital.

According to the Soviets, the proclivity of a militaristic policy is rooted in capitalism. This does not necessarily deny the existence of militarism in Soviet history, for it helps explain the evolution to the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the Soviet state. However, it does deny the existence of militarism in the Soviet-viewed “classless society” and appears to be a semantic interpretation.

Historically, the traditions and values of Russia were always militarized, and the military organization of society complemented the entrance of the militarized Bolsheviks. According to Dimitri K. Simes, this military tradition inherited from the days of the empire never completely died out in the Soviet Union. As the communist regime matured, the presence of the historical Russian personality became more and more apparent behind the facade of the Marxist-Leninist system. Vladimir I. Lenin intensified the militant element in the socialist doctrine—perceiving all human relations in terms of confrontations of life-or-death struggle. Marxist theory was also replete with an attitude of violence and coercion in dealing with the human dimension.

Out of necessity, the Bolsheviks had to rely extensively on military commanders from the old regime to fight and lead the revolutionary forces. However, they were treated with suspicion by the Bolsheviks, causing the creation of political commissars assigned to military units to act as watchdogs over the professional officers. This position remained in the Soviet military structure in one form or another until abolished in October 1942 by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This resulted in unparalleled control by the military elite over the professional activity for the armed forces.

The role of the military expanded continuously during the early years of the communist state. The Russian Civil War had demonstrated the need to mobilize the resources of the country to wage war. This was projected into the long-term struggle against international capitalism. Lenin never thought the defeat of capitalism was possible without actual war—thus his rationalization for maintaining a vast military establishment at a time when other countries were demobilizing. This provides the backdrop for Soviet ideology in that conflict is unavoidable between the communist and bourgeois governments and that proletariat existence must be assured—assured by the existence of a...
. . . the traditions and values of Russia were always militarized, and the military organization of society complemented the entrance of the militarized Bolsheviks. According to Dimitri K. Simes, this military tradition inherited from the days of the empire never completely died out in the Soviet Union.

strong military establishment.

This belief goes to the heart of the Soviet Union's organization of its society. Whether disavowed or not, it is a militaristic society permeating the economic, social and political strata. Fundamental to Marxist-Leninist doctrine is the importance attached to the economy as a military resource. The Soviets view the unacceptance of this idea as a major failing of Imperial Russia. To achieve victory, industrial productivity must be subordinated to military considerations. As a result, the consumer is called upon to sacrifice in the interest of military requirements.

Richard Pipes describes this rather succinctly by stating that militarism is not a byproduct of industrialism in the Soviet Union. Rather, industrialism is a byproduct of militarism. This has placed a significant burden on the Soviet economy. From 1965 to 1978, military expenditures absorbed between 11 and 13 percent of the Soviet Union's gross national product.

The social element in the ingredients for victory approaches the importance tied to the militarization of industry. The Soviet regime goes to great lengths to keep the memory of the Great Patriotic War alive among the people. Pipes implies that the regime's political appeal depends heavily on war experience, further encouraging Soviet militarism:

Embedded in Marxism-Leninism and strengthened by the memory of World War II, contemporary military doctrine places
Soviet society is inundated with militaristic influences. The visibility of the military, the steady stream of militaristic propaganda and the pervasiveness of military training in the educational system are a matter of daily routine to the Soviet citizen. Civil defense programs in all factories and farms add to militaristic indoctrination and reinforce the constant need to defend against the capitalist military threat. Millions of Soviet citizens have joined DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation With the Army, Air Force and Navy). There, they train in numerous military occupational specialties as well as participate in military-oriented athletic activities. Through this organization, they gain a greater exposure to military skills and values.

The military holds a special status in Soviet society. Its prestige, power and independence smash the myth of a classless society. Civilians are virtually excluded from the military’s workings. All jobs of importance, including those in the Ministry of Defense, are held by military officers. The military is also represented in the Politburo. It is the primary influence on political matters that deal with military functions and interests. However, its influence goes beyond matters that are solely of concern to the armed forces. It reaches into the political arenas of foreign and domestic policymaking, invariably becoming the implementing arm of political decisions.

The increased military influence in Soviet politics is directly linked to the political leader’s desire to be identified with the military. Most have spent their careers in the military-industrial complex, rising through the government and
party hierarchy with dual military and political affiliations. Even official Soviet dialogue reflects the strong association with the military and militaristic influences.

The concept of militarism, as defined in the West, is significantly apparent in the Soviet Union. It reaches to the very fabric of its society and elevates the military to an elite class in contradiction to the professions of a classless Marxist-Leninist ideology. The militaristic way has historically dominated Russian life and policies, and any advocacy to change it will be confronted with resistance based in the Imperial Russian past and the Soviet Union's present. It will remain an important factor in shaping the policies of the Soviet regime. The militaristic influence permeates the Soviet Union today just as it did under the Romanovs in Imperial Russia. What makes current Soviet militarism more dangerous than the Romanov style is that the Soviets have attempted to bridge the gap between the scientific and unscientific, the limited and unlimited, the efficient and inefficient to further one idea—total victory at home and abroad.

NOTES

3. ibid. p 16
4. ibid. p 22
9. ibid. p 68
10. ibid. p 68
12. ibid. p 881
13. Keep op. cit. p 79
15. Simes op. cit. p 130
17. Simes. op. cit. p 131
18. Pipes op. cit. p 5
19. ibid. p 6
20. Simes. op. cit. p 142
21. Pipes. op. cit. p 9
22. Simes op. cit. p 140
23. ibid. p 143
Forced March: Armor
WHAT began as a five-day probe into a gap in the enemy's defenses ended as an unqualified victory: 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanks, 300 guns and materiel beyond counting. The sharp armor/infantry probe through the gap in the line of desert forts quickly became an almost unopposed surge that led to the collapse of an entire army, the long-range pursuit of that army and its final demise. What made the victory so encompassing was an unprecedented flanking move across physically hostile terrain without adequate logistical support.

That move trapped and destroyed an army, and one of its generals told his captors, "You were here too soon." That was the point of the whole thing. Operation Compass buoyed the victor's hopes, dashed the vanquished's élan and ardor, and opened wide the door to total victory. The enemy's morale was shattered, and the vainglorious rantings of his pompous leader were proven worthless.

But a new and not unknown foe soon appeared. He turned the tables, won back all the lost territory and began a campaign that was to bring him immense personal fame and glory—and final defeat.

The 130-mile stab through unknown and brutally tough terrain deserves a closer look. It epitomizes what we today call the deep thrust—a hard, fast stab into the enemy's vitals and, based on calculated risks, a movement that has equal chances of success or failure. If successful, the thrust can wreak havoc throughout the enemy's rear and decimate his fighting and support forces.

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So it was in the winter of 1940-41 in the deserts of North Africa when Lieutenant General Richard O'Connor, commander of the Western Desert Force, sent his troops literally into the blue with the curt order, "Get to the coast." They did that—90 minutes ahead of the enemy. The trap slammed shut and, two months later, Rommel slammed it right back open.

The Italian Tenth Army, under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, commander in chief, Libya, began a 60-mile advance into Egypt on 13 September 1940. It met cursory resistance from the Western Desert Force, composed of the 7th Armored Division (understrength in men and tanks), and the 4th Indian (motorized) Infantry Division and their support elements.

On 16 September, the Italians halted at Sidi Barrani on the coast. They built a chain of fortified strongpoints south into the desert for some 40 miles. But there was a 15-mile gap between two of these forts that O'Connor exploited. He seized Sidi Barrani and began the 500-mile chase that led to the debacle and ruin of the Italian Tenth Army at Beda Fomm. The British recaptured the important ports of Bardiyah and Tobruk and kept after the Italians, nonstop. At Bardiyah, they gathered 40,000 prisoners, 462 artillery tubes, 127 tanks and about 700 trucks. At Tobruk, they took another 25,000 prisoners and a "mountain of supplies." The individual bravery of the hundreds of Italian soldiers who fought to the death was overcome by the speed and force of O'Connor's drive west along the coast.
road. After the fall of Tobruk, O'Connor split his forces, sending the 6th Australian Infantry Division along the coast road and the 7th Armored Division inland to Al-Mechili, south of Derna. Al-Mechili was an Italian strongpoint with a combined arms force of infantry, artillery and some 70 tanks.

O'Connor planned to eliminate the Italian force at Al-Mechili and then turn the 7th Armored Division north to assist in the capture of strongly held Derna on the coast. The Italians, however, evacuated Al-Mechili and went north into the Jebel Akhdar, the Green Mountains, a fertile region separating the coastal plain from the desert to the south. The Italian maneuver angered O'Connor. He ordered Major General Sir Michael O'Moore Creagh, 7th Armored Division commander, to push west at all speed across the desert and cut off the Italian escape route on the coastal road.

What follows is a classic armor movement with worn-out equipment, across terrible terrain as fast as possible and a just-in-the-nick-of-time deployment to bring the enemy to battle.

The Australians, limping along the coast road in pursuit of the retreating Italians, were using mostly captured vehicles running on captured gasoline. They were a rag tag army, more akin to that famous description of Washington's Colonial Army—"A rag, a hair, a hunk of bone"—than a part of the tradition and dress-proud imperial forces.

The 7th Armored Division was not in much better shape, but O'Connor, furious at the Italian's escape from Al-Mechili, told Creagh, "You are going to cut the coast road south of Benghazi, and you are going now, repeat now!" And the 7th went, with the 11th Hussars, an armored car regiment under Colonel John Combe, leading the way. They left at daybreak, 4 February, with 50 cruiser tanks and 80 light tanks. The cruisers were armed with 2-pounder (40mm) main guns and a rifle-caliber machinegun. The light tanks had only a pair of machineguns. They
headed into territory so bad the Italians took it to be impassable.  

The 1940-style deep strike force took off with full fuel tanks and a basic load of food and ammunition—period. A truck convoy would follow with two day’s supply of food, water and gasoline and two refills of ammunition. There was no hope of any further supplies. And, if that force did manage to meet up with the enemy, it would find a well-armed and desperate army.

There was 130 miles of rough desert terrain ahead of the 7th Armored Division, but it was buoyed by its previous spectacular victories over the Italians and pushed on. The vehicle wastage was horrific. The tanks, already worn out from desert fighting, broke down with steady frequency. If they could not be repaired with cannibalized parts on the spot, they were abandoned, stripped of everything usable and drained of every drop of fuel. The crews then climbed onto the nearest vehicle and pressed on:

*Men were jammed cheek by jowl in tracks and trucks as they bounced and hammered their way over rocky, bone-jarring ground. They were harried by blinding rain and vomiting from sheer fatigue.*

The trucks were packed to capacity, and the usually scheduled stops for food and sleep were cut in half. “Get to the coast,” was the order. The word had been passed to all ranks, “The code word is ‘Gallop.’”

Cold, bitter wind blew in their faces, and a full-blown storm sprang up. Rain? In the desert? Most assuredly. This was midwinter in North Africa, and that is a bitter season.

Navigating by hand compass and standing up in their trucks to see, the officers nearly froze to death as the long lines of tanks, armored cars, Bren gun carriers, trucks, guns and ambulances ground relentlessly on. For miles and miles across the terrible terrain that even the Bedouin seldom crossed, their speed rarely rose above 5 or 6 miles per hour. But they made it.

O’Connor, following in a staff car, was appalled at the number of abandoned vehicles. He turned to Major General Eric E. Dorman-Smith from General Archibald
P. Wavell's headquarters in Cairo and said, "My God, do you think it's going to be all right?"15

After some 50 miles of bitterly rugged cross-country driving, the 7th finally reached smoother ground. But another plague came to the division—dust. The dust was so dense that parts of the column became lost and only rejoined hours later.16

By 1500 on 4 February, the 11th Hussars entered Msus, still about 60 miles short of the coast road. The bone-tired crewmen all but fell out of their vehicles, but they pulled what maintenance they could. Tracks, tires, wheels and running gear were in terrible condition. But, as tired as they were, the crews still hoped to trap the Italians whom, with the Australians driving them from the rear, they hoped to destroy.

That evening, Creagh, in consultation with Brigadier John Harding (O'Connor's general staff), decided to split the British force. He sent Combe and his armored cars southwest to Antelat, a distance of some 28 miles, and the other part of the force to Soluch.

At 0700 on 5 February, Combe Force was on the move, and air reconnaissance showed the coast road was packed with Italian transports fleeing Benghazi. O'Connor left early that day in his staff car with one armored car and one staff car as escorts. The armored car and the staff car broke down, and O'Connor pressed on, now completely out of touch with his forces. When he finally reached 7th Armored Division Headquarters, Creagh had some good news for him. Combe had entered Antelat at 1034 and, finding it deserted, immediately sent his armored cars on to Beda Fomm and Sidi Saleh. By 1200, the armored cars, along with three batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery, had reached the coast road and blocked it.

One-half hour later, the first convoy of Italian trucks appeared, and the Royal Horse Artillery opened fire. The annihilation battle of Beda Fomm had begun.17

Combe Force totaled perhaps 2,000 men, the armored cars and three batteries of field artillery. The remnants of the Italian Tenth Army—some 20,000 men, 130 tanks, 300 guns and thousands of vehicles—wanted to get through.18 There was no armor support for Combe Force. Afraid that the Italians would get past him before the 7th could arrive, Combe put his force across the coast road and prepared to fight. The fighting was bitter, prolonged and all-out. The Italians desperately wanted to break through the thin British crust, and the British were equally determined to prevent them from doing so.

Time and again, the Italian tanks charged en masse, but each assault was driven back with great loss. The thinly armored (30mm frontal armor) and lightly gunned (one 47mm gun and one 8mm machinegun) M13/40 tanks were no match for the British antitank guns. Nor could they survive the 25-pounder field guns firing over open sights at them. The Italians at Beda Fomm fared exactly as the British did later at Halfaya Pass when their Matilda tanks met the Germans' 88mm antitank guns—ruination.

Combe Force battled valiantly against
the masses of Italians, but it was only a question of time until the enemy would break through. Where were the tanks? Infantry and field artillery cannot continually fight armor, not even relatively ineffectual armor, and hope to win. They desperately needed the 7th Armored Division.

And, like the cavalry in the movies, the 7th appeared—to the left and rear of the massed Italians. The fighting became a shambles as constant Italian breakthrough attempts, spearheaded by tanks, were beaten back. It went on for a day and a half in intermittent rain and through a bitterly cold night. At dawn on 7 February, the Italians mounted a 30-tank charge down the coast road and were stopped when British artillery brought down fire on the melee—British and Italians mingled. White flags then began to appear.20

Fifteen miles of wrecked and destroyed tanks and vehicles of all kinds and an additional 25,000 prisoners fell into British hands. They had wiped out an entire army and were justifiably jubilant.

But O'Connor had won too quickly and too decisively. If his stunning victory had come four months later, all of Germany's military strength would have been committed to the Soviet Campaign. As it was, Major General Enno von Rintelen, German military attache in Rome, was able to tell Benito Mussolini on 9 February that a panzer division and a light mechanized division were being sent to Tripoli. Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel would be in command—and the whole character of the war in North Africa would change.21

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 111
4 Ibid.
6 Sears, op cit., p. 20
8 Ibid
9 Barnett, op cit, p. 49
10 Ibid., p. 51
11 Collier, op cit
12 Moorehead, op cit
13 Collier, op cit
14 Moorehead, op cit, p. 110
15 Barnett, op cit, p. 53
16 Ibid
17 Ibid., p. 54
18 Moorehead, op cit, p. 111
19 Collier, op cit
21 Collier, op cit., p. 33

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The armies of World War II are studied by military professionals and amateur military history buffs alike. Probably the most studied army, and the one most cited as a role model for efficiency and effectiveness, is the German Wehrmacht. Blitzkrieg, Auftragstaktik and Schwerpunkt are only a few of the concepts that have been examined and offered as innovations worth emulating. Was the Wehrmacht really that good?

On the
Wehrmacht Mystique

Roger A. Beaumont
SINCE 1945, except for brief intervals in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Western Europe has been the main focus of US Army doctrine and resources. In view of 40 years of cohabitation, it is not surprising that German forms and concepts have grown in their influence on the US military system. Thus, the persistence of the Wehrmacht as a model for study and doctrinal support is a matter worth examining closely.

The image of German military prowess and unique efficiency, widely accepted in the United States, is not new. In the late 19th century, the Germans entered markets long dominated by other powers, and their sales pitch was based on those images. Their victory over France in 1870 had widespread effects. A view of Teutonic thoroughness was visible in the Wilhelminian Empire, under the Weimar Republic in the Nazi era, and in the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle of recovery after World War II.

Running parallel to it was an image of German ruthlessness. This arose from 19th-century master race theories, in the German colonies in the early 19th century and in the Schrecklichkeit (frightfulness) which the Allies' propaganda mills made much of in World War I. Nazi propaganda built substantially on such images, projecting a facade of industrial and military power, efficiency and ruthlessness well beyond actual levels of strength. This served to weaken the will of the enemies of the Third Reich before and during World War II.

From 1945 to 1948, Germany suffered major privation. Fuel, food and amenities were scarce but were somewhat more accessible to those closely linked with the conquerors. Thus, well before the Cold War plunged to freezing after the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, many bonds between Germans and Western occupation forces had been forged. Wehrmacht veterans served the Allies as border guards, technicians, intelligence agents, administrators, professionals and laborers. The US Army paid Wehrmacht officers to write monographs, as the Air Force did later on. The US space program developed around V2 rockets and German technicians gathered by the Army. At the same time, B. H. Liddell Hart, the British military writer, was interviewing German officers in British custody. After 1948, denazification and the Nuremberg trials were shelved as West Germany became the bastion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Many Allied troops came to admire the Germans as they cleaned up war wreckage and rebuilt their economy. Bonds of friendship, sport and amusement allowed Germans to present their views on the war in social settings. Many occupiers, however, did not realize how little support there was in West Germany for rearmament. In the early 1950s, the Bundeswehr grew more slowly than expected—but it grew.

Meanwhile, World War II was being refought in print. Memoirs by German commanders such as Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Hans Speidel and
Albert Kesselring and works by Western writers as well—Liddell Hart, J. F. C. Fuller and Chester Wilmot—criticized Allied performance. Disclosures of intelligence errors before Pearl Harbor, anti-Roosevelt historiography and S. L. A. The Nazi victories in 1939-40, however, proved to be more image than substance. While the numbers of forces overcome were great; the vanquished were not effectively allied. . . . Neutrality and appeasement had major political support in each country on the target list.

Marshall’s studies showing weak US infantry battle participation added to the sense of malaise, as did inter-Allied recriminations and the Strategic Bombing Surveys.  

Although significantly distracted in Korea and Vietnam, each time the US Army returned to its favorite scenario—conventional war in Europe. The power of the Wehrmacht mystique is evident in adjectives used in recent military analyses—for example, the German restructuring of defenses after France’s collapse in 1944 deemed "near miraculous," while a retired US general viewed Erwin Rommel’s Infanterie Greift An (Infantry Attacks) as "awesome." A Department of Defense monograph praised German doctrine while suggesting US doctrine was inappropriate in NATO defense. In discussing AirLand Battle doctrine in the spring of 1984, a West Point cadet wrote in Military Review:

To understand the philosophy behind our new doctrine, we must search for its apparent antecedents. A study of military history reveals that the doctrine employed by the German army from 1917 to 1945 and its underlying philosophy bears a strong resemblance to what we are trying to instill in ourselves today.  

We are all familiar with the superb record of tactical and operational success the Germans enjoyed from the routing of the Italians at Caporetto in 1917, through the spectacular Western Front offensives of 1918, to the dazzling days of the blitzkrieg in 1939-41.

It should also be noted that very few West German works criticizing the German-Nazi military tradition were published in Great Britain or the United States. A positive view of German military models was also presented by Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations and Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz’s "Cohesion and Disintegration in the German Wehrmacht in World War II."  

Huntington argued that the German officer corps had no political yearnings before Adolf Hitler. Judged by soldierly standards, "they [German officers] come off well." and US officers "could do far worse than resurrect the tradition of [Gerhard von] Scharnhorst and [Karl von] Clausewitz" whose views are in opposition to those of some historians of the German army.  

Shils and Janowitz’s article, based on interviews of German prisoners of war, has often been invoked in post-Vietnam critiques to suggest that small-group cohesion outweighed Nazi indoctrination in keeping German troops fighting beyond hope. While many senior commanders rejected Marshall’s claims of poor US infantry combat performance, it led to a "buddy" system and more crew-served weapons before the Korean War. After US troops’ performance in combat and as prisoners of war became a matter of public
debate in the mid-1960s, a major attempt to establish unit integrity close to perceptions of superior European models was made.

In the wake of Vietnam, a wide-ranging search for nostrums led to the oversimplification of Shils and Janowitz's article, leaving its complexities and sophistication far behind. Shils and Janowitz did not discount Nazism's motivational power since their data were drawn from prisoners facing defeat. While being seen as a Nazi was something to be avoided, after the war, some German officers saw National Socialist training as a source of initiative. Cross-links between the military and Nazism were extensive and, from late 1943, the Wehrmacht had Nazi commissars, the NSFO (National Socialist Leadership Officers).

After an attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944 failed, Heinrich Himmler, chief of the Gestapo/SS (state secret police/elite guard), became commander of the Ersatz Armee as the SS screened officers and took over the V2 rocket program. Army generals, including Karl von Rundstedt and Guderian, sat on honor courts that punished plotters. German troops, moreover, fought on after unit cohesion and integrity were lost ideals, and individuals were assigned as fillers to ad hoc combat groups. The driving forces of fear of retribution and atrocity and defense of one's own homeland obviously had some effect in stiffening resistance, but an effect not easily measured.

Nevertheless, a pristine and professional view of the Wehrmacht mystique developed, even as links between German militarism and Nazism remained a matter of concern in the Federal Republic of Germany (GE). The GE, as an open society, also faced the special problem of both crypto-Nazi para-Nazi movements and Waffen-SS veterans. While such elements did not become politically powerful in the GE, admiration for Nazism did not die out in Germany or in the world at large. Neofascism has grown on the fringes of European politics, drawing on working-class racism and the alienation of youth, visible in some forms of "punk" style, and Nazi symbols have appeared as an index of psychopathology.

The endurance of the Wehrmacht mystique raises several questions: If they were so good, why did they lose? Were the odds just too great? If they were so smart, after losing once, why did they try again? How good were they, relative to an objective scale? The frequent reliance on the Wehrmacht's performance as a hallmark of excellence overlooks that, in many respects, Nazi propaganda successfully masked rickety underpinnings.
Nor was the Wehrmacht outside or wholly free of links to the Nazi regime. It was recruited out of a society that was, in the six years before the war, heavily permeated by Nazism. Many went along to get along, but the steady reshaping of German culture could not be avoided any more than Soviets could avoid the imprint of Joseph V. Stalin, or the Chinese, Mao Tse-tung. That fusion, although resisted by many, was a central fact. Senior officers, the Reichswehr and elements seeking rearmament helped weaken the republic in the early 1930s and maneuver Hitler into power. Hitler then bent them to his will—against varying degrees of resistance.

The harshness of the Versailles Treaty had hardened the hearts of many Germans who sought revenge. The German military quickly claimed a "stab in the back"—the home front had let the army down by revolting in October 1918. Many non-German politicians, historians, journalists and diplomats accepted that view, and the appeasement by Great Britain and France in the 1930s and US isolationism gave fascist dictators a special advantage.

The legends of a stab in the back and an unfair peace settlement overlooked the harsh peace agreements imposed by the Germans on France in 1871, on Romania in 1916 and on Bolshevik Russia in 1918. The militarists successfully pushed burdens of guilt for a war they started and promised a victory in up to the final hours onto German politicians who opposed the war and policies like unrestricted U-boat warfare. The Weimar Republic and democratic government were thus flawed from the outset, and rearmament was linked with national honor in the eyes of many Germans.

The Nazis were but one of many political and social subgroups which revered and used the military traditions and values that ran back to the origins of the Prussian state in the 17th century. Prussia, a nation built around an army, grew steadily and survived many defeats. In 1815, after throwing off Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation, it shared in the victory at Waterloo. In 1870, Prussia led in the smashing of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's Second Empire as a unified Germany came under the Prussian royal house of Hohenzollern. Up to 1914, mastery of the techniques of offensive warfare, coupled with nationalist propaganda and diplomatic subterfuge, had paid great dividends. After 1918, Germany still sought reward from war and, from 1939 to 1942, it seemed that it might pull it off.

The Nazi victories in 1939-40, however, proved to be more image than substance. While the numbers of forces overcome were great, the vanquished were not effectively allied. Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway rejected liaison with Great Britain and France—whose own rapport was less than ideal. Neutrality and appeasement had major political support in each country on the target list. Great Britain, under a "10-year rule" on armaments from 1920 to 1938, scrambled to
catch up with German rearmament after the humiliation of Munich. In the first two years of World War II, most armies defeated by the Nazis were second or third rate. France’s forces included many first-rate units, but equipment, doctrine, organization and morale were unevenly orchestrated. The British Expeditionary Force was small and weak in armor.

Germany’s blitzkrieg victories of 1939-41 were close to home. Most of the victims were within medium bomber range of Grossdeutschland, and seven were on its borders. A main defect in the German military system was revealed in 1940 when the Wehrmacht could not move quickly to invade Great Britain after France fell. Weak interservice cooperation, a lack of contingency plans and an air force designed to support the army in a short war undercut Operation Sea Lion. However great its skill in some areas, amphibious operations were beyond the Wehrmacht’s reach throughout the war.

The Wehrmacht’s involvement in major campaigns before the attack on the USSR in June 1941 had been about three and one-half weeks in Poland, about two and one-half months in the spring of 1940 and six months in the Balkans. Only the 1940 campaign in France, the Netherlands and Belgium came close to the scale of operations in the east. The invasion of the USSR, moreover, was not designed to be the great prolonged close-hugging match of hundreds of divisions that developed. Hitler and many others saw the USSR as easy game. The purging of the Red Army’s upper ranks from the mid-1930s until the war’s beginning was followed by Soviet floundering in the Winter War with tiny Finland. Ultimately, German misestimates and Soviet ploys masked and distorted realities. Soviet tank strength was underrated, the state of highways was overrated, the great Ural industrial complex was a cipher and the Soviet capacity to generate reserves was underestimated.

Military professionals or students of war can hardly ignore that titanic struggle, but the problem is where to look. US analysts tend to focus on maneuvers of the kind they envision in their NATO defense role, with little attention paid to propaganda and psychological warfare. The Nazis, of course, did not invent propa-
ganda. But Germany is the land of Johannes Gutenberg where the poster and leaflet wars of the Reformation and Peasant Rebellion raged, and the Nazis arose in the wake of Allied success in discrediting Germany in World War I.

The Nazis' flair for shaping images carried over into the war. In the fall of 1939, a Nazi documentary of the blitzkrieg in Poland played in New York to audiences including Allied attaches. Nazi propaganda cut several ways, however. Images of power and ruthlessness frightened but also angered, and Hollywood director Frank Capra later used Axis films to show US troops what they were fighting. While images of mechanized force led the Allies to see Germany armed for total war, German industry did not go to full war production until 1943. Hitler hoped cheap victories and a high standard of living would keep the public from turning against the regime a la 1918. Whether full mobilization earlier in the war would have gained victory or generated major resistance to Hitler cannot be determined. In any case, it was not done, mainly because victory seemed just within reach to the Nazi leadership until mid-1943, two-thirds of the way through the war.

The Germans did not put the first jets into the air or lead in radar development. Nor were they ever ahead of the Allies in developing nuclear weapons. Their V2 program was developed from lines of investigation begun by an American, Dr. Robert H. Goddard. They also built on foreign developments in shaping the blitzkrieg, including tanks and dive bombers. After rejecting tanks as useful in World War I, many senior officers in the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht remained skeptical about them until after the war began. It is not clear how much a part the Reichswehr's secret training in the USSR during 1925-35 shaped the blitzkrieg, but architects of the panzer forces later testified to their reliance on British theories and exercises.23

The roots of the Stuka Junkers Ju-87 dive bomber lay in US Marine Corps developments in Nicaragua in the 1920s and subsequent refinement in the US Navy. The Stuka itself was a design derived from US Curtiss Hawk fighters shipped to Germany in the late 1920s by Ernst Udet, later the Luftwaffe's chief of development.24 The dive bomber concept retarded German heavy bomber design and development.25 Its early successes in Spain and the blitzkriegs of 1939-40 were eclipsed by heavy losses. When the results of resistance to long-range-level bomber development in the era of "Stukamania"26 became evident in 1941, Udet and another senior Luftwaffe dive bomber advocate committed suicide.27

How much Nazi military technology fell short of their enemies' perception became apparent only in stages. In the Battle of France in 1940, for example, the Western Allies had more and better tanks.28 The blitzkrieg was based on rapid advance against weak points, control by radios and bringing dive bombers to bear against
resistance before it could harden. Even today it is not generally realized that two-thirds of the German army marched. Throughout the war, its guns and transport were mainly horse-drawn.

It would be silly and unfair to suggest German troops did not fight very well, especially in infantry and armored combat. Yet, they had many problems, including difficulties with green troops early on. Armored design improved after early deficiencies but tended to trade off quantity in favor of quality. The Nazis also had a major geographic advantage. Since they did not have to put tanks on ships as the Allies did, they could develop larger models—but so could the Soviets. Their tank engine development, however, did not keep up with size, and it took two Tiger tanks to tow one. Armor experts generally view the Soviet T34 as the best all-around tank in World War II.

In the mid-1970s, a major Wehrmacht error was revealed in the disclosure of the Ultra secret. Higher headquarters had used radios and what were believed to be foolproof encryption-decryption devices to transmit messages until very late in the war, giving much vital information to the British. Only then did growing suspicion of interception lead to the use of other means of communication. The infantry lacked walkie-talkies at the small-unit level, putting the men at a growing disadvantage as the war progressed. This was mainly due to pressure on the electronics industry to provide systems to counter the bomber offensive.

The Wehrmacht lagged behind the Western Allies in several key areas of organization and coordination. German interservice rivalry was far worse than on the Allied side. For example, in the Battle of the Atlantic, where long-range bombers were critical, the Luftwaffe failed to provide even the small number that might have made a crucial difference in 1940 and failed to develop a successor to the structurally weak FW200 Condor. The Luftwaffe, most Nazified of Wehrmacht services, had its own firmament of gaffes. Command and control deficiencies in the 1940 campaign led to the bombing of Rotterdam and, a few days earlier, of a German city, Freiburg. Contrary to the widespread impression that Hitler ordered the bombing of London in August 1940 against the "best professional judgment" of air commanders, he was urged to do so by several of them.

As already noted, Nazi leaders, from June 1940 until the summer of 1943, expected to hold their gains and the Allies to grow weary of the war. In September 1941, Hitler ordered no military or naval research and development to continue which would not deliver a product to the forces within a year. This view caused Hans Jeschonnek, who later took his own life, to refuse the urgings of many that the Luftwaffe begin full-scale war training. He argued that the imminent victory over the USSR would free manpower and resources needed for such a task.

Another misjudgment was the abandoning of high-speed intrusion raids to
destroy US bombers over Great Britain as they returned to base. In September 1943, senior officers told Hitler that dive bombers sank the Roma when it had, in fact, been dispatched by a single FX1400 radio-controlled glide bomb.

The Luftwaffe, of course, did not have a monopoly on missteps. In 1943, also seeing victory just around the comer, the Navy used Duraluminum, critically scarce in the aircraft industry, to build insect-proof barracks frames for naval bases in the tropics when Germany regained its old colonies. Major malorganization also blunted aerial photography and interpretation. Although it had very high-quality aerial cameras and film, the Wehrmacht assigned interpretation to noncommissioned officers (NCOs), eschewing the use of stereoscopes and photogrammetry by officers, standard practice in the British and later the US forces. (Admirers of the Wehrmacht, however, have subsequently tended to see the use of NCOs to do officers' jobs in Anglo-American forces as a good thing sui generis.)

Eventually, senior Wehrmacht officers came to "look with envy" on their foes' "unified system of command." German army theater and army group commanders were denied control over a vast array of Nazi elements operating in their area, sometimes including substantial naval and air forces. Although now cast by some Western analysts as a part of the German military doctrinal tradition, Rommel expressed contempt for what he saw as overly academic influences in the Wehrmacht and praised US flexibility and adaptiveness, observing:

... the general balance of American organization and the steady development they have achieved in equipment and armament are things we have not yet been able to equal....

Much inefficiency stemmed from the tangle of Nazi civil and military organizations—for example, the Gestapo; the SD (security service); various SS formations; the Todt Organization; and the NSKK—National Socialist Motor Corps. That is not to suggest, however, that the relatively "pure" military side performed at a uniformly high level of efficiency. The resistance to tanks has already been noted. When the war began in 1939, in spite of years of clandestine preparation and three years of major rearmament, only 242 of 19,400 German army officers were fully qualified staff officers.

Nor was the army of one mind on going along with the Nazis. Elements in the army that resisted Hitler were suppressed by trumped-up morals charges. General Werner von Fritsch and General Ludwig Beck were chased out; others were bought off or murdered. The changing of the soldier's oath in 1934 to a swearing of loyalty to the Fuhrer was a moral watershed, as was acceptance of Nazi insignia as another symbol of the crumbling of resistance.

Nevertheless, substantial forces in Germany opposed Hitler, within the Army and outside, but with little effect. The Western democracies did not take advantage of overtures from such groups during the era of appeasement, nor were they exploited during the war. When Beck resigned in 1938 as chief of the General Staff and called upon key officers to shun Hitler, nothing happened. In 1943, German resistance to Hitler was undercut by Sir Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Casablanca Declaration. Before the "unconditional surrender" statement, however, some senior commanders, who later claimed they opposed or resisted Hitler, accepted grants of property in conquered territories—the so-called Dotationen—just as many accepted field marshal's batons.
Nor is there agreement among historians or survivors about the tough stance that some commanders described after the war in memoirs about their dealings with Hitler. Arguments that Hitler’s interference lost the war must be weighed against the fact that the army got Hitler started in politics, that it played a key role in his becoming chancellor in 1933 and that very few blocked his way until Germany appeared to be defeated. It seemed clear when Hitler was in his heyday that the Nazis had used the German army’s desire to rearm to get to power and then used rearmament to coopt the Army.

There is considerable irony, considering esteem for the German-Nazi military system in some quarters, in the frequency with which its performance fell well short of perfection. Ironically, the High Command’s failures in World War I led the radical wing of the Nazis to call for new military structures. The Arbeiterdienst, Luftwaffe and other paramilitary groups made inroads on the army’s traditional preserves before the war although Hitler purged the SA (Brown Shirts) to placate the army in 1934. Rommel was hyped by the Nazi propaganda machine during the war as a general outside the Prussian establishment who had cooperated with the Nazis. The Waffen-SS, which took the cream of the manpower and equipment from 1942 on, was elite in the enlisted ranks but generally the reverse in respect to senior officers.

Beyond that, errors in prediction and performance by senior officers aided Hitler. They overestimated French resistance to German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and Franco-British reaction to Hitler’s Czech demands in 1938. In 1939, Hitler berated senior officers for their anxiety over the forthcoming attack on France and the Low Countries. During the 1940 campaign, the panzers’ successes alarmed many senior officers, and a halt was ordered to “regroup” during the great sweep across the Allied armies’ rear. When victory came far more easily than they expected and the High Command had no contingency plans for a follow-through against Great Britain, the officer corps was again one down to the amateur Führer.

Friction between Hitler and various senior officers continued. Senior commanders became involved in an embarrassing squabble at the beginning of the attack on the USSR. The General Staff had no contingency plans for winter operations. There was no winter clothing, no emergency shelter and no antifreeze or winter oil. One hundred thousand men were crippled by frostbite, and one-quarter of a million horses died.

Wehrmacht planning failures also appeared as the Allies advanced across
France in the late summer of 1944. As the German High Command scrambled to construct a defensive line, it was found that the Siegfried line on Germany’s western frontier had been ignored since 1940. Bunkers had not been modified to handle larger antitank guns that had come into use as the war progressed. Many bunkers sheltered families displaced by bombing, or served as warehouses, while mines and barbed wire had been removed for use on various fronts.49

German army theater and army group commanders were denied control over a vast array of Nazi elements operating in their area, sometimes including substantial naval and air forces. . . . Rommel expressed contempt for what he saw as overly academic influences in the Wehrmacht and praised US flexibility and adaptiveness. . . .

Whatever its strengths and weaknesses, the Wehrmacht was a product of German culture at a certain time. It was also a wartime conscript force, with a small core of volunteer/regular elements. Conscripts were socialized by far different forces than those that did or would shape US forces. Beyond that lies the special problem of the performance of the opposing overall systems as compared with components of the systems.

In World War II, the use of “combined arms” became a basic aspect of conventional land combat. Most analysis of combat, however, has focused on ground warfare and mainly on infantry and armor rather than on artillery and air support. The overall system, therefore, is left out of focus, distorting the analytical process. Most military history does not depict artillery and air effects since they are far more diffuse and difficult to portray in maps, diagrams and tables than infantry and armor actions and movements. While it is obviously desirable to have US combat arms perform at as high a level as the Germans, it seems unlikely that purchasing such a specific advantage by weakening other parts of the overall combined arms system or the harmony of them would be a higher wisdom.

Wehrmacht doctrine can be seen in doctrines and discussions revolving around such concepts and documents as Field Manual 100-5, Operations, FIRST BATTLE, AirLand Battle 2000, and Division 86. Beyond the realm of tactical dynamics, there are value questions. Emulating such a model presents a special dilemma since it comes in the wake of a great structural change in US history—the creation of the All-Volunteer Force by the Nixon administration in 1970. Whatever else that change wrought, it cut the “feedback loop” linking US society and the military in the draft. With that isolation in view, therefore, gravitation toward the Wehrmacht as a model should generate concern among structuralists who sense how organization, policies and procedures shape behavior and attitude. It should also interest those concerned with civil-military relations in a broader sense.

Obviously, the analysis of many models and cases can be of use, and a careful study of Wehrmacht doctrine and tactics can aid doctrinal and tactical formulation. The related intellectual and historical complexities, however, are rarely kept in view,50 nor are the many linkages between the old German army and Nazism.51 From the 1860s through 1909, many in Congress and the US Army feared the effects of adopting a strong variant of the Grosse
Generalstab. That is not being proposed now, at least not directly.

There is another potential paradox. That is the tendency for peacetime expectations to be confounded and reshaped in war—not just plans but doctrine itself. Students of the American Civil War will remember the windrows of dead that marked the use of Napoleonic tactics against dug-in rifles. Variants of the syndrome appeared again and again at Mudder, Verdun and on the Somme as reliance on a single doctrine collided with complex realities and technical change.

The search for a more rarified professional self-image on the part of the US officer corps in the wake of Vietnam has some parallels with the Reichswehr, or so it should be presumed, given the dangers of seeking for firm guideposts in such unfirm ground. It may be possible to tease out the threads of pure operational-tactical art from the tangle of related fibers of culture and behavior.

But Nazism and militarism flourished in tandem. The West Germans remember it, and so should we. Interpenetration of ideology, doctrine and behavior between such systems as the Soviets, Chinese, British, French and other military systems is complex and profound. The adaptation of Chinese communist doctrine by Evans F. Carlson of the US Marine Corps in his second raider battalion is but one example. What must be asked is: Given the rising sensitivity to the complex interaction of such elements, is it reasonable to be confident that a major element of Wehrmacht doctrine can be absorbed with none of the side effects manifest in that case—and without the controls built into the Bundeswehr with that dilemma in view?

In conclusion, it is worthy to consider the caution of David N. Spires in his study of the Reichswehr, the crucible from which the Wehrmacht was poured:

"The professional army, which finds itself more isolated from its social base than the national conscript army, requires special attention from within and without..."

TAYLOR & FRITZ, INC.

NOTES

6 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the German Wehrmacht in World War II, Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1948, pp. 282-315. The authors note that supporting studies left much to be desired from the standpoint of scientific rigor (p. 314), that faith in Adolf Hitler was widespread until his death (p. 304), that all German units built around a strong National Socialist hard core perform best (pp 285-86), and that the heavily Nazified Waffen-SS was respected in other units (p. 304).
8 Ibid., p. 122.
9 Ibid., p. 124.
11 Shils and Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 280-83.


17 Max Hastings, ‘German Training, Outlook Different, ‘ Houston Chronicle, 6 June 1984, Section 4, p 2.


19 US social scientists surveying the US zone of occupation in 1948 concluded their research report with the observation that there is no reason to believe that the German people have ever given up their consistent support of Nazism in principle. See H L. Anspercher, ‘Attitudes of German Prisoners of War: A Study of the Dynamics of National-Socialist Fellowshio, Psychological Monographs 1948 Number 52, p 38.


20 For example, see Douglas Culligan, The Nazi Papers, Ontario, October 1980, p 52.


34 Führer Directive 11 September 1941 in Suchenwirth, op cit, p 51.


37 Becker op cit, p 226.


39 Tantum and Hoffschmidt, op cit, pp 44-45 and 104-8.

40 For example, see Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power, German and U. S. Army Performance 1939-1945, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1982, p 53.

41 Westphal op cit, pp 200-201.


44 A British airman theorist notes that the US combat command system of World War II was the most advanced of any armored force, and that the Bundeswehr adopted a modified form of it. See Richard M. Ognibene, Armored Forces, Arco Publishing N.Y., 1970, pp 181-82.

45 Seaton op cit, pp 98 and 173.


47 Seaton op cit, p 144.


51 For exceptions, see Richard F Timmons, Lessons From The Past for NATO, pp 3 11 and John M Nolen, J C S Reform and the Lessons of German History, Parameters, Autumn 1984, pp 2-20.

52 Friedrich Von Bernhardi, On War of Today, translated by Karl von Donat, Dodd & Mead N.Y., 1914 p 98. Ironically, the Prussian theorist Von Bernhardi cautioned: ‘Experience of war can never be applied directly to the future. The creative mind must anticipate experience of the future.

The US incursion into the island of Grenada was not a perfect military operation in anyone's estimation. Some critics even contend that, although the operation was an overall success, major flaws were uncovered in every area, including planning, intelligence, equipment, and interservice cooperation (see MR Summaries, pages 79-80). Did the operation reflect as much incompetence as alleged? This writer refutes some of these serious criticisms.
ON 25 OCTOBER 1983, US military forces, with several Caribbean allies, intervened on the island of Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury was initiated to protect the lives of US students, restore democratic government and eradicate Cuban influence on the island. Two US Army Ranger battalions, a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, a Marine amphibious unit (MAU), the Navy aircraft carrier USS Independence and its battle group, Air Force transports and Spectre gunships, and a few Special Operations Forces combined to swiftly overwhelm the Cuban and Grenadian defenders.

The US assault commenced at dawn with nearly simultaneous assaults on the island's two airfields. Army Rangers parachuted into the Point Salines airstrip, while two Marine companies secured the Pearls Airport and nearby Grenville. The Rangers encountered heavy antiaircraft fire, but they secured the runway and a group of grateful students at nearby True Blue Campus. Reinforced by paratroopers of the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the Army elements attacked into the thick foliage around Salines to isolate and destroy the remaining opposition.

Meanwhile, Joint Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III left one Marine company at Pearls and sent the rest of the Marine battalion landing team (BLT) to Grand Mal beach, north of the Grenadian capital of St. George's. The Marines landed by amphibious assault vehicle and helicopter on the night of 25 October. By the next day, St. George's was in US hands, Army units had rescued the US students at Grand Anse Campus and the backbone of the Cuban/Grenadian opposition had been broken. Significant scattered resistance went on for two more days, and some isolated sniping continued until 2 November.

During the eight-day campaign, 599 US and 80 foreign students were evacuated without injury. Civil order was restored. Cuban, Soviet and various Eastern bloc representatives were removed from the island. The casualty toll was relatively light. Eighteen US troops were killed in combat, one died of wounds, 115 were wounded and 28 suffered nonhostile injuries. The Cubans lost 24 killed, 59 wounded and 605 captured who were later returned to Cuba. The Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) suffered 21 killed and 58 captured. There were 24 Grenadian civilians killed during the operation. Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, commander, US Atlantic Command, said, "In summary, history should reflect that the operation was a complete success."

Not everyone agreed.

The Critics

The Grenada operation attracted the attention of five prominent members of the US military reform community. In three separate analyses, various aspects of Operation Urgent Fury were considered, and some rather serious complaints were presented. The accounts accepted the basic strategy set by President Ronald Reagan but noted significant faults in the execution of that strategy. Each report concentrated on slightly different subjects but, in general, all three provide harsh assessments of US operational plans and execution.

The first critique was presented at a Washington, D.C., news conference on 5 April 1984 under the aegis of the congressional Military Reform Caucus. The five-page report was prepared by legislative assistant and historian William S. Lind. Though no specific sources were given for
the report, Lind remarked that he had garnered much of his information from paying close attention at various officers' clubs.

A second review of the Grenada operation appeared in a copyrighted story in The Boston Globe on 22 October 1984. The story stated that Operation Urgent Fury was "a case study in military incompetence and poor execution." The authors were Major Richard A. Gabriel, US Army Reserve, and Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Savage, US Army, Retired. These officers had written the controversial 1978 book Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army. No verifiable documentation was included in the article; the authors stated that security strictures prevented a full disclosure of the sources.

The third and most authoritative consideration of the US military performance in Grenada was copyrighted in 1984 but did not receive general attention until spring 1985. This commentary was included in Chapter 2, "How the Lessons of Defeat Remain Unlearned," in Edward N. Luttwak's The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform. Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, Georgetown University, has served as a consultant to the US Department of State and the Department of Defense. He cited the US actions in Grenada, along with other examples of allegedly faulty US defense planning and execution. Luttwak listed the sources for his Grenada information as two articles from the May 1984 issue of the US Naval Institute Proceedings and news reports from October and November 1983 issues of various news publications.

I do not question the patriotism, sincerity or conviction of these men. Their accounts are all built around kernels of truth. Unfortunately, each of the treatises contains errors of fact, hasty generalizations and conclusions based on shaky premises.

The 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, says: "The operational level of
war uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. This level includes the allocation of forces, the deployment of troops against selected enemy forces and terrain objectives, and the command and control of engaged combat units. Each of these operational components in Grenada received criticism. It was said that too many forces were employed, the forces were deployed piecemeal against peripheral objectives and the operation was inefficiently directed. Lind observed:

... the United States required seven battalions of troops, plus elements of two other battalions, to defeat fewer than 700 Cubans and a Grenadian army that hardly fought at all.

Luttwak also thought the United States used too much force. He called most of the Cubans "construction workers" and said that only 43 were actually soldiers. He added "those few Grenadians who were actually willing to fight" to the opposition forces but commented that the Cuban PRA forces had no real tanks, artillery or air defenses. They had only a few wheeled "armored cars" and some light antiaircraft weapons. Gabriel and Savage stated that there were few enemy units and that the original US assault units were unable to cope with them.

The US military missions in Grenada were established from the president's strategic objectives. The safety of the medical students, not the destruction of the Cuban/PRA forces, was the immediate objective. As a result, US forces were initially directed against those opposition forces posing the greatest threat to the US citizens on the island. The civilian presence discouraged the massive use of mortar, artillery or naval gunfire, and air munitions.

The second objective was the restoration of a democratic government. This necessitated the destruction of the PRA. There had to be an island left to restore, so collateral damage and civilian casualties had to be held to a minimum. Equally important, there had to be enough US troops on the ground to physically sweep and control the island to prevent any Cuban/PRA guerrilla campaign. The elimination of the Cuban presence—the third objective—implied the isolation, destruction, or capture and removal of the Cubans.

In essence, rescue operations had priority. The US rules of engagement required minimum force and minimum casualties. With these constraints, the force structure had to include enough troop strength to handle the likely opposition without resorting to massive firepower.

The determination of the enemy's strength on the island was hampered by a lack of firm intelligence, but open-source military periodicals indicated a potentially sizable force. There were 701 Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) troops on Grenada. Of these, 43 advised (and, in some cases, commanded) PRA units. Ten Ministry of Interior officers provided similar advice to the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM). The Cuban construction engineer battalion was armed and organized as a military unit. The engineers lived in barracks, carried weapons and had received defense orders from Fidel Castro and their commander, Colonel Pedro Tortoló Comas. Air reinforcement from Cuba was possible.

The Grenadian PRA was composed of two infantry battalions, an antiaircraft battery and an artillery battery. This force had trained to deal with US airborne and amphibious tactics. Its armament included six BTR60PBs and some BRDM2 armored vehicles (which are still used by the Soviets), seven 130mm towed artillery pieces and six twin 23mm towed air defense guns. The PRA was supplemented
rescue operations had priority. The US rules of engagement required minimum force and minimum casualties. With these constraints, the force structure had to include enough troop strength to handle the likely opposition without resorting to massive firepower.

by seven PRM infantry battalions which had conducted major anti-invasion maneuvers in April 1983.

Soviet, Libyan, North Korean, East German and Bulgarian contingents were on the island. The Soviets, in particular, were rather well armed for "diplomats."

The total possible opposition to the US operation was 10 battalions plus combat support and combat service support units. US staff planning officers had to plan for the worst case. As it turned out, both the Cubans (who had almost 12-percent casualties) and the Grenadian PRA fought hard for the first two days. The PRM did not contribute much to the island's defense.

Terrain and weather also influenced US force levels. Grenada is not a small, flat, desert island. Its area is 119 square miles (311 square kilometers). Grenada's volcanic, hilly terrain is heavily vegetated. Its population of about 110,000 occupies the land at a greater density than is found in Massachusetts or Connecticut. In the Caribbean, only Puerto Rico has more people per square mile. Almost 30,000 Grenadians live in and around St. George's. The rest are spread in small towns and clusters of farm huts. About 12 percent of the island is primary rain forest, with most of the rest either secondary forest or cultivated cocoa, banana and nutmeg groves. The central rock formations and heavy vegetation limit areas for helicopter landing zones. The hot, humid air averages 82 degrees Fahrenheit which would affect US troops. The only real coastal plain is in the Point Salines area, and most beaches are treacherous, even for small boats, let alone landing craft.
### Ground Unit Force Ratios in Grenada
#### 25 October-2 November 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US/Caribbean</th>
<th>Cuban/Grenadian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 USMC battalion (+)</td>
<td>1 Cuban engineer battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 USA Ranger battalions</td>
<td>2 PRA infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 USA airborne battalion</td>
<td>7 PRM infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 battalion CPF</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**25 October**

4 1/2 battalions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC battalion (+)</th>
<th>2/3 Cuban engineer battalion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 USA Ranger battalions</td>
<td>2 PRA infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 USA airborne battalions</td>
<td>PRM (snipers; fragments)</td>
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**26 October**

5 1/2 battalions

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<thead>
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<th>1 3 Cuban engineer battalion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 USA Ranger battalions</td>
<td>1 PRA infantry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 USA airborne battalions</td>
<td>PRM (fragments)</td>
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<tr>
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**27 October**

6 1/2 battalions

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<th>1 1/3 PRA infantry battalion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 USA airborne battalions</td>
<td>(fragments)</td>
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<td>1/2 battalion CPF</td>
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**28 October**

7 1/2 battalions

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<th>fragments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 USA airborne battalions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 battalion CPF</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

28 October force levels maintained until 2 November, with steady erosion of Grenadian PRA units.

USA—US Army
USMC—US Marine Corps
CPF—Caribbean Peacekeeping Force
PRAF—People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces
PRM—People’s Revolutionary Militia

Two factors influenced force planners. The large population required precision in ground operations. Foot reconnaissance would have to be used in lieu of reconnaissance by fire. Also, the defenders had many camouflage advantages. The precipitous topography would absorb a lot of infantry. Securing Grenada with vehicles or helicopter scouts would not be very effective. Too much could transpire unseen under the trees.

Troops available for the operation were limited by time constraints and mission requirements. The Caribbean area comes under the US Atlantic Command; the USS Independence and Navy/Marine amphibi-
The total possible opposition to the US operation was 10 battalions plus combat support and combat service support units. US staff planning officers had to plan for the worst case. As it turned out, both the Cubans (who had almost 12-percent casualties) and the Grenadian PRA fought hard for the first two days. The PRM did not contribute much to the island's defense.

ous group were already available. Special Operations Forces were selected for a few critical tasks.

US Atlantic Command planners could reinforce the MAU by sea or by air. Sea transport takes a long time, and the dispatch of additional MAUs was ruled out. Air reinforcement was quicker but required the seizure of one or more runways. Army paratroopers were the logical choice, and the Army Rangers had trained to rescue hostages. Thus, the airborne Ranger battalions were added. More infantrymen were needed to complete the clearance of the countryside, and the 82d Airborne Division was the closest source of nonmechanized troops. They also had the ability to parachute into Grenada if necessary, and their normal readiness level is higher than other available Army units.

Force planners allocated the two Ranger battalions with Air Force airlift, the MAU, Air Force Spectre gunships and the USS Independence attack aircraft to the assault echelon. Air Force Military Airlift Command (MAC) planes would deliver the Caribbean peacekeeping force and two brigades of the 82d Airborne Division for reinforcements. The actual force ratios during the campaign proved adequate. However, the pace of US reinforcement indicates that the assault elements fought and won the major engagements without any overwhelming superiority in numbers or excessive use of firepower. US
troop strength peaked as the Rangers were withdrawn. The redeployment schedule was dependent on the MAC air-flow. The 82d Airborne Division was not flown in to meet unexpectedly heavy resistance. The first units were already en route as the assault elements landed.

A second criticism of the Grenada operation concerned the disposition of the forces employed. Lind thought the plan should have been one "in which overwhelming force is used to seize all critical junctures in an enemy's system at the outset." Luttwak wanted "a sudden descent in overwhelming strength that would begin and end the fighting in one stroke."

Mission considerations placed the two known student concentrations at the top of the list of geographical objectives. Enemy unit positions guarding these objectives were also designated for seizure. There was no enemy "rear" area because the Cubans and Grenadians were in discontiguous locations, tied into land features and important facilities. Most of the enemy force was located in the south although aerial photographs showed a Cuban An-26 Curl aircraft at Pearls Airport. The seizure of both airfields would cut off any possible Cuban reinforcements.

The terrain limited the amphibious entry points to three beaches—the Grand Mal, Grand Anse and Great River/Conference Bays. However, the MAU could use helicopters to lift into company-sized landing zones scattered around the island. The two available airborne drop zones—the airfields—were extremely tight. Only the Point Salines airstrip could accommodate MAC C141B StarLifter and C5A Galaxy aircraft. Pearls Airport would be a possible secondary site for C130H Hercules transports.

The US dispositions allowed Metcalf and his ground deputy, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the flexibility to move most of the Marine BLT around Grenada after Pearls was taken. The BLT (-) attack on 26 October, combined with Army attacks at Calliste and the Grand Anse raid, broke the back of the Cuban/Grenadian resistance. It was suggested that the movement of the BLT (-) to the St. George's area was too slow, and a "platoon or two" could have been sent by helicopter during the afternoon of 25 October. This move might have run afoul of the St. George's PRA antiaircraft gunners which had downed a Black Hawk and two SeaCobra helicopters by 1200 on 25 October.

Lind preferred a scheme of maneuver involving only the Marines. The main effort of the BLT would have been a landing at Grand Anse, followed by a move across the southwestern peninsula to cut off Salines from St. George's. "... this would have isolated the Cubans from the rest of the island and made any defense on their part meaningless." Unfortunately, it would have also left the True Blue and Lance aux Épines student concentrations well behind Cuban lines. The St. George's facilities would also have remained in firm PRA control.

The single Marine battalion might have encountered slow going in the thickly
undergrown Calliste/Frequente area, and the Marines' ability to contain the Cuban and PRA battalions across a mile of jungle foliage is questionable. Without an airstrip, the Marines would have to rely on seaborne reinforcement if they ran into trouble. The Cubans and the PRA, secure in their barracks and located near arms caches, could have held out for some time. This scheme might have worked over time, but the mission was to seize Grenada, not besiege it.

Luttwak desired a wholly Army operation and opined that:

...had Urgent Fury been planned by Army officers competent in land warfare, their natural tendencies would have been to stage a coup de main, using as many battalions of the 82d Airborne Division as could be airlifted, as well as the Rangers.
Luttwak said US troops should have come down directly on each objective, using parachutes, air landing, amphibious assault and infiltration. These forces would “suppress opposition” and capture all target areas simultaneously. The enemy command structure would be crushed at the very outset; the enemy troops would be stunned by the "sheer magnitude of the attack." Luttwak concludes: "Then there is no need for tactical movement on the ground or for airlifted vehicles, nor for coordination on the ground." There are six problems with this plan:

• Grenada only has two usable airborne drop zones, and many objectives were not near these drop zones.

• MAC airlift would require time to stage to the east coast before executing such a plan. The air-space coordination over Grenada would have been difficult, especially if the drops occurred at night.

• If US forces did use amphibious techniques, the troops available would have been limited to the Marine Corps MAU. Assembly of more Marines would have taken more time than gathering and organizing a MAC airlift. Assembling Army units for amphibious operations would take longer still.

• Near-perfect intelligence would have been required concerning likely objectives. Without vehicles, ground movement or coordination, US forces would have been unable to protect the 237 students who were not near the school campuses, Pearls or the St. George’s area. Enemy forces missed in the initial assaults would have been free to withdraw to the central mountain forests. This scheme would have lacked any operational flexibility.

• Airborne, amphibious, air assault and infiltration maneuvers all require careful coordination. It is not just a simple matter of dumping clots of men all over an area.

• Preparations for such a massive plan could scarcely be missed by Soviet and Cuban intelligence services. Due to an established pattern of exercises, it was possible to send out the Rangers and the first 82d Airborne Division battalion without telegraphing the punch.

Command and control “failures” also received attention from the critics. Lind stated that the operation was “a pie-dividing contest among all the services” when it should have been a naval operation. Luttwak takes the opposite approach and says the operation was "naval through and through" even though “the Navy merely provided transportation and some carrier-launched airstrikes that should not have been necessary at all.” Gabriel and Savage introduced the idea that “panic” over Cuban ground strength in the joint task force (JTF) and higher headquarters diverted C130Hs from “Fort Stewart, South Carolina” (sic) (it was actually Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia) to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to accelerate the arrival of the 82d Airborne Division.16

The US command and control organization was relatively simple. The JTF commander reported to one man—the commander, US Atlantic Command. Metcalf supervised five elements the first day (the Navy, the Air Force, the 82d Airborne, the MAU and Special Operations Forces), well within a normal span of control. This was reduced to four subordinate units by 1600 that day.

There was speculation that the Army Rangers wanted "in" on Operation Urgent Fury to justify a third Ranger battalion.17 In fact, the Navy and Marine task forces offshore were not capable of fulfilling the special operations requirements and facing three active battalions and possibly
The actual force ratios during the campaign proved adequate. However, the pace of US reinforcement indicates that the assault elements fought and won the major engagements without any overwhelming superiority in numbers or excessive use of firepower. US troop strength peaked as the Rangers were withdrawn.

seven militia battalions. Each of the services did things essential to their nature. The Navy secured the seas, provided carrier air power and landed the Marines. The Marines conducted three landings in seven days, both by LVTP7 and helicopter. The Army seized an airfield by airborne assault and fought the bulk of the Cuban/PRA ground forces. The Air Force airlifted supplies and reinforcements and employed powerful Spectre gunships. Each service freed the others to accomplish their unique missions.

The charge that the operation was too “Navy” in nature ignores basic US doctrine on amphibious operations. McDonald summarized the doctrine by noting that the landing force commander controls operations until follow-up (by doctrine, Army) forces are established ashore. Metcalf, assisted by Army deputy Schwarzkopf, exercised overall command from the sea until the Army took over the entire island from the Marines for consolidation. Metcalf’s position enabled him to divert readily most of the Marine BLT to
Each of the services did things essential to their nature. The Navy secured the seas, provided carrier air power and landed the Marines. The Marines conducted three landings in seven days, both by LVTP7 and helicopter. The Army seized an airfield by airborne assault and fought the bulk of the Cuban/PRA ground forces. The Air Force airtifted supplies and reinforcements and employed powerful Spectre gunships.

the St. George's area on 25 October. This action tore the heart out of the PRA resistance. That the Navy directed Operation Urgent Fury should come as no surprise: Grenada is an island.

The allegation that a panic in the command structure resulted in a redirection of the airflow and that "three quarters of the Ranger force never left Fort Stewart (actually Hunter Army Airfield)" was not true. Both Ranger battalions (minus a few headquarters people and some brand-new arrivals) jumped from five MC130Es and 18 C130Hs at Point Salines and played major roles in the fighting and rescue operations. The lead battalion of the 82d Airborne Division (already in the air as the Rangers jumped) arrived aboard C141Bs, not C130Hs. Rather than accelerate the deployment airflow of follow-up battalions to meet Cuban/PRA resistance around Salines, the JTF commander moved the BLT (-) to Grand Mal beach, using darkness to cover the maneuver. It was a prudent, calculated decision without any evidence of panic except perhaps on the part of the dismayed PRA units north of St. George's.

Few military operations are free of flaws and human errors, and the opera-
tional planning and execution of Operation Urgent Fury were not perfect. There is plenty of room for constructive criticism of the Grenada operation based on impartial analysis of available information. The US armed services should appreciate the sincere interest of men who provide this constructive criticism. Unfortunately, good intentions do not remedy a lack of accuracy. Nor should the final outcome be overlooked by anyone—the mission was accomplished.

NOTES


14 Luttwak. op cit. p 54.

15 Schemmer. op cit. p 13.


17 Schemmer. op cit.


20 D-Day in Grenada. op cit.

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TERRORISM is a fact of contemporary life. Depending on how we choose to view its genesis, terrorism has been a fact of human social reality for millennia and, by its most restrictive criteria, for the last two centuries. Today, the term terrorism is an "in" term, a fad which inevitably is used in the pejorative sense. For example, Cuba accuses the United States of practicing state terrorism, the United States accuses Cuba of fostering worldwide terrorism and an industry spokesman labels the February 1986 Tylenol capsule poisoning as terrorism.

Does this mean that anything which causes us to feel fear is terrorism? We may feel fear (or at least elevated anxiety) driving on the Santa Monica freeway or when our airplane encounters extreme turbulence. Yet, we do not hear other drivers or the pilot accused of terrorism, so we can surmise that fear alone is not the determining factor.

Perhaps violence is the key. Most authorities agree that terror is an extreme emotion which results from fear of death or injury caused by violence or the threat of violence. The emotion is heightened by conditions of ambiguity or unpredictability. On the other hand, one can be terrified as a participant in a barroom brawl. Similarly, it is violence when a person is mugged walking alone at night in a part of a city which enjoys a reputation as a high-crime area. In these cases, the victim might be criticized for poor judgment, but no one calls this violence terrorism. It would seem that violence, like fear, is not in and of itself the sufficient basis for labeling it as terrorism.

Could it be that the victim differentiates between violence and terrorism? It seems unlikely when we consider that, by contemporary usage, terrorism is practiced against governments, international organizations (for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), ethnic groups and other terrorist groups on a worldwide scale. Modern terrorism is equally ecumenical in its victims, ranging from government leaders and diplomats, to police and military personnel, to business leaders, prominent religious figures and ordinary citizens.

Possibly the method of doing violence has a bearing on what terrorism really is. But again, who is to say that the fear of having one's throat slit is more or less intense than the fear of being shot or terminally disassembled by an explosive device? The 1985 machinegun killing of prominent crime figures on a crowded street in New York is remarkably similar to the machinegun killing of four off-duty Marines in San Salvador that same year. Yet, we label one a killing and the other an act of terrorism. It seems that the tactics used to perpetrate the violence have less influence on the label than the other factors.

Recognizing that we are rapidly exhausting the list of possible factors, how about the perpetrator—the doer of the evil deed? Surely the doer must be the determining element. Apparently, if the fear-inducing violence is perpetrated by a terrorist, it is terrorism. If it is done by some-
one else, it is something else. The flaw in this thesis is that contemporary terrorists never consider themselves to be terrorists. In fact, since the Zionist Stern Gang of the late 1940s, no group has called itself a terrorist organization.

What is more, terrorism has been engaged in by males and females of all races and all age groups. Agents of various governments have practiced terrorism as have members of political, religious and ethnic groups as well as a fair number of criminals, thrill seekers and psychopaths. Obviously, we cannot define terrorism in such a way as to capture the unique physical or behavioral characteristics in such a disparate sampling of humanity.

Having looked at who does it, what is done, how it is done and to whom it is done, there still is not an identifiable, distinctive hook on which to hang a definition. About the only factor left is why. Why does the terrorist terrorize? Motivation may have some bearing on differentiating between actions which constitute terrorism and those actions which do not. It is the question of motivation that triggered a decade-long debate in the United Nations over a definition of terrorism.

Motivation is what makes most definitions of terrorism useless. It is also that aspect of terrorism which makes an airtight, universally accepted definition seemingly impossible. Motivation introduces the moral factor and accounts for the ridiculous situation of governments, referring to totally different activities, accusing each other of terrorism and doing so in good faith. It is also the basis for the operationally valid claim that terrorism is violence of which we do not approve.

For example, the Russian Social Revolutionaries who assassinated czarist officials between 1900 and 1911 were heroes. But, when they continued the practice (to include wounding Vladimir I. Lenin) after the 1917 revolution, they became terrorists in Bolshevik eyes. The same applies to various resistance groups in World War II. Ho Chi Minh was a patriot during the Japanese occupation; he only became a terrorist after France reoccupied Indochina.

It seems that any usable definition must have value-neutrality if we are to escape from simply labeling the other fellow's
violence as terrorism, while ours, or that
of which we approve, is referred to by such
euphemisms as "a judicious application of
force," or "maintenance of law and order." Value-neutrality is, like so many con-
ditions, easily stated but difficult to
achieve. This is particularly true with a
subject like terrorism.

Most authorities accept a tripartite
composition of a terrorist incident—the
act itself, the emotional reaction to the act
(on the part of the audience) and, sooner
or later, a sociological reaction (behavioral modification). The latter element may
or may not be what the terrorist hoped to
achieve. If we accept this analytical divi-
sion, it is immediately evident that the
emotional reaction is key to both the study
and definition of terrorism.

The following is a definition offered by
the US Department of State in 1984: "pre-
meditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets
by subnational groups or clandestine state
agents." Note that, to be terrorism in the
Department of State's eyes, the victims
must be "noncombatant targets." By this
definition, which assumes that combat-
ants are those who are combating the ter-
rorists, actions against police or military
personnel could not be labeled terrorism.

Additionally, since the perpetrators
must be "subnational groups" or "clandes-
tine state agents," terrorism could not be
practiced by overt organs of the state.
Under this definition, historical events
such as Joseph V. Stalin's terror of the
1930s and Argentina's repression of the
late 1970s would have to be labeled some-
thing on the order of "ill-advised domestic
policies" or "harsh social control meas-
ures." By its bias against terror from
below—that is, agitational terror—the
Department of State definition limits its
utility and guarantees rejection by much
of the world.
[The Army's] definition reflects awareness that, since the 1880s, terrorists have been 'playing to the audience.' That is, those they wish to influence are not the victim, but, rather, those who witness (usually vicariously through news media) the act.

escape the label of terrorism, but the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution would not be terrorism. There is some humor in noting that most scholars attribute the origin of the term “terrorism” to the French experience during 1793-94.

The third point which can be made is the absence of any reference to premeditation. Just as there are degrees of assault and murder in law, so also is there a difference in the violent acts associated with terrorism. Terrorism requires thought. It is systematic, designed and premeditated. Terror is natural. Terrorism is contrived by man. If, for instance, a man were to become enraged by something said in a political speech (hardly an unusual occurrence) and attack the speaker on the spot, the world would label him guilty of assault. By its definition, DOD would label him a terrorist.

By combining these three points and carrying them to a level of absurdity, an individual could be charged with terrorism for physically attacking a soft drink dispensing machine if he or she claimed the act was for political, religious or ideological purposes. On the other hand, an incumbent government could intimidate elements of its society through a systematic application of violence, and the US armed services could not call it terrorism. An unsympathetic observer might be tempted to accuse DOD of the same bias as that of the Department of State. Be that as it may, in neither instance can the definition stand the test of value-neutrality.

In 1983, the Army synthesized several definitions into a concise, usable definition which stands up well under scrutiny as value-neutral:

...the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

Applying our rules, we find there is no effort to identify the perpetrator. It is as applicable to the Reign of Terror in 18th-century France as it is to Lebanon in 1985. Terrorism from above (repressive or state terror) is accommodated along with that from below (revolutionary or agitational terror). The acts of individual sociopaths are excluded as are spontaneous acts of violence. There is no effort to create non-victims by excluding certain categories from consideration (for example, the Department of State’s "noncombatants").

Further, this definition reflects aware-
State affiliation is the quintessential element of identification. The defensive (antiterrorism) planner must know the state affiliation to anticipate probable targets the terrorist will seek and [his] level of sophistication...

ness that, since the 1880s, terrorists have been "playing to the audience." That is, those they wish to influence are not the victim but, rather, those who witness (usually vicariously through news media) the act. In short, the Army's definition reflects progress toward creating a functionally useful way to identify terrorism as opposed to simple violence. The fact that it will soon be replaced by the DOD offering does not detract from its value as an aid in understanding terrorism.

Having suggested that the search for a fundamental definition of terrorism has not progressed very far in the last few years, let us turn to a prominent set of terms which categorizes types of terrorism. Over the last decade, three terms have crept into the lexicon of contemporary terrorism:

- International terrorism—terrorist acts carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.
- Transnational terrorism—terrorist acts carried out by basically autonomous nonstate actors in countries other than their country of origin.
- Domestic terrorism—terrorist acts carried out by autonomous nonstate actors against their own nationals.

While these terms were useful in the definitional void of the mid-1970s, their value in the 1980s is questionable. The domestic descriptor will remain popular regardless of official usage. It is simply too convenient as a label for "homegrown" terrorists to even attempt to replace it even though terrorist groups having no contact with kindred spirits from other countries are an endangered species. The descriptors "international" and "transnational" tend to be confusing. International is explicit in meaning between nations. The prefix "trans" may mean through as well as across, with across being the meaning in this context. The operational utility of these terms to the US military is questionable.

The definitions of the terms international and transnational are burdensome to remember without repeated reinforcement through use, and few in the armed services have occasion to use these terms with any frequency. Another development which adds to the confusion is the universal reference to terrorist activities carried out by someone or some group from a different country as international regardless of state affiliation.

A suggested solution to this semantic problem is to adopt terms which are simultaneously self-explanatory and functionally useful. In 1984, the Army's terrorism counteraction community developed three terms which have proven their utility. The terms state-directed, state-supported and nonstate-supported reflect the condition of the governmental affiliation
of the terrorist group and are defined as:

- **State-directed**—a terrorist group whose activities are primarily at the direction of a government.
- **State-supported**—a terrorist group which receives substantial support from one or more governments but whose actions are autonomous.
- **Nonstate-supported**—a terrorist group which does not receive substantial support from any government and whose actions are autonomous.

State affiliation is the quintessential element of identification. The defensive (antiterrorism) planner must know the state affiliation to anticipate probable targets the terrorist will seek and the level of sophistication of the enemy. Recognizing that the logistics to support sophisticated terrorism are available on the open market for those who seek and have substantial financial backing, the resources of a government can still mean a great deal in terms of operational capability.

Offensive (counterterrorism) planners need to know if a terrorist group is affiliated with a state. The nature of that affiliation is paramount. The number of terrorist groups which do not enjoy some form of assistance from a government is shrinking rapidly. The assistance may be several times removed (for example, country X provides training to group Y which, in turn, helps train members of group Z), making the relationship less distinct, but the relationship is still a critical factor in planning retaliatory or pre-emptive actions.

The porous borders of democratic nations and the marvels of modern transportation enable anyone to span oceans or continents in a few hours. Therefore, the earlier terms based largely on geography have lost much of their utility for all but the specialized analyst.

While many would agree that the armed services devote excessive time and effort to developing terminology and definitions, in the field of terrorism, we may not have invested enough thought. For DOD to adopt a definition of terrorism which excludes the event wherein the term originated (that is, the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution) may be imaginative, but will it stand the test of utility and time?
Second Alert: Think

Last month, Military Review presented a general set of dos and don'ts to thwart terrorism or minimize personal risk. This month, we take the subject a bit deeper to aid your ability to cope with this threat.

The best counter to the terrorist threat is you—the target. The most important tool you have to work with is your ability to think. But you must reorient your mental processes to concentrate on the threat. This takes a real effort, especially for Americans, as they are not accustomed to a high personal threat environment. You must mentally assume the terrorist role and analyze everything you do from his perspective.

The terrorist is searching for a window of opportunity. He is looking for the easiest way to take you out with the least risk of failure. You may be a singular target or a target by association—because you are American, a soldier, and so forth. You don’t usually have the opportunity to know which kind of target you are, so don’t ever assume there is safety in numbers. What are your windows of opportunity? How do you close them?

The biggest window of opportunity is your degree of predictability. If your actions are predictable, you invite targeting. Do you go to work by the same route at the same time each day? Do you eat lunch at the same place repeatedly? Chances are, if you keep notes, you will find you are as predictable as the cows coming home at milking time. You must concentrate on reducing the predictability of your presence at any one time. This takes work. Write down in a notebook all of the places you must frequent—work site, home, and so forth. Keep track of the times and routes taken each day. Vary the times by at least half an hour, and vary the routes taken between places as much as major roads permit.

The second largest window of opportunity is your inattentiveness to your environment. The terrorist relies on your inattention. He knows that he can get to his target with little chance of detection because your thinking is misoriented. You walk across the street fumbling with your car keys on your way to your car instead of looking at what is going on around you. Who is in that parked car? Why is that man staring at me? What is that man carrying? If you are attentive and are aware of your surroundings, you can vastly reduce your window of vulnerability.

A terrorist usually will spend a great deal of time observing his target looking for vulnerabilities. If you are alert and studying those around you, he may suspect that you are on to him and back off. The terrorist knows that an alert, observant target vastly increases the risk and reduces the chance of his success. The same applies to his inert or area targets—office buildings, automobiles, restaurants, and the like. The more discerning the vigilance, the more likely it will be bypassed as a target. Emphasis is added to the word discerning because it is not quantity but quality that counts.

All too often, one finds scores of security forces assigned to protect an embassy or other vital installation, and a terrorist attack is successfully executed before their very eyes. It happens because the security forces either fail to act or fail to apply constant and discerning vigilance to the objects and events in their surroundings. But, guess what? That’s not going to change, probably because the security forces assume they are not a prime target—you or the other guy is. This is not
meant to berate security personnel. The point here is that you can't rely on someone else to do your thinking. Terrorism is a high-stakes game, and all of the players, especially you, must pay attention.

Now that you are thinking about everything you do and all you see, it is time for some action. Anything unusual must be reported and in detail. It is remarkable how often in the post-mortem of a terrorist incident that a number of people come forward and begin their statement with the words, "I didn't think much of it at the time, but I did notice..." Usually, it is enough information to have foreseen the incident. Unfortunately, it is untimely and, even if it had been reported, it would have lacked detail. Details are important.

Learn to be precise in reporting what you see. Concentrate on those unusual things that you perceive, and get your notes down on paper. What was the license color or number? What was the person wearing, how tall, features, and so forth? This is something you can and must practice. To reinforce this point, describe in detail what your spouse was wearing yesterday.

The channels for reporting suspected terrorist activity, as well as the dissemination of terrorist threat information, should receive priority attention at all echelons of command. Reports must be collected, analyzed and investigated promptly. Information has to get out top to bottom and fast if there is a threat. You, your subordinates and family, if accompanied, must be kept abreast of the threat—WHO? WHAT? WHERE? HOW? WHEN? The greater the threat, the more often you update.

Don't conceptualize the terrorist as some mystical, unavoidable, omnipotent giant. Nothing could be further from the truth. The typical terrorist is stupid for, if he were of reasonable intelligence, he would seek to achieve his purpose by reasonable means. If you are willing to accept that terrorists are just plain dumb and are less intelligent than you are, then you have gained your first and most important advantage. Remember, you are smarter than he is, but you must use your mind to close off his windows of opportunity.

Suggested Reading


**SUMMARIES**

The Alienated Soldier and Military Reform

By Gregory D. Foster

*Defense Analysis*, December 1985

The military, according to Gregory D. Foster, may unwittingly be promoting alienation among its members, and the "potential ramifications, if not fully appreciated, could weigh heavily on the future viability of the institution." Foster, writing in the December 1985 issue of *Defense Analysis*, says that, in its rush to attract personnel, the military "has been especially enamored" with the idea of self-actualization. In other words, enriched human values in the military can only be achieved by letting institutional members do their own thing rather than by creating a learning environment that challenges individuals and expects them to achieve their ultimate potential.

This has led to problems. The military thinks it can achieve its objectives only "by compromising cherished standards," according to Foster, whereas soldiers feel they have been "cut adrift by an institu-

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tion unable to find itself.” Foster claims this dilemma creates a “hothouse effect” in which alienation is permitted to thrive.

What can be done? Foster says the military must institute both systemic and intellectual adjustments that deal with alienation. Specifically, the military must deregulate, rationalize its established policies and programs, and accept competence as an ethical imperative. Also, the military must acknowledge that the alienated personality can potentially contribute to creativity, change and consensus.

Foster writes that only by doing these sorts of things “can the military hope to achieve the sort of institutional vitality and enduring legitimacy that will carry it into the 21st century.”

Foster says there is little evidence in today’s military of a learning environment in which “totally effective socialization can flourish.” In fact, he claims the military has traditionally lagged behind other sectors in societal development.

There are soldiers today who would probably perform remarkably well in combat but who cannot conform to “the mundane routine of garrison life.” Everyone wants to be a general, says Foster, but few actually can. He continues:

The frustrations of waiting for the promotion system to catch up with performance . . . are acute. Such frustrations, if left unattended, may produce institutionally destabilizing behaviors and also may exacerbate the voluntary departure of individuals who possess valuable wartime aptitudes.

Foster suggests several adjustments to improve the system:

- Drastically curtail regulations, de-emphasize hierarchy and adopt a system of “bottom-up, emergent norms which reflect the values of those levels and individuals deemed most important . . . to the institution.”
- Explain policies and programs to prevent depersonalization.
- Make competence an ethical imperative.

Foster says subordinates expect their superiors to assume responsibility equal to the authority the superior perceives he possesses. “Where there is a discrepancy, a perception of normlessness and a consequent feeding of disillusionment and disaffection are likely to result,” writes Foster.—ELH.

(Captain Daniel P. Bolger, in his article in this issue, discusses criticisms of the Grenada invasion leveled by Richard Gabriel and others. The following summary concerns an article in which Gabriel lays out his objections to the invasion so the reader can compare and contrast it with what Bolger has to say—Editor.)

**Scenes From an Invasion**

**By Richard Gabriel**

*The Washington Monthly, February 1986*

Many people have written about the success of the US military invasion of Grenada. But Richard Gabriel, writing in February’s *Washington Monthly*, asserts that the operation was a military success “largely because it could be nothing else.” The disparity of manpower and firepower guaranteed that.

It would be more correct, Gabriel writes, to view Grenada “not as a legitimate success against a significant enemy but as a political operation orchestrated to convey the impression that the U.S. has military credibility.” What distresses him most is that the failures that marred the invasion have gone generally unnoticed, not only by the public but also—most dangerously—by military planners. He writes:

That is a formula for future military disaster. We refused to learn from Vietnam; our refusal led to a decade in which the U.S. application of military force, five times in all, was marked by the same flaws. Our refusal to learn from Grenada does not bode well for the future.

What we must understand, according to Gabriel, is that Grenada demonstrated glaring failures in our intelligence-gathering and command and control capabili-
ties and also in our ability to conduct joint operations. Positions to be occupied by invading forces were not adequately known in advance, and Gabriel says ground units found enemy positions the hard way—"by stumbling on them." Adequate maps of the island became available only after US forces captured them from the enemy. The lack of proper map grid coordinates led to the destruction of a civilian mental hospital and a Marine attack on an Army command post. And, even though the invasion was launched to rescue US medical students, US forces had almost no idea where the students were.

As for command and control, Gabriel writes that US units occasionally attacked one another and could not communicate via radio despite deployment in the same area. Army calls for air strikes had to be relayed to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and then sent via satellite back to the Navy commander who passed them to air controllers aboard aircraft carriers.

Gabriel also says that the question of whether any operation should involve mixed forces "seems to take second place to the desire of all four services to be involved." Almost every joint operation since Vietnam has resulted either in failure or poor performance. These problems, evident in Grenada, will stay with us "as long as the JCS remains a jousting ground for parochial services and interests rather than an efficient planning mechanism," writes Gabriel.

In Grenada, soldiers died or were wounded because of these blunders. Fewer than one-third of our dead were killed by hostile fire, Gabriel says, and 20 percent of our wounded resulted from "friendly fire." No army can expect to sustain itself in battle when more than half its dead and one-fifth of its wounded are victims of its own fire, writes Gabriel.

But Grenada was a political success, he says, "insofar as almost every unit and officer that took part (and even many who did not) was able to enhance his career by being awarded a medal." Some 7,000 soldiers participated in Operation Urgent Fury and, within weeks, the Pentagon awarded 8,633 medals, writes Gabriel. He adds that, if the medals awarded are combined with those pending, the number more than doubles to 19,600.—ELH.

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War: Deter, Fight, Terminate: The Purpose of War Is a Better Peace
By Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., US Army, Retired
Naval War College Review, January-February 1986

One of the positive benefits of the military's experience in Vietnam has been the rethinking of the fundamentals concerning the use of US military forces, claims Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., US Army, Retired, in the January-February issue of Naval War College Review. In this regard, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's principles governing the commitment of US combat forces abroad are right on target.

They hit the mark, Summers says, because they heed Karl von Clausewitz's old admonition "not to take the first step without considering the last." Summers says Weinberger's emphasis on clearly defining our political and military objectives before we commit US forces to combat "is long overdue." He adds that "war termination is given the emphasis it deserves and winning is correctly defined as the realization of the objectives we set out to attain."

It has not always been this way. In Vietnam, for instance, US forces succeeded in everything they set out to do, according to Summers. They projected a huge force halfway around the world and sustained it better than any force had ever been sustained. "On the battlefield itself, the Armed Forces were unbeatable," Summers writes.

Yet, in the end, North Vietnam emerged
victorious. "How could the United States have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably?" Summers asks. That disturbing question led the Army chief of staff at that time to convene a strategic assessment group to reconsider the spectrum of war. Its new definitions are now part of official Army doctrine and are used by the Department of Defense in issuing its strategic planning guidance.

Summers notes, however, that, since the end of the Vietnam War, the military has concentrated on the means of strategy. A consensus has developed on how to deter war, and much has been written on conflict prevention. Another popular topic has been conflict control—how to fight on the battlefields of the future. But, Summers says, war termination has been virtually ignored. "In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have neglected the study of its ends—those objects which will lead directly to peace."

The author cites several historical examples to buttress his claim that we have traditionally had problems with the concept of war termination. In adopting what Summers calls a "strategic defensive" posture, the best our military could hope for on the battlefield was a stalemate while other elements of national power were used to achieve political objectives.

He applauds Weinberger's six preconditions for the commitment of US combat forces precisely because they downplay the defensive and give war termination its proper emphasis:

- Commit US forces only if our national interest or that of our allies is at stake.
- If we decide to commit troops, commit them wholeheartedly with the full intention of winning.
- If we commit forces, have clearly defined political and military objectives.
- Continually reassess and adjust the relationship between our objectives and the forces.
- Do not commit forces without a reasonable assurance of popular support from the people and members of Congress.
- Commit combat forces only as a last resort.—ELH.

The Mundane Side of AirLand Battle

The February and March 1986 issues of Military Review provided most interesting insights on the background and theory of AirLand Battle doctrine. As often happens with high-level discussions, mundane aspects tend to be overlooked or assumed to be too elementary. In real-life situations, however, it is frequently the elementary which makes the difference between success and defeat.

One such aspect in the nonlinear maneuver battle is the inevitability of units being cut off and forced to operate isolated from friendly forces for undetermined periods of time. US military history is very short on experience in this type of environment. There was "the lost battalion" in World War I and Bataan, Corregidor and Bastogne in World War II. It is questionable whether these experiences can form a suitable object lesson for the new doctrine since no offensive spirit was displayed, or was not possible, in any of these situations.

The new doctrine imposes a concept quite unfamiliar to the commander of conventional mind who, in most cases, is not trained for—and has difficulty envisioning—the conditions. Therefore, neither he nor his unit is prepared for isolated operations. In all probability, there is a lack of

I believe that the US Army should adopt a comprehensive approach that recognizes the importance of training at all levels of command. The Army will fail to harness the full potential of its personnel if it does not train them adequately. Training should be a continuous process, not a one-time event. The Army must ensure that its personnel are well-prepared to deal with any situation they may face.

Aside from this psychological and physical barrier, there are mundane—but critical—elements such as fuel and ammunition resupply. This raises the question of what preparations have been made by our North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces with regard to the basic load at the home station, which can be moved with the unit "when the bell rings." Let us hope we are not relying on the Hermann W. Göring concept for the resupply of Stalingrad in a situation which is bound to be more fluid and confusing than Stalingrad ever was.

Another aspect quite unfamiliar to us is the thought of "living off the land." Survival may depend on the ability to use captured Soviet weapons when our own ammunition runs out, for example. How many of our troops know how to operate AKs, RPGs or surface-to-air missiles, not to mention more sophisticated weapons? These are matters which tend to be ignored or found to be outside "the way we do things." Yet, if not addressed, they leave only the alternatives of annihilation or surrender.

I support the views of Major Glenn M. Harned in his article, "Offensive Rear Battle," in the February issue. The concept of using our military police against Soviet Spetsnaz as the linchpin in the current rear battle doctrine is unrealistic and may well be a carry-over of the current fad which regards the struggle against terrorism as a police function. As Harned points out, during World War II in the Soviet Union, the German military police were utterly useless against Soviet partisans, and special Jagdkommando had to be formed.

It also should be kept in mind that Spetsnaz forces far surpass the Soviet partisans of those days in skill, equipment and mental conditioning. It is the latter aspect which is frequently overlooked in the force equation or quite mistakenly classified as morale. This type of mental conditioning is rather different from cheerfulness and good spirit and is probably the most critical element in operations of this type. In order to fight commandos and guerrillas, one has to live and think like they do. There is nothing in our military police training or conditioning to prepare them for this task.

Capt Kevin H. Pilgrim, USA, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Straight Talk

The article, "Tactician, This Is Logistician. Talk to Me. Over.," by Major George C. Knapp Jr. (Military Review, February 1986), was superb. It was a well-written account of a real-world problem, not just another theory which no one can really question. This is the type of writing the Army needs!
A Vote for Grant

In his article, "Harnessing Creativity" Military Review, March 1986, Major Robert L. Maginnis offered us John Dewey's definition of creative thinking which, as I understand it, involves finessing obstacles as opposed to using the frontal attack. He then cited Ulysses S. Grant as someone who relied on brute force or, as Maginnis stated it, "the military prowess of an elephant." Maginnis went on to say that Grant was fortunate "the government could resource his uncreative philosophy of war"—so much for the man most responsible for the Union victory in the American Civil War.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, states:

General Grant also understood the essence of offensive operations. Although he could fight direct and bloody actions when necessary [my emphasis], he was a master of maneuver, speed, and the indirect approach. His operation south of Vicksburg, called the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil, exemplifies the qualities of a well-conceived, violently executed offensive plan.

FM 100-5 then illustrated the Vicksburg Campaign as part of the "Historical Perspective" for "Fundamentals of the Offense." In addition to the Vicksburg operation, Grant showed the same creative thinking in his earlier movements toward Forts Henry and Donelson, the latter leading to his capture of an entire Confederate army (the first of three). As to the Chattanooga operation, the speedy concentration of portions of three separate Union armies, the flexibility in the way these armies were task-oriented, and the audacity and surprise of the attack on the Confederate center are hardly characteristics of "elephant prowess."

I was surprised to learn from Maginnis that there was not a full day of battle on 1 July 1863 at Gettysburg. I hope that "creativity" does not mean ignoring historical fact.

Maj James D. Van Eldik, USA, US Army ROTC Instructor Group, Tennessee Technological University

Maginnis Responds

Perhaps Major Van Eldik is correct about Grant in the Western Campaign, especially at Vicksburg. Grant's plan was to cross the Mississippi below Vicksburg and attack the fortress from the east after destroying the Confederate forces in the field. His initial actions reflect possibly his boldest decision in the war. He decided to defeat the Confederates separately before they (Joseph E. Johnston and John
C. Pemberton) could unite. He abandoned his line of supply and moved north to attack Johnston. Grant's success at Champion's Hill decisively altered the Confederate effort to unite. Pemberton subsequently withdrew his forces behind Vicksburg's ramparts.

Grant's actions during the Henry and Donelson Campaign were not as creative. First, he was a subordinate to Major General Henry W. Halleck. It was Halleck's plan and not Grant's that was executed. Second, the confusion in the Confederate command, their lack of a "brown" navy and a less than forceful senior commander contributed more to the Union success than anything Grant, Halleck or Charles F. Smith did. This campaign was followed by the Battle at Shiloh (Pittsburg Landing), Tennessee. According to General Don C. Buell, Grant's "record is silent and tradition adverse to any marked influence that he exerted upon the fortune of the day." A more creative leader would have pursued the withdrawing Pierre G Beauregard. Grant did not.

At Chattanooga, Grant was fortunate to have an outstanding chief of staff and some excellent subordinate commanders. William T. Sherman and Joseph Hooker were already converging on Chattanooga when Grant assumed command. There is no denying that Grant was a fierce fighter, but his more than 2-to-1 advantage and the initiative demonstrated at the regiment and division commander level won the battle.

The war in the East was the big war. This was Grant's show. If he was a creative senior leader, it should have been evident during the battles of 1864 and 1865. Grant's lack of creativity in battle was especially evident during the Battles of the Wilderness (5-6 May 1864), Spotsylvania Court House (8-12 May 1864) and Cold Harbor (1-3 June 1864). The tone of his battles was set at Spotsylvania when he wrote, "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." That he did, one frontal attack after another.

Cold Harbor was the most controversial of these battles. One of his senior officers said, "in the opinion of a majority of its survivors, the Battle of Cold Harbor should never have been fought. There was no military reason to justify it." As a result, Grant was labeled the "butcher." (Union casualties totaled 55,000 in the battles.)

Grant was under strong political pressure to force the pace of the campaign to gain a decisive victory before the fall presidential election. Therefore, he massed an army of 108,000 to oppose almost 70,000 Confederates. This man of inflexible purpose and indomitable will later acknowledged the error of his way. He confessed:

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22nd of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor, no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.

His failure at Cold Harbor was attributed to grave miscalculations in estimating the morale and stamina of Confederate troops, the tactical skill of their commander and the effectiveness of rifle fire against troops in the open. He was also overly confident in thinking that he could achieve victory by pushing relentlessly as at Chattanooga.

Grant was successful because he was a fierce battle captain. He was aggressive! With the possible exception of Vicksburg, he was not an innovative tactician. Even his finesse in that battle can be traced to his academy days and his study of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1796 when the emperor found himself between the Austrian and Sardinian armies in the foothills of Piedmont.

Van Eldik also questions when the Battle of Gettysburg began. Although sizable elements saw some action on 1 July, the major fighting took place on 2 and 3 July 1863.

Maj Robert L. Maginnis, USA, Fort Benning, Georgia
C'I BACKUP

Despite large expenditures to develop sophisticated communications equipment, the French still maintain a 100-bird carrier pigeon force in their army, according to The Associated Press (AP).

The force reportedly is being maintained as a backup communications system. According to the AP, pigeon contingency plans have been developed, and the army maintains information on some 35,000 pigeon keepers in the country who may be called upon to supply birds during emergencies.

The French army even exercises the birds. Carrying on a tradition that dates to the Franco-Prussian War in the late 1800s, the army conducted pigeon maneuvers employing civilian pigeons and pigeon keepers a year ago. The AP says additional pigeon maneuvers are planned — Armed Forces Journal International, © 1986

MAKING ITS MARC

The US Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC) recently took delivery of the first of 27 self-contained, air-transportable command and control centers known as the MAC Airlift Control Element Reaction Communication (MARC) system.

MARC, produced by E-Systems Inc of Dallas, Texas, consists of a shelter that contains a wide variety of command and control communications equipment. Included are avionics radios and secure voice and secure record communications data terminals.

Transferred via MAC aircraft, the MARC system can be operational within two hours of delivery and needs no special equipment to assemble. Developers envision MARC being deployed to an isolated airfield at the beginning of an operation, serving as a command and control facility throughout the operation and being shipped out on the last aircraft to depart.

Each MARC system has communications and data processing equipment, a shelter, environmental control units for heating and air conditioning and diesel-powered generators. The systems are capable of providing high-frequency, very high-frequency, ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and UHF satellite communications to user units.

Additional MARC systems will be delivered at the rate of one every seven weeks through mid-1989, according to E-Systems.

PROXIMITY FUZE INTRODUCED

A new electronic double-action proximity fuze for mortar bombs has been introduced by the Israeli manufacturer, Reshef Defense Technologies Ltd. The fuze — called Alpha M787 — is compatible with 60, 81, 82, 120 and 160mm mortar bombs.

According to the manufacturer, the fuze has a "peak trajectory sensor" which activates the Alpha M787 only after it has begun descending. This feature increases the safety for friendly troops. The fuze, which can be set for proximity or point detonation, is powered by an air-driven alternator.

Armed Forces Journal International, © 1986
LIGHT ATTACK HELICOPTER

South Africa has developed a prototype light attack helicopter—the Alpha XH1—that makes greater use of locally developed components. Results of the helicopter's first test flights have been evaluated, and modifications are being made before further tests are conducted.

The Alpha XH1 is a two-seat aircraft with the weapons operator forward and the pilot behind him. A distinguishing feature of this attack helicopter is the wide field of vision—particularly downward to the sides—offered the crew members.

The main weapon is a 20mm GA1 cannon that can fire 600 rounds per minute. A thousand rounds of ammunition are carried on board. The gun turret is controlled through the weapons operator's helmet sight. Despite a low muzzle velocity, the GA1 rounds have an armor-piercing capability. The GA1 is recoil-operated and can be fed from either the left or right side.

Other weapons can be mounted on the Alpha XH1 as well. In one setup tested, four 7.62mm machine-guns were mounted. The production model will almost certainly carry unguided rockets and antitank guided missiles.

The airframe is metal with components of composite material. The aircraft also has a retractable tail wheel. A gas turbine engine reportedly gives the Alpha XH1 speeds comparable to similar aircraft. —Jane's Defence Weekly, © 1986.

ANOTHER MOBILE BRIDGE

The US Army has awarded a $612,000 incremental contract for the fabrication of a third prototype of a new mobile assault bridge for use in its heavy divisions. This prototype will be identical to the previous two developed by Bowen-McLaughlin-York (BMY) of York, Pennsylvania. The new system consists of a 100-foot-span bridge with a 70-ton capacity mounted on an M1 tank chassis. It features a double-folding design and uses composite materials for key components to reduce the system's weight.

BMY received an original $4.9 million contract in April 1983 covering design and fabrication of a single mobile bridge prototype. Another contract for $1.9 million was awarded in February 1985 for the second prototype. The total value of the three-prototype contract is nearly $8.5 million considering additional increments.
LARGEST MICROCOMPUTER CONTRACT

An estimated 90,000 personal computers will be supplied to the four services over the next three years under a $242 million contract—the largest microcomputer contract ever awarded by the US government.

Under the terms of the contract, Zenith Data Systems (ZDS) Corporation will supply its Z200 personal computer. In addition, other Department of Defense agencies can purchase personal computers under this contract. Zenith won the contract following extensive functional tests and cost evaluations by the US Air Force Computer Acquisition Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. The Z200 computer uses an Intel 80286 processor and runs virtually all software written for the International Business Machine personal computer, as well as XT and AT computers.

The contract calls for three Z200 versions—a dual floppy disk-drive unit, a dual-drive unit with a 20-megabyte hard disk-drive unit and a hard disk-drive unit with additional memory. Z200s will be delivered with a variety of peripherals, including printers, plotters and monitors.

THAI TRIALS FOR WEST GERMAN TANK

The Cavalry Center of Thailand recently completed a series of mobility and firepower tests on the TH301 medium battle tank produced by the West German firm Thyssen Hen­schel. These trials marked the first time the TH301 had been tested by a non-NATO country. The Thai Cavalry Center reportedly fired 130 rounds of West German ammunition through the Rh-105-30 main gun, including high-explosive antitank and armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarding sabot rounds.

Another test involved removing the power pack from the vehicle, separating the engine and transmission, and replacing the reassembled system. The Thais accomplished this in an hour. The Thais also fired at night with the TH301 fitted with a passive television system featuring individual monitors for the tank commander and gunner—Jane’s Defence Weekly, © 1986.

DIGITAL COMPASSES

The US Navy and Marine Corps have begun purchasing a line of digital compasses that are comparable in ruggedness and reliability to current gyro systems but which also interface easily with existing navigational systems. According to representatives of KVH Industries of Rhode Island, manufacturer of the digital compasses, their product uses custom chips and microprocessors to provide a low-cost, no-maintenance alternative to gyrocompasses.

The Marine Corps is already using a version of KVH’s PC103 compass on its LVT amphibious vehicles. The Navy’s SEAL Team 6 uses the PC103 on its high-speed boats. While the Nav-Sea Engineering unit in Norfolk, Virginia, uses the PC202 as a backup for gyrocompasses mounted on some large vessels. Batteries keep the PC202 operating for up to 40 hours.

KVH Industries also markets a hand-held digital compass system with a precision sight, push-button trigger, built-in readout and minia­ture flux-gate sensor. This compass is housed in a compact, waterproof case and includes a remote electronics unit plus cable, connectors and mounting hardware.

MORE GUN DISPLAY UNITS

In the seventh such contract renewal since 1980, Marconi Command and Control Systems Ltd. of the United Kingdom recently won a £5 million award for the production of an additional 1,000 gun display units for the US Army’s battery computer system (BCS).

BCS, the Army’s advanced field artillery computer system, has led to nearly £23.5 million in Marconi contracts over the last six years for producing the gun display units. Deliveries under the latest contract will begin this year and carry into 1988.

There is one gun display unit for each gun in a battery, and it normally consists of a section chief assembly, display terminals for azimuth and elevation, and a signal and power distribution unit.
SPANISH HORNETS

The first four EF18 Hornet aircraft built for the Spanish air force will soon be ferried to Zaragoza in northeastern Spain. They are part of a fleet of 72 of the strike fighters built by McDonnell Douglas and ordered by Spain in 1983.

The EF18 Hornet—the Spanish version of the FA18 aircraft being flown by the US Navy and Marine Corps—recently completed test flights in St Louis, Missouri. Spanish pilots began their Hornet training with McDonnell Douglas in March.

Spain is the third foreign country to purchase the Hornet. Canada ordered 138 of the aircraft, while Australia ordered 75.

TACMS CONTRACT AWARDED

Full-scale engineering development of the US Army Tactical Missile System (TACMS) is set to begin following the award of a $37.4 million contract to LTV Aerospace and Defense Company of Dallas. The contract, which over four years is expected to total nearly $160 million, calls for creation of a new conventional artillery weapon that can strike targets deep behind enemy lines beyond the range of existing cannons, rockets and the Lance missile now in service.

The Army TACMS and launch pod assembly will be compatible with the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). An $83 million contract was awarded to LTV's Vought Missiles and Advanced Programs Division to integrate TACMS and its container into the MLRS launch vehicle.

The Army envisions TACMS as a warhead for use against personnel, supplies and equipment. The engineering development program is structured to incorporate future technology advances.

HOLSTERS FOR GENERALS, TOO

Last year, the US Army adopted the Bianchi International M12 hip holster as the standard carrier for its new Beretta 9mm handgun (MR, Jan 1986, p 88). It recently awarded Bianchi another contract to produce a version of the M12 holster and ammunition pocket specifically for use by Army general officers.

The general's holster will be constructed of a thin, outer layer of soft, black leather over a nonabsorbent, closed-cell polyfoam core. The ammunition pocket will be made of the same materials. The holster features a fastener to securely attach the holster to the belt without threading.

Under the contract, Bianchi will deliver several thousand sets of the new holster and ammunition pocket during 1986.

Patriot PROCUREMENT

Fifteen Patriot air defense system (MR, May 1985, p 82) fire units, 770 missiles and additional spares will be produced by Raytheon Company under a recent $935.6 million contract that covers Patriot procurement during this fiscal year.

The US Army has deployed its first two Patriot battalions to West Germany and activated a third Europe-bound battalion for stateside training. The Patriot system uses a phased-array radar for target acquisition, tracking and missile guidance.

UP PERISCOPE!

A periscope image generator capable of simulating weather, time of day, sea state and effects of the earth's curvature has been developed for use in a submarine command team training device to be delivered soon to the British Royal Navy.

According to Ferranti Computer Systems Ltd., developers of the device, the periscope image generator will offer quality similar to that seen in most flight simulators. The detailed target images produced can be distorted by simulated land masses, other targets or foreground waves to add realism. A library of more than 600 target types is included.

The computer processor built into the system can generate up to eight targets simultaneously in any field of view. Many more targets can be generated within the simulated 360-degree pan of the periscope.
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE THIRD WORLD:
Agenda, 1985-86. Edited by John W. Sewell,
Richard E. Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab 242
Pages. Transaction Books, New Brunswick, N.J.
1985. $19.95 clothbound. $12.95 paperbound.

The first miracle of this book is that the
authors and editors display no discernible ax
to grind. The second is that the editors have
adopted a unique approach in that the various
chapters form a coherent whole and not mere
pottery shards of information.

The work stresses economic factors in US
relations with the Third World. Military
considerations are mentioned only as they affect
favored or disfavored economic relationships.
Most works deal with this topic in ominous
statements concerning "multi-national corpo-
rations," "economic imperialism" and "the
military-industrial complex." U.S. Foreign
Policy and the Third World approaches the
subject in a less shrill tone, focusing on domes-
tic ideology and the needs of US workers and
industry in the development of foreign policy.

Ninety pages of charts, tables and graphs help
to illustrate points in the text.

A final section traces US reaction to "radical"
regimes. The subject is easily a book in
itself. The editors survey the efforts of the last
two administrations to moderate the behavior
of immoderate regimes. Results are evaluated
with a nonpartisan scholarly attitude. It is sur-
prising at first to see South Africa grouped
with the radical regimes. The working defi-
tion, however, fits Africa's White Tribe which
presents an interesting case regardless of defi-
nition.

The work does not provide answers, much
less an agenda for US foreign policy. It raises
questions and evaluates past performance. The
work concludes that a nonideological eclectic
approach has succeeded most often in obtaining
Third World objectives, at the expense of
consistency.

Failure to provide an agenda for US foreign
policy cannot be considered a major loss in the
work. Had it provided such an agenda, it would
be obsolete by 1987. In its current form, the
book is a valuable historical work for many
years to come. It is not a book for the average
reader, but the Third World scholar cannot
afford to be without it.

Kevin L. Jamison, Kansas City, Missouri

SECURITY AND DETENTE: Conflicting Priorities
in German Foreign Policy by Helga Haftendorn.
$39.95.

In this rich and tightly constructed book
from a German academician, the argument is
made that the two elements named in the title
form the horns of an abiding dilemma for the
modern West German state. If scholars
instinctively resist attempts to incorporate
this sort of polarity into the interpretation of
complex events, the dilemma will persist.
Security and Detente goes far in explaining the
problems and opportunities of German foreign
and defense policy today.

The situation in Central Europe now evolved
from the courses pursued on basic questions of
German policies after World War II. There was
a choice between guaranteed military security
in the face of a predominant Soviet ground
power on the Continent and a more idealistic
course that proposed neutralizing both Germa-
nies as a prerequisite for reunifying the coun-
try. German policymakers, notably Konrad
Adenauer, opted first for security and close
union with the Western Powers that coalesced
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Alliance.

Though this choice brought such clear bene-
fits as a reduction of tensions with France and
permitted a certain economic integration in
Western Europe, it also understandably
pushed into the future any hope for an early
resolution of the division of Germany. It would
appear that any movement in favor of one alternative excludes improvement on the other. Yet, Helga Haftendorn shows that there is much room for maneuver in West German policy and demonstrates how idealism and reality have balanced each other in German policymaking since 1945.

Today, West Germany remains firmly rooted in the NATO Alliance although it is committed to finding openings in the stony reserve of its "brother republic." This commitment to Ostpolitik is now a common element of both Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties (and of the Free Democrats who have run the Foreign Office during the decades of coalition government). German governments have had to keep one eye on Washington, D.C., to measure the shifts in superpower relations that would either advance or retard their efforts. Washington and Bonn are frequently out of step in these events, but this is neither unusual nor particularly dangerous. Common interests make for essentially common policy.

Keeping its goals of security and continuing contacts with the East compatible is the challenge of West German policy in the 1980s, concludes Haftendorn. Thus far, our German allies have managed themselves well. Whether the postwar generations will resist renewed Soviet efforts to dissociate the West German brother from its security base will determine the future success of this balancing act in the middle of Europe. This still portends much for the alliance as a whole.

Alfred M. Beck,
Office of Air Force History,
Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

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What new subjects can be divined from the most scrutinized war in American history? Archie K. Davis, a retired banker from Winston-Salem, North Carolina, has discovered some new ground to plow with his *Boy Colonel of the Confederacy*. His subject, Henry King Burgwyn Jr., would not appear in most of the great works. He only commanded a regiment of North Carolina Volunteers—the 26th Infantry—and that for less than a year.

Burgwyn's distinction was not that he commanded 800 soldiers well, which he did, but that, when commissioned a lieutenant colonel at the age of 19, he became the youngest colonel in the Confederate Army. When the Civil War began, young Burgwyn had already earned a bachelor's degree from the University of North Carolina and was in his last months of study at Virginia Military Institute (VMI). He would have earned a second degree, graduating first in his class. The outbreak of war interrupted his studies and, along with most of the VMI students, he entered service to his state within the next month.

The 26th North Carolina Volunteers was commanded by Colonel Zebulon B. Vance, soon to be elected governor of North Carolina. Burgwyn was elected second in command. Vance's movement into the governor's office made way for Burgwyn to become the commander of the regiment at the age of 21.

Davis describes the meteoric career of the boy colonel beautifully. Meticulous in his research without becoming laborious, his style moves easily from the larger events of the Civil War to the lesser battles at New Bern, Washington and Fort Macon in eastern North Carolina. In that arena, Burgwyn led the 26th North Carolina and trained his men in preparation for more important battles. Like Thomas J. Jackson, his mentor at VMI, Burgwyn was a stern disciplinarian but was respected by his men.

The great moment for the 26th North Carolina came on 1 July 1863 at Gettysburg. Burgwyn had moved his troops from the North Carolina defenses to join Robert E. Lee's army for an invasion of the North. On the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, the 26th North Carolina attacked Solomon Meredith's "Iron Brigade" of Michigan soldiers. In its charge across the Emmitsburg Road and up the wooded slopes of McPherson's Ridge, the 26th drove three Union regiments from their positions. Of the 800 soldiers who made the charge, 708 fell, among them Burgwyn. His regiment would hold the dubious distinction of sustaining the highest casualty rate of any regiment at Gettysburg, and in the Civil War.

Davis' work captures the reader's attention from beginning to end. He uses letters and diaries from the Burgwyn family masterfully, integrating them with official records, regi-
mental histories, battle studies and newspaper accounts. The portrait he draws of Burgwyn is one of an exceptional young man, mature beyond his years, and an outstanding combat leader. The book is more than a biography—Davis depicts the political and social ethos of the Southern white slave oligarchy, describing the phenomenon with balance and objectivity.

Civil War students will want to read this work. It is well-researched, clearly written and entertaining. It deserves a prominent place in the military historian's library.

Ch (Maj) William L. Hufham, USA, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Washington, D.C.

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This is one of the most comprehensive examinations of the Vietnam War yet written. Gabriel Kolko has gone far beyond the obvious military, political and economic aspects of the war to explore in-depth the causative factors leading to the end result. The examination covers four decades of history and looks at the Communists, South Vietnam, the United States and worldwide forces impacting on the struggle.

The book is summed up very well in the introduction when the author states:

"War is not simply a conflict between armies; more and more it is a struggle between competing social systems incorporating the political, economic, and cultural institutions of all rivals."

He goes on to say that the longer a war lasts the more likely it will be decided outside the arena of arms and battles. This latter statement is certainly true of the Vietnam experience.

Those interested in a history of battles and campaigns will be disappointed. Anatomy of a War looks beyond the outward manifestations of events and examines such diverse topics as land reform, peasant motivations and allegiances, social and political structure, military tactics and strategies, the impact of the war on all of the national life of the participants, dominant personalities and many other factors. The sociological forces working on all parties are particularly emphasized.

Many American readers with vested interests in the war will not agree with much of what is said. The picture portrayed by Kolko lays the blame for what transpired directly at our feet. In his view, we never understood Vietnamese society or our own political, military and economic liabilities in a protracted war. In fact, one of the few weaknesses of the book is that Kolko goes too far in crediting the Communists with understanding, dedication and military powers. On the other hand, neither the US nor South Vietnamese governments were as venal as the author would have us believe.

Kolko is one of the foremost writers on US history and foreign affairs today. Anatomy of a War will add to his credentials. It is a well-documented, comprehensive book of interest to anyone wishing to study the Vietnam War in all of its ramifications.

Lt Col John A. Hardaway, USA, Directorate of Academic Operations, USACGSC

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HERO OR COWARD: Pressures Facing the Soldier in Battle by Elmar Dinter. 197 Pages. Frank Cass & Co., Totowa, N.J. 1985. $24.00 clothbound. $12.50 paperbound

The longer an army goes without a war, the more important books such as Hero or Coward: Pressures Facing the Soldier in Battle become. In that regard, the focus of this small book is critical. Elmar Dinter, a West German-Bundeswehr artilleryman, staff officer and lecturer at the British Staff College, seeks to respond to the timeless question of why some soldiers fight well while others flee. Ideally, Dinter's answers will aid every soldier to predict his or her individual reaction to the physical and psychological pressures of combat.

The principal objective of the study is to identify, define, compare and prioritize the truly decisive pressures of combat. In doing so, Dinter outlines standards for the most effective means of organizing, training and, most important, leading soldiers on the modern battlefield. Nevertheless, as intriguing as the book appears, especially after scanning its table of contents (chapters on stress, psychiatric casualties and effects on the commander), it is not without its problems, several of them serious.
Unfortunately, *Hero or Coward* suffers from a lack of support and a confusing style and structure. Conclusions are drawn and behavioral arguments freely made without adequate support. The writing style is at times erratic—"hit and miss"—perhaps a function of translation or the inherent difficulty in writing on a complex issue in a second language. Most disturbing, however, is the book's structure. Sequenced vignettes on the World War II Battles of Calais, Stalingrad and Monte Cassino are offered at the end of the book as historical examples to support statements made in the narrative. This design constantly requires the reader either to refer to them (as often as three or four times in a single brief paragraph) or surrender altogether in frustration and accept at face value what is presented, without a supporting anecdote. Collectively, these problems make reading difficult.

In fact, the book really says nothing new beyond its recommendations for modern armies in selecting, training and leading their soldiers. Despite these faults, *Hero or Coward* can aid the unseasoned soldier as well as the veteran in answering the question, "How will I behave in battle?" In that regard, the book is worth reading.

Maj Gary B. Griffin, USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

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*The Challenge of Command* by Colonel Roger H. Nye, US Army, Retired, represents years of insight derived from active service in peace and war. Nye's deep study and inspired teaching of history and international relations and his active participation in the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Study and the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) efforts add to this. It is the product of an active soldier who knows the value of clear thinking.

Nye's work is based on two propositions: all Army officers should develop integrated patterns of thought dealing with the military profession to meet the challenges of command, and these patterns of thought can best be developed by an officer of inquiring mind who systematically digests the literature of the profession and integrates the insights gained from this process with his own observation and experience. While Nye does not offer empirical data to prove either assertion, the weight of suggestive example in his work suffices to support them convincingly.

Based on these foundations, Nye then lays out eight substantive chapters on the challenges of command ranging from tactical and strategic responsibilities to moral and ethical considerations. The book concludes with an epilogue describing the commander's role as a teacher and mentor. Each chapter is both a thought-provoking essay on the subject at hand and a survey of the extant literature on the subject. At the end of each chapter is a list of 15 to 20 relevant works.

Nye's style is judicious, addressing multiple perspectives of controversial issues. His approach is comprehensive, balanced and useful. All significant aspects of the responsibility of command are addressed. The utility of his work is threefold:

- The serious professional soldier will be stimulated by Nye's observations to think more deeply about professional responsibilities.
- The suggested readings whet one's professional appetite to continue to learn.
- The individual chapters would be excellent vehicles for an officer professional development program in the field.

Many readers will want to make suggestions for a second edition. For example, with the Army's current doctrine articulating three perspectives on warfighting rather than the traditional two of tactics and strategy, Nye might wish to add a chapter on "The Commander as Practitioner of Operational Art." Clay Blair's recent book, *Ridgway's Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II*, with its detailed discussion of the human dimension of command at battalion, regiment, division and corps, would be an appropriate addition to the chapter, "The Commander as Tactician."

We should, however, applaud the first edition for what it is—an informed and judicious survey of the demands of the military profession, clearly organized and usefully formatted. This is a book that should be bought as well as digested. Its publication in paperback at a rea-
sonable price makes such a purchase practical as well as desirable.

Lt Col Hal R. Winton, USA, Deputy Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC


Two of the most influential men in 20th-century history are the subject of this highly readable biography by British historian Richard Hough. Both Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt played key roles in the naval strategy and tactics of two world wars. Using an interesting format, Hough weaves a good deal of naval history, grand strategy and international politics into the lives of the two subjects. The Greatest Crusade emerges as lively history and pert biography spanning more than 80 years of Anglo-American naval cooperation.

Churchill, of course, began his military career as a soldier. In his superb early autobiography, My Early Years - A Roving Commission, Churchill covers his military service in India, Africa, Cuba and elsewhere around the globe. The Greatest Crusade discusses most of this ground well, particularly his conflicts with Lord Horatio H. Kitchener. His naval career really began during the years immediately preceding World War I. He served with distinction in the British equivalent of the Department of the Navy up through the fiasco at Gallipoli. This section of the volume amply displays the fine sense of the gradually developing sense of naval strategy that Churchill exhbit.

Roosevelt's early experiences with things nautical were much more significant than Churchill's. When he was the assistant secretary of the Navy, for example, Roosevelt would often take the "con" and drive destroyers through tricky stretches of inland waters. He was an expert sailor whose knowledge and appreciation of the Navy's role in national events was always evident. His demonstrated "navalism" remained quite pronounced throughout his public service.

When each of the statesmen underwent a period of turmoil between the wars, Churchill as a political pariah and Roosevelt as a victim of polio, both emerged stronger for the experience. Their rise to the top of their nations as World War II unfolded is well documented in The Greatest Crusade, and their cooperation on the eve of the US entry into the war in writing the Atlantic Charter is the best told episode in the book.

If the volume suffers from a flaw, it is its overreaching scope. To try and pack the lives of two important statesmen and the naval history of two world wars into just over 200 pages is not feasible and is not the book's real intent. Hough, instead, provides a light and interesting read through a fascinating point of intersection between two of history's towering figures - their mutual fascination with the sea and naval warfare. In The Greatest Crusade, Hough illuminates one facet of two complex characters well, and, in so doing, spins a good tale. It is a book that serves at once as naval history, brief biography and high entertainment.

LCDR James G. Stavridis, USN, Naval Station, San Diego, California


During this rifle company's 100 days of combat, its regimental commander visited the company only once - after a particularly bloody attack. But the commander seemed "unsure" of the situation and did not come that far forward again. Often, the men in the company subsisted on K rations while the headquarters messes burned hot and bright. They ran out of ammunition in the middle of firefights. Their wounded often walked or crawled to the rear when they could. The armor and artillery that supported them were quite frequently as dangerous to them as to the enemy, and they were never quite there when they were needed most desperately.

Some of the 200 replacements found their way to the company without adequate gear and ammunition. Replacements sometimes perished before anyone knew their names. In nearly every engagement, someone broke down under the shock of battle: self-inflicted
wounds (SIWs) were not common, but neither were they unusual. For a large part of the worst European winter in 25 years, they fought and ate and slept in the frigid debris of battle.

They were K Company, 333d Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division, one of 27 line infantry companies in the division and one of 1,200 such companies then deployed along the Siegfried line in November 1944. In anticipation of their campaign to the Elbe River, the company had trained for two years in Texas and Louisiana. On the day before they entered the line at Geilenkirchen, they were, in every respect, the complete and typical infantry company. Then, they stepped off in skirmish line and the disintegration that threatens every unit in action.

Before long, after a disastrous series of engagements in the Würm Valley, the company was barely alive. The battalion medical officer believed the unit had been virtually "wiped out." Company K defied this opinion, however, filled its lost ranks and moved to the next objective. By March 1945, Company K was a few miles south of Berlin. Thirty-six company men had been killed in action and hundreds more wounded or injured. That they succeeded in going that far was a testament to their courage and fortitude against a skilled and well-practiced enemy, against indifferent higher commanders and indeed against the war itself.

Forty years later, the survivors of Company K have come together once more to produce, under the aegis of two of its former commanders, Harold P. Leinbaugh and John D. Campbell, an original and powerful piece of war literature. Although Charles B. MacDonald's Company Commander comes readily to mind, there is really no similar work from World War II. The work is all the more valuable because it is the story of an ordinary rifle company that even now offers its claims so modestly the reader may be deceived by what this unit and others like it actually accomplished. Without quite meaning to, The Men of Company K stands as a rebuke to those who would see war as somehow bloodless and abstract. It acts as a check upon those who would make war only on acetate overlays, where at:

... the tip of the arrow ... you find a handful of raggedy-assed riflemen, men who have more in common with the foot soldiers at Antietam or Chancellorville than with anyone a half mile to their rear.

The Men of Company K deserves a place in every professional soldier's library alongside S. L. A. Marshall's Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War and MacDonald's Company Commander. For those of any calling who would begin to understand the fundamental and profound facts of combat, The Men of Company K is indispensable.

Roger J. Spiller, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC


Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control and the Future is one of the best of the current crop of anthologies dealing with the debate over nuclear weapons. The editors are all connected with California's Claremont McKenna College. P. Edward Haley and David M. Keithly are with the Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, and Jack Merritt is a professor emeritus in physics. Written to serve as a textbook in courses on national security policy, the book has several strong selling points.

First, it consists almost entirely of primary materials such as documents and statements by civilian and military leaders. Of the 58 articles included, only 16 are by the civilian specialists or advocates outside of public office. Only one of the book's 11 sections is composed mainly of such articles, and that is the short section on the morality of nuclear deterrence. The editors wanted to find "classic" statements which represented official policy or central themes which decisively influenced policy.

Second, there is a section of nine articles by Soviet officials and military thinkers. The Soviet view of strategy is often overlooked in
anthologies which gives the impression (intended or not) that the problems of the nuclear arms race are entirely of US origin and could be solved by our unilateral action. The editors make clear that the Soviet view of war is quite different from the views that are dominant in the West. The Soviets stress the traditional pursuit of victory, inspired by a mixture of Karl von Clausewitz and Marxism-Leninism.

A wide number of topics are addressed, with sections on history, strategy, arms control (both the process and the agreements themselves), strategic defense, intermediate-range systems, alliance problems and future possibilities. Bibliographies are provided at the end of each major section. A very good introductory essay by the editors pulls these together and explains concepts in a way which is both thorough and concise. Though the book presents a cross section of views, the balance favors those who wish to strengthen the United States' strategic posture with active defenses and counterforce strategies rather than trust to assured destruction or arms control.

William R. Hawkins, The South Foundation, Knoxville, Tennessee


The successful German attack on Crete was one of the most dramatic episodes of the European war. When it was over, the British had sustained a major defeat which produced the first serious criticisms in parliament of Winston Churchill's leadership. Only later did it become clear that the cost of victory had been ruinously high for the Germans.

Subsequently, historians were to speculate on the foregone opportunity represented by Germany's failure to capitalize on Great Britain's precarious position in the Middle East in 1941. Later, it would become apparent that Ultra intelligence had given the British a remarkably clear picture of German plans and capabilities, leading Churchill to anticipate a defensive victory instead of the debacle that took place.

G. C. Kiriakopoulos is not interested in these larger issues (his bibliography, remarkably, includes none of the relevant studies on the impact of Ultra on British strategy and operations except F. W. Winterbotham's long-superseded memoir The Ultra Secret). He has concentrated, instead, on the battle itself, building his account on published materials. His writing is vigorous and clear. He has highlighted the fact that Greek troops and Cretan islanders played a role in the fighting, a fact that is not much stressed in British and Commonwealth accounts.

The practice of turning third person narration into direct dialogue doubtless adds, as the author claims, to the drama of his account. But, in fact, what the battle for Crete requires is not a highly dramatic writing style but searching analysis. Why exactly did Bernard C. Freyberg and his subordinate commanders handle—and lose—the battle as they did? Was the prime minister correct in his feeling that the British army lacked the determination it had shown in 1914-18? Or was the explanation that prewar British training and doctrine produced operational skills weaker than those of the Wehrmacht?

In Ten Days to Destiny, Kiriakopoulos has done a good job of telling his readers what happened on Crete. It would be nice if the next author to tackle the subject asked why.

Raymond Callahan, Department of History, University of Delaware

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED


STUDIES IN COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: Volume 6: The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead?: Military-Political Affairs in the


HITLER’S SPIES: German Military Intelligence in World War II by David Kahn 671 Pages Collier Books, N.Y. 1985 $14.95

BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT AFTER WORLD WAR II by Julian Lister 621 Pages Gower Publishing Co., Brookfield, VI 1985 $53.95


LEADERSHIP ON THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD, Edited by James G. Hunt and John D. Blair 349 Pages Pergamon Press, Elmsford, N.Y 1985 $30.00


SEEING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WHOLE by Brewster C. Denny 202 Pages University of Illinois Press, Champaign, Ill. 1985 $19.95


NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC BASIN. Edited by Claude A. Buss Foreword by W. Glenn Campbell 317 Pages Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Calif. 1985 $19.95


SPY-TECH by Graham Yost 288 Pages Facts on File, N.Y. 1985 $17.95

MAPLE LEAF ROUTE: Antwerp by Terry Copp and Robert Vogel 143 Pages Maple Leaf Route, Alma, Ontario, Can. 1984

MAPLE LEAF ROUTE: Caen by Terry Copp and Robert Vogel 125 Pages Maple Leaf Route, Alma, Ontario, Can. 1983

MAPLE LEAF ROUTE: Falaise by Terry Copp and Robert Vogel 143 Pages Maple Leaf Route, Alma, Ontario, Can. 1983


BALTIC ASSIGNMENT: British Submariners in Russia, 1914-1919 by Michael Wilson 244 Pages David & Charles. North Pomfret, Vt 1985 $29.95

MILITARY INCOMPETENCE: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win by Richard A. Gabriel. 208 Pages Hill & Wang, N.Y 1985 $16.95


DUEL FOR THE SKY by Christopher Shores 208 Pages. Doubleday & Co., N.Y 1985 $19.95

PAYBACK by Joe Klein 416 Pages Ballantine Books, N.Y. 1984 $3.95


THE RED ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE: In the Great Patriotic War by Albert Z. Conner and Robert G. Poirer 408 Pages Pressidio Press, Novato, Calif. 1985 $22.50


OKINAWA, 1945: Gateway to Japan by Ian Gow 244 Pages Doubleday & Co., N.Y 1985 $16.95


THE DEVIL’S HORSEMEN: The Mongol Invasion of Europe by James Chambers 190 Pages Atheneum Publishers, N.Y 1985 $6.95


OVER THE RHINE: The Last Days of War in Europe by Brian J. Gilchrist 64 Pages Hippocrene Books, N.Y 1985 $6.95

THE OXFORD BOOK OF MILITARY ANECDOTES. Edited by Max Hastings 514 Pages Oxford University Press, N.Y. 1985 $17.95

ANTHONY WAYNE: Soldier of the Early Republic by Paul David Nelson 368 Pages Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind 1985 $27.50

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Charles Ivie, artist, illustrator and graphic designer, joined the staff of Military Review in June 1979. For more than seven years, his talents have contributed to the image and effectiveness of the journal. But opportunity knocks, and he has taken a new position which means a promotion and increased responsibility. As he assumes his duties, we wish him continued success and this “Irish blessing”:

May the road rise to meet you,
May the wind be always at your back,
May the sun shine warm upon your face,
The rains fall soft upon your fields,
And, until we meet again,
May God hold you in the hollow of His hand.
Articles to Watch For:

The Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin
Marvin F. Gordon

The Military Situation in Nicaragua
Colonel William A. Depalo Jr., US Army

Violence: The Alternate Political Institution
Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vought, US Army, Retired, and Major Jesse M. Perez, US Army