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Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times are not necessarily the right ones in counterinsurgency situations. A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with every available weapon would be guilty of dereliction of duty; the reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to apply the minimum of fire. ‘No politics’ is an ingrained reaction for the conventional soldier, whose job is solely to defeat the enemy; yet in counterinsurgency warfare, the soldier’s job is to help win the support of the population, and in so doing, he has to engage in practical politics. A system of military awards and promotion, such as that in conventional warfare, which would encourage soldiers to kill or capture the largest number of enemies, and thus induce him to increase the scope and the frequency of his military operations, may well be disastrous in counterinsurgency warfare.”

“It has been asserted that a counterinsurgent confronted by a dynamic insurgent ideology is bound to meet defeat, that no amount of tactics and technique can compensate for his ideological handicap. This is not necessarily so because the population’s attitude in the middle stage of the war is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population’s stand. So much the better, of course, if popularity and effectiveness are combined.…

...The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good. And he cannot cheat much unless his political structures are monolithic, for the legitimate opposition in his own camp would soon disclose his every psychological maneuver. For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda.”


PHOTO: U.S. Army COL Thomas Vail, right, commanding officer, 506th Regimental Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division; an Iraqi police officer; and the commanding officer of the 6th Iraqi Army Division discuss where to position security personnel during the commemoration of the death of the 7th Shiite Imam, which drew more than one million pilgrims to the Kadhimiyah Shrine in Baghdad, Iraq, 20 August 2006. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Keith W. Devinney)