

- 8 Musicians of Mars in Multiple Domains**
Expanding Combined Arms in the Twenty-First Century
 Lt. Gen. Milford Beagle Jr., U.S. Army
 Col. Richard Creed, U.S. Army, Retired
 Lt. Col. Matt Farmer, U.S. Army, Retired
Both China and Russia possess large, modern militaries that can contest the U.S. joint force through land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace—an environment in which the U.S. Army has not fought for decades. Army forces meet this challenge through multidomain operations, the operational concept described in the new Field Manual 3-0, Operations.
- 20 Reframing Operational Art for Competition**
 Maj. Steven R. Chase, U.S. Army
There are shortfalls when applying operational art doctrine in an environment with increasing interstate competition. Adding the competition mechanisms communicate, coerce, and conciliate to complement existing doctrinal frameworks will allow a greater range for conceptual planning in operational art.
- 29 Term of Art**
What Joint Doctrine Gets Wrong about Operational Art and Why It Matters
 Maj. Rick Chersicla, U.S. Army
Current joint doctrine overly complicates the term “operational art” and offers a hollow definition that provides limited utility and no insights to the joint force. The joint force needs a clearer definition of operational art to prepare for modern challenges.
- 35 Mission Modeling for Commanders**
Improved Operational Effectiveness through the Use of Measurable Proxy Variables
 Capt. Bradford Witt, U.S. Army
 Sorin Matei, PhD
The style of command is an underresearched and misunderstood facet of operations, and while the mission command doctrine is an extremely flexible and effective philosophy, it is an ideal that is never fully realized. A relatively simple model proposes that with a better understanding of the command style we employ, we can be more accurate and effective in following our own doctrine.
- 43 Financial Access Denial**
An Irregular Approach to Integrated Deterrence
 Col. Sara Dudley, U.S. Army
 Lt. Col. Steve Ferenzi, U.S. Army
 Maj. Travis Clemens, U.S. Army
Economic statecraft is a critical adversary capability allowing access to targeted states, but its associated corruption is an exploitable vulnerability. Military finance capabilities must complement traditional warfighting to capitalize on this liability to expand the U.S. coercive arsenal—fully integrated with interagency partners in the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and State.
- 56 Through the Looking Glass**
Missing the Mark by Mirror-Imaging Competitors’ Reserve Forces
 Col. Andrew Jacob, Massachusetts Air National Guard
 Cmdr. Christopher Wear, U.S. Navy Reserve
 Lt. Col. Alexi Franklin, Maryland Army National Guard
 Lt. Cmdr. Spencer Willig, U.S. Navy Reserve
In reviewing China as the pacing challenge in theory, and as we actively oppose Russian malign influence in the field, DOD analysis should also include a closer look at our Reserve Component model and our opponents’ reserve force capabilities and goals.
- 68 Once More unto the Breach**
Air Defense Artillery Support to Maneuver Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations
 Col. Glenn A. Henke, U.S. Army
The air defense artillery (ADA) branch currently finds itself determining how to support maneuver forces in a multidomain fight with divisions as the primary unit of action. This requires a critical look at command relationships and authorities, the role of ADA assets supporting corps and divisions, and how best to train and equip ADA forces for large-scale combat operations.

85 Collaboration between Leadership and Behavioral Health

How One U.S. Army Brigade Created a Novel Approach to Suicide Prevention

Col. Timothy MacDonald, U.S. Army
Maj. Amy Thrasher, PsyD, U.S. Army

Through command-embedded behavioral health collaboration, the 18th Military Police Brigade developed and implemented a novel strategy that prioritized soldier well-being, enhanced suicide prevention programming, and achieved a positive command climate.

95 Coup d'œil and Cognition

How to Build Adaptive Tactical Experts

Trent J. Lythgoe, PhD

Coup d'œil is adaptive tactical expertise—the ability to apply warfighting knowledge flexibly and creatively to solve novel tactical problems. U.S. Army leaders can develop adaptive tactical expertise through deliberate practice, metacognition, and emotional intelligence.

108 Hiding in Plain Sight

Maj. Tony Formica, U.S. Army
Capt. Chris Pabon, U.S. Army

Success in large-scale combat operations requires Army divisions to develop the ability to overwhelm an adversary's capacity to perceive reality and make timely decisions, which necessitates the integration of a host of disparate capabilities within both divisions and brigade combat teams. These formations must change the way they organize their staffs, equip their formations, and train in their use of information to both survive on and dominate the modern battlefield.

119 Assessing the Modern Fight

Lt. Col. Mitchell Payne, U.S. Army

Effective organizational leadership requires an awareness of the environment, a forward-looking vision, and a clear understanding of the destination at hand to be successful. The military assessment process is how staff and commanders achieve a shared understanding of their surrounding environment and their way forward to reach the necessary military end state.

128 Sustaining Multidomain Operations

The Logistical Challenge Facing the Army's Operating Concept

Maj. Bryan J. Quinn, U.S. Army

Despite attempts to counter antiaccess strategies in multidomain operations (MDO), the concept is limited by a sustainment architecture optimized for past conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and a dependence on emerging, unproven logistical capabilities to solve inherent logistical challenges. As a result, the United States' ability to achieve objectives in future conflict, consistent with MDO's theory of victory, may be at risk.

139 Looking Outward

Lessons in Security Force Assistance from the French Experience in Africa

Maj. Daniel K. Dillenback, U.S. Army

The ability to develop and maintain a strong network of partners is critical to achieving national interests, and Army leaders have a vested interest in ensuring that the service is prepared to develop partner militaries that are competent, capable, committed, and confident.

REVIEW ESSAY

149 Blood and Ruins

The Last Imperial War, 1931–1945

Mark Montesclaros

The author critiques a book by Richard Overy that provides an exceptionally comprehensive discourse on the roots, conduct, and aftermath of the Second World War.