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
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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

MARCH-APRIL 2019



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Cover photo: Soldiers on guard enjoy the celebration with Portuguese citizens following the successful "Carnation Revolution" military coup 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal. The coup ended the four-decade-long dictatorship of the Estado Novo regime. (Photo by Alfredo Cunha, courtesy of Fundo Alfredo Cunha/Fundação Mário Soares, Casa Comum, <http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pas-ta=10079.001.029#>)

Next page: Soldiers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, as well as soldiers from allied nations, parachute from a U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft onto a drop zone 19 September 2018 during Saber Junction 18 in Germany. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Patrick Evenson, U.S. Air National Guard)



2019 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme: "What role do unofficial transnational and criminal organizations play in the global adversarial competition among nations occurring today? How specifically do China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or other specifically named adversary employ unofficial transnational or criminal organizations in their strategic efforts to undermine the United States or its allies?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general, or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest closes 15 July 2019

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 1st Place | \$1,000 and publication in <i>Military Review</i> |
| 2nd Place | \$750 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i> |
| 3rd Place | \$500 and consideration for publication in <i>Military Review</i> |

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/>.



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Net Gain or No Gain?

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Retired

Ambassador D. Bruce Wharton, Retired

Two retired members of the Senior Foreign Service of the United States provide an insightful look at the recent coup in Zimbabwe and then discuss that country's future specifically and the efficacy of coups in general.

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Ozan Varol

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Why the U.S. Army is Ill-Suited for Proxy Warfare Hotspots

Maj. Amos C. Fox, U.S. Army

Proxy wars are arguably the most common operating environments in modern war, according to this DePuy Writing Contest honorable mention recipient, but the United States has a poor understanding of how to achieve success in these environments.

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Rapid Transformation for a Combined Support Area Command Post

Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Drew, U.S. Army

Maj. Charles G. Fyffe, U.S. Army

The 2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Division (2ID/RUCD) established a support area command post and executed a proof of principle to demonstrate its feasibility along with verifying the combined requirements that are inherent to 2ID/RUCD as the only combined division in the U.S. Army. The authors summarize their experiences and lessons learned during this endeavor.

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From Predictive- to Probability-Based Assessments

Lt. Col. Michael J. Adamski, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Scott Pence, U.S. Army

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64 Recruiting, Vetting, and Training Police Forces in Postconflict Environments

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An experienced military police officer contends that successful stability operations in postconflict environments begin with security provided by a democratically trained and functional police force.

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Maj. Brad Townsend, U.S. Army

The lead planner for the creation of the Afghanistan National Army Territorial Forces discusses how its development is a significant demonstration of the growing ability of the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense to develop and execute complex logistical and structural change.

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A Historical Perspective for Discussion of "Land Ahead"

Col. Eran Ortal, Israel Defense Forces

An Israeli officer summarizes the progression of military revolutions throughout history, assesses the development of the Israel Defense Forces in a historical context, and discusses how his think tank used design theory to create the "Land Ahead" transformation framework for the Israeli ground forces.

100 Integrating Information Warfare

Lessons Learned from Warfighter Exercise 18-2

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Maj. Bryan Rhee, U.S. Army
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Five I Corps staff officers share their lessons learned during a recent Warfighter exercise regarding information operations and provide a model for the U.S. Army to integrate information-related capabilities for use against near-peer adversaries in future conflicts.

108 Where Field Grade Officers Get Their Power

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The authors discuss how field grade officers draw their "organizational power," or influence, in order to successfully solve problems, build teams, and develop leaders.

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An Emerging National Security Requirement

Lt. Col. David M. Beskow, U.S. Army
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Our military leaders must understand social cybersecurity and how it impacts our force, nation, and values. The authors define this emerging discipline, discuss its history, and describe current and emerging social cybersecurity trends and how the military must respond to them.

128 The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America

The Case of Brazil

Augusto César Dall'Agnol
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Fabiano Mielniczuk, PhD

The authors analyze the history of interactions between Brazil and Russia, painting a clear picture of the nature of their relationship. This article was previously published by Military Review as an online exclusive in July 2018.

REVIEW ESSAY

140 The End of Grand Strategy

U.S. Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century

Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, Retired

The author critiques a book by Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski that uses maritime operations as the backdrop for discussing its major theme, specifically that there are multiple U.S. grand strategies instead of the traditional single strategy guiding U.S. policy.

Suggested Themes and Topics

- Futures Command
- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? Nonstate actors? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What operational and logistical challenges are foreseen due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation and how can we mitigate them?
- What lessons did we learn during recent hurricane relief operations?
- What is the role of the military in protecting natural resources?
- What lessons have we learned from U.S. counterinsurgent military assistance in Africa?
- What are the security threats, concerns, and events resulting from mass refugee immigration into Europe?
- Saudi Arabia and Iran: How are cultural changes in both societies affecting the operational environment and potential for conflict between them?
- Iran: What should the U.S. military do to prepare for and promote normalization?
- Case study: How does Japan's effort to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere" compare with current Chinese efforts to expand control over the South China Sea?
- Are changes demanded to the professional development models of the officer and NCO structure in the face of large-scale combat operations and increased readiness requirements?
- What is the correlation between multi-domain operations and large-scale combat operations? How should this impact the Army's training, readiness, and doctrine?



- What material solutions are required to fulfill the Army's unified land operations obligations in large-scale combat operations?
- What is needlessly duplicated in the Army (e.g., what should be done away with, how should the Army adjust, and how would it benefit)?
- What must be done to adjust junior leader development to a modern operational environment?
- What must we do to develop a more effective means of developing and maintaining institutional memory in order to deal with emerging challenges?
- What is the role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- Case studies: How do we properly integrate emerging technology?
- What are the potential adverse impacts on military standards due to factors associated with poor integration of new cultures, ethnicities, or racial considerations and how can those impacts be mitigated?
- Case study: How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- Case study: How does tactical-level military governance during occupation following World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom compare?
- After eighteen years of institutional/operational experience largely focused on counterinsurgency, how do we return to preparing for large-scale combat operations?
 - See/understand/seize fleeting opportunities?
 - Develop the situation in contact and chaos?
 - Offset "one-off" dependencies and contested domains?
 - Rapidly exploit positions of advantage?
 - Survive in hyperlethal engagements?
 - Continuously present multiple dilemmas to the enemy?
 - Decide and act at speed?
 - Fully realize mission command?

German soldiers from 2 Company Multinational Engineer Battalion of NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force man an M3 Amphibious Rig bridging and ferrying system while conducting river crossing training 23 October 2018 during exercise Trident Juncture at Camp Rødsmoen in Rena, Norway. (Photo by Sgt. Marc-André Gaudreault, U.S. Army)





Members of parliament celebrate 21 November 2017 after President Robert Mugabe's resignation in Harare, Zimbabwe. Mugabe was swept from power as his thirty-seven-year reign of brutality and autocratic control crumbled within days of a military takeover. The bombshell news was delivered by the parliament speaker to a special joint session of the assembly that had convened to impeach Mugabe, who had dominated every aspect of Zimbabwean public life since the country's independence in 1980. (Photo by Jekesai Njikizana, Agence France-Presse)

Zimbabwe's Coup

Net Gain or No Gain?

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Retired
Ambassador D. Bruce Wharton, Retired

The scene in downtown Harare, Zimbabwe, on 21 November 2017 was extraordinary. Thousands walked through the streets, cheering, waving Zimbabwean flags, greeting soldiers

as heroes, and taking selfies with military personnel in armored vehicles. Exuberance, not fear, ruled the streets of Harare. Members of parliament, including those from the ruling party, Zimbabwe African

National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), ululated and danced in the aisles.

Robert Mugabe's resignation had just been announced by the speaker of parliament, ending a week of fear and uncertainty.¹ Zimbabwe exploded in jubilation in the belief that the long national nightmare of poor governance, corruption, and economic mismanagement was finally ending. Three days later, the coup (and it was a coup) was sanctified when the High Court of Zimbabwe ruled that the military's actions were "constitutionally permissible and lawful."²

In the background, almost drowned out by the cheering of most Zimbabweans, were words of caution. Former minister of education and human rights lawyer David Coltart warned, "In all of our euphoria we must never become so intoxicated as to forget that it was the same generals who allowed Mugabe to come to power in 2008 and 2013."³ And, "Once any change of power in any nation comes through a means other than the strict fulfillment of the constitution, in letter and spirit, a dangerous precedent is set, which is hard to reverse."⁴ Lawyer and political analyst Alex Magaisa wrote that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court's decision on the coup amounted to "effectively legalizing military intervention in the affairs of government."⁵

So, why were most Zimbabweans so pleased to see Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace pushed from power? And why was it not a good thing that Zimbabwe's military forced Mugabe's resignation? Let's look at how Zimbabwe got to November 2017 and what has happened in over a year since then.

War and Independence

Robert Mugabe dedicated his life to ending racist minority rule in Zimbabwe. He joined the ZANU party in 1960, was imprisoned by the Rhodesian government in 1964 for his political activities, and fled to Mozambique in 1974. By the late-1970s, it was becoming evident that majority rule would eventually come to Rhodesia, but it was not clear whether Mugabe or his rival revolutionary leader, Joshua Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), would emerge as the national leader. Ambassador Johnnie Carson, then the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Mozambique, was the first official American to meet with Mugabe. He and the late Congressman Stephen Solarz met Mugabe and two of his chief lieutenants at a deserted airstrip in Quelimane,

Mozambique, in July 1976 and left that meeting convinced that Mugabe would prevail as Zimbabwe's eventual leader. "He was ruthless and surrounded himself with people who would kill for him," Carson said later.⁶

As Rhodesia transformed into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979, and into independent, majority-ruled Zimbabwe in 1980, Ambassador Carson's prediction proved accurate. Mugabe became prime minister in 1980, then president in 1987. Whatever title he bore, Mugabe was clearly the man in charge.

Mugabe's speech at Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980 focused on peace and reconciliation.⁷ It drew sighs of relief from white Zimbabweans and the West. Mugabe was eloquent, highly educated, and seemed eminently reasonable. He was the very model of a modern African leader—a technocrat and the antithesis of corrupt, venal leaders such as Congo's Mobutu Sese Seko. The West swooned.

Troubled Rule, Economic Disaster

Viewed in hindsight, however, all was not well. Mugabe's control of the media coupled with global attention moving on to other hot spots in the mid-1980s obscured the trouble in Zimbabwe. Ethno-political tension between Mugabe's Shona-dominated ZANU on one side

and Joshua Nkomo's Ndebele-focused ZAPU on the other devolved into a conflict that killed as many as twenty thousand

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield

retired from the Senior Foreign Service of the United States in 2017 after thirty-five years of service. She is a senior counselor at Albright Stonebridge Group in their Africa practice and a Distinguished Fellow of African Studies at Georgetown University. She was assistant secretary for African affairs from 2013 to 2017 and director general of the Foreign Service and director of personnel from 2012 to 2013. Thomas-Greenfield was ambassador to Liberia from 2008 to 2012.

Ambassador D. Bruce Wharton, a retired member of the Senior Foreign Service of the United States, served as the U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe from 2012 to 2015, and principal deputy secretary of state for African affairs from 2015 to 2016. He also served as the public affairs officer at the U.S. embassy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2003.

“Zimbabwe, once the largest exporter of agricultural products in southern Africa, could no longer meet its own food requirement. ‘From breadbasket to basket case’ became the standard descriptor of the country.”

people in the mid-1980s. Most of the casualties were Ndebele civilians in southwestern Zimbabwe, and most of the violence was at the hands of a brigade of Shona-majority Zimbabwean troops trained by North Korea.

Those who threatened Mugabe’s power, people like ZANU guerilla commander Josiah Tongogara, retired Army Chief of Staff Solomon Mujuru, former Vice President Joice Mujuru, and others found themselves demoted or the victims of suspicious accidents. (Tongogara died in a car accident in 1979, Solomon Mujuru died in a fire in 2011, and Joice Mujuru was dismissed from the vice presidency in 2014.) Carson’s assessment of Mugabe’s ruthlessness and the willingness of his associates to kill on his behalf was accurate.

By the late-1990s, Mugabe’s mismanagement of the economy and his poor relations with international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor nations had significantly weakened Zimbabwe. Declining standards of living and life expectancy (lower in 2000 than in 1980) and growing out-migration of skilled workers were outward signs of Zimbabwe’s decline.⁸ As the formal economy and the living conditions of the middle and working classes declined, Mugabe built a system of political patronage and tolerated corruption and rent-seeking activities among

his supporters. In 1998, Mugabe sent the military to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to support the government of Laurent Kabila. This exercise cost Zimbabwean taxpayers about \$1 million per day, but

made rich men of the politically connected senior Zimbabwean military officers who were given contracts and concessions for mining, agriculture, and transportation.⁹ In 2000, angered that white commercial farmers were providing funding to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party, Mugabe unleashed his supporters against the farmers and gave significant land to military, judges, government ministers, and other political supporters. His so-called “fast-track” land reform program amounted to payoffs to political supporters and a return to subsistence agriculture for the working class. Zimbabwe, once the largest exporter of agricultural products in

southern Africa, could no longer meet its own food requirement. “From breadbasket to basket case” became the standard descriptor of the country.¹⁰

The Military Develops Corporate and Political Power

In 1997, Mugabe revived a Rhodesian-era institution, the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The JOC was nominally created to manage overall national



Joice Mujuru speaks 9 December 2012 at the Horasis Global Arab Business Meeting in Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. Mujuru was the vice president of Zimbabwe from 2004 to 2014. (Photo by Richter Frank-Jurgen via Wikimedia Commons)



Then president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe and his wife, Grace Mugabe, on 4 August 2013. (Photo by DandjkRoberts via Wikimedia Commons)

security and included the defense minister; the chiefs of the army and air force, national police, and prisons; and the director of national intelligence. Created to ensure coordination among the security services, the JOC became the de facto guarantor of Mugabe and ZANU's continued rule. The JOC developed strategies to influence elections in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2013, and it directed the military's work to intimidate voters, produce loyal or "correct" votes, and manage Election Day intelligence and official reporting of results.

The 2008 election was particularly violent. Tens of thousands of people were displaced, and more than two hundred people were killed by political violence. Even with this level of intimidation, and electoral results that were withheld for four weeks, Mugabe failed to capture a majority and was forced into a runoff against opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Credible reporting at the time held that Mugabe wanted to concede the election (which Tsvangirai almost certainly won in the first round) but that the JOC, securocrats, and beneficiaries of Mugabe's patronage system refused to allow his concession.

Some observers of Zimbabwe believe these events were a de facto coup, and that by mid-2008, Mugabe

was captive to the corrupt, nondemocratic system he had built over the previous thirty years. The second round of the 2008 elections proceeded with such pro-ruling party violence that the opposition withdrew to prevent a bloodbath. The 2008 elections were so grossly flawed and the results so questionable that South Africa and other countries stepped in to force Mugabe into a nominal power-sharing agreement with the opposition. Although Mugabe and his party retained control of the security services, opposition leader Tsvangirai became prime minister, several ministries went to the opposition, and Zimbabwe enjoyed three years of relative peace and economic progress.

In 2013 and 2018, the JOC coordinated more sophisticated means of fixing elections, including manipulating voter registration and the voters' rolls. These measures were so successful in the 2013 election that people were elected on the ruling party ticket who did

not even know they were running for office. Even die-hard ZANU-PF supporters were stunned by the 61–35 margin of their party’s victory.

In 2008, alluvial diamonds were discovered in eastern Zimbabwe, and the military moved in to “secure” this newly discovered asset.¹¹ Senior military commanders offered partnerships to Chinese mining companies and enjoyed enormous personal profit. Seven years later, even Mugabe was asking why the nation had not seen any benefits from the diamond mining operations. He needed

only to look at the hotel-sized mansions his generals were building in Harare’s posh neighborhoods to begin to understand where the money had gone.

Grace Mugabe and the Fracturing Ruling Party

Many of those mansion builders were comrades in arms from Zimbabwe’s war of independence. They, their families, and their business cronies were not eager to give up power or wealth. They were especially



disinclined to share power with those they derisively called “the salad eaters,” younger Zimbabweans who had not been involved in the liberation war and had grown up in the cities eating at fancy restaurants. Younger members of the ruling party—some technocrats and some opportunists—began to challenge the old guard. This group of younger government officials and business people aligned itself with Grace Mugabe and became known as the “Group of 40 Year Olds,” or “G40.”

Grace Mugabe was widely reviled in Zimbabwe for her venality and predilection for extravagant shopping trips. In 2003, when food insecurity brought on by a combination of “land reform” and drought threatened millions of Zimbabweans, Grace was accused of spending \$120,000 on shoes and jewelry in a single shopping trip to Paris. She was also a prime beneficiary of her husband’s “fast-track” land reform program and seized farms, businesses, and real estate for her personal benefit. Zimbabweans began calling her “Gucci Grace” and “Dis-Grace.” The University of Zimbabwe awarded her a doctoral degree three months after she entered the program, an act of such blatant disregard for educational standards that the university’s vice chancellor was later arrested for it.

As Mugabe’s age (ninety-three in 2017) caught up with him and his grip on power and his senses began to decline, the rivalry between the old guard and the Grace Mugabe/G40 faction intensified. In 2014, Grace Mugabe emerged as a serious political player, attacking then Vice President Joice Mujuru in public speeches, using vulgar language and expressions that shocked many Zimbabweans. At the same time, Grace’s role as nurse and caretaker for her increasingly frail husband was growing. Mugabe was becoming more prone to falling asleep in public, mumbling and stumbling, and needing more frequent trips to Singapore and Dubai for medical attention. The old guard’s nightmare scenario was one in which Grace’s power grew in direct proportion to Mugabe’s failing health, as she became the sole gatekeeper and conveyor of his wishes, taking his political legacy and power for her own. The intraparty fissures between the G40 and the old guard intensified and threatened those who thought they had earned the right to rule and profit from Zimbabwe because of their service in the war for independence. Mugabe fired Mujuru in December 2014, accusing her of “factionalism.”



People cheer a passing Zimbabwe Defense Force military vehicle 18 November 2017 during a demonstration demanding the resignation of President Robert Mugabe in Harare. Zimbabwe was set for more political turmoil with protests planned as veterans of the independence war, activists, and ruling party leaders called publicly for Mugabe to be forced from office. (Photo by Belal Khaled/NurPhoto/Sipa USA via AP Images)

Typical of the political balancing act Mugabe had choreographed for years, he then appointed his long-time aide, Emmerson Mnangagwa, to succeed Mujuru as vice president. As long as neither the G40 nor the old guard had too much power and the factions balanced each other out, Mugabe was safe. He was also trapped, though, in the finely balanced, no-clear-successor, political structure he had built.

Triggering the Coup

In early November 2017, Mugabe hinted that he might name his wife as vice president. This strengthened the G40's hopes of taking power and threatened the old guard and the military. The ruling party's youth league called for Mugabe to dismiss Mnangagwa, and Grace joined in the chorus. Provincial ruling-party committees began to pass resolutions calling for Grace to be made vice president.

On 6 November, Mugabe dismissed Emmerson Mnangagwa as vice president, and Mnangagwa fled to Mozambique fearing for his safety. On 12 November, then commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Gen. Constantino Chiwenga returned from an official trip to China. The G40, working with Zimbabwe Republic Police commander Augustine Chihuri, planned to arrest Chiwenga upon his arrival at the airport in Harare. Chiwenga, however, was tipped off, and soldiers disguised as baggage handlers overpowered the police and prevented Chiwenga's arrest. On 13 November, Chiwenga released a statement warning that the "purging" of ZANU-PF officials must stop.¹² In

response, a party spokesman accused Chiwenga of "treasonable actions."¹³ That was it.

On 14 November, there were reports of unusual movement of military vehicles on the northwestern approaches to Harare. That night, military forces took control of state television and radio and placed Robert and Grace Mugabe under house arrest at their residence. Security forces arrested or pursued a number of G40-aligned government officials. Some gunfire was heard in the city, and a few G40 officials sought refuge or went into hiding.

On 15 November, Maj. Gen. Sibusiso Moyo spoke to the people of Zimbabwe via state television and radio. He denied that there had been a coup and said that the military was "only targeting criminals around [Mugabe] who are committing crimes ... that are causing social and economic suffering in the country." Moyo sought to reassure the country that Mugabe

and his family were "safe and sound." Moyo went on to say, "As soon as we have accomplished our mission, we expect that the situation will return to normalcy."¹⁴

Over the next six days, Zimbabweans lived in suspense, as negotiations took place among the military, Robert Mugabe, and South African facilitators. On 17 November, Mugabe was allowed out of his home to preside over a graduation ceremony at a local university. On 18 November, thousands of Zimbabweans took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations calling for Mugabe's resignation. On 19 November, ZANU-PF dismissed Mugabe as its leader, but he was



President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, on 15 January 2019. Mnangagwa assumed the office of president in November 2017 after the resignation of Robert Mugabe. (Photo courtesy of [kremlin.ru](https://www.kremlin.ru) via Wikimedia Commons)

“When the speaker of the parliament read Mugabe’s resignation letter to parliament, members of both the opposition and ruling parties began to cheer, ululate, and dance.”

allowed to deliver a televised speech in which he was expected to announce his resignation as president of Zimbabwe. Much to the obvious consternation of the military officers sitting with him during the speech, he did not resign.¹⁵ On 20 November, the Zimbabwean parliament voted to begin impeachment proceedings against Mugabe on charges of “allowing his wife to usurp constitutional power.”¹⁶ On 21 November, as impeachment proceedings were underway and with the prospect of a Gaddhafi-like demise becoming more real, Mugabe formally resigned. When the speaker of the parliament read Mugabe’s resignation letter to parliament, members of both the opposition and ruling parties began to cheer, ululate, and dance.

Emmerson Mnangagwa returned to Zimbabwe on 22 November and was sworn in as president on 24 November. In his inaugural address and in the months that followed, Mnangagwa proffered a welcome change of rhetoric from his predecessor. He acknowledged the mistakes of previous economic and land reform programs and pledged to correct them. He spoke of his determination to fight corruption, create jobs, and improve relations with the IFIs and the West. Zimbabwean business people believed Mnangagwa was pragmatic about business and investment, and he would make good economic decisions. Civil society and media leaders perceived a greater tolerance for criticism of the government than had been the case under Mugabe. In the first weeks of the “new dispensation,” as Zimbabwean politicians called the Mnangagwa government, things were looking up.

As Mnangagwa assembled his cabinet, there was hope he would reach across the aisle and appoint some members of the opposition. That did not happen. Instead, Mnangagwa’s cabinet was heavy on career military officers who traded in their epaulets for pinstripes, confirming for all that this was nothing less than a coup.

Chiwenga, who on 13 November had warned against purging ZANU-PF officials, became one of Mnangagwa’s two vice presidents and remained head of the Joint Operations Command. Lt. Gen. Moyo, who had taken to

the airwaves on 15 November to reassure Zimbabweans that no coup was underway, became minister of foreign affairs and international trade. Air Marshal Perence Shiri, former commander of the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, became minister of lands, agriculture and rural resettlement. Lt. Gen. Engelbert Rugeje became the national political commissar for the ruling ZANU-PF party.

Each of these career military officers nominally retired before assuming their new civilian positions, but their presence in such senior positions gives rise to serious questions about who is really in charge in Zimbabwe. More than once, Chiwenga has appeared to contradict or ignore a statement or policy position from Mnangagwa. Two months before the 2018 election, the deputy minister of finance said what everyone was thinking, that there was no way the military would allow the opposition to win. Terrence Mukupe said to supporters, “How can we say, honestly, the soldiers took the country, practically snatched it from Mugabe, to come and hand it over to [opposition leader] Chamisa?”¹⁷

Still, the general impression among common Zimbabweans was that Mnangagwa brought improvement, and more importantly, Mugabe was out. The opposition was allowed to campaign in rural areas that had been off limits to them for years. People were less fearful of speaking critically of the government in public places. International media, long denied visas to report from Zimbabwe, were able to operate openly and file stories. Incidents of political violence declined. Mnangagwa invited international observers from Europe and the United States to observe the 2018 elections, and his government appeared interested in seeking to re-join the Commonwealth. Perhaps most important to ordinary Zimbabweans, the predatory actions of the Zimbabwean police—seeking bribes at road checkpoints every few kilometers—stopped.

Inside government, no one spoke of a coup. Rather, the events of November 2017 were called a “military assisted transition.” Outside of government, it was called a coup or, with Zimbabwe’s typically

wry sense of humor, the “coup that wasn’t a coup” or the “not-a-coup coup.” It was, of course, a coup, albeit one that had been informally endorsed by a jubilant public, officially endorsed by Zimbabwe’s High Court, and tacitly endorsed by neighboring states, the Africa Union, and all of the nations that sent election observers to the July 2018 elections, including the United States.

printing of ballots—a sensitive topic in Zimbabwe—was undertaken in secrecy, and the final ballot did not adhere to Zimbabwe’s own standards. While the opposition did have more freedom to campaign than they had in previous elections, their access to state media was limited in violation of Zimbabwe’s electoral law. The military steadfastly declined to state publicly that they would respect the outcome of the election, even if the opposition



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2018 Elections Fall Short

What President Mnangagwa and Zimbabwe needed to fully quell the coup/no coup debate, or show that a coup could be a good thing, was a peaceful, transparent, and credible election. Only through such an election—scheduled for 31 July 2018—could Mnangagwa’s government be certified as legitimate. That legitimacy was needed to restore confidence in Zimbabwe; resolve differences with former allies such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States; rebuild relations with the IFIs; and attract new investment. While Mnangagwa’s rhetoric on issues such as land reform, human rights, rule of law, improving the business climate, and reducing corruption was all positive, there was little actual action behind the words. Some Zimbabweans argued that Mnangagwa was still beholden to the military leaders who put him in power and could not afford to undertake serious reforms until he had an electoral mandate. So, a credible election was vital not just to Zimbabwe’s relations with the international community but for Mnangagwa’s hold on power as well.

It became clear to most observers in the months leading up to the election that the process was unlikely to deliver the credibility and legitimacy the government needed. Registration of voters appeared skewed to the advantage of traditional ZANU-PF supporters in rural areas and against young urban voters more likely to support the opposition. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not appear to be independent of the government and declined to be any more transparent than strictly demanded by the law. Procurement and

won. Given the Zimbabwean military command’s history of saying they would never salute an opposition government, and their role in political violence in previous elections, their refusal to state that they would accept the will of the people had a chilling effect on the process.

July 31, Election Day, was orderly and peaceful. On 1 August, the ZEC released preliminary results indicating that ZANU-PF had won a majority of seats in parliament. Opposition supporters protested what they believed was a rigged outcome and clashed with military forces in downtown Harare. Six protesters were killed in the confrontation. (In November 2018, a government-appointed commission of inquiry completed its investigation of the 1 August conflict and submitted its report to Mnangagwa. As of 5 December, the report had not been made public.) On 3 August, the ZEC declared Emmerson Mnangagwa the winner with 50.8 percent of the vote to opposition leader Nelson Chamisa’s 44.3 percent. These results are in line with public opinion research conducted by Afrobarometer in June and July 2018, so they may well be a legitimate result. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe’s history of rigged and violent electoral processes, the ZEC’s lack of transparency, the government’s inability to follow its own electoral laws, and the military’s unwillingness to pledge support for the people’s will left the 2018 election short of the credibility needed to rehabilitate the government’s legitimacy. The process was an improvement over 2013, and a great improvement over 2008 and 2002, but enough questions remained to undermine confidence in government.



Zimbabweans celebrate 18 November 2017 after President Robert Mugabe resigned in Harare, Zimbabwe. (Photo by Philimon Bulawayo, Reuters)

The New Dispensation

If Zimbabwe proves true to form, the country will settle into an uneasy political peace as common Zimbabweans struggle to make ends meet in a continually declining economy. Mnangagwa will remain president for at least five years. The ruling party has already announced that Mnangagwa will be their candidate in 2023, so he could be president through 2028, at which point he will be eighty-six years old.

While Mugabe has left the political scene, he and Grace continue to live in peace in Zimbabwe, much as his predecessor Ian Smith did for more than twenty years after majority rule came in 1980. But other than a different president, Zimbabwe has not changed much. As the events January 2019 have shown—the grossly disproportionate use of police and military force to stop protests and looting—Zimbabwe's government/ruling party remains willing to do whatever it takes to remain in power. Credible reporting by independent media and NGOs indicate twelve to eighteen citizens killed, scores wounded, and hundreds arrested in a three-week long government crackdown against protestors and members

of the MDC opposition party. Most disturbingly, there are credible reports of security forces raping women to suppress protests.¹⁸ Tragically, this government/ruling party use of violence against its own citizens looks just like what the Mugabe-led government/ruling party did in the mid-1980s and the early 2000s.

While there has been some new openness in political dialogue and more freedom for dissent, the state still controls radio and television, and it shut down the internet for several days during the January 2019 protests. While the government's talking points on fundamental issues such as rule of law, debt, and international cooperation are more rational, measurable reform is elusive. Shona-speaking political, business, and military elite continue to call the shots and live in luxury while the middle class emigrates and the poor suffer on. The government's economic managers continue to look for short-term responses to systemic problems, print fake money, and extract hard

currency from any place they can find it. The military remains the strongest, most capable institution in the country, and the High Court's blessing of the November 2017 coup keeps the threat of another coup alive. The executive branch of government has subordinated the judiciary and completely overshadows the parliament. Bankable title to agricultural land remains only a promise, so there is no collateral for new investment that could revive commercial agriculture and Zimbabwe's economy. Mining continues to generate some export earnings, but disputes with Chinese and Russian mining companies have hurt those ventures, and Western companies see more secure opportunities in neighboring countries. Much of the popular gratitude for the military's removal of Mugabe evaporated on 1 August 2018 when soldiers shot and killed six protesters.¹⁹ Public support for Mnangagwa and hope for reform is being trampled out of existence by the brutal actions of security forces in January 2019. Hopes that the coup of November 2017 opened a new beginning for Zimbabwe have proven false.

Are All Coups Bad?

According to data collected by University of Kentucky political scientists Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, there were about 450 coups worldwide between 1950 and 2010.²⁰ Most, like Zimbabwe's, effected little change in a country's underlying problems of poor governance, corruption, weak rule of law, and bad economic policy. The authors found that "coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least likely to democratize otherwise."²¹ However, looking at a list of current African leaders who have come to power via a coup, it is hard to see much promotion of democracy. That list includes Obiang in Equatorial Guinea, Museveni in Uganda, Guelleh in Djibouti, Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of Congo, Abdel Aziz in Mauritania, Bashir in Sudan, and Deby in Chad. It's not easy to see the democratizing impulse in any of these leaders.

Still, law professor Ozan Varol, author of *The Democratic Coup d'État*, argues that a military coup can sometimes establish a democracy. Varol lays out the following criteria for judging whether a coup is "democratic":

1. the coup is staged against an authoritarian or totalitarian regime,
2. the military responds to persistent popular opposition against that regime,

3. the authoritarian or totalitarian regime refuses to step down in response to the popular uprising,
4. the coup is staged by a military that is highly respected within the nation, ordinarily because of mandatory conscription,
5. the military stages the coup to overthrow the authoritarian or totalitarian regime,
6. the military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time, and
7. the coup ends with the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders.²²

Varol acknowledges that the vast majority of military coups are undemocratic in nature, and evaluated by his criteria, Zimbabwe's November 2017 coup is one of that majority.

Exceptions may illustrate the rule. Portugal's 1974 coup, Turkey's coup in 1960 and, perhaps, Ghana's coup in 1979 each seem to have led to stronger democracies. Ghana's was an incremental process, and Turkey is backsliding today, but Portugal remains an example of a coup that delivered democracy. However, three positive examples out of more than 450 coups or attempted coups is poor evidence of the efficacy of coups in advancing democratic governance.

As in Zimbabwe, coups generally leave the judiciary alone in exchange for some sort of court ruling that legitimizes the military's undemocratic action. And therein lies the greatest problem for coups. Once the courts legitimize a coup—an unconstitutional transfer of power—the bar is set lower and it sets a precedent for future coups. The one thing that coups seem to do consistently is increase the likelihood of subsequent coups.

If Zimbabwe's parliament had acted to impeach Robert Mugabe on their own accord, rather than waiting for the military to act first, Zimbabwe's chances for lasting, fundamental reform would be better than they are today. The immediate result, a Mnangagwa presidency, would likely have been the same. But, the parliament would be seen as a more potent branch of government, the judiciary would be less compromised, and the military could maintain the facade of being apolitical. These factors would have contributed to Zimbabwean and international confidence in the country's commitment to the rule of law and democratic process. The climb back to respectability would have been a little less steep, and the odds of another nondemocratic transfer of power a little less likely.

Zimbabweans remain a remarkable people, capable of finding solutions to problems that would overwhelm

others, and they deserve the chance to overcome their current challenges. Until recent unrest in response to the rise in petroleum prices and high inflation, most Zimbabweans still hoped for reform of the country's governance and economic systems, and some were still willing to give Emmerson Mnangagwa time to show that he is the reformer he has promised to be. However, recent splits within ZANU-PF and clear lack of control of the military by Mnangagwa, who responded to demonstrations with the live-fire killings of at least twelve and injuring of hundreds, including sixty-eight people wounded by gunfire, show

that the marriage of convenience between Mnangagwa and the military is unraveling. Signs that Mnangagwa and his government understood the expectations their citizens have of them were optimistic at best. Early euphoria has translated to high levels of frustration by a disaffected and marginalized youth population affected by high unemployment, shortages of major staples, and scarcity of foreign currency. Hopes that Zimbabwe, through Mnangagwa, would be one of those rare examples of a military coup that restores democracy are slowly and methodically being dashed by a military not willing to allow change. ■

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Soldiers on guard enjoy the celebration with Portuguese citizens following the successful "Carnation Revolution" military coup 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal. The coup ended the four-decade-long dictatorship of the Estado Novo regime. (Photo by Alfredo Cunha, courtesy of Fundo Alfredo Cunha/Fundação Mário Soares, Casa Comum, <http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=10079.001.029#>)

Love Ballads, Carnations, and Coups

Ozan Varol



***Editor's note:** The excerpt below is a shortened version of the first chapter of *The Democratic Coup d'État*, a book published by Turkish-born legal scholar Ozan Varol. In his book, Varol analyzes instances of military coups conducted by establishment military forces that had the intended result of producing democracy in the nations in which the coups occurred, with some success. To say the*

inequities and social injustices. In the eyes of the peoples of many nations of the world, representative democracy and its handmaiden, capitalism, have simply failed to deliver what was promised. As a result, much of the global community is watching closely the development and efficacy of other political constructs, such as the corporate state exemplified by China, Russia, and Iran, and considering calls for a



least, the topic has been controversial in a global political environment that broadly regards coups for any reason as anathema. However, examples of the extreme measures that some military institutions have taken in the past under the asserted justification that such were necessary to right the ships of state are especially relevant to consider today by students of war and society in the face of increasing popular restiveness due to overpopulation, underserved populations, and broad institutionalized corruption within many nations. Such events severely challenge the concept of republican-style representative democracy once envisioned by many as the universal panacea to mitigating economic

A woman gives a carnation to a soldier 25 April 1974 as massive crowds celebrate the restoration of democracy in Lisbon, Portugal. The "Carnation Revolution" military coup led to the end of the four-decade-long dictatorship of the Estado Novo regime. (Photo courtesy of Centro de Documentação—Universidade de Coimbra)

return to strongman oligarchic rule in such places as Latin America. These challenge both the fundamental concept that Western-style representative democracy is universally appropriate for all nations and raise in relief the question as to what role the military should have in our modern age.

*From The Democratic Coup d'État by Ozan Varol
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Excerpt from “Chapter 1 - Love Ballads, Carnations, and Coups”

The Eurovision Song Contest is an annual spectacle thoroughly mocked but also adored by millions of viewers.¹ The contest is produced annually by the European Broadcasting Union, whose membership includes fifty countries that expand beyond the borders of Europe. Each country nominates one song produced by a local artist, and national juries award points during a live event to the songs nominated by other countries. These points are then tallied to determine the winner.

As a child growing up in Turkey, I vividly recall being glued to the TV during each year's Eurovision Contest. I'd munch on popcorn and listen to my parents discuss conspiracy theories about why other countries are always loath to vote for Turkish songs. Eurovision has been around since 1956—long before *American Idol* or *The Voice*—and continues to inspire bizarre performances, music of highly questionable quality, and fierce nationalism as political battles get settled on the musical stage.

In 1974, Portugal's nominee for Eurovision was a ballad titled “E Depois do Adeus,” or “After the Farewell.” Penned by the singer Paulo de Carvalho, it depicts the end of a romantic relationship. The song performed abysmally in the Eurovision Contest, coming in fourteenth in a field of seventeen. Yet Carvalho's deep disappointment must have morphed into utter astonishment when his love ballad served as the signal to launch a military coup d'état in the heart of Europe.

In the Western world, military coups are ordinarily relegated to the fantasy realm. Coups are supposed to happen in backward, faraway lands, in countries riddled with corruption and incompetence, and in nations that end with *-stan*. But on April 25, 1974, Western Europeans awoke to a coup in their own backyard.

At the time of the 1974 coup,² the now democratic Portugal was home to a brutal dictatorship. Although it was dubbed the Estado Novo, the New State, the dictatorship was anything but new. António de Oliveira Salazar established the regime in 1933, and Marcelo Caetano took over the reins after Salazar suffered a stroke in 1968. By the time of the coup, the dictatorship had been around for over four decades, which gave it the dubious honor of being Western

Europe's oldest authoritarian government. Although the regime held periodic elections, opposition political parties were generally outlawed, except for a brief period immediately before the elections. This act of democratic window dressing left little opportunity for political parties to organize and mount effective election campaigns. With “sadistic efficiency,” the regime's reviled political police, known as the International Police in Defense of the State (Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado), censored, imprisoned, tortured, and outright assassinated dissidents.³

Under the Estado Novo, Portugal became the last European power to cling to colonial adventures in Africa. Colonies in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, among others, provided Portugal with gold, diamonds, and cheap raw materials and furnished an easy market for the export of Portuguese wines and textiles. To continue its lucrative colonial exploitations, the dictatorship committed Portugal to costly and disastrous wars in the colonies. These wars isolated Portugal from the international community, damaged its already ailing economy, and ruined its military.

During the dictatorship, Portugal was the most underdeveloped nation in Western Europe, with many Portuguese living in abject poverty. Portuguese workers were the most poorly paid in Western Europe; wages in Portugal were seven times less than Swedish wages and five times less than British wages. Labor unions and strikes were prohibited.

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Although the nation was ailing and disaffection was widespread, the regime prevented the opposition from catalyzing meaningful changes, and its stronghold on power showed no signs of abating.

In this corrupt dictatorship, the military was the only state institution with significant levels of popular support. In contrast to many nations, where the military is isolated from society, Portugal's continuous colonial wars made isolation impossible. To supply the military machine from a small population, the regime mandated a two-year military service for all men. By 1974, 1.5 million Portuguese had served overseas, and one in every four adult males was in the armed forces. Further, the low pay levels of military officers required them to work in the civilian sector to supplement their income while off duty, which kept them in frequent contact with civilians. Over time, in a very real sense, the armed forces became the Portuguese society.

For many years, the military was a mere pawn in the Estado Novo. The armed forces participated in Portugal's colonial wars and carried out most regime demands. But as dissatisfaction with the regime grew rampant, the military became the player that moved the pieces.

On April 25, 1974, devastated by unwinnable colonial wars as well as low pay and prestige, two hundred military officers decided to take action. The officers initially called themselves the Captains' Movement, which they later renamed the Armed Forces Movement to portray the image of broader support throughout the military. Their plan was to topple the dictatorship, fully restore civil liberties, hold elections for a constituent assembly to write a new constitution, abolish the political police, find a diplomatic solution to the colonial wars, and turn power over to democratically elected leaders. Although it was junior officers who planned and staged the coup, they picked a senior officer, General António de Spínola, to serve as its figurehead. Spínola was a well-respected war hero who had penned a controversial book, *Portugal and the Future*, which argued that a military victory in the colonies was impossible and instead proposed a political solution that granted the colonies limited autonomy.

The signal to launch the coup was two songs broadcast on two different radio stations. Precisely at 10:55 p.m. on April 24, a radio station would play Paulo de Carvalho's "After the Farewell," Portugal's ill-fated nominee for the 1974 Eurovision Contest. Less than two hours later, at 12:25 a.m. on April 25, it would be followed by a second song, "Grândola, Vila Morena," referring to a town in

southern Portugal as a swarthy or sun-baked town. This song was composed by Zeca Afonso, whose works were banned by the regime for advocating communism.


As "Grândola, Vila Morena" began to hum on radios across Portugal, the coup plotters moved into action. The soldiers first seized public news sources, followed by the Lisbon airport. Tanks rolled into Lisbon's Praça do Comércio, a central square situated on the Tagus River. Other units seized the Salazar Bridge across the Tagus to prevent any possible resistance from the South. Army officers loyal to the regime were quick to put down their guns after they realized they were significantly outnumbered. With his end in sight, the ruling dictator, Caetano, relented and called General Spínola to arrange for a transfer of power. Caetano and other prominent regime officials were forced into exile.

The forty-year-old dictatorship collapsed with remarkable speed. The coup was peaceful; there were no executions. But there were new sheriffs in town.

Following the coup, thousands immediately flocked to the streets in celebration. The crowds picked up carnations from the Lisbon flower market, a central gathering point, and placed them in the gun barrels of soldiers as symbols of support. Car horns honked the rhythm of "Spín-Spín-Spínola." During the May Day celebrations in Lisbon, which took place within a week of the coup, a banner that read "THANK YOU, ARMED FORCES" was unfurled in a soccer stadium packed with a crowd of 200,000 to hear speeches by leftist leaders who had returned from exile. In the following weeks, red carnations became ubiquitous across Portugal, displayed everywhere from buttonholes on men's jackets to women's blouses. The April 25 coup came to be known as the Carnation Revolution.

The day after the coup, on April 26, General Spínola delivered a brief statement on public television. He introduced the ruling military junta, a group of seven high-ranking officers from the army, air force, and navy. The junta would guide the transition process to democracy, establish and run a transitional government, hold democratic elections, and transfer power to a civilian government. On May 15, following his official inauguration as the president of the Republic, Spínola appointed Adelino de Palma Carlos, a politically moderate former law professor, as his prime minister. Carlos's government would work toward what came to be known as "the three Ds"—decolonization, democratization, and

WE RECOMMEND



Ozan Varol's beloved pal Einstein poses 22 October 2017 with a copy of *The Democratic Coup d'État*. (Photo from Ozan Varol's Instagram, [@einsteinthebostonterrier](#))

development—with the ultimate objective of integrating Portugal into the European community.

Soon after the coup political parties began to form, and within a few months approximately fifty parties were competing for power in the newly minted democratic marketplace. The military abolished censorship of the press and permitted freedom of expression. As a result, meetings and demonstrations—once completely banned—became a visible part of daily life. Political prisoners jailed during the Estado Novo were freed. The coup also ended Portugal's costly colonial adventures in Africa, with the ruling military granting independence to the colonies.

To achieve democratization, the military strove to win the hearts and minds of the rural population, which required increased levels of interaction between the military and civilians. For example, the military organized a rural development program called the Cultural Dynamization Campaign to educate the population about the ongoing democratization process. The campaign sought to ensure that the largely illiterate rural population would not be manipulated into reelecting authoritarian regime. The campaign was run primarily by soldiers, though civilian singers and artists also participated. Through its “sessions of enlightenment,” the campaign delivered information on a variety of political issues, such as decolonization and the upcoming democratic elections. The military brought its dynamization campaign to more than 1.5 million peasants, workers, and shopkeepers. These interactions, in turn, kept the military in touch with civilian values.

Like most transitions from dictatorship to democracy, the coup also brought social and economic turmoil to Portugal. When dictatorships fall, they fall hard. The Portuguese transition to democracy produced six provisional governments, three elections, and two coup attempts. After decolonization, the textile industry, which employed about 120,000 people at the time, lost its supply of raw materials and access to convenient markets in the colonies. The reduction in the size of the armed forces following the end of the colonial wars also swelled the ranks of the jobless. The newfound freedom of expression and freedom to strike prompted intense demonstrations, and once-forbidden strikes affected all sectors of the economy. Workers took over factories, and students

In his book, *The Democratic Coup d'État*, distinguished legal scholar Ozan Varol develops the controversial thesis that sometimes military coups lead to the establishment of democracy and not exclusively to the concentration of power in the hands of oppressive oligarchies or dictators so often associated with coups. In defense of his assertions, he links historical circumstances and events in a typology that relates diverse coups in history beginning with the Athenian navy's stance in 411 BC against a tyrannical home government, to the revolt against British injustice in the American colonies, to an assortment of twentieth-century coups that overthrew dictators and established democracy in countries in diverse geographical regions of the world. Deriving and relating common factors from examination of the circumstances of each such event, Varol challenges the dominant view that tends to affirm that all coups are unjustified, being equally illegitimate irrespective of motivation or outcome. In so doing, he addresses several questions that should be of great interest to students of political conflict in our own time as, for example, what distinguishes a legitimate from an illegitimate coup. Though a legal specialist in the details of international law on the subject, Varol has set aside complex and nuanced legal jargon and has written a book accessible to a general audience. To say the least, the book has proven very controversial internationally, stirring deep and bitter debate among the global intelligencia. As such, the arguments he offers as proof of his thesis should be of vital interest (and concern) to students of war and political conflict in general as the world becomes more crowded, more competitive, and more ethnically and culturally complex.



revolted in schools. Even the Carnation Revolution produced a few thorns.

As promised, the ruling military junta held democratic elections for a constituent assembly to write a new constitution, which were symbolically scheduled for the first anniversary of the coup, April 25, 1975. These elections were the first in Portuguese history to feature universal suffrage and a secret vote, and the first meaningful elections in Portugal since the 1920s. The turnout was an impressive 92 percent. Following parliamentary and presidential elections, the coup leaders, successful in dismantling the dictatorship, turned over power to democratically elected leaders. In addition to creating a democracy in Portugal, the coup instigated a global wave of democratization known as the Third Wave across more than sixty countries.⁴

The date of the coup became, and remains, a national holiday in Portugal. Along with many other streets and squares in Portugal, the iconic Salazar Bridge in Lisbon over the River Tagus was renamed the April 25 Bridge (Ponte 25 de Abril). In 1999, an exhibition opened to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the military coup and to celebrate the establishment of Portugal's still thriving democracy.

Egyptians hug and kiss a soldier 3 July 2013 after a broadcast confirmed the army would temporarily take over from the country's first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, in Cairo. Morsi's efforts to rewrite the constitution to impose Islamic law and disenfranchise political opponents had made him wildly unpopular. Tens of thousands cheered, ignited firecrackers, and honked horns as soon as the army announced Morsi's rule was over, ending Egypt's worst crisis since its 2011 revolt. (Photo by Mohamed el-Shahed, Agence France-Presse)

One of the two songs that triggered the April 25 coup, "Grândola, Vila Morena," came to symbolize the coup and the beginning of democratic rule. In February 2013, protesters sitting in the public gallery of the Portuguese Parliament interrupted Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho's speech with a rendition of the same song, to protest his government's economic and social policies. To his credit, the prime minister calmly awaited the removal of the protesters before commenting, "Of all the ways work might be interrupted, this would seem to be in the best possible taste."⁵

When we think of military coups, the first images that pop into our heads are not the establishment of Western democracies, carnations, or soccer stadiums filled with jubilant fans celebrating the gift of liberty. Rather the term

“coup d'état” brings to mind coups staged through corrupt backroom plots by power-hungry generals. Coups remind us of Muammar Gaddafi, Augusto Pinochet, Omar al-Bashir, and scores of other ruthless military dictators who wreak havoc on their local populations and set their national progress back by decades.

These military dictators, and others like them, abuse public trust and overthrow the existing regime not to democratize but to concentrate power in their own hands. Once they assume power, they stay in power. They disband parliaments, suspend constitutions, impose curfews, declare martial law, censor the media, ban protests, crack down on dissidents, commit atrocious human rights abuses, and instill fear in every corner of the country. *This* is the image that fits comfortably in our preconceptions of coups: brutal, ruthless, and *bad*.

The modern study of civil-military relations developed largely in response to these types of antidemocratic military interventions. The experts reached a consensus that all coups inherently present a menace to democracy, and we were told to move along—nothing to see or dispute here.⁶ As a result, when we think of military coups, we tend to do so in a homogeneous fashion: coups look the same, smell the same, and present the same threats to democracy.

It's a powerful, concise, and self-reinforcing idea.

It's also wrong.

I challenge this consensus about military coups. Distilled to its core, my hypothesis is this: *Sometimes a democracy is established through a military coup*. That simple statement conceals many complexities. I begin with an introduction to the basics.

A democratic coup occurs when the domestic military, or a section of it, turns its arms against a dictatorship, temporarily takes control of the government, and oversees a transition to democracy. The transition ends with free and fair elections of civilians and the military's retreat to the barracks.

Of course a military coup itself is an undemocratic event. In a coup, the military assumes power not through elections but by force or the threat of force. I use the term democratic to refer to the regime type the coup produces.

The target of a democratic coup is an authoritarian government. Under this definition, a coup staged against democratically elected leaders is not democratic.

Many coups have been perpetrated against supposedly corrupt, inefficient, or shortsighted politicians. These coups are not democratic because there is another avenue, short of military intervention, for getting rid of these politicians: vote them out of office. A coup may be considered democratic only when the incumbent politicians do not permit competitive elections.

Foreign interventions, in the name of democratic regime change or otherwise, are also excluded from my definition of a democratic coup. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq serves as a poignant reminder of the unique set of problems generated through interventions by foreign powers. In democratic coups, it's the domestic military that topples the dictatorship and oversees a transition to democracy.

At this introductory stage, the reader may object to even considering the questions I raise. If we succeed in explaining how military coups may produce democracies, will that not legitimize military coups? Doesn't the phrase democratic coup falsely glorify coups at the expense of preferable methods of regime change?

Ideally, of course, enlightened civilians, not military leaders, would oversee a transition process from authoritarianism to democracy. But often the conditions necessary for that ideal transition are absent. The civilian leaders at the helm may be unwilling to give up power. The dictatorship may crush popular movements before they take root. Worse, civilian elites may be in cahoots with the authoritarian government and lack interest in democratic progress. The press and civil society may be malfunctioning under the oppressive might of an authoritarian state.

In these cases, we may have to expand our aperture to include an institution traditionally assumed to hamper, not promote, democracy: the military. If other paths to democratization have been blocked by a dictator, the armed forces, equipped with sheer military might, may be the only institution capable of toppling the dictatorship and installing a democracy. In some cases the second-best option in theory may be the best option in practice.

The democratic coup remains the exception, not the norm. Many military coups continue to pose impediments to democratic development and pave the way for military dictatorships. But the democratic coup is *not* an extreme outlier. Countries as diverse as Portugal, Mali, Colombia, Burkina Faso, England, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Turkey, Egypt, Peru, and the United States have all undergone democratization after their militaries turned their arms against the incumbent

government. Each of these cases is a major snag in the standard thinking on coups.

Democratic coups are also not limited to these cases. According to an empirical study, in the post-cold war era, 72 percent of coups (31 out of 43) were followed by democratic elections within five years.⁷ As the authors of that study note, “the new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors.”⁸ According to another study of coups in African countries from 1952 to 2012, authoritarian states in Africa are “significantly more likely to democratize in the three years following coups.”⁹

A democratic coup is like chemotherapy: an extreme measure reserved for extreme cases. It can be highly effective in curing an authoritarian patient, but it can also have significant side effects, at least in the short term. Although numerous coups have produced meaningful democracies, the standard disclaimer still applies: Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Some readers may feel that I am offering a naïve account of military coups. After all, why would soldiers armed with guns ever submit to politicians in suits? How could an event as undemocratic as a coup lead to democracy? As Lord Acton famously quipped, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Military leaders may echo the rhetoric of democracy or mimic its rituals, but surely they cannot have any altruistic commitments to democracy that transcend the immediate lure of absolute power.

... Altruism is not the primary driver of the phenomenon I describe here. Where the interests of the military elites and a dictatorship are aligned, the military will tend to support the dictator. Where, however, conflicts emerge

between the military leadership and the dictatorship, or where popular opposition to the dictator becomes powerful enough to thwart the regime’s suppression efforts, the military’s incentives may change. Faced with a wobbling authoritarian government, the military might stage a coup, seize power from the regime, and oversee a



Ousted Islamist Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi is seen behind bars 8 May 2014 during his trial at a court in Cairo. (Photo by stringer, Reuters)


transition process that ends with the transfer of power to the people. That option allows the military to establish a more stable regime, emerge in the eyes of the people as a credible state institution, and preserve its own interests during a transition process that the military leaders themselves control.

Elsewhere [in my book], I have taken a step back

and more broadly explored the universe of democratic transitions ... and why we tend to romanticize democratic transitions like most romantic comedies glamorize love: The people gather in a central square, start protesting, topple the dictatorship, hold elections, and live happily ever after. On-the-ground facts often fail to live up to this simple ideal explaining why history is littered with failed attempts to democratize, and why even successful democratic transitions are often painfully long and violent. It is my hope to inject a healthy dose of reality into our [deleted word] expectations about emerging democratic movements, which, if unrestrained, can blunt our capability to appreciate alternative avenues for democratic regime change. The perfect should not be the enemy of the good, particularly since the perfect is often unattainable.

History shows that the military plays a decisive role in almost all revolutions and, in some cases, the military may be the only actor available to ignite democratic regime change.

... Having deposed a dictator, the military will have two choices: keep power and establish a military dictatorship or give up power to civilian leaders and pave the way



In the May-June 2018 edition of *Military Review*, Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Professor of History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, provides an essay-length assessment of Ozan Varol's *The Democratic Coup d'État*, which examines claims about the efficacy of coups to achieve democratic social and political objectives. This essay may be found at <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2018/Review-of-The-Democratic-Coup-dEtat/>.

for democratic regime change. Some militaries opt for the former, and others pick the latter.

This type of coup ends with the election of democratic leaders and the military's retreat to the barracks. In some cases, the coup may produce only a fragile democracy, teetering on the brink of collapse. Democratic institutions may not fully mature, and the military may roar back to life after a superficial exit from civilian

politics. But in other cases the budding democracy created by a coup can eventually blossom into a genuine liberal democracy, as it did in the case of the 1974 Portuguese coup. The establishment of democratic institutions—however unwittingly—can open up a democratic Pandora's box that even the military leadership itself cannot contain. Once ignited, democracy may persist, despite any attempts to extinguish it. ■

Notes

1. The description of the Eurovision song contest is taken from *The Spectacle of the Eurovision Song Contest*, Boston.com (last visited December 6, 2016), <http://archive.boston.com/news/world/gallery/051509eurovision/>.

2. My analysis of the 1974 coup in Portugal rests on Kenneth Maxwell, *The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution*, 54 *Foreign Aff.* 250 (1976); Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (1977); Lawrence S. Graham, *The Portuguese Military and the State: Rethinking Transitions in Europe and Latin America* (1993); John Hammond, *The Armed Forces Movement and the Portuguese Revolution: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back*, 10 *J. Pol. & Mil. Soc.* 71 (1982); Jose A. Santos, *Portugal: From Empire to Nation-State*, 9 *Fletcher F.* 125 (1985); Paul Christopher Manuel, *The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Portugal: Political, Economic, and Military Issues, 1976-1991* (1996); *Portugal: Cheers, Carnations, and Problems*, *Time* (May 13, 1974), <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908577-1,00.html>; Ozan O. Varol, *The Democratic Coup d'État*, 53 *Harv. Int'l L.J.* 292 (2012); Ozan O. Varol, *The Military as the Guardian of Constitutional Democracy*, 51 *Colum. J. Transn'l L.* 547 (2013).

3. *Portugal: Cheers, Carnations, and Problems*.

4. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991).

5. *Revolutionary Freedom Song Interrupts Parliamentary Debate*, *Portugal News Online* (Feb 16, 2013), <http://www.theportugalnews.com/news/revolutionary-freedom-song-interrupts-parliamentary-debate/27779>.

6. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, *Internationalizing National Politics: Lessons for International Organizations*, 13 *Widener L. Rev.* 265, 265 (2007) (noting that the international community has universally condemned military coups); Jonathan M. Powell, *An Assessment of the "Democratic Coup" Theory: Democratic Trajectories in Africa, 1952-2012*, 23 *Afr. Security Rev.* 213 (2014) (noting that "coups are almost invariably condemned");

Stephen E. Gottlieb, *Does What We Know about the Life Cycle of Democracy Fit Constitutional Law?*, 61 *Rutgers L. Rev.* 595, 604 n.43 (2009) (noting that a coup is a "non-democratic" form of regime change); Venkat Iyer, *Restoration Constitutionalism in the South Pacific*, 15 *Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J.* 39, 39 (2006) (noting that coups often lead to "regimes antithetical to freedom and democracy"); Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, *The Third Summit of the Americas and the Thirty-First Session of the OAS General Assembly*, 96 *Am. J. Int'l L.* 173, 175 (2002) (noting that a coup constitutes "undemocratic behavior"); Salvador Maria Lozada, *The Successful Appeal from Ballots to Bullets: The Herculean Hardships of Judicializing Politics in Latin America*, 25 *N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.* 123, 125 (1992) ("The coup d'état extinguishes democratic government and establishes a military dictatorship, which implies the disappearance of legislative power"); Tayyab Mahmud, *Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d'État and Common Law*, 27 *Cornell Int'l L.J.* 49, 51 (1994) ("Since an incumbent regime forms part of the constitutional order, its extra-constitutional overthrow is not only illegal but amounts to the high crime of treason."); Andrew C. Janos, *The Seizure of Power: A Study of Force and Popular Consent*, in *Res. Monograph No. 16*, at 36 (Ctr. Int'l Studies, Woodrow Wilson Sch. Pub. & Int'l Affairs, Princeton Univ., 1964) (noting that a coup is "the reversal of the process of revolution"); Julio Rios-Figueroa, *Constitutional Courts as mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil-Military Relations, and the Rule of Law in Latin America*, at 1 ("Coups kill the democratic rule of law").

7. Nikolay Marinov & Hein Goermans, *Coups and Democracy*, 44 *British J. Pol. Sci.* 799 (2013). This does not mean, however, that 72 percent of all coups in the post-cold war era are democratic coups. For example, if a coup is staged against a democratically elected government (as opposed to an authoritarian government), that coup would fall outside this book's democratic framework, regardless of whether democratic elections followed the coup.

8. *Id.*

9. Powell (2014).



Time, Power, and Principal-Agent Problems

Why the U.S. Army is Ill-Suited for Proxy Warfare Hotspots

Maj. Amos C. Fox, U.S. Army



Popular Mobilisation Forces fighters (mostly Iraqi Shia militia) ride in a tank near the Iraqi-Syrian border 26 November 2018 in al-Qaim, Iraq. (Photo by Alaa al-Marjani, Reuters)

Chinese statesman and military theorist Mao Tse-tung reasoned, “Unless you understand the actual circumstances of war, its nature, and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws of war, or know how to direct war, or be able to win victory.”¹ Mao’s argument, written almost a century ago, clearly captures the essence of understanding the war in which one is engaged. More recently, there has been a substantial amount of literature written about modern and future evolutions of conflict; however, the U.S. Army flounders at seeing operating environments beyond binary conventional conflict and counterinsurgencies.

Nevertheless, a proxy war is arguably the leading operating environment in modern war. A quick scan of current events shows proxies fighting on behalf of partners from Ukraine’s Donbass region to the Euphrates River Valley in Syria and Iraq, and all points in between. To highlight this issue, one needs to look no further than the recent posture statements by multiple U.S. combatant commanders. Certainly, discussions of proxy warfare dominate the posture statements of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of CENTCOM, has an entire section of his testimony dedicated to proxy warfare’s role within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.² Meanwhile, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of EUCOM, highlighted the influence Russian proxies are achieving across EUCOM’s area of responsibility.³

A proxy war is favorable for a variety of reasons, but most notably, it provides the principal actors a degree of standoff and limited liability. Retired Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster reflected on this phenomenon while discussing the Mutual of Omaha’s *Wild Kingdom* fallacy, one of his many works on the continuities and changes of future war. The fallacy posits that the U.S. military, and more specifically, the U.S. Army, can empower other forces—proxies—to do its fighting, just as *Wild Kingdom* host Marlin Perkins would have his assistants do the close-in work with the dangerous animals on the show. The problem with outsourcing fighting to proxies, as McMaster noted, is that these forces often are insufficiently resourced and possess limited will due to dissimilar interests.⁴ McMaster only scratches the surface of proxy hot spots, but his position serves as a point for starting the discussion.

Given the ubiquitous nature of proxy environments, the U.S. Army demonstrates a poor understanding of how to achieve success within these environments. The U.S. Army has achieved a modicum of success in Iraq (2014–2018) and the Philippines (2017), but its overall track record in proxy hot spots, including Afghanistan (2001–present), Iraq (2003–2011), and Syria (2014–present), illustrate this point. Notwithstanding the absence of empirical research, one can surmise that the U.S. Army poorly performs in these environments because it lacks a taxonomy for understanding proxy warfare. Furthermore, contemporary parlance obfuscates the true character of proxy hot spots through the use of terminology like *security force assistance*, *advise and assist*, and related language.

To take the argument a step further, the U.S. Army is ill-suited for warfare in the proxy environment because it mismanages the fixed time and the finite power it possesses over a proxy force in pursuit of waning mutual interests. Fundamentally, the salient features of proxy environments—available time, power over a proxy force, and mutual interests—are fleeting due to the fact that proxy relationships are transactional in nature; they are marriages of convenience in which a given force works through another in pursuit of provisionally aligned political or military ends. This dynamic is not discussed in doctrine but is vital to those directing activities in proxy hot spots.

In order to better position itself to succeed in the proxy environment, the U.S. Army must clearly understand the background and components of proxy warfare. The purpose of this article is to educate the reader about the proxy environment by providing a basic theory on proxy warfare. This is accomplished by addressing three major areas: (1) the U.S. Army’s unpreparedness for proxy warfare (which will be illustrated by probing U.S. Army doctrine as it relates to this type of warfare); (2) key ideas—principal-agent problems, a theory of power, and a theory of time—which are germane to understanding the character of proxy warfare but are absent from doctrine; and (3) a framework for understanding proxy environments. Lastly, this article will provide basic principles for proxy warfare to help guide future thinking, planning, and activities in hot spots. The proposed framework is focused at the high-tactical, operational, and strategic levels.⁵

Doctrinal Review: Inadequacies in the Race of Relevance

A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the U.S. government and military lack a doctrinal definition for working through proxies and instead rely on interpretations of a “by, with, and through” approach.⁶ A scan through U.S. Army doctrine supports this position. Current U.S. Army doctrine makes only a passing reference to the role of proxy environments. The much-ballyhooed Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, makes only one reference to proxy warfare.⁷ Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations*; ADRP 3-05, *Special Operations*; and Training Circular 7-100, *Hybrid Threat*, each make a single ephemeral comment on the role proxy war plays in the modern battlefield.⁸ Aside from those cursory mentions, proxy warfare is all but absent from U.S. doctrine.

From a U.S. perspective, proxy warfare is further obfuscated through the use of a more palatable array of words and phrases. Instead of plainly speaking about this type of warfare—something rife with negative connotation—the U.S. Army instead speaks of working *by, with, and of partner forces*. This terminology works well for softening the coarseness of proxy warfare, but it does little to illustrate the realities of it. Modern conflict, on the other hand, demonstrates widespread examples of proxy warfare.

Modern Proxy Warfare—Limited Liability War

Russia, historically speaking, has been one of the unequivocal leaders of proxy warfare. John Keegan, a preeminent British historian, noted that the Romanov dynasty, which ruled Russia from the seventeenth century until the Russian Revolution of 1917, regularly enlisted the Cossacks to serve as its proxy or to augment its own combat power.⁹ Similarly, Russia today dominates modern proxy hot spots by achieving access and influence with pliable local nationals, mercenaries, and foreign nationals sympathetic to its cause. Various forms of Russian proxies can be found throughout Eastern Europe and the southern Caucasus region, but one of the most interesting examples can be seen in the ongoing conflagration in Syria.¹⁰

Russia has a friend in Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Russia, seeking to support al-Assad, is leveraging Syrian proxies, private military companies,

and forces from its Chechnian client in coordination with its own armed forces. Furthermore, Russia practices strategic and operational jiu-jitsu by using the Syrian civil war and the mission to defeat the Islamic State (IS) against the involved parties while offering to mediate the chaos they create. Votel commented on Russia’s approach, stating that Russia plays both the arsonist and the fireman in Syria and the CENTCOM area of responsibility.¹¹

The United States is also well-versed in the use of proxies. Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is perhaps the most obvious example of U.S. proxy warfare in which U.S. forces, in conjunction with coalition members, militarily defeated IS in Iraq and are working to defeat IS in Syria. In each case, the United States employed a proxy to do the preponderance of fighting. In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces and Kurdish security forces were the agents; while in Syria, the proxy forces have predominantly been the Syrian Democratic Forces.

OIR is not the only example of U.S. forces engaged in proxy hot spots. The United States employed proxies to militarily defeat IS in the Philippines, as the Battle of Marawi illustrates.¹² In Saudi Arabia, U.S. forces are working through proxies to assist the Saudis against the Houthi rebels.¹³ Afghanistan, the U.S. Army’s longest running hot spot, has seen both direct U.S. combat and war since 2001. Most recently, the U.S. Army deployed its first security forces assistance brigade to spearhead its fight against the Taliban and other enemies in the region. Meanwhile, in Africa, the United States reportedly has over five thousand soldiers leveraging local agents to counter IS expansion on the continent.¹⁴

Although absent from doctrine, a handful of axiomatic certainties reappear in proxy hot spots. At the

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most rudimentary level, proxy environments appear to be bound by the following tenets:


- All proxy environments are driven by political interest; this forms the basis for military partnership and aligned military objectives.
- Proxy environments are based on a relationship between a principal and a proxy, or agent. The relationship between principal and agent is bound by a power-dynamic.
- Proxy relationships can be transactional or exploitative, but they all have a limited duration.
- Not all political, strategic, and operational decisions regarding a proxy relationship come with a noticeable or overt change at the tactical level.
- Battles won accelerate divergence, while battles lost weaken the principal-agent relationship.
- Proxy hot spots are not unique to one type of warfare, but exist anywhere along the war's continuum.
- The base of power within a proxy (principal-agent) relationship can shift if the proxy grows strong enough stand on its own, the proxy gains or mobilizes power from actors who are not the principal partner, or the proxy accomplished the goals that brought it in line with the principal.

Pro-Russian separatists from the Chechen "Death" battalion stand in a line 8 December 2014 during a training exercise in the territory controlled by the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic, eastern Ukraine. They said their "Death" unit fighting Ukrainian forces had three hundred people, mostly former state security troops, in the mainly-Muslim region where Moscow waged two wars against Islamic insurgents that is now run by a Kremlin-backed strongman. (Photo by Maxim Shemetov, Reuters)

Given proxy warfare's dominance and its axiomatic certainties, it reasons to delve deeper into its conceptual underpinnings in order to develop a basic theory of proxy warfare. The purpose of this theory should effectively prepare U.S. Army forces for the reality of the world's proxy hot spots. The unifying themes—the problem of agency, understanding power relationships, and the impact of time—are examined in the following sections.

Framing the Proxy Warfare Environment

Time is an inescapable dimension of war. Given the character of proxy warfare, which is driven by the principal and agent's shifting political winds, it is fair to say that proxy hot spots are dominated by a running clock.



- The proxy's need for the principal's assistance decreases over time if
 - a) the proxy experiences tactical, operational, and/or strategic success
 - b) the proxy is successful in generating force to compensate for battlefield losses
- Engagements, battles, and campaigns impact the proxy's dependency on the principal
- Host-nation force development impacts the proxy's dependency on the principal

(Figure by author)

Figure 1. Time's Effect on Proxy Relationships


Robert Leonhard, a preeminent U.S. military theorist, argues that the inability to effectively manipulate time, above all else, plagues most commanders.¹⁵ More to the point, Leonhard contends, “Military conflict—whether in wars, campaigns, or battles—seeks to summon that failure (or delay it) and is therefore, when reduced to its fundamentals, a contest for time.”¹⁶

Time operates at different rates across the levels of war, as well as the social and political spectrum. Furthermore, time operates at different rates given a society's level of involvement in a specified conflict. For instance, the Iraqi social and political clock, as it related to the defeat of IS, churned much quicker than did the social and political clock in the United States. As a result, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi was quicker than the United States to declare victory over IS and discuss U.S. troop reductions in Iraq.¹⁷

Further, social and political clocks operate quicker than a military's clock. Military commanders tend to press for more time, whereas societies and political leaders urge the military to conclude martial action, as recent U.S.

political-military discussions on Syria illustrate.¹⁸ In proxy hot spots, military commanders must balance the time being kept on all of these clocks. More importantly, leaders in proxy environments must be keenly tuned in to the social and political appetites of their proxies because, as Thucydides reminds us, actors wage war out of either fear, honor, or self-interest.¹⁹ Otherwise, leaders run the risk of turning the principal-agent relationship foul. Therefore, they must not allow their tactical predilections to get in the way of strategic and political imperatives (see figure 1).

The success of firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr, at the expense of al-Abadi, in Iraq's 2018 parliamentary elections was perhaps representative of the role time plays in proxy environments. For all intents and purposes, al-Abadi and his bloc should have fared better in the election. Prior to the election, they defeated IS, stymied Kurdish independence, and held the country together when it was teetering on collapse. However, al-Abadi and his government were unable to force the United States to reduce its presence in the country. The Iraqi electorate turned out to support al-Sadr's pro-Iraqi,



Principal-Agent Problem

- The principal acquires an agent, or proxy; the agent supports the principal.
- A common interest unifies the principal and the agent.
- At the same time, each is focused on its own self-interest and acceptable risk.
- If the common interest goes away, self-interest exceeds the common interest, or the level of acceptable risk is too high, the relationship can decouple.

Example

Operation Inherent Resolve's operational pause, from March to May 2018, in which the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) broke away from the U.S.-led coalition forces in eastern Syria is an example of the **Principal-Agent Problem**.

The U.S. and its coalition, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, were the principal. The SDF were the agent. Defeating the Islamic State in Syria was the common interest that bound the two.

Turkey's February 2018 **Operation Olive Branch**, an offensive into northern Syria to stymie growing Kurdish strength in Syria, proved to be a grave threat to the Syrian Kurds and SDF self-interest. Turkey's offensive triggers a strategic shift for the Syrian Kurds and SDF—they temporarily left the principal because their common interest did not outweigh the self-interest it had at risk by Turkey.

This resulted in an operational pause from March 2018 to May 2018, as the SDF departed eastern Syria to shore up its lines in Afrin, Manbij, and other areas threatened by the Turks. Thus, self-interest and acceptable risk caused the agent to step-away from the relationship, which hindered the principal's interest.

(Figure by author)

Figure 2: Principal-Agent Problems

Shia nationalist platform in the election, thus resulting with al-Abadi and his bloc coming in third place.²⁰ The effect of the election is unclear, but it is decidedly easy to see that the relationship the United States wants with Iraq will change in the future.²¹

The Principal-Agent Problem: The Root of Transactional and Exploitative Relationships

Understanding the principal-agent problem is essential to understanding proxy hot spots. Stanford

University professor and organizational theorist Kathleen Eisenhardt offers a sound characterization of the principal-agent problem. She argues that principal-agent problems arise in situations “in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent) who performs that work.”²² Further, Eisenhardt states that two primary problems arise in this dynamic: (1) the problem of agency and (2) the problem of risk sharing.²³ She defines the *agency problem* as a situation that occurs when “the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict.”²⁴ She defines the problem of risk




Figure 3. Wave of Influence

sharing as the principal and agent possessing dissimilar prerogatives toward risk, resulting in divergent action as contact with risk continues (see figure 2, page 34).²⁵

Eisenhardt's elucidation on principal-agent problems is at the root of the U.S. Army's unpreparedness for proxy hot spots. The U.S. Army tends to see the proxy, or agent, as possessing unlimited willingness to work with its forces; however, as the agent becomes more capable, or as other actors are able to identify agent vulnerabilities and positively manipulate those to their own end, the agent becomes gradually less interested in working with U.S. forces—a fleeting cooperation that the Army fails to see. To put it differently, as time progresses and objectives are accomplished, each party's self-interest begins to supplant the objectives and end states that brought the principal and agent together. OIR provides an instructive model in support of the principal-agent problem.



Following OIR's pulverizing Battle of Mosul, a series of additional tactical objectives remained. These objectives included defeating residual IS forces in Tal Afar, Hawija, and along Iraq's Euphrates River valley, from Fallujah to the Syrian border.²⁶ Given the two thousand IS fighters estimated to be in Tal Afar, the ensuing battles were expected to parallel the ferocity of that found in Mosul.²⁷

The Iraqi security forces (the agent) and the U.S.-led coalition (the principal) commenced hostilities 19 August 2017 against IS in Tal Afar, but in a strange turn of events, IS quickly evaporated.²⁸ Within eight days, the contest was over.²⁹ Casualties on both sides were relatively

low, especially when contrasted with those from Mosul. Al-Abadi, as well as many leaders within the Iraqi security forces, appeared to have taken two major points from this time period. First, the Battle of Mosul had a decisive effect on IS. The organization's military wing within Iraq was physically defeated, leaving little force for IS's political wing to continue large-scale combat operations. Second, Mosul hardened the Iraqi security forces and increased its steadfastness. These two effects resulted in the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces (the agent) losing interest in maintaining pressure on IS; or, in essence, following the battles of Mosul and Tal Afar, the principal's *raison d'être* and the agent's interest were beginning to rapidly diverge (see figure 3).

With the threat of IS marginalized and the Iraqi security forces self-confident, the government of Iraq reoriented on the Kurds. In September 2017, Iraqi Kurdistan, under the tutelage of Marzoud Barzani, voted for independence from Iraq. Al-Abadi, unwilling to accept Kurdish independence, launched a limited offensive in mid-October 2017 to thwart the movement. Sidestepping his coalition partners, al-Abadi's Kurdish operation was unilateral and a definitive gesture of divergence between principal and agent.³⁰

While OIR provides examples of the principal-agent problem, there are just as many additional examples as there are proxy hot spots across the world. As long as one entity seeks to work through another, agency and risk problems will always exist. Nineteenth-century Prussian general officer and



(Figure by author)

Figure 4. Wave of Influence in Adversarial Context

military theorist Carl von Clausewitz understood the problem of agency. He argued, “One country may support another’s cause, but will never take it so serious as it takes its own.”³¹ Nations or countries may no longer be the sole proprietor of warfare today, but Clausewitz’s position is no less valid today than it was upon publication. In the absence of strong bonded interests, *power* unifies the principal and its agent.


The Role of Power in Proxy Warfare

The role of power is critical in proxy hot spots. Robert Dahl, a twentieth-century political scientist, postulates that power exists in a relationship between two or more actors. He states, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not

otherwise do.”³² Dahl continues, stating that power is not self-perpetuating but in most cases possesses a base that is a potential energy that requires activation in order to generate a desired effect.³³ The base, or power base, consists of all the resources that can be harnessed to affect the behavior of another actor. Dahl argues that being able to effectively manipulate one’s power base is the primary means for maintaining power over another actor. He notes that a delay exists between A’s exertion of power and B’s ability to react. This delay in reaction time, which he refers to as “lag,” represents the processing and action time associated with A’s power and B’s ability or willingness to be overpowered.

Equally important, Dahl argues that a relationship or connection between two actors must exist, otherwise

Exploitative model: principal leads, agent follows



(Figure by author)

Figure 5. Exploitative Model

there is no vehicle for power to be enacted between A and B.³⁴ These relationships are not static but evolve over time as conditions change and other actors enter or depart a given situation. This idea, that associations change and increase or decrease one's relative power, is a central tenet in proxy warfare environments. However, it is often overlooked in applied relationships like those found in proxy wars, when A, guided by its own interests, attempts to maintain power and influence over B (see figure 4, page 36).

Tying Dahl's theory of power to the principal-agent problem, one can argue that Dahl's A equates to the *principal* while B is the *agent*. Therefore, the principal possesses power of the proxy, or agent, insofar as it can make it do something it would not otherwise do. Dahl's principles of power form the basis for understanding two theoretical models of proxy warfare: the Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model.


The Exploitative Model: Principal Leads, Agent Follows

Proxy hot spots can be characterized by two similar, yet distinct models—the Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model. From the outside, these models look quite similar, but their inner workings differ. The Exploitative Model is characterized by a proxy force being completely dependent on its principal for survival—the relationship could almost be viewed as one between a parasite and a host. The principal provides the lifeblood for the parasitic proxy to survive. This dependency creates a strong bond between the proxy and the partner, resulting in the latter possessing almost unlimited power and influence over the proxy.

Furthermore, the Exploitative Model is usually a result of a stronger actor looking for a tool—a proxy force—to pursue an objective. As a result, the proxy is only as useful to the principal as its ability to make progress towards the principal's ends. As a result, the agent's utility for the principal is temporal. Once the ends have been achieved, or the proxy is unable to maintain momentum toward the principal's ends, the principal discontinues the relationship (see figure 5).

The relationship between Russia and the separatist movement in Ukraine's Donbass region is an example of this model. The existence of the Russian-leaning separatists, the funding and materiel backing of its army, and its pseudo-political status are all Russian creations. Reports also indicate that Russia has its own generals at the head of the separatist army.³⁵ The U.S. relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi security forces—during Operation Iraqi Freedom—are also examples of the Exploitative Model in proxy warfare.

In each case, the agent is dependent on its principal; however, success can cause the power relationship to change between the partners (see figure 6, page 38). A successful proxy force can generate enough legitimacy or support to grow powerful enough to gain independence from its partners. Similarly, the political apparatus that the proxy supports can gain sufficient power and legitimacy, resulting in the proxy electing to no longer serve as an agent, as highlighted with the Iraqi security forces' independence following the U.S. departure in 2011. Through battlefield success, political wrangling, or other actors undermining the existing principal, the proxy can also find itself in the second model, the Transactional Model.



(Figure by author)

Figure 6. Proxy Success and the Evolution of Partnered Relationships


The Transactional Model: Agent Leads, Principal Follows

The Transactional Model is proxy warfare's second model (see figure 7, page 39). This model is a paradox because the proxy is actually the power broker in the relationship. In many cases, the proxy government is independent but needs help defeating a foe; it is not interested in political or military subjugation by its principal. Moreover, the proxy possesses the power in the relationship, because its association with the principal is purely transaction—each participant is interested in what they can attain from the other while in pursuit of their common interest. Given the transactional character of the relationship, the clock starts ticking on the duration of the bond as soon as the first combined shot is fired. As a result, the agent's interest in the principal recedes at a comparable rate as the common goal is gradually achieved. The Iraqi government's request for U.S. and coalition assistance to defeat IS in their country is an example of this dynamic.

A mental picture that supports this model is to view the proxy as the lead and the partner as a supporter or follower. Unlike the latter model, in the Transactional Model, the proxy force's government requests support from another nation to defeat a given threat. In doing so, the proxy force's government places parameters on the partner such as force caps or a clearly defined mission, end state, and time lines. The proxy provides these constraints to align the principal with its own political and military objectives and to limit the principal's ability to influence the proxy beyond the narrowly defined parameters of the association. Also, it is important to highlight that the proxy has fixed political and social interests in the principal; it is likely that the proxy will look to end its dependency on the principal once its goals are attained.

At the same time, the Transactional Model is vulnerable to external influence due to the proxy's lack of investment in the partner; unlike the Exploitative Model. This provides leverage for adroit actors to drive a wedge into a principal-agent relationship. Russian and Chinese activity in Iraq provides an instructive example of this

Transactional model: agent leads, principal follows



(Figure by author)

Figure 7. Transactional Model

dynamic. Seeking to weaken the U.S.-Iraq bond, both have managed to wedge themselves into the foreign military sales and foreign military finance realms, which were the bulwark of U.S. political and military strategy in Iraq.³⁶ In doing so, both Russia and China have managed to influence and gain access to tactical inroads across the country. Similarly, clever external actors will undercut the principal by providing support with fewer caveats to the agent in order to exploit gaps in the principal's policy and relationship strategy.

It is critical to understand the model in which one is operating. Hubris, inattentiveness, or naivety in the Transactional Model can result in the decoupling of the principal and the agent. An assessments program and an exit plan are important when operating within the Transactional Model. The assessments program allows the principal to see itself in relation to its agent and to determine where it sits with the agent. The exit plan is to conclude the relationship and move forward on favorable terms. Failure to have an assessment program and exit plan can result in the agent bilking the principal or the principal ruining the long-term political relationship between the two. This exploitation can come in the form of requests for monetary assistance, feigning bureaucratic incompetence to outsource its bureaucratic requirements to the principal, and a number of other ways.


Recommendations for Addressing Proxy Hot Spots

Everett Dolman, a contemporary military theorist, contends that if one communicates only in the

language of the system, then they are inextricably bound by that system's rules.³⁷ As established, the U.S. Army lacks a theory of proxy warfare, resulting in the absence of a proxy doctrine. Consequently, the U.S. Army instead relays its language of the system in an attempt to navigate ubiquitous proxy hot spots. This has likely hindered the U.S. Army's ability to achieve positive results at the high-tactical, operation, and strategic levels in proxy hot spots, resulting in indecisive, open-ended campaigns.

Given the aforementioned discussion of axioms and concepts, a number of principles for proxy warfare can be deduced. These principles, while not all-inclusive, should serve as the starting point for articulating a proxy warfare doctrine for the U.S. Army. The proposed principles of proxy warfare follow:

- Principals, agents, and actors act in a manner aligned with their respective political objectives.
- Proxy relationships will expire; therefore, it is important to identify one's own termination criteria and transition plan.
- Because of the lag between the tactical level and higher echelons, one should take tactical feedback as not wholly representative of operational, strategic, and political direction (see figure 8, page 40).
- A principal's continued presence beyond the end of the principal-agent relationship can cause the agent's political, social, and military entities to turn against its former partner.
- It is better to face one opponent than it is two; therefore, opponents will attempt to dislocate principal-agent relationships.



(Figure by author)

Figure 8. Graphical Representative of “Lag”

- Savvy opponents will seek to fracture the principal-agent alliance by attacking the relationships, bonding with the agent, or introducing existential threats that challenge that livelihood of one the partners.
- Due to the lag in tactical feedback, red teaming and assessments are critical to monitoring a principal-agent dynamic; red teams and assessment teams should tell the commander what they *need* to hear, not what they want to hear.³⁸

These principles, plus the Exploitative and Transactional models of proxy warfare, provide a starting point for the U.S. Army to begin crafting a comprehensive proxy warfare doctrine.

Conclusion

The prevailing mentality and literature on proxy warfare, which is insufficiently expressed in doctrine, presents the practitioner of war with insufficient theories, models, and lexicon to understand and communicate the nuance associated with proxy hot

spots. This work has sought to remedy that deficiency by introducing a general theory of proxy warfare. The theory—focused at the high-tactical, operational, and strategic levels—is dominated by three concepts: (1) time, (2) the principal-agent problem, and (3) power relationships. Power is the ability of one actor to make another actor do something they would not otherwise do. Power cannot occur without an existing relationship between participants. However, relationships can change over time as new parties are introduced or existing ones lose interest in the extant power dynamics and depart.

Principal-agent problems loom large in proxy environments. One never values the reason for fighting as much as the other. Once the objective has been accomplished, each partner pursues its own interests. The introduction of external actors or meddling adversaries, seeking to gain their influence or fracture the principal-agent partnership, often accelerates the divergence of interests. Thus, time dominates proxy hot spots.

Principals and agents have finite time to accomplish their goals; therefore, it is prudent for the U.S. Army to develop termination criteria and time horizons driven by an empowered red team and assessments crew to enable realistic environmental understanding.

Continuing along the same path—continually engaging in proxy wars without a theoretical and doctrinal foundation for proxy warfare while obfuscating

the realities of proxy hot spots through mismanagement of the environment—the U.S. Army will continue to find itself unable to successfully conclude its proxy wars on favorable conditions. While not a comprehensive theory, this article sought to provide a framework on the argumentation of modern proxy hot spots and why the U.S. Army should invigorate the discussion on proxy warfare. ■

Notes

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38. It must be noted that a paradox exists within this principle. If the high-tactical, operational, and strategic levels fail to properly monitor and assess the status of the principal-agent relationship, then actions at the tactical level can appear to be indicators or signs in changes in the relationship. However, this is only a result of overlooking indicators and warnings at the political, strategic, or operational levels.



Maj. Walter L. Ivory Jr., brigade support operations officer for 2nd Sustainment Brigade, and Republic of Korea (ROK) army officers Lt. Col. Jeng and Maj. Kim, ROK Support Group, synchronize U.S. and ROK support efforts in the combined support area of operations during Key Resolve 2018 on the Korean Peninsula. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Terysa King, U.S. Army)

Leveraging the Force

Rapid Transformation for a Combined Support Area Command Post

Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Drew, U.S. Army
Maj. Charles G. Fyffe, U.S. Army

The 2nd Infantry Division/ Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Combined Division (2ID/RUCD) completed training on 4 May 2018 as part of Exercise Key Resolve 2018 (KR18). Key Resolve is an annual three-week command-post exercise conducted by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK armed forces. Participants include the Eighth U.S. Army, the 2ID/RUCD, other Army and joint units, United Nations Command (UNC) sending states, and interagency organizations.

The scenario for KR18 required 2ID/RUCD to conduct detailed mission analysis to determine how to optimize mission command in the division given the distributed and dynamic nature of the mission. During mission analysis, the need for a division command post (CP) in the support area became evident—not only to coordinate combined logistics with U.S. allies but to also allow the division main command post to focus on shaping and decisive operations to maintain momentum.

During this exercise, 2ID/RUCD employed a modified post-World War II concept for sustaining a division on the move that stressed the importance of pooling resources. Consolidating capabilities and being able to distribute them back to the force on a geographic basis leverages economy of force, enhances flexibility, and reduces waste. By making these organizational and support relationship changes, sustainment forces provide the same, and in some cases better, support to the maneuver force.¹ In that effort, the division established a support area command post (SACP) and executed a proof of principle to demonstrate its feasibility along with verifying the combined requirements that are inherent to 2ID/RUCD as the only combined division in the U.S. Army.

By leveraging knowledge from across the force, 2ID/RUCD was able to use recent lessons from other

Army divisions and implement those evolving concepts into its own SACP development without having to endure the same encumbrances the other divisions had to overcome in order to make their improvements (see figure 1, page 45).

Leveraging Knowledge Management Resources

Prior to the exercise, 2ID/RUCD planners and leadership consulted their peers and colleagues, reviewed existing doctrine, referenced internal and external after-action reports, and utilized numerous publications including “The Pagonis Effect: A Doctrinal Future for the Support Area Command Post,” by Brig. Gen. Michael R. Fenzel and Capt. Benjamin H. Torgersen (hereafter referred to as “Pagonis Effect”), and “From Riley to Baku; How an Opportunistic Unit Broke the Crucible,” by Lt. Col. Jerem G. Swenddal and Maj. Stacy Moore (hereafter referred to as “Crucible”). The “Pagonis Effect” and the “Crucible” articles were both published by *Military Review*.


The “Pagonis Effect” references the many lessons learned and best practices from Lt. Gen. William “Gus” Pagonis, who was the Central Command deputy commanding general for logistics during the First Gulf War. He recognized the benefits of designating a single individual in the command chain to be responsible for all sustainment operations.²

Pagonis controlled receipt and delivery of supplies by all methods in theater and delegated significant authority to subordinate leaders to conduct area resupply of combat forces and protection of supply lines. This innovative approach ensured all sustainers across the theater could respond rapidly to exigent needs and remained flexible enough to address frontline requirements. “The application of this single command approach for all logistical resources directly contributed” to how we view the emerging requirements of the SACP of today.³

According to the article, the 1st, 3rd, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division all developed their respective SACP’s differently but were guided by these same principles. 2ID/RUCD developed its SACP with these same principles in mind while also building upon the lessons learned communicated by the other divisions. In addition, the 2ID deputy commanding general-support personally contacted the 82nd Airborne, 4th Infantry, and 3rd Infantry Divisions to discuss how they implemented SACP’s during their

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Maj. Charles G. Fyffe, U.S. Army, is the chief of operations for U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, Korea. He most recently served as a logistics planner and deputy chief of transformation for the 2nd Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea.



(Figure by Maj. Charles G. Fyffe, Lt. Col. John R. Gaivin, and Lt. Col. Kim Soon-Pil)

Figure 1. 2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-United States Combined Division Support Area Command Post Development Timeline


Warfighter exercises. It became apparent during those discussions that the establishment of a SACP is essential to supporting a division on the move. However, all divisions had challenges taking the required manpower along with command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems for a SACP out of the division main CP. In all cases, the functions of the SACP were almost universal, but the challenge of manning and equipping the SACP was accomplished differently for each division.

Support Area Command Post

According to Army doctrine, the establishment of the SACP is dependent on the operational situation and can take on many different forms. In most cases, the SACP is formed by integrating select staff from the division headquarters and the maneuver enhancement

brigade (MEB), as well as augmentation from the division's organic sustainment brigade (SB). The SACP is responsible for all areas of sustainment and protection to include support to the division headquarters and brigade combat teams on the front lines as well as maintaining the support area lines of communication (LOCs). The SACP is crucial in allowing the divisions main command (DMAIN) node to focus solely on the deep fight.⁴ Current doctrine and Army manuals specify that a unit should resource the SACP to ensure parallel capability with the main CP and the tactical CP without degrading the capabilities of either, such that all warfighting functions should be present in the SACP.⁵

The SACP is an evolving concept for the Army and the 2ID/RUCD, which had only executed it twice prior to KR18. The division first employed the SACP in a minimal capacity during its November 2017



(Figure by Sgt. Maj. Tommie Jones II)

Figure 2. Support Area Command Post Sustainment Cell Layout


Warfighter exercise and then during Warrior Strike 10, executed in January 2018 (see SACP timeline in figure 1 on page 45 and layout in figure 2).

At the field level of logistics, the SB commander is generally the lead synchronizer and senior sustainment adviser across the division and installation.⁶ Army doctrine recognizes that the SB is the single entry point for sustainment integration and the SB commander is the lead integrator and synchronizer of sustainment for the division within that area of support.⁷ “The sustainment brigade commander synchronizes combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB) operations” with other concurrent sustainment operations that support the maneuver units.⁸

According to logistician Col. Todd Heussner et al., the SACP is the sustainment hub “nexus where the two parallel lines of sustainment—operational and enterprise—can meet within the field-level of sustainment” for the area that it is supporting and should serve as the “single face of sustainment.”⁹

Proof of Principle

After the Warfighter exercise, the 2ID/RUCD commander directed the DCG-S and the 2ID SB commander to synchronize support area efforts. In order to meet the commander’s intent, the DCG-S directed his staff to develop a plan to expand the SACP capabilities and



(Figure by Maj. Charles G. Fyffe and Sgt. Maj. Tommie Jones II)

Figure 3. Division Support Area Fusion Cell Concept for Key Resolve 2018

attain the capacity for it to serve as the primary mission-command node, if required. The DCG-S communicated to his staff the need to develop this capability and continue to improve with each iteration of training in order to maximize its ability to support the warfighter.

The combined division G4 was overall responsible for the SACP and assigned his forward deputy and his sergeant major to lead the planning effort along with a primary ROK planner from the combine C4. The staff referenced after-action reports, reviewed existing doctrine, and researched best practices from the Center for Army Lessons Learned and *Military Review's* "Pagonis

Effect" and "Crucible" articles. Due to its unique mission set, the 2ID/RUCD SACP was designed to incorporate both U.S. and ROK army staff elements, along with other joint service members, which led to the establishment of a combined SACP in order to plan, command, and control combined sustainment operations.

The initial plan was to establish the SACP near the 2ID SB tactical operations center (TOC) in order to decrease communication issues and reduce the amount of confusion that occurred in previous exercises. However, upon evaluation from recent lessons learned, the planners determined that the most efficient way to accomplish this

goal was to collocate the SACP with the 2ID SB TOC, resulting in the division support area (DSA) fusion cell concept (see figure 3, page 47).

This decision was supported by a key concept from the “Pagonis Effect” article that was incorporated into the planning that recommended collocating the DCG-S and SB commander into one location with the MEB commander operating in the same area.¹⁰ As the article suggests, this was “important to achieve synchronization of activities in the support area and to facilitate immediate coordination and deconfliction during a quickly developing engagement.”¹¹

The decision to collocate achieved the synchronization desired, as it streamlined communications between the division and brigade support area staff and reduced overall response time. The combined division G4 noted that the layout streamlined multiple processes and eased the burden on communications platforms. The 2ID SB TOC was directly adjacent to the SACP, which enabled direct coordination between those entities. Conflicting reports and other requests for information could be quickly resolved without degrading the sustainment support to the warfighter. The DCG-S was at the center of all support area operations, and all efforts were coordinated through him to either “reinforce or complement DMAIN efforts.”¹²

The close proximity of the ROK and U.S. support area staff was instrumental in achieving synchronization and unity of effort during the exercise. The SACP was able to facilitate sustainment efforts across multiple domains while also coordinating directly with ROK military to synchronize area distribution activities that supported both U.S. and ROK forces. This also accomplished the SB commander’s goal for the proof of principle to leverage existing sustainment resources across the multi-domain battlefield, which was critical to successfully prove the concept.

Additional source material also supported this decision, as it is suggested that an SB command post and an MEB command post are appropriate to have set up and functioning in the DSA.¹³ As with most other divisions, 2ID/RUCD was unable to execute directly with its aligned MEB. However, it was able to incorporate the MEB into the operation notionally with the MEB’s response cells.

Overall, the exercise proved successful. The division accomplished its training goals and set the conditions to improve mission-command node posturing for the future.

It is now in the process of implementing necessary improvements determined during the proof of principle.

Future Implementation

The proof of principle needed to evaluate the current processes and procedures in order to identify operational gaps, duplication of efforts, and inefficiencies, along with determining mission command feasibility. This was successful and proved the concept for 2ID/RUCD. However, the 2ID commander envisioned that his SACP could not serve as a primary division mission-command node, augmented by its assigned MEB during operations. During the KR18 iteration, the division identified key areas that it needed to address in order to meet his intent.

A key discussion in the “Pagonis Effect” article was in regard to the controlling SACP versus the coordinating SACP concept. According to the article, the controlling option would have all the critical elements associated with either a DMAIN or division tactical CP in the SACP: “Those critical resources would include mission-command systems that allow the SACP to clear airspace, monitor airflow, and provide counterbattery fire. The systems required to carry out such actions include the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, the Air and Missile Defense Workstation, and the Tactical Airspace Integration System, along with operators with the expertise required to integrate the feedback into a clear common operating picture (see figure 4, page 50).”¹⁴

This concept was brilliantly identified by the authors of the “Pagonis Effect” article. However, 2ID, much like the 1st Armored Division, chose to employ their SACP during KR18 as a coordinating command post tied to the SB with notional augmentation from the MEB for protection and maneuver support.

However, the division staff needed to address the controlling and coordinating manning gaps to provide the commander with options for future implementation and decided to accomplish this by augmenting the SACP with personnel and equipment from the DMAIN and 2ID SB. Additionally, it determined that manning would be based on mission parameters, and plans would be developed for each mission set with options for both a controlling and a coordinating SACP.

In agreement with the authors of the “Pagonis Effect,” the staff decided that some concepts would



remain constant. The 2ID/RUCD DCG-S would always provide the command authority of the node and direct operations to ensure they are nested with the commanding general's intent. The division combined G4 would continue to serve as deputy of the command node until the arrival of the MEB, after which he or she would provide operational oversight in direct coordination with the 2ID SB commander. The SB commander would continue to serve as chief of sustainment and the MEB commander would serve as chief of protection. Also, the staff determined that it needed a SACP officer in charge (OIC) to serve as the overall node manager. This would be a major responsible for communication and synchronization with other command nodes, operations and battle tracking, equipment and its setup, and combined and joint staff training for the SACP. The additional staff augmentation and the OIC concept are pictured in figure 4 (on page 50).


2ID/RUCD, like 3ID, "recognized the importance of integrating the MEB into the fabric of their support area infrastructure."¹⁵ For future iterations, the division will expand the role of the MEB and

Capt. Alexis Billo, a logistics operations officer assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Division, participates in a support area command post exercise 24 July 2018 at Camp Humphreys, Korea. The exercise simulates the interoperability of sustainment assets—such as supply, finance, and military law enforcement—in a tactical environment. (Photo by Spc. Adeline Witherspoon, U.S. Army)

ROK army personnel for future planning and training exercises so that key staff members from all three organizations are working and training together under one roof. The early and continuous investment of cross talk among these organizations is key to successful implementation in the future.

Differing capabilities, requirements, mission sets, and cultures across branches and nations have created noncompatible equipment, communication, and requisition platforms along with differing processes in requisition and equipment support. This was apparent within 2ID/RUCD's SACP as well.

However, combined sustainment planning and execution with the ROK military were notionally achieved by utilizing multimodal sustainment support across



(Figure by Maj. Charles G. Fyffe and Lt. Col. Alejandro (Alex) Nunez)

Figure 4. Proposed 2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Division Operations Cell Layout with Coordinating and Controlling Options

multiple domains for the first time. However, deficiencies were identified that need to be resolved in order to optimize current U.S. and ROK LOCs. According to the deputy combined C4 in 2ID/RUCD, the ROK army is currently striving to field a C4I system able to receive multinational inputs to cope with the lack of interoperability between our existing C4I systems. This would greatly enhance ROK and U.S. communications and allow the combined staff to fully manage

all sustainment commodities required to support the multinational warriors on the battlefield.

Achieving Synergy with Multi-Domain Sustainment

On today's multi-domain battlefield, it is essential to leverage the resources available in every domain and distribute those resources via multiple modes of transportation as efficiently as possible in order



A Republic of Korea (ROK) officer, assigned to 2nd Sustainment Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division, participates in a support area command post exercise 24 July 2018 at Camp Humphreys, Korea. (Photo by Spc. Adeline Witherspoon, U.S. Army)

to maximize sustainment support to the warfighters so they can focus on the fight. Emerging doctrine suggests that a DSA mission command post is appropriate for this purpose because organizing assets, resources, and command priorities demand a node capable of enforcing decisions already made by the commanding general and directing actions that are consistent with his or her intent.¹⁶


The SACP is an emergent concept that was born out of necessity. If utilized properly, the SACP can be a fusion cell where combined forces can leverage joint and combined sustainment resources in multiple domains; ground, air, sea, and even cyber.

If properly outfitted, the SACP can be tailored to serve as this fusion cell that can communicate, coordinate, and synchronize with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and host-nations to maximize sustainment to the warfighter (see figure 5, page 52). The SACP is required in operations that require joint or combined forces that utilize multiple nodes of sustainment.

Warfighters in all branches require the same basic necessities—food, water, fuel, and ammunition—and units in each domain have separate but concurrent

sustainment operations specific to their branch or organization with mission command spread across multiple command levels. The ability to coordinate and utilize resources across these boundaries gives the commander at each level more options to support the warfighter.

Effective logistical support in a multi-domain environment requires an in-depth understanding of combined and joint processes and procedures. Leveraging these multi-domain resources requires deliberate planning and additional lead time to execute. Sustainers operating in the multi-domain environment must anticipate support requirements across all domains. This requires deliberate combined joint planning and analysis to adequately estimate the requirements and replenishment cycles of supported forces dispersed across a large support area. Commanders at an operational level must



2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-United States Combined Division (2ID/RUCD) support area command post and sustainment fusion cell concept with maneuver enhancement brigade in place

DCG-S—Deputy commanding general for support	ELAMS—Expandable light air mobile shelter	LSG—Logistics support group	ROK—Republic of Korea	SB—Sustainment brigade
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(Figure by Maj. Charles G. Fyffe and Col. Kenneth K. Williams)

Figure 5. Enhanced Division Support Area Fusion Cell Concept (Includes Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and 2nd Sustainment Brigade)

synchronize their assets and efforts in all domains in order to maximize warfighter support.

2ID/RUCD was able to conduct combined convoys and resupply missions, but the requisitions were still processed within the respective services of each country, so the ability to estimate and anticipate those requirements became the combining link between nations. By the end of the exercise, 2ID/RUCD could estimate replenishment cycles and area support requirements of both nations.

During KR18, 2ID/RUCD also developed and validated processes to leverage both U.S. and ROK logistical capabilities. This was accomplished by allowing the 2ID SB to operate independently from the SACP while also maintaining the balance between the division and SB functionalities. This responsive relationship set conditions that allowed both organizations to cultivate ROK-U.S. relationships at their respective

levels, setting the conditions for the future DSA fusion cell concept pictured in figure 5.

As key stakeholders, the 2ID SB commander and combined division G4 agreed that early and continuous communication between the brigade and division staffs was a key component in the progression of the division's SACP from the original concept to where it stands today.

SACP Emerging Concept

The SACP and Army MEBs are still relatively new concepts, although the principles on which they are based are not. They will continue to evolve to meet the needs of the organizations that they support. The mission command concept allows for each organization to develop these support centers to meet the needs of a particular mission or organization.

This requires expert knowledge management from those organizations to capture the lessons learned

from each iteration of training and also skillful planners to develop and refine those lessons-learned concepts for future implementation.

Each division has developed a SACP concept according to their own mission sets and strengths. This is also the case for the 2ID/RUCD, which continues to adapt and change along with its ROK army partners. To ensure that these concepts are maintained even during times of high turn-over in the division, 2ID/RUCD created a SACP SOP and standardized battle drills that are now maintained within its knowledge management section.

KR18 was the third iteration of training for the 2ID/RUCD SACP, and it was considered successful as the division accomplished its training goals and set conditions to improve its mission posturing. The proof of principle demonstrated the ability of the division staff and the 2ID SB to synchronize planning efforts and its ability to formulate and implement improvements rapidly.

Additionally, 2ID/RUCD is drafting a proposal for a table top exercise and proof of principle to focus on coordination and execution with the ROK army to better train the combined concepts. During KR18, we were able to notionally leverage existing ROK

logistical LOCs across multiple domains. These must be leveraged for future training and contingency operations in order to maximize sustainment capabilities.

The Army's ability to develop evolving concepts and disseminate to the force through various channels rapidly represents a paradigm shift in organizational development for the Army. This proved invaluable to the 2ID/RUCD staff and planners as they used recent lessons from other Army divisions and implemented these evolving concepts into their SACP development without having to endure the same encumbrances the other divisions had to overcome in order to make improvements. The ability to use these valuable lessons learned during concurrent operations is key to initiating rapid improvements to an organization. This saves time and resources that can be used to build upon those lessons learned from other units and implement improvements at an exponential rate. As a prime example, 2ID/RUCD was able to transform its SACP from a concept on paper to a fully capable command node in less than six months. If this trend continues, the Army will reach an inflection point in organizational development within the next decade, if not sooner. ■

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14. Fenzel and Torgersen, "The Pagonis Effect," 56–57.

15. Ibid., 52.

16. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 6 October 2017), 2-37; Fenzel and Torgersen, "The Pagonis Effect," 56.



Thriving in Uncertainty

From Predictive- to Probability-Based Assessments

Lt. Col. Michael J. Adamski, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Scott Pence, U.S. Army

War is the realm of uncertainty ... the realm of chance.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Commanders and their staffs need the most effective tools to thrive in conditions of uncertainty. The U.S. Army's capstone doctrine,

the National Defense Strategy, and current military theorists all reiterate this aspiration. The products our intelligence sections prepare, however, tend to present a binary choice of two predictive enemy courses of action. This article asserts that the common practice of specifying "most dangerous" and "most likely" enemy courses of action stifles analytic

agility and limits commanders from understanding the full range of potential mission events. It then reviews current doctrine to highlight the clear mandate for analysis that incorporates chance and uncertainty. The authors, one an intelligence officer and the other a cavalry officer, go on to assert that this mandate is not observed in the operational force and introduce formats that embrace probability rather than predictability. Although written from an Army perspective, the findings resonate with the joint and interagency communities as well. The goal of this article is to encourage commanders to reconsider their expectations of assessments they receive from their intelligence sections. Intelligence staff officers (designated as S2s at battalion and brigade levels and as G2s at division level and higher) owe commanders a roadmap of options available to a free-thinking enemy. And they need to articulate this over time as conditions change in the operational environment. By integrating probability tools into the military decision-making process, commanders and staffs can mitigate the risks and harness the opportunities inherent in the uncertainty of warfare.

Chance and Uncertainty in Our Current Doctrine

Current intelligence doctrine mandates S2s and G2s describe enemy capabilities and options. The newly released Army Doctrine Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, describes the purpose of intelligence as assisting commanders “in visualizing the operational environment, organizing their forces, and controlling operations to achieve their objectives by answering specific requirements focused in time and space.”¹ In addition, the current draft of Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, directs staffs to determine all valid threat/adversary courses of action and articulate them in order of likelihood.² This pins a

responsibility on S2s or G2s to continually present enemy capabilities and options.

Notably, appreciation of uncertainty is clear in the current versions; however, it was not always this way. Through the years, intelligence doctrine varied in its tolerance of predictive models. In 1984, Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, advised the G2 to list two or three enemy courses of action (COAs) in order of probability of adoption.³ In 1993, the language was changed from requiring S2s and G2s to predict enemy intentions back toward predicting enemy variables and options. The 1994 and 2009 versions of the *Army Field Manual for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (FM 34-130 and FM 2-01.3) both mention the necessity to present enemy capabilities and options but also discuss categorizing such as most likely and most dangerous when planning time is limited. These fluctuations in guidance have contributed to the confusion among S2s and G2s on how to articulate step four of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), “determine threat/adversary courses of action.”⁴ While S2s and G2s grapple with how to articulate the range of possible actions, operations doctrine remains relatively constant in its appreciation of uncertainty.

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Previous page: U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade plan 10 October 2017 during exercise Swift Response 17 in Hohenfels, Germany. Swift Response is an annual U.S. Army Europe-led exercise focused on allied airborne forces' ability to quickly and effectively respond to crisis situations as an interoperable multinational team. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Alexander C. Henninger, U.S. Army)

The first chapter of FM 3-0, *Operations*, states, “The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment (OE) makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the uncertain nature of military operations.”⁵ Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, adds, “Uncertainty pervades operations in the

screen line in the southeast and southwest avenues of approach to provide early warning to the defending infantry battalions. When the brigade commander saw this array on his Blue Force Tracking System, he immediately saw that the southeastern approach was not predicted by his S2’s most likely or most dangerous courses of action and repositioned the eastern troop west. During the night,

“The problem is that our tactics, techniques, and procedures have not caught up with our foundational doctrine.”

forms of unknowns about the enemy, the people, and the surroundings.”⁶ A review of our intelligence and operational doctrine shows an appreciation of uncertainty in operations and reflects the need for commanders to appreciate a wide range of possibilities.

Defects in Formulation, Packaging, and Articulation

What current doctrine directs is not what is happening in our maneuver formations. Despite doctrine’s call for adaptive intelligence to support a fluid operational environment, intelligence leaders at the operational and tactical echelons continue to publish stagnant assessments. Rarely, after the intelligence section completes its IPB and briefs the most likely COA to the commander, does the assessment change.⁷ Partly due to operational tempo and partly to hubris, the exquisite most likely COA usually remains throughout subsequent mission planning—often in spite of contravening information, contrary results of reconnaissance, and events antithetical to the original forecast. This tendency is reinforced because staffs find it inconvenient to the planning process when the S2s or G2s alter an assessment because it has a cascading effect on everyone else’s products. In a time-constrained environment, with a commander bent on executing the mission, humans on the staff naturally resist change and settle into a predictive analysis.

Presenting only two possible futures fails to appreciate the range of options available to a cunning enemy. For example, during a combat training center decisive-action rotation, a brigade combat team mounted a defense. The cavalry squadron arrayed its two mounted troops along a

the opposing force achieved surprise as they infiltrated from the southeast past each of the cavalry troop’s vacated observation points on their way to the brigade’s vulnerable support area. Had the intelligence section understood the range of enemy capabilities and the commander demanded more than a binary most likely and most dangerous assessment, they might have recognized that an airborne assault into a southeastern drop zone was a viable probability.⁸

It is not that our intelligence leaders do not know our doctrine; they do. And it is not that our commanders are not tactically proficient; they are. The problem is that our tactics, techniques, and procedures have not caught up with our foundational doctrine. By embracing the complex nature of military operations, commanders and their staffs can better prevent surprise by the enemy and be prepared to exploit positions of relative advantage.

Complexity Theory

Commanders can best understand a complex operational environment when they become comfortable speaking in terms of probabilities within complexity instead of predictive enemy courses of action. Complexity theorist Yaneer Bar-Yam noted that complexity sciences study how relationships between parts give rise to the collective behaviors of a system. He noted that the conventional question of whether to see the forest or the tree is insufficient. By understanding the details of the trees within the context of the forest system, one can see which aspects of the trees are relevant to the description of the forest. Bar-Yam used the term *emergence* to describe how to navigate complexity. For our purposes, this implies a knowledge of the range of options available to the enemy

(the trees) as well as a coherent vision for how those events could be executed in various times and spaces during an operation (the forest).⁹

The following five-step process seeks to incite emergence within the planning staff. The process offers a method for intelligence and operations officers to identify a range of events that could occur, assign probabilities to each event along a two-dimensional chart, and cue branch plans that can be visualized along multiple horizons. The outputs are a probability curve, which aids in understanding the likely range of possible events, and a Multi-Horizon Event Template (MHET), which enables a commander to visualize the probable events in time and space.

Step 1. Understand the Relevant Range of Possible Events

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.


—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*¹⁰

The first step is to generate the range of mission events that can occur. Mission events are concise statements of possible actions the enemy might choose to take, environmental and weather effects, actions of adjacent units or host-nation forces, and actions of subordinate units that could impact the course of the battle. Step one resembles a brainstorming phase. No mission event is better or worse than another if it is a possible event within the operational environment. The military decision-making process already incorporates running estimates from each staff section, in which the section analyzes the mission and relevant information from the perspective of their specific warfighting function. Within that running estimate, staff sections conduct reverse IPB in which they describe the threat capabilities within their warfighting function. The chief of staff or executive officer, after dictating the requirements and format, can delegate the creation of mission events by warfighting function. For example, the fires section can generate mission events related to the capabilities of the enemy indirect fire capabilities while the movement and maneuver section can generate mission events associated with the avenues of approach available to the enemy.

Each section submits mission events, and the S2 or G2 compiles them into a master listing. Each warfighting function section, using its knowledge, experience, and insight, assigns a value to each mission event in terms of the event's risk to the friendly unit's forces and to its mission (x-axis) and assesses the probability of the mission event occurring (y-axis).¹¹ In the example provided by figure 1 (on page 58), the risk to mission and force is rated from -2 to 10, with 10 representing catastrophic failure, 0 having no effect on the mission, and negative numbers highlight mission events that contribute positively to mission accomplishment.

The process of generating the range of mission events is scalable to the analysis required and the resources available. The cavalry squadron that tested this concept used sticky notes and a whiteboard to plot the events, and used that same whiteboard during the mission analysis briefing.¹² A tactical headquarters will find METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, time available, temperature and weather, and civilian considerations) sufficient as a template for analysis, while an operational headquarters will find PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time) more useful for its analysis. When relevant, planners should add the effects of host-nation force missions and those of adjacent units to provide a holistic context to the data. Resources available will also affect how the staff compiles the range of possible events. During hasty planning, intelligence officers generate events using only their knowledge and experience as guides. During deliberate planning, a more methodical technique generates the mission events. For operation plans and concept plans, operational planning teams should prepare a comprehensive listing of possible mission events.

Even if the staff completes none of the other steps, the act of generating the relevant range of possibilities enhances the commander's understanding of the operational environment. This is reflected in ADRP 3-0, *Operations*, which states, "The side that best understands an operational environment learns and adapts more rapidly and decides to act more quickly in conditions of uncertainty and is more likely to win."¹³ Winning in warfare means exploiting positions of advantage, and the next steps show how to operationalize this enhanced understanding.



(Figure by Scott Pence)

Figure 1. Events Plotted along a Probability Curve


Step 2. Plot the Range of Events

In figure 1, the mission event of “Scatterable mines along route 1” bears some risk on the mission (6) and is highly likely (80 percent). This plots on the chart at the (6,8) position. As the team populates the graph, a certain curve should take shape identifying the most probable mission events in the center with marginal to serious risk to the unit from left to right. In this particular example, the curve is symmetrical and is a bell curve. However, not every probability curve will be a symmetrical bell curve like our simple example. If the S2 or G2 is able to objectively quantify the data, the shape of the curve could quickly portray the relative danger of the operational environment. Curves that skew to the right represent a more dangerous operational environment, while curves that skew to the left represent a relatively less dangerous operational environment.

Commanders require techniques and procedures to integrate probability into the operations process

because of the roles chance and uncertainty play in warfare. Military affairs author B. A. Friedman recently introduced a metaphor that says strategy is to tactics just as Einstein’s theory of relativity is to quantum mechanics. The general theory of relativity exists and has influence over tiny particles, he noted, but the way in which we described them is very different. Tactics, like quantum mechanics, “does not predict a single definite result for an observation [or tactical event]. Instead, it predicts a number of different outcomes and tells you how likely each one of these is.”¹⁴ Friedman’s metaphor finds support from both military theory and modern commercial enterprises.

In his seminal work, *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz stated, “War is the province of chance,” and actors will commonly find outcomes that differ from expectations. War’s inherent uncertainty must be considered during planning. Clausewitz added, “War is the province of uncertainty: three-fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated, are hidden



(Figure by Scott Pence)

Figure 2. Focus on Most Likely Events (Middle of the Curve) to Prioritize Mission Planning

more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty. Here, then, above all a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the truth by the tact of its judgment.” This requires the blending of a commander’s experience and intellect, what Clausewitz labeled a commander’s *genius for war*, with planning practices which consider the range of potential events.¹⁵


In the world of finance, stockbrokers use probability algorithms to identify when to buy and sell stocks.¹⁶ In high-stakes poker, the top players study the range of probabilities of their hands beating an opponent’s hand and constantly adjust their probability assessments as the game progresses.¹⁷ In sports, Michael Lewis’s *Moneyball* chronicled the success of probability-based models for reorganizing the Oakland Athletics baseball team during the 2002 season.¹⁸ In industries in which uncertainty is prevalent, fierce and repeated competition demand systems that understand and embrace probability. The very best traders, poker players, and

baseball franchises complement the science of probability with experience and judgment to narrow the scope of possible actions to execute bold and decisive actions.

Step 3. Focus Attention on Most Likely and Relevant Events

The commander’s plan cannot address every possible mission event. The Prussian king Frederick the Great famously said, “He who defends everything, defends nothing.”¹⁹ The plan must focus on the range of actions that are both likely and relevant to the mission. The probability curve lends itself to this effort through quickly identifying those events that are both likely and relevant to the mission. During step 3, the planner reviews the range of possible mission events and draws two dashed lines, capturing the events in the middle of the curve (see figure 2).

By focusing on the events in the center of the curve, the staff resolves a critical “catch-22” of military planning in which the planner desires an enemy COA prediction



(Figure by Scott Pence)


Figure 3. Identify Branch Plans on Either Side of the Curve to Facilitate Adjustment Decisions

before writing the plan and the intelligence officer desires a friendly plan with which to predict enemy COAs.²⁰ Collaborative staff development of multiple horizons, grounded in the most likely and relevant events, fosters parallel and overlapping visualizations from enemy and friendly perspectives. An 82nd Airborne Division planner, Maj. Bruce Roett, noted after a division Warfighter exercise, “The more that initial concept addresses multiple enemy actions, the more anticipatory and responsive the overall plan will be. Risks and opportunities will already be built into the DSM [decision support matrix] and EDSM [enemy decision support matrix] and the friendly commander is empowered to operate within the enemy commander’s decision space, and win.”²¹ The staff holistically develops a product that focuses attention primarily on the concept of operations. The concept of operations and coordinating instructions for the mission address all of the mission events in the center of the curve between

the two dashed lines. Since “Scatterable mines along route 1” is a highly likely event, the coordinating instructions paragraph of the operations order automatically needs to contain risk mitigation measures for scatterable mines, regardless of the final concept of the operation. Warning Order 2 can easily highlight likely mission events in order to allow subordinate commanders to integrate them into mission planning, preparation, and rehearsals.

Step 4. Identify Branch Plans and Adjustment Decisions

The probability curve also allows commanders to visualize the less-likely events possible during the mission. These events require adjustment decisions consistent with guidance in ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, which states, “Adjustment decisions modify the operation to respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats. They often require implementing unanticipated operations and



(Figure by Scott Pence)


Figure 4. Mission Probability Quad

resynchronizing the warfighting functions. Commanders make these decisions, delegating implementing authority only after directing the major change themselves.”²²

Irrespective of careful planning, in every operation there is risk of catastrophic failure. The chance of “catastrophic” success, however, is also a feature in operations. Mediocre planners account for catastrophic failure while brilliant planners account for spectacular success. Once the staff identifies positions of advantage, it plans to exploit those temporary positions and take actions to make them permanent. Using a probability curve explicitly identifies enemy actions that have a beneficial effect on the mission and enables commanders and staffs to build branch plans and sequels to encourage and allow those events to occur (see figure 3, page 60). For example, the mission event “ENY does not defend at crossing site 2” is actually beneficial to the mission, so it receives a negative risk (-2) while also being very unlikely (10 percent).

Therefore, it plots on the chart at the (-2,1) position. This event occurred at Warfighter 18-04 when the opposing force decided not to defend a possible crossing site, allowing elements of 3 Division, United Kingdom, to cross unimpeded. Fortunately, the planning staff postured the force to take advantage of that possibility.²³

There are other ways to present this information. Intelligence sections should experiment with methods that best allow their commander and staffs to visualize the range of possible events. The method depicted in figure 4 is another possibility. To use it, plot the points just as steps 1 and 2 direct. Planners draft the plan to address the mission events in the shaded blue portion on the top half of the quadrant. The lower right quadrant contains the most dangerous possibilities and cues the S3 (operations officer at battalion or brigade level) or G3 (operations officer at division level and above) to create decision points to mitigate risk. To exploit the initiative and make



(Figure by Mike Adamski, Zach Alessi-Friedlander, Brian Bloomquist, and Jeremy Hobbs)

Figure 5. Multi-Horizon Event Template

temporary positions of advantage more permanent, the S3 or G3 creates decision points to capitalize on events shaded in green on the bottom left.

Step 5. The Multi-Horizon Event Template

Once planners identify branch plans and adjustment decisions, they package the key takeaways for the commander. A technique for accomplishing this is the MHET.²⁴ The MHET takes the staff work developed in step 4 and arranges it into an overarching visual depiction of the enemy's vision of success (see figure 5). It depicts enemy options, decision points, and objectives in space and time. It serves as a mechanism to communicate enemy branches and sequels without overcommitting to a singular course of action. By including priority intelligence requirements and a basic scheme of collection, it communicates how an S2 or G2 continues to adapt enemy options at a given point in the fight. It is updated on an appropriate recurring timeline. The MHET serves as an effective mechanism to assist planners as they visualize variables.

Figure 5 uses a fictional storyline to depict the philosophy and flow of the MHET. The intelligence team integrates enemy decision points along chronological, physical, and cognitive horizons. In this instance, at D+1, the 316th Reconnaissance Brigade conducts a guard in order to facilitate movement of the 88th Mechanized Division late on D+1 or early on D+2. Also on D+1, the commander of the 88th will make decisions associated with the apportionment of forces along two potential avenues of approach. On D+2, the commander of the 88th makes decisions for the commitment of forces to cross the river at two potential locations, and to eventually seize the capital city on D+3. Subsequent enemy decisions and actions in following phases are color-coded accordingly, and depicted both on the map and the timeline at the bottom of the chart.

From here, the staff returns to the military decision-making process. The intelligence section generates priority information requirements to support the most critical adjustment and execution decisions required by the commander. Then, the section nests

the priority intelligence requirements with essential elements of information and other information requirements and, finally, assigns sensors to answer specific information requirements. All of this is eventually captured in the intelligence collection matrix.

Conclusion

Intelligence professionals owe commanders a clear articulation of the probability of relevant events that can affect the mission; however, it is not possible to accurately predict precisely all the actions of a cunning

and free-thinking enemy. As a result, commanders should question assertions of certainty during all phases of the operation and demand techniques and procedures that incorporate ambiguity in a way that enables the exploitation of temporary positions of advantage as they emerge. Armed with sound fundamentals in our doctrine, our staffs have an opportunity to revise their habitual routines and develop techniques and procedures that embrace uncertainty. As leaders test and develop these techniques, they will steadily enhance the probability of thriving in uncertainty. ■

Notes

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2. Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, forthcoming).
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21. Written feedback on inherent friction between concurrent intelligence and operations planning as derived from Maj. Bruce Rott, a planner for 82nd Airborne Division and currently the Brigade S4, 2BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, 19 November 2018.

22. ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 4-33.

23. Notes from author Scott Pence, acting brigade commander during Warfighter 18-04, April 2018.

24. The Multi-Horizon Event Template was created in 2017 by Maj. Zach Alessi-Friedlander, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brian Bloomquist, and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jeremy Hobbs. The team was inspired by a format used by Col. Bryan Love and his opposing force team when he was the senior intelligence officer at MCTP.



Afghanistan National Army Military Police Guard Command (ANA MPGC) personnel conduct training on riot and crowd control techniques 17 January 2017 at the Afghanistan National Detention Facility Prison, Parwan Province, Afghanistan. The ANA MPGC conducted an emergency action drill at the detention facility to test response capabilities inside the prison as well as all necessary external support. (Photo by Bob Harrison, U.S. Forces Afghanistan Public Affairs)

Recruiting, Vetting, and Training Police Forces in Postconflict Environments

Brig. Gen. John F. Hussey, U.S. Army Reserve

Recently, Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov sent a letter to Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford. The letter, in essence, called upon the United States and Russia to cooperate with respect to beginning the process of rebuilding Syria.¹ One of the proposals was to assist refugees as they begin to return to their homes. The initial questions regarding this endeavor were, “What are the key aspects to undertake such a project?” and “Where do you begin?”

Stability operations in postconflict environments (PCEs) can best be defined as efforts to bring peace and security to a region or country. There are a variety of ways to do this. However, it should be recognized that each nation, international organization, or nongovernmental organization that donates funding, personnel, or logistics has its own objectives and vision as to how the instability in a PCE should be resolved. Based on their particular interests, those who contribute will often provide insights from their respective vantage points on how to resolve the problem. Regardless, a safe and secure environment provides the basis for the establishment of law and order, which is the precursor for a government to provide other essential services to the public. Maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment will pave the way for the host nation to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief to those trying to cope in a PCE. This article contends that successful stability operations in PCEs begin with security provided by a democratically trained and functional police force.

Initial Considerations for Establishing Security

The U.S. military has a vast amount of experience operating in PCEs, and those who have such experience realize that it is crucial to establish the rule of law in a country coming out of a conflict along with the security necessary to restore the confidence of the population in its government. Security is fundamentally important in a PCE, and the termination of hostilities hinges upon a host nation's ability to establish security. Although every PCE is different, there is one constant: the indigenous population desires and needs security that is dependent on some form of local law and order. If a host nation fails to meet the security

needs of the population, it will be problematic at best if the United States and the international community decide to intervene later. For purposes of this article, the international community will be defined as “all countries with international influence—that is, any country whose identity and sovereignty is recognized, and that chooses to participate in global discussions and decision-making,” and collective actions.²

Security can best be established by the rule of law. Unless comprehensive security needs are considered and planned for, nefarious actors, to include transnational organizational criminals (TOCs) and potential terrorists acting within the region, will find and exploit potential “brown zones.”

For purposes of this article, a TOC is defined as an organized crime element acting across international borders that involves groups or networks of individuals conducting illegal business ventures. TOCs will employ systematic violence and corruption to further their empires and achieve their goals.³ Brown zones can best be defined as specific neighborhoods or geographic areas where state governments are reluctant to intervene.⁴ One may consider these areas to be “no-man zones,” and leaders must anticipate that personnel operating within these areas will likely encounter a failed, broken, destroyed, or simply nonexistent justice apparatus (i.e., a lack of effective police, judiciary, and detention operations).

It is likely that such a situation will require immediate attention to protect the indigenous population, their property, and their economic livelihood, and the only alternative to providing security may be military personnel who are present within the borders. While this may be a necessary initial step to fill the *security gap* (defined as the “void after the fighting has ceased and prior to the intervention of a trained police force to restore and provide public order”), one must consider

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that military personnel lack the necessary training and experience to conduct civilian law enforcement within a civilian population.⁵ Military forces that are used to fill the security gap are often utilized to prevent an escalation of civil war and disorder, but they lack the mandate or the ability to enforce the local rule of law either by law-enforcement-specific training or experience.

police may be the most critical institution of the state. This is particularly true in PCEs that have experienced prolonged violence.

Members of the international community who wish to assist in a PCE must enhance their capability to deploy and support civilian police to address the temporary needs of the people with an emphasis on

“... the ability to restore law and order and treat the population humanely instead of reacting reflexively to provocations that arise with immediate recourse to violence, is key to long-term security and stability.”

Successful planning and execution of a security plan by the military, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations are essential to create the conditions necessary for a host nation to achieve initial stability. However, employing military forces to conduct civilian policing is not optimal. Combat soldiers, who by training and experience are taught to achieve goals by using aggressive violence, may not respond like qualified police officers to nuanced situations that require a range of different personal relations and investigative skills. A functioning police force with such skills and training, which gives them the ability to restore law and order and treat the population humanely instead of reacting reflexively to provocations that arise with immediate recourse to violence, is key to long-term security and stability. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the host nation and international community to plan for and develop a highly functional police force with the requisite law enforcement skills from the indigenous population that will enable the host government to establish security on its own.⁶

Police Operations in Postconflict Environments

The United Nations' Department for Peacekeeping Operations has recognized that democratic policing is a responsive and accountable police force that defends basic human rights and is essential for successful transition and long-term sustainable security.⁷ At the end of a conflict, the

security. In many instances, those who are sent to a PCE may be unfamiliar with the concepts of security and police operations, at least as they pertain to that specific region or culture. Such unfamiliarity may negate their ability to assist or train potential police recruits. Additionally, those members of the U.S. military or international community may not understand or appreciate the indigenous perception of how law enforcement ought to operate in relation to the cultural aspects of the county or region in which they are operating. For example, those operating in foreign areas often bring with them an ethnocentric bias that could complicate the establishment of a police force. Often, the international actors serving in a security role will train and model police forces based upon principles that are derived from their own cultural perceptions of what is proper and efficient as opposed to what may be perceived as appropriate in the culture of the population among whom they are serving.

For citizens who live in these troubled areas, a police officer is the symbolic representation of the government in charge; a positive popular opinion of the government as reflected by the police force that represents that government is paramount to establishing both security and the rule of law. Additionally, experience has shown that the success of police forces appears universally linked to a perception of law enforcement that is applied fairly and equally without regard for status, tribal or ethnic affiliation, or personal gain.

It follows that properly trained civilian police, as part of large-scale postconflict reconstruction, have



become much more relevant today. In the context of postconflict reconstruction, the role of the police should focus on “securing of basic law and order operations immediately after the end of the conflict.”⁸ Police should be transparent and accountable for their actions, and they must be seen as legitimate by the elected officials and the population that they serve. Additionally, police at all levels must view themselves as serving the entire population and not merely the government, a select few, or themselves.

Common Components of Police Training

In a nation emerging from conflict, those in power must strive to develop a legitimate police force in the eyes of the population, and this is accomplished through proper police training. Those responsible for developing police training must initially focus on the three areas in particular: investigation, adjudication, and detention while in police custody.

First, police training should focus on investigative techniques that encourage police officers to conduct prompt and impartial criminal investigations. The

Afghan police cadets graduate from training 5 January 2017 at the Sivas Police Training Academy in Sivas, Turkey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting the Afghan government by training more female police to help women have easier access to justice. As of March 2018, the Afghan female police force reached three thousand officers—steps closer to the Ministry of Interior’s goal of five thousand. (Photo by Igot Ryabchuk; courtesy of UNDP Afghanistan)

training should include basic investigative skills, interpersonal skills, and effective communication skills, both oral and written. In some nations, the police are responsible for interviewing alleged criminals and insurgents. In-depth training on specific skills such as interview techniques for both victims and criminals will prevent abuses and also bolster any subsequent criminal cases for the prosecution with tangible and legitimate evidence. Trainers must ensure that proper interview techniques comport with international humanitarian law. “Any indigenous interview methods in the host nation that could result in a coerced statement must be specifically discouraged and the negative ramifications of such illegal activity discussed during the training.”⁹

Police development and training must also focus on due process and the timely and fair disposition of cases for those who are arrested. Newly trained police officers must understand that they are only one facet of the rule of law. The rule of law is premised on ensuring basic human rights that are reflected in some form of a written law or code that ensures due process. The code of justice should guarantee both transparency and clarity of the criminal justice process in the eyes of the population. This can only be accomplished with the fair and impartial adjudication of cases, to include proportional punishment for those convicted of criminal activity. Police officers must learn to become detached from the cases and simply enforce the rule of law without bias. Police officers involved in an investigation and arrest must accept the adjudication of the case as determined by the courts.

Lastly, police officers in a PCE must understand, appreciate, and plan for the last component of the rule of law—detention. Police will be responsible for holding citizens for a certain period of time. However, unlike developed nations, which quickly produce a person accused of a crime before a magistrate, those held by police in a PCE may be in custody for an extended period

of time. To quote Dostoevsky, “the degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”¹⁰ To newly trained police officers, this means their jails or holding areas should meet basic human standards. Citizens that are held should be treated humanely and receive proper medical care, food, clothing to protect against climate changes, and the ability to engage with an attorney. Anything less is simply unacceptable.

Recruitment

One cannot overemphasize the importance of properly recruiting, screening, and selecting quality personnel to enforce the rule of law. It is vital for leaders or administrators in a PCE to recruit a diverse cross section of the community that truly reflects the population.¹¹ To do this successfully, eligibility criteria must be established prior to recruiting potential candidates for police training. Criteria such as age, education, criminal record, health, physical abilities, and psychological background are often used to screen candidates. Many Western democracies also consider minority recruiting to ensure a diverse police force that reflects the makeup of a community, thus enabling the police and the



community to better interact and resolve issues together. A trustworthy police force is seen by the public to be effective and fair, and to have shared values, interests, and a strong commitment to the local community.¹²

The recruitment of law enforcement applicants is a necessary but difficult task. One must be patient and understand that this process may take years, not simply

detailed, long-term planning to identify and design strategies that will be used to recruit people of ethnically and culturally diverse backgrounds, train them accordingly, and to monitor their effectiveness.

Police organizations and tactics will often differ from country to country because of historical developments, internal strife, religious considerations, and cultural fac-

“What is universal, however, is the need for police in areas of great diversity to gain the trust and legitimacy of the minority communities.”

weeks or months. Simultaneously, however, there may be great pressure from the newly formed host-nation government and the international community to rapidly recruit, train, and deploy a new police force. Regardless, it is important that those responsible for recruiting never allow substandard recruits to enter the system.¹³ Effective screening will help identify and weed out undesirable candidates, including those who have been accused of violating human rights or those who may have been involved in organizations who systematically abused the population. Recruiting these types of candidates will create resentment and cause the population to question the legitimacy of the government and newly formed police organizations.

PCEs may have diverse populations. They will be difficult to administer, and each will present a unique challenge for those responsible for setting up a police force. Accordingly, diversity management poses significant challenges for leaders in a new government or those who find themselves in temporary administrative positions. The formation of a new police force requires

tors, as well as different legal systems. What is universal, however, is the need for police in areas of great diversity to gain the trust and legitimacy of the minority communities. Police who are recruited from local populations have the advantage in this regard, both culturally and politically, based on coethnic cohabitation. However, they must always understand that there are competing cultures, religions, national identities that will challenge the newly formed government and law enforcement communities. Police forces must develop the ability to work with the local populations while simultaneously putting aside their prejudices as well as the scars of conflict that often plague those in a PCE.¹⁴

Vetting

Often after a conflict is over, there will be an effort by the host nation or international community to hire security personnel or police officers. The recruiting effort will compile a pool of potential candidates who are seeking employment in the new security sector. In the United States, as well as other Western democracies, many recruits who have passed the prerequisite requirements will then be vetted by a professional in the applicant investigation unit. It is the responsibility of the investigator to ensure a thorough investigation of each applicant, which includes a complete background check. This process is known as vetting. Vetting is best defined as taking the necessary measures to assess a candidate's suitability for public employment in the security forces or police.¹⁵ Part of the vetting process will be to ensure a candidate has complied with the international standards of human rights and professional conduct. It also

Previous page: A Royal Danish Army soldier (left) with Task Force Al Asad hands an M16 rifle to an Iraqi Federal Police Force trainee 15 March 2016 on the trainee's first day of military training at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq. Funding to purchase the equipment was allocated from the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF), which the U.S. Congress appropriated to provide assistance to military and other security services associated with the government of Iraq. ITEF, facilitated by Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, provided essential weapons and equipment to Iraqi security forces as part of the building partner capacity mission. (Photo by Sgt. Joshua E. Powell, U.S. Army)

attempts to eliminate candidates who are personally responsible for gross violations of human rights or serious crimes under international law. This will also include character as it relates to the integrity and trust of the citizens the candidates will eventually serve. Proper vetting is also critical to preventing insurgents and other

a “bad person” for acts of this type. This is more cultural than actual acts of criminal behavior. If an investigator does not understand this dynamic, many potentially good candidates could be eliminated. Regardless, in a PCE, the number of problematic candidates may be high, and those conducting the vetting process might



The host nation, which has the primary interest in training its newly established police force, should ensure that police training is an integral element of the broader process of peace and institution building.



nefarious actors from infiltrating the newly formed police force. Improper vetting would fundamentally impair the institution’s capacity to deliver its mandate that would call into legitimacy the entire organization.¹⁶

Individuals who are accused of or known to have committed gross violations of human rights or serious crimes under international law should not be allowed to continue with the vetting process.¹⁷ Proper vetting is also critical for preventing insurgents and other nefarious actors from infiltrating the newly formed police force.

In “The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments,” Sean McFate noted that during conflicts or times of turbulence, citizens may conduct themselves inappropriately by acting criminally or taking sides in the conflict. This will result in a large number of candidates being tainted.¹⁸ Unfortunately, it may be hard to identify many of these tainted candidates, as a general characteristic of PCEs is a severely flawed records keeping or storage process. The resources that are available for the vetting processes in Western democracies are not readily available in PCE; vetting resources such as education records, criminal arrest reports, land deeds, credit reports, and employment history simply may not exist. This means that each PCE is unique and may require flexibility and a variety of hiring and vetting standards and processes.

One must also consider culture when vetting. For example, in the United States, it would not mean a great deal for an applicant investigator to hear that a person stayed out late, did not pray five times a day, or played loud music. However, in nations that follow strict adherence to the Koran, it would not be uncommon for U.S. forces to be told that a potential police candidate is

find themselves rejecting most of the candidates.

Finally, not all applicants and vetting processes are perfect, so there should be a review or appeals process that should enable those conducting the appeal to assess all evidence, the pertinent witness statements, and the various versions of events in order to make informed decisions regarding potential candidates.

Police Training Considerations in Postconflict Environments

There are a variety of considerations when training police recruits for a PCE. Initial concerns will include the physical structure of the training academy, the program of instruction (with particular sensitivity to ethnic, tribal, and religious considerations), police equipment, recruit safety, and the permissiveness of the training environment. It is important to consider that while in these types of situations, “cookie-cutter” training programs have often been put in place. However, in complex environments, one size does not fit all.¹⁹

Logistics. While police compensation can be much of a law enforcement budget, funding for the logistical aspects of initiating a police or security structure must also be included. Additionally, maintenance costs must be included when planning for physical structures such as training academics and police stations.

In Afghanistan, funding for equipment and facility construction for the Afghan police force’s training became a challenge for the German Police Project Office.²⁰ The Afghans lacked the necessary physical space, which the Germans had to build or reconstruct. And, due to the economic deprivation in Afghanistan, the police recruits simply lacked the basic police equipment

necessary to begin their training, such as uniforms, personal equipment, office equipment, and police vehicles.

Training. There are numerous opinions on the best way to train potential police candidates in a PCE. The host nation, which has the primary interest in training its newly established police force, should ensure that police training is an integral element of the broader

taught methods that were not especially relevant in the Kosovan area such as a pursuit technique in which two police cars would block a third car. The relevancy of this instruction was called into question since most Kosovan officers lacked drivers' licenses, and therefore, the likelihood to perform such a task was slim. The Germans eliminated such training from the new curriculum.



process of peace and institution building. It is vital that the police force is developed with the goals of reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding an effective, legitimate, and sustainable indigenous police force with short- and long-term law enforcement capacities.²¹

Since there is usually a lead nation responsible for the security line of effort in a PCE, training for host-nation police forces will generally reflect the training received by police in the lead nation, using the lead nation's national curriculum. As an example, a German lead trainer in Kosovo wanted to change the training curriculum and use European standards. He believed that this change would make training more conducive and relevant to the Kosovan context. Conversely, U.S. police instructors

A member of the Iraqi Federal Police leads simulated prisoners during a final training exercise 8 January 2019 at the Besmaya Range Complex, Iraq. The Multi-National Force–Iraq coalition offers training programs in areas as diverse as operational planning, counterterrorism, logistics and sustainment, equipment maintenance, counter-IED techniques, and law enforcement. (Photo by Spc. Eric Cerami, U.S. Army)

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of a program of instruction for police in PCEs is the need to ensure they are trained to uphold human rights and democratic principles. "The United Nations Guidelines for the Effective Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement" has provided standard

“To increase the odds of long-term success, police candidates must be recruited from the various ethnic, religious, and tribal organizations, to include gender, that make up the demographics of the nation involved.”

guidance for police officials to include the use of force and ten basic standards for human rights:²²

1. Everyone is entitled to equal protection under the law without discrimination.
2. Victims should be afforded compassion and respect regarding safety and privacy.
3. Use the minimal amount of force to carry out one's duties.
4. Be cautious of using forces during peaceful assemblies and, if required, during violent assemblies only use the minimum amount of force that is required.
5. Lethal force should be a last resort.
6. Only arrest when legally sufficient grounds are present and in accordance with all prescribed laws.
7. Ensure detainees are afforded due process, medical care, and access to their families and legal representation.
8. Treat all detainees with dignity and respect.
9. There will be no gross violations of human rights to include extra judicial killings.
10. Report any violations of these tenets to your appropriate supervisor.

The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe's International Police Standards has authored the *Guidebook on Democratic Policing*.²³ This guideline endeavors to provide potential police officers with their specific responsibilities and obligations with respect to preventing crime and protecting human rights. Democratic policing upholds the values that all

citizens' rights should be protected, and the police should be responsive to their needs.²⁴

Conclusion

The United States and other members of the international community are highly likely to continue conducting operations in PCEs. They have little choice but to maintain an active role to counter, impede, and dissuade hostile states, nonstate actors, and TOCs from creating chaos in PCEs, and stability through security will be a key component of their actions. This will require funding, planning, and executing the development of a democratically trained and functional police force.

To create a police force from its inception is quite challenging. There are a variety of considerations to include in the size of the force; budgeting; recruiting, screening, and training of candidates; equipment and training facilities; and monitoring police activities. Naturally, the contributions of manpower and resources from the international community are paramount to the success of these endeavors and will have to be considered for near-term and long-term planning and solutions.

To increase the odds of long-term success, police candidates must be recruited from the various ethnic, religious, and tribal organizations, to include gender, that make up the demographics of the nation involved. Finally, and most importantly, the basic principle of human rights must be inculcated into a newly formed police force for it to have any chance of connecting with its citizenry, applying the rule of law, and maintaining security in a PCE. ■

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Afghan soldiers prepare to enter a building in July 2018 during an exercise at Camp Shorabak in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. According to the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, the country's forces are preventing the Taliban from capturing more territory but are finding it difficult to extend their own area of control. (Photo by Sgt. Luke Hoogendam, U.S. Marines)

The Development and Creation of the Afghanistan National Army Territorial Forces

Maj. Brad Townsend, U.S. Army

On 4 February 2018, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani signed a presidential decree establishing the Afghanistan National Army Territorial Forces (ANA-TF).¹ This decree represented the culmination of seven months of joint planning between the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and planners within NATO's Resolute Support (RS) headquarters. Conceptualizing, planning, and executing the creation of the ANA-TF is a significant demonstration of the growing ability of the Afghan MOD to develop and execute complex logistical and structural change. The ANA-TF is the first new pillar of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) created since the beginning of the RS mission, which replaced the International Security Assistance Force on 1 January 2015. This article discusses the origins and early development of the ANA-TF, including the driving impetus behind establishing this force and the lessons learned from earlier programs that were applied to its creation.

In July 2017, Ghani discussed the possibility of creating a force modeled on the Indian Territorial Army with the commander of the NATO Resolute Support mission, Gen. John Nicholson. As a result of this meeting, Nicholson tasked his planning staff to explore the concept. A small joint planning team consisting of planners from the RS CJ5 Future Plans section and their counterparts in the Afghan MOD GSG5 was formed to investigate the possibilities inherent in the concept. Based on Ghani's inspiration for this project, this small team of planners began studying the Indian Territorial Forces model to determine its applicability to the unique culture, geography, and political situation in Afghanistan.

Indian Models

The team started by conducting a fact-finding visit to India in August 2017 to determine the suitability of the Indian Territorial Army, including all of its subelements, and other Indian military and paramilitary organizations, to serve as a model for a similar Afghan structure. The centerpiece of this visit was a working group hosted by the Indian Center for Land Warfare Studies and led by its director, Indian Lt. Gen. Rameshwar Roy, with senior representatives from across the Indian Army present. These included current and former senior leaders of the Indian Territorial Army, Assam Rifles, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Kashmir Home and Hearth Battalions, and the Rashtriya

Rifles. From these meetings, it quickly became apparent that an exact replica of the Indian Territorial Army structure would be a poor fit for Afghanistan's situation.

The Indian Territorial Army is a reserve force with short initial entry training built around the harvest season in rural areas and around the normal workweek in urban areas. Its duties are primarily to relieve the regular army from static security duties, act as a reserve force to the regular army, and assist in disaster relief; these had carryover potential to Afghanistan, but the structure was a poor fit. The Indian Territorial Army is formed in battalion-level structures with a small cadre of regular officers that includes the commander, personnel officer, and operations officer. This battalion is expected to become embodied (mobilized) and serve anywhere in the country depending on mission and need.

The planning team determined that while the overall mission set of the Indian Territorial Army had applicability to Afghanistan, the concept of a large, lightly trained reserve force was a poor fit for the immediate needs of a country struggling to establish lasting peace and security.

Two other organizations that the planning team found intriguing were the Assam Rifles and the Home and Hearth Battalions of the Territorial Army. The Assam Rifles are a large paramilitary force with more than sixty thousand personnel operating as a border security force and counterinsurgency force in North-East India's tribal regions.² This force relies on a mixture of "sons of the soil" (locals) and recruits from across India with an officer cadre consisting entirely of regular army officers. This force

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uses a light infantry equipment set and receives specialized and extensive training in jungle warfare for up to forty-six weeks at dedicated training centers. It has been extremely successful in suppressing insurgent activity within its area of operations.

The second force that had potential applicability to Afghanistan was the Home and Hearth battalions in the contested Kashmir region of North-Western India. Just three of these battalions exist and are employed in company-sized elements attached to regular army units. Each Home and Hearth battalion is created from local recruits who receive extensive training from a parent regular army regiment. The regular Indian Army provides all officer and noncommissioned officer leadership down to the squad level for this force, allowing for tight supervision. This force provides the regular army units operating in the region with trained locals who act as an interface with

the local population. While soldiers in Home and Hearth units can be uniformed and act as regular infantry, they are rarely used in this role since they are much more useful operating in plain clothes and gathering intelligence to support regular army operations. In addition, great care is taken in some areas to ensure that the identities of the Home and Hearth unit members remain concealed to prevent retaliation and blackmail from insurgent groups.

None of the Indian models studied by the planning team were directly transplantable to Afghanistan, but the team still gleaned useful lessons from them that were applied to the development of the ANA-TF. First, recruits operating in and around their home region know the language, culture, and terrain, which eliminates one of the primary advantages that insurgents have over regular army units in Afghanistan. Second, national rather than local leadership, provided down to the lowest feasible level, provides the necessary supervision and control. Third, full integration into the structure of the regular army ensures adequate operational and logistical support. Finally, the



minimal level of training received by the Indian Territorial Army is suitable only for rear area security. Since rear areas do not truly exist in Afghanistan, a training plan for an Afghan equivalent force would need to be similar to the regular Afghan National Army (ANA).

Afghan Models

Next, the planning team looked at lessons learned from the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Established in 2010, the ALP is a locally recruited force of approximately thirty thousand members operating under the control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).³ The ALP was originally designed to strengthen local security by training rural Afghans to defend their villages against insurgents. Despite some level of success in providing local security, the ALP currently suffers from extremely poor supervision and support from the MOI.⁴ Initially created as a strictly local force, the ALP is limited to operating in the village or community where its forces are recruited. This means that it operates in relatively small numbers and requires support from national forces when facing a significant threat. Because the force falls under the command of the Afghan National Police (ANP) district chief of police within the MOI, it is difficult and cumbersome to request support from better equipped MOD forces.⁵ The lessons learned from observing the limited success of the ALP included that any new force needs to operate in significant numbers across a larger area than the ALP, and obtaining the proper logistical and operational support requires control by the MOD.

The planning team also looked to the historical precedent provided by the Soviet tribal regiments. The Soviet tribal regiments were an effort during the 1980s to reconcile tribal groups and former mujahedin through the creation of local militia forces responsible for area security with some nominal regular army leadership.⁶ At their peak, these regiments consisted of seventy thousand personnel operating in units as large as division strength.⁷ These forces quickly grew beyond the control of the central government since regular army leadership proved difficult to provide. They were also given responsibility for their own recruitment, and they

were not required to wear uniforms or integrate with other central government forces. Former mujahedin, who defected to the Soviet-backed central government and formed tribal regiments, blackmailed the government and demanded heavier weapons and more pay by threatening to return to the insurgency.⁸ In an effort to regain control of these forces, the central government attempted to incorporate many of them into the Afghan army.⁹ Those forces included former Northern Alliance leader and current Afghan vice president Abdul Rashid Dostum's 53rd Division, which continued to avoid wearing regular uniforms, even following incorporation, instead preferring traditional tribal garb.¹⁰ Eventually, a repetitive process of reconciliation and defection led to a situation where these tribal regiments received higher pay and better equipment than the ANA.

The result of this process of government-sponsored militia formation was short-term security gain at the cost of long-term disaster. These tribal regiments had little loyalty to the central government, and their leaders abused their authority to increase their own power at the expense of central government control.¹¹ In effect, the government created powerful warlords whose loyalty to the government was contingent on the continued receipt of money and weapons. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the cutoff of their support to the government, these militias mutinied and overthrew the central government.¹² What followed was a brutal civil war in which former militia commanders vied for control. Since this civil war gave rise to the Taliban, the creation of the tribal regiments is an indirect cause of the current NATO involvement in Afghanistan. Cognizant of the failures of the Soviet tribal regiments and the weaknesses of the ALP, the planning team presented their findings and recommendations to the senior leadership of the Afghan government for consideration.

ANA-TF Concept

Relying on the findings of this research, president Ghani—in coordination with RS—directed that four fundamental principles serve as the basis for the formation of the ANA-TF:

1. Locally Recruited: The members of the Territorial Forces (excluding cadre) will be residents of the district in which they will serve.
2. Nationally Trained: Professional forces require sufficient, appropriate, and consistent training based on

Previous page: Troops of the Indian Army's Sikh Light Infantry 13 January 2011. (Photo by Jaskirat Singh Bawa via Wikimedia Commons)

a proven model. ANA-TF will receive ANA training by national cadre at ANA military training centers.

3. Nationally Led: In order to guarantee its consistency and effectiveness, the ANA-TF will be led by a regular cadre drawn from existing MOD organizations and will be an integral part of the ANA.
4. Affordable and Sustainable: Afghanistan must have a national security architecture that is sustainable and affordable over time, solely by the Afghanistan government. The ANA-TF will be significantly less expensive and easier to sustain than the ANA.¹³

These four guiding principles apply the lessons learned from studying Indian models as well as recent Afghan history. Using these principles as a guide, the planning team developed a suitable recruiting, training, and operational employment scheme; and with President Ghani's approval, it began building the ANA-TF early in 2018. A short summary of the tasks, organization, and terms of service for the ANA-TF follows.

Purpose and Employment

The purpose of the ANA-TF is to support the ANDSF by consolidating its liberation of local districts, enabling the ANA to conduct further offensive operations, and ensuring the protection of the Afghan population.¹⁴ For this reason, the ANA-TF is specifically designed to operate in low-threat environments as a local security force accomplishing the following tasks:

- Connect the local population to the government of Afghanistan (via district governance).
- Provide local security at the district level and below.
- Act as a sensor of insurgent activity for the ANA and the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF).
- Deny enemy access and freedom of movement within the district.
- Secure and retain key district infrastructure (including routes).
- Interdict insurgent activity and buildup within the district.
- Secure ASSF/ANA-cleared areas to prevent insurgents from returning.
- Defend assigned area for limited duration (reinforced by the MOD).
- Support humanitarian/natural disaster relief.
- Provide local event security where required.¹⁵

The duties of the ANA-TF specifically *do not* include the following


- operating in insurgent-controlled or ISIS occupied districts
- serving as a regular maneuver force
- deploying to conduct tasks in other provinces/districts
- engaging in offensive operations against large groups of insurgents
- replacing ANA in base security roles
- acting as a quick reaction force for other district forces
- conducting precision strike/capture/rescue operations
- conducting civil policing

Essentially, the ANA-TF leverages local knowledge of the people and terrain to provide security in areas that lack a substantial insurgent presence. They are specifically excluded from conducting the civil policing role, as that responsibility belongs to the MOI within the Afghan government.

A further purpose of the ANA-TF is to provide security that is cost effective relative to the security conditions. In accordance with the Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, the Afghan government must be able to assume financial responsibility for its security by 2024.¹⁶ Utilizing regular ANA forces to provide security in areas without a substantial insurgent presence is inefficient and expensive. When ANA is not present, the ANP usually assumes the local security mission; however, the ANP are equipped to conduct policing, not local security. The ANA-TF fills this capability gap between the ANA and the ANP at less than half the cost of a regular ANA soldier. This combination of affordability and effectiveness in areas with only a small insurgent presence gives the MOD a force capable of holding areas cleared by the ANA and the ASSF.

Organization and Structure

The ANA-TF is organized into *tolay* (company)-level structures designed to operate within a single district as an integral part of the ANA. Each *tolay* receives light trucks for mobility as well as a comparable equipment set to the ANA—with the exception that the ANA-TF does not have a mortar section at the *tolay* level (see figure, page 79). For ease of interoperability with the ANA, the ANA-TF is organized along company and platoon lines



(Figure by author)

Figure. Afghanistan National Army Territorial Forces (ANA-TF) Structure and Organization

rather than using an alternative structure. After significant debate, the MOD decided that local recruits would be limited to serving at the squad level and below.¹⁷ All positions above the squad leader would be filled entirely by officers and NCOs drawn directly from the ANA.

These ANA-TF tolays are intended to operate attached to regular ANA *kandaks* (battalions) who have tactical control of the local ANA-TF when operating in their area.¹⁸ Administrative and operational control is retained at the ANA brigade level to ensure uninterrupted logistical support. This relationship structure is necessary because the ANA-TF is geographically limited

to operating within its home district, while ANA *kandaks* are not. Once the program expands and an appropriate density of ANA-TF tolays exist within a given region, ANA-TF *kandaks* may be formed.¹⁹ These *kandaks* will consist of a regular ANA *kandak* headquarters with four to five ANA-TF tolays assigned depending on local conditions.

Terms and Conditions of Service

The ANA-TF operates under very specific terms and conditions in order to ensure professionalism and minimize any tendency towards militia behavior. The first control on the ANA-TF is the strong presence of ANA leadership within each tolai. However, this ANA leadership—assigned as cadre for the ANA-TF—cannot be from the district in which they will serve.²⁰ This is designed to ensure that national-level control is retained and localism is reduced. There is also a pay differential to ensure that ANA-TF recruiting does not harm ANA recruiting. Assigned as cadre, ANA soldiers continue to receive full pay and benefits, while the local recruits

only receive 75 percent of ANA pay for their equivalent rank and years of service. Former members of the ANA and other branches of the ANDSF may join the ANA-TF if they meet the residency requirements, but they cannot retain any rank they may have previously earned above staff sergeant or serve as cadre.²¹ Recognizing the potential for mobility between the ANA-TF and the ANA, any recruit who successfully serves one year in the ANA-TF may advance into the ANA and retain rank earned in the ANA-TF. However, a former ANA-TF soldier cannot serve as ANA cadre for the ANA-TF in his or her home district and must serve elsewhere. Upon completion of



their enlistments, regular ANA are also permitted to transfer to the ANA-TF if an appropriate billet exists in their home district, though they will receive reduced ANA-TF pay and benefits.

Recruiting

The first principle specified that the forces would be locally recruited and would operate in the district from which they were recruited. District-level recruiting and operations represent a middle ground between the village level—where the ALP operates—and the provincial level. Districts are usually between thirty and fifty kilometers across and often represent a single tribal grouping. If recruiting was expanded to the provincial level, the bulk of recruits would likely come from the provincial capital and would be as unfamiliar with the terrain and tribes in the rural districts as if they had come from Kabul.

Due to the unique nature of the district level of ANA-TF, the normal ANA recruiting process was not feasible. The ANA conducts recruiting from its National Afghan Army Volunteer Centers (NAAV-C), which are run by the Afghan National Army Recruiting Command (ANAREC). There is usually one NAAV-C in each province that receives and processes interested

Khat Khas Afghan female tactical platoon (FTP) members perform a close quarters battle drill 29 May 2016 at Camp Scorpion outside Kabul, Afghanistan. The females work closely alongside the males on operations to engage and interact with women and children. The FTPs are trained in marksmanship, language, fast roping, and other combat-related skills. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Douglas Ellis, U.S. Air Force)

volunteers before sending them to Kabul for centralized screening. This is normally a passive process that is unsuitable for the ANA-TF. To ensure an appropriate number of recruits from a specific district, the regional corps commander coordinates with ANAREC as well as the provincial and district governor to conduct targeted recruiting over the course of several weeks. These recruits, between the ages of twenty and forty, are brought from the target district to the regional NAAV-C and then transported to ANAREC in Kabul. In Kabul, they receive the same medical and background screening that regular ANA recruits receive before beginning training.

Training

Following screening by ANAREC in Kabul, recruits are transferred to the Kabul Military Training Center

(KMTC) to complete basic warrior training (BWT) in line with the second core principle for the ANA-TF: they must be nationally trained. BWT is the standard twelve-week initial entry training that all ANA recruits receive. The ANA-TF trainees enter BWT as the full tolay recruited from their home district and train together as a group. During BWT, recruits receive the same training flow as regular ANA, which is conducted by a dedicated training cadre at KMTC. After the completion of BWT, the training cadre select the highest performing recruits to serve as team and squad leaders. These team and squad leaders are not automatically promoted to NCO rank. They continue to serve in their newly assigned role as basic soldiers until they complete the same centralized NCO training courses as the ANA, unless they have previous rank from prior service.

While recruits are undergoing basic training, the MOD-assigned ANA cadre conduct a three-week leadership refresher course at KMTC where they are educated on the role, concept, and mission of the ANA-TF. Following the completion of that course, they are integrated with the newly graduated ANA-TF soldiers for transport to the Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) nearest their home district. These RMTCs serve as the collective training centers for the ANA in each of the corps areas in Afghanistan and so are the preferred location for training on squad- and platoon-level security tasks for the ANA-TF. This training at the

RMTC lasts five weeks, using a tailored training curriculum designed specifically for the unique equipment and mission of the ANA-TF. Following this training, the freshly formed and trained ANA-TF tolays return to their home district to take over local security duties.

Conclusion

Building a new force from fundamental conception to execution demonstrates the growing ability of the Afghan government and the MOD to execute complex logistical and structural change. The fact that within nine months the MOD was able to successfully overcome the administrative hurdles and conduct the planning necessary to create an entirely new force structure is a testament to the growing maturity of Afghanistan's institutions. Despite this success, the task is far from complete, and planning continues. The MOD is currently conducting an initial proof of concept for several ANA-TF tolays in various locations across the country. This proof of concept is testing the operational concept as well as exercising the training and recruiting process. Ultimately, the ANA-TF is expected to grow to at least 36,652 soldiers over the next several years.²² A successful outcome will mean that the Afghan government has a locally recruited, nationally trained, nationally led, effective, and affordable force capable of filling the capability gap between the ANA and the ANP. ■

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We're Confused, Too

A Historical Perspective for Discussion of "Land Ahead"

Col. Eran Ortal, Israel Defense Forces

For the times they are a-changin'.

—Bob Dylan

The Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) Ground Forces Command concept, "Land Ahead," originally published in 2015 and again as a draft in 2017, is the IDF's most comprehensive attempt to redefine its ground combat concept and to offer a practical framework for the transformation of its ground forces.¹ There is virtually no debate about this assertion. "During the Land Ahead process," writes Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, "the Ground Forces Command officially identified in writing, for the first time, that the ground maneuver was facing a serious crisis ... The Ground Forces

Command recognized, again for the first time, that the existing force design trends themselves are not providing the IDF anything new. *More of the same* does not advance us toward the required change."² Maj. Gen. Kobi Barak, commander of the Ground Forces Command, adopted the "Land Ahead" concept from his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Guy Tzur, and wrote: "the change is so deep that it requires the IDF to deeply examine and change its operational behavior in every dimension."³

How was such a drastic conceptual leap achieved? The architects of "Land Ahead," along with the IDF's Dado Center, turned to design theory to create the concept. In his published reflections on its creation, Tzur specifically points to the design process as the enabling factor of the conceptual breakthrough.⁴ The process made clear that



A U.S. Marine Corps light armored vehicle from Battalion Landing Team, 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (BLT 2/6), 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is staged prior to training alongside Israeli soldiers 11 March 2018 as part of exercise Juniper Cobra at the National Training Center in Israel. The 26th MEU participated in Juniper Cobra with the Israel Defense Forces in order to improve interoperability and hone both forces' skills in a variety of environments. (Photo by Cpl. Jonathan Sosner, U.S. Marines)



the barrier between force employment concepts and force design concepts had to be torn down. Not only did the Dado Center design team need to gain expertise with technologies and the philosophies behind them, but the IDF force design system also had to think simultaneously about force employment. The “Land Ahead” concept was a turning point at which the IDF design team shifted its focus toward military transformation.

The idea of military innovation, or military transformation, is one of the foundations of modern military thought.⁵ Dima Adamsky suggests that we view Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as a radical military innovation in which new organizational structures integrate with new operational concepts, which usually stem from the invention of new weapon systems, and change the nature of warfare.⁶

Tzur, Haliva, and Barak are correct; what is unique and critical about “Land Ahead” is its innovative nature and its aim to leap forward, freeing itself from the “more of the same” phenomenon. We must, therefore, ask ourselves how we can figure out which of the wide variety of ideas added to the original 2015 concept are most in-

novative and best suited to our ground forces today? Further yet, how can we avoid the trap of investing our most advanced technologies to tweak past concepts instead of moving forward into the future?

In the past, the IDF invested in the most advanced technologies, such as the Digital Land Forces project (command and control), without stopping to think how these technologies enable significant transformation in ground combat. Today, the IDF faces a similar risk. Without a suitable historical and conceptual perspective, we might

someday find ourselves investigating “the lost decade,” despite our investments.

To minimize the risk of such an outcome, this article will offer a historically based conceptual framework. First, it will elucidate the manner in which military revolutions have progressed in the modern era, in parallel to technological developments. The historical process reviewed will then be extrapolated to deduce which step the IDF must take next, with an emphasis on ground combat.⁷ Third, the article will assess the development of the IDF and its enemies on the same historical scale. Finally, the article will discuss the Ground Forces’ current transformation requirements, as well as the necessity to reorganize the IDF’s internal discourse on the matter.

The Four Industrial Revolutions and the Measuring Stick for Military Revolutions

Alvin and Heidi Toffler famously arranged human history according to three technological and social waves: the agricultural wave, the industrial wave, and the information wave.⁸ In much military literature, the military parallels of the Toffler scale are the pre-modern war, industrialized war (characterized by firearms, general conscription, firepower, machinery, large mass, and scope), and information-age warfare.⁹

This perspective of history no longer serves us. The IDF adopted the military-information revolution (the reconnaissance-strike complex, developed based on the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle concept) several decades ago. Since, the other side has rapidly adopted the information-age revolution on its own terms (guided missiles and target intelligence). Both sides now have precision fire technology that neutralizes the other’s tactical mobility (combat platforms). Israel’s enemies, Hezbollah and Hamas, are currently holding a defensive position against Israel, thus providing them with the many inherent advantages of defense and allowing them to gain the upper hand in conflict.

A new historical framework can serve as a way to navigate “outside the box” toward the necessary military transformation. At the core of this proposed theoretical framework lies the discernment of four industrial revolutions (see figure, page 85).¹⁰

In 2011, as part of the preparations for an industrial fair in Hanover, Germany, a new historical perspective focusing exclusively on the modern era (“The Machine


Col. Eran Ortal,

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is the head of the Dado Center think tank in the IDF’s J3, where he assists senior leaders in developing strategy, operations, and force modernization programs. He served as a field observation officer in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. Ortal has also served in a variety of positions in the IDF General Staff’s Operations Directorate and Planning Directorate. He holds an MA in military studies from the Tel Aviv University and graduated from the Israel National Defense College in 2013. He is also the founding editor of the *Dado Center Journal*.

Age”) was developed. According to this perspective, four distinct industrial revolutions can be defined since the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹¹ The *first industrial revolution* (Revolution 1.0) harnessed the power of steam. The *second industrial revolution* (Revolution 2.0) was generated by the technological breakthrough of the internal combustion engine and electricity. The next breakthrough, the *third industrial revolution* (Revolution 3.0), included electronics, printed circuit boards, computers, software, information technology (IT), and the

technological and scientific developments such as the telegraph, engraving machines, steel factories, etc. This era generated enormous social change. We will focus on its implications on warfare, beginning with the American Civil War, which is considered the first modern war. The industrialized North owed their victory against the agricultural South to several substantial advantages (beyond population size). The North enjoyed a superior railroad network that provided effective transportation of troops and resources, as well as a modern telegraph network that



(Figure courtesy of Christoph Roser at AllAboutLean.com)

Figure. The Four Industrial Revolutions

automation revolution. It is also known as *the digital revolution*, which has defined our world since the 1980's. According to this concept, we are currently at the dawn of the *fourth industrial revolution* (Revolution 4.0), defined by computer-enhanced mobility and computer performance in the physical world (automation).

What exactly do we mean by the “fourth industrial revolution,” and why is it different from the “digital age”? More importantly yet, how is this related to our discussion about “Land Ahead” and the military transformation we need today? To answer these questions, we will connect the industrial revolutions to a series of RMAs.

Industrial Revolution 1.0. The technological essence of this era is the power of steam, along with further

facilitated the central management of the war effort and enabled the allocation of resources according to changing needs of the multiple fronts. The North also had greater production capabilities, which meant more weapons (such as cannons) and more ammunition.

Additionally, the North enjoyed a major economic advantage. Using their superior navy, the North enforced a naval embargo on the South, thus stunting the South's economic development. In fact, the American Civil War, the Prussian-French War, the Japan-Russia War, and even World War I, all exemplify the Modern Military Revolution 1.0. It is a revolution of strategic mobility (steamboats and trains), centralized management (the telegraph) and the development of a general staff and

senior headquarters that act as conduits between the industrial production at home and the resources needed on the front.¹² These elements create a total war—a war in which the entire home front is effectively conscripted to a war of attrition on a massive scale, through manufacture, transportation, and communications.

Industrial Revolution 2.0. The technologies leading this era were the internal combustion engine, electricity, the radio, and the modern production line. We will jump directly to the military perspective: the military revolution associated with Industrial Revolution 2.0 is undoubtedly the revolution in mechanized maneuver. Modern Military Revolution 1.0 was stuck in the trenches of World War I. The strategic home front continued to equip armies of millions and ship soldiers to the front in massive numbers. However, on the battlefield, the superior firepower of the machine gun and artillery stopped the human masses: the infantry and the cavalry. Although the tank and airplane were relatively overlooked at first, upon their premier appearance in World War I, they were a harbinger of the upcoming military revolution realized only some twenty years later, in the next round of European warfare. The German blitzkriegs of September 1939, May 1940, and June 1941 relied on the revolution of tactical mobility provided by tanks, trucks, personnel carriers, and close aircraft support, as well as the revolution of the radio that enabled decentralized and flexible mission command. This new tactical mobility required the reorganization of the forces in a way that provided them with local combat independence. This was the beginning of the doctrine of combined arms (even if not of the idea itself). To maintain the pace of tank movement, a close but diverse support system was required, including mobile infantry, engineers, supporting fire from towed and motorized artillery, and air support from dive-bombers. To broadly summarize, World War II took place on two levels. The first is the strategic level; it was a war of manufacture and transportation of resources, similar to World War I. The second level is operational; a war of mobility and denial of mobility. The Modern Military Revolution 2.0 is, therefore, the tactical mechanized and mobility revolution, and the revolution of huge campaigns of massive forces.

Industrial Revolution 3.0. Transistors, printed circuit boards, computers, and digital communication generated enormous changes in social and economic structures. Warfare also underwent changes in the

information era. The term “Revolution in Military Affairs” was coined in Western military thought in the 1980s. The military thinkers of these years, such as U.S. Army Gen. Donn Starry and Andrew Marshall from the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, understood that their current forces could not complete their missions.¹³ The U.S. military and its allies in Europe did not have the ability to stop the Warsaw Pact’s enormous mechanized force, but they also realized the great potential provided by the new era of technology. Electronics enabled the installation of sensors, which were once too large, on fighter jets. Lasers and electro-optics upgraded normal rockets into smart missiles. Computers allowed humans to quickly concentrate, process, and transfer all new information collected from sensors to digital management systems that helped other humans maximize their attack resources. The RMA 3.0 was coined in the U.S. military as AirLand Battle and was later named the Information Technology RMA.¹⁴

This revolution was successfully implemented in the first and second Gulf Wars and demonstrated the futility of combat between a mechanized 2.0 military (Iraq) and a modern 3.0 military (United States). RMA 3.0 was based on information dominance, precision weapons, and the ability to connect these two domains effectively and quickly. The critical reader will discern that these three key elements are mostly based on aerial assets (sensors, precise payload munitions delivered from air and space) on the one hand and fixed infrastructure (headquarters with excellent infrastructure and communications) on the other.¹⁵ The reconnaissance-strike complex required a revolutionary reorganization of the forces, combining intelligence with operational planning teams. Naturally, these teams were most effective in fixed headquarters.¹⁶ In the IDE, the primary recipients of new power were the regional commands (which established large intelligence and fire control centers), the Air Force, and the J2/Intelligence Directorate.

The next era—Revolution 4.0. What distinguishes the fourth revolution from the information revolution (Revolution 3.0)? The drama of the third revolution was the appearance of the computer processing and digital memory, the software dimension that enabled new ways of integrating things and the creation of cyberspace. From the military perspective, Revolution 3.0 contributed significantly to strengthening the operational environment awareness among commanding officers, and it created



new military capabilities—high-tempo, high-capacity, and precise long-term attacks and counterattacks. The software dimension contributed, and continues to contribute, to the accelerated pace of miniaturization and decreased costs of electronic products, especially sensors.

What remains for Revolution 4.0? This is where computers extend beyond the screen and the person in front of it and begins to operate in the real world—to operate independently, with a certain amount of human mediation but also without it. It is beginning to sound trite, but this is indeed a dramatic development. This revolution is not only being generated because of the integration of the cellular world and the communication cloud but is also and mainly a result of Internet of Things (IOT) technology, automation, and artificial intelligence (AI).¹⁷ Revolution 3.0 connected between everyone and created a universal network. Revolution 4.0 facilitates practical execution using computers in the physical world on a local level,

Union soldiers survey wreckage on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad August 1862 in Manassas Junction, Virginia, at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Military railroads were part of the revolution in strategic mobility in Modern Military Revolution 1.0. (Photo by Timothy H. O'Sullivan; courtesy of the Library of Congress)

via mobility and automation.¹⁸ For example, it enables smart homes to create local optimization by efficiently utilizing energy for a the household's needs.¹⁹ The General Electric jet engine is yet another example of this revolution. The engine uses advanced industrial IOT technologies to enable a network of sensors embedded within the engine to take various and highly precise internal measurements and connect the results during operation, thus significantly improving their performance.²⁰ The many different sensors harnessed to create the updated and sufficiently credible information necessary to allow a computer to drive a



Brig. Gen. Erwin Rommel and staff in June 1940 during the Battle for France. German blitzkrieg tactics, developed during Modern Military Revolution 2.0, relied on the tactical mobility provided by tanks, trucks, personnel carriers, and close-aircraft support. (Photo courtesy of the Bundesarchiv via Wikimedia Commons)

vehicle autonomously, is a third example of this revolution. Many experimental models of such vehicles are already traveling on roads around the world.²¹

If so, the essence of Revolution 4.0 is computer-processing power and precision communication. Together, these elements enable computers to execute tasks in the physical world that are complicated for humans to process.²² In some cases, such as the jet engine, propulsion turbines, and autonomous vehicles, computers are making actual life and death decisions.²³

Modern Military Revolution 4.0. How is this related to military matters? Militaries around the world today, including the U.S. military, explore the idea of the Internet of Battlespace Things as a possible answer to the threat of long-range guided munitions.²⁴ They also realize the potential of being inundated with information while pursuing an enemy through densely populated urban areas. This overwhelming abundance of data can be reduced to a manageable level if the attacking forces are equipped with data systems capable of processing and synthesizing the data they receive, using machine learning technologies or AI. These capabilities would facilitate the distinction between “noise” and helpful information,

simplify the location of Internet of Battlespace Things anomalies on the field, and most importantly, assist in the identification of the enemy’s location. In certain situations, such a system could even give commanders the option of allowing AI to make decisions for them.²⁵ Militaries are beginning to realize the connection between cyber and the physical-tactical world, as well as the necessity of waging the war in the communications and connectivity domain to ensure victory in the physical-tactical domain. Everyone is still “working on it,” but this is definitely the general direction.

The Modern Military Revolution 4.0 is the combined product of reconnaissance-strike resources and autonomous and automatic information processing.²⁶ The speed and precision of computers, sensors and missiles provide systems with the networking they need to achieve

real-time mission execution. The enemy can be precisely located, identified, and verified. Next, a decision can be made according to a safety protocol and the rules of engagement, and an attack can be executed—all within seconds. Moreover, the decreasing size and cost of missiles and platforms such as quadcopters allow for widespread manufacturing and distribution of such systems. Therefore, Modern Military Revolution 4.0 allows for the production of network-based weapon systems capable of all-around tactical performance.

What Can Be Learned from This Framework?

First, technology is a dominant factor in military thinking. Without diminishing from the importance of original military thinking, it is difficult to ignore the close connection between combat methods and technological progress around the world. This does not necessarily mean that every military undergoes transformation at the right time; however, it does mean that history smiles upon those who fully utilize the advantages provided by current technology, and truly change accordingly.

Second, having the right technologies doesn't mean we've got everything right. It is possible to procure the best technology of the time and to still completely miss the revolution. This is exactly what happened to the French, at the onset of World War II; although the French army and air force were technologically superior to the German *Wehrmacht* in May 1940, they lost the campaign due to conceptual misunderstanding. The French command failed to realize the significance of the mobility and pace of the new kind of warfare they faced on the battlefield, and maintained the old concept of static defense and centralized command.²⁷

Third, revolutions are cumulative. Revolutions do not cancel each other out. Rather, they are cumulative in nature, just like the cinema did not kill the radio, and television did not cause the cinema to disappear. For example, the strategic transportation of forces does not become any less important upon the appearance of mechanized tactical mobility. The combat platforms of Revolution 2.0—the tank and the airplane—have not disappeared with the development of Revolution 3.0.

Fourth, militaries are late to adopt. RMAs tend to appear late in comparison to the equivalent revolutions in industry. While World War I was the peak of Modern Military Revolution 1.0, the Western world was already

well-oriented and even controlled by the technologies of Revolution 2.0 (i.e., alongside the technologies of the previous wave). A military wise enough to understand the current change sooner, gains a substantial advantage.

Fifth, new revolutions are taking place at an accelerated pace. Revolution 2.0 is said to have appeared one hundred years after the first industrial revolution. Revolution 3.0 took place seventy years after the second, while Revolution 4.0 appeared only thirty to forty years later (see table, page 90–91).

RMA 4.0 and the Ground Forces

The largely neglected art of ground force maneuver is the nexus of our conceptual discussion. Within this context, we must take note of a historical pattern according to which waves of access and area denial are followed by waves reallowing maneuver. This new perspective sheds light on various phenomena we see today.

New 3.0 firepower left the ground forces behind.

This phenomenon was not a result of conceptual atrophy; rather, it was caused by objective conditions. The nature of the tactical forces made it nearly impossible for ground forces to take advantage of the Revolution 3.0 advances in firepower. While command-and-control capabilities developed among the ground forces, the maneuver force itself was left out of the revolution.²⁸ On the regional level, senior headquarters were now able to introduce combat power of a new kind—rapid and precise target destruction. On the other hand, on the local-tactical level, the improvement of situational awareness among commanders (which is important in of itself) could not significantly change the complexity of warfare. Even though the modern information and attack systems were effective in the face of the quantitative challenge presented by the mechanized enemy, it did not provide a new solution for the complexity and pace of a real tactical event taking place in complex terrain.²⁹ Moreover, guided munitions were costly, and it was difficult to equip the front-line units. The conceptual solution for these limitations was to define the complex, employed by senior headquarters, as a force meant to destroy the enemy and clear the path for the ground forces. “Joint” became a magic word.

The size of headquarters is increasing. The Revolution 3.0 reliance on human intervention and information processing is the main reason behind the increasing size of tactical headquarters.³⁰ There are some who perceive this as nothing more than the

natural tendency of bureaucracies to expand. However, it appears more likely that the large increase in rear echelons (both senior and tactical) is largely related to the new Revolution 3.0 military power.³¹

The ethos of command and control and “mission command” are at risk. The Modern Military Revolution 3.0 gave priority to the senior echelons in establishment of a coherent situational picture. The

senior echelons directly influence the actions of the tactical units even though they are in the rear and are generally less mobile. This occurrence contradicts the essence of the idea behind mission command. This major contradiction causes doctrinal tension between the way in which the IDF trains its commanders and the way it actually operates and fights. We train our commanders in accordance with the tactical doctrine

**Table. Industrial Revolutions and Their Military Manifestation.
So What Is the Takeaway?**

	1.0		2.0	
Era	~1800–1900		~1900–1970	
Technology	Locomotive, steel (trains, telegraph)		Internal combustion, engine, electricity, transistor	
Civilian implications	Status of workers, status of shareholders, entrepreneurship, colonialism		Middle class, consumption, culture, growth of major cities, suburbs	
Conflict	U.S. Civil War	WWI	WWII	Six-Day War, Yom Kippur
Military technology	Mass armies, industrial base as condition for independence at front, rifled barrels, machine guns, barbed wire (trains, telegraph)		Tank, armored personnel carrier, planes, radio, radar, mechanized artillery	
Center of gravity in military organization	Strategic mobility General staffs and complex headquarters Strategic level (Moltke, Foch, Pershing, Lunderdorff)		Tactical mobility Division, corps headquarters Operational level (Guderian, Rommel, Patton, Bradley, Montgomery)	
Implications for command and control	Concentration (power to headquarters)		Dispersion (mission command)	
Major doctrine	—		Blitzkrieg, combined arms	

(Table by author)

of the Modern Military Revolution 2.0 era and “mission command,” which stem from the idea that tactical mobility requires commander independence. Yet, the real power lies in the hands of the major headquarters; not only do they have real-time knowledge of the battlefield, but they also hold the power to take various actions that have a real influence on the campaign, such as the conduction of airstrikes on key targets.

The circle of centralization-decentralization and the fourth revolution act as a decentralized revolution. Modern Military Revolution 1.0 (mainly the train and telegraph) focused on the strategic transportation of forces and created the strategic headquarters. Abraham Lincoln’s war room with telegraph cables spread throughout it and the German General Staff serve as tangible examples of this first revolution.³² The revolution of

**Table. Industrial Revolutions and Their Military Manifestation.
So What Is the Takeaway? (continued)**

	3.0		4.0
Era	~1970		~2017
Technology	Microprocessor, personal computer, internet		Internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, Big Data, 3D printing
Civilian implications	Age of information, social media, change in union-state power balance		TBD
Conflict	First and Second Gulf Wars	Second Lebanon War, Days of Repentance, Operation Protective Edge	—
Military technology	Airborne sensors, guided munitions, control systems		Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flocks, multisensor information-meld, autonomous strike platforms on Internet of Battle-space Things network, automatic intelligence analysis, automatic intel processing, decision-support systems
Center of gravity in military organization	Neutralization of platforms Operational role for headquarters, regional commands, general staff		Intensification of maneuver space Automatic monitoring ability, immediate targeting and information processing allows striking from platforms, return of ground maneuver (?)
Implications for command and control	Concentration (regional command)		Dispersion (brigade, division)
Major doctrine	AirLand Battle		Multi-Domain Operations, Land Ahead

(Table by author)

tactical platforms and mobility (2.0) required the decentralization of decision-making and empowered the local command echelon. The mission command doctrine is an important legacy of this era. The military revolution of combined intelligence and attack assets (3.0) again concentrated exclusive authority in the hands of senior command echelons—this time with true combat power. The idea of a universal network (World Wide Web) dictated the nature of the third industrial revolution and allowed for the nonmobile headquarters to accumulate power and assemble vast amounts of information.

The fourth revolution, on the other hand, deals with local functions that require self-contained and phenomenal performance (e.g., autonomous vehicles). The Modern Military Revolution 4.0—the era of autonomy, data communication networks, and the IOT—allows for the local tactical echelons to hold the center of power once again. For the first time, ground-tactical units can now utilize the advantages of the connection between sensors, precision-attack assets, and data processing.

Tactical mobility. The perspective of tactical mobility sheds new light on the various RMAs. Revolution 2.0, with its mechanized platforms, returned tactical mobility to the battlefield and overcame the firepower of the Revolution 1.0. Revolution 3.0 presented far more precise and lethal new firepower. This revolution again limited the tactical mobility of mechanized platforms. The potential of Modern Military Revolution 4.0 is the return of mobility (maneuver) to the battlefield, as result of the automation and miniaturization of the reconnaissance-strike complex of Revolution 3.0 to tactical dimensions. Revolution 4.0 will make it possible to locate and suppress the other side's fire and overcome their ability to conceal themselves.

The New Military Challenge

Modern Military Revolution 2.0—mechanized platforms, side by side with radio and mission command—was the solution to the inability of maneuver to operate in the face of firepower in World War I. Modern Military Revolution 3.0 provided a convincing answer to the frightening question of the time: What can be done against the impossible force ratios in Europe to prevent nuclear war? Revolution 3.0 can also be seen as a return of sort to the days of World War I. Revolution 1.0 greatly restricted tactical mobility and

stifled the war; Revolution 3.0 did the same, first to our adversaries, and later to the IDF.

Which military challenges can we solve using the fourth industrial revolution? To answer to this question, we will briefly review the military developments of the last two decades. Both the U.S. military (in 2002 and 2003) and the IDF demonstrated on a number of opportunities that militaries who adopt the Modern Military Revolution 3.0 become too formidable an enemy for militaries using platforms of Revolution 2.0. Tanks and aircraft are simply too vulnerable in the face of the reconnaissance-strike complex of Revolution 3.0. Our adversaries' response is known as asymmetric warfare—giving up platforms and assimilating into complex terrain. IDF thinker and retired Brig. Gen. Itai Brun calls this response "The Other Side's RMA."³³ In other words, our enemies' response to revolution 3.0 is to take combat to a tactical area in which the reconnaissance-strike complex of senior headquarters is no longer an advantage.

However, the world did not stop at asymmetric warfare. The United States is currently preparing for conflicts with "near-peer adversaries." The U.S. military is concerned by what it calls anti-access/area denial. According to this concept, a major power (Russia or China) could potentially carry out a limited offensive act in a neighboring region (e.g., seizing the Crimean Peninsula, a Baltic country, or islands in the South China Sea). The U.S. forces stationed in the area will not have the slightest chance to respond in time with the force required; they will have to wait for the main U.S. force to arrive from the United States. However, the abundant enemy anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles deployed ahead of time will threaten the ability of the main force to reach the region (anti-access). This array of capabilities, combined with long-range and precise tactical firepower and disruption of U.S. electronic and cyber capabilities (area denial), will pose a threat to the U.S. forces that have already arrived.³⁴

What did the adversaries do, essentially? They decreased their dependence on vulnerable platforms (by limiting tactical mobility) and increased their usage of advanced missile and sensor technologies, to disrupt strategic and tactical mobility (advanced anti-tank capabilities and precise tactical firepower).³⁵ Due to the ability of missile-based forces to change positions and conceal themselves, they will be difficult to identify and destroy.

Although the scope and distances vary greatly, significant similarities lie between the contexts in which



A full-size model of an Israeli Elbit Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Advances in unmanned aircraft system technology ensure UAVs will continue to figure prominently in Modern Military Revolution 4.0. (Photo by Tal Inbar via Wikimedia Commons)

the U.S. military and the IDF think about war. From the IDF's perspective, Hezbollah has been a standing military for some time, even if it is not an official state force. The various approaches presented here, as well as Hezbollah's approach, are reminiscent of the Syrian "close-battle" period, which has guided IDF training over the past decade.³⁶ This concept envisions a limited surprise seizure of territory by an anti-tank infantry force; the force takes hold of an easily defensible area inside Israel, and controls it under the cover of artillery fire, tight aerial protection and advanced anti-tank capabilities. This description is also evocative of the Egyptian attack in 1973, during which infantry units equipped with advanced anti-tank capabilities took over a limited area by surprise, under aerial and artillery cover.³⁷ The difference lies in the scope of the enemy and the theater, but the basic concept is the same: denial of access to an area by means of long-range firepower, and prevention of maneuver within a combat theater using precision missiles against platforms and other fires capabilities.

In other words, our adversaries (e.g., China, Russia, Hezbollah, or Hamas) have adopted Modern Military

Revolution 3.0, mainly by combining missiles and sensors. They now have the ability to disable platform movement, including our own. Therefore, since playing defense requires less mobility, our adversaries have essentially gained the strategic advantage.³⁸ Our enemies succeeded in achieving a symmetric approach. On the one hand, their fire-attack maneuver capabilities near the border evade our Revolution 3.0 advantages. On the other, their regional and local defenses utilize missiles and sensors (the adversaries' Revolution 3.0) to neutralize the transportation of reinforcements and maneuverability of the United States and Israeli forces, while relying on the advantages of the defender and while taking full advantage of the terrain.

The outcome of such a development is clear. "We've improved our strike accuracy from eight digit

coordinates to 10, 12, 14, and even 15-digit coordinates (height dimension),” writes Barak in the *Dado Center Journal*. “Yet the enemy, on the other hand, is usually successful in fleeing from these targets before they are attacked. We destroy the coordinates, but are struggling to hit the enemy.”³⁹

We can now explain why the IDF is not alone in its quest to find ways of protecting its forces against threats from anti-tank missiles, precision fire, and small unmanned aerial vehicles. Western militaries are looking for tactical solutions to identify and rapidly attack targets discovered during combat. Due to the impression of superiority achieved during Revolution 3.0, many militaries believed their advantages in the air and on the ground were no longer under any significant threat. These militaries now find themselves lacking the capabilities that were once considered elementary (e.g., anti-artillery fire) and that have become relevant once again in face of current threats.⁴⁰ The challenges that were once considered unique to the IDF and asymmetric warfare now reflect the challenges China and Russia pose to the United States.

From the military perspective, the challenge of Revolution 4.0 is to return the tactical and strategic mobility to the battlefield—or in other words, to enable maneuver. This can be achieved by using new platforms—swarms of robotic drones, for example, combined with the aggressive suppression of enemy sensors and missiles. These measures will enable our larger platforms carry the necessary ground forces to maneuver (in a manner similar to Revolution 2.0), thus returning our ability to conquer, control, and defend territory.

The Discussion in “Land Ahead”

We will now explore the conceptual ideas raised in “Land Ahead” in light of the historical connection we have established, regarding the current discussion of military transformation in the IDF. We claim that the tactical ground reconnaissance-strike complex was, and must remain, the conceptual focal point of “Land Ahead.”

Force reorganization as combined arms brigade.

Regardless of whether or not this move is correct, critical or even unimportant, it is clear that the conceptual roots of the combined-arms brigade lie in the military revolution of the mid-twentieth century (Revolution 2.0). In other words, the combined-arms battle originates from the revolution of tactical mobility in World War II.⁴¹

After internalizing the lessons of the Yom Kippur War, the IDF fought in brigade and battalion-sized ad-hoc combined-arms units.⁴² Clearly, this integration does not serve as a sufficient response to the threat of anti-access/area denial missiles. While it may be possible to strengthen combined arms in ground forces, it is clear that this is not something related to the new military transformation.

Organizing tactical headquarters in ground units.

We are experiencing repeated waves of reorganization in division, brigade, and battalion headquarters; strengthening of professional disciplines; establishment of strike cells; and more. From the perspective of military revolutions, this is an attempt (possibly desperate) by ground forces to regain some of the relevance lost to higher echelon headquarters in the reconnaissance-strike complex era (Revolution 3.0). We are trying to do this by strengthening tactical headquarters in order to introduce the reconnaissance-air complex into the battlefield; militaries call this “joint combat.” Nevertheless, the real contribution has been crowded mobile headquarters with limited communication for assets that are usually held by the regional command or General Staff, and this contribution remains marginal. The constant changing and increasing size of tactical headquarters may be critical in the short term, but from an historical perspective, the “stretching” of the Revolution 3.0 paradigm produces diminishing returns.

Intelligence-based combat and the tactical internet project. The essence of these ideas is to lay the groundwork for communication that will enable all the “good” products and intelligence generated by higher headquarters to flow to the local tactical echelon.⁴³ As important as the mobile/cellular revolution of the third industrial era may be, it alone does not create the critical mass required for the fourth revolution. The world of mobile before the smartphone (e.g., the Nokia 6100 and flip phones) allowed us to read the news on a designated portal for mobile users. It connected us with the information that was prepared “from up above.” All of this did not turn mobile users into active systems that created relevant information by themselves, or in collaboration with others, for their immediate needs (e.g., Waze, the navigation application based on crowd-sourcing). The first cellular portals were considered unimpressive and not especially practical.

But this is not the case following the advent of smartphones. The new smartphone is not only



An unmanned vehicle travels on a range during a Maneuver Robotics and Autonomous Systems Live Fire Demonstration 22 August 2017 at Fort Benning, Georgia. (Photo by Patrick Albright, U.S. Army)

integrated with the open internet, but it also can communicate with connected sensors that allow it to assume new local roles in real time-space situations. For example, a gate at a municipal parking lot automatically opens when the sensor connects a license plate to a mobile parking app and the lot's gate. At the edge of the spectrum is the autonomous vehicle, which is a connected system composed of sensors and a closed circle of information processing.⁴⁴ It continues to operate even when it is not connected to the global network.

Returning to the issue at hand, the tactical internet and intelligence-based combat are important. While they do promote some of the efficiencies of Revolution 3.0 to the ground forces' tactical units, they will be insufficient by themselves to dramatically change the forces behavior in a complex tactical event.⁴⁵

The new fire process concept. Maj. Gen. Tamir Hayman wrote about the new concept of intelligence-fires circles.⁴⁶ It espouses a faster, automatic, and more precise connection of intelligence to the attack itself. Better integration, according to Hayman, will improve the *quality* of target attacks, as opposed to their *quantity*. Mirroring our theoretical framework, the

concept addressed by Hayman utilized technologies of Industrial Revolution 4.0 (e.g., artificial intelligence, big data, and automation) to improve the reconnaissance-strike relationship that is still concentrated in senior headquarters (Revolution 3.0). This is a much-needed step, but it still cannot be defined as military transformation from the conceptual perspective. It does not provide an answer to the main challenge—the return of tactical mobility for maneuvering forces; neither does it divert the military's focus toward the tactical echelons.

The Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Complex, a ground-force drone fleet. There was a reason that 2015's "Land Ahead" emphasized the Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (TRSC) (sensors to shooters networks) as the main issue for a conceptual leap forward for the IDF Ground Forces.⁴⁷ The TRSC's purpose is as follows:

[To] enable a drastic improvement in the tactical and operational effectiveness of ground forces in

discovering the disappearing enemy, pinpointing his location and striking him quickly...through the creation of layers of ground, mechanized, and air strike and intelligence-gathering layers connected together through a fast network that allows the fusion of data for closing targeting cycles in a matter of seconds ...⁴⁸

This idea called for a network that automatically connects sensors to munitions, based on small drones operated at the brigade level.⁴⁹ The network was meant to precisely locate the enemy, quickly attack it, and decipher its hiding locations by processing information quickly and locally. Haliva coined the phrase “Tactical Internet of Things” around this idea.⁵⁰ Barak developed the idea under the titles “Precise and On Time: The Direct Connection between Sensor and Strike” and “Deciphering the Enemy: Rapid Local Utilization of Information.”⁵¹ These senior officers actually described the essence of Revolution 4.0: automatic and small intelligence-attack assets will enable the return of lethal tactical mobility to the ground forces in battle.

Despite the relatively broad consensus that was presented in the beginning of this article, at least among senior officers, a process of reopening and redefining the concept has been ongoing for the last two years. Despite real change, military transformation demands clarity and unified efforts; it seems we lost some of it.

Resisting Transformation

Resistance to change is common in militaries. Nevertheless, some of the motivations of resistance are worth recognizing.

“Tech-phobia” and opportunities missed. “Don’t worry, the main thing is that the battalions are good and the battalion commanders are good” is a common attitude across land forces.⁵² The fear of technology and what has been mocked as “technology-based concepts” represents a lack of theoretical and historical knowledge about the idea of military transformation. But it could be that the Ground Forces’ fear of technology goes beyond the natural aversion to change that most of us suffer from.⁵³ It also stems from its experience from Revolution 3.0. This wave harmed maneuver and the independence of commanders. Therefore, the intuitive response is to reject additional “digital” reforms.

As stated above, this is a misunderstanding. Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, and George Patton were only

able to apply their genius because of radio and internal combustion technology, and they harnessed it to return tactical mobility. If we continue with our intuitive hesitancy, we will miss the potential of the new Revolution 4.0.

Parochial interests. The services and corps in their current state are a creation of the platform era (Revolution 2.0). The organizational efforts invested to maintain their respective positions are enormous.⁵⁴ IDF’s Air Force and Intelligence directorate (J2) have gained great influence and power due to the IT-RMA. None of these forces are interested in the Conceptual (rather than technological) Revolution 4.0. They are interested, in good faith, of the new technology that enhances the continuation of the concepts from Revolutions 2.0 and 3.0.

The opposition to the idea of Revolution 4.0 from within the Ground Forces, the other services, and General Staff directorates reflects the nexus of these interests.

Summary

The IDF must strive for the development of an autonomous sensor-strike-processing complex. Within the context of force defense, it must also be automatic. To achieve this goal, inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles that can carry sensors and transmitters connected to advanced attack and information-processing assets can be used. This all must take place on the local tactical level to repress enemy Revolution 3.0 capabilities and facilitate the return of maneuver superiority. Three major generals in the IDF Ground Forces Command have written on this subject. The U.S. Army has published many articles on the multi-domain battle concept, which aims to achieve similar goals.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, it does not appear that our efforts toward this vision are full steam ahead.

In the past, the IDF was able to identify the historical moment, to harness its technological prowess to innovative concepts and new organizational models, and to change. This happened in the 1960s with the Israeli fast attack missiles boat revolution, during the IAF’s preparations for the anti-SAM battle of the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon 1982, and regarding precision weapons in the 1990s.⁵⁶ We have the capacity to change again. ■

A Hebrew version of this research was published in the Dado Center Journal. This article expresses the opinions of the author and does not indicate official opinions of the Israel Defense Forces.

Notes

Epigraph. "The Times They Are A-Changin'," Bob Dylan, track 1 on *The Times They Are A-Changin'*, Warner Bros., 1964.

1. For more on "Land Ahead" as a strategic learning process, see Guy Tzur, "Land Ahead"—Formulating a Ground Maneuver Concept," *Dado Center Journal for Operational Art (DCJ)* 6 (January 2016): 104–33, accessed 9 October 2018, <https://www.idf.il/media/11155/tzur.pdf>.
2. Aharon Haliva, "More of the Same: The Need for Conceptual Leap in Force Design," *DCJ* 9 (December 2016), accessed 24 January 2019, <https://www.idf.il/media/11151/haliva-english-9.pdf>.
3. Kobi Barak, "The Sky is No Longer the Limit: The Need for Ground Airpower and Multi-Dimensional Warfare Capabilities," *DCJ* 11-12 (May 2017): 38–60, accessed 9 October 2018, <https://www.idf.il/media/11763/11-kobi-barak-pdf.pdf>.
4. Tzur, "Land Ahead."
5. See, for example, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The writers view many of the World War II events as a result of the militaries' ability or inability to adjust to the changing nature of war.
6. Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
7. We will refrain from providing a historical briefing of the development of air power, military nuclear capabilities, and other dramatic military commitments, unless directly related to the discussion of the ground combat.
8. Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981).
9. Presented by Alvin and Heidi Toffler following the Gulf War, in retrospect, in their book *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1995).
10. Klaus Schwab, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution* (New York: Crown Publishing, 2016).
11. Ibid.; Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, "Revolutionary Wealth: New Perspective," *Quarterly* 30, no. 4 (2013). The Tofflers write about the new age of wealth—the change in the economic base the world relies on, as a continuation of the information revolution.
12. The First World War exceeds the conventional timeframe for the first industrial revolution; however, its military characteristics match the method of war discussed here. In general, militaries tend to be late compared to general definitions of eras, which means that wars often "overreach" their boundaries.
13. For more on the role of Gen. Donn Starry, see "Extending the Battlefield," *Military Review* 61, no. 3 (March 1981): 31–50.
14. Adamsky, *Cultural Strategy and Military Innovation*, 101.
15. Edward Hershberger and David Ochmanek, "Information and Warfare: New Opportunities for US Military Forces," in "Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare," ed. Zalmay Khalilzad, John P. White, and Andy W. Marshall (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 157–78.
16. Michael Raska, "The Five Waves of RMA Theory, Process and Debate," *Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 36, no. 3-4 (2011): 6.
17. Pascale Minet, Ines Khoufi, and Anis Laouiti, "Increasing Reliability of a TSCH Network for the Industry 4.0" (16th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications [NCA], Cambridge, MA, 30 October–1 November 2017), 1–10.
18. "The Fourth Internet Era is at Our Doorstep and it Holds Great Potential for Israeli Startups [in Hebrew]," *Geektime*, 13 September 2016, accessed 24 January 2019, <https://www.geektime.co.il/the-potential-of-iot-for-israeli-startups/>.

19. Didi Hanoch, "A Smart Sensor for a Smart Home [in Hebrew]," *Haaretz* (website), 26 June 2013, accessed 24 January 2019, <https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/the-edge/premium-1.2056067>.
20. From a study session with representatives of a GE incubator in Israel, summer 2017.
21. For example, "Uber Launches Driverless Taxi Service in Pittsburgh [in Hebrew]," *Calcalist* (website), 15 September 2016, <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3698055,00.html>; for more information, see Wikipedia, s.v. "Vehicular automation [autonomous vehicles]," last modified 28 September 2018, accessed 9 October 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicular_automation.
22. Caution needs to be paid not to confuse this term with a term from the beginning of the previous century, which identified asymmetric warfare against nonstate organizations and coined it Fourth Generation Warfare. See, for example, T. X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare" (Herzliya, Israel: Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, August 2007), 53–54; William S Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," *Military Review* 84, no. 5 (September-October 2004).
23. Yoni Blau, "The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Reality on the Production Floor," *Calcalist* (website), 23 July 2017, accessed 24 January 2019, <https://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3717729,00.html>.
24. Shmuel Shmuel, *The Journey to the Third Strategic Shifting in the American Defense Establishment 2012-2016* (Ramat HaSharon, Israel: Dado Center, November 2016). This led to lively discussions concerning the role of autonomous systems in warfare—see, for example, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Unmanned Effects (UFX): Taking the Human Out of the Loop*, Rapid Assessment Process (RAP) Report #03-10 (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, September 2003); Artur Kuptel, Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-2014, "Policy Guidance: Autonomy in Defence Systems [Focus Area-Role of Autonomous Systems in Gaining Operational Access]" (PowerPoint presentation, HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, VA, 8 December 2014), slide 3.
25. Sydney J. Freedberg, "Should the Pentagon Let Robots Kill Humans? Maybe," *Breaking Defense* (website), 10 July 2017, accessed 9 October 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/should-pentagon-let-robots-kill-humans-maybe/>.
26. It is important not to confuse this with the concept of "Fourth Generation War" coined in the beginning of the former decade, which recognized the nonsymmetric fighting against organizations that are not countries. See, for example, Hammes, "Fourth Generation War," 53–54; Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," 12–16.
27. Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 6–49.
28. In a certain way, the firepower on the ground did become more sophisticated, but as soon as this was achieved, the senior headquarters were inclined to take the assets to themselves and deny precision munition resources to the ground forces themselves.
29. Moran Myrocheck and Gabi Siboni, "The Curse of Abundance," *Ma'arachot* 459 (February 2015): 12–19. Mayorchik and Siboni even claim that the abundance of information in the command and control systems hinder commanding officers to distinguish between what is important and what is not.
30. See, for example, Boaz Zalmanovitz, "Inflation of Command Headquarters: A Clear and Immediate Danger," *Ma'arachot* 425 (June 2009): 40–47. He attributes the growth of the headquarters to the

misunderstanding of combat theory, unprofessional officer behavior, and an excess of commanders in reserve duty.

31. Oren Haas, "The Israeli Staff: A Unique Staff Model," *Ma'arachot* 473 (October 2017): 15–16. Haas, for example, explains in his article that one of the causes of increased staff size is the concept of "the combat HQ" which is the adoption of a combat method that is rich in intelligence and air assets.

32. Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 33–34, Kindle.

33. Itai Brun, "'While You're Busy Making Other Plans'—The 'Other RMA,'" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 4 (August 2010): 535–65.

34. For more information on these issues, read more U.S. military publications, especially U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century (2025-2040)* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 2017).

35. The Russians and the Chinese have developed and equipped themselves with modern combat platforms, but more concerning from the U.S. military perspective is the prospect of salvos of missiles launched against maneuvering forces. The balance between missiles and maneuvering platforms changed in the present era.

36. See Amir Eshel, "On the Way to a Maneuver Stale-Mate," *Ma'arachot* 434 (December 2010).

37. Dan Schueftan, "The Unique Nature of the War from the Arab Perspective [in Hebrew]," *The Yom Kippur War: A Reappraisal*, ed. Chaim Opaz and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, 1999), 129.

38. Thanks to Professor Steve Rosen for clarifying this conclusion.

39. Barak, "The Sky is No Longer the Limit," 55.

40. Fire against artillery batteries. A technique of using artillery fire directly against enemy artillery units.

41. Diverse forces—cavalry, infantry, and archers, for example—have existed throughout history. But the introduction of corps as an organization that focuses on tactical professionalism and the introduction of an organizational mechanism for operational integration of tactical specialties (as part of the multi-arms command) were the trademark of a modern military in Wave 2.0.

42. Following the Six-Day War, the Israel Defense Forces were inclined to believe that combined arms was of critical necessity.

43. For more information about intelligence-based combat as "the most detailed and precise intelligence accessible to forces on the micro-tactical level," see Aviv Kochavi and Eran Ortal, "Ma'ase Aman: Permanent Change in a Changing Reality," *DCJ* 2 (July 2014): 30, accessed 10 October 2018, <https://www.idf.il/media/18519/mase-aman-article.pdf>; see "The IDF Network," interview with Nati Cohen, (chief teleprocessing officer), *Israel Defense*, 7 August 2016, for more information about the tactical internet project program as part of "the IDF Network."

44. For more information, see "Automated, Connected, Electric, and Shared Vehicles: Are ACES Leading to Unprecedented Change?," Center for Automotive Research, 27 November 2017, accessed 24 January 2019, <https://www.cargroup.org/automated-connected-electric-shared-vehicles-aces-leading-unprecedented-change/>.

45. "The IDF Network program is the construction of 'Tactical Internet project' infrastructure that will provide inter-service sharing of operational information." Ibid.

46. Tamir Hayman, "Learning in the General Staff," *DCJ* 8 (August 2016), accessed 10 October 2018, <https://www.idf.il/media/39138/learning-in-the-general-staff-tamir-hayman.pdf>.

47. "The main conclusion from the thought process (Land Ahead) was that the response times required in the battlefield had been

significantly reduced ... to achieve the last two components to the solution (neutralizing enemy surprise and disrupting the enemy's operational advantage with minimum exposure) led the Ground Force Command to write the reconnaissance-strike complex program ... This is a fabric of technologies that was connected to all the platforms and soldiers to one flat information channel A type of military IOT." "Measured Warfare against Terror," interview with Ami Rojkes Dombé (former senior officer in the Ground Forces Command), *Israel Defense*, 26 August 2017.

48. See also the Ground Forces Command's presentation: Kobi Barak, *Land Ahead* (conference presentation, Latrun, Israel, May 2017).

49. Aharon Haliva, "More of the Same: The Need for Conceptual Leap in Force Design," *DCJ* 9 (December 2016): 21, accessed 17 October 2018, <https://www.idf.il/media/11151/haliva-english-9.pdf>; for more on the concept, see Ami Rojkes Dombé, "IDF 2030: Small, Effective and Lethal," *Israel Defense* (website), 16 November 2017, accessed 10 October 2018, <http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/31785>; Amir Rapaport, "Bringing Precise Firepower to an Unseen Enemy," *Israel Defense*, 6 June 2017; Haliva, *The Maneuver Controls Territory*. An intelligence-air asset level, comprised of small, highly automatic vehicles that are operated by brigades and battalions on the ground, could enable us to locate the enemy and quickly strike. An attack within minutes or seconds will not only harm the location of the enemy but also the enemy itself.

50. Haliva, "More of the Same," 20.

51. Barak, "The Sky is No Longer the Limit," 37.

52. Ezer Gat, "Weapons, Doctrine and Basic Organization," *Ma'arachot* 278 (January-February 1981): 51. Gat is quoting a typical response of commanding officers regarding the observation that what we understand today as the precision-munition revolution (Revolution 3.0).

53. As Gat eloquently said, "generations of military officers haven't experienced anything like them (technological-doctrinal organizational revolutions-E.O.) in their lives. All of their hands-on experience naturally opposes breaking everything that appears to be checked and rechecked and based on the military profession." Ibid.

54. See, for example, Israel Tal: "The corps carried out and continue to carry out a decisive role in the IDF for force design and nurturing its quality ... but together with their contribution, an inevitable process also developed which all militaries go through. The corps organization was anachronistic: the professional staff neutralized the coordinating staff and the 'horizontal' organization was the loser. On this background, voices of protest have been heard in recent years against the discrimination of the 'combined battle.'" Israel Tal, *The Few Against the Many* [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing, 1995), 100.

55. TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*; Shmuel Shmuel, "Multi-Domain Battle: AirLand Battle, Once More, With Feeling," *War on the Rocks*, 20 June 2017, accessed 10 October 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/multi-domain-battle-airland-battle-once-more-with-feeling/>.

56. The IDF's Navy was the first to develop and employ surface-to-surface naval missiles boarded on small, fast vessels that ended up decisively defeating both Syrian and Egyptian navies in October 1973, the first missile battle in naval history. Also see Wikipedia, s.v. "Battle of Latakia," last modified 23 November 2018, accessed 24 January 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Latakia; Wikipedia, s.v. "Battle of Baltim–Damietta," last modified 21 June 2017, accessed 24 January 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Baltim. To learn more about the battle of the Beqaa Valley, also known as Operation Mole Cricket 19, see Wikipedia, s.v. "Operation Mole Cricket 19," last modified 16 November 2018, accessed 24 January 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mole_Cricket_19.

Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



Massing Effects in the Information Domain A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations

Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, U.S. Army, with Lieutenant Colonel Mark W. Garrett, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel James E. Hutton, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy W. Bush, U.S. Army

... I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Ummah.

—Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005

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If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a "D" or a "D-plus" as a country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today?

—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 27 March 2006

I N 1995, the Department of the Army, Forces Command, and the Training and Doctrine Command began a joint venture called Force XXI, the focus of which was to understand how information-age technology could improve the U.S. Army's warfighting capabilities. While many experiments with information technology and theory were conducted across the Army, the Task Force XXI (TFXXI) and Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiments

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The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations

Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army



This article was solicited from the author by the editor in chief of Military Review subsequent to a briefing the author presented to the Information Operations Symposium II held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 15 December 2005. The text is an edited version of a transcript from that briefing. It includes additional material and clarification of facts and events provided by the author.

DUTY IN IRAQ has a way of debunking myths and countering Ivory Tower theories with hard facts on the ground. I admit that while I was preparing to serve in Iraq as a brigade commander, I was among the skeptics who doubted the value of integrating information operations (IO) into my concept of operations. Most of the officers on my combat team shared my doubts about the relative importance of information operations. Of course, in current Army literature there is a great deal of discussion about IO theory. There is significantly less practical information, however, that details how theory can be effectively translated into practice by tactical units. My purpose in writing this article is to provide commanders the insights I gleaned from my experience.

Soon after taking command of my brigade, I quickly discovered that IO was going to be one of the two most vital tools (along with human intelligence) I would need to be successful in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. COIN operations meant competing daily to favorably influence the perceptions of the Iraqi population in our area of operations (AO). I quickly concluded that, without IO, I could not hope to shape and set conditions for my battalions or my Soldiers to be successful.

It certainly did not take long to discover that the traditional tools in my military kit bag were insufficient to successfully compete in this new operational environment. As a brigade commander, I was somewhat surprised to find myself spending 70 percent of my time working and managing my intelligence and IO systems and a relatively small amount of my time directly involved with the traditional maneuver and fire support activities. This was a paradigm shift for me. The reality I confronted was far different from what I had professionally prepared for over a lifetime of conventional training and experience.

Background

My brigade, the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), was part of the 1st Armored Division. For the first 12 months in Iraq, we were task organized in Baghdad with up to eight battalions, roughly 5,000 strong, all trained for conventional combat. The BCT consisted of two mechanized infantry

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For those interested in studying the evolution of information operations concepts and practices, the May-June 2006 edition of *Military Review* features two seminal articles by commanders who pioneered tactical information operations at the corps and brigade levels: "Massing Effects in the Information Domain: A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations" by Lt. Gen. Thomas

F. Metz, U.S. Army, and "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations" by Col. Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army.

To view the digital version of this edition of *Military Review*, please visit <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/165/rec/4>. The articles are found on page 2 and page 13, respectively.



The above propaganda leaflet depicting Islamic State executioners slaughtering innocent civilians in a meat grinder was dropped over Raqqa, Syria, in March 2015 by coalition forces to help prepare the way for follow-on maneuver operations against that city. Information warfare creates operational advantages by the synergy of physical attacks that deny, disrupt, and destroy key enemy command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems at the same time psychological and sociological measures are used to undermine the moral and cognitive commitment of adversaries to their cause by actions that foster confusion, intimidation, or persuasion. During I Corps' Warfighter Exercise 18-2, simulated leaflet drops similar to those conducted in Raqqa in conjunction with simulated physical attacks created the desired synergistic effects of information warfare in support of overall corps' exercise objectives. (Image courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Integrating Information Warfare

Lessons Learned from Warfighter Exercise 18-2

Lt. Col. Jonathan Rittenberg, U.S. Army

Maj. Mike Barry, U.S. Army

Maj. Daniel Hickey, U.S. Army

Maj. Bryan Rhee, U.S. Army

Capt. Holly Cross, U.S. Army

Conducting information warfare against nation-state near-peer competitors and various substate actors requires different approaches. Over the past sixteen years, U.S. Army information operations (IO) have focused on population-centric counterinsurgency operations with a strong emphasis on counternarratives, influence, and perception management. As the Army develops and inculcates new doctrine such as multi-domain operations and refocuses on near-peer adversaries, it must reinvigorate the use of information warfare.

Currently, U.S. joint doctrine does not provide an official definition for information warfare. The term last appeared in Joint Publication 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, dated 9 October 1998, which stated, “Information warfare is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.”¹ Outdated and too broad in scope, we found this definition inadequate for our use. For the purposes of this paper, information warfare is defined as actions directed at affecting an adversary’s “information detection sources, information channels, information processing, and decision-making systems.”²

To gain an advantage, information warfare effects must focus on denying, disrupting, and destroying key enemy command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems. The I Corps’ organizational structure and its implementation of information warfare, integrated through an enhanced G39 (information operations) staff section, provides a model for the U.S. Army to integrate information-related capabilities (IRCs) for use against near-peer adversaries in future conflicts.

Lessons from Warfighter Exercise 18-2

During November 2017, I Corps, “America’s First Corps,” participated in Warfighter Exercise (WfX) 18-2, a Forces Command validation exercise for a tactical

corps headquarters. The twelve-day command post exercise was set in a notional complex environment against a determined near-peer enemy force. WfX 18-2 tested the corps on all aspects of unified land operations and warfighting functions, and in all phases of the operations process.

One observation from the exercise was the need for rigor in the mission analysis process to understand the information environment.³ The most critical output for the G39 enterprise during mission analysis was the combined information overlay (CIO). The CIO is a part of joint and Army doctrine, but it is not commonly used by corps- and division-level headquarters, according to observations by the Mission Command Training Program observers and the J7 of the Joint Staff.⁴ The CIO developed during WfX 18-2 depicted enemy communications systems from strategic to tactical levels (see figure 1, page 102). Additionally, the CIO illustrated the information flow within the enemy



G39 is the information warfare enterprise staff section of I Corps. It is responsible for integration of information operations, psychological operations, space operations, and cyberelectromagnetic activities into operational planning.

organizational structure, which, when combined with intelligence assessments, clearly displayed the adversary’s decision-making and command-and-control nodes. The CIO encompassed physical communication infrastructure such as satellite communication stations, cell phone towers, fiber-optic lines, radio communication towers, AM and FM radio stations, and television stations, as well as communication support units and military couriers. This allowed the corps G39 to understand the adversary’s primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans and then prioritize physical destruction targets to disrupt enemy communication capability as well as prevent them from restoring communication paths.

Additionally, the CIO provided the staff with a general understanding of the communications processes and means the adversary government used to communicate with the population. This allowed the G39 to target these means (e.g., radio, TV, and cell phone text messaging) at the most advantageous time and place to create an information gap between the central government and the




Figure 1. Cognitive Combined Information Overlay on Adversary Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems and Information Flow

people, and it provided an opportunity for friendly psychological operations (PSYOP) messages that promoted civilian noninterference to reach the target audience.


The lethal and nonlethal targeting teams' analysis of the CIO provided refined targets to the corps high payoff target list. This analysis fed the targeting process by creating layered, synchronized, and coordinated lethal and nonlethal effects that disrupted, destroyed, and degraded enemy C4I systems. By delaying enemy decision-making and disrupting the enemy's ability to conduct coordinated operations, it created tactical advantages for the U.S. divisions in the corps area of operations. As enemy decision-makers grew more isolated and enemy units were destroyed, their maneuver forces began to reposition to consolidate combat power. These concentrations provided maneuver space for the divisions to target and exploit the remaining enemy. Additionally, the divisions

were able to shape enemy tactical-level C4I by targeting brigade-and-below communications retransmission sites identified through the corps collection plan.

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During exercise execution, the systematic destruction of enemy information systems, command-and-control elements, signal units, and information maintenance units, from the strategic to tactical levels, isolated operational- and tactical-level decision-makers from the national-level command. The isolation effect allowed for friendly PSYOP influence efforts to decrease enemy units' will to fight. These effects, as depicted in figure 2 (on page 104), were timed and coordinated as part of the corps shaping operations to set conditions for the corps' and divisions' fights. As the fight progressed, the combination of lethal fires with PSYOP "will to fight" messages resulted in noticeable and



Battle-damage assessment overhead imagery shows the effects of a September 2014 attack against an Islamic State command and control center in Raqqa, Syria. During I Corps' Warfighter Exercise 18-2, similar simulated attacks were conducted against key command-and-control nodes at the same time other information operations measures were simulated to create the desired synergistic effects of information warfare in support of overall Corps' exercise objectives. (Photo compilation courtesy of the Department of Defense)

measurable enemy surrenders as verified through the collection efforts of the corps intelligence (G2) section. While this is tough to replicate in simulation, the integrated planning, collection, and targeting processes are the critical lessons learned, and these results would likely be sustainable during actual combat operations.


An example of the combination of information warfare and fires against an enemy capability occurred during the corps shaping efforts against the enemy long-range artillery brigades. Through the targeting process, fires focused on the destruction of key capabilities and equipment such as the artillery pieces and their sustainment support. Concurrently, the information warfare focus was on disrupting enemy

communications through electronic warfare (EW) activities against radars and tactical communications systems. PSYOP focused on conveying the message that the enemy was doomed to inevitable defeat through leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts, as well as on nominating key enemy

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
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(Figure by Jonathan Rittenberg and Mike Barry)

Figure 2. Commanders Stand-Up Brief—Information Warfare Effects Applied during the Targeting Process



(Figure by Jonathan Rittenberg and Mike Barry)

Figure 3. G39 Staff Organization for Warfighter Exercise 18-2

garrisons for physical destruction. The PSYOP planners timed the release of the broadcasts and leaflet drops to occur just after destruction of enemy units, focusing on subordinate and adjacent enemy units. As discussed earlier, the resulting effect was an increase in enemy surrenders and desertions. Information warfare, specifically, physical destruction, was used to destroy the long-range artillery headquarters radio towers, telephone exchanges, and retransmission sites, which impacted the adversary's communications paths and overall ability to coordinate operations.

Corps G39 Organizational Structure

In discussion with other IO sections at both the corps and division levels, and with the Mission Command Training Program observer coach/trainers, it is clear that not every G39 section in the U.S. Army is organized the same. The I Corps G39 organization for WfX 18-2 is an optimal organizational structure to maximize effectiveness against a near-peer threat. The I Corps G39 is an integrated section made up of IO, EW, PSYOP, and space operations. For WfX 18-2, the G39 was augmented with a six-soldier PSYOP task force (POTF), a six-soldier

Army space support team (ARSST), and a six-soldier forward support team from the 56th Theater Information Operations Group. The intent for the augmentation while deployed is to increase the capabilities and work capacity of the G39 section to meet mission requirements and to provide the corps commander with more assets to use against the enemy. Figure 3 (on page 105) shows the organization structure of the I Corps G39 section during WfX 18-2. The increased capacity and staff integration provided through the intelligence support to information operations (ISTIO) team, the POTE, and the ARSST personnel were critical to I Corps success at WfX 18-2.

To sustain the understanding of the information environment during the exercise, it was critical to have an ISTIO team within the G39. This team consisted of two intelligence captains, a signal warrant officer, and an intelligence noncommissioned officer. The ISTIO team created an IO-specific intelligence collection plan that ensured information requirements were observed by corps organic and higher-level collection assets. This enhanced the G39's ability to assess the effectiveness against previous target nominations and to inform the G39 targeting officer for future information warfare nominations. More importantly, the ISTIO team's ability to assess the corps' information warfare effectiveness provided the corps commander with increased situational awareness through a clear operational picture of the adversary's degraded and destroyed C4I networks. Without the ISTIO team, the corps information warfare effects would not have been as timely, responsive, or successful.

The G39 also embedded an IO targeting team with the G3 (operations) fires section consisting of an IO major, a PSYOP captain, and a cyberelectromagnetic activities chief warrant officer. This team took the section's targeting priorities and ensured that they were nested with the corps high payoff target list and were integrated with the corps concept of fires.

The I Corps space support element (SSE) is a member of the G39 section at home station and forward. The SSE is typically augmented by an ARSST to provide continuous coverage for space events and to provide increased space capability to the corps. The ARSST and SSE focused on integration to provide space force enhancement to the corps staff for continued mission analysis and battlefield characterization as the operation progressed. The ARSST assisted with current operations by focusing on overhead persistent infrared data. By

plotting this data and monitoring trends, the ARSST was able to work with the G2's current operations section in the combined operations intelligence center and recommend shifting assets. This action allowed I Corps to confirm enemy locations and expand its targeting based on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance overflights. The ARSST also provided analysis to depict the effects of enemy jammers, while also monitoring jammer activity trends across the battlefield to provide targetable data for lethal fires. Additionally, the ARSST provided daily GPS accuracy data for maneuver and fires planning, and space weather and environmental data for the G6 section to maintain communication with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. The ARSST provided imagery to the combat aviation brigade, the corps engineer section, and the G39 to assist in branch planning. Using the ARSST allowed the SSE to focus on layering special technical effects with other nonlethal fires from the G39 and lethal fires to support maneuver operations.

Recommendations

We recommend that corps and division formations consider replicating the organizational structure discussed in figure 3. This structure effectively facilitated the integration of the IRCs, intelligence, and targeting support to the G39 and enhanced planning and targeting effectiveness. It was a catalyst that enabled shared understanding among the G39, G2, G3, and G3 fires sections and the corps commander about the information environment and the information warfare capabilities available to the corps.

Our experience leads us to recommend the addition of one 35-series (intelligence) warrant officer and one 131-series (targeting) warrant officer as permanent members of the G39 staff section. This will allow the section to increase its contributions to and understanding of both the collection and targeting processes. The alternative is to rely on an intelligence analyst and targeting officer from the G2 and G3 fires sections. When faced with a high operational tempo and as competing priorities increase, the ad hoc ability of another staff section to provide dedicated specialty support to the G39 information warfare fight is suspect.

These organizational structure recommendations increase the manning within the G39 section and may be viewed as "empire building"; however, we see it as necessary. For too long, leaders within the Department

of Defense have discussed the importance of IO and how, strategically, the U.S. Army has routinely lost in the information environment.⁵ Still, little has been done to organizationally increase unit IO and information warfare capabilities structures at the corps and division levels. The above recommendations may help improve how the Army fights and wins in the information environment.

Our final recommendation is to utilize all available authorities and IRCs to gain information superiority both against enemy C4I structures and in the narrative space. Information operations, and more specifically information warfare, is not restricted to nonlethal fires. It is our opinion that the title of “nonlethal fires” is a result of the years of focusing on counterinsurgency-centric concepts such as the battle of narratives, the war of ideas, or perception management. Additionally, nonlethal fires is often used to explain what IO does because for years, the results have been more often qualitative and hard to measure. As demonstrated in WfX 18-2, the I Corps G39 section’s focus was not limited to nonlethal fires, as it used physical destruction against the enemies C4I systems in concert with EW, PSYOP, and other IRCs.

When it comes to fighting a near-peer threat, IO practitioners and Army leadership need to think beyond how IO has been used since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism. Leaders must allow planners to widen the aperture of how IO and information warfare is planned and executed. This requires commanders to promote creativity, staff integration, and planning that expands our options of what is possible.

Finally, G39 planners, regardless of whether they are IO, PSYOP, EW, cyber, space, or any other warfighting function, must aggressively execute and take advantage of created opportunities. G39 planners have to proactively

integrate across the staff and break down any internal and external barriers to success. The bottom line is, if a G39 section is going to be successful in maximizing effects in the information environment against a near-peer adversary, the members of that section must increase the demand signal for information warfare, meet or exceed this demand, and tirelessly advocate for G39 capabilities and effects at every available opportunity.

Conclusion

I Corps put strong emphasis on the information warfare aspect of IO. This emphasis was decisive to setting conditions for the G39 to effectively isolate enemy formations through the destruction, disruption, and degradation of their C4I systems. These actions also enhanced the PSYOP effect on isolated enemy formations, increasing enemy surrenders and desertions, as well as increasing civilian compliance with I Corps instructions. The G39 focus on ensuring nonlethal targets were prioritized for collection ensured flexibility in subsequent targeting cycles to reinforce success or modify its nominations. A broad understanding of the information environment allowed the corps G39 to systematically dismantle the adversary’s C4I systems, which degraded the adversary’s ability to conduct operations. All of this was achieved due to the hard work of the corps staff and the optimized organizational structure of the G39. It is our hope that the recommendations in the paper will inspire other organizations to take a hard look at how they are conducting IO, to not settle for the status quo of the past sixteen years of counterinsurgency-centric logic, to challenge themselves and their staff to be agile and adaptive, and for the G39 section to truly integrate information warfare into every operation. ■

Notes

1. Joint Publication 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 9 October 1998 [obsolete]), I-1.

2. Zhang Yuliang, *The Science of Military Campaigns*, ed. Zhan-yi Xue (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 155.

3. Lt. Col. Daniel Billquist, Mission Command Training Program senior information operations observer coach/trainer, interview with Jonathan Rittenberg, November 2017.

4. Ibid.

5. Ralph O. Baker, “Information Operations: From Good to Great,” *Military Review* 91, no. 4 (July-August 2011): 2-7. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20110831_art004.pdf.



Maj. Jacob E. White salutes during pass in review 8 February 2018 as part of the activation ceremony for the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Where Field Grade Officers Get Their Power

Col. Robert T. Ault, U.S. Army

Jack D. Kem, PhD

Leadership seeks to influence others through the communication of ideas and common causes. Positive, empowering influence comes by knowing how to lead, relate to others, and free others to manage tasks.

—Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) graduates are expected to fulfill three crucial roles for the U.S. Army: they must be able to solve complex problems, build teams, and develop other leaders in order to meet the challenges of the future. These roles are reflected in the outcomes

for the CGSOC.¹ The focus of this article is on how field grade officers draw their “organizational power,” or influence, in order to solve those problems, build those teams, and develop other leaders after their CGSOC graduation. The backdrop for this discussion is the Army’s urgency to grow not just capability but readiness to fight and win against threats to the Nation. This specifically includes the ability to plan and conduct division- and corps-level operations against a peer or near-peer adversary threat with matching, or in some cases, overmatching military capabilities. To do this, the Army needs a vibrant, highly competent, critical thinking, professional core of field grade officers.

When does the Army recognize its officers as being fully vested in the profession of arms? One proposition is that this recognition takes place at the same time an officer is promoted to the rank of major, which is also the same time he or she attends the CGSOC at the Command and General Staff School.

The resident CGSOC is for educating and training the top basic branch officers in warfighting. This year-long graduate-level course has three parts. The first part is the Common Core (three and a half months) course that focuses on enterprise-level Army and joint processes. It also provides the Joint Professional Military Education (JMPE1) accreditation. The second part of the school year begins with individual basic-branch preparation courses that serve to both finish company grade officers in their branch’s doctrine and latest techniques in order to prepare them to operate as part of a notional division staff during the next phase of the year. The Advanced Operations Course (four months) follows and is the resident CGSOC main effort. This accrediting eighteen-week intensive program is designed to produce basic branch officers that understand large-scale combat operations at the division, corps, and brigade levels. Regardless of the mode of education (resident, satellite, distance, or Total Army School System), attendance at CGSOC marks a turning point in an officer’s career.

Attendance at CGSOC is significant as it occurs after the officer is beyond their obligated service point. The average CGSOC student in 2018 has nine to ten years in the Army. This professional time frame means the officer-students at CGSOC choose to attend a graduate-level professional education program. CGSOC students are credentialed as professionals by both senior Army leaders during the Army-level

board selection process and then by the Command and General Staff College faculty during the school year.

New CGSOC graduates, now considered fully vested in the profession of arms, find themselves in positions where their leadership must be exhibited by influence rather than by direction. Nonetheless, the Army expects these “iron majors” to effectively display influence, or “organizational power,” to solve problems, build teams, and develop leaders. Why do some officers succeed in accomplishing these three critical tasks while others do not? Controlling for a strong work ethic and a strong moral underpinning, what is it that makes a field grade leader successful?

Our answer is that a powerful and influential leader exudes confidence and competence in such a way that inspires others to listen and take actions accordingly. This skill set is learnable and repeatable. Our formula for organizational power and influence is expressed algebraically in the figure (on page 111).

On Language

The language component of the formula has two parts. First, the ability to read and write, clearly and concisely, in proper English; and second, the precise usage of the technical language associated with the specific military branch, unit or task to which the officer is assigned.

Clear and concise English writing brings clarity in defining and solving problems. CGSOC is designed to build on the skills of already highly successful captains and majors by increasing their ability to write and speak for a broader audience. The majority

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of the basic branch student officers are versed at writing for the tactical level (battalion and brigade). Unfortunately, at the tactical levels, PowerPoint and bullet sentences tend to rule the day. The influential field grade officer, however, understands the need to be able to write for a broader audience. Proper writing brings stability, orderliness, and clarity to thinking that is needed to define and solve problems. In other words, good writing promotes good thinking.

As a field grade leader, communication skills are no longer simple commands to subordinates that at least share some understanding of the problem being dealt with. The audience beyond company grade is much broader and, in many cases, does not share the point of view or have the same equities in addressing the problem at hand. PowerPoint slides, while helpful, cannot take the place of clearly written orders, white papers, or well-given briefings. In many cases, the CGSOC graduate's staff products will travel far beyond the unit or context where they originated. Therefore, in order to exercise appropriate influence, field grade officers must be able to write and speak clearly and concisely to save time and foster understanding. In conjunction, they must develop habits

that enhance the efficient use of time that is critical in developing overall effectiveness.

Students plan for a division-level defense in a contested region 5 February 2019 during the Advanced Operations Course at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The thirty-two-hour exercise spanned seven days and was the culminating event of this block. After completing the Advanced Operations Course, the students are considered "fully credentialed" as staff officers. (Photo by Danielle Powell, Army University Press)

that enhance the efficient use of time that is critical in developing overall effectiveness.

Management of time is critical to the officers, the teams they lead, and their bosses at the field-grade level. This means clarity must rule the day from beginning to end when speaking and briefing. CGSOC graduates must be able to communicate their cogent thoughts and ideas without delay in order to gain the required influence to lead teams of peers effectively.

Using correct technical language is the second part of the language component of influence. Proper understanding and usage of the technical language associated with specific branches, units, and problem sets reflects the credentials of the CGSOC graduate. Every time an officer speaks, he or she is being judged by not only the

Organizational influence = Poise (language + critical thinking skills + context)

(Figure by authors)

Figure. Organizational Power and Influence Formula

team members in the organization but also by the boss and by the officer's peers. Precisely delivered technical language sets the basis for displaying strong technical and tactical competence, and this creates an intellectual opportunity for the field grade officer.

The burden of translation falls firmly on the speaker, not the audience. For example, when under tactical conditions, the CGSOC graduate is expected to understand the doctrinal language related to large-scale combat operations and converse using the proper acronyms and technical terms relating to both concepts and materiel. Similarly, when under different circumstances, such as participation in a discussion on technical administrative labor-relations conditions, the graduate is expected to learn and speak the appropriate jargon correctly. Each of these situations, as well as others, requires a different set of technical language skills; the tactical language appropriate to large-scale combat operations is not interchangeable with that required for effective labor-relations engagements.

On the other hand, mastering the proper technical language and employing the jargon and language appropriate to the circumstances effectively opens the door for influence with the discrete audiences to which such language pertains. This is where the course of instruction at CGSOC brings value to its graduates in that it exposes students to the joint force, strategy, and the enterprise level of the Army, as well as deep immersion in the mechanics of fighting at the tactical level. The result is that graduates are conversant in many technical languages across the Department of Defense and even international spheres.

As an end state, CGSOC graduates are expected to be able to speak and write clearly and precisely in the English language, as well as to be proficient in the technical vernacular of their profession. CGSOC offer students the chance to greatly increase their skills via the numerous written and verbally delivered requirements throughout the year. This ability starts the officer's bid

for credibility, and in the end, it gives him or her a seat at the table and an opportunity to contribute substantively to the discussion.

On Critical-Thinking Skills

Field grade officers open their bid for influence with their language skills, but critical-thinking skills come quickly to the forefront. A CGSOC graduate can no longer afford to simply "execute well" or just be a hard worker; those attributes are assumed. An influential graduate is expected to be a field grade leader who can engage deeply and in a disciplined, meaningful fashion to solve problems. For company grade officers, their careers to date can be summarized by how they answer the question, "What do you know?" The response expected in most cases revolves around knowledge-based relevant facts and statements of black and white truths, such as "Sir, the answer is forty-seven trucks," or "Ma'am, it will take us twelve hours."

Good company grade officers understand that straightforward questions demand straightforward answers. This is largely because the problems presented to company-level officers are frequently centered on black-and-white issues. Such binary kinds of solutions are made possible because echelons above company, and even above battalion, work to shape the problem set to reduce the amount of uncertainty. This does not mean the problems at the company level are easy. Problems are problems, and they remain difficult at all levels and for all leaders. What changes at the field-grade level is the level of complexity that problems present.

Complexity brings with it ambiguity, as well as an increased rate of change and uncertainty. Complex problems are vastly harder to understand and define with the level of certainty associated with binary-type problems. As a result, the nature of complexity demands that CGSOC graduates bring more tools to the endeavor than required at the company-grade level. Graduates must be able to think their way through



problems versus fighting their way through as in the past. The ability to think through a problem means that the field grade officer must exercise a logical and repeatable process to organize facts and make reasonable assumptions. When dealing with unstructured complex problems, the ability to reasonably bound a problem set lays the ground work for critical thinking.

Bounding—or framing—a problem allows the graduate to begin to understand the conditions and environment within which the problem exists. Bounding, in effect, allows the officer to reasonably deduce what the problem is not. Once properly bounded or framed, the next step in critical thinking is to understand the facts and their relationships to other facts as well as the framework of conditions in which they relate. This becomes ever more difficult as the conditions and facts change. With the problem properly framed and an assessment of the facts complete, the officer is able to make reasonable assumptions in order to link facts, discern between correlation and causality, and understand risks. All this builds to enhance common understanding. The planning models taught at CGSOC, such as design methodology,

A .50 caliber machine gun crew explains their employment of the weapon to 173rd Airborne Brigade commander Col. Jay Bartholomew 13 March 2018 as the Brigade Support Battalion conducts base defense live-fire training in Slovenia. A primary responsibility of officer leadership is to build teams and develop subordinate leaders while solving complex problems through methodical and informed critical analysis. (Photo by Lt. Col. John Hall, U.S. Army)

the joint planning process, and the military decision-making process, are all built around the leader's ability to critically think about facts, assumptions, conditions, and risk.

Field grade officers and CGSOC graduates are expected to do much more than attempt to simplify the complex. Complex problems are, by their very nature, difficult to define and difficult to solve. The act of attempting to simplify the complex changes the very nature of the problem. An example of this is oversimplifying the way the human brain works. By doing so, one may conclude that the human brain is simply a network of nerves and receptors encased within the skull. While not wrong, this oversimplification is not helpful because it has failed to account for the sophistication of the brain in both its

structure and processes. The result is that the nature of the human brain is lost to any meaningful conversation. Any attempt at successful brain surgery based on this oversimplified assessment would be impossible.

The oversimplification error is worse on higher-level staffs (division and corps) working on complex problems under stress because it wastes time for the staff and commanders; in turn, this compounds the stress and strain on the problem solvers. The challenge in such situations for the CGSOC graduate serving as a staff officer is to make the complex clear. This value-added ability is hard and requires a focused effort within the time available.

In addition to making the complex clear, there is also an imperative to ensure that clarity is not sacrificed for accuracy. To quote Blaise Pascal, “I have made this [letter] longer than usual, only because I have not had the time to make it shorter.”² Making the complex clear is directly indicative of good critical-thinking skills as well as good communications skills. The ability to critically reason is learned and improved through disciplined repetition. Critical-thinking skills are also scalable and repeatable, which should create transparency that increases trust and confidence in the officer’s judgment. As a result of solid critical-thinking skills, an officer’s stock goes up and with it so too does his or her ability to make changes and exert influence in the organization.

A final word about critical-thinking skills; the ability to understand and recognize bias cannot be understated. This bias could be cognitive, contextual, or organizational. A CGSOC graduate is expected to be able to look beyond their biases to identify and solve problems. Too often, officers hold a solution in their minds and then go in search of a problem on which to impose their view of what should be done. This is a clumsy and brutish way of planning that in the end reflects a very narrow skill set in the officer. Good critical thinking keeps the problem at the center of the dilemma to be solved. Presenting clear solutions to complex problems that represent disciplined critical thinking is a major component of creating influence in organizations. The CGSOC curriculum is designed to test and develop the critical thinking of students by providing repetitions in numerous problem-solving frameworks such as the joint planning process, design methodology, and the military decision-making process. Throughout the year, students will be challenged

in their ability to apply solid, repeatable thinking. The next step in the equation is context.

On Context

Context is the ability to understand relationships and conditions within which the graduate operates and problems are solved. Closely linked to emotional intelligence, context allows the graduate the ability to nudge toward solutions versus forcing answers. As CGSOC graduates take on more complex problems within larger and more complicated organizations, they can no longer charge headlong into solving problems at the expense of their organization. Field grade officers must understand group dynamics and the context of their commander. Additionally, CGSOC graduates are expected to understand organizational context, the context of the problems at hand, and the context of time available for creating solutions.

CGSOC graduates must also understand that at the more senior levels (such as the division and corps level), the boss is not obligated to create “buy-in” with his or her subordinates. Being a field grade leader means quickly gaining an understanding of the boss’s vision and intent and making it one’s own. Influential and powerful field grade leaders allow the commander to extend his or her reach and influence both within in and outside the organization because the leaders “buy-in” on their own. Having an understanding of context means the CGSOC graduate is working to solve his or her boss’s problems first and foremost. Influential and powerful officers work to understand the boss’s perspective and not only solve those problems but also design their delivery of solution sets in this same space.

Context, at its core, is understanding what is important to the boss and what his or her priorities are. When operating within context, field grade officers present relevant, clear, and timely solutions to the commander well before decisions are made. In effect, influential and powerful staffs are able to see and then shape the conditions that not only avert a crisis but also create an intellectual environment for the commander to articulate his or her vision and communicate intent. Operating at this level, effective staff officers can bring synergistic clarity to the commander’s vision.

Finally, context will change based on the command climate. Context is actually an ever-evolving process



every CGSOC graduate must understand in order to learn how his or her boss takes in information and makes decisions. This will change based on the boss and command climate. Influential field grade officers will not be prisoners to former conditions, past methods, or former commanders but will continue to add to their tool kit of understanding and designing. They will keep the boss at the center of the problem and adapt to each one in order to be effective staff officers.

A comment is in order about the difference between content and packaging—or presenting—information. It is only the unsophisticated officer that seeks one over the other. The larger the organization, the more packaging and presentation matters. This is because in larger organizations there are limited opportunities to present information to decision-makers; a simple redo may result in the staff having to wait an extended period before it can reengage with the commander. At worst, a good solution poorly packaged can easily drive a bad decision by the commander.

Finally, a great solution that is not communicated effectively and fully understood is worthless. This is at the crux of the tension between the content and the packaging; one cannot have one without the other. CGSOC offers students the opportunity to understand

A combined staff conducts planning on a NATO scenario 1 March 2017 during Exercise Eagle Owl at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The two-week exercise, conducted twice annually, helps officers understand cultural and procedural similarities and differences, enhance their communications skills, build professional relationships, and work toward finding team resolutions to complex tactical- and operational-level problems. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

context by studying historical case studies of both leadership and campaigns. Using this education, graduates have a baseline to continue their personal development and a set of experiences to reach back to when solving their future problems.

On Poise

For the CGSOC graduate, poise is the combat multiplier across the equation. Poise is the ability to inspire confidence in others. Poise creates trust from subordinates and superiors alike. There is a recognition among the good leaders that bad things happen to good units. What separates successful unit leaders from unsuccessful ones is what happens next; this is poise. How does the leader facing a fatal accident, a death, or any other horrible event react? The good ones display the poise

necessary to rise above the emotion while remaining grounded and connected. Poise is vital to influence, because it reflects an inner calm that shows the graduate is remaining level-headed, cool, and deliberate in the face of the worst. CGSOC attempts to train and validate this characteristic through comprehensive oral exams and numerous other opportunities to present or defend ideas in public. The students who do this best are the ones who present with confidence. CGSOC is designed as a laboratory for officers to study how they bring poise on the personal level and to the staff.

Poise starts with how the officer carries himself or herself and continues with mannerisms, clarity, and tone. Poise concludes with how the officer ends the engagement. While standing up to speak in public can be a significant emotional event for some, concluding and getting off the stage is often even harder to do. This is because amateurs brief for feedback, not content. Briefing for feedback means the presenter continues along the script at the prompting of or affirmation from the audience (or boss). When the commander fails to affirm the amateur with praise, the briefer often feels compelled to rebrief parts or even the whole endeavor. Usually, this results in a generally unsatisfactory briefing because the officer unweaves his or her own work in front of the boss in an effort to gain affirmation. Briefing for affirmation is an indication of professional immaturity, because it indicates the briefer is insecure or needs his or her ego praised as a sign of value to the commander. CGSOC works to give repetitions at this by the critical and constructive feedback from the instructors who help students get better regardless of their starting point.

If there is a single characteristic that should mark the influential CGSOC graduate, it is the ability to separate his or her ego from the work. Graduates understand the equation of influence, work to solve the commander's problems, and are able to work relentlessly without ego. They are able to create value without it personally reflecting on them in the outcome. The CGSOC graduate must be content to spend all night working on a problem only to have the boss go in a different direction the next morning because of changing conditions. The aspiration is that the CGSOC graduate will not waste time defending his or her work and not be married to the course of action due to a sunk-cost bias. The CGSOC graduate will work from a position of humility to regain the commander's vision and start

again without praise or encouragement, ever focused on the problem and the commander's intent.

Powerful officers are humble; they don't work for feedback. They possess the emotional intelligence to be able to pick up on indicators from the boss or the situation. This frees the truly powerful and influential to simply solve problems. Field grade officers who lack this skill often have to look for work while the reward of an influential graduate is more work with greater scope and responsibility. The course load at CGSOC is designed to help students better understand how to translate the concept of economically managing time—focusing on doing only that which is necessary—to their work. Time is never free, so to spend more of it than is required is irresponsible.

It is important to address the role of poise under pressure, or the concept of "grit." Grit is the ability to endure or even thrive under conditions of unrealistic timelines, incomplete resources, and competing priorities—an amalgam of passion and perseverance.³ Another term may be "antifragility," as defined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his book, *Antifragile*.⁴ Antifragility is defined as those things or individuals that become stronger and more resilient from rough handling.⁵ This is an easy concept to write but is a much harder one to put into practice. The truth is that at the field-grade level, antifragility becomes as much a component of success as work ethic and intelligence. The core to becoming antifragile or developing grit is selfless service and commitment because these qualities keep the officer externally focused versus internally focused.

A CGSOC graduate has chosen to be educated within his or her profession—the profession of arms. Conversely, the Army has chosen the graduate as a solid investment for the future. This mutual recognition allows the graduate the freedom to focus on solving problems, building teams, and developing leaders, secure in the knowledge that the institution values his or her contribution. On a personal level, this allows the officer to create a safe intellectual space from which he or she can proceed. The knowledge that he or she has been trained, educated, and is valued by the Army offers the officer the ability to simply work relentlessly and selflessly. In essence, CGSOC graduates have all the tools to create antifragility or grit within both themselves and their organizations. This is not an easy concept, but

once understood, it can be a most powerful component in the field grade officer's tool kit.

Conclusion

Regardless of the mode by which a student attends the CGSOC, graduates are expected to bring significant, oftentimes exponential value to their organizations. The Army needs leaders who can solve increasingly complex problems, build strong teams from diverse groups, and understand how to develop other leaders. These high-impact, influential, and powerful field grade officers must lead with competence, compassion, and the highest standards of ethical behavior. They must work tirelessly and selflessly to consistently make the Army and its culture better.

To create and sustain the cultural shift of large-scale combat operations, graduates of CGSOC must be able to create power in their organizations. This meaningful change does not happen by accident. It is the deliberately designed course outcome of the CGSOC. Graduates are expected to demonstrate precise and concise use of both English and the technical language of their trade. They should also be held accountable for applying deep critical-thinking skills that correctly frame problems and then use facts and assumptions to create understanding in a repeatable manner that is doctrinally sound.

Graduates must be able to show context for the larger problem set and, as a result, should be working to solve their boss's problems while achieving the boss's vision. Finally, graduates must be expected to display unshakable poise in all that they do. They should inspire those around them and bring out the best in others.

These are the components of power that graduates of CGSOC are expected to bring to their organizations. Such humble, selfless influence will allow graduates to bring exponential value to their units. In creating a military that is designed, trained, and practiced to conduct large-scale combat operations against an existential threat, the Army must produce CGSOC graduates who "get it."

The complexity and sheer difficulty of bringing influence on division and corps staffs demand competence from CGSOC graduates like never before. It is not possible to "test out of" the skills and attributes of fighting on a large scale. The demand for field grade officers who can run divisions and corps is great. Graduates of CGSOC must fulfill this need for the nation. According to a sign at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, when Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen was asked what should be expected of a general staff officer, he replied, "Work relentlessly, accomplish much, remain in the background, and always be more than you appear."⁶ ■

Notes

Epigraph. Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 August 2012), para. 12.

1. Michael Lundy, "Command and General Staff Officer School Purpose" (unpublished slides, Command and General Staff Officer Course Development Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 August 2018).

2. *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, comp. Susan Ratcliffe (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), s.v. "Blaise Pascal."

3. Angela Duckworth, *Grit: The Power of Passion and Perseverance* (New York: Scribner, 2016), 56.

4. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile, Things that Gain from Disorder* (New York: Random House, 2012).

5. *Ibid.*

6. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 147.



Capt. Taiwan Veney (center), cyber warfare operations officer, watches members of the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group—(left to right) Capt. Adelia McClain, Staff Sgt. Wendell Myler, Sr. Airman Paul Pearson, and Staff Sgt. Thacious Freeman—analyze log files and provide a cyber threat update utilizing a Kibana visualization on the large data wall 3 June 2017 in the Hunter's Den at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Maryland. (Photo by J. M. Eddins Jr., U.S. Air Force)

Social Cybersecurity

An Emerging National Security Requirement

Lt. Col. David M. Beskow, U.S. Army
Kathleen M. Carley, PhD

Social cybersecurity is an emerging subdomain of national security that will affect all levels of future warfare, both conventional and unconventional, with strategic consequences. Social cybersecurity “is an emerging scientific area focused on the science to characterize, understand, and forecast cyber-mediated changes in human behavior; social, cultural, and political outcomes, and to build the cyber-infrastructure needed for society to persist in its essential character in a cyber-mediated information environment under changing conditions, actual or imminent social cyber-threats.”¹ Technology today is enabling both state and nonstate actors to manipulate the global marketplace of beliefs and ideas at the speed

of algorithms, and this is changing the battlefield at all levels of war.

While recently viewed through the lens of “hybrid” warfare, information warfare is becoming an end unto itself. Dmitry Kiselev, coordinator of the Russian state agency for

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international news, states that “information wars are ... the main type of war.”² Information is used to strengthen your narrative while attacking, disrupting, distorting, and dividing the society, culture, and values of other competing states and organizations. By weakening trust in national institutions, consensus on national values, and commitment to those values across the international community, an actor can win the next war before it has even begun. In fact, reflecting the change from periodic conflict to continual competition, senior leaders in the Russian General Staff have claimed, “Wars are not declared but have already begun.”³

Information is strengthening its position within the elements of national power. Strategy is often viewed through the elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. Technology now allows state and nonstate actors to extend their power in the *information* domain at a scale and complexity long thought impossible. If left unchecked, this emerging “information blitzkrieg” will have strategic effects on par with the physical blitzkrieg unleashed at the outset of World War II.

While technical in nature, social cybersecurity differs from traditional cybersecurity. Traditional cybersecurity involves humans using technology to “hack” technology. The target is information systems. Social cybersecurity involves humans using technology to “hack” other humans. The targets are humans and the society that binds them. This twist on the traditional cyber paradigm is sometimes referred to as “cognitive hacking.” While leveraging the cyber medium for mass delivery, this emerging information warfare leverages advances in targeted (or micro) marketing, psychology and persuasion, policy gaps at and between private and government institutions, and understanding of the social sciences to deploy coordinated information operations with strategic effect.

Social cybersecurity is inherently multidisciplinary computational social science. “Emerging theories blend political science, sociology, communication science, organization science, marketing, linguistics, anthropology, forensics, decision science, and social psychology.”⁴ Many researchers in this field are leveraging computational social science tools such as network analysis, spatial analysis, semantic analysis, and machine learning. These are applied at multiple levels, from the individual through the conversation level to the larger community level.

“If left unchecked, this emerging ‘information blitzkrieg’ will have strategic effects on par with the physical blitzkrieg unleashed at the outset of World War II.”


In order for the Department of Defense (DOD) “to defend the security of our country and sustain American influence abroad,” our military leaders must understand this emerging discipline of social cybersecurity and how it impacts our force, nation, and values.⁵ This article will introduce and define this emerging discipline, briefly discuss its history and the sociotechnological changes that enable it, and finally discuss current and emerging social cybersecurity “forms of maneuver.” Throughout this process, we will elaborate on the similarities and differences between social cybersecurity and traditional cyber operations.

Backdrop: Russian Information Blitzkrieg

Russia is waging the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare.

—Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO Wales Summit 2014⁶

The Russian propaganda apparatus, long directed at its own society as well as the satellite states of the former Soviet Union, is now aiming at targets abroad. In 2013, Gen. Valery Gerasimov identified information warfare as an important aspect of Russian warfare going forward in his now famous article, “The Value



(Graphic by victorhabbick via Adobe Stock)

of Science is in the Foresight.”⁷ While the West viewed the article backward through the lens of the Ukrainian conflict and has arguably misattributed it as the start of hybrid warfare for Russian armies, his article was in reality his perspective of the Arab Spring as well as U.S. operations in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.⁸ In Gerasimov’s view, the Arab Spring and the U.S.-led coalitions in the Middle East relied heavily on resources other than conventional military forces to shape events, especially information operations. Military forces were only introduced at the last minute as a coup de grâce.

Having studied these conflicts, he sought to accelerate ongoing information warfare initiatives, stating, “Information warfare opens wide asymmetric possibilities for decreasing the fighting potential of enemy.”⁹ These activities were in line with traditional Russian KGB (Committee for State Security) operations known as “active measures.” These were described by KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin as “active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs.”¹⁰ Kalugin’s quote highlights one of the critical roles of the theorized Russian information blitzkrieg, which is to drive wedges in every fissure possible, fracturing a nation or coalition. This includes driving wedges between political parties, between races, between religions, between a nation and its military, and between a nation and its allies. A fractured nation is inherently a less potent nation in terms of its ability to withstand an attack.

The emerging manifestations of Russian information operations are built on a long history of Soviet-era propaganda operations. In 1951, then Yale Law professor Harold Lasswell summarized the Soviet propaganda machine (to which the current Russian security apparatus is heir) by concluding,

The chief strategic aim of [Soviet Propaganda] is to economize the material cost of protecting and extending the power of the Russian elite at home and abroad. Such propaganda is a struggle for the mind of man, from the Soviet point of view, only in the sense that it is a struggle for the control of the material means by which the minds of the masses are believed to be molded. Hence the

purpose of Russian propaganda is not peaceful persuasion of the majority of the people in a given country as a prelude to taking power. Rather, the task is conceived as that of a minority that must remain an ideological minority until it succeeds in accumulating the material means of obtaining consensus ... Soviet propagandists and their agents can lie and distort without inner restraint, for they are largely immunized from the claims of human dignity in any other sense than the dignity of ... contributing to the present and future power of the Kremlin elite.¹¹

This general approach continues to this day, building a small nucleus while dividing all opposing organizations and institutions, leveraging disinformation at all times. Today, however, technology enables this at a scale and distance unheard of in 1951.

The Russian state is not approaching this haphazardly. Since as early as 2003, the Russian Academy of Sciences has conducted basic research to develop advanced applied mathematical models of information warfare and its application to society. Its researchers combine social science and mathematical modeling to produce research such as “Mathematical Modeling of Rumors and Information Propagation in Society.” While these articles claim to be defensive, their application in offensive operations is assumed.

Such operations are synchronized by a growing cadre of political technologists. These are leaders, both inside and outside the government, that understand the interrelated nature of the human, political, military, and technological domains. Leveraging this “multi-domain” understanding, they develop and coordinate shaping operations that leverage the cyber and technological domain to affect the social, political, and military domains. As an example, Alexander Malkevich, a Moscow-based technologist, established the Moscow-based www.USAreally.com website in advance of the 2018 midterm elections in the United States.¹² His mission was to both spread a twisted narrative as well as agitate in a manner aimed at promoting discord among the American populace that was to be picked up by mainstream American news, or at least mainstream news aggregators. The translated personal *description* from his Twitter account states, “Journalist. Media man. A person who is interested in life. And he



Alexander Malkevich, 3 March 2012. (Photo by A. Khmeleva via Wikimedia Commons)

is not afraid to work in the regions of Russia. And in the name of Russia.”¹³ This is a political technologist.

Change in the Strategic Center of Gravity

The twentieth century dawned with the most symmetric and kinetic wars in the history of warfare, while the twenty-first century, springboarding off decades of Cold War competition, has dawned with numerous asymmetric and nonkinetic conflicts. During World War I, nations sacrificed hundreds of thousands of

lives for mere yards of physical terrain. Today, many actors develop complex designs to slowly gain “yards” in the human domain with ramifications for the physical domain.

Geography still matters today. The United States’ two greatest security measures are still called the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.¹⁴ Crimea was annexed by Russia largely because of the strategic importance of its Black Sea Port (as well as energy implications).¹⁵ Afghanistan instability will persist partly because of its geography.¹⁶ Geography does and always will matter. However, numerous factors, to include technology, have arguably shifted the pendulum toward the human dimension.

This shift toward the human domain was hotly debated inside the U.S. military during the War on Terrorism. After years of debate, the majority seemed to agree with the quote from a 2009 article in *Small Wars Journal*: “One of the most profound changes the U.S. military must make to be effective at countering insurgency is to shift strategic centers of gravity from the physical to the human aspects of warfare.”¹⁷ While generally accepted in counterinsurgency environments, it remains to be seen how this shift toward the human domain will change large-scale combat operations.

This view of the population as the center of gravity took on new meaning in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, as decentralized population movements, enabled by technology, organized and overthrew multiple established autocratic regimes. These actions shocked the world and have been studied by leaders in both the East and the West. These events underscored the power of the human dimension as well as the power of social media to mobilize the masses. Multiple articles in military journals have documented these movements, with a specific focus on the social media that enabled them. Even Gerasimov’s 2013 article in Russia’s *Military-Industrial Courier*, studied

across the West as the genesis of *hybrid* or *gray* warfare, is more a personal reflection of the Arab Spring (as well as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia), than an attempt to create a new type of warfare.¹⁸

Multiple other state and nonstate actors observed these changes and began exploring the idea of manipulating these movements through cyberspace. Many of these states and actors already have experience manipulating their own populace or organization through information operations, and now seek to extend that experience to other populations and societies.¹⁹ Directly targeting the fabric of society, the true center of gravity of a nation, has massive ramifications for the tactical through strategic levels of war, and is the genesis of this emerging domain of social cybersecurity.

Enabling Changes

Two changes in human communication and societal information flows have enabled the social cyberthreat. First, technology has waived the requirement for physical proximity to influence society; and, the decentralization of information flows has reduced the cost of entry. Fabio Rugge of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies sums this up with this statement: “Cyberspace is a powerful multiplier of the destabilizing effects of manipulated information because it allows high connectivity, low latency, low cost of entry, multiple distribution points without intermediaries, and a total disregard for physical distance or national borders. Most importantly, anonymity and the lack of certain attribution of an attack make cyberspace the domain of ambiguity.”²⁰

Decentralization. Over the last thirty years, we have watched as information flows rapidly decentralized. Historically governments, large organizations, and a few large news outlets controlled most of the formal print, broadcast, and televised news coverage. These organizations controlled the flow of information and generally distributed it uniformly across a society. With the rise of blogs, microblogs, and social networks, most of the world now obtain their information in a nonuniform way on social media.²¹ There is now a low cost of entry, financial incentive to create viral content, and anonymity is relatively easy to accomplish. This decentralization has facilitated the entry of external actors with minimal attribution.

Quality control of information flow is now decentralized. Fact checking is now conducted at the user

level rather than the journalist level. Users, many who grew up in an era where news was largely trusted, are now unprepared to digest news in an era where truth and untruth are mixed, especially if distortions of the truth are designed to validate their own biases.

The traditional journalism business model requires truth. Journalists lose their jobs, and news organizations lose business if they are consistently in error. The social media business model, largely focused on overall traffic and advertising, does not rely as much on fact checking. However, this is slowly changing, as was observed in the August 2018 stock decline for both Twitter and Facebook, largely attributed to their slow growth while they purge their platforms of accounts that propagate fake news.

While recent legislation across the world is trying to find a way to centralize control, in all cases this involves some type of censorship and reduced freedom of speech. In some cases, it could end up in absolute chaos, especially if social media companies are required to provide a platform functionality for people to flag fake or malicious information. If this type of functionality is exposed to users either through an application programming interface (API) or a web/mobile interface, then the same bots that post fake news can now flag all kinds of accurate content as fake at the speed of algorithms, causing exponentially greater damage.

Physical presence not required. For most of history, influence required physical presence or at least physical proximity. To influence the conversation of the Roman forum, the heartbeat of Roman society, an actor or proxy had to be physically present in the forum or at least in Rome, clearly identifiable, and active in the conversation. “Cloak and dagger” operations occurred, but even these operations required physical presence. This requirement held true through the first part of the twentieth century, at which time radio and leaflet operations emerged, not requiring direct physical presence but nevertheless requiring some level of close proximity. Even robust Soviet-era propaganda operations were largely restricted to Eastern Europe and Asia due to geographical limitations. The internet has erased this requirement, with most societies interacting in free and open online environments that allow actors to participate from the far corners of the globe with few national borders in the cyber domain.

Those nations that value freedom of speech and open marketplaces for opinions and ideas are more vulnerable

to these threats.²² This is most evident by the fact that North Korea, arguably the most closed nation on earth, is still largely immune to social manipulation through the internet. Directly influencing the North Korean society still requires physical presence or proximity.

The vulnerability of open societies to social manipulation through technology is exacerbated by the fact that most of these strategic information efforts are launched on global social media platforms that are privately owned and outside of the direct supervision of governments (though influenced

by regulation). While all social media companies censor content on their platform, their motivation is generally focused on improving the user experience for the greatest number of people across the world, not national security concerns of any single nation. Choosing sides on any issue is generally bad for business because it alienates a segment of their customer base. Government censorship of content is assumed to be partisan and violates the freedom of speech espoused by these governments. Third-party efforts to censor content have been initiated but to

Table. The BEND Model of Describing Social Cybersecurity Forms of Maneuver

	Information Maneuver		Network Maneuver	
	Knowledge network manipulation		Social network manipulation	
	Things you can do by affecting what is being discussed		Things you can do by affecting who is talking/listening to whom	
Positive	Engage	Discussion that brings up a related but relevant topic	Back	Actions that increase the importance of the opinion leader
	Explain	Discussion that provides details on or elaborates the topic	Build	Actions that create a group or the appearance of a group
	Excite	Discussion that brings joy/happiness/cheer/enthusiasm to group	Bridge	Actions that build a connection between two or more groups
	Enhance	Discussion that encourages the group to continue with the topic	Boost	Actions that grow the size of the group or make it appear that it has grown
Negative	Dismiss	Discussion about why the topic is not important	Neutralize	Actions that limit the effectiveness of opinion leader such as by reducing the number who can or do follow or reply or attend to
	Distort	Discussion that alters the main message of the topic	Nuke	Actions that lead to a group being dismantled
	Dismay	Discussion about a topic that will bring worry/sadness/anger to group	Narrow	Actions that lead to the group becoming sequestered from other groups
	Distract	Discussion about a totally different topic and irrelevant	Neglect	Actions that reduce the size of the group or make it appear that the group has grown smaller

(Table by authors)

date, these have been narrowly focused and easily circumvented. An example of third-party efforts is the “Social Science One” initiative, a creative partnership between academic researchers, private industry, and funding from across the political spectrum that facilitates third-party research on social media data while maintaining individual privacy. Efforts like this are still in their infancy.

Forms of Social-Cyber Maneuver

As in the physical domain and the traditional cyber domain, the social-cyber domain offers multiple “forms of maneuver.” In this domain, an adversary can manipulate both the *information* as well as the *network*. These networks can be social networks (Sarah and Peter are *friends*), conversation networks (Sarah *replies* to Peter), or informational networks (Sarah and Peter both share the hashtag #NATO).

BEND forms of maneuver. The desired end state for information operations varies. Traditional information operations increase support for the desired narrative and reduce support for the counternarrative. Other operations simply have a desired end state of increased agitation and reduced trust, regardless of the narrative. This agitation serves to drive wedges into a society. Either desired end state are supported by the “BEND” forms of maneuver (as seen in the table, page 123).²³

The BEND forms of maneuver describe how an actor can manipulate the marketplace of beliefs, ideas, and information. These forms of maneuver build on the dismiss, distort, dismay, and distract paradigm introduced by Ben Nimmo at the Atlantic Councils Digital Forensic Research Lab.²⁴ The BEND model categorizes forms of maneuver by polarity as well as whether the target is the *information* or the *network*.

Information maneuver. Information maneuver is the manipulation of information and the flow or relevance of information in cyberspace. Examples of information maneuver include:

- Misdirection. Introducing unrelated divisive topics into a thread in order to shift the conversation.
- Hashtag latching. Tying content and narratives to unrelated trending topics and hashtags.
- Smoke screening. Spreading content (both semantically and geographically) that masks other operations.
- Thread jacking. Aggressively disrupting or co-opting a productive online conversation.


Network maneuver. Network maneuver is the manipulation of the actual network. In these maneuvers, an adversary maps a social network (once again realizing that an online social network is the projection of social and conversational links in the cyber dimension). Examples of network maneuver include the following:

- Opinion leader co-opting. Gaining access and acknowledgment from an online opinion leader and leveraging his or her influence to spread narrative.
- Community building. Building a community around a topic, idea, or hobby and then injecting a narrative into this group. This was accomplished in Ukraine by building communities of young men around adult content-sharing accounts, and then injecting anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian rhetoric into these networks.
- Community bridging. Injecting ideas of one group into another. In this case, the adversary will identify two communities, A and B. The adversary would like to inject ideas of group B into group A. This is done by first infiltrating group A, then slowly adding retweets or sharing ideas from group B, bringing the ideas of group B into group A.
- False generalized other. Promoting the false notion that a given idea represents the consensus of the masses and therefore should be an accepted idea or belief by all.

Bots as Force Multipliers

Within the context of information operations, *bots* are increasingly used as force multipliers. They leverage machine learning and artificial intelligence to conduct targeted and timely information transactions at scale while leaving critical nuanced dialogue to human operators. In this context, these human actors are often referred to as “trolls,” which simply differentiates human actors sowing discord from computer actors sowing discord (i.e., “bots”).

A bot is defined as a social media account that uses a computer to automate social media tasks. For example, in the Twitter environment, a bot account can automatically tweet, retweet, follow, friend, reply, quote, and like. The bot creator can use creative means to generate content, either “scraping” (and automatically summarizing) from elsewhere on the web, retweeting existing content, manipulating existing content from other human users, or creating their own content through a combination of



(Figure by authors)

Figure. Bot Involvement in the Core Twitter Political Conversation Surrounding Recent Election in Sweden

human input and artificial intelligence. Having created content, the bot creator can manipulate tweet timing to appear human (or if appearing human is not critical to the operation, can conduct thousands of actions around the clock). Finally, these bots are often deployed in bot nets (sometimes called bot “armies” or “coordinating” bots) where they friend, follow, and otherwise promote each other to appear popular.

Bots are used for a wide variety of reasons, creating effects that are positive, nuisance, or malicious. Some examples of positive bots include personal assistants and

accounts that notify the public of natural disasters. Nuisance bots distribute spam with content ranging from commercial advertising to adult content. Malicious bots are typically involved in propaganda, suppression of dissent, intimidation, and network infiltration/manipulation.²⁵

Although we often attempt to classify an account as bot or human, there is often a spectrum of automated involvement with an account. Many accounts are not strictly automated (all transactions executed by a computer). These accounts have human intervention to contribute nuanced dialogue while a computer executes tasks at scale in the background. When combined with artificial intelligence, these bots conduct sophisticated operations at scale at the speed of algorithms (see figure).

Conclusion

A new-generation war will be dominated by information and psychological warfare that will seek to achieve superior control of troops and weapons and to depress opponents armed forces personnel and population morally and psychologically. In the ongoing revolution in information technologies, information and psychological warfare will largely lay the groundwork for victory.

—Russian Military Thought, 2013²⁶

Arguably, the greatest strategic weakness for any country is internal, not external. Leaders must

understand social cybersecurity in order to defend these internal weaknesses from external manipulation. We as military leaders must understand that one of the information blitzkrieg lines of effort will be to drive a wedge of distrust between us and the society we defend as well as civil leadership that leads us. An untrusted institution will be underfunded, underused, and underperforming.

If one of our primary missions is to “sustain American influence abroad,” then we need to find our role in promoting American values in this international marketplace of beliefs and ideas within a coordinated interagency effort. This influence will range from online interaction to the handshake from a forward-deployed platoon leader.

Military leaders must enact policies that enable freedom of maneuver in the relevant information environments. A recent RAND information operations report concluded that the DOD must change its policy in order to fully enable ethical maneuver within the information domain.²⁷ Most social cybersecurity practitioners (both bot creators and bot defenders) use APIs and open source technology to access and maneuver in this data environment. In other words, APIs are the access point for both offensive and defensive social cyber operations. In the military, policies and authorities to access APIs are severely restricted for some organizations while not well-defined for others. We need agile policies that enable

initiative in a dynamic information environment while protecting the privacy of well-intentioned individuals and remaining within the authorities granted to the DOD.

In summary, we must directly educate our force and indirectly educate our society about the decentralized nature of the modern information environment, the risks that exist, and ways and means to individually vet the facts and opinions that we digest and allow to shape our beliefs and attitudes. We must develop a multidisciplinary approach to social cybersecurity. We must build relevant policy that enables social cybersecurity. We must seek to remove any wedge of distrust artificially driven between our military and the society we defend. We must search for the DOD role in an interagency effort to combat the information blitzkrieg we face today. Social cybersecurity is a required discipline for the foreseeable future. ■

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The Return of the Bear?

Russian Military Engagement in Latin America

The Case of Brazil

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The Russian Federation has a military-industrial complex that runs a range of operations in more than one thousand companies, research institutes, and development agencies, operating in about seventy-two divisions and subdivisions of the country that directly employ approximately two million people.¹ In light of its range, this military apparatus has always played a key role in the country's economy, accounting for a large part of Russian exports.²

Due to the sophisticated technology involved in its production, Russian military equipment has achieved international recognition, with its cost being up to three times lower than equipment produced in the United States and western Europe.³ These facts attract a growing number of countries interested in purchasing such equipment, which in turn promotes military-technical cooperation between Russia and other trading partners.

Russian Federal Law of 19 July 1998 establishes the legal guidelines in the field of military-technical cooperation between Russia and foreign states. In its first article, military cooperation is defined as “an activity in the field of international relations related to export and import, including the delivery or purchase

of military products, as well as the development and production of military products.”⁴

According to this law, military cooperation with other countries is seen as one way of promoting national interests abroad, aiming to strengthen Russian military and political positions in other regions. In this sense, according to Sergey Ladygin, Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport, “Latin America is one of the most promising regions for Russia in the development of technical-military cooperation.”⁵

Despite the structural constraints imposed by Washington, Russian inroads into Latin America have increased significantly in recent years. The nominal annual volume of exports of Russian military equipment to the region increased from US\$1.247 billion, in 2005, to US\$6.347 billion, in 2012.⁶ In light of these developments, the main goal of this article is to analyze the development of military cooperation between Russia and Latin American countries, with special attention to the Brazilian case.

In this regard, this article deals with the hypothesis, widespread in the American literature, of Russia's “geopolitical return” to Latin America. In order to do that, it is divided into two main sections. The first section presents a brief history of military-technical



cooperation between Russia and some Latin American countries after the Cold War. In this regard, it analyzes the development in Russian bilateral military equipment exports to Latin America.

The second section highlights the bilateral relations between Russia and Brazil regarding military cooperation. It offers an overview of their diplomatic relations, clarifying the context in which a “strategic partnership” was established between Moscow and Brasilia. In addition, it seeks to explore the main bilateral agreements on defense issues, and the obstacles hindering more effective cooperation in this area. The article closes with some final remarks.

Relations between Russia and Latin America in the Post-Cold War Period

Latin America has been a strategic region for both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War—particularly in the economic and political

Brazilian President Michel Temer (*left*) takes part in a wreath-laying ceremony 21 June 2017 at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall in central Moscow. Since the 1990s, Brazil and Russia have developed a close military and science technology relationship. (Photo by Sergei Karpukhin, Pool photo via Associated Press)

arenas. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian diplomacy toward the region declined significantly throughout the 1990s. Russia resumed its efforts to approach Latin America in 1997, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Primakov visited several countries in the subcontinent.⁷ It is worth noting that, in 1999, Russia’s influence in Latin America was revived due to its ties with the Venezuelan Bolivarian government and the increasing number of cooperation agreements on trade, energy, industrial, cultural, and military issues with certain countries in the subcontinent.⁸ Hence, with Putin’s rise to power in



2000 after Yeltsin's resignation, Latin America began to occupy an increasingly prominent role in the Kremlin's foreign policy priorities.⁹

These growing ties coupled with the increased Russian presence in Latin America, especially in Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba, triggered discussions about Russia's return to Latin America.¹⁰ As a consequence, in the twenty-first century, Russia has revitalized its relations with Latin America and initiated an unexpected activism toward the region. In this scenario, Russia would establish a strategic partnership with Brazil, expand political and economic cooperation with Argentina, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as boost its exports to the region.¹¹ However, these increased commercial and political activities in the region are not comparable to those carried out during the Soviet era, which requires treating the idea of Russia's return to Latin America with care.¹²

A first element to be taken into account concerns the role arms exports occupy in the Russian economy, which accounts for a significant share of manufactured and technology-intensive exports. This makes the arms industry one of the leading sectors that integrate Russia into the global economy.¹³ Therefore, official visits to

The Russian Pantsir-S1 missile and artillery weapon system fires during a demonstration 6 September 2016 at the international military-technical forum "Army-2016" near Moscow. The Brazilian military long expressed interest in acquiring this system. Though budgetary problems have precluded purchase, news accounts imply that acquiring the Pantsir-S1 system remains of great interest to the Brazilian military. (Photo by Maxim Zmeyev, Reuters)

Latin American countries were carried out by Russian President Vladimir Putin, third Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian General of the Army Sergey Shoigu between 2000 and 2017 in order to discuss political ties, joint defense, military operations, expansion and strengthening of trade between countries, and mutual economic development through investment projects. In this context, some issues figured prominently in the activism of Russia's senior officers, including discussions over naval exercises against drug trafficking in the Caribbean, the potential establishment of Russian naval bases in the region, and the modernization of Latin American militaries.¹⁴

Russia was the second largest exporter of weapons in the world between 2012 and 2016, accounting for 23 percent of the world's arms trade; additionally, it

provided weapons to fifty-one countries in this period, with 70 percent of its exports directed to four main countries (India, Vietnam, China, and Algeria). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2012 and 2016, Latin America accounted for a share of approximately 6 percent of Russia's arms export market—Venezuela (4.92%), Peru (0.49%), Nicaragua (0.34%), Brazil (0.24%), and Mexico (0.06%).¹⁵ However, in the 2000–2016 aggregate, Latin America accounted for only 4.6 percent of Russia's arms exports.¹⁶ This indicates that Russia's interest in Latin America is part of the promotion of its military-industrial complex.¹⁷

In this sense, Russia's military cooperation with Latin America is not only technical, but also politico-military, in that it has an important political component.¹⁸ However, it is important to take into account the relative low volume of military spending across the region, as well as the tendency among most countries to buy armaments from the United States or Europe.¹⁹ For example, arms sales to Latin American countries accounts for less than 15 percent of Russian total arms exports and, in trade terms, countries like Nicaragua and Venezuela are not among the first destinations of Russian exports.²⁰

As highlighted, the sale of Russian armaments to the three main Latin American countries—Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua—has increased their need for Russian technical-military assistance.²¹ In February 2014, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced progress in the talks with eight governments (Seychelles, Singapore, Algeria, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Egypt, and Iran) to establish a global network of air bases to extend the reach of maritime and strategic aviation, and thereby improve Russia's overall military presence.²² In February 2015, Shoigu traveled to Latin America to meet leaders and defense officials from these countries. Although the visit included Russia's participation in a Venezuelan military exercise, the focus of the meetings in

the three countries was access to ports and air bases to support Russian military operations in the region.

Technical-military cooperation with Venezuela, established during President Hugo Chávez's government and continued by President Nicolás Maduro, happened within the framework of the Venezuela-Russia Bilateral Intergovernmental Commission, and it was the product of a broader strategic alliance between the two governments.²³ In addition, there were discussions over the possibility of expanding exchanges between military teaching institutions in the countries and inviting children of Venezuelan officers to train in Russian military schools.²⁴ It should be noted that, one month after the Georgian War (2008), Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to carry out military exercises with Venezuela. More importantly, in November 2008, Russia conducted war games with Caracas in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint military maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy. This was an important symbolic act as it was the first time Russian warships visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.²⁵ However, the future of Venezuela's defense budget is uncertain due to the economic difficulties that afflict the country, which may compromise the government's ability to maintain military expenditures in current levels.²⁶

Russian efforts in Cuba focused mainly on "maritime cooperation issues as well as training of Cuban military

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servicemen in Russia.²⁷ However, discussions were more fruitful with Nicaragua, where Shoigu signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to facilitate Russian access to the ports of Corinto and Bluefields, as well as to strengthen antidrug cooperation and discussions over arms sales.²⁸ It should also be taken into account Nicaragua's announcement of the construction of a China-funded transoceanic canal and Russia's attempt to secure the canal's security contracts.²⁹ Finally, in addition to conducting joint patrols against drug trafficking with Russia, Nicaragua hosts a Russian monitoring satellite station, the GLONASS. With this, Russia hopes to improve its satellite navigation system—which competes with GPS—established in 2010, after the development of twenty-four satellites that allowed Russia to have total global coverage.³⁰

Russia has also been using antidrug trafficking activities as a means of engaging in the region's security affairs. This engagement has become a platform for the extension of Russian security cooperation with the subcontinent. Peru and Nicaragua, for example, share their intelligence with Russia and have conducted joint operations against drug trafficking.³¹ In this sense, the increase in arms sales not only generates foreign profit to the Russian government, but also opens the opportunity for long-term military relations, since the purchase of weapons includes training, maintenance, and renewal. Military training, particularly for antidrug operations, also offers a number of benefits to Russia. It challenges the prominence of the United States' role in combating the flow of drugs into the country and provides Russian experts with access to the region's intelligence and logistics networks, including U.S. strategies and tactics related to counternarcotics and counterterrorist activities.³²

In recent years, for example, Peru has continued to buy weapons from Russia, especially by acquiring Mi-171 and Mi-35 transport and combat helicopters, in order to increase the mobility and firepower of its counterterrorist and anticrime operations, including the case of Sendero Luminoso, in the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro valleys.³³ Also in June 2004, the Russian and Argentinian ministers of foreign affairs signed several joint documents, including a MoU for technical-military cooperation.³⁴ Bolivia and Russia signed MoUs for defense cooperation in August 2017, which signals broader arms transfers to Bolivia.³⁵ In Chile, the second center-left government of Michelle Bachelet

(2014–2018) opened the doors for military relations with Russia, including a MoU for naval cooperation.³⁶

However, in 2016, Russia lost important ground in the region. Mauricio Macri's election in Argentina sealed the fate of the already complicated purchase plans for the Su-24 interception aircraft, the construction of communication facilities for the GLONASS satellite, and the contract for the construction of a nuclear reactor at the Atucha nuclear complex.³⁷

In summary, Russia's return to Latin America was boosted by its economic and political recovery over the years 2000–2008, which validated Primakov's idea of a multipolar world.³⁸ In addition, it should be noted that, in contrast to Chinese activities in Latin America, Russia's engagement is focused on a limited number of countries and economic sectors—such as oil exploration, mining, some technology sectors, and the purchase of food products.³⁹ In light of this, the evidence does not seem to support the idea that Russia is encroaching on the United States' historical influence zone but instead points to the way Latin America and the Caribbean are forging new opportunities for international cooperation with countries other than the United States.⁴⁰

Military Cooperation between Brazil and Russia: From the Long Trajectory of Diplomatic Relations to the Establishment of the "Strategic Partnership"

When we analyze the official discourses between the Russian and Brazilian authorities regarding bilateral cooperation in defense, an idea is frequently repeated: the potentiality of the mutual benefits that this relationship can bring. However, in spite of the political will of the two players, which is registered by the diplomatic dynamism and the rapid growth of trade between the two countries in the last decade, the technical-military partnership is still much weaker than that of Russia and other Latin American countries. This section offers an overview of the diplomatic

Next page: Brazilian soldiers armed with the Russian-made Igla man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) 5 August 2015 during an antiaircraft artillery drill. The SA-18/24 Igla system is widespread within the Brazilian military. (Photo by Gilberto Alves, Brazilian Ministry of Defense via Wikimedia Commons)

relations between Brazil and Russia in the context of the “strategic partnership” between Moscow and Brasilia.

The Early Stages of Russian-Brazilian Bilateral Relations

Brazil was the first country in South America to have its independence recognized by Russia; at the time, the Brazilian Empire was the only state in the region to have commercial relations with the Russian Empire. However, although the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries dates back to 1828, it was not until the early 2000s that there was a significant strengthening of bilateral relations between Russia and Brazil. Their geographic distance was not the only factor hindering their rapprochement; in fact, the two countries have often been on opposite sides of the political and ideological spectrum. Referring to Russian-Brazilian bilateral relations, Graciela Bacigalupo argued in 2000 that until the end of the 1990s they have been “old” but “distant.”⁴¹

This can be observed during the period of the proclamation of the Brazilian Republic, in 1889, at

which time the Russian Empire suspended diplomatic relations with the new republican government. The geopolitical design established during the Cold War, with an ideological antagonism between a capitalist Brazil and a socialist Russia, as well as the structural constraints imposed by the United States, also limited the conduct of a stronger bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Consequently, from the establishment of diplomatic relations until the end of the Cold War, the relationship between Russia and Brazil had a low political profile, marked by periods of approximation and distance, which were often the result of external, internal, conjunctural, and structural constraints.⁴² These characteristics certainly prevented the development of multiple partnerships, mainly in the military area.

Bilateral Relations between the Russian Federation and Brazil in the 1990s

The systemic changes that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union inaugurated a new dynamic



in Russian and Brazilian foreign policies. By opening their internal markets to international capital and adopting neoliberal guidelines, the path was open for an ideological alignment between the two governments in the economic and political fields—something that was being probed since Brazilian democratization in the 1980s. However, this expectation did not bring effective results to their bilateral relations, remaining in the realm of a “rhetorical optimism.”⁴³ Even though Brazil was one of the first countries in Latin America to recognize the new legal and political status of the Russian Federation, the actual volume of economic and political ties between the two countries after the end of the Cold War was significantly reduced.⁴⁴

On the other hand, the economic adjustments in Russia resulting from the process of adapting a planned economy to a market economy, and the commercial opening of Brazil in the 1990s, have brought numerous economic difficulties for the two countries. This conjuncture coupled with their institutional political weakness also reflected in their external behavior. Both Russian and Brazilian governments tied their foreign policies to developed countries, which was seen then as a priority.⁴⁵

According to Alexander Zhebit, in the early 1990s, Russia had abandoned relations with Latin America, fearing to upset the United States in its traditional area of influence.⁴⁶ The author recalls that the country’s international trade with the region was almost interrupted, a fact symbolized by the situation of Cuba, a traditional partner of the USSR, which was left completely adrift in the changing world. Noticeably, this assessment of Latin America left no room for cooperation with Brazil.

The limited cooperation between Russia and Brazil gradually began to follow a more positive path after the replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Primakov as Russia’s foreign minister in 1996. In his first year as chancellor, Primakov paid special attention to Brazil-Russia relations. In this context, the creation of the Political Affairs Committee (CAP, in Portuguese) in Moscow, in October 1997, becomes relevant, since it formalized a political dialogue within an institutional framework. In addition, Primakov’s visit to Brazil in November was the first and only visit by an authority of the Russian high-ranking government to Brazil throughout the 1990s.

During Primakov’s visit, the constitution for the Brazil-Russia High-Level Cooperation Commission

was promulgated, establishing the Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission as its operational mechanism. However, internal disturbances in both countries were responsible for delaying the entire operation, with planned meetings between the Russian head of government and the Brazilian vice president within the scope of the Intergovernmental Commission being postponed at least five times until the year 2000.⁴⁷ As Bacigalupo argued, the acute political instability that Russia faced in the 1998–1999 biennium (culminating in Yeltsin’s resignation the following year) was one of the main factors influencing the low dynamism of the Commission in its early years:

Undoubtedly, this process led to deferments and suspensions of scheduled meetings with Russian high-ranks, who, in the face of new crises and transformations, were obligated to focus only on priority themes and relations.⁴⁸

Although the creation of the Brazil-Russia High-Level Commission demonstrates a clear interest of the two countries to intensify their bilateral relations, the turbulent political-economic framework registered in the 1990s obstructed the possibility of strengthening their diplomatic ties. This prevented the escalation of strategic issues on their bilateral agenda, such as cooperation in the area of defense. On the other hand, the resumption of the activities of the High-Level Commission coincided with the turn to developmentalism during President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second term.

Years 2000: the Russian-Brazilian “Strategic Partnership”

After the years of relative apathy in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Brasilia, in 2000, the High-Level Commission finally held its first meeting between the Russian prime minister and the Brazilian vice president, which marked a new phase in relations between the two countries. In this regard, during Cardoso’s official visit to Russia, in 2002, a “strategic partnership” was celebrated between the two countries. Since then, Russian-Brazilian relations have intensified, with growing trade and visits among the highest levels of government.

The rapid transition from the period of inertia experienced in the 1990s to the achievement of a strategic partnership in the following decade demonstrated the interest of both parties in making up for the “lost



time.”⁴⁹ This was the opportunity to advance relevant issues beyond the mere bilateral trade of commodities registered in the trade balance up to that moment.

In regard to defense cooperation, the signing in 2002 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Military Technologies of Mutual Interest stands out. Although this memorandum had few practical results beyond stating their intentions, its celebration establishes the basic precepts that would guide the military-technical cooperation between Russia and Brazil in the coming years.

The progressive trajectory in the Russian-Brazilian bilateral relationship continued to play a central role in the foreign policy of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, elected in 2003. In his inaugural address, the Brazilian president emphasized the importance of deepening “relations with large developing countries: China, India and Russia.”⁵⁰

In this context, the first visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Brazil, in 2004, celebrated the

Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega (left) presents the highest award of the Nicaraguan armed forces, the Nicaraguan Army Order, to Valery Gerasimov, vice minister of defense and chief of general staff of the armed forces of the Russian Federation 23 April 2013 at Casa de los Pueblos in Managua, Nicaragua. Left-wing governments like those governing Nicaragua and Venezuela have been especially receptive to Russia's aggressive efforts promoting arms sales throughout Latin America. (Photo by Cesar Perez, Nicaraguan Presidency via Agence France-Presse)

creation of a “technological alliance” and stipulated the strengthening and expansion of cooperation in the energy sector.⁵¹ According to Bruno Mariotto Jubran, Putin's visit had a strategic character for Moscow, because at the end of 2003, the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) reopened the bidding for the acquisition of military fighters.⁵² This official visit would be an opportunity for the Kremlin to “convince Brazilian authorities about the superiority of its SU-35s compared to its competitors.” This agreement, if

carried out, would represent the greatest advance in defense cooperation since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.⁵³

Although Russian aircraft were technically superior to their competitors, such an agreement never materialized.⁵⁴ In 2008, the FAB officially withdrew the Russian proposal from the final bidding phase. This decision was taken one week after the official visit of Russian President Dimitri Medvedev to Brazil, and during joint military training between Moscow and Caracas on the Venezuelan coast.⁵⁵ Still in this context, Boris Martinov argues that the reason for the Brazilian government's refusal to accept the Russian proposal is mainly due to the Russian manufacturer Sukhoi refusing to transfer advanced military technologies involved in the making of these aircraft.⁵⁶

On the other hand, during Medvedev's visit, the Brazilian government announced the purchase of twelve Mi-35 helicopters, worth US\$150 million, the delivery of which was initiated in 2010 and completed in 2014, despite Brazil's budgetary difficulties. This was the first and only sale of heavy military equipment between Brazil and Russia so far, and it can be considered the most relevant military cooperation between the two countries.⁵⁷ On this occasion, Brazil and Russia signed the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation and suspended visa requirements for tourists on visits of up to ninety days. In a press statement, Lula recalled that Brazil and Russia were in favor of a multipolar and just global order, and indicated that the two countries, together with China and India, should take advantage of the opportunities generated by the global economic crisis to further advance their development agendas.⁵⁸

The Military-Technical Cooperation agreement is the one-year mark of intense bilateral negotiations in this area. According to Brazilian press reports, in early 2008, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and Minister of Strategic Affairs Mangabeira Unger visited Russia in an attempt to conclude agreements on the construction of a Brazilian nuclear submarine and of a military vehicle factory in southern Brazil, but the visit did not bring results.⁵⁹ In April, however, Valentin Sobolev, vice president of the Russian Security Council, visited Brazil and signed a Cooperation Agreement with the Brazilian minister of strategic affairs for the launching of satellites and the construction of rockets and airplanes, providing for the

transfer of technology and the possibility of developing an alternative to the American localization system.⁶⁰

In the framework of the High-Level Commission, the joint declaration signed in Brasilia, in 2013, by the then Vice President of Brazil Michel Temer and the Russian Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev established the beginning of negotiations for the acquisition of Russian antiaircraft artillery Pantsir S-1.⁶¹ However, due to the political-institutional crisis and the budgetary constraints that Brazil later faced, the agreement between the parties has not yet been signed. According to Vladimir Tikhomirov, head of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, such a project provides for the transfer of this technology to Brazil: "We agree with the unrestricted transfer of technology and the need for after-sales support. We will train Brazilian partners who will carry out this support. We are making progress."⁶²

According to Andrey Maslennikov, although Brazil is one of Russia's main partners in Latin America, and the one with the greatest potential for Moscow, the country is still a "nonconventional" partner for the Kremlin.⁶³ In this context, while there has been a number of attempts to bring the two countries closer over the last decade, it is necessary to emphasize that their relations are still very incipient and, to a large extent, based on the purchase and sale of primary products. As discussed above, the military partnership between Brasilia and Moscow is a recent one, articulated by specific governments, and sometimes hampered or boosted by internal political-economic factors that have influenced the changes in the foreign policy priorities of both countries.

Final Remarks

In light of the above, it is imperative to point out that Russia's increasing involvement in Latin America does not mean a return to the twentieth-century alliance system but instead offers alternative cooperation paths to the countries in the region. At the same time, this transformation institutes a multipolar international cooperation structure that allows large and small countries alike to participate in the processes of globalization, military cooperation, and economic integration.⁶⁴ Likewise, Moscow is less interested in demonstrating to the United States its potential military influence in the region than it is in opening

up new markets for its weapons and retaking previous military-technical cooperation efforts.⁶⁵

We can therefore infer that Russia's diplomatic strategy is not sufficient in size or in scope, nor does it reflect a quest for diplomatic-strategic relations that might include resorting to force or to an offensive military alliance that could considerably affect hemispheric security.⁶⁶ It is important to note that, although Russia has been sending warships to Venezuela or modernizing Peruvian military hardware, the Kremlin does not seek another alliance similar to the one with Cuba during the Cold War.⁶⁷ Russia's engagement in Latin America today is not a return to the Cold War's proxy conflicts but indicates instead Russian interest in finding markets and partners to buy its hardware, to set up joint ventures on energy products, and to gather votes at the United Nations General Assembly to support its political positions. In our view, Russia's engagement with the former Soviet allies in Latin America does not represent a return of the "Soviet bear" to the U.S. backyard. That is, although Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua and the Castros' regime in Cuba have politically approached Russia since 2008 to achieve limited economic and security support, none of the

regimes have developed military or economic ties that resemble those with the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

Finally, the nonconventional character of the Brazilian-Russian military cooperation summarizes the limited scope of Russian ambitions in the region. Hence, the political results barely go beyond general declarations reinforcing the Russian multipolar rhetoric. If Russia wanted to revive the Cold War confrontation with the United States, the fight to increase its influence in the biggest regional player would require more engagement and resources. It would also be different from the kind of "partnership by invitation" performed in the relation with other regional partners, like Venezuela and Cuba, that welcome the Russian presence due to regional disputes with the United States. However, after more than twelve years of rule by the PT Party (The Workers' Party, a left-wing organization led by former President Lula da Silva) and a strong identification of the Brazilian foreign policy circles with the multipolar rhetoric, the prospects of military cooperation are still incipient. Taking into account the recent changes in the Brazilian government after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, the prospects of further cooperation with Russia in military affairs are even less likely. ■

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
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
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


REVIEW ESSAY

The End of Grand Strategy

U.S. Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century

Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2018, 252 pages



Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, Retired

The *End of Grand Strategy*, though it uses maritime operations as the backdrop for discussing its major themes, is applicable to more than just the maritime domain. It bolts out the gate by challenging a fundamental precept—or maybe dogmatic principle—of U.S. military planners and decision-makers inside the Beltway, declaring, “The very idea of a single, one-size-fits-all grand strategy has little utility in the twenty-first century. Indeed, it is often counterproductive.”

Echoing the platitude—heard with numbing repetition these days—that today the U.S. faces “the most complex array of actors and capabilities any nation has ever faced,” the authors insist on the need to abandon grandiose, preventive (or preemptive) visions and accept the fact we are increasingly reactive toward the environment just

described. While the tired phrase cries out for a coherent, overarching strategy that can inject order into an increasingly chaotic milieu of hurdles, the authors suggest that is the wrong approach. Like it or not, American strategy is both “multifaceted and contingent.” Unfortunately, that usually means it is less than satisfying to many onlookers who crave a simpler and more elegant policy articulation.

Grand strategy, as evidenced by, for example, the American containment strategy employed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a relic of the past, they contend, but one often clung to amidst troubling trends, considerable upheaval, burgeoning threats, new technologies, growing uncertainties, and the relative decline of the Westphalian system, the bedrock of interstate relations for nearly four centuries. Both

senior military professionals and policy wonks grasp at the notion of grand strategy because it briefs well and reflects continuity, despite often requiring a suspension of disbelief by those who should know better.

Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski do acknowledge that many grand strategy proponents recognize certain frictions will negatively impact our ability to implement any given strategy, but the duo insist those same individuals, after paying homage to those hurdles, routinely go about ignoring them.

The authors identify three dominant grand strategies afoot in American foreign policy making: hegemony, sponsorship, and retrenchment. From each of those dominant preferences emerge two substrains:

1. Hegemony incorporates “primacy” (often reflecting unilateralism, assertiveness, coerciveness, and confrontation) or “leadership”—sometimes dubbed “cooperative security”—whereby the United States leads, due to the preponderance of assets involved, or simply by entitlement. Each of these substrains relies on American dominance.
2. Sponsorship encompasses both “formal” and “informal” strategies. The former are “specifically authorized by international law and protocols”; the latter are responses to requests by coalitions of states and/or key actors rather than being authorized by intergovernmental organizations.
3. Retrenchment also comes in two flavors—“isolationism” and “restraint.” Isolationism is a controversial approach; by contrast, restraint is less so, though it has many detractors as well. Isolationism reflects the current administration’s “America First” rhetoric and policies. By comparison, supporters of restraint usually advocate slenderizing American ambitions, putting some brakes on globalization, and using the military in a more sparing way; in short, a less draconian form of isolation from the world.

Throughout its pages, the authors admit their primary objective is not prescription but rather “to explain when these calibrated strategies are used, why they are used, and what happens as a result.” American professional military education preaches doctrinaire solutions like intergovernmental and interagency cooperation, but the reality often pales in comparison to the aspiration thanks to gargantuan bureaucracies within the national security complex; the tumult generated by mass media often more interested in capturing eyeballs

than facts; and the inevitable tensions between the executive and legislative branches. The elegant strategies conceived of by academics and policy makers rarely mesh well with the intricacies encountered at sea (or in other domains) by those charged with operationalizing those singular visions. As a result, we are often left with “contrarian, unproductive, costly, and occasionally debilitating circumstances” when our military attempts to implement those policies.

The book unfolds using various case studies to explicate each of the six aforementioned substrains of the three dominant grand strategies. In that regard—explaining—the book succeeds; however, the book also leaves the reader wanting. Identifying the problem(s), while not necessarily an easy task, is easier than divining a solution, especially in a complex environment. And in that way, the book is less than entirely gratifying.

In the book’s conclusion, arguably its most potent chapter, the reader is treated to a rather flawless exposition on the presumptuousness inherent in grand strategy, where the authors eviscerate what they see as America’s flawed assumption: that it “can impose its values and will globally through strategies that link America’s ways and means to its ends. So, regardless of its particular form, grand strategy in each [variant] is consistent with a robust and muscular national security culture.” That assumption also meshes with several liberalist viewpoints that assert, at least implicitly, that other states and actors long for American-style institutions and capitalism.

In the lexicon of American policy making, the term grand strategy is sanctified as a first step on the road to a successful policy outcome because it will inevitably lend organization and synchronization to the various actors, facilitating unity of effort in solving the problem. While a worthy goal and possible outcome, it presupposes the overarching strategy is appropriate—let alone capable—of solving the issue at hand. And therein lies the real problem. Grand strategy is “psychologically reassuring.” It cradles and nurtures the idea the American government

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can determine the country's future through a combination of its unmatched military dominance and its continuing role as the axis upon which the global economy revolves. However, the relative decline of both our military and economic supremacy should inform and temper American hubris.

There was a time—a cherished time for military professionals—when the zenith of military strategy was the capacity to vanquish another state's military. Today, by contrast (and more so with every passing year, it would seem), the threats are often ambiguous. Admittedly, the most dangerous threats remain interstate competitors with conventional and nuclear arsenals. But the most likely threats are those military operations other than war and the newly minted term “hybrid war”—that may never breach the threshold to precipitate conventional conflict.

These realities, when coupled with ill-conceived presumptions that newer, more indistinct threats to the United States can be defeated versus managed, come innumerable, sometimes unpredictable ways. As such, any “grand strategy” purported as appropriate to deal with such a host of evolutionary possibilities is, at best, a fantasy; at its worst, an unmitigated disaster—and not just because it may not be a winning strategy *afar*; it may also lead to overreach and inestimable opportunity costs.

Advocates of ambitious grand strategies often suggest, or even tout, the flexibility of their prized approach in the face of changing circumstances. The authors cleverly leverage the metaphor of a house built to withstand an earthquake—it can sway but can only withstand so much pressure before capitulating to the forces arrayed against it. Theoretically, you could build “the mother of all houses” but at what cost? The idea of a single, relatively rigid grand strategy functioning properly in a global context demanding continuing adaptability just does not compute.

A static set of factors—core values linked to ways, means, and ends—inevitably collides with dynamic circumstances and the inflexible organizational structures required if the military is to function effectively on a daily basis. The military leadership is far more

aware than scholars or policymakers of that inherent problem.

Reich and Dombrowski are able to evade the thorny prescription problem by arguing “policy prescription is based on explaining how things actually work, not on characterizing how they should operate. Explanation [the purpose of their work] must precede prescription and not be skirted.” So, in essence, they leave the more difficult task to others following in their wake. Military planners, in a moment of candor, might be the first to agree that theories of grand strategy have little value because they fail to meaningfully link ways, means, and ends with their vision.

Ultimately, the authors argue we need to abandon the search for any single grand strategy. Instead, embrace the reality that already exists—a plurality of calibrated strategies (the ones highlighted earlier). To do so conveys several advantages:

1. It will signal to both policy makers and the public the limits of American power.
2. Any forthcoming debate—a healthy development—about the merits of a particular calibrated strategy would inform citizens about the degree to which America is influenced by global forces rather than always being the trendsetter (i.e., move away from exceptionalism).
3. Recognition of the need for a variety of strategies (as opposed to one) would likely temper expectations about what to reasonably expect from any particular military foray.
4. A deck of calibrated strategies would afford planners much greater latitude in light of the resources available.

All in all, this is a book with modest ambition. It does a solid job of explaining why the notion of grand strategy is outmoded in today's dynamic international complexity but declines to give any bold policy prescriptions that an interested reader would likely be seeking. In short, the book advocates strategic sobriety for an American national security culture still drunk on American exceptionalism. Think strategies, not strategy. There is no one true path to securing American interests in a complicated world. ■



Members of the Bolivarian National Police stand guard near “Dr. J. M. de los Rios” Children’s Hospital 30 January 2019 during a protest against the government of President Nicolás Maduro and in demand of humanitarian aid, called by opposition leader and self-proclaimed interim president Juan Guaidó in Caracas, Venezuela. Maduro hit out at military “mercenaries” he says are conspiring to divide the armed forces and plot a coup as the opposition planned a new protest to force the socialist leader from power. (Photo by Federico Parra, Agence France-Presse)

Contours of the New “Cold War”?

Editor’s note: The ongoing popular uprising in Venezuela may prove a unique touchstone for discerning the contours of the emerging world order competition in which the United States must operate into the foreseeable future.

Figure 1 (on page 145) depicts a recent alignment of opposing blocs of nation-states on the issue of Venezuela. Of note, those today aligned with Nicolás Maduro’s claim to governance are uniformly authoritarian regimes in contrast to those opposing his claim, which, for the most part, can be characterized as generally

legitimate and stable democracies. This alignment in some respects mirrors the adversarial blocs that once faced each other during the Cold War of the last century.


For comparison’s sake, figure 2 (on page 145) depicts Cold War relationships among blocs of nation-states circa 1975. Diverging in other respects, the modern alignments reflect notable changes as some states have switched Cold War-era allegiances, while others that have emerged from so-called “third world” status with a greater sense of self-identity and independence seem disinclined to take a side one way or the other with regard to Venezuela.



Over the past three years, the Venezuelan economy has collapsed due to falling oil prices, mismanagement of the economy, and deeply ingrained corruption among its leaders. The direct consequence is mass suffering on a scale not seen in Latin America for centuries that has resulted in a wide-spread popular revolt against the Socialist regime of Maduro. One collateral consequence of this collapse has been a mass migration of Venezuelans to countries throughout Latin America, numbering in February 2019 at more than three million people—about the same number of refugees who fled Syria in 2016—and projected by some experts to reach eight million by the end of 2019. The effects of this collapse have produced serious regional instability, overwhelming the ability of neighboring countries such as Colombia and Brazil to provide sufficient resources to deal with the problem of a mass influx of economic refugees.


For students of global national security, there have been two especially alarming features of Venezuela's slide into failed-state status. First, Venezuelan leaders have displayed an astonishingly callous indifference toward the suffering of the majority of their own people, eschewing international or other relief remedies readily at hand while seemingly pursuing as their sole objective staying in power. The callousness of the regime has been glaringly evident in the propensity of both civilian and military leaders to divert resources to line their own pockets in the face of the collapse of the state and the public misery this is producing. The other striking feature has been the jaded response by a variety of nations seemingly inured to the unfolding humanitarian disaster. These have stepped forward to provide support to Maduro's efforts to remain in power, seemingly heedless of the suffering of the Venezuelan people that Maduro's inept governance has caused. Interestingly, the alignment of states that has emerged to support the Venezuelan leadership's effort to hold on illicitly to power correlates closely with nation-states that themselves display a similar indifference to the suffering of large segments of their own individual populations. The case of Venezuela suggests that the degree of callousness that national leaders display toward suffering populations may be the most prominent bellwether of the new operational environment as nation-states wrestle with defining their security interests and relationships within the evolving world order. ■

Antigovernment protesters take part in a demonstration 2 February 2019 demanding the resignation of President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela. Momentum is growing for Venezuela's opposition movement led by self-declared interim president Juan Guaidó, who called supporters back into the streets for nationwide protests, escalating pressure on Maduro to step down. (Photo by Rodrigo Abd, Associated Press)



(Figure by J intela via Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 1. Cold War Alliances in 1975



(Figure courtesy of BBC; data as of 12:00 GMT on 5 February 2019. *The European Union has called for new elections, but some individual member countries have expressed their preferences)

Figure 2. Where Do Countries Stand on Venezuela?