LESSONS LEARNED
from the Recent War in Lebanon

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PART I: Musings on War in General

1. Every war has its particular weapons. Every war has its own competing powers and military structures, and its own unique circumstances. Every war gives birth to new military thought.[1] Just as general knowledge accumulates across history to produce a loftier human awareness, so military knowledge and experience accumulate. Thus, what happened in wars of the past provides lessons for those who will fight the wars of the future.

2. In war, man exploits the peak of his knowledge. He also exploits the most modern science and technology he has arrived at.[2] Every wave of civilization creates its own particular weapons. Agricultural societies have forged the sword, the dagger, and the scythe, the basic weapons of war—the Rwanda massacre was all perpetrated with these weapons. Industrial societies fight with the tank and the airplane—think Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. As for post-modern societies, digital technology and computer science have entered the military framework—the United States is a pioneer in this field.

3. One might ask, Are wars the direct cause of technological advance, or is it technology that encourages wars?

4. In war, there is defense and attack. There is also maneuvering and out-flanking. In war, one side aims to kill the other, or, to paraphrase Clausewitz, to impose its will on the other. However, as Georges Khodor has noted, there will always be an "other."[3] So, do we kill everyone?

5. With war, empires fall and rise. What was before a war is certainly not like what comes after one. Unless a war ends in stalemate, one side wins, the other side loses. On both sides, however, everyone is, at the very least, wounded.

6. After a war, nations live in a state of trauma, which they pass out of only gradually, just like an individual who loses someone dear to him. After a war, the victor seems intoxicated, living on his glories. The loser recalculates and prepares himself for a new stage.

7. In war, concepts fall and others appear. New technologies prove their effectiveness; others fail and are dismissed.

8. In war, weapons are tried out, plans are tested. Did Moltke the Elder not say that the most important, best-laid plans do not survive the first few seconds after a war breaks out? War as it is anticipated seldom matches war as it is practiced. On the battleground, prices are usually paid in blood.

9. In war, there are several dimensions: land, sea, and air. Now there is talk about hypothetical worlds. In World War I, the infantry proved that it was the best. In World War II it was armor, maneuvering, and penetrating the heartland. And if the infantry improved its anti-tank weapons, the tanks responded with

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PHOTO: A Hezbollah Katyusha-style rocket strikes a building in the Israeli coastal town of Nahariya, 13 July 2006. (AFP, Yoav Lemmer)

more armor, thicker and of better quality, and thus your waterwheel turns—action and reaction.

10. One time air power determines war's outcome and achieves the political goals without a land battle—as happened in Kosovo. Another time, air power is the most important factor in preparing the field for the battle of the land forces—as in the two wars on Iraq. But an air force can also fail to achieve its nation's political goals, as happened in the recent war in Lebanon.

11. So in war there is no heaven-sent principle; there are no immutable rules that cross time and place. The battlefield is usually the testing ground, even if certain postmodern countries invented what is called war gaming. As well, in war it is not enough for one country to possess the most modern weapons and technology to achieve victory.

12. The "creative human will," as the French philosopher Henri Bergson called it, must find the magic equation for quick victory through a military plan that is unique and inventive and surprises the enemy before he is able to adjust to it. If the enemy does adjust to it, the plan loses the element of surprise, and the balance of power changes.

13. In World War I, the Germans wanted to make a flanking maneuver through Belgium to encircle the French. The French succeeded in converting the war into a trench war. France's leaders thought the next war would be like the one before it—defensive. And so they built the strongest defensive line in history, the Maginot Line. Germany responded with blitzkrieg, a new modus operandi founded on coordination between tanks and airplanes via wireless radios. The Maginot Line was bypassed, and France fell under German occupation.

PART II: Thoughts About the 2006 War in Lebanon

In this part, we will analyze the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. We will focus mainly on Hezbollah's military achievement, while reviewing the war's political aspects. We will also go over the negative repercussions of this war for Israel, and the positive repercussions for Lebanon and the Arab world; in other words, we will analyze what the battleground reflected, both positively and negatively, after Hezbollah tried out its new plans and weapons. We will investigate, too, why Israel failed to achieve all its announced political goals.

Taking this war and its lessons as a starting point, we will build a hypothetical strategic framework for a future Lebanese defense strategy. We will finish by proposing a logical, viable, and effective approach for solving the problems presented by Hezbollah's new warfighting ability.

The War in General

Simply put, the July War, as the Lebanese call it, or the Second Lebanon War, as the Israelis call it, was unique. Why?

● It was a war between a non-state actor and a nation-state.

● The non-state actor participated in another state and in all of that state's branches: executive, legislative, etc.

● The state in which the non-state actor resided (the host state) did not know about the war before the first spark ignited.

● The war was fought by the non-state actor, but entered into diplomatically by the host state. The host state neither owned the war, in the official sense, nor managed the war's battles—not in the strategic dimension, not in the tactical dimension. This could be an example of what Clausewitz meant when he said that war is politics by other means: the non-state actor seized the political initiative from the host state's government by controlling the specific circumstances that led to the war.

● The non-state actor possessed a military arsenal and military organization that most nation-states in its region, and even in the world, do not possess.

● The war did not figure in the host state's national security strategy; therefore, the host state and its government had no say in setting goals for the war—even though the people and government were among the means being used in the war. Consequently, the host state's government has reaped no political benefits from the war's outcome: the only beneficiaries have been those who decided, planned, and sacrificed for the war—the non-state actor. On the other hand, had the war's results been negative, the state could not have escaped its responsibility.

● The host state was unable to enter the war. It had been absent from the war zone for more than three decades, and had abdicated its duty to defend the war zone to the non-state actor.

● The opposing belligerent (Israel) retaliated directly against the non-state party militarily, but

it did not exempt the host government, its military institutions, and its infrastructure.

● The war took place between Hezbollah (the non-state actor) and Israel (the opposing belligerent) with the host state (Lebanon) relegated to the sidelines. Hezbollah issued belligerent statements to which Israel responded with pamphlets—all part of the psychological warfare, all done in the absence of the concerned Lebanese ministry, the Ministry of Information. Hezbollah bombed Israel in its geographic depth. Israel responded by hitting the security quad—the Bekaa Valley and the south—where the Shi'ite majority lives.

● Israel imposed strategic paralysis on Lebanon, but the Lebanese Government more or less declined to respond in like or kind.

● Finally, Hezbollah is unlike all the other resistance movements we have known. It is resisting an outside power and not directly fighting its government for power. It says that its weapons are for all the sects in Lebanon—they are not just Shi'ite weapons. And it [Hezbollah] has reached the final stages of maturity, as attested to by its effective organization and its military prowess.

Was Israel Prepared for War?

The secretary-general of Hezbollah, Al-Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, has claimed several times that the party preempted Israel, dragging it into a war it was not ready for in terms of timing, preparation, and place.[4] Each time, Israel replied that it had not been preparing for war at all.[5]

Without relying on precise information, which only time will reveal, we can conclude that Israel mismanaged the war. It experienced significant logistical problems; its call-up of reserves was chaotic; its government continuously hesitated to specify the goals of the land campaign and did a poor job connecting military action to political goals; its intelligence about the areas adjacent to the Blue Line (the border between Israel and Lebanon) was inadequate; it failed to make needed substitutions in its Northern Command, especially during the course of military operations; etc. Altogether, the nature and extent of the problems Israel encountered suggest that it could

Billboards of Lebanon's Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, are seen on a road leading from central Beirut to a Shi'ite neighborhood, 20 July 2006.

not have been preparing for a land war of the size it found in Lebanon. Furthermore, in a paper presented to the Center for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut on 31 August 2006, the Arab representative to the Israeli Knesset, Dr. Azmi Bishara, stated that the decision to invade Lebanon was made quickly, shortly after Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers—the provocation that ignited the war—from inside the Blue Line.[6]

A news item published on an Israeli website might explain why Israel's land campaign was so poorly executed.[7] The website states that Hezbollah had broken up two spy rings Mossad had planted in the party, one before and one during the war. The rings' missions were to plant listening devices in Hezbollah's headquarters, observe the party's leadership, and place phosphorous markers on the party's headquarters and rocket-launching sites, marking both as targets for the Israeli Air Force. This suggests that Israel's real plan was to stage a simultaneous, swift, and comprehensive air strike against the entire Hezbollah leadership, effectively decapitating the party. When the rings were discovered and the plan negated, Israel had to come up with a plan B—the land campaign—quickly.

Bolstering this theory is the fact that the Israeli Air Force was very well prepared for action—above and beyond even its usual high state of readiness. Of course, to be positive about Israel's initial intentions, we will have to wait on the future and the information it brings.

Hezbollah's Approach to the War

Analysts may disagree about the Israeli Army's first reaction to contact with Hezbollah forces; however, Hezbollah cannot be considered to have executed anything but a first-rate tactical-operational surprise. Just how well prepared Hezbollah was can be deduced from Nasrallah's speeches, especially the ones delivered during and immediately after the Lebanese dialog roundtable and before the war's start on 12 July 2006.[8] Nasrallah's speeches indicate that—

1. Hezbollah had correctly identified the possible forms Israeli aggression against Lebanon might take, namely—

● A violent bombardment without occupying the ground, as happened in 1993 and 1996.

● A violent bombardment with a partial, temporary occupation, as in the Litani operation in 1978.

● A violent bombardment with a complete, long-lasting occupation, as in 1982 (until 2000).

2. Hezbollah had studied all possible lessons from all of Israel's previous wars.

3. Hezbollah had studied the strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli Army, taking as a starting point Sun Tzu's dictum, "Know yourself, know your enemy, and victory will always be your ally."

4. Hezbollah had scrutinized and outlined the battleground–the area stretching from the Blue Line to the Litani River—before the war. In fact, Hezbollah imposed the battlefield, giving the Israelis the impression that no matter what they did outside of this area, what happened in this area would determine who won and who lost. The Israelis could bomb anything in the Lebanese interior. They could conduct a number of airdrops wherever they wanted. But all these bombings and operations would not be decisive. A decision would only be gained in the area adjacent to the Israeli border.

5. Hezbollah analyzed the strategic culture Israel had accumulated across all the Arab-Israeli wars. The founder of this culture was David Ben-Gurion, a believer in Clausewitz's insistence on the necessity of annihilating one's enemy. Thus, one of the most important principles of Israeli strategic culture is, "If you want war with your Arab enemy, it's necessary to defeat him such that he's unable to reorganize himself for another encounter for a very long time."[9] But because toe-to-toe wars of annihilation would be too costly, Israel combined Clausewitz's call for annihilation with B.H. Lidell Hart's advocacy of an indirect approach. The combination of these two approaches yielded a strategy based on maneuver, air superiority, and firepower superiority. It acknowledged the necessity of changing the characteristics of the battlefield to accord with Israeli political goals, of gaining a quick decision and not getting bogged down in a war of attrition, and of portraying the war domestically as important for Israeli national security and even vital for the nation's destiny—a war could not be optional, as happened with Ariel Sharon in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

6. After determining what the battlefield would be, and after studying the Israeli military fighting creed and absorbing lessons learned from previous violent encounters with Israel, Hezbollah decided it would rely on a fixed forward defense while exploiting geographic depth.[10] The goal was to buy time and

David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founding father and first prime minister, is shown with Israeli troops during a visit to installations near the Gaza Strip region in 1957.

air, enjoyed much greater mobility, was equipped with the latest fighting technology, and had the support of the strongest country in the world, the United States. For its part, Israel had grown accustomed to destroying these armies, even if it was unable to impose a political solution. That happened in nearly all of Israel's wars with the Arabs: 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. In all of these wars, Israel failed to heed Clausewitz and prosecute war as a means toward political ends. War remained in the dimension of force, even excessive force, with no purpose other than destruction.

In the July War, Israel failed as usual to achieve any political goals. This time, however, Ben-Gurion's advice to pulverize the enemy's army also went unfulfilled. In fact, given the much greater size and power of the Israeli Army, and keeping in mind Henry Kissinger's assertion that "the resistance wins if it does not lose, and the nation-state loses if it does not win," the war looks like an Israeli defeat.[11] That said, let us consider the following repercussions of the war for Israel:

1. The war revealed the precariousness of Israel's ongoing security dilemma, which is built on the nation's permanent aspiration to gain and hold land it thinks it needs to guarantee its security. Israel's strategy has always been built on the principle of safe borders. In 1956, Ben-Gurion wanted the Sinai as a buffer zone. In 1967, it was the occupation of the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. In the first invasion of Lebanon, Sharon wanted a buffer zone in the south. The same principle lies behind the recent building of a dividing wall on the West Bank. But because these new borders were not (and still are not) internationally recognized—especially not by Arab countries—all of Israel's efforts to achieve lasting security have failed.

In addition to its land aspirations, Israel has relied on preemptive strikes to maintain its security. However, with Hezbollah, which had been

to inflict the greatest possible losses, particularly human, on an unprepared enemy. Ground lost would not mean that the Israelis had won—ground is not important in guerrilla warfare. Put another way, Hezbollah decided on a tactical attack (seizing several Israeli soldiers) with the goal of dragging the Israeli Army into a well-prepared playground where it (Hezbollah) was positioned to adopt a strategic defense and where time would work in its favor. If and when it lost ground, Hezbollah would reorganize itself to fight a guerrilla war, as it had from 1982-2000.

Thus, I believe that many thinkers and military-strategic analysts err when they describe Hezbollah's recent war against Israel as only a type of guerrilla warfare. It was actually a concocted mix, Lebanonized from several models of warfare. As such, it cannot be immediately generalized or exported across the Middle East because it is utterly unique.

7. Hezbollah's new style of war required equipment and training geared to counter the quality of Israel's forces. It required modern anti-tank weapons, which Hezbollah had obtained in quantity. The operational framework was completed with the addition of a unique rocket dimension—short, medium and long range. The important point about the rockets was that they were able to reach, with effect, into the Israeli interior.

Repercussions for Israel

In fighting Israeli forces, Arab armies had become used to clashing with an enemy that controlled the

preparing and lying in wait for six years, Israel would have to have fought a preemptive war every day—not a feasible option. Will Israel revive this principle? Possibly. It may depend on whether or not the international emergency forces in southern Lebanon today are a viable solution to Israel's border-security dilemma.

2. In all its previous wars, Israel plunged into battle on the edge of its safe borders, however far they extended (e.g., the borders after the Six-Day War). In the July War and in recent moves into the Gaza Strip, Israel began its plunge from the edges of its settlements, a clear indication that all of its previous efforts to secure itself by stretching its borders had not brought the magic solution.

3. By revealing hitherto unsuspected Israeli weakness, not just in the army but in the state, the war has lessened Arab fear of Israeli power; it has emboldened all Arab countries in their dealings with Israel. Those countries that made peace with Israel have been embarrassed in front of their publics, and they will be firmer in their stances towards Israel. Those countries that did not make peace have seen the results of last summer and now understand that there are other, not necessarily peaceful, ways to deal with Israel—a sentiment Syrian President Bashar al-Assad expressed in a speech after the cease-fire in Lebanon.[12]

What is especially significant is that there is now pressure on those countries still at odds with Israel to work towards liberating their lands. If Hezbollah was able to liberate Lebanon in 2000 and achieve a victory over the Israeli Army in 2006, why are the tougher, stronger Arab armies not able to take back their nations' lands? Did Hezbollah create the secret strategic formula for how to fight and defeat Israel? Perhaps, but such a judgment requires more time and study.

4. By exposing the inadequacy of Israel's safe-border strategy and reliance on force, the war has made it clear that Israel must work with its Arab

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neighbors to create a just and lasting solution to the region's problems. Like the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel now finds itself facing war on two fronts, Gaza in the south and Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon in the north. The war has helped Syria's president realize his father's dream of forming an eastern front to contain Israel; moreover, it has done so even in the absence of Jordan. Who knows what could happen now?

5. Today it is certain that there is trouble in the Zionist utopia. Zionism is more or less the only ideology that has achieved all its goals: bringing the Jews of the world together, founding the Zionist state.[13] So how will the war affect social assimilation in Israel, especially since the state already suffers from ethnic, religious, and secular problems? The army has long been looked at as "the national factory where differences between Jews melted away."[14] Will its lowered stature as a result of the war diminish its ability to bring Jews of many sects and ethnicities together? Will the future witness more of what is called "neo-Zionism," or will it enter a period of "post-Zionism"?[15]

6. The war shook the Israeli state, politically as well as militarily. Israel today is threatened by the tanks of traditional armies and the rockets of a non-state actor, Hezbollah. Last but not least, there is the danger of the knife—terrorism (according to the Israeli definition, of course).[16] In the political dimension, long-time leaders such as Sharon were absent, their places taken by novices in the science of war–Ehud Olmert and Amir Peretz. In the army, there was stumbling over the distribution of responsibilities, accusations met with counter-accusations, etc. And now, in the absence of any political effort to resolve the region's problems, Israel must rely on its military to hit the tanks, keep the rockets from falling on Tel Aviv, and thwart the knives. These are projects that will require a lot of time, a lot of money, and a convenient reality. Does Israel possess all these?

7. When Ben-Gurion read Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's book *Philosophy of the Revolution* and grasped Nasser's dreams, he feared greatly for Israel's survival. What would happen if Arab unity were achieved over the vast expanse of the Middle East, with its inexhaustible population and its riches important to the whole world? At the time, Ben-Gurion felt that Nasser must be gotten

rid of, and so plans were laid to strike him and his model for bringing Arabs together. There was the Tripartite Aggression, the combined Israeli, British, and French attack on Egypt in October 1956; subsequent undercover operations inside Egypt; and the permanent aspiration to encircle the Arab encirclement of Israel by opening up to Africa and all the countries surrounding the Arab world, especially Egypt.

Today, Israel is suffering from a new model, the non-state actor. This actor accumulated victories in 2000 and 2006. It is capable of gathering together Arabs and Muslims from every branch and sector, and it has embarrassed Arab regimes both friendly and hostile to Israel. This actor has provided a model that could be adopted to achieve victory over the Arabs' one great enemy. Finally, this actor is a player. Because of its performance in the recent war, new game rules have been established, not only for those at the fingertips of Israel, but for the region at large.

8. Ben-Gurion said that Israel had to depend on the support of a great power to survive. When some suggested England, he rejected the idea and decided to depend on the United States of America.[17] However, since 1991, the date of the first Gulf War, Israel has not played an important role in American strategy. It cited terrorism as a reason to invade Lebanon last July, but that seems to have been merely an attempt to jump on the American war-on-terror bandwagon. If the U.S. did delegate Israel the mission of wiping out Hezbollah, Israel failed in its mission. How will Israel regain Uncle Sam's trust? What does it have to do?

9. Although the negative effects of the war on Israel are many, naturally there were some positive results. For example, the war showed that Israeli society was able to absorb the impact of the rocket attacks in its interior, while its people cheered their soldiers on throughout the war.

10. In the recent war, the violent relationship between Hezbollah and Israel begun in 1982 finally reached a climax. Israel interacted with a non-state actor, much as it is doing now in the Palestinian interior. How has Israel's experience with Hezbollah affected its actions in Palestine? Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's first decision was to stop the

Israeli soldiers carry their gear as they walk along the international border with Lebanon, moments after crossing back into Israel, 18 August 2006.

unilateral withdrawal from designated areas in the West Bank. However, because of Israel's inability to defeat one non-state actor, and because it is impossible to measure victory in a war with such an actor, momentum seems to be forming in both the region and internationally for a political solution to the Israeli security dilemma. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 is but one sign of such momentum. Will it pan out, and if so, what will its impact be on the Lebanese scene?

In the end, the war's repercussions for Israel are connected to the extent that the state's political goals were—or were not—achieved. According to Olmert, Israel's war goals were to destroy Hezbollah and its arsenal, prevent its neighbors from arming Hezbollah (thus carrying out UN Resolution 1559), recover its two kidnapped soldiers, and restore the

deterrent image of the Israeli Army. While it has made the Lebanese Army responsible for security on the border today—an outcome desired by those who want to see Hezbollah destroyed as a first step toward solving problems in the region created by the Iranian-American rift—Israel really achieved none of its war goals. Hezbollah was able to stand strong, particularly militarily, and is considered by many Arabs to have achieved a divine victory; additionally, it now has 20,000 rockets instead of the 8,000 it had left after the war.[18] Israel also failed to retrieve its kidnapped soldiers, and the deterrent power of its army has been significantly degraded. In fact, the war has decreased Israeli society's trust in the army and the ruling class, a condition compounded by the recent plethora of sexual and financial scandals at the state's highest levels.[19] *MR*

NOTES

1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave* (Atlanta, GA: Turner Pub, 1995).

2. Ibid.

3. Georges Khodor is a Lebanese Greek Orthodox archbishop, a theological scholar, and a regular contributor of editorials to *Annahar*, Lebanon's leading day newspaper. He has published many books, most of a philosophical bent. Khodor's assertion that there will always be another "other" can be read as a rebuttal to Clausewitz's claim for the efficacy of annihilating one's enemy.

4. Speech by Secretary-General Al-Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, *Al-Safir* (Beirut), 5 September 2006.

5. The interim Winograd Report, an Israeli Government inquiry into July War mistakes, claims that "[Israel's] decision to respond [to Hezbollah's provocations] with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena." "Winograd Commission submits interim report," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Winograd+Inquiry+Commission+submits+Interim+Report+30-Apr-2007.htm>. The Israeli Defense Force's nonchalant approach to the war is perhaps epitomized by chief of staff Dan Halutz's taking the time, on 12 July, to manage his family's stock portfolio. See "Why did Halutz sell shares after Hizbullah attack?" <www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3291420,00.html>.

6. Azmi Bishara, paper delivered to Center for Arab Unity Studies, 31 August 2006, <www.daralhayat.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060816-18418797-c0a8-10ed-019d-d97b82b47fce/story.html>. In a raid across the Blue Line on 12 July 2006, a Hezbollah force killed three Israeli soldiers and wounded two. It also captured two soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, whom Hezbollah attempted to use as

chips in bargaining for the release of several Israeli-held Hezbollah prisoners.

7. "DEBKA*file* Exclusive: Spy fever sweeps Hizballah after breaking up two Israeli Mossad rings which included Lebanese Shi'ite agents," <www.debka.com/headline_print.php?hid=3208>.

8. For a collection of these speeches, see <www.moqawama.org/_dailynews.php?filename=20070724173449>.

9. Isaac Ben-Israel, "The Crisis in the Oslo Process through the Prism of Israeli Deterrence," *Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies,* vol 5, no. 2 (August 2002), <www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v5n2p6Ben.html>.

10. Cited in speech by Nasrallah, 21 July 2006, Beirut, <www.assafir.com>.

11. Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06): 16-31.

12. See account of speech by Assad, <www.qudspress.com/look/sarticle.tpl?IdLanguage=17&IdPublication=1&NrArticle=1473&NrIssue=1&NrSection=4>.

13. Ephraim Nimni, *The Challenge of Post Zionism* (New York: Zed Books, 2003).

14. Gil Merom, "Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, 114, no. 3. (Autumn, 1999): 409-434.

15. Nimni.

16. Eliot Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt, Andrew J. Bacevich, '*Knives, Tanks and Missiles': Israel's Security Revoluti*on (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).

17. Allon Gal, *David Ben Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1992).

18. Speech by Nasrallah during the victory festival in the southern suburbs of Beirut, reported in Al-Safir (Beirut), 23 September 2006.

19. Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, "Public losing faith in IDF, and Supreme Court," <www.haaretz.com>.