
In 2004, before most of the military establishment had begun to recognize, courtesy of the souring situation in Iraq, that the nature of warfare had changed, retired Marine Corps colonel Thomas X. (T.X.) Hammes published The Sling and the Stone (Zenith Press, Osceola, WI, 2004), a substantive, thought-provoking book about the evolution of modern warfare and how to combat today’s emerging enemies (including those in Iraq). Although fairly well received when it first came out, the book seems to be gaining momentum now, both in sales—a new edition recently hit the street—and with military thinkers. Can a two-and-one-half-year-old book be reviewed as a classic? It can, and should, if it says the kinds of smart, prescient things that Hammes had to say in 2004.

Working within the generational warfare framework model credited to the likes of William S. Lind and Gary I. Wilson, et al., Hammes begins with an overview of the first three generations of modern warfare, then proceeds to detail how the previous generations logically led us to what he calls “4th Generation Warfare,” or 4GW—warfare that utilizes all available networks (political, economic, social, and military) to convince an enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. According to Hammes, 4GW is measured in decades rather than months, and when properly employed, it can defeat greater economic and military power. Hammes argues that the U.S. political bureaucracy and the Department of Defense’s cold war (3GW) defense posture stifled our ability to respond effectively to insurgents and terrorists who employ 4GW, and who now dominate the contemporary operational environment.

Hammes credits Mao Tse-Tung with the birth of 4GW. Using a host of historical examples (e.g., Mao’s communist revolution, the Vietnam wars, the Sandinista rebellion, the two Palestinian Intifadas, and conflicts in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq), he depicts the versatility of 4GW enemies—enemies who will, in their own time and under their own terms, make use of whatever the environment provides them to combat nations like the United States. Hammes’s examples also highlight the difficulty and complexity of preparing for and effectively engaging in 4GW. He reminds us that no foe will dare to engage the United States in conventional warfare because they know full well that they cannot succeed; conversely, they can and will engage the United States with 4GW tactics and techniques because no 3GW superpower has ever defeated a 4GW enemy.

Hammes’s assertion (in 2004, remember) that the U.S. military has wandered into a strategy and capability gap is compelling. He particularly emphasizes the military’s inadequacy at using the media domain and its enemies’ savvy use of same; the military’s over-reliance on technology; and the cumbersome nature of a cold war organizational structure that has responded poorly to today’s enemies. Hammes also addresses the importance of leveraging networking, employing integrated systems, training to operate in chaos, and gaining greater force flexibility. Utilizing his extensive military intelligence background, he details in a very persuasive manner what he sees to be the real threats to the United States versus the (then) prevailing misguided assessments.

Hammes forcefully lays out the steps necessary to rectify intelligence failures and other perceived shortcomings in military defense, defense strategy, and the military personnel system. Such reform is absolutely essential if we are to build a military capable of addressing 4GW.

Hammes’s practical solution to succeeding in 4GW, as well as preparing for what he sees as possible 5th generation warfare—exemplified by the anthrax and ricin attacks on Capitol Hill—is to 1) get rid of bureaucratic obstacles that keep civilian and military experts apart, so that they can discuss and resolve issues, rather than spend the defense budget on expensive high-tech weapon systems and associated technical training and upkeep; 2) use savings from the latter to teach Soldiers and Marines language skills, to make them culturally aware, and to enhance their knowledge of the regions they might deploy to; 3) spend more time in the field conducting real-world training to gain relevant practical experience; 4) establish longer tours to reduce turnover of personnel serving in critical positions; and 5) significantly reduce heavy ground forces and create more flexible, versatile, medium-weight units capable of sustaining a forward presence for peacekeeping and nation-building. Hammes also asserts that specialized skills need to be developed or expanded in military police activities, saturation patrolling, assimilating within indigenous populations, training indigenous forces, and conducting close-air support—all within a unified command structure that lends itself to effective, efficient coordination with government and non-government entities.

The Sling and the Stone was written to appeal to a vast and diverse audience. It provides numerous jewels of information for the general reader as well as senior military leaders,

In the midst of a global war on terror in which Iraq could very well represent the first cog to fall in what President George W. Bush referred to as the “Axis of Evil,” author Ali Ansari offers a thoughtful examination of American foreign policy efforts in the supposed linchpin of the axis, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The result is a work that is as timely as it is captivating. In Confronting Iran, Ansari questions not just the role of consistently fundamentally flawed foreign policy in maintaining a dysfunctional relationship with the troubled nation, but our own inevitable culpability in spawning a modern extremist state.

According to Ansari, most Americans believe that Iran is “not just a member of the Axis of Evil, but the founding member, the chief sponsor of state terrorism . . . .” From the outset, he lays bare the increasing fallibility of our policies while at the same time exposing many of the myths that have perpetuated U.S. perceptions of Iran. Beginning with the U.S. role as a benevolent sponsor of emerging Persian nationalism in the aftermath of World War II, U.S. foreign policy has been confused, incoherent, domineering, and antagonistic. Such inconsistency, according to Ansari, eventually alienated most Iranians and was ultimately the root cause of the 1979 hostage crisis.

Initially, when our policy focused on ensuring that Iran retained the ability to explore its nationalist desires with its British patrons, Americans were viewed as benefactors. However, shortly after taking office in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower put America on a path that would alter the future landscape of the Middle East. Under the auspices of growing concern about the spreading threat of communism, Eisenhower authorized the fateful coup of 19 August 1953 that overthrew the government of Iran’s popular premier, Mohammad Mosaddeq. Because it enabled the British to reestablish control of the Iranian oil industry, the coup was perceived by many Iranians as an unforgivable betrayal of trust.

Ansari continues his tale of shortsighted policy with the ascension of the American-supported Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose own quarter-century of exploitive practices were viewed as an extension of Western dominance and interference and further alienated an increasingly impoverished populace. When events finally came to a head in 1979, most Americans were ignorant not only of our policies over the previous decades, but also how those policies had affected Iran’s attitude toward America.

In the years since, American policy toward Iran has either been outright hostile (the general approach of Republican administrations) or simply indifferent (President Bill Clinton’s approach). Sadly, in the days after the 9/11 attacks, at a time when a policy of reconciliation would have been beneficial, America turned away from the conciliatory overtones of Iran’s reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. According to Ansari, the Bush administration’s refusal to open relations with Iran weakened the moderate Khatami, ironically clearing the way for the extremist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to take the Islamic nation on a path that would further isolate Iran from the Western world.

Confronting Iran is an exceptional book. Ansari’s writing is succinct and to the point, offering an analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the region
that is as revealing as it is exasperating to those pondering the current standoff with Iran. Few books are as insightful, especially with respect to our role in what is arguably the most volatile region in our world. For readers with preconceived notions of Islamic anti-Americanism, this book is a necessary addition to the bookshelf.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR MADE NEW: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, Max Boot, Gotham books, New York, 2006, 624 pages, $35.00.

The prospect of a “revolution in military affairs” dominated American military thought during the final decade of the 20th century, as Soldiers, scholars, and journalists argued for various interpretations of how wars might be fought in the new millennium. Some of these theories have, in fact, proven their utility in combat, but necessity, not theory, remains the mother of invention. The ongoing “long war” has demonstrated and inspired a host of military innovations, from net-centric and asymmetric warfare to unmanned vehicles and improvised explosive devices.

In spite of these dramatic changes, the study of military affairs languishes on American college campuses. Nevertheless, the topic has become enormously popular in other venues, from the pages of major newspapers and magazines to cable news shows and best seller lists, and military analysis now seems omnipresent.

Enter Max Boot. A distinguished scholar and veteran journalist, Boot lends a particularly clear and pragmatic voice to our national conversation. His first book, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (Basic Books, New York, 2003), revisits the many lesser known conflicts that have shaped America’s military character and her problematic geopolitical status. His latest effort, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, casts an even wider net, examining how science has changed war over the past half-millennium.

Beginning with the French invasion of Italy at the height of the Renaissance, the author marches briskly through an interesting series of major and minor conflicts to illustrate how new and improved ideas deliver success on the battlefield and quickly inspire imitation and improvement. French artillery, for example, overwhelms the previously impregnable walls of city states such as Florence and Rome, leading to the development of new and better artillery, along with new and better fortifications to defend against it. Similarly, the Japanese navy borrows the idea for a carrier-launched attack at Pearl Harbor from the British success at Tarranto and is in turn driven from the seas by American naval power, particularly carrier battle groups. U.S. ship yards, notes Boot, launched more than 100 new carriers by the end of the war.

Better technology and greater industrial capacity are ingredients within this formula for military superiority, but social factors also play an important role, favoring those nations that foster public and private innovation. Empires that stifle intellectual curiosity (and ambition), such as the Hapsburgs and the Chinese, consequently lose their power and influence. Thus, Boot repeatedly questions divine preference for larger battalions by illustrating the ways in which smaller forces repeatedly employ better weapons and better tactics to vanquish their opponents, from Swedish combined-arms formations at Lutzen to Japanese battleships at Tsushima to American special forces in Afghanistan.

Boot presents these findings persuasively, but many of them sound like variations of a familiar theme, perhaps because his chosen topic and format follow a proven pattern. In fact, the evolution of military tactics and technology has become a sub-genre within the larger field of military history writing, with John Keegan’s 1993 effort, A History of Warfare (Vintage, New York, 1994), among the more prominent recent examples.

Boot’s analysis of the current Iraqi conflict also strikes a disappointingly familiar chord, partly because the author and others have already said and written so much on a war that is still unresolved. Still, Boot brings a refreshingly clear and lively approach, one that reflects his own curiosity and enthusiasm for this subject. The author’s concise summaries of such technical developments as the machine gun, the airplane, and the computer move the narrative forward at an energetic pace without sounding simplistic.

In addition, Boot frequently demonstrates a journalist’s eye for the telling detail. For example, his description of the young, peripatetic Curtis LeMay waiting all night for his B29s to return from the low-level fire bombing of Tokyo sticks out as one of the book’s most memorable images.

Unfortunately, this same enthusiasm for lively narrative occasionally goes overboard. Boot’s description of the Battle of Assaye includes cavalry sabers that tear through flesh “as if it were tender steak” and British infantry who “must have felt as if they were in a shooting gallery with bull’s eyes on their chests.” Describing the Battle of Midway, he notes that the belief in the supremacy of battleships “would finally be consigned to Davy Jones’s locker.”

In addition, Boot refers so regularly to movies (e.g., Zulu and Saving Private Ryan) to help illustrate various details that he borders on the patronizing.

These occasional excesses, however, amount to mere distractions within an otherwise intelligent and exceptionally entertaining work. Neither Boot’s topic nor his conclusions are revolutionary, but like many of the weapons and tactics he describes, his approach to military history represents an important addition to modern military thought.

LTC Bill Latham, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
**BOOK REVIEWS**


Writing in 1994, Army officer turned essayist Ralph Peters noted that “the soldiers of the United States Army are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers.” However, the primary challenge facing the United States was not likely to come from other soldiers, but from “warriors” whom he described as “erratic primitives of shifting allegiances, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.” While not endorsing Peters’ view of warriors as “erratic primitives,” Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew’s *Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* analyzes the tactics and strategies fighters from traditional warrior societies employ in modern conflict.

Schultz and Dew point out that tools for the analysis of conventional militaries such as the Joint Military Intelligence College’s *Handbook of Intelligence Analysis*, which instructs intelligence officers to make use of the enemy’s written doctrine, troop movements, order of battle, and encrypted communications to determine their military capabilities and likely modes of combat, are inappropriate for analyzing tribal warriors who wear no uniforms, do not organize themselves into battalions and brigades, and transmit fighting tactics through word of mouth and traditional practices rather than field manuals. However, the authors argue, this does not mean that information about tribal methods of warfare is unobtainable. Applying a structured set of questions to historical, anthropological, and cultural sources, Schultz and Dew demonstrate that tribal methods of warfare can be analyzed and studied as easily as the military capabilities of conventional opponents.

Central to their approach is the recognition that different cultures understand and rationalize war in different ways. Thus, the tactics and means employed in warfare vary as well. As the authors themselves point out, this observation is hardly new: when assigned as a liaison officer to the anti-Turkish Arab forces during World War I, T.E. Lawrence wrestled with the problem of how best to employ the Arabs in battle. Eschewing traditional Western modes of combat because his study of Arab culture led him to conclude that his allies were unsuited to serve as conventional troops, Lawrence believed that the “Arab way of war” was particularly suited to guerrilla operations. In fact, the irregular warfare waged by Lawrence’s Arab warriors proved highly successful against the Turkish forces.

The source of Lawrence’s insight was the oral tribal epics and poetry that exalted the raid as the ultimate test of courage and skill for a tribal warrior. To the Arab tribes Lawrence was advising, irregular warfare was the way war should be conducted. Schultz and Dew claim that Lawrence’s example is illustrative of their approach to analyzing how modern warriors fight. Like Lawrence, the authors advocate thoroughly studying the culture and history of the society in question.

Schultz and Dew apply their method to four case studies involving conflict between conventional militaries and tribal warriors: the UN/U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992; Russia’s first and second Chechen wars; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite the general discussions of traditional warrior societies in the introductory chapters, Schultz and Dew have uniformly chosen examples where the warriors are Muslim and the conventional power is Western.

In all cases, the conventional military struggled with the irregular tactics and decentralized command and control structures of their tribal opponents. Furthermore, the cultural practices of defending family honor and avenging “blood debts” led tribal warriors to fight in a very personal way. This escalated the viciousness of the conflict beyond what their more conventional military opponents viewed as appropriate for achieving relatively limited aims. When opposing enemy forces on their home territory, the tribal societies adopted something akin to total warfare, in which all able-bodied men became fighters and the rest of the populace functioned as scouts, spies, or sources of aid. Adapting their traditional ways of war to modern conditions, they remained highly dependent on societal norms and traditions that emphasized personal combat skills, courage, honor, and valor in battle.

The authors’ fundamental point is that “soldiers and statesmen must grasp the following: (1) armed groups found in traditional societies have long-standing methods of combat and ways of organizing to fight outsiders; (2) their members are well-versed in these modes of fighting and are prepared for their wartime roles; and (3) these traditional concepts invariably take protracted, irregular, and unconventional forms of combat.”

There is a somewhat uneven quality to the case studies in *Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias*, but the insight gained from Schultz and Dew’s approach becomes progressively apparent with each study. In the Somali case, for example, it is hard to see how an awareness of Somali methods of war and the role of Mohamed Farrah Aidid in clan society would have radically changed the UN/U.S. approach. On the other hand, when applied to the Iraqi insurgency, Schultz and Dew’s method clearly indicates how various components (Sunni Arab rejectionists and Shiite extremists) could have been handled in a manner that would have minimized the number of Iraqis who took up arms against coalition forces.

The unevenness in the applicability of insight highlights a central shortcoming in *Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias*: How do you apply the knowledge gained from Schultz and Dew’s framework to defeat tribal warriors? Knowing how an enemy will fight is certainly useful, but the key is to know how to act.
on that information. The authors note that “when soldiers fight warriors, they must also know how to adapt to their adversary’s way of war in order to prevail against it.” Unfortunately, they don’t provide any guidance about how knowledge gained from their framework can be used to defeat tribal methods of war. In fairness to the authors, they don’t claim to provide such prescriptive advice. However, more than 10 years after Somalia, the defense policy community is looking for more than such observations as “when statesmen and their military and intelligence services dismiss the capabilities of irregular adversaries as primitive, and fail to plan appropriately, catastrophe ensues.”

On the whole, *Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias* is a useful introduction to the topic of traditional warriors and modern warfare. However, the lack of prescriptive guidance for responding to the challenges posed by tribal irregulars leaves the reader wanting more. Those in search of works that combine analysis with recommendations would probably be better served by consulting John Poole’s *Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods* (Prosperity Press, Alexandria, VA, 2004) or the various writings of Ralph Peters.

**Walter Ladwig, Oxford University, United Kingdom**

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Paul Murphy has traveled extensively in Russia and Central Asia, and *The Wolves of Islam*, his fifth book, is an insightful account of the prolonged Chechen insurgency in the Caucasus. Relevant to both the long war and the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, it looks at a ruthless insurgency animated by nationalism and a radicalized Wahhabist version of Islamist ideology. The book is salient because it analyzes the external support of transnational nonstate armed groups and the financing linked to Al-Qaeda and its associated movements. Military strategists, defense specialists, and counterterrorist practitioners will also find the book useful because it covers a broad array of insidious asymmetric methods that the Chechens and some of their Arab allies have employed to inflict losses on Russian forces and protract the Chechen war.

Murphy offers a descriptive, chronological narrative of the characters and events between 1994 and 2004 that helped precipitate and protract a mélange of internal and external insurgent and terrorist actions in the Caucasus and the Russian heartland. Some of the violence and perfidy it captures is so barbaric that it seems surreal. Murphy’s depiction of the full panoply of insurgents, terrorists, mafia criminals, human traffickers, and foreign Arab fighters operating across the Caucasus is sordid, but instructive.

Khattab, “the Black Arab,” is one such predatory character. In a chapter entitled “The Black Arab and the Wahhabi Factor,” Murphy explores the roles and influence of Khattab and other members of an Al-Qaeda-trained cadre of radical Islamist Arab fighters who were active in Chechnya as early as 1995. The Black Arab’s task was to proselytize and train radicalized Wahhabi guerrillas to kill Russians. His methods were so brutal and vile that one could easily conclude that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi emulated them in Iraq a decade later.

Ultimately, *The Wolves of Islam* is germane because it illuminates one example of the network of Islamist nonstate armed groups and transnational criminals who pose grave threats to the Westphalian system of states. The book’s single biggest shortcoming is its absence of notes, which points to potential shortcomings in research. Nonetheless, I recommend *Wolves* as a worthy read that can give one a better understanding of the types of enemies we face in our own long war.

**LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait**

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*Defending America*, according to its publisher, “offers a telling glimpse into a military undergoing a demographic and legal transformation.” Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, a military veteran, former Air Force Academy history instructor, and now an associate professor of law at Rutgers University’s School of Law, aims to lead the way in both the historical and legal study of the military justice system. Moreover, she contends that studying cold war courts-martial reveals not only the condition of the U.S. armed forces at that time, but also the character of cold war America.

Hillman begins this brief volume with a discussion of post-World War II military justice reform and the institution of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Although the UCMJ provided the accused greater legal protection, it also gave commanders more authority over the definition of crime, thus limiting reform. The new code did, however, reduce the frequency of general courts-martial, largely because the new rules meant that such trials were more likely to expose “military folly.” Consequently, the military turned to less public and less drastic forms of discipline, such as Article 15 punishments, to “maintain exclusive military culture.” Overall, when convened, courts-martial were intended more as “spectacles” that testified to military values and reinforced the services’ control over service-members. Hillman concludes that cold war military justice was ineffectual, biased, and arbitrary.

Other topics of examination include the cold war military’s attitude toward dissent within its ranks, the tension between military obligation and family responsibility, race, women, and the sexual conduct of service personnel. In her discussion of official reaction to political dissent, Hillman seems to consider the Army’s response to
American prisoners of war (POW) who defected at the end of the Korean War a form of political oppression prompted largely by the defectors’ low social status. She declares that “communist doctrine had intrinsic appeal” to POWs who knew firsthand the “inequities of American society.” She does not explain why this intrinsic appeal did not convince more American POWs to defect. There is a note of surprise in her declaration two pages later that the military “could not tolerate soldiers” who “gave away secrets” or succumbed to “communist enticements.”

Hillman’s examinations of the military’s response to service-members’ family worries, racial minorities, and women are, on the whole, an extended discussion of sexuality, sexual behavior, and what was an apparently official obsession with service-members’ sex lives. The military was particularly concerned about homosexuality among its men and women, so much so that senior leaders generally escaped prosecution for most offenses save homosexuality. Hillman also claims that homosexual enlisted women were even more unacceptable than homosexual enlisted men.

According to Hillman, race was largely a matter of sex in the official view. It seems that “servicemen’s sense of sexual entitlement, fueled by the military’s culture of sexual opportunity, clashed with the military’s efforts to limit race mixing.” Indeed, interracial marriage and bigamy were “predictable” outcomes of military life.

Ultimately, Defending America is a curious little book. It is full of useful and fascinating information about military justice, but it also features stereotypes and generalizations and lacks the cold war context promised. Regardless, readers may find it a good brief description of post-World War II military justice reform and a profitable source of information on military legal cases. Consider checking it out from your library.

Janet G. Valentine, Ph.D., U.S. Army Center of Military History


Deborah Avant, associate professor of political science at George Washington University, has written an extremely useful analysis of the global trend toward privatization of military and security forces. Avant moves past the heated debate concerning the immediate political, economic, or ethical pros and cons of this burgeoning industry and instead provides much-needed insight into its long-term implications. Peering into the past and studying the present, she identifies the potential consequences of privatization.

Avant makes her case by analyzing the relationship between institutional values that motivate action and the capability to control violence. She notes that “privatization should redistribute power over the control of violence, both within states and between state and non-state actors.” Although scholars have identified at least three dimensions—functional, political, and social—of the monopoly of force in nation-states, Avant maintains that “ultimately all three . . . (and how they fit together) hold the key to controlling violence.” The state’s ability to determine the military’s capabilities often enhances its (the state’s) power, but increased reliance on private security firms to fulfill specific roles can undermine the state’s monopoly on force. The lack of control or accountability that can result from using contractors detracts from political control—from “who gets to decide about the deployment of arms and services.” Thus, market forces begin to intrude on the range of options available to policymakers. Additionally, through democratic processes that serve as mechanisms of “social” control, private security forces may become even less accountable to established political institutions. Foreseeable results may include significant changes in political authority, shifts in societal and professional norms and economic practices, and alterations in the relationship between the state and its citizens.

Avant’s analysis is refreshing for two reasons. First, she neither advocates nor admonishes the private security industry. Avant notes that “strong state cases all experienced less impact from privatization than weak states,” with the key being to determine an appropriate balance of forces and capabilities. Additionally, and perhaps more interestingly, Avant acknowledges that institutional behavior does not derive solely from economic interests or random decisions, but rather is often the result of a variety of influences, including a sense of social norms derived from history and perception.

This work is useful to those who contemplate policy and to military professionals who must implement and manage privatization initiatives. Avant successfully blends theory, history, and contemporary knowledge into a comprehensive, mature work that analyzes the current state of the private military industry. She provides leaders with an informed vision of factors that will profoundly affect the future of military operations.

Deborah Kidwell, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Michael S. Sweeny states that he wrote The Military and the Press to “set forth what has been wrong, and what has been right, about American wartime journalism . . . .” Sweeny’s subtitle, however, provides a better indication of what his book is really about: the long-running conflict, with its off-again, on-again truce, between the Pentagon and the press. Sweeny does a relatively admirable job discussing what’s been wrong and what’s been right, but his tracing of the long, fitful relationship between the military and the media is excellent.

Overall, Sweeny gives us a history lesson on the genesis and development of military-press relations.
He begins with the Revolutionary War, ends with a discussion of future military-media relations, and in between covers the connection in every major U.S. conflict. Generally, Sweeney looks at how effectively or ineffectively the military used the media. In doing so, he shows how the media evolved from being an information agency for the government into an independent purveyor of information for political and profit-making organizations.

Not surprisingly, The Military and the Press discusses some of the key issues in the history of military-media relations, such as Sir William Blackstone’s groundbreaking attempt to codify what the relationship between the press and power ought to be, and the introduction of the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment. The reader also meets famous journalists—Richard Harding Davis, Ernie Pyle, and Marguerite Higgins, to name a few. Elsewhere, Sweeney’s analysis is mostly objective, but in describing Harding, et al., it sometimes seems as if he is writing a glorified history of war correspondents. This, however, is one of the book’s few shortcomings.

Vietnam, of course, severed the formerly close connection between the military and the press, and in “The Great Divorce” Sweeney describes what went wrong. The media chafed at the inconsistency of what military spokesmen were telling them compared to what they actually saw when they accompanied troops into combat. The military in turn blamed the press for eroding the U.S. public’s confidence in the armed forces’ ability to win the war. Since then, the truce has been truly “uneasy.”

Sweeney’s final three chapters discuss current military-media relations, how they got that way, and what the requirements will be for a successful partnership in the future. The escorts and press pools of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the press’s exclusion from Afghanistan, and the embeds, press boosterism, and news distortions of Operation Iraqi Freedom, all with their implications for future conflicts, figure into what is arguably the most valuable part of the book for military readers.

On balance, The Military and the Press represents a good contribution to an important debate. It gives the reader a real appreciation for how media relations with the military have evolved and what it will take to ensure that both sides—and the nation—benefit from their mutual relationship.

LTC Gerald F. Sewell, USA, Retired, Kansas City, Missouri

DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2006, 384 pages, $27.95.

From 24 October through 20 November 1962, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) operated continuously at Defense Condition 2 (DEFCON-2) as the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the edge of nuclear war. The U.S. aggressively disputed Nikita Khrushchev’s attempt to protect Fidel Castro’s Cuba from invasion and to supplement Soviet strategic weapons by placing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on the island.

Norman Polmar and John Gresham retell this crisis from both the Soviet and American perspectives and make a number of interesting points. First, because of the possibility that American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft would be shot down over the island, the U.S. delayed flights for two weeks, thereby allowing the Soviets to achieve their unprecedented deployment in secret; in effect, the United States almost lost the argument before it began. Next, even though the United States eventually learned that Russia had based IRBMs on the island, imagery analysts were never able to locate the nuclear warheads. They also overlooked the presence of hundreds of smaller, tactical nuclear weapons that would have made the planned U.S. invasion of Cuba a bloody prelude to a world war. Furthermore, unlike in later cold war crises, in 1962 military leaders like General Thomas Power of SAC and General I.A. Pliyev, the senior Soviet officer in Cuba, had the power and the personalities to initiate hostilities even when their political leaders were trying to prevent conflict. Readers will also be surprised to learn that while seeking a solution, Soviet and American leaders showed little or no concern for the needs of their allies, such as Cuba and Turkey.

Although this new study is well researched, a few omissions result in an incomplete picture of events. The most important omission concerns the arrival of Russian IL-28 bombers in Cuba in late September. Although the authors mention the U.S. discovery of these bombers, they overlook Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s response. Informed of the bombers on 1 October, McNamara ordered intensified planning and the preparation of forces to invade Cuba, thereby initiating the buildup of U.S. forces two weeks earlier than most accounts of the crisis recognize. Overall, however, DEFCON-2 is a refreshing and informative study of a major strategic crisis in the history of the cold war. As such, it is instructive about many aspects of intelligence, government, and national security.

Jonathan M. House, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In D-Days in the Pacific, Donald L. Miller addresses the issue of “D-Day” in the American collective memory. He argues that the “D-Days in the Pacific” have received short shrift because of the popularization of the Normandy landings in the national consciousness. Miller sets out to correct the record and educate Americans about the immense scope of their country’s amphibious operations in the Pacific. Eventually, when the U.S. invaded Okinawa in the last year of war, these operations exceeded that of Normandy.
From Guadalcanal to Okinawa, the amphibious operations in the Pacific were critical to our nation’s final victory in that vast theater of operations. Miller uses some of the latest scholarship to tell the story. Especially useful are analyses of the war’s end by a broad spectrum of scholars. Miller is also careful to remain objective: while he highlights the brutality of the Japanese military, he keeps a clear, unbiased eye on U.S. actions. The bulk of the book, though, is about the actual amphibious operations, and Miller proceeds chronologically through them all. By necessity, he sticks to the operational level, although he does block-quote from participants to give his narrative a gritty, first-hand feel. His anecdotes are well chosen and effective; they keep the reader’s interest.

On the downside, there is little new in terms of primary research in _D-Days_. Also, Miller perpetuates unfortunate myths about Guadalcanal and impugns the character of Admiral Frank “Jack” Fletcher, the nominal commander at both Coral Sea and Midway who has long been criticized by historians for “abandoning” the Marines at Guadalcanal. Miller would have done well to consult John Lundstrom, who finally gives Fletcher credit for being one of the great naval warfighters of the early war.

Despite these relatively minor issues, Miller’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on the Pacific War. The book has pictures as well as maps that help the reader understand the brutal and vast nature of this conflict. _D-Days_ deserves a wide readership. Historians, students, and the general populace too will find it compelling.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


The Battle of Britain is so enshrined in myth that a reexamination poses serious challenges for a historian, not to mention a gentlemanly writer like Derek Robinson. Robinson, however, is up to the task. His new book, _Invasion 1940_, is a leisurely read done in an older style of writing that may lull the reader into complacency, but should not disguise the fact that the book is a first-class product.

Robinson’s thesis is that the Battle of Britain was not decided by the Royal Air Force (RAF), but by the continued existence of the Royal Navy. He covers old ground in setting the stage, relating how Adolph Hitler connived to allow the British Expeditionary Force to escape at Dunkirk and failed to take advantage of England’s vulnerability. Robinson’s twist on this standard historical take is that he blames Hitler’s architect, Albert Speer, for sidetracking the Fuehrer with plans for the new buildings of Greater Germany.

Robinson’s main contention is that historians have failed to account for the role the Royal Navy played as a deterrent to invasion. The usual argument is that if the Navy had had to return to England (from positions off Crete and Malaysia) to stop a seaborne invasion, it would have been susceptible to the Luftwaffe because it would have been forced to run a gauntlet of overwhelming fire. However, this counterargument doesn’t consider the RAF’s superiority to the Luftwaffe. In any running battle over great distance, the German Air Force would have been at a great disadvantage to the RAF, whose planes could stay in the fight longer. According to Robinson, the Germans’ major misstep was in failing to determine what the air campaign’s focus should be: air supremacy, local air superiority, or invasion coverage. The Germans could not address the campaign’s real center of gravity, the ability to invade by sea, because of their marked naval inferiority.

_Invasion’s_ greatest strength lies in Robinson’s masterful description of German inadequacies in invasion planning and invasion fleet composition. His description of the German fleet and the series of defeats the Royal Navy would have inflicted on it argues compellingly that Hitler understood at some primitive level that Germany was not equal to the task in 1940 and called it off.

_Invasion_ has only one good map and no photographs, equipment tables, or tables of organization. It is puzzling that Robinson, after sparing no detail in elaborating on the motley vessels comprising the German invasion armada, failed to include any photographs of them. The book is marred by printing glitches, too, and a few sentences that escaped the proofreader’s notice. Nevertheless, _Invasion_ is a well reasoned book that is a pleasure to read.

**LTC Robert G. Smith, USA, Germantown, Maryland**


_Shattered Sword: the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway_ is exactly as the title describes. Drawing upon Japanese primary sources for the first time, Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully have skillfully researched, analyzed, and drawn sound conclusions about the actual causes of Japan’s defeat at Midway. The authors evaluate wartime data and, in the end, expose many myths that surround the battle. This is the first truly complete and balanced examination of the decisive battle of Midway.

Parshall and Tully have made a complete study of their Japanese sources. Interpreting message traffic; analyzing original documents, doctrine, and tactics; and assessing the technologies the Japanese used and the decisions they made, the authors provide new insight. They skillfully describe the battle just as it transpired, and provide plenty of graphic aids—94, in fact—to illuminate the
text. The book’s most intriguing part is about the myths surrounding Midway, including the long-held one that the American dive-bomber attack on Japanese carriers preempted a decisive counterattack the Japanese were about to launch against the American carriers.

*Shattered Sword* is important because it is one of those rare books that offers a historical revision based upon information not previously considered by historians; moreover, it involves the intricate study of joint operations from both sides and integrates many facets of the battle into the overall study. The book is extremely relevant for today’s military officer, not only because of its joint flavor, but because it provides an example of how to analyze a battle from both the enemy and the friendly perspective.

**LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Many contemporary officers want to view the military arena as detached from politics. In fact, nothing is further from the truth. Throughout our history, the Army and politics have remained inextricably linked. Historically speaking, the years following the Civil War put the Army in the political arena more than in any other era.

Donald B. Connelly has produced a new examination of General John M. Schofield, a very important player in the politics of the post-Civil War Army. Connelly focuses on the impact of politics on military thought and deed throughout Schofield’s lengthy career, both in the military and after. Unfortunately, the jacket cover portrays Schofield in action against the Confederates, which may cause many readers to expect yet another drums-and-trumpet submission to Civil War bookshelves already clogged with such material. The first seven chapters are sure to please the war buffs, but it’s the second half, which will delight those seeking to know more about 19th-century civil-military relations, that makes a real contribution to military scholarship.

Connelly’s portrayal of Schofield speaks to the current experiences of many senior officers. Schofield’s tenure as a department commander (the regional commanders of their day) found him at odds with the presidential administration, Congress, and the Army bureaucracy at one point or another. Do we really think that today’s regional combatant commanders have it any different? Later, as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, Schofield again found himself contending with many of the same groups, although sometimes for different reasons than before. He even had a brief stint as secretary of war, while still holding the commission of a major general, an experience that gave Schofield an entirely different appreciation for operations in the political realm.

In producing an evenly critical assessment, Connelly succeeds where many biographers often fall short. While his regard for Schofield comes across clearly throughout the work, he candidly assigns blame where Schofield deserves it, especially regarding his subject’s racist and elitist attitudes. These came into play during his tenure as the military district commander for Virginia in 1867, and again during his involvement in the 1880 court-martial case of Cadet Johnson C. Whittaker.

Although the 19th century is beginning to seem like distant history, Connelly’s study of Schofield and the politics of generalship offers pertinent, unforced lessons and insights to anyone interested in the current relationship between the Army and its civilian overseers. On the whole, this work will go a long way towards better informing uniformed professionals about the important links between the military and its civilian leaders.

**MAJ Frederick H. Black, Jr., U.S. Army, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Eric Walther’s biography of William Lowndes Yancey, sometimes described as the “Patrick Henry of the Confederacy,” follows the remarkable development of a man from a staunch unionist to orator of secession. The death of Yancey’s father, a Navy war hero, and the remarriage of his cantankerous mother to a New England preacher, had a profound impact on young William. He grew to hate his stepfather and the New England society that had spawned him, and that hatred would spur Yancey’s politics for the rest of his life.

By 1850, Yancey had come to believe that the best interests of the South lay outside the Union, and he began to agitate for secession. He tried, unsuccessfully, to split the Democratic Party in 1848 and then succeeded in splitting both the party and the Union in 1860-1861. Having brought about the division of the Union, he served the Confederacy as an ambassador to England, a position for which his often intemperate style ill-suited him. Later, Yancey served in the Confederate senate. He died in 1863, having lived long enough to see his Confederacy in deep trouble after the disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

Walther’s telling of Yancey’s story is intimate and thorough. While he notes the dangers of what he calls “psychohistory,” in Yancey Walther has a subject who is ripe for it. Yancey craved public approval and went to extremes to gain it. His rhetoric was often hyperbolic, and he had a penchant for violence—as a young man, he was convicted of manslaughter, and in a speech he once threatened to bayonet a political opponent. It is tempting, too, to look for psychological causes behind Yancey’s sea-change from arguing forcefully (pre-secession) for a strict construction of Federal Government powers to his
later endorsement (post-secession) of a large expansion of Confederate government powers. In the end, however, Walther provides a balanced and critical but fair picture of the man.

The book’s only noticeable flaw is that it doesn’t contain the texts of Yancey’s speeches. Yancey was known as a great orator, but Walther gives only excerpts from the speeches. The complete text of a few archetypal Yancey speeches in an appendix would have been a welcome addition to an otherwise excellent biography of a complicated man and influential orator.

LTC Jonathan White, USA, Oxfordshire, England

DON’T GIVE UP THE SHIP! Myths of the War of 1812, Donald Hickey, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, IL, 2006, 376 pages, $34.95.

A Cause to Live For

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald E. Paulus, U.S. Army, Retired, Mesa, Arizona—In Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown’s article “Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad” (January-February 2007) he did a great job describing his experiences in Iraq. We can all learn from his trials and tribulations. He had a great team, many of whom I trained with when preparing to deploy from Fort Carson, Colorado.

LTC Brown identifies correctly that the enemy blends into the population, learns and adapts, rapidly reseeds leadership positions, and has multiple groups with multiple cells operating in the area of operation (AO). There is a critical message here for our leaders.

The insurgency in Iraq, mostly composed of local men between the ages of 18 and 40, can be likened to criminal gangs or organized crime elements more than they can be to conventional war fighters or terrorists. Their fight is not an ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. They tend to be decentralized in operations, are local within a small territorial range (only kilometers from their homes), and recruit their fighters from local talent.

Upward mobility is important to the insurgents. They compete for leadership positions, which allows them to reseed quickly. Their “cause to die for” is a result of the government’s failure to provide hope to or meet the most basic levels of service. LTC Brown concludes that “the people in our AO would allow the insurgents to move freely through them and live among them […] Tribes [would] protect their own. Individuals willing to provide information about insurgents or criminals would do so about members of other tribes, but never about members of their own.” He makes the critical observation that the insurgents are truly locals.

Although disastrous for the Republic in many respects, the War of 1812 has strangely been heralded as a great patriotic victory. In Don’t Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812, Donald Hickey attempts to show how this war could be conceived as a glorious triumph in spite of its unclear strategic aims, ruinous political and military execution, and ambiguous conclusion. The book exposes how little most Americans, even accomplished historians, know about the conflict and how even their limited knowledge is steeped more in folklore than in historical truth.

Hickey covers the war’s battles, weapons, logistics, and personalities by breaking each down into vignette-style analyses. These analyses seek to expose the truths behind the war’s major issues (e.g., its causes), its greatest mysteries (death of Tecumseh), and some obscure, overlooked tales (the Canadian Paul Revere). Each topic or tale has been meticulously researched and, despite Hickey’s somewhat encyclopedic organization, they are presented in an engaging prose style. Hickey also examines the broader impact of the war’s legacy on the American culture, its effects on Great Britain and Canada, and its geopolitical implications in North America and globally. Unfortunately, the work explores only the military aspects of the conflict; it does not delve deeply into the politics, economics, or social issues of any of the belligerent nations.

Hickey has clearly mastered his topic. Don’t Give Up the Ship! provides a cogent, entertaining examination of what its author considers (with great validity) the “forgotten war.” Students of military history wishing to alleviate their ignorance and misconceptions of this conflict will find it an enjoyable remedy.

Bradford A. Wineman, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LTC Brown speaks about the insurgents’ penchant for interpreting everything through the lens of self-interest (as is all human behavior). This is especially noticeable when dealing with people on the lowest rung of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. LTC Brown states that […] while the Iraqis in [his] AO would accept gifts, money, and projects, such perks did little to sway them to our side.” Insurgents have little allegiance to anyone and this can be a key strategy in beating the insurgency. They can quickly apostatize. We must create a “cause to live for” that is greater than their “cause to die for.”

LTC Brown reminds us what Maslow told us long ago: “you can’t self-actualize when basic needs are not met” […] He clearly demonstrates that the root cause of the insurgency in Iraq is not religion, or terrorism, or sectarian rifts, or tribal feuding—it is poverty […]
We need to ask a fundamental question: what are our democratic values? Pluralism and tolerance are not values, because by their very definition, they are valueless. As soon as somebody staked a belief in anything, they become intolerant of its opposite. For example, some of those reading this letter are already bristling that I challenge the article written and consign it to an infantile approach. Those bristling at such are proving this point, and are demonstrating intolerance to my critique.

Amazingly, we continue to fall for such nonsense. We continue to slip into the fantasy world that everyone wants what we have. It never dawns on us that many in the world don’t even want freedom. Most people, even in this nation of ours, prefer security, which is the antithesis of freedom. But, the more security one has, the less freedom they get, or deserve, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin.

When school teachers tell their students not to cheat on tests, they are demonstrating intolerance for cheaters. Conversely, if teachers tolerate cheaters they are demonstrating intolerance for those who refuse to cheat by at least granting them a special advantage on the tests. Our very drive for “pluralism” and “tolerance” demonstrates that we believe in nothing, not even democracy. Thus, with empty heads and vacuous minds, we blunder from one “system” to the other, searching for the silver bullet that will somehow make it all right.

With this approach we have become nothing but technocrats, striving to solve values-based problems with mathematical solutions. If we just find the right system, things will get better. All we need to do is solve for X. We keep looking for the technical solution to a values problem, and thus try to slam a round peg into a square hole. The problem here in the United States is that the vast majority of people no longer believe in anything, save for their personal peace and their material comfort. Thus, Kierkegaard and his “leap of faith” have met the “material girl” in a swiveling drivel of philosophical goo in which its practitioners no longer believe there is anything worth fighting, or for that matter, dying for. Unfortunately, our opponents on the other side of the asymmetric fight don’t think like us. And as a result, any serious student of history can see that we are in deep serious, trouble.

To F.J. Bing West:
Has the U.S. Military Become the Primary Source of Diplomacy?

Staff Sergeant Sheila Huff, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois—Thank you [Mr. West] for your candid discussion of the situation in Iraq (“Waiting for Godot in Iraq,” F.J. Bing West, January-February 2007). I especially applaud page 7 where you remind your readers of the very critical fact that the State Department, AID, Department of Justice, and the rest of the U.S. Government never showed up. I’ve worked missions from the Cold War to present and have never felt such an absence of these agencies as I have in Iraq. As a PSYOP soldier, I often worked closely with the State Department in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as on missions in Central and South America. I cannot stress enough how the absence of these other agencies has negatively impacted the success of missions in Iraq. I am often left to wonder in the current state of affairs, has the U.S. military become our primary source of diplomacy???

Mr. West responds:

SSgt—you are quite welcome; and yes, the military has become the diplomatic corps because only the military has shown the resolve and fortitude to get out among the people.