AN ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLICATION
http://www.armyupress.army.mil
PB-100-17-07/08
Headquarters, Department of the Army
PIN: 201923-000
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

JULY-AUGUST 2017

Multi-Domain Battle
Perkins, p6

Curbing the "Helicopter Commander"
Breckenridge, p14

The Collapse of Venezuela
Ellis, p22

Russia's Evolving Way of War
Thomas, p34

Military Review

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July-August 2017, Vol. 97, No. 4
Professional Bulletin 100-17-07/08
Authentication no.1713605
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Military Review (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830) is published bimonthly by the Department of the Army, Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293. Paid subscriptions are available through the Superintendent of Documents for $42 US/APO/FPO and $58.80 foreign addresses per year. Please call U.S. Government Publishing Office sales at 1-866-512-1800. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing offices.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Military Review*, Army University Press, 290 Stimson Ave., Unit 1, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1293.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the department. Funds for printing this publication were approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 25-30.

Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

Cover photo: A U.S. Army paratrooper assigned to Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment, Task Force Spartan Steel conducts rear security while on patrol 7 April 2012 near Forward Operating Base Salerno, Afghanistan. (Photo by Spc. Eric-James Estrada, U.S. Army)

Next page: A U.S. Army paratrooper participates in the Best Squad Competition on 23 May 2017 as part of "All American" Week at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The week celebrated the 82nd Airborne Division with events for the division's soldiers and veterans. (Photo by Sgt. Jesse Leger, U.S. Army)

Greetings!

As the deputy director of the Army University Press, I am sometimes required to perform the duties of interim editor in chief of *Military Review*. This is one of those times. Lt. Col. Erica Cameron, our former director, has been called away on an operational assignment, leaving me to fill the gap between her departure and the arrival of Col. Katherine Guttormsen, the next director of our journal, who is also fulfilling an operational assignment.

Although Lt. Col. Cameron was only with us for a year, she oversaw huge changes in the Army University Press. As a strategic planner, she brought a very different mindset to our organization that will positively affect the way we do business for a long time. On behalf of all of us at *Military Review*, I'd like to thank Lt. Col. Cameron for her leadership and friendship.

This issue of *Military Review* covers a wide range of topics. There are several insightful articles concerning countries with significant potential impacts on the United States: Russia, Venezuela, Japan, and North Korea. And, in the first in a series of three articles, TRADOC commander Gen. David Perkins discusses the multi-domain battle concept. We also have an interesting comparison of the U.S. Army Stryker medium-force concept and Soviet motorized rifle equipment and organization, and we have the winning submission to the 2016 Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition with a discussion on "helicopter" commanders.

Finally, in our last issue, we ran a tribute to Spc. Hilda Clayton on our inside back cover. Clayton, an Army photojournalist, was killed during a training accident in Afghanistan. The story and Clayton's photograph struck a nerve; major print, television, and online media outlets picked up the story, many expounded on it, and all provided tremendously positive coverage that was viewed by millions. Thanks to all the journalists who covered the story with the respect and consideration due to one of our fallen soldiers.

Thank you also to all our readers and contributors for supporting the Army University Press and its flagship publication, *Military Review*. Find us online at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/, like us on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/ArmyUniversityPress/, and follow us on Twitter @ArmyUPress. ■

Themes and Suggested Topics



Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group conduct Zodiac maritime operations training 1 November 2016 at Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan. Nearly twenty special operations support soldiers, many new to the Special Forces unit, completed the fourteen-day, biannual Special Forces Basic Combat Course-Support. Per regulation, the soldiers—from cooks to drivers, intelligence to signal—are required to complete the uncompromising course prior to deployment or every two years.

During the two-week trial, soldiers revisited basic tasks like marksmanship, communications, and troop-leading procedures while tackling more advanced concepts like the Zodiac training shown here, all-terrain vehicle driver training, and tactical combat casualty care. (Photo by Richard L Rzepka, U.S. Army Garrison Okinawa)

The Changing U.S. Army

- Are U.S. Army rotational units as effective as permanently assigned, forward-deployed units?
- Does the Army need designated security force assistance brigades? How should they be organized?
- Is there a role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- How does Army doctrine need to change to incorporate the cyberspace domain?
- Have associated units helped or hindered readiness?

Global Challenges

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What are the ramifications of increased Russian military presence in the Middle East?
- What are the military implications of China's economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and broader Asia?
- What must the U.S. military do to prepare for possible contingency operations in the South China Sea?
- What are the security implications of the growing Islamic presence in Europe? Elsewhere in the world?
- What must the Army do to prepare to fight in urban terrain or megacities? What are the ethical challenges to operating in this type of environment?
- What operational and logistical challenges arise from domestic and foreign infrastructure limitations and how can we mitigate them?
- How can we better prepare soldiers to operate against atypical combatants (i.e., nonuniformed or child warriors) and under conditions where noncombatants are difficult to distinguish?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

6 Multi-Domain Battle

Driving Change to Win in the Future

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army

In the first of a series of articles, the commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command describes the framework for the development of multi-domain battle concept.

14 Curbing the "Helicopter Commander"

Overcoming Risk Aversion and Fostering Disciplined Initiative in the U.S. Army

Maj. Lynn Marie Breckenridge, PhD

The author discusses the problem of risk-averse leaders who engage in micromanagement—what she describes as "helicopter commanding"—as an alternative to mission command in this 2016 General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition winner.

22 The Collapse of Venezuela and Its Impact on the Region

Dr. R. Evan Ellis

An expert on Latin American and Caribbean security issues provides an insightful discourse on the critical situation in Venezuela, its impact on neighboring countries and the United States, and actions those countries must be prepared to take in response to potential future Venezuelan scenarios.

34 The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War

Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired

A senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office analyzes and compares three prominent Russian military articles to describe contemporary Russian military thought regarding modern warfare.

43 North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations

1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, U.S. Army

North Korea should be considered a major cyber threat to U.S. and South Korean military forces at both strategic and tactical levels. The author suggests North Korea will launch tactical cyber attacks in support of combat units during war.

52 Advancing Security Cooperation through Executive Education

Maj. Michael Carvelli, U.S. Army

The military must properly capitalize on security cooperation educational opportunities so U.S. forces can continue to improve their ability to work in concert with allied and partner nations.

56 The Role of Forward Presence in U.S. Military Strategy

Col. Dave Shunk, U.S. Air Force, Retired
Lt. Col. Charles Hornick, U.S. Army
Maj. Dan Burkhart, U.S. Army

The authors argue for maintaining a U.S. military forward presence in key geographical regions to deter wars, assure allies, favorably shape the security environment, and enable contextual and cultural understanding.

July-August 2017
Volume 97 ◆ Number 4

66 **The American Motor-Rifle Brigade**

Issues with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Concept

Capt. Matthew D. Allgeyer, U.S. Army

There are many similarities between development of the Stryker medium-force concept and that of Soviet-era motorized rifle units. The author recommends new directions for its development based on historical analysis and current scholarly research.

75 **Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific**

Lt. Col. Peter D. Fromm, U.S. Army, Retired

The U.S. military must ensure its bilateral alliance with Japan progresses in a way that considers Japanese sensitivities and enhances Japan's role in the East Asian security community.

84 **Professional Military Education**

Proven in Combat during the Mexican War

Capt. Patrick Naughton, U.S. Army Reserve

U.S. Army success during the Mexican War validated the need for further development and implementation of professional military education for U.S. armed forces.

92 **The Military Moral Education Program**

Checking Our Ethical Azimuth

Maj. Timothy Leone, U.S. Army
Maj. Saythala Lay Phonexayphova, U.S. Army

The Army must characterize its ethical training as moral education and implement systematic methods of reinforcement so that the profession interprets its ethic as a standard that each member aspires to internalize.

100 **Navigating through the Challenge of Culture and Law in Postconflict Stability Operations**

Lt. Col. John B. (J. B.) Shattuck, U.S. Army, Retired

U.S. military members must fully understand their own culture before they can gain a thorough understanding of other cultures, specifically with respect to the establishment of foreign-nation law enforcement agencies.

REVIEW ESSAY

111 **Queen of Spies**

Daphne Park, Britain's Cold War Spy Master

John G. Breen, PhD

The author critiques a book by Paddy Hayes that explores the role of women in espionage, specifically detailing the life and career of Daphne Park, who rose to the most senior ranks of the British Secret Intelligence Service.

Multi-Domain Battle
Driving Change to Win in the Future

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army

This is the first of three articles discussing the impact of multi-domain battle through the lens of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This article frames the ideas taking shape for how land forces might conduct future operations under the multi-domain battle concept being developed by the Army Capabilities and Integration Center. In recognition of the centennial of American Expeditionary Forces entering World War I, the articles will incorporate relevant historical observations and lessons to help drive home the new and differentiate it from the old.

"Perhaps we are losing too many men," is not the way to start a conversation about changing doctrine.[1] Army Gen. John J. Pershing penned these words in August 1918 after American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) sustained more than sixty thousand casualties over about four months.[2]

When the United States entered World War I in the spring of 1917, Pershing firmly believed the Germans would be driven from the trenches and defeated in the open by self-reliant infantry employing a doctrine of *open warfare*.[3] Open warfare doctrine imagined infantry brigades maneuvering outside the trenches that had immobilized the war months after it began in 1914. Instead of stationary fighting from trenches, U.S. brigades supposedly would employ speed and mobility to inflict decisive defeats on the Germans. Though Pershing coined the phrase open warfare, the ideas were consistent with prewar doctrine—heavily influenced by German military thought—that minimized the use of artillery and machine guns.

However, casualties suffered by German and Allied forces starting in 1914 forced the combatants to realize that the lethality of rapidly firing artillery, machine guns, mortars—and later, gas, tanks, and aircraft—made tactics such as those advocated by Pershing's open warfare doctrine almost suicidal. European armies, confronting unsustainable casualties, had to adapt and develop new doctrine and tactics after a stalemate settled in.

Facing his own unsustainable list of casualties, Pershing directed his General Headquarters to conduct a doctrinal review.[4] What little change came was too late; over half of U.S. casualties in World War I happened in late 1918 during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[5] Despite the talk of change, open warfare persisted as leaders such as Pershing maligned Allied tactics and doctrine while continuing to create extraordinarily aggressive and optimistic attack plans.[6] They underestimated the importance of heavy firepower and their control, communication, and coordination.[7]

The approaching centenary of the end of World War I provides a moment to reflect on how land forces should adapt to changing operational environments. Despite the heroism of the AEF in 1917 and 1918, it is clear that the Army did not adapt its doctrine for the operational conditions that existed on the Western Front before the United States entered the war. The United States had an opportunity to observe and learn from European experience. Instead, the Army persisted with doctrine that had already been found wanting. The United States now faces a comparable moment. Operational environments are changing rapidly. However, when called to fight, the Army cannot afford the price paid in blood during World War I. This time, the Army must understand the changes as they occur and anticipate how they will affect operations. Doctrine must evolve before the Army faces potential enemies, not after. We must learn from careful study and analysis so we will not have to learn from bitter experience.

Changes to How the Army Will Fight

When the Nation calls upon the Army to fight and win its next war, the operational environment will be unlike the circumstances of our recent experiences. It will be defined by an enemy who will challenge our ability to



This graphical representation is one of the first to depict the inherent integration and convergence of the future multi-domain battlefield. The scenario here shows joint forces achieving cross-domain synergy by applying the multi-domain battle concept. (Graphic by author)

maintain freedom of maneuver and superiority across the air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space domains and the electromagnetic spectrum. As U.S. forces arrive on the battlefield with high-tech and expensive precision-guidance missiles, enemies may counter with innovative and effective responses costing pennies on the dollar. To counter our state-of-the-art communications network, they may hack in, disrupt, and deny our assurances through a well-organized group of experts hitting targets purposefully selected with intelligence and acting in accord with a larger maneuver plan—all executed from outside the area of operations. The Army Capabilities and Integration Center is developing the multi-domain battle concept to help prepare the Army for these possible future battlefields, in which current American strengths could become future weaknesses, and domains of present dominance could become areas of violent struggle.

Doctrine describes how the Army conducts and trains for operations today with the capabilities it already has. Conversely, *concepts* describe how the Army may operate in the mid- to far-term future based on anticipated future operational environments. When published in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pamphlets, concepts guide the study, experimentation, and evaluation of new solutions for doctrine and for organization, training, materiel, personnel, and facilities (the

force domains, together known as DOTMLPF). When validated, concepts lead to changes within the force domains, including doctrine.

Change is never easy, especially in large organizations. The Total Army is a massive enterprise of over 1,030,000 soldiers plus thousands of Army civilians spread across the globe in a wide variety of operations and readiness stages.[8] To change the Army and to prepare it for future operations is not as simple as rewording the Army's doctrine and purchasing new equipment. Due to its size, the Army will change on a scale beyond that imaginable by almost every Fortune 500 company. That change requires the Army to develop an operational concept based on a thorough campaign of learning that will guide changes across the entire force.

In *Forging the Sword—Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army*, Benjamin M. Jensen explains that doctrinal change takes hold through shock and competition or through cultural self-selection.[9] Change from shock and competition is change by force, from failure or from observing others' failures. Armies that fail before changing may not have the luxury of keeping their preferred organizational structures; they must quickly adapt to the immediate realities of what will work in their current fight. With failure, an army is forced to adapt immediately or to continue to fail and even lose. Among many examples, Pershing's failures in doctrine reverberate this truth—U.S. forces were victorious in the end but after too many lives lost.

Change from cultural self-selection, however, is proactive change. It is change by choice, made by anticipating problems and evolving to prevent failure. In proactive change, leaders have the time and opportunity to focus change reflective of their cultural and organizational strengths.[10] The best historical example of change by choice is the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s.

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy, an MS in mechanical engineering from the University of Michigan, and a master's degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College. He previously served as commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

AirLand Battle as a Model for Change

In contrast to the bloody learning by experience that the AEF endured in World War I, the development of AirLand Battle offers a better model for change. The genesis of AirLand Battle came from observing Israel's devastating lack of readiness at the start of the October War in 1973 (also called the Yom Kippur War or the Ramadan War), when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Sinai Peninsula. Since 1967, a confident Israel had considered itself ready to repeat its decisive victory over an Arab coalition in the Six-Day War. In 1973, however, the Arab armies advanced quickly, and Israeli forces suffered heavy casualties before their eventual victory. With the Arabs supplied by the Soviet Union and the Israelis supplied by the United States, the conflict pitted Soviet and American capabilities against each other in combat.[11] The U.S. Army's ability to observe and learn from Israel's mistakes allowed it to change proactively and to build on strengths unique to it and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Army leaders in 1973 understood that the Army was a force ready to fight counterinsurgency in Vietnam, not major combat on the plains of Central Europe. They understood that their likely operational environments had changed and that the Army needed to change to keep pace. Over the course of more than eight years, AirLand Battle was developed in an ongoing process, first as a concept, and ultimately as doctrine, in the 1982 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*.

Of the many takeaways from AirLand Battle, three offer value regarding multi-domain battle. The first is the introduction of *operational art*, as it is known today, and the *battlefield framework*.[12] The framework gave Army commanders a clear visualization of their battlefield, codified as *deep*, *close*, and *rear* areas. The second was *decentralized execution*, requiring commanders to continuously monitor their sector for possibilities to exploit—a precursor to mission command.[13] Third, *integrated battle*, a term coined by Douglas Skinner, was the idea of maneuver, synchronization, and firepower being integrated in execution on the battlefield.[14] While not specifically defined in FM 100-5, integrated battle as an idea permeates the document. Integrated support of all arms and services is critical in *close operations*, to include integration of airpower for attacking the enemy in echelon.[15]

The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact ended the threat that AirLand Battle was intended to counter. Instead, in 1991, Operation Desert Storm offered a chance to fully validate AirLand Battle as doctrine. In executing the seemingly impossible left hook, Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf relied heavily on planners who had graduated from the School of Advanced Military Studies versed in maneuver warfare and operational art. Decentralized execution combined with combined arms maneuver had been honed to a knife's edge through constant rotations and exercises at combat training centers. That tactical superiority became clear to the world during the one-hundred-hour ground war. Operation Desert Storm was AirLand Battle's debutante ball, and it proved that an effective process adjusts the doctrine before the next battle.

> "…the United States is reaching the end of a period in which it can make change by choice, without having taken severe losses. The Army must evolve and change."

The Multi-Domain Battle Concept for the Future

In developing the multi-domain battle concept, the Army seeks to follow the path successfully blazed by the developers of AirLand Battle. It intends to avoid the sort of bloody, traumatic learning that the AEF experienced in 1918. Multi-domain battle is a concept driven by proactive choice and informed by the threat of failure. It is an evolution of the Army operating concept, detailing a response to our observations of developments in the South China Sea, Russian New Generation Warfare, and continued challenges in the Middle East. It is an acknowledgment that the United States is reaching the end of a period in which it can make change by choice, without having taken severe losses. The Army must evolve and change.

Concept development gives us the opportunity to define complex problems, develop a framework to better understand those problems, and then break those complex problems into smaller, more detailed, and solvable problems through real-world scenarios. They give us the opportunity to fully develop the what, why, and how of change. They force us to change.

For the multi-domain battle concept to eventually succeed as doctrine, and in the other force domains, the first step is to clearly understand the potential operational environments it is meant to address. The 2017 white paper "Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century" defines the central problem this way: "U.S. ground combat forces, operating as part of … joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams, are currently not sufficiently trained, organized, equipped, or postured to deter or defeat capable peer enemies to win in future war."[16] Whereas in AirLand Battle, the terrain, politics, and enemy were known, today, multiple adversaries of varying and growing capabilities are actively achieving their objectives under the threshold of armed conflict. Military action in response to our adversaries' actions faces a variety of complex problems. Adversaries may threaten the costs of a highly lethal battlefield, limit access to critical domains, challenge the ability to maintain superiority in air and maritime domains, and attempt to deny access into the theater.

Drawing from these complex and interrelated problems, the multi-domain battle concept will ultimately detail these problems to a level that solutions can be developed, applied, tested, and evaluated. Critical to achieving this level of detail is the establishment of a battlefield framework. A battlefield framework is a cognitive tool used to help commanders exercise mission command. The right battlefield framework allows commanders to clearly visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources. As operational environments change, previous frameworks will prove inadequate to these tasks. Reimagining the battlefield framework is essential to multi-domain battle's success.



(Graphic by author)

Figure. Draft Battlefield Framework Compared to AirLand Battle

AirLand Battle gave us a battlefield framework of deep, close, and rear to frame the problem of how the U.S. military would fight outnumbered and win. Multi-domain battle's framework must allow victory in an even more complex world. Multi-domain battle is developing an expanded battlefield framework to fight across the breadth and depth of enemy capabilities, seamlessly reaching from battlefield to home station and across multiple domains. The figure illustrates a draft version of the battlefield framework, as evolved from AirLand Battle, based on the construct's development at the time of this article's publication.

The draft framework being developed by the Army Capabilities and Integration Center comprises six physical spaces: *deep fires, deep area, close, support, operational support area,* and *strategic support area.* In application to real-world missions, these areas are not necessarily linear or contiguous; assignment and delineation of these areas are completely dependent on the geopolitical terrain where they are placed:

- A deep fires area is beyond the feasible range of conventional maneuver forces, but it is where joint fires and national capabilities may be employed to operational or strategic effect. Likely within sovereign borders, it is largely denied by maneuver elements.
- A deep area contains challenges that must be defeated in order to be successful in the close area. In a deep area, maneuver forces must have the capability to converge and open temporary windows of domain superiority to seize the operational initiative.
- A close area is where the major direct fire fight unfolds. In a close area, ground forces seize and hold key terrain, maneuver to destroy enemy ground formations, and secure populations.
- A support area directly supports the forward fight. A support area enables operations in the

close, deep maneuver, and deep fires areas with sustainment, fires, maneuver support, and mission command capabilities.

- An operational support area holds the central point, key capabilities, and sustainment of joint forces. An operational support area provides the location of critical joint force mission command, sustainment, and fires and strike capabilities.
- A strategic support area stretches from the homeland, along deployment lines of communication, to the initial point of entry. In detail, a strategic support area encompasses home ports and stations, strategic sea and air lines of communication, and homeland communications. Traversing through, and operating within, the strategic support area will undoubtedly require acute cross-combatant command coordination.

It is important that even virtual locations are tied to physical locations within this framework. Space, cyberspace, and information are often cited as exclusive virtual domains or dimensions, but that attribution is inaccurate. Achieving a physical effect requires a physical location of a delivery mechanism, supporting points to facilitate delivery, and the point of the intended effect.

Additionally, across the levels of war and throughout all operational phases, virtual capabilities are positioned in physical space according to their level of employment. For example, an organized group of hackers operating in a deep fires area may use proxy servers of another deep fires area, outside the theater of operations, to deliver effects against a specific unit holding key terrain in the close area. The hackers may do this by targeting their enemies' dependents in the homeland. These effects could be lethal, utilizing social media and open source imagery to select targets on the unit's more vulnerable home-base and community, or they could be nonlethal, such as emptying bank accounts. Through either approach, the targeted unit would become distracted, thus opening a window of opportunity for the enemy to exploit.

Through this battlefield framework, problems identified in "Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century" go from broad strokes to detailed problems we can solve. These problems are conceived along the battlefield framework against specific adversarial capabilities. Through this approach, whether we are dealing with the lethality of the battlefield or refining capabilities to mitigate weaknesses in our command and control networks, the battlefield framework provides a basis to develop depth of understanding so that DOTMLPF solutions can begin to take shape.

Multi-Domain Battle—A Descendant or Fundamentally Unique?

The question now is whether the battlefield framework has expanded the battlefield, compressed it, or both. While the proposed framework has expanded far beyond AirLand Battle doctrine, it appears to have actually compressed the battlefield. In the draft framework, however, the vastness of space and cyberspace—along with the far-ranging effects of information operations, electronic warfare, and even some conventional weapons—ensures that the battlefield is limitless. From home station to the close area, there is the potential to be engaged instantaneously with long-range fires, cyberspace, space, electronic warfare, and information. If the battlefield truly is compressed, it will drastically change how and why DOTMLPF solutions are sought.

Multi-domain battle, as a concept, and the expansion of the battlefield both draw on a resurgence of past ideas. The battlefield framework brings back a construct similar to deep, close, and rear—the standing operational concept for the U.S. Army until it was replaced in 2001 with full-spectrum operations, only to return with publication of Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*, ten years later.[17] There is also a clear focus on the operational level of war and the idea of Skinner's integrated battle. Last, multi-domain battle's genesis comes partly from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work's call for an AirLand Battle 2.0 as a means to operationalize the third offset strategy (initiated November 2014 by then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel).[18] While multi-domain battle is a descendant of AirLand Battle, every step of its evolutionary process is designed to confront prevailing challenges by developing solutions that are both new and different.

The prevailing challenges facing the U.S. military today demonstrate a battlefield that is being compressed. In the geographically massive framework of multi-domain battle, planning for the inability to assure communications and domain superiority would be an entirely new focus, although the threat is not entirely new in

war. From this perspective, multi-domain battle evolves as something informed by the past but set to take on circumstances new and far different from those U.S. land forces faced generations ago.

Beyond just the framework, integrating space and cyberspace domains and the electromagnetic spectrum for how Army units and joint forces will fight is something the Department of Defense is just now beginning to understand. Multi-domain battle reintroduces the idea that converged cross-domain capabilities across DOTMLPF are an absolute prerequisite for success; this is how the concept frames integration. Finally, because of the role of new technology, from artificial intelligence to robotics, multi-domain battle accounts for how the character of warfare on the future battlefield will be different. However, as a concept, multi-domain battle draws back from science fiction and looks to the specific capabilities that will be required to win in the future fight.

The Army—along with all the services—has a clear window of opportunity. The security environment is evolving and will continue to change quickly. Our challenges may extend beyond the immediate adversaries on whom we focus. However, by focusing on how to respond to our adversaries' capabilities, the concepts and subsequent doctrine we create will continue to improve our DOTMLPF capabilities in a converged and integrated fashion across warfighting functions, and, hopefully, across joint forces so we can arrive on the future battlefield with convergence and integration—one step further, one step faster, than our enemy. Victory starts here. ■

Notes

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Congratulations on your retirement!

Ms. Desirae Gieseman is retiring after serving as an Army civilian on Fort Leavenworth for more than fifteen years. During that span she worked in the International Military Student Division of the Command and General Staff College, the Center for Army Tactics, and the Army Doctrine Proponency Division of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. She culminated her career with *Military Review*, where she gained a well-deserved reputation as a consummate editor, writer, and mentor. Her uncompromising standards of excellence in writing significantly enhanced the quality of twenty-two issues of our journal. We will miss Desirae both personally and professionally, and we wish her good luck and happiness in all her future endeavors.

Maj. Steven Miller is retiring after serving as the operations officer for the Army University Press. Formerly a field artillery officer, he served two combat tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. With a master's degree in English and experience as an English instructor at West Point and as a public affairs officer, Steven contributed immeasurably to the editing and production of *Military Review*. He was also instrumental in making our challenging transition to a subordinate organization of the Army University Press as smooth and painless as possible. We will miss his professionalism, candor, and humor. We wish him the best of luck as he transitions to the civilian world.

ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS

Curbing the "Helicopter Commander"

Overcoming Risk Aversion and Fostering Disciplined Initiative in the U.S. Army

Maj. Lynn Marie Breckenridge, PhD

Mission command is an approach to decentralized leadership that emphasizes the exercise of local initiative to accomplish tasks within the framework of a commander's guidance and intent. Mission command is guided by several principles, including "exercising disciplined initiative" and "accepting prudent risk."[1] The former is ordered of the subordinate leader, while the latter is required of the senior leader. A delicate relationship exists between the two variables, one that is rarely discussed in detail. Without the senior leader's willingness to accept prudent risk, the junior leader will never feel empowered to exercise disciplined initiative. Conversely, if the junior leader does not exhibit competence to exercise disciplined initiative, the senior leader will assess the level of risk as too high to allow the junior leader freedom of action.

In some cases, the commander's low assessment of the junior leader's level of proficiency may be accurate, and a certain degree of oversight and professional development must occur before mission command can be successful. However, there are several factors that might lead a commander to abandon mission command and opt for micromanagement as a leadership style. These interrelated factors include a "zero defect" work environment, risk aversion, poor leader development, and lack of mutual trust in a cohesive team.

Army leadership doctrine describes six principles for successful mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.[2] A recent *Military Review* article by Robert Scaife and Packard Mills suggested other factors that must be present in order for mission command to be successful: trust, initiative, dialogue, and freedom of action within intent.[3] In addition, by tracing mission command back to its German origins in *Auftragstaktik* (mission-type tactics), it is apparent that certain factors have always been recognized as crucial to its success: obedience, proficiency, independence of action, and self-esteem.[4] However, despite all these "recipes for success," commanders continue to find difficulty with decentralized leadership. One area of particular trouble for leaders is the ability to let subordinates struggle and fail before finding their own way.

Most Army leaders agree that, in theory, subordinates must be allowed to learn from failure if they are to become agile and adaptive leaders who can execute complex tasks in unfamiliar and uncertain environments.[5] Putting

theory into practice is an altogether different thing. Indeed, commanders are not alone in their hesitancy to let their subordinates fail. A large body of literature suggests that American culture has shifted toward risk aversion. This is particularly evidenced by what has been coined as "helicopter parenting." Like micromanaging commanders, helicopter parents lack faith in their children's ability to solve problems on their own, and they allow risk aversion to govern their parenting style. Their moniker comes from their tendency to hover above their children, waiting to swoop in at the first sign of trouble. It is the postulate of this essay that the U.S. Army is experiencing an era of "helicopter commanders," brought on by improved communication technology and a perception of increased stakes. They behave in similar ways as helicopter parents, hovering above subordinates, ready to offer increased direction at every turn.

The term "helicopter commander" might appear tongue-in-cheek, but the problem is of serious concern. Over time, the result of helicopter commanding is less competent leaders who are less prone to initiative-taking and are incapable of agile and adaptive leadership. Helicopter commanding is often done with good intentions, but it is a disservice to the U.S. Army and the Nation we serve.

Conceptualizing micromanagement as helicopter commanding serves as a way to examine the factors that impact the execution of mission command, highlight similarities from psychological research in the field of helicopter parenting, and suggest how commanders might apply this knowledge to develop more agile, adaptive leaders.

The Need for Mission Command

In July 2015, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Daniel Allyn stood before an Association of the United States Army conference and highlighted the current operational status of the U.S. Army: over 140,000 Total Force soldiers forward-stationed or deployed in over 150 locations around the world. Many of these committed soldiers operate in small units led by entrusted professionals in decentralized command structures. With our force so dispersed, he noted, mission command is more important than ever. Allyn went on to recognize that current operations "place an enormous premium on the quality, breadth and depth of our leader development efforts at every echelon."[6] Military leaders will have to continually evolve and diversify to meet these challenges to the Nation's defense, and will have to do it with fewer personnel and limited resources due to the drawdown of forces.

The Parallel between the Zero Defect Army and Twenty-First Century Parenting

It must be noted that while the challenges posed by the emerging complex operating environment make mission command more important than ever, a resurgent zero defect mentality poses a threat to the Army's ability to embrace mission command.[7] We are experiencing the second era of the "zero defect Army." The first occurred from the end of the Cold War in 1989 until combat operations began in 2001. Several

articles have been published about the deleterious effects it had on officers' ability to exercise decentralized command. Characteristically, when downsizing has occurred, commanders have engaged in certain thought processes and actions, both overt and suggestive, in an attempt to ensure that there are absolutely no defects, mistakes, or flaws under their leadership. As a result, decisions have been centralized at a higher level than they needed to be, and leaders minimized or overshadowed subordinates' control.[8]

In 1997, in an effort to change the "zero defects" cultural mindset, the Army began masking all junior officer evaluation reports in their official military personnel files once they were promoted to the rank of captain or chief warrant officer three. Masking junior officers' ratings conveyed the message that junior officers are expected to take risks, and that senior leaders are more forgiving of failures during those learning years.[9]

Cadet Douglas MacArthur and his mother, Mary Pinkney Hardy MacArthur, pose for a photo at West Point in 1899, the year he entered the military academy. To ensure her son's dedication to his studies, his mother took up a two-year residence in the West Point Hotel so she could personally monitor her son's activities. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

However, in 2015, the Army began reinstating those reports—evidence of a return to the zero-defect Army.[10] With the ultimate reduction of more than 189,000 personnel, leaders are feeling the same scrutiny that was present during the previous drawdown of forces.[11] They perceive that any "strike" (in terms of a visible failure by self or subordinate) may be enough to end their careers. After more than a decade at war, most successful leaders are comfortable operating with unparalleled authority, flexibility, and resources. However, as we transition from combat operations to garrison administration, the Army faces additional oversight from external stakeholders, including Congress and veterans' organizations. Leaders are increasingly criticized regarding their use of resources, and they are expected to be more attentive to the health, welfare, physical, and mental well-being of soldiers.[12] The confluence of these factors is causing leaders to reconsider whether to allow junior leaders flexibility, or to micromanage and constrain them to avoid failure.

While the zero-defect Army drives officers' fear of not "making the cut," helicopter parenting is driven by *fear of not doing enough*. Helicopter parents fear that something catastrophic will happen if they do not take every possible precaution to keep their children safe and to ensure their success. Much like micromanaging commanders, they lack the faith that their children have the ability to keep themselves safe and to find their own way to success.

Influenced by media programs designed to create awareness for missing children and criminals at large, and sentiments that American children were falling behind academically, "baby boomers" were the first generation recognized for their helicopter parenting, but they certainly were not the first parents to hover. In 1899, Gen. Douglas MacArthur's mother moved to West Point with him. She lived in a nearby hotel overlooking the school, and watched him through a telescope to make sure that he was studying.[13] Like present-day commanders, parents feel pressure to be highly involved, overly directive, aware of, and accountable for every move their children make. Commanders fear Army Regulation 15-6 investigations for allowing a second lieutenant to act independently; parents fear Child Protective Services inquiries if they allow their nine-year-old to go to the playground alone.[14] It is a trend that begs intervention.

Considering that MacArthur finished first in his class at West Point, one could argue that high levels of parental involvement can be beneficial.[15] In the common

(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

The View from 5,000 Feet Up Is Always Perfect

terminology of the Army, helicopter parenting *gets results*. However, these are just short-term gains. By robbing children or subordinates of the opportunity to try new things and fail, parents and commanders ruin the chance of developing a crucial psychological trait, self-efficacy. Albert Bandura described self-efficacy as the belief in one's own capabilities to organize and execute actions required to manage and achieve desired situations, a necessary trait for an Army leader.[16]

Though there is a paucity of documented evidence to prove the detrimental effects of micromanaging Army leaders, there is substantial evidence that this is true in helicopter parenting. Studies have found that students with helicopter parents were less open to new ideas or ways of behaving, and were more anxious, vulnerable, self-conscious, and depressed.[17] Helicopter-parented students were excellent at test-taking and concrete assignments but became anxious when it came to independent decision making and projects that did not involve specific instructions.[18] It is easy to understand how similar results could be disastrous in the military.

Mission Command from History to Current Context

The roots of today's mission command philosophy can be traced back to at least 1806. Prussian officers began to rethink their approach to command after observing Napoleon's ability to achieve a high-operational tempo through rapid communication of orders and intent, tolerance for initiative by junior officers, and a shared understanding of basic doctrine.[19] From its beginnings, Prussian officers had difficulty with the concept of enabling junior leaders to have greater freedom in making decisions. Through rigorous, strenuous debate and the advisement of Helmuth von Moltke the

Sgt. 1st Class Darren Toedt (*center*) yells out commands 12 June 2015 as his platoon consolidates and reorganizes following an attack live-fire exercise at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Toedt is a platoon sergeant assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry Regiment. Professional development can only happen when soldiers and their officers are given the freedom and authority to make decisions during training events like this that may result in honest mistakes without the prejudice of a "zero defect" command environment. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Elder, "bounded initiative" was developed. Central to the philosophy was the belief that mistakes were preferable to hesitancy, and that the commander's role was only to steer bold action in the right direction.[20] Notably, Moltke's bounded initiative and its successor, Auftragstaktik, assumed a significant investment in the development of junior officers so there could be faith that they would act appropriately when given only basic orders.

Bounded initiative required an assumption that has recently been called into question in popular psychology literature. All forms of decentralized command are based on the premise that young officers can and will take the initiative, given the right tools. However, recent studies have suggested that many young adults from the "millennial" generation are having difficulty with taking initiative, possibly as a result of helicopter parenting. Many employers have raised concerns that adults born between approximately 1980 and 2000 have more difficulty with independence and initiative taking than do previous generations.[21] Given that approximately 57 percent of active-duty Army officers and 86 percent of enlisted members are millennials, this assertion is of significant concern.[22]

By virtue of joining the military, service members disprove many of the millennial stereotypes, which include aimlessness in career choices, prolonged transition to adulthood, and increased need for emotional and tangible support from parents.[23] However, anecdotally, commanders' complaints about junior leaders are often similar to what is characteristic of over-parented millennials: ambivalence; high expectations in terms of guidance, "hand-holding," and explanation; and a lack of problem solving and initiative. Research has shown that when a child is used to being given the answers, when they are never forced to struggle, they grow to be less engaged, less autonomous, less confident, and less independent.[24]

Consider the over-parented millennial recruited into the military and placed in a leadership position: he or she exhibits the qualities listed above, and therefore does not gain the confidence in his or her commander. The commander does not trust the junior leader's decision-making skills, and therefore does not empower him or her to exercise disciplined initiative. By hovering above the junior leader, refusing to allow failure to occur, the commander denies the subordinate the opportunity to grow into a confident, agile, adaptive leader. The cycle needs to be broken.

What Needs to Change

To overcome the tendency to helicopter command, commanders must learn to be less risk averse, emphasize professional development of their subordinates, and foster an atmosphere of trust in a cohesive team.

Risk aversion. In his essay about the first era of the zero defect Army, Lt. Col. Robert Kissel defined risk avoidance as the result of centralized command, when "the subordinate, realizing or perceiving a cost (penalty) for making a mistake, avoids risk taking by either doing nothing or deliberately abdicating the majority of his decisions to his superior."[25] Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders,* cautions commanders to avoid this, stating that "learning comes from experiencing both success and failure. An environment that allows subordinate leaders to make honest—as opposed to repeated or careless—mistakes without prejudice is essential to leader development and personal growth."[26]

One of the Army leadership competencies is "lead by example."[27] Risk-averse senior leaders produce risk-averse junior leaders. Parenting research supports this. Having risk-averse parents was a significant predictor of risk-averse children, and children reported that their biggest fear in making mistakes was their parent's response.[28]

Assuming that this is also often the case for officers, there is an important conjecture that could be made: by responding harshly to risk taking or mistakes, a commander teaches junior officers to make decisions based on the probability of the commander's negative response, not on the probability of a success or by assessment of benefit to the organization. A junior leader with a risk-averse commander is likely to avoid action simply because of the possibility that the commander will not like the action.

Professional development. Leaders who micromanage to get immediate results rather than professionally develop subordinate leaders are doing so at the long-term expense of our Army and our nation. Every leader is responsible for the professional development of his or her subordinate leaders. Leader development is an investment; it requires time and resources but can pay out exponentially in the long term. When a subordinate leader is trained, proficient, and trustworthy, the commander is able to delegate authority and responsibility, thereby allowing for more efficient execution of mission orders.

ADP 7-0 states that "growth occurs when subordinates are provided opportunities to overcome obstacles and make difficult decisions. They improve their ability to adapt through exposure to—and the intuition gained from—multiple, complex, and unexpected situations in challenging, unfamiliar, and uncomfortable conditions."[29] This is consistent with parenting research literature. However, there is more to be learned from challenging, unexpected situations: initiative taking. Commanders should be aware that the current generation of officers may be lacking in initiative-taking skills and incorporate challenges that foster initiative into any professional development program.

Adolescent psychology expert Reed Larson suggests that in order for an adolescent to learn initiative, three elements must be present: intrinsic motivation, in association with concerted engagement in the environment, over time.[30] Larson believes that in order to learn initiative, adolescents must exert "constructive attention on a field of action involving the types of constraints, rules, challenge, and complexity that characterize external reality."[31] He indicates that despite

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its name, initiative is more than just the ability to start an action. It involves a temporal arc of effort that will likely include setbacks, reevaluations, and adjustment of strategy. Students must be taught that initiative is "the cumulative effort over time to achieve a goal" without being deterred by obstacles.[32] Leaders should strive to incorporate these principles in a professional development program, both expressly and in practice.

Lack of trust in a cohesive team. In order for subordinates to feel comfortable showing disciplined initiative and taking prudent risks, they must trust that the commander will show support and respond in predictable, reasonable ways. In order for commanders to assume risk and empower initiative, they must trust their subordinates.

Charles Allen and William Braun suggest that there are four components of trust: credibility of competence, benevolence of motives, integrity with the sense of common and greater good, and predictability of behavior.[33] When commanders engage subordinates in high-quality professional development, they simultaneously create a cohesive team based on these components. Scaife and Mills suggest that units must have a "foundation of confidence, trust, and dialogue, through a robust professional development program."[34]

Helicopter commanding is a way of managing lack of trust, and reciprocally, it is not necessary once trust is built. Commanders must consciously make a decision to trust, and to foster trust amongst their subordinates. Mission command cannot exist without it.[35]

Further, adolescent studies indicate that there is a positive correlation between autonomy giving, parent-child communication, and adolescent's trust in parents, and a negative correlation between parental control and adolescent's trust in parents.[36] If this also applies to command team relationships, it would suggest that commanders who allow their subordinates freedom of action and engage in dialog with them have better trust relationships, and that commanders who micromanage have poor trust relationships. While causation cannot be proven, it appears that open dialogue, trust, and willingness to allow initiative are all significant, interrelated factors in establishing positive relationships.

Conclusion

Given current force reductions, leaders are more likely to be risk averse and engage in helicopter commanding as an alternative to mission command. Leaders must strive to develop trust with their subordinates in order to foster disciplined initiative and prudent risk taking. By incorporating research about overcoming helicopter parenting, leaders can improve upon their professional development programs. Leader development should be challenging, complex, and realistic, and should allow subordinates opportunities to fail and overcome obstacles without intervention. Doing so is crucial to the development of agile, adaptive, competent leaders. ■

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

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People look for food in garbage dumped outside a looted supermarket 21 April 2017 in the El Valle neighborhood of Caracas, Venezuela, after demonstrations against the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. (Photo by Ronaldo Schemidt, Agence France-Presse)

The Collapse of Venezuela and Its Impact on the Region

Dr. R. Evan Ellis

In May 2017, as the number killed during protests against the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela climbed toward 40, and with more than 130 injured and over 1,300 arrests, many in the United States and the region asked, "How much longer could it go on?"[1] In addition to the crisis within Venezuela, the collapse of its economy and the escalating criminal and political violence have also

produced a massive outflow of refugees to neighboring Colombia and Brazil, to the nearby Caribbean islands of Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, and Curaçao, and to other locales throughout the region. In total, an estimated 1.5 million of Venezuela's 32 million people have left the country since the government of Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999.[2] Venezuela's neighbors watch the unfolding drama not only with concern for the Venezuelan people but also from the perspective of how that crisis could affect them as it deepens and possibly becomes more violent.[3]

The situation in Venezuela is often mistakenly diagnosed as principally a political or economic crisis.[4] It is better understood as a criminal act without precedent in Latin America: the capture and systematic looting of a state, achieved by first capturing its institutions through mass mobilization and bureaucratic machinations, then increasing control of the state through military force, as the criminal nature of the act and its consequences become apparent to the nation's citizens. Former Venezuelan government officials have suggested that as much as $300 billion may have been diverted over the last decade from national coffers to private accounts through the currency control system alone.[5]

The crisis in Venezuela is a problem for the country and the region that neither international law nor existing multilateral institutions are well equipped to handle. For neighboring states, politically acceptable alternatives appear to be few. For example, it is unlikely that the United States, or organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States (OAS), will choose to physically intervene or be able to act in a manner sufficiently impactful to alter the current trajectory of Venezuela toward a broader and more violent internal crisis. Yet, both the United States and multilateral institutions do have plausible alternatives and may yet have the ability to play a decisive role in managing the consequences of that crisis for the region without direct intervention.

The Situation in Venezuela

It is difficult to anticipate when or how the Maduro regime in Venezuela will collapse, yet it is clear that its current course is both economically and politically unsustainable. In economic terms, destructive government policies, including expropriations, price controls, and currency controls, in combination with rampant corruption and mismanagement in government enterprises, have progressively eliminated the capacity of the Venezuelan economy to produce even the most basic goods required by the people of the country to survive. Additionally, declining petroleum output, high production costs, debt service obligations, an accumulation of adverse legal judgments from past expropriations, and increasing reluctance of creditors (even politically supportive China and Russia) to lend new money are shutting off Venezuela's access to hard currency to buy goods from abroad, even though international oil prices have recently trended upward.[6]

Defaulting on the loan obligations of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (Venezuela's state-owned oil company, PDVSA) to use the hard currency to import more goods (to ease political pressures) would trigger legal consequences that could bring about the seizure of the company's assets, even oil shipments abroad, aggravating the regime's liquidity crisis in a way that could endanger its ability to maintain power.[7] The Venezuelan government has thus engaged in an increasingly desperate series of delays, legal actions, and fund shifting to make bond payments, while making a minimum quantity of foreign currency available to state organs and friends of the regime for the purpose of importing goods to maintain the support of the military and other key regime support groups.[8]

These measures have included drawing down remaining international reserves (largely in gold), continuing to expropriate companies such as General Motors, rolling over bond payments, mortgaging assets such as the petroleum refiner and distributor CITGO, seeking new loans from state partners such as China and trusted companies such as Rosneft,

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and filing creative legal actions to delay decisions and awards against the government.[9] Yet, little new credit is coming in, and the government is running out of assets to mortgage and legal options to postpone payments.

Venezuela is unable to produce needed goods domestically and lacks the cash to import them. The result, as increasingly evidenced in reports coming out of Venezuela, is ever greater scarcity of everything from food and medicine to toilet paper. Store shelves are empty, and people are spending significant portions of their day seeking food and other necessities.[10] Seventy-two percent of Venezuelans report having lost weight in the past year because of such shortages.[11] As *Wall Street Journal* reporter John Forero put it, "Venezuela is starving."[12]

The Maduro government has attempted to address the political implications of such shortages by appointing the military to distribute scarce food.[13] As a result, the system mainly channels the little available food to those who support the regime while also ensuring the military both has reliable access to food for itself as well as opportunities for earning money by selling food on the black market.[14]

With respect to political dynamics, the maneuvers adopted by the Maduro regime have demonstrated its determination to maintain power at any cost and its unwillingness to pursue a sincere political compromise or a constitutional solution that could result in its loss of power. A string of events and U.S. government actions in recent years against leaders in the current Venezuelan regime has highlighted that there are likely solid criminal cases against a significant number of persons in that government, thus signaling to them that a loss of political power could lead to their extradition and imprisonment in the United States. Indicative events include the July 2014 arrest of former Venezuelan security chief Hugo Carbajal when he left the country to become his country's ambassador to Aruba, the November 2015 arrest in Haiti (and subsequent conviction on narcotrafficking charges) of Maduro's nephews, and the U.S. Treasury Department's February 2017 designation of Venezuelan Vice President Tareck El Aissami as a foreign narcotrafficking kingpin.[15]

Reflecting such incentives to maintain power, Maduro and his fellow Chavista elites have violated Venezuela's constitutional order in increasingly egregious ways, demonstrating that a resolution of Venezuela's political and economic crisis through democratic processes is increasingly improbable. Key actions in this regard include dubious rulings by the pro-Maduro National Electoral Council and the Venezuelan Supreme Court

- preventing the opposition from using the supermajority it won in December 2015 elections (by blocking the seating of three opposition congressmen, giving pro-Maduro legislators two-thirds of the chamber);
- blocking a constitutionally stipulated recall referendum against the president;
- stripping the opposition-dominated congress of budgetary and other authority;
- ruling unconstitutional virtually all of the initiatives passed by that congress;
- postponing state and local elections; and
- eliminating key opposition leaders, including jailing Leopoldo López and disqualifying Henrique Capriles.

The Maduro regime has further begun a process of "renewing" the nation's political parties, likely designed to disqualify parties and leaders hostile to the regime if currently delayed local elections or future presidential elections are held.[16] Its boldest step to date, however, was its May 2017 initiative to form a constituent assembly and rewrite the constitution, a process almost certain to eliminate the elected opposition-dominated parliament.[17]

If such actions demonstrate the unwillingness of the Maduro regime to respect constitutional processes and limits that could lead to their loss of power, the Venezuelan military has equally demonstrated its unwillingness to intervene to restore the democratic order or to avert a further economic and political meltdown in the country. While Venezuela's armed forces have traditionally acted as guarantors of the nation's constitutional order, during the eighteen years of rule by populist leader Hugo Chávez and his successor, Maduro, the military has been politicized and heavily indoctrinated with pro-regime ideology. In addition, virtually the entire cadre of its senior leaders has been replaced by regime loyalists.

Further decreasing the likelihood that the armed forces would act to restore Venezuela's constitutional order, the military leadership (and particularly the National Guard) has become too deeply involved in drug trafficking, contraband, and other illicit activities to risk allowing or bringing about such change.[18] Furthermore, the regime has embedded Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence agents throughout the military to keep an eye out for defectors.[19]

Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro (*right*) and Vice President Tareck El Aissami shake hands 14 February 2017 during a meeting with governors in Caracas, Venezuela. El Aissami is heavily involved in drug trafficking and has been widely reported to be providing material and financial support to terrorist groups in the Middle East, including Hezbollah and Hamas. He would assume the Venezuelan presidency under the current Venezuelan constitution if Maduro were forced from office before scheduled elections in October 2018. (Photo courtesy of Venezuelan Government/Miraflores Palace handout)

While the United States has been highly critical of the actions of the Maduro regime, it has not, to date, indicated a disposition to move beyond the imposition of economic sanctions.[20] And, while the OAS under Secretary Luis Almagro has strongly denounced the interruption of the democratic order in Venezuela, the organization principally functions on consensus, and the block of left-leaning anti-U.S. governments represented by the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our Americas (ALBA) continues to oppose any anti-Venezuela action by the OAS.[21] Venezuela's fellow ALBA countries may not agree with Maduro's decisions in governing Venezuela, but, arguably, they do not find it in their strategic interest for the OAS (in which the United States is an important actor) to condemn Venezuela or play a significant role in the region's politics in general. Even if the OAS were to expel Venezuela from the organization for violation of its democratic charter, the Maduro regime already gave its notice in April of its intention to leave the body.[22]

Similarly, while the United Nations Security Council, in theory, could authorize an intervention in Venezuela, permanent members Russia and China would likely veto such action, insofar as each has significant business interests in the country, as well as strategic interest in the persistence of a Venezuelan regime that actively resists the expansion of U.S. influence in the region.[23]

Adding to Venezuela's problems, the probability that violence will escalate is increased by the government's creation and deployment throughout the country of *collectivos,* relatively undisciplined armed bands of civilians, to enforce its will. This will ensure a high cost in lives of Venezuela's own military or of a foreign military if anyone attempts to change the regime by force.

Potential Scenarios for Venezuela

The plausible scenarios for Venezuela (all negative) loosely fall into three groups, based on assumptions regarding which side prevails and whether violence is sustained or dissipates: (1) resistance burnout and consolidation of the criminal state, (2) escalating violence resolved by imposition of a pseudodemocratic compromise regime, and (3) prolonged criminality, repression, and insurgency.

Resistance burnout and consolidation of the criminal state. In this scenario, the military and the government maintain cohesion, and there is no foreign intervention. Eventually, through the regime's control of resources and brutal repression (including violence by the collectivos), the majority of civil resistance is

suppressed or flees the country. Millions depart the country as economic or political refugees, or to escape the criminal violence. With the diminishing of resistance, the regime consolidates its totalitarian order, probably imposing a new constitution and legislative body. Following the imposition of stability, Maduro is killed or pressured to step down, and power passes to a new leader, similarly committed to the populist ideology and the criminal enterprise, but with more rational economic policies and improved managerial capabilities.

With some stability and improved leadership, key anti-United States statist investors such as the Chinese and the Russians begin loaning new money to the regime, further expanding their access to Venezuela's oil resources. New credit from these allies, possibly assisted by rising petroleum prices, supports further consolidation of power by the regime.

Escalating violence resolved by imposition of a compromise regime. In this scenario, violence increases significantly over that manifested in May 2017, possibly involving sporadic major confrontations between collectivos and Venezuelans identifying with the opposition and demanding the restoration of the previous constitutional order. Armed, self-interested groups are involved on all sides.

Violence exceeds the ability of Venezuela's National Guard to control; the regular military, already reluctant to participate in the repression of civilians, is deployed but refuses to act, possibly with some units dissolving or declaring themselves loyal to the opposition. Key extrahemispheric players, including the Chinese and the Russians, make a tacit agreement with the opposition in return for guarantees of the protection of their businesses and other interests in the country. Maduro and other key regime leaders are killed or leave the country, while others cut a deal for a power transition, with the support of key military leaders, in return for limited immunity and protection from extraditions.

Prolonged criminality, repression, and insurgency. In this scenario, like the prior one, violence increases significantly, and the regular military splinters or is too unreliable to be employed. Some key figures possibly flee the country. By contrast to the previous scenario, however, a deal involving a power transition cannot be achieved. Key external players such as Russia and China maintain a "wait-and-see" posture. Protest-based violence, including selective attacks against protesters by collectivos, deteriorates into broader, bloodier efforts by pro-regime forces to intimidate or silence regime opponents through large-scale violence, sparking reprisals by anti-Maduro groups, and occasionally drawing the National Guard and regular military forces into the conflict.

Continuing violence, including possible sabotage of oil installations and other government assets, leads to a broad economic collapse and the highest outflow of refugees of the three contemplated scenarios. In this scenario, major foreign actors, including China, would likely coordinate to evacuate their workers. Depending on the risk posed to Russian, Chinese, and other oil installations, United Nations Security Council agreement to a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission could be possible, presuming that Chavista forces would see permitting such deployments as advantageous, or would no longer be able to block them.

There is no inherent limit to the deepening of suffering, violence, and criminality that could occur. Indeed, the economic plight and abuses by the regimes in Zimbabwe and North Korea serve as reminders of how much a people can suffer at the hands of a totalitarian regime that pursues irrational policies but is determined to maintain itself in power with the acquiescence of its military.

Implications for Venezuela's Neighbors

Each scenario discussed implies an expansion of the already significant outflow of refugees to neighboring Colombia and Brazil, nearby Caribbean islands such as Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad and Tobago, and the rest of the region, as well as the export of arms and broader impacts on the criminal and political landscape.

Colombia. Historically, people and goods have always moved relatively freely across the Venezuela-Colombia border; the mother of Maduro was born in Colombia, and possibly the president himself was as well.[24] Nonetheless, the influx of Venezuelans into Cúcuta and other Colombian border towns has created some resentment among Colombians. Some perceive the new arrivals as competing with them for jobs, particularly in the informal sector, and some believe the refugees have undermined security.[25]

In 2016 alone, over 150,000 people entered Colombia from Venezuela.[26] Some enter on a temporary basis to earn money in the informal or illicit economy and purchase goods not available in their

Venezuelan National Guard soldiers stand on a highway 3 May 2017 overlooking an antigovernment march trying to make its way to the National Assembly in Caracas, Venezuela. More than a hundred Venezuelan protesters were detained and put before military tribunals that week, a sudden upsurge in the use of a practice that legal activists say violates the constitution, which limits military courts to "offenses of a military nature." (Photo by Fernando Llano, Associated Press)

home country, while others choose to remain indefinitely.[27] The Colombian border town of Cúcuta has been the focus of this movement, with significant increases in the population of Venezuelans in the city, including those who work in the informal sector as prostitutes and street vendors, and in other activities. A portion of those crossing the border from Venezuela into Colombia are actually Colombians by birth who had immigrated to Venezuela years or decades prior in search of economic opportunity or to escape violence.

Colombia's major cities such as Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali have also registered significant increases in Venezuelans.[28] However, because two major roads from Venezuela's capital, Caracas, converge on the Colombian border near Cúcuta, an expanded flow of migrants from a deteriorating situation in Venezuela would probably concentrate there and, to a lesser extent, to the north in La Guajira department, including the town of Riohacha, and Valledupar in Cesar department. Nonetheless, some of those leaving Venezuela will also enter Colombia at more southerly points, including Arauca, Puerto Carreño, and Inírida, where controls are weaker.

Of those who initially migrated to Venezuela from Colombia, many now returning are expected to settle in the border region, since they have family or other contacts in the region.[29] Of those arriving from cities on Venezuela's Caribbean coast, such as Caracas, Puerto Cabello, Maracay, and Valencia, many will likely migrate toward Colombia's own Caribbean coast, to cities such as Maicao, Barranquilla, and Sincelejo, where the climate and culture are familiar. By contrast, Venezuelans coming from more rural areas to the south of the nation's principal mountain range will likely gravitate toward cities in the interior of Colombia on the other side of its flatlands, such as Villavicencio and Bogotá.

(Map courtesy of Google Maps)

Venezuela and Neighboring Countries

Other migration routes notwithstanding, the focus of migration on Cúcuta and La Guajira raises particular concerns for Colombia since the area, particularly Catatumbo and other parts of the province of Norte de Santander, is a hotbed of criminal and terrorist activity, with Colombia's notorious Gulf Clan and the National Liberation Army (ELN) vying to fill in areas being vacated by the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC).[30] In this complex dynamic, the newly arriving immigrants are both potential victims of and recruits for those organizations. Indeed, given the established history of cross-border smuggling, Colombian security officials believe that some people crossing the border are moving drugs and contraband, among other illicit activities.

Further to the south, in border towns such as Arica, Puerto Carreño, and Inírida, although the current and expected volume of immigration from Venezuela is less of a problem, the area is the center of the illicit mining for coltan, a strategic mineral used in a wide array of advanced batteries and electronics products.

In addition to the potentially destabilizing impact of refugee flows on both the Colombian economy and centers of organized crime in the country, Colombian security experts worry that some of Venezuela's collectivos and other groups will sell their FN FAL (light automatic) rifles and other military equipment to help maintain themselves, flooding contested criminal areas such as Catatumbo with arms as well as people in economic need.[31]

As the Venezuelan crisis deepens and the flow of refugees grows, de facto encampments are likely to form, particularly around Cúcuta. It will be in the interest of Colombia to formally manage such camps to alleviate suffering and to prevent them from becoming centers of criminal recruitment and victimization, given the challenging environment of the zone.

In preparation for a refugee crisis, the Colombian government has an established system, the "national entity for the management of the risk of disasters," that was used when Venezuela expelled more than six thousand Colombians from the country in August 2015.[32] Nonetheless, security experts in Colombia are concerned

that the resource requirements and the complexity of a massive flood of refugees from Venezuela would likely overwhelm the system's capacity.[33]

For Colombia, such challenges come at a time in which its military's resources for operations and maintenance are declining significantly, while the government is searching for the resources to fund the substantial obligations that it incurred in the agreement that it signed with the FARC in November 2016. Colombia must also deal with the upsurge of criminal and other violence between the ELN and criminal bands as the FARC demobilizes and withdraws from its former territory.[34]

Beyond outflows of people and guns, as the position of the Maduro leadership in Venezuela becomes more uncertain, Colombian security and defense professionals also worry that Venezuela could seek to provoke a war; this would serve to divert the attention of the Venezuelan people and the international community as well as maintain the unity of the Venezuelan military.[35] Indeed, Venezuela has a long history of aggressive posturing toward Colombia, including territorial claims over La Guajira and substantial parts of Colombia's eastern plains in Venezuela's 1999 constitution.[36] In March 2008, then President Chávez called to move ten Venezuelan armored brigades to the Colombian border in response to Colombia's signing of a base status agreement with the United States.[37] It further conducted a war game that year, Guaicaipuro, focused on a preemptive Venezuelan invasion of the Guajira. More recently, provocative Venezuelan actions include its conduct of a nationwide mobilization exercise, Zamora 200; its deployment of a small military force across the Arauca River into Colombia in March 2017; and the increasingly bellicose rhetoric of the Maduro regime toward Colombia, calling the nation a "failed state."[38]

Brazil and Guyana. While Colombia has, to date, borne the brunt of the spillover effects of the Venezuela crisis, Venezuelans have also crossed into the Brazilian state of Roraima. On one weekend in June 2016 alone, an estimated 150,000 Venezuelans crossed into Brazil, although only a portion stayed, while others came to purchase food and other goods.[39] In May 2017, the mayor of the Brazilian city of Manaus declared an emergency after more than 350 Venezuelan refugees appeared on its streets, while more Venezuelan refugees have also been seen in the provincial capital of Boa Vista.[40]

With respect to Venezuela's other neighbor, Guyana, although the two countries share a land border, the relative lack of infrastructure connecting the two across Guyana's Essequibo region and the lack of population in the area has limited the migration of Venezuelans to Guyana to date. As with Colombia, however, Guyanese worry that in a moment of crisis, the Maduro regime could provoke a military crisis with Guyana as a diversionary tactic, based on a historical dispute over the Essequibo region. The Maduro regime attempted to resurrect the dispute in September 2015, just months after ExxonMobil discovered significant oil deposits off the coast of the disputed area.[41]

Island nations. In addition to the countries that share a land border with Venezuela, instability in the country is affecting its neighbors in the Caribbean. Venezuelans looking to obtain supplies or to escape economic and other hardship in the country are crossing the relatively narrow expanse of Caribbean water to the nearby islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad and Tobago.[42] In Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuelans reportedly take a ferry or hire local boats to cross the seven kilometers of water separating the two countries in order to buy goods in Trinidadian stores. In some cases, they bring guns from Venezuela to trade for food and other basic goods. And, the interchange between Venezuela and its island neighbors, exacerbated by the combination of sheer economic need and the breakdown of law and order, has also contributed to piracy off its coast.[43]

In Trinidad and Tobago, as in the La Guajira region on the Caribbean coast of Colombia, an additional risk is created by the possible migration of persons with ties to radical Islamic groups such as Hezbollah. During recent years, Iran reportedly used Venezuela as a point of entry for its Qods forces (religious paramilitary agents), while Venezuelan authorities sold government-issued passports to refugees from Syria and other parts of the Middle East.[44] While there has been little evidence of the outflow of such migrants to date, the established Muslim communities in Trinidad and Tobago and La Guajira make both a logical destination if the crisis in Venezuela deepens. Given that Trinidad and Tobago is already a leading source on a per capita basis for foreign fighters to the Middle East, migration from Venezuela of those affiliated with radical Islamic groups would have a potentially radicalizing and destabilizing effect on the Islamic communities in those areas.[45]

Recommendations for the United States

Despite the systemic looting of Venezuela by the Maduro regime, U.S. intervention in Venezuela would be strategically unwise. While such action could topple Venezuela's Bolivarian socialist government, it would reinforce the historic perception of the United States in the region as interventionist, sowing distrust and other anti-U.S. sentiment. In addition, in the short-term, it would leave behind an economically decimated, highly corrupted and politically polarized state. Following intervention, the United States would face the dilemma of allowing the newly "liberated" but broken Venezuelan state to continue as a source of criminality and instability in the region or engaging in the lengthy, expensive effort of trying to rebuild the country. In the process, as in the Middle East, the U.S. presence in Venezuela would likely become the focal point for rallying anti-U.S. sentiment, and U.S. forces in Venezuela would present a tempting target for the Chavista "resistance" and leftist terrorist groups posturing as resistors of the "yanqui invasion."

While it would be unwise for the United States to intervene in Venezuela and unrealistic for the international community to do so, both nonetheless have an important role in shaping the evolution of the situation in a positive direction, and in managing the consequences of the crisis in Venezuela on its neighbors. With respect to Venezuela itself, the United States should give the fullest support possible to the OAS, currently under Secretary Almagro, in condemning the departure from the democratic order established by Venezuela's constitution, and it should support the OAS and other multilateral and bilateral efforts pressuring the Chavista elite to restore that order. Also, it is imperative that the United States continue to highlight publicly the illegitimacy of the Maduro regime as a criminal elite that has, through administrative machinations, stolen control of the resource-rich state from its people, and which is increasingly relying on the force of arms to continue looting the state with an eye to making good a "getaway" with the money.

As part of such efforts, the United States must lead the international community in isolating the Chavista leadership through individually targeted economic sanctions, cooperating with other players in the international community to deny the Chavistas sanctuary in other countries after their rule. The U.S. State Department, Treasury Department, and other appropriate organizations should particularly focus on the legal and financial arenas, supporting Venezuela's National Assembly as it invalidates contracts made by the Chavista elite outside the constitutional order. This approach may have only limited short-term impacts in Venezuela itself, but it may help change the calculations of key Maduro regime benefactors such as China and Russia, convincing them that their best strategy for securing their oil holdings and other interests in the country is by working through the constitutionally legitimate National Assembly rather than the executive branch, whose operation outside the constitution leaves its commitments of Venezuelan resources to others without legal validity.

Beyond addressing the crisis in Venezuela itself, the United States should actively work with the country's neighbors to prevent the byproducts of the crisis, including the outflow of refugees and arms, from destabilizing the region. Venezuela's neighbor, Colombia, confronts the double challenge of being the country most impacted by the flow of Venezuelan refugees and arms (and possible military provocations), while dealing with the enormous resource and internal security challenges arising from its government's peace agreement with the FARC. While the Colombians take pride in their own capabilities, they will need more (and different) support from the United States, not less, in the months ahead.

In the short term, the United States should coordinate with Colombia, as well as Aruba, Curaçao, Trinidad and Tobago, and other states, in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations, to support the needs of the refugees. It should collaborate with the governments of the region to provide logistics, intelligence, and other support as permitted by national laws to help protect those refugees from victimization and criminal recruitment, as well as to monitor who is coming in, where they are going, and how they are affecting the local criminal environment. Particularly in Colombia, the United States should consider increased intelligence, training, and material support to police, prosecutors, and special military units combatting organized crime, which will likely expand through the refugee and arms flows.

In the unlikely, but not inconceivable, event that the Maduro administration attempts to provoke a military conflict with Colombia or Guyana, the United States should be prepared to provide military and other support to defend the territorial sovereignty of each. However, it

Venezuelan citizens holding signs that read *Primero Justicia*, or Justice First, fill the streets of Maracaibo, Venezuela, 6 September 2016, demanding the recall of President Nicolás Maduro. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

should avoid direct military intervention in Venezuelan territory aside from possible selective removal of offensive capabilities being used against Venezuela's neighbors, such as combat aircraft and helicopters in their bases, or forward-deployed armored vehicles.

As the United States supports the countries of the region in their response to the Venezuelan crisis, it should, wherever possible, work through the OAS and other multilateral institutions of the Inter-American System, including a coordinated response to the handling of refugees.[46] The United States should also look for ways to leverage the events of the Conference of American Armies, of which it is head during the current two-year cycle, as a vehicle for such coordination in military affairs.[47] Finally, the United States should be prepared to work with the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping or peace enforcement force into the region when the evolution of the crisis and the positions of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council make such action feasible.

Conclusion

The crisis in Venezuela is a tragedy with grave implications for its neighbors and the region. Yet, in that tragedy, there is also opportunity for the United States to strengthen its relationship with countries in the region by tangibly demonstrating its commitment to work with them to mitigate the effects of the crisis. It is also an opportunity to do so in a way that strengthens the OAS and Inter-American System (in whose functionality the United States has a strategic interest) as the principal multilateral vehicle for addressing regional security issues.

The Venezuela crisis may be the first opportunity of the Trump administration to define its vision for democracy, security, and good governance in the region, and to demonstrate its commitment to the partner nations with which the United States shares the Western Hemisphere. Given U.S. connectedness to the region through geography, commerce, and family ties, doing so is critical not only for the Trump administration and Venezuela's neighbors but also for the United States and the region as a whole. ■

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Staff conversations, which included General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov (*second from left*) and then General-Lieutenant Andrey Valerievich Kartapolov (*second from right*) were held 15 July 2015 at the Russian Ministry of Defense in Moscow with representatives of the Republic of Korea. The writings and published speeches by both men are widely regarded as reflecting dominant strategic concepts guiding development of the Russian military. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War

Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired

This article discusses the three Russian military articles about which most Western military analysts specializing in Russia have focused their attention over the past four years. Unlike other analyses of those articles, this one offers a different perspective in that it compares them side by side, examining the text of the original versions and not merely the press reports about them. New graphs and tables included in the original versions are named, and a few are discussed further, and one is included here. This article is intended to do four things in particular. First, it demonstrates that five elements of Russian military thought continue to dominate

the descriptions of conflict by military experts. Second, it demonstrates the Russian General Staff's preference for the term "new-type" warfare over the term "new-generation warfare" (NGW) and the near total absence of the latter from Russian publications since 2013. Third, it highlights that there are also indications in the articles that Russia may have in mind yet another way to describe the contemporary way of war still in development. Lastly, the absence of the Russian military's use of the term "hybrid" to describe its way of war is noteworthy.

Description of the Articles

For the past four years, Westerners have treated three articles in the Russian military press as the loci of contemporary Russian military thought. They are the transcript of General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov's early 2013 speech at the Academy of Military Science, retired General-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov and Reserve Colonel S. G. Chekinov's article in late 2013 in *Military Thought*, and the transcript of then General-Lieutenant (now Colonel-General) Andrey V. Kartapolov's early 2015 speech at the Academy of Military Science.

In these articles, Gerasimov discusses tendencies and new forms and methods of fighting; Bogdanov and Chekinov cover what they term "new-generation warfare," an expression that has not appeared in Russian military publications ever since; and Kartapolov examines what is termed "new-type warfare" (NTW).

Of interest is that Western explanations of these articles have been incisive but also sometimes incorrect—incisive in that many of the main issues are highlighted but incorrect in that they offer no context or access to the original articles, which has conveyed some inaccuracies that have clouded accurate analysis. For example, the title of Gerasimov's 2013 speech is "Basic Tendencies in the Development of Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding their Improvement" and not "The Value of Foresight," which indicates that most analysts did not have access to the original article but rather read only how it was titled and stated in Russia's *Journal of the Military-Industrial Complex* (*VPK*). The focus of this article is actually trends in warfare, and forms and methods of confronting them.

In addition—for Gerasimov and Kartapolov's articles in particular—there were several graphs or tables that went with their speeches that were published in the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science* that do not appear to have been analyzed in discussions outside or inside of Russia thus far. Though only one graph is included in this article, each graph or table added much to one's understanding of their speeches.

This paper will briefly examine the contents of these three works and will focus on the messages of each author when applied within the context of Russian military thought. It is important to keep in mind (as reflected in these three documents) that Russian military thought, in the opinion of this author, consists of five basic elements: trends in war's changing character, forecasting, strategy and the correlation of forces along strategic axes, forms and methods of the means of struggle, and the use of past lessons.[1] Each author's discussion tends to emphasize many of these elements of military thought.

Finally, Russian military authors indicate that its military conducts NTW and not hybrid war. While no specific article is used to make this point, it is worth noting that Russia's military makes the opposite assertion, that the west is using hybrid tactics against Russia (see discussion of the Kartapolov article below). For example, with regard to hybrid war, a Russian military journal article in 2015 stated the following:

> "Hybrid warfare (*gibridnaya voyna*)," then, is not exactly the right term and is slightly at odds with the glossary used in this country's military science. Essentially, these actions can be regarded as a form of confrontation between countries or, in a narrow sense, as a form in which

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forces and capabilities are used to assure national security.[2]

Further, Russian President Vladimir Putin (on 30 May 2017) stated in an interview with *Le Figaro* newspaper,

> There is no need to escalate anything, no need to think up mythical Russian threats, hybrid wars, and so on. These are your own fancy, and then you scare yourselves, and based on that formulate a policy prospect. Such a policy has no prospects.[3]

Gerasimov in Early 2013

General Staff Chief Gerasimov's speech, transcribed and published in an article in *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)* in 2013, is about trends, forms (which are military organizations), and methods (which include weapons and types of military art) for use by Russia's armed forces.[4] He begins his discussion with some of the trends he observed in war's changing character. These trends include the assertions that

- wars are no longer declared,
- "color revolutions" (mass popular demonstrations conducted in conjunction with other popular efforts to undermine national governing institutions) can occur quickly;
- new-type wars are like regular wars (his mention of NTW precedes Kartapolov's by two years, and Gerasimov never used the NGW term in any of his five annual speeches at the Academy of Military Science); and
- nonmilitary methods at times are more effective than military ones.



The 2013 issue of the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science* in which Valery V. Gerasimov's article "Principal Trends in the Development of the Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding their Improvement" was published (page 24). (Image courtesy of the author)

Gerasimov first asserts that a combination of nonmilitary methods, including the protest potential of the population, covert military measures, information operations, and special forces' activities, are being implemented by some nations to control conflict. (Ironically, the formula he describes is reminiscent of Russia's own activities associated with the annexation of Crimea.) He also notes that peacekeeping and what he terms "crisis regulation" operations can sometimes be used as open military employment of forces to achieve specific goals.[5]

Second, Gerasimov lists a set of developments that appear to describe how an actual contemporary war would be fought. He asserts that the principal tactic within this set of developments is noncontact or remote engagement, since information technology has greatly reduced the spatial and temporal distances between opponents. As a consequence, he notes, operational pauses are disappearing. He then describes how the levels of war and fighting (strategy, operations, tactics; offense and defense) have leveled off due to the existence of information technologies. Third, he specifies that the use of joint mobile forces operating in a reconnaissance and information environment is growing. Fourth, he describes the efficacy of no-fly zones, blockades, and the use of private military companies, observing that they are being used more often. Fifth, he describes the types of asymmetric methods of confronting an opponent that are under development. To further progress in these areas, Gerasimov requests during his speech that the Academy of Military Science help in developing new forms and methods of asymmetric use.

Finally, he asserts that the use of precision-guided munitions, robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, and weapons based on new physical principles will be the new main methods for engaging an enemy.[6]

Next, Gerasimov reviews and describes the forms and methods of fighting that Soviet forces used in Afghanistan, to include a table in the article listing them. He states that "a very important set of issues is associated with improving the forms and methods of employing force groupings." And, in accordance with the title of the article, he goes on to describe a number of forms and methods needed by Russia's military, such as those used for implementation outside of Russia's borders; for Russia's aerospace forces; and for rescue, humanitarian, special, evacuations, and other operations. Gerasimov also notes that forms (no mention of methods) are also needed for strategic operations and peacekeeping.[7]

This description of forms and methods is augmented with an assessment of how to improve Russia's territorial defense concept. In furtherance of this objective, Gerasimov indicates that he is seeking a way to integrate civilian and military infrastructures so that, in case of conflict, everyone would fight in defense of Russia's territory. This must be accomplished, Gerasimov then notes, with the cooperation of the state's power structures and other state structures. One consequence of this need is the development of new ways to support decision making.[8]

In light of his comments naming territorial defense as a specified need, subsequent progress seems to have been made toward achieving this objective, since it appears that Russia's National Defense Management Center (NDMC), during the Kavkaz–2016 exercise, accomplished the goal of improving territorial defense by taking charge of integrating military and civilian structures. Additionally, the NDMC, which was the focus of Gerasimov's 2015 academy speech, reportedly also has instituted modeling and simulations to improve decision-making capabilities and has begun teaching civilians integration techniques with the military.

Gerasimov concludes his speech noting that changes in the nature of conflict require new support systems and new forms and methods for employing the means of struggle. He states that Russia must not copy foreign experience. Rather than follow, the requirement is to "outrun" adversaries and be in a leading position with regard to these means. To date, with its focus on developing new weapons of all types, from hypersonic to quantum, Russia's Defense Ministry appears to be closely adhering to this advice. Further, he asserts that forecasting the types of war into which Russia could be drawn was very important. He closes by citing Alexander Svechin's comments on strategic thought from years ago that "each conflict has a logic all its own." He concludes by stating that he is counting on the Academy of Military Science to study various ways to approach different types of conflict and support his efforts in this regard.[9]

Gerasimov's speech includes several diagrams or tables. One diagram highlighted the use of nonmilitary methods being used by a 4:1 ratio over military methods. There are three diagrams that focused on forms and methods of conflict (traditional, new, and those used in Afghanistan). Finally, there is a list of the principal tasks of military science, a diagram of U.S. robotics, and a list of ways to use Russia's Armed Forces outside of Russia's borders.[10]



Military Review

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For more detailed discussion of the intellectual and cultural environment within which Russian officer thinking is shaped, see Timothy Thomas's monograph "Thinking like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016) by visiting http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20Officer_monograph_Thomas%20(final).pdf.

Chekinov and Bogdanov in Late 2013

In the conclusion to their article in issue 10 of *Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought)* in 2013, retired General-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov and Reserve Colonel S. G. Chekinov state that "information superiority and

anticipatory operations will be the main ingredients of success in new-generation wars."[11] To understand this point of view, it is important to backtrack in the article and focus on what supporting evidence the authors offer for these two items.

A key assertion they make is that forecasting is perhaps a better way to understand "anticipatory operations." The Russian translation actually is "the first to see will be the first to start decisive actions."[12] With regard to information superiority, the authors make two key points in their paper. The first point is that "no goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains information superiority over the other."[13] Therefore, it will be necessary to obtain superiority in regard to information technology since new weapons have greater killing power, range, accuracy, and speed. Superior information technologies are needed to provide the intelligence, reconnaissance, control, communications, and information warfare capabilities with greater potential.[14] Such weapons have "altered significantly the patterns of manpower employment and the conduct of military operations."[15] This requires a focus on new-generation weaponry in particular, such as robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, quantum computing, precision-guided munitions, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and electronic warfare capabilities.[16] These weapons are the result of technologies that both integrate capabilities at nanosecond speed and offer capabilities never before anticipated.[17] For example, robotics can conduct reconnaissance, coordinate combat operations of different branches, repair weapons, build defenses, destroy enemy hardware, clear mines, and deactivate contaminated areas.[18]

The 2013 issue of *Military Thought (#10)* in which retired General-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov and Reserve Colonel S. G. Chekinov's article "On the Character and Content of Wars of a New Generation" was published (page 13). (Image courtesy of the author)

The second point the authors make is the need to establish what they refer to as "information and psychological warfare" superiority. This refers to control over information pressure that can be exerted against an adversary through the media, nongovernmental organizations, foreign grants, religious organizations, propaganda, and disinformation designed to stoke chaos in a society.[19] Meanwhile, Russia will attempt to defend itself from similar threats and create a favorable setting for armed forces operations by countering the information-psychological warfare it believes is being waged against it through nonmilitary and deterrence means. Nonmilitary means include information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, economic, and others. Deterrence measures also include a demonstration of force readiness, a warning about the immediate use of the nuclear option, and the preparation and conduct of an information operation to mislead the enemy about Russia's readiness to fight.[20]

The authors' discussion of the forecasting aspect of NGW's ingredients for success is equally, if not more, interesting, since it focuses on the importance of the opening and closing periods of conflict, the identification of targets that ensure success, and the employment of measures that will ensure victory. The opening period of war (the authors had earlier written on the initial period of war) is forecasted as pivotal. They assert that it will include a targeted information operation, an electronic warfare operation, an aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms, long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles. The closing period will be used to roll over or annihilate remaining units, primarily through the use of ground troops.[21]

Targets that must be identified in the forecasting process and subsequently neutralized are critical government and military control centers, key military-industrial complex facilities, and the opposing armed force's management system. Also of vital importance is the prevention of an orderly deployment of an opponent's forces. Victory is assured if an opponent's political and economic system is made ungovernable, its population demoralized, and its key military-industrial complexes destroyed or damaged beyond repair, according to the authors.[22]

The other key aspect of this article is a focus on the trends in the changing character of war that Russia sees developing, not the forecasted nature of how to defeat these trends as the opening and closing period forecasts suggest. Here three such trends are noted. First, the principal tactic of NGW is stated to be remote engagement, since information technology has greatly reduced the distance (physical, temporal, and informational) between opponents. Second, the levels of war and fighting (strategy, operations, and tactics; offense and defense) have leveled out due to the existence of information technologies. Third, the use of joint mobile forces operating in a reconnaissance and information environment is growing.[23] Of note, these trends and a few others, almost word for word, appear lifted from Gerasimov's earlier 2013 speech.

The authors go on to observe that new weapons and methods for using them have radically changed the character and content of armed struggle. New patterns of manpower employment and the conduct of military operations have changed in several ways. As a consequence, there are now no longer clear dividing lines between opponents; flanks are more exposed; orders of battle have gaps; attacker high-tech weapons offer overwhelming superiority; long-range high-precision weapons can be used on a mass scale; vital economic facilities and control centers can be destroyed as never before; reconnaissance, fire, electronic, and information warfare forces of different branches and arms are now integrated; and orbiting satellites are playing a role on a wide scale.[24] Finally, asymmetric means, nonmilitary measures, and indirect means will be used more than before to offset an opponent's superiority.

Thus, this article focuses on the necessity of gaining information superiority, forecasting war's probable direction, and developing an appreciation for the changing character of armed conflict, such as an increased role for nonmilitary operations. In their writings after this article appeared, the authors resorted only to the use of NTW and not NGW. Of interest is that the NGW topic appears to have disappeared in Russian military journals since Chekinov and Bogdanov's 2013 article. Moreover, the authors did not touch on NGW in the seven articles they have written since, which covered topics in *Military Thought* on futurology, the art of war, forecasting, military art, twenty-first century military security, strategy, and the concept of war. They only referred to NTW, indicating a preference for the General Staff's terminology, as the next section demonstrates.

Kartapolov in Early 2015

General-Lieutenant Andrey V. Kartapolov was chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff when he gave a speech at the Russian Academy of Military Science that covered the elements of NTW in early 2015. Regarding Russia's armed forces, he noted,

> Nonstandard forms and methods are being developed for the employment of our Armed Forces, which will make it possible to level the enemy's technological superiority. For this, the features of the preparation and conduct of new-type warfare are being fully used and "asymmetric" methods of confronting the enemy are being developed.[25]

He goes on to assert that the shift from large-scale operations to the use of precision-guided munitions has changed the character of warfare, since they are directed not just against force groupings of a state but also against critical infrastructure deep inside an opponent's state. The United States and NATO, with new strategic missile defense systems, are attempting to offset other nations' abilities to conduct such operations, thus undermining global stability and disrupting the developed correlation of forces in the nuclear missile sphere.[26]

Kartapolov then discusses many of the same elements of Russian military thought as Gerasimov, Chekinov, and Bogdanov. These include the need to develop new weapons, the forms and methods of their use, new changes in the nature of armed struggle, and the increasing use of nontraditional models of confrontation that use both direct and indirect actions. He then spends considerable ink on what he describes as America's anti-Russian campaign and its attempts to remain the world's sole superpower through the introduction of hybrid methods that include information-psychological effects. This involves



(Graphic translated by Dr. Harold Orenstein)

Graphic from Andrey V. Kartapolov's "Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Resources and Methods of Conducting Them. Direct and Indirect Actions in Contemporary International Conflicts," Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 2 [*Journal of the Academy of Military Science* 2] (2015): 35.

indirect actions that consist of covert activities directed toward igniting internal problems in an opponent's population and the use of so-called "third forces." Political campaigns run by the West, he notes, conduct hidden "information pressure" that accuses others of human rights violations, tyranny, development of weapons of mass destruction, and absence of democracy. Information confrontations are conducted using falsifications, replacements, or the distortion of information.[27] All of these, interestingly enough, sound exactly like the methods Russia used in Ukraine to seize Crimea.

Kartapolov then goes into a long discussion of color revolutions, which he says result in confusion among the West's opponents over who is fighting and for what, what is truth, and what is a lie.[28] Again, this sounds very close to what Russia's state-controlled media has excelled at in areas such as the Baltics, where they concoct their own reality and ignore the truth. He then states that the West's use of NTW methods is violating humanitarian standards, is displacing populations, and is more like the conduct of genocide. The pretext for interference by force is conducted "under the guise of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe and stabilizing the situation." He then asserts that NTW is 80–90 percent propaganda and 10–20 percent violence.[29]

To combat these tendencies, direct action (such as offensive actions) must adhere to the principle of dynamism, as a passive operation will lead to a loss of command and control. Also, he asserts that armed resources must be improved, especially the capabilities of intelligence, command and control, and destruction means, with the capability to strike from great distances.[30]

It is thus a contradictory view of NTW that Kartapolov presents. He stresses several times how the West, and the United States in particular, uses the concept and does so in a ruthless manner. Then, at the end of his presentation, he clearly states that Russia is preparing to conduct NTW as well in conjunction with the development of asymmetric methods. The NTW diagram (graphic on page 40) Kartapolov uses to explain the concept is attached at the end of this presentation.[31] Note that he equates indirect actions (a Russian focus) with hybrid ones (a U.S. focus). The importance of the diagram is that Kartapolov offers something no other Russian officer has attempted, a view on how future conflicts develop and are handled in phases.

Subsequent to publication of his 2015 speech at the Academy of Military Science, Andrey V. Kartapolov was promoted to colonel-general and appointed as commander of the Western Military District troops in 2015. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Kartapolov notes at the end of his presentation that the development of asymmetric and indirect actions must be introduced into operational training. Further, he adds that new and improved resources and methods for conducting contemporary military conflicts are growing and are "capable of giving birth to other forms of warfare as well."[32] Thus, he implies that NGW and NTW methods may only be steps along the way to the development of new forms and methods of warfare.

Kartapolov's presentation includes several graphics. They discuss the United States' 2015 national security strategy, the development and escalation of military conflicts, basic differences between traditional wars and contemporary conflicts, classical forms of the conduct of armed warfare (here were cover photos of Russian military regulations), changes in the character of armed conflict, priority trends in the development and creation of contemporary combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, and a chart with several types of asymmetric operations.[33]

Conclusions

All three articles focus on developing trends in warfare, the changing character of conflict, and the need for new forms and methods of fighting. Owing to the prominence of the authors, they may be taken as representative of prevailing Russian military thought at the highest levels. Each presentation, however, also has a particular proclivity that is worthy of mention.

In Gerasimov's article, it is the fact that Russia must try to outrun its potential opponents in weaponry and not just copy foreign experience. For this reason, the West must expect Russia's modernization example to continue unabated until, from Putin's point of view, Russia surpasses the West in competency on modernized equipment and preeminence in asymmetric insights and capabilities.

Gerasimov's speech is also the first to express the observation that in contemporary conflict, nonmilitary methods are being used at a ratio of 4:1 relative to military methods. Finally, he focuses on improving Russia's territorial defense concept, which gives the country defense in depth by integrating civilian structures with military ones. This objective seems to have been accomplished with Russia's development of the NDMC.

For Bogdanov and Chekinov, their explanation of NGW as a topic seems to have disappeared. Whether this is because discussion of the concept has now entered classified channels in Russia or if it has simply lost its utility and has been replaced by other concepts is unknown. Irrespective, the discussion of new generation weapons

has continued. Almost daily in the Russian press, there is mention of weaponry's new generational impact, whether it be weapons based on new physical principles or, as one author noted, weapons that cannot be discussed in the press at this time. The authors further stress that new patterns of manpower employment have evolved and the conduct of military operations has changed.

Kartapolov's article is the most controversial in that he spends an inordinate amount of attention on Western methods of fighting, asserting that hybrid methods were used by the United States and NATO for the past twenty years. He describes the characteristics of NTW and offers a diagram illustrating how NTW might proceed. Then, at the end of his article, he notes that Russia will be implementing NTW and improving it with asymmetric and indirect methods. Perhaps of greatest interest is his statement that new and improved resources and methods for conducting contemporary military conflicts are growing and are "capable of giving birth to other forms of warfare as well."

Meanwhile, U.S. military centers around the country continue to focus on NGW concepts. Undoubtedly, there is value in this, and the effort should continue. But, leaders also need to be made aware of the fact that this concept, a "one off," has disappeared from Russian writings. It is time that an equal amount of focus be placed on NTW, the concept of recent emphasis, which even the authors of the new-generation article appear to have adopted. It is very important to continue to follow what these and other prominent Russian military authors have to say in the future. Their insights on the changing character of warfare, in particular, help all nations obtain another perspective on the path that humanity is taking in accordance with the development of new weaponry. The path is not an optimistic one, as it is littered with potential risks for unintended and perhaps tragic consequences for most nations if many of the concepts—use of hypersonic, nuclear, quantum, etc.—are ever used, especially by rogue nations. ■

Notes

1. For a discussion of these elements, see Timothy Thomas, "Thinking like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War" (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016), accessed 10 May 2017, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20Officer_monograph_Thomas%20(final).pdf.
2. V. B. Andrianov and V. V. Loyko, "Questions Regarding the Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Crisis Situations in Peacetime," *Voennaya Mysl* 1 (*Military Thought* 1) (2015), 68.
3. "Macron et Poutine: L'entente Contre le Terrorisme," *Le Figaro*, 30 May 2017, cited in Russian Interfax News Agency (in English), 30 May 2017.
4. Valery V. Gerasimov, "Principal Trends in the Development of the Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding Their Improvement," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk* 1 (*Journal of the Academy of Military Science* 1) (2013): 24–29.
5. Ibid., 24.
6. Ibid., 24, 26.
7. Ibid., 26–27.
8. Ibid., 28.
9. Ibid., 29.
10. Ibid., 25–28.
11. S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "On the Character and Content of Wars of a New Generation," *Voennaya Mysl* 10 (*Military Thought* 10) (2013): 13–24.
12. Ibid., 24.
13. Ibid., 14.
14. Ibid., 15.
15. Ibid., 17.
16. Ibid., 21–22.
17. Ibid., 20.
18. Ibid., 22.
19. Ibid., 17–18.
20. Ibid., 20, 24.
21. Ibid., 23.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 13.
24. Ibid., 16–17.
25. Andrey V. Kartapolov, "Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Resources and Methods of Conducting Them. Direct and Indirect Actions in Contemporary International Conflicts," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk* 2 (*Journal of the Academy of Military Science* 2) (2015): 35.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 29.
28. Ibid., 30–31.
29. Ibid., 33.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 28.
32. Ibid., 36.
33. Ibid., 27–28, 30–32, and 34–35.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects the Sci-Tech Complex 28 October 2015 in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency)

North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations

1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, U.S. Army

As recently as 2014, some Western cyber experts were describing the cyber capabilities of North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) with apparent indifference, such as Jason Andress and Steve Winterfield in *Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners*, who characterized the DPRK's capability to carry out cyberattacks as "… questionable, but [it] may actually exist."[1] The well-known November 2014 cyberattack attributed to the DPRK, executed against Sony Corporation as a response to the film *The Interview,* helped change perceptions in the United States of DPRK cyber capabilities—from a minor local nuisance directed at South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) to a major global strategic threat.[2]

While the DPRK has been considered a major strategic cyber threat since the attack on Sony, consideration also should be given to the potential tactical use of cyber capabilities as an extension of its warfighting strategy.

> … the real purpose of the DPRK's military policy and political aggressiveness has become to control and subdue its own population and retain power …

The less familiar tactical use of cyberattacks as a means of warfighting poses a greater threat to ROK and U.S. forces than any politically motivated strategic cyberattack ever could. The DPRK military's materiel is considered technologically obsolete at the tactical level. However, evidence suggests the Korean People's Army (KPA) will conduct cyber operations as an asymmetric means to disrupt enemy command and control and to offset its technological disadvantages during combat operations; therefore, U.S. and partner forces should prepare for this threat.[3]

North Korean Military Strategy

To understand how the DPRK would be likely to conduct tactical cyber operations in support of combat units during war, it is helpful to consider the historical aims and presumed military theory of the increasingly isolated and technologically declining nation. After failing to unify the peninsula from 1950 to 1953, *kukka mokp'yo*—communization of the ROK, through military force if necessary—became and has remained a primary objective of the DPRK, according to Korea expert James M. Minnich.[4] As a 2012 report to Congress pointed out, however, the real purpose of the DPRK's military policy and political aggressiveness has become to control and subdue its own population and retain power rather than to unify the Korean Peninsula.[5] Nonetheless, events such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 and the exchange of artillery fire in Yeoncheon in 2015 have shown that minor provocations have the potential to erupt into open combat. Moreover, combat could become full-scale war. Whether through accidental escalation of force or a premeditated surprise invasion, the DPRK may be fully willing to go to war.[6]

Following its failure in the Korean War, the DPRK expanded and reorganized its military using features of the Soviet and Chinese militaries. Subsequently, it has continued to draw influence, equipment, and doctrine from Russia and China, according to Minnich.[7] To avoid the same fate as the drawn-out invasion of the ROK, the DPRK military appears to have developed a strategy known as *kisub chollyak*, which calls for a quick, decisive war conducted with mixed tactics against ROK and U.S. military forces on the peninsula.[8] This approach has become more intransigent over time due to the DPRK's increasing economic inability to sustain a protracted war. Therefore, to achieve its tactical objectives as rapidly as possible, the DPRK has organized its military to initiate combat with "massive conventional and chemical cannon and missile bombardments while simultaneously employing special operations forces teams," according to Minnich.[9] Estimates of the number of DPRK special operations forces vary between eighty thousand and one hundred eighty thousand soldiers who could conduct asymmetric attacks in the south, intended to enable the large-scale light infantry forces that would follow.[10]

Initially, the DPRK likely considered bombardment and special operations followed by a large-scale invasion force sufficient to quickly disrupt, confuse, outmaneuver, and overwhelm peninsula-based ROK and U.S. military

forces before U.S. reinforcements could arrive. However, the strategy faced a shock in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of materiel support that came from it. This shock no doubt was amplified in 1991 by the unexpectedly fast and easy defeat by the United States of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army, which attempted to employ similar tactics and weaponry against the United States as the DPRK had long planned to use against the ROK.[11] The fall of Hussein's numerically superior army to the U.S. military surely came as a wake-up call to China and the DPRK, which were relying on technologically inferior but numerically superior forces to overwhelm their enemies quickly. Technology was proven superior to overwhelming numbers in force-on-force combat. Concurrently, the likelihood that DPRK forces would be easily overmatched by U.S. technological advantages was accompanied by a rapid decline of the DPRK economic and agricultural sectors, which further diminished its ability to project and sustain military forces.[12]

The DPRK's response to these events included building its nuclear program.[13] While U.S. success in Operation Desert Storm implied that the DPRK military could be quickly and decisively defeated by the United States in conventional war, albeit at a potentially high cost of life of Korean civilians, the DPRK's nuclear program introduced a high risk of mass destruction of ROK and U.S. targets, should the United States or the ROK provoke war.

Notwithstanding, while the development of a nuclear deterrence option supported defensive political goals for the DPRK, it did little to advance the prospect of kukka mokp'yo. For that, the DPRK seems to have emulated China's apparent doctrinal changes made in the wake of Desert Storm.

After the United States defeated the Iraqi army—the fifth largest in the world in 1990—in just five weeks, the Chinese military apparently reevaluated its warfighting strategy and tactics.[14] In the 1990s, China developed a strategy of hybrid warfare that relied on relatively cheap technological methods for negating the United States' qualitative military superiority through indirect attacks. In 1999, evidence of the Chinese military's new approach appeared in *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America* (an English summary translation based on a 1999 publication by two Chinese army colonels), which described using several asymmetric measures to defeat the United States, including conducting information warfare aimed at negating the U.S. military's visibility of the battlefield through all means necessary.[15] National security scholars Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake assert that this strategy has resulted in China's adoption of large-scale cyberwarfare, which would include the stealing of technological information and the tactical targeting of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets to equalize the battlefield in any force-on-force action.[16]

Believing its nuclear program would deter attacks on its homeland, and having survived the economic and agricultural crisis of the 1990s, the DPRK faced a dilemma in the early 2000s similar to what China faced in the wake of the Gulf War, when it became apparent that China would be vulnerable to defeat by advanced U.S. weapons technology. The DPRK's general response to this dilemma was threefold: increasing the number of special operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare, expanding its electronic warfare and signals intelligence assets to conduct jamming operations, and, most important, creating tactical and strategic cyber operations under what are known as Bureau 121, No. 91 Office, and Lab 110.[17] As with any aspect of the DPRK, it is difficult to verify information about these secretive organizations.

North Korean Cyber Organization

It is reported that Bureau 121, No. 91 Office, and Lab 110 are components of six bureaus under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) that specializes in intelligence gathering under the administration of the General Staff Department (GSD). While the GSD is responsible for the command and control of the KPA, it falls under the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF), according to Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford.[18] This arrangement would give the RGB direct operational control from the top of the chain of command and ensure the cyber component could conduct operations independently and in support of the KPA based on operational need.

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Bureau 121 reportedly comprises an intelligence-gathering component and an attack component. The unit is thought to operate primarily out of Pyongyang as well as the Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, China.[19] No. 91 Office is believed to operate out of Pyongyang to conduct hacking operations for the RGB.[20] Lab 110 is believed to conduct technical reconnaissance, infiltration of computer networks, intelligence gathering through hacking, and planting viruses on enemy networks.[21]

While there appear to be numerous other cyber organizations in the DPRK, those outside the RGB primarily pertain to internal political control or spreading political propaganda to foreign nations. Therefore, their work relates little to tactical or operational cyber support for combat operations.

Estimates of the size of the DPRK's cyber force have ranged from as few as 1,800 hackers and computer experts to nearly six thousand, which would make it the third largest cyber agency behind the United States and Russia.[22] The higher estimate reportedly came from ROK intelligence early in 2015, but the number cannot be verified. Moreover, it was unclear whether No. 91 Office and Lab 110 were included in the calculation, but given the ROK's desire to influence the United States to consider DPRK cyber threats a priority, it is likely their strength was included (some consider the ROK estimates inaccurate due to bias). Furthermore, the ROK's estimate represents 2013 data and, like much intelligence on North Korea, is already out of date.

North Korean army hackers are widely reported to work in the Chilbosan Hotel (photographed here 17 April 2005), partly owned by the North Korean government, in Shenyang, China. Such reports are plausible due in part to the apparent advantages of working from China, such as the ready availability of multiple lines of communication, not to mention modern equipment, training, logistical support, and a reliable source of power. (See, for example, James Cook, "PHOTOS: Inside The Luxury Chinese Hotel Where North Korea Keeps Its Army of Hackers," Business Insider website, 2 December 2014, accessed 12 June 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/photos-chinese-hotel-where-north-korea-keeps-hackers-2014-12). (Photo by tack well, Flickr)

Irrespective, the shortage of concrete knowledge of DPRK cyber organizations is compounded by the nature of DPRK's Internet access. The DPRK has divided its networks into two components. Only government and military agencies can access the outward-facing network routed through China, which hackers use for conducting cyberattacks. The other component is the *kwangmyong*, a monitored intranet of government-selected content.[23] As of January 2013, one "Internet café" was reported

in the DPRK, in Pyongyang, where citizens reportedly can access only the kwangmyong.[24] The use of Chinese networks to access the global Internet provides a buffer for DPRK hackers to deny responsibility for their intrusions and attacks. Moreover, they can safely conduct outbound attacks while avoiding inbound attacks from the ROK or the United States.[25]

However, use of third parties for outward Internet access also makes DPRK cyber operations reliant on continued cooperation from China and other partners. Despite waning support for the isolated state in recent years, China's support seems assured during peacetime. However, it is not guaranteed if war breaks out.

Since the low level of connectivity functions as protection from outside attacks, the DPRK can focus on developing offensive cyber capabilities. Few DPRK systems or networks if compromised would reduce warfighting capabilities.[26] The high-profile cyberattacks attributed to DPRK hackers have served largely strategic and political purposes. However, cyber support to combat units in the event of full-scale war likely remains a key component of a DPRK strategy.

Cyberwarfare is unique in that once a new methodology or technique has been used in an attack, the victim can create countermeasures relatively quickly to prevent future attacks. Probably for this reason the DPRK has not, and most likely would not, conduct large-scale tactical or operational cyberattacks on the ROK or the United States unless at war. Rather, the DPRK would conduct only small-scale reconnaissance and testing of methodologies on enemy networks. This approach would mitigate the risk of enemies developing countermeasures that would compromise advantages the DPRK wants to maintain for full-scale war.



A satellite image of North Korea compared to South Korea at night. Technological backwardness reportedly compels North Korean army hackers to seek locations outside of North Korea, such as the Chilbosan Hotel in China, where access to technology and communications lines is readily available to conduct cyberattacks. (Image courtesy of NASA)

Although U.S. and partner forces know relatively little about the DPRK's cyber capabilities, China and Russia can be studied as models. China, as North Korea's closest (and perhaps only) ally, provides not only outward-facing networks for North Korean cyber units but also bases of operations, such as the Chilbosan Hotel, and training. Known Chinese cyber actions have primarily focused on technological espionage, something the DPRK probably has little interest in as it lacks the infrastructure to build or maintain technologically advanced weaponry as China does. In contrast, Russia's cyber activities during its 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 military action in Ukraine suggest the DPRK's likely tactical cyber actions in the event of war on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korean Tactical Cyber Support to Warfighting

While a land, air, and sea war on the Korean Peninsula would commence, or escalate, at a specific date and time, the cyber war would begin long before any shots were fired.[27] While, arguably, the cyber war with the DPRK is already ongoing, it would need to increase the frequency and intensity of cyber reconnaissance and attacks before a general war in order to

successfully support conventional combat units. In the lead-up to war and early stages of war, North Korean asymmetric cyber units would target civilian communications through simple denial of service.

In 2008, Russia preceded its attack on Georgia with distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks for weeks before Russian soldiers crossed the border to test their capabilities and conduct reconnaissance on Georgian networks, planning to attack them again later. Russia attacked Georgian communications, crippling the government's ability to communicate and coordinate against Russian forces.[28] The Russian cyberattacks combined simplicity with sophistication in execution; they allowed Russia to cheaply take down Georgian command and communications. What would have taken days, if not weeks, of bombing and coordination between intelligence and air power took minutes from the safety of Russian computers but achieved the same result. U.S. and partner forces can reasonably expect that as a technologically inferior nation with an obsolete air force and navy, the DPRK would conduct similar attacks.

Furthermore, the DPRK appears to have demonstrated such capability. From 2014 to 2016, the DPRK reportedly hacked "more than 140,000 computers" in the ROK belonging to government and businesses, and it tried to attack the ROK transportation system's control network.[29] The attacks, likely carried out by Bureau 121, enabled the DPRK to gain access to and monitor ROK government and business communications.

If this had occurred during an invasion, the DPRK might have turned off all 140,000 computers, rendering these organizations' communications defunct. It might have been able to shut down or desynchronize the ROK transportation network.

If increased in scope and aggressiveness, such attacks could cut the ROK's communication and information-sharing capabilities with the military. Conducted in conjunction with special operations forces destroying physical communications systems in the ROK, the DPRK might disable ROK and U.S. communications, leaving units on the battlefield blind. Cutting communications in the early stages of the war would cripple the ROK and U.S. ability to coordinate artillery and aerial assets, giving DPRK forces time and space to overwhelm ROK and U.S. forces in the demilitarized zone.

While targeting of communications and critical networks in the ROK would hamper ROK and U.S. efforts, alternative means of communication might still enable the two nations to counter the DPRK's aggression. However, vital secondary means of communication could be neutralized by targeting the ROK power grid, potentially negating the ROK and U.S. advantages over DPRK forces by slowing a timely coordinated response to aggression. Several years ago, such an attack would have been deemed impossible for a nation as technologically backward as the DPRK. Today, such an attack by the DPRK in the event of war is almost certain.

For example, in December 2015, Russian hackers caused a power outage in Ukraine via cyberattack. They installed malware on Ukraine's power plant network and remotely switched breakers to cut power to over 225,000 people.[30] Russia then swamped Ukrainian utility customer service with fake phone calls to prevent the company from receiving customer calls.[31] Given the level of sophistication that DPRK cyber units seem to have reached and the relationship the DPRK maintains with Russia, it is likely that the DPRK has received support from Russia for potentially conducting similar attacks against ROK power plants.

Cyberattacks, in essence, would be an asymmetric approach to compensate for the DPRK's almost nonexistent air force. They could inflict tactical and operational damage on the ROK to enhance the "shock-and-awe" bombardments that likely would precede military invention. By knocking out critical communications, transportation, and support infrastructure, the DPRK would cause confusion and disorder that would facilitate its conventional infantry forces' overwhelming ROK and U.S. forces.

Nevertheless, while these methods could be effective, it is unlikely Bureau 121 would be able to fully take the ROK network offline, although a fractional network disruption could severely hinder ROK and U.S. actions on the battlefield. To fully negate ROK and U.S. technological superiority, the DPRK would need to employ more sophisticated cyberattacks against GPS, radar, logistics support systems, and weapons targeting systems. Exactly how the DPRK would conduct such attacks is outside the scope of this discussion. The threat should be taken seriously, however, as the Defense Science Board warns, "should the United States find itself in a full-scale conflict with a peer adversary, … U.S. guns, missiles, and bombs may not fire, or may be directed against our own troops. Resupply, including food, water, ammunition, and fuel may not arrive when or where needed."[32]

Students work at computers 13 April 2013 at Mangyongdae Revolutionary School in Pyongyang, North Korea. The school is run by the military, and school administrators say it was originally set up in 1947 for children who had lost their parents during Korea's fight for liberation from its Japanese occupiers. (Photo by the Associated Press)

Hacking or taking radar and GPS offline, if even for several days before ROK and U.S. forces could recover, could ground air power, offering DPRK units freedom of maneuver on the battlefield. Moreover, the disruption of GPS would not only negate the use of GPS-guided weapons systems, but, more dangerously, it could also cause weapons to fire at incorrect coordinates. The hacking of U.S. satellites, which China reportedly has already shown it can accomplish, could blind ROK and U.S. intelligence to DPRK movements on the ground.[33]

If the DPRK hacked automated logistical networks that supported ROK and U.S. forces on the peninsula, those forces would have difficulty sustaining warfighting capabilities. Tracking, requisitioning, and delivering essential war supplies could be disrupted by a simple DDOS attack that would shut down systems or corrupt data, causing logistical supplies to be sent incorrectly. ROK and U.S. soldiers could quickly find themselves without the resources necessary to fight.

Therefore, the DPRK could use cyberattacks to ensure its numerical superiority and overwhelming volume of firepower could triumph despite inferior materiel. When combined with electronic warfare and special operations forces acting behind the battle lines, this would, consistent with the ideals in *Unrestricted Warfare*, cause ROK and U.S. forces to lose momentum and maintain a defensive and reactionary posture.

Unrestricted Warfare describes the "golden ratio" and the "side-principal" rule. The idea is that the golden ratio, 0.618 or roughly two-thirds, which is usually applied to art, architecture, and mathematics, can be applied to warfare. The authors point out that once the Iraqi army was reduced by the U.S. Air Force to 0.618 of its original strength, it collapsed and the war ended.[34] The side-principal rule, in essence, is the idea that war can be won through nonwar actions. When taking these two theories together, it becomes apparent that while the Chinese may

believe they could not defeat the United States in war through conventional combat, they probably believe they could defeat the United States if nonwar actions were used to diminish the U.S. military's strength to around two-thirds of its combat power.

For China, the options for achieving this are numerous, as China has increasing resources it can draw upon to carry out nonwar actions for extended periods, be they cyber, financial, or political. For the DPRK, with its goal of kukka mokp'yo and its extremely limited resources, the options are fewer. The DPRK likely would translate the golden ratio and side-principal rule into diminishing ROK and U.S. forces through cyberattacks, combined with numerous other asymmetric means, by one-third. With their systems taken offline or corrupted, U.S. and ROK warfighting capabilities would be diminished or disrupted to a point where, theoretically, the DPRK army could launch a massive ground invasion. Cyberattack, therefore, is a means by which the DPRK likely would strike at enemy warfighting support systems, thereby giving its numerically superior military the space, time, and freedom of maneuver to sustain a fight on the peninsula.

A cyberattack could include a nuclear-detonated electromagnetic pulse that would disable electronic devices within a 450-mile radius.[35] The DPRK could, theoretically, achieve this by detonating a nuclear device in the atmosphere at an altitude of thirty miles. This attack could negate technological advantages of friendly forces on the peninsula, rendering equipment with an electronic component useless. However, given the threat of nuclear retaliation as well as the increased likelihood of U.S. support of a prolonged war, which would most likely result in the DPRK's defeat, this option probably would remain a last resort short of a tactical nuclear strike.

Solutions to Counter North Korean Cyber Capabilities

North Korean leadership likely believes the DPRK could revert the tactical balance of power to that of the 1950s, using its cyber capabilities to gain an advantage. In June 1950, U.S. tactical ground forces were embarrassingly defeated by a numerically superior enemy that was less trained, less equipped, and thought to be less prepared for war. As the United States continues to withdraw permanent combat units from the ROK and revert to a support role, leaving its forces on the peninsula unprepared to mount a major defense, the United States should take action to avoid finding itself in a situation similar to 1950.

DPRK cyber capabilities are not without their vulnerabilities. In 2014, in retaliation for the Sony hacks, the United States conducted a DDOS attack on the DPRK that took the kwangmyong offline.[36] This attack, however, did not retaliate against the cyber units, mostly operating out of China, but instead took the intranet offline. This event highlights a major vulnerability of the DPRK in a time of full-scale war. DPRK cyber operability likely would be at the mercy of the Chinese government. Should the Chinese government decide the continued support of the DPRK was politically unsustainable, the DPRK's cyber capability could become marginalized.

To mitigate the risk of DPRK cyber threats, Army assets must actively partner with ROK forces and reassess the way they view cyber operations. As a preventive measure, Army cyber assets must monitor U.S. networks within the ROK and networks of units scheduled to deploy to the ROK, as these units are the most likely to be targeted by DPRK assets. Rather than actively neutralize identified DPRK cyber threats, Army leaders must assess the intelligence benefits gained by allowing adversaries limited freedom of action in order to study their tactics, techniques, and procedures in the cyber domain.

Army leaders should begin studying cyber operations as a force multiplier from both an offensive and defensive vantage, and not as a discipline outside the tactical or operational domain. Additionally, Army forces stationed in the ROK should develop contingency plans with ROK forces anticipating DPRK cyberattacks similar to those outlined in this article, and they should train in environments shaped by cyberwarfare. In this way, U.S. and South Korean forces could mitigate the significant threat posed by North Korean cyber forces. ■

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Comprehensive Crisis Management Course 17-1 fellows don rubber gloves as they perform a virus outbreak exercise at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. The six-week course ran from 9 February through 15 March 2017 and was attended by over one hundred fellows from thirty-seven different locations. (Photo courtesy of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)

Advancing Security Cooperation through Executive Education

Maj. Michael Carvelli, U.S. Army

The Asia-Pacific region contains more than half the world's population, two of the three largest economies, and several of the world's largest militaries.[1] As such, it is becoming the world's political and economic center of gravity. The United States' priority is to strengthen cooperation among partners in the Asia-Pacific, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based order and addresses regional and global challenges.[2] The mission of the Daniel

K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) is to build capacities, networks, and shared understanding by educating, engaging, connecting, and empowering security professionals in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It is incumbent upon leaders in all branches of the military to properly capitalize on security cooperation educational opportunities so that U.S. forces can continue to improve their ability to work in concert with allied and partner nations.

Security cooperation (SC) comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.[3] SC encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments. This includes all DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs that build defense and security relationships, promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.[4]

Within the realm of SC, there are several tools available to the DOD to leverage relationships, equipment, and institutions. Leveraging shared experiences and education through the International Military Education and Training program is one way in which the DOD exercises soft power, or the "ability to achieve one's goals without force."[5] Joseph Nye states, "When we learn how to better combine hard and soft power, then we will be what I call a smart power."[6] The ability to vary the mix of hard and soft power enables the DOD to respond to individual events, needs, and necessities globally, as required. Academic forums, including senior service colleges, centers of excellence, and regional centers, provide flexible and adaptable venues to adjust SC strategies in response to domestic and foreign training requirements.

Within the DOD, there are five Centers for Regional Security Study, or regional centers (RCs), that utilize unique academic forums to build partner capacity by focusing on security leaders across the globe.[7] The RCs accomplish their mission through resident and in-region programs, including conferences, seminars, courses, bilateral workshops, alumni outreach events, and research publications. DKI APCSS is one of the five RCs, along with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC), the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (WJPC), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). Each RC is aligned with a DOD geographic combatant command (GCC) as follows:

- GCMC—European Command
- DKI APCSS—Pacific Command
- WJPC—Northern and Southern Commands
- ACSS—Africa Command
- NESA—Central Command

It is significant to note that RC alignment is not restrictive regarding each GCC's area of responsibility. By design, RCs help to bridge the seams between the six GCCs.

Guidance for the conduct of SC is issued through several offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This guidance ensures all activities are aligned to achieve maximum effects across regional and transnational issues. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides policy oversight and annual guidance to RCs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs provides regionally focused guidance for Asia-Pacific as a component of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Additionally, global and functional guidance is received from the Assistant Secretary for Defense offices for

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Fellows attending Comprehensive Crisis Management Course 16-1 discuss issues associated with social inclusion impacts on crisis response and resiliency 17 February 2016 at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. (Photo courtesy of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)

International Security Affairs; Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict; and Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the executive agent providing programming, budgeting, and financial management of the resources to support the operation of the centers.[8]

DKI APCSS offers six courses throughout the year as part of its effort to educate executive-level operators. The Asia-Pacific Orientation and Transnational Security courses last five days each, and the Senior Asia-Pacific Orientation course lasts three days. Comprehensive Crisis Management, Comprehensive Responses to Terrorism, and Advanced Security each last five to six weeks. Policy guidance drives strategic recruiting and seat allocations on an annual basis in collaboration with stakeholders to include embassies, SC organizations, U.S. Pacific Command, and service components. Long courses and the Transnational Security course focus on international partners but include a small percentage of U.S. fellows. Both orientation courses focus on U.S. participants from the whole of government to include the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and myriad other agencies but include a small percentage of international fellows. Curricula include regional perspectives, treaty alliance partners and security challenges, key regional players and security challenges, transnational trafficking, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, terrorism, and others.

The training division of U.S. Pacific Command and each service component—U.S. Army Pacific, Pacific Fleet, Pacific Air Forces, and Marine Corps Forces Pacific—set the guidelines for internal distribution of each course. It is in the best interest of each commander to specially select each attendee to meet the specific needs of his or her organization. A recommended near-term consideration for selection to a course is participation in an operational deployment, training center rotation, expeditionary team movement, or other theater training exercise. Army organizations directly

benefit from individual participation in several ways: understanding of partner security positions on cultural, political, social, and economic views; new relationships that may be leveraged during turbulent times; and early exposure to regional and global issues. Generating understanding and nurturing nascent relationships provide springboards from which organizations can train and deploy to foreign locations already aware of current situations and able to contact security professionals in the region.

The U.S. Navy's Asia Pacific Hands program is similar to the better-known Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program that has been in operation for several years.[9] Both programs provide an opportunity for a participant to gain a language skill and graduate schooling to provide formal understanding of regional cultures. Although not a substitute for foreign area officers, Asia Pacific Hands works toward building U.S. Pacific Command area expertise, understanding, and confidence in select officers enroute to Pacific-focused operational-level billets.[10] This program was in response to Gen. Martin Dempsey's Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services and Commanders of the Combatant Commands, in which he directed the "Joint Staff to begin exploration of a Hands-like program focused on the Asia-Pacific region."[11] As of the date of this publication, the Navy is the only service that has produced a formal program in response to this directive. Should the other services pursue a similar program, this would be a long-term consideration for the selection of service members to attend one or more of the DKI APCSS course offerings. This would surely provide organizations with personnel who are capable, if placed in the appropriate billet, of advancing SC in training opportunities and operational deployments.

Dempsey, while chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, noted, "Our military has traditionally relied on education in times of uncertainty to develop an understanding of the future security environment, lead adaptation and ensure readiness to face future, unknown challenges."[12] Now, as in many periods in the past, the future security situation is unknown across the globe. Harnessing the power of an educational experience where attendees receive an in-depth analysis of countries, subregions, and key trends within the Indo-Asia-Pacific will enhance the capability and capacity of each organization. This, combined with relationships to security practitioners across the region, will positively contribute to the DOD SC strategy. ■

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Polish citizens greet Battle Group Poland 26 March 2017 as the convoy of tactical vehicles crosses the border from the Czech Republic into Orzysz, Poland. The contingency of soldiers from the U.S. Army 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment; the United Kingdom; and Romania integrated with the Polish 15th Mechanized Brigade, 16th Infantry Division, as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence to serve as a deterrence force. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Patricia Deal, U.S. Army Europe)

The Role of Forward Presence in U.S. Military Strategy

Col. Dave Shunk, U.S. Air Force, Retired

Lt. Col. Charles Hornick, U.S. Army

Maj. Dan Burkhart, U.S. Army

Today's Army maintains significant forces stationed and rotating overseas that provide a visible and credible deterrent. However, should war occur, we must terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. … In the end, the deployment of the American Army is the ultimate display of American resolve to assure allies and deter enemies.

—2016 Army Posture Statement

As the United States considers changes to its military forces and global force posture, decision makers should fully appreciate the historic role and continued relevance of the joint forces' forward presence. Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a global forward presence, particularly in East Asia, in the Middle East, and in Europe with our NATO allies. However, some in the United States are now questioning the strategic value of a globally engaged military, wondering if the Nation would be better off with fewer global commitments.

As discussions over our strategic posture unfold, decision makers need to keep in mind the origins of the current world order and what is required to preserve it. Overlooking or underappreciating the positive influence of forward-positioned forces, both stationed and rotational, may lead to decisions that will undermine future U.S. efforts to prevent war and ensure the stability of the international system. U.S. retrenchment risks destabilizing regional security architectures that have taken decades to build and are essential to secure U.S. national interests. A present joint force deters wars, assures allies, favorably shapes the security environment, and enables contextual and cultural understanding. Moreover, the U.S. Army component of the joint force forward presence has been, and should remain, a prominent element of U.S. national security strategy since, as will be discussed, the Army is central to each of these critical missions.

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Deterring War

Preventing war and the human suffering it entails has long been a core element of U.S. national security strategy and military strategy. Although diplomacy and economic power have significant roles in forestalling conflict, our military is the ultimate means of deterring aggression.

To deter enemies means to prevent them from taking hostile action by persuading them that the cost of the action will outweigh the benefits. This can be accomplished through two principal approaches: deterrence by threat of punishment or deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is threatening to inflict pain against aggressors if they take an action that threatens U.S. national interests. Deterrence by denial is accomplished by dissuading potential adversaries from taking actions contrary to U.S. interests by making it clear that these actions cannot succeed.[1] Specifically, the adversary calculates that the likelihood of success is so low the probable gain is not worth the effort.[2] This type of deterrence is preferable under a range of circumstances, especially when deterrence by threat of punishment could be undermined by carefully limited enemy action, designed to stay below the U.S. threshold for response. An example is Russia's operations in the Ukraine, which stayed below the U.S. threshold for response. Additionally, the threat of punishment has its risks, as it might result in the expansion or escalation of conflict.

Deterrence requires capacity, communication, capability, and will.[3] Indeed, the adversary's perception that you will use military force is central to deterrence. While we can never know exactly what conveys evidence of will, deterrence resides in the mind of the adversary. We do

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know that physical presence conveys both commitment and intentionality. U.S. security strategies since World War II also provide lessons of practice that buttress deterrence theory. We know from broad experience what does and does not work, and this knowledge can inform us how to position our forces for the deterrent outcomes we seek.

For the past seven decades, U.S. land forces have had an instrumental role in deterrence. Although air and naval power contribute indispensable capabilities to the joint force, these forces, operating on their own, principally facilitate deterrence by punishment. Land forces in their forward presence role are often the linchpin of deterrence by denial. In addition, the forward presence of land power is the most credible signal of U.S. commitment to a nation or region. Positioning land forces in a contested area causes the enemy's calculus to be far

Exercise Noble Partner 16 begins with an opening ceremony 11 May 2016 at Vaniani Training Area, Georgia. There were displays of multinational soldiers and their equipment, airborne operations, and speeches from senior officials, including Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili. Noble Partner 16 was a critical part of Georgia's training for the light infantry company it contributed to the NATO Response Force and for enhancing Georgian territorial self-defense capability. (Photo by Sgt. Daniel Cole, U.S. Army Europe)

different than if U.S. forces are offshore. The prospective adversary has no reason to question the will of the United States to respond to aggression. Quite simply, forward-deployed Army forces raise the stakes and create uncertainty among would-be aggressors that armed conflict would achieve their desired objectives.

The absence of U.S. land forces increases an adversary's temptation to act in ways that slide under the U.S. threshold for inflicting punishment. It may also increase an adversary's willingness to try for a *fait accompli* before U.S. forces can be brought to bear. This is seen in the Baltic states, where there is concern that Russia will seize territory and then make the West back down by threatening an expansion of conflict. While over-the-horizon strike assets, as well as the unmatched U.S. ability to airlift forces into theater, are formidable threats, they are reactive, and they cede the initiative to the aggressor. When ground forces are present, the United States maintains the initiative as potential aggressors know the costs of aggression will be outweighed by any potential gains.

Nowhere is this more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. According to historian Allan Millett, "the withdrawal of the U.S. [Army] Fifth Regimental Combat Team from the approaches to Seoul in June–July 1949, sealed Korea's fate. This action, not careless or careful words uttered in Washington or Seoul, heartened the Communists [to attack in June 1950]."[4] Since the end of the Korean War, the continued forward presence of U.S. land forces has made America's retaliation against a North Korean invasion an almost expected automatic response. Many scholars believe that in the 1970s, China's Mao Tse-tung reined in North Korean leader Kim Il-sung when he threatened to repeat his quest to reunite Korea by force.[5]

Today, combat-ready forward-based American soldiers—armed with guns, tanks, and helicopters—communicate in no uncertain terms that the United States is committed to maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea (ROK). This forward Army presence, coupled with powerful U.S. and ROK military capabilities, deters North Korean aggression.[6]

Similar to the Army presence in Korea, capable forward-deployed U.S. Army units, as part of a NATO combined force, provided a strong deterrent against Soviet aggression throughout the Cold War. Although

some scholars of the Cold War question whether the Soviet Union had designs on Western Europe, we do know the Soviets were opportunistic.[7] The forward presence of U.S. Army forces ensured that no temptation readily presented itself for Soviet opportunism.

Today, U.S. Army Europe is leveraging forward-stationed and rotational Army forces to deter aggression against its NATO allies. This is done, in part, by the Army's contribution to the European partners and allies through its "Strong Europe" approach and cooperation to make the Army forces in Europe of "30,000 Soldiers look and feel like 300,000" toward the defense of Europe.[8] Since Russia's annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, many of our European partners and NATO allies have feared a militarily resurgent and aggressive Russia. "Strong Europe" seeks to both assure our allies and raise the stakes to deter further Russian aggression in the region.

Assuring Allies

The enduring, well-developed nature of America's global network of alliances makes it easy to take these relationships for granted. These relationships must be maintained with deeds as well as words. While economic cooperation between the United States and its allies advances the fiscal interests of both sides, rotational and enduring forward Army presence addresses many security needs and tangibly assures our partners of our unwavering commitment. Many rightly regard forward presence as the cement that holds our alliances together.[9]

U.S. Army forward presence also helps to curb dangerous, destabilizing security competitions and prevent the emergence of security dilemmas. Presence helps to facilitate regional stability in many places around the world, to include Europe and East Asia. While the international community still faces a range of wars carried out by nonstate actors and other civil conflicts, U.S. forward presence has helped to temper competition among states in many places around the world. Over the past forty years, there has been a dramatic drop in the quantity and frequency of state-on-state conflicts, and we have seen nothing like the two cataclysmic wars that dominated the first half of the twentieth century.[10] Arguably, one of the principal causes of this trend has been the assurance that U.S. forward presence has provided to our allies.

Stemming Regional Arms Races

The certainty that comes with a U.S. security commitment, backed by the forward presence of the Army, persuades many partners and allies not to engage in a security competition with others in the region. Competition more often than not is replaced with cooperation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, former Warsaw Pact members such as Poland and the Baltic states chose to partner with NATO, including the United States. In the Pacific, former foes such as Japan and South Korea now cooperate with the United States to resist Chinese and North Korean threats.

Furthermore, because U.S. presence diminishes the instinctive fear of invasion or armed coercion, nations feel comfortable seeking levels of military force that are unlikely to trigger arms races (and thus regional instability). Over the past several decades, forward-deployed Army air and missile defense units, especially Patriot batteries, have provided assurance to our allies not only in the Middle East but also in East Asia and Europe.

Mitigating Regional Security Dilemmas

U.S. forward presence also prevents the emergence of security dilemmas. These occur when a nation is faced with a decision to either grow its military or to remain vulnerable and thus risk exploitation.[11] For example, Germany developed the Schlieffen plan prior to World War I, fearing it would be in dire peril of losing a war if it

Planners from the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces engage in missile defense planning 13 February 2014 during the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Wargame V in the 613th Air and Space Operations Center at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Nathan Allen, U.S. Air Force)

were compelled to fight on two fronts against the expected enemies of France in the west and Russia in the east.[12] The plan aimed to quickly defeat France first so Germany could then focus its efforts on defeating Russia in the east, which it believed was the more difficult adversary. The plan hinged on the rapid mobilization of the German army, for which it overtly prepared, in turn heightening nervousness on the continent.

Aware of German anxiety, the situation presented other European states with a choice: heighten their readiness for war (and risk provoking Germany) or remain weak and risk invasion. Thus, one view is that it was not interests but rather tension and insecurity that led to the onset of the "Great War."[13]

Since World War II, U.S. forward presence has reduced such tension and insecurity by assuring allies in Europe and elsewhere that America would reinforce their security in the face of aggression, especially from the threat posed by the Soviet Union (and later Russia). This presence has had a calming and reassuring effect in many regions, and it has helped to stifle rivalries and head off competitions in Europe, East Asia, and other parts of the globe.[14]

Geopolitical Management

Finally, assuring allies enables the United States to pursue an effective and efficient geopolitical management strategy. Alliances allow the United States to influence outcomes in important regions. What U.S. Army forces are doing in the Pacific is a good example. Through its Pacific Pathways program, the U.S. Army's Pacific Command is implementing a new concept to assure allies in the region by developing long-term, meaningful relationships with them. By participating in joint

and combined arms exercises such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian in Korea and Yama Sakura 65 with Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, the U.S. Army forward presence is establishing and maintaining bonds that reassure allies regarding U.S. commitments.[15]

Allies who regularly work and train with U.S. Army forward forces contribute to the common defense and shared interests more than they would independently. Through these engagements, developing a comprehensive understanding of each other's method of standards and principles improves interoperability between our forces.

Together, combined U.S. and allied forces who have rehearsed contingencies dissuade other powers or combinations of powers from dominating areas of U.S. interest. Without allies and partners in a given region, the United States would be forced to directly contain emerging powers in the region unilaterally, by maintaining its own large military force there, or to retreat and act according to the rules and preferences of the region's hegemon.[16] Both options are costly, and the latter is exceptionally dangerous.

Shaping the Security Environment

Security environments are by their very nature complex. A multitude of factors—ranging from weak state institutions to contested territories—can provoke and sustain armed conflict in a region. Forward-positioned Army forces allow the United States to help shape security environments by reinforcing fragile states where collapse and chaos linger on the horizon, by building partner capacity to prevent revisionist states from seizing territory and by restraining allies and friends from escalating tensions. These actions, which take myriad forms, help temper the propensity for actors to seek to achieve their aims by coercion and force.

One of the most successful examples of the United States shaping a security environment by reinforcing a fragile state is that of Colombia, one of the oldest democracies in South America. For decades, the United States assisted Colombia in its struggle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In 2009, Colombia signed an agreement with the United States that allowed U.S. personnel to be stationed at seven military bases in Colombia.[17] Peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC followed some seven years later, and now Colombia enjoys much greater stability.[18] Additionally, Colombia is now positioned to provide reparations and assistance to the nearly six million internally displaced victims of the fifty-year struggle.[19]

Building Partner Capacity

Whether forward-positioned U.S. forces are strengthening mature military forces, fixing the tactical shortcomings of indigenous militaries, or establishing completely new military forces and security institutions, they build the capabilities and capacities required to help maintain stability in a region. This is a central part of U.S. Army Africa's "African Horizons" operational approach, which leverages enduring partnerships to increase stability in both Africa and the broader region. Within this approach, Army forces enable African and European partners to create lasting solutions to conflict in Africa.[20] These partners often contribute to peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the United Nations or the African Union. The improved militaries of these countries also conduct operations against violent transnational extremist organizations that could otherwise exploit Africa's vast, austere spaces as sanctuaries from which to attack our homeland and interests.

The Army has had several such successes in Africa in recent years. In Uganda and Burundi, U.S. forward forces greatly assist in the fight against al-Shabaab by training forces deploying to the African Union Mission in Somalia. This enables a slow but steady improvement in the security situation in Somalia.[21] Similarly, U.S. partnerships with nations in the Lake Chad basin involving regionally aligned Army forces, special operations forces, and other joint forces are steadily degrading the Islamic State-allied Boko Haram and decreasing its territorial control. They are setting the theater and enabling the joint force to support the multinational effort. For example, a U.S. Army forces deployment early in 2017 to conduct base operations support integration in Cameroon is just one part of this effort against Boko Haram.[22] These and other accomplishments in training and engagement often go unheralded, but they are significant contributions to regional security and world order.

Although assisting allies and partners has a moral component, maintaining strong relationships has a very practical purpose. In clearly definable ways, these relationships magnify American military capabilities. When considering the recently coined 4+1 problem set (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and radical Islam), the

U.S. relationship with its allies is neither a convenience nor merely a means to lend legitimacy to U.S. actions abroad.[23] Alliances strengthen U.S. military capacity and enable power projection. As international relations scholar Bernard Brodie observes, having "strong allies who were contiguous with our enemies has been an incalculable benefit to us. It has enabled us to hit our enemies hard, and to do so on their thresholds rather than ours."[24]

Forward presence can also restrain our allies from taking provocative action or escalating dangerously during crisis. When North Korea struck the *Cheonan*, an ROK naval vessel, U.S. military officials proved invaluable in preventing the escalation of the crisis. The night the ship sank, Gen. Walter Sharp, then U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Korea commander, immediately contacted his South Korean counterpart. Sharp not only offered his condolences over the incident and the loss of Korean life but also helped manage the crisis. In an overt move to demonstrate commitment to the region and at the same time prevent escalation, the United States offered South Korea the privilege of hosting the 2012 nuclear security summit.[25] This, along with the reassurance offered by U.S. presence, enabled the South Koreans to maintain their composure in what could have been the beginning of all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. None of this would have been possible without the strong relationships and trust Sharp and his predecessors had developed with their South Korean counterparts.

Maintaining Operational Access

Forward presence provides yet another vital contribution to U.S. national security—physical access. One of the more perplexing challenges emerging in the future operating environment is the prospect of denied, or at least contested, operational access. It is clear that increasingly capable adversaries will seek to deny the United States operational access to vital regions of the world. We can expect future scenarios in which anti-access/area denial strategies will threaten the Nation's vital interests. Forward presence enables regular contact with the senior military leaders and institutions and, in cases such as South Korea, physical presence that will prove indispensable in future crises. These relationships and physical presence help the United States shape regional security agendas that result in mutually beneficial economic and operational access around the globe. While virtual presence from air or maritime forces is often advocated in lieu of land forces, such presence can, in some scenarios, mean the absolute absence of a permanent on-scene force.

Enabling Contextual Understanding

Gaining an appreciation of the relevant factors that motivate behavior, fuel tensions, and influence the dynamics of a region is difficult work. The activities conducted by both rotational and forward-positioned troops are instrumental in garnering the situational awareness required to prevent and, where necessary, prepare for conflict. For example, the Army's participation in the Sinai peacekeeping mission—the Multinational Force and Observers—not only serves to diminish tensions between Egypt and Israel but also allows the United States to better understand the values, interests, and social subtleties of these two important regional actors.[26] Such insights are achieved not only at the tactical level but also at the strategic level. Operating in a particular place over a long period builds insight and forms of institutional knowledge and cultural awareness that cannot be otherwise attained. Because they operate on land and interact with people, only armies can provide this level of detailed insight, knowledge, and nuanced understanding.

Experiences in recent conflicts support assertions made by Thomas Sutton and Phillip Lohaus in their article on the use of military power outside traditional wartime environments. They explain,

> It is important for armed forces to establish contextual understanding well before conflicts begin. Evolving operational demands require a force that can evaluate and understand the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements influencing actors in the environment.[27]

For example, U.S. Army soldiers participating in NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo benefitted from the contextual understanding participants had gained through sustained operations in a specific location.[28] The same is true with soldiers stationed in other locations around the world who have attained deep understanding of the factors Sutton and Lohaus discuss. While difficult to quantify, contextual understanding gained through forward presence can be an indispensable element in protecting and promoting U.S. interests and gauging the intentions of partners. If Sharp had not had this deep understanding of the South Korean leadership, the results could have been catastrophic.

Furthermore, the contextual understanding that U.S. ground forces gain while regionally engaged with partner forces significantly contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the actual challenges of conflict in that region and what forces and capabilities would be needed to prevail. This appreciation of the relevant challenges helps ground force development in the Army and joint forces in the realities of future operating environments, rather than generic, inward-looking exercises.[29]

The ongoing civil war in Syria and the turmoil in the greater Middle East, along with the mass migration of refugees into Europe, are bringing home the hazards of regional instability, and many are asking how to restore stability. These are complex problems that require a deep understanding. Forward presence is a critical element required to achieve contextual understanding of such problems, which is a key to finding enduring solutions.

Conclusion

America's strong, global forward presence since World War II has underpinned U.S. foreign policy, deterred war, and supported a stable international order. The forward presence of U.S. Army forces communicates U.S. priorities to the world, strength to our enemies, and commitment to our allies, partners, and friends. Diminished U.S. forward presence, especially of permanently stationed Army forces, will cause a shift in U.S. strategy from proactive engagement to reactive crisis response.

In the aftermath of years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, some advocate retrenchment and an end to U.S. forward presence in many parts of the globe.[30] This approach has drawbacks and dangers. U.S. forward presence has facilitated a global order of deeply advantageous terms for the United States. Withdrawal risks actually increasing regional tensions in many parts of the world rather than diminishing them, which could spur arms races and spawn more frequent conflicts.

Indeed, while retrenchment may appear on the surface to be a bargain, it may prove terribly expensive over the long term. Moreover, overestimating the role of technological and virtual-presence solutions to global challenges risks America's enduring relationships and credibility with our allies, partners, and friends, and it risks encouraging our adversaries. Such a course also fails to appreciate how allies magnify the strength of U.S. military capacity and capability. As one former Army general recently argued, "A 'Fortress America' approach that brings all forces home is unhelpful … . Alliances and partnerships are relationships, and no relationship is sustainable if it is only long-distance, episodic, and one-sided."[31] Consequently, American disengagement risks creating instability that could lead to unnecessary conflict.

Since World War II, Army forward presence has been the indispensable glue that has sustained America's global network of alliances, partnerships, and friendships by signaling commitment and constancy. It has deterred wars, assured allies, favorably shaped the security environment, and enabled contextual understanding. This legacy of past success is important to understand and build upon in designing strategies for our nation's security into the future. A clear-eyed assessment will see that Army forward presence is fundamental to American success in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. ■

Notes

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The American Motor-Rifle Brigade

Issues with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Concept

Capt. Matthew D. Allgeyer, U.S. Army

Recent and proposed developments to the Stryker combat vehicle and how it is employed bear striking similarities to Soviet and later Russian development of the *Bronetransporter* (BTR) armored personnel carrier and motor-rifle formations. These similarities mirror both materiel and doctrinal concepts developed by the Soviets as they introduced, modified, and updated the BTR. However, the current Stryker developmental path is following an outdated methodology that is

Left photo: A convoy of BTR-82A armored personnel carriers participates in the Victory Day parade 7 May 2013 in Moscow. (Photo courtesy of Vitaly Kuzmin, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net/)
Right photo: U.S. Strykers carry soldiers from Battle Group Poland (comprised of U.S., U.K., Romanian, and Polish soldiers) to conduct weapons zeroing 6 April 2017 in Orzysz, Poland. (Photo by Georgios Moumoulidis, Training Support Team Orzysz/U.S. Army)

inappropriate for the modern battlefield. This article identifies the regressive approaches currently being used by the U.S. Army to develop the Stryker medium-force concept and recommends new directions for its development based on historical analysis and current scholarly research.

Materiel Comparison of the Stryker Platform and the Russian BTR Series

The Stryker concept has been in a constant state of flux since its inception. This is to be expected since it is a relatively new concept in the Army. Originally proposed by Gen. Erik Shinseki in the 1990s, the Stryker does not have the same depth and breadth of historical experience for the purpose of assessment compared to many other U.S. weapon systems due for materiel upgrades.[1] For example, the development of the M1 Abrams tank commenced with the XM (experimental model) in the 1970s. It was fielded in 1979 and continues in service today, a long period over which data have been collected, including from its use in combat situations.

The medium vehicle and force concept is not new worldwide. The Soviet Union fielded a medium-armored vehicle in the BTR and began to develop the motor-rifle regiment concept circa 1961.[2] The Soviet concept is distinctly different from World War II-era medium-armored vehicles. Some World War II-era armored vehicles and mobile guns can be said to be medium platforms, but these vehicles were always task-organized with heavier platforms. In contrast, the Soviet motor-rifle regiment was the first mechanized force organized to take advantage of the unique abilities that are afforded unilaterally by a medium force. Though the motor-rifle regiment may be involved in operations with heavy armored forces, it is considered distinct and separate from those forces. Similarly, the Stryker concept resembles the motor-rifle concept in that it is conceived as a stand-alone medium force. However, it differs from the Russian concept in some key areas.

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While some changes to the original concept of the Stryker are expected and necessary, such as the ongoing Stryker upgrade to a double V-hull (a survivability design that deflects blasts from below a vehicle away from the crew compartment), some of these adoptions appear to be ad hoc and piecemeal.[3] Following the current Stryker upgrade to the Stryker Double V–Hull, General Dynamics has proposed several improvements for the next generation of Stryker, including the addition of a 30 mm cannon for some vehicles to increase the Stryker's direct-fire capability.[4]

Of note, this addition mirrors earlier Soviet-era development of medium-armored vehicles. The Soviet Union identified a similar weakness in the armament of its BTR in the 1960s. The BTR was originally fielded with the 12.7 mm DShK heavy machine gun, which is comparable to the current Stryker's armament of the M2 Browning .50 caliber machine gun. The Soviets replaced it with a heavier 14.5 mm cannon in later productions of the BTR 60.[5] Still later, during its modernization program, Russia adopted the even heavier 30 mm Shipunov cannon for the BTR-90 to give it greater direct-fire capabilities.[6] Additionally, Russia also added the 30 mm cannon to the BTR-80 series with the fielding of the BTR-82A. Notably, this gave the BTR offensive direct-fire capability similar to the *Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (*BMP) infantry fighting vehicle, which mounts the same cannon.[7] This is comparable to the current proposed change to the Stryker main gun, which would give the Stryker direct-fire capability akin to the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.

Furthermore, in the 1990s, the Russian Federation identified an antitank weakness in the BTR and integrated the AT-5 "Spandrel" with the BTR 90.[8] This system is mounted on the side of the turret and can be detached and fired from the ground. Russia also adapted the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) capability to its BTR-82s with the Kornet antiarmor system.[9]

Top left photo: A modernized BTR-82A armored personnel carrier with 30 mm cannon rehearses 4 May 2015 for the Victory Day parade in Moscow. (Photo courtesy of Vitaly Kuzmin, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net/)
Bottom left photo: The first prototype Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle outfitted with a 30 mm cannon was delivered to the Army in October 2016. (Photo courtesy of the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems)

These systems remain in service today throughout the Russian motor-rifle formations and exported BTRs.

Similarly, Raytheon and Lockheed-Martin have proposed extending their Joint Javelin Venture Program (JJVP) to mount the Javelin missile system on a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station for some Strykers.[10] Like the Spandrel, the Javelin is also mounted on the side of the turret and can be detached and fired from the ground. The addition of the Javelin will give the vehicle and formation antitank capability in addition to the M1134 ATGM Stryker variant.

The proposed Stryker upgrades are, unsurprisingly, in response to a 2016 request by the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which was concerned that its Strykers were overmatched by Russian materiel.[11] Soviet-era materiel, or equipment based on Soviet materiel, is utilized by the clear majority of potential U.S. adversaries.[12] Therefore, this concern is well-founded for the Stryker platform and is not just a specific theater concern to be dealt with at the local-unit level.

These proposed U.S. materiel responses seem unintentionally reactionary at best. Notably missing from most of the conversations about these proposed Stryker upgrades is any discussion of the BTR or the motor-rifle regiment, the peer force that the Stryker could potentially fight against. The BTR has had a 30 mm cannon since the early 1980s and an antiarmor capability since the mid-1990s. This means that the previous generation of the Russian medium-armored vehicle already had overmatch on a proposed upgraded Stryker. When we compare the proposed Stryker armament upgrades to the historical BTR, it appears that the Stryker is thirty to sixty years behind current medium-armored trends. The adoption of these materiel upgrades is not inherently bad or dangerously outdated in and of itself. What is problematic and missing from the upgrades is the next step after the current adoption. We have independently confirmed what the Soviets discovered thirty years ago, namely that a medium force does not work against a heavy force independently.[13]

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

(Graphic from Army Field Manual 100-2-3, *The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1991, (obsolete)], 4-9)

Figure 1. Russian Motor-Rifle Brigade

This is important beyond an academic discussion of peer weapons systems. Russia has moved on to its second generation of medium-force vehicles and is actively innovating. Russian materiel testing and acquisitions do not suffer from analysis and adoption problems similar to the United States when it comes to medium-armored force vehicles. The current generation replacement for the BTR, the *Bumerang*, has adopted an engine in the front as opposed to the rear, where it was located in the BTR. The Bumerang also has a back troop ramp instead of a side troop door as was found in the BTR. Both of these adaptations appear to be similar to those of NATO vehicles and are a marked departure from the line of development of the BTR.[14] This means that if we were to catch up to the current line of BTRs today, we would still be behind because Russia is actively modernizing their medium-armored platform.

Doctrinal Comparison of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the Motor-Rifle Brigade and Regiment

The similarities between U.S. and Russian medium forces are not limited to materiel developments. The United States has also started to adopt similar doctrinal and organizational aspects of the motor-rifle formations depicted in figure 1. The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) shown in figure 2 (page 71) is similar to the Russian motor-rifle regiment, utilizing a lighter, faster medium-armored vehicle to bridge the gap between rapidly deployable light infantry and the heavier, slower-to-deploy armor units.

Conspicuously different, however, is that the motor-rifle division has always included a BMP regiment, and the motor-rifle regiment has always included a tank battalion.[15] The Russians have always attached heavy platforms to allow BTR formations to fight

effectively against an armored threat. Similarly, SBCTs conducting National Training Center (NTC) rotations focused on decisive-action scenarios recently started having tank battalions attached. This is in response to the historically poor showing of SBCTs when confronted with an armored threat during previous rotations.

Russia has seen the lack of a supporting heavy-armor component as a weakness in the Stryker formation since its inception. One critique of the Stryker concept put forward by the Russian *Foreign Military Review* in 2004 was its lack of an armored contingent.[16]

It is unsurprising that Stryker units have had difficulty dealing with an armored threat in exercises. An extensive study by the RAND Corporation in 2004 identified that a medium-armored formation would fare poorly against a competent heavy-armored threat generally, especially without a forced-entry armor system.[17] The ongoing problems with the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS)—poor performance in the antiarmor role, mechanical and technical issues, and user-reported difficulty in maintenance—make the MGS unable to fulfill its secondary role as a direct-fire support platform to counter enemy armor.[18] Conversely, the ATGM Stryker variant has been shown to be effective as the primary means to counter enemy armor. The TOW 2 missile system remains a proven and combat-tested antitank guided missile.[19] Unfortunately, the SBCT fields only nine of them.[20] Even if the MGS and the ATGM variants worked exactly as proposed, SBCT would still be overmatched by a standard Russian BTR motor-rifle regiment. A motor-rifle regiment fields a tank battalion and 146 BTRs, the majority of which have ATGM capabilities organically. This basic task organization



(Graphic from Army Field Manual 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2015], 1-9)

Figure 2. Stryker Brigade Combat Team

gives a motor-rifle regiment a huge overmatch when compared against an SBCT.

Lack of Air Defense Artillery

SBCT doctrinal force structure has additional problems when confronting a peer or near-peer threat. Currently, there is no air defense artillery (ADA) organic to the SBCT. In contrast, the motor-rifle regiment is organized with an ADA platoon in each battalion.[21]

This lack of ADA assets has had a very damaging effect on rotational units at the NTC. For example, NTC rotation 14-08 saw a large portion of its ground forces destroyed after the Red Force attack helicopters had attrited friendly-force air weapons teams (pairs of Apache helicopters).[22] The teams were having similar issues to the ground forces in that they were fighting an uphill battle against an enemy that had overmatch from the start. This enemy also could engage in a combined arms maneuver that was impossible for friendly forces to counter due to lack of organic ADA assets. At the NTC, organic ADA gave the Red Force the ability to mitigate aerial risk and thus enhance a freedom to maneuver that was denied to the Stryker battalions. While it can be argued that there are many artificialities at the NTC that do not transfer directly to the conventional battlefield, the direct-fire ADA shortfall is not one that can easily be explained away by such arguments.

Notwithstanding, though no ADA upgrades have been proposed for the SBCT yet, the Army has acknowledged that there is a short-range ADA gap developing in Europe when compared to Russian capabilities.[23] Recognition of this materiel shortfall is another example of the Stryker concept following a similar development pattern to that of the motor-rifle regiment.

Analysis

If we accept that the Stryker concept is developing along similar lines as the motor-rifle regiment, the question becomes, why is the Army slowly aligning its medium force with that of the Russian Federation and the historical Soviet Union thirty years later? I do not believe, nor is it credible, that this parallel development is the U.S. Army intentionally aping the previous Russian experience. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate if it were. I also do not believe that it is being driven entirely to match the capabilities of the Russian Federation's formations together with those of its allies. That is to say, I do not think the Army is consciously mimicking Russian materiel and doctrine simply because it is the adversary we are currently concerned about (i.e., that we would copy whatever the Russian medium force was in theater, not specifically the BTR and motor-rifle regiment). A more credible explanation is that the Stryker force is suffering from a lack of direction and focus and is simply reinventing on its own the wheel Russia made a long time ago.

The Stryker formation does not have a unified concept. Multiple levels of leadership are pulling the organization in different directions. We do not have one ideal of what the medium-force concept is supposed to be that we can devote our training, doctrine, and development toward. As such, we are suffering from organizational ennui that has separate parts of the Stryker formation developing in a vacuum without consideration of what the parts are doing.

The SBCT community wants all the positive aspects of a light force: lower cost, a small tooth-to-tail ratio, greater operational-level speed, etc. But, it also wants the ability to confront a heavy-armored force on its own terms without having to adopt the cost, support, and deployment time required by an armored force. Since these two ideas are mutuality exclusive, we have been forced to adopt a piecemeal response to shortcomings identified during training and training center rotations. This has led to competing ideas on how to train, implement, and support the SBCT, which is why our materiel and doctrinal development have been unintentionally following what the Soviet Union discovered thirty to sixty years ago. Our lack of unified vision has us developing *ex nihilo* the way that the Soviet Union did when it first started its medium-force program. We are now forced to relearn these lessons for ourselves, inadvertently giving our adversaries following the Soviet model a thirty-year head start.

Recommendations

The solution is a radical restructuring of thought around the Stryker concept. First, the Army must drop "Stryker" from doctrinal terms for forces as it focuses thinking around a platform and not a concept. We do not call armored brigades "Abrams brigades" because it would inappropriately limit the doctrinal scope of the brigade. In this same way, the use of Stryker for the medium force is limiting. Junior Army leaders do not have a concept of a medium force,

and they are not taught to think doctrinally about a formation between a light and an armored formation. Therefore, doctrine does not provide a shared framework to compare and contrast a Russian motor-rifle regiment against an SBCT. This lack of a conceptual medium-force doctrine also exacerbates the continued counteractive directions that the Stryker concept is being pulled in. Similarly, the Stryker should be referred to as a medium-armored platform by doctrine. This would give us a common intellectual structure to weigh medium-armored vehicles and related materiel against each other. As it stands now, junior leaders cannot doctrinally talk about medium-armored capability differences among the Stryker, the BTR, and the German *Gepanzertes Transport-Kraftfahrzeug* Boxer.

Second, if we are committed to having the medium force confront a modern heavy-force threat supported by aviation assets, we need to acknowledge that the medium force will fare poorly without significant combat multipliers, namely organic ADA and more robust direct-fire support not offered by the MGS. One of the RAND Corporation's key recommendations was a restarting of the M551 Sheridan replacement program to provide this direct support.[24] This would mean a new solution program and not returning to the XM8 Armored Gun System, which is 1990s technology.

Additionally, even if the medium force has better organic direct-fire support and ADA, it will still require combined arms to overcome a heavy force. Fighting as a combined arms force should be incorporated into the mission-essential task list for medium-force units, and those tasks should be the focus of joint training, especially training with our Air Force partners. Training with the U.S. Air Force would also ensure that our units are capable to deploy via airlift. The current Army medium force was designed to be transported via air. This ability is essential to lower the time required to build combat power in theater.

Finally, U.S. Army Materiel Command should thoroughly analyze current peer medium-armor systems, especially the BTR and Bumerang. There is a wealth of knowledge available in friendly and competitor forces' experience with their medium platforms. This analysis should focus on which foreign lessons learned should be adopted in the current battlefield environment and which are inappropriate. These findings should then drive near-term upgrades and acquisitions. This would solve the short-term materiel listlessness and give strategists a starting point from which to innovate.

This article is meant as a critique of the current Stryker concept and is therefore generally negative. However, the reader should not take this to mean my intent is in any way to argue that the Stryker concept is wholly ineffective or unnecessary; quite the contrary. Shinseki's argument for the Stryker concept remains sound. Study of the medium-armored concept historically and in current operations shows its effectiveness.[25] The medium force has historically fared better than its heavier counterpart in complex and urban terrain.[26] This has remained true for the Army, as it has adopted the Stryker concept during the war on terrorism. The medium-armored formation's ability to bridge the gap between light and heavy forces during a sustained peer or near-peer conflict is an invaluable capability. The medium-armored force's ability to quickly bring heavy overmatch to a light formation in contact with a light formation, or to provide quick support to a heavy formation with a lower support requirement, is a compelling conceptual argument. The Army's medium concept, when paired with its air mobile capability and high-quality combined arms support, gives it the potential to be the premier medium force worldwide. For this to happen, we must focus our materiel efforts to fill identified gaps and refine our doctrine. If we do not, we will continue to unintentionally recreate the obsolete Cold War-era motor-rifle regiment. ■

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Some of these sources were knowingly taken from Russian state-owned or supported organizations. Any specific capabilities claims by these sources should be considered with that understanding.

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Crew members of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF) latest Izumo-class helicopter carrier DDH-184 *Kaga* stand in front of Japan's naval flag 22 March 2017 during a handover ceremony for the JMSDF by Japan Marine United Corporation in Yokohama, Japan. (Photo by Toru Hanai, Reuters)

Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific

Lt. Col. Peter D. Fromm, U.S. Army, Retired

The political-military climate in Japan is undergoing a series of unprecedented changes; these include broad new discussion about Japan's future relationship to Article 9 of its postwar constitution conceived by the United States.[1] Oddly, that Article 9 is now over seventy years old does not seem to have diminished the resonance of its framework in projecting the *image* of intentional pacifism,

Japanese soldiers prepare to clear rooms down a hallway 18 September 2016 during a bilateral urban warfare exercise in support of exercise Orient Shield 16 at Aibano Training Area, Japan. Orient Shield is an annual bilateral combined arms training exercise designed to improve joint operations, combat readiness, and interoperability between the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, U.S. Army Japan, and U.S. Army and Air National Guard forces. (Photo by Spc. Elizabeth Scott, U.S. Army National Guard)

as it was originally intended to do.[2] Japan's pacifist image is still very important to the region and will continue to be so in the decades ahead.

In a 2001 *International Herald Tribune* article, Michael Richardson quoted predictions made by Chinese professor Wu Xinbo of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai:

> Given the evolving political, security, and economic trends in East Asia, the U.S. security involvement in the region ten years from now will have to be transformed, both in form and substance. … The U.S. forward military presence will decline, security alliances will become less relevant as an instrument of U.S. policy, and a pluralistic security community will very likely emerge.[3]

The professor was clearly wrong in predicting the decline of U.S. security alliances with East Asian nations. The bilateral alliance with Japan and alliances with most others in the region are as strong as ever, and U.S. cooperation with Japan has evolved into one of the strongest and most important security relationships in the world, a fact the U.S. Pacific "pivot" underscores. Wu, however, was correct in predicting the evolution of a pluralistic security community. Moreover, that security community, led in part by the United States, aims to contain Chinese hegemony. However, the U.S. military needs to ensure it conducts its bilateral relationship with Japan in a way that enhances Japan's role in the East Asian security community and avoids unintended consequences such as those in the Philippines, which now courts China.

The Future Normalization of Japan

In spite of recent debate about reinterpreting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, a true collective self-defense

alliance between the United States and Japan is probably decades away.[4] Such an agreement would entail as yet undetermined changes in Japan's political situation and a vital alteration of its constitution, but significant change is inevitable, however distant. In brief, the reasons Japan will move inevitably, albeit slowly, toward true collective self-defense with the United States and other nations are varied. They include that Japan aspires

- to become a truly "normal country," one that exercises the right of collective self-defense under international law;
- to gain respect from the international community as a nation willing to share the burden of world stability;
- to improve its credentials as a legitimate member of the United Nations Security Council;
- to demonstrate to the American public that Japan is willing to become a full partner in a normal defense alliance (which would forestall Japan's having to bend to China's will and hegemony in the region should the U.S. public come to oppose what it views as a one-sided alliance); and, in a seeming paradox,
- to free itself of its too-heavy reliance on U.S. power.

Again, these are the reasons that Japan will normalize—as a military power—in the distant future, but it will move so slowly that the image of the "Peace Constitution" will persist.

In a draft 1995 U.S. Army War College thesis, Maj. Gen. K. Mochida of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) relayed sentiments not uncommon among senior Japanese policy makers today:

> Japan cannot become an active partner in the construction of the new world order as long as there is uncertainty about Japan's future direction both inside and outside of the country. Without such a clearly established and articulated direction, Japan runs the risk of losing the respect of other nations and becoming nothing more than an international "check writer" who is not included in the discussions as to how the "check" will be used.[5]

This is the condition John Dower described as Japan's special problem: "Japan's peculiar dreams of peace have come to involve a gnawing sense of entrapment."[6]

That "sense of entrapment" is still very much alive and well nearly two decades after Dower wrote *Embracing Defeat*. Dower's book is still considered current, as conditions have only changed marginally since *Embracing Defeat* was published. The book is used by U.S. Army Japan in its Leader Certification and Development Program for all new officers, senior NCOs, and senior civilians.

Implicit in Mochida's observation above is the idea that Japan's security connects more to economic issues than to political ones, and that willingness to share military burdens carries a moral responsibility eclipsing the constitutional standards of nonbelligerency. The links between military security and economic vitality are of course not unique to Japan. However, since Japan is the only nation that recognizes, yet rejects, the right of collective self-defense, the linkage is troubling when juxtaposed with Japan's still strong economy (number three worldwide as of 2015).[7] For a country as strong and rich as Japan is to be a mere "check writer" rather than a full participant in world security undermines its position for autonomous self-interest in world affairs. Yet, eighteen years after Dower's observations, incremental progress has been made. Note this observation on the disagreements involved from "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance":

> While the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] insists that the Constitution must be amended to reflect today's realities, politicians on the Left counter that the realities of Japanese security policy should be changed to reflect the provisions of the pacifist Constitution. Many moderates, meanwhile, maintain that the best way to adapt to changing circumstances is to continue to pass new laws under the current provisions of Article 9. In addition, a number of liberal politicians have called

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for constitutional revision with a completely different aim from the LDP's: to more narrowly define and circumscribe the scope of self-defense and the duties of the SDF, including participation in collective security.[8]

There is little agreement on the best way to move forward, and the progress that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made toward true collective self-defense can realistically only be described as limited. On 3 May 2017, Abe released a video message declaring his efforts to add a third paragraph to Article 9 by the year 2020 that would clearly define the existence of Japan's armed forces, yet even that small change, which would be the first alteration to the constitution in its seventy-year history, was met with skepticism at best.[9]

Since the end of World War II, East Asian nations such as China and Korea have feared a militarily recidivist, aggressive Japan, hence the go-slow approach for expanding the scope of employing its military forces is pragmatic. It is difficult to predict when the world, particularly China and Korea, would accept Japan as a true military power and collective defense partner akin to South Korea or Australia.

Even so, regional concerns about an aggressive Japan are unwarranted, and, strange as it may seem, concerns among Japan's Asian neighbors are largely not understood or appreciated by Japanese citizens.[10] Nevertheless, Japan will continue to appear to resist changes to the constitution's meaning while aiming toward normalization, thereby maintaining the facade of a pacifistic posture (maintaining the *image* of pacifism) to ameliorate lingering regional fears (or mere resentment).

The government will continue to maintain the pacifist image to enhance political and economic power internationally, as ironic as that sounds. Although the go-slow approach to normalization is a good thing for the region and for Japan, the Japanese posturing of pacifism—as a slowly dwindling facade—may seem a controversial notion. However, the logic of self-interest underpins the behavior of all nations, and seeming contradictions are just that—merely on the surface. The fact that the debate on change is painfully slow in itself reveals Eastern views of history and national strategy.

There is and has been broad belief inside Japan and perhaps elsewhere in the West that the nation is now fundamentally pacifistic, that World War II somehow changed the Japanese cultural psyche.[11] The Eastern fear of a neo-imperial Japan in the future is the other side of this form of dissimulation. Neither pacifism, which is logically incoherent, nor an equally incoherent political imperialism would best serve Japan's future interests or the interests of anyone. Logic of circumstance suggests that, more for self-interested economic reasons, less for ideological ones, a return to a politically imperialistic Japan is unlikely.

Further, the United States can do much to mitigate Asian fears of Japanese military power by maintaining a U.S. military presence in Japan and by supporting Japan in its chosen pace of change. By encouraging Japan to change in a balanced way, America can help Japan maintain the appearance of contrition for its previous history of Asian expansionism that has until now stabilized the region. The challenge America faces in cooperating with Japan is how to encourage Japanese political changes without implying that America would like to see a radical reinterpretation of Article 9, or its abolition, even if U.S. leaders thought changing Article 9 would be the best course of action in the long term.

Pressuring the Japanese in this area would not be a good idea; they must proceed at their chosen pace to demonstrate they are striving for a harmonious and predictable change. If America miscalculates in trying Japan's patience with its view of the western Pacific, Japan may come to alienate itself from the alliance and rely more on its independent potential for unilateral actions, or even on a renewed relationship with Russia or China, however unlikely that may seem now. Such moves would be destabilizing for the region.

Importance of a Continuing Cooperative Relationship

The partnership between Japan and the United States is vitally important to both countries; it might also be the best hope for the rest of the world in advancing the prosperity of the Earth, given the economies and combined strength of the two nations. Squandering this relationship through carelessness and arrogance would be a moral issue that could quickly have strategic implications. As America's partnership with Japan is a matter of the common global good, it becomes of general interest for the community of states because it represents a fusion of two overwhelmingly dominant world civilizations at the height of their development.

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Type 87 self-propelled antiaircraft guns participate in the annual Japan Self-Defense Forces military parade 23 October 2016 at Camp Asaka, Japan. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe conducted a review of troops. (Photo by Honey Nixon, U.S. Army Japan)

There is nothing deeper than that common self-interest at work between the two countries. That is to say, the relationship is not primarily a friendship, a thing Americans are used to entailing with unconditional affection. The United States' bilateral partnership with Japan represents self-interested peaceful coexistence and cooperation along the main fault line of civilization in the modern world. On the surface, we speak of friendship with Japan, and it is a useful metaphor. We may have friends in Japan on the level of the individual, and that can help. But Japan as a nation is our bilateral partner first and foremost, and—as the Chinese are well aware and may attempt to leverage—it can cease to be at any moment. A political environment in the United States that seeks to minimize or even penalize Japan in some way could be the first step to the ruin of the partnership.[12]

That partnership is not fragile, but it is also something the American policy makers should not take for granted. The Japanese are a people to whom the United States handed an ultimatum twice in the mid-twentieth century; first in 1941, when we told them to get out of the colonies they had annexed or face embargoes, and second in 1945, when we demanded an unconditional surrender. For the Japanese, the Pacific War was one that "took on the qualities of a clash of civilizations."[13] The author of those words, Mochida, wrote, "By this I mean that there was no idea of coexistence; on the contrary, the fighting had at its foundation the amplification of mutual distrust, which lacked fusion/harmony. It could be said that this was a repeat of the conflict between Rome and Carthage."[14] In other words, as Mochida explains it, Japan had deep-seated cultural and ideological interests at stake as well as economic ones in that struggle.

Their involvement in World War II was, as the Japanese saw it, a war of survival fought along a fault line of world views that would determine how the world's civilizations would evolve. Sentiments such as those show how deep the Japanese themselves think the differences between East and West are. Mochida's not mentioning in his analogy the infamous fate Rome imposed on Carthage implies through its absence that Japan would not, and will not, allow itself to suffer a similar total eclipse at the hands of Western

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force members carry simulated humanitarian supplies from a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, 18 November 2016 at Oruma Air Base, Nagasaki, Japan. (Photo by Cpl. Darien J. Bjorndal, U.S. Marine Corps)

dominance. Consequently, if Professor Jay Parker, an Army analyst, is right in his guess that Japan will eventually take the option of getting on China's bandwagon, such would be a step to prevent eclipse by the West.[15]

In turn, that step would signal the East polarizing itself from the West once again. Professor Paul Bracken warns against this possibility in *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, pointing out, "the sources of conflict in Asia arise from nation-states, not civilizations … a pullback [by the United States] would prove disastrous for the United States, and for Asia."[16]

What is left to American decision makers today is the task of finding the "fusion/harmony" Mochida talks about. Japan will seek to find a harmony regardless of how the world develops and—as nearly all agree—it would be better for the world at large if that harmony was with America than with the next alternative. As history has shown since the end of World War II, it has been in America's interest to coax Japan out of its American-engineered pacifism and into rational military empowerment to one degree or another. Still, there is form to consider, which is as important as substance is in the Asian East when dealing with the legacy of World War II and the hangover from military rule, and that means that sudden movements would be good for no one. Form is more important than substance in the development of Japan as a "normal country" with military capabilities that could communicate a willingness to use offensive operations. The Japanese word for heart is *kokoro*, and the way in which they grow out of their twentieth century legacy has to reflect the kokoro of peace that they want to communicate.

At the very least for Korea and China, Japan must keep up the face of benevolence, docility, and pacifism for the sake not only of appearances but also of practical political realities. The longer it maintains a strong alliance with the United States, the longer it can take emerging

from its so-called pacifism in a public way, and the less likely tension will arise among its neighbors.

Importance of History

The main difference between Western and Eastern cultures is their foundational philosophical perspectives—even that phrase is telling. In the West, we have what we call a world "view," and although there are many, they all spring from the same source (i.e., the Judeo-Christian traditions). In the East, people have a "way" of being in the world, and although there are many, they have a common origin different from the West's (the seminal texts of Hinduism and Buddhism and of Confucian and Taoist philosophies). Both perspectives suffer from plagues of fear, ignorance, and prejudice among the poor and the poorly educated. Surmounting these obstacles to effective cooperation from the Western side of the cultural gap is America's obligation to the alliance. History suggests Americans have had difficulty in this regard. Bracken, in *Fire in the East*, calls the Western inclination to shape things according to Western views the "challenge of self-conception."[17] When working with the Japanese, assuming this posture deliberately or unwittingly can have undesirable consequences for the alliance.

Centuries of domination by the military ethos of a political and moral elite have shaped the discourses of the nation, the dominating ideologies that form the psyche of a people, and the way they navigate in the world on every level. Harvard scholar Thomas Cleary reminds the inattentive West that "crucial to understanding Japanese psychology and behavior is an assessment of the influence of centuries of military rule."[18] Not even the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that culminated in Japanese surrender and the end of World War II, and the abrupt changes that followed those disastrous events, can alter that. Expecting such an alteration would be like telling Westerners to stop using the Judeo-Christian tradition as a lens for viewing the world.

However, as noted above, the legacy of military rule and defeat does not suggest that Japan will again become militaristic—the lingering fear of many nations in the region. It has a historical pattern of pragmatically adapting the ways and ideas of other civilizations (for instance, as in the case of adopting Chinese religion and technology in the sixth and seventh centuries and Western military technologies in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries). This implies rather that the Japanese have good reason to continue to pretend pacifism because that is what is pragmatically the best course of action now for the economic security and stability of the region and to emerge from the perception of relative political-military impotence in whatever way serves Japan's own best interests and its place in the world.

Japan's history shows a clear progression from religious elites, to emperors, to military dictatorship, to military oligarchy, to representative government. Americans need to remember how long a military government ruled in Japan—roughly nine hundred years. Patience, self-reliance, and self-determination are part of the bushido (samurai) ethic that has suffused itself among the general population.[19] These virtues are as important to the country as to its individual citizens, and Japan sees the need to preserve them to keep its own best interests on the table in future power discourses.

The Glue in the United States–Japan Security Alliance

The importance of American military bilateral engagement in Japan, with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and with Japanese society, cannot be overestimated. The alliance depends upon the military and civilian relationship at the ground level, where Japanese and American soldiers and leaders train with each other in cooperative broadening assignments, where the military staffs plan and conduct exercises together, and where local politicians and bureaucrats work with and interact with American bases. Although Japan combines the best geographic and geopolitical factors as the location most suited for America's military command and control center in the western Pacific, there are better reasons for thinking hard about future improvement of the fabric and quality of American presence in Japan. Since Japan represents the economic and cultural pivot for the best interests of America's future, and since Japan is America's most important ally in Asia if not in the world at large, *host-nation relations* should be the top priority of the U.S. military, with exercises taking a back seat to the qualitative nature of alliance maintenance. Military exercises must serve the maintenance of the relationship, not the other way around. Operations serve strategy, and there is no room for parochialism on the part of exercise planners.

The Army has the lion's share of this maintenance responsibility in spite of it having the smallest footprint of U.S. forces in Japan. The JGSDF is by far the largest and, arguably, the most influential of the branches of Japanese military service.[20] In this sense, the U.S. Army has a significant burden in the maintenance of the bilateral alliance, one that is likely the most crucial among the services given the current state of affairs. The Army, too, is welcome in Japan; there are no significant movements and little sentiment to oust Army presence from Japan, and no efforts to do so are likely. The challenge for American soldiers will be keeping the Army's relationship with the JGSDF at a level that communicates the respect Japan deserves as our ally. Looking out to the future, the Army bilateral engagement program should receive renewed emphasis from the Department of the Army, expressed as a higher rank structure for officers in Japan.

Fifteen years ago, as I was retiring from the active Army as an officer on the U.S. Army Japan staff, I heard a top-level commander of the JGSDF remark, "the U.S. Army still has no interest in Japan; they are just as blind as ever—they see no relevance." That may still be true given the Army's preoccupation with the Middle East, and if so, it needs to change. Understanding Japan and its probable future role in security for Asia is critical to the best-case outcomes for the world at large. ■

The author would like to thank Cdr. Mark L. Kreuser, U.S. Navy, retired, for his perspectives and kind assistance in his capacity as the chief of political-military affairs, U.S. Army Japan. Errors made in this article are solely the author's and do not reflect on Kreuser or the command. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone.

Notes

1. "Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution," Library of Congress website, last updated 29 September 2015, accessed 21 March 2017, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php. See also Kitaoka Shinichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism,'" Nippon.com website, last updated 2 April 2014, accessed 3 May 2017, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/.

2. "The Constitution of Japan," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, accessed 16 May 2017, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

3. Michael Richardson, "China Developing a Navy that Could Confront U.S.," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 January 2001.

4. "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance," Nippon.com website, 31 August 2016, accessed 4 May 2017, http://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00146/.

5. K. Mochida, "The Dawn of a Second Pacific Era" (unpublished manuscript, 1995), draft copy in possession of the author.

6. John W Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 563.

7. "Gross Domestic Product 2015," World Bank data, 2015, accessed 21 March 2017, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.

8. "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance."

9. "PM's Call for Revision to Article 9 of Constitution Puzzle Even Ruling Parties," *Mainichi*, 4 May 2017, accessed 16 May 2017, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170504/p2a/00m/0na/010000c.

10. This is the author's observation based on sixteen years of living predominately in Japan and the author's personal conversations with a broad cross section of the society, including family, friends, fellow students at the International Christian University, and coworkers spanning from 1972 until present.

11. Pacifism formed the nucleus of Japan's foreign policy in the postwar era. The policy is rooted in the horrors of the Pacific War and Japan's wartime trauma, including the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Article 9 of the postwar constitution, drafted under U.S. occupation in 1947, declares that the Japanese people "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation." See Matt Ford, "Japan Curtails its Pacifist Stance," *The Atlantic*, 19 September 2015, accessed 4 May 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/japan-pacifism-article-nine/406318/. After Abe's success in reinterpreting Article 9, "Tens of thousands of students protested the bill in Tokyo, and opposition leader Tatsuya Okada warned that the bill and other security-related measures would 'leave a big scar on Japanese democratic politics.'"

12. See discussion about Western arrogance toward Eastern countries in E. Valentine Daniel, "The Arrogation of Being by the Blind-Spot of Religion," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 33 (2001): 83–102, accessed 1 May 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43294582?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Professor Daniel, Columbia University anthropologist, presented a lecture at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo on anthropological distinctions between the East and West. He finds full elucidation of cultural misunderstanding deeper than explanation allows. He claims that framing the differences in typical Western ideas about world "views" is a category error, a logical mistake. He speaks of the "innocent arrogance" of Western people imposing the idea of a "view" on the rest of the world.

13. Mochida, "The Dawn of a Second Pacific Era." Because his view reflects what many people in Japan believe but will not say openly, what Gen. Mochida has said about the war from the Japanese perspective is both revealing and important to understanding Japan's current view of their own history: "There were many Japanese who believed in the ideals reflected

in the Japanese idea to free other nations from the bonds of Western colonization and the Japanese plan to build a sphere of coexistence and co-prosperity. I believe that looking at the current situation in Asia, this idealistic plan is nothing that Japanese should have to be ashamed of now … Japan ended up in defeat, but as a result of the war many Asian countries were released from their colonial bonds and became independent nations. We are too close to the rainbow now, but as time progresses, it will be important to calmly and objectively evaluate and understand Japanese actions from the Russo-Japanese war to World War II … It is important to bear in mind that Japan's defeat in World War II served as a symbolic historical turning point which made the Japanese realize the impropriety of the use of force to attempt to dominate other countries. The idea that the use of force to achieve national desires is legitimate had been rooted in ancient history and the practice had continued since then. However, based on our World War II experience, we Japanese came to recognize that this kind of thinking did nothing but cause suffering and delay human progress. This is the lesson that should be learned not only by Japan, but also by the countries who were victorious in the war … Although there are various sources of friction between the U.S. and Japan today, we Japanese are making the efforts to open our markets in the spirit of harmony, not confrontation."

14. Ibid.

15. Jay M. Parker, "Japan at Century's End: Climbing on China's Bandwagon?" *Pacific Focus* 15, no. 1 (2000): 6. Professor (Col.) Parker believes that, of Japan's three options (continuing reliance on the U.S. security arrangement, rearming as a technological superpower, or accommodation of China's interests), Japan will move away from America and toward China. This has not happened in the fifteen years since he wrote, but it remains a possibility.

16. Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East* (New York: Perennial, 1999), 163.

17. Ibid., 170.

18. Thomas Cleary, *The Japanese Art of War: Understanding the Culture of Strategy* (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), 123. In this sense, as Cleary remarks, "The obvious front is not the measure of what it is supposed to represent, even though the existence of the facades is an inescapable fact of life when dealing with Japanese culture as a political reality."

19. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese* (Boston: Harvard, 1977), 214. See also Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1963), 63.

20. U.S. Army Japan, "Command Brief" (Camp Zama, Japan, 2016).

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

The Combat Studies Institute is proud to announce the publication of Dr. Leo Hirrel's *Supporting the Doughboys: US Army Logistics and Personnel in WWI*.

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Professional Military Education
Proven in Combat during the Mexican War

Capt. Patrick Naughton, U.S. Army Reserve

Professional military education (PME) is a critically important part of building effective military leaders. This fact is sometimes overlooked due to the misguided belief that experience and field service alone will make the best leader. While these items are significant, when combined with PME, they make a more potent recipe for a truly well-rounded military leader. Ultimately, the decisive test of the success of PME is its relevance and application in combat situations.

The Mexican War (1846–1848) occurred in an often-neglected period in America's history. It is mainly remembered and studied by historians for the insight it gives into the early military careers of many famous American Civil War officers on both sides of the conflict. What is not as readily realized is that it served as the validation and true starting point for the further development and implementation of PME for America's armed forces.

History of Early American Professional Military Education

No program of formal military education was established by America upon its independence from Great Britain. Officers were generally selected from the higher echelons of society, and they received their commissions through family connections or purchase.[1]

This lack of a proper PME program to educate newly commissioned officers was not due to negligence. Many Americans feared the rise of an aristocratic officer class as seen in Europe and were hesitant to implement anything to encourage such a rise. However, then Gen. George Washington adamantly believed in a formal education system for new officers as long as it was appropriately managed. Numerous times, in person and in writing, he declared his desire for the establishment of a formal PME program for the country:

> A military academy instituted on proper principles, would serve to secure to our country, though within a narrow sphere, a solid fund of military information which would always be ready for national emergencies, and would facilitate the diffusion of military knowledge as those emergencies might require.[2]

The establishment of an American PME program began as early as 1795 at a military garrison called West Point, New York. From 1795 to 1797, a military school was established there to educate artillery and engineer officers. Taught by three French officers, the school was short-lived because of funding problems, internal and external tensions due to the foreign instructors, and the competing need for officers on the frontier.[3]

Though the formal school was no more, West Point remained an Army garrison. Between 1797 and 1802, pressure from a number of American officers and politicians for the establishment of a permanent military academy grew. On 16 March 1802, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (commonly known as West Point) was formally established when Congress authorized the president to organize and establish a school for the Corps of Engineers. West Point underwent a

Battle of Cerro Gordo (1847), hand-colored lithograph, E. B. and E. C. Kellogg, New York and Hartford. The engagement was a key battle in a campaign that aimed at capturing Mexico City, the capital of Mexico. Many junior officers of the U.S. force participating in the battle would later gain prominence as senior commanders in the U.S. Civil War; among these, Capt. Robert E. Lee. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

number of changes, reorganizations, and expansions to other branches until the formal establishment of a true curriculum in 1817.[4]

Curriculum at West Point

All West Point officers who fought in the Mexican War (hereafter, referred to as the MW) were educated and disciplined under the same basic PME guidelines. This was mainly due to the superintendent who served from 1817 to 1833, Col. Sylvanus Thayer.

From its founding in 1802 until 1817, West Point had no formal curriculum or examination system. However, upon assuming his position as superintendent, Thayer, then a major, quickly implemented a structure broken down by battalions, classes, and subclasses, all dominated by areas of study. In a letter to Secretary of War George Graham, Thayer informed him, "on assuming command I lost no time in calling a meeting of the Academic Staff with a view to a new arrangement of the studies and to the classification of the cadets." He goes on to say, "Each professor or other head of a Department is charged to draw up a programma [*sic*] specifying in minute detail all that is to be taught in his Course." He closed the letter with a note that the end goal of this project was to be a complete four-year study plan, which would be submitted to the War Department for approval.[5]

A set curriculum with an examination system was quickly established, and it became the norm. Thayer also implemented weekly progress reports and a system of measuring merit and class standing among all cadets.[6] In this system, cadets received marks from 0.0 (poorest) to 3.0 (greatest) for all classroom and most practical work. These scores represented how proficient a cadet was in

a particular subject. Additionally, each subject was assigned a specific weight relating to its importance in the overall scheme of the curriculum. A cadet's daily score in a specific topic was calculated and then aligned with the weight of the importance of the overall subject. These two scores would be calculated and combined with a demerit system of rewards and punishments to determine a cadet's standing among his peers.[7] Table 1 lists the weight assigned against the curriculum that all West Point officers would have been subjected to in the period leading up to the MW.[8]

The Onset of the War

Hostilities between Mexico and the United States had been brewing for years. The catalyst that initiated actual armed conflict between the two nations stemmed, in general, from border disputes over the annexation of Texas and the American belief at the time in "manifest destiny."[9]

In 1845, the U.S. Army was wholly unprepared to go to war. The entire Army consisted of fourteen regiments (two dragoon, four artillery, and eight infantry) with a total authorized enlisted strength of 7,883.[10] About three-fourths of the officers on the line were graduates of West Point, though none were general officers. During the MW, 523 West Point graduates served in the Regular Army. The volunteer forces initially had thirty-six graduates from the academy, but more would be assigned. By the end of the war, forty-nine would be killed, ninety-two wounded, and 447 brevet promotions would be awarded for bravery.[11]

The Army's training was superb, focusing on small-unit, tactical-level field exercises rather than garrison parade-field pomp.[12] However, ironically, the primary weakness of the Army at this time was also its focus on small-unit tactics. Operations against guerrilla-style attacks in the first two Seminole Wars and other conflicts with Native Americans, the Army's small size, and its geographical dispersion across the United States precluded its forces from practicing massive unit engagements and tactics of the type necessary for large-scale conventional war.[13] To help mitigate this, the study of large movements of forces in past conflicts became a standard component of the West Point curriculum, and a large-scale organization mindset was introduced to cadets from the first year by structuring the curriculum based on battalion rather than company level.[14]

Additionally, the study of artillery was emphasized at West Point, which proved crucial during the MW. Even before the reorganization of the curriculum in 1817, Thayer wrote to the secretary of war and the head of the Corps of Engineers requesting the addition

Table 1. Weight of Subjects in West Point's Curriculum before the Mexican War

Subject	Weight assigned in 1820	Weight assigned in 1840
Engineering	2.0	3.0
Natural Philosophy	2.0	3.0
Mathematics	2.0	3.0
Drawing	1.0	1.0
French	0.5	1.0
Chemistry	---	2.0
Mineralogy and geology	---	2.0
Tactics:		
– Infantry	1.0	1.5
– Artillery	1.0	1.5
– Cavalry	1.0	---
Conduct	1.0	---
English:		
– Ethics	---	---
– Geography	1.0	---
– History	1.0	---
– English	---	2.0
– Rhetoric	---	2.0
– Ethics	---	---
– Law	---	---
– Logic	---	---
– Law	---	---
– Grammar	---	---
Ordnance	---	---
Gunnery	---	---
Spanish	---	---
Practical engineering	---	---
Military efficiency	---	---
Military deportment	---	---

(Graphic by author)

of several officers to the West Point staff. This request included a call for an artillery officer "to take charge of the Material of that arm, to Superintend [*sic*] the artillery drills, The Laboratory, the practice at the cannon, howitzer, & mortar & teach the nomenclature of the pieces."[15] Thayer called these officers "indispensable to the prosperity of this institution."[16]

The schoolhouse preparation for use of artillery proved indispensable as American forces during the MW often faced a fortified and numerically superior enemy where artillery played a critical role. Maj. Samuel Ringgold, a West Point graduate killed during the Battle of Palo Alto, is credited for his innovative efforts in light artillery, focusing on rapid deployment and maneuverability. This technique became known as "flying artillery"; it became one of the building blocks of the branch and is still integral to indirect-fire employment.[17]

Historian and West Point graduate Edward Mansfield, writing about the Battle of Palo Alto in his published MW history, states, "Never was there a more complete demonstration of the superior skill of that arm of the service [artillery] as conducted by the accomplished graduates of West Point."[18]

Engineering and the ability to effectively scout out enemy defensive works were other skills taught at West Point. Thayer, being an engineer officer, understood the importance of this branch of study. In an 1817 letter, he informed the secretary of war of his plan for instruction in this field: "We have transferred Engineering and the branches connected from the 3d to the 4th Years course because it was found that one year (of which only 9 months are devoted to study) is not sufficient for the instruction of that branch."[19]

Thorough reconnaissance conducted by engineers trained at West Point repeatedly proved crucial during the MW. Gen. Winfield Scott, commanding general during the war, wrote numerous after-action reports that are filled with references to future American Civil War officers, and it contains by-name praise for numerous West Point graduates and their abilities as engineers.[20] His report from the Battle of Cerro Gordo demonstrates this:

> The style of execution which I had the pleasure to witness was most brilliant and decisive … I am compelled to make special mention of the services of Capt. R. E. Lee, Engineers. This officer greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Vera Cruz, was again indefatigable during these operations, in reconnaissance as daring as laborious, and of the utmost value.[21]

This effective combination of engineers and artillery officers trained via their PME experience at West Point was repeatedly observed throughout the conflict. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox, MW veteran and West Point graduate, also makes this observation. In his history of the MW he states,

> The capture of Vera Cruz was an affair, in the main, of the staff and artillery. The engineers located and constructed the batteries with such good judgment and care, that there were few casualties; the fixed ammunition used by the artillery was prepared under the direction of ordnance officers with a skill ensured by their education and their experiments and labors in the laboratory.[22]

The performance of these officers in the MW is graphically illustrated by examining the weights assigned against certain subjects in West Point's curriculum. The information in table 2 (page 88) illustrates the reasons behind these officers' successes in several areas.[23] In addition, by adding the 1860 data, the influence of the MW on the importance of certain subjects in the curriculum is apparent.

The areas highlighted in table 2 reveal why West Point officers were proficient in certain areas. Just before the MW, engineering, natural philosophy (the precursor to modern science), and mathematics were weighted heavily, translating to success on the battlefield (highlighted in green). These areas remained important in the 1860 curriculum, and the importance placed on practical engineering increased as well. The criticality of artillery and ordnance was also realized in the MW, resulting in gunnery and ordnance topics being weighted more heavily in 1860 (green highlight).

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Interestingly, infantry, artillery, and cavalry (highlighted in yellow) lost their weight in 1860. This may be due to the realization that the Army was adept at small-unit tactics, and it needed more operational and strategic topics.

Also demonstrated in table 2 is the rise in importance of military efficiency, military deportment, and overall areas in English (highlighted in blue). This would serve to create an officer better poised to exercise critical thinking on a larger scale.

The analysis above overlooks the importance of the sum of all of the topics in the successful education of West Point officers and what they were able to bring to the fight during the MW. For example, drawing proved critical in mapmaking and reconnaissance. Essentially, all the topics in the curriculum were relevant, and they could be directly applied on the battlefield, which ultimately should be the goal of PME.

Table 2. Weight of Subjects in West Point's Curriculum before and after the Mexican War

Subject	Weight assigned in 1820	Weight assigned in 1840	Weight assigned in 1860
Engineering	2.0	3.0	3.0
Natural Philosophy	2.0	3.0	3.0
Mathematics	2.0	3.0	3.0
Drawing	1.0	1.0	1.0
French	0.5	1.0	1.0
Chemistry	---	2.0	1.5
Mineralogy and geology	---	2.0	1.0
Tactics: – Infantry – Artillery – Cavalry	 1.0 1.0 1.0	 1.5 1.5 ---	 --- --- ---
Conduct	1.0	---	---
English: – Ethics – Geography – History – English – Rhetoric – Ethics – Law – Logic – Law – Grammar	 --- 1.0 1.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---	 --- --- --- 2.0 2.0 --- --- --- --- ---	 0.5 0.5 --- 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
Ordnance	---	---	1.0
Gunnery	---	---	1.0
Spanish	---	---	1.0
Practical engineering	---	---	1.0
Military efficiency	---	---	1.0
Military deportment	---	---	1.0

(Graphic by author)

Commentaries on Performance of West Point Officers in the Mexican War

Gen. Scott, presenting a toast at a dinner party at the close of the MW, loudly and earnestly praised the academy. He declared, "This army, multiplied by four, could not have entered the capital of Mexico" without the West Point-trained officers in his command.[24] Later in life, when asked to provide input on PME at West Point, Scott wrote, "I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories to our share."[25]

In December 1848, Secretary of War Randolph B. Marcy declared, "Among the considerations which render the U.S. Military Academy at West Point an appropriate depository of the trophies of the successful victories of our arms in Mexico is the admitted fact that the graduates of that institution contributed in an eminent degree to our unexampled career of success."[26] Historian Edward Deering Mansfield concluded his

1849 history of the MW saying, "To this institution, more than to any state, or any arm of the service, or any exertion of valor, is the country indebted for the success and brilliant achievements of the war."[27]

In 1860, shortly before the American Civil War, Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield, inspector general of the Army and MW veteran, was charged to examine and report on the academy. His conclusion of the validity of its PME drew directly from the MW: "I have only to cite the career of our Army in the Mexican War … I make no hesitation in the assertion that there was no failure in the undertaking of any military operation or expedition during the war resulting from a want of education in the graduate."[28]



Grant at the Capture of the City of Mexico (1860–1870), painting, by Emanuel Leutze (artist) and printed in *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*. The painting depicts future Union general Capt. Ulysses S. Grant leading a contingent of U.S. soldiers to position a cannon inside a church tower that targeted the San Cosme Gate leading into Mexico City during the final battle to capture the capital. Fire from the cannon helped clear the way for Maj. Gen. William J. Worth's 1st Division to enter the city. Lt. George E. Pickett and Maj. James Longstreet (future Confederate States' generals) also participated in the battle. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Mansfield's conclusion would be further supported after West Point graduates performed exceptionally on both sides of the American Civil War. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, West Point graduate and future president, credited West Point for his success in the American Civil War. Grant pointed to the personal relationships that he made during his time at the academy as being crucial to his success while in command: "The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion."[29]

Grant's published memoirs contain forty-five references to how his connections to, and knowledge of, other West Point alumni assisted him throughout his life, both on and off the battlefield. As such, networking is another key benefit of PME. Those relationships formed among attendees serve to enhance careers by extending influences beyond the chain of command. The memoirs of Gen. Robert E. Lee, West Point graduate and former superintendent, read similarly and further expound on the importance of this networking process.[30]

Varina Davis, wife to West Point graduate and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, also supported this claim. She wrote in his memoirs, "During all his life he remembered his old companions at West Point and wrote many loving words."[31]

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

The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War: The Occupation of Mexico May 1846–July 1848

By Stephen A. Carney

The Mexican War is an often underappreciated event in the history of the United States that dramatically shaped its social and political character. During eighteen months of fighting, the U.S. Army won a series of decisive battles, culminating in the defeat of the Mexican Army and seizure of Mexico City. At termination, the conflict had added approximately one million square miles of land to the United States, including the important deep-water ports of coastal California. Moreover, it gave the Regular Army experience in large-scale conventional operations that later was applied on a much grander scale by both sides of the American Civil War. To view an online copy of this book, visit http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/073/73-3/CMH_Pub_73-3.pdf.

She went on to credit the taming of the western American frontier as being due to the refined education its young officers received at West Point, especially their ability to bring civilization to the wilderness.[32] She stated that this experience silenced the critics of West Point and their shouts of "toy soldiers" and "shoulder-strap aristocracy" forever.[33]

Davis put his pre-Civil War career in Congress on the line by vehemently defending West Point against proposed funding cuts or threats of closure numerous times.[34] In addition, as secretary of war, he proposed the academy's program be extended from four years to five, demonstrating how highly he regarded West Point.[35]

Lessons Learned for Professional Military Education Today

The superb combat performance of West Point officers during the MW was due to PME combined with practical field experience. The curriculum taught in the classroom directly translated to a force multiplier on the battlefield.

Scott credited his West Point-trained officers for the rapidity of the execution and closure of the MW, and the value of their education is the major lesson from this conflict: the PME obtained by the cadets at West Point was crucial to the success of the Army in 1846 to 1848. This must be the goal of today's PME curriculum—to educate the Nation's soldiers on relevant topics that will translate to rapid and decisive victory on the battlefield.

Identifying gaps created by constrained funding—which affects training dollars for large-scale field exercises, equipment, and supplies—is the second lesson learned from the MW. These gaps must be mitigated by PME. During the MW, it became clear that a fissure existed between training at the tactical level and at the operational and strategic levels of the Army due to budget constraints placed upon the force. However, this gap was in part mitigated by teaching operational and strategic concepts to future officers at West Point. This same identification process must be applied to current PME being offered to military leaders. If an operation cannot be executed in the field due to a lack of funding, then at the very least, the type of operation and its strategic purpose must be studied during PME.

Conclusion

West Point cannot claim to be the sole reason behind victory in the MW, as many of the untrained volunteer officers and noncommissioned officers performed valiantly and superbly. However, the success of the academy's graduates during that war demonstrates and validates the need for a useful and thoroughly applied PME program in a professional army. PME, combined with practical experience obtained through realistic field training events, will produce a better leader.

The challenge lies not in realizing the importance that PME plays in developing enlisted personnel and officers who can win in future conflicts but rather in formulating a PME curriculum that anticipates what the future of conflict will look like. PME cannot take a "cookie-cutter" approach toward educating future leaders. It must remain flexible and constantly incorporate feedback from those serving in current engagements around the world.

A substantial investment in developing a robust and adaptive PME program rooted in continual reevaluation is crucial. This is the only way the force can mitigate budget constraints and keep Army leaders prepared to fight in future ever-changing and challenging conflicts. ■

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1st Lt. Patrick Higgins (*foreground*) of 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment surveys a village as Spc. Aaron Trapley and Sgt. Gary Fordyce provide sniper overwatch and Sgt. Nicholas Gauthier provides security during a foot patrol 23 February 2009 near Forward Operating Base Mizan, Afghanistan. To deal with the extreme stress and moral ambiguity of such situations, the authors assert that high standards and methods for ethical decision making need to be inculcated in troops and their leaders through intensive education. (Photo by Sgt. Christopher S. Barnhart, U.S. Army)

The Military Moral Education Program

Checking Our Ethical Azimuth

Maj. Timothy Leone, U.S. Army

Maj. Saythala Lay Phonexayphova, U.S. Army

Horrific war crimes, the sort portrayed in the film *The Kill Team* and the book *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death*, and major transgressions by senior leaders that make for embarrassing headlines typically dominate the Army's discourse on moral education.[1] While no one argues that those responsible were somehow unaware of their actions being wrong, such events commonly elicit immediate demands for further instruction and improvements in the ethical reasoning of all soldiers. In its haste to respond, the Army repeatedly deploys its intellectual capacity toward solving the wrong problem.

Failure to identify the root of a complex problem can sabotage even the best intentions. Imagine for a moment a purpose-driven soldier motivated to improve his fitness level. Each morning, he inspires his fellow soldiers by giving 100 percent during physical training. Yet, he shows little improvement. Only after an honest counseling session with his squad leader does the soldier confess that he rewards himself with eight hundred calories worth of coffees, free donuts, and breakfast assortments after each session on the way to conduct hygiene. Immediately, the squad leader recognizes the problem: the soldier is attending to a multifaceted end (general health) along only one relevant line of effort. Similarly, the Army is unaware of its own blind spot in character development.

Recent military initiatives—such as the addition of an ethics block for professional military education and the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign—have led to a more comprehensive curriculum in ethical theory that seeks to improve soldiers' moral reasoning skills. However, the Army must simultaneously improve its soldiers' moral will—that is, their moral motivations. The proper ends of the Army ethics program include moral action rather than *merely* moral knowledge.[2] These are two deliberate, but not necessarily discrete, ends. One might gain moral knowledge without interest in pursuing moral action. In contrast, one cannot act morally without the prerequisite knowledge (ethical reasoning) that allows him or her to discern right action. The Army must characterize its ethical training as moral education and implement systematic methods of reinforcement so that the profession interprets its ethic as a standard that each member aspires to *be* rather than simply *do*.

The contemporary environment is complicated and growing ever more complex. While the Cold War-era military prioritized efficiency and effectiveness, the modern military emphasizes flexibility and adaptability. Training attends to the former; training prepares soldiers and leaders to succeed in the next *known* mission. Education attends to the latter; education prepares soldiers and leaders to succeed in the next *unknown* mission. While training prioritizes highly specialized, repeatable expertise (battle drills, for example), education prioritizes "big-picture" thought that understands the interoperability of efforts—their necessary causes and likely effects on mission accomplishment. Moral knowledge requires education initiatives rather than further training initiatives.

Similarly, the Army might seek to train soldiers toward the second end suggested above: moral motivations. Training may habituate good activities by virtue of an organized system of rewards and reprimands. That model might achieve more immediate compliance, but it is unlikely to gain enduring commitment. Formerly, in a more centralized formation, that course of action would prove acceptable, feasible, and suitable. However, contemporary low-intensity environments impose upon the military a need for far greater autonomy throughout the force—from the combatant commander to the fire-team leader. Junior leaders find themselves responsible for large swaths of battle space, armed with incredible assets, and able to make major strategic impacts. Rewards and reprimands often require immediacy and deliberate oversight to be effective; operational conditions are not conducive for such a method of reinforcement. This is to say that a punitive system does not work as well in the fight our Army faces today.[3]

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Foundations: Moral Education Matters

Michael Walzer, in his seminal work *Just and Unjust Wars,* best captures the essence of what it means to be a good soldier when he suggests that "soldiers must be 'men of spirit,' like Plato's guardians. … It is almost certainly true that they fight best when they are most disciplined, when they are most in control of themselves and committed to the restraints appropriate to their trade."[4] According to Walzer, well-disciplined soldiers do not just act morally or fight justly.[5] They *are* moral people who consistently align their actions with objective moral truths—those that the Army explicitly codifies in its professional ethic (normative rules, regulations, values, and creeds). Foremost in this professional ethic is the claim that its people are stewards of the profession who have an "ethical workspace," or nonphysical realm, that they maintain at all times to foster trust.[6] That is, the Army's professional ethic maintains the ideal that Army professionals are ethical beings with stable moral dispositions. Further, they do not set aside ethical obligations and duties during off hours—weekends, leaves, or when they retire.

In requiring that military professionals *be* stewards, the Army accepts the moral principles of virtue ethics in some important ways. We turn to Aristotle, the most well-known virtue ethicist, to provide a theoretical framework that can guide a clearer approach to moral education. For him, the state of *being* moral is more important than acting justly and morally; that is to say that a person's habitually moral actions derive from his or her character.[7] Similar to Aristotle's perspective, we look at ethics as an integral part of how a person should be throughout an entire lifetime. We want soldiers whose actions originate from a stable character that conforms to the Army's professional ethic. When people's interests, values, and passions match with their organizational beliefs, it is more likely that they will be committed to the profession.

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* explains how people could lead good lives and act rightly from deeply rooted motivations. Aristotle's thesis centers on the question of what is a good life—the Greek term for good life, or human flourishing, is *eudaimonia*. To morally self-actualize, Aristotle proposes a "functionalist" theory of the human good; he claims that just as the goodness of a flute player or sculptor resides in his proper function/purpose (*ergon*), so "the good of man" resides in "whatever is his proper function."[8] Moreover, he stipulates that "the proper function of man … consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle … [and that] the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue."[9] Here, Aristotle means that human beings distinguish themselves from other living organisms, because we have a rational capacity that allows us to be people who can achieve excellence, or flourish, not by simply acting but by *being* virtuous. For instance, for soldiers to be excellent, they ought to be people whose actions are consistent over time, and their actions ought to originate from right motivations.

Their virtues should conform to the Principle of the Golden Mean, which says that good actions are between two extreme vices (e.g., the virtue of courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness). By being a virtuous person, who acts between the mean of two vices, one fosters stability in his or her organization and provides coherence for that person's identity and actions. Thus, to have a good life (to be *eudaimon*) is to live a life in which one engages in excellent activities that utilize abilities unique to human beings. A good life is a life of excellent activity. A morally virtuous person has values that are so firmly instilled in that individual that they are truly part of that person; these values, in essence, are inseparable from the person and guide his or her actions in life.[10]

In regards to practically applying Aristotle's position, we begin by discussing the military's unique group dynamics and highlighting potential benefits in regards to character development. We have made the following two assumptions: first, a better measure of character is one along a spectrum that traverses from vicious to virtuous (in accordance with the Aristotelian Principle of the *Golden Mean*) rather than assuming its uncompromising presence or absence; and second, formal and informal mentorship better motivates ascent along that spectrum than less personal methods commonly employed by more conventional training (to include those that exist within the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign). Informed by an Aristotelian model, these two assumptions will help us respond to four bad arguments or practices that we often see in the military when it attempts to yield a successful moral education program.

First Bad Argument: "You are a moral person until you prove otherwise." In order to explicate our

concept of measuring character along a spectrum, we first depict that method within a more quantifiable domain, physical fitness. The military has clearly outlined physical fitness standards of excellence and failure. There is no confusion over how the profession designates, scores, and records those standards. However, the Army anticipates that its largest population of service members will score somewhere well between what they consider an excellent or failing score. For instance, it would be absurd to designate a failing score just below one that represents excellence. However, that same absurdity persists in our understanding of character development; the institution assumes every service member has exceptional character, until he or she does not. For years, the officer evaluation report allowed only for a single check to describe a leader's embodiment of the Army values: commitment to duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Marking "yes" indicated the officer was fit for service, while "no" condemned him or her as absent decent character; with few exceptions, the latter rarely occurred.

While different in its form, the revised officer evaluation report instituted in 2014 maintains a similar dichotomy: either one is a moral exemplar or a deviant. Raters now draft descriptive prose in the block devoted to character. However, their comments identify most subordinates as "operating with impeccable integrity and ethic" (or something comparably laudatory). Any comment other than one that speaks to a rated officer's pristine character would greatly damage his or her career. The interpretation that everyone's character is exceptional and without any room for improvement is, again, absurd; not only does it make no intuitive sense, leaders clearly do not employ such a stark distinction in any other category on the evaluation. We must admit that most members of our profession operate in that aforementioned third category that is not necessarily void of high moral character, but could certainly stand to further mature as they might in any other capacity within which they are rated.

Second Bad Argument: "Punishment makes good soldiers out of common men." There is value in returning to the physical fitness domain again. As previously assumed, the majority of military members remain well within the spectrum between exemplar and failure. Admitting the benefits of the conventional "carrot and the stick approach" for those soldiers on the cusp of either designation, one must concede that most do not fear "the stick" of failure, nor are they inspired by the "carrot" to excel, as they likely see it as impossible for them. For the majority, those incentives offer very little to motivate improvement. For them, their relative performance in respect to their performing peer group offers better motivation. In that regard, the military offers a powerful advantage discernible in its unique group dynamics and subculture.

> "The interpretation that everyone's character is exceptional and without any room for improvement is, again, absurd ..."

The military has carefully addressed instances of hazing; it must continue to root out inappropriate behaviors of that sort. However, it stands to continue benefitting from appropriately employed peer pressure. Its potential motivation is the predictable result of a phenomenon referred to as Social Identity Theory. Proposed by Henri Tajfel, a former professor at the University of Oxford and a founding member of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, the theory suggests that people base their sense of who they are largely on their group memberships.[11] His hypothesis is that group membership indoctrinates its members in a way that emphasizes the negative aspects of an out group in order to enhance their own self-image. In pursuing his theory further, some argue they have exposed the psychological nature of prejudice by better understanding Tajfel's principles of basic cognition involved in the group-formation process.[12]

First, one categorizes people into a group according to certain common attributes that he or she admires. Second, one assimilates or socially identifies him- or herself with that group by adopting its identity as his

or her own by establishing an emotional bond with group members. Third, one coheres, or socially compares, him- or herself and his or her group with others through a lens that is predisposed to recognize one's own advantages and an outsider's disadvantages.[13] That is all to say that soldiers likely similarly self-actualize out of desire for inclusion in a peer group they value.

We can apply this discussion of the in-group versus the out-group dynamic to physical fitness. The average soldier is motivated to improve him- or herself in order to remain in the fold. Absent clearly identifiable goals, such as those available to the soldiers on the margins of excellence or failure, those around a soldier motivate and compel that soldier to improve. Sadly, no similar peer pressure exists in the domain of character development. A soldier admires the moral exemplar, and avoids association with the pariah; however, most are generally content and uninspired to grow (as identified above, they may not even understand growth as an option as they interpret themselves as already endowed with "impeccable" status). The Army must impose valuable pressure within the ranks that encourages the already present benefits of group dynamics to perform how it does elsewhere. Educational mentorship, rather than more training, will provide that valuable pressure.

one is valued as a mentor. Why is that? While mentorship requires sincere commitment by both parties, it also requires certain attributes, skills, and characteristics such as humility, sympathy, competence, and relevant experience.[15] If it is so valuable and it requires so much to be successful, why pretend everyone can do it?

It is here that we propose a major shift in the professional military education model: a deliberate emphasis on one-on-one mentorship. When a rater comments on a subordinate's potential for future assignments, one of the most coveted comments should be in a newly created *professional military education mentor* category. While the specifics of such a role would require far more discussion than is within the scope of this article, identifying a subordinate with the promising attributes of a mentor would suggest to the board superior merit in those attributes the Army values most—clearly identifying him or her as a steward of the profession. Further, such identification would impose an obligation to uphold and spread that moral value among the ranks. This identification creates a more accurate understanding of the spectrum of character in the force. Those leaders would serve as moral exemplars. The majority would now populate some newly created middle ground that more accurately reflects reality. With the landscape redrawn, we might consider now the advantages afforded to the military by this new population of mentors in regards to moral education and motivation.

"While mentorship requires sincere commitment by both parties, it also requires certain attributes, skills, and characteristics such as humility, sympathy, competence, and relevant experience."

Third Bad Argument: "Everyone is a moral exemplar and, thus, everyone can be a mentor." Thomas Ricks, a sincere critic of military leadership, earmarks a fascinating dynamic for further discussion in his controversial book, *The Generals*. He calls attention to the inconsistency present in military leadership's unwillingness to fire senior leaders.[14] While professing that generalship is incredibly difficult and requires a unique set of skills and characteristics, the military's reluctance to fire general officers tacitly endorses the notion that everyone promoted to that rank has those rare skills and characteristics. Ricks' suggestion bears import here as well. By virtue of remaining in the military long enough,

In its recent emphasis on moral education, the Army has taken a necessary (but we argue insufficient) step by requiring moral education as an element of soldiers' annual training, resiliency programs, and professional military education.[16] Following its flawed premise that everyone can be a mentor, however, the Army places the moral education and training of its soldiers in the hands of retired or seasoned Army officers, chaplains, and military lawyers. In the Army's eyes, those moral experts set the course for the profession.

The Army needs to recheck the azimuth on this course, because it does not provide enough resources to the preparation of those who are responsible for the moral education of our soldiers. Some have little education in ethics as an academic discipline and some have no experience as educators. The Army, as a learning institution, must invest in its intellectual development and bring the right educators into the classroom in order to facilitate proper mentorship and learning. Specifically, it should open its faculty to civilian moral philosophers and ethicists (real academics) in order to enrich the classroom, stop privileging tactical experience over ethical understanding, and stop relegating moral discourse only to the realm of religious experts. We do a harm to our soldiers when we fail to recognize that there can be a distinction between the morality of the profession and the morality of a religious discipline. The best person to talk about morality may not be the chaplain in the formation.

Fourth Bad Argument: "Soldiers and junior officers are the only proper audience." Influential political theorist John Rawls offers insight into the dynamic process of moral development in his seminal work, *A Theory of Justice*. Properly interpreted, moral psychological development is a persistent process that occurs throughout one's life among three interdependent stages.[17] With disregard for rank, all service members reside in one of the three stages he articulates; it is our contention that proper moral education will motivate more members toward the third, and most desirable, stage. We suggest that each member of the profession ought to pay consistent attention to his or her moral development. The Army ought to inform its efforts with that premise.

The first stage of moral psychological development strives to implant an objective standard in concordance with a proper authority. Its resultant effort may manifest itself in, "prized virtues [of] obedience, humility, and fidelity to authoritative persons."[18] Without proper moral development at this stage, the second state of evolution, "morality of association," becomes potentially as dangerous as it does beneficial. The second stage allows moral momentum to build by associations that one develops among peers; the second stage, simply understood, amounts to rightly oriented peer pressure. The third stage of moral development, "morality of principles," pursues fuller maturation; the fully matured person acts out of an internal sense of pride that emanates from membership in a decent, principled society. As Rawls articulates, "by acting upon [these principles] men express their nature as free and equal rational beings. Since doing this belongs to their good, the sense of justice aims at their well-being even more directly."[19]

This process is dynamic; at any time, a member participant may experience a set of circumstances that forces them to devolve. This may result from a loss of respect for authority due to perceived impropriety, betrayal by associates, or from the perception that the existent principles that one reveres are no longer serving his or her better interests. The structure must be constantly reinforced and strengthened. A second reference to the structure as dynamic is the way in which its fulfillment of each stage intrinsically provides the necessary foundation and motivation to enter into the next; it is a self-perpetuating process.[20]

Recommendation: Checking the Ethical Azimuth

In gathering the science regarding learning, Drs. Henry Roediger and Mark McDaniel collaborate with Peter Brown to describe a number of successful learning techniques in *Make It Stick*. The authors suggest a number of potentially beneficial teaching techniques that are naturally present in our proposed form of mentorship. The technique we will focus on in our closing remarks is one they refer to as *generative learning*, "the process of trying to solve a problem without the benefit of having been taught how."[21]

What most consider merely "interference" in the process of learning actually offers a critical opportunity for greater retention and greater internalization. One may understand the operative premise in our argument by considering the following example: "when letters are omitted from words in a text, requiring the reader to supply them, reading is slowed, and retention improves."[22] By this exercise, the instructor forces the reader to work harder in order to graft the text onto meanings and heuristics already in his or her memory. That process activates deeper recognition of the relevance of the new information to information already stored and internalized. We suggest that this same sort of thing might occur in a personal one-on-one interaction between mentors and their mentored. The anecdotes proposed will require the learner to construct

courses of action and assess their likelihood of success, and will provide the learner with an opportunity to receive timely feedback from his or her mentor without lasting consequence. That iterative process of back and forth "filling in the blanks" will certainly result in mutual benefit for both parties.

soldiers, giving positive feedback on performance, and using disappointment as a motivational technique."[24] Given this data, it is here that we directly apply pressure along the dimension of moral motivations. Mentors not only instruct the facts and rules of ethics, but they also hold the subordinates accountable to

"The Army is guilty of placing ethics instruction among a list of competing demands and poorly emphasizing its priority."

Effective sessions would result in learning long after the session concludes by way of encouraged reflection. Reflection includes several cognitive activities: "retrieval (recalling recently learned knowledge to mind), elaboration (for example, connecting new knowledge to what one already knows), and generation (for example, rephrasing key ideas in one's own words or visualizing and mentally rehearsing what one might do differently the next time)."[23] We propose that the sort of model we are suggesting makes moral education a persistent process that survives among, not in competition with, the many training requirements with which units already contend.

Currently, ethics training occurs discretely. Predominantly, the Army instructs ethics within professional military education programs and requires small-unit leaders to iterate the major points annually. At both times, the Army is guilty of placing ethics instruction among a list of competing demands and poorly emphasizing its priority. The proposed mentor program demands an open dialogue that occurs as, or when, necessary. While anticipating the necessity that units outline some standards in order to ensure some commonly shared experience, those standards must remain limited to meet the intended spirit of the initiative.

The soldier is more likely to value the topic of ethics and moral instruction if it is taught by an exemplar than if it is modularized and mass-produced in the way it is currently. According to Chaplain Kenneth Williams, in his study of Initial Entry Training, "Based on the qualitative data, leaders played the key role in influencing soldiers' moral and character development. Effective motivation by leaders included encouragement and inspiration, spending extra time with them as a moral agent. That personal dimension serves as an intermediate step toward inculcating the notion that the profession (not merely an individual professional) holds one to account; initially represented by an individual, ultimately he or she is representative of an ideal worthy of one's conformity.

Dialectic is the only way to instruct the topics covered in ethics and moral education. Mentors must inspire subordinates to dig far deeper and reconcile their individual world views with their professional ethic—all while solving real-world problems. This sort of pursuit remains only superficial when conducted in mass; it allows far too many to remain on the sidelines of those critical discussions necessary to develop and mature one's character. This one-on-one proposal demands that sort of valuable interaction.

Being virtuous and establishing caring relationships of mentorship matter in moral education, because the types of people we are and the relationships we form are fundamental to our happiness. Most people want to align their personal and professional values; they seek to maintain their personhood in the military so they can recognize themselves in a mirror before, during, and after service. Similarly, people want to know that the organization (namely, the people within it and their leaders) care about them. This concept of care is significant, because soldiers want to be a part of a trusting profession. As Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army*, stipulates, "Trust is the core intangible needed by the Army inside and outside the profession … [because] the Nation depends upon trust."[25] By emphasizing the importance of moral mentorship, we can better ensure that the byproduct of the organization is trust.

Members feel as if they are part of a trusting organization that cares for and enables them to maintain their values, ways of life, and outlooks for the future.

When the gunfire and explosions go silent and the soldiers are no longer in their battle fatigues, they should feel like they are complete persons who have done a great service to the Nation. The military profession and the Nation should want their soldiers to recognize who they are as people when they return home to their families. They should see that their physical and mental sacrifices are appreciated because they have taken a road less traveled—one that is unique in its dangers and sacrifices but made possible by an equally unique ethos. The profession and the Nation cannot forget them. We should help them find their roads back home; we can do this by respecting and educating them as people. ■

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Notes

1. *The Kill Team*, directed by Dan Krauss (New York: Oscilloscope, 2014), DVD; Jim Frederick, *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death* (New York: Broadway Books, 2010).

2. Take the case of the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign as an example. The campaign does address the issues of moral challenges, to include moral injury, but morality does not have its own category—spirituality does. There is a difference between spirituality and morality. The Army would serve itself well by recognizing the differences between these two concepts.

3. The changes we recommend will require attention to the overarching education of the soldier as a moral agent. Moral education must educate soldiers so that they might discern right actions, and then choose to conduct those actions out of respect for the profession and its ethic. To develop a disposition of moral responsibility, we need to take a new approach to learning; we must encourage full-scale debates about moral issues (a dialectical method) that allows soldiers to question and deepen their personal convictions until they adopt the profession's morals as their own. These changes to the military moral education program will benefit the military in two ways: collectively decreasing the occurrence of moral failures, and individually fostering greater resiliency against moral tragedy by appropriating soldiers' morals within the greater Army ethic.

4. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations,* 4th ed. (New York: Basics Books, 1977), 308.

5. In this paper, we do not recognize a distinction between ethics and morals. There is much disagreement and conflation of the terms and it is beyond the scope of this article to separate them.

6. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 17 September 2012), 2-9. This doctrinal publication further describes that trust is between soldiers; between soldiers and their leaders; among soldiers, their families, and the Army; and between the Army and the Nation.

7. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 15.

8. Ibid., 17.

9. Ibid.

10. Eva Wortel and Jolanda Bosch, "Strengthening Moral Competence: A 'Train the Trainer' Course on Military Ethics," *Journal of Military Ethics* 10, no. 1 (2011): 20.

11. Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. Steven Worchel (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1985).

12. Michael Billig, "Henri Tajfel's 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' and the Psychology of Bigotry," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 41, no. 2 (June 2002): 172, accessed 17 February 2017, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1348/014466602760060165/abstract (subscription required).

13. Tajfel and Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," 35–36.

14. Thomas Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), xx.

15. One of the basic assumptions we make about mentorship is that the mentor *cares* about whom he or she is mentoring. A caring relationship is dynamic but has stable characteristics that are involved with both parties. Humility is a requisite characteristic, like sympathy or empathy, because in a caring relationship, it enables people to account for and consider the feelings of others and act upon them to gain trust. Humility allows individuals to grow, learning from one's mistakes and successes. Absent humility, relationships rely only on unsustainable success to maintain themselves.

16. Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 August 2014). Topics such as ethics, moral leadership, and ethical reasoning practices are mandated throughout the regulation.

17. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard, 1999), 420.

18. Ibid., 408.

19. Ibid., 417.

20. Ibid., 420.

21. Peter C. Brown, Henry L. Roediger III, and Mark A. McDaniel, *Make It Stick: The Science of Successful Learning* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard, 2014), 94.

22. Ibid., 87.

23. Ibid., 89.

24. Kenneth R. Williams, "An Assessment of Moral Character Education in Initial Entry Training (IET)," *Journal of Military Ethics* 9, no. 1 (2010): 49.

25. ADP 1, *The Army*, 2-2.

A member from the Iraqi security forces beats an Islamic State insurgent who was captured 1 April 2015 in Tikrit, Iraq. Iraqi troops and Shi'ite paramilitary fighters were battling Islamic State forces in northern Tikrit, which officials described as the Sunni Muslim militant group's last stronghold in the city. (Photo by Alaa Al-Marjani, Reuters)

Navigating through the Challenge of Culture and Law in Postconflict Stability Operations

Lt. Col. John B. (J. B.) Shattuck, U.S. Army, Retired

Long-term, postconflict stability operations will always be a challenge; complicate the situation with an insurgency and the difficulty of the challenge is further elevated. Critical to meeting this challenge during stability operations is promoting the development of legal institutions, particularly law enforcement, to establish rule of law. This will sound familiar for many who have been deployed over the last sixteen years. Still, there is cultural friction when attempting to understand what rule of law is, what it means, and how it should be applied. Consequently, it is imperative that we recognize understanding our own cultural perspectives and the cultural foundation from which they grow as a prerequisite for attempts to influence others in their perspectives regarding appropriate law enforcement.

There are many examples of short-term, mission-specific task forces manned by specialists that have established a track record for stability mission success in operations with limited and discrete objectives. Among these are the Ebola relief effort in West Africa, the earthquake relief effort in Haiti, and the counterpiracy efforts in East Africa.[1] However, long-term rebuilding of a conquered nation is an entirely different challenge.

During any stability operation, we (U.S. military members) make an honest attempt to learn all about the culture of the people in the affected region. Routinely, however, there is a lack of effort to gain greater understanding with regard to our own cultural perceptions. Consequently, without effective efforts to obtain introspective knowledge of ourselves and our own culture, we are ill prepared to anticipate the cultural friction points we will encounter when we try to influence, or impose, a law enforcement system on a very different culture.

In stability operations that include efforts to change law enforcement perceptions and methods, a key point of cultural concern is an understanding of the prevailing legal traditions of the occupied society, including how they police themselves. Without such understanding, the most important aspects that need to be changed may be overlooked. This may result in training that focuses on the comfortable and familiar routine of teaching and improving law enforcement skills and techniques rather than the more vital efforts to change attitudes and values. Such a circumstance presents the danger of reinforcing, or even empowering, the worst aspects of those segments of the military involved in internal security, and may simply be conducive to instituting a perpetual state of oppressive martial law once the training mission is complete.

In any case, changing cultural attitudes and values is no easy task, and it is well understood that within stability operations it will be tough to effectively establish normalcy ruled by law even backed by knowledge of institutions that need to be modified or newly established. However, prepared or not, the task will fall on the shoulders of the ground maneuver forces. A study by the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute concluded that

> Post-war planning cannot be separated from war planning. All phases of the war need to be coordinated to work towards the same end … ground forces need to be prepared to take on stabilization and reconstruction tasks after the conflict. Only they are able to do it in the immediate aftermath of the conflict because of the power vacuum. They must be given the proper training to handle these tasks.[2]

Our recent history of organizing and training for stability in long-term, postconflict scenarios in Iraq and Afghanistan, both complicated by an insurgency, demonstrate mixed results at the tactical level. Moreover, with the downsizing of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we seem to have given up on the separate advisor effort under its own authorities, such as Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq. Or, if not given up, then we have pushed them into the background and focused efforts on advise-and-assist brigades (AABs).

Nevertheless, for all such engagements and operations, the challenge is determining where the most gain is made in the limited training time available. Well before any deployment announcements are made, training needs to begin on this basic fundamental: understanding our own culture in a way that is conducive to a deeper understanding of the role of civil law in society generally.

Cultural Preparation

Unfortunately, such essential preparation is not being accomplished: teaching one's own culture as a platform for understanding other cultures is now not normally

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done. As a consequence, it is pretty tough to identify points of cultural friction without a shared understanding of the differences between one's own culture and that of others.

To familiarize our troops with foreign cultures, we set up language labs, provide computer-aided culture instruction, and hire foreign expatriates with cultural experience in a given operational area to teach us about that prevailing culture from their perspective (a mistake, but more on that later). Additionally, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) can launch mobile training teams prepared to teach any culture in the world. But, unfortunately, among all such training, the segments on self-awareness of one's own culture, together with cultural empathy and perspective, are usually deleted in the push for predeployment preparation and skills training.[3]

We normally do not identify who we are culturally or develop even modest awareness of how our culture may potentially conflict with the target culture of interest. As a result, a stability force is often sent in that understands surface culture practices and issues but stumbles clumsily through a landscape of deeper cultural issues. Much of this stumbling about is unintentional ignorance that stems from lack of effort to understand how we are different.

As previously mentioned, expatriate foreign personnel with experience in a specific operational area are commonly hired to provide cultural insight to soldiers preparing to deploy into that area. While hiring a foreign expatriate culture instructor sounds like a good idea, there is significant potential for getting highly biased or parochial instructors who lack true cultural expertise. Many appear to speak authoritatively from personal localized experience with one segment of a population, but lack the broader, formal scope of cultural knowledge that may include knowing where family, local, and regional culture ends and national culture begins. This problem can be highlighted by imagining that a U.S. expatriate overseas was asked to provide cultural insight to persons preparing to come to the United States on some of kind of relief mission. Obviously, there are many certain generalized observations the expatriate could make about his or her culture from his or her own experience, but there is also the risk of deceptively overgeneralizing that experience for the entire population across the entire nation. To illustrate, a white male from New England and an African American female from the Deep South may have certain common cultural traits and experiences as

Iraqi army soldiers look on as U.S. soldiers use a sand table to demonstrate how to react to an ambush 24 March 2015 during a training exercise at a training area on Camp Taji, Iraq. (Photo by Sgt. Cody Quinn, U.S. Army)

American citizens but would have significantly different cultural experiences at the family, local, and regional levels. It requires a culturally well-educated expatriate to identify common cultural traits and also to distinguish them for their students from local and regional traits.

So, who should instruct us on our own culture? For the long term, training doctrine and "research efforts must include a greater investment in the human and behavioral sciences."[4] As noted previously, the TCC can provide mobile training teams. In addition, cultural anthropologists could be contracted from local universities, and there are also a limited number of applied anthropologists who work outside of academe as culture advisors who may be available for hire.

Also, in the absence of true cultural experts, as a remedial measure, it may be possible to pool human resources in a unit sufficient to "teach oneself." In the current environment, there may be enough members in the organization who have spent sufficient time engaging at a cultural level with foreign personnel in a stability environment to provide useful and meaningful insight gained from the experience of being an outsider looking in.

Insight into Our Own Culture

So what are the salient elements of our own culture about which we must be aware? There are volumes written about American, North American, and Western cultures, but a few points are particularly salient. Among the most important, a general trait of American culture is the tendency to see only two sides to any issue—black and white, red and blue, cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians, Hatfields and McCoys, home team and visitors, winner and losers, etc.

This tendency is reflected in the multiplicity of recreational sports competitions in the United States. Given enough contestants, these competitions are organized into a schedule of one-on-one contests and called a tournament that must culminate with a winner. The black and white dichotomy is also reflected in the U.S. political system. Unlike European parliamentary systems, which routinely encompass numerous political parties, our two-party political system generally eschews multiple parties, and relegates third-party candidates into the outsider or spoiler role. These

examples help illustrate that we in the United States have a distinct cultural inclination to categorize all parties as either "my team" or "the other team." The proclivity to see the world in two camps pitted against each other obscures our cultural perception when we encounter a collectivist society that encompasses many tribes, families, sects, and groups; all with their own positions, goals, and plans.

For example, tribal leaders in the Middle East seem to enjoy intrigue and complex dealings, negotiations of assistance and support set amidst a kaleidoscope of shifting alliances. When we attempt to place such leaders in a Western-style taxonomy—sorting individuals and groups into black, white, and gray lists—understanding the relationships of these to each other and attempting to categorize reliable loyalties makes heads spin.

Most troubling to U.S. operatives is the gray list. It is normally populated by persons whose loyalties are unclear to us, or who are in the process of shifting allegiances—a frequent and completely accepted cultural occurrence in some areas. Although a conflict in such a cultural environment may seem to be red versus blue, almost everyone in that environment seems to be a shade of purple. Unfortunately, a typical reaction among U.S. planners operating under their own cultural perceptions has been to group the mostly reddish purple into the red team and the mostly bluish purple into the blue team and be done with it. The end result is a mix of groups that are neither as hostile nor as friendly as the Western-style categorization into groups would lead some to believe.

Experience has shown that operating under a culturally inflexible blue-red construct without nuanced understanding of each part of the whole has often created more adversaries than existed when an operation originally began, and has sometimes led to U.S forces being exploited by self-labeled friends. Furthermore, once a clear understanding is obtained, the entire rest of a tour may be spent trying to get alienated true third-party groups under control and onboard with the end goal.

Additionally, as a strategy against cultural oversimplification, some nongovernmental organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, deliberately maintain their independence. This confounds unit leaders who cannot seem to brook these wildcards out there following their own agenda.[5]

Avoiding the Pitfall of Ethnocentricity

We humans tend toward an ethnocentric view of the world—seeing and evaluating the world around us through the lens of our own experience and culture. One result is that we work under the assumption that the way we learned to do things is the only correct way.[6] In the military, this ethnocentric proclivity is exacerbated by a predilection toward the kind of excessive pride, esprit de corps, and euphoria stemming from the experience of having already defeated the host-nation armed forces prior to the postconflict stability period. We assume a level of cultural superiority on our own part and a level of cultural mediocrity on the part of host-nation forces. However, such inflated views can blind us to the reality of events and circumstances on the ground, undermine stability operations, and lead to mission failure in circumstances where clarity of cultural vision is imperative.

Looking a little deeper within, our Declaration of Independence provides a glimpse into our core values and beliefs:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.[7]

The fundamental belief in equality among people appears so engrained in the aspirations of the writers of the Declaration of Independence that they felt unburdened to provide proof; they perceived that it was so obvious as to be self-evident. And, there is no more clearer statement of the basic American values that now underpin our national consciousness and behavior. Admittedly, it took some time for these core values to permeate American society and become fundamental cultural mores for all U.S. ethnicities and genders; moreover, there is still room to grow in some respects. Nevertheless, the John Locke-inspired ontological vision provided by the Declaration is the basis for our national narrative and cultural faith in a class-free society.[8] Holding this concept of class-free equality, Americans appear to generally share the belief that a level playing field is necessary to allow each individual to rise as far as his or her own talent and drive will take them. This is further reflected in the passing of laws and policies aimed at establishing equal rights, as well as in the establishment of monitoring agencies such as equal opportunity offices to ensure that the measures put in place to advance equality are being enforced.

In contrast, the antithesis of the ontological society with its focus on equality, natural rights, and right to the opportunity for individual advancement through merit is the collectivist society. In collectivist tribal societies, social advancement occurs through patronage rather than through individual merit. Such patronage is a common custom, particularly in the Middle East.



(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Conflicting Behavior with Core Values and Beliefs Behavior Concept

Without the benefit of broad cultural understanding, U.S. military operatives see patronage as antithetical to the level playing field of opportunity they are trying to promote, and they normally categorize it as a type of corruption. U.S. planners often make the further mistake of assuming others in a society are as empowered culturally as we are to make individual choices. Nurtured in a culture where all have the opportunity to rise as far as their talent and drive will take them, we naturally assume this is a universal social reality. However, this cultural sense of individual empowerment does not exist in many foreign cultures. In the eyes of his or her superior, a foreign police officer or soldier may not be considered to be anything more than obedient and docile manpower that exists to serve his or her superior. In such circumstances, individual initiative may be regarded as an actual threat to the existing order; it may even be punishable. As such, some foreign soldiers would never dream of taking the same initiative we expect to see in our own young soldiers. Therefore, without a refined cultural awareness of why initiative is discouraged in some societies, lack thereof may serve to reinforce perceptions of mediocrity in the foreign force.

Motivations, cultural biases, and differences in expectations affect mission accomplishment. In nearly all stability or postconflict resolution efforts, there is a mission-related need to influence, motivate, and shape attitudes and capability in order to complete the overall mission and depart. In attempting to influence behaviors, we have often focused on the differences between what we consider acceptable behavior as opposed to what a local tribe, clan, or unit may think. In approaching the issue as an adversary trying to impose our perceptions and values on a society, we lose the opportunity to find and expand on common ground as we focus on dissimilar values. It is essential therefore to find common ground if we are to move forward.

The Boundaries and Limits of Behavior

When building a methodology for stability operations, it is essential to refine both the limits of tolerance as well as the space for cultural diversity of activity. The art of cultural engagement is navigating through unacceptable behavior and deciding what cannot be tolerated, what can be influenced over time, and what will just have to be accepted as part of the cultural landscape. Beyond the range of acceptable behavior is the realm of what we cannot tolerate during stability operations; this unacceptable behavior conflicts with our core values and beliefs (see figure 1).

In this model, behavioral limits as well as freedom of action can be estimated. When two groups come into contact that share very similar core values and beliefs, the shared range of acceptable behavior is quite large (figure 2, page 106). Conversely, the area of conflictive behavior is small and at each other's cultural periphery of the acceptable or unacceptable. Any conflict between red and

blue is a periphery issue that is easily resolved without cutting close to the core values and beliefs.

A much greater and more common problem for blue exists when a group with very different core values and beliefs is encountered. A much smaller area of commonly acceptable behavior is seen in figure 3 (page 107). In addition, some of the unacceptable behavior is close to the other group's core values and beliefs. Just to create a hypothetical example, treatment of dogs as a ceremonial food source might be unacceptable behavior to blue but may be a religious ceremony and fall in very close to fundamental beliefs and values in the red acceptable behavior zone.

When red is a group that we find we must influence, our typical focus is on mitigating what we regard as the unacceptable behaviors inside the range of what they regard as culturally acceptable behavior. However, engagement aimed at changing a culturally accepted behavior often causes resentment and indignation, and it can polarize and drive the core values and beliefs of the two groups even further apart.

Where efforts should focus is on shared values, beliefs, and acceptable behaviors, particularly those shared acceptable behaviors close to the red core. This will serve to bring core values closer together over time, bringing more red behaviors into an acceptable zone while bridging divergence. In this construct, some unacceptable behavior must be tolerated, at least for a time, in order to influence, motivate, and shape attitudes over time. For example, over time, the practice of ceremonial dog meals may drift toward the periphery of red's acceptable behavior, find less adherents to the ceremony, and become less of an issue; however, it is unlikely to ever disappear entirely.



(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Core Values Closely Aligned

The Martial Law-Civil Law Conundrum

A significant application of the art of cultural navigation is the cultural understanding it takes to simply stand up the agencies of normalcy and restore essential services to a functioning civil authority. The most significant of these services is a functioning law enforcement system. The restoration of other services can be more easily established once civil authorities have control of law and order. The institutions of law enforcement include police, judiciary, and corrections; referred to as the civil authority triad.[9] A significant challenge is to understand the cultural underpinnings of civil authority that provide policing as they relate to law enforcement systems operating within a cultural context to support civil authorities.

Let's face it; many may not understand civil law or the rule of law. As a military force, we establish martial law when trying to bring order to areas we control. During a deployment to Iraq on an advisor mission, I heard a colonel serving as the division judge advocate general state that we had no definition for rule of law, but he would describe it as an absence of chaos. To be fair to the colonel, if the definition of rule of law is googled, a long list of subtle variations is found, including "rule according to law; rule under law; or rule according to a higher law."[10] In practice, we typically establish local legal authorities to process and imprison detainees, and are not looking to establish a host-nation legal system to be subservient to. Therein lies a quandary: how is rule of law established if we are unwilling to be ruled by the rule of law institutions we establish? It is a deeper challenge than one may first realize as, like cultural baggage, there are learned legal norms that people are normally not even aware of.

Without realizing it, U.S. forces often maneuver about the hard-won territory newly under their control while demonstrating ignorance of and irreverence for the local legal systems they want to emplace. In order to engender the type of respect toward the rule of law we want to develop, it is imperative we ask ourselves what example are we setting, and what lessons are we teaching to those who are standing up and partnering with us?

Further complicating matters is that staff legal expertise necessary to guide the development of law enforcement capability is often directed to other efforts. For example, how often are staff judge advocate officers assigned as a primary mission to become experts in host-nation legal code? Instead, they are often kept occupied with processing damage claims, trying Uniform Code of Military Justice cases, or acting as liaison officers in the civil-military operations center. In Iraq, "major problems ensued because so many international specialists did not understand the Iraqi criminal justice system and the policies, procedures, and nuances required to make things happen in an appropriate fashion."[11] With no shared definition of rule of law and ignorance of the local criminal justice system, it should be no surprise that there are challenges to establishing a professional police force.

At the brigade-combat-team level, the only organic military police are the provost marshal (a captain) and two noncommissioned officers.[12] But, in postconflict, if not sooner, military leaders will find themselves with the task to establish security and rule of law, which then requires them to understand the fundamentals of local policing as it may be some time before professional policing advisors arrive.

> In Iraq's second largest city, only three … police officers were deployed … from June to December 2003. Thousands of military troops were tasked with police training and police tasks and were given inappropriate responsibilities and roles.[13]

As uneducated as we may remain in host-nation criminal systems, our knowledge of policing and of police primacy is just as low. Again in Iraq, "there was no police primacy or primacy of rule of law strategy in Iraq; there was instead a military-led and military-dominated attempt at enforcing law and order."[14]



(Graphic by author)

Figure 3. Core Values and Beliefs Widely Divergent

The difference between enforcing law and order (absence of chaos) and policing is a topic beyond the normal professional education and experience of the great majority of military leaders. Military leaders will need to overcome this deficit in order to be successful in establishing effective police forces in future postconflict stability operations.

Far too often it is thought that local police are some kind of light infantry with a badge. Indeed, I have heard well-intended leaders explain the lengths to which they had to go to camouflage an invited police unit at a live-fire training event. It took time to explain why it was

inappropriate to camouflage a police unit, as well as to explain the concept of the police identifying themselves as representatives of civil authority versus the concept of a military force conducting operations under the law of land warfare in armed conflict.

Additionally, there is a challenge in enforcing law and order, as we are shaped by our military experience and training. To counter an adversary, intelligence is used to predict future action. Law enforcement will use evidence to prove misconduct to hold an individual accountable. As military strategists, gaps in knowledge are inconsequential as long as there is enough to counter an adversary. However, knowledge gaps in a law enforcement investigation represent reasonable doubt in an alleged criminal's guilt. For example, in 2011, our unit captured an individual with rocket launcher rails in the back of his vehicle. He was turned over to the local police and there were high-fives all around. During the military analysis there was enough information to know that we had a bad guy; if he was not launching rockets, he was at least supporting those who were. However, the first questions the investigating judge asked were what rocket did he launch? What damage or injury is he responsible for? With the case incomplete, the individual was released, and only a prediction of this outcome helped stem our normal conclusion from a judicial action like this: "the judge must be corrupt."

Corruption, bribery, kickbacks, inducements, payoffs, and the like; infiltration by those loyal to an insurgency; or loyalty to anything other than the civil authority from which the police's authority comes is even worse. It all exists and challenges the establishment of a professional police force. It is extremely difficult, however, to gaze through the lens of cultural baggage and law enforcement ignorance, and see it accurately.

In 2006, while serving as an advisor to a National Police unit in Baghdad, Iraq, a teammate and I observed two sheikhs arrive for a meeting with a senior national police leader. Knowing these two sheikhs were from a tribe hostile to coalition interests, we followed, curious as to why they would be there. In the meeting that followed, a detainee (clearly from a family of importance within the tribe) confessed to his sheikh that yes, he had committed a number of crimes. With that confession, the national police leader restored the familial honor that was lost by the detention; the hostile sheikh was no longer honor-bound to seek retribution against the police. To the advisors, it was an amazing example of cultural maneuver. However, three days later, the loyalty of the police official was in question as a report of his secret meeting with hostile sheikhs was distributed—never mind that we were in the room for this allegedly secret meeting. For the most part, the author of that report had accurate information, he was simply culturally ignorant and misinterpreted events in his analysis. He could not imagine a loyal member of the blue team meeting with the red team other than to negotiate terms of red team's surrender. From the cultural stand point of the individual who prepared the report, there are no meetings with adversaries until after they are defeated.

Conclusion

First, recognizing how valuable training time is, simple awareness on the part of maneuver leaders can go a long way. Leaders with a sense of empathy, maturity, respect, humility, a sense of humor, and a desire to learn can overcome a great deal as they become versed in local customs, particularly if they are aware of their own cultural knowledge shortcomings. Staff specialists such as the judge advocates, provost marshals, civil affairs officers, and chaplains can educate themselves in the appropriate cultural institutions and then apply cultural expertise to decision making. Additionally, long before the announcement of a deployment in support of a postconflict stability operation, individuals and units can invest available time to learn more about their own culture, the significance of martial versus civil law, and some of the principles of policing. These same topics should be added to the professional military education curriculum.

Next, avoid what can be called the "Dorothy Trap" by continually assessing who potential friends and adversaries are, why they are, and who is none of the above. Remember Dorothy? She lands her utility house in LZ Munchkin in the land of Oz, accidentally killing a local faction leader and unknowingly taking a priceless heirloom, and wonders why the Wicked Witch of the West (who she learns from her "friends" is evil) seems so angry with her. She is sent by the Wizard of Oz to recover the broom of the witch; a suicide mission, and the propaganda section probably has the story of the martyrdom of the

Staff Sgt. Damian Remijio instructs an Iraqi National Police (NP) officer assigned to the 3rd NP Brigade, 1st NP Division, to keep his sights on a door during a training event 24 June 2009 at Forward Operating Base Hammer, located outside of eastern Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Alex Licea, U.S. Army)

brave foreign fighter from Kansas all ready to go. Even after the wizard is revealed to be a charlatan, he is still on the "friend" list. It is only after the bungled personnel recovery mission that the "good" witch drops the little bombshell that Dorothy had the means to go home all along. She blunders through Oz making enemies, is used by her friends, and never seems to be aware of any of it.[15] How often have some of the same mistakes been made by U.S. forces during postconflict stability operations?

We ultimately must gain cultural understanding—first of ourselves and then of future cultures-in-conflict as crisis events unfold. This understanding must not be only of surface differences; it must include a deeper mastery of skills such as those instructed by the TCC on collective sources of identity, communication norms, engaging and influencing the local populace, and negotiating within the context of their culture. The fundamental values and mindsets in those cultures must also be learned, but the urge to hire foreign expatriates to teach their own culture must be resisted. Leaders need to learn to accept the range of purple-hued neutrals, and to focus on shared values and acceptable behaviors in order to align the interests of many purple, disparate groups with our own.

Leaders will have to understand martial versus civil law, and the law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections institutions necessary to turn control and authority for internal security over to a host-nation's own law enforcement. Next, the host-nation's military will need to be trained to protect the territorial integrity of the nation rather than maintaining internal order in a perpetual state of martial law.

Finally, well before knowing where the next deployment is, time can be dedicated to studying one's own culture; in that way, half of the cultures with which one has to contend is already well understood upon arrival. ■

(Photo courtesy of https://ukraine-memorial.org/ua/biography/kizilo-andriy-oleksandrovich/)

Maj. Andrei Alexandrovich Kyzylo

May 2, 1993–January 29, 2017

Extract from a Letter to the Editor

(Editor's note: We publish this extract and photo as a reminder that our allies also make heavy sacrifices during armed conflict to preserve their freedom.)

Author Victor Morris ("Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations," *Military Review* 97, no. 1, January-February 2017, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2017/ART-010/) recently contacted our staff to inform us that the subject of a photo that accompanied his article, then Ukrainian Army Capt. Andrei Kyzylo, was killed in action while fighting separatists in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. Morris wrote:

> I'm writing because I respect and trust *Military Review*. Andrei, pictured in our January Complex IPB article, was killed in action on 29 January 2017. … He was killed in Avdiivka, eastern Ukraine (23 years old). I sent him the article draft right before Christmas because he was the best student and we highlighted him. I wanted him to be proud. Lastly, as a joint and multinational force, we are that much stronger, but our personal losses are greater. Andrei will be missed.
>
> Sorry for the somber news.

Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations

Victor R. Morris

From IPB to Complex IPB

illustrates sixteen of the various groups inside and outside of the operational area, it does not account for "friendly, neutral, and unknown" actors and groups whose decisions and behaviors affect operations. These actors should also be included in a holistic analysis for appropriate engagement and effects assessment in order to produce the most comprehensive assessment of the OE.

Nevertheless, the participants did assess that the effects of the threat's behavior and the population's behavior would be "a stalemate, with neither the government nor the insurgency gaining ground."[16] More refined analysis, however, would reveal the factors that were influencing the most vulnerable portion of the population who did not fully support the insurgency and felt betrayed and disenfranchised by the legitimate government in Kiev. Thus, on one hand, future assessments would identify additional, interrelated PMESII implications involving military reform, anticorruption, and reconciliation initiatives by the Ukrainian government. On the other hand, continued assessments would identify implications of external defense support and ceasefire dyadal monitoring missions by intergovernmental organizations.

Finally, while understanding how nonmilitary groups influence their OE can help military forces conduct successful operations, complex IPB assessments also reveal that the problems that lead to conflict cannot be solved by military force alone. Current hybrid threats and external influences will continue to exploit vulnerabilities and grievances if they are not acknowledged, holistically reconciled, and politically accommodated by the Kiev government. Therefore, the

A Ukrainian company commander analyzes threat network associations and interactions during company-level intelligence and countering threat network training, 19 September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Josh Rymer)

Notes

1. Luis Martinez, "U.S. Military to End Ebola Relief Mission in Liberia," ABC News website, 10 February 2015, accessed 27 December 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-military-end-ebola-relief-mission-liberia/story?id=28876608; Gary Cecchine et al., *The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2013), accessed 27 December 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR304.html; NATO, "Counter-Piracy Operations (Archived)," NATO website, last modified 19 December 2016, accessed 27 December 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm.

2. Kate Phillips, Shane Lauth, and Erin Schenck, *U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation*, ed. W. Andrew Terrill (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2006), 15, accessed 27 December 2016, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub653.pdf.

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11. Stephen White, *Police Primacy* (Washington, DC: International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, June 2014), 40.

12. MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90, *Force Structure Reference Data* (Fort Benning, GA: MCoE, September 2012), 15.

13. White, *Police Primacy*, 40.

14. Ibid., 41.

15. The events described are an alternate interpretation and military application of the events portrayed in the movie *The Wizard of Oz*, directed by Victor Fleming (Beverly Hills, CA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1939). An alternate interpretation is inspired by the Broadway play *Wicked*.

Queen of Spies

Daphne Park, Britain's Cold War Spy Master

Paddy Hayes, Overlook Press, New York, 2016, 336 pages



John G. Breen, PhD

In early February 2016, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released *Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019* to the public, which offered "a unified roadmap for diversity and inclusion goals, actions, and accountability measures at the CIA over the next three years."[1] This strategic framework was informed, in part, by the 2013 "Director's Advisory Group on Women in Leadership" report, the culmination of an effort led by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, which addressed the question, why are more women at the CIA not being promoted to the highest leadership positions?[2] The study came to the somewhat unsatisfying conclusion that there was "no single reason" why women in the organization were, presumably, not getting promoted into the ranks of the Senior Intelligence Service. The ten recommendations of the Director's Advisory Group were simply a menu of "best management practices."[3] According to a 2015 statement by then CIA Director John Brennan, the subsequent 2014 Diversity in Leadership Study identified "cultural, management, and organizational issues that contribute to a lack of diversity in the Agency's leadership."[4]

As of 2013, women represented approximately 46 percent of the CIA's workforce—a slight improvement from 38 percent in 1980.[5] Promisingly, the number of women holding the ranks of GS-13, 14, or 15 increased from 9 to 44 percent in that period.[6] These are agency-wide statistics, but what remains unacknowledged is the percentage of women who have made their way to the heights of the Directorate of Operations—leading the case officers who clandestinely recruit and handle the CIA's spies, and who conduct presidentially directed covert action. This is the most important work of the CIA, representing some of the agency's greatest successes and most publicly embarrassing failures. Women have indeed held some senior leadership positions at the CIA—notably, the first-ever female deputy director of the CIA, Avril Haines, who then moved on to become the deputy national security advisor to the president in 2014.[7] That said, there has never been a female director of the CIA, nor to anyone's knowledge has there ever been a female deputy director for operations—the officer in charge of the Directorate of Operations.

Paddy Hayes, in *Queen of Spies*, explores the role of women in espionage, detailing the life and career of Daphne Park, who rose to the most senior ranks of the British Secret Intelligence Service (BSIS) as an area controller for

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operations in the Western Hemisphere—United States, Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Hayes takes the reader back to Park's childhood in Africa and to her initial foray into espionage and covert action during World War II with the Special Operations Executive—the organizational equivalent to the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the CIA. Her subsequent career in BSIS included notable espionage assignments to Moscow, the Congo, and Vietnam. Park served in the Soviet Union at the height of the mid-1950s Cold War, handling clandestine Russian agents in the most challenging of counterintelligence environments. In the Congo, Park was involved in the now infamous removal from power and death of the country's leader, Patrice Lumumba.[8] And, in Vietnam, she was the BSIS representative to North Vietnam, stationed at the British Consulate in Hanoi from 1969 to 1970. Daphne Park retired from BSIS in 1979. She became the principal of Somerville College, Oxford, from 1980 to 1989, and she was named by then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as a board member of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Park's career makes for interesting reading, and the author does an admirable job weaving her exploits into the larger fabric of Cold War intrigue.

Her story is, of course, incomplete without addressing the immense challenges Park faced as she attempted to move up the ladder of an organization dominated by an old-boys' network. Very early in her Special Operations Executive career, when she was training three-man covert-action teams for Operation Jedburgh, Park dared to question the abusive leadership style of her male superior, only to be dismissed from her position and questioned whether she had been sleeping with her trainees.[9] As her career blossomed in the Congo, so too did unfounded rumors that she was romantically attached to one of her contacts. As Hayes notes, "this was the risk that single women, and not just those in the SIS, ran: any perceived closeness to a male was considered grounds for tittle-tattle and speculation."[10] BSIS regulations became hurdles to overcome for females hoping to rise to the most senior levels; female BSIS intelligence branch officers were not allowed to marry until well after the end of the Cold War.[11] Hayes relates that Park, as it turned out, had a decades-long love affair that she was forced to keep a secret from BSIS—"that option wasn't open to her if she wished to see out her service in SIS."[12]

What makes *Queen of Spies* particularly good is not so much these exemplars of the inane challenges she faced, but the glimpses the author provides into the ultimately triumphant character of Daphne Park. This reader, though, could not help but ask the question, with all the cultural, management, and organizational hurdles put in front of her, what could Park have accomplished in a fully supportive organization? Hopefully, we are now asking similar questions about the role of women in the CIA and in other organizations within the national security enterprise. If the right candidate can be identified, one way to address these questions would be to ensure that the next director of the CIA or director for operations is the best person for the job—and a woman. ■

Notes

1. "CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Releases Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019," CIA website, 9 February 2016, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2016-press-releases-statements/cia-releases-diversity-and-inclusion-strategy-for-2016-2019.html.

2. CIA, "Director's Advisory Group on Women in Leadership," unclassified report (Washington, DC: CIA, March 2013), accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIA_Women_In_Leadership_March2013.pdf.

3. Ibid., 14; a summary of the group's ten recommendations appears on p. 2.

4. "Statement from Director John Brennan on Improving Leadership Diversity at CIA," CIA website, 30 June 2015, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2015-press-releases-statements/director-brennan-statement-on-improving-leadership-diversity-at-cia.html.

5. "Former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Speaks at CIA in Honor of Women's History Month," CIA website, 19 March 2013, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2013-press-releases-statements/albright-speaks-at-cia.html. The General Schedule (GS) is the pay scale for most federal employees; 13 through 15 are the highest GS levels. The next levels up are in Senior Executive Service positions.

6. Ibid.

7. "Statement by CIA Director John Brennan on the Selection of Avril Haines as Deputy National Security Advisor," CIA website, 18 December 2014, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2014-press-releases-statements/statement-by-cia-director-john-brennan-on-the-selection-of-avril-haines-as-deputy-national-security-advisor.html.

8. Paddy Hayes, *Queen of Spies: Daphne Park, Britain's Cold War Spy Master* (New York: Overlook Press, 2016), 173.

9. Ibid., 32.

10. Ibid., 201.

11. Ibid., 212.

12. Ibid., 244.

Farewell
Lieutenant Colonel Erica Cameron

Our staff will sorely miss the director of the Army University Press and the editor in chief of *Military Review*, Lt. Col. Erica L. Cameron. Although her tenure with us was only one year, she oversaw a remarkable number of changes to this organization.

Under her charge, the Army University Press transitioned into a twenty-first-century publishing enterprise, with a new, easily accessible website, enhanced multimedia production capabilities, and an expanded social media presence. She oversaw the planning for the *NCO Journal's* move to Fort Leavenworth and the publication of the first issue of the *Journal of Military Learning*.

Thank you Lt. Col. Cameron, for your energetic, positive leadership and foresightful vision. We wish you the best of luck in your next assignment and in your Army career!

Thank you