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Cover Photo: White on patrol in Baghdad, SSG Dan Forsythe (L) of the 7th Infantry Division and an interpreter working for the U.S. Army (R) talk to Iraqis attending a funeral, 1 August 2005. (REUTERS/Andrea Comas AOI/DY)
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It has become commonplace to blame the neoconservatives in the Bush administration for the confusion and continued bloodshed in Iraq. But as we enter the fourth year of the Iraq war, it is not too early to stand back and review our military performance in order to maintain some perspective. Below are several observations.

1 The insurgency in Iraq was based on the Sunni rejection of democracy. Saddam did not rule alone. His enforcers—and those who shared in the plunder—were predominantly Sunni. American and British troops liberated the Kurds and Shiites from their Sunni oppressors. The essential confusion about Iraq stems from a lack of candor by American leaders in acknowledging that democracy stripped the Sunnis of their power. Were it not for the American occupation of the Sunni areas north and west of Iraq, the fragile Shiite-based democracy stood no chance of taking root. Most Sunnis viewed as illegitimate the presence of the American troops, whom they call “occupiers,” which by definition they are.

Accustomed to dominating and oppressing the Kurds and Shiites, the Sunni population sympathized with, and were intimidated by, the insurgents who freely mixed with them in the marketplaces. Yet instead of being forthright about the Sunni bedrock of the insurgency, American officials too often suggested that most Sunnis also supported democracy, but were intimidated by shadowy insurgents.

True, the insurgents are deadly intimidators. Beyond that, however, deeply held religious beliefs and tribal patterns of social behavior take decades to change. Efforts to include Sunnis in the Iraqi Army are laudable. In addition, for years there have been negotiations to coax the insurgent Sunni “rejectionist” leaders to stop fighting, much as the British encouraged the Irish Republican Army to cease attacks in northern Ireland. Unfortunately, these political talks have not yet yielded results.

2 The major intelligence failure was deeming culture an illegitimate subject of analysis. Virtually all Western intelligence agencies believed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction; the reasons for being misled were understandable. The real failure was not seeing that Iraq had fallen apart as a cohesive society. The evidence was widespread. The British engineers and Marines who seized the “Crown Jewel” in March of 2003—the pumping station north of Basra that facilitated a multibillion dollar flow of oil—were appalled to see scrubby grass, broken windows, open cesspools, and vital equipment deteriorating into junk.

Common eyesores in Iraqi cities are the heaps of garbage outside the walls of the houses. Inside the courtyards, tiny patches of grass are as well tended as the putting greens on golf courses. A generation of oppression had taught the society to take care only of its own, to enrich the family, and to avoid...
any communal activity that attracted attention and charges of deviant political behavior. The society fell apart, with each family and subtribe caring only for itself.

The civilian neoconservatives in the Bush administration were convinced that Iraq’s educated middle class, so in evidence a half-century ago, would reemerge as the enlightened, moderate leadership. The intelligence community, trained to report only on technical, quantitative “hard data” and to regard cultural and societal variables as the province of novelists, ignored the critical deficiency in Iraq: the dearth of leadership caused by decades of tyrannical greed. No enlightened middle class was waiting to emerge and to bring together the best and brightest Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Responsible Iraqi leadership was the commodity in least supply in post-Saddam Iraq.

3 The critical military error was abolishing unity of command in 2003. During the march to Baghdad, General Tommy Franks, commanding U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), fiercely warded off “suggestions” from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) prior to the war, insisting that unity of command was essential in war. Prior to his retirement, however, Franks in May of 2003 supported the White House in removing Lieutenant General Jay Garner as the deputy in CENTCOM responsible for reconstruction. Franks fully endorsed the creation of an entirely new organization under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.

Bremer’s appointment replaced unity of command with two chains of command. He was given the authority to decide the policies and the budget for all Iraqi security forces; CENTCOM retained responsibility for ensuring security until the Iraqis were capable of taking over. This stripped Army General John P. Abizaid, who became CENTCOM commander in late June, of command authority over the Iraqi security forces. Authority was divided from responsibility, a breach of organizational commonsense compounded by the antagonism between the two separate staffs.

The United States foundered for the first critical year after seizing Baghdad. We were in the midst of a war, but a civilian ambassador, not Abizaid, had the power—and the ear of the president. Unity of command was shattered. The U.S. military had scant influence on the mission, composition, and leadership of the Iraqi security forces. Ambassador Bremer and a handful of staff thrown together in a few months were making decisions about the missions, budgets, size, and training of the Iraqi security forces. This organizational decision made no sense.

4 The disbanding of the Iraqi Army in May 2003 changed the mission of the American soldiers from liberators to occupiers. The Iraqi Army melted away in April of 2003, but it was eager to regroup in order to gain pay, jobs, and prestige. Indeed, the American battalion commanders paying the Iraqi officers and soldiers a pittance for their years of service reported that they could easily reconstitute trained battalions. CENTCOM and the JCS, however, did not object to Bremer’s swift decision to abolish the army. With no Iraqi security force, the U.S. military forces moved alone into the Sunni cities.

The Sunni imams promptly proclaimed it was the duty of true Muslims to oppose the infidel occupiers. The imams seized the power vacuum left when the army melted away. Sunni officers and Baathist officials went to ground, unsure what fate awaited them. The mosques emerged as the center of information, rumor, and gradual resistance.
The salutary effect of more boots on the ground in 2003 has been exaggerated. Had the 4th Infantry Division attacked in March 2003 through Turkey as planned and then to the north of Baghdad, there would have been more U.S. units in the Sunni area. Alternatively, the 1st Infantry Division could have landed in Kuwait.

The net effect of another division immediately after Baghdad fell, though, is unclear because CENTCOM was not issuing firm orders to the divisions. When Baghdad fell, the population was joyous and in awe of the Americans. When CENTCOM did not order American forces to stop the looting, American forces lost the respect of the Iraqis. More American troops in the Sunni area immediately after the fall of Baghdad would have substantially dampened the insurgency—if Iraqi security forces joined the Americans. But the decision to disband the Iraqi Army foreclosed this. Dispatching more American Soldiers to fight alone in the Sunni triangle would not have prevented the emergence of the insurgency.

The insurgency began gradually, and picked up steam. Recently it has become conventional wisdom to argue that the fedayeen encountered on the march to Baghdad in 2003 constituted the vanguard of an insurgency that had been planned in advance. This myth persists, despite exhaustive interviews of captured generals who laughed at the notion that delinquent teenagers recruited by Saddam’s pathological son constituted the essence of their strategy.

The insurgency began gradually in the summer of 2003, as diverse gangs of disaffected Sunni youths and former soldiers heeded the urgings from imams and Baathists. Their tactics were trial and error, and the attacks increased as awe of the Americans and their armor dissipated.

2004 was a year of military setbacks due to imprudent political-military decisionmaking. Although facing an insurgency, American operations remained decentralized, with most division commanders focused on unilateral offensive operations. This was the wrong focus because American sweeps and raids could not attrit the insurgent manpower pool of a million disaffected Sunni youths. The U.S. divisions lacked a field commander who would curb their natural instinct for decisive battle and lay out a thoughtful counterinsurgency plan. Anbar Province, the heart of the Sunni insurgency, degenerated in 2004. April was a month of disasters. Calls for jihad swept across the province, and Baghdad was reduced to a few days of fuel and fresh food. Fallujah erupted when four American contractors were murdered and their bodies dismembered on the main street. Washington and Baghdad ordered the reluctant Marines to attack the city of 300,000 in early April.

Simultaneously, Bremer decided to move against the dangerous Shiite demagogue, Moqtada al-Sadr. American troops were thus engaged on two fronts—against Sunnis in Anbar and Fallujah and against Shiites in Baghdad and Najaf. At Fallujah in late April, the White House and Bremer, taking counsel of their fears that Iraq would fall apart because of adverse publicity about the assault, ordered the astonished Marines to pull back just as Major General James Mattis was squeezing the insurgents into a corner.

Former Sunni generals came forward, claiming they could bring order to Fallujah. The Marines, to the chagrin of the civilians in Baghdad and Washington, turned the city over to the generals and a “Fallujah brigade” that included the insurgents. In Najaf, al-Sadr was cornered, but the American officials in Baghdad decided not to press home the attack. Within a month in Fallujah, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and foreign fighters took control, driving out the former Iraqi generals. By the summer of 2004, Iraq was a military mess.

Turnaround in 2005. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Abizaid agreed that Army General George W. Casey should take command in the summer 2004. Casey promptly put down a second uprising by Sadr, then insisted that the interim Iraqi government support a full assault against Fallujah. In November of 2004, 70 Americans died in bitter house-to-house fighting that destroyed half the city.

Casey then undertook a systematic campaign to seal the Syrian border and flush the insurgents out of Mosul and Talafar in the north. Most important, Lieutenant General David Petraeus took over the training of the Iraqi Army and deployed a 10-man advisory team with each battalion. Casey insisted that every Iraqi battalion partner with an American battalion.

The result in one year was a remarkable turnaround. The insurgents had learned not to challenge the Americans to a stand-up fight. The Iraqi soldiers, perhaps
PERFORMANCE IN IRAQ

70 percent Shiite and 15 percent Kurd, would stick in battle as long as they were provided adequate leadership. General Casey designated nine cities as pivotal and established satisfactory control in seven. Baghdad and Ramadi remained in crisis at the end of 2005.

The challenges in 2006. The main threat in the Sunni areas became not the disaffected Baathists, but instead the Al-Qaeda jihadists. Fallujah was the turning point; thereafter the Baathist leaders, many operating from Syria, lost control of the field generalship of the insurgency. Baathists bankrolled the insurgency, while impoverished Sunni youths—dedicated to throwing out the American infidel occupiers and apostate Shiite soldiers—supplied ample manpower. Baathist insurgent leaders clung to the belief that they could manipulate the jihadists and, when the time was right, throw them aside.

But they were mistaken. Their time had passed. The backbone of the insurgency was the Al-Qaeda jihadists. Some were foreigners and some Iraqis. What the jihadists had in common was their determination to rule Taliban-style in accord with the primal dictates of extreme fundamentalism, imagining the reemergence of a 10th-century caliphate. To argue that Iraq constituted a diversion from the war on terror was a reasonable position to hold two years ago. But wars change course and leaders. Sheik Abdullah al-Janabi and other Iraqi fundamentalists gradually came to the fore as the field generals of the insurgency.

By 2006, the jihadists had increased their campaign of terror bombing against Shiite civilians, and the Shiite militias had responded by dispatching death squads to kill Sunnis. Baghdad erupted in sectarian strife, illustrating that the police were untrustworthy. Casey then moved to place police training under his command. While a necessary step, training alone was not the answer. Too many police were corrupt and controlled by Shiite militias, and senior Iraqi leaders were doing little to punish disloyalty.

The Iraqi Army had emerged as loyal to the central government. The soldiers, or jundi, were relatively reliable as long as they were moderately well-led. The American attention had shifted from improving the individual battalions to ensuring that the institutional links from battalion to Baghdad functioned.

Battlefield trends to watch. The insurgents have demonstrated more effective small-unit leadership than have the Iraqi government forces, perhaps because the Sunnis are accustomed to dominating the Shiites. That advantage, however, can gradually be offset by superiority in numbers and resources.

The insurgents do not have a reliable sanctuary. Syria is the conduit for the passage of suicide bombers. But it is a sanctuary only for those Baathists who can afford bribes. Syria will not risk the confrontation that would ensue should it harbor large numbers of insurgents.

Inside Iraq, the insurgency relies upon civilian vehicles. As entry points to cities are controlled, the movement of the insurgents is restricted. The rank-and-file insurgents must rely on their tribes not to betray them in their home villages and cities. Therein lies the heart of the matter. The insurgency’s roots lie below the level of the military effort. The Iraqi Army provides a security umbrella only as long as squad-sized patrols are present in an area. In Sunni cities, the insurgents can mingle with the people and walk by army patrols with impunity, safe as long as they are not betrayed. In these parallel universes, the insurgents can coexist with the Iraqi military for years.
It is supposed to be the duty of the police, not the army, to provide order and to apprehend the insurgents in the markets. But any policeman who makes an arrest risks assassination. The policeman who is recruited locally in a Sunni city survives on the streets by accommodation. Only the military can stand up to the intimidation that has paralyzed the police in cities such as Fallujah. The police, however, fall under the Iraqi minister of interior, while the army is under the minister of defense. The army has partnered with American units; the police are languishing.

On a balance sheet, the insurgents enjoy the support of the Sunni population and control the pace of the engagements. There are few firefights, and almost no one is apprehended emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED). The campaign of IEDs and murderous bombings of civilians will continue until the perpetrators are betrayed by the dozens of neighbors who know who they are.

The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a piece about Iraq that accused the American military of not adapting. That was true in 2003 and midway through 2004. But no reasonable person can walk the Iraqi streets with American Soldiers today and argue that the U.S. military is hidebound. The American military today is not trying to subdue the insurgency by force of arms. Iraq is being handed over to the Iraqis. And in a bemused but real sense, the Americans have become the ombudsman for the Sunnis. In his direct way, Colonel Larry Nicholson, commanding a Marine regiment, said it best when addressing the Fallujah city council in May 2006. “Sooner or later, the American military is leaving,” he said. “Work with us now to insure your own security and living conditions. Or risk returning to 2004, when al-Zarqawi and imams with whips took over your city.”

At this stage, no one can predict how Iraq will turn out. American leadership is not the determining factor. The three critical tasks demand Iraqi rather than American leadership. First, the government in Baghdad must drive a wedge between Shiite extremists and the Shiite militias, and similarly split Al-Qaeda and the religious extremists from the Sunni “mainstream” insurgents. Second, the ministries in Baghdad must support their police and army forces in the field. As matters stand, American advisers and commanders time and again have to apply pressure before Baghdad responds. At all levels in the Iraqi system, there is an instinct to hoard—and too often to steal and skim—that deprives the fighting units of basic commodities. Third, the police must be reformed. How Sunni police can be effective and
not be assassinated in their own cities has yet to be shown. Conversely, the Shiite police in Baghdad have lost all trust among the Sunnis.

On the positive side of the ledger, three major hurdles were cleared during the past 12 months. First, elections were held and a government was chosen. Second, an Iraqi Army at the battalion fighting level emerged. Third, Iraq weathered the sectarian strife in February without a political collapse.

With a bisectarian government in Baghdad, the mainstream Sunni rejectionists have lost their rationale. In private conversations, Iraqi officials are asking the insurgents, why are you fighting when your own politicians are in the legislature and a Sunni is in charge of the army? The insurgent leaders, however, avoid risk in battle by paying impoverished youths $40 to emplace IEDs. Although it spent over $300 billion in Iraq, America never created a jobs program to compete with $40 IEDs. If captured, those leaders face a porous and corrupt judicial system that too frequently sets them free. Before they stop, they will ask what reward they will receive and how they can remain alive to enjoy it. In addition, the insurgency enjoys the support of hundreds of Sunni imams who preach sedition, knowing the judicial system will do nothing.

Three cities are the bellwethers in Iraq and bear watching over the next six months:

- In Baghdad, the police do not deserve credibility. Watch Baghdad to see if the Maliki government has the courage to declare de facto martial law and place everyone carrying a weapon on the street under the command of an Iraqi Army that does have credibility.
- In Ramadi, Al-Qaeda must be destroyed as an antecedent to any local settlement. Watch Ramadi to see if the Iraqi Army and police will fight together.
- In Fallujah, Al-Qaeda does not control the local insurgents. Watch Fallujah to see if a political settlement can be reached between a predominantly Shiite national government and the Sunni local insurgent leaders. By American standards, the violence in that city is horrific. But the mayor, the city council, the police—and the local insurgents—are bargaining politically with Baghdad about their future.

If you compare the city with its own past, diplomat Kael Weston said, “Today Fallujah is a cauldron of politics, not military battle.” Weston, with 2 years’ experience on the front lines, had won the respect of the Marines. He was saying roughly what Casey, the Multi-National Force commander, told me. “Iraq is a political-military problem,” Casey said, “with the political component written in big block letters. It’s not about us; it’s about the Iraqis who have to work it out.”

A drumbeat of negative tone has unintended long-term effects. While there is no unity of military judgment about the civilian management of the war, the Bush administration has been injudicious in its consultations with the military. The trust senior officers repose in senior civilian officials has eroded. Inside the senior levels of the military and among those who follow foreign policy, anger is directed at elected and appointed civilian officials seen as too blithe in initiating the war and too obtuse in leading once the going got tough.

The Iraqi war is being played out against a backdrop of bitter partisan politics in the United States. Of those on the front lines, 70 percent get out after four years of service, with no long-term benefits. All they want is praise for their valor and service. They want to be able to say, “I served at Fallujah, Najaf, or Mosul”—and be respected for their dedication.

Their valor is absent from this war because it is not reported. In Fallujah, for instance, 100 Marine squads engaged in 200 firefights inside cement rooms, using rifles, pistols, grenades, and knives. By any historical comparison, this was extraordinary. In Hue, Vietnam, in 1968, there was one fight inside a house. In the entire history of the SWAT teams in the United States, there have not been 200 fights with automatic weapons inside rooms. Yet the courage of our Soldiers and Marines in battles in Fallujah, Najaf, etc., received little press notice. Now we face the test of whether the press will place the tragedy of Haditha in perspective, or whether Haditha will unfairly become a false symbol.

More broadly, there has been a breakdown in our shared polity. Since World War II, no war has united our country; undeclared wars are fought for limited objectives and circumscribed causes. The next war is likely to be as politically divisive as this one. What happens if the youth of America adopt the same fractious attitudes as their political leaders? Who then will serve? In the tone of our criticisms while we are at war, we as a nation should be very careful that we do not undercut our own martial resolve. If we as a nation lose heart, who will fight for us? MR
In accurately defining the contextual and cultural population of the task force battlespace, it became rapidly apparent that we needed to develop a keen understanding of demographics as well as the cultural intricacies that drive the Iraqi population.¹

—Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Baghdad, 2004-2005

CONDUCTING MILITARY OPERATIONS in a low-intensity conflict without ethnographic and cultural intelligence is like building a house without using your thumbs: it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure. But while waste on a building site means merely loss of time and materials, waste on the battlefield means loss of life, both civilian and military, with high potential for failure having grave geopolitical consequences to the loser.

Despite these potential negative consequences, the U.S. military has not always made the necessary effort to understand the foreign cultures and societies in which it intended to conduct military operations. As a result, it has not always done a good job of dealing with the cultural environment within which it eventually found itself. Similarly, its units have not always done a good job in transmitting necessary local cultural information to follow-on forces attempting to conduct Phase IV operations (those operations aimed at stabilizing an area of operations in the aftermath of major combat).

Many of the principal challenges we face in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) stem from just such initial institutional disregard for the necessity to understand the people among whom our forces operate as well as the cultural characteristics and propensities of the enemies we now fight.

To help address these shortcomings in cultural knowledge and capabilities, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) organization that supports the Combined Arms
Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is overseeing the creation of the Human Terrain System (HTS). This system is being specifically designed to address cultural awareness shortcomings at the operational and tactical levels by giving brigade commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with “human terrain”—the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating. So that U.S. forces can operate more effectively in the human terrain in which insurgents live and function, HTS will provide deployed brigade commanders and their staffs direct social-science support in the form of ethnographic and social research, cultural information research, and social data analysis that can be employed as part of the military decision-making process.

The core building block of the system will be a five-person Human Terrain Team (HTT) that will be embedded in each forward-deployed brigade or regimental staff. The HTT will provide the commander with experienced officers, NCOs, and civilian social scientists trained and skilled in cultural data research and analysis. The specific roles and functions of HTT members and supporting organizations are discussed below.

To augment the brigade commander’s direct support, HTS will have reachback connectivity to a network of subject-matter experts now being assembled from throughout the Department of Defense, the interagency domain, and academia. This network will be managed by a centralized information-clearinghouse unit nested in FMSO.

At the same time, to overcome the kinds of problems now typically encountered when in-place units attempt to transfer knowledge about their area of operations upon relief in place, HTS will provide for the complete transfer of HTT personnel together with the HTT database to the incoming commander upon transfer of authority. This will give the incoming commander and unit immediate “institutional memory” about the people and culture of its area of operations.

Five HTTs will deploy from Fort Leavenworth to Afghanistan and Iraq beginning in the fall of 2006 to provide proof-of-concept for the HTS. If they are successful, an HTT will eventually be assigned to each deployed brigade or regimental combat team.

Why We Need HTS—History

Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict what the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better understand what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in which we serve, and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the enemy.3

—Major General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, CJTF-76, Afghanistan, 2006

The many complex and unexpected issues resulting from lack of cultural knowledge have often been extraordinarily challenging for newly deployed commanders and their Soldiers, especially in insurgent environments like those of OIF and OEF. To address recent challenges, many military thinkers have independently sought answers by studying practices and procedures from previous historical experiences. Consequently, the writings of T.E. Lawrence and David Galula have become standard reading for those searching for answers to the current insurgencies.4 Interest has also been rekindled in the U.S. Marine Corps’s Small Wars Manual, a volume first published in 1940 that outlines doctrine the Corps developed for counterinsurgency in other eras.5 Other thinkers have reexamined the basics of more recent counterinsurgency practices, in Vietnam and elsewhere, in the search for appropriate and currently applicable counterinsurgency measures.6 Still others have gone back to the lessons of British imperial and French colonial experience.7

What has emerged overall from these varied examinations of the historical record of insurgency is a broad consensus that civil society in Iraq and Afghanistan—as in past insurgencies—constitutes the real center of gravity. The current insurgencies in the Middle East are manifestations of the unmet expectations and desires of large segments of the Iraqi and Afghani populations. Disappointed by their unrequited aspirations, the people tolerate and even support the presence of insurgents, thereby making insurgency possible. Such conclusions logically demand that past experience guide our understanding of how best to meet, in a manner that supports our own military objectives, the expectations and desires of the people at the heart of such struggles. And, to truly understand such expectations and desires, it is imperative to view...
them from the perspective of the cultures in which
the insurgencies are being waged.

**Learning from Vietnam**

History has shown that insurgency is a complex
form of armed struggle that can only be dealt with
effectively if the counterinsurgent makes an effort
to understand the conflict from its origin, through
its evolutionary stages of development, down to its
current situation. Most insurgent wars have been
inherently political in nature, and therefore share the
characteristic of having been decided by one side or
the other’s ability to finally win the allegiance of the
general civil population in the conflict area.

In contrast, however tempting it may be to advo-
cate “draining the swamp” by force as a solution to
insurgency (i.e., denying the insurgency support by
uprooting or terrorizing the local population), such
policies have historically only increased popular
resentment, eroded popular trust, and stimulated the
indigenous recruitment of additional insurgents.

While history offers many examples of insurgen-
cies worthy of study, the HTS concept has been
largely inspired by lessons drawn from the U.S.
experience in Vietnam. During the Vietnam conflict,
U.S. Armed Forces essentially fought two different
wars: one a conventional war against regular North
Vietnamese formations; the other an insurgency
war against guerrillas who, for a long time, moved
freely throughout the area of operations because
they enjoyed the support of a significant number
of the rural South Vietnamese people. The record
reveals that U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the
early part of the conflict were severely hobbled
by a lack of understanding of, or appreciation for,
Vietnamese culture, and a paucity of cultural skills,
especially language ability.

Subsequently, among the many weapons brought
to bear against the insurgency in South Vietnam
during the course of the war, perhaps the most
effective was one that involved South Vietnamese
forces backed by advisors from the Civil Operations
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
program, a project administered jointly by the South
Vietnamese Government and the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV). Implemented under
the Johnson administration, the CORDS program
specifically matched focused intelligence collec-
tion with direct action and integrated synchronized
activities aimed at winning the “hearts and minds”
of the South Vietnamese. CORDS was premised
on a belief that the war would be ultimately won
or lost not on the battlefield, but in the struggle for
the loyalty of the people.8

With CORDS, intelligence collection and civil-
military operations were consolidated under a single
civilian head, in order to shift the focus of military
operations from defeating the North Vietnamese
Army and regional communist guerrillas by direct
military force, to working with the South Vietnam-
ese to gather human and cultural intelligence and to
develop economic and social programs. These latter
programs aimed to undermine indigenous support
for the communist forces.

William Colby, one of the architects of this strat-
egy, later blamed the final loss in Vietnam on failure
to fully implement the CORDS strategy. Colby
asserted that the “major error of the Americans in
Vietnam was insisting upon fighting an American-
style military war against an enemy who, through
the early years of the war, was fighting his style of
people’s war at the level of the population.”9 Colby
asserted that efforts to transform rural life through
economic development would create the conditions
necessary to foster peace and stability. Such develop-
ment, he maintained, would counter any appeal the
terrorists might have for the people by creating local
opportunities for the people to exercise real freedoms
within their own institutions and values.10

More recent work appears to validate Colby’s
assessment. Robert K. Brigham stresses this point
in a study assessing the South Vietnamese Army
and its linkages to its own society—the society
from which the army had to draw its resources and
its legitimacy.11 Colby’s views are further supported
by the work of James H. Willbanks. In his recent
treatment of Vietnamization, Willbanks addresses
the tension between defeating the opposing regular
force and pacifying the south in the final stages of
that war (1968-1975). He underscores the link-
age between pacification and Vietnamization, and
argues that the former contributed to the overall
stability of rural South Vietnam.12

Despite CORDS’ shortcomings (the overall suc-
cess of the program is still heatedly debated by histo-
rians), it is hard to argue with the statistics from that
era. Where CORDS was effectively implemented,
enemy activity declined sharply. In memoirs and
records opened in the aftermath of the conflict, North Vietnamese leaders repeatedly express their concern about the effectiveness of the CORDS program in impeding both their operational and subversion campaigns.13

A key feature leading to the success of CORDS was an effective information collection and reporting system that focused on factors essential for the promotion of security, economic development, governance, and the provision of needed government services down to the hamlet level. Cultural, economic, and ethnographic reports were paralleled by monthly reports on the training, equipment, morale, and readiness of Vietnamese Armed Forces from the separate platoon level to the highest echelons.14 Though imperfect, the systematic collection of such information gave both the South Vietnamese Government and MACV sufficient situational awareness, at the granular level of detail needed, to cope effectively with many areas dominated by insurgents. The major problem with CORDS appears to have been that it was started too late and ended too soon.

Regardless, the Vietnam-era CORDS experience provides many important lessons to guide the development of an effective cultural intelligence program, one that can support tactical- and operational-level commanders today.

Among the most significant deficiencies evident in the otherwise effective CORDS program was that it had limited reachback capability. This meant that CORDS operators had to rely mainly upon the program’s own independently developed databases and sources for information. CORDS was not structured or resourced to take full advantage of the massive U.S. capabilities for cultural and social research and analysis that would have enabled even greater effectiveness in dealing with the culturally diverse environment of Vietnam. Instead, CORDS advisory teams were left largely to their own devices to invent collection systems and methods for storing and analyzing their own data. HTS will not suffer such shortfalls in capability.

Why We Need HTS Today
In the current climate, there is broad agreement among operators and researchers that many, if not most, of the challenges we face in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted from our failure early on to understand the cultures in which coalition forces were working. In other words, failing to heed the lessons of Vietnam and CORDS, we did not take the steps necessary to deal appropriately with the insurgencies within the context of their unique cultural environments. Moreover, there appears to be general agreement that whatever notable successes we have had in specific localities closely correlate with proactive efforts by coalition units to understand and respect the culture. By conducting operations that took indigenous cultural norms into account, those units garnered support for coalition objectives.

Yet, current intelligence systems and organizations still remain primarily structured to support commanders in physical combat. They are engineered to collect traditional elements of information like order...
of battle, enemy dispositions and estimated capabilities, and friendly and neutral capabilities for actual combat. Generally, such data is maintained in automated databases and arrayed on computer screens that depict enemy forces, friendly forces, communications nodes, key logistics facilities, and the like.

But, as the current conflicts have moved further away from combat involving regular formations and heavy maneuver warfare, and more toward insurgency operations with fragile stability operations requirements, it is now apparent that the technical information required for high-intensity conflict has diminished in importance relative to the requirement for the kind of ethnographic, economic, and cultural information needed to stabilize a polity and transfer power to an indigenous government.

Irrespective, today, commanders arriving in their areas of operation are routinely left to fend for themselves in inventing their own systems and methodologies for researching and analyzing such data. Developing a system and processes requires the expenditure of enormous amounts of precious time and involves a great deal of trial and error, together with a steep learning curve. The resulting database is generally accomplished through ad hoc rearrangement of the staff. Nor are these homegrown databases formally linked to other databases to allow the seamless sharing of information or the archiving of data for broader use within the Army. Moreover, the database and institutional memory that go with it are not effectively transferred to relieving units upon redeployment. As a result, new commanders entering the area of operations usually must start again from scratch, developing their own system for researching and analyzing cultural data.

Consequently, it is glaringly apparent that commanders need a culturally oriented counterpart to tactical intelligence systems to provide them with a similarly detailed, similarly comprehensive cultural picture of their areas of operations.

HTS aims to mitigate these problems by providing commanders with a comprehensive cultural information research system that will be the analogue to traditional military intelligence systems. It will fill the cultural knowledge void by gathering ethnographic, economic, and cultural data pertaining to the battlefield and by providing the means to array it in various configurations to support analysis and decisionmaking. Moreover, the forward deployed brigade-level elements upon which the system is based will have reachback capability for research. Additionally, the whole database and institutional memory will be transferred in total to successive commanders upon unit rotation, providing for needed continuity of situational awareness.

A Closer Look at HTS

In its current conception, HTS is built upon seven components, or “pillars”: human terrain teams (HTTs), reachback research cells, subject-matter expert networks, a tool kit, techniques, human terrain information, and specialized training.

Each HTT will be comprised of experienced cultural advisors familiar with the area in which the commander will be operating. The actual experts on the ground, these advisors will be in direct support of a brigade commander. All will have experience in organizing and conducting ethnographic research in a specific area of responsibility, and they will work in conjunction with other social-science researchers. HTTs will be embedded in brigade combat teams, providing commanders with an organic capability to gather, process, and interpret relevant cultural data. In addition to maintaining the brigade’s cultural databases by gathering and updating data, HTTs will also conduct specific information research and analysis as tasked by the brigade commander.

Teams will consist of five members: a leader, a cultural analyst, a regional studies analyst, a human terrain research manager, and a human terrain analyst.
The HTT leader will be the commander’s principal human terrain advisor, responsible for supervising the team’s efforts and helping integrate data into the staff decision process. He or she will be a major or lieutenant colonel and a staff college graduate, and will have spent time as a principal brigade staff officer.

The cultural analyst will advise the HTT and brigade staff and conduct or manage ethnographic and social-science research and analysis in the brigade’s area of operations. The analyst will be a qualified cultural anthropologist or sociologist competent with Geographical Imaging Software and fluent enough in the local language to perform field research. Priority selection will go to those who have published, studied, lived, and taught in the region.

The regional studies analyst will have qualifications and skills similar to the cultural analyst.

The human terrain research manager will have a military background in tactical intelligence. The manager will integrate the human terrain research plan with the unit intelligence collection effort, will debrief patrols, and will interact with other agencies and organizations.

The human terrain analyst will also have a military intelligence background and be a trained debriefer. He or she will be the primary human terrain data researcher, will debrief patrols, and will interact with other agencies and organizations.

The HTT will be responsible to the brigade commander for three deliverables:

- A constantly updated, user-friendly ethnographic and sociocultural database of the area of operations that can provide the commander data maps showing specific ethnographic or cultural features. The HTT’s tool kit is Mapping Human Terrain (MAP-HT) software, an automated database and presentation tool that allows teams to gather, store, manipulate, and provide cultural data from hundreds of categories. Data will cover such subjects as key regional personalities, social structures, links between clans and families, economic issues, public communications, agricultural production, and the like. The data compiled and archived will be transferred to follow-on units. Moreover, although MAP-HT will be operated by the HTTs, the system will regularly transfer data to rear elements for storage in a larger archive, to allow for more advanced analysis and wider use by the military and other government agencies.

- The ability to direct focused study on cultural or ethnographic issues of specific concern to the commander.

- A reachback link to a central research facility in the United States that draws on government and academic sources to answer any cultural or ethnographic questions the commander or his staff might have.

Finally, as previously noted, the team and database will not displace when a commander or unit

**Figure 1. Human Terrain Team (HTT)**
departs upon change of responsibility. Instead, the HTT will transfer in its entirety to the incoming commander and unit.

Reachback Specifics

To provide the reachback that CORDS lacked, an organization called the HTS Reachback Research Center (RRC) will be established as part of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth. All HTTs will have direct connectivity with the RRC.

Initially, the RRC will have 14 researchers, all experts in the cultural and ethnographic characteristics of the geographic area they support. The RRC will systematically receive information from deployed HTTs through the MAP-HT system. Data will be collated, catalogued, and placed into a central database. The RRC will also be able to conduct additional analysis in support of forward HTTs.

The RRC’s main purpose is to help HTTs answer forward-deployed commanders’ specific requests for information. Apart from its own institutional expertise, the RRC will be able to access a network of researchers throughout the government and academia to conduct research and get answers. RRC researchers will also constitute the primary pool from which replacements for forward HTTs will be drawn. RRC personnel will periodically rotate into theater to serve tours as forward HTT members. They will be designated to reinforce in-theater HTTs during an emergency or in a surge period, as required by a brigade commander.

Overall System

In addition to the capabilities the HTS offers to brigade commanders and other decisionmakers in given areas of operation, the data it compiles will be available for the training, modeling, and simulation communities to better support deploying forces in their mission rehearsal exercise scenario development. Other U.S. Government agencies will also have access to the central database. And finally, to facilitate economic development and security, the compiled databases will eventually be turned over to the new governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to enable them to more fully exercise sovereignty over their territory and to assist with economic development.

Getting the Data

Most civilian and military education is based on unclassified or open-source information derived from the social sciences. Similarly, most cultural information about populations is unclassified. To ensure that any data obtained through the HTS does not become unnecessarily fettered or made inaccessible to the large numbers of Soldiers and civilians routinely involved in stability operations, the information and databases assembled by the HTS will be unclassified.

Many Grounds for Optimism

To date, although our brigades have performed with heroism and distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan,
lack of cultural knowledge and language capabilities appear to have been major common factors standing in the way of optimal success. With the introduction of the HTS and its human terrain teams, future deploying brigades will get a running start once they enter theater. They will be culturally empowered, able to key on the people and so prosecute counter-insurgency as Lawrence, Galula, and other practitioners have prescribed—not by fire and maneuver, but by winning hearts and minds. In turn, the Army, our Nation, and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan will benefit from the fielding of this powerful new instrument for conducting stability operations and reconstruction. **MR**

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**NOTES**


2. The concept for the current Human Terrain System was suggested by Montgomery McFate Ph.D., J.D., and Andrea Jackson as described in their article, “An Organizational Solution for DoD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs,” Military Review (July-August 2005): 18-21. Most of the practical work to implement the concept under the title Human Terrain System was done by CPT Don Smith, U.S. Army Reserve, of the Foreign Military Studies Office, between July 2005 and August 2006. Under this concept, “human terrain” can be defined as the human population and society in the operational environment (area of operations) as defined and characterized by sociocultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data and other non-geophysical information about that human population and society. Human terrain information is open-source derived, unclassified, referenced (geospatially, relationally, and temporally) information. It includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and rules of behavior of an operationally relevant group or individual.


When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incognita.

—Robert McNamara, In Retrospect

The proliferation of empowered networks makes “ethnographic intelligence” (EI) more important to the United States than ever before. Among networks, Al-Qaeda is of course the most infamous, but there are several other examples from the recent past and present, such as blood-diamond and drug cartels, that lead to the conclusion that such networks will be a challenge in the foreseeable future. Given the access these networks have to expanded modern communications and transportation and, potentially, to weapons of mass destruction, they are likely to be more formidable than any adversaries we have ever faced.

Regrettably, the traditional structure of the U.S. military intelligence community and the kind of intelligence it produces aren’t helping us counter this threat. As recent debate, especially in the services, attests, there is an increased demand for cultural intelligence. Retired Army Major General Robert Scales has highlighted the need for what he calls cultural awareness in Iraq: “I asked a returning commander from the 3rd Infantry Division how well situational awareness (read aerial and ground intelligence technology) worked during the march to Baghdad. ‘I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil,’ he replied. ‘Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and [rocket propelled grenades]. I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence…wrong enemy.’”

I propose that we go beyond even General Scales’s plea for cultural awareness and look instead at amassing EI, the type of intelligence that is key to setting policy for terra incognita. The terra in this case is the human terrain, about which too often too little is known by those who wield the instruments of national power. The United States needs EI to combat networks and conduct global counterinsurgency. This paper will therefore define EI, discuss some cases that illustrate the requirement for it, and propose a means to acquire and process it.

**EI Defined**

According to Dr. Anna Simons of the United States Naval Postgraduate School, “What we mean by EI is information about indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of mobilization.
Clans, tribes, secret societies, the hawala system, religious brotherhoods, all represent indigenous or latent forms of social organization available to our adversaries throughout the non-Western, and increasingly the Western, world. These create networks that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; they come in forms with which we are not culturally familiar; and they are impossible to ‘see’ or monitor, let alone map, without consistent attention and the right training.\textsuperscript{4}

Because EI is the only way to truly know a society, it is the best tool to divine the intentions of a society’s members. The “indigenous forms of association and local means of organization” are hardly alien concepts to us. Our own culture has developed what we call “social network analysis” to map these associations and forms of organization.\textsuperscript{5} These unwritten rules and invisible (to us) connections between people form key elements of the kind of information that, according to General Scales, combat commanders are now demanding. Because these rules and connections form the “traditional methods of mobilization” used either to drum up support for or opposition to U.S. goals, they demand constant attention from the U.S. Government and Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{6} Simply put, EI constitutes the descriptions of a society that allow us to make sense of personal interactions, to trace the connections between people, to determine what is important to people, and to anticipate how they could react to certain events. With the United States no longer facing a relatively simple, monolithic enemy, our national interests are found in a confusing cauldron of different locales and societies. Each of these has its own “latent forms of social organization” that create networks we cannot see or map, and to which we may very well fall victim, unless we aggressively pursue EI.\textsuperscript{7}

The Threat: Three Case Studies

American national interests are affected by many societies about which we may know very little. In the early 1960s, few Americans recognized the importance of the terra incognita of Vietnamese society.\textsuperscript{8} In the 1990s, America either failed to develop, or failed to employ EI on Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, or Iraq.\textsuperscript{9} Today, we have little insight into which cultures or networks may soon become threats to our national interests. For this reason, America must seek to understand and develop EI on a global scale, before it is surprised by another unknown or dimly understood society or network. As a first step toward becoming more EI-smart, we might look at three illustrative cases: the blood-diamond cartel, drug trafficking syndicates, and Al-Qaeda.

The blood-diamond cartel. West Africa’s blood-diamond cartel is a good example of the seemingly random mixture of networks, private armies, governments of questionable legitimacy, and social environments in conflict that plague the world today. At the core of the cartel are guerrillas in Sierra Leone who have used terror tactics to control access to diamond mines. They were assisted by the former government of Charles Taylor in Liberia, which helped launder the diamonds in Europe for money. Some of that money then went to international arms dealers who smuggled weapons to the guerrillas, and some went to finance international terrorists like Al-Qaeda. War, as the U.S. military has traditionally preferred to consider it—the clash of state armies and navies—has given way to a mix of crime, money, and terror executed by dark networks in league with each other and with reprehensible governments to secure profits and export terrorism. According to H. Brinton Milward and Jorg Raab, “Covert networks have come together with warlords controlling access to resources to create commodity wars. These wars are fought over control of diamonds, petroleum concessions, coca leaves, and poppies that yield narcotics, not for any real ideological or political reason.”\textsuperscript{10}

While entities like the blood-diamond cartel have heretofore not been deemed threatening to vital U.S. interests, and thus have not justified the attention of significant American assets or numbers of troops, such a presumption is overdue for reconsideration. The United States cannot afford—or should it be inclined to act—as the world’s policeman,
but these unholy alliances now demand scrutiny. This is where EI enters the picture. When crime, brutality, poor governance, and terrorist financing come together, they are so enmeshed in the local social environment that only a detailed understanding of ethnographic factors can provide the basis for further identification of who and what truly threaten U.S. national interests. An understanding of the societies in which these networks roost is the indispensable bedrock upon which any further analysis rests.

Traditional military intelligence, in examining opposing formations and weapons systems, does not even speak in the same terms as those found in the blood-diamond “conflict.” In Milward and Raab’s words: “In the period after Taylor became president, the Republic of Liberia became a nexus for many dark networks. There are linkages between various dark networks; some are more central than others are and some only loosely linked with the others.”

Borrowed from social network analysis, terms like “network,” “nexus,” and “centrality” are useful concepts that allow analysts to better identify threats to American security. It is only through extensive, on-the-ground observation that latent forms of social organization and mobilization can be made apparent. When those indigenous forms of social organization are exploited by people like Charles Taylor, or become linked to external nodes such as other networks, then EI feeds and blurs into the police-style social network analysis needed to identify and counter threats to U.S. interests. In this way, EI takes the incognita out of the human terra so that the United States can craft effective, realistic policy actions.

**Drug trafficking syndicates.**

Drug syndicates or cartels are another networked threat that will not disappear in the foreseeable future and that cannot be depicted effectively by order-of-battle-style intelligence. Phil Williams has clearly articulated the ethnic qualities that make drug trafficking a particularly opaque threat: “[M]any networks have two characteristics that make them hard to penetrate: ethnicity and language. Moreover, many of the networks use languages or dialects unfamiliar to law enforcement personnel in the host countries. Consequently, electronic surveillance efforts directed against, for example, Chinese or Nigerian drug-trafficking networks do not exist in a vacuum, but instead operate in and from ethnic communities that provide concealment and protections as well as an important source of new recruits. Some networks, such as Chinese drug-trafficking groups, are based largely on ethnicity. They are global in scope and operate according to the principle of guanxi (notions of reciprocal obligation), which can span generations and continents and provides a basis for trust and cooperation. Such networks are especially difficult for law enforcement to infiltrate. In short, drug-trafficking networks have a significant capacity to protect their information and to defend themselves against law enforcement initiatives.”

By themselves, drug gangs might not represent a clear and present danger to America, but they warrant
study for two reasons. First, they are increasingly moving beyond mere profit-making ventures into alliances with other types of networks, such as the gun-runner and terrorist networks active in West Africa, that do pose a significant threat to the United States. Second, drug-trafficking networks provide a relevant example of how subversive groups can exploit ethnic social bonds and indigenous forms of mobilization about which we Westerners remain ignorant. Phil Williams’ illustrative invocation of guanxi, which won’t appear in any traditional military intelligence summary, is instructive here. A concept of mutual obligation that can endure from generation to generation and across great distances, guanxi can be a powerful tool in the hands of a network with evil intent. Drug trafficking can be harmful enough to a society, but when it is lashed together with the trafficking of weapons, money, and perhaps even materials of mass destruction, such racketeering does become a clear and present danger to America. A nexus of dark networks, peddling destruction in various forms, and facilitating international terrorism, becomes inordinately threatening when powered by traditional social practices such as guanxi that are invisible to states that don’t do their ethnographic homework. Williams appropriately notes that these practices, or means of “indigenous mobilization,” work precisely because they are embedded in an ethnic population. This is true whether the population in question inhabits an ethnic enclave in a culturally dissimilar host nation or occupies its home region. In fact, under the latter conditions, local forms of organization and means of association can become more powerful than any written law, and therefore that much more efficacious for the network using them. They can be extraordinarily effective at creating local networks. However, he who has done his ethnographic analysis stands a decent chance of neutralizing the hostile actions of a dark network or perhaps even turning the activities of the network to advantage.

Al-Qaeda. A third case that illustrates the need for EI is Al-Qaeda. In 2004, Marc Sageman wrote Understanding Terror Networks to clarify what he saw as a widespread misperception in the West about who joins these networks and why they join. Sageman concentrates on Al-Qaeda’s sub-network constituents, mapping the individual networks and partially filling in their foci, such as certain mosques. Sageman obtained his information by accessing documents via friendly means, but he freely admits that his examination is limited.

Sageman’s main agenda is to refute the myth that terrorists such as those in Al-Qaeda are irrational psychopaths created by brainwashing impoverished Muslim youths. He contends that the majority of terrorists are educated, generally middle-class, mature adults. They are usually married, and they come from caring families with strong values. They are also believers wholly committed to the greater cause of global Salafist jihad.

According to Sageman, these people belong to four general groups in the Al-Qaeda network: the Central Staff, the Southeast Asians, the Maghreb Arabs, and the Core Arabs. The Central Staff is comprised mainly of Osama bin Laden’s older compatriots, men who heard the call to jihad against the Soviet infidels in Afghanistan and who continue the fight today. The Southeast Asians are mostly disciples of two particular religious schools. The Maghreb Arabs are first- or second-generation Arabs in France. Socially isolated, the Maghrebs have sought community ties in local mosques. The Core Arabs grew up in communal societies in Islamic lands, but became isolated and lonely as they moved away to schools or jobs.

With the exception of some Maghreb Arabs, many of Al-Qaeda’s recruits have a good education and strong job skills; they have no criminal background. Sageman writes at some length about the feeling of isolation that led many of the expatriate Al-Qaeda members to seek out cliques of their own kind, and about the gradual strengthening of their religious beliefs prior to joining the jihad as a source of identity and community. He emphasizes that people join in small cliques, and that the motivation is primarily fellowship, and only later, worship. The cliques are not recruited as much as they seek out membership in Al-Qaeda. In the search for fellowship, some men happened upon one of the relatively few radical mosques or became embedded in a clique that happened to have an acquaintance in the jihadist network. Sageman debunks the theory that Al-Qaeda has recruiters in every mosque, yet he does point out the existence of a few people who know how to contact the larger group and will provide directions, travel money, and
introductions to clandestine training camps. In sum, Sageman argues convincingly that our stereotypes of Al-Qaeda are dangerously misleading.

Sageman’s analysis of the Al-Qaeda network has been widely quoted, yet he himself underscores the lack of available first-hand information and makes it plain that he used open-source documents, with some limited personal exposure; in other words, he wrote the book without much access to EI.\textsuperscript{15} Let us imagine what Sageman’s sharp intellect would have found if he had had access to a full, well-organized range of EI from each of the four subgroups’ regions. What might a dedicated core of EI specialists have discovered about the recruitment pattern? As an illustration, Sageman uncovered a key ethnographic point in the bond between student and teacher in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{16} The active exploration of this key example of “indigenous forms of association” might have led to the two radical Southeast Asian schools much sooner. Perhaps armed with such knowledge, the governments in question could have taken more steps against the network years ago.

**Acquiring and Processing EI**

To acquire ethnographic knowledge, there is no substitute for being on the scene. For the U.S. military, the structural solution to EI could be relatively easy. Some form of U.S. Military Group, or the military annex to the embassy, could become the vehicle to collect EI. While the defense attaché system is charged with overtly collecting military information and assessing the military situation in particular countries, there currently is no comprehensive effort to collect and process EI. The security assistance officers attached to U.S. country teams often obtain a fine appreciation of the cultural aspects of their host nation, but they are not charged with the responsibility to collect EI and may not always have a smooth relationship with the defense attaché (if one is even assigned).\textsuperscript{17}

There is a relatively low-cost way to set up a system to collect EI. The United States could develop a corps of personnel dedicated to the task and base them out of a more robust military annex to our embassies. There are two key points to developing such a corps: it must be devoted exclusively to the task without distraction, and its personnel must be allowed to spend extended time in country and then be rewarded for doing so.\textsuperscript{18} Their work could be considered a form of strategic reconnaissance, and in reconnaissance matters there is simply no substitute for being physically present on the ground. Since the ethnographic ground in question is actually a population and not necessarily terrain, a constant and near-total immersion in the local population would be the means to turn McNamara’s terra incognita into a known set of “indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of mobilization.”

While the most streamlined EI organization would probably combine the functions of the defense attaché and security assistance officer, such a move is not absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{19} The most important structural aspect is that the EI developed in country should be analyzed at the embassy, forwarded to the staff of the geographic combatant commander, and shared laterally with other relevant embassies. This kind of information sharing would make for better contingency plans, and it would create a hybrid network to counter the dark networks that profit from blood diamonds, drugs, and terror.

A small number of Americans, usually military foreign area officers (FAOs), are already in tune with this type of work, and some have achieved a high level of excellence. There are not many of them, though, and they are not organized into a truly comprehensive system focused on the ethnographic aspects of networks. A sterling example of the capacity that the United States could build can be found in an officer named “David.” On a mission with a platoon of Army Rangers in western Iraq to find out how foreign fighters were infiltrating the country, David traveled in mufti. At one village, he “met a woman with facial tattoos that marked her as her husband’s property. As they chatted, the pale-skinned, sandy-haired North Carolina native
imitated her dry, throaty way of speaking. ‘You are Bedu, too,’ she exclaimed with delight.” From her and the other Bedouins, David finds out that the foreign fighters are using local smuggling routes “to move people, guns, and money. Many of the paths were marked with small piles of bleached rocks that were identical to those David had seen a year earlier while serving in Yemen.”

David gained access and operational information by using ethnographic knowledge. The deeper that personnel like David dig into local society, the better their ability to assess which groups threaten the United States and which should be left alone. If America could build a healthy corps of people like David, based out of each U.S. embassy in the world, then our nation could identify those networks that, in Simons’s formulation, are “invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; [and that] come in forms with which we are not culturally familiar.”

Sadly, there aren’t nearly enough Davids in the military. The Army has about 1,000 FAOs, but most of them are in Europe. A mere 145 are focused on the Middle East, and even that number can be deceptive because a FAO’s duties include many things that aren’t related to EI, such as protocol for visits and administrative duties. Certainly, one solution to the growing threats from networks would be to produce more Davids and reward them for extensive time on the ground exclusively focused on the development of EI.

The benefits to be derived from such a corps would be tremendous. Consider, for example, the impact good EI could have had on the war plan for Iraq. There has been much discussion of late about how American forces did not really understand the Iraq’s tribal networks, a failure that contributed to the difficulties we are currently facing. With the “consistent attention and the right training” Simons has prescribed, knowledge like this could have been built into contingency plans and then updated in the regular two-year plan review cycle to insure currency. Ethnographic understanding could have allowed U.S. forces in Iraq to use tribal networks to advantage from the outset; they would not have had to figure things out for themselves, as Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan did: “The key is a truce brokered by the National League of Sheiks and Tribal Leaders and U.S. Army Lt. Col. Tim Ryan, the 1st Cavalry Division officer responsible for Abu Ghraib—a Sunni Triangle town west of Baghdad and a hotbed of the insurgency. Under the agreement, Ryan now meets regularly with tribal leaders and provides them with lists of residents suspected of taking part in attacks. The sheiks and their subordinate local clan leaders then promise to keep their kinsmen in line. ‘They [the sheiks] do have a lot of influence. To ignore that is to ignore 6,000 years of the way business has been done here.’”

EI that might lead to beneficial relations with local power figures, along the lines of the one between Ryan and the sheiks, could be developed from each U.S. embassy around the clock in peacetime to inform contingency plans and enable activity against the dark networks that seek to harm America. In some places, such as pre-war Iraq or in outright killing fields similar to a blood-diamond zone, Washington will judge the presence of an embassy to be too dangerous, but in the absence of an on-site embassy, personnel can be invested in the surrounding embassies to glean as much EI as possible through borders that are often porous.

The Broken Windows Theory of criminologists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling suggests that we might reap another benefit from establishing an American ethnographic counter-network in surrounding, linked embassies. The essence of the theory is that if a building has a broken window that remains unfixed, then people will assume that no one is in charge or cares; as a result, they will do whatever they wish to the place—the broken window will invite vandalism, graffiti, and so on. Once these acts of disorder commence, crime becomes contagious, like a fashion trend or virus. A more robust military annex to an embassy and a low-key, constant interest in overt ethnographic matters would show that the United States cares and is indeed watching. Perhaps this constant attention
would serve to subtly constrict the amount of safe-haven space available for dark networks. The overt information gathered by military ethnographers could complement the covert work done by the CIA (and vice versa).

U.S. citizens, at least intuitively, have always recognized the presence of networks in society, from family ties to economic relationships, indeed, to the very structure of daily life. The law enforcement community has long since recognized and acted against domestic criminal and extremist variants of these networks. However, the U.S. Government and military have had a difficult time coming to grips with networks like Al-Qaeda. It took the shock of the September 11th attacks to galvanize national attention on terrorist networks, and the ensuing years of struggle to grasp that terror networks can be more than ideologically motivated, and that they can flourish in the nexus of crime, drugs, weapons trafficking, money laundering, and a host of other lethal activities.

Terrorism can take many guises, and it blends very well into the cauldron of dark phenomena like blood diamonds, drug trafficking networks, and Al-Qaeda. The United States desperately needs a counter-network to fight the dark networks now surfacing across the globe. Ethnographic intelligence can empower the daily fight against dark networks, and it can help formulate contingency plans that are based on a truly accurate portrayal of the most essential terrain—the human mind. United States policymakers must not commit us ever again to terra incognita. The Nation must invest in specialized people who can pay “constant attention” to “indigenous forms of association and mobilization,” so that we can see and map the human terrain. MR

NOTES

6. McNamara, 30-33.
7. Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004); Robert Baer, See No Evil (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002).
9. Ibid., 28.
10. Ibid.
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21. Ibid.
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Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency

Kyle Teamey and LTC Jonathan Sweet, U.S. Army

The very essence of counterinsurgency is the collection of intelligence for the government.
—Lucian W. Pye

EFFECTIVE, ACCURATE, AND TIMELY intelligence is essential to conducting any form of warfare, including counterinsurgency operations, because the ultimate success or failure of the mission depends on the effectiveness of the intelligence effort. The function of intelligence in counterinsurgency is to facilitate an understanding of the populace, the host nation, the operational environment, and the insurgents so that commanders may address the issues driving the insurgency.

Insurgencies, however, are notoriously difficult to evaluate. The organization of the standard military intelligence system, developed for major theater warfare rather than counterinsurgency, compounds the difficulty. Intelligence systems and personnel must adapt to the challenges of a counterinsurgency environment to provide commanders the intelligence they require. This is a “best practice” in counterinsurgency, without which counterinsurgency efforts will likely fail.

Principles

Practical experience and research indicate six major factors make intelligence in counterinsurgency different than in other forms of warfare. First and foremost, intelligence in counterinsurgency is about people. Commanders must understand the host nation’s people and government, the people involved in the insurgency, and the conditions driving the insurgency. They must have insight into the perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and decisionmaking processes of individuals and groups. These requirements are the basis for collection and analysis efforts.

Second, counterinsurgency is an intelligence war. Both insurgents and counter-insurgents need effective intelligence capabilities to be successful. Insurgents and counterinsurgents therefore attempt to create and maintain intelligence networks and fight continuously to neutralize each other’s intelligence capabilities.

Third, a strong feedback relationship exists between operations and intelligence. This can be positive or negative. Effective intelligence drives effective operations, producing more intelligence. Ineffective or inaccurate
intelligence drives ineffective operations, reducing the availability of intelligence.

Fourth, all operations have an intelligence component. All service members are potential intelligence collectors when interacting with the people. Therefore, operations should always include intelligence collection requirements.

Fifth, intelligence flows from the bottom up in counterinsurgency, and all echelons both produce and consume intelligence. This is because insurgencies are like a mosaic in that they are local and vary greatly in time and space. The insurgency one battalion faces is often different from that faced by an adjacent battalion. Tactical units at brigade and below require a great deal of support for intelligence collection and analysis because their organic intelligence structure is often inadequate to deal with these realities.

Finally, units at all echelons find themselves operating in a joint, combined environment. Commanders and staff personnel at all echelons must coordinate intelligence collection and analysis with coalition and host-nation militaries and intelligence services and with many different U.S. intelligence organizations.

Resourcing the Effort

We must understand the challenges posed by a counterinsurgency environment and the factors that differentiate counterinsurgency from major theater warfare, and then we must allocate intelligence personnel and equipment appropriately. Intelligence personnel are normally concentrated at echelons above brigade, with relatively few personnel at brigade and below. However, in counterinsurgency, requirements to collect, process, and analyze intelligence inundate units at brigade and below. The ability of these units to gather and analyze intelligence effectively is critically important in counterinsurgency. It has been cited as a key to the success of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines in 1899-1902.

New authorizations of intelligence personnel for Army brigade combat teams go a long way toward meeting these requirements, but in many cases they are still lacking. The Marine Corps has doubled or tripled the size of its battalion intelligence sections in Iraq by pushing personnel down from the division and Marine Expeditionary Force level. The technique is effective and could potentially be expanded to Army units, although it would likely mean assigning or task-organizing intelligence personnel from echelons above division down to the battalions.

Pushing intelligence collection assets down to tactical units benefits all echelons. Benefits include improving the collection capabilities of tactical units, ensuring reports go through appropriate channels to reach higher echelon audiences, and most important, positioning collectors closer to the insurgents. Human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, counterintelligence (CI) agents, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms and personnel will be particularly important to the intelligence effort at the tactical level, with HUMINT being the priority effort. In Iraq, however, the demand for these personnel often exceeds available forces because CI/HUMINT personnel are necessary to many mission-critical tasks, such as building and running CI/HUMINT networks, interrogating captured insurgents, and vetting local workers.

Battalions also need more analysts. Current battalion intelligence sections lack the personnel to collect patrol debriefs, analyze incoming intelligence from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence products, and disseminate products to consumers. In many cases, brigade intelligence sections and military intelligence companies also require additional analysts.

Analysts can be beneficial at the company level, too. This is the case when a maneuver company has a set area of operations (AO) and must collect a lot of information on its people and insurgents. An analyst can aid a company commander and his junior leaders in collecting and processing information and developing an operating picture of the AO. Pushing analysts down to the tactical level would place them closer to collectors, would improve the overall intelligence picture, and would help higher echelon staffs get answers to their priority information requirements (PIRs). If no additional analysts are available, commanders may have to reallocate non-intelligence personnel to work in the intelligence section. Anecdotal evidence indicates that use of non-intelligence personnel in intelligence roles is common practice in units currently conducting counterinsurgency missions.

Even if additional collectors and analysts are given to tactical units, a lack of linguists can limit their effectiveness. Linguists are required to interact effectively with locals, translate open-source media
and captured documents, and perform other tasks. An infantry battalion in Iraq might require 30 to 40 linguists who are fluent in Arabic. Lack of linguists is a show-stopper for counterinsurgency operations and is often cited as a constraint on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We should also consider creating a combined or joint intelligence operations cell for intelligence at the theater and national levels to ensure unity of intelligence effort at those levels. Ideally, such a cell would consist of two complementary sections, one in theater fulfilling the requirements of the theater commander and subordinate units, the other out of theater fulfilling the intelligence requirements of U.S. national leaders. For continuity and situational awareness, personnel would rotate between the two sections of the intelligence cell on a regular basis.

A final consideration involves the training of intelligence personnel. Effective counterinsurgency operations require intelligence personnel trained in their AO’s sociocultural factors and able to evaluate cultures and social groups, so that commanders can better understand the nuances of the AO. Intelligence personnel must also—

- Be trained to operate in a joint or combined environment.
- Be able to take thousands of pieces of information and combine them into an accurate, comprehensible picture that enables predictive analysis based on insurgent capabilities and intent.

Moreover, each unit in charge of an AO must have an adequate number of officers and enlisted personnel trained in HUMINT operations.

Organizing Collection Efforts

The purpose of intelligence collection in counterinsurgency is to determine what factors drive the insurgency and to provide commanders with information on those factors and ways to reverse or mitigate them. Obviously, intelligence collection should focus on those people in the AO who are involved in or support the insurgency.

The theater intelligence cell should coordinate the overall intelligence effort. However, because of the localized nature of insurgencies, tactical units must have flexibility in formulating and collecting their own intelligence requirements. The benefits of balancing intelligence requirements and tasks reach all echelons because accurate intelligence pictures at the tactical level facilitate a holistic, accurate picture at the theater level.

Personnel trained in various intelligence disciplines will perform much of the intelligence collection for counterinsurgency, but they are not necessarily the primary producers of intelligence reporting. As noted earlier, all service members are potential intelligence collectors. All day-to-day tactical operations should be a part of the collection plan. Every patrol or mission should receive intelligence collection requirements in addition to operations requirements; PIRs should be understood at the lowest level; and all units should write debriefs after conducting a mission. Debriefs and other operational reports are an important form of HUMINT in counterinsurgency. In some cases, nonstandard HUMINT reporting, such as meeting and patrol debriefs, is the primary form of intelligence for an area.
For collection to be effective, there must be a conduit for operations personnel and analysts to provide feedback to collectors. This is necessary to keep reporting relevant, to encourage the development of effective HUMINT networks, and to maintain an accurate understanding of the operating environment.

Feedback must go to all collectors, including personnel writing mission debriefs. Feedback may include a positive or negative assessment of an intelligence source, requests for additional information, or new collection requirements.

**Organizing the Analytical Effort**

The purpose of analysis is to convert raw reporting into intelligence products that support operations. Intelligence analysis in counterinsurgency is challenging. Analysts must understand a complex web spun from society and conflict, perceptions and culture, hundreds or even thousands of personalities, and relationships between and among key personalities. The local nature of insurgencies and their tendency to change over time add to the complexity of the analysis. In many ways, intelligence analysis in counterinsurgency has more in common with law enforcement than major theater warfare.

Additional analysts must be allocated to battalion and brigade staffs to ensure tactical units have the analytical support they need. Tactical analysis at brigade and below is the basis for operational intelligence developed at higher echelons. The bottom-up flow of intelligence in counterinsurgency should shape prioritization of intelligence resources. Battalions and brigades develop the intelligence picture in their AOs, while higher echelons fuse the tactical pictures into a theater-wide assessment of the insurgency.

There are two basic analysis functions at all echelons: analysis of enemy actions and network analysis. Analysis of enemy actions is commonly called current operations analysis because it focuses on current enemy operations. Network analysis focuses on the people in an AO and develops an understanding of interrelationships and the ideas and beliefs driving insurgent actions. Current operations information helps determine threat warning conditions and the metrics of enemy capabilities, while network analysis provides intelligence for targeting, effects synchronization, and planning. Commanders tend to concentrate on current operations at the expense of network analysis. However, to ensure a thorough understanding of the insurgency and operational environment, it is critical that some analysts, particularly at brigade and above, perform network analysis.

The complexity of analyzing an insurgency means it often takes analysts months to fully understand the battlefield environment and the insurgency. In addition, insurgencies often span years, requiring analysts to take a similarly long-term view. For these reasons, analysts should observe the insurgency for as long as possible by having intelligence and other staff sections alternately participate in the conflict and track the fight from their home stations.

Battle handover between units must not disrupt continuity. Processes must be in place to ensure analysts moving into a theater are able to understand the intelligence picture, the intelligence plan, and applicable intelligence databases. Without continuity, the intelligence picture will begin anew with every troop rotation, and there will be no consistent long-term analysis of the insurgency.

**Organizing Information Flow**

Insurgencies often vary in space and time, and insurgents often adapt rapidly to counterinsurgent operations. The flow of intelligence and information between units should reflect these realities. If not, it will be impossible for commanders to get inside the insurgents’ decisionmaking cycle.

Units must be able to pass intelligence rapidly to track an enemy that regularly moves across unit boundaries. Traditionally, intelligence has been passed in a hierarchical manner that does not work well because it is often slow and cumbersome. For example, an insurgent might drive from Mosul to Ramadi in less than a day, but it might take much longer than a day to process a formal request for information about that insurgent through multiple
Intelligence Principles for Counterinsurgency

1 Intelligence in counterinsurgency is about people.

2 Counterinsurgency is an intelligence war.

3 Operations and intelligence must feed each other.

4 All operations have an intelligence component.

5 Insurgencies are local, vary greatly in time and space, and are mosaic-like.

6 In a joint-combined environment, all echelons must work at intelligence.
duct regular meetings to share collection priorities, deconflict activities and operations, discuss target development, share results of operations, and establish and maintain joint situational awareness. Such an intelligence cell would permit economy of force, and its meetings would build mutual trust among members and enhance understanding of each member’s mission, capabilities, and limitations. If integrated with unit targeting meetings, targeting effects synchronization boards, and S2X-G2X deconfliction meetings, the intelligence cell would further enhance the commander’s knowledge of enemy activities, local atmospherics, and friendly forces operating in the AO. Incorporating host-nation intelligence services, military forces, and local government officials and coalition partners into the intelligence cell should also be considered to foster teamwork, gain insight into local customs and activities, and prepare the host nation to assume the mission when coalition forces depart the area.

**Once More**

To be successful, counterinsurgency forces must be heavily weighted with intelligence support. Additionally, the counterinsurgent must continuously evaluate and prioritize his organization and allocation of intelligence resources to ensure that commanders get as complete an intelligence picture as possible. Speed, too, is important to intelligence in a counterinsurgency: the more rapidly intelligence personnel develop an understanding of the insurgency, the sooner they can deal with it and the greater the potential for reducing the length and intensity of the conflict. It’s time we got the drop on our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan. One way to do it is with a better-organized, better-equipped, and quicker intelligence system. *MR*

**NOTES**

4. John Nagl, ’Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 4. In the preface to the paperback edition, LTC Nagl cites the intelligence-operations dynamic as one of the greatest challenges when he was a battalion operations officer in Iraq.
5. Conrad Crane, personal communication to the author, January-June 2006. Dr. Crane is directing the effort to produce the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24. He used the term ’mosaic war’ to describe insurgencies.
7. Brian McAllister Linn, ’Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899–1902,’ *Intelligence and National Security* 6 (January 1991): 96-109. Linn argues that ineffective intelligence at the theater level forced tactical units to conduct their own intelligence work. He concludes that this situation led to counterinsurgency success because the dearth of information from higher headquarters virtually forced every commander to become his own intelligence officer and to establish a network designed for his own area. The Philippine experience highlights the importance of local intelligence, though it does not necessarily obviate the need for theater intelligence.
9. Marine intelligence personnel have noted some negative aspects of pushing personnel down: it may cause problems with unit integrity and result in higher operations tempo for intelligence personnel than for other Marines. However, by expanding this program to the Army, involving echelons above corps, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and possibly national intelligence agencies and defense contractors, ample personnel should be available to better support counterinsurgency efforts while maintaining other global mission requirements.
12. David Kilcullen, ’Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,’ *Military Review* (May-June 2006): 104. Kilcullen advocates the establishment of an intelligence section at the company level to enable the company’s collection and evaluation of intelligence on its area of operations. This intelligence section is then used to drive the company’s operations. The intelligence section is particularly important at this level if the company is developing its own intelligence from interacting with the populace rather than receiving intelligence products from a higher headquarters.
13. This was the number of interpreters determined necessary for battalions in the 101st Airborne Division during its first deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thirty to 40 interpreters per battalion reflect the unit’s mission requirements in terms of the number and frequency of patrols and other operations that require interaction with the people in a given area of operations. This allows the battalion to have at least one interpreter per squad with additional interpreters available for leaders.
16. Derek Harvey, personal communication, June 2006. Colonel Harvey was an intelligence officer for Combined Joint Task Force 7 and heavily involved in negotiations with insurgents in Fallujah in spring 2004. Harvey said that much of the intelligence from the battle for Fallujah in spring 2004 was recorded by operations personnel in the form of meeting debriefs and emails. This non-standard HUMINT was neither stored nor transmitted effectively, thereby leading to a loss of valuable intelligence.
17. Grau, 44.
19. MAJ Patrick Michaelis, personal communication with author, March 2005 and February 2006. MAJ Michaelis developed Cavnit information-sharing software for the 1st Cavalry Division while it was deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004 and 2005. The system worked well enough for tactical information and intelligence sharing that it is still in use in Iraq and being further developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
20. MAJ Michael Marti, personal communication with author, June 2006. MAJ Marti performed an informal survey of brigade and division intelligence sections rotating in and out of Iraq between 2003 and 2005. Those surveyed provided the 45 to 60 day range as the amount of time required to establish effective intelligence architecture and to gain a thorough understanding of an AO.
22. Grau, 49.
ONE OF THE GREATEST CHALLENGES for the current generation of American military professionals is relearning the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). This includes intelligence professionals who must not only tailor the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process to the requirements of COIN, but also learn the intricacies of foreign cultures and peoples. Analysts have to shift their focus from military capabilities to social networks, culture, and people. The level of understanding required to conduct COIN operations at the tactical and operational levels presents challenges.

At the beginning of a COIN campaign, before patterns in the enemy’s method of operating have emerged, the intelligence analyst is more dependent on military art than science. In such a situation, to generate actionable intelligence, friendly forces must frequently begin by executing an action.1 In that type of operation, the role of intelligence shifts from one that supports maneuver to a more central role.

Perhaps the biggest intelligence challenges presented by COIN arise from the difficulties friendly forces face in identifying insurgents and in understanding complex cultural environments. Examples can be seen in the chart on the following page. Before discussing COIN, we must review IPB against more conventional threats to appreciate the changes in collection, analysis, and support to targeting.

Traditional Threats

For more than 40 years, the United States prepared for a conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies. The cold war affected every facet of Army operations, from weapons procurement, to the development of tactics, to training at the combat training centers.

Cold war planning also affected the various parts of the intelligence cycle: direct, collect, process and disseminate. In developing the IPB process, the intelligence community utilized doctrinal templates that became the basis for the development of enemy Courses of Action (COA). The availability of Soviet doctrine, combined with their rigid adherence to it and the minimal amounts of initiative they afforded junior leaders, made the doctrinal templates a useful and accurate tool. Over time, IPB became a scientific process.
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<td>Collectors scheduled by blocks of time for D3A</td>
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<td>High demand for the “unblinking eye” for D2TDA</td>
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<td>[decide, detect, deliver and assess (BDA)] [decide, detect, track, deliver, assess (1st to 3rd-order effects)]</td>
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<td>Collectors employed at a stand-off range</td>
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**Legend:** BDA, battle damage assessment; C2, command and control; COA, course of action; EPW, enemy prisoner or war; FCOORD, fire support coordinator; HUMINT, human intelligence; IO, information operations; IPB, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (battlespace); SIGINT/IMINT, signals intelligence/imagery intelligence; TENCAP, tactical exploitation of national capabilities; TTP, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

**Collection**

Collection of intelligence against enemy targets focused on the threat’s large networks, including command, control and communications; air defense; and sustainment. Intelligence assets at all levels utilized a balance of the various intel disciplines—human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT)—to find the enemy for targeting. Tactical and operational Military Intelligence (MI) units used their organic systems as well as Tactical...
Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) feeds to find concentrations of Soviet forces.

► Analysis

Define the battlefield environment and describe the battlefield effects. In this part of IPB, the intelligence section focused on the effects of weather and the physical terrain on friendly and enemy operations. It focused on the military aspects of terrain, mobility and the impact of terrain on the range of the weapons systems.

Evaluate the threat and determine threat courses of action. Determining the effects of weather and terrain allowed an intelligence section to predict an enemy force’s scheme of maneuver in a situational template. Further adjustments were made by taking into account range fans, doctrinal rates of movement, and the space and time between echelons. Units that trained in exercises against this threat believed that the IPB process did a good job of depicting its operations. The reality, however, is that we may never know, because we never faced the Soviet Army in battle.

► Targeting

Tactical targeting in conventional operations had a kinetic focus. Friendly forces targeted high-payoff targets that would weaken the enemy at a decisive point. These target sets traditionally included reconnaissance units, armor, engineer equipment, long-range artillery, rockets, and attack-aviation assets. At the operational level, the targeting effort focused on key enablers such as petroleum storage facilities, supply warehouses, and ammunition supply points. Additionally, using Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), friendly forces tried to demoralize enemy forces and dissuade them from fighting and to influence other forces. During a conventional fight, intelligence supported most parts of the targeting process: decide, detect, deliver, and assess.

Intelligence Support to COIN

Supporting COIN operations with intelligence requires the analyst to know the indigenous people in a way not required by conventional operations. This human-intelligence dimension involves examining the role that culture, demographics, political
support, religion, and ethnicity play. It also necessitates learning about patterns of social networking. The intelligence cycle begins with directing requirements to different intelligence assets and then conducting collection operations.

►Collection

In the COIN environment, identifying the enemy is a significant obstacle and an important part of the collection process. Potential adversaries have the advantage of blending in with the population. Identifying insurgents must occur in order to separate the insurgents from their bases of support through population control.

The focus of collection efforts in COIN differs greatly from that of conventional combat operations. Because human factors are extremely important, standoff collection assets have less value. In COIN, useful intelligence is most often obtained through personal contact with the population. This puts a disproportionate level of importance on HUMINT and requires a different understanding of it. In conventional operations, HUMINT is the domain of interrogators and counterintelligence agents; that has changed.

In COIN, the preponderance of HUMINT comes from the units who have the most familiarity and contact with the population. Special Forces teams, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel, the unit chaplain, the commander, engineers, the squad automatic weapon gunner, and everybody else who has daily contact with the population notice changing conditions in their areas before anybody else. Some of the changes might match indicators and warnings from the intelligence section that precede an insurgent action. Input from first-contact units gives the commander the ability to see first, understand first, and act first. The increase in situational awareness helps friendly forces gain and maintain the initiative, which is critical in COIN.²

While COIN demands that we break our reliance on technical collection and put renewed emphasis on HUMINT, the other intelligence disciplines—SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT—still have value. Friendly forces can take advantage of national collection assets using organic TENCAP systems to confirm or deny HUMINT reporting. As Colonel Rick Allenbaugh notes, “[In a COIN targeting cycle], the key is [still] cross-cueing and synchronization.”³ Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) also gains a measure of importance that it does not have against a conventional threat. The intelligence analyst has much to gain from what people say on the radio and write in newspapers. Just gauging the number of pro- and anti-government newspapers printed in a certain area is telling.

The sources of intelligence and the collection assets that an intelligence professional has access to in a COIN environment are much different from those of a conventional combat operation. In a conventional operation, the intelligence section accesses organic assets with limited or no access to interagency, international, or national sources of information, especially at lower echelons. In COIN, intelligence operations strive to fuse intelligence from nonorganic collection sources into a seamless picture of the insurgency networks and to provide corroborating intelligence for targeting.

As noted by retired Major General James Marks, maneuver commanders are also conducting operations to gain intelligence: “Commanders at all levels must develop intelligence to develop their missions. Higher headquarters often will not and cannot provide sufficient clarity of task or purpose to drive operations at the lower levels.”⁴ As a result, intelligence operations are now considered operational missions. For example, operational elements may plan to increase patrols and establish roadblocks surrounding a neighborhood suspected of harboring Al-Qaeda senior leadership. Door-to-door checks through residences may trigger movement of a target that might be detected by unmanned aerial vehicles or by cordon-and-search forces when the target attempts to escape the area. Another example of the relational changes is the integration of intelligence professionals into information operations and the nonkinetic targeting processes.

Operators are now trained for and accustomed to collecting forensic evidence during search operations.

While COIN demands that we break our reliance on technical collection and put renewed emphasis on HUMINT, the other intelligence disciplines—SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT—still have value.
During site exploitation, residences suspected of providing safe havens to insurgents are now treated much like crime scenes. Operators search for and collect items that may provide leads for future operations. As Allenbaugh notes, “Forensics are new and not fully accepted or understood.” Building a forensic case has two major benefits: It allows Host-Nation (HN) security forces to build legal cases against insurgents and their supporters; and it provides information that interrogators can use to confront suspects and gain more intelligence on their network and operational plans.

The COIN environment requires joint, interagency, international and HN collaboration for collection operations and target development. National intelligence support teams, when deployed to an operational command, provide access to national-level collection assets from Other Government Agencies (OGAs). Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), composed of military and government intelligence analysts and collectors, offer another way of accessing national intelligence and analysis. Military analysts fuse that intelligence with organic collection to gain the best possible understanding of the insurgent network, high-value targets and the populace.

Centralized and synchronized intelligence collection between all elements deployed in a theater is important for providing a more complete picture of terrorist networking through more thorough intelligence fusion. In current operations, a target tracked by the JIATF in Afghanistan or Pakistan may carry operational plans between the Al-Qaeda senior leadership and other operatives, and later turn up in another command’s sector in Iraq. This makes mutual support between commands a necessity. The insurgent network is linked; we should be, too.

Mutual support between the various units, agencies, and countries often meets parochial and cultural roadblocks. Intelligence professionals must work cooperatively but forcefully to cut through bureaucratic red tape and to keep everybody focused on the end state: actionable intelligence. The synergy of intelligence collaboration is too valuable to sacrifice to petty concerns.

Winning over the population denies the insurgents their base of support. The people have to believe that the government can fulfill their needs and personal interests. In the above photo, a 7th Special Forces Group medic provides medical care to a villager from a remote area in Afghanistan as part of the medical civic assistance care program organized by Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force.
Analysis

Define the battlefield environment and describe the battlefield effects. One of the requirements in the first IPB step is to establish an Area of Interest (AI). Although U.S. forces face adversaries who conduct transnational operations and aspire to lead a global insurgency, the AI, as a practical matter, cannot be the entire world. Intelligence analysts work to incorporate local nodes that the insurgents use to connect with other parts of their network into the AI. Doing this creates an AI that encompasses a manageable area for analysis. These AIs may include avenues of approach that cross an international boundary and lines of communication, including known or likely courier routes, SIGINT networks and local Internet service providers.

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, in his article “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” offers some valuable advice about studying the terrain: “Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.”

Depending on the operational environment, a myriad of other demographic considerations may also become relevant in COIN. These considerations include social class structure, race, ethnicity, tribe, political party, gender, age, physical ability, nationality, language, religion, professional or occupational status, and employment levels. Additionally, key personnel and groups have become the new key terrain. These may comprise religious clerics, financially powerful families, influential members of the opposition, or anyone with influence over a large or important constituency. Insurgents may target, agitate, or subvert any of these groups to further their aims.

Key terrain also encompasses the neutral pockets of the population, the “fence sitters” who represent the operational center of gravity. Intelligence sections should graphically depict the geographic areas of these various groups in population status overlays and continuously develop the relationship of social networks using link diagrams. Population analysis enables military forces to identify key formal and informal leaders as well as groups of people who require intelligence and operational focus. This socio-cultural analysis bolsters the power of full-spectrum military operations by providing a starting point for winning “hearts and minds.”

An evaluation of the battlefield’s effects begins with an analysis of the environment and its effect on friendly and enemy operations. The analyst also considers political topography and the factors that relate to it. These may include infrastructure and enemy capabilities that previously were not evaluated. In the COIN environment, one must consider the importance of infrastructure and not merely its location and effect. Opening an office of a government ministry in a certain neighborhood could have second- and third-order effects that the commander must weigh when he considers COAs.

Owing to technology and the asymmetrical nature of the threat, the battlespace now heavily favors the use of information operations. Using cyberspace and the media, the insurgents seek to influence their target audience, expand their numbers, and exploit their acts. Outlets that allow the insurgents to spread their message must be incorporated into the analysis of the environment. COIN forces should pay attention to Internet pages, in particular, as they provide an effective means of reaching a large audience from an electronic sanctuary.

Evaluate the threat and determine threat courses...
The requirements of steps 3 and 4 of IPB, as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, show that the process is adaptable to COIN, although COIN presents additional challenges. Step 3 consists of converting patterns of operations to graphics, describing, in words, the threat’s tactics and options, identifying high-value targets (HVTs), and defining the threat capabilities.\(^\text{10}\)

COIN forces must exercise operational patience and allow enough time for insurgent patterns of operation to emerge. Interrogations of detained insurgents and the exploitation of captured manuals, equipment, and information will also help to confirm suspected patterns of operation and tactics, techniques and procedures.

In assessing threat capabilities, the intelligence section will try to link personnel with events using an activities matrix. A series of incidents, along with information from captured personnel and equipment, may help reveal key personnel within the network. Examples may include bomb makers, financiers, and arms dealers. Their relative power within the network is high because multiple operational teams rely on the support that they provide.\(^\text{11}\) Individual teams or cells, on the other hand, have less connection to the network. This makes finding them a more formidable task. The section has a number of analytical tools, such as the association matrix for mapping the network and finding its key nodes (who may become HVTs).

One of the greatest challenges in COIN is to identify those pockets of the population that indirectly or secretly provide support to the insurgency. Winning over the population denies the insurgents their base of support. To do this, U.S. forces must obtain sufficient cultural intelligence to gain rapport, trust and credibility as an ally of the HN. Cultural missteps impair our relationship with the HN and the people. The people have to believe that the government can fulfill their needs and personal interests. “We never do a good job of cultural intelligence: of understanding what makes people tick, what their structure is, where authority lies, what is different about their values, and their way of doing business.”\(^\text{12}\)

**Targeting**

Owing to the demands of the “three block war,”\(^\text{13}\) in which U.S. forces could find themselves providing humanitarian assistance, conducting peace operations and fighting a mid-intensity battle simultaneously, targeting has become more complex. It also demands much more from the intelligence community. With the full-spectrum operations required by COIN, U.S. forces do two types of targeting:

- Lethal—targeting of key leaders and nodes (“kill/capture,” “raid”)
- Nonlethal—gaining support from the population (“hearts and minds”)

The obvious difference in the two comes in the “deliver” phase. One type of targeting uses combat operations (maneuver and firepower) to destroy, while the other uses nonlethal fires (IO and PSYOP) and CA to persuade. The “detect” phase, however, is also different. The first target is threat-based, but the second considers the neutral population as the target audience. The first type requires the tracking of certain key leaders, while the second type requires an understanding of the environment and the people. The first poses technical challenges; the latter is conceptually difficult.

In order to maintain contact with key leaders or other HVTs, the targeting process in COIN more closely follows “decide, detect, track, deliver, and assess,” instead of the cold war “decide, detect, deliver, and assess.” The change places greater demands on intelligence assets to provide an “unblinking eye” or continuous surveillance of either fixed or moving targets. We know that lethal targeting does not itself provide a solution in COIN.\(^\text{14}\)

We have to target the people’s support, which is the center of gravity for both the HN government and the insurgents. Understanding how factors like culture, religion, and tribal structure cause different behaviors and perceptions is difficult; it requires education and experience. Intelligence sections should seek out a HN military counterpart (English-speaking or not), other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, immigrants within the ranks, or others who have area expertise.\(^\text{15}\)
Having contributed to the “detect” phase of targeting, the intelligence analyst is still not finished—the “assess” phase is critical in COIN. Instead of merely doing a battle-damage assessment, the analyst must anticipate the reaction of key groups and second- and third-order effects. A UAV camera will not pick up the most important effects. Intelligence analysts must be the commander’s experts on culture and be able to predict the consequences of servicing targets.

A critical aspect of targeting the insurgents and the population is that both groups form part of a larger social network. Killing or capturing a key leader could generate ripple effects throughout that network and outside it. Targeting certain groups through nonkinetic means will also affect members of other groups that because of fear, insult, or jealousy, develop a connection to the event. Using link analysis, the analyst should try to anticipate these unintended consequences so the commander can more accurately assess his operational risk. With proper intelligence support, targeting allows us to assist the HN government to secure popular support, which, once accomplished, is decisive.

Conclusion

Almost overnight, it seems, MI analysts have gone from templating Soviet motorized rifle divisions to assessing the capabilities of clans, tribes, gangs, and militias. The practice of intelligence has evolved from a military science in conventional operations to a military art in COIN. With that change came the challenge of learning about different peoples and their environments.

In COIN, the environment is as important as the enemy, because the neutral majority, the center of gravity, resides there. COIN requires an appreciation of cultures, religions, tribes, classes, ethnicities, and languages, so that the people will view U.S. forces and their own government positively and work against the insurgents. Knowledge of the population, social networks, and the insurgency helps us to highlight the importance of human factors in fighting an insurgency. Consequently, most intelligence in COIN is collected by HUMINT, including information from Soldier debriefings and reporting. The other intelligence disciplines work in support to confirm or deny HUMINT reporting.

To target the population effectively, intelligence professionals use all-source intelligence gained from HN, joint service, interagency, and multinational partners. Tearing down the walls between these groups and fusing intelligence enables effective targeting. Targeting the enemy and the population through lethal and nonlethal means results in a weakened insurgency that has been denied its base of support. Intelligence and operations, working closely together and with the HN, bring about this end state.

NOTES

2. These may range from newly hung posters of a particular leader of coalition concern or population movements into or away from the town.
3. E-mail to the authors, 9 April 2006. Cross-cuing refers to tasking more than one collector to confirm or deny information coming from another.
4. E-mail to the authors, 20 April 2006.
5. E-mail to the authors, 19 April 2006.
6. The JATFs in Afghanistan and Iraq work together through working groups, targeting meetings, and operations and intelligence planning. JATF responsibilities include collection, targeting, and development of actionable intelligence.
7. “Area of interest”—The geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the commander’s operation. The AI is usually larger than the command’s AO and battle space; it includes any threat forces or characteristics of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence accomplishment of the mission. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), G-4.
8. Kilcullen, 103.
10. Intelligence sections use patterns of operation, or tactics, techniques and procedures, in lieu of threat doctrine. Once portrayed graphically, the product becomes a doctrinal template. See FM 34-130, 2-1–2-2.
11. In social-network theory, such a node would score a high Eigenvector centrality, a number that measures the node’s importance within the network.
13. This term was coined by retired GEN Charles Krulak, USMC, to describe a construct of post-cold war conflicts that demanded full-spectrum operations simultaneously. “In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war.” Charles C. Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” presented at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, 139.
14. As the early 20th-century author and theorist General Sir Charles Gwynn notes, the use of military force must be kept to an absolute minimum because “the military object is to re-establish the control of civil power and secure its acceptance without an aftermath of bitterness.” Sir Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: MacMillan and Company, 1934), 13.
15. New York Times columnist Tom Friedman observed the practice and consequence of making lethal targeting the primary focus at the operational level: “Have you noticed how often Israel kills a Hamas activist and the victim is described by Israelis as a ‘senior Hamas official’ or a ‘key operative’? ... By now Israel should have killed off the entire Hamas leadership twice ... [The result is] something I call Palestinian math: Israel kills one Hamas operative and three others volunteer to take his place, in which case what Israel is doing is actually self-destructive,” New York Times, 15 June 2003.
16. Examples of this could include a supportive tribe’s anger at numerous gov- enment projects and funds for building infrastructure going to a competing tribe that does not support the coalition.
The XVIII Airborne Corps on the Ground in Iraq

Lieutenant General John R. Vines, U.S. Army

From January 2005 to January 2006, XVIII Airborne Corps served as the nucleus of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The Corps deployed with an experienced staff of officers and NCOs who had spent time in Afghanistan or Iraq, and it went through extensive training and preparation; however, it quickly became clear once we got in country that this deployment would present unique challenges.\(^1\)

The intent here is to offer observations, lessons learned, and recommendations based on our rotation. As a professional staff we have an obligation to share our thoughts with leaders and organizations that continue to support our military’s “Long War” strategy for winning the Global War on Terrorism.

After a brief review of the Corps’ year in Iraq, this article will focus specifically on three areas: the operational environment; battle command and the challenges in achieving a common relevant picture in a dynamic electronic warfare domain; and reengineering our existing Live-Virtual-Constructive (L-V-C) processes to better prepare Soldiers and units for deployment.

Looking Back

Iraq held a national election in January 2005 that was preceded by significant coalition combat operations in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Najaf. In the wake of these kinetic operations, observers questioned whether conditions were right for an election, but Iraqi citizens came out in record numbers and, despite threats against their lives, voted for a new and free Iraq.

After the elections, there was a lull before the Iraqi Transitional Government formed and its ministers were appointed. Some had underestimated the challenges of establishing the government and the elements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Maintaining the momentum of those elections would be a key mission.

When the Corps arrived, Saddamists and members of the former government and army were identified as the principle threat. This view changed in the spring, when a wave of suicide attacks pointed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s (AMZ) Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as the primary threat to the successful establishment of a legitimate government. Some Corps elements were specifically focused on AQI. To support this effort, the Multi-National Force Commander directed that Iraqi control of the border be reestablished by November. His three broad themes were: AQI out, Sunni in, and ISF in the lead. Kinetic operations were only a part of this process, as information operations were employed to inform the Iraqi populace.

Intelligence emerged of a network that moved foreign suicide bombers through infiltration routes in the Western Euphrates and Tigris River.

The views expressed herein are those of the author, not the Department of Defense or its elements.

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Valleys to attack Ramadi, Fallujah, Baghdad, and Mosul. Some of those infiltrators attacked Shi’a at mosques, markets, and where large groups collected. Zarqawi released a letter in July declaring that Shiites were legitimate targets and that any Sunnis killed in attacks were acceptable collateral damage. This letter confirmed AMZ’s willingness to kill innocent Iraqi citizens to advance his goal of establishing a caliphate.

Consequently, our operations shifted northwest to Sinjar and Tal Afar. A regiment was sent to Multi-National Division—Northwest, where it was partnered with an Iraqi division.

Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) from all four services and some coalition partners were sent to facilitate the training of Iraqi forces. Linkages to the other elements of the government remained latent or immature.

Much effort was given to develop a means to gauge the readiness of Iraqi forces. A Training Readiness Assessment (similar to our own Unit Status Report) was developed that was an entirely new tool for the Iraqis. Under Saddam, it was extremely dangerous to identify shortcomings, so the report represented a significant cultural shift. Another key event occurred in May, when the Iraqi Ground Force Headquarters was created. That fall, the headquarters executed its first operation, and with good success.

Challenges were encountered in standing up Iraqi units. Most of these were caused by the new army’s lack of logistical capacity, so units had to be fielded and trained. There were no division or corps support organizations, and these too had to be organized, equipped and trained.

Progress was evident in the Western Euphrates River Valley. By Jan 2006, 80 percent of the operations in northwestern Iraq involved the ISF. Thanks to coalition assistance and generally good Iraqi leadership, ISF units demonstrated that they were, for the most part, mission capable.

As the ISF evolved, it added to coalition tasks. Formerly, our commanders commanded their own

Figure 1. Operation SAYAID—the coalition campaign in the Western Euphrates River Valley.
units, but now they were being additionally asked to train and mentor the ISF in a complex environment. The MiTTs stimulated enormous growth in their Iraqi organizations, but the commitment of those transition teams reduced the personnel available within coalition units to accomplish their other assigned tasks.

Further, Saddam Hussein’s trial was ongoing. Moving the principals; protecting the judiciary, witnesses, and accused; and providing medical support for a trial of such magnitude increased the requirements and the complexity of operations. In 2003, there were only about 240 up-armored vehicles in the entire U.S. inventory. By January 2006, there were more than 18,000 in theater. This was an astonishing logistical accomplishment by government and industry, and it provided a significant counter to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat.

In January 2006, XVIII Airborne Corps handed over command responsibilities to V Corps and redeployed. At that time, there were 227,000 trained and equipped ISF soldiers, 112 Iraqi battalions were in the field, the western border had been re-established, AQI was in disarray, and three successful national elections had been executed, with more than 12 million Iraqi citizens voting in December. It had been an historic year in an historic land.

The Operational Environment

In Iraq, the Corps had four major concerns, each of which played a role in the planning and execution of operations.

Training ISF to lead. A priority was to develop the ISF into a force capable of assuming control of independent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and defeating insurgent forces. Significant planning, combat, and logistical resources were committed to ISF development to enhance its fighting and sustainment capabilities.

Iraqi political and security concerns. Development of a government that included Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds was critical to ensuring that each segment of the population viewed itself as being represented. Tied to this concern was the need for credible, effective Sunni leadership. As the group that had lost the most influence after Saddam’s fall, Sunnis needed leaders in the government to give themselves a stake in the development of a new Iraq. Finally, crucial to the survival of the new Iraqi Government and its legitimacy was the development of loyal, competent security forces.

Battlefield framework. Doctrine for COIN and for employing an effects-based approach to COIN operations was (and still is) evolving. Consequently, a methodology was developed to achieve the effects necessary for success.

Along with these doctrinal issues, a constantly evolving battlespace required adjustments in planning and operating procedures. The increased likelihood of logistics units contacting the enemy compelled continual revisions in the way we trained newly arrived units.

One of the more challenging aspects of operating in Iraq was the many different types of Iraqi forces. Battle-tracking the Iraqi Army, Police, Special Police, Border Enforcement Forces, and armed contractors moving around Iraq was difficult, but essential to preventing armed engagements between coalition units.

Enabling operations. Throughout our tour, we addressed challenges with respect to the gathering, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information. In many cases, intelligence operations in Iraq constitute a search for critical enemy leaders and nodes—a search conducted with legacy systems designed to find ships, tanks, and enemy regiments, not individuals. Not only were our systems not optimized for COIN, but the data they provided was often deposited into stove-piped databases; therefore, it could not be easily evaluated in conjunction with inputs from other systems, nor could it be rapidly disseminated to the warfighters in useful forms. Much organizational effort was spent streamlining intelligence data collection and moving intelligence more easily among warfighters.

Our usual method of apportioning Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to units did not allow us to weight our ISR efforts most effectively. When looking for individuals or command and control nodes, persistent ISR coverage—“the unblinking eye”—is critical to capturing the moment in time when a target is vulnerable to detection and surveillance. Equitable distribution of an ISR asset among subordinate commands does not satisfy the requirement for persistent coverage of areas or nodes of interest.
Two other battlefield enabling operations were critical to our campaign in Iraq. The first, information operations, delivered non-lethal effects. However, it became evident that their immediate and net effects were not routinely assessed with the same analytical rigor used to gauge those of maneuver operations and lethal fires. Enormous effort was devoted to evaluating the effects of information operations, and the process remains a work in progress. Integration of our conventional forces with Special Operations Forces also played a large part in the campaign. Cooperation between ground forces and their special operations counterparts is close, and continues to improve.

Operational challenges. Some critical challenges were identified. Success in these areas is fundamental to success in Iraq; therefore, they must be mentioned.

- **Limited interagency presence.** Development of governing capacity requires a significant commitment of resources. To this point, a lack of capacity in non-security areas has delayed the establishment of crucial governmental systems such as justice and banking.

- **Lack of ministerial capacity.** Many Soldiers are uninterested in the functions of bureaucracies, yet these organizations are key to critical government functions. Iraq did not have the structures required to make many vital functions routine. As a result, the inability of agencies such as the ministries of defense and interior to support their forces in the field affects the ISF’s overall effectiveness.

- Deficient or nonexistent ministerial capacity in areas other than security may also degrade ISF operational readiness. The lack of a centralized banking system, for example, detracted from forces available. ISF soldiers get paid in cash, and once a month must journey back to their homes to pay debts and pass the money on to their families. They are normally gone for up to a week, with the resultant loss to the unit of ready combat power.

- **Infiltration of security forces.** An obvious concern of both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments is the infiltration of military and police forces by insurgents and their sympathizers, or persons loyal to organizations other than the Iraqi Government. Mixing personnel from different tribes and areas mitigates this, but the prevention of infiltration of the security forces remains problematic.

- **Corruption and criminality.** Especially in the petroleum and electrical industries, many attacks or actions that appear to be part of an insurgent campaign are actually criminally motivated. In the petroleum industry, there is little potential for the individual to profit. However, attacks on the oil infrastructure allow criminals to profit by protecting or repairing the pipeline, by hauling oil not being moved through the damaged pipeline, or by siphoning oil from the damaged pipeline and selling it on the black market. This potential for gain encourages criminal elements to attack the oil infrastructure. Such criminality, or corruption, can be found in other areas in both the Iraqi public and private sectors.
• **Restarting the petroleum industry.** Because Iraq’s most important economic resource is petroleum, the export of oil and petroleum products is necessary to ensure the country’s economic viability. Aging infrastructure, vulnerability to attack at many locations, and a lack of repair capacity limit the export of oil and the import of currency required to rebuild Iraq.

• **Border security.** A common measure of national sovereignty is a nation’s ability to control its borders. Iraq’s borders, especially the western one in Al-Anbar province, have historically been porous. Smugglers and traders move routinely between Iraq and Syria, and so did insurgents. Coalition forces and the Iraqi Government committed manpower and ISR resources to border security to restrict the movement of anti-Iraqi forces into Iraq. Large commitments of materiel, funding, and training assistance have been made to the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement.

**Battle Command**

The Corps identified significant issues in this key warfighting function.

Battle command is based on three key enablers. The first is knowledge management (KM). Operational KM means synchronizing people, processes, and technology to deliver the right information, to the right people, at the right time in order to achieve battlespace dominance. KM is commander’s business: it must be operationally and not technically focused, and it must cross all functions. The key KM imperatives are—

- Requirements must be driven by operations, not technology.
- There must be interoperability (a common military domain for all joint and coalition applications).
- The system must be collaborative—it must be scalable and non-proprietary. The collaborative tools need to support high bandwidth, as well as disadvantaged users with limited bandwidth. All users must be able to collaborate with each other regardless of bandwidth limitations.
- Knowledge must be continually, iteratively developed as close to real time as possible in response to the warfighter’s needs.
- Knowledge must be able to cross domains, seamlessly bridging secure data networks.
- KM systems must be easy to use.

• The KM architecture must be net-centric compliant, in accordance with the standards of Joint Services Oriented Architecture.

The second pillar is that KM must lead to the creation and distribution of common “relevant” operational information. It must be adaptable to the mission (i.e., it can support full-spectrum operations from COIN to high-intensity conflict environments); it must be timely and flexible to accommodate changing missions (i.e., the data can be “task organized” or data structures changed to support changing missions); and it must be supportive of joint and coalition operations.

The last pillar requires commanders to understand bandwidth limitations and to ensure that they manage spectrum allocation as they do classes of supply. XVIII Airborne Corps considers information and data management common operating picture (COP) tools, spectrum management, enabling technology, and their associated processes to be key components to battle command.

In Iraq, battle command spanned the full spectrum of joint and coalition warfighting concerns, to include policy differences on how we protect our data networks through information assurance, service differences on networking and collaboration, the standards necessary to implement active directories, and our ability to share information in a complex architecture. It was challenging to synchronize the many divergent battle-command efforts in theater to produce timely and relevant information with the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) of record.

**Information Management Challenges**

Joint Publication 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*; Field Manual 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*; and other joint and Army doctrinal publications all identify interoperability among C4 systems as a key to good planning, decisionmaking, and mission execution. Two other major factors necessary for successful net-centric, effects-based warfare are self-synchronization and speed of command.

In the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO), we had more than 300 different databases tracking friendly and enemy event data across all the warfighter
Figure 2. Battle command as it should be: Compatible pieces, a seamlessly functioning system.

Figure 3. Battle command as it is in the ITO: Lots of pieces that don’t fit together.
functions. These systems included the service component Battle Command Systems (BCS) of record, Command Post of the Future, web portals, various significant-activities databases (e.g., Marine Expeditionary Force Command Journal and Digital Battle Captain), spreadsheets, IED databases, and a host of other data depositories. Even within the same warfighting functions—logistics, for example—all users could not see the same data. Theater-wide, there was no common relevant database that all data producers and consumers could subscribe to; one had to know where to go to get information. Consequently, much of the data available could not be shared, resulting in an incomplete picture of the battlespace and little shared situational awareness.

**Battle command systems of record.** Many of the joint and individual service BCSs fail to deliver timely, relevant, and accurate information across all the warfighting functions to the right person, at the right place, at the right time. This impairs our ability to synchronize desired effects on the battlefield. The principal reason is that information is stove-piped within functional areas and warfighting functions, a condition that creates significant barriers to data and information sharing.

Our legacy systems also have limited utility for supporting information requirements in COIN and stability and reconstruction operations because they are not full spectrum. Most of the BCSs in Iraq were accredited for U.S. classified-data networks (i.e., the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET]) and not coalition networks. Thus, there were limited tools to support information processing in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. In many cases, the systems’ complexity created high learning curves resulting in training shortfalls and rapid decay of user skills.

**Multiple common operational picture tools.** Although there were multiple programs of record for battle tracking (MCS, C2PC, ADOCS, FalconView, GCCS, etc.), none were able to create a combined view of enemy and friendly events on a map.³

**FusionNet.** An application called FusionNet was developed to augment the current battle command systems. FusionNet is a tactical knowledge management system designed to fuse cross-domain information and distribute it to the lowest connected echelon of tactical users. Because each divisional headquarters in the ITO had implemented its own version of battle-tracking information systems, we needed a tool to standardize the collection of important tactical data and permit visibility ITO-wide for common situational awareness. The standardization of information was also essential for operational analysis in support of MNC-I’s shaping operations.

Designed for use at all echelons, FusionNet displays significant-activities information in a list or on a map, and it is visible to any FusionNet user in near-real time. FusionNet allows subject-matter experts to add information to an initial spot report, thereby enabling a collaborative process that enhances understanding and awareness of the original event information. The FusionNet database captures all this in a searchable format that allows subsequent queries for analysis and report presentation.

**The BCS bottom line.** Battle command in the ITO is based on a complex of systems and processes that ultimately must address the information needs of warriors, from the soldiers at the tip of the spear to echelons above corps. Future battle command systems must be more conducive to information sharing in a coalition environment, more supportive of KM processes, and easier to use and implement.

**Data management challenges.** There were significant challenges in managing the multiple active directory domains and security domains in theater. The Corps installed, operated, and maintained four separate data networks (Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router [NIPR]; SIPR; CENTRIXS; and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System [JWICS]) for e-mail, collaboration, Voice Over Internet Protocol use, video-teleconferencing, web-portal access, and FusionNet.

On the NIPR network alone there were more than 40 different active-directory domains (e.g., 42d Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, MNC-I). This made it difficult to replicate global address books, push group policies, and centralize configuration management. Users who left their bases could not authenticate into the network because they were outside their network domain, and permissions and trusts between networks were lacking.
Spectrum management challenges. The XVIII Airborne Corps managed more than 82,000 frequencies in support of U.S. military units and government agencies, coalition organizations, and Iraqi military and security forces. We became the de facto Federal Communications Commission for the theater, responsible for deconflicting frequencies between the military and the Iraqi civil sector. It was a huge and unwieldy process. Iraq, and in particular Baghdad, has a dirty radio frequency (RF) spectrum. It affected C4I systems, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Blue Force Tracker (BFT) systems, and some force-protection systems.

There were additional challenges supporting the 26 different UASs flying in support of the ITO, and we quickly ran out of spectrum for vehicle requirements. Only by intensively managing times and spaces could the impact of the spectrum be minimized.

A larger challenge many of our units faced was working through “RF fratricide” caused by co-site interference from all the C4I, BFT, counter-IED, and force protection systems mounted on many of the leaders’ vehicles. This interference created additional fog and friction for leaders already working in an unforgiving RF environment.

Live, Virtual and Constructive (L-V-C) Trainers

Having offered observations and recommendations about the operating environment and battle command in theater, we need to consider one other issue: what must happen before deployment, in particular, how units should prepare for Iraq.

Given the dynamic nature of units moving through the Army Force Generation pools and the need to train on mission-specific requirements, we must continue to stress the importance of tailored L-V-C training. Often, units arrived in theater unaware of the latest insurgent tactics. Although Multi-National Force-Iraq established the Counter-insurgency Academy to address this training deficiency, in-theater training is too late—this training should be done at home station. Additionally, the home-station L-V-C environment must be capable of database and scenario changes to maintain training relevancy. It is imperative that commanders be able to alter scenarios based on current reports and Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) emerging from the field. The change from the react-to-ambush battle drill to escalation-of-force TTPs is an excellent example of adapting training to address emerging in-theater tactics.

Establishing a fully integrated L-V-C training capability is a major undertaking. Processes must support the synchronization of training-enabler
funding with system fielding. Finally, we must develop mechanisms to ensure lessons learned and TTPs are pushed from theater to units and organizations to improve training relevance.

**Conclusion**

The operational environment in Iraq is dynamic and complex. It reaches across all lines of operation, from security and training of the Iraqi Security Forces, to development of critical infrastructure, to supporting and developing a fledgling democratically elected government and setting the conditions for its success. COIN requires a capability to find cells and individuals, not motorized rifle regiments. Army training simulation systems have to adapt quickly to provide relevant training for Soldiers and units. This is especially true for units that are not part of a brigade combat team or do not get the benefit of a mission rehearsal exercise at one of the combat training centers. Every one of the challenges addressed in this article are surmountable and can be fixed over time for future rotations.

The real strength of our nation however is not systems, doctrine or policy. It is young men and women who, if necessary, are willing to go in harm’s way and defend our nation against a dangerous enemy. They were, and remain, on point around the world, and they are a national treasure. *MR*

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**NOTES**

1. To prepare for its MNC-I duties, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters deployed to Korea to support the Ulchi Focus Lens exercise, conducted four command post exercises, went through the Battle Command Training Program, and participated in Joint Forces Command Academics and mission rehearsal exercises.


3. MCS stands for Maneuver Control System, C2PC is Command and Control Personal Computer), ADOCS is Automated Deep Operations Coordination System, and GCCS is Global Command and Control System. FalconView is an airborne digital mapping platform.
Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: The Path Forward in Iraq

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gibson, U.S. Army

The ARMY is going through a period of introspection regarding its counterinsurgency (COIN) practices and their effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 Opinions vary on this topic, but I doubt three years ago anyone could have predicted the current situation in which we find ourselves. Hence, the time is right for a critical conversation.

My task force—2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division—recently returned from its second short-notice deployment to Iraq in less than a year and a half. We served in Baghdad and Mosul from December 2004 to April 2005 and in Tal Afar from September 2005 to January 2006. Fate put us at the center of the insurgency in northern Iraq both times.

Originally deployed to secure the dangerous Airport Road in Baghdad, we were ordered to Mosul with no notice after the 22 December 2004 Mosul dining-facility bombing. We found ourselves in significant battles with the enemy immediately on arriving in Mosul. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), chiefly the police force, had collapsed after synchronized insurgent attacks on police stations on 10 November, and the security situation was so serious that several battalions, including my own, were sent to reinforce Multi-National Force, Northwest (MNF-NW).

Attached to the 25th Infantry Division’s (25th ID’s) Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), we battled our foe throughout the month of January, ultimately prevailing and setting the conditions in our zone for the first-ever free national elections in Iraq, on 30 January 2005. Through aggressive combat operations and with the help of useful information from locals, we defeated insurgent cells and secured the streets, thereby averting a potential strategic defeat. (As late as December 2004, political leaders were seriously contemplating not holding elections in Mosul.)2

Four and a half months after redeploying from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF II), we were sent back to Iraq and attached to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to help liberate and stabilize the insurgent safe haven of Tal Afar, in Ninevah province. Tal Afar has been the focus of considerable media coverage over the past year.3 In early 2005, while coalition forces in the north focused on defeating the insurgency in Mosul, enemy fighters took control of
the dense urban terrain of Tal Afar, a city just 40 miles from the Syrian border and a staging base for terrorist training and safe passage throughout Iraq. By spring 2005, Islamic extremists led primarily by former regime elements had established a tight grip on the city. They took over schools and mosques and intimidated, kidnapped, or murdered those cooperating with the coalition or Iraqi Government. With unfettered freedom of movement, the insurgents created a sanctuary for the ideological indoctrination of uneducated, unemployed teenage youths and a training base from which to launch attacks on coalition and Iraqi forces. All of this inflamed sectarian tensions, stimulating widespread violence and chaos.

Coalition forces sent in the 3d ACR to conduct Operation Restoring Rights (ORR). After shaping operations and a final assault, the city was liberated. Our battalion task force moved into the violent Sarai neighborhood and transitioned to stability operations within 72 hours. What set this operation apart from earlier ones in Tal Afar and other areas across Iraq was the highly developed and well-resourced phase IV (post-assault/stability) dimension of the campaign plan. My paratroopers were committed to living and operating in the same neighborhoods we liberated.

As ORR unfolded, U.S. forces worked closely with the ISF throughout the 3d ACR sector obtaining actionable intelligence from the local population to defeat insurgent cells; enabling secure, widely participated-in elections; and in general helping northwestern Iraq enjoy a more stable life. Although by U.S. standards Mosul and Tal Afar remain dangerous places to live, conditions are emerging which favor lasting peace throughout Ninevah province.

We pursued these aims concurrently, although security was the first among equals.

Security
The central task of COIN forces is to secure the populace from the insurgents. When locals perceive COIN forces as working in their best interests, they tend to provide more useful information regarding terrorist activity. Additionally, once the population accepts COIN forces and decides it will no longer host the insurgency, stability and victory are close at hand. However, there is no doubt that before any meaningful affiliation can occur, friendly forces

Defeating the Insurgency
Our COIN tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) were consistent with the current administration’s direction to “clear, hold, build.” We addressed—
- Establishing security by gaining situational awareness, developing intelligence, and dominating the battlespace.
- Affiliating with the local populace.
- Developing the ISF.
- Strengthening civilian institutions.

No amount of money or kindness, and no number of infrastructure programs, will facilitate winning over the populace if COIN forces cannot provide security to the population.
must demonstrate their competence, particularly the ability to secure the population from the enemy with precision operations and fires (when necessary) while minimizing collateral damage. No amount of money or kindness, and no number of infrastructure programs, will facilitate winning over the populace if COIN forces cannot provide security to the population. Without security, nothing else matters.

**A nuanced, balanced approach.** Kinetic/offensive operations occupy one end of the COIN spectrum; at the other end are economic and social incentives and programs to sway the populace and eliminate the conditions causing the insurgency. Given our mistakes over the first three years in Iraq, the soft operations seem to be gaining in popularity. Some now suggest we can neutralize and defeat insurgencies primarily by addressing sewage, water, electricity, and trash removal (SWET) deficiencies and by providing medical and other types of humanitarian support. Such initiatives are essential to the political, economic, and social reconstruction of Iraq and help COIN forces affiliate with the local populace, but we should not delude ourselves: these soft operations alone will not stabilize Iraq. What we need is a balanced and nuanced approach built upon situationally aware COIN forces exercising sound judgment as they pursue operations across the full spectrum.

**Convince the people.** COIN forces must be able to convince the people that they can provide security. Without that, locals will not associate themselves with—or even be seen in the presence of—security forces, since doing so invites terrorist violence on themselves and their families. Once security is established, however, locals can see that COIN forces offer a better vision for the future than the insurgent forces do. In Ninevah Province, initially in concert with ISF units, and thereafter with the ISF in the lead and us in support, coalition forces provided security and assistance to facilitate the emergence of increasingly competent civilian authorities.

**Work deliberately.** To achieve dominance, we used a deliberate approach.\(^5\) We began by attempting to understand the zone’s pre-2003 history. We studied tactical problem sets, sought to understand our enemy and the population harboring him, and looked for patterns in the places, tactics, and techniques of attacks. What was the nature of the insurgent forces in our zone? Was the enemy monolithic, or was he made up of varying elements (religious extremists, foreign fighters, criminals working for money)? What was his source of strength? What were his vulnerabilities? Where did he strike? Who was he targeting and why? Where were his infiltration routes? Where did he meet, train, and live? How was he financed?

To answer these questions, we needed intelligence sources. We directed our intelligence toward those priority intelligence requirements and found that the enemy repeated his attack patterns until he was made to pay in blood for his deeds. We also noticed a correlation between where we traveled and where we were attacked. As we studied our enemy and attempted to determine his likely places of attack, we recognized that our own actions largely played into the attack locations our enemy chose. With that understanding came opportunity.

**Know the people.** To dominate the zone, we had to gain access to the populace. In both Mosul and Tal Afar, to enhance the perception of security we lived in combat outposts in neighborhoods, not in a forward operating base. The first two weeks in zone, we saturated our battlespace, putting 100 percent of our combat forces out in the area of operations (AO) to conduct constant patrols. We employed a combination of dismounted, mounted, and mixed (mounted and dismounted) reconnaissance patrols and tasked them with specific information requirements: Who are the local leaders? What is their perception of security? Their vision for the future? What is the status of basic services? Who are the people fomenting violence or otherwise intimidating the locals?\(^6\) To show good faith, we issued claims cards for U.S. damages inflicted during the ORR main attack. These gave us opportunities to interact with locals and gain situational awareness while also making some amends for collateral damage. This effort showed our respect for the people of Tal Afar, and it was generally well received.
To facilitate claims, we set up a civil-military operations center (CMOC) in our zone. After our dismounted patrols inspected damaged dwellings and issued claims cards, locals brought the cards to the CMOC for processing. Part of the processing included taking a photo and acquiring basic contact information from the claimant. We used this data to establish the basis of our population census. Ostensibly, our intent was to reduce fraudulent claims, but we also gained a database to query as we interacted with locals.

COIN forces must determine who is supporting the enemy and who is actively fighting them. The census helped us gain situational awareness because it documented identities, afforded a means of cross-checking stories and histories, and provided pictures of suspected insurgents that we could use to test the veracity and accuracy of our intelligence sources. After we had established the credibility of an intelligence source, we could then ask him to identify insurgents from among the census photos and to provide detailed witness statements of violent acts by those insurgents. Altogether, the census enhanced our targeting and thus our ability to defeat insurgent cells.

We recommend combining the baseline biometrics of the census database with more advanced biometrics programs (such as iris scans and fingerprinting), higher level intelligence, and other command and situational awareness databases so that Soldiers can query a single database during combat patrols and obtain an electronic report on locals that includes all of their previous interactions with COIN forces. Of course, this is invasive, and it intrudes on civil liberties, but given the good this tool can do for securing the local population, those with nothing to hide should welcome it. Indeed, classical political philosophy is replete with writers who would be sympathetic. Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and others have advanced the idea that the first responsibility of government is security.

**Gauging success.** One of the lively contemporary topics in the COIN literature involves metrics; in other words, how do we know if we are succeeding? Here, rather than focus on process variables, we looked at end-state conditions: How safe and secure is the zone as measured by the number of enemy attacks over time? Are the trends decreasing or increasing? Are the Iraqi Security Forces progressing? How specifically have they progressed (or regressed) since our arrival in zone? What is the status of civilian institutions in our zone? Have they improved or gotten worse? And finally, what is the status of civic participation in our zone? Are locals taking more or less responsibility for their neighborhoods?

Related to the first variable, security, beyond the number of successful enemy attacks we calculated...
the percentage of attacks we responded to with effective precision targeting. Once COIN forces establish dominance over a zone and affiliate with the local populace, they will often garner the situational awareness needed to prevent many attacks or to respond precisely when they occur. No zone in Iraq will probably ever be violence-free, but if we have the local populace with us, COIN forces will often be able to glean information in the immediate aftermath of successful enemy attacks to help track down the perpetrators. If a coalition force is experiencing a large number of enemy attacks and cannot figure out who is executing them, it’s a telltale sign that the struggle to win over the support of the local populace has yet to be won.¹⁰

**Intelligence operations.** Experience has shown that effective targeting should be, in the main, driven by intelligence garnered by troopers interacting respectfully and empathetically with the populace. That is not to say that other means should be excluded. Indeed, this approach should be augmented by all other intelligence means available, including technological ones.¹¹ But COIN forces that rely primarily on technical means are doomed to fail because of operational fragility. If innocent civilians are mistakenly identified and targeted, security declines precipitously. Mistakes invariably happen in war, but they occur more frequently when units rely primarily on technical intelligence and do not cross-check information with a population that generally knows best regarding insurgent activities.

**IED threat.** The enemy’s main weapon is the improvised explosive device (IED). We dedicated a maneuver force solely to address this threat. Team Delta (our heavy weapons company), significantly reinforced, was able to degrade the enemy’s ability to attack us successfully with roadside bombs. Summarized generally, our approach included multiple intelligence-gathering means, defensive electronic countermeasures, persistent surveillance over notorious trouble spots, a constant presence (both mounted and dismounted) throughout our zone, mobilization of the populace into neighborhood IED watches, holding local leaders responsible for their streets, and offensive operations to deny the enemy the sanctuary to plan, coordinate, and emplace IEDs. The approach worked. During both deployments, higher headquarters solicited our TTP for their lessons learned network, and during OIF III, Multi-National Coalition, Iraq (MNC-I) headquarters solicited our TTP for its “best practices” section of its website. By dedicating a counter-IED force instead of requiring all company teams to put assets against this mission, we were able to neutralize the enemy’s greatest strength economically while the preponderance of the task force focused on offensive operations (intelligence-gathering operations and precision raids) and helping the Iraqis. Despite being committed to two of the most dangerous cities in Iraq, we did not have a single KIA from an IED in the eight months we were deployed to OIF II and OIF III.¹²

**Drive-by shootings.** In Mosul, we were plagued early on by drive-by shootings. Several of our casualties, including both of our KIAs, came from such enemy attacks. However, we neutralized this threat and destroyed the insurgent cell that was perpetrating them through a series of actions we called “chokehold operations” and “baited ambushes.”
Once the enemy established a pattern by conducting several drive-by shootings in the same place, we would set up a two-step ambush. First we would execute the “chokehold,” cordoning off all traffic on the busy road where most of the drive-bys had occurred. After we had stopped all vehicles in the chokehold, we systematically went from vehicle to vehicle checking for contraband and listening for tips on terrorist activities. We captured a few terrorists in the chokehold, confiscated their contraband, and developed several intelligence sources. The real tactical value, however, came with the accompanying “baited ambush.”

Once the enemy figured out that we were using the chokehold, he countered with drive-by shootings at our chokehold security positions, but this was a fatal mistake. Anticipating his move, we had established ambush positions along his infiltration/exfiltration routes and we killed him as he sought to get away. This technique ultimately was decisive. In a series of successful baited ambushes in February 2005, we killed over half a dozen enemy fighters who had initiated drive-by shootings in our zone. After that, there were no more drive-by attacks.

**Mortar threat.** In both Mosul and Tal Afar, the enemy liked to use mortars to inflict casualties. To counter that threat, we saturated the zone with patrols to deter enemy mortar use and followed up aggressively on tips from locals indicating locations of caches. The latter led to successful raids in which we destroyed enemy mortar systems. Before periods when the risk of enemy mortar attacks was high (on an election day or while we executed an air medical evacuation), we conducted an analysis of craters left by previous mortar attacks. Based on this information, we could estimate the likely enemy mortar positions and occupy those positions first. It became a battle drill for us. The theory was that the enemy would have to literally knock us out of the way to fire his mortars, and that wasn’t going to happen. This technique worked. After we adopted this TTP, we did not sustain a single casualty due to mortar fire, nor did we have any civilian casualties from mortars.

**Shape the environment.** As operations proceed, units must integrate all assets at their disposal, including information operations (IO) personnel, civil-affairs teams, psychological operations (PSYOP) support, and public affairs officers and elements. Because the population is the center of gravity, these means of influence can help you beat the enemy by exposing his fraudulent, morally bankrupt vision for the future, so that the people choose to support the nascent government and COIN forces. Aggressive use of IO clarified our intent and overcame the enemy’s propaganda efforts. Even using tactical PSYOP teams to broadcast helped calm locals by keeping them informed that the loud noises they were hearing were simply routine training exercises with ISF. This prevented the enemy from claiming successful attacks on COIN forces or, even worse, asserting that we (or the ISF) were attacking the populace. COIN forces must constantly stay on the offensive, kinetically and non-kinetically, to retain the initiative and the support of the locals.

**Know the terrain.** Situational awareness and precise operations are key. Units should consider adopting a standardized set of graphic control measures, including naming conventions for specific buildings in the battlespace. This approach proved invaluable to the 3d ACR during ORR in Tal Afar. Every building in a city of 250,000 was labeled, which enabled rapid targeting, successful integration of attack aviation, and quick resolution to population-control aviation, and quick resolution to population-control challenges.

We also developed a “White Falcon Fighting-Position Book” that included digital photos of all outpost and patrol base fighting positions, with standard range card information, landmarks, and locations of significant activities appended. Thus, anyone could immediately achieve situational awareness upon assuming duty. We turned these over to U.S. and Iraqi forces upon our departure, along with a standing operating procedure on how to create fighting positions in new locations.

**Evacuation.** Another successful TTP we employed in Tal Afar was to evacuate citizens prior to combat. In large cities, this technique might not be possible, but where practicable, evacuation facilitates stabilization. Before the main assault, the 3d ACR commander directed the evacuation of civilians from the main battle area, an initiative that minimized civilian casualties and enabled coalition forces to take the initiative unfettered. As a result, we destroyed many IED and weapons caches, identified insurgent defenses and “safe houses” used before the assault, and were able to control repopulation. With the help
of tips from locals, we caught terrorists trying to infiltrate back into the populace. Even though the evacuation was disruptive, in the end, the populace appreciated the effort.13

Affiliate with the populace. Affiliation begins with security and includes SWET and similar initiatives. Helping Iraqis, the people we were sent to protect, was not only the morally right thing to do, but it also stimulates intelligence-gathering operations, significantly enhancing situational awareness. The perception of security is inextricably tied to actual security.14 If the locals feel safe, they are more apt to provide targetable information on terrorists. We actively pursued interaction with the people to make them feel safe and help us achieve security dominance. After the decisive phase of ORR, we filled out claims cards for locals whose houses and property had sustained damage, and we processed several hundred thousand dollars worth of claims. In many cases, we received information that was targetable, and our intelligence increased daily as a direct result. Moreover, we dedicated U.S. dollars to water system and electricity projects, rubble removal, storefront refurbishments, school renovations and the like. These were all efforts that relied on local hires, which helped the unemployment situation. Although we didn’t please everyone, our projects were generally well received.

Develop the ISF. U.S. forces must make development of local security forces a high priority concurrent with ongoing operations. This means embedding support cells with Iraqi battalion task forces, integrating with the Military Transition Teams (MiTTS), and forging partnerships at the company level.

Professionalization begins with values indoctrination. To earn the respect and trust of the populace, local security forces must practice sectarian impartiality and political neutrality; thus, codes of conduct must be promulgated, disseminated, and enforced as the foundation for impartiality and the discipline that underpins it. We were all familiar with the Ranger Creed and how it helps inculcate values in ranger students, so we used a similar code to help indoctrinate the Tal Afar Iraqi police. Our values-first approach paid off: we had few instances of inappropriate behavior from our ISF partners.15

After imparting a baseline of professionalism, the partner unit must pursue basic soldier competencies. Local security forces have to be able to account for and care for their people and equipment; and they must secure, logistically support, and sustain themselves at all times. Training should include marksmanship; small-unit drills and other collective tasks; and COIN competencies, especially those that focus on developing intelligence and affiliating with...
the local populace. To accomplish many of these tasks, we set up a training range on the outskirts of Tal Afar.

The partner unit must help the local ISF get organized by showing them how to set up a tactical operations center and a planning section for future operations, and how to track logistics status and significant activities in zone. In all instances, partner units need to show their Iraqi counterparts “what right looks like.” By colocating a battalion support cell with the ISF, we established what amounted to a joint coordination center to enhance our COIN, humanitarian, and government support operations. Joint patrols and other operations must be the norm until ISF self-sufficiency enables coalition forces to depart. This necessitates joint planning, rehearsals, the teaching of good practices, enforcement of standards, and discipline.

Civilian institutions. Strengthening civilian institutions is vitally important. We worked with emerging Iraqi leaders, including the mayor and his elected city council, to help them develop a functioning and responsive government. The nascent governing entity must provide basic services to bolster its legitimacy with the people. To be embraced, the government must be caring, competent, and willing to solve basic problems. Toward that end, we took an interest in the civil service. The water and electricity departments were key—they must be effective and impartial in the distribution of service. This was a huge challenge in Tal Afar, as the existing waterworks suffered from war damage and over 20 years of Baathist neglect. We did not, however, take over the waterworks and do the job for the Iraqis. It’s fine for coalition forces to help, but true success—establishing the Iraqi Government’s legitimacy—means that the government has to take the lead in solving such problems.

Related to this, ordinary Iraqis need to be mobilized and organized to participate in all aspects of collective civic responsibilities, including security efforts. Stabilization efforts in Ninevah were relatively easier than in places like Baghdad, which has 3 times more inhabitants than Mosul and 12 times more than Tal Afar. A city the size of Baghdad poses a much more difficult challenge and can only be stabilized, in my estimation, by combining the methods described herein with aggressive efforts to mobilize and organize the populace to resist and report insurgent intimidation and activity. The closest analogy I can think of is the “neighborhood watch” often used in the United States. Organizational efforts like these might be built along family or tribal lines (although we should be careful not to rely solely on such potentially self-interested groups). Whatever the mechanism, Iraq needs community/neighborhood leaders ready to reject violent means and embrace peaceful and conciliatory methods.

Successful democracies are built on the rule of law. For Iraq, much work is needed on an almost nonexistent judicial system. Impartial judges must be appointed and then held accountable for their work. This will undoubtedly pose a security issue as terrorists target such judges. Still, we must remain committed to helping. Ultimately, too, the United States should get out of the detainee-holding process. Iraqis should hold convicted terrorists while U.S. forces assist by drafting codes of conduct and helping police enforce compliance with them.

Finally, coalition forces should facilitate the growth of capitalism. We have to cultivate entrepreneurs. Many already exist in Iraq, but they are reluctant to come forward out of fear for themselves or their families. Here again, the perception of security is key: as it grows, so will the economy. One engine of growth will be reconstruction, which can mean big money for localities. In sum, comprehensive progress along social, political, and economic lines is possible by tying together progress in the security environment, impartiality in the distribution of government services, and direct U.S. aid.

Final reflections on security. History put us in Mosul and Tal Afar when decisive battles were raging, and in both, coalition and ISF elements succeeded: three peaceful elections took place in 2005, the last two of which were widely participated in by all ethnic groups in Ninevah. More hard days lie ahead, but as a direct result of successful COIN and reconstruction efforts by U.S. units and their ISF brothers-in-arms, Ninevah has a good chance for lasting peace. Our battalion task force is proud to have been a part of bringing that about. Like all units, we made mistakes, but, on balance, we believe we were effective in defeating the enemy and in linking our battlefield successes with political, economic, and social lines of operation.

Our experiences varied widely in these two cities.
only 40 miles apart. In Mosul we experienced almost daily direct-fire contact, but in Tal Afar we had considerably fewer gun battles. Among the challenges I had to deal with in Tal Afar was “catastrophic success.” At least until recently, my paratroopers had been primarily trained to fight. They got to do that often in Mosul, and, by most accounts, they found it professionally rewarding.19 The circumstances in Tal Afar were different. There, our dominance over the zone and constant stream of actionable intelligence on insurgent activities coming from the populace resulted in more preemptive raids than reactive gunfights. Despite this overwhelming success, my Soldiers at times peppered me with comments about their desire to be back in Mosul in direct-fire contact with our enemy. My response was, “You’re not supposed to be in direct-fire contact with the enemy.” Tips from local nationals will often enable COIN forces to capture terrorists before they are able to attack, precluding direct-fire engagements. Ironically, from these varying experiences in Iraq, I found that engaging the enemy in direct-fire engagements was hard, but from a leadership standpoint, the absence of that was harder.

Overall, the key lesson we learned about security in a counterinsurgency is that by dominating your zone, you are truly able to secure the population—and that’s the Holy Grail of COIN pursuits.

When you dominate, the enemy is less able to harm or intimidate locals, there are fewer gunfights in which civilians can be caught in the crossfire, and there are fewer accidents because you will know and control your zone better. Consequently, civilian casualties from enemy attacks, collateral damage, and counterinsurgent accidents will decline.20 In the four months we were in Tal Afar, we caused no civilian deaths, a fact the locals knew and tremendously appreciated. They thanked me often during my patrols through the town. Their confidence in us and the security environment led to more helpful tips on terrorist activities, which enabled precision raids before terrorists could finalize their battle plans. Like many facets of COIN operations, success bred more success.

Training and Organizing for Success

Units must make COIN a priority during home-station training; it cannot be a secondary effort. Mission-essential task lists (METLs) must reflect the challenges and missions expected overseas, and resources must be allocated accordingly. Of course, this implies managing training risks, because conventional METLs must not atrophy. In the 82d Airborne, we must be able to conduct an airborne assault followed by mid-intensity conventional offensive operations, and then quickly and seamlessly transition to COIN and peacekeeping tasks.

We had four months between OIF II and OIF III deployments. In that time we worked and trained on—

- The paratrooper essential-task list, which included marksmanship, physical fitness, medical skills, small-unit drills, airborne proficiency, and leader development.
- Theater-specific tasks and issues, including understanding the populace; terrain and language familiarization; cultural awareness; according basic dignity and respect; enemy problem sets with enemy cell development; detainee packet development and tactical questioning to foster an effective intelligence-gathering approach; and driver’s training.
- COIN situational training exercises and field training exercises (STXs and FTXs). These scenario-driven exercises reinforced effective practices and made troopers more comfortable with risk assessment and mitigation and rules of engagement.
They also put our leaders and paratroopers in situations where they had to think fast and make difficult decisions quickly. Immediately after a critical event in an exercise, we hot-washed the results of the leader’s or trooper’s estimate of the situation and his decisionmaking process and discussed what he should have done. Although we certainly reinforced standards, the most important dimension of this training was teaching and developing our thinking and decisionmaking processes so that paratroopers could become confident in their personal COIN approach. To make training more realistic, we rented civilian vehicles, populated the training site with livestock, committed a company to simulate an insurgent cell and civilians on the battlefield, incorporated attack aviation and combat engineers, worked counter-IED operations, and required units to work with “indigenous” security forces.

Given competing demands on time, in the future we need to ensure that all collective training events incorporate as many force multipliers as possible—engineers, artillerymen, PSYOP and civil affairs teams, Air Force personnel, tactical human intelligence personnel, medical augmentation support, and military police—so that we train as we will fight in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Battalions would also benefit by being able to tap into a pool of Iraqi/Afghani role players for training. Even a handful of individuals would significantly enhance STXs/FTXs. The same goes for equipment: battalions need help getting access to theater-specific equipment such as Warlock electronic countermeasures equipment, SIGINT assets, vapor trace/X-Spray, and up-armored HMMWVs.

We need to continue to pay attention to the fine points, too. For example, company supply sergeants should participate in logistics training exercises to become more familiar with SOPs and battle drills for logistics package operations. Crater-analysis training should be incorporated into FTXs. Home-station medical training must also be as realistic as possible.

When developing COIN training scenarios, we must ensure our enemy situation approximates the anticipated GWOT threat. We plan to have the exercise design cell create an insurgent cell, provide role players to fill the various parts, and make company and task-force intelligence sections do link analysis and intelligence training concurrently with COIN STXs. Every trooper must be capable of quick thinking and sound judgment.

While our training prepared us for most of the challenging circumstances during OIF, we can do better, and we are fervently committed to doing so. We need to sustain our strengths, improve our weaknesses, and build other capabilities for different deployments and missions (for example, Afghanistan).

Organizing for COIN. To win the GWOT, we need organizational reform to help our forces. In addition to altering METLs, we should upgrade
and enhance home-station training areas to better reflect Central Command’s area of responsibility (AOR). We need to resource the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network down to battalion level for classified email and Internet traffic and should provide deploying task forces with Small Extension Node communications capabilities when possible. We also should forge closer habitual relationships with CA and PSYOP units on post.

We should sustain tactical intelligence team augmentation for deploying battalion task forces and have an intelligence analyst at the company level and an interrogator with the battalion S2 section. Now that the cold war is over, it’s time to revisit the distribution of our intelligence assets. We no longer need huge ACEs at corps and division. This made sense when we were preparing to fight the Soviets on the open battlefield, but, in a COIN fight, units are responsible for given areas and, over time, intelligence tends to come from the bottom-up, not vice versa, as it did during the cold war. Companies and battalions plainly need more intelligence analysts. We should redistribute our intelligence assets.

We should also exploit technology fully to augment and support our intelligence operations, including standardizing software for personal cameras to enhance relaying data between units and acquiring surveillance cameras to mount in sector to facilitate monitoring areas of interest and enemy attack sites. We should widely publicize them through aggressive IO. We should also purchase decoy surveillance cameras and place them throughout the AO to complement persistent surveillance.

Battalions also need a small CA staff section (S5). Currently, we are building one “out-of-hide” when we deploy, but we should form one during training so it will be more effective in combat. While in Tal Afar, our task force—through our Air Force Joint Tactical Augmentation Cell (JTAC) element—had the ability to downlink from a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle right into our TOC, a capability that provided real-time situational awareness of actions on the objective. These practices were quite helpful and should be proliferated throughout the force. We have not established habitual relationships with deploying JTACs, and need to do so (although modularity should resolve this shortcoming).

Technology that enhances situational awareness must be pursued. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below system has been helpful in improving our command and control capabilities. The proliferation of UAVs has also been helpful, and we are excited about the prospect of future-generation UAVs with expanded capabilities. The ability to see through walls is something worth pursuing. It will enhance our precision in operations and ultimately provide better protection for our troops.

Finally, because there are many recurring COIN tasks for which we do not have doctrine, units need to supply an alternative guide. Our battalion developed and published a tactical SOP (TACSOP) that codified our COIN TTP. Derived from our experiences, this TACSOP will fill the void until doctrine catches up. We remain a learning organization, and so our TACSOP is a working document that we will continually update in the light of new experience and knowledge.

Strategic Success

It’s been widely claimed that in Vietnam, the U.S. military did not lose a single battle. Yet, in the end, our strategic objectives were not realized. As painful as it is to admit it, we lost. Let that not be our fate in Iraq. Commanders must constantly be searching for ways to translate battlefield successes into strategic contributions by effective linkage across all military, political/institutional, economic, and social lines of operations.

There is a clear opportunity now in northern Iraq to achieve greater levels of stability and to integrate Sunnis into the fabric of this nascent nation—both important steps toward achieving our strategic objectives. Given the high voter turnout in Ninevah province, it appears Sunnis will be appropriately represented in the new government. That development and an improved ISF offer opportunities for meaningful negotiations with almost all factions of the insurgency about quitting the fight. This should set the conditions for a lasting peace—one that isolates Al-Qaeda and extremist factions.

To make that happen, the ISF should take primary control of security operations in the province, enabling all but MiTT advisors and quick reaction forces in Mosul and Tal Afar to withdraw. By turning over security responsibilities and largely removing the U.S. presence, we would mollify a sizeable number of insurgents who continue to fight “the occupation.” In essence, we could placate
a significant number of homegrown insurgents with political inclusion and security responsibility transfer, which should lead to a more stable security environment. Simultaneously attaining coalition and Iraqi Government strategic objectives will further isolate Al-Qaeda. With those developments we should expect actionable information on Al-Qaeda to dramatically increase because we have co-opted former insurgent groups who have separated themselves from foreign, extremist elements. Once the local populace sees an opportunity for lasting peace and fair representation in government, it will turn on those fomenting violence.

With enhanced precision targeting, COIN operations will only get better over time, which, in turn, will further improve the security situation. This cycle has the potential to be positively reinforcing. Before long, Ninevah province should realize the kind of stability that enables real economic and political reconstruction. This will positively influence social reconstruction, since all sects have symbiotic relationships with each other and need one another to continue economic growth.

With Ninevah stable, the Iraqi Government will be in a better position to convince Sunni-majority provinces to embrace peaceful solutions to grievances and political disagreements. In essence, Ninevah could become the strategic model for long-term peace in all of Iraq. None of this, however, will be easy. 24

We in the coalition are engaged in a just struggle to protect and defend our cherished way of life and to help freedom-loving people worldwide enjoy security and prosperity. However, the nobleness of our effort and our battlefield prowess do not guarantee success and ultimate victory. We need an integrated strategy that effectively ties together military, political/institutional, economic, and social lines of operation and that has identifiable, pragmatic steps and milestones. And we need one soon. Considering what is at stake, we must not fail. MR

NOTES
5. By “dominance” I mean preventing lawlessness. In the United States that is generally achieved through the rule of law backed up by a police force and legal system to adjudicate suspected violations. In countries with an insurgency, auxiliary means, such as military and paramilitary forces (police forces with army-like capabilities), are required to compel compliant forces. As lawlessness is attenuated, countries can move to the left on the spectrum of use of force until such time as rule of law is established and generally followed. COIN forces that dominate their battlespace in a place like Iraq do what the rule of law would achieve in a stabilized country.
6. We found that by employing a combination of all three basic methods of patrolling we were able to saturate the zone and deny the enemy freedom of movement; stay in close contact with the locals; and provide for mobile and lethal reaction forces capable of reinforcing our dismounted patrols in minutes, when necessary. This provided both a real capability and a deterrent to enemy attacks. In essence, we were able to enjoy the strengths of dismounted and mounted patrols while minimizing the potential hazards or drawbacks of any single employment method.
7. The task force should develop a claims-card-marking SOP so that they can decrease corruption during civil affairs operations.
8. The inspiration for establishing the census came from our experience in north-west Mosul, where we knew one of the major leaders of the insurgency lived. Our extensive efforts to capture that high-value individual (HVI) were ultimately unsuccessful and, as we flew back across the Atlantic en route to Fort Bragg, I thought that if I had it all to do over again, we would take a picture of every adult in the neighborhood and then go door-to-door inquiring about the identity of the HVI until we found someone who would anonymously identify him. As we began operations in Tal Afar, we put that to dramatic effect. While the CMOC provided a basis for a user-friendly database, preferably linked to a biometrics program.
9. In some cases, perception was reality until our IO campaign was able to convey truth. The state of security is often fragile at best, and IO battle drills must be developed in advance to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack or incident. Insurgent attacks cannot always be thwarted, and how COIN forces deal with them will sway the population one way or another toward the perception of security.
10. We worked with outstanding ISF in both Mosul and Tal Afar, most recently with the 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3d Iraqi Infantry Division.
11. Given the considerable ability of ISF to gain intelligence, it is critical that during their training and development, COIN forces focus on helping local security forces perfect intelligence analysis and dissemination capabilities both within their higher level staffs and in infantry companies.
12. Disappointingly, my experience with the Sunni sheiks in Tal Afar was not that positive. Although they knew who was fomenting violence in their neighborhoods, they were reluctant to provide actionable intelligence to secure their people. In some cases Sunni sheiks covertly supported the insurgents. In the end, most of these tribal leaders were part of the problem and not part of the solution. We asked them repeatedly to help us recruit Sunni Turkomen to join the new police force to help with the legitimation/acceptance within the Sarai neighborhood which was overwhelming Sunni Turkomen. Although we eventually succeeded in getting some of these men to join, it was not due to the sheiks. As a consequence, our task force chose to minimize our official contact with the sheiks, instead recruiting them on a case-by-case basis, but making a conscious effort not to enhance their place in the community. Increasingly, we noticed that the local populace viewed their sheiks as titular figures and, as a result, began to look towards new, informal leaders across the community. These new leaders rose to prominence through their actions to help the good people of Tal Afar. Indeed, brave Iraqis who helped stabilize the streets from violence and stimulate economic growth and social healing were gaining stature as we redeployed. We
attempted to help those individuals solidify their power base and encouraged them to run for local office in city and provincial elections. A great example of emerging Iraqi leaders is the current mayor of Tal Afar, Najim al-Jibouri.

18. In Iraq, local governments suffer from a lack of funding from the central government in Baghdad, something which, if addressed, would significantly improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of regional and sub-regional governments and help the overall efforts to democratize the country.

19. The most significant engagement occurred on 4 January 2005 in northwest Mosul. Running gunfight developed that lasted about three hours and involved every company team in the task force along with both OH-58 and AH-64 helicopters in the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and kinetic modes. Based on feedback we received from the Stryker Brigade Combat Team through sensitive reporting, this engagement resulted in an estimated 10 enemy killed, one enemy wounded, one enemy captured and four U.S. WIA. Although we had a few more battalion-task-force-level engagements after that day, we were never again challenged to that level of intensity. Throughout our time in Mosul, we ultimately defeated two major enemy cells, one in northwest Mosul that we called the Santa Fe Gang and one on the east bank of the Tigris after our repositioning following the 30 January election. We significantly degraded the capabilities of another cell in central Mosul, too. We definitely achieved success during OIF II, but it came at a high cost because we suffered 2 KIAs and 31 WIA. In total, 19 of our Soldiers were decorated for valor that tour.

20. Another key to our success in minimizing noncombatant casualties and protecting the population was the “shoot, no shoot” training we underwent at Fort Bragg before deployment.

21. ACE stands for “All-source Collection Element.”

22. By Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, our battalion task force is now authorized a three-person Air Force element to facilitate joint fires planning, coordination, and execution.

23. Within the category “political/institutional,” I include the information-management dimension—the requirement to clearly articulate goals, objectives, and milestone progress, and to provide context and meaning to the daily events (good and bad) in this long struggle. Some treat this as a separate line of operation, but to do so is to detract from the integrative nature of information management within the political or institutional and substantive realm and, quite frankly, leads to the questioning of sincerity, which is not accurate and not helpful to the cause.

24. Including the Sunnis is only one of the major obstacles we currently face in Iraq. This paper was initially drafted in the spring of 2006, and between then and now, sectarian violence in Baghdad has spiked, arguably posing a challenge equal to the largely Sunni-based insurgency. Still, by emphasizing broader Sunni inclusion via effective military and non-military means (e.g., diplomatic and economic), we will help isolate Al-Qaeda and bring more stability to the region, thereby enabling us to devote more resources to reducing sectarian violence in Baghdad.
China’s Presence in Latin America: A View on Security from the Southern Cone

Admiral Alejandro Kenny, Argentine Navy, Retired

There is no contemporary analysis that can possibly disregard China, a commercial, financial, and political presence of mythical proportion that has been created around a growth that, from a distance, looks like some strange miracle.¹

From the Southern Cone and at a distance of 10,000 miles, almost 40 hours of flights and stopovers or a number of weeks at sea to deliver cargoes, we try to imagine China and its people. In an enormous country, the Chinese number some 1.3 billion people who walk the opposite side of the globe. A great majority of them speak Mandarin, which is the most widely spoken language on Earth. They are there down under—on the other side of the planet—with their feet pointed directly at us. In 2006, China will probably leap from the seventh to the fourth most economically powerful nation on Earth, eclipsing the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.²

After more than a quarter century of gradual market reforms in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and their impact in achieving an average economic growth of 9 percent per annum, the impetuous advance of the Asian power in economic and political terms, even the power of its ideas, has become evident. During the Industrial Revolution, Great Britain required 70 years to double the real per capita income of its population. When the United States emerged as the world’s principal industrial power between 1890 and 1920, it took 35 years to double real per capita income. China has done it in nine years.³

In 2005, China’s foreign trade exceeded $1.4 trillion, an increase of 24 percent over the previous year; its trade surplus tripled to $101.9 billion; and the Central Bank of Beijing accumulated a reserve of $711 billion. China appears to have changed the nature of the world commodities market. It has replaced the United States as the principal consumer of coal, steel, copper, aluminum, magnesium, and zinc. The United States outpaces China only in oil consumption, but even there the Chinese are gaining. China’s oil consumption has doubled since 1994, and current demand shows a 9 percent increase annually, while the rate of increase for the United States is 4 percent per annum.

To appreciate China’s impact on the world commodities market, consider what her insatiable consumption of commodities implies. Between 1990 and 2003, global oil consumption increased 13 percent; during the same period, Chinese consumption jumped 81 percent. Global demand for cement grew 52 percent; China’s more than doubled. Demand for stainless steel increased 48 percent; China witnessed an eight-fold increase. Copper consumption rose 39 percent; in China, it soared 423 percent. Overall, China’s increased demands have driven a sustained increase in the price of metals. Copper,
for example, reached its highest price in 15 years in 2005.

There is no doubt that China’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization will have an impact on international trade. On the positive side for Latin America, China’s doors are now open to a wide variety of Latin American goods. Moreover, because China can no longer openly subsidize certain products such as steel, it is having less of an effect on the international market. On the other hand, low salaries and labor costs in China are forcing Latin American countries to compete with Chinese workers in labor-intensive industries. Nevertheless, economic relations between China and Latin America are, and should remain, beneficial for all concerned, especially for those South American countries whose economies complement China’s.

Economic Exchange

Latin American and Caribbean countries have an abundance of many of the key resources China needs, and they have centuries of experience in providing and exporting raw materials to industrialized or industrializing nations. If the PRC uses its “soft” economic power, it need not resort to heavy-handed persuasion in either region. Economic necessities have convinced many Latin American and Caribbean countries that trade with China provides a good counterbalance to trade asymmetry with the United States.

“Northern” Latin America

Cuba. China and Cuba share a common ideology, communism, which facilitates China’s involvement in Cuba. After the 2004 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting and state visits to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Cuba, where he signed 16 bilateral trade agreements and committed China to invest more than $500 million in the country. Overall in 2004, Chinese-Cuban bilateral trade expanded 36 percent, to a total of $401 million. The two countries also conducted the first annual forum on “Chinese-Cuban Investment,” with the support of 400 businesspersons in both countries.

Mexico. Chinese trade with Mexico has expanded at the same rate as Chinese trade with the rest of Latin America. Between 1998 and 2003, Mexico’s exports to China grew 337 percent, while its imports from China increased 476 percent. In 2004, trade between China and Mexico was more than $7 billion, a 44 percent increase over the previous year.

In contrast to other Latin American countries, Mexico has a large and growing trade deficit. Mexican imports from China in 2003 were approximately $9.3 billion, compared to exports of only $463 million to China. While the economies of many other Latin American nations complement China’s, Mexico competes directly with the People’s Republic, particularly in the low-value-added, labor-intensive manufacturing sector.

Mexico has a significant amount of oil and other strategic materials and a number of developed port facilities along its Pacific coast, but it consumes almost all the oil it produces, and its proximity to the United States could make China wary of aggressive, short-term investment. Nonetheless, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Qinghong visited Mexico during a swing through Latin America and the Caribbean in January and February 2005.

Panama. Panama’s strategic importance to China lies in the Panama Canal and related infrastructure for transporting goods from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Oil pipeline expansions will permit 100,000 to 800,000 barrels of oil daily to move between Panama’s two coasts, lowering the cost of Venezuelan crude sold to China. China has leased port installations in Cristobal and Balboa and will probably develop the former U.S. naval base in Rodman in order to potentially control maritime traffic at both ends of the Canal.

South American Countries

Bolivia. China is primarily interested in Bolivia’s natural gas and other strategic materials, although exporting some of these resources hinges upon better port access. Bolivia’s ability to export natural gas also depends on changes to the Hydrocarbon Law of 1996, currently under revision by the government.

Chinese trade and investment in Bolivia is relatively modest, the most important initiative being the construction of a urea plant to produce 180,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and 300,000 tons of urea. Natural gas, which Bolivia has in quantity, is one of the key elements in the production of urea. Bolivian president Evo Morales has visited China to meet with high-level authorities there.
Brazil. China’s number-one Latin American trading partner and a competitor of Argentina’s in the Southern Common Market free trade zone, Brazil is a top producer of soybeans, soy oil, iron, steel, and wood. China is particularly interested in Brazil’s iron and oil. It plans to build a gas pipeline through Brazil and to conduct joint exploration and refinery development with the state-owned petroleum company, Petrobras. China is also interested in soybean, beef, and chicken production and has therefore pledged to help modernize Brazil’s transportation infrastructure and expand its rail system. The two countries also work closely in the aerospace arena. They have jointly developed and launched two research satellites and plan to launch another two by 2008.

When Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traveled to Beijing in 2004, 400 Brazilian businesspersons accompanied him. This is understandable. Trade between China and Brazil grew by an impressive 69 percent in 2003, to $6.7 billion, and China announced $3 billion in new investments in Brazil. Brazil’s direct foreign investment in China will soon reach $5 billion.

Chile. The first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement with the PRC, Chile has 38.3 percent of the world’s copper reserves and is the world’s number one producer of copper, while China occupies the number three spot in reserves (6.7 percent) and is seventh among producers. China’s copper consumption has increased 10 percent a year for the last five years. This has stimulated a substantial increase in the price of copper. It has also made Chile strategically important to China as a provider of copper. Chile has well-developed port facilities to support trade between the two nations, whose bilateral trade rose 50 percent in 2004, to $5.3 billion. The Chinese firm Minmetals signed a $1.93 billion accord with the Chilean copper production firm Coldeco to gain access to Chilean copper for the next 20 years.

Colombia. Trade agreements between China and Colombia are somewhat limited, reflecting among other factors, the strong bonds between Colombia and the United States. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe did visit China in 2005 to promote Chinese investment. Colombian and PRC interests in petroleum delivery are clearly confluent. The construction of oil pipelines through Colombia will allow Venezuelan oil to flow to the Panama Canal without any shipping costs.

Ecuador. Ecuador is important to China because of its strategic resources and Pacific ports, which are maritime conduits to China for goods produced elsewhere in Latin America. Chinese firms show interest in Ecuadorian oil, steel, and cement production. Chinese trade with the country has increased notably.

Paraguay. Paraguay is the only Latin American nation that recognizes Taiwan. A Chinese community of Taiwanese descent is active in the Tri-Border Area (where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet). Some 15,000 persons of Chinese origin live in the Paraguayan Tri-Border city of Ciudad del Este, in which the Taiwanese bank Chinatrust has established an international branch bank.

Peru. Zeng Qinghong visited Peru after the 2004 APEC summit and returned in January 2005 to strengthen commercial ties. As in Ecuador, China shows interest in oil products and in Pacific ports that can facilitate shipment of raw materials to China.

Uruguay. The Uruguayan Government wants to improve its export performance and negotiate a free trade agreement with the PRC. In the first 10 months of 2005, Uruguay exported products worth $100 million to China while importing $191.4 million worth of Chinese goods.
**Venezuela.** Venezuela is China’s primary strategic partner in Latin America. Its president, Hugo Chávez, hopes to develop alternative markets for petroleum exports and to limit U.S. influence in the region. However, until an oil pipeline permits exports via the Pacific Ocean, only tankers whose size and displacement allows them to pass through the Panama Canal can deliver Venezuelan petroleum to China. Venezuela has given China permission to develop and exploit 15 oilfields with proven reserves. With China’s help, Venezuela could double its oil production.

China will also help extract natural gas and coal, provide machinery and credit to increase food production, and invest in improvements to the rail system in order to transport Venezuelan products. Joint Chinese and Venezuelan efforts to develop telecommunications capabilities in Venezuela are underway, including the launch of a satellite for this purpose. Altogether, China has invested more than $1.5 billion in Venezuela, the largest total in the region. Bilateral trade reached $3 billion in 2005, the majority of which was Venezuelan petroleum exports.

**A Case Study: China and Argentina**

China is the number one Asian buyer of goods made in Argentina. Economic cooperation has led to binational enterprises and reciprocal protection of Sino-Argentine investments. China and Argentina do business in petroleum operations, port infrastructure, and machinery for hydroelectric dams. Chinese investments in Argentina are geared toward mining, chemical fertilizers, fishing, and electronics.

Argentine industrialists worry about an invasion of Chinese products. Argentine government, academic, and business circles, however, are optimistic about Argentina’s commercial relationship with China. Argentina has no ports on the Pacific, but because it is located precisely on the opposite side of the globe from China, the distance to China from Argentina’s Atlantic ports is about the same as from those on the Pacific. Predominant winds and currents favor eastern routes for maritime traffic, and ports along the Rio de la Plata, the Paraná-Paraguay Waterway, and the South Atlantic coastline have improved in efficiency and offer lower transportation costs. The economic relationship between China and Argentina is a complementary one. The Chinese economic juggernaut could help Argentina recover from its 2001 economic collapse.

Argentina sells China oil-producing seeds and fruits, fats, animal and vegetable oils, skins and leathers, and pet foods. It imports Chinese machinery, electronic spare parts and equipment, washers, refrigerators, boilers, toys, and organic chemical products. Argentina is a copper and gold producer of regional and potentially global importance, exporting $1.09 billion in these metals in 2004. In 1990, there were seven mining companies in Argentina; now, there are 55.

Argentina, along with Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia, appears to have the best prospects and the greatest economic opportunities with China, because these countries’ economies complement China’s.

**Foreign Policies**

As Julio Sanguinetti, the former president of Uruguay, has noted, “China has been a peaceful nation. It does not have the militaristic tradition of Japan and Russia. It practices a life philosophy that always tends to balance. Its men of State, since they left the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution in their wake, feel that this is their destiny.”

Of the 26 countries that recognize Taiwan as an independent nation, almost half are in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a subject of some concern for Beijing.

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### Latin American/Caribbean Recognition

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<tr>
<th>THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC</th>
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<td>Cuba (9/28/1960)</td>
<td>Belize</td>
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<td>Chile (12/15/1970)</td>
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<td>Argentina (2/19/1972)</td>
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<td>Trinidad and Tobago (6/20/1974)</td>
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<td>Venezuela (6/28/1974)</td>
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<td>Surinam (5/28/1976)</td>
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<td>Santa Lucia (9/1/1997)</td>
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<td>Grenada (1/20/2005)</td>
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Cuba was the first Latin American nation to establish diplomatic relations with the New China. On 28 September 1960, the PRC and Cuba simultaneously issued a communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to the Chinese, the agreement between China and Cuba began a new era of Chinese-Latin American relations.

On 15 December 1970, the Peoples Unity Government of Salvador Allende in Chile established diplomatic relations with China, making it the first South American state to do so. Other Latin American and Caribbean countries followed suit, while 12 countries in the region still recognize Taiwan.

The significant Latin American voting bloc in the U.N. also stirs Chinese interest in Latin America. The PRC is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and considers itself a representative of Third World nations.

With the exception of Paraguay, South America has not had conflicts with China. The governments of the region are moving toward the political left and, broadly speaking, consider U.S. cooperation during the last decade to have done more harm than good. China could perceive this as an opportunity to consolidate its gains in South America and, by extension, throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. China has been an observer nation in the Organization of American States since the 1990s, and as part of a peacekeeping force under U.N. mandate in 2004, it sent 125 police officers to Haiti—a country that recognized Taiwan at the time.

Potential Conflicts

The interests of powerful nations intersect in Latin America. The British have a presence in the Falkland Islands and foreign fishing fleets ply the fishing grounds beyond Latin American economic zones on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Offshore oil and gas fields are becoming more profitable, underscoring the need to establish clear limits on use of the continental shelf and on scientific research in Antarctica. However, no enormous expenditures are required to protect these areas, and major conflicts are unlikely to spin out of control in the region.

China’s quest for food for its enormous population and raw materials for its industry comes in the context of a water shortage in China and the abundance of water in Latin America, a situation that might generate tensions over time, as well as fears of a “yellow danger” similar to the threat Japan was believed to have posed in times past.

However, South America and, by extension, all Latin American and Caribbean nations, have benefited from the economic bonanza delivered by the Chinese locomotive. Creating conditions that promote PRC investment is a high priority because the region believes the “Chinese presence...has a leveling effect in Latin America, especially vis-à-vis the United States.”

Even so, the enormous real and potential economic influence wielded by China in Latin America might generate unwanted muscle flexing. China’s economic influence can also have undesired effects. Its demand for copper might produce asymmetries between neighboring countries whose defense budgets are linked to the price of copper (Chile is one such country). However, optimistic forecasters expect the PRC to have a small impact in Latin America, not to interfere with relations between the United States and the region, and to have its closest economic ties with countries outside the American sphere of influence.

Defense

China is implementing profound changes in its defense system. With military equipment technologically inferior to that of developed countries, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has reduced its number of active-duty personnel and developed special troops and new tactics while maintaining a large defense budget.

To avoid arousing suspicions among neighboring countries and others around the world, the PLA has revised its doctrine and improved the transparency of its military plans and equipment by increasing military contacts with other Asian nations and with the rest of the world.

China has maintained military exchanges with 138 countries and conducted 41 bilateral and multilateral projects of cooperation. Its navy has conducted joint rescue exercises with Pakistan, India, and Thailand. Chinese military delegations have visited Latin America to gain experience in a number of areas ranging from equipment and weapon usage procedures to personnel administration, selection, and evaluation. The PLA has opened its bases to journalists and shown its installations and military lifestyle to the public.
Exchanges conducted with Latin America include—

- Visits by ministers of defense and chiefs of the joint staff and the armed forces.
- Visits by other high-ranking military authorities.
- A three-month PLA military doctrine and national defense course conducted annually in Beijing for international officers.
- A “Forum for Security Cooperation with an Eye for the Future between China and Latin America” seminar in China for high-level military officers (colonel or equivalent) from Latin America. (Paraguay was excluded due to its relationship with Taiwan.)

Internal Security: Triads

Eclipsed by trade, political problems have taken a back seat in the Chinese-Latin American agenda. However, it is possible to find subjects linked to security that merit attention. The presence in the region of Chinese Triads is one such security concern.

Operating on mainland China, Taiwan, Macao, and in Chinatowns in Europe, North America, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, the Triads are criminal organizations whose origins date back several centuries. Based in Hong Kong since 1949, they formed as patriotic societies and rose to key positions in the power structure of China before losing their raison d’être and becoming mafia-like criminal groups.

Fifty Triad groups are active in modern-day Hong Kong, the most important being the Sun Yee On, Wo Shing Wo, and 14K. Triad activities include drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration, gambling, prostitution, car theft, racketeering, and theft of intellectual property such as computer software, music CDs, and boxed films. These groups are difficult to penetrate, given the ethnic and cultural elements that unite them. They have worldwide connections, and have adapted their businesses to modern times. One of the most powerful Triads in Latin America appears to be Fu Chin, whose primary business is human trafficking.\(^{17}\)

It is reasonable to suspect the existence and development of Triads in the Tri-Border Area, especially in Ciudad del Este and Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the ethnic Chinese population approaches 45,000 and more than 4,000 small supermarkets belong to members of the Chinese community.

China and the Environment

Economic growth in China and India is one of the major threats to the global environment in the 21st century. The Worldwatch Institute says the two countries have the fate of the planet in their hands in the next few years. They can continue economic development without any concern for the environment—with unpredictable consequences for the climate and nature—or they can move to the vanguard of sustainable development and renewable sources of energy. Worldwatch says there are reasons for optimism: “Opinion-makers in China and India recognize that the model for economic growth with intensive consumption of raw materials does not work in the 21st century. China and India can overtake industrialized nations in a period of ten years and become leaders in the world market in energy and sustainable agriculture.” The Institute notes that per capita carbon dioxide emissions in the United States are six times those of China and twenty times those of India.\(^{18}\)

Observations

Neither large-scale nor threatening, Chinese commerce with Latin America trails the United States’s, the European Union’s, and Japan’s. Beijing’s goals in Latin America are to find new markets for China’s wide array of exportable goods and to obtain natural resources to support its internal development.
China’s relations with Latin America support other Chinese goals, such as the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. The PRC does not appear to have an appetite to challenge the United States in Latin America; rather, it sees the region as a part of its growing sphere of influence—not in word, but deed—and hopes to gain access to technologies, improve its international image, and support Chinese communities while avoiding any association with Chinese criminal organizations.

In the past, Beijing focused its attention on Washington and Moscow, but today it has strong ties with the rest of the international community, and Latin America is part of this agenda. Betting that Latin American countries will be relatively stable and not present strategic difficulties, China has already developed economic, political, and military bonds with them. PRC and Latin American relations include aerospace cooperation, Chinese influence over the Panama Canal, and Chinese-Cuban military and intelligence cooperation. One note of concern is that the Chinese undertake projects of such magnitude that the Latin American, Caribbean, and Southern Cone states risk losing control over their economies, natural resources, and environments.

Chinese immigration over many years has had a notable effect on Latin American cultures and economies. Crimes committed by Chinese Latin Americans are an internal security concern.

China is preoccupied with military cooperation and wants to make such bonds as strong as possible. This is a by-product of the strong influence the Chinese military has over its foreign ministry rather than of any well-thought-out mutual agreements with Latin American ministries of defense. However, opportunities in this area merit further study. PRC peacekeeping operations in Haiti present an excellent opportunity for operational exchanges and lessons learned that go beyond China’s limited U.N. police functions there.

Some observers believe China’s soft economic power could become too great an influence over Latin American economic elites, intellectuals, and technocrats because of the allure of China’s strong economic growth, huge profits, internal order, and ironclad rules for conducting business. U.S., European, and Asian academic and political circles also decry the lack of political freedom in China, but to no effect.

U.S. national security operatives in Latin America worry about Chinese power. In something of a paradox, U.S. Government officials say Washington must closely monitor the growing Chinese economic, cultural, and diplomatic presence in Latin America just when commercial, financial, and political ties between China and the United States are increasing.

Another paradox: Washington is increasing tensions by voicing suspicions and issuing alerts regarding China, while Latin American neo-liberals (traditionally aligned with the United States) and the predominantly leftist governments of the region increasingly admire and do business with China. More social restraints, less corruption, and a better distribution of wealth might overcome the second paradox, despite Washington’s continued suspicion of Chinese activities in the region.

NOTES
2. These predictions began to take form on 20 December 2005, when the National Statistics Office of China issued the results of its recalculated GDP for 2004.
6. Ibid.
9. R. Evan Ellis.
10. Ibid. 12.
11. Tramutola, Castro, Monat, 196.
12. Ibid.
17. Delamer, Goldstein, Malena, and Porn, 91.
18. No other information given.
19. Delamer, Goldstein, Malena, and Porn, 87.
For some time now, there has been debate in academic circles about just how much civilian politicians in Latin America need to know, and do, to control their militaries. David Pion-Berlin, a highly regarded scholar on Latin American civil-military relations, has argued that “civilians do not have to worry about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training.”1 Pion-Berlin bases his argument on deductive logic and history, but we believe the situation has changed significantly in the region. Therefore, we respectfully disagree. In our opinion, civilians must know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are required to do, not only in terms of submitting to civilian control, but also in successfully fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles and missions assigned to security forces in Latin America. Unlike Pion-Berlin, we believe that the security threats facing Latin America are now so broad and so critical that civilians have little choice but to engage with them and invest political capital in responding to them.

We must first recognize that in agreement with Pion-Berlin there is, in fact, an important disincentive for civilians to become expert on military issues.2 In Aesop’s fable about the hedgehog and the fox, “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. This suggests that the fox, for all of his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog’s defense.”3 Like foxes, democratically elected politicians must know many things, while the armed forces, like the hedgehog, only have to know one big thing: national security—even though the definition of this concept is in transition. Military officers spend their careers studying and training in it; they belong to institutions that focus on it; and they ascend through the ranks depending on their knowledge of it. It is impossible for civilians, lacking this background, to develop anything like the national security expertise of military officers. We have seen senior military leaders use a hedgehog strategy to challenge civilian control of the military precisely because of the dearth of civilian knowledge about national security issues.

We believe that civilians do not need to be experts on national security to exercise control over the military and determine its roles and missions. However, they clearly must know something, and just as important, they must be aware of what they don’t know. In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, security is being reformed to mean much more than “national” security: it is widely understood to include “public” and “citizen”

Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau and Dr. Richard B. Goetze Jr., Major General, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
security as well. While civilians might not need to know everything about national security, they must know about public and citizen security, and they must be ready to act in response to the demands of society regarding both. National security has meant defending the continuity and sovereignty of a state. This is the traditional role of national defense forces. Public security refers to the state’s ability to maintain public order so that basic sectors such as transport, communications, and commerce can function. Citizen security addresses the exercise of human, political, and social rights by individuals and groups in a democracy.

The combination of threats in contemporary Central America is so serious that it challenges all three levels of security. Civilian elites currently employ the armed forces, among other instruments, to respond to these challenges. Public opinion surveys reveal that insecurity is the first concern of citizens in Central America. Our interviews indicate that political campaigns hinge on it, and that politicians expect to be held accountable for it. Even the academic literature is catching up to this fact of life.4

A Spectrum of Missions

Before turning to these threats, it might be useful to examine a national security mission that some countries view as an opportunity: peacekeeping and peacemaking, collectively termed Peace Support Operations (PSO). These operations are integral to the region’s armed forces. In response to Argentine President Menem’s strategy to change the international image of his nation, the military began by participating in PSO. More recently, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala sent troops to Haiti for United Nations Chapter 7 peacemaking operations. Chile, like Argentina, has established a PSO training center, and El Salvador and Guatemala are doing so as well. El Salvador also sent troops to support the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

All scholars who write on PSO emphasize the critical civil-military component of these operations, not only at policymaking levels, where the ministries of foreign affairs and finance work closely with the ministries of defense, but also locally, where troops interact with governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).5 There is, in short, a new element to civil-military relations in Latin America. Increasing numbers of countries are involved in what unfortunately promises to be the growth industry of PSO. There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that civilian policymakers are sending troops to Haiti. In Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, civilians were actively engaged in all phases of the decisions to send troops to Haiti and to keep them there.6

Organized crime is another threat keeping the region’s militaries employed. Many Latin and Central American countries face extremely serious crime problems that threaten the quality of life of millions of people and potentially even the survival of democracies. Organized crime threatens public and citizen security and, in some cases, national security as well. Organized crime and money-laundering in the Tri-Border Region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), drug-lord control of Rio de Janeiro favelas, organized crime and narcoterrorism in Colombia, and drug shipments throughout the region have been enormously corrosive. There is also the newer phenomenon of the maras, or gangs, in Central America and Mexico. Conservative estimates by El Salvador’s National Police have put the mara membership in Central America at approximately 70,000, with 36,000 in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, 11,000 in El Salvador, 4,500 in Nicaragua, 2,700 in Costa Rica, 1,400 in Panama, and 100 in Belize. The maras are not only a Central American regional phenomenon; in fact, they are transnational. The MS-13 gang, for example, reportedly has 8,000 to 10,000 members in the United States, 4,000 members in Canada, and a presence in 25 states in Mexico.7

The maras’ defining characteristic is their exceptionally violent behavior. Initiation into the gangs,

...civilians do not need to be experts on national security to exercise control over the military and determine its roles and missions. However, they clearly must know something...
discipline, and ascension into leadership positions are based on violence. In MS-13, four members beat each prospective gang member for 13 seconds while he puts up no resistance, protecting only his face and genitals. Later, mara members have to kill a person for no other reason than to show they can. The maras are believed to be responsible for 60 percent of the 2,576 murders committed in El Salvador in 2004, and the percentage is increasing.

Countries with maras have overtaken even Colombia, with its active insurgency, in homicides. In 2005, the number of homicides per 100,000 people was 54.71 (3,761 homicides) in El Salvador, 40.66 (2,836) in Honduras, 37.53 (5,500) in Guatemala, and 33.76 (14,503) in Colombia.8

Besides fighting criminal gangs, Latin and Central American countries are also becoming increasingly involved in counterterrorism. None of the region’s countries except Colombia was concerned with terrorist threats before 11 September 2001, but since then Washington has made eliminating these threats priority number one in international relations. As General Bantz Craddock states in “SOUTHCOM Priorities and Investment Guidance: War on Terrorism,” “The number one priority for this command is to prevent terrorist groups from using the SOUTHCOM AOR as a staging ground to conduct terrorist operations against the United States or our vital interests in the Western Hemisphere, including partner nations throughout the region.”9 Those partner nations have been urged to strengthen their counterterrorist capabilities and to cooperate and coordinate with each other and the United States. These are civil-military issues because top civilian and military leaders decide when to use intelligence and special operations forces against terrorists.

Appreciation of the terrorist threat and action taken against it varies by countries in the region. We find that the governments of some countries that did not take the threat seriously, such as Brazil and Uruguay, are now developing strategies and committing resources to fight terrorism. El Salvador has received threats because of its role in Iraq and has responded to the threats.

It should be obvious from this short summary that civilians must be knowledgeable and engaged in order to manage the scarce funds, personnel, and equipment available to handle PSOs, maras, and terrorism effectively.10 They really have no choice. They must become involved in PSOs if they want other nations to take them seriously; they must fight the maras if they do not want criminals to take over their cities; and they must develop effective intelligence if they want to prevent terrorists from using their countries to stage attacks on the United States. They have to act. How well they act, and how well informed they must be, is now the real issue.

Nobody can expect civilian foxes to become hedgehogs and know everything about the “one big thing” that military officers spend their careers studying. However, civilian awareness and engagement must extend beyond the ministries of defense and the armed forces to include intelligence agencies and ministries of gobernacion, where the police are normally located.
Controlling the Military

According to Pion-Berlin, “Latin America is not a region where politicians have ever had or will ever have the incentive to get up to speed on defense issues” in terms either of resources or employment. These civilians lack incentive because Latin America, historically, has been free of the kinds of wars that might require civilians to know about those issues. Even today’s “internal threats (narcotraffickers, terrorists, guerrillas) do not pose challenges that warrant great military preparedness and sophistication.” Pion-Berlin goes on to highlight the contrast in competence between civilians and military officers by pointing out that “with defense perceived to be off limits, civilians have never been able to prove their worth. Instead, they have developed a kind of inferiority complex that just reinforces their dependency on the military.”

The lack of civilian expertise isn’t such a big problem, however, because “during the past two decades, while the balance of competence still tilts heavily in favor of the military, the balance of power has moved in favor of civilians.” Civilians must manage the military because it is both the coercive arm of the state and a self-interested institution whose needs must be addressed. They have done so “largely through a form of political civilian control, which is a low cost means of achieving a relative calm in civil-military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, legislative oversight, and large budgets.” And finally, “while civilians interface, they do not intervene. The government stays out of the military’s defense sphere of influence principally because of its lack of knowledge and staff.”

Latin America might be a “zone of peace” with regard to external conflict, but it is not peaceful internally, as the maras, drug traffickers, organized crime, and insurgencies (in Colombia) illustrate. Currently, civilian policymakers in Mexico and Central America have put the armed forces either on the frontline against criminal gangs or in support of anti-crime efforts. Civilian leaders also have directed the military to fulfill international responsibilities short of war, as the PSO support of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other Latin American countries shows. Although such missions are not directly related to national defense, they employ the armed forces (and to a lesser degree police forces) in support of perceived national interests. For example, Brazilian generals head up the UN Mission in Haiti, and a Brazilian brigade of 967 soldiers is deployed there.

Civilian policymakers not only manage the armed forces, but also decide upon its roles and missions, whether they want to or not, and whether they are well informed or not. These are empirical facts: presidents and their appointees decide on a daily basis about the use of security forces, including the armed forces. Analysts can agree or disagree with the wisdom of the decision, but in 2004, Guatemalan President Oscar Berger decided to reduce military manpower and budget by 50 percent. He accomplished that in about 90 days. Civilian policymakers don’t need to know the “one big thing,” but it seems to us that they do need to establish institutions to embody and perpetuate the knowledge and expertise needed to deal with military missions as they arise. Only in this way can democratic governments routinely deal with problems and crises in an internationally acceptable manner.

The Trinity

Based on our work for over a decade in more than 100 countries in all parts of the world, and drawing from the literature on security and civil-military relations, we see civil-military relations as a trinity. The first part of the trinity is “democratic civilian control of the armed forces.” This is a fairly simple concept, concerns power, and must be implemented through institutions such as ministries of defense, oversight committees in the congress, civilian control of officer promotions and military education, and the like. The other two elements of the trinity are “effectiveness” and “efficiency.” By effectiveness, we mean that the armed services and other security forces successfully implement the roles and missions assigned to them by democratically elected civilians. Efficiency means that they accomplish their missions at the least possible cost.

...we see civil-military relations as a trinity. The first part of the trinity is democratic civilian control of the armed forces.
Civilian control of the military

in lives and resources. Because there are no simple mathematical formulae that define least possible costs, countries must have civilian institutions in place to determine priorities for assigning resources. Civilian policymakers—the foxes—need to think beyond problems of control and consider whether their forces can achieve their assigned roles and missions, and if so, at what cost and at what level of risk. Control does not imply effectiveness and efficiency. Indeed, the simplest way to control the armed forces would be to eliminate them, as in Costa Rica and Panama, or to severely constrain their budgets, as in Ecuador. Neither leads to effectiveness or efficiency.

Institutions

If we analyze how different countries deal with elements of the trinity, we can identify four sets of structures and processes that we call “institutions” to emphasize their empirical nature. Table 1 illustrates how these four institutions support the trinity of civil-military relations.

Ministries of defense (MOD). MODs can support all three elements of the trinity.20 Civilian policymakers can control the armed forces through a MOD. The MOD also typically evaluates the effectiveness of military roles and missions while cadres of civilian and military lawyers, economists, and accountants within the MOD measure how efficiently resources are used.

Legislatures. These institutions support all three elements of the trinity. They ensure democratic civilian control by maintaining the separation of powers, controlling the budget, and exercising oversight. Diversity of political representation (through elections) and the development of expertise among members and particularly their staffs allow legislatures to improve the effectiveness of military roles and missions. Furthermore, legislatures ensure efficiency by routinely exercising an oversight function through hearings, auditing units, and inspectors general. In most of the older democracies, legislatures enhance efficiency more than effectiveness.21

Interagency communication and cooperation mechanism. Whether it occurs via a national security council or another executive-level organization such as Brazil’s Institutional Security Cabinet, the government must have a way to effect interagency communication and cooperation—such a mechanism is critical for effectiveness. The interagency process is an element of democratic civilian control, but it depends on institutions such as an MOD to influence effectiveness. With an interagency process, civilian leaders can determine roles and missions in a rational manner. Moreover, because security today spans a wide spectrum of possibilities, this interagency process or mechanism must be robust.

Intelligence system. This system supports the first two elements of the trinity. Contemporary democracies maintain elaborate military and civilian intelligence systems and even more elaborate mechanisms to control them. There is also much emphasis today on effective intelligence. However, although executive and legislative institutions scrutinize intelligence systems, there is often no real effort to monitor their efficiency. The emphasis on secrecy in intelligence collection, analysis, and budgeting militates against true efficiency.22

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<th>MOD</th>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Inter-Agency Process</th>
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<td>Democratic Control</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
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Table 1. Institutional bases for trinity of democratic civil-military relations.

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<th>Legislature</th>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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Table 2. Institutional bases for trinity in two countries.

Status: El Salvador and Guatemala

Having laid out the four “institutions” used to support the trinity of civil-military relations, we
think it would be informative to see just how effective two of the region’s countries, El Salvador and Guatemala, have been at implementing civilian control of the military.

**El Salvador.** As table 2 indicates, El Salvador has made tremendous progress in recent years. Although an active-duty general still heads the MOD and few high-level civilians work in the ministry, there have been major reforms in other areas. About ten members of the 84-member congress are knowledgeable about security issues and have informed, competent staffs. A national security council has been active since the mid-1990s, and a secretariat with six permanent, full-time members has provided continuity and support to the council since 2005. El Salvador’s intelligence system is robust and highly professional. It includes a presidential intelligence agency, military intelligence, and a police intelligence component.

**Guatemala.** In Guatemala, everything is “on the verge” of happening—but it has been that way for many years. The Guatemalan constitution requires the minister of defense to be an active-duty general officer. In the last few years, the minister has assumed a bigger role and more power than the chief of the general staff of the armed forces (as one might expect given the fact that the last three ministers had previously served as chief). The ministry has a half-dozen qualified civilian members, mainly in the areas of defense policy and legal affairs, and plans to have a civilian vice minister of defense if the constitution cannot be changed to allow a civilian to run the MOD. The Guatemalan congress requires annual turnover of the heads of committees; consequently, nobody develops any expertise, a drawback that is aggravated when the committee staffs change as well. While Guatemala’s president does have periodic cabinet meetings with the ministers of defense, gobernacion, and foreign affairs, there is no permanent or technical staff to support those meetings and effect any resolutions issuing from them (although there is a written plan for a national security system that is “on the verge” of implementatio). Guatemalans and their foreign allies have focused much attention on intelligence since at least 1997, but there is only nominal oversight of it from the executive branch and none from the congress.

Explaining the variations. To account for the differences between El Salvador and Guatemala in civil-military relations, we must look first at the terms and conditions of each country’s post-civil war transition to democracy and the prerogatives accruing to each country’s armed forces.

First, we note that in 1992 El Salvador’s military developed “Plan Arce 2000,” which they have been implementing ever since. Now “Plan Arce 2005,” it reformed the armed forces and provided a new, democratic approach to civil-military relations. In Guatemala, the military initiated the transition from a military to a civilian regime, and it continued to support that change along with the peace process; however, to the best of our knowledge, that was the end of their plan, and the end of their influence.

Second, international involvement and influence has been extremely important in El Salvador, but much less so in Guatemala, where foreign engagement in the peace process was less central. Of course, foreign influence can work only if there is some way for outsiders to engage with domestic constituencies. Unfortunately, the region has no organization, like NATO or the European Union, that can set forth detailed rules for, among other things, democratic civil-military relations as prerequisites for membership. The United States has at least partially filled that vacuum, but while it has been willing to continue a high level of security assistance for El Salvador because of its continued participation in Iraq, it has not done so for Guatemala because of the latter’s record of human rights abuses and its difficulty in working with other governments. Guatemala’s transition has also been impeded by (in our view) the overly influential role single-issue NGOs have played in determining U.S. policy toward the country.

Third, at least in countries that were formerly under military control, the government can only...
address issues in civil-military relations when it is stable and coherent enough to govern. The “deal” in El Salvador held, and yielded a relatively stable political system that included the rebel Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. The deal in Guatemala failed on the civilian side. President Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabrera, who had come to power promising to fight corruption and defend Guatemala’s poor and indigenous majority, had to flee to Mexico in 2004 to avoid corruption charges.

The fourth and final point concerns political learning. Scholars know that political and organizational learning is important. It is, however, a very difficult indicator to assess. At a minimum, we envision leaders learning about civil-military relations in MODs, educational institutions, and think tanks. In El Salvador, the Plan Arce 2000 created the Command for Doctrine and Military Education, which institutionalized learning for all branches of the armed forces in 18 educational institutions, including the College for Higher Strategic Studies, a school with an impressive 15-year record of educating civilians and officers to work together in the executive and legislative branches of government. In short, there are multiple areas for political learning in El Salvador, including a myriad of foreign-funded NGOs and think tanks that provide funding for academics and activists.

In Guatemala, reality has finally intervened, and much is changing. In our interviews there last March, including a meeting with President Berger and his security cabinet, we learned that he and his government perceive serious security threats at all levels—national, public, and citizen—and are planning on implementing changes that will institutionalize the interagency process and the intelligence system.

There are at least three reasons for these potential changes: the U.S., British, and Colombian Governments are encouraging and supporting change; under Berger, the government is stable; and NGOs and a defense community founded in 2001 have accumulated a critical mass of knowledge and access. If these trends continue, Guatemala might catch up to El Salvador in civil-military relations and the institutions necessary to institutionalize them. If it does, it should begin to respond more effectively to the multiple security challenges facing the country and the region. MR
Dogs and soldiers keep off the grass!  
So the hoary motto is passed  
From generation to generation,  
Of the enlightened class;

About my brothers, some in the present,  
And some in the past.

Baby killer, knave, drunkard, coward!  
We don’t need any military power!  
So the enlightened ones shout and glower.

Make love not war!  
The only thing that makes us sore,  
Are soldiers and sailors defending our shore!

Peace at any price! they happily rant.  
Freedom, oh Freedom! they cheerfully chant.  

They don’t ken freedom isn’t free.  
And the cost of that freedom is a very high fee.

Too high to be paid by their peace loving souls,  
They call on soldiers to pay the whole toll.

Men of honor and integrity still pay the blood fee,  
Through service and sacrifice keeping us free.

So chant the chants and rant the rants!  
But don’t try and kick me in the pants!  
Dogs and soldiers keep off the grass!  
They can just kiss my “G.I.” brass.
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:
Framing an Authentic Preemptive Strategy in the 21st Century

AS THE UNITED STATES considers, adopts, and implements preemptive national security policy for the 21st century, it is important to ensure that we maintain a broad policy that not only keeps America secure, but also demonstrates a realistic and moral approach to solving national security challenges—challenges that can no longer be answered by the cold war policies and paradigms of containment, détente, and peaceful coexistence. A genuinely preemptive strategy shouldn’t just “defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants”; it should attack the causes and conditions that give rise to terrorists and tyrants. Our “gravest dangers to freedom” do not come from “the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology”; they come from the crossroads of ignorance and poverty.¹

National security policy in the latter half of the 20th century changed dramatically. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it moved from addressing a bipolar, international power struggle between NATO-allied countries led by the United States and Warsaw Pact countries led by the former Soviet Union, to assuming U.S. hegemony. Geopolitical fault lines that had defined international politics seemed to melt away.² The first Gulf War set the precedent for a benevolent superpower leading an international coalition against tyranny. With Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, that paradigm was soon replaced by the precedent of a unilateral superpower leading a “coalition of the willing.” Many historians now believe that the bipolar, international security framework of the cold war provided a more stable, secure, and predictable strategic framework. But living in the past is not an option.

Interestingly, some students of international relations see a new paradigm forming in the 21st century that bears some resemblance to the cold war. For example, former Iranian President (1997-2005) Mohammad Khatami postulates that the world order is morphing, once again, into a bipolar struggle. In this instance, the struggle will entail a global conflict between NATO-allied countries led by the United States and Islamic-based, theocratic states.³ Similar hypotheses in elite foreign relations circles suggest that the new security paradigm will probably pit the haves against the have-nots, or, as Samuel Huntington has posited, civilization against civilization. Either way, the great clash will not be between states.⁴ Even our own president, George W. Bush, seems to refer to the U.S. “War on Terror” as being a “war of ideas,” not a contest between states.
If the world order has indeed changed in any of these ways, the implications for how the United States formulates its forward-looking national security policy will be profound. Containment, détente, and peaceful coexistence will not work. To ensure its long-term national security, America will have to remain decisively engaged, with the full understanding that in a global economy its security and prosperity are both directly and indirectly linked to the most remote regions of the world. A national security policy best disposed to meet this challenge must be considered in the guise of “enlightened self-interest” and human security; in effect, we must broaden our past definition of national security to meet the challenges and threats that lie ahead.

I am proposing here that we build the future framework of U.S. national security policy around a new paradigm: “human security.” First, however, we must understand where the term “human security” comes from. Some would argue that justification for a policy based on human security is a priori rational. Through our study of history and our most recent national experiences, we see that the concept can also be proven a posteriori.

**Background**

Following the fall of the Wall, a community of political scientists, academics, and leaders of international governmental organizations and nongovernmental/humanitarian assistance organizations began to talk about changing the way “we” think about national security. They postulated that rather than formulating security policy around the state, security policy ought to be thought of and formulated around individuals. In other words, instead of thinking about how to make nations secure, we ought to think about what makes individuals secure. Whereas “national security,” the traditional term used to frame security concerns, emphasizes the safeguarding of territory and populations, human security focuses on protecting “the dignity and worth of the human person.” In essence, this approach to security studies is “people-centric” rather than state-based. It reframes traditional human-rights issues as national security challenges.

However, using individuals, not states, as the reference point for security policy can be problematic because it diffuses fiduciary responsibility and accountability. Providing for the security of citizens is a principal attribute of national sovereignty. Indeed, nation-states are best prepared to fill this role, for which they are held accountable by the governed. The nation-state is, and will likely remain, the greatest guarantor of individual freedoms in the 21st century. Shifting the focus of security from the collective desire of free people to provide for their common defense to the protection by international standards and non-state actors of a range of individual political, economic, and cultural rights can confuse, rather than clarify, the nature of the modern state’s roles and responsibilities. However, through patient, prioritized, strategic national leadership and full engagement and partnership with international organizations and institutions, such a shift can work.

**Repackaged Wilsonianism?**

Conservatives will quip that the concept of human security strongly resembles liberalism, the conception of foreign policy that appeared over the course of the first half of the 20th century. Under liberalism, states are not monolithic, rational actors; rather, their decisions represent the cumulative influence of social-group interests. Foreign policy and national security strategy are products of the cooperative view of the state’s “empowered” elements. Liberalism also takes a structuralist approach to international relations (power is exercised and distributed through formal organizations and institutions), but its theoretical framework includes domestic players (legislatures,
unions, corporations) and non-state actors (nongovernmental and international organizations). In the liberal paradigm, conflict and competition are not inevitable. Institutions can act to ameliorate international conflict and promote cooperation, trust, and joint action.8

**Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms**

A dialogue about using the collective power of states to protect the rights of individuals emerged as part of the debate over what the world would look like after World War II. The challenge was how to prevent the reemergence of poisonous fascist ideologies that, during the Nazi era, became state policies, without interfering in the legitimate sovereignty of individual states. President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to provide an answer in his “Four Freedoms” speech on 6 January 1941, to the 77th Congress.9

Roosevelt’s speech outlined the world he wanted to see in the future—the one the United States would be helping to make secure in the coming years of World War II. This world would be founded on four freedoms. The first was the freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world. Second was the freedom for everyone to worship God in his or her own way. Freedom from want, which Roosevelt translated into economic relationships, came third on his list. Roosevelt’s fourth freedom was the freedom from fear, by which he meant “a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.” Altogether, he envisioned a world order in which all peoples would enjoy a secure, peaceful life.

In July 1941, Roosevelt, in concert with Winston Churchill, used the Atlantic Charter to expand on his “four freedoms” view of the world. A former Wilson administration member, Roosevelt left an ambivalent record of what he believed the charter stood for, but many of his administration’s postwar initiatives encouraged international governance by democratic processes, with international organizations serving as arbiters of disputes and protectors of the peace.10 The years following the end of World War II saw the establishment of mechanisms that stabilized the international economy and further promoted a vision of collective security of all types.

For example, the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944) established rules, institutions and procedures to regulate the international monetary system. The agreement required each country to adopt a monetary policy that fixed its currency exchange rate to a certain value plus or minus one percent in terms of gold, and it permitted the International Monetary Fund (established during the Bretton Woods conference) to bridge temporary payment imbalances. For approximately the next 30 years, the system worked to promote its members’ common goals.

The signing of the United Nations charter on 26 June 1945 provided yet another push toward collective security. The charter established the following goals for the organization:

- “To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.
- “To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.
- “To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.
- “To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.”11

In the decades that followed, the U.N. bureaucracy came to view itself as a body whose role was to facilitate international security, international law, economic development, and social equity. Much of the U.N. agenda involved the protection of “human rights.” Although the term human rights had been in common use before 1945, its meaning was largely recast in the postwar years. In the
Enlightenment, human rights had been associated with concepts of natural law, often interchanged with the term “rights of man.” Referring to a narrow set of individual legal entitlements, human rights also served as a synonym for “civil rights.” After World War II, “human rights” was used to delineate the difference between democratic and fascist civil society. Democratic societies recognized that individuals were entitled to certain rights merely by being human. In 1948, the U.N. published a universal declaration of human rights in 300 languages.

**Cold War to Present**

The outbreak of the cold war did much to dampen the drive toward international governance. While there was much discussion of the role of human rights in foreign affairs, their protection was considered a matter of national policy only. Charges of human rights abuses were endemic during the course of the cold war. Some were valid complaints. Others were made for propaganda value or as part of psychological warfare campaigns. In part because of the cold war standoff between the nuclear superpowers, the international community was loath to interfere in the internal governance of other countries, even in the face of massive human rights abuses and genocide.

Everything changed when the Wall fell. “Human security,” used in the international context to signal movement away from “national security” (a term frequently associated with the cold-war emphasis on states as actors), came into vogue. The term was and is meant to define security within a new context and global framework: it broadly defines security as “political, strategic, economic, social, or ecological [in] nature.” It is now argued that “security” means more than just physical security and the benefits of common defense, and that the international community has rights and responsibilities to protect human rights that may supersede those of individual states. This is, in effect, the global village concept.

One impetus behind the human-security movement is the continued globalization and interconnectedness, in all its forms, of the world. Specifically, the growth of international, multinational, transnational, nongovernmental and non-state actors challenges academics and practitioners of security studies to think more broadly and to reconsider the world construct and the role of traditional state actors.
In the early 1990s, the U.N. Development Program published a series of annual reports referring to human security. These reports stated that “now that the cold war is over, the challenge is to rebuild societies around people’s needs.” Furthermore, “security should be reinterpreted as security for people, not security for land [emphasis added].” The emphasis was clear. In the post-cold-war world, individuals, and not the collective community, mattered most.

Human Security Today

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan recently wrote in Foreign Affairs that “the states of the world must create a collective security system” for all peoples. He was harkening back to President Roosevelt’s grand vision of a world with “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” However, while human security sounds good rhetorically, in practice it must clarify, not obscure, how states and non-state actors should think about national security, as well as where international organizations should direct their attentions to monitor state activities appropriately. Non-state actors may voluntarily or at the behest of the state monitor, assist, and facilitate states in their responsibilities, but at the end of the day, the state is solely responsible and accountable to the population in its charge.

The human-security movement is making great progress in promoting an individual-centered security regime as a reasonable approach to addressing national security. Many states use its principles as the foundation for their foreign policy, and burgeoning international organizations and global networks are dedicated to its values and underlying missions. In January 2001, for example, the U.N. established the Commission on Human Security. The Commission has three goals:

- To promote public understanding, engagement, and support of human security and its underlying imperatives.
- To develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation.
- To propose a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security.

The U.N. also established a permanent U.N. Advisory Board on Human Security, and shortly thereafter the European Union study group published “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe.” Countries and organizations are increasingly making human security the foundation of state foreign policy. Nevertheless, as more states and organizations embrace human security, its dangers must be considered.

Conservatives Consider Human Security

Proponents of human security often imply that it is based on two universal, unimpeachable truths—that human security is a grand and noble goal for which all humankind should strive, and that the human community as a whole has and must fulfill global responsibilities in the international community. The term also suggests that there is a broad consensus over which political, economic, cultural, legal, and physical rights constitute human rights. There is, however, a debate brewing among conservatives and liberals over whether these presumptions are true.

It is also not clear what the term adds to the discourse about the state’s obligations to serve and protect its citizenry. Conservatives argue that rather than being a genuinely new paradigm through which to approach international relations, human security is really more of a repackaged “neoliberal” philosophy of international relations. They also contend that there is great danger in the way the term is being applied. As currently conceived, human security can readily be used to delegitimize and undermine even secure states with productive economies and strong, open civil societies. Under the current U.N. definition, human security includes:

- Economic security – ensuring individuals a minimum income.
- Food security – guaranteeing access to food.
- Environmental security – protection from short and long-term natural and manmade disasters.
- Personal security – protection from any form and perpetration of arbitrary arrest or violence.
- Community security – protection from the loss of traditions and values, and from secular and ethnic violence.
- Political security – ensuring individual basic human rights.

Conservatives argue that this definition essentially requires each state to establish a perfect society, and that the standards for a state’s satisfactory performance are relatively ambiguous.
state, they say, can meet all the security needs of its people as outlined by the U.N. For example, under the U.N. definition the United States might, it could be argued, be illegitimate because it failed to adequately look after citizens in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. This proposition is, of course, absurd; still, conservatives would have us believe that it could logically follow from the guidance laid out by the U.N.

Along the same lines, since states do not have infinite resources, no state will ever be able to meet all the human-security needs of every individual. And because the U.N. has failed to set priorities among the six kinds of security, states seeking to meet the demands of human security might easily disburse their resources on peripheral priorities that fail to meet the community’s most basic responsibilities—the physical security of its citizens and fundamental political freedoms.

Conservatives also complain that the ambiguous nature of the term human security could be exploited as a tool for unwarranted state oppression or international intervention.

In short, the current concept of human security suffers from three significant shortfalls:

- There is a lack of common understanding and application of the term.
- It provides no new conceptual advantages to assist in understanding the nature of international relations.
- It does not prioritize rights, and therefore can be readily exploited to undermine the legitimacy of any state.

Conservatives point to these shortfalls and profess to be disconcerted by the notion that human security should become an integral part of the international relations lexicon. In their estimation, the term’s undefined and incomplete nature—its failure to articulate clearly the responsibilities and accountability required of state and non-state actors—naturally confuses and potentially misdirects state fiduciary responsibility.

What’s Next for National Security

Although conservatives believe it would be naïve and wrongheaded to supplant national security and the preservation of freedom with human security as the state’s fundamental responsibility, it is clear that our conceptions of national security must evolve to reflect the realities of the world in which we live.

For the United States, one way to do this would be to address national security in tandem with international security challenges.

During the cold war, national security was simply considered within the context of our bipolar world, a world in which the United States, the USSR, and their respective spheres of influence squared off against one another ideologically, diplomatically, economically, politically, and militarily. National security was measured in terms of nuclear warheads, weapons platforms, military divisions, and defense spending. Now, states view their security not just in terms of military threats or territorial invasions, but also with regard to challenges that, left un-tackled, become breeding grounds for terrorism and radical ideologies; facilitate economic threats, dangers, and catastrophe; and permit environmental degradation and devastation.

The term “national security” is legitimately under scrutiny. For over a decade, world-renowned scholars have written about the need for new thinking in national security. Francis Fukuyama alluded to it in 1989 in an article in *The National Interest* and again in 1992, in *The End of History and the Last Man.* In 1993 and 1996, Samuel Huntington and Michael Klare offered glimpses of the threat we currently face. According to Huntington, “World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be—the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others . . . . It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. . . . Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. . . . The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”

Klare opined that “the changes associated with the cold war’s end have been so dramatic and profound that it is reasonable to question whether traditional assumptions regarding the nature of global conflict will continue to prove reliable in the new, post-cold-war era. In particular, one could question whether conflicts between states (or groups of states) will
remain the principal form of international strife, and whether the boundaries between them will continue to constitute the world’s major fault lines. . . . Others have argued that the world’s future fault lines will fall not between the major states or civilizations, but between the growing nexus of democratic, market-oriented societies and those ‘holdout’ states that have eschewed democracy or defied the world community in other ways.”25

Dan Henk has appropriately summarized the flood of new thinking loosed by such theorists as Fukuyama, Huntington, and Klare: “The end of the Cold War unleashed a debate that had been growing for years, provoked by scholars and practitioners increasingly dissatisfied with traditional conceptions of security.”26

Discarding the idea of national security is not the answer, however. Rather than replace the term with a broad moniker that could be perceived as useless and dangerous, international relations theory should strive to clarify the relationships among security, economic, political, and foreign-policy issues, and the cascading effects each has on the others. In his February 1993 confirmation hearing, James Woolsey, President Clinton’s first director of the CIA, alluded to the United States as having defeated the USSR or “slain the dragon.” In its place, he feared, “We now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes, and in many ways the dragon was easier to keep track of.”27

As it has in the past, the Department of Defense continues to use reflexive terminology to describe the global operating environment and U.S. policy. For DOD, such terms as “deterrence,” “détente,” “containment,” “crisis response,” “conflict management,” and “consequence management” are still current. All of our national strategies are spelled out in this defensive-reactive context. That’s got to change.

If President Bush truly changed the nature of U.S. strategy on 1 June 2002 to one of preemption that requires “all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary,” where should the United States set its sights and what elements of threat should it target?28

Thomas P.M. Barnett outlines a grand strategy to answer this quandary in his book The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century. According to Barnett, as globalization continues to shrink our world, it will confront friction from underdeveloped nations, peoples, and cultures: “A few years ago, I was doing some simple mapping of where we sent US military forces since the end of the Cold War. We sent soldiers into conflicts almost 150 times, seemingly around the planet, but when you actually plot it out, you realize it’s clustered, rather significantly, in a series of regions. When I drew a line around those regions on the globe, I realized there were certain things about those regions that were similar. . . . there was a pattern: when you look at the area where we’ve committed our forces, you’re seeing the parts of the world that are least connected to the global economy. . . . I realized the shape I was staring at I’d seen in many, many forms: biodiversity loss, poor soil quality, where the most fundamentalist versions of religions are, where there’re no fiber optic cable, where there are no doctors.”

About the stable and unstable regions of the world, Barnett noted: “Across that Core I see integrating economies, the regular and peaceful rotation of leadership, and no real mass violence. . . . [there is] commonality in a struggle against global terrorism. Meanwhile, when I look at the other areas . . . . I see almost all the negative situations we’ve faced since the end of the Cold War. . . . in that Gap I found virtually all the wars, civil wars, ethnic cleansings, genocide, use of mass rape as a tool of terror, children forced or lured into combat activities, virtually all the drug exports, all the UN peacekeeping missions and almost 100% of the terrorist groups we’re fighting . . . . It’s a simplistic map, of course, but the match-up is profound: show me where globalization and connectivity are thick

**For DOD, such terms as “deterrence,” “détente,” “containment,” “crisis response,” “conflict management,” and “consequence management” are still current....**

*That’s got to change.*
and I’ll show you people living in peace. Show me where globalization hasn’t spread, and I’ll show you violence and chaos.”

**Human Security as Human Welfare**

From the lowest military commander to the highest, from Afghanistan to Iraq, and from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, those who implement national security policy on the ground and on the frontline must understand that outdated approaches will not succeed. Providing weapons, uniforms, equipment, and training to the security institutions of Afghanistan and Iraq will not pan out. Frontline leaders already understand that the Afghani and Iraqi people have a vote. Rather than guns, they want education. Rather than tanks, they want jobs. Rather than military formations, they want electricity and health care. To ensure our long-term national security, we must provide for their long-term human welfare and personal security. In fact, their national security will evolve from their human security.

The discourse over human security is really about human welfare and human rights. They are the means to an improved standard of living. Human security equates to dignity and a sense of well-being, to working for a greater sense of happiness and self-fulfillment. It is the means that allows competition within a free market economy and, secondly, a means to provide rights and human dignity.

Recognizing the concept of human security as a desirable condition rather than an international social issue has three advantages:

- It legitimizes the notion that international organizations have the responsibility to debate intercession in state sovereignty based on human security concerns.
- It allows communities maximum freedom to shape their own destinies and build the kinds of civil societies that suit them best.
- It preserves the unique distinction of human rights as a category of inalienable rights broadly accepted by the community of free nations.

**Recommendations**

To date, with no exception, a liberal democratic state appears to be, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, “the endpoint in mankind’s ideological evolution.” The goal of international relations discourse should be to strengthen the state as the best guarantor of the security and liberty of individuals and to preserve the core notions of evil that define regimes that sacrifice their right to sovereignty (e.g., genocide, unjustified war). Additionally, today’s policymakers must understand that there will always be threats to global peace and stability. It is human nature—we are a world forever divided by ethnicity, race, culture, language, religion and caste.

Divisions in society act as natural friction points. But friction can be lessened through the formulation of realistic, moral, and preemptive national security policies—policies that address economic, demographic, sociological, and environmental challenges. Therefore, a preemptive U.S. national security policy should:

- Retain recognition of geopolitical boundaries, and implement policies with an awareness that cultures, religions, and ethnic ties and allegiances ebb and flow freely across manmade boundaries.
- Encourage, foster, and promote broadened thinking on how human security imperatives are interwoven with domestic, social, economic, political, defense, and foreign-policy priorities.
- Promote study, dialogue, and debate on human security, human welfare, and human rights as cornerstones like-minded states can use to promote common programs of social, economic, and political development.
- Nurture the linkages between national security and human rights and discourage consideration of the two as mutually exclusive. Acting within the rule of law, national security policies must target and preempt those threat elements that endanger human rights, globalization, and the development of disadvantaged peoples.

Short-term, shortsighted policies that achieve instant political gratification via heavy-handed security and stability are not the answer. The United States must gather the courage and political will to implement long-term policies that foster and protect human security. War, aggression, violence, inequality, and all the negative aspects of living in a real world will continue to impact and affect individuals, states, and regions of the world. As long as this remains a reality of international politics and foreign relations, national security as a function and responsibility of the state will remain key to human security overall. Any discourse that suggests anything less risks making us less safe and less free. **MR**
Unlike Antoine Lavoisier*

Here is where it all goes wrong:
you’ve got twenty teams in perimeter
at the site of the bombing, boy,
quartered on the cloverleaf overpass
unable to see each other, some
local men start a scrap fire for tea
as if the world billowing from dust
is nothing new, squatting, while police
hover at the government building
unsure if they should blame themselves.
the blast, northwest of the bypass,
blooded ventricle, you’ve shut down
traffic, make them go around, pump them,
compress, suck, the flares sputter for
flat, safe landing, and slowly for the dead
a flight medic drapes and zips the bags.
Anticipation, rather than reaction, one team
must sacrifice its Igloo, ice and all; off
To find when the wrecker rolls it,
An experiment unlike blinking in the sand.

—CPT Benjamin Buchholz

*Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794), the “Father of Modern Chemistry,” used empirical methods to debunk much of what had passed for science prior to the Enlightenment. Through a series of experiments, he figured out that combustion and respiration are chemical reactions involving oxygen. As Commissioner of the Royal Gunpowder and Saltpeter Administration, he greatly improved the process for manufacturing gunpowder. In 1794, Lavoisier was sent to the guillotine by Robespierre. Legend has it that Lavoisier arranged one last experiment before his execution: after the blade fell he would blink his eyes as long as he could, so that his assistant might determine how long a man could retain consciousness after beheading. Lavoisier supposedly blinked between 15 and 20 times.
Statistics, Real Estate, and the Principles of War:
Why There is No Unified Theory of War

Dr. Jan S. Breemer

Callicratus: We’re lucky men, you and I. We’ve been present at the moment the world changed.
Eupolis: What’s that supposed to mean?
Callicratus: What’s new, what’s going to change the world, is that once they’ve beaten us they don’t let us go. They’re going to destroy this army, whatever it takes. I’ve been thinking about it, since we got cooped up in here, and I can’t think of a single instance where it’s happened before. Those men don’t want to win a battle and set up a trophy and be big heroes. They want to kill us, and they want to do it as efficiently as possible.

HAD HE HEARD of the principles of war, Callicratus might well have told his comrade-in-arms that their enemy had changed the principles.1 The above dialogue, from Tom Holt’s story of the Athenians’ last stand against the Syracusans in 413 BC, is fictional.2 The event itself is real. Hunted relentlessly by their enemies, Callicratus and Eupolis, together with thousands of other Athenian soldiers, had taken refuge in a walled olive grove. Here, they were subjected to a constant barrage of javelins and arrows. When the survivors surrendered, they were sold into slavery.3

For the Athenians, the slaughter in the orchard was a different kind of war. An army used to fighting wars for limited objectives, they faced an enemy whose aim was unlimited. As Victor Hanson has observed, battle for the classical Greeks meant that after an hour or so of intense, close-in fighting, victory went to the side that still held the field. The winners had won the right to build a trophy; the losers fled, leaving most of their weapons behind, but rarely in fear of being hunted down and killed by the equally exhausted victors.4 In 413 BC, the Syracusans broke the rules. They had defeated the Athenians by the “normal” standards of victory and defeat, but they decided to eliminate them once and for all; they would finish them off.5 They did so by violating another principle. Instead of fighting according to what Hanson has called the “Western way of war” and battling their opponents face-to-face with spears or swords, the Syracusans bombarded the Athenians with “cowardly” stand-off weapons.6

All Wars Not Created Equal
War has always changed. Few people will disagree, but most will quickly add that this is true only for the conduct of war, not its nature. This essay disagrees: all wars are not created equal. Clearly the essence of insurgency wars is different from that of conventional wars, and both are intrinsically different from nuclear war. The difference between the three turns on the relationship between politics and violence. It necessarily follows that the
bundle of ideas called “principles of war,” which apply to one “population” of wars, may have little or no relevance for others; those wars have their own principles. There is one other consideration. Principles of war not only vary between kinds of wars, they also change within wars. Some principles that appear cemented in stone today had no meaning in the past; conversely, principles we may not recognize today will be at the heart of tomorrow’s military doctrines.

What are these things called “principles of war”? “Principle” has a dozen or so dictionary definitions—“axiom,” “fundamental,” “law,” and such synonyms. Whatever these martial principles are, they clearly do not have the same stature as scientific principles. Not even the most committed student of military science will claim that the principles of war can describe, and even predict, phenomena that are invariably true. The best we can say is that they describe tendencies about the conduct of warfare, tendencies that can inform military strategic and operational decisions.

The principles of war are somewhat analogous to statistical probability statements. In statistics, a group of values is commonly displayed by way of a curve. The curve shows that as long as the group is drawn from a “normal population,” nearly 70 percent of the values lay within one standard deviation of the mean value in the group. For example, suppose homes in a neighborhood sold for a mean price of $200,000. Let us also assume a standard deviation of $30,000. This means that a buyer has enough information, and need not make further inquiries, to know that $170,000 to $230,000 will give him an almost 70 percent chance of finding a suitable home. The principles of war do basically the same thing. Using them, a military commander knows that based on experience, and all other things being equal, he is more likely to be right than wrong if he heeds principles one through nine.

The statistical analogy has limited validity, of course. For one, the principles of war are based on anecdotal, not statistical, evidence. Nevertheless, it is useful to continue the analogy. Suppose our homebuyer got word that one homeowner needs to move quickly and will sell below the market average, say, $160,000. In statistical terms, the price lays more than one standard deviation from the mean. Thanks to this bit of intelligence, the buyer can abandon his conservative strategy of committing up to $230,000. Similarly, the military commander who has the benefit of special intelligence about his opponent’s plans or dispositions can, in fact should, break the “rules.” The German panzers in May 1940 did exactly that; they could “safely” violate the principle of security and race ahead with flanks unprotected because, thanks to air superiority, the German field commanders knew where their opponents were.

Our ability to use sample data to make inferences, draw conclusions, and ultimately make predictions about the world-at-large critically depends on whether the data is valid—in other words, that the data represents the “reality” we are interested in. Thus, knowing that most houses in a neighborhood will sell for between $170,000 and $230,000 may not help the buyer who is looking in a different part of town. The validity issue is just as important in the study of war. Standard military doctrinal publications acknowledge that the relevance and importance of the principles change with circumstances, but insist that they are “fundamental tenets” nevertheless. In truth, there are principles of war, and then there are principles of war. Principles can serve the military commander as reliable signposts only if they are valid; that is, they are drawn from the same population of battles and wars he is fighting. The U.S. military’s nine principles of war belong to a particular “neighborhood” of warfare: conventional state-against-state war, in which the belligerents field organized armies that wear distinct uniforms so as to tell them apart from the (civilian) nonbelligerents. This kind of war has been the Western way of war for centuries, but,
in recent decades, it has increasingly been joined by wars from two very different neighborhoods: nuclear war and insurgency war. Each of those has its own principles.

**Principles of the Nuclear Neighborhood**

It is arrogant for students of war to claim a single, stable body of principles when the much more scientific physical sciences have yet to fulfill the dream of a unified Theory of Everything. Growing specialization, with each discipline claiming its own laws and principles, has marked the history of science. We see a parallel in the development of the principles of nuclear war, or rather principles of nuclear non-war. To begin with, not long after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were recognized as more than just particularly powerful versions of conventional high explosives—they threatened to change the very nature of war. Bernard Brodie wrote down the implication as early as 1946: “Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful military purpose.”

This simple statement became the foundation for our subsequent thinking about nuclear weapons. It set the stage for the development of a set of ideas about the problem of nuclear war, ideas that, because they dealt with the prevention of such a war, had to be radically different from the old principles. In fact, the specter of nuclear holocaust seemed to mark the ruination of Clausewitz’s basic definition of war as a political instrument. A handful of theorists made a valiant effort to prove the possibility of controllable and limited nuclear wars, but, in the end, it was broadly agreed that nuclear weapons were “different,” that this difference amounted to a “threshold” between the known and unknown in warfare, and that this threshold, if crossed, almost certainly spelled the end of politics. These were the givens that became the foundation for a whole series of principles addressing the deterrence and avoidance of nuclear war. Of these, the principles of mutual vulnerability and of mutual invulnerability are central.

The principle of mutual vulnerability proposes that for mutual deterrence to hold, both sides must ensure that the opponent remains confident of his ability to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction against the other’s civilian population. This means, for example, that neither side should build ballistic missile defenses. This principle is the essence of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Although the Principle of Mutual Invulnerability seems to contradict MAD, it does not. Mutual Invulnerability holds that both sides have an interest in ensuring that the other side is confident of its ability to survive a surprise first strike and then inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. The underlying assumption is that, come a crisis, the side whose nuclear weapons could be destroyed by a surprise attack might be under pressure to use rather than lose its missiles and strike first.

These and a series of subsidiary principles dealing with such problems as how to control escalation, how to signal credibility, and so forth, in many cases constituted rejections of the old verities. Thus, the traditional principle of offensive became meaningless under the new principles of mutual vulnerability and invulnerability. Similarly, the principle of mutual invulnerability essentially denied the conventional principle of surprise. It is important to recognize, however, that the new rules of nuclear non-war did not replace their conventional predecessors. This was not a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the sense that the new principles marked a more authoritative
insight into the overall phenomenon of war. Rather, the new and the old belonged to different neighborhoods of warfare.

**Principles of War in the Slums**

Since 1945, there have been a dozen or so conflicts that can be labeled conventional state-against-state wars. All others have been mostly intrastate wars variously called rebellions, guerilla wars, insurgency wars, wars of liberation, and so forth. Significantly, they are collectively described as “unconventional,” “irregular,” and, most recently, “asymmetric.” For our purposes here, we will use the term “insurgency.”

Insurgency has been around as long as regular warfare. One would therefore expect that a body of principles unique to it would have long been in place. Not so. The tendency has been for military professionals to treat insurgency as an exception to the rule, an anomaly that should not divert attention from “true” war and its “true” principles. The statistician would call insurgencies “outliers”—occasional exceptions to the normal and predictable distribution of events. The reality is that insurgency wars belong to an entirely different population of wars. To fight insurgencies according to the conventional principles would be like applying the real estate rules in suburbia to the slums in a city.

Insurgency wars embody a different relationship between politics and violence. If conventional state-against-state warfare is seen as a natural extension of international politics, and if nuclear warfare effectively spells the separation of politics and violence, then insurgencies mark the merging of politics and violence. In this kind of war, politics is violence, and violence is politics. Insurgencies are struggles about internal sovereignty; they are “competition[s] in government.” The insurgent’s rejection of the legitimacy of the existing system of sovereignty, or regime, means that he cannot be, by definition, part of the “normal” political process. Instead, his politics are aimed at proving and reinforcing the regime’s illegitimacy. His specific operational goal is to undermine, through violence, the most basic trappings of internal sovereignty and legitimacy: the regime’s monopoly on law and order.

One implication is that insurgent violence is directed only incidentally against the regime’s military. That is to say, the insurgent aim usually has far less to do with gaining an operational advantage—i.e., a military “victory”—than exposing the vulnerability of the regime’s principal instrument of internal sovereignty. This signifies that conventional measures of victory and defeat, such as numbers of casualties and terrain won or lost, rarely matter. In conventional wars, combatants seek to destroy each other’s military capability; in an insurgency, the rebels want to inflict pain and punishment. In the former, fighting is directed against the opponent’s physical capacity to resist; in the latter, the goal is to undermine his moral desire to continue fighting. Insurgent strategy has three targets: the regime in power, notably its security forces (including those of an outside backer); the
population at large; and in the case of an international backer, public support abroad.

As to the first target, a consistent theme in the history of insurgencies has been the difficulty regular armies have in maintaining high morale. First, by refusing to fight according to the normal rules of war—for example, by persisting despite casualties that conventional soldiers would find unacceptable—the insurgent deprives the regime soldier of the satisfaction of knowing he is getting closer to the “objective.” Frustration with lack of clear progress and with the insurgent’s “underhanded” methods has commonly led, in turn, to increasingly harsh retaliatory measures. Since all insurgency conflicts are to varying degrees “people’s wars,” and it’s difficult to tell insurgents from innocent civilians, the latter have commonly borne the brunt of any regime response. When this happens, the population tends to blame the regime. If lack of progress on the battlefield coincides with growing popular support for the insurgents (or at least growing disaffection with the regime), the third target in the insurgent’s campaign against morale becomes vulnerable: support at home for the regime’s foreign benefactor (if there is one). Because the benefactor’s stake in the conflict is usually smaller than the insurgents’, his threshold for pain is almost always lower. Once the insurgency’s three morale targets merge, the regime is almost certain to lose.

This leads to four clear-cut principles of insurgency wars (though there are others, no doubt). Some are deductive in the sense that they are distillations of the actual experience of insurgency conflicts; others are inductive of the basic proposition that, in this neighborhood, violence and politics are one.

● **The Principle of Morale.** Napoleon is supposed to have said that morale is to the physical as three is to one. The insurgent’s repeated ability to prevail despite being heavily outnumbered and outgunned, and despite far greater casualties, suggests that, in wars in the slums, the ratio between the two favors morale even more. This is equally true for the forces fighting the insurgents: the moral stamina to sustain the fight will weigh more heavily than the physical capacity. Moreover, just as it is the insurgents’ first priority to undermine their opponents’ morale, so the insurgents’ morale must be the first and foremost target of the counterinsurgency effort. Maintaining the morale of forces fighting insurgents requires, first of all, that troops believe they are fighting “the right war.” Ideally, this means that soldiers believe the issue at stake is vital. Next, forces must see concrete progress on the ground. It is especially important that they understand the connections between tactical and operational actions and the strategic big picture.

● **The Principle of Objective.** This “old” principle has a different meaning in insurgency wars. First, the objective in counterinsurgencies is not to kill insurgents. For insurgent movements to thrive, they must enjoy at least passive support from a considerable portion of the people. It therefore follows that the true objective of a counterinsurgency effort at the operational level of war is to separate the insurgents from the people. This has a political and a physical dimension. Politically, the counterinsurgency must hold out hope of a better future and a better regime than are offered by the insurgents. An important reason why the Malayan Emergency became a rare instance of insurgency defeat was the British promise of Malayan independence. It vastly undermined the communist insurgents’ claim to legitimacy as the people’s sole champion of independence. Measures to isolate the insurgents from their popular base must be seen as reinforcing the promise of a better future. While the immediate military aim is to dry up the insurgents’ sources of recruits, intelligence, money, etcetera, the overarching political goal is to free the people of terror and intimidation and to create an environment of law and order. In this regard, the highly successful U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam comes to mind.

There is an important corollary to the above. If the goal of separating the insurgents from the people is not undertaken early and consistently, and the insurgents are instead given the opportunity to become embedded in the population, it will be nearly impossible to dislodge them without inflicting severe collateral damage that risks aiding the insurgents in the battle for popular morale.
The Principle of the Defensive. In conventional wars, the objective is to destroy the enemy’s military. Doing so naturally highlights the principle of the offensive and what Clausewitz called the Vernichtungsprinzip (principle of destruction). In insurgency wars, killing insurgents is merely a means to the true objective of separating the insurgents from their population base. The priority of the new principle of the defensive follows logically. It does not deny the need for offensive search-and-destroy tactics when there is good intelligence. But the key operational presumption is that counterinsurgency forces are mainly in business to protect a given piece of territory and its inhabitants. In this sense, the counterinsurgency’s purpose resembles that of anti-submarine forces in World War I. Initially, the British Navy sought to defeat Germany’s U-boats by applying the offensive hunt-and-kill tactics that had served it so well in past wars on the surface of the seas. When the offensive strategy failed and the British recognized that their real goal should be to maximize the safety of shipping and cargoes, not sink U-boats, the defensive convoy system was introduced.

The Principle of Dispersion. The new principles of objective and the defensive dictate that concentration of force, so essential to the conventional battlefield, makes little sense in an insurgency environment. In the first place, it has been shown time and again that insulating the people from the insurgents requires a strategy of garrisoning—the establishment and gradual expansion throughout the countryside and urban areas of small but mutually reinforcing and very mobile military strong points. Insurgent raiding parties are usually small in number; in a fight with an equal number of professional soldiers, they almost always lose. This suggests that outposts should be built around company-sized units. Battalions or even larger formations are too big, too unwieldy, and have historically been shown to be too slow in responding to sudden emergencies. Physical dispersion must go hand-in-hand with dispersed command and control. It may be argued that this strategy will be highly vulnerable to the third and last phase of a Maoist people’s war, when insurgents have coalesced into full-blown regular armies. On the contrary. New technologies in the areas of reconnaissance, surveillance, and mobility strengthen the case for friendly dispersion, and invite enemy concentration.

Ideal and Real Principles of War

Clausewitz makes an important distinction between the abstract phenomenon of “ideal” war and the practice of “real” war. The first, he says, only exists in a theoretical world in which the collision of arms is uninhibited by chance, friction, and the intervention of politics. The “laws of probability,” he claims, determine the ebb and flow of real war. The conventional principles of war are the U.S. military’s “ideal” principles; they are the do’s and don’ts for fighting the kind of wars America excels at. We cannot exclude future conventional conflicts, in which case some, if not all, of the “old” principles will serve us well. But given America’s excellence at this kind of warmaking, the laws of probability dictate that most “real” wars of the future will likely be fought in the slums.

NOTES

1. Unless specified otherwise, the term “principles of war” refers to the U.S. military’s nine principles: objective, offensive, economy of force, mass, maneuver, unity of command, simplicity, surprise, and security.  
6. On the classical Greeks’ disdain for projectile weapons, see Hanson, 15-16.  
7. An example of how a modern-day principle of war would have been meaningless for armies of the past concerns the Macedonian phalanx. Armed with long, heavy spears, it was almost unbeatable in a set-piece battle in open terrain. It was also incapable of maneuver; for example, it could not deal with a sudden threat to its flanks. Its final demise came in 168 BC at Pydna in modern-day Greece, when it was defeated by a more maneuverable Roman legion.  
8. The influence of “intelligence asymmetry” on operations during the German campaign of 1940 raises possibly interesting questions about the stability of the principles of war in an information-rich combat environment.  
9. See, for example, British Maritime Doctrine BR 1806, 2d ed. (Norwich: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1999), 229.  
15. This is one of the themes of Gil Merom’s How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
16. Asprey, 787.  

Editor’s Note: This article was written in June 2005 and came to Military Review in the fall of the same year. In February of 2006, U.S. Joint Forces Command published the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations. Readers may notice some similarity between the figures in this article and some of the figures in the Commander’s Handbook. The similarity is coincidental.

In the May-June 2002 issue of Foreign Affairs, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described his strategy for transforming the U.S. military. Part of that strategy is to “change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war.”1 Fundamentally, joint doctrine describes how the armed forces think about war, and under the Secretary’s vision that thinking process is changing to meet the challenges posed by global terrorist organizations and potential nation-state adversaries. As part of this transformation, the old battle-proven objectives-based methods used to plan, execute, and assess operations are evolving into methods based on effects. But how radical should this evolution be? How will the traditional hierarchical focus on a center of gravity evolve into a focus on the connections among actions, effects, and objectives in pursuit of a desired end-state?

In recent years, effects-based planning and assessment has moved from doctrinal debate into operational implementation by the U.S. military. Although strategies to implement Effects-Based Operations (EBO) vary among the combatant commands and services, each faces the difficult task of planning and assessing operations. The Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series: Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations, provides valuable insight for implementing EBO.2 The pamphlet defines the concept; discusses in detail an effects-based approach to planning, execution, and assessment; and reviews operational implications for doctrine, leadership, education, and training. What’s missing, though, is any frame of reference showing how the objectives-based (in effect, center-of-gravity-based) planning concepts are folded into the EBO methodology.3 This essay therefore offers current planners a means for viewing centers of gravity through the prism of EBO.

Defining EBO

The definition of EBO has changed as the concept has developed, and for many, defining EBO has been like trying to hit a moving target. For the purposes of this paper, the definition in Pamphlet 7 suffices: “Operations that are planned,
executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.”

EBO Today

With the publication of Pamphlet 7 in 2004, the effects-based methodology has fully evolved from a linear strategy-to-task approach into a system-of-systems baseline to develop relationships (or linkages) between effects, nodes, and actions. The three key EBO components (planning, execution, and assessment) are enabled by a collaborative information environment and operational net assessment, the latter intended to provide a holistic understanding of the environment through a system-of-systems analysis (figure 1). Within each of the interrelated Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) systems, “nodes” represent a functional component of the system (person, place, or thing) while “links” represent the relationships (behavioral, physical, or functional) between the nodes.

In the effects-based planning method described in Pamphlet 7, an adversary system-of-systems analysis output determines the direct and indirect relationships between nodes across the PMESII that can be exploited by friendly actions. System-of-systems analysis results become the input for the development of a linkage between enemy nodes and friendly Effects, Nodes, Actions, and Resources (ENAR). Understanding these relationships allows commanders to choose from a set of ENAR options when developing and selecting courses of action. In figure 1, direct relationships exist between adjacent nodes A and B as well as between nodes B and C. Indirect relationships exist between nodes related via another node, in this case between nodes A and C. The ENAR construct also represents desired as well as undesired effects. In Pamphlet 7, desired effects are those that support strategic objectives while undesired effects are those that can adversely affect strategic objectives. At node C we can see an undesired effect caused by an action at node A.

The intent of system-of-systems analysis is to treat each PMESII element as a system and the entire PMESII structure as a system of systems. The product sought is a nodal analysis that forms the basis for coupling nodes to effects, actions, and resources. Notably, as described in the pamphlet, this approach does not employ the traditional center-of-gravity analysis outlined in joint doctrine.

Does changing the way the Department of Defense (DOD) thinks about war mean that the seemingly timeless concept of center of gravity has run its course? Or does such a change merely require us to adapt the concept to handle the complexities of warfare today?

Centers of Gravity through an EBO Prism

The authors of Pamphlet 7 identify the need to redefine center of gravity in broader terms if EBO is officially adopted. One approach to a broader definition is provided by Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron, who see centers of gravity as “dynamic and powerful physical and moral agents of action or influence with certain qualities and capabilities.”

In the system-of-systems methodology, Strange and Iron’s definition can be applied to nodes with

![Figure 1. Systems-of-systems model (2004 JWC Pam 7).](image-url)
influence over other nodes in the system. The level of influence of a node would be driven by the "qualities and capabilities" of that node. Further, Antulio J. Echevarria II argues that center of gravity could be redefined to mean "focal point." This definition also lends itself to the idea of a systems approach.

Strictly speaking, the system-of-systems approach in Pamphlet 7 does not need the idea of center of gravity to be effective. Therefore, another option is to adopt the network-based method and eliminate center of gravity altogether from joint doctrine. However, as a practical matter it is unlikely that planning staffs around the world would embrace a new methodology that does not address center of gravity, at least not in the short term. The issue then becomes, "What additional advantages does a systems approach offer, and what is the best way to view the concept of center of gravity in this new network construct?"

Based on Strange’s 1996 definition of center of gravity, the current center-of-gravity methodology is hierarchically structured. Capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities are arranged in a tree structure with nodes branching out from a center of gravity (figure 2). This approach is very effective at capturing the direct relationships between vulnerabilities and a center of gravity. It is not effective, however, at capturing the indirect relationships between two or more requirements of a given center of gravity or between multiple centers. The tree structure cannot account for the complexity added by indirect relationships. A network approach (figure 3), however, is flexible enough to "map causal relationships between components of the system," as Darrall Henderson demonstrates. In a network structure, capabilities, requirements, and other qualities contribute to the influence of each node, and the node with the greatest influence becomes the center of gravity. Visualizing the relationships between components of an adversary network is one significant advantage of a system-of-systems approach.

Fortunately, envisioning an adversary as networked rather than hierarchical does not mean we lose the fidelity available in the current center-of-gravity methodology. Referring again to figures 2 and 3, the hierarchical linkages in the current center-of-gravity model can be retained in the system-of-systems model while the indirect relationships can now be represented. In addition to retaining the information available through current center-of-gravity analysis, a system-of-systems approach can produce a descriptive model of the relationships between the components of the six PMESII systems—relationships not captured by current center-of-gravity modeling methods. Changing the way DOD thinks about war will not necessarily require us to conclude that Carl von Clausewitz was wrong. However, adapting the center-of-gravity concept to account for the complexities of warfare today is necessary, and a system-of-systems approach allows for this.

Adapting to the Complexity

To further adapt the center of gravity to the system-of-systems network approach presented in

![Figure 2. COG structure.](image)

![Figure 3. Network structure applied to a COG.](image)
Pamphlet 7, we suggest adding the idea of “maximum influence node” within a network. A maximum influence node is consistent with Strange and Iron’s broader definition of a center of gravity. In effect, this addition extends Pamphlet 7’s definition of a node as “a person, place, or thing” to include an “event.” For example, in Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Doshan Tapeh Air Base, nuclear weapons, and Ramadan—an event—are all potential nodes.

Robert S. Renfro and Richard F. Deckro suggest that a maximum influence node has two key characteristics: first, the node with the maximum influence is a pressure point; and second, the best way to influence (or act on) this pressure point may not be through a direct attack, but rather through other nodes within the system. Since influence and power are synonymous, the node with maximum influence within a given system is the most powerful node. This idea is also consistent with Echevarria’s “focal point” definition. Identified through systems analysis, the node with the maximum influence is also the center of gravity of a PMESII element.

A maximum of six nodes—one center for each system—could represent the centers of gravity of the PMESII construct. On the other hand, if the most influential node in the political system is also the most influential node in the social system, then these two PMESII systems will share the same center of gravity. In either case, the construct gives us insight into the relationships between system components.

Returning to the system of systems, figure 1 illustrates the meshing of centers of gravity into an effects-based methodology for a PMESII network. For simplicity, the network structure is limited. In figure 1, the filled-in (black) nodes represent the most influential nodes in the network and are the centers of gravity. With centers of gravity included, the development of a linkage between ENAR still follows directly from the system-of-system results, as Pamphlet 7 describes.

Considering ENAR is similar to listing capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities in order to develop courses of action, but because using ENAR allows for a broader understanding of the adversary, it gives the commander more options to employ as he seeks to achieve his desired outcome.

Recognizing that a link may be a more lucrative (or vulnerable) target than a node in terms of influence on the overall system, we add the link into the construct, so that effects, nodes, actions, resources becomes Effects, Links, Nodes, Actions, and Resources (ELNAR). Figure 4 combines the center of gravity and the linkage between ELNAR.

Figure 4. Regional terrorist group example.

Legend: COG, center of gravity; NGO, nongovernmental organization.
Figure 4 shows three systems (military, infrastructure, and economic) of a simplified PMESII network with the most influential node (or center of gravity) in each system being the same node (the filled-in circle). Effects, actions, and resources are linked to one node and one link. Secondary or indirect effects (dotted line and circle), both desired and undesired, are shown manifesting themselves through previously unknown nodes and linkages.

To illustrate in a more concrete manner, we will use two notional examples, one of a regional terrorist group (figure 4) and the other of a more conventional air defense system (figure 5). Our notional terrorist group, group A, has a presence in countries Orange and Black. Group B is a local ally in country Black, where it receives support from a nongovernmental organization and provides support to group A in the form of funding and fighters.

The maximum influence node, or center of gravity, is a training camp where both notional groups have sanctuary and reside. That is, the military, economic, and infrastructure elements of each group overlap at this node. Two of the notional desired effects are to disrupt the operation of group A and to kill or capture members of groups A and B. To that end effects, actions, and resources are matched to the center of gravity and to a transportation link between countries Orange and Black. In other words, we attack group A directly at the center of gravity and indirectly through the maritime transportation link. In this case, friendly actions have a desired effect of discovering a charity acting as a funding source, and the undesired effect of a public square bombing by a previously unknown cell or individual. While especially appropriate for acting against a terrorist organization, this system-of-systems methodology also applies in our more conventional example of an air defense system.

The network structure for a very simple air defense system is shown in figure 5. Note that only one PMESII system is represented in this case: the military. Additionally, our notional desired effect is air superiority in one cycle of darkness. For simplicity, we only show the air defense portion of the network (we do not show other potential elements such as connections to other adversary military forces). The air defense network consists of radar posts, airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, a weapons control post, and an operations center. The center of gravity (or most influential node) in our example is the operations center. Actions and resources are matched with the desired effect at the center of gravity and other nodes and links within the network. A secondary effect of these actions is the detection of a previously unknown missile site.
From these two examples, we see that the maximum influence node concept can incorporate the idea of a center of gravity. However, our examples are only intended to illustrate the feasibility of establishing a node of maximum influence as a center of gravity. An important caution is necessary at this point: in this new scheme, centers of gravity are a product of system-of-systems analysis, not the other way around; therefore, the EBO methodology does not permit a cookie cutter approach. Additionally, centers of gravity produced through a disciplined system-of-systems process may not be what some planners would consider traditional centers of gravity. For example, leadership is more often than not a default center of gravity. However, Russ Marion and Mary Uhl-Bien, through a network analysis of Al-Qaeda, have demonstrated that the direct influence of the core leadership over the network may be limited; thus, Al-Qaeda’s leadership is not the organization’s center of gravity. Finally, there are some important limitations to planning with the system-of-systems network.

**Limitations**

One practical limitation of the system-of-systems approach in Pamphlet 7 involves the size of the PMESII network itself. As we have seen with the previous examples, although the system-of-systems analysis was significantly simplified, the PMESII network still seems relatively complex. An actual PMESII network, depending on how they are constructed, could have hundreds of nodes for each PMESII element. In a quest to gain “total battlespace awareness,” a planning staff could induce self-paralysis by having too many nodes to consider.

Another problem will be the availability of data to populate the network. If intelligence cannot sufficiently describe the nodes and links within a PMESII element, the network may not permit identification of a center of gravity. Part of 21st-century operational art will involve deciding how many nodes and how much information is enough to conduct planning. Still, even in the absence of definitive information, the system-of-systems approach can supply a descriptive model of the adversary and an improved understanding of the relationships between components of the adversary system, neither of which are attainable using the old center-of-gravity-focused, objectives-based approach.

**Slowing Down the Prism**

Changing the way the military thinks about war means modifying the center-of-gravity concept to account for the complexities of warfare today. One method of accomplishing this adaptation is to mesh centers of gravity with the system-of-systems methodology by employing the concept of a maximum influence node. Doing so will enable planners to see centers of gravity through an EBO prism, which will provide a bridge during the transformation from the hierarchical strategy-to-task approach of the cold war to the network-structured practice of effects-based operations in the 21st century.

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**NOTES**

3. Objectives-based planning concepts are addressed principally in Joint Pub 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 5-00.1, Doctrine for Campaign Planning.
4. Pamphlet 7, 2.
5. Ibid, 10.
10. Strange and Iron.
12. Echevarria.
Among the many oddities on display in my home office is a print depicting Captain A. K. Wilson, Royal Navy, engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with an enemy warrior during Britain’s 1884-1885 Sudan War, an action for which he would be awarded the Victoria Cross. I often have wondered how a Royal Navy officer—and a captain, no less—found himself in the desert fighting Arab tribesmen.

In February 2003, I found myself serving ashore in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti deserts. At the time, I was attached to the Navy’s “Deep Blue” team, a unit created to develop innovative, transformational concepts for naval operations. Although my permanent duty station was the Pentagon, I had been assigned temporary additional duties with the staff of U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT), headquartered in Bahrain. Immediately after arriving in theater, I became NAVCENT’s liaison officer to the Coalition ground component (Army) commander, a position I filled throughout the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This posting, which took me to Kuwait and Iraq, caused me to reflect upon what the Navy could, and should, be contributing to the ongoing war in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

While I will offer examples from my own experiences in the Middle East, my purpose isn’t to tell a personal story, but to put forward ideas on how the Navy might make broader contributions to ongoing operations in that troubled region and on other battlegrounds in the war against terrorism. My recommendations will lack the drama of Captain Wilson’s heroic conduct. But, between his time and ours—and throughout the centuries that preceded both of us—there is a common heritage of Navy personnel participating in operations in the littorals and ashore.

Historical examples of Sailors engaged in similar missions include America’s early 19th century war with the Barbary pirates of North Africa, the deployment of Royal Navy gunners at the Battle of Ladysmith during the Boer War, the Yangtze River patrol that began in 1854 and lasted until 1942 (best known through the book and movie *The Sand Pebbles*), and Operation Market Time in Vietnam, to name but a few.

With its expeditionary culture rooted in its founding and cultivated throughout its history, the Navy always possessed an inherent flexibility that allowed it to be responsive in a variety of combat and related missions. More recently, in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as well as through all stages of OIF, Navy personnel were deployed to serve as liaison officers, planners, logisticians, and engineers. They also provided security, intelligence, weather, medical, clerical, and other services. Their
skills, mobility, and agility made them particularly valuable to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commanders.

**Expeditionary Missions**

Many essential missions in Iraq and in the war on terrorism are well suited to the capabilities of the Navy and its expeditionary Sailors. These missions aren’t limited to the important and more familiar contributions made by SEALs and Seabees, or to strike missions flown from carriers or launched from surface platforms. The Navy should consider what it can provide across a broader sweep of operational requirements falling outside its commonly accepted roles.

Let us consider three examples of Navy contributions to operations in Iraq—examples that focus on defending that nation’s vital, yet vulnerable, oil infrastructure.

**Oil terminal security.** On 24 April 2004, in the northern Persian Gulf, two Iraqi oil terminals, known collectively as OPLATs (oil platforms), were attacked by an undetermined number of bomb-laden suicide boats. Fortunately, alert Coalition maritime forces disrupted the attacks, although two Sailors and one Coast Guardsman were tragically killed. In 2004, over 90 percent of Iraq’s oil revenues were earned from exports delivered through these terminals. Months before the April attacks, the Coalition Maritime Force (CMF) commander in the Gulf had recognized their vulnerabilities and acted decisively to strengthen their defenses. In the days immediately following these attacks, a concerted effort was initiated to ensure the security of the OPLATs. In partnership with Deep Blue, the CMF commander sought out additional new technologies to strengthen platform defenses. Naval personnel rapidly identified and brought surveillance and protective capabilities into theater for installation on the terminals and for use by maritime boarding parties. The mission had a special urgency, and the Navy pursued it with appropriate seriousness and determination.

Through the summer and autumn of 2003, OPLAT defense was the responsibility of the Ground Force Commander in Iraq. But, he lacked the necessary tools and resources. This required the Navy to assess the OPLAT’s vulnerabilities and provide appropriate defense assets. When the task of protecting the OPLATs was turned over to the maritime commander in the region, his on-scene commander, a Navy captain, assembled a combination of U.S. and Coalition Navy and Coast Guard surface and supporting ships, Marines, Iraqi security guards, Navy Mobile Security Detachments, and Special Operations Forces to provide for their defense. A similar composite maritime task force had not been assembled since Operation Market Time in 1965.

**Oil security ashore.** It was clear that reinforcing only one section of the network would cause the enemy to direct attention toward less guarded locations. Of particular concern was the vulnerability of those sites ashore that fed oil to the platforms at sea. Sensing that the same problems found on the OPLATs—poor material condition and lack of adequate defenses—existed throughout Iraq, the Navy began to consider what it could quickly contribute to assist in the protection and restoration of those sites.

The Coalition Provisional Authority and Oil Ministry needed a thorough survey of Iraq’s oil infrastructure to appraise the condition of equipment and facilities and to establish priorities for repair and reconstruction. This type of work did
not necessarily demand engineers; it simply needed someone with the know-how to conduct inspections and the ability to evaluate operational opportunities and vulnerabilities. In May and June of 2004, Navy personnel from Allied Naval Forces Central Europe were actively engaged in such surveys on Iraq’s Al Faw Peninsula. As veterans of innumerable Propulsion Examinations, Combat System Reviews, and other material inspections, who in the military is better at inspecting systems and putting together restoration and repair plans than Navy Surface Warfare Officers? Sailors more commonly engage in mechanical rather than civil engineering (with the notable exception of the Seabees), but there’s a common engineering mindset that can offer solutions to the problems of post-combat reconstruction.

Having completed its inspection tour of the Al Faw Peninsula, the team proceeded to Baghdad where it presented its report on the state of the southern pipeline, complete with photographs, to the Coalition military commander responsible for infrastructure protection throughout Iraq. The photos showed damaged, severely corroded, or missing components and equipment. No doubt similar conditions existed throughout the country. Although the survey was cursory, it was persuasive, inspiring Coalition leaders to take more aggressive corrective and protective action.

Coastal security. Complicating the challenge of protecting the vital flow of oil was the more difficult task of managing the battle hand-off space between the predominately British Army ground forces ashore and the predominately U.S. Navy forces at sea. The Navy commander on-scene (the same officer responsible for defending the OPLATs) devoted considerable attention to this issue. For example, the insurgents who planned and executed the attacks on the OPLATs did not execute all their plans at sea. They lived, planned, and assembled needed equipment ashore from support bases on the Al Faw Peninsula. It quickly became apparent that the surest way to protect the offshore infrastructure was to hunt the terrorists down before they put to sea and became a direct threat. This required thorough, ongoing land-sea coordination between forces. The naval commander had to work from a common doctrine that used the same terminology as his onshore Coalition counterpart.

In a similar vein, the ground and maritime commanders were challenged to protect shipping bound for Iraq’s major export ports, Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr. Both ports are located approximately 50 miles inland along the Khawr ‘Abd Allah Channel (see map), an exposed, vulnerable channel in need of constant dredging. Proper protection of this channel requires coordination between forces afloat and forces along the banks. This might not appear to be difficult, but it is. Waterborne naval patrols can easily mistake friendly forces ashore...
for the enemy—and vice versa—with the obvious potential for disastrous results.

A need for proper boats, weapons, detection devices, and communications gear compounded the inherent difficulty of these missions. However, the greatest problem wasn’t equipment, but the lack of a common doctrine on how to coordinate and conduct these types of operations. The Navy has a responsibility to the Nation to learn how to perform this mission. This means more than simply investing in the required resources. It requires developing doctrine and training to a standard for operating boats and other vessels in inland waterways in cooperation with ground forces ashore.

Going Forward

It is not my purpose to put forward a comprehensive list of what Sailors are capable of providing in support of inland and littoral combat operations. My objective is to raise the issue for discussion. The Navy has much to contribute in the way of coastal and riverine warfare, support to Special Operations Forces, intelligence, and maritime intercept operations.

The Navy does a lot already, but can do more. To that end, the Director of the Navy Staff has published a memorandum titled “Implementation of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Guidance—Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Capabilities,” dated 6 July 2005. In it, the former CNO directed several actions to expand the Navy’s capabilities to prosecute the GWOT, among them the establishment of a riverine force in both the active and reserve components, the formation of a civil affairs battalion, the creation of a Navy Expeditionary Sailor battalion concept, and the development of a Navy Expeditionary Training Team concept.

Sailors not only have specialized skills which could be put to excellent (if non-traditional) use, but also possess a core set of talents that our Nation sorely needs in order to successfully prosecute the ground portion of the GWOT. Lest anyone doubt that the Expeditionary Sailor can offer something of value to ground combat operations, I submit the following observation from the Battle of Ladysmith: “Upon the height thus won General Buller [Lieutenant General Sir Redvers Buller, the British Army commander] planted his powerful artillery. The naval 12-pounders were stationed behind sandbag defenses, which enabled them to defy the enemy’s projectiles.”

The U.S. Navy clearly has important capabilities to contribute. The expeditionary mission is worth embracing. MR

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1. Former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clarke created Deep Blue shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America. Its initial mission was to develop innovative, transformational concepts for maritime combat operations. Since then, it has participated in a wide range of naval missions such as developing the Expeditionary Strike Force and Fleet Response Plan concepts and identifying Navy operational lessons learned from OIF and OEF.

2. Neither the Khawr Al-Amaya oil terminal nor Al-Basra oil terminal is an oil well. Oil is piped underwater from the mainland to the terminals, then loaded onto ships for export.

IN 1997 THE ARMY inaugurated a new officer evaluation system and a redesigned Officer Evaluation Report (OER), Department of the Army Form 67-9. The popular previous version had been compromised by an insidious inflation during the 19 years of its existence, as more and more officers received above-average ratings. Instead of reserving such ratings for the exceptional few, senior raters awarded top-block evaluations to nearly all officers as a matter of course. The records of average versus superior performers became increasingly hard to distinguish from each other, complicating the task of identifying officers best qualified for advancement.

The Army implemented the new OER to fix this. The main feature of the new document was a major curtailment of senior-rater discretion. Instead of the complete freedom that the previous system granted to senior raters, the new system limited the number of top-block ratings to 49 percent or fewer of the total. Excess top block ratings (more than 49 percent) appear in the rated officer’s records as “center of mass” (COM). The intent was to create a clear distinction among officers that was not present under the previous, inflated report.

Nearly a decade later, however, inflation—the bane of the old OER—has given way to a new pitfall, distortion. The distortion emanates from two sources. The first is the failure of many senior raters to base their evaluations on a well-developed senior-rater philosophy. This produces a reactive approach to OERs in which the main factor is neither performance nor potential, but the senior-rater’s profile at the time he or she renders the report. Above Center of Mass (ACOM) reports are awarded almost on a first-come, first-served basis, depending on how close to the 49 percent cap the senior rater is.

The second distorting factor is a pervasive sense of entitlement. Senior raters often implicitly assume that every officer is entitled to his or her “fair share” of top block reports and to an equal shot at promotion. Senior raters frequently pass over those most qualified for ACOM reports in order to take care of less qualified officers facing impending selection boards.

Clearly, senior raters consider performance and potential when rendering ratings, but many are reluctant to make the tough call that decides which officers stand out from the rest. This is sometimes less pronounced in mature profiles large enough to accommodate ACOM reports for both those who deserve them and for those who merely need them. In the final analysis, however, senior raters seem strongly inclined to choose against the best qualified officers in favor of others based on a perceived need instead of merit.
In short, senior raters frequently render reports on the basis of expedience.

The 1997 OER system may be more effective than its predecessor at identifying the best qualified officers, but distortion distracts from its effectiveness. This effectiveness can be bolstered, however, by changing senior-rater practices and by further reforming the OER system.

Senior raters can accomplish the first change within the framework of the system as it exists now. Every senior rater must adopt a rating philosophy that assumes that evaluation reports exist not to give every officer an equal chance at advancement, but to give the best qualified officers the greatest chance of advancement. This is a critical distinction. Individual officers are not entitled to an equal chance at promotion. Rather, they are entitled to a fair and equitable review of their qualifications as reflected in fair and accurate OERs, and to be promoted if they are found to be best qualified. A model senior-rater philosophy is depicted in the matrix below.

Under this rating method, the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel would be terminal grades at which officers might reasonably expect to culminate their careers. The ranks of second lieutenant through major would be developmental grades at which officers would not be expected to culminate their careers; for these officers, potential for successful service at higher grades would be a requirement for retention in the force.

Improved senior rater practices alone are not enough, however. They will always feel pressure to render expedient ratings to accommodate the needs of particular officers regardless of actual performance and potential. Certain anomalies within the OER system itself aggravate this phenomenon. For example, current practices force senior raters to relegate some COM evaluations to officers despite superior performance and potential until the senior rater’s profile has matured sufficiently to support ACOM evaluations.

Unfortunately, the current system requires senior raters to consider individual ratings in isolation rather than within the context of the rated population, encouraging a reactive cycle driven by the status of their profiles. Coupled with the entitlement mentality, this frequently results in unjust ratings that distort the image of the officer corps presented to selection boards. Systemic change is required.

One approach would be to transform the management of senior-rater profiles. The current method, under which a senior rater has a single profile which he or she must manage over the course of a career,
should be replaced with a profiling system based on annual cohorts. Under a cohort system, rather than rendering reports throughout the year as they come due, senior raters would complete OERs based on annual cohort cycles.

A senior rater’s annual cohort cycle would begin when he assumes a new duty position. Senior raters would complete the narrative portion of each OER when due just as they do now, but would decide the box-check portion of all ratings in a single cohort on the first anniversary of having assumed the duty position. Senior raters reassigned before this anniversary would complete all ratings at the time of reassignment.

This cycle would repeat each year during the senior rater’s tenure in the position. The profile would automatically restart on the completion of each cohort cycle, so each senior rater would have a series of annual profiles instead of the single career-long profile he must use today.

Most rules governing OERs would remain intact under the cohort system, including rules governing rater and senior-rater eligibility. The senior rater would rate all officers with rating periods ending during the cohort cycle, provided he is eligible to do so under current rules. Raters would render reports for their subordinates when due under the rules in place now. The senior rater would draft the narrative portion of the OER immediately, as is the case under the current system.

The completed OER, with rater and senior-rater comments—but temporarily sans the senior-rater profile—would be submitted and filed in the rated officer’s records just as now, except that it would be filed as an interim report, pending profiling of the cohort. Instead of an ACOM, COM, or BCOM rating, this portion of the interim report would state “cohort not yet profiled.” The interim report would then be available in the officer’s record for promotion and selection boards should they convene before the end of the cohort.

Assignment of ACOM, COM, or BCOM ratings would be deferred until the end of the cohort cycle, at which time the senior rater would choose one of these ratings for all officers at the same time. An exception would be made, however, for BCOM reports. Senior raters rendering BCOM reports would have the option of profiling the report immediately to give the rated officer the maximum opportunity to improve his or her performance during subsequent rating periods, rather than deferring that portion of the OER to the end of the cohort cycle. The senior rater’s profile would not be based on the number of reports he previously rendered as is the case now, but rather on the number of officers rated during the cohort cycle.

Profiling would be managed electronically. At the end of the cohort period, the senior rater would assign ACOM, COM, or BCOM ratings, retaining the current constraint limiting ACOM reports to 49 percent or fewer of the total. The senior rater would profile and re-sign the OER electronically and forward it via e-mail to the rated officer, who would then electronically re-sign the profiled document. The profiled OER would then replace the unprofiled OER in the officer’s record. This paperless profiling system allows execution of the process no matter where the rater, senior rater, and rated officer are located and no matter what their status, even if they are reassigned, deployed, or released from active duty before the end of the cohort cycle.

Transitioning to a cohort profiling system would benefit the officer corps in several ways. Ratings would provide a more valid assessment of each officer because all officers rated during the same cohort cycle would have served in closer proximity to one another in time, space, and circumstances. Forcing senior raters to consider all subordinate officers at the same time and in the same context would reduce the reactive, haphazard handling of senior-rater evaluations so common today. Finally, this approach would reduce the incidence of superior-performing officers receiving COM reports simply because their senior rater has a small or immature profile, or because they joined the unit later than less qualified but already rated officers.

The 1997 OER reform was an important achievement, but should be regarded as an interim reform. Building a truly effective officer evaluation system will require even more, and farther reaching, reform. 

NOTES

Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy

Sarah Sewall

While the updating of U.S. Army counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is long overdue, its imminent arrival is cause for celebration. The reality, however, is that the military doctrine won’t fully address two challenges that remain critical for its ultimate success. One—altering approaches to risk—confronts an inhospitable politico-military culture and institutional history. The other key issue—the need for all components of the U.S. Government (USG) to develop shared assumptions and expectations in COIN—is above the pay grade of military doctrine. If the United States expects to be engaged in COIN in the future—and some would argue that the Long War is essentially countering a global insurgency—it had best address these issues rather than assume that forthcoming military doctrine resolves them.

I. Military Doctrine Review

In February 2006, an odd fraternity of experts diligently combed through a revision of Field Manual-Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations. It was an unusual crowd of veterans of Vietnam and El Salvador, representatives of human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, academic experts, civilian agency representatives, journalists, and active duty U.S. and foreign military. At the behest of Lieutenant General David Petraeus, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, the assembly sought to make decades-old Army and Marine Corps doctrine freshly applicable to the contemporary insurgencies. The doctrine needed obvious updating to account for modern technologies, military capabilities, and operational concepts; to create a new breed of forces equipped to engage a global terrorist network; and to better address modern political and normative realities.

Perhaps more critically, the doctrinal update required reckoning with the enduring truths and dilemmas facing any counterinsurgency. These reflect lessons from prior British, French, and other foreign-power operations as well as from America’s war in Vietnam. Ironically, perhaps, it is these persistent truths about COIN that pose the greater challenge for U.S. forces. Two points in particular stand out. The first is the counterintuitive need to accept greater physical risks to personnel in order to achieve political and military objectives. This is a particular challenge for the American military, which, as Russell Weigley showed, has spent decades developing a style of warfare that institutionally minimized those risks. The second point is the need for an integrated government strategy in an era when the military is often both the first tool and last resort of U.S. policy and many intra-government efforts fall short of the mark.

Breaking the conventional paradigm. For decades, the U.S. Army in particular had discounted the need to prepare for counterinsurgency—a messy, hydra-headed conflict that can, by its very nature, only be won incrementally. One reason for ignoring the challenge was that, as Vietnam so painfully underscored, COIN is hard to do well. A related but deeper factor is that effective counterinsurgency efforts confront core American predilections. American culture and U.S. military doctrine prefer a technological solution and the overwhelmingly decisive blow. Americans have a penchant for black-and-white clarity and have historically shown little patience for complexity and extended commitment. We Americans also like to win on our own terms. And, with the major exception of Vietnam, the United States has been remarkably successful in modern warfare.

Accordingly, much of the U.S. military’s post-Vietnam efforts focused on neat, linear, and decisive concepts of warfare. Taking refuge in the Powell Doctrine, the armed forces prepared to fight and win conventional conflicts. Large massed formations, heavier weapons employed at increasing distances, and overwhelming force at the strategic and tactical level were the hallmarks of U.S. planning. Unconventional war, if it reared its head, was relegated to the subculture of U.S. special operations. But wishing away messy, multidimensional, and lengthy conflicts has not been an adequate solution.

Having so diligently shaped their units and strategies for the conventional fight, our forces were ill-prepared for operations that didn’t fit that paradigm. After Operation Desert Storm, however, that’s what U.S. ground forces have faced. During the 1990’s, the Army and Marine Corps dutifully labored through small-scale stability operations from Haiti to Kosovo. Since 9/11—except, perhaps, for the first month of the Iraq invasion—it has all been messy, multidimensional counterinsurgency for American forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond.

Institutional and cultural challenges. The U.S. military has belatedly recognized the need to address the COIN challenge. Enormous energy is now being devoted to the “engines of change”—revising doctrine, revamping training, restructuring organizations, adding elements (e.g. Special Forces, intel units, infantrymen, military police, etc.), introducing new equipment, and even dramatically adapting schoolhouse curricula—all informed by a robust effort to capture insights and lessons from ongoing operations. Much of this version of transformation is the antithesis of the information- and technology-centric transformation.
touted within the Beltway. The process of change relies heavily on the vision and leadership of key individuals in the Army, including Petraeus and Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, Commander of the Multi-National Corps, Iraq. Having experienced the realities of Operation Iraqi Freedom, these leaders have recognized a responsibility to prepare troops to meet the wars that call them, not the wars they might prefer to fight.

Yet there should be no illusions about the simplicity of the task. There is a reason that T.E. Lawrence likened fighting guerrillas to “eating soup with a knife.” It remains counter-institutional within the armed forces—and countercultural within the United States—to think about the simplicity of the task. There is a reason that T.E. Lawrence would deem prudent (e.g., respond only to accurate fire, and only if the shooter can be identified). Consider the example of Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes, commander of the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, whom President Bush praised for defusing a potentially explosive clash with Iraqi townspeople in Najaf. Hughes responded to growing violence from an angry crowd of hundreds by commanding his soldiers to kneel and point their weapons to the ground. His was an effective but unconventional response. Consider, too, the instances in which U.S. Soldiers and Marines have used nonlethal methods or a calculated additional moment to avoid turning a check-point incident into a tragedy. There is no question that the restrained use of force can, certainly by individual incident and in the short term, equate to increased physical risk for counterinsurgent forces. Yet counterinsurgency demands increased acceptance of physical risks to forces in order to enhance the prospects for strategic success.

This is an operational requirement—not a normative preference. It must be factored into the design and conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The risk differential helps explain why COIN appears to require counterintuitive thinking and actions on the part of military forces, particularly with regard to the emphasis given to force protection. Failure to understand why and how risk levels must differ in COIN can undermine the prospects for mission success.

Risk tolerance is reflected at the strategic and operational levels during campaign planning when forces and capabilities are allocated. At the tactical level, guidance regarding the escalation of force and specific rules of engagement play a larger role in shaping degrees of risk. U.S. forces assume different force-protection postures based on a variety of factors, including political objectives, threat assessment, and nature of the mission. By law, policy, and doctrine, U.S. forces generally seek to minimize risk to the maximum extent possible.

COIN is a particularly dynamic, decentralized, and three-dimensional form of warfare because the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation are more interdependent than in typical conventional operations and because the end-state cannot be achieved strictly by military means. Both the level of threat and focus of tactical effort may differ dramatically among sectors and over time. Moreover, political considerations—the most overarching of which is the need to create and support Host-Nation (HN) legitimacy—must have primacy. For these reasons, a short-term focus on minimizing risks to counterinsurgent forces can ironically increase the risks to the larger campaign, including the longer-term vulnerability of U.S. forces.

Of course, many insurgent groups exhibit different attitudes about risk—risk to their own forces and risk to the civilian population—further complicating the challenge for U.S. forces. Cultural, political, religious, or other factors often imbue insurgencies with significant casualty tolerance. The United States was slow to accept this fact in Vietnam. U.S. forces today struggle with an enemy willing to execute suicide missions and invert the laws of war by routinely targeting and placing civilians at risk. These insurgent attitudes and tactics not only undermine “rational” approaches to risk, they vastly complicate U.S. responses on the battlefield.

Enhancing the safety of U.S. forces has involved both concepts and actions (including passive and active measures). Operational concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) may variously emphasize risk assumption or minimization. Passive measures include improved intelligence, body armor, and heavily protected vehicles. Active measures frequently equate to greater reliance on the use of force. This reliance has several dimensions, including the speed/frequency of employing kinetic versus non-kinetic means, the routine application of greater levels of force, and the application of force from greater distances and/or with less definitive target identification.

When force protection is of paramount concern, the resulting decisions and actions can produce a myriad of unintended negative effects. For example, commanders might require that troops operate only in large numbers with heavy firepower, they might rely on airpower instead of infantry where the latter is more appropriate, or they might direct vehicles to move routinely at high speeds. Sometimes these courses of action are entirely
appropriate. However, each of these examples can have broader second-order effects. The large-convoy requirement may impede flexibility and intelligence gathering, privileging airpower could result in more intense applications of firepower than necessary for specific objectives, and speeding vehicles can inadvertently antagonize or injure civilians. These results are inconsistent with the principles of effective counterinsurgency.

In fact, the short-term tolerance of casualties is directly linked to strategic success. This central paradox is noted in the new COIN manual: the more you protect your force, the less secure you are. But this point is not yet widely understood or accepted within U.S. circles.

**Strategic value of risk tolerance.** Increased assumption of risk is implicit in the following objectives, each of which is critical for enhancing HN legitimacy and overall COIN success:

- **Minimize civilian impact and backlash.** COIN must restore security and normalcy for the population and be conducted in a manner that enhances HN legitimacy. Attaining passive or active indigenous civilian support hinges in large measure on the degree of confidence that the HN, not the insurgents, can provide a more secure future. Frequent and swift reliance upon force, or routine application of maximum allowable (versus minimum required) firepower can cause unnecessary civilian harm and thereby antagonize the local population. Such actions can crucially affect the attitudes and motivations of sympathetic or neutral civilians, which can dry up local information and cooperation and create sympathy, support, and recruits for insurgents. Unless U.S. military operations are conducted with significant risk tolerance, they may create more enemies than they eliminate.

- **Facilitate integrated operations.** Higher risk acceptance often proves essential for creating a greater level of security for the nonmilitary partners needed for a broader counterinsurgency effort. The military alone cannot provide economic reconstruction, political reform, and social assistance on the scale or for the duration that most COIN requires. Nonmilitary actors, to include other USG agencies, contractors, international and regional organizations, host nation agencies, and NGOs must be able to operate safely and effectively on the ground. The precise nature or degree of security required for different types of actors and organizations has not yet been clearly defined, and the military needs greater clarity on this point. Yet it is self-evident that the more secure the environment, the more numerous and significant in scale nonmilitary efforts can be. In the absence of adequate security, the nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency efforts cannot take hold and the prospects for strategic success are greatly reduced.

- **Show American values.** Restraint on the part of U.S. forces can enhance positive perceptions of the United States and, by extension, the HN itself. Closely controlled use of force and greater risk tolerance demonstrate an American commitment to the highest ethical, moral, and legal standards. In addition to avoiding harm to U.S./HN reputations, such restraint offers the local population (and HN security forces) a clearly preferable model of conduct. U.S. officials frequently bemoan the inadequacy of the government’s communications efforts in both ongoing wars and the broader fight against terrorism. U.S. actions are likely to prove the most effective communications tools. When U.S. actions are consistent with American values, information operations can more effectively contrast U.S./HN values and actions with those of the insurgents or terrorists. Concrete and consistent examples, coupled with the civilian population’s personal experiences, are the most powerful route toward countering insurgent propaganda.

- **Demonstrate U.S. resolve.** Greater risk assumption, when understood and accepted in the United States, can also signal the strength of the U.S. commitment to mission success. U.S. forces continue to suffer from a worldwide perception that casualties will erode domestic support for military operations. Low risk tolerance—particularly outside the spectrum of high-intensity conventional conflict—only strengthens that perception, which in turn increases risks to all Americans.

Therefore, even where the intensity of violence is high, it is often counterproductive to use force in a manner that—while fully consistent with conventional doctrine and training—could undermine the strategic purpose of counterinsurgency. The emerging emphasis on escalation-of-force measures in Iraq reflects a growing awareness of the problem.

In sum, while acceptance of greater risk alone will not guarantee success, it remains a necessary ingredient in any COIN strategy. Because more risk is likely required to achieve both military and nonmilitary success, increased risk tolerance may be the linchpin on which COIN success ultimately hinges.

**Moving from principle to practice.** The new COIN field manual, to its great credit, acknowledges the need for greater risk tolerance. Yet it is one thing to state the point; gaining widespread acceptance of this principle and then transforming it into practice will prove far more difficult. Increased risk assumption has obvious implications across the spectrum of routine and pre-deployment training, doctrine, and education. It must also be factored into operational design and anticipated troop-to-task ratios across the spectrum of capabilities, to include logistics and medical support. For example, some of the most successful units in Operation Iraqi Freedom swapped firepower for additional intelligence specialists and conducted more frequent but smaller patrols. It is worth noting that civilians in government must similarly address questions of increased risk tolerance if they are to be effective partners in COIN.

There are many reasons for both conceptual and practical resistance to rethinking risk. First, for decades conventional doctrine and training have stressed the primacy of firepower and technology in operations and have increasingly emphasized the importance of force-protection measures. Force protection has also been a priority at the lower end of the spectrum of operations, such as during stability operations in the Balkans. The broader risk aversion of American society generally has helped create a political-military culture that, in relative terms, has been shielded from risk.

Furthermore, the inherent nature of COIN poses additional barriers to assuming greater risk in practice. For one thing, the successful conduct
of COIN requires empowering lower level commanders with maximum flexibility to adapt to local conditions and opportunities. While decentralized responsibility is essential for adaptive operations, it can create additional psychological barriers to reducing the emphasis on force protection.

The problem is amplified by the apparent absence of immediate and concrete advantage in assuming greater risk. Simply put, COIN success is elusive and difficult to measure. Instead of a radical and lasting tactical military or political victory, success often lies in simply mitigating counterproductive effects (avoiding the foul). Yet justifying decisions is easier when, at the end of the day, the hill is clearly taken, despite the losses that may have been incurred. When greater risk simply avoids harming overall operational objectives—without providing measurable progress—risk assumption may prove harder to sustain. Again, this is likely to be particularly acute in decentralized operations where the bigger picture is harder for a unit commander to assemble. Calculated in a strictly military context, the cost/benefit analysis of force protection can produce an equilibrium that does not meet the larger political campaign goals most effectively.

For all of these reasons, it may be necessary to appear to overstate the risk-assumption requirement in doctrine and training in order to induce the requisite changes in Soldiers’ understanding and actions. COIN confronts an institutional history, practice, and set of assumptions that run in the other direction. There are obviously risks that such an overemphasis will be perceived as straying from prudent force protection. Therefore, just as the standing rules of engagement reiterate the self-defense requirement, so must any risk reorientation for COIN emphasize the continuing centrality of self-defense even as the escalation of force is to be more tightly controlled.

Central to any sustained change, though, is an expanded appreciation of the relationship of risk assumption to mission success and a COIN exit strategy. This is the logical conclusion of emergent efforts to define and implement escalation-of-force measures. To avoid creating more new enemies than a given operation eliminates; to demonstrate the professionalism, moral distinction, and commitment of U.S. forces; and to enable non-American and nonmilitary actors to assume ultimate responsibility for the COIN effort, military forces must tolerate higher levels of risk in the conduct of COIN operations.

Equally important, civilian leaders must endorse and explain this operational requirement and ensure that the American public accepts the risk corollary of counterinsurgency. Our democratic system of government and the voluntary character of our armed forces require all Americans to grapple with the risk requirements for successful counterinsurgency. In turn, greater risk tolerance must be factored into all aspects of COIN, most critically any national command authority decision to commence a counterinsurgency campaign. While the risk corollary may be difficult for American leaders and citizens to accept, it is vital for the United States’ ability to fight the Long War effectively.

III. A National COIN Strategy

Given the relative paucity of official thinking and writing on counterinsurgency during the past four decades, there is insufficient USG understanding of COIN among both military and nonmilitary actors. Therefore, in an effort to fill the vacuum of knowledge across all levels of the USG, the draft field manual shifted uneasily between strategic guidance and the minutiae of tactics, techniques, and procedures. The authors recognized the danger of depriving Soldiers of a workable field manual, but at the same time they understood the document’s potential role in helping orient a broader and higher level USG audience toward COIN principles and requirements. The interrelationship between political decisionmaking on the one hand and military requirements and execution on the other is glaringly apparent in COIN. And while the military desire to plug USG knowledge gaps is understandable, ultimately the civilian leadership must take responsibility for creating a counterinsurgency “meta-doctrine.”

Craft national doctrine. The most startling feature of the field manual is the primacy it accords to the political. The manual purveys military doctrine, yet that doctrine recognizes that the military framework and military tools have limited utility in the overall campaign. Political reform, communications strategies, economic development efforts, and other civilian activities are critical aspects of responding to an insurgency. It is axiomatic, therefore, that the ultimate success of COIN hinges upon the civilian conceptualization of the COIN challenge and the broader USG response.

How civilian actors carry out their responsibilities, or fail to coordinate or execute them, will of course have a significant impact on the ground. But unity of effort and competence in execution are meaningless unless unity of purpose has been collectively articulated and agreed upon. If military units individually achieve tactical goals with mutually contradictory results, we can hardly consider their efforts a success. Doctrine exists to provide conceptual coherence, supported by standardized and coordinated execution. Because of its ongoing responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq and its institutional reliance upon doctrine, the military has sought to fill the conceptual vacuum. Yet the primacy of the political in COIN demands that military doctrine flow from the creation of an integrated civil-military approach to COIN.

To conduct COIN effectively, though, much of what the military does on the ground should flow from clearly articulated U.S. policy guidance on everything from support of political reform to economic development, including related expectations of the host nation. In reality, though, such clarity does not always exist, in part because of unresolved tensions between the military and civilian sides and amongst civilian agencies. Even before issues of resources and roles are engaged, COIN operations can be hobbled by competing orthodoxy about achieving the general goals or the desired sequencing and prioritization of efforts.

The most basic elements of a COIN strategy still beg a myriad of questions. Take the goal of political reform. Is it necessarily synonymous with democratization? Do the local citizens and leaders shape that process? Will promoting national elections increase or decrease national unity or the security situation? How should the United States reconcile an American fixation on civil and political rights with the economic
and social needs that may be more pressing for the local population? The goal of economic reconstruction can be similarly deceptive. What principles should guide the effort? Meeting humanitarian need? Advancing the political process? Rewarding cooperation with the host nation? Three years into the Iraq war, the United States is still debating whether to focus assistance on immediate employment of Iraqi men to help stabilize communities and improve security or on broader economic reform and privatization, which can increase social dislocation, at least in the short term. Transporting unexamined U.S. policy orthodoxy into a COIN context can prove problematic.

In almost every arena (or line of operation), U.S. counterinsurgent efforts will struggle to reconcile American ideas and values with local traditions, culture, and history, which can increase social dislocation, at least in the short term. Transporting unexamined U.S. policy orthodoxy into a COIN context can prove problematic.

Know your capabilities. After attaining greater conceptual clarity about COIN strategy, the United States can more usefully consider whether it possesses the expertise and capabilities required to implement that strategy. A COIN capacity assessment will rediscover many known deficiencies. Some harken from the early 1990’s when the USG renewed its nation-building activities in peace operations: cumbersome and bureaucratic economic assistance processes; too few civil affairs units and translators; insufficient or nonexistent adaptive security capabilities—particularly those bridging police and military functions. Other COIN shortfalls will be unique or refinements of known shortfalls. For example, Iraq highlights the need to develop effective ministerial capacity to oversee the military, police, and intelligence services early in COIN operations. There must also be HN capacity in critical financial and economic sectors. Which U.S. agencies have that responsibility and are their capacities sufficient given the centrality of those functions?

Develop the right people. Any examination of the government’s capacity is likely to conclude that a well-prepared cadre of personnel remains a key shortfall. COIN requires individuals with hybrid political-military sensibility, the ability to think and act across labels and stovepipes, a single-minded and empathetic focus on host-nation legitimacy coupled with an improvisational, results-oriented attitude. Through both experience and training, the armed forces have come to understand or even adopt many “civilian” roles and tasks (e.g., conducting negotiations, facilitating political activities, administering municipalities), whereas many civilian actors continue to view the military aspects of COIN as entirely other and apart. Cultural differences between military and civilian USG actors impede communication, let alone unity of effort. Some State Department personnel express discomfort with the term counterinsurgency to describe their efforts in Iraq and elsewhere. In 1962, the State Department fully embraced responsibility for coordinating counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense activities. There was no question about the need for familiarity with and appreciation of all elements of national power. Our U.S. personnel systems, from education and training to promotion and assignment, must do more to familiarize civilians with military culture and operations and to integrate civilian and military personnel in professional-development activities related to COIN.

A related aspect of developing people with the right mindset and knowledge is the need to empower them to act effectively. There is a tension between the autonomy and flexibility required for effective decentralized operations and the accountability demanded of those responsible for dispersing significant funds at the local level. Should U.S. legal requirements regarding small-scale contracting, assistance, compensation, and other uses of funds be relaxed in the context of ongoing armed conflict? This is a different issue from preventing fraud and abuse by major private corporations, as proved problematic in Iraq.

Unless COIN actors, both civilian and military, can respond quickly to local need, they may find themselves irrelevant. Consider Hezbollah’s immediate and small-scale provision of relief following the recent cease-fire in Lebanon. Congressional suspicions regarding the Commander’s Emergency Response Fund program suggests unresolved larger issues and a lack of understanding of COIN requirements. Cumbersome procedures, however well-intentioned, may be inconsistent with the trust and flexibility COIN requires from USG personnel on the ground.

Align responsibilities with capacity. COIN capacity should also be considered in a broader context. What advantages does the U.S. Government have compared to other actors, such as private contractors, NGOs, allied states, or international agencies? There is a difference, of course, between the ideal division of labor and the actual partnerships that are likely to occur in a particular COIN operation. Indeed, this reality often prompts military commanders to advocate for some degree of United Nations or multinational involvement in interventions. Even as it develops contingency plans for acting without partners, U.S. national strategy should recognize and plan for the ideal of a shared effort.

In USG planning, agencies must confront the difference between
nominal responsibility and ability to execute. For the military, it matters little that the Justice Department is best suited to a particular task if it will rarely be in a position to carry it out. Obtaining greater clarity, not simply about which USG agencies “own” issues or tasks, but whether how and in what timeframe they can achieve those goals, is vital. This assessment would include not only resources, expertise, and legal authorities, but also a realistic appraisal of the availability of personnel to operate effectively in a COIN environment of increased security risks.

The underlying question is whether military forces must be prepared to take on all tasks in COIN or whether civilian actors can become effective partners in a low-intensity-conflict environment. There are few political incentives for addressing the questions, and thus the issue festers unresolved. If the civilian capacity can be effectively addressed, it makes more sense to enhance field capabilities where substantive knowledge and bureaucratic authority is already located. Should the government as a whole be unwilling to reallocate resources to enable the “right” actors or agencies to perform needed responsibilities, it had best reassign those responsibilities. Yet progressive militarization of COIN, or of U.S. foreign policy generally, would further undermine the likelihood of success in both arenas. Only when the USG faces the implications squarely is it likely to take the requisite action to enhance civilian capacity.

Even integrated political-military planning, a shibboleth of the USG for decades, remains a theory, not a practice. The creation of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) offers hope of a home for civilian COIN planning and activity. The proof, however, lies in the pudding of decisionmaking and resource allocation. The planned $100 million transfer from the Department of Defense to S/CRS is symptomatic of the underlying problem and not a lasting solution. The DOD “gift” is positive only if it never needs to be repeated because adequate funding will have been made available in future State Department budgets. A facade of civilian capacity, buttressed by stop-gap military actions, serves no one.

**Lines of authority.** Unity of command is a sacrosanct concept and practice within the armed forces. The primacy of politics throughout COIN, however, suggests a potential flaw in conceiving of independent civilian and military spheres of action. The uncertain ad hoc accords established between a U.S. ambassador and force commander certainly leave much to be desired. Yet the implicit requirement to subsume military command within civilian authority even at the operational level would challenge widely held military and civilian expectations and, frankly, most civilian abilities. At the same time, the model British colonial administrator, a military officer fusing civilian efforts into a holistic strategy, seems an icon of the past.

Without an easy answer to the unity of command question, policymakers default to promoting “unity of effort”—an idea more appealing in theory than effective in practice. The use of “handshake-con”—achieving informal understandings amongst various leaders of parallel efforts in the field—has been successful where U.S. military officials have had the vision and stamina to implement it. Such intense personal engagements offer an alternative to a formal chain of command or a pro forma but ineffective coordinating arrangement. But handshake-con may be better suited for foreign and local military forces than working across agency lines, and even then it is highly personality-dependent. This underscores the importance of developing that hybrid persona, the government professional familiar with both the military and civilian components of COIN and how the pieces must work together in support of the host-nation and COIN strategy. A cadre of such professionals will enhance the prospects for actually achieving unity of effort and might eventually allow consideration of unity of command.

**Next steps.** While revising military doctrine is essential, it is only a partial step toward crafting an effective national COIN strategy. To maximize U.S. success, military doctrine should flow from a political-military concept of operations. This would create greater understanding of the capabilities, assumptions, and appropriate synergies among military and nonmilitary capabilities and policies than currently exists. Unity of concept must precede unity of effort.

It is highly encouraging, then, that the State Department is embarking upon an interagency effort to create a framework for COIN. With an initial meeting scheduled for September 2006, the stated aim is to produce a National Security Presidential Directive outlining an analytic framework, U.S. agency roles and missions, and capacity gaps. It will certainly be useful to bring together governmental actors in charge of various aspects of COIN in order to codify their operating principles and capabilities. Unfortunately, after several years of effort in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. agencies are still disputing economic policies, the relationship of security to political reform, and the relative resourcing of civilian and military effort. This underscores the importance of first defining a unified strategy.

The challenge in any USG interagency effort is that the process tends to replicate the very stovepipes and capacity weaknesses at the core of the problem. Furthermore, interagency processes often reach nominal agreement by skirting central issues and finessing tough choices. The 1994 presidential directive on peace operations followed this pattern, and there is little reason to believe COIN, in all its complexity, will fare differently.

It therefore would be beneficial to create an outside group—a blue-ribbon commission or advisory panel—to bring a fresh, objective, and comprehensive approach to this topic. The commission would necessarily involve government agencies, but would stand apart in formulating an integrated strategy. It is particularly important, given the politics of the Iraq war, that the commission be bipartisan in composition and outlook. These days, it is unfashionable, and perhaps atavistic, to call for bipartisan efforts. But COIN is a challenge facing the USG for the foreseeable future, not a unique problem for the current administration. Even a sound presidential directive will lack the consensus and support needed to sustain it over the longer term. Since a national COIN strategy is a long-term proposition, building a unified and bipartisan approach is critical for the Nation.
A Practical Approach to Leader Self-Development

The forthcoming field manual on COIN remains a signal accomplishment: it articulates a modern approach to counterinsurgency while affirming COIN’s enduring but decidedly counterintuitive principles. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the updated doctrine settles the question of how the United States should prosecute its Long War or the smaller counterinsurgency campaigns within it.

In any struggle that ultimately hinges on winning over or neutralizing an ambivalent civilian population, those wielding force must do so with great care. Like it or not, the United States Armed Forces are held to the highest standard with regard to how they fight. Both the military and the broader public that supports them prefer to avoid considering the question of risk tolerance. Yet in counterinsurgency, U.S. unwillingness to assume risk may be the most severe limitation on its COIN efforts. This is as great a challenge to the body politic as it is to the uniformed military, although only the uniformed military can effectively make the case for change in this arena.

The military must look to civilian authorities first, though, when it comes to the nonmilitary aspects of COIN. The U.S. Government as a whole must pony up to the demands of counterinsurgency. It’s become vogue to cite a lack of interagency cooperation and civilian capacity in Iraq and beyond. Yet the prior failing is conceptual. It’s difficult to codify process or build capacity in the absence of a universal doctrinal framework. More narrowly, even the extant military doctrine is on shaky ground when broader governmental assumptions, principles, and requirements remain unknown or ad hoc. Creating a common understanding of insurgency and the demands for defeating it remains a core challenge for the nation. MR

The Leadership Battlebook: A Practical Approach to Leader Self-Development

Lieutenant Colonel Ted A. Thomas
USA, Retired, Ph.D.

. . . I love the man that can smile in trouble, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.

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Thomas Paine emphasizes several important concepts that leaders need to take to heart—“big minds” develop talents, skills, thoughts, and reasoning and devote time and effort to developing the competencies involved with leading. Leading involves pursuing self-development, seeking excellence, knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses, and taking action.

The Army Training and Leader Development Model features three domains for leader development: institutional, operational, and self-development. Although the institutional domain is paramount to development, most leaders recognize that the bulk of their learning occurs on the job.2 It is in the operational domain that the leader really hones his unique craft. Staff rides, professional development classes, tactical exercises without troops (TEWT), terrain walks, computer simulations, and myriad other programs develop leaders’ competence in a profound manner. The operational domain is also the place where individual development action plans are produced jointly between leaders and supervisors.

The institutional and operational domains are well structured, well defined in doctrine, and generally well implemented. However, they do not offer enough to allow the leader to realize his full potential. Only by actively seeking self-development can a leader achieve his optimum potential. Yet, of the three domains, self-development is the least well structured, defined, or executed. According to the ATLDP Officer Study Report, “Army training and leadership doctrine does not adequately address it, Army leaders do not emphasize its value, and the Army does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning.”3 This article looks at why leader self-development is so important and suggests a practical approach to implement and monitor a viable self-development program.

The Importance of Leader Self-Development

Army leaders are servants of the Nation. In times of war, they carry the primary burden for victory or defeat; in times of peace, they are the primary drivers to mission accomplishment. Consequently, Army leaders have an obligation to develop their leadership competencies to the utmost. They accomplish this through disciplined, daily study and reflection, and by seizing every opportunity to better themselves. As President Ronald Reagan once said: “The character that takes command in moments of crucial choices has already been determined by a thousand other choices made earlier in
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Sarah Sewall is Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government where she teaches courses on foreign policy and the conduct of war. She also directs the Program on National Security and Human Rights, currently focusing on ethical and operational aspects of counterinsurgency. Sewall served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance during the Clinton Administration, receiving the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Before this, she served as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell for six years, was a delegate to the Democratic Policy Committee, and was a member of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. She is a member of the Center for Naval Analyses’ Defense Advisory Committee, the National Academies’ Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, and founder of the White House Project’s National Security Boot Camp. Sewall graduated from Harvard College and Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and is writing a book on civilian harm in war. She would like to thank Ben Renda for his editorial assistance and senior Army officers for their insightful and constructive comments.

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seemingly unimportant moments…. It has been determined by all the day-to-day decisions made when life seemed easy and crises seemed far away—the decisions that, piece-by-piece, bit-by-bit, developed habits of discipline or of laziness; habits of self-sacrifice or self-indulgence; habits of duty and honor and integrity—or dishonor and shame.24

A leader’s daily life is full of opportunities and choices. What leaders do with these opportunities and choices can help either to optimize their leadership development or to let it languish. Army leaders should care about the daily decisions they make regarding self-development and the development of their subordinates.

Self-development involves introspective examination of one’s strengths and weaknesses and includes a conscious effort—a choice—to improve certain areas of one’s character and abilities. Leaders who pursue self-development in earnest become more confident, better able to solve complex problems, and more qualified to make decisions against a thinking, agile, asymmetric enemy in times of uncertainty, fear, and chaos.5 Self-development empowers leaders, yields greater job satisfaction, develops competencies needed to accomplish missions, and broadens a leader’s vision; thus, it prepares the leader to take on positions of increasing responsibility.

Organizations permeated with self-development programs enjoy higher morale and an increased sense of commitment. They develop a culture that inspires people, sparks innovation, and engenders cooperation; they achieve a level of excellence that makes extraordinary accomplishments possible; and they are able to sustain the pace of change required in today’s dynamic environment.6

The concept of self-development is codified in Army policy and doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, says Army members are obligated to develop their abilities to the greatest extent possible and to assist subordinates in doing likewise.7 Field Manual 3-0, Operations, emphasizes that it is every leader’s duty to become competent at his job “through continual training and self-study.”8 U.S. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 350-58, The Enduring Legacy—Leader Development for America’s Army, adds that self-development is “a joint effort involving commanders, leaders, supervisors, and subordinates. The individual and his leader structure self-development actions to meet specific individual goals and needs.”9 Perhaps no one has articulated the self-development imperative more eloquently than General Omar N. Bradley: “For most men, the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for Army officers, the obligation to learn and grow in their professions, is clearly a public duty.”10

The 2000 ATLDP report shows that most Army leaders know self-development is important for professional growth and essential for lifelong learning.11 However, a study of over 400 captains attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School in 2002 found that almost two-thirds rated themselves as having performed little to no self-study.12 This gap between the perceived need for self-development and its actual pursuit indicates a need for command involvement, which can provide the feedback essential to make a self-development program work. Feedback is necessary because we are all somewhat blind to our own behavior and to what others really think about us; we might think we are developing, or we might believe that our boss is pleased with what we’re doing, but we can be wrong. Feedback also provides a means of accountability, encouraging the leader to pursue his goals. In sum, the leader who aspires to self-development needs a leader battlebook.

The Leadership Battlebook

The leadership battlebook is a practical self-development tool for the leader and his chain of command. It can take many forms and can be as simple as a three-ring binder with dividers containing different sections or topics. Whatever form it takes, the battlebook should be divided into topic areas specific to the individual’s development. The following nine topics are given as examples.

Warfighting and training tips. This niche provides a place for the leader to collect information and tips on the Army leader’s primary business: training and warfighting. Putting this section first enforces the need to strengthen the warrior ethos and maintain a warfighting focus. Leaders can tailor the content of this section to address their personal needs and interests. For example, a combat engineer might want to learn more about rapid repair of roads damaged by explosives, so he would collect the pertinent tactics, techniques, and procedures, and write them down in this section.

Leadership models and theories. To develop a deeper, broader understanding of leadership, Army leaders need to know both Army and civilian leadership models and theories. Nonmilitary leadership models may focus on such subjects as transformation, ethics, teams, situations, skills, traits, styles, or gender, to name but a few. One worthy nonmilitary model to consider here would be Bruce Avolio’s Full-Range Leadership Model, which emphasizes transformational leadership. Avolio’s lessons on transforming the organization through inspirational motivation, individualized consideration, idealized influence, and intellectual stimulation are applicable to most leadership situations.13 Each theory, whether nonmilitary or military, will have some relevance in different cases. For example, the Army’s current “Be, Know, Do” model focuses on the values, attributes, skills, and actions of its leaders, thereby providing an effective framework for developing the competencies needed to lead the future modular force. The new Army leadership manual, FM 6-22 (currently in draft), may change the competency framework, but it will still emphasize competencies.14

360-degree assessments and evaluations. The ATLDP report declares two leadership requirements—self-awareness and adaptability—to be “metacOMPETENCIES”: that is, they are foundations for all other competencies. A self-aware leader knows his strengths and weaknesses, his nature, talents, emotional stability, and capabilities.15 Self-awareness is a prerequisite to adaptability: Without it leaders do not have the necessary tools to adapt to unforeseen exigencies. Likewise, leaders who are self-aware, but too hidebound or otherwise unable to adapt quickly, become irrelevant to their operational environment and, hence, dangerous to their Soldiers and to the mission. Leaders who are open to candid feedback from a variety of sources and echelons
inside and outside their organization will go a long way toward achieving self-awareness.

Many assessment tools are available to help leaders achieve greater self-awareness. The officer evaluation report is one, as is the newly mandated individual development plan (IDP) each officer is required to create. The Army is also piloting a 360-degree assessment meant to identify a leader’s five main strengths and five weaknesses. Other assessment tools, such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the Adaptive Skills Inventory, should also be maintained in this section. These tools help the leader understand how he learns, how he interacts with people, how he relates to the outside world, and how he processes information, thereby helping him become a better leader who can interact with and motivate his subordinates more effectively.

This section lets the leader compare his self-assessments with the assessments of his peers, superiors, coaches, and mentors. Such comparisons help leaders deduce trends regarding their strengths and weaknesses. Armed with this knowledge, leaders can determine their developmental needs, then plan and execute a successful self-development program.

Goals. Self-awareness leads to self-regulation, that is, the desire to act on the knowledge of personal strengths and weaknesses gained through self-awareness. Self-regulation is an extension of self-awareness; it helps leaders set goals to correct leadership deficiencies and become more innovative, adaptable, and flexible. Goals define a desired end-state that leaders envision for their self-development program, so that they can set a proper azimuth to take them from self-awareness to that end-state. Hence, leaders must have clear goals to help them determine self-development plans.

Leaders should take care to link their goal-setting with the assessments and evaluations from the previous section. Areas needing improvement or weaknesses identified in the previous section are certainly good places to start. Leaders should also specify goals as either short, intermediate, or long term to ensure a natural progression in achieving them. Specificity counts; the more specific the goal, the more likely it is to be achieved. Finally, leaders should devise a list of actions to be taken to turn goals into achievements. The list should include a timetable as well.

Leadership, leader, and command philosophies. This section contains the individual’s personal leadership, leader, and command philosophies. Leadership philosophy is the leader’s personal philosophy; it includes values, priorities, how he leads, and other leadership items important to him. The leader philosophy builds on the leadership philosophy by applying the latter to the leader’s assigned organization. The command philosophy applies the leader philosophy to a command’s position; it requires him to describe, among other things, his vision for how the organization will achieve its desired end-state.

As a leader matures and his responsibilities change from direct to organizational to strategic level, each of the three philosophies of leadership are also likely to change. Hence, these philosophies should be reviewed frequently and the leader’s values and priorities reaffirmed. Putting his philosophy into words will help the leader decide who he is and how his core beliefs relate to his organization. It will help him think through his values, expectations, and priorities. Personal leadership, leader, and command philosophies serve the organization well because they establish the leader’s more enduring intent.

Book reviews. Professional reading has long been recognized as key to the Army leader’s development. Thus, it comes as no surprise that there are many professional reading lists available, including one from the Army Chief of Staff. Unlike the average reader, the leader must focus his reading if he seeks self-development. He also has to digest and capture what he reads, so he needs a format for reviewing books, one that addresses what the book is about, why he is reading it, what lessons he might learn from it, and any memorable quotations it might contain. To aid in reviewing and retention, he should take notes while he reads. A paper folded in thirds and inserted in the book provides an easy way to take notes; it will assist the leader in retrieving references, quotations, and lessons learned from the book.

Mentoring tips. Although the Army has no formal or mandatory mentorship program, Army leaders clearly recognize that mentorship, when applied appropriately, is a great way to develop and improve leadership. Every leader should find one or more mentors for self-development and in turn act as a mentor for other leaders. Mentoring relationships don’t necessarily have to be between a senior officer and a junior; they can be between officers and NCOs or retirees or anyone the leader thinks can help his professional development.

This section of the battlebook provides a place for the leader to record questions he might ask his mentor and the subsequent answers or advice he receives. The leader can also record advice he gives to someone he is mentoring, as well as contact information for his mentors and those he advises.

Leadership journals. Here, the leader can record his thoughts on leadership. Generals George S. Patton and Omar Bradley and German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, among others, captured their thoughts in journals. One way to begin a journal is for the leader to reflect on his career and identify defining moments in his leadership development. These might take the form of lessons learned from his own decisions (good or bad) or from his observations of another’s leadership. They might also include lessons learned from movies, his children, lectures, news articles, or any activity or random thought. This advice about journals comes with a caveat: If the leader sees this section as a drill in journal keeping, it is doomed to failure before it begins.

Other. The last section functions as a catch-all for other leadership concepts or ideas. The 2004 study Leadership Lessons at Division Command Level lists several areas that could fit in this section, among them interpersonal skills, team building, improving command climate, and coaching and counseling. Additional topics might include ethical decisionmaking or the role of faith in leadership. A list of websites could be also placed here.

The Bottom Line

Leaders who would guide the future modular force to full-spectrum dominance in current and emerging operational environments
can no longer pass on self-development. Nor can their organizations, since self-development programs achieve their best results when organizations are actively involved. Leaders, in fact, have an obligation to make their own development and the development of their subordinates a priority. By doing so, they augment the developmental efforts made in the institutional and operational domains to benefit the individual and the organization.

A leadership battlefield can be a useful tool for leaders serious about self-development. Again, a three-ring binder and a few dividers are all one needs to get started. If some sections aren’t currently needed, then populate them later; if additional ones are needed, just add them. Whatever form it ultimately takes, the battlefield can be an effective means by which leaders and organizations discharge their responsibility for a vitally important but often ignored program.

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**NOTES**

6. Ibid.
10. FM 22-100, 5-25.
11. ATLDP, OS-17.

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**Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice**

David Galula, reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Terence J. Daly, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired

When reading *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* for the first time, most people have what could be called the Galula Moment: “That’s it! He gets it!” French Army Lieutenant Colonel David Galula’s book, first published in 1964, is quite simply the definitive work, the primer, of classic counterinsurgency doctrine. It is the one book on counterinsurgency that everyone, from policymakers to fire-team leaders, should read and understand.

Galula’s globe-trotting military career gave him numerous opportunities to study war, conventional and unconventional, close up. During World War II he fought in campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and Germany, became a military attaché, and then, in the immediate post-war period, served as an observer. He would later work as an assistant military attaché in China during that country’s civil war and as a UN observer in Greece during the Greek civil war. Posted to Hong Kong on attaché duty, he developed and maintained contact with officers fighting insurgencies in Indochina, Malay, and the Philippines. In 1956, Galula was assigned to the 45th Colonial Infantry Battalion, with which he spent the next two years fighting Algerian rebels, first as a company commander and then as an assistant battalion commander.

With all this experience under his belt, Galula was sent to Harvard’s Center for International Affairs in 1962. While participating in a RAND Corporation symposium on counterinsurgency, he made such an impression that he was asked to write a treatise about his experiences in Algeria. The ensuing work was published in 1963 as *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-58.* The following year, Galula produced his seminal *Counterinsurgency Warfare.* He died in 1967.

We know that Galula’s main claim—you defeat an insurgency by controlling the target population—works. It worked for Galula when he commanded an understrength French infantry company in the harsh terrain of the Kabylia in Algeria, and it worked for the U.S. 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) in Tal Afar in Iraq.

The 3d ACR was required to read *Counterinsurgency Warfare* before it deployed. The book’s lessons were suitably modified for the conditions the regiment was about to face, and then used to inform the planning and execution of their successful campaign to subdue the insurgency in Tal Afar. Currently, Galula’s ideas pervade the new counterinsurgency manuals that are being developed for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

**The Basics**

Galula’s basic insight into insurgency (which he terms “revolutionary war”) is that “Revolutionary war is political war.” The objective of the counterinsurgent must therefore be to win the population’s support. According to Galula, French and American traditions stipulating that “military” activities should be handled only by Soldiers and Marines and “civilian” activities should be handled only by politicians and bureaucrats is
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fallacious. “Every military action,” he asserts, “has to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa.” This means that every sweep, every search-and-destroy mission, every convoy operation has to be planned with uppermost consideration for the effects it will have on the population’s support; conversely, every new sewage system or classroom has to be examined for its military impact.4

According to Galula, the greatest advantage insurgents have over Western democracies, especially the United States, is that “an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted…to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.” For the counterinsurgent, “the operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgent’s threat and to convince it that the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration.” Galula emphasizes that to fight a successful counterinsurgency, it is important to have a national consensus and a resolute political leadership.5 In Pacification in Algeria he stresses that when the French Government was strong, insurgent recruiting dropped off because it looked like the counterinsurgents would win; however, when the French Government was weak and it looked like the French would leave Algeria, insurgent recruiting increased.6

As promulgated in the 1960s by Galula and Britain’s Sir Robert Thompson (author of Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam), classic counterinsurgency theory is often criticized.7 Detractors argue that fighting rural Marxist-Leninist insurgents is much different than fighting today’s urban-based Muslim extremists. With the caveat that his concepts may be dangerous if applied rigidly to a specific case, Galula notes that it is difficult to deny the logic on which his concepts are based because they can be recognized easily in everyday political life.8 He addresses a universal human condition when he lays out the essence of defeating an insurgency: “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.” In any insurgency, then, urban or rural, communist or confessional (religion-based), each side must weaken or eliminate the opposition, strengthen its own backers among the populace, and win over the uncommitted.

The struggle will be waged ruthlessly, and it will be deadly. Galula makes no distinction between city or village dweller, ideologue, or religious fanatic when he states: “All wars are cruel, the revolutionary war perhaps most of all because every citizen, whatever his wish, is or will be directly and actively involved in it by the insurgent who needs him and cannot afford to let him remain neutral. The cruelty of the revolutionary war is not a mass, anonymous cruelty but a highly personalized, individual one.”9

The struggle for influence is therefore dominated by another condition universal to all human beings in all insurgencies regardless of the environment: fear. Galula writes: “The population’s attitude . . . is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which side threatens the most, which one is likely to win; these are the criteria governing the population’s stand.” Meanwhile, “political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population.”

For Galula, control over the population is the key to success. Only by gaining and keeping control of the population can the counterinsurgent establish the secure environment in which those who support the counterinsurgent and his cause can come forward to organize for their own governance and eventual self-protection.

Galula describes, in detail, the steps by which the counterinsurgent can gain control of the population. Designed specifically for political effect, these steps comprise a coordinated, multifaceted process that provides the populace security in order to gain and keep its support. The counterinsurgent must use all his assets: “His administrative capabilities, his economic resources, his information and propaganda media, his military superiority due to heavy weapons and large units.” Military, police, and judicial and political operations blend: “The expected result—final defeat of the insurgents—is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they all are essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero.”10

The Need for Unity of Command

Galula is adamant about the necessity of heeding the military principle of unity of command: “A single boss must direct the operations from beginning to end.” Further, the “boss” must be a representative of the political side: “That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the country’s political regime and to defend it is a political affair. Even if this requires military action, the action is directed toward a political goal.”11 If we read Galula correctly, then one major deficiency in the U.S. Government’s current counterinsurgent effort is that no government department or agency is capable of exercising this authority.

The Strategy

According to Galula, in devising a countrywide strategic plan, it is best to begin by pacifying the quieter areas and then progressing to the more difficult ones. First, doing so gives the counterinsurgent “a clear-cut, even if geographically limited, success as soon as possible,” which demonstrates that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win. Second, “the counterinsurgent, who usually has no practical experience in the nonmilitary operations required in counterinsurgency warfare, must acquire it fast,” and that is much easier to do in a relatively calm area. Of course, this strategy is risky: by concentrating on the easy areas, the counterinsurgent leaves the insurgent alone to progress into other areas.12 The counterinsurgent must, however, accept that risk.

The Phased Approach

In Galula’s multi-phased approach to prosecuting this strategy, phase one, concentrating enough armed forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents, is undertaken to prepare the area for the rest of the counterinsurgency process. It is complete only when the forces that will garrison the area can safely deploy to the extent necessary. Military forces must prevent armed insurgents who have been scattered from regrouping; if the armed insurgents
have been expelled from the area, they must be prevented from returning. In this phase, the counterinsurgent must be prepared to fight conventional battles to dominate the area completely. Aggressive, carefully planned, and flexible information operations directed at the insurgents, the counterinsurgent’s own forces, and the population must be thoroughly integrated into this and each succeeding phase of the operation.13

In phase two, the counterinsurgent switches targets from the armed insurgents to the population. He maintains strong military forces in the area, though, because the “support of the population is conditioned.” The people know they are being watched by the insurgency’s supporters and are still threatened with punishment by armed guerrillas. Counterinsurgent forces are assigned to sectors, subsectors, and other divisions with the principal mission of protecting the population and civic action teams. The troops are deployed to locations where the people are, not to locations deemed to possess military value.14

Phase three, maintain contact with and control of the population, is the most critical phase because it involves transitioning from military to political operations. Galula’s objectives include reestablishing the counterinsurgent’s authority over the population, physically isolating the population from the guerrillas, and gathering intelligence that will lead to the next step: the elimination of insurgent cells.

Control of the population begins with a census and issuance of identity documents. A curfew is an integral part of phase three, as are other movement controls. Intelligence gathering is enhanced by increasing contact between the population and counterinsurgent personnel, each of whom must be imbued with the idea that he is an intelligence collector. Galula notes that because insurgents are human, they have differing degrees of commitment to the insurgent cause. The counterinsurgent therefore must attempt to divide the insurgents by creating dissension between the lower ranks and their leaders, which he then exploits by luring away the disaffected.15

Phase four, eradicating insurgent secret political organizations, is a sensitive area for the counterinsurgent. Secret insurgents are often prominent local people with local connections and family ties. Secret organizations must be eradicated to remove the threat they pose to counterinsurgent supporters and to keep the insurgency from reestablishing itself. Galula suggests an indirect approach, in which cell members are arrested based on their disclosures.16

Meanwhile, the counterinsurgent is deeply involved in recruiting, training, and vetting local supporters for the remaining parts of his program. These parts are built on the elections of provisional local officials, and they include testing the new officials, formation of self defense units, grouping new leaders into a national movement, and final eradication of insurgent remnants.17

The Myth of Sisyphus

For Galula, victory can be declared only when the local people cut off contact with the insurgents and keep them cut off of their own will, using their own resources. However, the myth of Sisyphus is a recurring nightmare for the counterinsurgent, as he must try to build in irreversibility at every step. The turning point will occur only after leaders emerge from the population, commit themselves to the side of the counterinsurgent, and form an organization that can protect them and the population. The leaders must prove their loyalty with deeds, not words, and they must have everything to lose if the insurgents return. Still, as Galula observes, even when the responsibility for the area is turned over to the local people, leaders, and security forces, the main counterinsurgent force must be able to return quickly to protect what it has left behind.

The Possible Drawback

Galula seems to provide a clear, comprehensive blueprint that democracies such as the United States can use to defeat an insurgency. His work has one major gap, however, as far as the United States is concerned: he attaches too little weight to the importance of the counterinsurgent’s cause. Galula continually stresses that a cause is vital for the insurgent, but pays little attention to the counterinsurgent’s motivation. Either the counterinsurgent simply wants to retain power, or he has a competing cause that Galula dismisses because it will lead to civil war. Even when he notes that the British promised independence to Malaya during the Emergency, a move that cemented the loyalty of the majority ethnic Malay population, Galula seems to draw no particular conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the counterinsurgent’s appropriating the insurgents’ cause. For Galula, reforms are to be carefully titrated for tactical advantage.

Unlike Galula’s France, the United States in the 21st century is not a colonial power, and our counterinsurgencies during the past 40 years have been well intentioned and prosecuted with a clear political aim—what Sir Robert Thompson calls “To establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.”18 The United States possesses one of the most powerful political slogans ever devised: “the legitimacy of a government derives from the consent of the governed.” On a less exalted level, we are the leading exporter of modern mass consumer culture, the “Universal Solvent”—the magical fluid ancient alchemists sought that made old substances disappear and new ones form. It behooves us to understand how our cause, or causes, are viewed by the people whose hearts and minds Galula tells us we should fight for.

In the Long War we are now facing, we have to consider whether our difficulties stem from the strategic problem that Robert B. Asprey defines in his magisterial War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Asprey theorizes that French counterinsurgency doctrine in the Algerian rebellion “failed from the beginning, because, it ignored Mao’s first lesson: ‘If the political objectives that one seeks to attain are not the secret and profound aspirations of the masses, all is lost from the beginning.’”

As described by Galula and Thompson and tailored to fit each situation, classical counterinsurgency can be a sound guide to successful counterinsurgency if we are confronting a population whose “secret and profound aspirations” are to live in a state where “the legitimacy of the government derives from the consent of the governed.” The unanswered question, however, is, Do we need a guide for doing so if the population’s “secret and profound aspirations” are to live in the 7th century?

Thomas E. Ricks, the prominent Washington Post military affairs reporter, has contributed his own assessment of the evolving U.S. entanglement in Iraq in his new book, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. This work follows just several months after Michael R. Gordon and retired General Bernard E. Trainor released Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Pantheon, Westminster, MD, 2006), and will undoubtedly elicit strong reactions from those in uniform. Ricks broadens the aperture of debate, sharply needling the Bush administration and senior military leaders for their slapdash approach to the postwar effort. He is especially caustic about U.S. leaders’ failure to understand that we had wandered into the pernicious thicket of an insurgency; about our misdirected and sluggish response once we did recognize that we were facing an insurgency; and about the abysmal conditions that led to the Abu Ghraib scandal.

While Ricks conducts a trenchant post-mortem of the convoluted lead-up and embarkation to war, Fiasco primarily focuses on the time between the occupation of Baghdad in April 2003 and the second battle for Fallujah in late 2004. There are no unprecedented revelations here. Ricks does not reveal the hideaway locations for weapons of mass destruction, nor does he uncover evidence to substantiate pre-war claims about clandestine Baathist-Al Qaeda linkages. Instead, what he brings is a numbing degree of clarity, both anecdotal and evidentiary, to support three essential claims.

The first claim involves the argument for going to war. Ricks contends that it would have been insufficient to muster support had it not been made in the shadow of 9/11. With sad repetitiveness, he demonstrates how Congress seemed to sleep through the administration’s drumbeat, unwilling to challenge even the wobbliest assertions that had been flagged within the intelligence community. He also indicts the media for its own docility at the time, singling out Judith Miller for her series in The New York Times that seemed to validate the administration’s claims about weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Unfortunately, Fiasco went to press just a bit too soon to take note of a late July 2006 poll revealing that more than 60 percent of the American public still believe that Iraq had a WMD program. This, despite scores of post-invasion investigative reports that have consistently asserted the opposite—that there is scant evidence of anything resembling the notion that Saddam aspired to reinvigorating such efforts. It makes one wonder where the American public gets its news.

Ricks’s second focus for critique is the lack of post-war planning. One senses the reporter’s increasingly visceral response to what sometimes seems like a deliberate avoidance of preparation for the aftermath. He cites an Army War College convocation led by historian Conrad Crane in December 2002 that presciently warned: “The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace is real and serious… Thinking about the war now and the occupation later is not an acceptable solution.” Ricks condemns the planning done by Joint Task Force IV, under the direction of then-Brigadier General Steve Hawkins, citing one officer’s assessment of JTF IV as “fifty-five yahoos with shareware who were clueless.”

But even here, Ricks is not so much turning over new rocks as reinforcing what has already reified into conventional wisdom. After all, in the days immediately following the fall of Baghdad, the whole world watched spellbound as Iraqi citizens ransacked their own edifices of culture while American soldiers stood by, seemingly mystified by the erupting chaos around them.

Ricks is most ruthlessly effective when he disrobes the emperor by dissecting the administration’s unwaveringly sunny outlook. Insistent denials that events had conspired against the U.S., after a series of convoluted attempts to define exactly who or what the American forces in Iraq were experiencing increased attacks from, further eroded the credibility that was so desperately needed to restore public confidence, both American and Iraqi. Ricks relentlessly exposes the failure of U.S. politicians and senior military leaders to understand the nature of the war they were facing, from the explosion of violence in Fallujah against Marines, to the concatenation of improvised explosive device attacks on the roads, to the growing turbulence of militias like those commanded by Moqtada al-Sadr.

Eventually, U.S. leaders would realize that they were in a full-blown
counterinsurgency, but the application of technique to counter the threat was unevenly applied in the absence of a coherent, Iraq-wide strategy. Ricks especially zeroes in on what he contends was the wrong approach, as exhibited by the heavy-handed kinetic operations waged by the 4th Infantry Division under then-Major General Ray Odierno. (Ricks is, however, somewhat ambivalent about the division, since he is obviously respectful of the battlefield leadership exhibited by Lieutenant Colonel Nate Sassman, the 1-8 Infantry battalion commander whose career foundered following an investigation. Ricks also expresses cautiously positive regard for Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell, whose battalion achieved an arguable degree of traction in the face of mounting hostility.)

The third particular object of Rick’s ire is those who were responsible for the infamous Abu Ghraib scandal. According to the writer, any combat successes the coalition enjoyed till then paled beside the damage done by a couple of lowly soldiers armed with digital cameras on a night shift by a couple of lowly soldiers armed with digital cameras. (Ricks, however, somewhat acknowledges the cathartic killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, no bit player in the unending mayhem across the country, who televised beheadings of his captured victims.)

Unfortunately, however, two other series of events now unfolding would seem to reinforce the validity of Ricks’s pessimism. In his epilogue, he declares that Iraq could collapse into civil war. That forecast gathered considerable steam in July, when Generals John Abizaid and George W. Casey both acknowledged that dramatic steps were needed to quell an explosion of sectarian violence in Baghdad. To add to the woe, as the book went to press, it became clear that the long-anticipated troop reduction would not occur; in fact, there would be yet another increase, with the 172d Stryker Brigade being extended to add boots to the effort to subdue Baghdad. And finally, events in Israel and Lebanon seemed to lend some credence to Ricks’s assertion that the Iraq war could precipitate wider regional turmoil. Of course, every book must find its ending and draw a line in the sand. But this hairpin turn in regional instability will almost certainly have dramatic consequences for the future of Iraq.

In *Fiasco*, Ricks brings substantial authority, overwhelming corroboration of his claims, and cumulatively distressing conviction to what he clearly sees as a tragic misadventure. If it hasn’t already, time will perhaps add to the injuries he has chronicled. But as all of us who have been to Iraq have realized with bittersweet clarity, when it comes to what will ultimately become of the Land between the Two Rivers, only time will tell.

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The nominating committee for the inaugural Michael Kelly Award (a $25,000 award given in memory of Michael Kelly, the first American reporter killed while on assignment in Iraq) predicted that 20 years down the line, scholars searching for a definitive account of the troubled aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq would no doubt turn to George Packer. That was in 2004, and the nomination was for Packer’s “War After the War,” which appeared in the 24 November 2003 issue of *The New Yorker* magazine. Packer, however, was only a runner-up for the Kelly prize.

Today *The Assassins’ Gate*, Packer’s super chronicle of the continuing bureaucratic and military struggle in Iraq—which includes much of his reporting for the *New Yorker* but goes far, far beyond that—is already being cited as the most comprehensive if not “the” definitive examination of what turned into chaos for both victor and vanquished following the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Journalism being instant history, Parker does a mind-boggling job at what he does best: on-the-spot reportage, trenchant interviews assembled from all ranks of military and civilian society, compellingly drawn personalities, a look at the complicated psychology of Iraqis themselves (a surface never scratched in invasion planning), valuable background information and some lifting of rocks to shine daylight on the murky history of neo-cons.

Yet in the final analysis, the author leaves a major gap for future historians to fill. The unanswered questions persist: Why did the self-serving
Word of certain exiles weigh so heavily with the U.S. administration? Why a rush to judgment that excluded, for example, opinions such as those of Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki? Were weapons of mass destruction a red herring from the very start? Why was such a far-reaching foreign policy initiative undertaken with planning that excluded all unwelcome opinion? Why did the administration not admit to initial mistakes, and recalibrate?

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), created in early 2003 by President George W. Bush, may have been relegated early to the dustbin of history (its conclusions were not even sent to Washington), but its unheeded analysis offered a eerie look into the future: “History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the post-hostilities activities.”

Shinseki’s testimony on the military requirements he perceived necessary to secure Iraq and rebuild the country was mocked by his civilian boss, the deputy defense secretary and ranking neo-con, Paul D. Wolfowitz. Packer writes that “it was Wolfowitz who ended the one serious public discussion of the fundamentals of the war plan before it had even begun. . . . His message to Shinseki was a message to everyone in and out of uniform at the Pentagon: The cost of dissent was humiliation and professional suicide.”

Poignantly, Packer points out that “Wolfowitz, like nearly every other architect of the Iraq war, avoided military service in Vietnam, in his case through student deferments.” Vice President Dick Cheney, who received five deferments, later explained: “I had other priorities in the ‘60s than military service.” John Bolton, who like Bush joined the National Guard, was more straightforward: “I confess I had no desire to die in a Southeast Asian rice paddy.” (It should be noted that the dust jacket of this book and several published biographies do not list any military service for the author. He did, however, serve in the Peace Corps.)

Indeed, Iraq’s odyssey in the 21st century has been compared to that of Vietnam of the 20th century (in public statements at least, it has become an oft-repeated military article of faith that there is no comparison). Iraq also has been held up for analysis against Malaysia, Algeria, the Central American wars and even the fall of France in 1940.

One reviewer wrote that he read The Assassins’ Gate with pen in hand and watched forests of exclamation points grow in the margins. As a confirmed book lover, I would suggest that you eschew such notation within the pages of the book, and instead keep a yellow legal pad handy to record every name along with its identity. Packer fills his narrative with the jetsam of failed programs who received their 15 seconds of fame, or infame as the case may be. Like the proverbial sporting event, you can’t tell the players without a program.

Thomas E. White? He was secretary of the Army, but not for long; now, he’s just another sacked footnote. Mohamed Makinya. Kanan’s father. Who? This book has no tidy ending, as befits a war careening from quick victory toward unmanageability. The book itself also seems to unravel after the sharply focused early stages, dissolving into on-the-other-hands and maybe.

Packer readily admits to once being a liberal hawk on Iraq in the neo-con mold. He digs to find gems of hope amid a sea of gloom. In mid-book he writes that “in the absence of guidance . . . commanders in the provinces, such as the 101st Airborne’s Major General David Petraeus in Mosul, moved ahead with forming councils, finding business partners for reconstruction, training security forces, even setting local economic and border policy.” Meanwhile, however, Bernard Kerik (another name to write on your yellow pad), the colorful New York cop sent by Bush to rebuild security forces, “spent his time in Baghdad going on raids with South African mercenaries. . . . He went home after three months.”

Optimism heavily overlaid with caution reappeared in Packer’s “The Lesson of Tal Aflar,” in the 10 April 2006 issue of The New Yorker soon after The Assassins’ Gate was published. Revisiting Iraq, he assessed yet another “success” sound bite from Washington: “The effort came after numerous failures, and very late in the war—perhaps too late. And the operation succeeded despite an absence of guidance from senior civilian and military leaders in Washington. The Soldiers who worked to secure Tal Aflar were, in a sense, rebels against an incoherent strategy that has brought the American project in Iraq to the brink of defeat.”

George W. Ridge Jr., J.D., Tucson, Arizona is a freelance writer who is widely published.


Rather than sending a film crew to Iraq to create another documentary on the war, director Deborah Scarton just sent cameras. She equipped three New Hampshire National Guardsmen with digital cameras and gave them a bit of training in their use. The resulting film, The War Tapes, creates an image of the war that is simultaneously intimate, sweeping, troubling, and inspiring.

For those few of us who have yet to deploy to Iraq, the film’s unmediated view of the war is a refreshing change from coverage all too often so far removed from the Soldiers’ view that it seems like, well, news coverage. The three main characters in the film—Sergeant Zach Bazzi, Specialist Michael Moriarti, and Sergeant Steve Pink—are caught on camera in moments of fatigue, fear, laughter, and cynicism, expressing their views with a candor few could capture through conventional documentary techniques.

Scarton edited over 900 hours of footage in Iraq and over 200 hours of footage back home—some of it filmed in the Soldiers’ absence and some capturing their return and reintegration—into a 94-minute film that won the Tribeca Film Festival’s Best International Documentary competition.

The War Tapes is a testament to the American Soldier who, despite danger, disappointment, and political discontent, does his job well and remains surprisingly sensitive under the layer of bravado he dons at times.

The film’s main characters are an interesting batch: Moriarti, a patriot so upset by 9/11 that he cannot wait to get to Iraq; Pink, a quietly funny man with a penchant for vivid metaphors, who regrets enlisting
even before the unit deploys; and Bazzi, a Lebanese-American fluent in Arabic, who reads The Nation and was apparently one of just several in the company who did not vote for the president in the elections that occurred during their deployment.

We follow the men and their comrades through train-up, their arrival at Camp Anaconda, and their many missions escorting convoys through the Sunni heartland. The film captures their “mad minute” response to an improvised explosive device attack early in their deployment. It captures their fear after a mortar strike near their tents. It captures their moments of toughness—calloused responses to the deaths of insurgents in Fallujah. It also captures their rash statements about the value of their lives versus those of Iraqi civilians—but balances these with the outrage the Soldiers express at a policy forbidding treatment of wounded Iraqis on their base and the anguish that grips the Soldiers after their vehicle hits an Iraqi pedestrian. Their grief is clearly deeper and more genuine than even their most convincing tough-guy routines.

The film’s predominantly amateurish camera work immerses us in the action as no professional following the squad with a Steadicam could. During intense engagements the camera, completely forgotten but still filming, pans and tilts wildly, so wildly that the only semblance of a coherent narrative the viewer receives is aural: the shouts of confused men and the bark of weapons close at hand. Somehow the genuineness of this footage achieves the gut-wrenching immediacy that the most meticulous action-film editing strives for but falls somewhat short of.

Upon the Soldiers’ return, we see them struggle to resume their former lives, not knowing how to speak to friends and loved ones about the war, not knowing how much treatment they should seek, and making decisions about their futures. Most interestingly, Bazzi—the Soldier most strongly opposed to the administration’s policies—becomes a citizen shortly after redeployment, and is the only one to reenlist.

Unlike some documentaries, this one takes no sides. It uses scenes of laughter, heartbreak, discouragement, and danger only to show us the war as it is for those we ask to fight it, reminding us of their foibles, but, in the end, highlighting their strengths as they negotiate the murky terrain of nation-building and counterinsurgency.

Major William Rice, Fort Bragg, North Carolina


Shaul Shay is a research fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Centre and head of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) department of history. His previous books include Terror at the Command of the Imam, The Endless Jihad, and The Shahids. Shay’s ostensible subjectivity towards Iranian-sponsored terror in the Levant notwithstanding, this book is of value to military readers for two reasons: it explains the genesis and evolution of Hezbollah from the 1979 Iranian revolution and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, and it explains how Hezbollah adapted its techniques—particularly with innovations in suicide bombings—to improve its effectiveness in striking Israeli and other targets in the Levant and around the globe. Any elucidation of Hezbollah is salient because, after 1996, the organization’s bomb experts established a degree of cooperation with Al-Qaeda. This book is germane for one other compelling reason: insurgents in Iraq have been emulating and adopting tactics and techniques that the terrorists of Hezbollah perfected in Lebanon and elsewhere in the latter part of the 20th century.

Shay explores the religious underpinnings of the Iranian Revolution and the export of that revolution through the radical Shi’ite fundamentalist sponsors of terrorist organizations in Lebanon and elsewhere. He describes the Shi’ite terror networks that operated and continue to operate around the world, and explains Hezbollah’s modus operandi. The book contains a chronology of Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks carried out in the 1980s and 1990s (sorted by type), a catalogue of Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups and their attacks against the IDF and other Israeli targets, and a comprehensive account of Iranian-sponsored attacks against a host of Western and Middle Eastern citizens.

Shay provides insight into Iranian-funded Shi’ite terrorist activity in the post-Khomeini era. More salient to this readership, Shay explains Iranian support of terrorist operations in the post-9/11 period in the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly the employment of Shi’ite terrorists in Iraq since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also explores Iranian foreign policy objectives in view of the GWOT and, more significantly, in consideration of the reality that U.S. forces and their partners occupy two countries that straddle Iran’s western and eastern borders. Finally, Shay discusses the current U.S. policy toward Iran and Syria and the implications that stem from that policy.

This book has some shortcomings. For example, Shay inclines towards descriptive lists and chronologies that can at times be cumbersome. Overall, however, this work merits reading because it provides lucid insights into Hezbollah and other Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups, some of which also may have subsequently influenced Al-Qaeda and its associated terrorist organizations.

LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait


In The Chinese Army Today, Dennis Blasko set out to write the kind of book he wished he’d had available when he was assigned as a military attaché to China. The book’s purpose is to provide a concise but thorough picture of Chinese ground forces as they face the challenges of the 21st century.

By way of orientation, Blasko provides a short history of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from its origins as a guerrilla organization fighting for social transformation to its incarnation as a conventional army in the late 20th century. But his focus is on the current transformation of the PLA as it prepares to meet the challenges that are sure to emerge as the People’s Republic flexes its economic and political muscle in Asia.

The current push for transformation in the Chinese military
Military Review 

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BOOK REVIEWS


As the United States remains engaged in the complexities of Iraq’s reconstruction and Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons, it cannot neglect adversaries in its own hemisphere. The U.S. is facing illegal immigration that allows terrorists to enter the country, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez continues his campaign of anti-American rhetoric, and finally there is Fidel Castro, the main subject of Brian Latell’s new book, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader.

Latell, a national intelligence officer for Latin America from 1990 to 1994, takes readers into the minds of Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl, the longest serving defense minister and Fidel’s designated successor. The brothers were the illegitimate sons of a Spanish peasant named Angel Castro and grew up in a rough rural area in Brian, Cuba. Fidel’s future, in particular, was shaped by his upbringing. Doted on by his sisters and mother and, because he was the first-born son, allotted an allowance by his father until he was 24, Fidel became a spoiled narcissist. In 1945, he entered the University of Havana Law School, not to become a great litigator or judge, but to seek control of the campus’s political life.

Studying Fidel’s university years helps the reader understand how the future dictator organized groups into mafias that agitated and protested the government. It also looks into the books that influenced the Cuban dictator. Fidel was obsessed with the poetry and essays of Jose Marti, who wrote primarily about Cuba’s war for independence from Spain. Marti also saw a need to check the United States from eroding the unity of the Spanish-speaking Americas.

Fidel’s 21st year was an eventful one. He took charge of university groups agitating for the liberation of Puerto Rico. Also, he and several other Cuban students traveled to Bogota, Columbia, to disrupt the pan-American conference that was about to establish a realist and Fidel as a dreamer. After imprisonment for the failed raid, the brothers fled to Mexico, where Raúl introduced his brother to communist movements in the country and where they recruited Ché Guevara. Although Raúl became a committed communist in Mexico, Fidel did not fully convert until after he had seized power in Cuba in 1959. To the older brother, communism was a means to garner the power needed to topple the ruling regime in Cuba; later, it became an important source of ideological and actual support.

When Fidel finally passes from the scene, Raúl, supported by his generals, will ascend to the leadership. Ever the realist, Raúl wants to engage the Pentagon in discussions about immigration, counternarcotics, and security along the Florida strait even though U.S. policy limits talks between Cuban and U.S. military officials to fence-line discussions at Guantanamo Bay. Raúl has already made a policy decision to return Al-Qaeda detainees to Guantanamo if they escape the detention center, and he has embraced counterterrorism—something his brother has yet to come to terms with.

But Raúl is in his 70’s, and there is no succession plan should he die before his brother. This is important to the United States because a widespread breakdown of law and order in Cuba could result in a massive seaborne exodus of Cubans to Florida. U.S. policymakers should pay attention to this book for two reasons—the prospect of a more practical, less dogmatic leader coming to power in Cuba, and the potential for a huge wave of illegal immigration.


MAJ (P) Prisco R. Hernández, USA, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OF THE OPERATIONAL ART,

Lcdr Yousef Aboul-Enein, USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland

originate with the desire of Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, to bring China into the 20th century with his four modernization programs for agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. Wisely, in light of the low national-security threat to their country in the last two decades of the 20th century, the Chinese communist leadership decided to subordinate military modernization to economic development, a more basic national need.

Taiwan’s rapid modernization and economic prowess, and the increasingly defiant statements issued by the leaders of what is perceived by China as a “break-away province,” led to a renewed emphasis on the modernization of the Chinese armed forces. This is especially evident in the increased importance of amphibious operations and exercises since the late 1990s.

Modernization of the PLA goes beyond the obvious development and purchase of better arms and equipment. It also includes a thorough revision of doctrine, training, organization, tactics, and leadership. As other armies have realized, a smaller and better led, trained, and equipped force is much more effective than the kind of mass armies active than the kind of mass armies}

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Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art is a unique collection of essays by a distinguished group of professional officers and military historians. Bruce Menning’s opening essay discusses the origins of operational art by addressing the changing nature of the military art, by looking at the professional vocabulary, and by reviewing the development of operational art in U.S. doctrine. The balance of the book is divided into four parts, each tracing developments in the operational art of a particular country during a particular period: Napoleonic France from the Jena campaign to the beginning of World War II; Germany from Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke’s rise to blitzkrieg operations in World War II; Russia from Imperial Russian Army practices in 1878 to the end of the cold war; and the United States from the Gettysburg campaign to Operation Desert Storm.

The well-researched essays in this book provide a succinct history of the origins and development of operational art in theory and practice. Editors Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips review the problems associated with devising a terminology to distinguish operational art from tactics and strategy and place various national practices in historical context. In their view, each nation developed either theory or practice based on historical experience, the impact of technological change, or the prevailing intellectual atmosphere. The French, for example, concentrated on the practical rather than the theoretical aspects of operational art. They took specific lessons from the Franco-Prussian War and used them to determine their practice at the start of World War I; similarly, lessons learned from World War I influenced French practice at the start of World War II. Krause traces Moltke’s influence on German operational art to the Franco-Prussian War. German Army Brigadier General Guenther R. Roth discusses General Alfred Graf von Schlieffen’s influence and the dangers inherent in a doctrinaire approach. Roth also looks at Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s contributions to theory and practice as evidenced in the Sickle Cut Operation (France, May 1940) and the Rochade Operation (the counterstroke on the Donetz, February-March 1943).

The individual essayists discuss a variety of important doctrinal issues such as the importance of simultaneity and sequencing in campaign planning, the commitment of the operational reserve, how operational miscalculations can be overcome by tactical flexibility, Karl von Clausewitz’s concept of the culminating point, and the utility of German Auftragstaktik. In reviewing Germany’s operational innovations during World War II, Roth shows how operational deception helped fix the Allied focus on the North German border, thereby enabling the spectacular surprise airborne assault on the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. In a lengthy article on operational logistics, Graham H. Turbiville explains the Soviet approach to the integration of operational planning and logistics from 1939-1990, a topic not often given the attention it deserves. Other articles analyze problems with intelligence support to operational planning (Gettysburg), with integrating an important tactical operation into a larger campaign plan (Normandy), and with command and control (the separation of X Corps from Eighth Army command after the Inchon landing).

Several aspects of this book intrigued me. The research and historical analyses are outstanding, and I found it interesting to trace the different national approaches to operational theory and practice. I noted that it took a certain kind of intellectual environment to set the incubating conditions for doctrinal development, but at the same time, no matter how intellectually rigorous the ensuing development was, the doctrine could fail in practice, where it counted—as the Soviets learned in Afghanistan. Any book that stimulates a reader to think has value. Krause and Cody have provided a fine work for both the theorist and the practitioner.

LTC Christopher E. Bailey, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia


Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age offers revealing insights into the frequently misinterpreted realities of fanaticism. Drawing on the usual historical and contemporary examples, but including less obvious ones like the Sudanese Dervishes of the 1890s and the loyalist Orange Order parades of Northern Ireland, the authors assembled here skillfully bring to light the complex nature of this recurring phenomenon. Adroitly researched, the book highlights the philosophical underpinnings of fanaticism and probes the ideological links between politics and religion. It illuminates the many expressions of fanaticism in the modern era. In “Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism: the Case of Hamas,” Meir Litvak explores the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement and concludes that fanatical movements need not be devoid of rational thinking; they can, on occasion, give precedence to tactical needs or recognize constraints in order to serve strategic goals. Barrie Paskins makes one of the more profound claims about fanaticism in “Fanaticism in the Modern Era” when he declares that “the concept [of fanaticism] is complex and shrouded in prejudice and stereotype.” This perceptive observation points to one of the book’s central themes: where you stand—your own environment, your cultural values, the standards you adhere to—determines how you will perceive a particular act. For the military planner, this has important connotations. Instead of merely demonizing a rival whose actions fall outside the bounds of Western norms, military professionals should endeavor to understand and rationalize the motives behind those actions. If this is done, the fanatic becomes less primeval; we can figure out his motivations and use them to make him susceptible to influence. The case studies presented in this book prove that fanatics, while fanatic, are far from irrational. Understanding their motivation is essential if we are to succeed in the Global War on Terror.

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