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Cover Photo: A prison guard passes Mara Salvatrucha graffiti at the entrance of the module where gang members are incarcerated at the National Penitentiary in Tamara, Honduras, 1 February 2006. (AFP)

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Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation:
OEF-PHILIPPINES
and
The Indirect Approach

Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army

Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen and defended by its citizens.

—President George W. Bush

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PHOTO: Marines deployed to the Southern Philippines as part of JSOTF-P live fire during force protection training, 2004. (DOD)

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS of 9/11 have ushered in a new era of counterinsurgency to deal with Al-Qaeda-linked insurgent and terrorist organizations. The U.S. military's initial success in Afghanistan, as impressive as it was, forced the enemy to adapt. To survive, Al-Qaeda has transformed itself into a flatter, more cellular organization that seeks to outsource much of its work.[1] Thus, insurgency has become an Al-Qaeda priority in terms of rhetoric, recruitment, and spending.[2] The connection between terrorism and insurgency is now well established, and in fact there is tremendous overlap between the two.[3]

The U.S. military, though, is struggling to adapt to protracted, insurgent-type warfare. America's affinity for high-tech conventional conflict and quick, kinetic, unilateral solutions that avoid contact with the local populace has slowed its response to this complex form of conflict.[4] How, then, can the U.S. military tailor a more efficient, more effective approach to future military efforts against Al-Qaeda-linked groups around the globe? Specifically, how can the U.S. military implement a sustainable, low-visibility approach that is politically acceptable to our current and future partners, and that can help change the moderate Muslim community's perception of U.S. operations in the War on Terrorism (WOT)?

The history of insurgent conflict during the Philippines Insurrection (1899-1902), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946-1954) shows that successful COIN operations are protracted efforts that rely heavily on indigenous security forces.[5] Therefore, the U.S. WOT strategy should emphasize working indirectly "through, by, and with" indigenous forces and building their capacity to conduct effective operations against common enemies.

The Unilateral Approach

As free societies gain ground around the world, the U.S. military is going to be increasingly restricted in terms of how it operates. An age of democracy means an

**Southern Philippines—
Joint Operations Area**

age of frustratingly narrow rules of engagement. That is because fledgling democratic governments, besieged by young and aggressive local media, will find it politically difficult—if not impossible—to allow American troops on their soil to engage in direct action.

—Robert Kaplan[6]

The current COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that unilateral U.S. military operations can be ineffective and even counterproductive to the democratic institutions we are trying to establish. To reduce our footprint in Iraq, our top priority now is to stand up Iraqi security forces to take over the fight against insurgents. These forces must prevail if Iraq is to achieve and maintain long-term stability.

A large foreign military presence or occupation force in any country undermines the legitimacy of the host-nation government in the eyes of its citizens and the international community. As we now know, large U.S. occupation forces in Islamic regions can create problems for us. A senior British military officer who served in Iraq has remarked that the U.S. Army there has acted much like "fuel on a smoldering fire"; he suggests that this is "as much owing to their presence as their actions."[7] If he is right and our mere presence can be counterproductive, then a tailored, low-visibility approach that plays well in the moderate Muslim community and is politically acceptable to our potential WOT partners makes sound strategic sense.

Blowback

Osama bin Laden has made the presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East a rallying point for global jihad by a new generation of Muslim holy warriors.[8] Just as the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets created the leaders of today's global terrorist network, so Iraq has the potential to produce far more dangerous second- and third-order effects. Blowback from the current war in Iraq might be even more dangerous than the fallout from Afghanistan.

Fighters in Iraq are more battle-hardened than the Arabs who fought demoralized Soviet Army conscripts in Afghanistan. They are testing themselves against arguably the best army in history and acquiring skills far more useful for future terrorist operations than those their counterparts learned during the 1980s. Mastering how to make improvised explosive devices or conduct suicide operations is more relevant to urban terrorism than the conventional guerrilla tactics the *mujahideen* used against the Red Army. U.S. military commanders say that today's militants in Afghanistan have adopted techniques perfected in Iraq.[9]

The transfer of these deadly skills to Al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies presents a clear and present danger. The world has already seen bomb-making skills migrate with deadly results from the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyya to the Abu Sayyaf Group in Manila and throughout the Southern Philippines.[10] Other countries with Al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and India.[11] Developing indigenous capacity to confront this emerging threat will become increasingly important to future WOT efforts.

The Southern Philippines

The Southern Philippines is typical of areas that are ripe for Al-Qaeda influence. It is located along ethnic, cultural, and religious fault-lines in a region that has been only loosely controlled or governed throughout its long history of occupation.[12] The area is home to a discontented Muslim population dominated by a predominately Catholic government based in Manila. Approximately 5 million Muslims live in 5 of the poorest provinces of the Philippines, in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In these provinces, the majority of the population has an income well below the poverty line.

These regions are what Sean Anderson calls "grey areas"—"ungovernable areas in developing nations over which unstable, weak national governments have

nominal control but which afford criminal syndicates or terrorists and insurgent groups excellent bases of operation from which they can conduct far reaching operations against other targeted nations."[13]

Philippine "grey areas" are notorious for civil unrest, lawlessness, terrorist activity, and Muslim separatist movements. They are home or safe haven for several Al-Qaeda-linked organizations, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf, and the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyya. The core leaders of many of these groups received their initial training in the camps of Afghanistan and their baptism of fire in the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.[14] Al-Qaeda did not originate these movements, but it has used them as vehicles to expand its global reach and spread its extremist ideology.[15]

The United States became interested in the Southern Philippines shortly before 9/11, after Abu Sayyaf kidnapped several U.S. citizens and held them hostage on their island stronghold of Basilan.[16] After 9/11, the region became a front line in the WOT when Washington and Manila set their sights on the group's destruction. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) officially began in early 2002 and is best known for Joint Task Force (JTF) 510's combined U.S.-Philippine operations on Basilan (Balikatan 02-1). Special Forces (SF)

advisory efforts began in the Southern Philippines in 2002 and continue to this day.

The Diamond Model

The unconventional or indirect approach of working "by, with, and through" indigenous forces has remained consistent throughout OEF-P.[17] Led by Brigadier General Donald Wurster and Colonel David Fridovich, OEF-P planners created their guiding strategy using principles that can be found in Gordon McCormick's strategic COIN model, called the Diamond Model.[18] This model can help planners develop an effective holistic approach to cut off organizations like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyya from their bases of popular support and to isolate, capture, or kill their members and leaders. The Philippine Government and its armed forces now call the application of principles found in the Diamond Model the "Basilan Model," after its successful use against Abu Sayyaf on Basilan in 2002.

The Diamond Model establishes a comprehensive framework for interactions between the host-nation government, the insurgents, the local populace, and international actors or sponsors (figure 1). The host-nation government's goal is to destroy the insurgents or limit their growth and influence to a manageable level. Their opponent's goal is to grow large enough to destroy the state's

Principles of the Diamond Model

- **Consider popular support the center of gravity**
- **Enhance government legitimacy and control**
- **Focus on people's needs and security**
- **Target insurgent safe havens, infrastructure, and support**
- **Share intelligence (esp. HUMINT)**
- **Develop indigenous security forces**

Figure 1. McCormick's Diamond Model

control mechanisms and then either replace the existing government or force political concessions from it that achieve the group's objectives. Jemaah Islamiyya's and Abu Sayyaf's objectives were to create Islamic caliphates or states in the Southern Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[19]

To develop an effective counter-strategy, the state must first understand its advantages and disadvantages relative to the insurgents. With its armed forces and police, the state has a force advantage over the insurgents. On the other hand, the insurgents have a marked information advantage. Being dispersed and embedded in the local population, they are difficult to detect and target; additionally, they have visibility of the state's security apparatus and infrastructure and can easily target them. As McCormick asserts, "The winner of this contest will be the side that can most quickly resolve its disadvantage."[20]

The state's goal, then, should be to rectify its information disadvantage so it can effectively locate the insurgents and capture or kill them. The insurgent group's goal is to grow in strength and effectiveness so it can threaten the state's security apparatus and infrastructure before the state can overcome its information disadvantage. Time is typically on the side of the insurgents because they can often achieve their goals simply by surviving and exhausting government efforts and the national political will.

The Diamond Model can help establish the optimal strategy the state should pursue to rectify its information disadvantage and win the COIN fight. Legs 1 through 5 of the model depict the actions the counterinsurgent should take. In the case of legs 1 through 3, these actions should be sequential.[21] The upper half of the model addresses the state's internal environment. Because it suffers from an information disadvantage, the state must first pursue leg 1 to strengthen its influence and control over the local populace. McCormick defines control as "the ability to see everything in one's area of operation that might pose a threat to security and the ability to influence what is seen."[22] This level of visibility requires an extensive human intelligence network; it cannot be achieved by technological means. What military strategist John Paul Vann pointed out about U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam is true today: "We need intelligence from the local civilians and soldiers from the area who understand the language, customs, and the dynamics of the local situation, who can easily point out strangers in the area even though they speak the same language."[23]

Gaining popular support is a zero-sum game. One side's loss is the other's gain, and vice versa. Strengthening ties with the local populace by focusing on their needs and security also denies or degrades insurgent influence over the people and leads to information that exposes the insurgent infrastructure. This allows the state to attack leg 2 with operations that disrupt the insurgent's control mechanisms over the people. These moves often lead to actionable intelligence, which the state can use to target the insurgency's infrastructure. Actionable intelligence gained by patiently pursuing efforts along legs 1 and 2 enables the state to identify and strike the insurgents along leg 3.

Military forces conducting COIN operations typically ignore legs 1 and 2 of the model and attempt to directly target their opponents. As the Vietnam war showed, this usually entails large-scale search-and-destroy operations that the insurgents easily avoid and that often produce collateral damage that alienates the people.[24] The state can defeat most insurgencies by operating effectively along legs 1 through 3, in that order.[25] The overall strategy (internal to the state) identifies the local populace as the center of gravity in the COIN fight and winning popular support as the key to the state's ability to remedy its information disadvantage and win the conflict. The indirect approach of working through the local populace and indigenous security forces to target the insurgents thus becomes the most direct path to victory.

The lower half of the Diamond Model depicts the external environment. If an external sponsor is involved, the state attacks leg 5 by directly targeting the supplies and financing flowing from the outside to the insurgents. At the same time, the state implements diplomatic operations along leg 4 to gain support and resources for its COIN efforts from partner nations and other international actors. It simultaneously employs diplomatic pressure and punitive measures to influence the behavior of insurgent sponsors.

OEF-P Lines of Operation

One of the more critical elements of COIN planning is synchronizing the overall effort with the

country team or embassy staff. The Diamond Model prompts planners to consider all elements of national power when planning WOT COIN operations.[26] In countries with well-established governments, WOT military operations play a supporting role to efforts managed by the U.S. State Department. Planning that integrates the military and country-team staff members produces optimal results. Because of the protracted nature of these operations, military and country-team staff must maintain close relationships and conduct interagency coordination on a regular basis. In the Philippines, OEF-P planners coordinate closely with the country team to facilitate interagency planning and synchronization.[27]

Applying the principles found in the Diamond Model within the political constraints of the Philippines led to the pursuit of three interconnected lines of operation:[28]

● *Building Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) capacity*. U.S. ground, maritime, and air components trained, advised, and assisted Philippine security forces to help create a secure and stable environment.

● *Focused civil-military operations*. Philippine-led, U.S.-facilitated humanitarian and civic-action projects demonstrated the government's concern for regional citizens and improved their quality of life.

● *Information operations (IO)*. Aiming to enhance government legitimacy in the region, the joint U.S.-Philippine effort used IO to emphasize the success of the first two lines of operation.

The lines of operation complemented country-team efforts to help government security forces operate more effectively along legs 1 through 3 of the model, thereby enhancing the host nation's legitimacy and control of the region; this in turn reduced the insurgents' local support, denied them sanctuaries, and disrupted their operations. Diplomatic efforts executed along leg 4 were also critical.

Balikatan 02-1

Principles found in the Diamond Model were successfully applied against Abu Sayyaf during OEF-P on Basilan Island in exercise Balikatan 02-1.[29] Located 1,000 kilometers south of Manila at the northern tip of the Sulu Archipelago in the war-torn Southern Philippines, Basilan is 1,372 square kilometers in size and home to a population of just over 300,000 people. As the northernmost island in the Sulu Archipelago, Basilan is strategically located. It has traditionally served as the jumping-off point or fallback position for terrorists operating in Central Mindanao, and its Christian population has long been prey to Muslim kidnapping gangs.[30] In the 1990s, Abu Sayyaf established a base of operations there and began a reign of terror that left government forces struggling to maintain security as they pursued an elusive enemy.

To succeed in COIN, the counterinsurgent must first understand the root causes of the insurgency: What are the underlying conditions that make the environment ripe for insurgent activity? To answer this question, U.S. Pacific Command deployed an SF assessment team in October 2001 to the Southern Philippines.[31] The team conducted detailed area assessments down to the village level and updated them throughout the operation. They gathered vital information about the enemy situation, army training requirements, local demographics, infrastructure, and socioeconomic conditions.[32] Measurements ranging from infant mortality rates and per capita income to the number of squatters, government services, and local education levels enabled planners to "build a map of disenfranchisement to ascertain where active and passive support would likely blossom."[33] These assessments provided critical information concerning the root causes of civil unrest at the village level. They also laid the foundation for the operational plan, for as military analyst Kalev Sepp notes, "The security of the people must be assured as a basic need, along with food, water, shelter, health care and a means of living. The failure of COIN and the root cause of insurgencies themselves can often be traced to government disregard of these basic rights."[34]

In February 2002, the United States dispatched JTF-510, comprised of 1,300 U.S. troops, to the Southern Philippines. Its mission was to conduct unconventional warfare operations "by, with, and through" the AFP to help the government separate the population from, and then destroy, Abu Sayyaf.[35] The bulk of the force consisted of an air component in Mactan, Cebu, and staff and support personnel located at the JTF headquarters in Zamboanga. The tip of the U.S. spear consisted of 160 SF personnel and, later, 300 members of a Naval Construction Task Group. All U.S. forces operated under restrictive

rules of engagement.[36] Once on Basilan, SF advisers deployed down to the battalion level and moved in with their Philippine counterparts in remote areas near insurgent strongholds. The SF teams found the Philippine units in disarray and lacking in basic infantry skills and initiative. One SF adviser said, "The situation had degraded to the point that the AFP no longer aggressively pursued the insurgents. The combination of neglect and lack of military initiative had created circumstances that contributed not only to the continuing presence and even growth of insurgent groups, but to the genesis of new terrorist and criminal organizations."[37]

Using their language and cultural skills, the SF teams quickly formed a bond with their military counterparts and local villagers. Their first goal was to establish a secure environment and protect the local populace. SF advisory teams went to work immediately, honing AFP military skills through focused training activities that increased unit proficiency and instilled confidence.[38] According to one SF adviser, "SF detachments converted AFP base camps on Basilan into tactically defensible areas, and they trained Philippine soldiers and marines in the combat lifesaving skills needed for providing emergency medical treatment with confidence.

Those lifesaving skills were a significant morale booster for the AFP."[39]

Increased patrolling accompanied training, which allowed the AFP and local security forces to reestablish security at the village level and seize the initiative from the insurgents. SF advisers credited an aggressive increase in AFP patrolling with denying Abu Sayyaf its habitual sanctuary and curtailing the group's movement.[40] The SF teams played a key role in building AFP capacity by accompanying units (as advisers only) on combat operations.[41] Reestablishing security and protecting the Basilan people were the foundation for all other activities along leg 1 of the Diamond Model.

Once security was established, both civil affairs and SF Soldiers worked with their counterparts to execute high-impact projects that produced immediate and positive benefits for the local population.[42] Humanitarian assistance and civic-action projects were initially targeted to meet the basic needs of the local populace, then refined and tailored for particular regions and provinces based on assessment results.[43] As the security situation improved, the U.S. Naval Construction Task Group deployed to the island to execute larger scale projects such as well digging, general construction, and improvements to roads, bridges, and piers. In addition to enhancing military capabilities, these infrastructure projects benefited local residents. When possible, locally procured materials and workers were used in order to put money directly into the local economy. Humanitarian and civic-action projects on Basilan improved the image of the AFP and the Manila government and helped return law and order to the island.[44] A key component in leg 1 of the model, the projects earned local respect, improved force protection, and reduced Muslim village support for the insurgents. Consequently, the AFP was

Navy medic Aaron Vandall provides Combat Life Saver training to members of the Philippine Armed Forces as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines in March 2003.

DOD

Five Philippine Army soldiers try on U.S. protective vests turned over to the Philippine military as part of the RP-U.S. Military Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), 24 January 2003.

able to cultivate closer relations with the people in insurgent-influenced areas. [45] As Colonel Darwin Guerra, battalion commander of the 32d Infantry, AFP, reported, "Where once the people supported rebels and extremists because they felt neglected or oppressed by the government, the delivery of their basic needs like health and nutrition services, construction of infrastructure and impact projects, and strengthening security in the community that the Balikatan program brought [sic] changed their attitudes and loyalty. As residents began to experience better living conditions, they withdrew support from the militants."[46]

The AFP consistently took the lead on all activities and projects throughout Balikatan 02-1, with the U.S. military playing a supporting role. Putting the AFP in the lead enhanced AFP and government legitimacy at the grassroots level and helped end passive support for the insurgents. Targeted humanitarian assistance and civic-action projects also drove a wedge between Abu Sayyaf and the local populace. At the same time, these activities provided opportunities to interact with the locals and tap into the "bamboo telegraph," the indigenous information network.[47] As villagers became more comfortable, they openly shared information on the local situation with AFP and U.S. forces.

Intelligence collection and sharing was also critical to the operation. SF advisers conducted extensive information collection activities to gain situational awareness and contribute to a safe and secure environment. They shared intelligence with the AFP and helped them fuse all sources of information to develop a clearer picture of the insurgents' organizational structure. Improved relations with local residents generated increased reporting on Abu Sayyaf activity. SF advisers also leveraged U.S. military intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, integrating these assets into intelligence collection plans to support AFP combat operations. Actionable intelligence stimulated progress on leg 3, direct AFP combat operations against Abu Sayyaf.

By August 2002, just six months later, the synergistic effects of security, improved AFP military capability, and focused civil-military operations had isolated the insurgents from their local support networks. As the security situation on Basilan continued to improve, doctors, teachers, and other professional workers who had fled the island began to return, and the Philippine Government, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Growth with Equity in Mindanao Program, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and various nongovernmental organizations brought in additional resources to further address the root causes of the civil unrest.[48]

Results of Balikatan 02-1

My visit to Basilan Island in 2005 revealed a vastly different environment from the terrorist safe haven once dominated by Abu Sayyaf. The island's physical landscape remained largely unchanged. The rugged mountains, jungle terrain, and remote villages that rebel groups and extremists had once found so inviting and conducive to their deadly activities were all still there. What had changed were the attitude and loyalties of the Basilan people, making the environment far less favorable for insurgent activity.

The U.S. military and the Philippine Government know that Balikatan 02-1 was a success, and the operation is now commonly referred to as the "Basilan Model." While it didn't destroy Abu Sayyaf altogether, the model proved effective in—

● Denying the insurgents and terrorists sanctuary in targeted geographic areas (Basilan Island).[49]

Characteristics

- Advise and assist—all levels
- Small footprint: 50-300 personnel
- Support and sustainability
- Distributed ops
- Low-visibility
- Intelligence sharing
- Find low tech solutions
- Interagency coordination
- Reachback
- Leverage bilateral exercises
- AFP leads / U.S. supports

Lines of Operation

- Indigenous capacity-building
- Focused civil-military ops
- Information ops

Legend: AFSOF, Air Force Special Operations Forces; ARSOF, Army Special Operations Forces; CRG, Contingency Response Group; DoS, Department of State; JSOTF, Joint Special Operations Task Force; LCE, Liaison Coordination Element; MIST, Mobile Information Support Team; NAVSOF, Navy Special Operations Forces; SOCPAC, Special Operations Component, United States Pacific Command; USEMB, U.S. Embassy.

Figure 2. Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines Advisory Model

● Improving the capacity of indigenous forces (AFP).[50]

● Enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government in the region.[51]

● Establishing the conditions for peace and development (Basilan Island).

● Providing a favorable impression of U.S. military efforts in the region.[52]

The holistic approach used on Basilan enabled the AFP to gain control of the situation, to become self-sufficient, and eventually to transition to peace and development activities. Both U.S. and AFP military forces could then focus their efforts and resources on other insurgent safe havens. This approach is characteristic of the expanding inkblot, or "white zone" strategy, used during successful British COIN efforts in Malaya.

Continuing the Fight

Despite the success of U.S. and Philippine WOT efforts on Basilan, the fight against extremism in the Southern Philippines is far from over. Although Abu Sayyaf was neutralized on Basilan and significantly reduced in size, its leaders managed to flee to Central Mindanao and the island of Sulu.[53] Using the peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine Government for cover, and with assistance from Jemaah Islamiyya, Abu Sayyaf has increased its urban bombing capabilities and

extended its reach as a terrorist organization.[54] To gain better visibility on this emerging threat and to continue to assist the AFP, SF advisory efforts have adapted as well.

Soon after Balikatan 02-1, JTF-510 reorganized into a much leaner organization called the Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines (JSOTF-P), which continued advisory efforts with selected AFP units at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (figure 2).[55] Follow-on JSOTF-P advisers have pursued the same strategy, but with greatly reduced resources along some lines of operation.[56] The reorganization reflects a shift in focus to indigenous capacity-building efforts, with the deployment of advisory teams to particular AFP units near terrorist safe havens or transit points in the Southern Philippines.

Deployed at the tactical level, SF advisory teams called Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) are small, tailored, autonomous teams of Special Operations personnel from all services.[57] They advise and assist select AFP units in planning and fusing all sources of intelligence in support of operations directed at insurgent-terrorist organizations.[58] LCEs conduct decentralized planning and execution using a robust reachback capability to the JSOTF to leverage additional assets in support of AFP operations. These assets range from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets such

as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles to humanitarian assistance to tailored information products.

The JSOTF has increasingly emphasized information operations that heighten public awareness of the negative effects of terrorism and provide ways to report terrorists to local security forces. Also featured are positive actions the government and military take to foster peace and development. The introduction of a Military Information Support Team in 2005 significantly enhanced the production of print and media products in support of U.S. and Philippine Government WOT information objectives.[59] Products include newspaper ads, handbills, posters, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and novelty items (example at figure 3). These IO efforts have helped to raise public awareness of the U.S. Government's rewards program.[60] Osama bin Laden's chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has said, "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims."[61] If this is true, then shaping an environment less conducive to terrorist activity by raising public awareness is a true combat multiplier.

Figure 3. AFP/U.S. public information product

Indirect Approach Advantages

With U.S. forces stretched to the breaking point globally, SF advisory efforts will become more attractive to U.S. policymakers in the future. These efforts have some marked advantages over unilateral military operations.[62] Economy-of-force operations by nature, they are characterized by a small footprint, low resource requirements, and limited visibility. This makes them ideal to use in politically sensitive areas where a large foreign military presence would undermine the host-nation government's legitimacy and serve to rally opposition extremist elements. Additionally, with their low profiles, SF advisory operations can usually be sustained for a long time, a distinct benefit during protracted struggles.[63] Operations in the Southern Philippines have been ongoing since 2002, and so far they have received very little attention from the U.S. media and public.

The SF advisory approach also creates a more favorable impression of U.S. military efforts. Advisers are much more politically acceptable than Soldiers who take a direct role in combat. Humanitarian and civic-action activities performed with indigenous forces demonstrate the U.S. and host-nation government's commitment to promoting long-term peace and development. In 2002, U.S. advisers operating on Basilan went from seeing throat-slash hand gestures to receiving smiles and handshakes from local Muslims after the latter discovered the true nature of the SF's activities.[64] In 2005, U.S. military forces received a hero's welcome when they returned to Basilan for training exercises. The people repeatedly thanked them for their assistance during Balikatan 02-1.[65]

This good word has spread to the neighboring island of Sulu, a notorious Abu Sayyaf and extremist stronghold. In 2005, the Sulu provincial government asked U.S. military and AFP officials to conduct the "Basilan Model" on their island during Balikatan 06.[66] Prior to the exercise, local Islamic religious leaders asked the Muslim populace of Sulu to welcome U.S. forces.[67] Patricio Abinales, Associate Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, credits the American military presence in the Southern Philippines for contributing to the emergence of reformist leaders (especially former Moro rebels) and politicians identified with "moderate Islam" who represent a change in conduct from the "guns, goons, gold" custom associated with traditional politicians.[68]

A Regional Approach

A regionally networked approach will optimize U.S. efforts to build indigenous capacity. The enemy is part of a transnational global network and flows across borders in many regions of the world like Southeast Asia. Terrorists and insurgents use ungoverned areas to their advantage so that efforts

by individual states alone will not be effective. The best way to confront a network is to create a counter-network, a non-hierarchical organization capable of responding quickly to actionable intelligence. The goal should be a networked regional capability that can seamlessly pass intelligence among SF advisory teams collocated with indigenous forces in strategic locations. In denied or unfriendly areas, surrogate forces developed and operating under the direction of SF and interagency partners should perform this task. As Steven Sloan notes, "The development of counter terrorist organizations that are small, flexible, and innovative cannot be done in the context of a unilateral approach to combating terrorism. There must be unity of action on the regional and international level that breaches the jurisdictional battles among countries that often seem to take precedence over an integrated war against terrorism."[69] The U.S. Government, military, and people must understand that these long-duration efforts require patience and determination. Gaining access, fostering trust, building relationships, and developing an indigenous or surrogate military capacity can take years, and success can often be difficult to measure. SF advisory teams must deploy forward to access indigenous capability and develop the situation in critical areas near suspected terrorist safe havens and transit locations. Once they complete their assessments, more refined plans ranging from small-scale LCE operations to larger Basilan-type efforts can be developed. This strategy has the added benefit of being preventive instead of just reactive. Positioning SF advisory teams as "global scouts" forward will provide early warning and allow our policymakers to assist our partners in shaping a more favorable environment.

Basilan in Iraq?

The "Basilan Model" and follow-on U.S. efforts offer a template for a sustainable, low-visibility approach to supporting America's allies in the WOT. In Iraq, where unilateral conventional operations have often been ineffective and even counterproductive, we should consider employing SF advisory teams on a large scale. Because they know the geography, language, and culture of the region and are skilled in working "by, with, and through" indigenous forces, SF is uniquely suited to adeptly navigate Iraq's politically and culturally sensitive terrain to enable effective host-nation operations against our common enemies.

By itself, however, just building the host-nation's capacity to capture or kill insurgents will not guarantee victory. The United States must employ a holistic approach that enhances the legitimacy of the host-nation government and its security forces in the eyes of the local populace. Using the Diamond Model, it must focus on the people at the grassroots level as the enemy's center of gravity. Ultimately, we will win the "long war," as the *Quadrennial Defense Review* now calls it, by gaining broader acceptance of U.S. policy within the moderate Muslim community. The best way to do this is by working in the shadows, "by, with, and through" indigenous or surrogate forces to marginalize the insurgents and win over the people. In an irony befitting the often paradoxical nature of counter-insurgency warfare, "the indirect approach" offers us the most direct path to victory. *MR*

A U. S. Army Special Forces Soldier conducts security assistance training for members of the Phillipine Armed Forces on the Zamboanga Peninsula, 20 March 2003.

DOD

NOTES

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6. Robert D. Kaplan, "Imperial Grunts," *Atlantic Monthly Online*, October 2005, 2, <www.theatlantic.com/doc/200510/kaplan-us-special-forces/2>.

7. Aylwin-Foster, 4.

8. According to an Al-Qaeda fatwa delivered in 1996, "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grips, and in order for their armies to move out of all lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim." Full text available online at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html>.

9. Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, "Blowback Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 2005): 4.

10. Zachary Abuza, "Balik Terrorism: The Return of the ASG [Abu Sayyaf Group]," *Strategic Studies Institute* (September 2005): 31.

11. John P. Sullivan, "Terrorism, Crime and Private Armies," in *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency*, 72.

12. The Philippines were occupied by the Spanish from 1542 to 1898; the United States from 1898 to 1941; the Japanese from 1941 to 1944; and the United States again from 1944 to 1945. The United States granted the Philippines full independence in 1946.

13. Sean K. Anderson, "U.S. Counterinsurgency vs. Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism" in *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency,* 85.

14. Abuza, 2.

15. Ibid., 5. Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, was dispatched to the Philippines in 1991 and established a network of Islamic charities that have been linked to terrorist financing in the region.

16. The Abu Sayyaf Group conducted numerous kidnappings prior to 9/11, but it is best known for kidnapping three American citizens, including a missionary couple, and several wealthy Filipino citizens from Dos Palmas Resort on the island of Palawan, 27 May 2001. ASG subsequently moved the hostages to Basilan Island.

17. The "indirect approach" was first advocated by British military theorist, journalist, and historian Basil Henry Liddell Hart to prevent a repeat of earlier trench warfare deadlock. His theory included a form of blitzkrieg using both tanks and infantry.

18. In 1994, Dr. Gordon McCormick created the triangle insurgent/COIN model. He later created the Diamond Model to capture the interaction with external international actors. See Gordon H. McCormick, "A 'Pocket Guide' to Internal War," Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming.

19. Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 124.

20. Class notes from Dr. Gordon McCormick's "Seminar on Guerilla Warfare," Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, October 2005.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Rick Webster, "Counterinsurgency: The John Paul Vann Model," *Sitrep* (Winter/Spring 2004), <www.lists.opn.org/pipermail/org.opn.lists.vwar/2004-May/001227.html>.

24. Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 190.

25. McCormick, class notes.

26. For a more detailed discussion of applying strategic counterinsurgency models to the planning process, see LTC Eric Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare Magazine* (September 2005).

27. Close coordination with the ambassador, the Joint United States Military Assistance Group, the regional affairs team, local representatives of the United States Agency for International Development, the political-military adviser, and other key members of the country team will ensure unity of effort.

28. Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P) lines of operation were developed by the JSOTF-P and Special Operations Command, Pacific staff.

29. Balikitan means "shoulder to shoulder" in Tagalog. While the U.S. Government views OEF-P efforts in the Southern Philippines as military operations in a declared hostile-fire area, the Philippine Government describes them as training exercises to avoid perceived constitutional restrictions against foreign troops participating in internal combat operations.

30. COL Darwin Z. Guerra, "Peace-Building in Basilan: The Army's 103rd Brigade Soldier's Final Battle,*"* unpublished, 1.

31. COL Dave Maxwell, "Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?", <www.army.mil/professionalwriting/ volumes/volume2/june_2004/6_04_3.html>.

32. Wendt, 10-11.

33. Ibid.

34. Sepp, 9.

35. Maxwell, 1.

36. Cherilyn A. Walley, "Impact of the Semi-permissive Environment on Force-protection in the Philippines Engagement," *Special Warfare*, 2004, 1, <www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_1_17/ai_n954388>.

37. Ibid., 4. Interview of an SF adviser by Dr. C. H. Briscoe.

38. MAJ Joe McGraw, SF Detachment Commander on Basilan during Balikatan 02-1, interview by the author, Monterey, CA, 19 January 2006. Training initially focused on basic individual infantry skills and progressed to more advanced collective skills. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units have very little training ammunition and rarely fire their weapons other than in combat situations.

39. C. H. Briscoe, "Reflections and Observations on ARSF [Army Special Forces] Operations during Balikatan 02-1," *Special Warfare*, 2004, 1, <www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_1_17/ai_n9543891>.

40. Ibid., 1.

41. McGraw interview. SF advisers initially were not allowed to accompany AFP units below the battalion level during operations, but after a lengthy mission review process (CONOPS), advisors were allowed to work at company level toward the end of the operation.

42. "A 'PACOM-imposed force cap' on Army SF personnel and heavy weapons in the exercise area of operations constrained the use of CA [civil affairs] teams. That compelled the commander of Forward Operating Base 11 to task SF detachments with the CA mission." C. H. Briscoe, 1.

43. Cherilyn A. Walley, "Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island," *Special Warfare*, 2004, 3. <www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_1_17/ai_n9543878>.

44. C. H. Briscoe, 1.

45. Ibid., 1.

46. Guerra, 2.

47. McGraw interview.

48. After security was reestablished during Balikatan 02-1, the Philippine Government, the Growth with Equity in Mindanao Program, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and various nongovernmental organizations provided economic and developmental assistance to Basilan Island. The U.S. Government provided an average of $80 million of economic and developmental assistance a year to the Philippines from 2002 to 2006, of which 60 percent was designated for the Mindanao region. See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P. L. 109-102).

49. The ASG no longer poses a threat on Basilan. Its armed strength has fallen from an estimated 1,000 in 2002 to somewhere between 200 and 400 in 2005. Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, "The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, 10 January 2006, 8.

50. AFP forces deployed on Basilan improved their capacity while working directly with Army Special Forces during Balikatan 02-1. Follow-on security assistance train-and-equip modules and SF advisory efforts have continued to build AFP capabilities.

51. Balikatan 02-1 enabled the Philippine Government and AFP to reduce security forces on Basilan Island by 70 percent and transition to peace-building activities.

52. Sepp, 10.

53. Khaddafy Janjalani assumed leadership of the ASG after Abu Sabaya's death during an AFP-led, U.S.-assisted operation in June 2002.

54. Lum and Niksch, 7.

55. JSOTF-P has fluctuated between 50 and 300 personnel. Advisory teams interface at the strategic level with the U.S. Embassy in Manila and the AFP General Headquarters in Manila; at the operational level, with AFP Southern Command in Zamboanga; and at the tactical level, with select AFP combat units. Advisory teams also work with AFP civil affairs and psychological operations forces.

56. Humanitarian assistance and civic-action project funding was greatly reduced after Balikatan 02-1. Some funding was diverted to tsunami relief in 2005.

57. Liaison Coordination Elements generally consist of 4 to 12 SF advisers who are embedded with select AFP ground, naval, and air forces down to the battalion level.

58. JTF-510 advisory efforts were directed strictly at the ASG while JSOTF-P advisory efforts have expanded to include Jemaah Islamiyya.

59. This Military Information Support Team consists of psychological operations personnel who develop combined products with the AFP Civilian Relations Group. Products are approved through both AFP and U.S. chains of command.

60. U.S. Government rewards programs in the Philippines have led to the apprehension of 23 terrorists. Products are designed by AFP and U.S. personnel working together to ensure they are portrayed in the correct cultural context. Muslim soldiers within the AFP have played a key role in this effort, translating products into native languages like Talsug.

61. Cited in a speech by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Council on Foreign Relations, Harold Pratt House, New York, NY, 17 February 2006, <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060217-12574.html>.

62. Stretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a "thin green line" that could snap unless relief comes soon, according to Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Thin Green Line*, Report to the Pentagon, <msnbc.msn.com/id/11009829/>.

63. Sepp, 9. SF advisory efforts in El Salvador were conducted for over 12 years.

64. Robert Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts* (New York: Random House, 2005), 245.

65. Author's experience on Basilan, March 2005.

66. Author's experience on Sulu, February 2005.

67. Roel Pareno, "Sulu sultan leads Jolo rally backing Balikatan," *Philippine Star*, 12 Feb 2005.

68. Patricio Abinales, "American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview," *East-West Center Working Papers, Politics and Security Series* 7, (October 2004): 14.

69. Stephen Sloan, "Forward: Responding to the Threat," in *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency*, xxi.

VERTICAL VERSUS HORIZONTAL MEDIA

Using Agenda-setting and Audience Agenda-melding to Create Public Information Strategies
in the Emerging Papyrus Society

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I. The Emerging Papyrus Society

After 11 September 2001, when United States and coalition troops engaged Taliban forces in Afghanistan, one of my 20-year-old students told me he was very glad the capable volunteer Army was available to engage in war. I am sure we all are glad that our nation has such proficient, highly motivated, and well-equipped ground, air, and naval forces to represent us. Still, my student might have made the same comment about the local fire department coming to extinguish a dormitory fire. For him, fighting wars, like fighting fires, seemed to be the special province of trained professionals; the rest of us belonged on the sidelines. Incredibly, he added that he would hate to think that such important missions would have to rely on draftees. But it is draftees who lie row on row in graves in Europe, in the small towns of America, and in Arlington National Cemetery. These extraordinary yet ordinary Americans shouldered their share of the communal burden in past national crises, when citizenship presumed service, and they performed superbly. Today we have a volunteer military, and we still have some sense of shared history and commitment to community, but communities evolve. Ours is—and in a challenging way.

Let's begin with a metaphor to describe this evolving community. I had an opportunity several years ago to visit the three towering pyramids at Giza, where the many stones at the base support the fewer stones at the top more than 400 feet up. Like other tourists, I marveled at ancient Egyptian engineering. What a view of the surrounding sands (and modern Cairo) there must be from the top! If Demosthenes had stood there, transported in time and place, thousands might have heard his apparently magnificent voice. Nearby, in Giza itself, shops still produce ancient Egyptian papyrus paper by trimming the outside green covering of the triangular papyrus reed, then cutting and pressing the pulpy white strands inside the plant. Craftsmen lay one strip down, then one over and another down and so forth, like Scottish tartan plaid, to form sheets that can be connected, dried, then rolled into a scroll resembling the rolling pin in your kitchen. Scrolls were the books of the ancient world, and the words written on the flat horizontal surfaces they contained came to challenge the power of those who stood at the top of organizational pyramids.

Such is our argument. From papyrus to animal-skin vellum to Johannes Gutenberg's books, from newspapers and magazines to radio and television to satellites, computers, the Web, and iPods, communication technology has

demonstrated the power to level societies, perhaps not from the point of view of those who lead our necessary organizations, but certainly from the point of view of those being led. In the 1930s, Albert Speer, Adolph Hitler's chief of armaments (among other roles), remarked on his leader's power to reach the masses, allowing citizens and party members to share the same message at the same time.[2] Of course, Hitler moved to smash alternative agendas, but leaders today, even in China and North Korea, have found that horizontal media communications—not the vertical mass-media television and radio networks, but niche magazines, websites, blogs, cable TV shows, satellite radio stations, and such—nibble at the foundations of power. The era of mass media is passing into history, and as it does, the ability of leaders to shape and control national agendas is diminishing; in fact, their agenda-setting is now quite often contested.

This is where we find ourselves today. We, as individual Americans, are blending the agendas of vertical and horizontal media into that Scottish weave, like ancient papyrus paper, thus creating a more horizontal, papyrus-like society less responsive to univocal sources of information. The U.S. Armed Forces today need a public information strategy that fits this papyrus society emerging around us. Vertical and horizontal forces, as we shall see, have competed for centuries to be the dominant public media portraying important public issues. So this is nothing new. But the Army's challenges are.

This article attempts to deconstruct the American national community in the new century as the press evolves, as audiences express more personal interests, and as a military with a vertically-based operational planning history adapts to horizontal social forces. It will also offer suggestions for how the Army and its fellow services might best respond to the new communication paradigm.

Americans spend about six hours daily with various media such as websites, television, or MP3 players. These media are so ubiquitous that it is hard to believe that the age of *mass* media is passing into history. Mass media, such as daily newspapers, network radio, and national television address the concerns of an entire community. Yet these powerful media have seen their audience diminish for decades (although local television less dramatically so). There were nearly 3,000 daily newspapers at the time of World War I; today, there are fewer than half that, and collective daily newspaper circulation is steadily declining despite a continual increase in national population. In 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt spoke to the Nation from his White House fireside, he reached a huge, attentive audience. In the 1950s, the dominant networks some evenings reached more than eight of ten households in the national viewing audience. Today, the nation's premier mass-media event, the Super Bowl, brings in about a third of the national audience.

Mass media address the entire community from a vertical (top-down), entire-community perspective. We generally learn of events from mainline journalists charged with being society's sentinels. However, we often turn to more personalized news sources, such as special-interest magazines, talk shows, satellite radio outlets, or trusted websites to deepen our knowledge and to provide a context for what Walter Lippmann once called the "confusing buzz of events."[3] Full of opinion and bent on interpretation, these media frame the news to fit within a particular ideological view. We gravitate to them because they cater to our own, often established, views. In this way, the ability of professional journalists to provide a balanced context for events has been challenged in the United States and elsewhere in the world, even in totalitarian states. For many, the mass media have been replaced by radio hosts like Rush Limbaugh and Stephanie Miller—20th-century versions of 18th-century Cotton Mather.

It is not hard to see why people seek to nest knowledge of public events within their own perspectives. Take a look at the various service-oriented newspapers: there is an *Army Times*, a *Navy Times*, a *Marine Corps Times*, and an *Air Force Times*. No doubt all present news about major events, but each paper shapes the details to fit the interests of its particular service audience. Similarly, editors who assemble *Cosmopolitan* or *Seventeen* sometimes cover the same major events, but from a presumed perspective of older or younger women, and the same is true of *Sports Illustrated, Fortune*, or any other magazine. Even *Time, Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and World Report* seem directed at a particular audience—an educated middle class interested in political news. Most media today aim at specialized audiences–what we call horizontal media– while daily newspapers, network radio, and national television outlets—vertical media—still aim

mainly at the entire community from the president to the humblest citizen.

Both vertical (mass media) and horizontal (niche) media aim to inform, but their missions—their agendas—are somewhat different. The vertical and horizontal media we use influence the way we see events. Vertical media remain strong, but horizontal media perspectives are rising as audiences enjoy the rich and readily available information environment. One consequence of our ability to reach for media that fit our personal interests is that now, as never before, we can fit events to our own expectations. In other words, we can meld the news to fit our own agendas. Such agenda-melding is occurring wherever the horizontal media have spread, with all their potential for enriching citizen knowledge and destabilizing rigid vertical societies and institutions.

The temptation to live in a horizontal community, ignoring the vertical society, can be powerful. It's like living entirely on an enclosed military base with its own schools, hospitals, libraries, and mall—in an integrated small social system. If you plug "walled off" into a search engine, you will find there has been an explosion of gated communities in America, to perhaps 80,000 or more, where (often well-off) people live safely within walls. Similarly, many of us seem tempted to live within specialized information communities, paying diminishing attention to the larger society around us. Perhaps that is why vertical media have struggled to hold their audience in recent years while horizontal media have exploded (see figures 1-3).

Our horizontal differences often become manifest, and when they do, they can influence the entire social pyramid. Social commentator Kevin Phillips finds that those with, for want of a better term, old-fashioned faith and those with oil interests voted Republican in the 2004 presidential election.[4] One predictor of presidential voting in 2004 was: Do you go to church regularly? Horizontal strands can be powerful discriminators. The United States may not be as sectarian as Iraq or Bosnia or Israel, but it is not isolated from powerful horizontal forces that provide meaning for large groups of individuals. Three Supreme Court decisions in the early 1960s mandating "one man, one vote" have resulted in gerrymandering of the 435 congressional districts along party lines, making congressmen and women into magazine rather than newspaper editors. They now represent relatively homogeneous horizontal constituencies rather than diverse vertical districts. In short, there has been a profound "horizontalling" of federal power.

Americans who were socialized in the first half of the 20th century grew up with the most powerful

Figure 2. Daily newspaper readership, 1960–2002

**Figure 1. Growth of the web, 1996–2006**

Figure 3. Evening news viewership, 1993–2003

vertical media thus far in human history: network radio and television. Even young people today can identify the voice of President Roosevelt. Americans who came of age in the 1920s and 1930s lined up without question to fight in 1941. Vertical issues were very strong for the World War II generation, socialized as it was by the mass media of the period. Recent wars have created only tiny blips in recruiting. Today's generations, however, have been or are being shaped by both vertical and horizontal messages. They are more likely to think in terms of the fire department than the bucket brigade, the volunteer Army serving a specialized mission rather than the Nation collectively fighting a war. How did this happen?

2. Agenda-setting and Agenda-melding

Before we consider how the current generations' focus has shifted from a general to a particular perspective, we need to look at how the media work. Our thesis is simple: people today want more information; they want context, details, interpretation, opinions. The more or less objective vertical media give them largely facts; they do not satisfy their audience's information needs.

The limits of vertical media. Some will claim, and loudly, that the vertical media are subjective, that they do tell their audiences what to think. Such critics like to point to media coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, as having been blatantly anti-war. This belief has achieved something akin to the status of gospel. However, rigorous content analysis has been conducted of TV (mass media) coverage of the Vietnam war and it has found that the coverage was not negative; overall, it was neutral or even positive.[5] Whatever you might feel about the coverage of Vietnam or any other conflict, media agenda-setting boils down to a few important points: media cannot *create* public opinion; they may not even be able to influence public opinion very much; and they cannot change minds (unless people take the information they receive and make up their minds in one way or the other). Admittedly, the mass media do have an impressive role in telling people *what* to think about. They are able to put a particular issue on the public issues agenda and draw the public's attention to that issue. The media cannot compel readers and viewers to adopt their opinions, but they can force attention to certain issues while excluding others.

Setting the agenda. Lippmann, observing that modern life is so complex that we necessarily learn of events via the press, claimed that the press functions like a spotlight on a stage, focusing on a certain character or action, then another character or action, then another, et cetera.[6] Since then, other observers have discovered that the press does have, as political scientist Bernard Cohen put it in a study of foreign media, the power to tell us what to think about, although not what to think.[7] In 1972, communication theorist Maxwell McCombs and one of us (Shaw) decided to systematically test Lippmann's claim that the press worked like a spotlight. What we wanted to know was: What, if anything, do the vertical media teach their audience? And just as importantly: Do the media shape attitudes, as so many observers suspect, especially those wary of press bias? Our study of the 1968 presidential campaign between winning Republican Richard Nixon and losing Democrat Hubert Humphrey employed a content analysis of what the press (newspapers, magazines, and television) focused on in a single community, along with what undecided voters in that community thought were important issues.[8] Presumably, undecided voters needed information to make a choice; they would get that information from the media accessible to them, and they would then vote according to what that information had told them. Our study concluded that those undecided voters did reflect the issues that the media had featured. One could almost predict about 50 percent of their answers by knowing what media they were reading. So in fact, the press did set the agenda, just as Cohen had suggested in his study of foreign news coverage.

Since then, many other studies in the United States and elsewhere have concluded that the press seems to have the power under many circumstances to tell us *what* to think about, if not to tell us *how* we should think. These studies show that media ranking of issues at Time 1 is judged by audiences to be important soon thereafter, at Time 2. Correlations show the degree of connection to a high .70 on average, with 1.00 meaning a perfect match and .00 no match at all. (Correlations can also be negative.) McCombs calls this transfer of broad topics a "transfer of objects." Scholars now call it agenda-setting, level 1.

More recently McCombs and his colleagues have discovered that audiences also learn major

details of a subject along with the main subject (a connection so close that he surmises the press also can tell us *how* to think about issues under certain circumstances).[9] McCombs therefore has divided the power of the press into two parts, which he calls agenda-setting, level 1, and agenda-setting, level 2. In a recent book, he discussed the way topics (which he calls "objects") and details ("attributes") transfer over time from media (Time 1, first mention) to audience members (Time 2, after publication).[10]

Several other recent studies have also asked audiences what topics and associated details (or frames), they learned from a particular media story. The studies show that audiences reflect the same patterns of absorbing the details as of the major topics—about .70 or higher.

Alternative views of vertical media. There are many perspectives on what happens in media agenda-setting. Some analysts, like Stanford's brilliant Shanto Iyengar, believe that the details the media choose to provide in a story—how the media frames the message—can define social problems in such a way that the story tells the audience what to think. Consider what happens with the reporting of crime stories. Such stories nearly always blame the perpetrator; they rarely blame the conditions, such as poverty or lack of education, that might have been an underlying factor in the crime.[11] An interpretation of the story is implied: if the perpetrator is at fault, then there is no problem with the system and no need for collective social action. Political scientist Robert Entman, who used content analysis, found that Chicago television stations most often framed crime in terms of race, specifically, African-American race.[12] Put the two frames (perpetrator, African-American) together and you can see the power of agenda-setting, level 2. The subject is crime, but people of another race are individually responsible—such might be one result of object and attribute agenda-setting. Or, those who struggle to make ends meet on a minimum wage should just work harder or get more education; as with crime, no social action is needed. By the same token, if a military operation fails, should that failure be framed in terms of the Soldiers or leadership involved—thereby exculpating you and me—or are we all to some extent to blame?

Iyengar and Entman's theories notwithstanding, vertical journalists really think little beyond balancing "both sides" of controversies, perhaps without much awareness that audiences, often intensely interested in topics, may not find that adequate. The vertical media introduce audience members to an issue or event, and they may have some power to push members to begin thinking a certain way about the issue or the event, but the vertical media will soon move on, as they must in a changing world full of events. In their wake, they leave a public still hungry for information.

Audience involvement. Public absorbing of agendas at levels 1 and 2 does not mean that information absorption ends with newspapers and television. Audiences continue to learn of events from many other sources. The more significant the event, the more people seek additional information, and not without their own values and attitudes coming into play.

All of us learn basic *values* from our parents and family, schools and religious leaders, social and political systems, friends, and media as we mature. These values form the base of our pyramid of cognition. With little more than values to guide us, we may form *attitudes* toward a particular subject. Attitudes are based on affect and emotion; they are visceral, not intellectual. *Opinions*, although more informed by conscious thought, are not as deeply held as attitudes or values. Then, of course, we have *knowledge* of events and issues gained from direct or mediated experience. We can draw a picture of this personal pyramid of values, attitudes, opinions, and knowledge in the order of their importance to us (figure 4).

There is no evidence to suggest that news about events translates easily into opinions or attitudes


Figure 4. Individual knowledge, opinions, attitudes and values

about the event, at least in the short run. As we mentioned, all of us have acquired values, and these values, along with the attitudes and opinions we have accumulated, act like filters through which we form, over time, other attitudes and opinions. The values, attitudes, and opinions that anchor our lives are powerful players when we read and interpret the news. For one thing, if readers judge a medium as biased (to their values, attitudes, and opinions), they might avoid that medium. Similarly, they are liable to be attracted to media (e.g., talk shows) whose hosts share their leanings. In sum, our acquired three-part filters limit the power of vertical media, even though those media give us our initial knowledge of events. It is easy to argue that a journalist's major role, like that of a Soldier's, is to alert us to dangers, but after we are alerted many of us turn to interpreters in the horizontal media for meaning. Is the thud in the forest a danger? Yes, say some bloggers or broadcast hosts; no, say others.

Agenda-melding. The power of media reaches down to the edge of our attitudes and values, but our values and attitudes also reach up. For messages to become part of the total social fabric, there must be a marriage, a melding of personal and media agendas. Certainly audiences do reach up. Communication scholar David Weaver tested the notion that voters who, 1) wanted to vote and 2) knew little of campaign issues and 3) needed orientation, then 4) sought information from newspapers and television that would 5) reflect the media agenda more than did voters who were not interested in voting or who already knew about the issues and therefore had little need for orientation. Weaver's findings, almost unique in mass-communication literature because they are predictive (and not just explanatory after the fact), are sketched in figure 5.[13]

Using the Weaver model, one may speculate how different populations—older and younger people, for example—use media to arrive at a particular view (figure 6). Each group could perceive an event initially in the same way, but later they may access media so differently that they end up operating in different cognitive environments. In short, the view of older people, who typically depend on vertical media, can be represented as "Xvvv" while younger people looking at

the same issue might see it as Xhhh (X = the issue; V = vertical media details; H = horizontal media details). Put another way, given information about a firefight in Tal Afar, older people might conclude, "We won by blowing up the insurgents," while younger people might think that "such violence only plays into the insurgents' hands."

Supplementing the vertical media. Many studies suggest that audiences learn about subjects from mass media, and there is growing evidence that they also pick up the details of a subject from those media. Vertical media, in other words, do seem to have agenda-setting power, levels 1 and 2. But we argue that the vertical media's reach has declined, while that of the alternative media—horizontal media that primarily interpret details—has increased. We get an initial view of events, such as the 2003 explosion of the space shuttle Columbia, and then we turn to our favorite website for discussions of whether or not there was a conspiracy to blow up the spacecraft, or to find out if the astronauts were


Figure 5. Audience need for orientation and agenda setting


Figure 6. Learning media messages: the divide between older and younger audiences

adequately prepared, or to learn which company sold NASA a defective part (this is a hypothetical example). Little or none of that would be provided by the vertical media, unless it could be conclusively documented.

John Milton's 1644 *Areopagitica* argued for the freedom to express all views, contending that in a fair fight truth would defeat falsehood. Never has Milton's argument about wheat and chaff been more tested. Today, there are many voices other than the pharaoh's.

Americans today live in a world in which mass agendas rarely dominate public thinking, and, as we have seen, even when they do (agenda setting, level 1), audiences often reframe the issues (agenda setting, level 2) by use of those horizontal media with which they are comfortable. Every mainline vertical journalist in American could reflect the view of the National Command Authority (NCA), but that would not—as it often did in the Depression and during World War II—guarantee that the government's agenda would be learned and absorbed in the way the NCA desired. Times have changed; media agendas have fragmented; audiences have gained great power to frame events. How did this come to pass?

3. Framing the Public Issues over History

The evolution of technology that made it possible for average people like us to connect via email and find news channels that match our own views is increasingly evident to us today. Less evident has been the influence technology has had on the rise of dominant media in various periods of our history. Media are dominant when they capture the attention of the leaders and followers of a period, and thereby also attract economic support. In our system, the media are free to pick and choose topics, but they also are part of the economic system and must win support to survive. The rise and fall of vertical media has shifted the focus of public issues over time, from local place to social and economic concerns, to national ideology and community, to individuals and groups within the global economy. During all these periods, community issues have been framed and reframed…and reframed again.

Newspapers and place, 1700-1870. Newspapers dominated public attention from roughly 1700 (the first successful colonial newspaper was founded in Boston in 1704) to 1870. Newspapers, then and now, are a medium that concentrates an audience's

attention on a specific place (e.g., the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune)*. These media present news from around the world, but the events of the world are viewed from a particular, locally flavored perspective. Even today, newspapers regard community news as their franchise, and smaller newspapers, unlike large dailies, have mostly retained their audience and even occasionally expanded it. Because newspapers focus on place, issues are framed in terms of place.

In the early years of newspaper dominance, an emerging America confronted its most dramatic challenge of place: wresting political independence from Britain. As the young republic expanded, it defended place again in the War of 1812, and in the 1860s it finally confronted one of its most dramatic social issues, slavery. The North defeated the South to remove slavery from the fabric of America, thereby settling a social issue in terms of place, just as the American Revolution had won the independence of a specific place.

The major documents of our national life were formed in the era of place—the Declaration of Independence, for example, and the Constitution, which recognizes the role of place by mandating two senators for all states, regardless of size. The day's issues were framed in terms of place; newspapers were addressed to specific communities, even if significant segments, for example women and African Americans, were often ignored in the early days. Consider the newspapers of 1700-1870 as providing a vertical strand of issues that helped frame the earliest days of our republic.

Magazines and class, 1870-1930. The magazine made its first appearance in America in the mid-18th century. Benjamin Franklin, whose shadow falls across so much of our early history, was one of the earliest magazine publishers. Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, the single most powerful piece of literature published in America in the 19th century and certainly the most effective challenge to slavery in U.S. history, first appeared as a magazine serial in 1851 (she did not even have an ending for the story when she started). It wasn't until after the Civil War, however, roughly between 1870 and 1930, that magazines exploded, with publications of an early version of *Cosmopolitan* for women, *The Progressive* for farmers, and issues for every conceivable interest group that had the means to follow the topic. Artist

Charles Gibson's girls, drawn for the covers of many magazines, revealed women who rode horses and bicycles, and did so without men around. The world of middle-class women emerged in front of American eyes on the front covers of magazines.

These magazine-dominant years were ones of class, by which we mean that Americans identified themselves as members of specialized groups, or niches. There was, in effect, a more horizontal slicing of American life. Individuals and groups who could do so consolidated power. There were winners. Women, who also founded their own horizontal publications, such as *The Revolution* and *The Lily*, gradually gained ground. In 1920, the 19th Amendment guaranteed the right to vote in national elections for women and for those living in states that had not yet passed such laws. There were losers, too, in the age of class. Native Americans were put on reservations, and African Americans, who enjoyed a season of political freedom (along with economic struggle), were re-segregated. The era also saw a titanic, class-oriented struggle between capital and the growing labor unions.

Even newspapers, such as the mass-circulation papers published by William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, aimed at major segments (for example, immigrants in their cities of publication), while Adolph Ochs, who bought the nearly bankrupt *New York Times* in 1896, pointed the *Times* at the upper economic and educational strata of New York—a fact that is still true of the *Times* today.

Between 1870 and 1930, America, an emerging nation, turned inside and then outward. Muckraking magazine journalists, such as Lincoln Steffens and Ida M. Tarbell, may have saved democracy by attacking the burdens an economic plutocracy placed on the middle class at the turn of the century.[14] Magazines, and even large daily newspapers, framed issues in terms of groups, adding a horizontal strand to our emerging papyrus society.

Radio, TV, and mass ideology, 1930-1980. Radio, the next technological innovation to hit America, soon regularized sounds in the air into programming. By the mid 1920s, David Sarnoff's NBC and William Paley's CBS had put radio networks together, so that by the 1930s the leaders of all advanced nations could reach mass audiences with the same message at the same time. The years from 1930 to 1980 were dominated first by network radio, then by network television (first NBC and CBS and then ABC). This was a period of true mass media, of news aimed from the top down, and the media, along with its technology, fit the age. President Roosevelt's calm voice from his White House fireside soothed a nation devastated by the Great Depression. In Germany, Hitler's propaganda machines skillfully blended voice and brutal political practice to organize the agenda of national socialism. In 1969, television captivated much of the Western world for days when Apollo 11 landed on the moon.

This was also the period that saw the first systematic studies of mass-media effects. In the 1930s, social scientists used scientific methods to study the reach of modern mass media. They concluded that their reach was powerful indeed, though not directly. In sum, radio and TV broadcast networks certainly laid a powerful vertical strand to our emerging papyrus society.

New media and space, 1980-present. The major TV networks' audience share began declining in roughly 1980. Since then, we have been living in an age of space, participating in a global economy wherein individuals contact each other through newspapers, via radio or TV programs, and by e-mail. Sometimes citizens take action, as they did in 1999 when they materialized in person to disrupt the proceedings of the World Trade Organization in Seattle. In *Smart Mobs*, Howard Rheingold highlights the swift transition from information to a sense of community to action, all made possible by the new media.[16] This capability would have dazzled Samuel Adams, confined as he was to mobilizing revolutionary interest in the years before the American Revolution via mails that could take weeks or months to travel from colony to colony. Speedy information isn't all that the new media have to offer. According to an *Army Times* story in June 2006, a first lieutenant who recently refused duty in Iraq claimed that while some Soldiers want to shoot him, others have shaken his hand. The lieutenant says he has received email from NCOs and field-grade officers encouraging him to follow

his beliefs.[17] Social support is just as important as information. In the papyrus society, no one need feel lonely if he has access to the new media.

The rise of alternative, horizontal media has undercut the vertical media's ability to—for want of a better term—dominate the interpretation of events. The new media have threaded another horizontal strand into our emerging society. Much of this is good news: as a people, we should be less tractable, not so prone to spurious crises or complacent about unaddressed problems or inequities. The new media has the potential to make us a smarter, more civically active population. At the same time, however, as we noted earlier, the rise of niche media might also be tremendously divisive: it could split the national community into specialized groups, each of whose interests supersede the larger community's interests.

As citizens, it is incumbent upon us to attend to media whose agenda stretches across the entire society, not just to those media that personally interest us. We must engage in open public dialog to share our own views with more than our friends. We have to vote. We have to involve ourselves in public life at all levels of community. If we do not, the papyrus society may break into strands.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

If you have come this far and are wondering what happened to your own niche magazine—why, you might ask, are you reading about newspapers and blogs in *Military Review*?—you could be experiencing a symptom of the new media paradigm. That said, we do have a reason for writing in *Military Review*: we are doing what the military should be doing: making its case not just via the vertical media, but to the specialized horizontal media, too. This is particularly critical today, when intelligent, well-meaning people like my student seem to have divorced themselves from the idea of active military service. We might have a professional Army right now, but that Army must be refilled continuously and there is no guarantee that citizens will, as they have in the past, come forward to serve. Additionally, it is conceivable that our professional Army will need supplementation at some time in the near or distant future to address crises beyond its current ability to respond. Where will those Soldiers come from?

The need for an information strategy. Because its mission transcends administrations, the military should develop broad public-information strategies—and not just for the conflict environment—that build and maintain relationships both vertically and horizontally (with due regard given to the NCA) with the U.S. public. Information strategies should reflect this truth: military forces belong to the Nation, not to any particular commander-in-chief and his or her administration.

No one in the military should be surprised by the direction that modern communication technology has taken, with its movement from large to smaller audiences. The technological and communication changes that have so altered the world of mass media likewise have altered the planning, training, and deployment of military forces. In the Civil War, companies were assembled into regiments, then into divisions, then into armies, and that was pretty much the way they stayed. This static method of organization continued for more than a century. Now, the Army has strong independent brigades that can be assembled for a particular need, as surely as a White House chef assembles the ingredients for either a state dinner or a small dinner entertainment.

The Army has become mainly modular (it had been partly so for decades); in other words, it has become as horizontal, at least organizationally, as many other modern institutions. Internally, the Army must retain the ability to communicate effectively from the top down. As it was for the ancient pharaoh, so it is for all modern leaders, from president to professor to a private first class in charge of a work detail: they need to be heard clearly; the mission must be done.

But the pharaoh—and his generals—must also listen. Although it is a very vertical organization, the military must adapt itself to an increasingly horizontal world. This means that the military, like all organizations, should develop information programs cognizant of the fact that citizens are constantly shifting into public life who have no previous involvement with the military other than what they have learned via the media (either vertical or horizontal). Congress was once filled with veterans in the post-World War II decades. Their sons, then, often served. No longer. Military service is increasingly the exception in the House of Representatives and the Senate, not the rule. This has profound implications for the armed services. The military's strategic information planning should therefore

be zero-sum and cyclic, without any assumption that warm feelings developed for the military over previous decades have necessarily transferred to the younger generation. We cannot rest on our laurels. We can't take anything for granted.

Address both media. The evolution of technology favors both vertical and horizontal media, and citizens in a free society will avail themselves, if they are interested and have the means and access, of a variety of agendas, although they will be partial to those that fit their values and interests. As we have seen, sometimes vertical and horizontal media work together to build national community, and sometimes they work at cross-purposes, polarizing segments of the larger community. The military's information strategies should recognize that significant "advertising" of the armed forces in vertical media (of the positive type) is necessary but not by itself sufficient to build relationships with citizens of the entire community (many of whom spend little time with vertical media). A home run in the first inning—a great pro-military story in, say, the *Washington Post*—does not guarantee victory. Already, for example, those who handle Army recruiting are finding that they must also target audience niches via specific cable or radio shows.

Implementation. The following suggestions are offered to assist the Army in developing effective communication strategies that use both vertical and horizontal media.

● *Clarify objectives*. As some public affairs (PA) practitioners have discovered, an effective way to achieve one's information goals is to begin with the prospective audience and work backward to develop appropriate messages and themes. The Army has various audiences; therefore, an Army organization must first ascertain its primary audience and then figure out the best way to approach that audience. The organization has to determine what attitude it must instill in that particular audience to achieve the effects desired. Appropriate information delivered by the right mix of media—vertical and horizontal—should help elicit the necessary attitude. Figure 7 depicts the possible links between how individuals and groups receive

their news, how they process it, how they adopt an attitude, and finally, how they act on it.

The public uses both types of media at times, most commonly receiving initial information on a topic through vertical media before going to their medium of choice (e.g., talk shows, blogs) to find more specific information. The "attitude" category above depicts methods the Army currently uses (or could use) to divine the public's attitudes toward the service. Congress and the NCA naturally provide their input. Focus groups, surveys, blog reviews, and content analysis of media could provide additional information on various publics' attitudes toward the Army.

In the end, we want these various audiences to act on the attitudes generated by our media messages. If the Army is generating appropriate messages and using both vertical and horizontal media effectively, the outcomes will include public approval, successful recruiting and retention, and support from various audiences.

● *Restructure the PA effort*. Currently, Army PA has three major functions: media relations, command information, and community relations. PA personnel are expected to perform duties in all three areas to varying degrees and in various situations. The media-relations activities that are perhaps the most visible—providing press statements, interacting with media representatives, running the embed program—are all examples of media-relations functions. Army PA personnel perform command information duties when they publish or broadcast any material on behalf of leadership that is specifically aimed at informing Soldiers. Finally, the community-relations side to Army PA historically interacts with the cities and towns adjacent to military installations in order to foster mutually beneficial relationships between the military and its civilian neighbors.

Figure 7. Securing outcomes through the media

To accomplish its mission effectively, Army PA could and should restructure the above three functions while adding additional functions. The Division PA offices could have two sections, one horizontal and one vertical, that would capture all of the existing functions while allowing for new ones. The vertical section of a PA unit would take on the job of interacting with vertical media (newspapers, television, radio). Command-information activities would also translate effectively into the vertical section. Finally, the vertical section would be the best team to keep the local community informed. It would use vertical media and would act as the single point of contact between the installation and the community during heavy deployment times.

The horizontal section should be staffed by individuals who are creative and aggressive. It would perform community-relations functions while expanding the definition of community to include the world. This section should be able to engage various forms of media, such as websites and blogs, in accordance with Army policy and in coordination with the vertical section. The horizontal section staff should receive language and culture training so they can interact with international media when deployed.

● *Adjust PAO training.* To enable public affairs officers (PAOs) to communicate the military's messages to all audiences, PAO training should be adjusted to focus on leveraging emerging technologies and the vertical and horizontal media. Currently, the only mandatory training for PAOs is the PAO Qualification Course at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Fort Meade, Maryland. This course does an excellent job of preparing new PAOs for their first assignments (as editors of military publications or as command spokespersons), but that's about the extent of it. The DINFOS curriculum doesn't provide enough training on issues like media analysis, public opinion, polling, engagement of local and regional media, or the political ramifications of the media and communications, and it offers no formal training for mid-career or senior PAOs.

We recommend that DINFOS add two additional courses for career PAOs. The first would focus on senior majors and lieutenant colonels, and the second would be solely for those officers selected for colonel and general officer. Both courses should be tailored to the specific requirements of rank and responsibility.

A New and Improved Public Affairs Organization

	Vertical Section	Horizontal Section
Media Relations	* Engage vertical media (newspapers/local television)	* Engage horizontal media (internet/ blogs/satellite television) * Engage international media
Community Relations	* With the local community	* With the global community and in the area of operations
Command Information	* All command information	* Internal communications

Suggested topics include strategic planning, media analysis, the importance of public opinion, emerging media, audience development, and working with and understanding the foreign media.

Media-related training should extend beyond PAOs to all officers from major on up. Information-strategy planning should be part of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College and the senior war colleges. Nor should we neglect senior NCOs. Even an inarticulate officer or sergeant can be effective if he or she looks at the public as a major player in modern conflict. Wisdom and maturity, not speaking skill, is the major requirement for sound information-strategy planning and implementation, just as it is for all military missions. It would help, too, if members of the military reminded themselves that the press did *not* undermine military operations in Vietnam, and that both the military and the press work on behalf of the public. This latter connection became clear for many journalists and service members with the embedding efforts during the early phases of the Iraq conflict. As it had been in earlier wars, the arrangement was fruitful for both sides.

The current operating environment underscores the need for adding this type of training. Our enemies are using the horizontal media to communicate effectively. Contemporary communication research suggests that poor information strategies can risk the possibility of winning the kinetic battle and losing the information battle—a development that could cost U.S. military forces victory in the new types of conflict in which we are engaged (such as wars against terrorism, not against specifically bounded nations) as public opinion becomes a very real element of contemporary wars. The loss of public support could leave American forces exposed to opinion climates that might remind us more of the final period of the Vietnam war, traces of which lingered for

years, than the closing periods of earlier, large-landmass conflicts such as World War II and the Korean War.

Just as brigades replace divisions and other large units, smaller communication segments replace mass media as major sources of information and opinion. As military forces are fitted to specific conflicts, many media fit to specific audiences, a trend certainly emerging with the decline of the reach and power of daily newspapers and network radio and television. A call for unquestioned support from American media fit World War II (where support was not *always* unquestioned by some Americans) but not all contemporary conflicts, especially those rooted in ideological or ethnic differences that do not fit state boundaries. Journalists are as well trained and targeted as are military leaders, and both work for the same audience, the public. From that point of view, journalists and the military share the same bed, as they have in past conflicts, and so they will always be aware of each other's tossing and turning. That is not likely to change.

● *Give senior PA positions more rank*. Army Transformation is already rectifying previous deficiencies in PAO staffing (too little rank) at corps, division, and brigade levels. The rank structure for the senior military PAO slate should also be adjusted. Currently, the senior military PAOs for each service are one or two-star flag officers. The senior PAO officers in the major or combatant commands are still 0-6s (colonels or captains). We recommend that each service's senior PAO be, at a minimum, a two-star flag officer. In addition, a minimum two-star position should be created to advise the Joint Chiefs, and a one-star position created to advise the secretary of defense.[18] Right now, despite increasing responsibility, the PA rank structure has not increased in proportion to other areas. This may cause friction or influence gaps between PAOs and commanders or other staff members. The PAO rank structure should *at least* parallel that of doctors, lawyers, and chaplains. Figure 8 shows the current rank structure of PAOs and other selected staff sections.

● *Increase Guard and Reserve PA forces*. Often a National Guard or Reserve PA detachment provides

Figure 8. Potential PAO influence gap

support to deployed units. These detachments bring a wealth of technical writing and broadcast skills to the fight, providing much needed manpower and expertise to the command-information and media-engagement sections. The current media operating environment requires even more support from Guard and Reserve forces. We need units that can plug in at the senior staff levels and provide key support to senior PAOs and commanders. Just as the military has developed broadcast- and print-specific units, so it should develop media-analysis, public-opinion-tracking, and media-engagement units.

Final thoughts. One legacy of the 20th century is that mass media have mass effects. After World War I, a war in which propaganda played a significant role, the "hypodermic needle" theory of the press (the press as inoculator or drugger of populations) became part of popular belief. The power of media naturally concerns many leaders, scholars, and citizens, some of whom assume that the vertical media have more power than they actually do. In the 21st century, we know that newer, more horizontal media agendas often blend with the messages of mass media, resulting in a mix of messages by audiences that can challenge old ways of thinking and even those institutions to which we have long given our loyalty. Every issue now is zero-sum, and we have to explain our activities to many audiences via a variety of targeted media. This most certainly includes military actions and conflicts. Writer Ben Bagdikian, for example, has often cited concerns about the accelerating consolidation of media, most recently

in his book *The New Media Monopoly*.[19] Still, as economic consolidation pulls together the top of the Japanese fan (vertical media), the fan's colorful bottom blades (horizontal media) are opening wider than ever. Media cannot set agendas without audiences, and audiences have a lot of choice.

Unfortunately, despite having so many media sources from which to choose, we do not always follow Milton's implied suggestion that we sample many sources in order to separate the wheat of truth from the chaff of falsehood. In a study of websites, legal scholar Cass Sunstein found that more than 90 percent of sites direct users to other sites that reflect the same perspective, either liberal or conservative.[20] Such blinkering can lead only to reinforcement of one's position, not to an honest assessment of it. In the emerging papyrus society, vertical institutions like the military that need broad top-down support face the danger of becoming horizontalled—separated from rather than included as a part of vertical public life.

Who imagined that communication-technology development would have continued so relentlessly, shifting more power down the pyramid? When tiny transistors replaced big, hot vacuum tubes in the 1950s, it became possible for each of us to own small portable radios, then TV sets, and then computers, so that families no longer had to cluster around the big family radio, as did the fictional Walton family in the 1930s to hear President Roosevelt. Now, many homes have TV sets for individual viewing, some even in the bathroom. Newspapers once brought citizens to coffeehouses and taverns to read and share the news.

Today, communication technology fragments audiences into separate rooms according to their personal interests; in fact, the newest media, iPods and computers for example, seem to divide us from the start. From the point of view of social structure, the new media represent a two-edged sword: while they offer unparalleled access to information, they also have the power to slice the community into segments.

My 20-year-old student does have a lot for which to be grateful: a strong democracy and a skillful military force to defend the Nation. Likewise, he benefits from a vibrant free press and a multiplicity of agendas. As he mixes information from media that can communicate from top to bottom with media that focus on his specialized interests, his actions are not, metaphorically, unlike the production of ancient papyrus paper. For him, national community is likely to be more complex than it was for his parents and grandparents. Still, he is an essential part of a solid information strategy, one that can leverage an iPod as well as a bugle. Like all of us, my student needs to follow Milton's suggestion to pick the wheat from the chaff, and he must resist the temptation to live in a walled-off information community. Certainly the United States Army cannot live there. The Army is part of all of us. Any information strategies it employs have to be as flexible as its operational strategies to keep it ready. To meet the changing national and world communication requirements of the emerging papyrus society, the Army—indeed, all military services—will have to be as flexible with information as it is with combat operations. ***MR***

NOTES

1. John Milton, *Complete Poems and Major Prose*, ed. by Merritt Y. Hughes (Indianapolis: Odyssey Press, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), 746.

2. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: MacMillan, 1970).

3. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: MacMillan, 1922).

4. Kevin Phillips, *American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century* (New York: Viking Press, 2006).

5. See Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). See also Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977). This point needs to be carefully reiterated: reporters, particularly TV reporters, did not create a bad image of the Vietnam war for home consumption. Additionally, the oft-heard charge that reporters lifted their eyebrows or made physical gestures telegraphing their "true" opinions was also found to be bogus. To get beyond anti-press prejudice, we have to accept this fact, as well as the reality that wars are conducted in the name of the American people, for whom the media are the principal conduit of information. Both the military and the press work for all of us.

6. Lippmann.

7. Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

8. Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1972).

9. Esteban Lopez-Escobar, Federico Rey Lennon, et al., "Two levels of agenda setting among advertising and news in the 1995 Spanish elections," *Political Communication* 15, no. 2 (April-June 1998): 225.

10. Maxwell McCombs, *Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

11. Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

12. Robert Entman and Albert Rojecki, *The Black Image in the White Mind* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

13. David Weaver, "Political Issues and Voter Need for Orientation," in Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, *The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda Setting Function of the Press* (St. Paul, MN: West, 1977).

14. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: from Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York: Knopf, 1955).

15. Milton, 747.

16. Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution* (New York: Perseus Books, 2002).

17. William Cole, "Lieutenant defies Army over 'illegal' war," Army Times, 6 June 2006, online at <http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1851191.php>.

18. The two-star advisor to the Joint Chiefs would also be charged with coordinating information strategy across military and civilian branches of government in all phases of military operations and activities. His (or her) office would have representatives in other branches of government, and would issue internal studies regularly that integrate various aspects of the ongoing information strategy. This position would be more narrowly focused than the White House Security Advisor and would concern itself primarily with the public's perception of current military forces. This position obviously could coordinate the perspectives of the service branch general officers into a coherent picture, so that the Joint Chiefs would be able to see operations from a longer perspective than that provided by the daily news. The office would be able to issue regular internal assessments to the Joint Chiefs. It would rotate every few years among the services.

19. Ben Bagdikian, *The New Media Monopoly* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004).

20. Cass Sunstein, *Republic.com* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA

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FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS of the United States were on the decline in the Muslim world prior to the attacks of September 11th. Operations Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom in Iraq have not helped change those perceptions, particularly with religious extremists. Accordingly, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of State (DOS) to reassess its public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim regions. DOS then established an advisory group, which produced a report in September 2003 with recommendations calling for a "transformation of public diplomacy" through increased funding. The aim was to establish a new strategic direction for public diplomacy, and the report recommended that the president and Congress lead this new initiative.

This article reviews public diplomacy as a form of "soft power," shows how it can be used to promote U.S. interests in the Arab-Muslim world, and assesses DOS's public diplomacy efforts since the advisory group published its report. It concludes by calling for a more effective organization, one similar to the old U.S. Information Agency (USIA), so that public diplomacy can once again be employed as an effective instrument of national power.

Soft Power

When one thinks of sovereign state power, the first thought is likely that of military capabilities. But the sovereign state has many instruments of power available to it, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments. In *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Joseph Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a recognized expert on international affairs and the effects of soft power, provides some useful observations on power and its relationship to the sovereign state. Power, Nye says, is "the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want."[2] Influence can be accomplished through forceful means, or hard power, such as military action or economic restrictions. Nye then describes an alternate source of power: soft power. He explains that soft power uses attraction to "get the outcomes you want without the tangible threats or payoffs."[3]

According to Nye, a state derives its soft power from three sources: culture, political values, and foreign policy.[4] The strength of the state's soft power depends on the attraction or repulsion its culture, political values, and foreign policy generate in the citizens of the targeted country. To make soft power work effectively, a state must carefully select the methods that will attract others to its interests. Soft power, it must be said, is not an exclusive replacement for hard power; rather, it can strengthen applications of hard power, and it may be less expensive. Soft power can be directed at either an opposing state or at its individual citizens. Public diplomacy is one form of soft power employed

by the United States. The Nation used it during the cold war to communicate American values to the populations of Communist countries (and to neutral countries and allied populations as well).

Public Diplomacy

The United States Information Agency Alumni Association (USIAAA), formed by members of the old USIA, provides information on public diplomacy. According to the group, the term "public diplomacy" was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The USIAAA cites a brochure from the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Fletcher that offers this definition: "Public Diplomacy…deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications."[5]

By distinguishing public diplomacy from other common terms used for information exchange, the USIAAA has contributed to a better understanding of the term. The group compares public diplomacy with public affairs by suggesting that public affairs focuses primarily on domestic audiences, whereas public diplomacy focuses on foreign audiences. It then distinguished public diplomacy from diplomacy. The latter focuses on government-to-government relations, while public diplomacy focuses on influencing foreign publics. USIAAA does not attempt to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda. Instead, it candidly admits that public diplomacy is a form of propaganda based on facts.[6]

In June 1997, the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information

The U.S. Information Service library in Lahore, Pakistan, was one of the earliest successful U.S. public diplomacy missions. Membership peaked at 10,000 in the '80s and '90s.

Agency into the State Department provided its own definition of public diplomacy: "[It] seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences."[7]

The 1987 *U.S. Department of State Dictionary of International Relations Terms* states that "public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television." DOS does, in fact, use a variety of media in its efforts to convey U.S. national values to foreign publics. They include information exchanges, English language education programs, student exchange programs, collaboration with indigenous or nongovernmental organizations, and radio and television.[8] Newer media such as the Internet and satellite broadcasting have also become effective tools for employing soft power. DOS uses them to provide direct information exchange to remote areas.

Public diplomacy is one of the national instruments of power employed to implement the U.S. National Security Strategy. By winning over the hearts and minds of individuals within a state, public diplomacy can help the U.S. Government move a state toward more democratic forms of government. If the United States can successfully use public diplomacy for this purpose, then it achieves one of the National Security Strategy objectives: to "expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy."[9]

Despite—or perhaps because of—the success it had conveying enduring U.S. values to the people in Communist countries, USIA was downsized after the cold war, and its functions were eventually merged into DOS. With these actions, the United States relegated public diplomacy to a lesser priority and effectively marginalized its ability to brandish soft power.

After 9/11, the United States declared war against religious terrorists originating in Muslim countries. In many of these

A USIA-sponsored Van Tac Tu drama troupe arrives at a Vietnamese village in 1967. Fifteen such troupes traveled throughout South Vietnam dispensing propaganda via song and dance.

countries, there is a general lack of understanding and, in some cases, a total rejection of Western ideals; U.S. interests are often misunderstood. Nye suggests that unrest in the Middle East lies at the heart of this terrorism, and that the unrest is symptomatic of a struggle between Islamic moderates and extremists. He claims that the United States and its allies will win the war on terror only if they adopt policies that appeal to the moderates and use public diplomacy effectively to communicate that appeal.[10] While all elements of national power can be used to counter religious extremists, public diplomacy can be especially effective in winning over moderates and reducing the influence of the extremists. The U.S. Government, in its national policy decisions, should give increased emphasis to the use of public diplomacy as an instrument of national power.

Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy

In a June 2003 supplemental appropriations bill, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee directed DOS to "engage the creative talents of the private sector…[in order] to develop new public diplomacy approaches and initiatives…[and to] establish an

> *While all elements of national power can be used to counter religious extremists, public diplomacy can be especially effective in winning over moderates and reducing the influence of the extremists.*

advisory group on public diplomacy for the Arab-Muslim world to recommend new approaches, initiatives, and program models to improve public diplomacy results."[11] In response, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell established the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab-Muslim World, in July 2003.

Chaired by Edward P. Djerejian, the former Ambassador to Syria and Israel, the Advisory Group consisted of a core group of 13 people with a variety of backgrounds—foreign service, academia, medicine, news media, public affairs, law, and business. Between July and September of 2003, the group expanded on the work of at least seven other studies that had been conducted since September 2001. Its members met with many specialists, both domestic and international, in the public, private, and nongovernmental arenas. They visited Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Senegal, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and France, and had teleconferences with key individuals in Pakistan and Indonesia. In October 2003, the group produced a report of its findings that offered recommendations to DOS regarding public diplomacy.

The report, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab-Muslim World" (frequently referred to as "the Djerejian Report"), begins by claiming that at a time when it is needed most, U.S. public diplomacy capability is inadequate due to outmoded techniques, insufficient resources, and too little strategic direction. The report flatly asserts that "the U.S. today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation, and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim World."[12] Although the report focused on Arab-Muslim areas, the Advisory Group claims that many of its recommendations apply to public diplomacy in general.

The Djerejian Report emphasizes that state-to-state diplomacy isn't changing Arab-Muslim attitudes and that public diplomacy is needed. Although the aforementioned U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and U.S. moves vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict have certainly affected how Americans are perceived in the Arab-Muslim world, the Advisory Group thinks that the fundamental problem is a lack of understanding of American culture. It claims that Arabs and Muslims are exposed to heavily filtered

media (e.g., limited TV stations, restricted and filtered access to the Internet) that typically deliver messages in native languages with the American viewpoint rarely represented. Although globalized technologies such as satellite TV and radio are breaking down these barriers, and although the Group was frequently told by Arabs and Muslims that they like American values and technologies, the same Arabs and Muslims said that they do not like the policies and actions of the American government. The report concludes that public diplomacy can reconcile this dichotomy through more effective communication of American policies.

Current public diplomacy techniques are not getting the word out. The Djerejian Report observes that even though Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, Egyptian citizens give more credit to the Japanese for developing an opera house in Cairo than to the United States for funding critical infrastructure development in Egypt's cities. The report found that even though broadcast media, specifically television, are the most effective means to disseminate ideas, U.S. policies or positions are usually absent from Arab-Muslim media programs.[13]

Citing information from a September 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on public diplomacy, the Djerejian Report provides statistics collected by several opinion research firms on favorable public opinion of the United States.[14] The data summarized in table 1 below indicate that favorable public opinion has been declining over the past several years. The Djerejian Report also refers to an April 2002 Zogby International survey (mentioned in the GAO report) showing that Arabs and Muslims had a favorable view of American

movies, television, science and technology, and education, but were opposed to American policy toward Muslim countries.

The Djerejian Report provides detailed information on current public diplomacy activities as well as specific organizational, financial, and programmatic recommendations to transform DOS's public diplomacy efforts. It suggests that all public diplomacy programs should have some demonstrable measures of effectiveness before being implemented (although it does not make specific recommendations on such measures). Some current creative ideas, it says, need to be expanded. Among these are the "American Corners" program, which establishes cultural centers that provide free Internet access, books on American culture, and English language classes to citizens in Arab-Muslim cities; several Arabic-language radio programs (e.g., Radio Sawa) and magazines (e.g., *Hi*); and an Arabic-language TV network (Alhurrah) that offers regional programming. The report also approves of a new initiative, the American Knowledge Library, which will translate en masse books related to science, democracy philosophies, and American culture.

Despite these DOS efforts, the report concludes that U.S. public diplomacy is not making enough of an impact. It goes on to make its recommendations about increased funding and a new strategic direction (the latter led by the "political will" of the president and Congress).[15] The report also sets up the "Ends" (better understanding of U.S. national values among Arab-Muslim populations), "Ways" (establish and execute a strategic plan), and "Means" (increased levels of funding) to increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy in the Arab-Muslim world.

	% Favorable in 1999/2002	% Favorable in 2003	Change
Indonesia	61 (2002)	15	-46%
Saudi Arabia	7 (2002)	0	-7%
Pakistan	23 (1999)	12	-11%
Turkey	52 (1999)	12	-40%
Jordan	25 (2002)	1	-24%
Egypt	6 (2002)	0	-6%

Table 1. Change in favorable views of the United States between 1999/2002 and 2003.

Reporters from the Voice of America and *Newsweek* interview BG Steven Hawkins of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at the Dawrah power station in Baghdad, Iraq, on 14 April 2003.

Agencies Using Public Diplomacy

A variety of organizations use public diplomacy to promote U.S. interests, many of them sponsored by DOS, to include the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Other independent organizations, such as a small Syrian group called Dar Emar, contribute to this effort.

The BBG, an independent federal agency that supervises all U.S. Government-supported non-military international broadcasting, is verifiably an effective public diplomacy instrument. The BBG oversees radio and TV stations (e.g., the Voice of America, Radio Sawa, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) that broadcast in 65 languages to over 100 million people around the world. The BBG's Radio Sawa, transmitting in over fifteen Arab-Muslim countries, is considered one of the most innovative public diplomacy initiatives, according to the BBG website.[16]

Both the Advisory Group and the recent 9/11 Commission have recognized that effective public diplomacy can influence moderates within Arab-Muslim countries. The 9/11 Commission claims that "the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to

the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences."[17] The Commission has also emphasized that the BBG needs to run programs that counteract religious extremist movements in the region because "local newspapers and the few influential satellite broadcasters—like Al-Jazeera—often reinforce the jihadist theme that portrays the United States as anti-Muslim."[18]

The BBG has claimed that "Radio Sawa, a 24/7 station, has garnered large audiences of young people in the region with its mix of news, information and Western and Arabic music," but the Djerejian Report criticized the station for simply appealing to youthful Arab musical tastes and not influencing the larger public.[19] The BBG countered that the Advisory Group doesn't understand its (the BBG's) role, which is to offer examples of high-quality American journalism that promote and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and information about the United States.[20] The BBG might also have cited a February 2004 ACNielsen report which found that "the percentages of adults (age 15 and older) listening to Radio Sawa on a weekly basis are 73 percent in Morocco, 42 percent in Kuwait, 35 percent in UAE, 27 percent in Jordan, 11 percent in Egypt and 41 percent in Qatar."[21] Further, 80 percent of Radio Sawa's listeners consider it a reliable news source, and another ACNielsen survey, in October 2003, found that Radio Sawa's listeners view the United States more favorably than do non-listeners.[22] Nor is that all. The age demographic in many Middle Eastern countries is heavily skewed toward the younger generation, with over 50 percent of the populations in many countries under the age of 20.[23] Appealing to a youthful audience appears to be the right way to go.

Despite criticisms in the Djerejian Report of the effectiveness of the BBG, both the Advisory Group and the 9/11 Commission recommend increasing the BBG's funding for new broadcasting programs. The Middle East television station Alhurra, created

in February 2004, is a recent result of new funding. Alhurra directs its programming at Arabic-speaking viewers in 22 countries across the Middle East.[24]

Another organization contributing to public diplomacy is USAID. An independent government agency under the direction of the secretary of state, USAID provides humanitarian, developmental, and democracy-building assistance to developing countries and countries affected by disaster and afflicted with poverty.[25] USAID relies on partnerships with voluntary organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, and other U.S. and foreign governmental agencies to improve the lives of people in developing countries. By helping to expand democracy and the free-trade market, it plays a key role in carrying out U.S. foreign policy.

The Djerejian Report criticizes a legal restriction that prevents USAID from promoting the good work it is doing. Prohibiting "USAID…from using program funds to disseminate information about its activities" overlooks the fact that "a great deal of [US]AID's work is public diplomacy."[26] USAID has since established an Office of Public Diplomacy within its Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs. According to an April 2004 USAID press release, "The Office of Public Diplomacy helps to coordinate and infuse the development and humanitarian message of USAID to the U.S. Government, the American People and the Arab world."[27] The release also introduced Walid Maalouf as the new Director for Public Diplomacy for Middle Eastern and Middle East Partnership Initiative Affairs.

Maalouf has international-affairs experience, having served as the alternate U.S. representative to the United Nations' 58th General Assembly. Another USAID press release highlights his credentials: "He was an integral part of the Middle East team at the Mission and the first U.S. Representative to deliver a speech at the U.N. in Arabic. Maalouf's new Office for Public Diplomacy (in USAID) has taken quick action to engage Arab communities."[28] At a media summit in May 2004 with key Arab press correspondents and Arab-American publishers, Maalouf declared, "USAID's new diplomacy initiative is committed to presenting a more accurate image of America to the greater Middle East and promoting a better understanding of the policy goals of Presidential Initiatives and the mission of USAID."[29] A press release noted that "this media summit was the largest exchange between Mideast-American correspondents and U.S. officials and was the first of several outreach events to the Arab and Moslem communities in the United States."[30]

Besides government-sponsored public diplomacy, private citizens seek to establish better relations between Muslims and Americans. In an article in *The Jerusalem Report*, Yigal Schleifer describes how Syrian Ammar Abdulhamid is using his nongovernmental organization, Dar Emar, to promote a better understanding of American culture and democracy in Syria. Dar Emar is translating appropriate English texts in an attempt to educate Syrian citizens about American culture and the philosophical foundations of democracy. Abdulhamid says, "When you have an intense project of translation, it leads to dialogue and questioning and hopefully a renaissance will come out of that…. If you want positive change in Syria, there is no substitute for positive engagement."[31]

Dar Emar's website provides specific details of many proposed programs. One program, Project Etana, attempts to bridge the knowledge gap between the Western and Arab worlds and provide insight into Western culture. The effort will translate into Arabic many classical and modern Western works, especially in history, science, and the humanities. Speaking about his efforts, Abdulhamid admits, "This is not easy, nor should it be…my first idea was that we don't understand America, even Muslims living in America don't understand it, so forget about Syrians living in Syria under a socialist government."[32]

Assessments of Progress

Much has been written about soft power, public diplomacy, and the Djerejian Report, with discussions about the pros and cons of recent efforts in these areas. The Council on Foreign Relations, founded

…in general, current U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts are deficient.

after the 1919 Paris Peace Talks to promote knowledge of foreign policy, focuses on broadening America's understanding of the world and U.S. foreign policy. Through its magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, and its various sponsored forums, the Council encourages a wide range of views while avoiding advocacy for specific policies.[33] The Council's website provides a question-and-answer page on terrorism that discusses the implications of public diplomacy and its recent impact on terrorism. Citing a 2002 Gallup survey conducted in nine Muslim countries, the Council concludes that America has an image problem abroad that could hinder the war on terrorism.[34]

The Council's website acknowledges some of the recent attempts to reach Arab and Muslim audiences, such as appearances by Colin Powell, then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Al-Jazeera, and it credits former Ambassador to Syria Christopher Ross for appearing on Al-Jazeera and speaking Arabic; however, it claims that, in general, current U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts are deficient.[35] To improve the U.S. public image in the Arab-Muslim world, the Council suggests that public diplomacy should be integrated into U.S. foreign policy development processes. Apparently, it believes that embedding public diplomacy within DOS isn't working, and that public diplomacy needs more attention at the strategic level.

Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, an associate professor of communication at DePaul University, has addressed the ways soft power enhances other instruments of national power. "As a nation," she argues, "we may have the mightiest military and the most sophisticated technology, but such strengths ultimately will not matter if we fail to capture the minds and hearts of people around the world with the enduring story of freedom and democracy."[36] Fitzpatrick points out that we must first educate ourselves about other countries before we attempt to change their views. She too recognizes that for public diplomacy to be effective, it must be considered when developing foreign policy. She also warns against the dangers of "diplomatic chaos"—the confusion experienced by foreign citizens when U.S. policies and goals shift each time a new president is elected. Says Fitzpatrick: "[It's] no wonder foreign citizens get confused about what this country really stands for."[37]

John Brown, of the Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds, assesses the Djerejian Report in his article "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: Reconsidering the Djerejian Report."[38] He claims that the report was too easy on DOS, and asserts that many of the public diplomacy challenges discussed in the report have been around since World War II. Brown recognizes that accurate measurement of the effectiveness of public diplomacy is difficult, if not impossible, but claims the report does not make any specific recommendations to address the problem. The report's recommendations are unimaginative, he says, and simply call for continuation of existing programs, more bureaucracy, and more funding. Nevertheless, Brown proposes that program assessment is not as important as acknowledging that public diplomacy programs are inexpensive and life would be more dangerous without them. He recommends that foreign officers be empowered to implement public diplomacy solutions that they feel will work in their regions, and that Americans be reminded that cultural differences play a significant part in foreign policy, so public diplomacy should be considered in development of foreign policy.[39] Again, there is the suggestion that public diplomacy is not emphasized enough at the strategic level within DOS.

In a June 2003 article in *Foreign Policy*, Nye claimed that anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, while U.S. soft power has been reduced.[40] One of the goals of the National Security Strategy is the promotion of democracy; however, Nye stated, "democracy…cannot be imposed by force."[41] Nye therefore proposed a time-phased strategy to develop effective public diplomacy. First, there should be a short-term focus on communicating current events through broadcast media. Nye believes that Radio Sawa is working, but thinks the United States needs a larger voice in such Arab media as Al-Jazeera television. In the near term, he argues, the United States should develop and communicate strategic themes or messages that depict it as a democratic nation interested in helping Muslim nations. He cites Bosnia and Kosovo as examples of American intervention on behalf of Muslims. Nye also advocates long-term efforts in cultural and educational exchanges. He believes that partnerships with governments, businesses, universities, and foundations can be exploited to encourage cultural understanding and exchange of information. In Nye's estimation,

the biggest problem affecting United States public diplomacy is its underfunding.[42]

Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies for the American Enterprise Institute, has argued that democracy is on the rise in Arab countries. "Democracy is the talk of the Arab world," she claims, "…democracy is now at the center of debate in Arab capitals."[43] Asserting that change is underway, Pletka notes that "the Arab League has embraced a series of…reforms; the Saudis have announced plans for municipal elections starting in November; and the Bahrainis and Qataris are making real changes to their political systems."[44] She warns that politically restrictive governments and low literacy rates in the region are obstacles to the expansion of democracy, but she provides evidence that some Arab citizens want reform and are looking to outside organizations to impose it.[45] Likewise, she notes that Palestinian scholar Daoud Kuttab has argued that "Arab democrats have failed to reach their goals through their own efforts," and they should welcome support from outsiders "irrespective of the messenger."[46] Although Pletka claims that President Bush is making "headway" in the promotion of democracy in Arab countries, she charges that he hasn't been aggressive enough. Many of the concerns she raises can be addressed by doing a better job of directly articulating U.S. values to Middle Eastern citizens. Public diplomacy initiatives can help to secure the recent democratic gains against extremists who violently oppose such change.

> *…the United States should develop and communicate strategic themes or messages that depict it as a democratic nation interested in helping Muslim nations*

DOS Activities

In testimony before Congress, DOS officials have defended the public diplomacy efforts they have undertaken since the Djerejian Report. But Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Margaret Tutwiler told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 2004 that U. S. Government public diplomacy efforts "must do a better job reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials." She described the effort to improve America's image as a difficult challenge that will "take years of hard, focused work."[47] Patricia Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, offered testimony regarding public diplomacy efforts focused on Arabs and Muslims to the House International Relations Committee in August 2004. Citing DOS's strategic ends for public diplomacy, she stated, "The foundation of our public diplomacy strategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics in order to increase understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives." Harrison asserted that the ways to achieve these ends are "through traditional programs and all the tools of technology, involving both public and private sectors" along with "daily briefings and public outreach by our missions around the world."[48]

Tutwiler's and Harrison's testimonies describe many new efforts to improve U.S. public diplomacy. These include changes in funding and organization and new programs for exchange, education, information, and broadcasting. For example, public diplomacy funding has been refocused to aim at the heavily Muslim regions of the Middle East and South Asia, so that 25 percent of all funding for exchange programs is now aimed at this region, as compared to 17 percent in 2002. Organizational changes include establishment of the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and an interagency Policy Coordinating Committee on Muslim Outreach focused on strengthening coordination with the Department of Defense and other agencies. Elsewhere, the Fulbright Scholarship program is now operational within Iraq and Afghanistan (the program was absent in Afghanistan for 25 years); USAID is working to ensure that recipients of its programs know that they are being assisted by the United States; thirty public diplomacy officers have been assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, making it the largest public diplomacy operation in the world; and the Alhurrah television network is now broadcasting to a huge Middle Eastern audience.[49]

Persistent Problems

Clearly, the United States has taken great pains to expand its influence in the Arab-Muslim world through public diplomacy efforts. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy provides some of these details in its 2004 report, which concludes that "significant progress has been made in many areas."[50] However, the report goes on to say that "there is still much that can be accomplished" and "the agencies and structures of public diplomacy need to be properly coordinated to achieve maximum efficiency."[51] While asserting that U.S. public diplomacy is making an impact, it suggests that public diplomacy still needs more strategic-level influence.

Despite being one of the four DIME instruments of national power, the information element does not get enough attention at the strategic level. DOS has cabinet-level influence and execution responsibility for the diplomacy element, but only recently, with the creation of the White House Office of Global Communications, has the information element attained strategic-level policy attention. Although DOS employs public diplomacy to execute the information element of national power, it does not give public diplomacy the same top-level attention as diplomacy or international development.

In October 1998, USAID and USIA were merged into DOS. The old USIA promoted U.S. national interests through a variety of international information, education, and cultural programs. Today, the functions and authority of the former USIA have been assigned to the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In contrast, USAID remains an essentially intact organization within DOS, receiving only overall foreign policy guidance from the secretary of state. Interestingly, USAID retained its old public diplomacy functions within the Office of Public Diplomacy under the Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs. Hinting at a need for reform, DOS recently established a Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy to ensure synchronization between the two DOS organizations.

According to Edgar Schein, a prominent organizational theorist, coordination of effort is one of the four essential elements necessary for effective organizational performance.[52] The Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy is an attempt to achieve this coordination of effort within DOS. Another of Schein's essential elements is "authority structure"—having an organizational structure or chain of command that gives one the right to direct the actions of others.[53] DOS, however, has split the public diplomacy functions between organizations with different chains of command. Without a proper authority structure, it will be difficult to coordinate public diplomacy effectively.

A New-Old Recommendation

To address these persistent shortfalls, the U.S. Government should resurrect within DOS a construct similar to the old USIA. This new agency, which might be called the Public Diplomacy Agency, should be tightly coupled to DOS in both policy and management, just as USAID is. In a tripartite relationship with DOS and USAID, an organization like the Public Diplomacy Agency could wield the information instrument of national power very effectively to help us achieve our national objectives. If the president appointed its director and Congress appropriated funding, this independent agency would have the agility to execute its mission and the authority structure needed to coordinate public diplomacy in the most effective manner—all while remaining accountable to national security policy and the public.

Summary

Since the Advisory Group published its report on the use of public diplomacy to influence the hearts and minds of Arab and Muslim people, DOS has made some improvements. The BBG's broadcasting efforts, in particular, have been a real success. Probably the most difficult challenge for DOS will be to develop feedback mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of its myriad public diplomacy programs. In the face of this challenge, we should remember that without any public diplomacy efforts, the world would be a more dangerous place.

Although DOS has made improvements in wielding the information element of national power, public diplomacy initiatives continue to lack adequate funding, they aren't being properly coordinated with other foreign affairs agencies, and they need more strategic direction. Nevertheless, DOS has shown through the recent expansion of U.S. influence in the Arab-Muslim world that it has the necessary knowledge and processes to execute a truly effective public diplomacy program.

DOS does, however, need a better organizational structure to provide strategic focus. One solution would be to stand up an agency within DOS—something along the lines of the old USIA—that is specifically charged to prosecute public diplomacy. Doing so would ensure that public diplomacy policy is effectively coordinated at the department level and would allow for greater influence at the cabinet or strategic levels. The DOS-USAID model worked exceptionally well during the recent tsunami relief efforts in Asia; it could certainly be used to create a more effective organization for employing the information element of national power. Now is the time. To win the war on terror, we have to ensure that the Arab-Muslim world hears a consistent, positive U.S. message. We need a public diplomacy agency. **MR**

Editor's Note: The military in general and the Army specifically are wrestling with the development of an as-yet unsatisfactorily defined capability for influencing foreign populations at the cultural level of engagement. This capability has been variously described as "public diplomacy," "strategic communications," and "information operations." Whether this is even an appropriate mission for the military continues to be heatedly debated in many quarters of the military and the government. Ironically, the government at one time had within its structure an organization dedicated to just such activities—the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). The USIA served in this role from the onset of the cold war to 1999, when it was officially disestablished. It ran a wide variety of programs aimed at promoting goodwill through respectful, culturally sensitive foreign engagement, as well as activities aimed at promoting among foreign peoples an understanding of U.S. institutions, society, and culture. During times of military crisis, the USIA became part of the country-team, performing the very functions of public diplomacy and cultural engagement that the military now appears to be trying to develop. Overall, the USIA played a dominant role in winning the values dimension of the cold war. It did this not through propaganda and bombast, but by focusing on the contrast between communism and democracy and using a policy of openness and exposure to America with all its positive aspects as well as its flaws. More information about the USIA and its functions can be obtained at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/ or http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf.

NOTES

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41. Ibid.
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43. Danielle Pletka, "Arabs on the Verge of Democracy," *New York Times*, 9 August 2004, A-15.
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46. Ibid. Daoud Kuttab's comments were published in the London-based Arabic daily *Al Hayat.*
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48. Department of State, "Harrison Reviews Public Diplomacy Focused on Arab, Muslim Outreach," 19 August 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Aug/19-981349.html>.
49. Ibid. Also, Department of State, "Tutwiler Emphasizes Need to Reach Beyond Foreign Elites."
50. Department of State, "2004 Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy," 28 September 2004, <http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/36522.htm>.
51. Ibid., 40.
52. Peter Hess and Julie Siciliano, *Management: Responsibility for Performance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1996), 182.
53. Ibid., 183.

Are the *Maras* Overwhelming Governments in Central America?

Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau

VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA has grown so much in the last half decade that Colombia is no longer the homicide capital of the region. In fact, it now ranks fourth in that ignominious distinction behind El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.[1] The violence is mostly due to the phenomenon of street gangs, also called *pandillas* or *gangas,* but most often *maras.* They have grown in number, sophistication, and stature and have largely overwhelmed the security forces of Central America's fledgling democracies. Altogether, these maras represent a significant threat to the security of the countries in the region. Numerous national, binational, multinational, regional, and hemispheric conferences have sought to address the problem.

Origins of the Maras

The maras emerged from conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua during the 1980s. Thousands of people fled north, including a large number of young men who had fought on the governments' side or with the insurgents. Many of these young men went to Los Angeles, but because they were poorly educated, few were able to find work. In a city already structured in terms of gangs, their familiarity with guns and armed combat was their one advantage. Some were incorporated into such neighborhood gangs as the African–American Crips and Bloods; the Mexican-American, illegal-immigrant gang EME; and the Mexican Mafia. Some of the men, especially those from El Salvador, joined the multi-ethnic 18th Street Gang. Other Salvadorans founded the *Mara Salvatrucha* (Group of Smart, or savvy, Salvadorans) *13,* or *MS-13,* to compete with the 18th Street Gang because they believed the Salvadorans in that gang were traitors.[2] (The new gang gave itself the number 13, as in 13th Street, where many Salvadorans had settled.) As most of what the maras were (and are) involved in was criminal activity, they were arrested and put into prison, where they further defined their gang identities and honed their criminal skills.

When federal anti-immigration laws toughened and the civil conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala ended, many gang members were deported to their countries of origin as soon as their prison sentences ended.[3] Once they returned to San Salvador, Guatemala City, or San Pedro Sula, the maras established themselves in the countries' war-torn societies. *Clicas* (cliques, cells, or groups) deported from the United States established MS-13 in San Salvador in 1992, replacing less violent and less sophisticated gangs. The 18th Street Gang became M-18 and was established in El Salvador in 1996 with three clicas.

PHOTO: A gang leader shows the weapons with which he killed 13 inmates at the Pavoncito penitentiary, south of Guatemala City, 24 December 2002.

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Location, organization, and numbers. El Salvador's National Police (PNC) say there are 36,000 gang members in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, 11,000 in El Salvador, 4,500 in Nicaragua, 2,700 in Costa Rica, 1,400 in Panama, and 100 in Belize. That's nearly 70,000 in the region.[4] In addition to MS-13 and M-18, there are *Los Cholos* (The Half Breeds), *Los Nicas* (The Nicaraguans), and *Los Batos Locos* (The Crazy Boys) in Guatemala; *La Mau Mau* (derived from the name of rebels in Kenya and a New York gang in the 1950s) and *La Maquina* (The Machine) in El Salvador; *La Mau Mau*, *Los Batos Locos*, and *Los Rockeros* (The Rockers) in Honduras; and the Gerber Boys and *Los Charly* in Nicaragua.[5]

The *maras* are not just a Central American phenomenon; they are transnational. MS-13, for example, reportedly has 20,000 members in the United States, 4,000 members in Canada, and a large presence in Mexico.[6] The numbers fluctuate—mara membership being dynamic, and gang membership is difficult to gauge.

Mara organizational structures are elaborate, flexible, and redundant. A leadership cadre often has another cadre to back it up. The maras can function as networks, with extensive transnational linkages. They have internal functional branches specializing in recruiting; logistics; attacks; intelligence collection and propaganda; and murder, drug trafficking, and extortion. Figure 1 depicts a typical organizational diagram.

Behavior. The national police in El Salvador say maras are involved in selling drugs; extortion; prostitution; homicide; and illegal movement of drugs, people, and arms across borders.[7] They increasingly arm their members with heavier weapons, including M-16s, AK-47s, and grenades, which the mara are reportedly improving their skills at using.

There is much more that is disturbing about the maras. They define themselves in contrast to the rest of society and to other gangs by wearing unique tattoos, using their own symbols and graffiti, and communicating through a special language and unique hand signals. Each mara has its own elaborate internal rules as to when a gang member can fight, what the punishment will be for certain behaviors, and what is required if a fellow clica member is killed. The use of violence is probably the most defining characteristic of the maras. Indeed, their unique vocabularies emphasize brutality and criminal activity. Initiation, ascension into leadership positions, and discipline are all based on violence. To enter the MS-13 mara, for example, a prospective gang member must agree to be beaten for 13 seconds by 4 members of the gang without putting up any resistance and protecting only his face and genitals. Later, as part of the ascension process, new members have to kill a person for no other reason than to show they can. This is called *sangre afuera, sangre adentro* (blood outside, blood inside). If women are strong enough, they undergo the same initiation rite. If not, they have to have sex with all the male members of the mara. The maras fight continuously, not only against the

Figure 1. Mara structure

Source: PNC El Salvador

authorities, but against each other for turf, markets, and especially for drugs. As part of their aggressiveness, some gangs mutilate and decapitate their victims.

Responding to the Maras

Each country in the region has responded in different ways to the mara problem. In 2003, Honduran President Ricardo Maduro forced a change in his country's penal code, establishing a maximum 12-year prison sentence for gang membership. Soon after, he increased the sentence to 30 years and put the army on the street to back up the nation's 8,000 police officers.[8]

In El Salvador, President Tony Saca pushed anti-gang legislation known as *Super Mano Dura* (Super Hard Hand) through Congress.[9] Salvadoran authorities now arrest youths simply for having gang-related tattoos or flashing signs, and gang members serve up to five years in prison (gang leaders up to nine). Additionally, San Salvador and Washington have developed an exchange program between PNC and FBI personnel, and El Salvador has developed some rehabilitation and prevention programs (with questionable success).

President Oscar Berger and the Guatemalan Congress have also approved new anti-gang laws, although these are not as draconian as the ones adopted in Honduras and El Salvador. Four thousand reserve army troops now support a government presence in troubled neighborhoods in Guatemala City, and a new interior minister's sole purpose is to fight crime. Guatemala has also instituted some programs aimed at preventing crime and assisting at-risk youths, especially former gang members.[10]

In contrast to *Mano Dura,* President Martin Torrijos of Panama launched *Mano Amiga* (Friendly Hand) to offer at-risk youths positive alternatives to gang membership. The program seeks to provide access to theater and sports activities for some 10,000 Panamanian youths.[11]

In addition to these national efforts, many bilateral, multilateral, and regional efforts aim to combat the maras. For example, Berger and Vicente Fox, Mexico's president, agreed to establish mechanisms to fight mara drug trafficking along their border. Similarly, Berger and El Salvador's Saca agreed to set up a joint security force to patrol gang activity

AFP

Guatemalan women weep after the discovery of four dead members of an indigenous family, two of them minors, killed approximately 800 meters from the Guatemalan National Congress in the capital, 3 August 2006.

along their border. In January 2004, Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Honduran, Nicaraguan, and Dominican Republic officials created a database on crimes to better track movements of criminal organizations. Saca proposed a "Plan Centroamerica Segura" (Central American Security Plan) to the Central American Integration System (in Spanish, SICA), in June 2004 at the Summit of Central American Presidents. SICA held an "Anti-mara Summit" in April 2005 where the presidents of all the Central American nations were joined by representatives from Mexico and the United States. More recently, the Spanish Ministry of Interior, with the participation of seven Central and ten South American countries, plus Mexico and the Dominican Republic, met to discuss the issue in March 2006. In April 2006, the government of El Salvador met with the FBI for a very large anti-gang regional conference.[12]

All in all, the region's governments are now paying great attention to regional coordination, and many different U.S. departments and agencies have become involved.

Impact of the Maras

The maras present a serious threat to the democracies, economies, and security of Latin America. They overwhelm the governments, the police, and the legal systems with their sheer audacity, violence, and numbers. One telling statistic is that at least 60 percent of the 2,576 murders committed in El Salvador in 2004 were gang-related, and the trend continued in 2005.[13]

Despite the governmental responses outlined above, the high level of violence and the difficulty

these countries have in dealing with the maras raise serious questions about the governments' ability to maintain law and order. For these new democracies, any challenge as strong as the maras aggravates already existing doubts about democracy as a viable, effective system of government.

To be successful, a democracy must have legitimacy. Latin America's new democracies have not yet established the authority needed to earn legitimacy. Political elites in Guatemala and Nicaragua, right up to the level of president, have been proven corrupt, and the two countries' political systems function poorly. Already challenged by historical and current problems, these new democracies now have to contend with maras that make a travesty of public services.

In El Salvador, the maras have established small businesses. Needless to say, they compete unfairly. They use violence against competitors, and they rent themselves out to other businesses, such as bus companies, to intimidate their competition. The maras' behavior corrupts other businesses because

Police officers detain gang members as part of a government plan to crack down on violent youth gangs or 'maras' in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 14 April 2005 .

it perpetuates itself and can result in a spiral of violence. Some who monitor maras wonder what they do with the money they make. They do not pay taxes, and their facilities and equipment are inexpensive. Will they buy up legitimate businesses and pay off government officials, including the police?

El Salvador's National Police believe that the maras are trying to penetrate police forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and political groups. If this is accurate, it shows that the maras can think and act strategically. The concern is that they may further jeopardize democracy by making themselves available for hire to interest groups and radicals who have not been successful in the new democracies' elections.

"National security," or, more precisely, the security of the nation-state, refers to the safeguarding of the state's sovereignty over the territory and population within its borders, and implies that the state should have policies to confront any threat to that sovereignty. "Public security" connotes the maintenance of civil order necessary for basic societal functions (for example, commercial transactions, transportation, or communications) and the rule of law. "Citizen security" alludes to the capacity of individuals and groups to enjoy or exercise their political, economic, and civil rights.[14]

The maras threaten all three security levels. Citizens cannot go about their business without fear of being robbed or killed in their neighborhoods. Businesses such as commerce and transport are prevented from operating unless they pay off the maras. Whole sections of cities, such as Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa, are under the control of maras, which, of course, fight each other for control of turf. When international organized crime employs maras, entire sections of countries, such as the Peten in Guatemala, slip from the state's sovereign control.

In sum, the maras pose serious challenges to all levels of security, to economic development, and to democratic consolidation. It cannot be emphasized enough how tentative and fragile these Latin American political and economic systems are following decades of authoritarianism and internal conflict. It would not take much to destabilize them. Guatemala's recent past provides a case in point.

With their violence, networks, and emerging strategies, maras can pose challenges that will be even more serious in the future, particularly if they build

on their current ability to intimidate political parties and support radical groups. There are signs of this happening now, and if it works, given the maras' ability to communicate and learn, more such outrages can be expected. The fear is that Central America will go the way of Colombia, with the loss of state control over great swaths of the country and the expansion of organized crime based on narcotics and terrorism. In Central America, unlike Colombia, the threat is located in the urban areas, and is not due so much to government neglect as to a lack of resources. The motivation now appears to be present to do something.

What to Do?

All Central American countries want to respond to the maras in some meaningful way. Because the maras operate in a networked fashion, governments must do the same. It takes networks to fight networks.[15]

The SICA-sponsored agreement among the Central American nations (and the Dominican Republic) commits each country to strengthen efforts against the maras by developing regional strategies for improving security, by sharing information and intelligence, by creating a regional rapid reaction force with broad jurisdiction, and by creating programs to keep at-risk youths out of gangs.[16] Even so, implementation at a national or, even better, local level, requires overcoming such impediments as a lack of personnel, vague police powers, questionable legality/constitutionality, judicial unwillingness to enforce the laws, the legal systems' vulnerability to intimidation and corruption, and criticism by UN entities and NGOs.

Further, the merging of police and military/national intelligence can be difficult because these organizations' goals are often diametrically opposed: police want to prosecute criminals based on evidence gathered *after* a crime has been committed whereas national intelligence agencies attempt to provide warning of *pending* activity. This is not to say that police never attempt to disrupt operations, or that military and governmental intelligence agencies do not reflect on past activity to support analysis; however, police want the legal means to take people to trial while national agencies function in a broader context. To make any headway against the maras, it will take focused effort, detailed intelligence-sharing agreements, the granting of broad jurisdictional authority to

national and international forces, the incorporation of technology, and coordination among regional and international partners.

To our knowledge, there is no credible evidence linking the maras to terrorism. This is clearly good news for the United States considering the ease with which gang members cross the borders into this country.[17] Further, while the maras are a crime problem in cities across the United States, the situation in most of Central America is much more serious because of a lower level of economic development and the fragility of the new democracies and their institutions. As a result, in Central America the maras challenge all levels of security and have the potential to frustrate economic development and democratic consolidation. Clearly, there is work to do at many levels of government to put best practices and policies into place to fight this growing threat. *MR*

NOTES

1. In 2005, the number of homicides per 100,000 was as follows: El Salvador, 54.71 (3,761 homicides); Honduras, 40.66 (2,836); Guatemala, 37.53 (5,500); and Colombia, 33.76 (14,503). These figures are widely cited. See <http://luterano.blogspot.com/2006/01/el-salvador-pain-murder-rate-highest.html>.

2. "Mara" means "people rioting or out of control." The word is ultimately derived from the name for a carnivorous swarming ant. "Salva" refers to those coming from El Salvador, and "trucha" means savvy or streetwise.

3. Between 2000 and 2004 an estimated 20,000 criminals were deported to the countries of their birth. See Ana Arana, "How the Street Gangs Took Central America," *Foreign Affairs* 84, 3 (May/June 2005): 100.

4. These data are from the PNC in El Salvador. They are more conservative than other data we have seen.

5. Dennis Rodgers, "'We Live in a State of Siege': Violence, Crime, and Gangs in Post-Conflict Urban Nicaragua," Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, September 2002.

6. See Arian Campo-Flores, "The Most Dangerous Gang in America," *Newsweek*, 28 March 2005; Armando Salinas Torre, Secretario Particular del C. Subsecretario Subsecretaría de Población, Migración y Asuntos Religiosos, 5 January 2005, in *Gaceta Parlamentaria* 88 (8 Feb 2005), <www.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/?sesion=2005/02/08/1&documento=6>.

7. This information comes from PNC studies, our interviews in El Salvador and Guatemala in the first two weeks of April 2005 and March and April 2006, and newspaper accounts in the United States and Central America.

8. Clare Ribando, *Gangs in Central America*, Congressional Research Service, 10 May 2005.

9. Saca's predecessor, President Francisco Flores, initiated the original *Mano Dura* laws in August 2003.

10. Stephen Johnson and David B. Muhlhausen, "North American Transnational Youth Gangs: Breaking the Chain of Violence," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* 1834 (21 March 2005), 11; and Ribando.

11. Ribando.

12. Natalia Gómez Quintero, "México y Guatemala van contra `Maras`," *El Universal* (Mexico), 22 February 2005; "Central America Creates Security Force," *The Guardian*, 4 March 2005, <www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-4840032,00.html>; "Maras en Centroamérica: de las guerras civiles a la ultraviolencia callejera," *La Hora* (Guatemala City), 30 March 2005, <sww.lahora.com.gt/05/03/30/paginas/nac_4.htm#n3>.

13. Ribando.

14. We have found the straightforward definition used by Douglas A. Kincaid very useful. Interestingly enough, it comes from an article on El Salvador and Guatemala. See Douglas A. Kincaid, "Demilitarization and Security in El Salvador and Guatemala: Convergences of Success and Crisis," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, 4 (Winter 2000).

15. See Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). Ronfeldt and Arquilla have published other important works on networks and their implications.

16. Extraordinary Meeting of the Chiefs of States and Governments of the Countries of the Central American Integration System, <http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones_Presidentes/DECLARACION_CONJUNTA_01-04-05.htm>.

17. According to the Salvadoran National Police, more than 2,500 MS-13 members from 6 Central American countries were arrested in and deported from the United States in 2005.

Osama bin Laden's *Global Jihad:* Myth and Movement

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ASSESSING THE SOUNDNESS of Osama bin Laden's global jihad concept by analyzing the movement and its myth has implications for U.S. information operations and counterinsurgency strategies and demonstrates the importance of cultural understanding. Much has been written already on the topic of global jihad, but my analysis is quite different from those that interpret Bin Laden's endeavors on the basis of Western thought. My analysis takes an inside-out (vice an outside-in) approach that is based on my interpretation of Arab-Islamic thought. Before engaging in this effort, though, we must first define key terms.

Definitions

In American society, the word "myth" is too often taken to mean "fictitious story" or "fable"—something to be discredited in rational and scientific pursuits. Thus, if the global jihad concept is a myth, it can be readily dismissed. This interpretation, however, runs counter to my intent. I use myth in its technical, anthropologic sense: a partly fictional story (or image) with some historic basis that imparts a lesson to society. In this sense, mythmaking is a culturally unique, effective means of influencing behavior, not something to be easily dismissed. With respect to Bin Laden's movement, the behavior sought is resistance to or rebellion against governmental authority, and the main mythic theme is grievance against that authority.

Myth of grievance. Many students of insurgency recognize the importance of the myth of grievance, although they do not all use this term. Some authors prefer "grievance narrative."[1] In one of the more comprehensive works on insurgency, Bard O'Neil addresses the same concept in terms of "esoteric appeal."[2] The difference in terminology, however, should be no distraction: it merely reflects difference in educational backgrounds, prospective audiences, references, and other influences. Regardless of which term is used, the significant point is that the myth is complex and adaptable and consists of many elements that might change in their use or emphasis over time.

Insurgency movement. Any use of "myth" warrants clarification, and so too does the use of *movement*. One of the basic meanings of the latter word is "an organized effort to attain some end." Expanding that definition, we

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can characterize Bin Laden's movement as militant and its end as political. Thus, we are dealing with insurgency or something akin to it.

In the U.S. Department of Defense's *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* insurgency is defined as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."[3] A resistance movement is defined as "an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability."[4] There is considerable debate over how to classify Bin Laden's movement, but any movement has methods, strategies, and goals, and we can analyze these.

With key terms defined, we can move on to the substance and method of analysis. Most observers of contemporary jihadism agree that, with the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the movement now has two prominent leaders, Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and numerous advisers and ideologues who influence them. Observers also agree that the movement is not fully cohesive because the spokesmen's words convey different immediate objectives and emphases. To examine all of these differences and underlying motives and influences would require writing a book, so I am focusing on Bin Laden's concept, pointing out variances where they seem significant.

An image taken from Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television, 23 June 2006, shows footage of Ayman al-Zawahiri vowing to avenge the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed in a U.S. air raid 7 June 2006.

Articulating Jihad

Where does Bin Laden articulate his global jihad concept? It is not found in any one text, but rather in a series of public statements he has made since the early 1990s. The task of acquiring the text of these statements is more complicated than it might seem. Multiple, slightly different versions of Arabic "originals" exist, all with variant English translations. Nonetheless, editor Bruce Lawrence recently published *Messages to the World,* an English-language collection of 24 of Bin Laden's most significant statements (speeches and interviews) for which the translations are consistent.[5]

Lawrence's work is an excellent source compendium, except that it includes an abbreviated instead of a full version of Bin Laden's famous "Declaration of Jihad."[6] To have a more complete base for content analysis, I examined the full-text version of Bin Laden's declaration as well as the recent audio message to America presenting the alternatives of "More Operations, Long-Term Truce."

The 25 statements reveal that Bin Laden's myth of grievance is comprised of substantive complaints, relevant principles, and an overarching motive to act. His substantive complaints concern infidel (U.S.) troop presence near the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia; U.S.-backed Israeli aggression in Palestine, including dispossessing native Muslims and pressing claims on the Temple Mount site; and bilateral collusion in undervaluing oil—the wealth of many Islamic countries. Bin Laden repeatedly cites these three issues, couching them in terms of Islamic beliefs.

U.S. troop presence. Bin Laden views the Saudi regime's accommodation of a U.S. troop presence in the kingdom as a grave offense, given the belief that Muhammad desired to rid Arabia of Christians and Jews. Bin Laden quotes hadiths according to which Muhammad said, "There can be no two religions in the Arabian peninsula"; and "I am banishing the Jews and Christians…so that I preach only to Muslims."[7]

Israeli aggression in Palestine. Bin Laden laments various diplomatic concessions to the Israelis. He reminds his audience that the Temple Mount site

(al-Harâm al-Sharîf) in Jerusalem is a sacred place for Muslims and that Palestine is Muslim land. He alludes to the former as "the first of the (two) directions of prayer" and the latter as "the land of the Prophet's night journey" (ascent to heaven).[8]

Undervaluing Oil. Bin Laden questions the morals of regional rulers who, he says, fix the price of oil and make costly arms deals with the "infidel" West. He recalls the Quranic verse: "All of them committed excesses in their lands, and spread corruption there; your Lord let a scourge of punishment loose on them."[9]

Grievances on Principle

Bin Laden adds impetus to the above complaints by evoking the anti-materialist, anti-elitist, and anti-civic tendencies of Islamic social thought—what I would call "grievances on principle." He gains his intended effect through the repetition of words and word images that connote the three tendencies. Because they are somewhat less tangible than his substantive grievances, we will discuss these tendencies individually.

Anti-materialism. The theme of anti-materialism is common to many religions and cults and is not essentially a negative concept. Rather, it most highly values spiritual life in the hereafter. An associated belief is that wealth is transitory, but salvation through moral discipline is lasting. Thus, the true believer should be willing to sacrifice his wealth, if not his life, for the sake of salvation. Bin Laden evokes this theme at least 25 times in his major statements, with "A Muslim Bomb" and "Depose the Tyrants" accounting for half that number. His appeal is traditional, in that he draws on the lore of the Quran and hadiths. Interestingly, he does not use the motif of an archetypal contest between spiritualist and materialist doctrines, which was a concern of the early Muslim activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.[10]

Anti-elitism. This theme is also found in various cultures. However, in its Islamic version, it does not refer to the inherent equality of men or to the social inequities described by anti-aristocratic or anti-oligarchic movements in other societies. The key idea for Muslim dissidents such as Bin Laden is that nobility derives from fulfilling the obligations of Islam. Rulers are to be judged by this standard and, if found lacking, deposed by the people. The

historic precedent is the case of the third Caliph Uthman, whose mutinous troops killed him when he declined to punish their governor for wrongdoing. While the authors of Islamic tradition neither condemn nor applaud regicide, the event led to the murder of the next caliph and caused a permanent division in the Islamic population over the issue of legitimate leadership.

Bin Laden does not mention these historic precedents, but he views contemporary regional rulers as having compromised their positions through various acts of commission and omission. He first cautions, then denounces, them. By contrast, his nobles are (mostly) nameless young men who fulfill the duty of jihad and are called heroes, knights, or lions. Bin Laden makes anti-elitist allusions over 80 times in 12 of his major statements. "Declaration of Jihad" and "Nineteen Students" extol the common young men who fulfill their duty of jihad. "Depose the Tyrants" criticizes Saudi rulers who fail to fulfill their obligations under Islamic law.

Anti-civic. The anti-civic theme is largely unknown in Western civilization. Western political and legal norms are founded on the ideal of representative assemblies of various size framing constitutions and regulations on the basis of reason, natural law, and public interest. This ideal is completely alien to Islamic culture, where the validity of law depends on its conformance with divine revelation. Thus, for Bin Laden, man-made law is invalid, U.S. democracy is hypocrisy, and the United Nations is a tool of the infidels. He evokes such ideas at least 25 times, although the theme does not dominate his major statements.

Overarching Motive to Act

At this point we see that Bin Laden's myth has three grievances of substance and three grievances on principle, but what is the catalyst, or motive, that makes them incentives for action? It is the theme of "Erasing Shame." To understand how significant the feeling of shame is to Muslims, we must consider the Arab psyche. The key point is already well presented in the writings of two renowned authorities: Raphael Patai and David Pryce-Jones. Patai highlights the overriding importance of the honor-shame syndrome in his treatment of Bedouin values in Arab behavior.[11] Pryce-Jones tells us that honor-shame judgments are harder to ignore than

the obligations of Islam. He writes, "Acquisition of honour, pride, dignity, respect and the converse avoidance of shame, disgrace, and humiliation are keys to Arab motivation, clarifying and illuminating behavior in the past as well as in the present. . . . Honour is what makes life worthwhile; shame is a living death, not to be endured, requiring that it be avenged."[12] The point is well put, but the intensity of this syndrome cannot be fully understood except through personal interaction with the culture.[13]

In any case, its importance is clearly seen in Bin Laden's statements. He builds a theme of erasing shame by constantly mentioning situations of enduring humiliation and disgrace and prospects of restoring honor and dignity. He brings up this theme over 75 times in 18 of his major statements, with "Declaration of Jihad" accounting for roughly one-fifth of the relevant remarks.

Bin Laden's Targets

In his myth of grievance, Bin Laden has developed a complex rationale for striking out at antagonists. He clearly defines three sets of targets: infidel regimes, apostate rulers, and the "Crusader Alliance."

Infidel regimes. In Bin Laden's view, the United States, Great Britain, and Israel comprise the core of what he calls the Crusader Alliance against Islam. Bin Laden selectively quotes from the Quran and hadith to justify jihad against these "Christians and Jews." He ignores passages that enjoin tolerant treatment of the "People of the Book" because, in his view, "modern Anglo-American Christians and Zionist Jews" have violated the conditions that warrant such treatment.

Apostate rulers. Bin Laden's second set of targets consists of so-called apostate rulers, leaders of Muslim countries who have not only reneged on their obligations to Islamic society but also ignored appeals for reform and have thus become "lawful blood." He condemns them for allegedly creating injustice and abetting the crusader cause. However, to Bin Laden it is more difficult to justify Muslims killing other Muslims than it is to justify Muslims killing infidels. On this point, Bin Laden frequently appeals to the authority of the 14th-century religious scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who denounced the Mongol rulers of his time, despite their being Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya's writing justifies for Sunni Islam the

> *Acquisition of honour, pride, dignity, respect and the converse avoidance of shame, disgrace, and humiliation are keys to Arab motivation.…Honour is what makes life worthwhile; shame is a living death…*

tenet of takfîr (the right of one Muslim person or group to treat another Muslim as an infidel due to supposed violation of Islamic law). Actually, the first recourse to takfîr antedated Ibn Taymiyya by many centuries, and that history is well worth recalling, but not before we consider Bin Laden's third set of targets.

The Crusader Alliance. The so-called Crusader Alliance consists of the societies of the allied Crusader and Zionist states and the henchmen of their collaborators. Bin Laden clearly seeks to ruin America's economy and undermine its war-making capacity, which means that some noncombatants must become collateral casualties. He justifies the death or injury of employees of embassies, defense contractors, and other targeted sectors by contending that the killing of innocents, even women and children, is allowed in retaliatory self-defense. Bin Laden saw the World Trade Center as a legitimate target because "the ones who were attacked and who died in it were part of a financial power. It wasn't a children's school! Neither was it a residence."[14] Still, circumstances matter: Bin Laden does not advocate the wanton killing of the populace of an enemy state or community. Indeed, he takes noticeable effort to dissociate himself from such practice, which is the hallmark of the Kharijites of old and the takfirists today. In fact, he states that the Riyadh regime "has accused the mujahidin of following the path of the Kharijites, but they know that we have nothing to do with such a school of thought."[15]

The Kharijite Movement

What then is the significance of Bin Laden's allusions to the Kharijite movement, which has been long relegated to the dustbin of history? The movement created the first sectarian rift within the

Islamic dominion. During the Alid-Umayyad dispute over succession to the caliphate in the fourth decade of the Islamic era (circa 650-660 A.D.), the Kharijites turned against both contending parties on the grounds of anti-elitism. They denounced the conventional notion that the clans of Quraysh (the Prophet's kin group) were an elect group and the concomitant belief that the caliph must be of Qurashi lineage.

The Kharijites developed a new creed, which emphasized the equality of all Muslims and refuted the moral doctrine of justification by faith (versus deeds or good acts). These people held to a militant, puritanical, and fanatically self-righteous stance. They adopted the principle of takfîr (excommunication or declaring a person or group of people non-Muslim) and raided and killed in any vulnerable Muslim community that would not accept their beliefs. These renegades were reviled for their incessant uprisings and their slaughter of noncombatants, including women and children.

Because the Kharijite doctrine of takfir appealed to social groups dispossessed of wealth and disaffected with government, the Kharijites found ample converts and allies. The movement spread throughout Iraq and Iran and was particularly tenacious in Arabia and Algeria. Kharijite insurrections afflicted the Islamic dominion during the first 300 years of its existence. However, Kharijism as a political force gradually succumbed to the countermeasures of legitimate regimes. Of the various offshoots of the original movement, the only prominent one to have formally survived is the moderate Ibadi sect found in Oman and Zanzibar. Kharijism seems also to have survived among the Berbers of Algeria in the form of folk religion. True, the movement expired centuries ago; however, the same mindset has survived in other manifestations.

The Wahhabi Movement

Many of the characteristics of Kharijite thought and behavior are reflected in the Wahhabi movement, which arose in eastern Arabia during the mid-18th century. The movement originated as a puritanical reaction to Ottoman Turkish and other foreign influences and combined the theological leadership of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the practical leadership of Muhammad ibn Saud, the eponymous ancestor of the Saudi dynasty.

Technically, the Wahhabis were not Kharijites in that they held different beliefs relative to justification by faith and lawful blood. Yet, Wahhabism had many of the same features as Kharijism. The Wahhabis, led by the House of Saud, accepted the principle of tafkîr and so conducted jihad against other Muslims. Considered to be puritanical, fanatical, and self-righteous, they accepted a leader (imam), actually a dynast, who was not of Qurashi lineage. They also reserved the right to depose the imam if his motives became suspect. Thus, Wahhabi militiamen revolted against Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman, the restorer of the Saudi dynasty, when he ordered them to cease raiding the British mandates of Iraq and Transjordan. Abd al-Aziz retained sufficient support to defeat the Wahhabis at the battle of Sabala in February 1929 and eventually extinguished the revolt in subsequent campaigns.

In "Depose the Tyrants," Bin Laden recasts the relevant events of 1929 in an attempt to show that the Saudi leader deceived his followers on two counts: sanctioning takfîr and bending to the British. Bin Laden takes this tack as part of a serious effort at averting the blame for the deaths of innocent people, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. He disavows any deliberate intent to take innocent Muslim blood. In his appeal, he laments coincidental Muslim deaths and emphatically denies that his followers are Kharijites, a charge he had previously rejected in "Resist the New Rome."

Righteous Retaliation

In "Terror for Terror," Bin Laden considers innocent blood in the context of righteous retaliation. He asserts that both religion and logic justify attacks on non-combatants to avenge like attacks and deter future ones. Even so, he makes the claim that those who struck on 9/11 "did not set out to kill children." He says they were only attacking the military and financial centers of a powerful enemy.

Just as the question of intent is important, so too is the question of innocence. In "Nineteen Students," Bin Laden contends that America instigated the 9/11 attacks. In his later address, "To the Americans," he tells us why he considers the American people in general to be culpable:

● They choose their government, which supports Israel's oppression of the Palestinians.

● They pay the taxes that fund the military

machine that bombs in Afghanistan, destroys homes in Palestine, occupies the Persian Gulf region, and blockades Iraq.

● The American army is part of the American people.

● They employ their men and women in the Armed Forces, which attack the Muslims.

From his constant attention to the question of "innocent blood," it would seem that Bin Laden sees it as a vulnerability. With this mindset, he would probably disagree with some of the measures employed by Zarqawi's followers and allies in Iraq. Indeed, some observers see Zawahiri's 2005 "Letter to Zarqawi" as an effort by Al-Qaeda's leadership to curtail the wanton brutality occurring there.[16] Although the authenticity of that text is questionable, Zarqawi ostensibly felt some pressure from somewhere to defend his actions. Abu Mus'ab published his own doctrinal tract, which argues against wanton killing but justifies bloodletting on the basis of circumstances.[17] The same concern over excessive brutality is reflected in the efforts of Iraqi insurgents to differentiate honorable resistance from terrorism.

Thus, Bin Laden caveats his targeting, which in itself seems to be fairly well defined. Can the same be said of his desired end state? Many observers contend that he seeks the restoration of a pan-Islamic caliphate. That view, however, seems uninformed. Bin Laden's geostrategic perspective is very selective, while his concept of the caliphate is quite vague.

Bin Laden's Geostrategic Perspective

From a geostrategic perspective, Bin Laden's first concern is his homeland—Saudi Arabia. He is indignant over the monarchy's decision to allow U.S. troops to use Saudi Arabia as a stage for strikes against Muslim Iraq and at Saudi Arabia's policies on Israel, Palestine, and oil, which ignore the interests of Muslims. In his view, the Islamic holy land has been desecrated and "sold" to infidel interests. He sets forth his case in several of his earlier public statements and returns to it in "Depose the Tyrants." Bin Laden argues that, being a leader of veteran mujahideen, he should have been summoned to defend Saudi Arabia against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990, but the monarchy succumbed to the pressure of the Crusader-Zionist alliance, as it consistently did in previous and subsequent decisions.

Bin Laden's second concern is Palestine, which takes on special significance because of its Islamic beliefs.[18] Bin Laden asserts that this territory that had been part of the Islamic dominion should never have been ceded to non-Muslim control, nor should any Muslim regime have ever endorsed such an event. The Temple Mount (al-Harâm al-Sharîf) in Jerusalem is Islam's third holiest site. It is the first direction of prayer (qibla) and is held to be the place of Muhammad's night journey to heaven and point of assembly of true believers on the final day of time. Bin Laden raises these points in his first major statement, "The Betrayal of Palestine," and returns to them in subsequent ones.

Also of note is that Bin Laden shows no concern whatsoever for Damascus, the last of the four holiest sites of Islam. On this point, his perspective seems somewhat less than comprehensive.

He does, however, show concern for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He laments the pre-2003

Nineteen Airmen died and hundreds were injured in the terrorist attack at Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996.

U.S.-led bombing and international sanctions that directly and indirectly caused Muslim deaths in Iraq. In his address "To the People of Iraq," he calls on Iraqis to recognize their common Muslim bond and encourages them to continue the resistance to U.S. intervention. However, he offers no vision of the aftermath of the struggle, perhaps realizing that the emergence of a Sunni Islamist regime is a low probability. Nor does he draw notice to the strategic importance of Iraq, given its proximity to both Arabia and Palestine. To Bin Laden, Iraq has significance only as a land of jihad.

Afghanistan also has such significance, although its merits go beyond that. The country is renowned as the site of the physical Al-Qaeda (the base established by the Mujahid Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri) as well as Bin Laden's one-time home in exile. Bin Laden frequently extols it as the place where Muslims won a jihad against the Soviets and established an Islamic emirate. The mujahideen of Afghanistan deserve the acclaim of all Muslims and, after the turn of events, their support against the Karzai regime.

The Taliban is not giving up its effort to regain power, yet it is not making much headway. Meanwhile, Bin Laden ostensibly has a new safe haven, and Pakistan holds the key to both his and the Taliban's prospects. Bin Laden is highly supportive of the Islamists of Pakistan, while he is highly critical of Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf's regime for its support (albeit reluctant) for America's war on terror.[19] Bin Laden and Musharraf seem to be holding one another in check.

Apart from the five lands noted, Bin Laden's statements summarily recognize the historic importance of Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, and Bosnia; the ongoing importance of Chechnya and Kashmir; and the emerging importance of Indonesia and the Philippines for the jihadist movement. However, he does not suggest an interrelation among the places or hint at a possible scenario for victory. There seem to be no strategic thoughts (in the Western sense), just the intent to promote jihad against the infidels wherever circumstances avail. Granted, Bin Laden also calls for insurrection against the "apostate regimes" in Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf; however, significant gaps remain in this broader view, suggesting that it does not reflect a deep strategy.

Apparent Anomalies

The first of several apparent anomalies is Bin Laden's virtual disregard of Algeria. One might expect him to extol Algeria as a model of rebellion against unjust rule and a wellspring of mujahideen. His silence remains a matter of conjecture. However, he might be loath to draw attention to the site of enduring Muslim-on-Muslim brutality, since he otherwise seems intent on dissociating himself from the depredations of neo-Kharijism or takfîrism.

Bin Laden is similarly reserved about Egypt, another Sunni-dominant Arab country. He might have pointed to its importance in Islamic history as the site of al-Azhar and the base for Saladin's drive against the crusaders. He might have praised the Egyptians who championed militant Islam: Sayyid Qutb and the assassins of Anwar Sadat. It may be that Bin Laden simply avoids discussing Egypt in deference to his colleagues from the Egyptian Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Whatever the reason, the silence is conspicuous. As already noted, Syria is similarly neglected.

Bin Laden shows relatively no interest in Iran and the wider Shi'ite world. When he speaks of jihad in Lebanon, he recalls the conflict between the Israeli invaders and the Palestinian émigrés, not the Hezbollah militias. The potential geostrategic dilemma is that Iran blocks the land-link between the eastern (Afghanistan-Pakistan) and western (Arabia-Palestine-Iraq) fronts of the jihadist movement.[20] The physical link might be maritime, but this point goes unmentioned. He also virtually ignores another large part of the Islamic world—the largely Turkic lands of Central Asia.

Lack of Envisioned End State

As we have seen, Bin Laden's vision of strategic geography seems spotty. In addition, a consideration of doctrine also seems to be lacking. Bin Laden vaguely alludes to the restoration of the caliphate in two of his major statements; however, he takes no position on relevant doctrinal questions.[21] Must the caliph be of Arab ancestry and, more particularly, of Qurashi lineage? What should the forum and method be for selecting the caliph or, alternatively, deposing him? What are the caliph's powers? Where is the seat of the caliphate? He addresses none of these critical issues.[22] Indeed, it might be counterproductive to broach them, since

they are all potentially divisive. Still, how does one direct a movement without some explicit vision of the end state?

Certain U.S. officials and commentators will not let go of the threat-image of a revived caliphate. Advocates of this view suggest that Bin Laden has deferred to his colleagues on matters of strategy, citing the supposed words of Zarqawi and Zawahiri. Journalist Fouad Hussein's "Seven Steps to the Caliphate," which is attributed to Zarqawi, projects struggle beyond 2016.[23] The scenario is that the mujahideen will triumph in Iraq, the center of the movement. They will then take Syria, then Arabia. Zawahiri's supposed "Letter to Zarqawi" suggests four stages to the "restoration of the caliphate" and emphasizes the central importance of Egypt and the Levant (Syria, and Palestine). Neither text addresses the issues noted above. Assuming that these views are genuine, they are sufficiently inconsistent to cause us to doubt the existence of any definitive scheme to establish a new caliphate.[24]

It is quite likely that Bin Laden's end state is really a commonwealth of Sunni Muslim countries with governments that respect Islamic law, not some monolithic caliphate. He asserts his purpose is simply to motivate the youth of Islamic societies to undertake jihad, to promote a broader movement.[25] Bin Laden is certainly not the self-styled leader of all mujahideen forces or the enforcer of doctrinal cohesion among allies. In cases where he offers military advice, it lacks proficiency. He fails to realize that the terrain conditions that accommodated the defense-in-depth scheme in eastern Afghanistan do not exist in central Iraq or other areas of conflict.[26] For the sake of a common goal, Bin Laden is willing to cooperate with groups whose doctrine he considers to be beyond the pale of Islam.[27] His strategic sense seems to be that actual and latent struggles can be self-directing, but complementary in distracting the enemies' focus, attriting their assets, and eroding their resolve.[28] Bin Laden also suggests that America's willingness to engage militarily abets the conditions that will bring about its failure.

Appropriate Countermeasures

Given this analysis of the myth and movement of global jihad, we must ask: What are the appropriate countermeasures for societies or societal sectors under jihadist attack? First, we will consider what information operations efforts might deflate Bin Laden's myth of grievance, and then, what counterinsurgency efforts might contain the jihadist movement.

Information operations. To deflate Bin Laden's myth of grievance, it seems imperative to focus on the catalyst—the need to erase shame. The right recourse would be to avoid evoking shame and humiliation and to try to bestow honor and esteem. However, this might be difficult to do because American journalists, moviemakers, scholars, and politicians are free to convey messages that may be humiliating to Muslims. Still, public diplomacy and foreign information programs might highlight official and private messages that accord honor. Perhaps the more effective work could be done at the local, vice society-wide, level. We will return to this consideration later.

Substantive grievances cannot be redressed short of a radical change in U.S. regional policies. However, the grievances on principle do lend themselves to counter-appeals. To offset the anti-materialist theme, it might be effective to draw attention to the mujahid's obligations to his extended family—as opposed to lost opportunity to fulfill oneself in this life, as might be viable in the West. We might, for example, call attention to the passage in the Quran that says, "Your Lord decreed that you worship only Him and serve parents well, whether one or both of them attains old age with you; do not grumble (say "uff") at them or chide them but talk to them respectfully."[29] To offset the anti-elitist theme, it might be advantageous to play to it. In other words, in-country U.S. officials could broadcast festive greetings (on appropriate occasions) to the local people, as distinct from the government. Last, to counter the anti-civic theme, it would be productive to show a willingness to work with and through non-elected leaders: ulema (religious scholars) and tribal sheikhs. It would be doubly productive to treat them with honor.

The most obvious vulnerability is Bin Laden's sensitivity to being branded a neo-Kharijite. He has taken on allies of convenience, although he remains critical of their beliefs and practices. This is risky for Bin Laden because he cannot readily disassociate himself from allies who commit atrocities. An obvious priority for information warfare would be a sustained negative publicity campaign

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to compel him to break with the takfîrists and other extremists. The Saudi Government is already taking measures to discredit Bin Laden with the Muslim masses. The U.S. interagency community should support and expand that endeavor with technical and diplomatic assistance. The main effort should stay with the Saudis and other Arab allies, because they have people with far more credibility to exploit differences in Islamic doctrine. Appeals by Western infidels, even well-qualified ones, are likely to be dismissed summarily, if not considered as further affronts to Muslim dignity.

Counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. interagency community should keep a low profile when lending active counterinsurgency support to friendly governments in such countries as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Relevant measures include assistance with surveillance, collection of information, and special teams' skill training, in contrast to direct involvement in active operations.

Muslim communities that have been victimized by takfîrists or neo-Kharijites might be willing to mobilize an irregular self-defense force. The U.S. assistance effort could be directed toward them, provided the host government has no objection to using irregulars. This recourse is probably more feasible in Afghanistan or Iraq, where the governments are still revamping internal security structures.

Strategic Issues

The low-profile approach should also be considered for strategic issues. Bin Laden clearly seeks to bait the United States into overextending itself. He reflects that "White House leadership, which is so keen to open up war fronts for its various corporations, whether in the field of arms, oil, or construc-

tion, has also contributed to remarkable results for Al-Qaeda."[30] Many observers would agree that the intervention in Iraq not only detracted from the war on terrorism, but also created new opportunity for the jihadist movement. The United States should be cautious about making another such major commitment of resources. The attendant question, though, is whether Bin Laden can create compelling circumstances to lure the United States into another major move. He is certainly not now in a good position to orchestrate rebellions in Africa, the Levant, or Southeast Asia. Of the several countries he targets for regime overthrow, Pakistan seemingly holds the most strategic importance.

Bin Laden addressed one of his major statements to "Our Brothers in Pakistan," after domestic violence occurred there on 24 September 2001. In the statement, he laments the deaths of people who protested the regime's alliance with the United States, and he encourages dedication to jihad. He says, "It is no surprise that the Muslim nation in Pakistan will rise up to defend its Islam, for it is considered Islam's first line of defense in this region…. We exhort our Muslim brothers in Pakistan to fight with all their might to prevent the American Crusader forces from conquering Pakistan and Afghanistan."[31] He exhorts "the brothers in Pakistan" at the closing of "Terror for Terror" and asserts in "The Example of Vietnam" that "we will not let Pakistan and its people stand alone."[32]

These words alone do not convey Pakistan's true strategic importance. The country has roughly 150 million people and constitutes a large sector of the Muslim world. An Islamist insurrection there would present a major problem for the region; an Islamist takeover would present an even greater one. Afghanistan's eastern and southern borders would experience more hostility. The maritime route from Baluchistan to Arabia would be more open to militants' use. The Kashmir conflict would inevitably be heightened. Nuclear-capable India would be unnerved. Last, Pakistan's nuclear weaponry might slip from responsible control.

Such a crisis would certainly burden the United States, and Bin Laden might consider provoking it in a more determined way. However, while an Islamist uprising might give him the advantage, it might also provoke decisive U.S. assistance to the Musharraf regime, which could consequently

jeopardize Bin Laden's current relative safety in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.

The U.S. Government faces an equal dilemma. If it exerts too much pressure on Islamabad to operate against Bin Laden and other militants in the border regions, it could provoke the Islamist uprising that abets Bin Laden's cause. There seems to be a stalemate, albeit one that might be broken by developments within Pakistan's society.

At this point, the relevant countermeasures have been noted, and the purpose of the analysis has been fulfilled. Nonetheless, this is not a complete strategy for defeating global jihad. In addition to information and counterinsurgency operations, the interagency effort must address the internal development of countries whose societies are susceptible to Bin Laden's jihadist appeal. Neither conditions of poverty and low quality of life nor perceptions of abasement and social injustice are direct causes of revolt. All these factors, however, cause shame, and shame is what the jihadists are keen on exploiting. The daunting thought is that the internal development aspect of the remedy will take decades to effect. *MR*

NOTES

1. See, for example, Paul Jackson, "Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda," in *Small Arms and Insurgencies* 15, 1 (Spring 2004): 19-37; Thomas M. McKenna and Barbara O. Metcalf, eds., *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Johnny Ryan, "Justifying Terror: Histories of Persecution in Islamist and Irish Republican Terrorist Campaigns" (Master's thesis, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2005), online at <www.geocities.com/x4401/w-terror.html>, accessed 27 September 2006.

2. Bard E. O'Neil, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, rev. ed. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 99-103.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], as amended through 8 August 2006).

4. Ibid.

5. Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, trans. David Howarth (London and New York: Verso, 2005).

6. A complete English version of Bin Laden's "Declaration of Jihad" is online at <www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html>, accessed 26 September 2006. For a complete English translation of "More Operations, Long-Term Truce," see Open Source Center, online at <www.fbis.gov/portal/server.pt>.

7. Arabic hadîth are nonrevelatory sayings by or about the Prophet Muhammad. The two cited are from the collections of Ibn Malik and Ibn Muslim, respectively. For context, see Bin Laden, *Messages*, 264.

8. For examples of many instances where Bin Laden uses these designations, see *Messages*, 17, 46.

9. Quran 89:11-14, as translated in Bin Laden, *Messages,* 247.

10. See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 124-26. For more information about Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's career, see Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî* (Berkeley: University of California, 1968 and 1983); Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997).

11. Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 90-96.

12. David Pryce-Jones, *The Closed Circle* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 34-35.

13. Joyce M. Davis provides many excellent native testimonials concerning the motive of erasing shame in *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

14. Bin Laden, *Messages*, 119.

15. Ibid., 263.

16. The "letter" from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, dated 9 July 2005, is online at <www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zacahiri-zar-

qawi-letter_9jul2005.htm>, accessed 26 September 2006.

17. Zarqawi's tract appeared on Internet Arabic message boards on 22 March 2005 and was edited and translated by Northeast Intelligence Network Strategic Arabic Translations. See online at <www.homlandsecurityus.com>.

18. Bin Laden clearly sets forth his first and second priority concerns in "Terror for Terror," in *Messages*, 127.

19. See Bin Laden, "To our Brothers in Pakistan," in *Messages*, 99-102, and comments on 143-44.

20. Bin Laden uses the term "axes" in *Messages,* 204.

21. Ibid., 121, 194.

22. For the classic Islamic doctrine of the caliphate, see Hourani, chapter 1. For early Islamic modernist thinking on the revival of the caliphate, see Ibid., 239-44, 273.

23. For commentary on and a synopsis of the "Seven Steps," see Yassin Mush-arbash, "What al-Qaida Really Wants," Spiegle Online, 12 August 2005, at <http://service.spiegel.de/cachye/international/0,1518, 369448,00.html>.

24. The journalistic "Seven Steps" text is certainly not an original source statement. I believe Zawahiri's letter is a forgery, albeit a good one, considering anomalies in its style and content. Certain words and phrases suggest an underlying Western mind-set, while allusions to the Taliban are quite inconsistent with Zawahiri's more recent "Obstacles to Jihad" (speech posted to Syrian Islamic Forum, 11 December 2005).

25. See Bin Laden, *Messages*, 69, 77, 86, 107-108.

26. Ibid., 150, 181-83.

27. Various Internet sources allude to doctrinal disagreements among jihad-ists. See, for example, the section on Isam al-Turabi's testimonies in "Bin Laden's Life in Sudan—Part One," excerpt from a Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation of the Arabic text of al-Quds al-Arabi, 24 November 2001, 13, online at <www.fpa.>; F. Gregory Gause III, "Saudi-U.S. Relations and the War on Terrorism" (address to Foreign Policy Association, New York, 17 October 2002), available from <www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=126331>, accessed 28 September 2006.

28. Bin Laden's scheme seems to fit the "leaderless resistance" model, which has emerged in the terrorism-analyst community. See Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 274-80. For another perspective on this phenomenon, see Sherifa D. Zuhur, *A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency* (Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, January 2006), online at <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=636>, accessed 28 September 2006.

29. Quran, Sûrat al-Isrâ', 22; my translation.

30. Bin Laden, *Messages*, 241-42.

31. Ibid., 101.

32. Ibid., 129, 143.

Attacking Insurgent Space:
Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army, Retired

The U.S. military campaign has disrupted the ease with which Al-Qaeda may operate in Afghanistan and probably will force Al-Qaeda to adapt and evolve in several ways. First, because of U.S. military action, Afghanistan has ceased to be a sanctuary of impunity for Al-Qaeda's senior leadership. Al-Qaeda has 'gone to ground'—hiding from the assault of superior training and weaponry. It now seeks alternative physical and political space to regroup and to reconstitute the infrastructure it lost in Afghanistan, which included training camps as well as its command, control, and communications.

—Michael Sheehan[1]

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DENYING INSURGENTS operating space attacks one of the triad of options in irregular warfare (the other two being time and will) that weaker actors employ to take on the strong. Porous borders and spaces for sanctuary, which provide operating space, can prolong an insurgency if the counterinsurgent ignores them or handles them insufficiently. In Afghanistan, while the security line of operation has been effective in enabling friendly social and political processes to proceed, the number one operational dilemma remains the enemy's ability to operate in "ungoverned space" throughout the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Area and portions of Baluchistan and to cross the border into Afghanistan whenever he chooses.[2] In Iraq, the issue is not so much the sanctuary afforded by Syria and Iran in the classic sense (providing insurgents safe areas for base camps, reconstitution, recruitment, and training), but porous borders that offer insurgents lines of communication, temporary escape, and transnational transit.

This article provides advice about how to attack insurgents in their sanctuaries. It also suggests measures for conducting effective border interdiction. For this study, insurgent sanctuary is defined as an area in a contiguous nation-state used by insurgents for basing and support (versus such in-country sanctuaries as urban areas, rugged terrain, and sympathetic populations). When insurgents enjoy sanctuary, they can become either a persistent irritant to counterinsurgents, or an operational-level problem.

Sanctuary Benefits

Conventional wisdom says that to win, insurgents must gain both internal and external support for their effort. While the target native population can provide a certain level of assistance, mostly intelligence and warning, immediate logistical needs, and temporary safe haven, insurgents face a real challenge if they are cut off from the normal amenities and access to safe venues in which they can rest, refit, and plan. Sanctuary gives the insurgent all that and more: it effectively allows him to neutralize the superior

Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction

Task Force Critical Tasks

- Observe sanctuaries and border LOCs
- Disrupt sanctuary/LOCs
- Locate, capture/kill insurgent leadership
- Gain situational awareness inside of sanctuary
- Reinforce IO/PSYOP
- Provide barrier & forces for border security operations
- Conduct diplomatic influence operations

Supporting Objective

Maintain Space and Information Superiority

Neutralize supporting populace

Disrupt leadership and C²

Destroy/neutralize arms resupply capabilities

Establish and maintain local ground maneuver superiority

Establish and maintain local border control

Defeat terror operations

Develop HN border security capability

Employ cross-border forces

Isolate and attrit insurgents

Initiate shaping of operational areas with ISR

Create "governed" space

Maintain regional and international support for COIN operations

Operational Effects

Insurgents restricted to limited area of operations

Neutralize effectiveness against friendly forces

Enemy does not have the logistical support to sustain effective fights

Does not penetrate border

Cannot reinforce ongoing operations

Insurgents incapable of influencing local populace

Create dissatisfaction among insurgents

Deny arms for insurgent military activity

Insurgent political party incapable of ideologically directing the populace

Phase Objectives

Deny guerrilla sanctuary forces maneuver

Neutralize or influence nations providing support

Destroy or neutralize infiltrating forces

Defeat insurgent protracted strategy

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technology, arms, and training of counterinsurgent forces.[3] At the same time, insurgent fighters can profit from the physical and moral support of the host-nation government and the local populace inside the sanctuary while their leaders conduct an active, unhindered public relations and information operations campaign to legitimize their cause and build support for it. Criminal activity in or near the sanctuary can also work to the insurgents' benefit. Insurgents can get financial and technological support from criminals in exchange for protection, or use smuggling routes as lines of communication.

Historically, insurgents who have obtained sources of supply and sanctuary and who have operated in favorably rugged terrain have been very difficult to defeat. Conversely, insurgents who did not enjoy sanctuary tended to fail, at least in the security line of operation.

Sanctuary Vulnerabilities

If the advantages of sanctuary and access to border transit are critical to the insurgency, then the sanctuary becomes a center of gravity to be attacked. Insurgents in sanctuary are inherently vulnerable because the government they establish within the sanctuary will automatically threaten their host's sovereignty. Other vulnerabilities include the support they need from the local populace, their sources of supply, and their base defense systems. Insurgents must conduct a fine balancing act to protect all of these vulnerabilities, but their challenge to the host government's authority could be their biggest problem.

In a sense, insurgents hand us a gift when they establish sanctuaries and base camps. Most insurgencies are fought on "human terrain," offering few instances when the counterinsurgent can actually find, fix, and fight the enemy. But when the enemy seeks sanctuary, engagement becomes possible. Once we have located and defined the sanctuary area, we can focus our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets on it and then, in at least some instances, our combat power. We would be negligent if we didn't force insurgents to earn

Insurgents in sanctuary are inherently vulnerable because the government they establish within the sanctuary will automatically threaten their host's sovereignty.

their pay when they congregated and surfaced. Of course, attacking them in their host-nation sanctuary will require synchronization of military and other government agencies' capabilities at the operational level and higher, to ensure that kinetic actions do not result in defeats in the international court of public opinion.

Insurgents can also be attacked physically when they attempt to enter and leave their sanctuary. They generally do not own their own air transport, so they must transit the sanctuary and contiguous border on foot, mounted on animals, or by a variety of automotive means. At some point, they must physically cross the line demarcating the border. With artful intelligence, we should be able to pinpoint where those lines of transit and crossing points are. This can be accomplished using a combination of human and electronic intelligence.

The third opportunity insurgent sanctuary offers lies on the friendly side of the border. Insurgents in transit require the same necessities as our own Soldiers—food, rest, medical support, supplies, access to logistical needs (transport, communications, and weapons), physical security—as they move from sanctuary back into their operational areas. Groups or locations offering these various kinds of support must communicate with one another, and when they do they provide an additional vulnerability for exploitation. Conducting a good intelligence preparation of the battlefield on friendly border areas can yield information on routes of transit, illegal activities flow, supportive populations, rest areas, and possible medical facilities, which can then be targeted or surveilled. Additionally, using such information, analysts can estimate just how far insurgents might travel in one- or two-day increments via their assorted transport modes. The possibility of interdiction can thus be heightened.

Offensive Actions

If insurgents have sanctuary, counterinsurgents must combine a myriad of techniques to win. They must use diplomacy to pressure governments hosting insurgents, conduct combined maneuver with cross-border host-nation security forces, emplace physical or virtual barriers, provide for support and integration of customs and border policing actions, and execute raids into insurgent safe havens. All of these things must be done within the architecture of an effects-based plan.

We continue to look for measures of effectiveness (MOE) in counterinsurgency. At the tactical level, this endeavor is fairly easy because counterinsurgents can quickly identify what works or does not work, and so measure their progress. But when we try to achieve operational-level effects, MOEs become a bit fuzzier, primarily due to many intangibles (for example, the protracted nature of an insurgency, or the human-terrain dimension). Sanctuary denial and border interdiction, though, are two cases of operational maneuver with which the counterinsurgent can seek an effect and hope to achieve measurable results. The means to solve operational-level problems should be effects-based; that is, they should involve getting the enemy to do your bidding while simultaneously attacking to prevent him from accomplishing his goals. We can keep insurgents from protracting the nature of the insurgency if they decide it costs them more to operate from sanctuary than it benefits them.[4]

Preparing the battlefield. Achieving the effect desired—denial, disruption, interdiction, influence—begins with a careful analysis of the physical nature of the sanctuary and border area. Technology is useful here, particularly 3D terrain-analysis tools combined with space products (to map foliage, hydrography, habitats, movement patterns, weather patterns). Such analysis can assess the terrain to identify likely areas of habitation and potential lines of communication. Overlaid on top of this product should be the lines of criminality and commerce. Finally, a demographic and cultural analysis can be added to complete the picture and determine where insurgents might hide and operate.

The next step is to introduce various ISR methods to confirm the analysis. Physical reconnaissance and emplacement of human or technological surveillance in suspected areas of operation are particularly effective

Physical barrier design for border interdiction.

Legend:
- ☐ Interdiction forces
- ⬟ Hedgehog fortifications
- ● Counter-mobility devices
- ✦ Sensors
- ▲ OPs (observation post)
- ·—·— Mobility

Interdiction Zone (cleared of populace)

SF

Barrier with sensor and counter-mobility fields front and rear

for assessing insurgents' actual use of identified areas of interest. Efforts to verify collection and analysis might include cross-border reconnaissance operations within the enemy sanctuary. One caveat seems necessary here: insurgents will always be more familiar with their sanctuary and lines of communication, so counterinsurgents must remain patient to gain a commensurate level of knowledge.

After conducting thorough analysis and identifying the tools at hand, the third step for the COIN strategist is to design a mini-campaign. A variety of methods exist to deny, disrupt, interdict, or influence, but a combination of options—a mosaic-like application of methods—will provide the synergy to attain the desired end-state.

Attack by the host. The best strategy to attack sanctuaries and porous borders is to get the host nation (which may be providing tacit support) to conduct operations and dry up support for insurgents in sanctuary areas. Diplomacy will likely be the means to pressure an otherwise uncooperative host into action. The host-nation security forces then conduct operations within the sanctuary while employing measures to control their borders. In both cases, indigenous operations are much preferred to those conducted by foreign forces, contracted security, or proxies.

Host-nation governmental measures are also needed to turn the ungoverned space that makes sanctuaries possible into governed space. At the same time, the host-nation government must get at the roots of the populace's active or passive support of insurgents by engaging with the network of local political, religious, tribal, or ethnic leaders. The host nation must also diminish, or provide alternatives to, the criminal enterprises within the sanctuary and problem border areas. Cleaning up these areas will pave the way for the introduction of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the area—and NGOs can be a significant factor in helping to reduce the negative conditions that make sanctuaries possible.

In its attempt to police sanctuary and border areas, the host government may even resort to its own form of unconventional warfare. Whatever the means adopted, counterinsurgents assist the effort by conducting complementary operations on the other side of the border; for example, they might move to interdict insurgents attempting to flee the besieged sanctuary.

Attack the sanctuary. The second measure to deny sanctuary requires physical operations in the insurgent base area with military, paramilitary, or fake guerrilla forces, all achieving the best effect when tailored hunter-killer teams are deployed. These typically long-range, long-duration operations depend greatly on intelligence and stealth. Again, using indigenous forces familiar with the terrain and area tends to lead to bigger payoffs. Rules of engagement need careful crafting for these strikes, to ensure there are mechanisms to govern "hot pursuit."

The French were particularly successful during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) with direct kinetic operations against insurgent *Armee de Liberation Nationale* (ALN) sanctuaries in Tunisia

and Morocco. They employed special tracking teams to hunt down ALN units in the sanctuary areas, and they specifically targeted enemy leadership there in an attempt to cut off the insurgents' head. By combining these operations with ruses (such as setting up fake guerrilla organizations to confuse the real guerrillas and even sow dissension among them) and by skillfully using traitors to lure insurgents, they destroyed the enemy where he lived.

During the Vietnam War, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Studies and Observation Group achieved similar successes. Small indigenous raider forces, ably led by special operations leaders, conducted a variety of missions in Laos and Cambodia to identify, disrupt, and destroy enemy infrastructure. These teams also emplaced sensors and acted as forward observers for air interdiction, thus enhancing their utility.

Attack the border. The third option for defeating an enemy using sanctuary is to interdict the border by emplacing a barrier system. This operation can yield the highest payoff of the three options. When combined with sensor technology and counter-mobility measures, barriers have always been effective against insurgents. Barriers should be backed up in depth with hedgehogs for fortifications, each garrisoned by reaction forces that intercept insurgents who somehow penetrate the barrier. The fortifications don't have to be continuous; they can be reinforced by flying checkpoints and aggressive patrolling.

The axiom that the counterinsurgent must be as mobile as, or more mobile than, the insurgent certainly applies in this operation. Ground mobility for reaction forces can be enhanced by building roads or trails throughout the interdiction-and-denial area. Air mobility—especially helicopters, but also short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft and long-loiter piston planes—can greatly assist the reaction forces too.

Another option in the barrier-fortification area is to employ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are becoming increasingly less expensive and more effective. UAVs can monitor open areas and detect insurgent breaches where counterinsurgent forces are stretched thin. There is a caveat about air assets, however: although air interdiction of sanctuary and border areas can contribute to achieving the effects desired, by itself it has not proven to be highly effective. Therefore, the counterinsurgent's best practice is to synchronize air with other assets.

In setting up and executing a border interdiction campaign, the counterinsurgent can increase his chances of success by enacting population control measures. Such tactics as clearing the population from zones along the border are perhaps extreme, but they can flush out the insurgents (by drying up the sea—the populace—in which they hide and swim) while permitting counterinsurgent forces to use combat power without fear of hitting noncombatants.

The French in Algeria. Two of the best barrier systems ever used to interdict insurgents were employed by the French in Algeria. Once it recognized that the ALN had set up sanctuaries (complete with barracks, training areas, and medical facilities) in Tunisia and Morocco, the French Army emplaced barriers, set up zones of interdiction, depopulated the zones, and deployed border maneuver forces to seal off the borders and interdict infiltrators.

The French built the Morice Line along the Tunisian border and the smaller Pedron Line along the Moroccan border. These *barrages* consisted of hundreds of miles of wire fences augmented with lights and minefields, with over 40,000 troops assigned to static posts near the barrier. Garrisoned in blockhouses and camps, these troops were backed up by roving patrols and mobile reaction forces. Naval radar technical units were also employed, to detect insurgents and to provide counter-mortar capabilities. All told, French interdiction efforts along the borders and the coast effectively shut down any infiltration by the insurgents and resulted in the isolation of over 30,000 ALN fighters.

Vietnam and McNamara's Line. Critics might point to the ineffective McNamara Line, built by then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara during the Vietnam War to stem North Vietnamese infiltration southward, as evidence that barriers or barrier systems are impractical. This criticism misses the mark, though. Like the Morice and Pedron Lines, the McNamara Line was characterized by physical measures (barriers, outposts, and reinforcing bases), but it was also supposed to have sensors as part of the barrier array. Due to manufacturing problems, the sensor portion of the barrier system was never emplaced, thus creating holes in the line's detection capability. Ultimately, the same technology was deployed around the Marine base at Khe

Sanh, where it proved to be extremely effective.[5]

Regular border policing. Good governance at the border by the friendly government will buttress counterinsurgent efforts to create an effective border-interdiction plan. One of the counterinsurgent's logical lines of operation is "legitimacy or the establishment of governmental institutions." Within this line, consideration must be given to financing and facilitating border security mechanisms (such as border patrols) and the associated customs activities all states employ as signs of their sovereignty. Early on, nation-builders must establish means to restrict the flow of human traffic and trade to key points along the border. Doing so will ultimately enhance the possibility of foiling criminal actions and interdicting insurgents. Technology at key locations can assist in the detection and removal of resources destined for transit deeper within the friendly country's borders. By covering dead space in the crossing area, roving border guards and patrols can deter insurgent efforts to merely bypass any checkpoints.

Tunnels. While all the measures described above are surface operations, care should also be given to detecting underground penetration via tunneling (as we have seen along the southern U.S. border and in the Demilitarized Zone between the Koreas). Finally, just as in the more purely military barrier-interdiction operation, a robust reaction force should be stationed within striking distance of border checkpoints and along suspected transit routes. With enhanced mobility, these forces could react quickly to situations that might overwhelm government border-security forces.

Recent border operations. A successful example of border operations occurred in Iraq in September 2005, when the Iraqi prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, sealed the northern border with Syria to prevent the infiltration of foreign fighters into his country. Mea-

The North Koreans have attempted to tunnel under the DMZ on several occasions so that they could send spies and saboteurs into South Korea. Their first tunnel was discovered in 1974, and several others have been discovered since.

sures taken by al-Jaafari's Interior Ministry included shutting down foot and vehicular traffic (although railway lines of commerce remained open), imposing a curfew in towns near the vicinity of the border post, and conducting combined cordon-and-search operations on the friendly side of the border to root out infiltrators. Predictably, Syria did not assist in these efforts. Had it done so, it would have contributed immensely to the operation's success.[6]

Concluding Thoughts

Allowing insurgents untrammeled use of sanctuary and the freedom to cross borders enables them to sustain and prolong their rebellion. Whether sanctuaries are permitted willingly or unwittingly by the host nation should not deter the counterinsurgent from attacking, either kinetically or along other security lines of operation. Counterinsurgents do not have to destroy the sanctuary; they can also succeed by disrupting or denying sanctuary and free border transit. When they do the latter, they can seize the initiative from the insurgent and dictate the tempo of combat.

The path to a successful counter-sanctuary campaign lies through the conduct of a well-planned effects-based offensive designed to achieve desired outcomes. Such a campaign must be executed with

tailored forces conducting parallel attacks in concert with other lines of operation. This multi-pronged approach will strip away the advantages the enemy gains by hiding behind another country's border; it can turn the sanctuary and the remote border area from a temporary resting spot for insurgents into a final one. In the end, the message is clear: to dry up the insurgency, dry up the sanctuary. *MR*

NOTES

1. Michael A. Sheehan, "Diplomacy," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy,* ed. Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 99.

2. The weakness Pakistan's government has shown in granting autonomy to tribes along the Afghan border has inadvertently created a lawless area, an "ungoverned space" ripe for insurgent sanctuary. Moreover, with a pre-Taliban-era insurgency still festering in Baluchistan, that area appears to be Al-Qaeda's and the Taliban's new base from which to conduct attacks into southern Afghanistan (see Tarique Niazi, "Baluchistan in the Shadow of al-Qaeda," *Terrorism Monitor* IV, 4 (23 February 2006): 3-5.

3. For good contemporary discussions of sanctuary, its benefits, the complications it poses counterinsurgents, and related issues, see Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare,* Chapter 4 ("The Environment") (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990); Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 2002); and Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency,* Chapter 17 ("Elements of a Counterinsurgent Strategy"), (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004).

4. Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., *Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998). Key readings on effects-based war and parallel attack can be found in Chapter 4, Colonel John A. Warden III's treatise on "Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century," and Chapter 5, Colonel Richard Szafranski's essay "Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness?"

5. Peter Brush, "The Story Behind the McNamara Line," *Vietnam Magazine* (February 1996): 18-24.

6. Jacob Silberberg, "Iraq seals Syrian border; Tall Afar sweep resumes," *Denver Post,* 11 September 2005, 2A.

Training Indigenous SECURITY FORCES at the Upper End of the Counterinsurgency Spectrum

Colonel John R. Martin, U.S. Army, Retired

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq...is a model for the future: helping others to help themselves is critical to winning the long war.

—Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006

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PHOTO: Iraqi Police perform a pass and review during a graduation ceremony in Numaniyah, 3 November 2006. (DOD)

THE "COUNTERINSURGENCY SPECTRUM" may be less of a linear phenomenon than a multifaceted matrix. In that matrix, various factors define the nature of the fight and the challenges facing those who seek to train indigenous security forces to battle the insurgents. The basis of the insurgency is one of the factors: a sectarian insurgency may be more intractable than one based on a particular ideology. An insurgency that limits itself to attacks on valid military targets should be fought differently from one that attacks the population indiscriminately. A low-level insurgency with some "acceptable" level of attacks requires a different approach from one which has advanced to the stage of civil war, where the insurgents are complemented by conventional forces operating from territory controlled by the insurgents, perhaps governed by their political arm. The job of training the host country's security forces is also affected by a variety of determinants. Those include whether sovereignty in the nation involved is being exercised by an indigenous government or by a U.S. or coalition element. The latter gives the occupying force more freedom of maneuver, but the former is key to legitimate governance, a key goal of any counterinsurgency. If the host nation is sovereign, the quality of the governance they provide also has an impact. The scale of the effort is another factor; what works in a small country like El Salvador might not work in a large one like Iraq. A large "occupying" force or international counterinsurgency effort is a factor that can facilitate success in training indigenous forces, but one that also clearly complicates the situation in the host country. There are certainly other factors, but the idea is that many things have an impact on training an army to combat insurgency. Trainers must be acutely aware of the challenges involved and be quick to adapt to changing situations.

By almost any measure, the war in Iraq, from 2003 to the present, must be considered as occupying the "high end" of any counterinsurgency and indigenous training model, so not all of the lessons of Iraq will apply across the spectrum of insurgent conflict. As with any "lessons of history," lessons from the Iraq example must be treated skeptically and applied judiciously, but the war and the training of Iraqi Security Forces present several valuable guidelines for success in that continuing fight and for any similar situations in future wars.

Pillars of Indigenous Security Force Training

Success in the training effort in Iraq, according to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, hinges on three pillars: training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces to standard, the use of transition teams to guide the development of leaders and staffs, and partnership between the U.S./coalition forces on the ground and the developing Iraqi forces.

Training and equipping to standard. "To standard" may be the operative term in this pillar of indigenous security force training. The standards for the training and equipping of an indigenous force must be developed by studying and adapting to the tactical and operational situations on the ground. In Iraq, organizing the Iraqi Security Forces was the first step in defining those standards. Initial plans called for three infantry divisions oriented on defending against external threats, complemented by various police forces (mostly in community stations) to maintain law and order within Iraq's borders. Because the coalition could provide combat support and other combat enablers, the original force design focused on combat organizations.

An enduring lesson from Iraq is that the U.S. and coalition forces must be flexible and adapt to changing situations. As the insurgency matured on the ground, the desired size of the Iraqi military grew and their focus went from external threats to counterinsurgency. While maintaining the Iraqi Army's ability to evolve into a more conventional military, the organizers of the Iraqi Army changed the organizational design from that of a force to defend Iraq's borders to one designed to work with the police and the coalition forces to eliminate a deadly insurgency. The organization of the police forces similarly matured, from the Western and peacetime notion of lightly armed forces operating in a benign environment to that of a more paramilitary organization. Individual police stations *enforcing* law and order remained the goal, but the evolving organization needed some larger units for *establishing* law and order in the most troubled regions of the country. The organization of the Iraqi Security Forces was adapted to the situation as the insurgency unfolded.

Once organizational design and size are determined, defining an ideal force seems fairly simple: that force would have the latest in weapons and technology, would be highly trained utilizing the best training methodologies found around the world, would be free of corruption and any tendency to violate human rights, and would be loyal to the central government. But just as organizations must adapt to tactical and operational imperatives, so must training and equipping. The most modern equipment was not the right equipment for the Iraqis. The new Iraqi Army, like the old one, was to be equipped with less modern Warsaw Pact equipment. Many of the Iraqis knew how to operate and maintain it. Their cash-strapped government had a better chance of being able to afford its acquisition, operation, and maintenance. (Acquisition was especially helped by the willingness of the newer NATO nations to donate the surfeit of Warsaw Pact equipment they had on hand.) For forces well trained in the modern military system, the Warsaw Pact equipment meets the equipment standard. A well-trained force facing a technologically superior force with a lesser level of training will very likely be able to achieve its goals or at least to thwart achievement of the enemy's goals.

Training also must adapt to the tactical situation. Approximately twenty weeks of basic police academy training are required in Pennsylvania before a rookie policeman is commissioned. That initial investment of time may then be followed by significant amounts of on-the-job training and mentoring by an experienced police officer/trainer. In the U.S. Army, basic military training is approximately eight weeks long, followed by advanced individual training that takes several more weeks. As with police forces, Soldiers are then released to units where more on-the-job training is accomplished. The "ideal" training regimen might be expected to follow these same models.

For the Iraqi Security Forces, many contend that the only way to teach professionalism and avoid corruption and human rights violations is to take the police and military forces out of the country for training in an unhurried environment that is conducive to instilling major cultural changes. Unfortunately, the enemy has a vote in this election. A longer training period means that fewer soldiers and police are put on the streets or on the nation's borders. The forces ultimately deployed would theoretically be better forces, but the Iraqi citizenry would have paid for this with longer exposure to

A scout attached to the 4th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, looks through binoculars at an improvised explosive device that he and other scouts discovered on a road in the Nasser Wa'Salaam area of Fallujah, 31 October 2006. Iraqi and coalition forces cordoned off the area while an explosive ordinance disposal team destroyed the device.

the ravages of a brutal insurgency. There must be a balance struck between fielding the ideal force and fielding one that lacks the ability to protect itself and the populace; consideration of that balance point must include the needs of the people. In Iraq, former policemen (and some military) received three weeks of police training and were sent to work in neighborhood police stations. Recruits with no previous police or military experience underwent eight weeks of training, still far less than that received by police in Western countries. As the forces were developed and fielded, the training lengthened and changed in response to the increased lethality of the insurgents and terrorists and tactical lessons learned. This evolutionary process must continue in any counterinsurgency effort.

Shortcomings in organizational design, equipment or training must be addressed eventually. In Iraq, the focus on combat units in the military became more evident as the coalition felt itself more and more burdened with the need to provide logistics, intelligence, fires, and other support. As a result, the indigenous training base started to focus on building combat enablers.

As an example of how those shortcomings were addressed with the police forces, the training evolved with the addition of two more weeks of training to ensure new police were familiar with the operating environment in their assigned region. This brought the total training required for police in Iraq to about half of what it takes in Pennsylvania, but that will continue to evolve. In 2005, preparations were underway to restart the Baghdad Police Academy with an initial course length of six months, ramping eventually to as much as three years for police officers. As it regained sovereignty, the government of Iraq started to be the driver for training, equipping and organizational design changes.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is frequently touted as a "solution" to the need to train foreign military leaders. This is especially true for those personnel from countries where exposure to U.S. processes and values is expected to produce leaders with better attitudes toward human rights violations, corruption, treatment of subordinates, etc. IMET is clearly a valuable program, but the size of the program is not sufficient to make major headway in developing leaders for a major military force. Other nations similarly offer out-of-country training, sometimes even promising the volume of training needed to make a significant difference. These offers must be evaluated in light of the cost to the indigenous forces. The bill is not one paid only in the nation's currency; the cost also includes the absence of quality personnel from the ongoing fight. Out-of-country training must be considered and employed where appropriate, but is often insufficient to train the significant numbers of personnel required in a short time and may be more expensive than the embattled country can afford.

Transition teams. In Vietnam, advisers to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) provided valuable services, but in many instances went beyond a purely advisory role and acted as "shadow commanders" of ARVN units. With Americans essentially commanding their units, ARVN officers and noncommissioned officers of all ranks were denied needed opportunities for development as leaders. In Iraq, the effort to avoid this pitfall started with the naming of the organizations that would provide the same advisory services.

Instead of adopting the "adviser" term—and the pejorative connotation from association with the failures of Vietnam—those organizations were called transition teams and were meant to focus

on development of leaders and staffs at battalion, brigade and division levels. A training program for indigenous security forces can have solid curricula, sufficient training facilities, and capable trainers, but still seem disjointed to the unit being trained. Transition teams help to overcome this by performing an integration and continuity function, starting with the indigenous force in the training base and continuing with them even after they become operational. Once the indigenous unit becomes operational, the transition team members should accompany them at times on operations to see the results of their training and mentoring efforts and to establish or maintain credibility with the indigenous forces. However, transition team members should remain focused on staff and leader development, not oversight of operations.

Recognizing the complexity and challenges of training security forces while simultaneously engaged in combat and understanding that successful training of the indigenous security force is key to counterinsurgency victory, the military should assign the best personnel available to the transition teams. One of the lessons of Vietnam is that the best people weren't always assigned to the advisory teams; the development of the ARVN suffered as a result. If, as in the case of Iraq, transition becomes the main effort, the Army should assign its best qualified personnel to the transition teams, making even TOE assignments a lower priority. Because of the increased amount of time they have available for training, the best team members generally would be active duty personnel, including personnel in the training base in the United States. Reserve Component personnel can backfill these personnel in active units (even if deployed) and in the training base and other positions. Conversely, the best personnel for a police training mission may be found in the Reserve Component, where some law enforcement personnel serve as citizen-Soldiers. Unless they are assigned to Military Police units, this may cause them to be diverted from the unit with which they had been assigned. The adverse impact of this action must be considered before "cherry picking" Soldiers who have law enforcement experience for transition teams.

Any personnel assigned to transition teams will need supplemental training, which becomes especially important if the highest quality Soldiers are not assigned to the transition task. To the maximum extent possible, this should be done in specialized pre-deployment training. Some training may be best conducted in the host country, but limitations on deployment lengths mean that training done in-country decreases the time spent with the indigenous forces.

A common misconception is that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the best forces for conducting indigenous security force training. SOF are especially talented at the mission of foreign internal defense when the host military and police need only limited training to accomplish their counterinsurgency mission. In a country the size of Iraq, with military and police forces being completely rebuilt, the limited numbers of SOF suggest that significant augmentation by conventional forces is required. Conventional forces may also be better suited for training other conventional forces, perhaps allowing the SOF to focus on training the host country's elite nonconventional forces.

Some analogy can be drawn between SOF and Military Police (MP). There is a tendency to draw on the MPs to conduct training of indigenous police forces. They offer a valuable asset in police training, but the skills required of Military Police are not exactly the same as those required for civilian police forces. As with SOF, there are also not enough MP units to train the civilian police forces in a country as large as Iraq. Civilian police make excellent indigenous police trainers and can contribute significantly to the overall effort. Such police forces may be available through the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), although these personnel have a significant price tag and security considerations often limit their employment. Military leaders of indigenous security force training efforts must plan to incorporate civilian police trainers and overcome the inherent challenges of employing civilians on the battlefield.

Planning for transition team employment must consider replacements. Because of their proximity to operating indigenous forces, transition teams will regularly suffer casualties. The size of the transition team will be determined by its mission and force protection guidelines, but few teams will be large enough to absorb casualties without adverse impact on the team's ability to move about the battlefield and accomplish its mission. Replacements must be considered holistically: personnel casualties are usually accompanied

by equipment losses. Individual equipment will come with the personnel replacements, but an operational readiness float must also be immediately responsive to the need to replace vehicles, weapons, and other specialized equipment. Replacements must be made quickly; each day lost in training or in operations requires a corresponding correction later.

Partnership. Because of the small size of transition teams and their limited reach and focus, their efforts must be complemented by partnership of the indigenous unit with the U.S. or coalition forces operating in the country. If oversight of operations is needed, the U.S./coalition forces should have the manpower to perform that task at all levels, from squad/team to division. Making partnership with indigenous forces a specified mission for the multinational operating forces ensures that some degree of ownership is felt; without that ownership, multinational forces may focus instead on accomplishing missions themselves, rather than figuring out how to incorporate and develop indigenous forces.

Coalition partners will almost always be involved as transition team members and as operating forces. Capability limitations, as well as various national imperatives, can be expected to affect how well the coalition units partner with the indigenous forces. Some will be more concerned about force protection or addressing national interests than in achieving the desires of the multinational command, either for training or for operations. For that matter, capability —or leadership—limitations of some U.S. forces will also adversely affect how they work with their indigenous partners. The multinational training and operations commands must monitor the efforts of subordinate units and ensure effective and coherent partnership.

The partnership effort also complements the transition teams in mentoring and advising indigenous leaders. After indigenous units graduate from the training base, transfer of the transition teams to the command of the operating forces helps to ensure that the adviser/mentor roles are coordinated.

Moving Ahead: Two More Pillars

As the advisory mission evolves and the indigenous forces grow in strength, force development efforts can move on to other important objectives: developing infrastructure and indigenous leadership.

Civilian infrastructure development. When the first few indigenous forces are fielded, the need for a civilian infrastructure to support them is not always evident since the multinational force takes care of the soldiers and police. As more and more indigenous forces take the field, the need grows exponentially for the host nation to provide that support. This support includes contracting guidance, promotion regulations, life support for deployed forces, equipment acquisition, and development of maintenance systems. Development of the civilian force sustainment infrastructure, both military processes for broad force sustainment and governmental organizations to establish policies, is a task probably best accomplished by civilian organizations from the various nations contributing to the multinational force. Use of civilian agencies to accomplish this task sets a good example of civilian control of the military, but many civilian agencies —in the U.S. and elsewhere—are not resourced for the mission. In addition, many of them have an organizational culture that can impede the agencies' ability to provide the "nuts and bolts" development of the civilian infrastructure. Adequate resources and unity of effort in civilian infrastructure development are critical. If U.S. and other civilian agencies are not effective, those are probably best provided by assigning that mission to the multinational training force. This ensures unity of effort through unity of command. This has limitations: developing the civilian infrastructure for the military and police forces is probably at the limit. Taking the lead in developing the civilian infrastructure for administration of justice, penitentiary, financial, and other complementary security capabilities will be tempting, but must be passed to civilian agencies from the United States, such as the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, or other coalition governments. Contractor support to this effort may be the best way to accomplish the mission when personnel resources of civilian agencies are not adequate for the task.

Key in developing civilian infrastructure and training indigenous police and military forces is indigenous leadership. Early in an operation, coalition leaders may have direct control of leader selection; this control is quickly lost as the host nation regains sovereignty or asserts its own independence in such decisions. Cultural considerations may override what appear to be logical choices for leaders at various levels of police and military command.

Iraqi soldiers of the 4th Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, patrol Camp India, 31 October 2006, in one of the new Humvees. The vehicles were added to the unit's fleet to provide better protection for soldiers on missions.

While continuing to emphasize selection of the best person for leadership roles, multinational leaders must also hedge against selection of poor leaders because of tribal or other influences. One of the best ways to do this is through staff development, one of the key tasks of the transition teams. A mediocre commander, backed by a competent staff, can still produce a capable police or military unit.

Another hedge against selection of poor leaders is leader training and education. The multinational training command must plan for officer training from precommissioning and junior officer tactical training to operational training and education for mid-grade officers and through some "capstone" level for the higher operational and strategic leadership.

A similar comprehensive training and education program should be developed for noncommissioned officers. Whether it is in Iraq or one of the former Warsaw Pact countries, challenged militaries frequently do not have the professional NCO corps that traditional Western countries possess. This is even more important in the modern military system, which hinges on junior leaders executing independently in accordance with the commander's intent. The importance of capable junior leadership increases significantly in a counterinsurgency, where independent action is critical. In addition to schoolhouse training and education, indigenous NCOs—and their officer leaders— should be exposed as often as possible to their U.S. partner-unit NCOs performing their daily duties with their typical professionalism.

Imitation of U.S. NCOs will significantly improve the performance of indigenous NCOs; their officer leaders should also see from the U.S. example the value of having their own professional NCO corps. However, the cultural impediments to development of NCOs are significant. Many countries—Iraq, in particular—have cultures in which capable junior leaders are viewed as a *coup d'etat* threat.

Final Considerations

Below are additional considerations for training indigenous forces.

"Get after it!" Don't study the situation to death; get on with development of military and police forces. Although police forces represent a somewhat greater challenge, the basic outline of the indigenous military forces can be divined very quickly. Even very junior officers understand the basic outline of a military force; they can use the doctrinal battlefield operating systems to make a rapid assessment that is "about right." Delaying for more detailed assessments may eliminate some inefficiencies, but is seldom worth the time. The initial assessment should be buttressed with more thorough analysis as time permits. Adjustments should then be made, but initial steps taken after even perfunctory analysis will seldom require wholesale change. The tendency to synchronize every step of the effort must be avoided. Synchronization suggests some kind of smoothly operating machinery. Development of indigenous security forces from scratch in an active insurgency environment is more about overcoming fog and friction than about avoiding waste through perfect synchronization.

Interagency. Multinational operators and trainers must demand robust interagency participation in the training effort. This is particularly important in the realms of the police and the civilian infrastructure. Coalition partners should be asked to make "coalition interagency" contributions. Some partners will have more experience than U.S. forces with the type of police or military forces being developed. For example, the U.S. does not have a national police force, which is the norm in many countries.

Multinational operators and trainers must also hedge against not having robust interagency participation. Many tasks that would be better performed by other government agencies will have to be done by the military. Where possible, the interagency

contribution should be used to the maximum extent possible. To paraphrase T.E. Lawrence, it may be better for the interagency to do something tolerably than for the military to do it perfectly.

Resources. As in fighting the insurgency, money is ammunition for the training effort. Adequate funding needs to be readily available early. Funding should not have borders around it; commanders should be able to apply it where needed. Flexibility in contracting for projects is also critical. The commander needs to have the flexibility to contract with the agency that is best able to meet the command's requirements regarding cost, quality, and timing.

Metrics. Measures of effectiveness will be required in any effort. Selection of the appropriate metrics is key. Too often, measurements that are easy to take are mistaken for measurements that are needed. For example, counting the numbers of soldiers equipped or battalions fielded is fairly easy and reasonably accurate, but may be of little value. Measuring the training level of fielded units is significantly harder, but immeasurably more informative. Even harder is measuring the loyalty of indigenous forces in a sectarian society. In assessing a nugget of coprolite, measurements of its size, the smoothness, of its texture, and the shine on its surface are fairly easy, but don't address the inherent value of the coprolite. In the end, the shine, smoothness, and quantity simply distract from the fact that the coprolite is nothing more than fossilized dinosaur dung. Some of the easy-to-measure metrics are important, but assessing progress in developing indigenous security forces far more often requires difficult and subjective analysis.

Flexibility. There are no universal answers about how to train indigenous security forces while fighting insurgents. Be prepared to adapt the pillars described herein based on the tactical situation, the culture, and direction from the host-country government. Adaptability is the key. *MR*

Coalition Interoperability: ABCA's New Focus

**General Richard A. Cody, U.S. Army, and
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis,
U.S. Army, Retired**

THE U.S. ARMY is simultaneously transforming and fighting the Global War on Terrorism alongside foreign partners who are also transforming and aggressively working to advance battlefield interoperability. One of the best venues for that important work is the re-energized 60-year-old umbrella organization known as the ABCA Armies' Program—America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and most recently New Zealand, which became a member in 2006. Although not a formal alliance, ABCA has become an interoperability standard-bearer focused on the challenges associated with our current operating environment.

Professional Army leaders need to understand ABCA, its rich history, its transformation, and what it is doing to enhance global coalition readiness.

History

ABCA evolved from a World War II coalition, a security relationship between the United States and her Anglo-Saxon allies based on a common culture, historical experience, and language.[1] The ABCA Armies' Program was seeded in 1946 when British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery recommended to U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower that America, Britain, and Canada should "cooperate closely in all defense matters." Added Montgomery, "Discussions should deal not only with standardization, but should cover the whole field of cooperation and combined action in the event of war."[2] Later that year, the British Government concluded that these three countries should consider the feasibility of standardizing the weapons, tactics, and training of their armed forces.[3]

The 1947 "Plan to Effect Standardization" agreement led to ABCA's standardization program among the American, British, and Canadian armies. Its aim was to remove doctrinal and materiel obstacles to complete cooperation.[4]

The 1954 and 1964 Basic Standardization Agreements replaced the 1947 Plan. The 1964 Agreement remains in effect today; however, a new memorandum of

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ABCA'S VISION

The ABCA Program will achieve the effective integration of the capabilities necessary to enable ABCA Armies to conduct the full spectrum of coalition land operations successfully in a Joint environment, now and into the future.

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understanding to improve cooperation and program effectiveness is expected to be finalized by 2007.

The 1964 Agreement states that the program's aim is to "ensure the fullest cooperation and collaboration" and "to achieve the highest possible degree of interoperability among the signatory armies through materiel and non-materiel standardization."[5]

Not surprisingly, given the peculiar nature of multinational arrangements, standardization and interoperability have been hit-and-miss among the ABCA armies. Historically, the program's success was measured by the production of cold war-era tactical standards and pamphlets and hosted seminars or exercises.

ABCA Transforms

In June 2002, the ABCA Executive Council—composed of four-star-level generals—concluded that the new conditions and circumstances of our rapidly changing strategic and operational environments had outstripped the program's culture, structure, procedures, and practices. It was time to revitalize the organization and respond to new global security requirements.

A special working party identified four distinct phases of work: strategic assessment; vision, mission, and enduring goals; prioritization of efforts; and business practices. The group examined the international security environment and concluded that "the extensive range of threats requires ABCA armies to address those areas where it can achieve significant advances in interoperability . . . rather than allocating scarce resources to an expansive range of areas that may only achieve minimal outcomes."[6]

Focusing the program's limited resources on a smaller universe of advances in interoperability gave direction to the team's work on a new vision, mission, and goals. The new vision statement is much shorter than the old one. It focuses like a laser on the effective integration of the armies' capabilities in a joint environment. The new mission seeks to optimize interoperability through collaboration and standardization. The goals are ambitious: relevance and responsiveness; standardization, integration and interoperability; mutual understanding; sharing knowledge; and efficiency and effectiveness.

ABCA's new goal to be relevant and responsive was tested in late 2002, when the organization became an integral and critical part of coalition war

Signaller Allister Scott from the 1st Combat Support Regiment, Darwin, Australia, and PFC Kyle Summers from the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Richardson, Alaska, provide support to a combined night parachute jump by Australian and U.S. Forces as part of exercise Talisman Sabre 2005.

planning. ABCA assembled a cadre of urban operations experts to draft coalition procedures before the coalition's armies entered combat in Iraq. These procedures became a chapter in ABCA's *Coalition Operations Handbook.*[7] The handbook has proven to be a valuable document. In addition to urban operations, it addresses such topics as forming effective coalitions, logistics, communications, and full-spectrum operations. In 2004, NATO used the handbook as the base document to produce the *NATO Handbook for Coalition Operations.*[8] The U.S. Army's Battle Command Training Program has used the ABCA handbook for mission-rehearsal exercises to prepare units for deployments to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The special working party took its cue from the narrowed mission and vision to define the program's new priority efforts as well. The new priorities include the contemporary operating environment and emerging threats, transformation and modernization, joint

interagency multinational operations, capability integration, knowledge exploitation, and ABCA products. These priorities support the U.S. Army's transformation strategy, focus on the war on terrorism, and recognize that closing capability gaps among coalition members will provide armies needed punch.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), ABCA partners caught a glimpse of just how challenging capability gaps could be. British and American forces were interoperable to some extent because of shared procedural measures, the use of liaison officers, and doctrinal compatibility, but they didn't come close to satisfying requirements for interoperability called for by U.S. joint regulations.

ABCA's most visible program changes were in its business practices: prioritizing resources across identified interoperability gaps, particularly for combat operating systems. A futures concepts capability group worked with member armies to identify gaps. Other capability groups, formed around battlefield operating systems, produced solutions to close those gaps.

ABCA officers worked closely with forward-thinking transformers from the U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan's Objective Force Task Force to brainstorm and exchange ideas from the embryonic concept development stage through experimentation, doctrine, and equipment fielding stages. This was a significant effort that enhanced interoperability to depths and degrees never seen before.

In 2003, ABCA leaders reviewed the results of the yearlong program assessment and approved a series of radical changes focused on closing interoperability gaps among the member armies.

More ABCA Contributions

Today, the revitalized ABCA is active on many important fronts. The new program's first annual meeting took place in July 2004 at the National Defense University. Annual meetings have been guided by strategic guidance issued by the Executive Council, which stands up project teams to tackle tough, combat-relevant coalition interoperability challenges. These teams are closely supervised by capability groups of subject-matter experts from the member armies.

ABCA's 2006 Strategic Guidance focuses on a range of critical stability operations tasks with an emphasis on the production of reports based on recent coalition battlefield lessons. Member armies take these reports to their appropriate commands for inclusion in doctrine, training, and standing operating procedures.

In April 2006, ABCA's national directors (one-star-level leaders from each member army) concluded that ABCA can no longer limit its valuable interoperability work to its five member nations. They directed the capability group leaders (of the command, act, sense, sustain, and shield domains) to produce battlefield-appropriate, universally applicable interoperability solutions that apply to all potential coalition partners and include the wide variety of missions required for the long war on terror.

ABCA's new way of doing business led to the creation of a Coalition Lessons Analysis Workshop (CLAW) to gather, collate, and analyze observations from current operations and exercises and to produce an annual report to inform the program directors and to support interoperability gap analyses. In addition, ABCA's CLAW seeks to identify best practices and then pass them to the nations to

complement other findings. These products, which are closely monitored by the Department of the Army and the Training and Doctrine Command's Center for Army Lessons Learned, play a critical role for the revitalized program by validating its necessity.

To help prepare America's leaders for the ongoing coalition battlefield, the U.S. Army is working hard to incorporate ABCA products into its doctrine and to push ABCA products into its curricula and unit SOPs. Indeed, ABCA has already had an impact:

● As aforementioned, the U.S. Battle Command Training Program is using ABCA's *Coalition Operations Handbook* for mission-rehearsal exercises.

● U.S. Army Field Manual 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations,* acknowledges that "much of the information in this manual is based on the ABCA *Coalition Operations Handbook*."

● The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College uses the handbook as part of its elective course curricula.

ABCA is very much a joint forces player. For years, U.S. Marines have participated in ABCA meetings, but in 2004, the Marine Corps' assistant commandant became an official member of the Executive Council, and now Marine experts are active with ABCA capability groups.

Finally, ABCA hosts biennial exercises, with each army sharing the responsibility in turn. In the past, the purpose of the exercises was to validate ABCA standardization agreements, to identify areas for future standardization efforts, and to facilitate information exchange. In recognition of the new focus on interoperability and realistic operations, the program's national directors are considering designing an ABCA exercise hosted by the U.S. Army at one of the combat training centers. Using stressful combined arms training that approximates actual combat and reflects realistic future coalition scenarios, this ABCA-CTC "boots on the ground" event will look closely at interoperability.

Prior to the war on terrorism, ABCA exercises were especially helpful in preparing for real operations. For example, the 1998 ABCA exercise Rainbow Serpent was a dress rehearsal for a later, actual operation in East Timor, Indonesia. A brigade-level command post exercise involving an Australian deployable joint-force headquarters, Rainbow

> ## ABCA and Law of War
>
> *ABCA's legal information team, which provides a forum to examine legal factors in military planning that may impinge on both coalition operations and interoperability, helps the partners to examine complex rules of engagement, law of war, host-nation issues, and much more.*

Serpent '98 focused on peace support operations and operations other than war in a fictitious Pacific island. It resolved many interoperability issues. When the East Timor operation became a reality in 1999, the ABCA armies quickly responded. The United States provided logistic and intelligence support, and Australia, augmented by a New Zealand battalion, a Canadian company, and a British battalion with a Gurkha company, provided the bulk of the land forces.

The Bottom Line

ABCA has come a long way from 1946, when Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower created the program. Today, a revitalized ABCA addresses the post-9/11 security environment by providing relevant interoperability solutions to ensure the free world's ground forces meet their many important combat-related challenges. The U.S. Army understands the need to fight alongside our allies. It is aggressively working through programs such as ABCA to build interoperability with our coalition partners. *MR*

NOTES

1. After World War II, ABCA allies established peacetime security arrangements with the United States. Canada and the United States established the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. Australia and New Zealand joined the United States in the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty in 1951. The 1954 Manila Treaty established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which includes these partners as well.
2. Cited in Thomas-Durell Young, "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1991): 282.
3. Edward C. Ezell, "Cracks in the Post-War Anglo-American Alliance: The Great Rifle Controversy, 1947-1957," *Military Affairs* (December 1974): 138-139, as cited by Thomas-Durell Young in *Supporting Future U.S. Alliance Strategy: The Anglo-Saxon, or ABCA Clue* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 June 1990), 7.
4. Ibid, 8. The other ABCA programs are the Air and Space Interoperability Council, the ABCA Navies Quadripartite Standardization Program, the AUSCANNZUKUS Naval Communications Organization, the Combined Exercise Agreement, the Combined Communications Electronics Board, and the Technical Cooperation Committee.
5. ABCA, "Basic Standardization Agreement among the Armies of United States-United Kingdom-Canada-Australia," 1 October 1964.
6. Special Working Group Program Review, "A Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment," 2 May 2003, C-21.
7. *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, The American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies Program Primary Standardization Office (Arlington, VA).
8. *NATO Handbook for Coalition Operations,* no other information available.

TRANSFORMING ARMY INTELLIGENCE

Lieutenant General John F. Kimmons, U.S. Army

T HE U.S. ARMED FORCES face a changed paradigm of warfare. Ongoing counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reflect the tough challenges inherent in countering savage, extremist enemies in highly complex environments. We are fighting smart, adaptive, ruthless opponents who leverage globalization, employ asymmetric tactics, and conduct deliberately brutal, indiscriminate attacks on an unprecedented scale.

As part of the Army's efforts to increase full-spectrum operational capacity at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, Army intelligence is transforming its organization, training, and techniques to provide fused, all-source, "actionable" intelligence along tactically useful timelines to Soldiers and commanders. Four components are key to this transformation:

- Increasing military intelligence (MI) capacity and skills balance.
- Enabling distributed access to an all-source, flat, integrated network.
- Revitalizing Army human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Increasing intelligence readiness.

Increasing MI Capacity and Skills Balance

The complex, dynamic nature of warfare today makes it essential that BCTs have the ability to collect intelligence on all aspects of their environment. Each BCT and subordinate battalion must be able to rapidly detect and positively identify, track, and target enemy activities with minimal assistance from higher-level intelligence centers. Even more important, to understand norms, changes, linkages, and significance in near-real time, each BCT and battalion intelligence section must be able to rapidly fuse and visualize *all* sources of information, regardless of classification, on common geospatial displays.

The 1990s-era MI structure and skills mix at brigade and battalion levels are inadequate for today's demands, a shortfall painfully highlighted by wartime experiences since the 9/11 attacks. Aggressive efforts are now underway to significantly increase the number of MI collectors, intelligence synchronizers, and analysts at brigade and battalion levels. Maneuver battalion S2 (intelligence) sections have increased from 4 to 9 people; BCT S2 sections have more than doubled, from an average of 8 MI Soldiers in a BCT S2 section in 2001 to 21 Soldiers today; and there will be an additional increase, to almost 40 people, by 2011. Each transformed BCT has an assigned MI company with organic HUMINT, unmanned aerial vehicle, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and analysis platoons.

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Even with these enhancements, wartime experience suggests that BCTs also require additional *downward* reinforcing intelligence support in highly demanding settings like Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, additional intelligence capabilities are required to work white-space regions, boundary areas, borders, and seams beyond the limits of BCT areas of responsibility. To accomplish these tasks, the Army is forming from 8 to 10 MI collection battalions heavily weighted with HUMINT source-handler and inter-rogator capabilities as well as advanced SIGINT collection and site exploitation teams well suited to combat in complex terrain. These purpose-built MI battalions form the core of new, multifunctional battlefield surveillance brigades (BfSB) designed for enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in both conventional and irregular environments.

A Human Intelligence Team member from the 311th MI Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, contacts Iraqi civilians.

The Army is concurrently building four Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center battalions to provide robust, expert interrogation capability at theater and/or joint task force levels in close coordination with military police detention forces. By 2013, the Army will add over 7,000 MI Soldiers to its ranks. More than 90 percent of that growth will be aligned with enhanced tactical collection and analysis. Army HUMINT capacity will increase more than any other intelligence discipline and will more than double in strength. Ongoing intelligence transformation will produce a better balanced, more capable, more modular MI force to meet the heavy demands facing Army and joint forces.

Flat-Network Access

Increasing the number of MI Soldiers is necessary, but it will be insufficient unless the Army concurrently connects them to the full power of modern data networks and gives them the training and software tools to mine and manipulate large volumes of data along tactically useful timelines. Today's complex environments make it essential

that MI Soldiers and combat leaders understand frequently ambiguous intelligence reporting within the context of "all there is to know" about places, things, and related events–the complete "memory" of all that is knowable as a function of past reporting from any source.

To be effective on today's complex battlefields, MI Soldiers must be able to rapidly access and search large data holdings and visualize the results on operationally relevant imagery and geospatial products for rapid problem-solving. Relevant context for analysis includes information reported by intelligence, tactical, and other sources regardless of classification or originator. Seeing bits and pieces of data within a rich, layered context, aided by widely available advanced software tools, enables analysts to recognize otherwise hidden linkages and relationships. All of this converges on the ground to trigger action to confirm or deny leads and generate actionable intelligence—the provision of a high level of shared situational understanding—delivered with the speed, accuracy, and timeliness necessary for commanders and Soldiers to operate at their highest potential and conduct successful operations.

Army military intelligence is aggressively working to field these flat-network capabilities down to battalion level via the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) program, which is integrated with Army G3 battle command initiatives to provide a common operating picture for commanders. The program builds on the pioneering

data-fusion work the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has accomplished since 2001, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)]-sponsored experiments conducted in South Korea since 2002, and USD(I)-supported efforts to employ proven flat-network analysis capabilities on a distributed basis in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dubbed the "Joint Intelligence Operations Capability-Iraq (JIOC-I)," the program was formally transitioned into the DCGS-A program of record in June 2006. Wartime supplemental funding has enabled fielding of DCGS-A capabilities to units in Iraq and Afghanistan 2 years earlier than would otherwise have been possible. The results have been powerful. DCGS-A remains a top Army intelligence transformation priority and is a forcing function for the key net-centric sharing and software tool solutions necessary for success in today's complex operational domains. DCGS-A solutions also thread directly into enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities embedded in the Army's Future Combat System.

HUMINT Revitalization

Close access HUMINT collection (military source operations, interrogation, and counterintelligence) provides critical capabilities needed for successful operations, particularly at the BCT level and below, where recurring interface with the local population and other sources generates information leads, threat warnings, and environmental understanding not available through any other means. HUMINT collection is a nonnegotiable ingredient for effective CT and COIN operations.

Wartime lessons learned confirm the pressing need for an increased HUMINT capacity. Action is well underway to establish HUMINT platoons in every MI company at the BCT level, and two robust HUMINT companies are being incorporated into every BfSB MI battalion, providing an unprecedented level of tactical HUMINT capability.

Legend: C & E, Collection & Exploitation; IEW, Intelligence Electronic Warfare; HCT, HUMINT Collection Team; MSG CNT, Multi-sensor ground control; OMT, Operational Management Team; TECH, Technical Collection.

Proposed structure of MI Bn (BfSB)

Experienced HUMINT planning and management sections (S2X) have been added at BCT and division levels. HUMINT training is also being expanded and strengthened through collaboration between the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAIC) and the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) Defense HUMINT Management Office (DHMO). DHMO leaders are establishing joint HUMINT training standards for military-source operations and interrogation training courses, and a Joint HUMINT Training Center of Excellence is being established at the USAIC complex at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Intelligence Readiness

Concurrent efforts are also underway to increase intelligence readiness and effectiveness across Army forces. Part of this derives from better, more comprehensive preparation for military operations within complex cultural environments; a key corollary piece relates to changing the way Soldiers think about intelligence and their role in generating intelligence. No mechanical collection device will ever match the observation and reasoning power of a trained Soldier: with a unique ability to recognize and report useful information gained from close access into otherwise denied areas, he is the ultimate sensor.

The Army is making a concerted effort to better prepare Soldiers for their roles and to capitalize on the results. Four ongoing programs are key to this effort: the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) program, cultural-awareness training, language training, and the INSCOM "foundry" program.

ES2 program. The ES2 program encompasses a range of training initiatives designed to inculcate tactical curiosity in Soldiers at all levels across the force and drive significantly enhanced reporting about the environment, baseline norms, changes, personalities, relationships, and other tactically relevant information key to achieving the situational understanding so important in warfare against adaptive enemies. Observing and noting day-to-day routines and understanding why things change; understanding the role people play within their villages and tribes; and knowing how goods, resources, and services are provided and who controls them are critical pieces that provide rich context for understanding (often ambiguous) intelligence reporting.

ES2 training modules begin at the basic-entry level and are reinforced by memory reinforcement exercises integrated into normal training. An ES2 computer simulation using contemporary tactical settings reinforces ES2 observation and reporting skills at the individual Soldier level. The Every Soldier is a Sensor Simulation (ES3) pilot program is now in operation at the Army's largest entry-level training center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and it shows promising results.[1] More advanced training blocks are being incorporated into noncommissioned officer and officer training courses and reinforced in evaluated collective unit training at Army combined training centers. The doctrinal framework for ES2 is being integrated into key tactical operations and intelligence training manuals.

Cultural-awareness training. Cultural-awareness training complements ES2 by helping Soldiers understand the complex, interwoven dynamics of foreign societies, religions, and regions. USAIC builds and exports cultural awareness training packages to all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schools and provides specially trained cultural awareness mobile training teams to help forces prepare for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. USAIC also manages the wartime employment of specially recruited and trained foreign-born translator-aide Soldiers to embed a trusted source of cultural expertise into committed forces.[2]

Language training. Language training, which relates directly to cultural savvy and understanding, is receiving unprecedented emphasis. The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California, aggressively supports commanders preparing for deployment and enhances USAIC cultural awareness efforts through mobile training team language instruction, video teletraining sessions, and expanded formal linguist training tailored for wartime needs. Army Forces Command supplements DLIFLC training through the use of native contract instructors at home station as well.

The INSCOM foundry program. The INSCOM foundry program provides tactical intelligence units with one-stop shopping assistance for advanced skills training beyond those the USAIC provides or what is normally available to units in garrison. With intelligence brigades located in every theater, and in close partnership with the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, DIA, and others, INSCOM is uniquely suited to integrate live-environment and specialized certifications into busy predeployment preparation schedules. This highly successful program, formally initiated in early 2006, continues to provide responsive support to the warfighter.

Focus on the Soldier

The Army is blessed with the finest Soldiers America has ever produced. We owe them the best possible tools, the most complete information available, and our dedicated, relentless support as they execute tough wartime and contingency missions worldwide. Army military intelligence, as part of the joint intelligence team, is taking aggressive action to meet these challenges. The intelligence programs and initiatives outlined here constitute the heart of the Army Intelligence Campaign Plan and Army MI transformation. Significantly enhanced situational awareness by commanders and actionable intelligence available along tactically useful timelines are the objectives and principal measures of merit. Army intelligence continues to push the envelope in close collaboration with joint, USD(I), and national partners. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Soldiers can access ES3 worldwide via the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website, <www.army.mil/ako/>.

2. The Army's newly created military occupational specialty, 09L, is used to recruit and train foreign-born Soldiers to act as translator-aides who can provide language proficiency and help enhance cultural awareness.

Avoiding the Cookie-Cutter Approach to Culture:

Lessons Learned from Operations in EAST AFRICA

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PHOTO: A goat herder tends his flock near Tadjoura, Djibouti. (Lieutenant Colonel O. Shawn Cupp, U.S. Army, Retired)

S EVERAL YEARS AGO, a group of cease-fire monitors preparing to go to the Nuba Mountains in Sudan received a situation briefing in the Pentagon. At the conclusion of the briefing, one monitor asked about crime and economic violence in the area. The briefing officer, a colonel in the Army, patiently explained that the conflict in the Sudan was between Muslims and Christians and that crime was not a concern. His response, which reflected a common approach to examining conflict, underscored the need to integrate cultural understanding into the spectrum of military operations. The reality in the Sudan and elsewhere is that political, economic, and religious factors cannot be examined in isolation. In that area of the Sudan, for instance, competition between herders and farmers had political, religious, and military dimensions. The economic tension framed much of the conflict, and escalating economic violence was the single largest threat to the cease-fire.

Culture has been described as "multiple discourses, occasionally coming together in large systemic configuration, but more often coexisting within dynamic fields of interaction and conflict."[1] Culture is so broad that we cannot isolate it and study it apart from other societal factors such as history, economics, politics, religion, and relationships ranging from local to international. But in both military history and counterinsurgency literature, references to culture and regional understanding too often consist of a single line or paragraph stating that such knowledge is critical for success. In the past, one-hour cultural briefs conducted during preparation for deployment often misrepresented the culture and diminished its importance in planning operations. Now, largely because of challenges in Iraq, there is a growing recognition of the need for cultural awareness and understanding in the military. Lessons learned in Iraq include the need for—

- Continuity of personnel and institutional knowledge in each region.
- Cultural training in our educational institutions.
- Diversity in language capabilities.
- Socioeconomic analysis conducted during the planning process by regional specialists.
- Timely reachback to sector specialists.

Problems in East Africa

In 2002 the U.S. military established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti for the purpose of "detecting, disrupting, and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region."[2] Part of its mission involves economic assistance in the form of civil-military operations to reduce the conditions of poverty that help foster terrorism. Implied in this endeavor is an understanding of complex socioeconomic and cultural factors that influence the behavior and beliefs of peoples throughout the Horn of Africa and parts of East Africa.

Inadequate preparation and planning. Despite the lessons learned in Iraq, operations like those ongoing in Kenya and Tanzania are marked by high personnel turnover. Moreover, most of the personnel deployed have received little or no training on the region, have no Swahili language ability, and do not have a chain of command insisting that they learn the indigenous language *in situ*. To further compound the problem, few of those who plan the operations have been to the countries involved, and, even if the planning staff includes a section of regional specialists, the section usually has little influence on other staff sections. We can attribute the latter deficiency to the way military staffs typically work; that is, they tend to operate independently and focus on a functional area rather than integrating all aspects of local and regional variations into their operational plan. Regulations, standard operating procedures, models, and guidelines developed in other contexts reinforce this tendency. As a result, the staff develops the plan in a vacuum with little regard for the importance of regional concerns and specificities.

Mistaking the power of tribal identity. It is very common in Iraq to hear American military personnel state that Iraqi society is tribal, and that if one understands tribes, then one understands Iraq. The same thinking is common in East Africa. Because war often involves the complete breakdown of political and economic structures, theories about the resurgence of primal religious and ethno-tribal identities rise to prominence. These theories focus on cross-cultural interactions and insist that some basic interactions supplant other forms of interaction. This analysis is tempting in its simplicity, but it is wrongheaded. The variable role of tribal identity is certainly important within the shifting mix of other factors such as race, religion, nationality, history, mode of livelihood, and locality; however, none of these factors can be examined in isolation from the other factors or under conditions that stress one factor over others.

Tribal identities may play a less obvious role in peacetime engagement activities because these operations usually occur in sovereign countries with functioning governments and judicial systems that might hold greater sway than cultural and ethnic concerns. Nevertheless, cultural factors play an important role in governmental and societal structures. Accordingly, each staff section must consider them during planning and execution. This simplistic statement may be axiomatic, but its application is complex.

Overlooking cultural complexity. The cookie-cutter approach to incorporating culture in operational planning for humanitarian and other peacetime operations is simplistic; it disregards the complex reasons why people choose terror as a form of action. For example, consider the August 2006 press conference in Tanzania at which a senior U.S. military commander declared that the U.S. military was in Tanzania "going after the conditions that foster terrorism." Tanzanians were perplexed by the commander's comments, and a reporter from the Associated Press found them amusing and went around asking Tanzanians if they had seen any terrorists recently. Tanzanians greatly appreciated the U.S military effort, but the reason given for providing assistance did not enhance critical ties of trust to the degree they could have.[3]

The politicization of discontent born from poverty and social oppression is nothing new. It has long been part of the rationale behind the U.S. Agency for International Development and its counterparts in foreign governments. Saying that poverty alone causes terrorism simplifies complex situations and ignores a bevy of other factors besides gross domestic product that affect social conditions and attitudes. The commander in Tanzania conducting the press

> *Components of culture [history, economics, politics, religion] cannot be isolated from each other…*

conference wanted to publicize U.S. military humanitarian-assistance activities. But his comments, obviously linking U.S. actions to fighting terrorists, actually lessened the effectiveness of the operation: they drew attention to the fact that American forces were in Tanzania to advance U.S. national interests, not to improve the welfare of the Tanzanian people. The commander's comments revealed his staff's limited focus and lack of knowledge of the intricacies of Tanzanian rural areas.

Dubious public-affairs efforts. Military public affairs officers are supposed to be specialists in dealing with the media, but without experience in a given region,

U.S. Army CPT Dwayne Overby, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, medicates a donkey during a Veterinary Civic Action Program in Ali Adde, Djibouti, 19 September 2006.

they often default to the idea that the more press there is, the better. However, if the purpose of an operation is to improve social conditions, thereby reducing an area's potential as a breeding ground for terrorists, then publicizing the action would be largely unnecessary and perhaps even counterproductive. Local news passed by word-of-mouth is sufficient to inform the target audience about the U.S. effort and to convey the idea that Americans are undertaking humanitarian assistance for more than the sake of immediate attention and gain. Unfortunately, U.S. military and State Department personnel often do only a one- or two-year tour of duty, which limits their impact and the number of projects they can effect. It is understandable that they want to publicize the actions they do undertake, but unreflective publicity can make it appear that the United States is involved in high-visibility, flash-in-the-pan actions, not long-term programs. Informing the national and international news media about these operations invites criticism because it opens U.S. actions up to a larger audience, one that might link the operations to "militaristic" or "imperialistic" U.S. actions elsewhere in the world. This is less the case when publicity is limited to the local level.

Misunderstanding religious influence. Perceptions that rural areas in Tanzania are potential breeding grounds for Islamic extremism are not necessarily wrong, but they generally ignore local religions, paths of development, civic attitudes, and the popularity and accessibility of elected government officials. In the district where the commander made his remarks, there is a historical blend of Islam and Christianity (the latter mainly Catholic and Anglican) under a larger African cultural umbrella. This syncretic religious mix recognizes the role and power of spirits and magic, as well as the influence of family ancestors, in contemporary life. It also fosters a religious tolerance that promotes coexistence and economic networking. Throughout the locality, interfaith marriages are common, as are conversions from Islam to Christianity and vice versa (with gender playing no role).

Lately, however, an influx of external, less tolerant religious influence has been challenging the status quo. Specifically, there is a growing number of Pentecostalists who have declared that placating the spirits of one's ancestors is a form of devil worship and that Muslims are barred from heaven because they do not accept Jesus as a god. But Muslims in the area have refuted the Pentecostalists' attempt to

divide the community. By deeming the Pentecostalists to be heretics who worship Jesus instead of God—and not merely a different Christian sect of the same (syncretic) religion—they have effectively expelled the newcomers from the larger community. The theological specifics of the Christian Trinity have proven to be less important than maintaining a system that allows for peaceful coexistence. Similarly, extreme Muslim views that do not accommodate local beliefs and allow conversion to Christianity are unlikely to resonate with these Tanzanians. Obviously, this greatly affects the area's potential to breed terrorists. We should incorporate this fact into American civil-military strategies.

Ignoring economic and power relations. The commander's comments also ignored civic identities and modes of livelihood that affect attitudes and proclivities toward supporting or using violence. Political opposition to the United States in the area is limited, but where it does exist, it must be placed in socioeconomic context, not be taken at face value—appearances can be misleading. For example, a majority of residents in another, overwhelmingly Muslim, village in the same district declared their hatred for America and stated that no American was welcome there. These villagers couched their views in political and religious rhetoric, but in this case, politics and religion were less important than economics. The village sits on the coast, and its residents were smuggling marijuana, mangrove poles, and poached meat to Zanzibar and the Middle East. The attitudes they espoused were less political than pragmatic: they wanted to minimize outside attention to the area because it would disrupt their ongoing illegal enterprises.

Likewise, on a recent visit to Bagamoyo District, we observed a large number of cattle herders. These people had recently moved into the area because of a drought in their traditional grazing lands. Their presence is a source of tension, and conflict with farmers in the district is common. Consequently, U.S. civic action to provide veterinary services to the herders' cows might seem an obvious course of action, but it would likely anger the indigenous residents of the area and generate ill will toward the United States.

One fallacy shared by Americans and many Westerners is the belief that civic action projects are always positive and relatively simple to execute. The idea that local populations must perceive such activities as beneficial is just not true. In the former colonial countries of East Africa, religion was a tool for colonization, and the motto "Uhuru and Kujitegemea" (Freedom and Self-Reliance) indicates East Africa's resolve to avoid a repeat of the dependency relationships of unequal exchange that characterized the colonial era. Even if development is correctly billed as an effort to win hearts and minds, it is not always seen as a benign force. The United States cannot gain the acceptance of a population simply by spending money on social projects. On the contrary, the population often regards such expenditures as another way for developed nations to advance their national agendas and diminish African sovereignty.

Developmental assistance is also frequently portrayed as a cover for military and intelligence operations. For instance, several months ago, Tanzanian and Kenyan newspaper articles discussed a U.S. military "top secret plan" to fight terrorism. The articles stated that Army coordination elements and military liaison elements, composed of highly trained Green Berets proficient in local languages, were operating under the cover of humanitarian projects to collect intelligence and infiltrate terror networks.[4] One can see how easy it is to associate contemporary civil-military operations with covert military operations. The U.S. military must establish priorities and guidelines with regard to conducting these operations.

Who Should Do Culture?

Understanding the role culture plays in society is neither an easy task nor one for which military

> *One fallacy shared by Americans and many Westerners is the belief that civic action projects are always positive and relatively simple to execute. The idea that local populations must perceive such activities as beneficial is just not true.*

units are ideally suited. Special Forces, foreign area officers, and Soldiers working in civil affairs and psychological operations receive language and regional training. The level of that training varies depending on the region and on current requirements and priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is common, however, for "specialists" on Africa to have no training on Africa and to have never deployed anywhere on the continent. Thus, even if regional specialists are available and we utilize them effectively, they may lack expertise.

To make up for this, some military units use chaplains as culture specialists. Their commanders consider this a natural fit, given the close link between religion and culture. But while chaplains have an assigned role to advise commanders on religious matters in military operating environments—a role they have generally performed with great success in Iraq—having to deal with culture as a whole will create a dilemma for them: How do they segregate religion from culture? This is an all-but-impossible task. Components of culture cannot be isolated from each other, and broader cultural analysis is not an area in which chaplains are trained. Advising on religious considerations in an AOR is also a vague doctrinal role and brings into question the extent to which chaplains should perform missions interacting with locals outside of military bases, since many might view chaplains as biased, dogmatic, or ethnocentric. This is ultimately a command decision, and the point here is simply that commanders need to be aware of potential negative effects from the use of chaplains as cultural advisors and liaison officers.

These nontraditional missions may have unintended consequences. For example, a senior U.S. military chaplain recently requested permission to enter Tanzania to meet with key national religious leaders. His intent was to "[develop] ways in which religion, [a component] that plays a critical role in international relations here in this region, can be

DOD

Marines assigned to Bridge Co. "A," 6th Engineering Battalion, and soldiers of the Ugandan Peoples' Defense Force work together to build a new roof for a nurses' cottage during a Medical Civil Action Project (MEDCAP) in Serere, Uganda, as part of Exercise Natural Fire 2006, 20 August 2006.

used as a force for peace and cooperation." His justification for visiting Tanzania further stated, "We have also sent donations by way of others to make their way into Southern Sudan. We liaise with secular and religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) throughout our Area of Interest (AOI) to leverage more efficient and effective shared goals."[5] All aid, humanitarian or otherwise, has at least some political and even military significance, but Christian NGOs fund the Sudan People's Liberation Army outright. By using his military position to funnel aid to the Sudan, the chaplain was consciously or unconsciously pursuing a politico-religious agenda; he was circumventing controls put in place by the U.S. Government to prevent such actions.

The U.S. system of governance includes the separation of church and state; thus, no government agency has a mandate to do religious work. Chaplains in the U.S. military, however, are something of an anomaly. Because they are paid by the government specifically to minister to Soldiers, there is no disguising the fact that they are religious advocates. The ill-advised use of the word "crusade" by American military and political leaders to describe the war in Iraq might make the chaplain

look, to Arab-Muslim eyes, like a crusader, a Judeo-Christian jihadist ("crusade" in Arabic translates as *harb al salibeya*: a war of the cross, which can easily be translated as "Christian jihad").[6] In two cases I observed in Iraq, this was underscored by chaplains carrying weapons, an act of questionable legality that violates the tenets of common sense and reinforces impressions of interfaith warfare.

For these reasons, designating military chaplains, who are overwhelmingly Christian, as cultural experts and as the primary agents for cultural interaction might give American regional activities a religious tinge. This is not an indictment of chaplains, but a cautionary note about the potential liabilities inherent in using chaplains in expanded roles in some politico-religious contexts. Overall, using chaplains as cultural specialists and advisers underlines the failure of the military chain of command to understand the complexities of local culture. In turn, this highlights the need for methodologically analyzing and integrating cultural factors into military operations.

Lessons Lost

Using its operations in East Africa as a case in point, it is evident that the U.S. military has not applied lessons learned in Iraq. Thus far, U.S. forces bound for East Africa have received no training on East African culture prior to deployment; instead, the Army trained them for Iraq and Afghanistan. While much of this training was undeniably good—it included convoy live-fires; prisoner handling; and study of the law of war, small-unit tactics, and IED-recognition techniques—it simply wasn't applicable to operations in East Africa. Consequently, U.S. forces in the region have often relied on the U.S. Embassy for basic assistance, both logistical and informational. This can lead to clashes with embassy personnel, who may see U.S. military forces new to a region as a drain on time and resources and as a potential source of embarrassment.

The lack of regional training and overall expertise also prevents U.S. forces from adequately integrating into foreign societies. They sometimes reside in luxury hotels and hire translators or "expeditors" to procure items in the local economy and to advise them on how to interact with locals. Sustained operations have involved the creation of luxurious "safe houses" in the wealthy expatriate communities of East Africa. Although this arrangement meets embassy guidelines for force protection and helps keep forces under some form of control through proximity, it doesn't provide the optimum setting in which to learn about a country.

If the U.S. military is going to conduct peacetime engagement activities, it must incorporate ever-changing socioeconomic, cultural, ethnic, and historical knowledge into operations planning and execution, and it must give its leaders access to information and specialists so they can make informed decisions. We must overcome dogmatic institutional prerogatives. We need mature, informed decisions influenced by feedback. We must build an institutional knowledge base that gives us flexibility and continuity.

One cannot understand the conditions that breed terrorism by observing them from the isolation of luxurious enclaves in capital cities during a 90-day stint of temporary duty. It takes years of training, and it takes command recognition that the mission is important. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Nicholas Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry Ortner, *Culture/Power/History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4.
2. Mission statement, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, <www.hoa.centcom.mil>.
3. "U.S. Builds Clinic to Win Hearts and Minds of Tanzanians," *This Day* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania), 19 August 2006.
4. "Special Forces to Serve at U.S. Embassies," *The Citizen* (Dar es Salaam. Tanzania), March 2006.
5. Personal correspondence of the author.
6. For instance, on 16 September 2001, during a televised speech and press conference, President Bush said, "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take awhile…." See Peter Ford, "Europe cringes at Bush 'crusade' against terrorists," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 September 2001, 12. During Desert Storm, the author observed a tank with "CRUSADER" painted on the barrel, and another example is the Army's Crusader artillery system.

Advances in Predeployment Culture Training:
The U.S. Marine Corps Approach

Barak A. Salmoni, Ph.D

This article is dedicated to the memory of Captain Brian S. Letendre, USMC, and Lance Corporal Cory R. Guerin, USMC.

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PHOTO: Marines with Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and 6th Civil Affairs Group, walk in a market near downtown Hit, Iraq, 26 January 2006. (DOD)

THE HISTORY AND SELF-IDENTITY of the United States Marine Corps are based on operations in foreign environments, in close proximity to peoples from foreign cultures and with indigenous security personnel. Still, the systematic study of foreign cultures in an operationally focused fashion is a relatively new phenomenon for Marines.

Since late 2003, Marine units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have undergone orientation training on the culture of places to which they will deploy. A three-stage evolution has taken place in the conception and execution of such training.

At first, the moniker was "cultural sensitivity training." The goal of the training was to learn how to avoid offending indigenous people by focusing on decorum, taboos, "do's and don'ts," pleasantries, and the etiquette of face-to-face non-military interactions. Some referred to this as "culturization." The training also included an introduction to the history of the operational areas. Marines returning from deployments later commented that social aspects of such training only partially reflected realities in what were diverse, changing areas of operations, while the coverage of history was too academic, with insufficient links to contemporary dynamics.

"Culture awareness classes," a term used into 2004, placed more emphasis on the *contemporary* history, political legacies, and visible religion of the OIF and OEF theaters. The training began to address evolving social dynamics, and it was based on the first-hand observations of deployed troops and the personnel teaching the classes. The training also paid more attention to culturally important tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as the use of translators. In this sense, culture trainers moved beyond a priori assumptions of what might be important to deploying troops, to a method of curriculum development that integrated Soldiers' and Marines' recent experiences and articulated needs.

Into 2005, "tactical culture training" or "operational culture learning" replaced culture awareness classes. The focus shifted from not offending people (a *negative* incentive) to grasping local human dynamics in order to accomplish the mission (a *positive* incentive). Thus, culture *knowledge*—knowledge applied toward achieving mission goals—became an element of combat power and a force multiplier. Increasingly realistic culture dynamics were injected into field exercises, in particular the stability and support operations exercises coordinated by Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM).

The responsibility for finding qualified instructors and appropriate learning materials evolved in a similar fashion. In the 2003-2004 phases, battalion, regimental, and division commanders preparing for second deployments into theater recognized the need for culture and language education and attempted to identify the knowledge necessary and those who could teach it. Their conscientious but improvised efforts in a new field of predeployment military learning yielded uneven results across the deploying Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

In late 2004, TECOM took over the responsibility for all aspects of predeployment training in the Corps. It too turned to culture training, coordinating and eventually encompassing efforts already in progress while continuing to consult with operating forces.

Along with removing the burden of developing and coordinating culture training from the operating forces, TECOM, via ongoing consultation with OIF and OEF veterans, initiated changes to help determine who was a subject matter expert for warfighter culture training. Instead of generalist historians, religion specialists, and journalists, younger personnel who combined recent operational experience with academic study, site visits, and debriefing of returning units conducted the training. In this respect, cultural trainers have been working to shorten the lessons-learned feedback loop from deployment to deployment.

From Ad Hoc to Institutional and Operational

The culmination of the culture training process was the emergence in May 2005 of the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), established on the initiative of Lieutenant General James Mattis, the commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and based on his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. The planning and initial stand-up of CAOCL occurred under the guidance of TECOM's commanding general at the time, Major General T.S. Jones.

Mattis and Jones were guided by the emphasis the Marine Corps Commandant, General Michael Hagee, put on invigorated training and education for global contingencies in an irregular warfare environment. Hagee's vision called for more and better training and education on foreign cultures, languages, and the regional and cultural contexts of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.[1]

CAOCL immediately assumed the role of coordinating, sourcing, and planning operational culture predeployment training throughout the Marine Corps. By August 2005, CAOCL staff had visited the MEF area of responsibility (AOR) in al-Anbar province, Iraq, to evaluate previous culture training in order to develop new material for the upcoming training cycle. The staff emerged with standardized procedures for culture training assessment and sustainment teams that would go to other areas of operation. By partnering on these visits with instructors from Marine Corps Professional Military Education (PME) schools and students in regional learning programs, CAOCL affirmed two central principles: first, to conduct effective culture training, culture trainers need to know and understand cultures in a military context by experiencing them first-hand; second, to effect change across the service, there must be a feedback loop from predeployment culture training to the schoolhouses.

Although CAOCL brought onto its staff Marines and civilians who had been involved in culture training since 2003, it suffered and continues to suffer from the need to quickly and continually expand its educational and training ambit in a time of war, as opposed to gradually and methodically building up in a time of peace. Nevertheless, the hectic operational tempo has helped CAOCL to better understand its mission and to evolve responsively and responsibly. Thus, even with a skeleton staff, by January 2006 its trainers had begun to service training requests in Hawaii and Okinawa, supporting I, II, and III MEF. This was in addition to providing predeployment classes and learning tools for culture and language to detachments deploying to OEF and areas of responsibility in the Caucasus and Africa.

CAOCL is chartered as the Marine Corps' operational culture and operational language center of excellence, with chief responsibility for the training and education continuum. The latter currently consists of three main waypoints:

● *Predeployment training at the small-unit to major-subordinate-command level*. This remains CAOCL's overarching, highest priority. Through small one-to-three-man teams, the Center teaches Marines in classrooms, observes and evaluates

field exercises, and provides scenario-development assistance to command post exercises, often through solicited "injects" to the efforts of already existing TECOM elements.

● *Integration of culture training into PME.* Commanders at all levels have articulated a concern that predeployment training, be it for culture or language, is in reality just-in-time, last-ditch training. TECOM leaders have thus made it a priority to ensure that PME at all appropriate levels integrates curricula on operational culture concepts and tools, aligned with the rank of PME students and the roles they are to take up after graduation. TECOM seeks to create a chain linking all phases in operational culture PME on both the officer and enlisted levels, and CAOCL has been charged with ensuring these linkages. To best do this, in summer 2006 CAOCL established a Professorship of Advanced Operational Culture at Marine Corps University, filled by a cultural anthropologist with significant fieldwork abroad.

● *Establishment of institutional culture and language programs.* A cardinal principle of the post-cold war world of irregular warfare is uncertainty about the nature and location of military engagements. An effective military will feature operating forces seeded with personnel possessing a baseline capability to operate with culture and language knowledge in many environments and types of operations, from disaster relief through police actions and counterinsurgency up to high-intensity, force-on-force combat. To meet this challenge, the Marine Corps has begun to develop career-long regional culture and language learning opportunities to be offered via the Internet and at language learning resource centers at the major Marine bases across the globe. These opportunities will be directed at noncommissioned and commissioned officers in the career force and are intended to draw on the conceptual learning underway in the PME schools.

CAOCL is also tasked to liaise with the other services' emerging centers for culture education. It bears noting that the Army, in particular, has made fast strides of late in this direction, with the Navy and Air Force in hot pursuit. Continuing collaboration and liaison will be important as each service seeks to ensure that its own needs are met. CAOCL has also pursued links and mutual learning opportunities with similar military centers among allies in Europe and the Middle East.

A Threefold Shift

The establishment of CAOCL marks a significant threefold shift. First, Marine Corps senior and field-grade leaders now understand that operational culture and language are central to mission success, especially in the brave new world of irregular warfare and distributed operations. Second, learning from I MEF's and II MEF's past efforts, the Marine Corps has chartered CAOCL to take the burden off the operating forces in the culture-language realm while they (the forces) prepare for deployment. Battalion commanders, for example, will not have to make their best Rolodex-aided guess on whom to call for culture and language training. CAOCL staff will either provide the training or evaluate and recommend other providers. The key is that CAOCL will consult with the requesting unit to ensure defined needs are met.

> *…the Marine Corps has chartered CAOCL to take the burden off the operating forces in the culture-language realm…*

Third, if we look at the body of literature about culture in warfighting, we see an evolution. In early 2004, writing focused on the same initial message, worthy of repetition: culture is important.[2] But from late 2004 on, writers attempted to define culture in a military context. The overall harvest has produced some intellectually abstract work ill-suited to warriors, along with approaches edging towards stereotypical conclusions.[3] On the other hand, authors closer to the warfighting community began to produce work with conceptual and informational utility for culturally educating Marines and Soldiers preparing to deploy. Some of this was published.[4] Other materials were authored by service people looking after the needs of their units.[5]

As the proponent for service-level doctrine on operational culture in the training, educational, and operational domains, CAOCL aspires to carve

out a niche focused on the operator. This focus is reflected in the emerging definition of operational culture CAOCL has provided for officer PME. The definition ignores factors that usually constitute generic definitions of "culture" and adds atypical factors from "operational culture." In this way, CAOCL seeks to ensure that training focuses on what can be broadly described as "the lived human dynamics that influence a particular military operation." There are three clusters of ideas to be defined: operational culture, operational culture learning, and culture operator.

● *Operational culture.* Governed by a particular operation's goals, material assets, and functional areas of personnel, "operational culture" consists of—

— Operationally relevant behavior and expressed attitudes of groups within indigenous forces against or with whom Marines operate, civilians among whom Marines operate, and indigenous groups whom Marines wish to influence.

— Factors determining operationally relevant behavior and attitudes, to include biological, social, environmental, and individual.

— Historical mechanisms shaping the factors behind determinants of operationally relevant behavior and expressed attitudes.

— Knowledge in order to successfully plan and execute across the operational spectrum.

● *Operational Culture Learning.* In predeployment training scaled to rank and billet and focused on mission locality and objectives, "operational culture learning" includes—

— Study of a specific area of operation's (AO's) human environment and its shaping forces.

— Training in billet-focused language domains.

— Use of distance learning, face-to-face classes, and field exercises.

In PME phases geared to the responsibilities Marines will have to undertake at the completion of each level, the learning includes—

— Study of the concepts of operationally relevant culture.

— Development of skills necessary to succeed in diverse environments.

— Examination of human, print, and electronic resources for learning about operational culture.

— Exploration of the role of culture as suggested by past operations and simulations, along with discussion of the relevant skills needed for the deployment AO.

— Introduction to the application of skills to the current operating environment.

In the career continuum, appropriate to military occupational specialty (MOS), phase of career, and leadership responsibilities, learning includes—

— Service-, command-, and self-directed study of emergent operating environments.

— Maintenance of knowledge with respect to likely future areas of operation.

— Monitoring of service- and DOD-provided resources for culture learning.

— Fostering unit study of foreign cultures for operational benefit.

— Recording culture observations about deployment areas.

● *Culture Operator.* A "culture operator" works at the tactical, operational, and strategic level within his AO. He—

— Continually rereads the changing human terrain.

— Diagnoses the dynamic interaction among the conditions and parameters of human existence.

— Grasps the basic culture-influencing forces of the human environment.

— Considers the impact of Marine operations as a new condition and parameter of human existence.

— Influences local behaviors and attitudes.[6]

In such fashion, the Marine Corps is creating a training and educational program useful to deploying Marines at all levels. CAOCL's staff has found the above three categories useful as it continues to improve its approaches to structuring, executing, and evaluating operational culture learning.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The remainder of this article seeks to illuminate Marine Corps predeployment culture and language training lessons learned, and suggest steps to the implementation of these lessons. Marine Corps lessons may be of benefit to sister services, each of which is now establishing centers for culture education and training.[7]

A seat at the table. Predeployment training and work-ups are planned, usually through a comprehensive process involving solicited opinions; interactions between units, higher commands, and

training entities; and meetings of interested parties. This process enables the creation of a coherent overall training package.

The culture component must be included in this preplanning process. Doing so is difficult because the concept of robust, systematic culture training is new to military thinking, and the individuals responsible for providing it across all the services are also new and relatively unknown. However, when planning for predeployment culture training occurs late, as an add-on, it jeopardizes the training. Preplanning is necessary to provide the right training to the right audiences at the right intervals in the predeployment cycle. It is the first step to achieving integrated, holistic, and mission-relevant culture training.

Inclusion of culture training in the planning process should occur at the highest possible operating force level—in this case, the G-3 of the MEF. Although lower-level units do not like being told what to do by higher, particularly when it comes to training, command direction is necessary to ensure a properly sequenced, integrated approach to training. It will also prevent subordinate units from overtaxing their operations sections in planning and coordinating culture training. When the highest levels of command drive the overall planning process, including culture and language training, they can transfer that burden to CAOCL.

Timing it right. Training for different kinds of skills must be timed right: it has to be relevant to when Marines use those skills. This is particularly true in the realm of operational culture and language. If training on these two related topics comes too early or too late, many Marines will think it is irrelevant to the upcoming deployment, no matter what they are told to think by commanders who get up to lecture them. In addition, if it is done too early, Marines might lose some essential concrete skills—use of a translator, formulaic interaction, spatial dynamics, key phrases in the local language, culturally coded interaction with females, informational interviewing techniques, or de-escalation of tension techniques.

Conversely, cultural and language training too close to the deployment date runs the risk of finding Marines unavailable because of last-minute requirements. It is also too late then to include concepts for application in field exercises—they might appear to be added "bricks in the pack." Most important, at this point, the unit already has a fully crystallized deployment mindset: some commanders inculcate a perspective in which the indigenous culture is a core consideration, while others might permit a solely kinetic inclination.

In-unit, leader-mentored study of service-level-approved materials must precede the main block of face-to-face culture training. The face-to-face classes should precede, by 10 days to 2 weeks, the major field exercises that come a few weeks before deployment to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Center at 29 Palms, California.

Language training should phase in a month earlier, and in a fashion that does not separate Marines from units during the important predeployment phase. Using audio/video and printed pre-study tools at this point can help commanders and trainers identify the appropriate personnel for further face-to-face language training. Language training can continue afterwards, through use of learned phrases at Mojave Viper exercises and through web- and CD-based sustainment materials. Additionally, due to the relatively quick decay of survival-level language learning, language training cannot end earlier than two weeks prior to deployment.

Eluding the fire hose. A well-known method of training in the military is the "fire hose" method: spewing out immense amounts of information to huge, disparate groups in a short amount of time. It results from extremely tight training timelines and intense operational tempos. Such a pedagogical method is detrimental to learning "soft skills" with concrete ramifications.

A different scenario suggests the needed course of action. From January 2004 through July 2005, 1st Marine Division Schools ran Combined Action Program (CAP) training, inspired by positive Marine experiences in Vietnam. By the summer

Inclusion of culture training in the planning process should occur at the highest possible operating force level…

of 2004, when it was in full stride, small groups (either platoons or two platoons accompanied by the company commander) would undergo a multi-day package. Sometimes in-unit reading and discussion preceded the training.

The CAP culture class took up a nine-hour day—long enough to teach concepts, answer questions and discuss solutions, practice certain skills, and play hip-pocket tactical-decision games. Allowing enough time for several breaks and lunch permitted recovery as well as unstructured learning. CAP platoons took further learning materials away from the program, and they practiced skills at field exercises. It should be noted that over the past two years, CAP platoon commanders and Marines have continued to grow their culture and language skills during and between deployments, often acting as the larger company or battalion's point man on these matters.[8]

Although breaking MEFs into platoon-size elements for culture training is the most pedagogically sound method, it is likely unrealistic. CAOCL currently breaks a battalion-sized unit into three groups, to which it sends small training teams. Sergeants and below receive three-and-a-half hours of face-to-face training. Staff sergeants through first lieutenants receive four-and-a-half hours, and captains and higher receive a five-and-a-half-hour class. Commanders are encouraged to determine whether they require senior NCOs and warrant officers from the company and battalion staff to join the third group. The substance of each class must be aligned according to the planning and operating functions of the Marines in grouping the class. Trainers work to catalyze students' active engagement by responding to questions and employing hip-pocket tactical-decision games.

This only partly does away with fire hosing. Whatever the rank cut-offs, class size should not exceed two companies. To be fully effective, self- or commander-driven PME reading should precede classroom study. CAOCL then provides programs scaled to different ranks and functions. In the same spirit, the classroom only begins the learning process; it is followed by distance learning. CAOCL currently offers CD and web-based distance learning material consisting of audiovisual modules on human-terrain mapping, negotiations and meetings, the state of the Iraq insurgency, work-ing with the Iraqi Security Forces, culture aspects of convoy operations, cultivating relationships with Iraqi officials, use of a translator, culture aspects of interacting with Iraqis in and around domiciles, and third-country/Arab journalist measures. This is in addition to basic and basic-plus language support. Commanders who choose to prioritize this distance learning find that their units' performance in field exercises improves and that their Marines consider culture and language as integral to the overall tactical and operational fight.

Qualified instructors. Another issue having to do with culture training involves who is qualified to teach the operational culture of a particular AO. If the instructor is uniformed, he or she must be a Soldier or Marine who has recently deployed operationally to the AO in a job requiring ongoing interaction with the indigenous population—the division combat operations center watch officer from OIF-I will not do. MOS is not important here; interaction with Iraqis on a regular basis is.

The Marine instructor must be temperamentally inclined to teach culture as an operational force multiplier, and be able to combine experience-based knowledge with further learning and research. He or she must pursue, and be afforded the time and opportunity for, cross-pollination with Marines who have just returned from deployments. Fundamentally, the Marine instructor must be a good communicator.

One military community conspicuously unsuited to executing predeployment culture training is the chaplaincy corps. For several reasons, studying a religion to minister to a flock does not prepare one to teach about other cultures. First, the chaplain's primary mission is to provide religious, moral, and psychological support to warfighters. Anything diluting this would be an imprudent distraction. Second, chaplains may be inclined to perceive culture as being *determined* by an AO's religion. They may also focus on the *textual* as opposed to the *lived* dynamics of the religion in that area. In OIF and OEF, this is equally true of Christian and Muslim chaplains, because very few of the latter come from the Middle East or Central Asia. Third, all humans are biased, but chaplains, given their calling to minister for one particular religion, are more so. Additionally, because of their rank—O3 through O6—they have extra moral weight, so that

if they allow religious bias into teaching, it would more likely be taken as truth.

If the teacher is a civilian, matters are more delicate, and criteria more subjective. The Marine Corps must seek out and benefit from the civilian Defense Department, academic, and general community; it cannot deny deploying Marines the benefits of such expertise. Civilians without prior service must have lived in the AO in question or in a similar adjoining country. It is preferred that they possess advanced academic training, so they can speak at a level of expertise beyond the anecdotal or journalistic.[9] This assumes they will also possess language skills for the AO, if only as a matter of credibility. They must also be familiar with the military, with the Marine Corps, and with the nature of the unit they are talking to, and they should have enough of a grasp of the mission to be instructionally useful to the Marines.

In fact, civilian authorities, especially academicians, must be positively inclined to the Corps and the mission. Fundamentally, they must know how to talk to Marines at various levels, and be open to learning from Marines about the Corps, its culture, and their experiences. It is also important that they be able to teach: good *analysts* are not always good *teachers*; *briefing* is not *teaching*; and a good *performance* is not always the same as good *teaching*.

One final point: due to the global nature of Marine Corps deployments and the constantly evolving Marine demographic, deploying units or their neighbors will frequently have in their ranks Marines native to the upcoming deployment AO. Units and outside trainers must locate these Marines and use them to provide educational and operational value-added to personnel going forward.

Making communicators. Operating forces need language capabilities corresponding to actual functions, just as they need orientation to the dialect used in the actual AO. Marines and Marine units also require pedagogical methodologies that resonate with them.

Thus far, commanders have called upon various language learning resources, with mixed results. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) is rightfully promoted as the one-stop shop for language. Government-sponsored or commercial contracting organizations have presented quick fixes ranging from pointy-talky cards to machines that translate as you go (phraselators). At times, MEF- or division-level training officers have worked with local community colleges to develop survival-level language courses. All of these resources have been helpful and have provided lessons for improvement. But they come with drawbacks:

- They all cost money.
- Different foci and impetuses have influenced quality. For example, contracting organizations are primarily interested in profit, not necessarily in what might work best for Marines on the ground. Government-sponsored think tanks, another source of possible solutions, tend to favor a technology-heavy approach to something that, by its very nature, cannot be solved solely by technology.
- DLI's primary mission has been to train cryptographic linguists and foreign area officers in 40-

Iraqi children escort U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Gregory A. Frank while on patrol in Al Ish, Iraq, 10 May 2006. Frank is with Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward).

to 63-week courses. There has been less historical emphasis on the short-term preparation of operational units in the basic terms, phrases, and learning skills needed for specific AOs and functions. DLI has made strides in this direction, but the operating forces and services must still aid, guide, and craft the materials DLI produces, as well as supplement the classes they provide, so that DLI can continue its traditional role of preparing language professionals.

● Survival or familiarization language programs have had mixed success in filling the needs articulated by training officers, units, and returning Marines. "Market research" in the form of pre-program planning with receiving units, in-country site visits, no-holds-barred debriefing of returning units, and inclusion of returning Marines in subsequent planning sessions has often been one task too many for ad hoc programs whose personnel are scrambling to deliver training on very short timelines. Survival-level courses provided at community colleges close to Marine Corps bases have been a good alternative to unit-fabricated training. Proximity to the units has facilitated a feedback-to-teaching loop that has facilitated effective instruction. The survival-level courses at Coastal Carolina Community College, for example, have greatly improved thanks to Marine input.

To ensure Marines get the best possible predeployment language training, units and returning Marines must participate in the program planning stage to define skill sets for operating levels from fire teams to field-grade officers. This planning must also address what kind of pedagogical products will actually work in the Marine classroom and what kinds of operational language tools will work in the field. Unit representatives, higher-level developers of the overall predeployment training timeline, and service-level coordinators of language training must all meet to determine the timing and sequencing of language exposure as well as the mix of classroom and distance learning.

In executing language training, it is necessary though not sufficient that teachers be native or near-native speakers of the language. They must also understand Marine learning styles and the Marine mission in an area. Fundamentally, they must be teachers by profession and training, not by accident of native speaking skills. Like those who teach culture, ideally they should also have had operational experience with Marine or Army units

in the field. Furthermore, to the extent possible, language-capable Marines, even if their skill levels are rudimentary, must be included in the training as instructors' assistants.

Audiences. Because Afghanistan and Iraq are so culturally foreign, everyone wants predeployment cultural orientation. The senior commander's intent has often been that every Sailor and Marine receive it. This approach indicates the seriousness with which the Marine Corps now approaches the issue, but it is not certain that training "every Sailor and Marine" is the most prudent course of action.

Any Sailor or Marine who has to go outside the wire to interact with indigenous people should, when it is plausible, participate in distance learning and face-to-face training. The intensity and detail of the training should be the greatest for infantry units, civil affairs groups, military police units, military/police adviser teams, and air-naval gunfire liaison elements. Intensity and detail also need to be substantial for commanders and staffs at the regimental through MEF levels (although the issues and skills covered will differ).

Certain support units have a high likelihood of performing infantry-like roles or interacting with indigenous people. These include motor transport, combat engineers, engineer service battalions, medical personnel, and those components of the MEF logistics group who liaise with third-country contractors, laborers, and government officials. Intelligence assets external to infantry units, logistics units, and the wing also need specific culture training (although it should be provided by the intelligence community). For all of these units, culture awareness and culture skills are necessary in the planning and operating continuum.

Thus, an integral part of culture training prior to planning must involve determining which personnel should get what kind of exposure to operational culture, and what the mix of distance learning and face-to-face training should be…

There are, however, a large number of Marines and Sailors who will never go outside the wire (or off the vessel): those who have no operational planning role, and those in the more technical fields where interaction with indigenous people will be limited. Aircraft mechanics, bulk fuel specialists, nuclear-biological-chemical specialists, aircraft ergonomics and aviator human stress specialists—these Marines will not interact meaningfully with indigenous people; such being the case, using limited culture training assets and time to deliver classes may ill-serve a laudable intent.

Thus, an integral part of culture training prior to planning must involve determining which personnel should get what kind of exposure to operational culture, and what the mix of distance learning and face-to-face training should be for each audience. In this way, the commander's intent will indeed be served through economies of force benefiting both the training cadre and the personnel receiving the training. This method will have the added benefit of ensuring from the outset that the predeployment certification requirements of all echelons are met.

Current Status of Training

Predeployment operational culture and language training now unfolds in the following fashion: as soon as higher headquarters and TECOM begin to plan for predeployment training, those providing the culture components through distance learning, classroom interaction, and tactical exercises provide input, ensuring that the culture piece is timed right and sequenced appropriately.

Then, as units are pegged on the deployment schedule and assigned dates for classroom teaching and field exercises, CAOCL representatives brief battalion-level operations officers to plan the distance learning phase that will precede and follow the face-to-face interactions. During this time, CAOCL conducts in-theater site visits to develop timely, relevant learning categories and materials based on critical reviews of past practices.

Face-to-face interactions in the predeployment phase follow up on and synchronize with distance learning. Rather than one-day, multi-hour fire-hose sessions, CAOCL mobile training teams engage in more, but shorter and less intrusive, teaching visits to units, making course corrections as leader evaluations of classes and unit performance require.

Classes are followed by experiential culture learning at field exercises monitored and reported on by culture trainers. Instructional after-action reports, focusing on the performance of Marines and other exercise forces, are distributed to unit leaders and exercise controllers.

Immediately prior to deployment, leaders from platoon commanders on up receive the results of a CAOCL visit to the AO. The purpose of the visit is to cover evolving trends and access information that redeploying units might not transmit in the relief-in-place (RIP) process. Thus, through leaders' seminars or reports, the training cadre ensures that culture coordination occurs as part of the RIP. Finally, CAOCL personnel visit the theater to observe and interview Marines at mid-deployment to glean critical input about the efficacy of previous training. With this information, they then begin the education and training cycle for the next units.

Into the Future

As Marines and Soldiers experience multiple tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other AOs, their insights about how to best conduct culture training matures. Based on participant observation and debrief of returning personnel, CAOCL thus works to evolve in response to articulated needs. The Marine Corps will therefore embrace new training initiatives in the coming months. First, Language Learning Resource Centers at Marine bases will provide ongoing language training in Iraqi Arabic, Dari, and Pashto, in addition to supplemental languages for the Pacific Command region. This means that predeployment language learning will be continuous, beginning much earlier than before. Distance learning will therefore provide a basis of capability upon which more targeted face-to-face instruction will build.

Second, inspired by successes the U.S. Army TRADOC Culture Center has had with "train-the-trainer" methods, CAOCL will transition in this direction. CAOCL is now developing week-long curriculum packages to be executed at regiments. These will target senior NCOs and company-grade officers who have had previous tours involving substantial interaction with indigenous people. By combining Marines' experiential knowledge with added instruction and training resources provided through TECOM, CAOCL will ensure units at the

battalion and company level have organic training expertise available on demand, thus sustaining the credibility, responsiveness, and building-block nature of operational culture training. In effect, CAOCL instructors will assume the role of deep-fight resources, although they will continue to provide mobile training teams for more targeted, advanced-level seminars and exercise evaluation.

Conclusion

By establishing CAOCL, the Marine Corps articulated a vision of the human dynamics of indigenous peoples—culture—as a central planning and operating consideration for the present and future. This vision obliges CAOCL to provide culture learning worthy of the Marines whom the Center serves. Through planning, program development, and consultation with sister services and foreign allies, TECOM has begun to implement a long-range vision encompassing Marine culture education at all levels and throughout the career continuum. Likewise, there is talk of a joint-level coordinating body or executive agent. However, before we contemplate any such initiatives, it would be prudent to continue to improve and sustain the predeployment training and education of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines going forward into the close fight. *MR*

NOTES

1. See General M.W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps Updated Guidance (The 21st-Century Marine Corps—Creating Stability in an Unstable World)," ALMAR 018/05, 18 April 2005 <http://www.usmc.mil/almars/almar2000.nsf/52f4f5d11f10b4c4852569b8006a3e35/35a74723d7bcc61085256fe70061040a?OpenDocument>.

2. See MAJ Chris Varhola, "American Challenges in Post-Conflict Iraq," *Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes,* 27 May 2004 <www.fpri.org/enotes/20040527.americawar.varhola.iraqchallenges.html>; George W. Smith Jr., "Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)," *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition: Essays 2004* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 21-38; Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly 38,* 2005; Barak Salmoni "Beyond Hearts and Minds: Culture Matters," Proceedings of the Naval Institute Press, November 2004; Alex Davis and Dan Fu, "Culture Matters: Better Decision Making Through Increased Awareness," *Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC)* 2004: <www.stottlerhenke.com/papers/IITSEC-04-culture.pdf>.

3. See Davis and Fu; Celestine Ntuen, "Culture-Centric Models for Military Simulation and Training," The 7th Annual Symposium on Human Interaction with Complex Systems 2005, 18 November 2005. Regarding potential stereotype formation, see Helen Altman Klein, Anna Pongonis, and Gary Klein, "Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision Making," Research Paper prepared through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Contract No: DAAH01-00-C-R094: <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/2000ccrts_klein_culture.pdf>.

4. COL Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," *Military Review* (March-April 2005); LTC Philip C. Skuta, "Cross Cultural Savvy," U.S. Army War College Strategic Leadership Program, December 2005; MAJ P. M. Zeman, "Goat-Grab Diplomacy in Iraq," *Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 2005).

5. A growing number of company-grade Soldiers and Marines have fulfilled this role within units. For examples, see John Koopman, "Marines Seal Bonds of Trust: Special Unit Wants to Win Hearts and Minds," San Francisco Chronicle, 4 July 2004, <www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/07/04/MNG4T7GMRL1.DTL&hw=John+Koopman+Iraq&sn=053&sc=542>; and Greg Jaffe, "Trial by Fire: On the Ground in Iraq, Captain Ayers Writes His Own Playbook," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 2004.

6. See Barak Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture: Considerations for Integration in Expeditionary and Irregular Operations (CAOCL/TECOM: Forthcoming).

7. The Army has established a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center, and has begun initiatives through its Combined Arms Center (CAC). Working through its Senior Language Authority, the Navy has also established a nucleus for systematic operational culture and language training, while the Air Force has established a Center for Culture and Language Studies. The JFK Special Warfare School features a robust culture and language training program, and has continued to improve it.

8. For information about the CAP Program in Iraq, see 1LT Jason Goodale and CPT Jon Webre, "The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette* 89, 4 (April 2005); LTC Phil Skuta, "Introduction to 2/7 CAP Platoon Actions in Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette 89,* 4 (April 2005); and John Koopman. For information about precursors to the Vietnam CAP, see Al Hemingway, *Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994).

9. That is not to say journalists have no role. As guides to and informants about foreign cultures, they can be unrivaled resources. For an example from a region of growing concern to the Marine Corps, see Jeffrey Tayler, Angry *Wind: Through Muslim Black Africa by Truck, Bus, Boat, and Camel* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005).

The Army's New
TRADOC Culture Center

Major Remi Hajjar, U.S. Army

AN IMPORTANT PART of the ongoing transformation of the U.S. Army involves its cultural awareness (CA) campaign, which seeks to enhance Soldiers' abilities to understand and leverage cultural factors. If the early conflicts of the War on Terrorism foreshadow the future, then the need to understand foreign cultures takes on an unprecedented level of significance. Contemporary analyses increasingly identify foreign populations as centers of gravity (COGs), a fact that underscores the necessity of the CA initiative.[1] One important development in the promotion of cultural awareness in the U.S. Army is the emergence of the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Culture Center, located at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.[2]

The Culture Center opened its doors on 1 February 2006, although it began providing significant CA training and support to the Army well before then. The Center's main purpose is to support CA development and training and to disseminate relevant cultural training, knowledge, and products across the Army and, potentially, across the Department of Defense (DOD).[3]

The Center's vision includes cross-cultural training, education, research, collaboration among military and civilian scholars, and physical and virtual organizational features. As the Center matures, it anticipates influencing the rise of new culture centers across the Army, military, and DOD. Its concept of how to leverage cultural knowledge to enhance military operations includes four levels of understanding a particular culture that range from instruction for baseline Soldiers at the lowest level to key military decisionmakers at the highest.[4] The Center's preliminary charter mandates—

● Developing Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian cultural products (with heavy emphasis on the Middle East).

● Developing, refining, and assessing training standards.

● Producing proficient trainers to teach culture.

● Expanding ongoing cyberspace initiatives, including building a digital library and a cultural website to support the "Military Intelligence (MI) University."

● Building partnerships with military and civilian institutions that contribute to the Center.

The Center's Structure

The Center has five sections: a front office or headquarters, a Cultural Training and Education Branch, a language lab, a Partnering Branch, and a Cross-Cultural Applied Research and Dissemination Branch.[5] (See figure 1.)

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
Figure 1. TRADOC Cultural Center's structure

The front office supervises all aspects of the Center's missions and functions, to include overseeing critical training missions, developing and cultivating beneficial professional relationships, formulating grant proposals, and determining requirements and associated research assignments for relevant present and future country and area studies.

The Center falls under the 111th MI Brigade of the USAIC. TRADOC and the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth are at the apex of the Center's chain of command.

The Cultural Training and Education Branch (CTEB) develops and provides cultural products to all customers, including USAIC schools, other TRADOC schools, Army units, and DOD and national agencies, among others. Its main mission is to coordinate and conduct training with CA trainers and developers for its customers. CTEB also manages trainers, contractors, and instructors for classroom support; develops and exports distance-learning products; develops and helps construct lesson plans; and coordinates the exchange of cultural knowledge and training products with its partners, such as the Defense Language Institute (DLI), the University of Foreign Military and Culture Studies (also known as Red Team University), and other institutions.

The language laboratory, a part of USAIC before the Culture Center was developed, is one of the branches of the new Center. It is tasked with—

● Providing language sustainment training opportunities for cadre and students.

● Serving as a repository for foreign language literature.

● Administering relevant language exams (such as the Defense Language Proficiency Test).

● Sponsoring video-teleconferencing that supports language training.

● Maintaining close ties with DLI.

● Providing the rest of the Culture Center team with language-oriented insight.

The Partnering Branch develops collaborative relationships with various military, governmental, academic, and civilian agencies to formulate grants and further the Center's purpose, mission, and vision. The branch seeks to build a synergistic team that simultaneously enhances the Center and benefits professional allies. For example, it aims to build alliances with foreign students attending USAIC schools in order to draw on their expertise and insight to better the Culture Center. Several organizations are Culture Center partners, among them TRADOC, CAC, DLI, the Army Research Lab, and other components of the U.S. Army; organizations from the other services; the America, Britain, Canada, and Australia (ABCA) program; and a handful of major universities such as New Mexico State, Columbia, and Brigham Young. The list goes on. Partnering Branch continues to expand its professional associations and relationships to provide the Center with cultural awareness products and opportunities based on cutting-edge research, knowledge, and ideas.

The Cross-Cultural Applied Research and Dissemination Branch coordinates and conducts applied research for current and anticipated future needs. Its mission is to help generate funding to support research and dissemination; to serve as a repository of cultural materials; to initiate publication of a refereed journal of applied cultural research; to coordinate and supervise the visiting scholars program; and to support the entire Center, particularly the training and education branches.

Center Membership and Accomplishments

A unique, talented team with ideal backgrounds and experiences propels the Culture Center forward in support of its purpose and vision. Team members include 18 CA experts and educational specialists, among them 12 linguists. Four members of the team hold doctorate degrees, most possess advanced degrees, and together the team has more than 100 years of combined military and civilian experience in the Middle East.[6] Some members are former interpreters, others are retired military officers, and one is a former journalist. Many team

members speak Arabic and have lived in the Middle East. Anteon Corporation, a contractor, provides a number of the Culture Center's members.[7]

The Center has made significant progress in support of the Army's CA campaign. It arranged for an imam affiliated with Georgetown University to brief USAIC on moderate interpretations of Islam, which helped to bolster knowledge and cultural awareness; developed common core standards and topics for professional military education (PME); and produced numerous CA classes that enable units across the Army to train Soldiers in cultural issues vital to success in military operations.

The Center has also—

● Expanded the development of cultural products on the Middle East and Southeast Asia (especially the former).

● Made noteworthy progress on potential future CA needs, including development of products on Africa and other global areas of concern.[8] (See figure 2.)

● Deployed training teams across the Army to assist CA trainers and Soldiers preparing to deploy.[9] (See figure 3.)

● Experimented with innovative educational ideas, including CA practical exercises that cater to the younger Soldier's penchant for playing video games.

Challenges

Preliminary insights from Army battalion commanders whose Soldiers received training from the Center reveal that some of the commanders thought the Center provided generally sufficient CA training for junior enlisted troops. This feedback indicates that the Center has done well in providing the Army with the basics (for example, tiers 1 and 2 of CA training), which will help Soldiers in contemporary missions. However, at least one commander wished the Center provided more sophisticated, detailed, and specific

cultural knowledge for more senior Army professionals. So it seems that at least one Army leader eagerly anticipates the availability of higher level CA training (tiers 3 and 4) at his installation.[10]

Preliminary feedback also suggests that perhaps the U.S. Army is mildly resistant to CA training. One Army training evaluator received feedback that some units did not have the time to conduct CA training because of other, overwhelming, training requirements. However, such resistance is not necessarily directed at the specific type of training (CA training, for example); the resistance might stem from being overtasked in general, a condition that makes it difficult to add CA training to an already full training plate. This observation should remind Army commanders everywhere that leaders must set unit training priorities and seek sufficient, quality training on the tasks they deem most imperative (including CA). If TRADOC installations feel overtasked, this leads to a pertinent question: Are sufficient hours and attention being dedicated to CA training across the force? If foreign populations are COGs in current and projected military operations, then CA training is critical; it must receive adequate time and attention if it is to become a force multiplier today and into the future.

Islam
Cross Cultural Communications
Middle East Geography
Middle East History
Arab Culture
Afghanistan Overview and Culture
Tribalism in Afghanistan
History of Mujahadeen in Afghanistan
Mujahadeen Tactics in Afghanistan
National Security Strategy of the
   United States
Empire of Liberty
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   Knowledge
Tactical Application of Cultural
   Knowledge Practical Exercise Class

Bahrain Overview and Culture
Egypt Overview and Culture
Jordan Overview and Culture
Kurdish Overview and Culture
Kuwait Overview and Culture
Lebanon Overview and Culture
Oman Overview and Culture
Syria Overview and Culture
U.A.E. Overview and Culture
Yemen Overview and Culture
Israel Overview and Culture
Pakistan Overview and Culture
Iran Overview and Culture
Turkey Overview and Culture
Qatar Overview and Culture
Shi'a Hierarchy (The Ayatollahs)
The Culture of Terrorism
Terrorism Overview
Palestine Overview

Figure 2. Developed training materials

11th ACR Fort Irwin TTT	40 hours 11 to 22 October 2004
Deploying Reserve Officers	40 hours 25 to 29 October
Camp Shelby TTT	8 hours 7 to 9 December
Camp Bullis TTT	8 hours 13 December
Fort Huachuca TTT	16 hours 17 December
Fort Benning CRC TTT	40 hours 9 to 21 January 2005
Fort Riley 3rd BCT TTT	40 hours 17 to 21 January
Fort Stewart 1st 76th FA TTT	40 hours 24 to 28 January
Fort Lewis Deploying GTMO unit	8 hours 11 February
Fort Knox Train the Trainer	40 hours 14 to 18 February
Fort Lewis Deploying GTMO unit	40 hours 28 Feb to 4 March
Fort Huachuca MICCC TTT	8 hours 4 March
Fort Lewis Deploying GTMO unit	40 hours 28 Feb to 4 March
Fort Huachuca MICCC TTT	8 hours 4 March
Fort Wainright Alaska TTT	8 hours 21 to 23 March
Fort Knox TTT	40 hours 14 to 18 March
351st CA Cmd TTT	40 hours 4 to 8 April
Fort Huachuca NGB TTT	30 hours 11 to 13 April
Camp Shelby TTT	8 hours 8 April
Fort Huachuca 111th MI BDE TTT	40 hours 18 to 22 April
Fort Drum 10th Mt. Div TTT	8 hours 18 April
Fort Hood 4th Bde 4th ID	40 hours 2 to 6 May
Fort Lee Combined Arms Support Cmd	40 hours 19 to 24 June
Fort Sill Field Artillery Center	40 hours 11 July to 15 July
Patrick AFB Defense EO Management Inst	40 hours 25 July to 29 July
Aberdeen Proving Grounds	40 hours 8 to 12 August

Legend: ACR, armored cavalry regiment; AFB, air force base; BDE, brigade; BCT, brigade combat team; CA, cultural awareness; CRC, CONUS Replacement Center; EO, equal opportunity; FA, field artillery; GTMO, Guantanamo; ID, infantry division; MI, military intelligence; MICCC, Military Intelligence Captain's Career Course; NGB, National Guard Bureau; TTT, train the troops.

Figure 3. Examples of CA training conducted

The TRADOC Culture Center is a vital part of the U.S. Army's transformational CA campaign. The Center has already added value to the force by creating solid CA classes on relevant cultures for Army schools and courses, deploying units, and the Army at large. Like any new organization, however, it faces some preliminary challenges, including securing long-term funding and additional resources to meet growing requests for CA support. The Center must also refine and expand its regional analysis and associated CA classes. Clearly, though, TRADOC's Culture Center benefits the U.S. Army. All members of the profession should tap into this valuable new institution to bolster force-wide cultural awareness.

How to Request Training Support

The Center plans its training schedule out to 18 months, but its calendar fills up quickly. The deputy director hopes to expand the size of the Center as soon as possible to increase its ability to fulfill all of its missions and requests for support, including providing personnel to travel to Army installations worldwide. Art Vigil, the Center's current scheduler, is the point of contact for arranging CA training. If your unit wants CA training support from the Center, contact Vigil at <art.vigil@us.army.mil>, giving him as much lead time as possible. *MR*

NOTES

1. See MG (now LTG) Peter Chiarelli and MAJ Patrick Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 6.
2. For more information, see U.S. Army Intelligence Center, USAIC Cultural Center Proposal (Fort Huachuca, AZ: May 2005).
3. Ibid., 3.
4. Ibid., 6.
5. Ibid., 9-14.
6. See "The U.S. Army Intelligence Center Opens the TRADOC Culture Center," *The Fort Huachuca Scout*, 9 February 2006, A3.
7. Ibid.
8. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), "Cultural Awareness Training in Common Core PME [Professional Military Education]: Decision Brief to Commanding General, CAC," 14 September 2005, 13-14. Figure 2 comes from this briefing.
9. Ibid., 15. Figure 3 comes from this briefing.
10. Based on an interview with another Army commander, it seems this particular Army unit is on the cusp of incorporating tier 3 and 4 CA classes in its PME curriculum, which should ameliorate concern about the lack of senior-level CA training. In this case, it seems the issue boils down to a matter of actually applying the higher order CA training in PME classes as opposed to critiquing the CA material.

COMBAT MOTIVATION

Colonel Fernando Rodrigues-Goulart, Army of Brazil

F OR CENTURIES, commanders and military thinkers have reflected on the factors that contribute to motivation and morale during combat. In 401 BC, Xenophon alluded to the "force of the soul" to convince the Greeks to withstand the enemy during a campaign in Asia. At about the same time in China, Sun Tzu noted the importance of "moral law" in his teachings on the art of war. The Romans remarked on the importance of moral and motivational aspects in war and focused on them when they organized their legions. More recently, in the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz categorically affirmed that "the effects of a victory cannot in any way be explained without taking moral impressions into consideration."[1]

The Second World War was the first conflict in which human behavior on the battlefield was scientifically analyzed. The studies of this time indicated that regardless of such variables as terrain, enemy fire, and logistics, units that achieved their objectives during battle essentially did it by having Soldiers who were well disposed toward combat.

Despite great advances in warfighting technology in the last few decades, the combat Soldier—the one who operates tanks and helicopters and weapon systems, who attacks from armored vehicles and defends his post—is still the essential element on the battlefield. Thus, motivation is and always will be crucial to leading Soldiers. In many situations, it will also be the key to achieving success in combat.

The Meaning of Motivation

Motivation can be defined as that which compels a person to act with determination, or that which gives rise to an inclination that manifests itself through a specific behavior. In certain circumstances or under certain stimuli, the individual assumes particular attitudes and acts on them.

In his book *Motivation and Emotion*, Edward J. Murray asserts that motivation has two essential components: impulse and motive. Impulse refers to the internal process that incites a person to act. Motive is that which generates the behavior and helps the person achieve his objective. The objective is the reward that satisfies the individual's internal urges.[2]

Some sociologists argue that motivation necessarily includes a conscious desire to obtain something. In *Human Motivation*, M.D. Vernon agrees with that theory, declaring that a great part of human behavior is organized around being motivated and oriented toward a defined objective. Although individuals are not always conscious of the motives that propel them, they are always conscious of the objectives that they desire to achieve.[3] Figure 1 lays out the elemental aspects of motivation.

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PHOTO: U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA

Motivation and Morale

Motivation for combat can be understood as "the impulse that compels the Soldier to face the enemy on the battlefield" or "the determination that induces Soldiers to fight, in spite of the adversities and the inherent dangers of war."[4]

Motivation for combat and morale (or military morale) are intimately related concepts. They are not, however, identical. Morale refers to the psychological state or attitude of the individual or group before they undertake a task, whereas motivation describes those impulses that make an individual act. Historically, the consideration of human behavior in battle tends to concentrate on collective morale. It is legitimate, however, to suppose that the actions of the group have an individual predisposition as their basic determinant. According to this line of thought, one should first consider personal motivation before connecting it with the collective disposition toward action.

Intuitively, one may affirm that morale refers to the Soldier's attitude or mental preparedness for action, while motivation refers to the impulses that lead to action. Hence, there exists a definite distinction between morale and motivation: motivation has a more dynamic, more immediate connotation in relation to the action undertaken. Morale and motivation for combat can also be defined, respectively, as the mental state of preparation and the impulse to fight.

Factors of Motivation

Motives to fight are influenced by cultural, ethnic, and religious considerations. In addition, they might vary (and normally do) from one person to another. From any given group of Soldiers it is possible to glean a wide variety of military, social, and individual values, beliefs, and feelings. These might include a sense of duty, a sense of accomplishment when a mission is completed, responsibility, spirit of sacrifice, love of glory, an adventurous spirit, leadership, esprit de corps, unit cohesion, training, self-confidence, discipline, logistical efficiency, confidence in systems of sub-institutions, predilection for recognition and rewards, notions regarding

Figure 1. Elemental aspects of motivation.

a war's legitimacy, hope of victory, hatred of the enemy and, lastly (on many occasions), a need for self-preservation.

What we can gather from this long list is that individual motivations for combat can be diverse and wide-ranging; in fact, they constitute a very blurry universe of ideas. These motivations can include several powerful factors that are highly abstract in nature. In this context, the studies of the Canadian Anthony Kellet and the German General Dirk Oetting surpass others, offering a solid base from which to study combat motivation.

According to Kellet, the primary combat motivators are small-unit cohesion; esprit de corps; strong leadership; belief in, and notion of, values; rewards and recognition; efficient and fair management of human resources (sub-institution policies); and discipline.[5] Kellet recognizes other motivating factors, such as training and the degree of individual integration into the military culture, but acknowledges that those factors stimulate the Soldier at other times and not only during moments of combat.

Oetting's aim is to identify the most important combat motivators based on academic research.[6] To that end, he has compiled a list of the factors most often mentioned by significant thinkers in the field. Using this methodology, Oetting has identified such "essential motivation factors" as group cohesion (in pursuit of the objective to be achieved), small-group leadership, legitimacy, and efficiency of force.

Differences between the motivating factors noted by Kellet and those highlighted by Oetting result from the two authors using different criteria to devise their lists. Kellet opted for a wider focus;

Despite great advances in warfighting technology in the last few decades, the combat Soldier is still the essential element on the battlefield.

concept of the citizen-soldier who acts in harmony with his civic convictions and who is compelled by his conscience, or by something the Germans called *innere Fuhrüng* (leadership and civic education). Integrating these new citizen-soldiers into combat formations introduced doubts about the effectiveness of formal discipline on the battlefield.

It is also worth offering some comments regarding hatred of the enemy as a motivating element. In the past, this motivation was important in many conflicts. During the cold war, for example, Soviet Bloc soldiers were indoctrinated to hate their Western enemies and all they symbolized. One can even say that hatred is still a significant motivation today, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. In the Middle East, guerrilla units and terrorists feed off of hatred of Israel and the West in order to keep fighting.

For many armies, though, hate is not a relevant motivational factor. The cordial character of the Brazilian soldier, for instance, does not incorporate hatred well, nor do the armed forces stimulate it, since it makes the establishment of peace difficult after war ends. Accounts of Brazilians who participated on the Italian front during World War II indicate they respected the Germans and greatly admired their combat qualities. German prisoners were treated by their captors with consideration, so much so that the Brazilian Expeditionary Force headquarters had to intervene many times to keep prisoners from receiving cigars or words of encouragement just before they were to be interrogated.

Essential Factors of Motivation

As Oetting suggests, some motivational factors are more important than others, and so it is very useful to identify them. With this goal in mind, a research project was conducted using Brazilian World War II veterans. The research indicated the importance of having a sense of duty, believing in the legitimacy of the cause, being confident about the effectiveness of the force and its leadership, and building unit cohesion. Above all, the aspects most mentioned were sense of duty, capable leadership, and small-unit cohesion.

Oetting restricted his study to the motivating factors he deemed to be most important. However, the absence of discipline from Oetting's essential factors is worthy of attention.

Discipline has always been considered an important element in the proper performance of armies on the battlefield. This notion reached its peak during the days of absolute monarchies, when linear tactics were employed. During that era, the need to concentrate force and coordinate fire made it essential to keep forces in formation. This required rigid discipline based on strict order and severe punishments. The lethality of the battlefield also provided a powerful stimulus for Soldiers to maintain good order and discipline: doing so would lead to victory, thereby increasing the Soldiers' probability of surviving.

During the 19th century, formal discipline began to lose its importance in battle. The development of new weapons (such as the automatic rifle and the machinegun) necessitated greater troop dispersion and the use of terrain. With the abandonment of close formations, Soldiers could escape the close vigilance of their superiors, and draconian discipline declined.

During World War II, the cohesion of troops and their confidence in their commanders, not the threat of punishment, were decisive factors when inspiring troops to advance. Combat in small units, the maneuver of scout units, and troop dispersion on the battlefield gave Soldiers the liberty to think and act on their own, thus increasing the importance of self-discipline and a sense of mutual responsibility.

Modern democratic societies gave rise to the

> *When it comes to actual combat, the Soldier must also believe in the legitimacy of the war, in the possibility of victory, and in the importance of his own role in battle.*

The motivating factor behind doing one's duty can be explained by psychologist Abraham Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs.[7] The satisfaction of fulfilling a relevant obligation in the midst of a difficult situation and being lauded for the excellence one achieves when overcoming any obstacle to success is tied closely to the search for personal fulfillment.[8] In war, notable performance means completing combat-related tasks in spite of inherent difficulties. To overcome difficulty, one must have a sense of duty.

Sense of duty is mentioned only briefly in the literature on combat motivation; however, it appears frequently in accounts of wars and battles. It seems that some authors confuse duty with discipline, while others subsume duty into the other military ideals and values considered to be the real motivators. The degree to which duty is established in the military cultures of many countries (Brazil's included) validates the consideration of sense of duty as a specific factor for motivation. Unquestionably, sense of duty constitutes an important moral and psychological support for many Soldiers on the battlefield.

The legitimacy of a particular war is established and reaffirmed by society, not the military. Different social actors interpret the history, causes, and objectives of a conflict within the context of law, reason, and justice. Later, these ideas are translated for public opinion into justifications for the validity of the war. As an integral member of society, the Soldier must believe in the legitimacy of a war to motivate himself to fight.

The effectiveness of force depends upon the Soldier's belief in his unit's ability to advance to its objectives without suffering an inordinate number of casualties. Here, "force" can be defined as an operational unit that brings together combat, combat support, logistics, and the capabilities of sister services (e.g., close air and naval support). In other words, a Soldier's belief in his unit's chance of success is related to the confidence he has in the effectiveness of his unit's weapon systems, logistics, operational doctrine, working strategies, and command and control elements. The latter is especially important. Firm and decisive leadership during critical moments has the power to elevate the morale of troops, galvanize their energies, and increase the will to fight from within.

Cohesion is determined by the intensity and quality of relationships in small groups, particularly at the platoon and company levels. Oetting attributes great value to this motivating factor. He directly relates mission success to how closely small units establish their own objectives and align them with the intent of their higher echelons.

We can now see the essential factors of motivation coalescing. At this point, the need for confidence comes to mind. Toward the end of the 19th century, Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq referred to "personal, firm, consistent confidence that does not disappear in the moment of action" as one of the necessary elements of an efficient army.[9] Oetting, for his part, considered confidence as a true motivating factor, although he has a slightly different definition of it than the other writers.

Confidence is the outcome of the various motivating factors forged together into a holistic system of motivation. It is a catalyst for motivating factors and the amalgamator that will make them more effective. Commanders should have confidence in their troops, and vice versa. Soldiers should have confidence in their comrades, their weapons, and their unit's efficiency. When it comes to actual combat, the Soldier must also believe in the legitimacy of the war, in the possibility of victory, and in the importance of his own role in battle.

If he is imbued with a sense of duty, believes in the legitimacy of his nation's cause, and trusts in the efficiency of his forces (to include his comrades and his leader), the Soldier will be highly motivated to fight. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Krieg,* vol. 1, book 3, (Schleswig, Germany: S.L. Lelk, 1963).
2. Edward J. Murray, *Motivação e Emoção* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Editora Guanabara Koogan S.A., 1986), 21.
3. M.D. Vernon, *Motivação Humana* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Editora Vozes, 1973), 189.
4. Reuvan Gal, "The Motivation for Serving in the Israeli Defense Forces: In the Mirror of Time," *Strategic Assessment* 2, no. 3 (December 1999): 2.
5. Anthony Kellet, *Motivação para o Combate: o comportamento do soldado na luta* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: BIBLEX, 1987).
6. Dirk W. Oetting, *Motivation und Gehechtswert: von Verhalten des Soldaten im Kriege* (Frankfurt, Germany: Report Verlag, 1988).
7. Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Needs," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943), 370-396.
8. Vernon, 211.
9. Ardant du Picq, *Estudios sobre o Combate* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: BIBLEX, 2000), 99.

Military Planning for a Middle East Stockpiled with Nuclear Weapons

Richard Russell, Ph.D.

The media is loaded with coverage of the international crisis over Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program. The 24/7 news cycle is focused on the latest tit-for-tat in the West's ineffective diplomatic effort to get Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and other suspected nuclear-related activities. Media coverage has also focused on the likelihood of American military action against Iran's nuclear-power infrastructure. However, the media has paid little or no attention to the longer term implications of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons.

It is easy to envision Iran working toward robust capabilities to enrich large quantities of uranium as well as producing stocks of plutonium for nuclear weapons under the guise of civilian electricity production. But the United States is reluctant to threaten or use military force to punish Iran and to disrupt its nuclear program because U.S. international political capital and military capabilities are wearing thin with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent the United States, the Europeans—or the Israelis, for that matter—could not project sufficient military power to do anything more than dent Iran's geographically remote and dispersed nuclear infrastructure. In 10 to 25 years, Iran might be capable of producing large stocks of fissile material, harnessing it into warheads, and marrying the warheads to a large inventory of ballistic missiles capable of reaching most of the Middle East and swaths of southern Europe.

American military commanders and strategists have to squint and try to peer over the horizon to see the longer term security challenges posed by an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. What would the regional fallout be? How would regional states react? What would the impact of these reactions be on regional stability? How would these changes affect American force projection capabilities? How should the United States adapt its posture and forces in the region? We can offer only speculative and tentative answers, but having a sense of the trends and directions is critical to putting the American military on the right footing today to be better prepared to face tough strategic challenges in the coming decades. We cannot turn on a dime in transforming and repositioning the American military to tackle the problems posed by a nuclear-weapons-saturated Middle East, but we could plot a smart course in that direction.

Playing Nuclear Weapons Catch-up

Nuclear detonations, or more likely, regional suspicions that Iran is hiding a nuclear bomb in the basement would, over the long run, probably accelerate already strong security incentives for regional states to follow suit. The major regional states of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey would not want to be vulnerable to coercive Iranian political power derived from a nuclear weapons advantage. These states would want their own nuclear forces to deter Iranian threats and to ensure their national, regional, and international prestige. Moreover, they would not likely have a great deal of confidence in an American nuclear security umbrella as an alternative to their own nuclear deterrents. Riyadh, Cairo, and Istanbul would likely worry that the United States would hesitate to come to their aid in a future military contingency with a nuclear-armed Iran. Their security calculus would be similar to that of France when it acquired its nuclear "force de frappe" during the cold war in Europe.[1]

Saudi Arabia will be engaged in a bitter political competition with Iran for power in the Persian Gulf and would want a nuclear weapons capability to keep pace. Nuclear weapons would also bolster the Saudis' domestic prestige against militant Islamic extremists seeking to oust the royal family, and they would increase the country's political stature as the protectorate of the Sunnis against the regional Shi'a political revival led by Iran.

To support its nuclear weapons capability, Saudi Arabia would likely turn to its security partners in Pakistan and China. The Saudis procured intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the Chinese in the 1980s. These missiles had been previously armed with nuclear warheads in China's nuclear arsenal. The Chinese and Saudis claim that the missiles in Saudi Arabia are armed with conventional warheads, but no one has independently verified these claims. Nevertheless, the Saudis now have an institutional foundation in their military to support missile operations and future purchases of more modern missiles from China or Pakistan. The Saudis and Pakistanis have longstanding, close security ties, and the Saudis have long been suspected of subsidizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. It is entirely conceivable that Islamabad might help Riyadh obtain nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles, the ideal deterrent for an Iranian nuclear weapons arsenal.

Turkey too would be uneasy with a nuclear-armed neighbor in Iran and might pursue its own weapons. Ankara would likely fear abandonment by NATO and the United States if it were to have a crisis with a nuclear-armed Iran. The Turkish General Staff painfully remembers that NATO rebuffed Turkey when it asked for NATO protection in the run-up to the 2003 war against Iraq. The Turks, moreover, have a civilian nuclear power infrastructure and the

technological wherewithal to use it as a cover for a military program.

Regional suspicions that Saudi Arabia and Turkey were tilting toward nuclear weapons programs to counterbalance Iran's would send shivers down the spines of military planners and strategists in Iraq and Egypt. In 25 years, Iraq might not be in the chaos it is in today. And, even if Iraq emerges as a stable, democratic, and moderate state, Iraqi strategists would be sorely tempted to resurrect Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons aspirations if faced with a nuclear-armed Iran.

Iranian nuclear weapons would threaten Egypt too. Cairo has long seen its prestige and power slip in the region, and Iranian nuclear weapons might be the last straw that pushes the Egyptians to drop their diplomatic push for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East and embark on a quest for nuclear weapons. Egypt might even leverage the weapons for political legitimacy at home and abroad to counterbalance Israeli capabilities and to keep pace with the growing Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish rivalry for power in the region. Like Turkey, Egypt has a civilian nuclear power infrastructure that it could use as cover for a military program. The Egyptians also could turn to the North Koreans, with whom Cairo has long cooperated on ballistic missiles, for nuclear-weapons-related assistance.

Syria also has pressing security needs for nuclear weapons. Regionally isolated and vulnerable to international pressure as well as internal political pressure, the Syrian regime fears Israeli conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities and might calculate that Syrian nuclear weapons would deter both conventional and nuclear Israeli power. The Syrian regime might also calculate that while a clandestine nuclear weapons program would run the risk of provoking an Israeli preemptive attack, in the longer run the risks of not having nuclear weapons would be even greater. Damascus could develop deeper and closer security cooperation with Tehran and receive Iranian technological assistance, fissile materials, and even Iranian missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Tehran might see nuclear weapons transfers to Damascus as a means to put pressure on Israel and distract attention from Iran.[2]

The regional states—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria—could also look for international shortcuts to nuclear weapons technologies. In the past, large nuclear energy programs were seen as technological prerequisites and necessary political cover for military nuclear weapons programs. However, the history of Libya's cooperation with Pakistan's A. Q. Khan network shows otherwise. That network was providing off-the-shelf uranium enrichment capabilities and nuclear weapons designs. Future networks could set up similar operations to give Middle Eastern states shortcuts to producing nuclear weapons stockpiles that are difficult to detect.

A Regional Nuclear War?

How would the Middle East be affected by numerous states armed with nuclear weapons? The good news is that some international security experts argue that the spread of such weapons would actually stabilize the region. In fact, they argue that international relations would be enhanced if nuclear weapons proliferated slowly, if states had time to become accustomed to them, and if nuclear arsenals were immune from preemptive strikes. They argue that nuclear deterrence is easy to understand and to put into practice: statesmen would realize that the costs of going to war with nuclear weapons would be prohibitive, which would reduce the risk of war between states to nearly zero. To support their argument, these analysts cite the fact that two nuclear-armed states have never waged war against one another.[3]

The bad news is that these experts probably are dead wrong. The theory is appealing, but theory rarely, if ever, conforms to reality. States armed with nuclear weapons in the Middle East might well wage war against one another under a variety of strategic circumstances. Iran might undertake conventional military operations against neighboring states calculating that its nuclear deterrent would prevent a retaliatory American or Arab Gulf state response. Saudi Arabia, in turn, fearing its conventional forces are inferior, could resort to the tactical use of nuclear weapons to blunt Iranian conventional assaults in the Gulf, much as NATO had planned to do against Warsaw Pact forces in cold-war Europe. Egypt had no nuclear weapons in 1973,

but this did not stop it from attacking Israeli forces in the Sinai. Along with other Arab states, Egypt could use conventional forces in saber rattling against Israel, and conventional clashes could erupt into a general war. Right now, American forces cannot deter a Syria without nuclear weapons from sponsoring jihadist operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. A Syria armed with a nuclear deterrent might be emboldened to undertake even more aggressive sponsorship of guerrilla war against U.S. and Israeli forces, and this could tip a crisis into open warfare.

Sitting on hair triggers in the narrow geographic confines of the Middle East, states armed with nuclear weapons would be under strong incentives to use them or lose them and to fire nuclear ballistic missiles in a crisis. At the height of a regional crisis, Iran, for example, might launch huge salvos of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons against Israel in order to overwhelm Israeli ballistic missile defenses, decapitate the Israeli civilian and military leadership, and reduce the chances of Israeli nuclear retaliation. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union had about 30 minutes of breathing time from the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles to their impact. That was 30 potential minutes of precious time to determine whether warnings of launches were real. In the Middle East, there would be only a handful of such warning minutes, and regimes would feel even more vulnerable than the United States and the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Many nation-states in the Middle East resemble city-states more than industrialized nations; they have much less time to hide their leaders from enemy attack and fewer places to hide them.

Nuclear-armed states in the Middle East could also transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. Iran is the top concern on this score. Over the past two decades, Tehran has nurtured Hezbollah with arms, training, logistics, ideological support, and money to enable it to serve as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy. Iranian support helped Hezbollah destroy the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in the early 1980s and kill about 250 Marines.[4] According to a former director of the FBI, senior Iranian

government officials ordered Saudi Hezbollah to bomb Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996.[5] The explosion killed 19 U.S. airmen. Iran has used Hezbollah to do its dirty work and maintain "plausible deniability" to reduce the chances of American retaliatory actions. The strategy worked because the United States has yet to retaliate militarily against Iran. Calculating that its nuclear weapons would deter conventional retaliation against it, a nuclear-armed Iran would be emboldened to sponsor even more aggressive and devastating attacks to push American forces out of the Middle East.

A Middle East loaded with states armed with nuclear weapons also would increase the odds of "loose nukes." We worry today—and probably not enough—about Russia losing control of its nuclear weapons, but nuclear worries about Russia today might pale in comparison to those about the Middle East tomorrow.

Saudi Arabia already has a slow-boiling insurgency on its hands with Al-Qaeda, which might someday manage to take over a Saudi nuclear weapons depot. The Saudi regime in the future might have to face a civil war with Iranian- or even Iraqi-inspired Shi'ites in eastern Saudi Arabia. The Saudi royal family could even fall victim to internal power struggles between warring Saudi princes, and control of the Saudi nuclear arsenal might determine the winner.[6] Militant Islamists inside Egypt's military ranks assassinated President Anwar Sadat. Egyptian Islamic extremists might again organize within Egypt's military to take over Egyptian nuclear weapons stocks or to topple the regime itself. The Iranian revolution in 1979 blindsided the United States and converted a security partner into a bitter foe virtually overnight. A similar watershed event could occur in Egypt or Saudi Arabia in the next 25 years. In short, in the Middle East of the future, numerous nuclear weapons stores will sit atop potentially explosive political powder kegs like the one that exists in Pakistan today.

The Risk to U.S. Forces

The United States relies on large airbases to surge air expeditionary power into the Middle East in times of crisis. American airpower is fast to deploy and has the immediate impact of reassuring our partners and deterring our adversaries in the region. For example, when the United States dispatched air forces to Saudi Arabia quickly in the wake of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the deployment reassured the Saudis and might have deterred Saddam Hussein from using his ground forces to rush farther south, into Saudi Arabia. American airpower also was essential in providing air defense of the kingdom and protecting the build-up of coalition ground forces there for the campaign to liberate Kuwait in 1991.

Air, sea, and land access points for American force projection into the Middle East would all be vulnerable to the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons. Iran, for example, could threaten to attack Egypt and the well-known major airbases in the Arab Gulf states to deter the United States from surging air expeditionary forces into the region. For land forces deployment, the United States relies on port facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. Iran could threaten to attack those ports with nuclear missiles, thereby deterring the United States from landing its ground forces to bolster the defenses of regional security partners.

American military planners might counter that Iran would never threaten to use, or actually use, its nuclear weapons against our forces because the United States would retaliate in kind with devastating consequences. But the Iranians, for their part, might believe that the United States, which takes great pains to minimize civilian casualties in war, would not engage in nuclear retaliation because of the horrendous number of Iranian civilian casualties that would ensue. Additionally, a future American commander-in-chief might make the political judgment that it would be prudent statesmanship to withhold nuclear retaliation in order to reestablish the international taboo against using nuclear weapons. The president might instead order limited conventional retaliation on the regime officials who ordered the nuclear strikes against American forces rather than massive conventional or nuclear assaults on innocent civilians who bear no responsibility for nuclear strikes.

The Iranian regime might judge also that its "brave and courageous" use of nuclear weapons would polish its revolutionary credentials at home and win wide Muslim favor in the Middle East. The regime might also anticipate that nuclear strikes would terrify the American public, which, in turn, would demand that the president immediately withdraw military forces from the Middle East to reduce their vulnerability to more devastating casualties.

Americans were once enamored of the Air Force's "Shock and Awe" strategy, and mistakenly believed that it could, by itself, overwhelm the Nation's adversaries and force them to capitulate politically. Iran and its Arab neighbors might follow suit and come to believe that they could exercise their own versions of "Shock and Awe," whereby early, fast, and concentrated use of nuclear weapons against American forces destroyed those forces, shocked the American body politic, and compelled American public opinion to call for the quick withdrawal of U.S. forces. Many Middle Eastern observers judge that the United States "cut and ran" in Lebanon in the 1980s and in Somalia in the 1990s, and that it is on the verge of doing so again in Iraq because of mounting American casualties. Middle Eastern adversaries might conclude that inflicting casualties on the Americans with nuclear weapons would hasten the complete withdrawal of American power from the region. In reality, such attacks probably would work the other way and spark American public bloodlust against Iran. However, how we see ourselves is not how the Iranian clerics see us or how they read our strategic behavior.

Hedging against Nuclear-Armed Enemies

A Middle East populated with several states armed with nuclear weapons would pose formidable challenges to American force projection capabilities. The United States over the past 25 years has surged forces—largely unfettered by enemy operations—into the Middle East for a variety of military contingencies. However, in the future, a region replete with nuclear weapons could prevent the United States from

deploying forces en masse into the Middle East, especially into the Persian Gulf, in the same way it has in the past. What might American forces do differently to prepare for a Middle East stockpiled with nuclear weapons some 25 years down the road?

American military command centers and headquarters in the Middle East would be weak links and centers of gravity vulnerable to enemy attacks with nuclear missiles. U.S. command centers are in fixed locations, and in an era of off-the-shelf global positioning systems, at readily identifiable coordinates. Enemy nuclear missiles would not have to be very accurate to hit command center and headquarters targets. If the Iranians, for example, were to conclude that the political and military advantages of nuclear weapons strikes outweighed the potential costs, they would likely see the cities of Doha, Qatar, and Manama, Bahrain, as prime targets.

American military planners might reply that their forward headquarters are hardened against attack. But would that hardening stand up to the demands of a real war? The Iranians could use missile barrages to weaken, exhaust, and then overwhelm American land- and sea-based missile defenses around command nodes. If only a handful of nuclear weapons got through, they would probably disrupt U.S. command and control. Even if these hardened facilities survived, imagine the cities of Doha and Manama in radioactive ruin. How long could hardened command-center operations run without food, water, electricity, and sanitation? How would American forces eventually rescue personnel from command centers in a deadly radioactive environment? These questions are too demanding to answer here, but they loom just over the horizon.

To reduce their vulnerability to nuclear weapons, U.S. strategists will have to surge forces into the region in a geographically dispersed fashion. U.S. forces must acquire the capability to project power not from large troop concentrations analogous to "footprints," but from a far greater number of smaller, highly mobile "raindrop" force packages deployed over a wider swath and variety of geography. These raindrop forces would have to be networked and

synchronized to move into battle with the speed and intensity of a torrential rainstorm.

The time between the insertion of forces and the kickoff of operations against an adversary would have to be greatly compressed, or better yet, conducted at a rolling start to minimize the enemy's reaction time and to disrupt his command, control, and operations. American forces in a Middle East full of nuclear weapons would not have months to marshal in the desert sands, assemble at lines of departure, and then move out against an adversary as in the 1990-91 Gulf war. Even an air and land campaign like the one against Iraq in 2003, with its rolling start, would have too lengthy and lethargic a deployment timeline and be too heavily concentrated in Kuwait to be a model for a campaign against a nuclear-armed Middle Eastern state. Enemy strategists in the Middle East might take a lesson from Saddam's failure to disrupt coalition military preparations in Saudi Arabia in 1990-91 or in Kuwait in 2003 and resolve that "if the Americans come, hit them hard, hit them fast, and hit them early, and kill a lot of them so American public opinion will pull them back home."

Demand for missile defenses would increase exponentially in a nuclear Middle East. In the states that witnessed missile exchanges first-hand in the Iran-Iraq war and first Gulf war, such demand has always been keener than in the United States and Europe, where many analysts still cling to the cold war logic that missile defenses destabilize because they undermine the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD theorists argue that states must remain vulnerable to missile attacks in order to be deterred from launching their own attacks. They take this logic a step further and argue that a state with effective missile defenses might attack an adversary because it felt itself safe from retaliation. There is, however, little evidence that regime officials and military planners in the Middle East subscribe to the MAD theory—especially not the Iranian clerics and Revolutionary Guard commanders who would control Iran's nuclear weapons and would likely want robust missile defenses.

Missile defense systems such as the Patriot, which Americans

consider tactical, could provide strategic defense for the small Arab Gulf states. They would, however, have to be more densely deployed than they are today, given the grave risks of even one nuclear-tipped missile penetrating defenses. Seaborne missile defenses also would have to be deployed more thickly in the Middle East. Being highly mobile and less vulnerable to enemy missile attack than ground-based defenses, they would have an added advantage; however, naval vessels equipped with missile defenses would have to resupply, refuel, and rest outside the Persian Gulf because the port facilities American forces now use there would be vulnerable to attack.

Given the likely porousness of even densely layered ground- and sea-based missile defenses, the United States will have to devote much more attention to the military means used to destroy missiles and nuclear weapons arsenals on the ground. The U.S. Air Force will have to improve its fixed-wing and unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities substantially to detect missiles, launchers, and nuclear weapons depots. The Air Force's inability to destroy Saddam's missile forces on the ground in 1990-91 showed that it has a long way to go on this score. Moreover, the United States' current inability to accurately gauge the missile orders-of-battle in the Middle East suggests that the United States has not improved its missile detection and target capabilities much since the 2003 Gulf war.

The United States also must redouble efforts to strengthen Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities to strike enemy missile forces on the ground and to secure or destroy nuclear weapons stockpiles. SOF units claimed kills of Iraqi missiles on the ground during the Gulf war, but extensive post-war investigations could not confirm these claims.[7] SOF elements should prepare for insertion into nuclear-armed countries in the Middle East in the throes of civil war and insurrection to secure, remove, or destroy nuclear weapons stocks before they fall into the hands of Al-Qaeda and like-minded insurgents. Future Egyptian or Saudi regimes, for example, might successfully acquire nuclear weapons stockpiles only to find themselves

threatened by militant insurgents and crumbling internal security forces. A future American commander-in-chief might want military options to secure or destroy Egyptian or Saudi nuclear inventories lest they fall into hostile hands. The United States today already faces the potential for such a nuclear nightmare in Pakistan, where President Musharraf's regime could one day fall victim to Islamic extremists. Egypt and Saudi Arabia might follow along the same path in 25 years.

Humility and Warfare's Future

The above scenarios and analysis undoubtedly will strike some, if not most, readers as unrealistic. However, if one pauses to reflect on just a brief sketch of military history, several salient points come to the fore that should induce a sense of humility and caution about our ability to foresee the future of warfare clearly.

First, we can seldom predict the outbreak of war with any precision. No one was predicting war six months before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, or before NATO began air operations against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, or in 2006 when Israel launched a major air campaign and ground assault against Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.

Second, we can seldom anticipate the means or nature of combat with any great accuracy before the clash of arms occurs. European general staffs were not thinking about trench warfare before the outbreak of World War I, and the Japanese kamikaze attacks in the Pacific in World War II caught the U.S. Navy by surprise.

Third, we can rarely predict how wars will end or what their consequences for international security will be. None of the major combatants on the eve of World War I, for example, anticipated that their empires would not survive the war. The Kremlin certainly did not expect that its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan would grow to be such an enormous burden that it would contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

To make the point from fresher history, military technological advances have not made American general officers immune to surprises sprung by the enemy in battle. Lieutenant General William Wallace, the commander whose corps spearheaded the ground invasion that captured Baghdad in 2003, remarked of the Iraqi insurgent attacks in southern Iraq that slowed his advance, "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of those paramilitary forces."[8] More recently, General James Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said of NATO operations in southern Afghanistan, "We should recognize we are a little bit surprised at the level of intensity, and that the opposition in some areas is not relying on traditional hit-and-run tactics."[9] These remarks by American general officers should remind their peers, successors, and subordinates that surprise will be the norm, not the exception, in combat. With that rule of thumb in mind, the common, knee-jerk wisdom that future adversaries in the Middle East would "never be so foolish as to use nuclear weapons against the United States" should look more than a little questionable.

On top of our habitual inability to foresee the outbreak, conduct, or consequences of war, we also have a poor track record of understanding the strategic mindsets of our adversaries. The United States gravely misjudged Saddam Hussein when it assumed that his military build-up along the border with Kuwait in July 1990 was to intimidate the Kuwaitis and not to invade Kuwait. Americans still have difficulty understanding Saddam's mindset in the run-up to the 2003 war. Post-war debriefings indicate that Saddam did not understand that the United States was determined to march on Baghdad and oust his regime.[10] Americans dismissed Osama bin Laden's public calls for jihad and the bloodletting of Americans in the late 1990s as empty rhetoric only to discover painfully otherwise in 2001. Many observers now dismiss Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's public rantings against the United States and his call to wipe Israel off the map as mere rhetoric to whip up domestic political support in Iran. However, what if Ahmadinejad means what he says? What appears illogical and irrational from an American perspective might not appear that way to our adversaries, who carry with them profoundly different worldviews, assumptions, prejudices, and ambitions.

These reflections on military history and our necessarily limited knowledge of our adversaries' strategic thoughts should help us see that future scenarios in which nuclear weapons are used against American forces and security partners in the Middle East are not out of the realm of possibility. Such being the case, it would behoove us to begin considering our military options now, while we still have room to maneuver. **MR**

NOTES

1. The French during the cold war opted to deploy their own nuclear deterrent force—the *Force de Frappe*, or Striking Force—because Paris was uneasy about relying on American nuclear forces under NATO's security umbrella to deter the Soviet Union and to protect French national interests. For an informative examination of the development of French nuclear doctrine, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 320-324.

2. For an extensive analysis of Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations and the pressure a nuclear-armed Iran will put on other regional states, especially Saudi Arabia, to move along the nuclear path, see Richard L. Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 71-119.

3. The founder of this school of thought is Kenneth N. Waltz. See his "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990). Another advocate is John J. Mearsheimer, who argued that the Ukraine should not have surrendered its nuclear arsenal because it would have had a stabilizing effect on European security. See his "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993). For a critical analysis of the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons proliferation, see Russell, 136-150.

4. Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 40.

5. Louis J. Freeh, "Khobar Towers," *Wall Street Journal*, 23 June 2006.

6. The author is indebted to Saudi expert Simon Henderson for raising this scenario. See his *The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy*, Policy Paper No. 58 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003), 38.

7. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 72-73.

8. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, "Inside the Command," *New York Times*, 13 March 2006.

9. BBC News, "Afghan Force 'Needs More Troops'," 7 September 2006.

10. Steve Coll, "Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival," *Washington Post*, 3 November 2003.

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The Centurions, Jean Lartéguy, translated by Xan Fielding, reviewed by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, Director, U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A conventional Western army is defeated by Vietnamese insurgents in a brutal, decade-long conflict. The soldiers return home to an indifferent public and reflect on their experiences. Sometime later, the same army is engaged in another guerrilla war—this time against an Arab revolutionary movement—that it is ill-prepared to prosecute. After suffering severe setbacks due to its conventional mindset and tactics, the army eventually adapts to the unique conditions and requirements of counterinsurgency warfare. Certain units excel by changing their organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the needs of the irregular battlefield. Along the way atrocities are committed, prisoners abused, and ethical dilemmas abound.

No, this is not the story of the U.S. Army as recounted in Thomas E. Ricks' *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.*[1] It is, rather, the story of the French Army in Vietnam and Algeria in the 1950's as told by Jean Lartéguy in his classic historical novel *The Centurions.*[2]

Lartéguy's heroes are a tough band of French paratroop officers led by an irascible Basque colonel by the name of Pierre Raspéguy. Their story begins in the spring of 1954, at Dien Bien Phu, where the French are defeated in a set-piece, conventional battle by a supposedly third-rate, rag-tag Vietnamese army. Taken prisoner by the Viet Minh, Raspéguy and his paratroopers suffer their own version of a death march hundreds of miles through the jungle to an internment camp, where they undergo months of reeducation under the tutelage of the communist cadre. The lessons they learn, however, have little to do with the economic theories of Karl Marx. Instead, they discover the truths of "modern war." Reflecting on his situation as a prisoner, Captain Jacques de Glatigny, an aristocratic officer, realizes that the previous rules of war have been overturned. "In 1914 cavalry officers used to shave before going into action," he muses. "In modern warfare all those rites were ludicrous; it was not enough to be well-born, smart and clean; first of all you had to win."

The officers embark on a deep, almost mystical journey of self-discovery. The French Army lost in Indochina, they reason, by applying a conventional mindset to an unconventional war. It failed to reorganize itself to fight effectively in the hills and jungle, and instead remained tied to its clunky logistical tail and system of fortified bases. More damaging, it failed to involve the Vietnamese people in their own defense, "corrupting them with modern amenities instead of keeping them wiry and alert with the offer of some valid purpose in life…." Yet what purpose could the French colonialists offer? Independence? Freedom? Revolutionary war is 80-percent political, Mao famously proclaimed. The French officers realized too late that in modern war the people are the prize, and words that can bring them to one's side matter a great deal: politics, propaganda, faith, and reform are more important than aircraft, tanks, and artillery.

Repatriated to France after the Geneva armistice, the officers find themselves strangers in their own homeland. While they were fighting and bleeding in Vietnam, the French people had turned against both them and the war. Old friends, lovers, and family cannot relate to their experiences or understand their changed outlook on life. Stodgy officers who never set foot in Vietnam proclaim an end to the French Army's participation in revolutionary warfare. "The army has finished with 'operations' of that sort," an elderly general remarks to Glatigny. "It must recover its former position, resume its traditions…."

If the French Army was finished with insurgents, however, insurgents were not finished with the French Army. In the end, the bonds of combat and Prison Camp One prove stronger than those of love and genetics. When Raspéguy reunites the group in Paris and tells them he is forming a new unit to fight in Algeria, to a man they sign on to follow him and become the cadre of the 10th Colonial Parachute Regiment.

In Algeria the paratroop brotherhood fashions an elite fighting unit from a misfit group of reservists and recruits, one capable of fighting the Arab guerrillas on their own ground. Raspéguy reorganizes his staff for the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare. He understands the unique needs of this kind of war: "For our sort of war you need shrewd, cunning men who are capable of fighting far from the herd, who are full of initiative too—sort of civilians who can turn their hand to any trade, poachers, and missionaries too, who preach but keep one hand on the butt of their revolvers in case any one interrupts them…or happens to disagree."

If one were to write this passage down as a job description for a counterinsurgent, it would not be far from the mark—although the words might appear a bit strange on an Officer Efficiency Report. Raspéguy comes to the conclusion that France's only hope to win in Algeria, or anywhere else in the struggle against communism, is to build a revolutionary army that can wage revolutionary war.

The 10th Colonial Parachute Regiment's drive to win at all costs, however, leads it down a dark path to moral bankruptcy. When a popular lieutenant and his driver are captured by the insurgents and gruesomely executed, their comrades exact revenge by slaughtering the male inhabitants of a nearby village. Ironically, this massacre works to the paratroopers' advantage. With a French unit in the neighborhood equally ruthless as the insurgents, the population's support for the guerrillas wavers. Good intelligence work, combined with torture of key suspects, leads to the unraveling of the entire insurgent network and,

ultimately, the destruction of the main guerrilla force in the region controlled by Raspéguy's paratroopers.

It is in Algiers, however, where the full extent of the French Army's slide into the ethical abyss is revealed. Ordered to do whatever it takes to secure the city from the urban terrorism that threatens to paralyze it, the paratroopers seize suspects, torture those believed to have critical information, and shatter the terrorist network with a series of lightning raids. A general strike is averted through cold-blooded measures. The French Army wins the battle of Algiers, but loses its soul in the process. What the paratroopers have not discovered is that in modern war it is not enough to win—you must win while maintaining the humanity and ideals that form the basis of modern civilization.

For the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *The Centurions* is not just a timeless story, but a timely one as well. In Lartéguy's novel one can find many of the principles and para-

doxes of counterinsurgency warfare. The primacy of politics, the need to secure the population, the criticality of good intelligence (which can only be obtained by engaging the people), the requirement to adapt conventional units to fight in an unconventional manner—all of these lessons and more can be found in Lartéguy's masterpiece. The novel also explores the dangers of going too far in the quest for victory. The moral dilemmas of the French in Algeria echo only too loudly in Iraq and Afghanistan today. *The Centurions* is a compelling story and a good read, too, one that I highly recommend be included in an officer's program of self-study and professional development.

Although the threat of communist revolution has all but ended, the use of insurgent methods is on the rise. Until the West can show itself capable of defeating insurgents, it will continue to be challenged in this manner. Larteguy, in a sense, foretells this when one of Raspéguy's officers, a French-Algerian taken

prisoner at Dien Bien Phu, reflects that he may soon be a rebel himself, but on behalf of Islam, not communism. The reflection is meant to foreshadow the looming conflict in Africa, but it speaks to our own predicament 50 years later, in the Middle East. **MR**

NOTES

1. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, Penguin Press, 2006).
2. Jean Lartéguy, *The Centurions*, trans. Xan Fielding (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1961).

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ᴹᴿBook Reviews

Featured Review

WHILE EUROPE SLEPT: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West From Within, Bruce Bawer, Doubleday, Westminster, MD, 2006, 237 pages, $23.95.

Some of our European allies have joined the long war against radical Islamic terrorists, but for them the battles are also at home in London, Madrid, and in an ever-growing number of communities. Muslim immigrants have flooded into European ghettos, challenging the continent's tolerant culture and stretching its cradle-to-grave social welfare systems. In his latest book, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying The West From Within,* journalist Bruce Bawer presents a riveting account of the clash between a naïvely elitist Europe and a rapidly expanding minority of Islamic fun-

damentalist immigrants demanding accommodation.

Bawer, a prolific author, provides an American view of Europe's Islamic crisis. He informs, challenges, and entertains with his detailed and well-documented accounts of Islamic confrontation and Europe's too-tolerant cultural response to intolerant Islamists.

Not one to shy away from controversy (he has criticized fundamentalist Christianity and written on behalf of "mainstream" homosexuals), Bawer immersed himself for this project in European culture by learning several languages, working with the European media, interviewing government officials, and experiencing the native's lifestyle in order to provide a behind-the-scenes view of Islam's assault on Europe and the continent's cultural passivity.

Military officers will find *While Europe Slept* a great primer on

the ideological challenges posed by a rapidly growing European Islamic immigrant population and its all-too-successful efforts to force post-Christian Europe to tolerate and, more frequently, to embrace, *Sha'ria*. Bawer argues that the Islamic cultural assault on Europe could be replicated in America if the latter were to abandon its long-held foundational values.

Bawer documents the heroic actions of Europe's few "Paul Reveres" who are publicly warning fellow citizens that they will pay a high price if they ignore the rapidly expanding minority of Muslim immigrants who refuse to integrate. One of Bawer's Paul Reveres, the now acclaimed Dutch cultural maverick Wilhemus Fortuyn, author of A*gainst The Islamicization of Our Culture* (book information not available) was murdered, according to his killer, for views that "stigmatized" Islam.

Fortuyn dared to criticize Muslims for their so-called anti-Dutch values. Young Muslim men growing up in Holland, according to Fortuyn, are taught throughout childhood that infidels (non-Muslims) are beneath respect, that Western women are whores, and that the only response to the West's godlessness is the fury of jihad. Fortuyn complained, "I refuse to hear repeatedly that Allah is great, almighty and powerful, and I am a dirty pig."

While Europe Slept juxtaposes Europe's naïve treatment of radical Muslims with its widespread anti-American views to illustrate cultural blindness. Both public views appear to be prompted by liberal media and multicultural elites. But those very same American values that Europeans attack—courage, patriotism, and religious faith—are widely lacking and in part explain why radical Islam is overtaking the continent. European elites do not understand the motivation of deeply held Muslim religious views, nor do they appreciate love of country.

Europe has remained silent about fundamentalist Muslims' unequal treatment of women and their lack of respect for people of other faiths. But the same restraint isn't evident when the topic turns to America. European elites and the average media-believing Europhile see Abu Ghraib as representative of America's presence in Iraq. Guantanamo Bay's jihadist detainee prison has become a cynical caricature for America's role in the War on Terrorism. The 9/11 attacks on America are portrayed suspiciously by a sizable minority as an elaborate conspiracy. Perhaps not surprisingly, nearly one-third of Germans under 30 believe the U.S. set up the attacks.

Bawer warns that America-bashing and uncritical tolerance for Islamic radicalism are symptomatic of a confused culture and are contributing to a possible future populist backlash reminiscent of the rise of fascism in the 1930s. He argues that Europe is at a Weimar moment—the post–World War I era when Germans grew frustrated with social-democratic elites and drifted away to Nazism on the right. As evidence of Europe's possible Weimar slide, he cites the 2005 populist rejection of the European Union's constitution. Three issues fed that rejection: elitist mocking of national pride, a burdensome taxation system that supports inefficient welfare systems, and reckless immigration policies.

According to Bawer, moderate European Muslims should find their voices to fight radicalism within their own communities. They must disavow and discredit radicalism as an extreme expression of Islam while "discover[ing] more liberal ways of understanding their faith."

While Europe Slept offers native solutions for the clash with Islam, such as educating Muslim women, who will influence the next generation. But as Bawer states, Europe's enemy is not Islam, but Europe itself. The continent has a values crisis that could lead either to surrendering to radical Islamists like the proverbial frog that refuses to jump out of the pot of boiling water, or it could give rise to another round of populism that could lead to fascism or worse.

Bawer bemoans the course the emblematic Dutch (read "most Western European countries") have taken as "tragic." He points out that the Dutch have done much to bring Western civilization to "its utmost pinnacle in terms of freedom and the pursuit of happiness," yet they have "turned a blind eye to the very peril that would destroy them." Bawer hopes Europeans will awaken to the tragedy of their course, embrace time-tested American values, and vigorously oppose intolerant Islamic views before the continent becomes ground zero for a future Islamic caliphate or another Lebanon, torn by civil war.

LTC Robert L. Maginnis, Retired, Alexandria, Virginia

BLOOD MONEY: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq, T. Christian Miller, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 2006, 293 pages, $24.99.

T. Christian Miller, an investigative reporter for the *Los Angeles Times*, clearly states that he wrote *Blood Money* to ask how the United States could put a man on the moon in 1969, yet cannot make toilets flush in Baghdad in 2006. He examines what happened in the aftermath of the Iraq war, as America attempted to stabilize and rebuild a country that had been devastated by the initial Gulf War, the decades-long rule of a tyrant, and a dozen years of U.N.-imposed sanctions. What he finds are multiple major mistakes that have helped foster a corrupt, anything-goes environment not at all conducive to building a functional democracy.

Miller presents compelling evidence to support the by-now familiar claim that civilian leaders, military commanders, and planners from the top down gave little thought to the post-combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He discusses the disarray caused when the head of the newly created Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, retired Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, was replaced within three weeks of his arrival. Miller claims that Garner's successor, U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer, made two quick decisions that dramatically damaged the reconstruction process: to remove all Ba'athists from public office, and to immediately disband the Iraqi Army.

That Miller's chronicle of Iraq's reconstruction period is generally unbiased comes as a bit of a surprise, given the book's title. One might have expected a relentless attack on Halliburton, for example, yet this is not the case. Miller criticizes Halliburton when its performance is poor (e.g. maximizing Iraqi oil production), but in the end he acknowledges that the company more often than not delivered its promised goods and services.

Blood Money really stands out from other recent critiques of the war with its emphasis on the role contractors play on today's battlefield. Miller notes that contracting work is nothing new; after all, who but Brown and Root (Halliburton) built our airfields and hospitals in Vietnam? These days, however, much more work is being contracted, and some of that work is considered essential to the

war effort. What would happen if that work wasn't done? Soldiers cannot refuse a mission, but contractors can; critical supplies could be held up in transit if individual contractors decided that delivery was too dangerous. Miller provides a thought-provoking discussion of contractors in combat zones, particularly in the area of security. On more than one occasion, contractors (who were authorized to conduct only defensive operations) found themselves engaged in lengthy battles with insurgents. What, then, is a contractor's status on the battlefield? How do their actions as combatants affect a military commander's plans? What happens if they commit a war crime?

Miller makes a compelling point that reconstruction is destined to fail in a country whose environment is as unstable as Iraq's. He cites as a case in point the Parsons Corporation's attempt to build forts along the Iran-Iraq border and several health clinics and hospitals elsewhere in Iraq. One of the world's most prestigious engineering and construction firms, Parsons hasn't performed to its usual high standard. Miller explains that because Parsons was so concerned about its employees' welfare, the company

kept many of its workers back in secure areas. It subcontracted most of its work to locals and rarely conducted onsite inspections.

In an effort to show just how problematic our operations in Iraq have become, Miller uses both his opening and closing chapters to discuss the plight of Army Colonel Ted Westhusing, a philosophy professor at West Point who had enthusiastically deployed in January 2005 to train Iraqi security forces. Westhusing apparently committed suicide in June of the same year, disillusioned with what he had seen and fearful that his own reputation would be blackened. This is a heart-rending narrative, one that captures a dramatic change in personality occasioned by Westhusing's struggle with people he described as greedy contractors, senior officers interested only in themselves, and Iraqis unworthy of trust. Miller, however, does not seem to have captured all of the story. He quotes from Westhusing's suicide note, but does not answer the accusations made in the note; instead, he merely observes that the Army's investigation revealed no significant issues with the organization's command climate, and he does nothing with Westhusing's observation about

untrustworthy Iraqis. The book's two most powerful chapters, the first and the last, seem to leave more questions unanswered than answered, especially when Miller hints that Westhusing might have been killed by contractors who feared that he would report their misconduct. One of the Army's leading ethicists apparently committed suicide and left a note saying "[I] came to serve honorably and feel dishonored." Miller should offer more here.

In the end, *Blood Money* is very much worth reading, though at times it is a bit of a challenge. Wading through its detailed narrative of the behind-the-scenes fight to secure a cell-phone contract for the Iraqi police, or reading about oil pipeline failures and other infrastructure problems, may not excite everyone. Still, it is important for one to appreciate the problems caused when massive money—some $30 billion—is handed out with minimal oversight. Miller concludes with the observation that this war has turned into a corporate affair, where companies battle for contracts and life-and-death decisions are based on the bottom line.

LTC James E. Varner, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Featured Review

FOR PROPHET AND TSAR: ISLAM AND EMPIRE IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA, Robert D. Crews, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006, 463 pages, $29.95.

Stanford historian Robert D. Crews examines the relationship between the Russian empire and its Muslim constituents from the reign of Catherine the Great to the Revolution of 1917. In particular, Crews advances two intertwined propositions. The first is that administering the population by dividing it into communities of faith, a governing strategy referred to as "confessionalization" that Crews attributes to Catherine, did much to maintain calm and order within the empire. Second, he asserts that this approach "allowed the state to govern with less violence and with a greater degree of consensus than historians have previously imag-

ined." In effect, the author contends that a kind of symbiosis evolved between the state and Islam.

Crews develops these assertions over a daunting historical expanse of time (two centuries) and territory (the Caucasus to Central Asia). Basing his extensive research on court, police, and other official records, he effectively dispels perceptions that the state was simply an instrument for the repression of Islamic cultures or that those cultures, in turn, were seething with animosity toward the Russian Empire. By implication, a "clash of civilizations" was neither a permanent nor inevitable feature of Russo-Muslim relations. Rather, the Tsar's regime sought to forge a relationship that in significant ways paralleled the one it enjoyed with the Orthodox Church.

In constructing this relationship, the state found opportunity in the demographic diversity and dispersal

of the Islamic communities it encountered. Because Islam in Russia and Central Asia did not have an elaborately developed hierarchical organization for managing the populace, the state stepped in to help establish one. A sterling example was the Orenburg Ecclesiastical Assembly, which was roughly analogous to the Orthodox Holy Synod, whose membership was approved by the state. Established by Peter the Great, the Holy Synod became an ideological pillar of the regime, binding spiritual authority to temporal in the person of the Tsar in a manner that accorded nicely with emerging Enlightenment political theory in the West. In turn, the assembly regulated Muslim affairs in a manner that was at least tolerable both to the Tsar and the community of faith it served. In the resultant concordance, the call of Muslims to worship in the empire normally in-

cluded a prayer for the preservation of the Romanov dynasty. The Islamic hierarchy benefited substantially, as state support afforded government-approved senior clerics a level of legally enforceable authority they had not previously possessed.

Ultimately, one of Crews' key findings is his rejection of the traditional explanation of Russian historians that imperial arrangements in the administration of its Muslim population were in large measure a reflection of "undergovernment," a simple lack of administrative reach into distant portions of the empire that in turn necessitated limited reliance on native institutions. On the contrary, Crews contends that new forms of societal interactions in Muslim areas were in reality a product of governmental influence. The state sanctioned an official clerical estate and in exchange shaped interpretations of the *shar'ia* to its occasional advantage. The author documents this assertion throughout the book, noting innumerable instances in which Muslims appealed to state authority to resolve disputes.

Although persuasive, this line of reasoning does not fully sustain the author's intent to discredit the thesis of "undergovernment." The effective, as opposed to theoretical, power of the state was in fact extremely limited, if only by virtue of the treasury's inability to cover the cost of maintaining the requisite network of bureaucratic offices and civil servants. An equally valid indication of the true state of assimilation into the imperial system was the status of most Muslims in regard to military service. Even the Bashkirs and Crimean Tatars, Muslim peoples long subject to Russian authority, were exempted from a new law on universal conscription in 1874. In general, St. Petersburg regarded its Muslim subjects warily, while the Muslims acceded to the legitimacy of Tsarist rule only within implicit limits. Russia's disastrous attempt to conscript Central Asians in 1916, even for military service in noncombatant capacities, was a vivid instance of the state's attempting to exceed those limits.

In fact, Crews' demonstration of a certain symbiotic arrangement between government and Islam is not incompatible with the older thesis of a weak state presence in the borderlands. Indeed, Crews' own observation that reliance on Islam was crucial to imperial administration can easily be construed as indicative of the precarious foundation of the Tsar's authority. To be sure, the carefully nurtured relationship with Islam afforded the government two considerable advantages. It certainly mitigated the threat of native hostility to Russian rule based on a popular sense of religious persecution. For example, the affirmation by many indigenous clerics that the empire enjoyed status as *dar al-Islam* (a House of Islam) was of inestimable value. Then, too, official support for a cooperative domestic spiritual authority constrained the influence of potentially troublesome foreign Muslims within Russia's borders.

Overall, this is a fine work that sheds valuable new light on the processes of empire and the management of cross-cultural governmental relationships. In this sense especially, Crews' research has considerable contemporary relevance.

Robert Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ENDURING THE FREEDOM: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan, Sean M. Maloney, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2005, 336 pages, $27.50.

There have been several books published recently about the current events in Afghanistan. Most are by journalists, who often do a good job with surface reporting but lack the background to do in-depth analysis. Many journalists, for example, have never spent a day in uniform, so they do not really understand the military; nor do they typically have post-graduate degrees in history, anthropology, archaeology, or regional studies, so they do not understand the region. Sean Maloney is a former Canadian Army combat arms officer who teaches in the Canadian Royal Military College War Studies Programme and is the strategic studies adviser to the Canadian Defence Academy.

In Afghanistan, Maloney spent time with Canadian, Dutch, German, Irish, Romanian, and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members, went on operations with the 82d Airborne Division, and met with prominent and ordinary Afghans. He provides a military historian's perspective of Afghanistan's history from before 9/11 through his first visit in 2003.

Enduring the Freedom is a history, a travelogue, a look inside the mysterious ISAF, a positive Canadian view of the U.S. military, and a hoot to read. Maloney is a serious, yet irreverent, historian who gathers his data from the war zone, not the dusty tome. Blunt, uncompromising, and a brilliant analyst without a speck of political correctness about him, he covers the good and the bad with a measured sense of proportionality.

Maloney has provided a good look at the ISAF mission through 2003 and at the changing U.S. mission as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began pushing out from the airfields and into the countryside. Not surprisingly, the book is stronger when it discusses ISAF and OEF than it is when discussing the Afghan perspective. That said, I have no real qualms about recommending *Enduring the Freedom* to historians and military professionals alike.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR AND THE ENGINEERS: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, Keir Lieber, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2005, 226 pages, $39.95.

The title of Keir Lieber's latest book could have been more appropriate: *War and the Engineers* is really not a book about war or about engineers; it is about the latest scholarship on the offense-defense theory in political science. This quibble aside, Lieber's study breaks new ground by openly criticizing and eventually refuting the theory.

The book's introduction outlines the foundations of current offense-defense theory. Broadly, the theory holds that war and peace depend on technology and perceived power. If a country has offensive capabilities, it will attack and expand, overthrowing the status quo. When

defense predominates (ideologically, technologically, or otherwise), cooperation and peace are more likely. In subsequent chapters, Lieber considers both military and political outcomes to discredit the theory. By analyzing offense-defense using its own vocabulary and definitions, Lieber deconstructs it persuasively. He uses two case studies of offensive mobility (trains in the wars of German unification and tanks in WWI), and two case studies of the evolution of defensive firepower (small arms in WWI and the nuclear revolution), to turn the theory against itself. Lieber argues effectively that neither offensive nor defensive capabilities pushed or prevented war in the time periods he examines.

The book's conclusion offers an overview of the theory and Lieber's argument, and it presents an alternative argument, "technological opportunism," which provides just enough information for readers to look forward to Lieber's next project.

War and the Engineers is the latest contribution to the ongoing debate in political science circles about war's causes. It is well-written, well-argued, and concise, and its extensive bibliography provides a wealth of information on the field. Historians, political scientists, officers, and analysts, all of whom should be familiar with offense-defense theory, should read this book. I give it my highest recommendation.

S. Mike Pavelec, Ph.D., Hawaii Pacific University

BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, Marco Palacios, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2006, 299 pages, $22.95.

Marco Palacios' *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002* is an analysis of how social, economic, and political conditions combined to create a hyper-violent outburst that has reverberated like shockwaves through Colombia's history. Palacios, a leading Latin American expert, organizes his work according to relevant historical events instead of the strict chronological sequence usually used in histories of Colombia. This technique allows readers to concentrate on the events, essentially grasping the relevance and impact of each.

The work begins by describing political struggles prevalent in the late 1800s, a period that saw three civil wars, as a contest between federalist radicals and centralist conservatives, both vying for constitutional control. Palacios then illustrates how the Catholic Church's strong influence led to reforms, now known as "the regeneration," which amounted to nothing more than the church regaining its control over society. He also examines the period between 1903 and 1930, years dominated by the struggle between capitalist entrepreneurs and their workers. According to Palacios, Colombia experienced economic growth during this period by opening up to foreign investments and entering the international trade arena.

Palacios then shifts his focus to the period from 1930 to 1944, when conservative power collapsed and the global economic depression set in. This was the precursor to the period of riots and war known as *La Violencia*. Palacios surmises that as the masses gained more rights and privileges, they desired even more, which exacerbated friction between them and the "Plutocratic elites." Palacios' account of this period is by far the most detailed modern work on *La Violencia* to date. He claims that "the political system could not digest the new levels of political participation that Gaitan [the populist chief of the Colombian liberal party] had wrought." The work finishes by focusing on the consequences of the compromise between the two major parties that eventually led to what the author calls "savage capitalism," in which drug lords commonly intervene in presidential elections.

Palacios has packed a huge amount of historical data into this very palatable work. He provides his readers with insight into the root causes of Colombia's violent past and connects those causes to its current instability. *Between Legitimacy and Violence* is an intellectual multi-tool for any military member struggling to understand the complex socioeconomic problems of the contemporary operating environment in Colombia.
MAJ Douglas C. Judice, Monterey, California

THEY JUST DON'T GET IT: How Washington is Still Compromising Your Safety and What You Can Do About It, David Hunt, Crown Publishing Group, Random House, Inc, New York, 2005, 252 pages, $25.95.

David Hunt has written a book about a subject that should make every American reader angry and rightfully so. Unfortunately, his tone, his personal attacks on leaders at every level, and his use of profanity for profanity's sake combine to produce a book that should not have been published in its current form.

Hunt introduces compelling information to support his position that the government is not making much headway in the War on Terrorism mainly because individuals and government agencies simply do not understand the problem. However, by making personal attacks on government officials, Hunt causes the reader to question his objectivity. For example, when he introduces Sandy Berger, the former National Security Advisor, Hunt refers to him as Sandy "I Ain't-Going-to-No-Stinking-Vietnam" Berger. What does not going to Vietnam have to do with Berger's ability to perform his duties?

If the reader is willing to wade through such ad hominems, this book is full of convincing examples of how commanders, government agencies, and national leaders missed opportunities to snatch or kill terrorist leaders. For example, Hunt shows how we wasted actionable intelligence by allowing Al-Qaeda operatives to escape two weeks into the invasion of Afghanistan. He cites the case of Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was spotted in a convoy and then tracked for three hours by a CIA-owned, U.S. Air Force-operated, Central Command-controlled Predator unmanned aerial vehicle. Both the CIA and the Air Force had eyes on target, but final clearance had to come from Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. After

considerable deliberation, Central Command scrapped the mission because of concerns that Zawahiri's family members or other non-terrorists might also be in the convoy. While concerns about collateral damage can and always should be taken into account, Hunt argues that they should not be allowed to thwart an opportunity to take out the number two person in Al-Qaeda.

Hunt is a patriot who is attempting to motivate people to demand substantive change. He chronicles how the government wasted time and money on a series of reorganization efforts that have yet to cause any real improvement in effectiveness—a fact that ought to make any American taxpayer mad. Unfortunately, through his frustration, Hunt has produced a book that is hard to recommend in its current form.

LTC John C. Barbee, USA, Retired, Fort, Leavenworth, Kansas

UNRAVELING VIETNAM: How American Arms and Diplomacy Failed in Southeast Asia, William R. Haycraft, McFarland and Co, Jefferson, NC, 2006, 263 pages, $35.00.

Unraveling Vietnam is a revisionist work that attempts to refute the idea that the war was a result of flawed foreign policy. William R. Haycraft argues that the war was necessary and would have been winnable under better circumstances and with better leadership. His purpose is to provide comprehensive coverage of the period from 1946 to 1975, and to challenge the orthodox position that the Vietnamese Communists were nationalists fighting to unify Vietnam while the United States immorally supported a separatist South Vietnam.

As a basis for refuting the view that the Viet Cong were nationalists, Haycraft presents a plausible version of what the enemy might have been thinking. He uses the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's Resolution 15, which placed the highest priority on achieving unification by revolutionary war in the South, as evidence of the Communist North's control of the Viet Cong. This connection, however, is more implied than proven.

Although Haycraft tries to put both sides' actions into context, he periodically misses the mark. For example, when addressing Pham Van Dong's four points for negotiation, he makes no reference to President Lyndon Johnson's complementary speech at Johns Hopkins University. Haycraft also states that during Tet there were "some PAVN [Peoples Army of Vietnam] attacks around the DMZ [demilitarized zone]," but he does not discuss Khe Sanh. Johnson's speech and Khe Sanh are covered later, but by then we have lost their connections to other events.

Another weakness of the book is its coverage of the subject of diplomacy, which is ironic considering its subtitle. Haycraft provides only limited discussion of U.S. efforts to get the South Vietnamese Government to change its policies on such issues as land reform. Nor is there much discussion of U.S. national strategy, which Haycraft should have cited to connect diplomacy to the use of military power. The book does, however, underscore U.S. failures to understand the enemy and the type of war the Nation was fighting—failures that kept the United States from developing a viable political and military strategy.

Despite its flaws and the fact that its conclusions lack solid cause-and-effect relationships, Haycraft's book ultimately succeeds in calling into question much of the orthodox positions. *Unraveling Vietnam* does not broach much new information, but it is well-written and provides a good overview of the war. In short, this is a good work for the undergraduate and general reader, as well as those who want to gain an appreciation of the myriad issues involved in Vietnam.

LTC Paul B. Gardner, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BATAAN: A Survivor's Story, Lieutenant Gene Boyt with David L. Burch, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 2005, 237 pages, $24.95.

First-person accounts such as this are gems in a genre often filled with works that are well-researched, but that lack the emotional depth of a personal memoir. *Bataan: A Survivor's Story* is simply one of the best first-person accounts of the Death March that I have read. Gene Boyt, a survivor who endured the march and three ensuing years of captivity, tells his story in the fireside-chat style that marks the very best of published memoirs.

An engineer lieutenant assigned to the Philippines before the onset of war, Boyt was not a particularly remarkable man. He was a son of the Great Depression, an Oklahoma boy who worked in the Civilian Conservation Corps and earned a college degree through sheer willpower and determination. He was proud to serve his country and yearned for the adventure of an exotic assignment far from the shores of America. His retelling of the days before the war is not overly exciting, but just the kind of story you'd hear on a Friday night at the American Legion or the local VFW post. It's the way he tells his story, so ordinary in so many ways, that captures and holds the reader's attention. By the time he gets around to the events of 7 December 1941, the book is literally impossible to put down. His characters come to life. You can sense the electricity in the air and take in the scents of the Philippine jungle.

There is no self promotion, no grandstanding, and no posturing in *Bataan*. Boyt's story is amusing at times, tragic at others, but always enthralling. He is a simple man telling a story that is anything but simple. To read this book is to step inside the world of Lieutenant Gene Boyt and live the events of the time through his eyes. With the able assistance of David L. Burch, Boyt presents a marvelous account of his experiences in the Pacific Theater during World War II. More than worth its modest price, *Bataan* will make a fantastic addition to any bookshelf.

LTC Steve Leonard, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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<superscript>MR</superscript>Letters

Assurance about Afghan PA Article

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Ricks, *U.S. Army, Retired*—This letter addresses the factual issues raised by three corrections suggested by Lieutenant Colonel, Retired, Pamela Keeton, to my article "Telling the Afghan Story . . . Their Way" on the uniqueness of Afghan public affairs (PA) practices (*Military Review,* March-April 2006).

The controlling fact is that the Coalition and Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) are conducting separate but complementary PA operations. Because of the vast cultural differences, one can't assume that what works for one automatically works for the other. Now to specifics:

1. Keeton's detailed discussion of the Coalition's adaptive PA tactics demonstrates important cultural awareness but is not relevant to a discussion of Afghan PA operations. The fact is the Afghans begin with a bicycle and personal contact. It's not their "Plan B." Those few Coalition PA assets who mentor the MoD on a daily basis must accept that reality. Otherwise they won't be credible.

2. The fact is that Coalition and NATO/International Security Assistance Force, PA, and International Organization officers prepared messages and supporting slides to be used by Major General Zahir Azimi on 7 and 8 October 2004. Their identities are not relevant as the story isn't about them; each is highly skilled and well intentioned. Azimi respected both. I have photographs in which one of them is preparing text for Azimi by synchronizing the Coalition messages and slides on a laptop with Azimi's prepared text. In fact, one of *Military Review's* photos shows a Coalition-prepared title image behind Azimi as he speaks. Within days the cooperative sharing of information replaced the imposition of messages. This approach became very successful and was eagerly welcomed by Azimi. This change allowed him to control his own comments and gave him more credibility.

3. On 28 April 2005, several months after Keeton's departure, I attended the National Day Military Parade in Kabul. This was one of four such events involving national leadership that I assisted with after the inauguration. I discussed with colleagues the contrast between the Afghan media procedures we observed in April and the "cage" of the previous December. A Coalition brigadier general, who was listening nearby, intervened to say that he had made the decision to erect the cage and impose the very restrictive rules on the reporters. He had been concerned that the laissez-faire media approach practiced by the Afghans would jeopardize the strict timeline for the inauguration. His comments and their consistency with the facts of the inaugural preparations (as described by Keeton) led me to include the cage in the article and confirmed my comments about outside intervention and its motivation. As Keeton herself points out, that decision was unfortunate.

Thus the facts stand as I describe them in the article. So does my message: Let the Afghans tell their stories their way!

Thanks to LTC Kilcullen

Lieutenant Colonel B. Scott Marley, *Battalion MiTT Leader, India Base, Iraq*—I recently gave a copy of Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen's article "'Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency'" (May-June 2006, *Military Review*) to my Iraqi Army battalion commander (Colonel Munam). After he read it, we discussed several of the author's points that applied to local national forces. Colonel Munam asked me to convey his thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen and the Arabic language staff at *Military Review*. The next day Colonel Munam began reminding his soldiers of the importance of winning the local people to the government's side against the insurgents.

Thank you for making *Military Review* available to our Arab allies.

Baghdad April

Who would have thought even minutes ago
Black Hawk swept from the taupe
Medieval California Kuwait to the quivering sandust of Talil
Sweat, Al-Hilah, Marine bird, older than damp crew, machine
Smell, vibration ammo cammo scraped paint web belts, still
Tighten gray roar and chaos, nose down, brown. Just get us there.

Now green. For ten thousand lives this river ran brown with blood
Helping reeds limber bodies once passed as blind. Just get us there.

Down, then BIAP, destruction for glory
Spurts and unthinking tremors, the shakti of nonduality,
Bills unpaid as crushed planes kneel lame,
Torn tarmac shattered with dust
Fade, then the comic book cantos: a prince of
Babylon, sword of Assyria, builder of Ur, heavens perturbed,
Trauma hung close in crumbled glass, a facade (yet more)
Meaning deep to those who looted that brief cosmic day
Missed by those who watched.

Stories, reprise, thunder run
Endless dust nights of expendable men
     blind (they must have been)
To spin a rusty truck against a tank
With only, what? passion? hate?
     fear?
Perhaps no thought at all
Except to hope the engine would start (or not)
     and no one else would see.
No matter. They are now mist, counters in a game.

We hurry, are watched, relief, no love and
Bomblets are toys, slipping through dry canals with a last black smoke
to please a small hand as
Green towers turn red, mating in the night.
Somehow we must have known (even a
first summer wind will dry the eye). Yet
Rank on file is an army of shrouds, mist,
And hot days turn gray, crafting wry smiles.
Then fade. Finally,

   to destroy and build, Shiva in web gear
While somewhere a bridge is lost. But what?
Who is destroyer, who a builder? We know
Often great power is only owning the detritus.
Still there is BIAP, flight out, home, strong shoulders and
Hiphop, path to insanity and relief.
And then, a tiny point of blood receding on the glass.

— *Dr. Steven Metz*
U.S. Army War College