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IT IS BOTH AN HONOR AND A PLEASURE to be part of the Landon Lecture series—a forum that for more than four decades has hosted some of America’s leading intellectuals and statesmen. Considering that, I at first wondered if the invitation was in fact meant for Bill Gates.

It is a pleasure to get out of Washington, D.C., for a little while. I left Washington in 1994, and I was certain, and very happy, that it was the last time I would ever live there. But history, and current events, have a way of exacting revenge on those who say “never.” I’ve now been back in the District of Columbia for close to a year, which reminds me of an old saying: For the first six months you’re in Washington, you wonder how the hell you ever got there; for the next six months, you wonder how the hell the rest of them ever got there.

Looking around the world today, optimism and idealism would not seem to have much of a place at the table. There is no shortage of anxiety about where our nation is headed and what its role will be in the 21st century.

But I can remember clearly other times in my life when such dark sentiments were prevalent. In 1957, when I was at Wichita High School East, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, and Americans feared being left behind in the space race and, even more worrisome, the missile race.

In 1968, the first full year I lived in Washington, was the same year as the Tet offensive in Vietnam, where American troop levels and casualties were at their height. Across the nation, protests and violence over Vietnam engulfed America’s cities and campuses. On my second day of work as a CIA analyst, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. And then came the 1970s—when it seemed that everything that could go wrong for America did.

Yet, through it all, there was another storyline, one not then apparent. During those same years, the elements were in place and forces were at work that would eventually lead to victory in the Cold War—a victory achieved not by any one party or any single president, but by a series of decisions, choices, and institutions that bridged decades, generations, and administrations. From—

- The first brave stand taken by Harry Truman with the doctrine of containment; to
- The Helsinki Accords under Gerald Ford; to
- The elevation of human rights under Jimmy Carter; to
- The muscular words and deeds of Ronald Reagan; to
- The masterful endgame diplomacy of George H.W. Bush.

All contributed to bring an evil empire crashing down not with a bang but with a whimper. And virtually without a shot being fired.
In this great effort, institutions, as much as people and policies, played a key role. Many of those key organizations were created 60 years ago this year with the National Security Act of 1947—a single act of legislation which established the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the United States Air Force, and what is now known as the Department of Defense. I mention all this because that legislation and those instruments of national power were designed at the dawn of a new era in international relations for the United States—an era dominated by the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War, and the attacks of September 11, marked the dawn of another new era in international relations—an era whose challenges may be unprecedented in complexity and scope.

In important respects, the great struggles of the 20th century—World War I and World War II and the Cold War—covered over conflicts that had boiled and seethed and provoked wars and instability for centuries before 1914: ethnic strife, religious wars, independence movements, and, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century, terrorism. The First World War was, itself, sparked by a terrorist assassination motivated by an ethnic group seeking independence.

These old hatreds and conflicts were buried alive during and after the Great War. But, like monsters in science fiction, they have returned from the grave to threaten peace and stability around the world. Think of the slaughter in the Balkans as Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s. Even now, we worry about the implications of Kosovo’s independence in the next few weeks for Europe, Serbia, and Russia. That cast of characters sounds disturbingly familiar even at a century’s remove.

The long years of religious warfare in Europe between Protestant and Catholic Christians find eerie contemporary echoes in the growing Sunni versus Shi’a contest for Islamic hearts and minds in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia.

We also have forgotten that between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, two American presidents and one presidential candidate were assassinated or attacked by terrorists—as were various tsars, empresses, princes, and, on a fateful day in June 1914, an archduke. Other acts of terrorism were commonplace in Europe and Russia in the latter part of the 19th century.

So, history was not dead at the end of the Cold War. Instead, it was reawakening with a vengeance. And, the revived monsters of the past have returned far stronger and more dangerous than before because of modern technology—both for communication and for destruction—and to a world that is far more closely connected and interdependent than the world of 1914.

Unfortunately, the dangers and challenges of old have been joined by new forces of instability and conflict, among them—

- A new and more malignant form of global terrorism rooted in extremist and violent jihadism;
- New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world;
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- Failed and failing states;
- States enriched with oil profits and discontented with the current international order; and
- Centrifugal forces in other countries that threaten national unity, stability, and internal peace—but also with implications for regional and global security.

Worldwide, there are authoritarian regimes facing increasingly restive populations seeking political freedom as well as a better standard of living. And finally, we see both emergent and resurgent great powers whose future path is still unclear.

One of my favorite lines is that experience is the ability to recognize a mistake when you make it again. Four times in the last century the United States has come to the end of a war, concluded that the nature of man and the world had changed for the better, and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security—in the process, giving ourselves a so-called “peace” dividend. Four times we chose to forget history.

...September 11, marked the dawn of another new era in international relations—an era whose challenges may be unprecedented in complexity and scope.
Isaac Barrow once wrote, “How like a paradise the world would be, flourishing in joy and rest, if men would cheerfully conspire in affection and helpfully contribute to each other’s content: and how like a savage wilderness now it is, when, like wild beasts, they vex and persecute, worry and devour each other.” He wrote that in the late 1600s. Or, listen to the words of Sir William Stephenson, author of *A Man Called Intrepid* and a key figure in the Allied victory in World War II. He wrote, “Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any people, when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible it is in a future too far distant to foresee.”

After September 11th, the United States re-armed and again strengthened our intelligence capabilities. It will be critically important to sustain those capabilities in the future—it will be important not to make the same mistake a fifth time.

But, my message today is not about the defense budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power, both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former director of CIA and now as secretary of defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use “soft” power and for better integrating it with “hard” power.

One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described.

So, we must urgently devote time, energy, and thought to how we better organize ourselves to meet the international challenges of the present and the future—the world you students will inherit and lead.

I spoke a few moments ago about the landmark National Security Act of 1947 and the institutions created to fight the Cold War. In light of the challenges I have just discussed, I would like to pose a question: if there were to be a “National Security Act of 2007,” looking beyond the crush of day-to-day headlines, what problems must it address, what capabilities ought it create or improve, where should it lead our government as we look to the future? What new institutions do we need for this post Cold War world?

As an old Cold Warrior with a doctorate in history, I hope you’ll indulge me as I take a step back in time. Because context is important, as many of the goals, successes, and failures from the Cold War are instructive in considering how we might better focus energies and resources—especially the ways in which our nation can influence the rest of the world to help protect our security and advance our interests and values.

What we consider today the key elements and instruments of national power trace their beginnings to the mid-1940s, to a time when the government was digesting lessons learned during World War II. Looking back, people often forget that the war effort—though victorious—was hampered and hamstrung by divisions and dysfunction. Franklin Roosevelt quipped that trying to get the Navy, which was its own cabinet department at the time, to change was akin to hitting a featherbed: “You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted,” he said, “and then you find the damn bed just as it was before.” And Harry Truman noted that if the Navy and Army had fought as hard against the Germans as they had...
fought against each other, the war would have been over much sooner.

This record drove the thinking behind the 1947 National Security Act, which attempted to fix the systemic failures that had plagued the government and military during World War II—while reviving capabilities and setting the stage for a struggle against the Soviet Union that seemed more inevitable each passing day.

The 1947 Act acknowledged that we had been over-zealous in our desire to shut down capabilities that had been so valuable during the war—most of America’s intelligence and information assets disappeared as soon as the guns fell silent. The Office of Strategic Services—the war intelligence agency—was axed, as was the Office of War Information. In 1947, OSS returned as CIA, but it would be years before we restored our communications capabilities by creating the United States Information Agency.

There is in many quarters the tendency to see that period as the pinnacle of wise governance and savvy statecraft. As I wrote a number of years ago, “Looking back, it all seem[ed] so easy, so painless, so inevitable.” It was anything but.

Consider that the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947—the Department of Defense—was meant to promote unity among the military services. It didn’t. A mere two years later the Congress had to pass another law because the Joint Chiefs of staff were anything but joint. And there was no chairman to referee the constant disputes.

At the beginning, the secretary of defense had little real power—despite an exalted title. The law forbade him from having a military staff and limited him to three civilian assistants. These days, it takes that many to sort my mail.

Throughout the long, twilight struggle of the Cold War, the various parts of the government did not communicate or coordinate very well with each other. There were military, intelligence, and diplomatic failures in Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Grenada, and many other places. Getting the military services to work together was a recurring battle that had to be addressed time and again, and was only really resolved by legislation in 1986.

But despite the problems, we realized, as we had during World War II, that the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions—many of them nonmilitary. The Marshall Plan and later the United States Agency for International Development acknowledged the role of economics in the world; the CIA the role of intelligence; and the United States Information Agency the fact that the conflict would play out as much in hearts and minds as it would on any battlefield.

The key, over time, was to devote the necessary resources—people and money—and get enough things right while maintaining the ability to recover from mistakes along the way. Ultimately, our endurance paid off and the Soviet Union crumbled, and the decades-long Cold War ended.

However, during the 1990s, with the complicity of both the Congress and the White House, key instruments of America’s national power once again were allowed to wither or were abandoned. Most people are familiar with cutbacks in the military and intelligence—including sweeping reductions in manpower, nearly 40 percent in the active army, 30 percent in CIA’s clandestine services.

What is not as well-known, and arguably even more shortsighted, was the gutting of America’s ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world—the “soft power,” which had been so important throughout the Cold War. The State Department froze the hiring of new foreign service officers for a period of time. The United States Agency for International Development saw deep staff cuts—its permanent staff dropping from a high of 15,000 during Vietnam to about 3,000 in the 1990s. And the U.S. Information Agency was abolished as an independent entity, split into pieces, and many of its capabilities folded into a small corner of the State Department.

Even as we throttled back, the world became more unstable, turbulent, and unpredictable than during the Cold War years. And then came the attacks of 11 September 2001, one of those rare life-changing dates, a shock so great that it appears to have shifted the tectonic plates of history. That day abruptly ended the false peace of the 1990s as well as our “holiday from history.”

As is often the case after such momentous events, it has taken some years for the contour lines of the international arena to become clear. What we do know is that the threats and challenges we will face abroad in the first decades of the 21st century will extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency.
The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War—from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—make clear we in Defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called “asymmetric warfare.” As I told an Army gathering last month, it is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms—at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos.

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America’s nonmilitary instruments of power.

So, what are the capabilities, institutions, and priorities our nation must collectively address—through both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the people they serve?

I would like to start with an observation. Governments of all stripes seem to have great difficulty summoning the will—and the resources—to deal even with threats that are obvious and likely inevitable, much less threats that are more complex or over the horizon. There is, however, no inherent flaw in human nature or democratic government that keeps us from preparing for potential challenges and dangers by taking far-sighted actions with long-term benefits. As individuals, we do it all the time. The Congress did it in 1947. As a nation, today, as in 1947, the key is wise and focused bipartisan leadership—and political will.

I mentioned a moment ago that one of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success.

The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past, although new resources have permitted the State Department to begin taking on a larger role in recent months. Still, forced by circumstances, our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils—usually in a language they don’t speak. They have done an admirable job. And as I’ve said before, the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities—something the ROTC cadets in this audience can anticipate.

But it is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise.

A few examples are useful here, as microcosms of what our overall government effort should look like—one historical and a few contemporary ones.

However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action, and economic development. The CORDS program, as it was known, involved more than a thousand civilian employees from USAID and other organizations, and brought the multiple agencies into a joint effort. It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, putting “all of us on one side and the enemy on the other.” By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam.
The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned—the hard way—through the effort to staff provincial reconstruction teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development—to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground—even in small numbers—we have seen tangible and often dramatic changes. An Army brigade commander in Baghdad recently said that an embedded PRT was “pivotal” in getting Iraqis in his sector to better manage their affairs.

We also have increased our effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside the government—untapped resources with tremendous potential.

For example, in Afghanistan the military has recently brought in professional anthropologists as advisors. The New York Times reported on the work of one of them, who said, “I’m frequently accused of militarizing anthropology. But we’re really anthropologizing the military.”

And it is having a very real impact. The same story told of a village that had just been cleared of the Taliban. The anthropologist pointed out to the military officers that there were more widows than usual, and that the sons would feel compelled to take care of them—possibly by joining the insurgency, where many of the fighters are paid. So American officers began a job training program for the widows.

Similarly, our land-grant universities have provided valuable expertise on agricultural and other issues. Texas A&M has had faculty on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003. And Kansas State is lending its expertise to help revitalize universities in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, and working to improve the agricultural sector and veterinary care across Afghanistan. These efforts do not go unnoticed by either Afghan citizens or our men and women in uniform.

I have been heartened by the works of individuals and groups like these. But I am concerned that we need even more civilians involved in the effort and that our efforts must be better integrated.

And I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institutions to rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the future. The examples I mentioned have, by and large, been created ad hoc—on the fly in a climate of crisis. As a nation, we need to figure out how to institutionalize programs and relationships such as these. And we need to find more untapped resources—places where it’s not necessarily how much you spend, but how you spend it.

The way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions of the past such as AID or USIA. On the other hand, just adding more people to existing government departments such as Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and so on is not a sufficient answer either—even if they were to be more deployable overseas. New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.

For example, public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, “How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication society?” Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications.

Similarly, we need to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills, a need that President Bush called for in his 2007 State of the Union address, and which the State Department is now working on with its initiative to build a civilian response corps. Both the president and secretary of state have asked for full funding for this initiative. But we also need new thinking about how to integrate our government’s capabilities in these areas, and then how to integrate government capabilities with those in the private sector, in universities, in other non-governmental
organizations, with the capabilities of our allies and friends—and with the nascent capabilities of those we are trying to help.

Which brings me to a fundamental point. Despite the improvements of recent years, despite the potential innovative ideas hold for the future, sometimes there is no substitute for resources—for money.

Funding for nonmilitary foreign-affairs programs has increased since 2001, but it remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities. Consider that this year’s budget for the Department of Defense—not counting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—is nearly half-a-trillion dollars. The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department is $36 billion—less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. Secretary Rice has asked for a budget increase for the State Department and an expansion of the foreign service. The need is real.

Despite new hires, there are only about 6,600 professional foreign service officers—less than the Manning for one aircraft carrier strike group. And personnel challenges loom on the horizon. By one estimate, 30 percent of USAID’s foreign service officers are eligible for retirement this year—valuable experience that cannot be contracted out.

Overall, our current military spending amounts to about four percent of GDP, below the historic norm and well below previous wartime periods. Nonetheless, we use this benchmark as a rough floor of how much we should spend on defense. We lack a similar benchmark for other departments and institutions.

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.

Now, I am well aware that having a sitting secretary of defense travel halfway across the country to make a pitch to increase the budget of other agencies might fit into the category of “man bites dog”—or for some back in the Pentagon, “blasphemy.” It is certainly not an easy sell politically. And don’t get me wrong, I’ll be asking for yet more money for Defense next year.

Still, I hear all the time from the senior leadership of our Armed Forces about how important these civilian capabilities are. In fact, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen was chief of naval operations, he once said he’d hand a part of his budget to the State Department “in a heartbeat,” assuming it was spent in the right place.

After all, civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises.

A last point. Repeatedly over the last century Americans averted their eyes in the belief that remote events elsewhere in the world need not engage this country. How could an assassination of an Austrian archduke in unknown Bosnia-Herzegovina effect us? Or the annexation of a little patch of ground called Sudetenland? Or a French defeat at a place called Dien Bien Phu? Or the return of an obscure cleric to Tehran? Or the radicalization of an Arab construction tycoon’s son?

What seems to work best in world affairs, historian Donald Kagan wrote in his book On the Origins of War, “Is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose.”

In an address at Harvard in 1943, Winston Churchill said, “The price of greatness is responsibility . . . The people of the United States cannot
escape world responsibility.” And, in a speech at Princeton in 1947, Secretary of State and retired Army general George Marshall told the students: “The development of a sense of responsibility for world order and security, the development of a sense of overwhelming importance of this country’s acts, and failures to act, in relation to world order and security—these, in my opinion, are great musts for your generation.”

Our country has now for many decades taken upon itself great burdens and great responsibilities—all in an effort to defeat despotism in its many forms or to preserve the peace so that other nations, and other peoples, could pursue their dreams. For many decades, the tender shoots of freedom all around the world have been nourished with American blood. Today, across the globe, there are more people than ever seeking economic and political freedom—seeking hope even as oppressive regimes and mass murderers sow chaos in their midst—seeking always to shake free from the bonds of tyranny.

For all of those brave men and women struggling for a better life, there is—and must be—no stronger ally or advocate than the United States of America. Let us never forget that our nation remains a beacon of light for those in dark places. And that our responsibilities to the world—to freedom, to liberty, to the oppressed everywhere—are not a burden on the people or the soul of this nation. They are, rather, a blessing.

I will close with a message for students in the audience. The message is from Theodore Roosevelt, whose words ring as true today as when he delivered them in 1901. He said, “As, keen-eyed, we gaze into the coming years, duties, new and old, rise thick and fast to confront us from within and from without…[The United States] should face these duties with a sober appreciation alike of their importance and of their difficulty. But there is also every reason for facing them with high-hearted resolution and eager and confident faith in our capacity to do them aright.” He continued, “A great work lies ready to the hand of this generation; it should count itself happy indeed that to it is given the privilege of doing such a work.”

To the young future leaders of America here today, I say, “Come do the great work that lies ready to the hand of your generation.”

Thank you. MR
ON 6 FEBRUARY 2007, the president announced the establishment of a tenth unified combatant command called Africa Command, or “AFRICOM.” Its area of responsibility will cover Africa, and it will have an unprecedented number of interagency civilians in leadership roles (including a civilian deputy commander). This new command’s objective will be to enhance Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to assist African partners in achieving a more stable environment through security cooperation.

Yet questions abound. AFRICOM’s vision, as outlined by the president on the day of its public unveiling, is anomalous among unified commands. Words like “development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth” are atypical of military missions, which traditionally center on fighting and winning wars. In many ways, AFRICOM is a post-Cold War experiment that radically rethinks security in the early 21st century based on peace-building lessons learned since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Will it work? This article explores possibilities by analyzing AFRICOM’s origins, timing, strategy, and composition as well as the early challenges that will confront the nascent command.

Why AFRICOM?

AFRICOM originated as an internal administrative change within DOD that remedies “an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War,” in the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Or, in the words of Ambassador Robert Loftis, the former senior State Department member of the AFRICOM transition team, it was created because “Africa is more important to us strategically and deserves to be viewed through its own lens.” That lens is the new unified command.

Unified commands, or combatant commands, were instituted during the Cold War to better manage military forces for possible armed confrontation with the Soviet Union and its proxies. Today, they are prisms through which the Pentagon views the world. Each command is responsible for coordinating, integrating, and managing all Defense assets and operations in its designated area of responsibility, per the Unified Command Plan. This plan is regularly
reviewed, modified as required, and approved by the president.

The unified command design has proven problematic for DOD’s involvement in Africa, a continent not viewed as strategically significant during the Cold War. That DOD never designated a unified command for Africa evinces the want of concern for one of the largest and most conflict-prone continents on the planet. Instead, DOD divided African coverage between three unified commands: European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM). This lack of focus had several deleterious effects.

The first effect is that Africa was never a number-one priority for any unified command. Each viewed its strategic imperative as being elsewhere, leaving Africa as a secondary or even tertiary concern. For example, EUCOM’s strategic center of gravity has always been Europe, with the overwhelming majority of its forces, staff, and resources dedicated to that continent, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Second, the three-part division of responsibility violates the principle of unity of command, increasing the likelihood of an uncoordinated DOD effort in Africa. This disunity can occur especially at the “seams” between unified commands; for instance, a hypothetical U.S. military response to the crisis in the Darfur region might be complicated because the area of interest straddles the EUCOM and CENTCOM boundary, causing coordination challenges.4

Third, owing to historical disinterest, DOD never developed a sizable cadre of dedicated African experts. Only within the past decade has DOD invested in the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (a think tank akin to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany) to support the development of U.S. strategic policy towards Africa.

Lastly, Africa has never benefited from the advocacy of a four-star commander whose undiluted mandate includes helping policymakers understand the perspectives of African countries and formulate effective African security policy.

Taken together, these four deficiencies resulted in a disjointed and hindered approach towards Africa that lacked primacy within the Pentagon and, by extension, U.S. interagency networks.

Partly in response to this unwarranted lack of attention, DOD decided to redraw the unified command landscape by creating AFRICOM (see figure 1). As Secretary Gates testified before the Senate, creating AFRICOM “will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between [different unified commands].”5 AFRICOM combines under a single unified command all but one of the countries conventionally considered “African.” (Egypt is the exception, owing to its relationship with the Middle East in general and Israel in particular. It remains covered by CENTCOM).

AFRICOM will be a distinct unified command with the sole responsibility of Africa.6 A four-star general will command it and its approximately 400-700 staff members. It will be temporarily located in Stuttgart, Germany, as a sub-unified command, but is scheduled to move to Africa (place to be determined) and be operational by 1 October 2008.7 Its four-star commander will be able to enhance policy decisions regarding Africa by advocating for African security issues on Capitol Hill and raising the military’s strategic awareness of the continent.

DOD intends AFRICOM’s presence to be innocuously transparent to African countries. Ryan Henry, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, continually reiterates: “The goal is for AFRICOM not to be [sic] a U.S. leadership role on the continent but rather to be supporting the indigenous leadership efforts that are currently going on.”8 The theme of partnership is ubiquitous in DOD’s dealings with AFRICOM and Africa. The department has, for example, conducted high-level delegations to African countries to discuss the creation of the command. As Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense of African affairs, explains, “If we take partnership seriously, then we must go out in a way never done before and consult with the nations affected. This manner of approaching partnership was not done with EUCOM, PACOM, or CENTCOM.”9

Why Now?

AFRICOM is more than just an administrative change within DOD; it responds to Africa’s increased geopolitical importance to U.S. interests. As Deputy Under Secretary Henry has stated, “Africa…is emerging on the world scene as a strategic player, and we need to deal with it as a continent.”10 U.S. strategic interests in Africa are many, including the
needs to counter terrorism, secure natural resources, contain armed conflict and humanitarian crisis, retard the spread of HIV/AIDS, reduce international crime, and respond to growing Chinese influence.

Counterterrorism dominates much of U.S. security policy as the U.S. prosecutes its War on Terrorism. In a stark reversal of Cold War thinking, the 2002 National Security Strategy asserts that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than . . . by failing ones.” From the U.S. perspective, the inability or unwillingness of some fragile states to govern territory within their borders can lead to the creation of safe-havens for terrorist organizations. Government recalcitrance was indeed the case with Afghanistan in the late 1990s, when the Taliban permitted Al-Qaeda to operate unfettered within its boundaries, leading to the events of 11 September 2001. Africa contains the preponderance of fragile states in the world today, placing it squarely in the crosshairs of the War on Terrorism. AFRICOM will oversee current U.S. counterterrorism programs in Africa, such as Operation Enduring Freedom: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). America is also interested in Africa’s natural resources, especially in terms of energy security. As instability in the Middle East grows and international demand for energy soars, the world—and the United States in particular—will become increasingly beholden to Africa’s ability to produce oil, an inelastic commodity. Central Intelligence Agency estimates suggest Africa may supply as much as 25 percent of imports to America by 2015. Already by 2006, sub-Saharan African oil constituted approximately 18 percent of all U.S. imports (about 1.8 million barrels per day). By comparison, Persian Gulf imports were at 21 percent (2.2 million barrels per day).

At present, Nigeria is Africa’s largest supplier of oil and the fifth largest global supplier of oil to the United States. However, instability in the Niger Delta region has reduced output periodically by as much as 25 percent, escalating world oil prices. For instance, the price of oil jumped more than $3 per barrel in April 2007 after Nigeria’s national elections were disputed, and it spiked again in May after attacks on pipelines in the delta. To help control this volatility, AFRICOM may become increasingly involved in the maritime security of the Gulf of Guinea, where the potential for deep-water...
drilling is high. “You look at West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, it becomes more focused because of the energy situation,” General Bantz Craddock, EUCOM Commander, told reporters in Washington. Safeguarding energy “obviously is out in front.”

Stemming armed conflict and mitigating humanitarian catastrophe also remain important U.S. objectives. Africa has long endured political conflict, armed struggle, and natural disasters, all of which have exacted a grave toll on Africans and compromised international development efforts. The direct and indirect costs of instability are high in terms of human suffering and economic, social, and political retardation. Although Africa is afflicted by fewer serious armed conflicts today than it was a decade ago, it hosts a majority of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.

African militaries make up a sizable contingent of the African peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN and such regional organizations as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite a willingness to participate in these operations, many African militaries lack the command, training, equipment, logistics, and institutional infrastructure required for complex peacekeeping, leaving the onus of support on the international community. This burden has prompted some donor countries to help build the capacity of African militaries, thereby enhancing their ability to participate in peacekeeping operations. In 2004 the G-8 introduced its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral program that plans to create a self-sustaining peacekeeping force of 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, by 2010. The U.S. Department of State manages GPOI, as it does the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which also trains peacekeepers. According to Chip Beck, who heads ACOTA, “Our job is to help African countries enhance their capabilities to effectively take part in peacekeeping operations.”

Although AFRICOM will not manage GPOI or ACOTA, it should offer technical assistance to such programs and partner with African states in security sector reform (SSR).

HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death on the continent, and controlling its global spread remains a critical concern for the U.S. In 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell described HIV/AIDS as “the greatest threat of mankind today.” According to the UN, nearly 25 million Africans were HIV-positive in 2006, representing 63 percent of infected persons worldwide. The rate of infection in some African security forces is believed to be high (between 40 and 60 percent in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo), raising concerns that those forces may be unable to deploy when needed and may even be vectors of the disease’s spread.

International crime in Africa is also a U.S. interest, especially the narcotics trade. West Africa has become the newest center for trafficking drugs. In the past year Nigeria, West Africa’s economic hub, has made 234 drug-trafficking arrests at the Lagos airport, which is just grazing the surface, according to government officials. Guinea-Bissau, another West African country, is quickly developing into a narco-state. Its soldiers have been caught facilitating the transfer of narcotics to mostly European markets. To suggest the scale of this emerging problem, there were two seizures of over 600 kilos of cocaine, worth over $30 million each, during the past year. In Guinea-Bissau, narcotics trafficking accounts for almost 20 percent of GDP. African trade in contraband such as narcotics, small arms, and human beings is a continuing global concern.

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) expanding influence in Africa is also a continuing worry for the United States. The continent is quickly emerging as a competitive battlefield in what some U.S. defense intellectuals are describing as a proxy economic cold war with China, especially in the quest for resources. China’s insatiable appetite for oil and other natural resources is the product of its own success. The PRC’s economy has maintained an incredible average of 9 percent growth per annum over the last two decades, nearly tripling the country’s GDP during that time. African oil fuels this growth. Until 1993, China was a net exporter of oil; now it is the world’s second-largest energy consumer, obtaining 30 percent of its oil from African sources, especially Sudan, Angola, and Congo (Brazzaville). China is also seeking new markets for its goods. As its policy paper on Africa bluntly asserts: “The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises’ investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and
buyer credits to this end." Currently, over 700 Chinese state companies conduct business in Africa, making China the continent’s third largest trading partner, behind the United States and France, but ahead of Britain. A series of diplomatic initiatives buttress these commercial ventures, aimed initially not only at isolating Taiwan but also at broader policy objectives. The PRC has diplomatic relations with 47 of Africa’s states and offers limited, but not inconsiderable, development assistance in exchange for diplomatic support. China also engages in multilateral efforts to build strategic partnerships in Africa. In 1999, then-president Jiang Zemin petitioned the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) to create a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. A year later the first ministerial conference took place in Beijing with 44 African states participating. In 1995, two-way trade between Africa and China hovered at less than U.S. $1 billion. By the end of 2006, it exceeded U.S. $50 billion.

At the core of China’s rapid push into African markets is its drive to forge strategic alliances. African countries constitute the largest single regional grouping of states within any international organization, accentuating their importance to Chinese diplomacy. Furthermore, in multilateral settings such as the UN, African countries tend to engage in bloc-voting, an effective tactic for influencing rules formulation, multilateral negotiations, and other international processes. China has relied on African support in the past to overcome staunch international criticism. For example, African votes were crucial to blocking UN Commission on Human Rights resolutions that condemned Chinese human rights abuses. In the words of Premier Wen Jiabao: “China is ready to coordinate its positions with African countries in the process of international economic rules formulation and multilateral trade negotiations.” Strategic relationships with Africa will give China, at relatively low cost, the means to secure its position in the World Trade Organization and other multilateral venues.

This clout rankles the United States, which has admonished the PRC not to support “resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes.” Nevertheless, Beijing has secured many African alliances, public and private, through direct aid and concessional loans with “no political strings” attached. As Premier Wen told African delegates at the 2003 China-Africa Cooperation summit at Addis Ababa, “We do offer our assistance with the deepest sincerity and without any political conditions.”

Perhaps the best-known beneficiary of China’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is Sudan. China is both the largest direct foreign investor in, and the largest customer of, Sudan’s petroleum production. The PRC owns 13 of the 15 largest companies working in Sudan and purchases more than 50 percent of Sudan’s crude oil. In return, China is arming the Sudanese regime: according to recent Amnesty International reports, it is violating the UN arms embargo by illegally exporting weapons—including fighter jets—to Khartoum at the height of the Darfur conflict. By Amnesty’s estimation, the PRC has exported $24 million worth of arms and ammunition, nearly $57 million worth of parts and military equipment, and $2 million worth of helicopters and airplanes to Sudan. If this estimate is correct, then China’s implicit willingness to abet genocide puts it squarely at odds with multiple U.S. positions, especially in terms of national security policy. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council,
China must realize that its actions contravene the council’s own mandatory arms embargo. In sum, U.S. security interests in Africa are considerable, and Africa’s position in the U.S. strategic spectrum has moved from peripheral to central. In 2006, EUCOM’s then-commanding general James Jones said that his staff was spending more than half its time on African issues, compared to almost none three years prior. The current EUCOM commander, General Craddock, was unequivocal in his written testimony for Congress: “The increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR [Area of Responsibility]. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in Africa.”

This relatively new interest in Africa is not confined to EUCOM, which currently covers the majority of the continent for the military. The president, for one, has mandated increased interest in Africa. The March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy affirms that “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration,” and that “the United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.”

AFRICOM is a product of this broad policy. More than a mere map change, it represents a response to the early 21st century’s new security environment.

**A New Strategic Paradigm**

How should AFRICOM help secure Africa, a continent in crisis? It must begin by adopting a new security paradigm, one that regards security and development as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. This linkage is the nucleus of the security-development nexus, the strategic paradigm most likely to produce more durable security in Africa.

Since the Cold War’s end, development donors have come to realize that if the security sector operates autonomously—with scant regard for the rule of law, democratic principles, and sound management practices—then sustainable, poverty-reducing development is nearly impossible to achieve. Africa has been the recipient of several Marshall Plans worth of foreign aid since World War II’s end, yet it remains arguably as impoverished today as it was in 1946. This situation partly stems from the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other organs of development traditionally eschewing security-related development, allowing the cycle of violence in Africa’s fragile states to continue.

As U.S. problems in Iraq have shown, if there is a single lesson to be learned from recent nation-building experiences, it is that security is a precondition of development. This axiom should play a central role in formulating a new security strategy for Africa, the most underdeveloped continent on Earth. Sadly, however, U.S. security and development institutions have long been divorced from one another in terms of perspective, operations, and outcomes. USAID is prohibited by law from supporting defense-oriented reform, resulting in a strained toleration of corrupt police forces and abusive militaries that tend to spoil the fruits of development. DOD traditionally shuns noncombat missions, limiting its involvement to narrow venues such as the Joint Combined Exchange Training and Foreign Military Financing programs, which are necessary but insufficient for wholesale security sector transformation. Over time, the schism between these two communities has ossified into interagency intransigence, lack of interoperability, and absence of strategic coordination, all of which have contributed to Africa’s failure to develop despite decades of dedicated resources.

AFRICOM’s mission should not be development, but the failures of development may drive AFRICOM. This paradoxical relation stems from the principal threats to African security, which are not interstate but intrastate in nature. For example, the largest threat to Liberian security is not a Sierra Leonean blitzkrieg across its border, but internal: guerilla warfare, insurgency, coup d’etat, or terrorism. Full-scale invasions of one country by another are uncommon in African military history. African conflicts have sprung mostly from domestic armed opposition groups. Such groups find it easier to change governments through violence rather than through the legitimate means of democracy, given the political exclusion many regimes practice, the paltry rule of law, easy access to small arms, and expanses of ungoverned territory in which to find sanctuary.
Domestic armed groups do have a weakness: they must rely upon local popular support to hide, survive, and thrive within the borders of a country. To attain this support, they must gain public sympathy by exploiting public grievances—real or perceived—that often can be attributed to failures of development. Common grievances include disproportionate distribution of wealth, lack of social justice, political exclusion of some groups, ubiquitous economic hardship, ethnic violence, inadequate public security, and failure of democracy.

To deny the sanctuary in which armed groups incubate and thereby stave off internal conflict, governments must address the root causes of public grievances. These grievances are development based; therefore, the security solution must be development based. The best weapons against intrastate threats often do not fire bullets; in fact, large, idle security forces can incite violence as much as check it. As Jacques Paul Klein, the former special representative of the secretary general for the United Nations mission in Liberia, has quipped, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, many African armies “sit around playing cards and plotting coups.”

Only by addressing the challenges of development can security be achieved and maintained. This is the core of the security-development nexus. Failure to heed this linkage results in a “security-development gap,” where the lack of security prevents development from taking root, thus perpetuating conflict and compromising development in a vicious cycle. AFRICOM’s strategic mandate must be to narrow the security-development gap.

Securing Development

Narrowing the security-development gap does not mean militarizing development. Nor does it mean transforming DOD into an aid agency. Narrowing the gap means shifting military strategic priorities from combat to noncombat operations; it means focusing on conflict prevention rather than conflict reaction. For some, the idea of a military command without a combat orientation is heretical. To others, AFRICOM represents an experiment in early 21st-century security, and potentially serves as a prototype for post-Cold War unified commands. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Whelan explains, “Ultimately we [were] simply reorganizing the way we do business in DOD. But then we saw an opportunity to do new things, to capture lessons observed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, to create an organization designed for the future and not the past.” In many ways, AFRICOM is an opportunity to institutionalize and operationalize peace-building lessons captured over the past 15 years.

The first lesson is that strategic priority should be given to conflict prevention rather than reaction. Owing to the size and complexity of Africa, concentrating on fragile states before they fail or devolve into conflict represents an economy of force. Intervening only after a crisis festers into conflict, as in Somalia in 1993, is costly in terms of American blood, treasure, and international standing. Moreover, such military interventions rarely achieve durable peace because they fail to address the root causes of conflict.

By focusing on pre-conflict operations, AFRICOM will help “prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts,” as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review advocates. Military campaigns
are conventionally understood to proceed in four stages: phase I—“deter/engage,” phase II—“seize initiative,” phase III—“decisive operations,” and phase IV—“transition/stability operations.” Recently, military thinkers have introduced an additional phase, “phase zero,” which encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of phase I. In other words, phase zero is purely preventative in nature, focusing on everything that can be done to avert conflicts from developing in the first place. In a shift of traditional unified command strategy, AFRICOM should adopt conflict prevention as its primary mission, as Ryan Henry makes clear: “The purpose of the command is...what we refer to as anticipatory measures, and those are taking actions that will prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming conflicts. So the mission of the command is to be able to prevent that.”

The second lesson informing AFRICOM is that phase IV, transition/stability operations, may eclipse combat operations when it comes to determining “victory.” The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it patently evident that lethal force alone is no longer the decisive variable in military campaigns. To this end, in 2005 the White House issued “National Security Presidential Directive 44,” which recognizes the primacy of reconstruction and stabilization operations. Although a rudimentary document, it forms the foundation for interagency coordination of all stability and reconstruction programs. Additionally, that same year the Pentagon issued DOD Directive 3000.05, which defines stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” that “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” This definition marks a revolution in military strategy for a military that has traditionally focused on fighting and winning wars. Moreover, these new policies are influencing DOD, State, USAID, and others’ funding and program development for 2008 and beyond. This new focus represents a seismic shift in military thought, as it prioritizes noncombat functions above traditional warfighting missions in the pursuit of durable security.

**A Civilian-Heavy Military Command**

The shift of strategic focus from combat to noncombat missions will require a commensurate shift in how unified commands function. If AFRICOM is expected to supervise an array of missions that are a hybrid of security and development, then it must forge interagency modalities, fusing the capabilities of DOD with State, USAID, and other civilian organizations. This coordination will prove difficult. As Ambassador Loftis puts the challenge, “How do you create a structure that is both a military Unified Command but needs to incorporate enough civilian inputs yet does not appear to take over these agencies and authorities?” Issues concerning organizational structure, institutional culture, lines of authority, funding sources, best practices, and perspectives will mire efforts to create synthesis. Moreover, there are fears—both inside and outside the U.S. Government—that AFRICOM signals the militarization of U.S. foreign aid. Pentagon officials object to this perception, stressing that DOD will not be crossing into “other people’s lanes” but simply wants to work more effectively with other agencies, recognizing the symbiotic relationship between it and the interagency in peace-building missions. Only time will tell.

Forging particular interagency modalities will be a gradual process with few shortcuts. The effort was initiated by a decision to staff AFRICOM heavily with interagency civilians, many of them in key decision-making positions and not just traditional liaison roles. In an unprecedented break from tradition, one of two deputy commanders will be a civilian, most likely an ambassador. That DOD sees AFRICOM as becoming a “combatant command plus,” with the plus being the exceptionally high number of civilians from other agencies, indicates the department’s commitment to addressing security challenges on the continent in a thoroughly interagency manner. But again, this process will take time. As Theresa Whelan confirms, “The command will continue to evolve over time, and will ultimately be an iterative process. It will not become a static organization in October 2008, but will continue to be a dynamic organization, as circumstances merit.”

**Security Sector Reform**

Moving beyond a strategy of conflict prevention and post-conflict transition, the best tactic for narrowing the African security-development
gap is SSR. Security sector reform is the essence of “security cooperation,” as it builds indigenous capacity and professionalizes the security sector so that African governments can effect development for themselves. As a senior USAID official and member of the AFRICOM transition team with extensive experience in Africa explains, “Security sector reform could contribute to a security architecture that ensures that citizens are provided with effective, legitimate, and democratically accountable external and internal security. What is needed is security sector reform that professionalizes forces for the protection of civilians and enables development. This would be a significant contribution.”

SSR is the complex task of transforming organizations and institutions that deal directly with security threats to the state and its citizens. SSR’s ultimate objective is to create a security sector that is effective, legitimate, and accountable to the citizens it is sworn to protect. This objective is the essence of “cooperative security,” as it can only be achieved in partnership with the host nation, civil society, and other indigenous stakeholders. SSR programs can range from building the capacity of a single military unit, such as a joint-combined exchange training mission, to the total reconstitution of a country’s armed forces and ministry of defense, as in the Joint U.S.-Liberia Security Sector Reform Program. SSR is crosscutting transformation, requiring a multidisciplinary, “whole-of-government” approach by the U.S. Government.

DOD’s role in SSR is essential but not all-inclusive. Building security-sector capacity and professionalizing actors requires many kinds of expertise, which fundamentally dictates an interagency effort. For example, DOD is not the best agency to train border control forces or set up criminal courts, two parts of the security sector. Rather, the Department of Homeland Security is best suited to train customs and immigration agencies, while the Department of Justice can assist with criminal justice reform. DOD’s strong suit is transforming the military sector, which goes far beyond current train-and-equip programs and may entail a comprehensive, soup-to-nuts approach, especially in failed states.

Lastly, institutional transformation is key to SSR, since all institutions must rise together. DOD, for instance, cannot begin to train indigenous soldiers until the ministry of finance has the capacity to pay their salaries, which may be dependent on training from the U.S. Treasury Department. Failure to synchronize development may cause a relapse into conflict, as unpaid soldiers and police forces are a precipitant to violence. AFRICOM will be dependent on other agencies to implement SSR, hence its civilian-heavy nature.

African Perceptions of AFRICOM


Regional superpowers Nigeria and South Africa have refused to give the U.S. permission to establish AFRICOM on their soil, and they have warned their neighbors to do the same. Morocco, Algeria, and Libya, too, have reportedly refused U.S. requests to base AFRICOM forces in their countries. Member states of such regional organizations as the 14-country Southern African Development Community (SADC) have also agreed not to host AFRICOM, and there is discussion within the 16-country ECOWAS to do the same. South African Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota summarizes the sentiment of many countries: “If there was to be an influx of armed forces into one or other of the African countries, that might affect the relations between the sister countries and not encourage an atmosphere and a sense of security.” He warns that it would be better for the United States not “to come and make a presence and create uncertainty here.”

There are other reasons behind the suspicion and refusals. To name a few, AFRICOM has been equated with CENTCOM, which is fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the U.S. interest in African oil is well known and perceived to be predatory; and Africa’s colonial past has ingrained distrust in its leaders.

Some of the opposition may also be in response to AFRICOM’s inability, despite its consultative approach, to articulate its message to Africans. Rwandan General Frank Rusagara, former secretary
general of the Rwandan Defense Ministry and top policymaker for Rwanda’s military development, expresses a frustration common among military officers on the continent: “The lack of information [about AFRICOM] has resulted in people not knowing what it is and how it will relate to Africa.” This statement is especially worrisome because Rusagara is no stranger to U.S. military operations and doctrine: he attended military courses at the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. Rusagara thinks that if AFRICOM wants to contribute to African security, it must do three things. First, it must embrace new strategic thinkers and innovative concepts of security, such as “human security,” for peace-building in Africa. Second, U.S. officers must explain AFRICOM to their African peers—the command cannot simply rely on senior DOD officials to brief senior African government officials. Third, AFRICOM must enhance African capacity for peacekeeping operations.

Not all African countries have turned their backs on AFRICOM, however. Some, such as Liberia, see it as a boon to the continent. Having just emerged from a brutal 14-year civil war, Liberia has a significant perspective on African security. Liberian Minister of Defense Brownie Samukai explains that AFRICOM has the potential to “build partnerships, lead to the convergence of strategic interest, prevent conflict, and conduct operations other than war.” He also believes that professionalizing African militaries through SSR will promote good governance, buttress development, and enhance peacekeeping operations. Samukai adds that supporting AFRICOM does not indicate naiveté about U.S. interests in Africa, but rather shows a willingness to find synergies of interest between the U.S. and African countries. Owing to this understanding, he says, “ECOWAS stands to benefit most in terms of cooperation, interest and intervention, if necessary.” Liberia not only supports AFRICOM, but has also offered to host it.

Working with External Organizations

Another major challenge is courting nontraditional military partners early, such as non-government organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These organizations often know the African lay of the land better than DOD, have decades’ worth of operational know-how, are development experts, and have access to places that
may be denied to the U.S. military. Moreover, NGOs (both developmental and humanitarian) and DOD have complementary interests in terms of securing development and providing support for complex humanitarian crisis response. Their responses to the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan demonstrate their convergence.

However, there are several challenges facing this partnership, each of which deserves examination. First, many NGOs are uneasy about working with the U.S. military, believing it puts their people at risk of violent reprisals from groups targeted by U.S. combat operations. As Jim Bishop of InterAction, a large umbrella organization for many NGOs, explains: “Humanitarian organizations may want to keep some distance between themselves and the U.S. military, especially in environments with potential for violent opposition to the U.S.”

Second, some NGOs believe that aligning themselves with the military impugns their neutrality or impartiality, sometimes their only guarantee of safety in conflict-prone areas. Similarly, working with neutral or impartial NGOs may prove incompatible for AFRICOM, since “neutral” NGOs do not take sides and “impartial” NGOs give assistance where needed most, even if that conflicts with U.S. interests. Third, Defense’s understanding of the complexly diverse NGO community remains limited, and it risks viewing that community as a monolithic whole, which would have adverse consequences. Fourth, AFRICOM might find it difficult to partner with NGOs since they often receive money (and mandates) from multiple countries and sources, do not operate like contractors, and typically demand relative autonomy over program management and outcomes.

Still, there is reason to be hopeful. Currently, both DOD and elements of the NGO community are working to bridge the military-NGO divide. Defense is sensitive to NGO concerns regarding neutrality, as Theresa Whelan acknowledges: “We recognize that their [NGOs’] safety depends upon their neutrality, and we are looking for mechanisms that allow all of us to work together without undermining their mission.”

Mechanisms under consideration include the African Center for Strategic Studies and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), either of which could function as a “neutral space” for the government and NGOs to jointly explore opportunities for partnership.

Another alternative is working through NGO umbrella organizations like Global Impact or InterAction, which could act as credible interlocutors. Global Impact represents more than 50 U.S.-based international charities (e.g., the overseas Combined Federal Campaign), has worked with DOD in the past, and has even participated in AFRICOM planning cells. InterAction is a coalition of approximately 150 humanitarian organizations that provide disaster relief, refugee assistance, and sustainable development programs worldwide. On 8 March 2005, representatives from DOD, State, USAID, and InterAction met at USIP to launch a discussion of U.S. armed forces and NGO relations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. The meeting yielded pragmatic guidelines that could serve as a foundational model for AFRICOM.

Lastly and perhaps most importantly, AFRICOM should draw on USAID’s considerable experience and expertise working with NGOs. USAID staff can help translate perspectives, objectives, and best practices for both NGOs and AFRICOM, thereby deconflicting efforts on the ground and mitigating misunderstanding. As a senior USAID member of the AFRICOM transition team explains, “Effective and agreed upon mechanisms for dialogue could help keep each other informed about each other’s efforts and [help everyone] . . . coordinate differing approaches as appropriate. Such dialogue could also provide an opportunity for NGOs to discuss pressing concerns or issues.”

Although many challenges persist to forging a functional NGO-AFRICOM relationship, there are also many avenues for potential cooperation.

Conclusion: Will it Work?

Skeptics consider achieving durable security in Africa a sisyphusian task, and it probably is, if dependent upon the dominant security paradigm. Therefore AFRICOM must eschew this paradigm and adopt a new strategic focus that links security with development and regards them as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing—the core of the security-development nexus. In Africa, most armed threats are intrastate in nature and reliant upon the support of the local population to hide, survive, and thrive within the borders of a country. To attain this, they exploit public grievances, real or perceived, that result from the failures of development. However, by “securing development” and narrowing the
security-development gap, AFRICOM will deny armed groups their sanctuary, thus fostering durable security on the continent.

Strategically, AFRICOM will narrow this gap by prioritizing conflict prevention and post-conflict transition over traditional “fighting and winning wars.” This represents a major shift in military strategy, and it requires a holistic interagency approach to security, hence AFRICOM’s extraordinary civilian-heavy structure and unprecedented civilian deputy commander. Tactically, AFRICOM will narrow the gap through security sector reform and other programs that professionalize forces, promote good governance, and help Africans improve their own security. Security sector reform is at the center of AFRICOM’s conflict prevention and security cooperation mandate.

Will it work? Clearly it is too early to tell, with major challenges ahead, including instituting interagency best practices, addressing African concerns, and attracting NGO/PVO partners. These challenges may not be resolved by October 2008, but that does not mean AFRICOM will ultimately fail in its bid to stabilize the continent. The strategy it will employ is a promising one, suggesting that there is sufficient reason to be hopeful. MR

NOTES


4. It should also be noted that the issue of “seams” is not unique to DOD. The Department of State also divides Africa between sub-Saharan Africa and northern Africa/Middle East, rather than treat the continent as an organic whole. The Bureau of African Affairs is responsible for sub-Saharan Africa and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs is responsible for northern Africa and the Middle East.

5. Gates testimony.


15. Ploch, CRS Report, 12.


20. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, speech at the Gheskio Clinic, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 5 April 2004.


27. Capaccio.


40. Whelan interview.

41. In some ways, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is a model for AFRICOM, as it has incorporated some of the security-development lessons learned since the end of the Cold War. However, AFRICOM is envisaged to expand this model significantly.


44. Henry, press briefing. See also, Quadrennial Defense Review, 17.


47. Whelan interview.

48. Whelan interview.

49. Henry press briefing.


51. Whelan interview.

52. USAID senior conflict mitigation advisor and member of the AFRICOM Transition Team, personal interview, 16 August 2007.

53. Currently, the U.S. Institute of Peace is working with DoD and other U.S. agencies to develop a ‘whole of government’ approach to SSR.


55. Guvamombe.


59. For the purposes of this discussion, NGOs and PVOs will be treated as the same.

60. Jim Bishop, Vice President for Humanitarian Policy and Practice InterAction, personal interview, 29 June 2007.

61. Whelan interview.


63. USAID senior conflict mitigation advisor interview.
Colonel Michael A. Coss, U.S. Army

Colonel Michael A. Coss, U.S. Army, commands the 192d Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of Saint Johns College and holds a masters degree from Harvard. Previous assignments include CJ3 of Combined Joint Task Force-76; G-3, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry); and numerous command and staff positions at the joint, strategic and operational levels.

PHOTO: 10th Mountain Division Soldiers traverse a cliff on patrol in Parwan Province, Afghanistan, 23 December 2006. (U.S. Army, SPC Josh LeCappelain)

FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE of the Taliban in Afghanistan and its escape into Pakistan in 2002, remnants of the group were forced to focus their efforts on mere survival. However, aided by funds from illicit opium growers and abetted by criminals and Al-Qaeda survivors, they began to infiltrate back into Afghanistan in an effort to re-engage the coalition and revive the conflict. By 2006, attacks were increasing against Afghan Government officials and security forces as the Taliban undertook a determined effort to regain influence and power.

This was the situation coalition forces faced in Afghanistan in February 2006 after 10th Mountain Division assumed command of Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76). To thwart the Taliban and its allies and support Afghanistan’s continued progress toward something resembling a democracy, the task force systematically and successfully undertook Operation Mountain Lion, a campaign built upon a “clear, hold, build, and engage” strategy. A brief survey of CJTF-76’s development and employment of this model is offered here in the hope that it will aid others in designing campaign plans for similar circumstances.

Background

Combined Joint Task Force-76’s mission was to support the conditions necessary for growing a moderate, stable Afghan Government capable of controlling its territory. To aid the task force in accomplishing its mission, planners analyzed Afghan political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMEsI) factors. Combined with predeployment training in religion, tribal influence, language, and other cultural concerns, this analysis increased the force’s ability to comprehend the human terrain of Afghanistan and address the motivations behind friendly, enemy, and noncombatant behavior.

Having analyzed its mission and situation and developed its clear-hold-build-engage counterinsurgency model, CJTF-76 implemented three simultaneous, synchronized, synergistic lines of operation (LOOs): security, governance, and reconstruction and development (R&D). For security, CJTF-76 could quickly bring to bear a tremendous amount of firepower; intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and maneuver capability. It could also employ healthy nonlethal capabilities in pursuit of governance and R&D.

Synchronizing “effects-based operations” to achieve desired PMESII results, the CJTF commander in effect assumed a role analogous to that of an orchestra conductor. Figuratively speaking, he was required to arrange a musical score and regulate an ensemble of instruments in nuanced ways to win over his concert audience. In reality, the commander had to decide which weapons and nation-building skills to employ; a coherent, detailed strategy was his metaphorical score; and the CJTF staff and subordinate units were his orchestra. The audience he played to, and whose response he constantly had to monitor and evaluate, consisted of friendly, neutral, and enemy forces in the CJTF-76 battlespace.

To achieve harmony among the task force players required a score with four essential parts. The first part, “clear,” aimed to separate the insurgents from the population they depended on for support. The task force planned to clear by targeting and eliminating the enemy’s key leaders and eradicating his weapons and ammunition caches. Also key was CJTF-76’s goal of inserting the most competent Afghan Army or police forces between the enemy and the population as quickly as possible, to begin cultivating popular confidence and trust in the new Afghan Government. These initial tasks would prove particularly challenging in the rugged terrain and primitive infrastructure of eastern Afghanistan.

The second part of the CJTF-76 commander’s score was “hold.” During “hold” operations, coalition forces were to develop capacity to make the new indigenous security forces and government credible and permanent. To do this, CJTF-76 had to—

- Establish combat outposts to extend combat power throughout the area targeted for a holding operation.
- Deny the enemy sanctuary, bringing a measure of immediate security to the people.
- Oversee the development of relatively competent indigenous security forces capable of controlling battlespace and enforcing the law.
- Help stand up Afghan Government agencies that would respond to the needs of the population.

One particular impediment to implementing the “hold” portion of the strategy was funding; in fact, throughout the operation, money was a constant problem. It was costly to train and equip a competent Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and stand up effective government agencies where none had previously existed. Still, CJTF-76 made noteworthy progress in both these areas.

“Build,” the third component of the commander’s score, transforms the physical and human terrain. In the build phase, the CJTF planned to establish permanent security and assist the government with R&D projects to improve physical and human conditions. Such projects help to persuade the population—the center of gravity in any insurgency—that stability and prosperity advanced by the government exceed anything the insurgents have to offer.

These efforts connect the people to their government, but they must be tailored to local traditions, values, and norms or they will fail. Coalition provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), members of the Department of State (DOS), and other interagency partners sensitive to the cultural norms would be counted on to coordinate these efforts and transform Afghanistan.

The fourth and final component of the commander’s score was “engage.” The task force planned to meet with Afghan civil and military leaders and regular Afghan citizens to help them develop the sense of responsibility they would need to eliminate insurgent activity in sanctuaries, among the population, or in transit through the border region. CJTF leaders would also engage Pakistani leaders, in an effort to deny insurgents safe haven across Afghanistan’s eastern and southern border.

**Operation Mountain Lion**

Operation Mountain Lion, conducted from 11 April to the end of June 2006, would show CJTF-76 synchronizing its three LOOs to clear-hold-build-engage in eastern Afghanistan. Mountain Lion pitted U.S. Army and Marine Corps infantry battalions and several Afghan National Army (ANA) brigades against insurgents accustomed to surviving in eastern Afghanistan’s harsh environment. Coalition forces had entered the area the previous summer, losing 16 Navy special operators when insurgents downed their rescue helicopter, but they had not come to stay. This time it would be different.

CJTF-76 intended first to “clear” (or separate) the insurgents from the population. It would do this in part by aggressively attacking enemy forces in sanctuary and transit areas, where they enjoyed
freedom of movement. To initiate this plan and the “clear” stage of Operation Mountain Lion, coalition forces infiltrated to blocking positions while the main effort conducted a massive air assault against significant enemy sanctuaries in the Korengal and Shuryak valleys.

The scale of Mountain Lion was unprecedented in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as was the unity of effort among all players. Joint, interagency, and coalition partners—equals all—worked seamlessly, maximizing their complementary capabilities. Despite the diversity of forces deployed, no intelligence was compromised. Nor did the service parochialism often associated with JTFs impede the mission; in fact, U.S. forces cooperated much more closely and effectively than they had earlier in OEF.

This new cohesion grew in part from plans that took advantage of lessons learned from the poorly coordinated use of airpower during early phases of OEF. One of those lessons was that airpower was most effective when ground forces employed and then exploited it. Through careful coordination among command and control (C2) structures, joint air forces were able to support ground troops at the required times and locations and with the right mix of assets. A responsive coalition air operations center (CAOC) in Qatar made this possible. The CAOC coordinated air operations with direct representation inside the CJTF headquarters, where an air coordination control element (ACCE) responds to the commander’s priorities. It integrated the ACCE directly into all operations to meet the commander’s priorities for air power. From ships in the Arabian Sea and bases in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, Diego Garcia, and the continental United States, joint air assets provided close air support, electronic warfare, and ISR to Soldiers and Marines on the ground.

Planning for the operation had begun in late February after transfer of authority from the Southern European Task Force to 10th Mountain Division. Ground forces designated for involvement in the operation included elements of the 10th Mountain’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, a USMC infantry battalion, brigades from the ANA’s 201st and 203d Corps, multicomponent special operations forces (SOF), and various support elements. Also present were

Figure 1. COIN model in Afghanistan.
joint PRTs to coordinate R&D activities, engineers to provide mobility and support R&D, and embedded training teams to train and mentor the ANSF. All combined to form CJTF-76.

The embedded teams operated directly with Afghan units, providing both tactical advice and access to coalition artillery and air. Their use enabled two ANA corps to fight effectively alongside U.S. forces while a Canadian-led multinational brigade secured terrain in southern Afghanistan. Pakistan, too, contributed forces, deploying 11 infantry battalions to disrupt insurgent cross-border movement and resupply efforts.

**Shaping Operations**

Shaping operations for CJTF-76’s “clear” phase consisted of lethal and nonlethal actions, which continued as planning proceeded. Special operations forces neutralized several high-value targets, among them key leaders, enemy IED cells, and weapons caches. Eliminating these targets from the battlespace helped disrupt enemy operations prior to the assault. Intelligence collection also continued throughout this phase to pinpoint enemy defenses and strongholds. In the nonlethal realm, task force planners worked on humanitarian and medical assistance, R&D, and Afghan work programs to ensure coalition forces could immediately give the impression of a credible government response following seizure of initial assault objectives.

When D-day arrived and ground-force infiltration was complete, maneuver forces assualted at H-hour using multiple medium- and heavy-lift helicopters whose powerful noise disturbed the frigid night. With artillery and air force fires suppressing the enemy, CJTF-76 laid a noose around the insurgent sanctuary that would gradually be tightened by ongoing operations.

By morning, task force units had achieved all their initial objectives, but they found most of the rural villages deserted by combatants. There were 72 compounds in Kandlay, yet only 7 adult males were detained among the population on the first day of the assault. Apparently, most of the insurgents had fled toward the surrounding mountains. The outer cordon, however, had already been set by units infiltrating prior to D-day. Finding their escape routes blocked, enemy fighters sought refuge in caves, mountainous terrain, or remote villages.

They seemed to think the attack was another sweep-and-leave effort by the coalition. After several days, they adapted to CJTF-76’s presence by camouflaging themselves as noncombatants. Making their way back into villages to acquire food and supplies, they appeared content to merely survive and wait out the coalition presence.

The vigorous presence of the ANA with CJTF-76 signaled the change in coalition strategy. Having participated in the initial assault and fighting, the ANA brigades had gained combat experience and, thus, credibility and legitimacy. To enhance the perception of government determination, at dawn on the first day the ANA brigade commander went down into Kandlay and prayed with the locals in the village mosque. His action underscored the ANA’s religious and cultural ties to the village. It also initiated the overall effort to establish personal links with the local population.

Assembled for a *shura* that day, some villagers asked CJTF-76 leaders how long the forces would stay. They were worried. The last time coalition forces had entered this valley they had promptly left, and the Taliban insurgents had killed those who cooperated with the coalition. Task force leaders assured the people that they had come to stay and would protect them from the insurgents.

To back this up, when the ANA chief of staff visited the troops after the first week of fighting, CJTF-76 soldiers worked with him to help establish a permanent ANA outpost in the heart of enemy territory. This commitment had a dramatic impact on the people in the surrounding valleys. They knew that with government forces present, insurgents could not easily return to terrorize and intimidate them.

After several weeks of fighting in which scores of insurgents either died or surrendered under the “Strengthening Peace” program (a national reconciliation program), the area of operations began to show signs of stability. These results validated CJTF-76’s principle of establishing a permanent presence in disputed areas. They also underscored the value of partnering with local security forces, whose cooperation and credibility paid dividends.

Having cleared enemy forces from the area, CJTF-76 was ready to continue the operation by “holding.” The “hold” part was comprised of two objectives.
First, the counterinsurgency effort had to dominate the physical terrain by creating permanent or semipermanent facilities. Therefore, CJTF-76 forces built a combat outpost on the dominating terrain in the middle of the Korengal Valley. The ANA chief of staff personally raised the Afghan national flag during the base opening ceremony. His intent was to demonstrate the establishment of Afghan sovereignty in the area. One could see the flag throughout the valley signaling both ANSF and government commitment.

Second, CJTF-76 had to dominate the human terrain. This kind of dominance required capable internal security forces and reasonably effective government agencies. Achieving it required substantial investments in money ($5 billion) and effort. CJTF-76 established a partnership program to accelerate Afghan security-force development. Similar U.S. and ANSF units were paired together during mission, training, and refit cycles to expedite the transfer of U.S. methods and leadership techniques to the Afghan forces.

Coalition engineer units worked alongside ANSF engineer units constructing bridges, de-mining areas, and clearing routes of IEDs. The coalition engineers helped the ANSF units develop key skills for later autonomous actions. American aviation and medical units partnered with the ANSF to support coalition operations and build capacity among those Afghan units. Afghan Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters began flying support missions for CJTF-76 operations, while Afghan military and civilian doctors treated casualties. These efforts created a base-line capability to meet future Afghan needs.

Concurrently, coalition partners facilitated the establishment of provincial coordination councils and provincial development councils, which coordinated security and R&D throughout the provinces and enabled Afghan leaders to coordinate with development agencies to meet the population’s needs.

Whenever possible, CJTF-76 conducted operations at the behest of provincial governors, whose capability improved to the point where they led development and security planning sessions. The people’s confidence increased in their own government officials. This trend, if it continues, will eventually lead to the insurgents’ defeat.²

To guarantee a government victory, the “build” stage of operations must transform the physical and human terrain by showing the tangible benefits that come from supporting government operations. Accordingly, CJTF-76 leveraged Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to improve the infrastructure and economic environment. CJTF-76 obligated $82 million in CERP money in 2006 and an additional $160 million in 2007. Construction and rehabilitation of the economy improved living conditions and bolstered the government’s credibility.
During Operation Mountain Lion, CJTF-76 obligated money to projects at locations that promised immediate impact. The task force built 9 bridges and 13 new district centers, built or refurbished 7 schools, and constructed or paved nearly 400 kilometers of road. These projects put over 1,800 potential insurgents to work and infused millions of dollars into the local economy. In this way, CJTF-76 immediately connected the people to their government. Opportunities were seized to cement these ties. For example, at the ribbon-cutting for the Pech River Bridge, which opened up the entire Korengal Valley to economic activity, selected families were asked to participate with CJTF-76 representatives by speaking about the benefits the bridge would provide to the area.

In addition to these projects, CJTF-76 dropped humanitarian aid packages from USAF aircraft as ground forces cleared valley towns. This assistance enabled villagers to return to their homes and—again—it reinforced the perception that their government was interested in their welfare.

Such demonstrations of constructive intent were critical for counterinsurgency operations. Thus, the CJTF-76 staff carefully planned and coordinated R&D as the nonlethal “exploitation force” that one hoped would ultimately undermine potential support for enemy insurgents.

Within CJTF-76’s “build” element, and closely related to efforts at promoting economic development, was the simple responsibility for ensuring responsible governance wherever possible. On occasion, it proved necessary to intervene to ensure that the government was being led by responsible and reasonably uncorrupted leaders. In one instance, CJTF-76 successfully lobbied the government to replace a provincial governor widely suspected of corruption. The new governor was far more trustworthy, and the impact of his leadership was immediately evident. When insurgent activity unexpectedly spiked...
(in the form of increased sniper attacks and a rise in IED ambushes of CJTF-76 patrols), he ordered his security forces to establish an economic blockade of the Korengal. This angered the local elders, but he held firm, telling them they would have to stop harboring terrorists before he would lift the blockade. They soon yielded. The governor’s deft handling of the crisis validated CJTF-76’s course in helping to build a determined, competent government backed by a reliable security force.

The last element of the strategy for defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan was “engagement.” Because the people are the center of gravity in an insurgency, CJTF-76 planners assessed person-to-person contact as the best means of achieving good outcomes. This strategy applied especially to the fence-sitters. The task force operated under the assumption that such contact should take place at all levels and in all possible forums. Consistent with this principle, it engaged with the people in every available venue throughout all phases of Operation Mountain Lion.

During “clear” operations, the task force reached out by holding shuras from the first day on, introducing the ANA to communities and leveraging the cultural ties Afghan soldiers had with their own people. During the course of follow-on “hold” operations, CJTF-76 expanded its networks of personal contacts and associations through the many opportunities for daily personal contact. During establishment of combat outposts, and as ANA security forces were introduced, opportunities for personal contact became ingredients of effective governance. In the “build” phase, CJTF-76 continued its networking by linking R&D projects to local leaders and government officials. This had the added effect of building government credibility. To bolster the prestige of local officials, CJTF-76 also took every opportunity to conduct combat operations under their direction. In effect, every Soldier and leader became an ambassador, and their collective efforts produced cumulative effects. The combination of securing areas with sufficient forces while simultaneously encouraging local support through personal contacts and public projects dramatically limited insurgent operations.

Dealing with Pakistan

In addition to efforts aimed directly at engaging the Afghan populace, CJTF-76 also initiated talks with Pakistani leaders. This was a must, since Pakistan had the ability to reduce regional support for insurgent sanctuaries and limit their impact on stability operations.

At the strategic level, CJTF-76 participated in quarterly talks with Afghan and Pakistani military headquarters. The talks helped build trust among the three military forces. They also provided forums that allowed the participants to confront major issues such as interdicting high-value targets and exploiting sanctuaries in Pakistan. During monthly border-security subcommittee meetings, task force officers addressed specific border and sovereignty issues facing forces operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan divide. Both the monthly and quarterly forums offered opportunities to resolve issues at the tactical level. The task force leveraged these forums for exchanges such as “border flag” meetings that enabled small-unit commanders to meet their counterparts and establish relationships. Although yielding mixed success in terms of influencing operations on each side of the border, the meetings did much to defuse tensions.

Another benefit of CJTF-76 engagement with Pakistani leaders was that it set the conditions for combined operations, mainly patrols to police the border region. These patrols blocked many of the infiltration routes used by terrorists to enter Afghanistan. The meetings also produced a combined exercise that included U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani forces. Operation Inspired Gambit exercised CJTF-76 forces in a scenario that included an air-assault operation to seize key terrain and secure a notional terrorist compound followed by patrols on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to interdict terrorists and deny them key transit areas. This combined exercise not only helped suppress the Taliban, but also improved relations with Pakistan.

Conclusions

The “clear, hold, build, and engage” model employed by CJTF-76 had a dramatic impact in eastern Afghanistan. This model was subsequently applied, again with significant success, in southern Afghanistan in the late spring, during Operation Mountain Thrust. In that operation, coalition forces disrupted enemy units operating in key population centers and then cleared north to defeat insurgents.
operating in sanctuary in Uruzgan province. Key R&D projects valued at over $31 million extended roads, power, and water into this remote region, and improved governance. Coalition forces also continued to employ the “clear, hold, build, and engage” model in fall and winter campaigns in eastern Afghanistan during operations Mountain Fury and Eagle, the final components of CJTF-76’s campaign plan during 2006.

In these final operations, coalition forces cleared over 2,500 enemy combatants from the battlefield and, by establishing 12 new ANSF combat outposts and expanding 8 others, took up permanent presence on key terrain. Furthermore, effective governance was extended into new areas via construction of approximately 1,500 kilometers of new roads and 53 new district centers, the opening of 18 schools, and obligation of over $500 million to new R&D projects across Afghanistan.

The ANSF achieved new levels of proficiency and competence as they worked with coalition forces. Indigenous Afghan units now patrol many locations under the independent direction of their provincial governors.

At this writing, stability and prosperity are emerging in eastern Afghanistan. The effectiveness of CJTF-76’s “clear, hold, build, and engage” model has been confirmed.

If coalition forces follow the model and give it enough time to work throughout Afghanistan (and elsewhere), we will win this “long war” with Islamic extremists. Conversely, turning away will likely mean failure. We should choose wisely when the stakes are as high as they are, and especially when we have a ready template for success. MR

NOTES

Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing for the Future

Major James B. Cogbill, U.S. Army

Shortly we will be fighting our way across the Continent of Europe in battles designed to preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers that symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve. It is the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a message to troops on the eve of the Normandy Invasion

On 10 April 2003, one day after the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdaus Square, representing the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces, looters plundered Iraq’s National Museum. By taking advantage of the rapid collapse of the state’s security apparatus and the chaos that ensued, thieves were free to take what they wished. While initial reports that 170,000 artifacts were stolen have turned out to be wildly exaggerated, experts generally agree that at least 15,000 objects, representing priceless treasures and an integral part of Iraq’s cultural heritage, were carried off without significant intervention by the U.S. military. The U.S. failure to prevent this disaster raises questions about the extent to which the military integrates cultural considerations into its planning. Historical examples from World War II demonstrate that in the past, planning for protection of arts and antiquities was an important part of U.S. military planning. Since World War II, broader cultural considerations such as language and customs have been and continue to be incorporated into military planning, but specific planning for protecting cultural objects has been conducted only on an ad hoc basis. Although there have been some recent successes in safeguarding cultural treasures during wartime, the failure to protect the National Museum of Iraq clearly demonstrates the need for a more permanent and capable mechanism to effectively integrate cultural protection measures into U.S. military campaign planning.

Protection of Cultural Treasures: World War II

After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, America totally mobilized for war. All instruments of national power, both public and private, joined forces to contribute to the war effort. One example of this was the university-government cooperation that occurred with the goal of protecting arts and antiquities. In 1942, George Stout, of Harvard’s Fogg Art Museum, raised the issue of vulnerable cultural sites in wartime Europe, and in January 1943, the American Council of Learned Societies convened a committee to discuss it. The committee incorporated noted intellectuals such...
as Columbia’s William Dinsmoor, president of the Archaeological Institute; Francis Henry Taylor of New York’s Metropolitan Museum; David Finley of the National Gallery; and Paul Sachs of Harvard. Responding to this group of academic and artistic scholars, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, and appointed Dinsmoor and Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts to lead it. The military then created its own organization—the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Service (MFA&A)—which would be responsible for limiting war damage to cultural artifacts and sites and returning any looted objects found during the course of military activities.

Officers from the MFA&A were integrated into the force as early as the invasion of Italy, in September 1943, and were successful at minimizing damage to Italy’s artistic treasures. For instance, MFA&A members persuaded allied commanders to avoid combat inside Florence, a city that many consider to be the cultural capital of Italy. In addition, MFA&A personnel were present for the invasion of Normandy on D-Day to ensure that cultural treasures would be safeguarded, sorted, cleaned, and restored. Later, at the direction of President Harry Truman, the United States repatriated these cultural treasures to their rightful country of origin.

After the war, General Lucius Clay, High Commissioner of Germany during the U.S. occupation, was instrumental in restoring German art treasures. When members of the U.S. Third Army rescued pieces of the Kaiser Friedrich collection, to include 10 works by Rembrandt, from the salt mines in Merkers, Germany, Clay had the collection shipped back to the U.S. National Gallery of Art for restoration. He then thwarted an attempt by members of Congress to appropriate the paintings as war reparations. (He did, however, allow the works to be displayed during a major exposition in 1948 which toured 13 U.S. cities and raised $2 million for German child relief.) In 1950, the U.S. Government returned all the paintings to Berlin, where they became part of the Prussian State Collection. Clay summed up the success of these efforts to protect and restore Germany’s cultural heritage: “Perhaps never in the history of the world has a conquering army sought so little for its own and worked so faithfully to preserve the treasures of others.”

All of these actions clearly demonstrate the commitment U.S. leaders had to preserving cultural heritage during World War II. This dedication manifested itself in the way America deliberately planned, prepared for, and ably executed the mission of protecting priceless objects of culture.

**Looting of the Baghdad Museum**

In stark contrast to the successful efforts to protect art and antiquities during World War II, the plundering of the National Museum in Baghdad represented a failure to adequately plan and prepare for protecting cultural sites during combat operations. The story of the planning that did occur provides insight into where the process fell short and why a permanent structure for safeguarding cultural treasures during wartime is necessary.

In late November 2002, following in the tradition of George Stout, who six decades earlier had raised the issue of protecting cultural sites in wartime Europe, Dr. Maxwell Anderson and Dr. Ashton Hawkins published an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post* entitled “Preserving Iraq’s Past.” At the time, Anderson was president of the Association of Art Museum Directors and Hawkins was president of the American Council for Cultural Policy. Their article called on U.S. leaders to conduct systematic, government-wide planning to protect Iraq’s religious and cultural sites. In support of this call, they argued that the land of Iraq, formerly ancient Mesopotamia, represented the cradle of civilization and therefore included not just the cultural heritage of Iraq, but of the entire world. They urged that steps be taken to protect Iraq’s religious and cultural sites and monuments. They specifically called for the prevention of looting and destruction. Finally, they pointed out that scholars in the United States familiar with Mesopotamian and Islamic archaeology would be willing to help identify vulnerable sites. Shortly after publication of the article, Anderson received a phone call from an official at the Pentagon requesting a meeting.

On 24 January 2003, Anderson, Hawkins, and Dr. McGuire Gibson, a professor at the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago and an expert on Near East archaeology and antiquity, met with Dr. Joseph J. Collins, deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations, and three other members of Collins’s staff, at the Pentagon.
the meeting, the three art historians discussed their concerns about the vulnerable cultural sites within Iraq, going over many of the same issues Anderson and Hawkins had raised in their article. They were primarily concerned about the threat of tanks or bombs destroying monuments, religious structures, and other cultural and archaeological sites. However, they also addressed the threat of looting and noted their concerns about the National Museum in Baghdad, which they said was a repository of everything that had been excavated in Iraq since 1921, and was therefore the most important cultural institution in Iraq.

According to Anderson’s recollection of the meeting, the Pentagon officials stated that they had a plan addressing these concerns and were aware of a few dozen potentially vulnerable cultural sites. Gibson responded that the actual number of sites was closer to a few thousand. Based on this discrepancy, the Defense officials agreed to meet later with Gibson to refine their list of cultural and archaeological sites.

After their meeting with Collins and his staff, Anderson and Hawkins visited the State Department to give a similar briefing. Officials at State seemed much more attuned to the threat facing Iraq’s cultural heritage. Their ability to take action, however, was constrained by the fact that the Defense Department had the lead for all invasion planning. By many accounts, the Pentagon tightly controlled the reins of pre-war planning and did not successfully integrate the efforts of the government’s civilian agencies. For example, at approximately the same time as these meetings, in January 2003, the Pentagon was just beginning to stand up its Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was supposed to integrate civilian capabilities into the post-war planning effort.

Former undersecretary of defense for policy Douglas J. Feith, who along with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley wrote the charter for ORHA, has stated that ORHA would have been a much more successful venture had it been created 20 or 30 years earlier, and not on an ad hoc basis immediately prior to the invasion. Feith rightly argues that the U.S. Government needs to have a permanent mechanism for integrating civilian capabilities into military efforts. Likewise, avoiding destruction of cultural heritage sites during wartime hinges on institutionalizing the planning to protect them.

As a result of ORHA’s inexperience and inefficiency, the office never integrated well with Central Command and had only limited success. Illustrative of this problem, ORHA apparently sent a letter to senior U.S. military officials in late March warning of the threat to the National Museum. The letter reportedly stated that after the national bank, the museum was the number two priority for protection from looters. Unfortunately, later events clearly demonstrated that military commanders did not heed the letter’s warnings.

After the initial meeting at the Pentagon, Dr. Gibson stayed behind to share his extensive knowledge of Iraq’s archaeological sites. The next day, he gave Defense officials a disk containing information on all the known sites. A week and a half later Gibson met with Dr. John J. Kautz, division chief, Operational and Environmental Analysis Division at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). At this meeting, DIA officials sought more information about the locations of archaeological digs. In Gibson’s opinion, the analysts wanted the information not to ensure that the sites would be protected, but to ensure that targeting planners could distinguish dig sites from dug-in air defense artillery sites on imagery.

As U.S. forces began to converge on Baghdad in March 2003, Dr. Gibson sent emails to Defense officials warning them again about the potential threats to the National Museum. He was shocked when they responded by asking, “Where is the museum?” (they wanted specific coordinates) and other questions that Gibson had previously addressed and whose answers he had thought were already incorporated into the war plan.

Despite this last-minute confusion, it does appear that the list of cultural sites was successfully incorporated into military planners’ no-strike lists or no-fire areas. Indeed, according to Dr. Collins, the minimal destruction of cultural sites by direct U.S. military action is an underreported success story. In his words, the extensive “target deconfliction activities that made sure the ziggurats were not hit by a JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munitions] even if there were snipers in the upper spires was an incredible accomplishment.”

According to most sources, initial plans for the siege of Baghdad called for U.S. Army mechanized
infantry and armor forces to surround the city while light infantry forces cleared the city block by block. Instead, an armor brigade from the 3d Infantry Division conducted its famous “thunder run,” an armed reconnaissance mission into the center of Baghdad, on 7 April 2003. This violent, decisive action led directly to the collapse of Saddam’s defenses and the fall of Baghdad in just two days.  

Unfortunately, the speed of the victory contributed to the virtual security vacuum that ensued. Local Iraqis began looting former government ministries and, from approximately 10 to 12 April, the National Museum. Without enough troops in Baghdad to deal with remaining pockets of resistance and simultaneously control the looting, the U.S. Army initially allowed the looting to continue unchecked. Furthermore, according to an Army spokesman, U.S. forces in Baghdad had orders to secure presidential palaces and potential WMD sites, but there were no specific orders to secure cultural sites.

Despite pleas from National Museum administrators, U.S. troops did nothing to stop the theft of at least 15,000 objects. The list of treasures lost is a long one: Abbasid wooden doors; Sumerian, Akkadian, and Hatraean statues; 5,000 cylinder seals from different periods; gold and silver material, necklaces, and pendants; ancient ceramics; the Sacred Vase of Warka, the world’s oldest carved-stone ritual vessel; the Mask of Warka, the first naturalistic sculpture of the human face; a gold bull’s head that had adorned Queen Shub-Ad’s Golden Harp of Ur; the Bassetki Statue; the Lioness Attacking a Nubian ivory; and the twin copper Ninhursag bulls.

Responding to an immediate outcry from the international press, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers stated, “It’s as much as anything else a matter of priorities.” According to Myers, the need to counter ongoing enemy combat operations overrode the need to protect the museum. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was blunter. When asked about the rampant looting, he memorably replied: “Stuff happens.” One of the prominent criticisms emerging from the press was that the U.S. military managed to guard the Oil Ministry in Baghdad but left the other ministries and the museum to the mercy of the looters.

Finally, on the morning of 16 April 2003, an American tank platoon arrived at the museum and set up guard. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, of the U.S. Marine Corps, led a joint interagency coordination group consisting of civilian representatives from the FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the New York Police Department to the museum to begin an official investigation into the looting and to initiate the process of recovering lost artifacts. With assistance from Interpol, the UN Educational, Science, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and other international groups, U.S. efforts to recover the stolen antiquities have been quite successful. So far, over 5,500 of the 15,000 or so missing artifacts have been located and returned to the museum. Most of approximately 9,500 artifacts still missing are smaller, easier-to-conceal items such as cylinder seals, gems, and jewelry.
In addition, through American assistance (including $2 million from the State Department and the Packard Humanities Institute of Los Altos, California), the museum has been restored and even modernized. For instance, a new state-of-the-art electronic security system with guardhouses, fences, and surveillance cameras has been installed.

What Went Wrong?

Why does the failure to protect Iraqi art and antiquities from looting in 2003 seem to stand in such stark contrast to the successes of World War II? And how could planning for the protection of cultural heritage during wartime be improved in the future? To be fair, the U.S. mobilization for World War II was markedly different from U.S. preparations for the invasion of Iraq. In World War II, the entire country truly mobilized for war. Families cultivated victory gardens, the government issued war bonds, and the military-industrial complex went into overdrive; in short, all instruments of national power engaged in the war effort. This general mobilization helps explain why an esteemed panel of experts from the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) convened in 1943 to determine how they could contribute to the war effort (thus leading the President to create a commission and the military to form the MFA&A).

In contrast, prior to the invasion of Iraq, the military mobilized, but the government’s other agencies and the private sector conducted business more or less as usual. While Anderson, Hawkins, and Gibson’s exertions were noble and in keeping with the precedent set by the ACLS, they did not match the scale or carry the same weight as the academic effort that occurred during World War II.

Furthermore, in terms of timing, the ACLS prepared its assessment a full eight months before the invasion of Italy and over a year and a half before the invasion of France, whereas the meetings at the Pentagon in 2003 occurred less than three months prior to the invasion. The relative lack of preparation time for Iraq undoubtedly hindered the integration of cultural-site protection into the planning process.

Finally, the force sent into Iraq was only a fraction of the size of the one that invaded Europe. The relatively small size of the 2003 force is probably the principal reason the U.S. military failed to protect the National Museum. According to Dr. Collins, there were not even enough troops to guard ammunition dumps and weapons caches that U.S. forces knew about, let alone cultural sites. None of these things excuse the U.S. military’s unpreparedness to guard Iraq’s cultural treasures after the fall of Baghdad, but they do provide some mitigating factors.

There are several areas where planning to protect cultural sites could have been enhanced. First, the planning should have been conducted much sooner, and with much greater involvement from civilian agencies. If ORHA could have been created even two to three months earlier, there would have been a much greater chance of capitalizing on expertise in the State Department, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental entities such as UNESCO. As reported by Dr. Anderson, officials at the State Department seemed to have a better understanding of the risks to cultural sites within Iraq, but they were relegated to a secondary and perhaps undervalued planning role.

Another problematic aspect of the planning for Iraq was the delegation of responsibility for protecting cultural sites to the deputy assistant secretary
of defense for stability operations. In the words of Dr. Collins, who held the position prior to the war, this office was basically “the junk drawer of OSD policy,” taking on missions and responsibilities that other agencies and directorates preferred not to deal with. At the time of the invasion, that assessment was probably accurate.

Furthermore, this office was responsible primarily for stability operations—in other words, for operations that are commonly understood to occur after the conclusion of combat operations. In essence, protection of cultural sites was not viewed as an aspect of the operation’s combat phases. Instead, it was relegated to what the military calls “phase IV,” the stability and reconstruction phase of an operation. This could certainly explain why security of the National Museum did not become a priority until after major combat operations in the city had ceased. When asked after the war why he did not order commanders to halt the looting of the museum, Collins responded, “We are a policy shop… We are not in the business of guiding military operations.”

The final major factor contributing to the failure to protect the museum was that, once again, the mechanism for overseeing the mission was thrown together ad hoc. Currently, no permanent structure in the Department of Defense or the government’s civilian agencies is charged with overseeing the protection of art and antiquities during wartime. As previously noted, during World War II the president created the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, and the military created the MFA&A, but these institutions did not endure much beyond the war’s end. The lack of an enduring structure virtually ensures that cultural site protection will continue to be ad hoc, making future destruction of art and antiquities during wartime a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Planning to Protect Arts and Antiquities

Through examination of the problems noted above, it is possible to formulate a prescription for improving planning to protect arts and antiquities. First, the role of cultural experts in developing plans for protecting cultural sites and coordinating those plans with operational plans should be enhanced and formalized. This step will ensure that cultural-protection planning occurs on more than just an informal basis. We should not expect our military personnel to be experts on the location and significance of art and culture in countries around the world. That knowledge resides in the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government, in academia, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations. The military’s relationship with these organizations should be formalized so that experts can play an active role in integrating cultural considerations into military planning.

The U.S. Government has already recognized the need to enhance civilian capabilities for the type of military operations it confronts today. To that end, it has created the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which the President has tasked to coordinate and lead all efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.
A complementary mission of the S/CRS is to create the Civilian Reserve Corps (based on the U.S. military’s reserve) to capitalize on civilian expertise in both the public and private sectors. The S/CRS and the Civilian Reserve Corps could each contribute to building U.S. Government capacity to plan for protecting cultural sites during wartime.

The U.S. Government should create a permanent, dedicated structure within the Department of Defense that, at a minimum, ensures that appropriate cultural planning occurs and is disseminated to all levels of command. This organization should be fully integrated into the operations and policy directorates—not marginalized as an afterthought in the “junk drawer” of the Pentagon. It would also be responsible for coordinating directly with whatever civilian agency has overall responsibility for protecting cultural arts and antiquities. Perhaps most importantly, cultural planning should not be relegated to the periphery as part of “phase IV” operations. Unless such planning is a formal aspect of all phases of the operation, it will not be executed properly.

Conclusion

Over 60 years ago, General Eisenhower stated that it was “the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect” symbols of cultural heritage during wartime. That responsibility continues today. As wars of the past attest, once lost or destroyed, cultural heritage can never be rebuilt. For the present, the treasures of Iraq’s National Museum represent the collective cultural heritage of the strife-riven Sunni and Shi’a sects in Iraq. Indeed, these treasures represent the unifying heritage of the whole world. For these reasons, the importance of protecting these sites cannot be understated. By ensuring their safekeeping and the safekeeping of art and artifacts during future wars, we will give our own cultural heritage a much better chance of remaining secure and available to posterity. MR

NOTES

3. Arndt, 245.
4. Anderson and Hawkins.
5. Description of these meetings derived from interviews conducted by the author with Dr. Maxwell Anderson on April 23, 2007 and Dr. McGuire Gibson on 24 April 2007.
15. Interview with Dr. Collins.
17. Lawler, 583.

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PHOTO: Democratic Unionist leader Ian Paisley (left) and Sinn Fein chief Gerry Adams (right) speak to the media after agreeing to set aside animosities and share power in a new Northern Ireland government. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern and England’s Tony Blair called the agreement “historic,” “reconciliatory,” and “transforming,” Belfast, 26 March 2007. (AFP, Paul Faith)

A Balanced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration

Major John Clark, British Army

Since 1969 the United Kingdom (U.K.) has attempted to resolve conflict in Northern Ireland through amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration (AR2). Conflict resolution in Northern Ireland presents valuable lessons for any student of AR2 because it is a rare example of such processes in the context of a Western liberal democracy. This discussion surveys British AR2 efforts, framing them as a case study to help with understanding how these three concepts functioned in leading to peaceful resolution.

Terms and Processes

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines amnesty as “a general pardon, esp. for political offenses.” In this paper, however, I widen this definition to include a “weapons amnesty” or, as referred to in Northern Ireland, “decommissioning,” which represents a critical part of the peace process as a whole. “Reconciliation” often signifies the breaking down of social barriers within communities. While that meaning remains important in this case, the term also betokens opposing groups managing their political agendas so that meaningful and progressive dialogue becomes possible. Finally, in the context of Northern Ireland, “reintegration” suggests the coming together of opposing sides to form a viable polity and society, allowing those granted amnesty to play a part in AR2.

Given this understanding of terms, AR2 is still happening in Northern Ireland, and it will take some time to determine whether it will be fully successful. Even though the political process appears to have been concluded with...
the reconvening of the Northern Ireland Assembly on 8 May 2007 and the ending of the British military’s security operations the following July (after 38 years), AR2 will continue for years to come.

While the British military’s role in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Northern Ireland has received the lion’s share of attention and analysis, it was only a part of the wider AR2 process. This article will look at the wider whole, highlighting military force as an important factor rather than narrowly focusing on it. By suggesting ways in which the British military made positive contributions to the AR2 process, and sounding cautionary notes where it arguably had an adverse impact, the hope is that this case study provides insight for future military planning for similar situations.

The roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland were chiefly political and economic. Resolution of the so-called “troubles” there has, for the most part, come by way of political agreements encouraged by economic incentives. But AR2 has not taken place in a vacuum of politics and economics; rather, it has transpired in an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, and violence, with far-reaching consequences. As David Bloomfield writes: “The protracted nature of the violence has, through a process of institutionalization that has spanned a generation, produced profound effects in structural and societal aspects that are less amenable to quantification; for example, the spread and normalization of paramilitarism, the growth of intimidation as a constraint on social behavior, [and] the growth of the ‘security’ industry.” Resolution of the conflict required a security component to cope with the violence and intimidation that engendered fear. Fear in turn impeded political and economic progress. These three dimensions—political, economic, and security—influenced one another in the dynamics of societal progress in AR2 in Northern Ireland.

As Michael Cunningham writes: “Political progress, aspects of social reform, the defeat of terrorism and economic progress are mutually reinforcing and advances (or regressions) in one area can have a knock-on effect in others.” The U.K. Government was unable to make real progress in Northern Ireland until it achieved a balance between security operations and progressive political dialogue encouraged by economic growth. In examining this balancing act, the following analysis describes the security, political, and economic dimensions of AR2 as they influenced one another and combined to shape the resolution process in Northern Ireland.

After discussing this dimensional model, the article moves to examining amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration processes in Northern Ireland to assess their contribution to conflict resolution. This part of the article explores the importance of existing conditions at the commencement of the process. The key conclusion of the case study is that, in planning for and conducting conflict resolution operations, governments, and in particular militaries, must consider every action in light of its impact on the longer-term success of AR2. For militaries, COIN operations should not be considered as an “end in itself” but, rather, as a key ingredient in laying the foundations for AR2.

Background

After power devolved from the U.K. Government to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1920, the side in favor of political union with the United Kingdom, the unionists (mainly Protestants), dominated. Their opposition, the nationalists (mainly Catholics), desired political union with the Republic of Ireland, from which they derived much of their strength. Considerable animosity existed between the two communities, with the unionists discriminating against the nationalists in voting rights and housing. As political and social divides grew, the Catholic community appealed to the U.K. for protection. In 1969, the unionist-dominated authorities responded to Catholic civil rights campaigns in a particularly hostile way. Consequently, the British military was deployed to the province, ostensibly as an impartial force tasked to protect the Catholic community. When an initial attempt at political reconciliation failed, the U.K. Government again assumed responsibility for
Northern Ireland (in 1972). This marked the beginning of over 25 years of paramilitary violence that eventually led to the deaths of over 3,600 people (of a population of just over 1.5 million) and countless more injuries and bereavements.

**Impact on Society**

Bloomfield notes, in his “structural approach” to the study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, that “community relations work operates to develop more inclusive communal relationships that will facilitate politics in working out more inclusive political settlements.”10 Such a structural approach reveals that political developments give society mutually beneficial goals to aim for in AR2.

A “cultural approach” can complement a structural approach by studying events from the grassroots up to the political level. From this perspective, economic developments contribute to the political process and give society incentive to believe that AR2 is preferable to continued interfunctional strife. Society in general gains from the synergy of freer economic development and goals of increasing political harmony.

When security operations are applied effectively and discourage a resumption of hostilities, they establish an environment in which mutual trust can become part of that societal synergy. On the other hand, heavy-handed tactics and allegations of partiality create distrust and obstacles to progress in society. In *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland*, Mari Fitzduff claims that in Northern Ireland “the security forces increasingly realized that their own occasionally hostile interface with the communities . . . and the tactics that they sometimes employed became a problematic of the conflict itself.”11 The goal of security forces should be to focus on enhancing the interconnected progress of political and economic goals. As an important dimension of AR2, security operations should avoid becoming an impediment to the other two lines of operation.

**The Political Dimension**

There are four key areas to AR2 in the political dimension:

- The political process.
- Interaction of the key political parties.
● Involvement of regional powers.
● Involvement of outsiders as brokers.

The political process. The political process has been critical to AR2 in Northern Ireland. Initially, a focus on security and the perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game in which one party would win and the other would lose hampered AR2. Security, or at least a commitment from the warring factions to cease violence, renounce it, and decommission weapons, became a precondition for political dialogue. With the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Council in 1983, the U.K. Government began to move toward achieving a political settlement. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 established an intergovernmental conference to discuss affairs of mutual interest in Northern Ireland. In December 1993, a joint declaration created the basis of a peace process, eventually termed “A New Framework for Agreement,” which was implemented in February 1995. The process proposed a method for arriving at a future settlement that would not prejudice the aspirations of the opposing sides in Northern Ireland. As such, it paved the way for political dialogue that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 10 April 1998. That agreement, as Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern put it, was “a precise mechanism for achieving a united Ireland, possible only with the consent of Irish people, defined and accepted by all sides.” The political process ended with the Northern Ireland Assembly’s reestablishment in May 2007.

The negotiators considered each agreement in light of previous achievements and drew up goals, with attendant deadlines, for future progress. Even if the deadlines were not met, the existence of agreed timetables gave the political process hope and direction.

Interaction of key political parties. The timetables notwithstanding, vehement disagreements between the main political parties, fuelled by the parties’ positions as representatives of increasingly militant and divided communities, inhibited political development. Indeed, such was the strength of the vitriol that many saw the 2007 meeting of Democratic Unionist Party leader Ian Paisley and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams as merely the first sign of progress. In fact, the reconciliation of Northern Ireland’s two main political parties was quite another matter.

After three decades of fervent opposition, this first physical meeting between the nationalist and unionist leaders was a watershed event. It demonstrated the commitment of these bitter enemies to work together. The close association of political parties and paramilitary organizations—Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) on the nationalist side and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) on the unionist side—had been a considerable obstacle to political progress. The United Kingdom had refused to deal with political parties so closely associated with terrorist and criminal groups. As Fitzduff wrote in 2002, “The objectives of the politicians [did] not differ significantly from the objectives of many of the paramilitaries, and during the conflict, the constitutional political parties frequently accused each other of colluding secretly with the different paramilitaries.” Such were the difficulties facing the key political parties.

Involvement of regional powers. Arguably, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision to drop arms decommissioning as a condition to dialogue and his subsequent invitation to Gerry Adams to meet with him at 10 Downing Street finally broke the deadlock. Bringing Sinn Fein into the political process when its association with the IRA still tainted it was a bold move only made possible by Blair’s landslide victory in the general election of 1997. Yet Blair, by doing so, made real progress toward AR2.

The changed attitudes of nations with a stake in Northern Ireland were fundamental to progress in AR2. For the U.K. Government, the conflict initially was an internal issue to resolve by imposing its will on the recalcitrant. When this policy failed to make headway, the U.K. handed the reins to local politicians and began to deal with other regional stakeholders, including the Republic of Ireland and the European Union. For its part, the
Republic of Ireland abandoned its relatively isolated position to deal with the United Kingdom on the nationalists’ behalf. Bloomfield suggests that “the partnership between Dublin and London exemplified by the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 represented the single most important change in the parameters of British structural policy.” With the positive involvement of neighboring stakeholders and regional powers, the conflict in Ulster saw the possibility of real progress.

**Outsiders as brokers.** Internationalization of the conflict propelled opponents into making resolution genuinely possible. As Seamus Dunn notes, “Although it is difficult to find a measure of the influence of external actors, such as the United States and the European Union, there can be little doubt that interventions by the international community have contributed to the process toward peace.” The involvement of the United States (in the person of Senator George Mitchell) paved the way for political dialogue by opening lines of communication between the nationalist political parties and the U.K. Government.

Despite the U.K. Government’s objections, President Bill Clinton invited Gerry Adams to the White House in 1994. Adams thereby remained a fundamental part of the AR2 process throughout his tenure. These actions raised AR2 to the international level, forcing the U.K. Government to be more inclusive and more accountable in its approach. That attitude ultimately led to the decision to give Sinn Fein a seat at the negotiating table as a stakeholder, a critical step in the AR2 process.

Once the United States had internationalized the issue, the European Union became increasingly involved in the process. The EU supported AR2 economically and politically. Because of its experience in creating federal institutions, the EU became one of the most influential brokers, guiding the peace process through the GFA and delivering tangible economic development that helped push continued political progress.

The EU’s role highlights the overlap between the political and economic aspects of AR2. In essence, the EU tied political progress to economic incentives, which encouraged the political parties to keep the process moving. The people they represented began to see political progress as economically worthwhile. In turn, political development and cooperation helped open borders and encourage trade. The political dimension thus laid the groundwork for further economic development, and economic development (with the hope it represented for a better future) provided the incentive for further political developments. This cycle proved to be a powerful motivator in Northern Ireland, and it demonstrates the importance of the synergistic relationship between politics and economics in AR2.

Turning to security, if military action is the “continuation of political intercourse,” 10 years without actual political dialogue does not mean 10 years without political activity. The longer the military struggle continued, the more politically entrenched the positions became and the more the government’s hope of re-engaging the political parties receded. A security operation that divided communities to keep the peace was not conducive to political dialogue. Furthermore, the close association of political parties and paramilitary organizations meant that military actions in Northern Ireland might disproportionately influence the political process. The influence of outside brokers essentially changed the landscape for these associations.

In AR2’s initial stages, the emphasis was on security to the detriment of other dimensions of the process. Wherever the parties viewed the conflict mostly in military terms, security forces and paramilitary political arms found it much harder to control militant behavior. Genuine progress in AR2 occurred when the security operation corrected this imbalance by subordinating itself to the political process. It took the influence of powerful outside interests to make that happen. When the opposing sides committed to political interaction with their sworn enemies, they were able to see beyond a zero-sum game, and found an alternative to succeeding through violent means. Pressure from outside brokers helped in getting the security apparatus to back off its dominating posture.

**The Economic Dimension**

Economic development was a key condition for effective AR2 in Northern Ireland. Poverty was responsible for many of the root causes of the conflict. Employment discrimination against the Catholic community contributed to growing animosity toward the U.K. Government. As noted earlier, markets opened up for Northern Ireland only after
internationalization of the problem, coupled with economic incentives, stimulated political progress. The international community’s and the EU’s involvement was particularly important to economic development in Northern Ireland. Funding for the EU’s Program for Peace and Reconciliation (sometimes referred to as the “PEACE Program”) reached over €1000 million (American billion). Its aims of social inclusion, economic development and employment, urban and rural regeneration, and cross-border cooperation directly related to AR2.22 Because the delivery of aid was made contingent on heeding donor countries’ interests, Northern Ireland’s economic development made an impact beyond the geographical boundaries of the region. The quid pro quo of aid for interest had the salutary secondary effect of returning Northern Ireland to the world economic system. The economic dimension also affected the security dimension. Unemployment provided a good recruiting ground for paramilitary groups and drove many of them into criminal activity to fund their campaigns of terror.23 Fuel smuggling, drug running, and bank robberies placed great demands on the security services, spurring occasionally draconian security measures. With their adverse effect on legitimate trade, these measures exacerbated the economic depression and increased the need for even more security. Waging a military campaign to end terrorism and criminal activity without giving much thought to the economic consequences created a vicious circle, which stunted economic growth in Northern Ireland. In short, economic incentives could flourish only where both security operations and political progress took place. Eventually, the U.K. Government and other players realized that economic incentives were powerful motivators and used them to good effect. By building commercial ties between sides in the conflict, they were able to stabilize the security situation and achieve political progress. Over time, this encouraged a fractured society to put aside political differences in favor of pursuing prosperity. The U.K. Government’s recognition of the Republic of Ireland’s interests in Northern Ireland also reaped economic dividends. The Republic achieved unprecedented economic growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its GDP rose by 53 percent between 1988 and 1994—the fastest growth in the EU over the period.24 Northern Ireland was able to piggyback on this success, and from 1987 to 1997, the nominal value of Northern Ireland’s exports to the Republic of Ireland increased by 93.3 percent while imports from the Republic of Ireland increased by 68.3 percent.25 This growth contributed to a sharp upturn in the Northern Irish economy with “2.4 percent growth per annum for the six years ending 31 December 1996 compared to 0.9 percent for Great Britain as a whole for the same period.”26 From a peak of 17.2 percent in October 1986, unemployment plummeted to 7.6 percent in November 1997, its lowest level in around 17 years. This progress had two major consequences. First, it removed one cause of the disaffection and disenfranchisement that made the criminal activities of paramilitary organizations appealing. Second, employed persons became stakeholders in society and sought a peaceful, politically progressive environment in which to work and prosper. As Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk tell us, “Some terrorist groups [had offered] recruits financial incentives and additional family support . . . Social and economic development policies . . . [helped] to reduce the pool of potential recruits by reducing their perceived grievances and providing the members of these communities with viable alternatives to terrorism.”27 Highlighting the wider impact of economic development on social reconciliation, Cragin and Chalk point to the emergence of a new middle class in Northern Ireland: “Members of this particular demographic sector have formed important mediation networks to reduce violence between supporters of militant Protestant groups and those sympathetic to the cause of the Real Irish Republican Army.”28 The Security Dimension From the start, security forces in Northern Ireland were meant to serve as a visible threat to keep the parties involved in the political process. Military de-escalation was intended to be a bargaining tool to encourage political progress. However, failure to be impartial, or the perception of partiality, prolonged the process. The military resort to a security solution was therefore detrimental to political progress in AR2. The security operation evolved into an end in itself with little consideration given to political (and economic) developments so long as the environment was dangerous. The U. K. used its army
in these early years to counter accusations of Royal Ulster Constabulary partiality, but the army’s presence politicized the security effort and undermined police authority.29 When the GFA and subsequent Patton Commission created the Police Service of Northern Ireland in November 2001, police forces finally began to play an effective role in AR2.30

The security situation also had an impact on the economic dimension, as noted above. Border controls and increased internal security measures (e.g., segregation) undermined paramilitary efforts by cutting off smuggling and black marketeering as sources of funding, but also stifled trade. Ironically, absent substantial economic and social development addressing unemployment, the illegal trade the paramilitary organizations engaged in became the source of livelihood for many in Northern Ireland. Cutting off this earning opportunity without providing alternative livelihoods was unpopular and increased discontent.

S.E. Sneddon writes of the early years, “Mistakes were made; the heavy-handed colonial approach of the 1970s that utilized internment, hard interrogation, curfews, and area searches was massively counter-productive and generated deep sympathy for the IRA.”31 The U.K. Government found it difficult to appear impartial when everyone viewed its military as being partial to the unionist side. The government began to counter these allegations by developing new police forces, although the military had a role in this too. As Sneddon observed, “One of the greatest achievements of the armed forces was the ability to evolve and fall more closely into step with political progress, becoming a vital, but always subordinate part in the overall campaign.”32 When the military subordinated itself to the political process, security operations started to have a much more positive effect on the cycle of economic and political progress.

In summary, security forces in Northern Ireland initially enforced peace and protected the citizens by persuading the opposing sides that the economic, political, and social benefits of AR2 outweighed the benefits of continuing the struggle. This security presence eventually created a relatively secure environment for AR2, but real economic and political progress became possible only when the police had primacy over the military and the people believed security forces were impartial. The following sections discuss AR2 in light of how these dimensions shaped resolution of the conflict.

### Amnesty

In discussing AR2, one should remember that certain conditions have to have been met in order to proceed with an effective process. Specifically there has to be initial political agreement, although, as described below, amnesty can often form part of this initial agreement. As Brian Gormally writes: “Politics have to come first. Only . . . on the basis of a real political solution, will demobilization and reintegration support be fundamental . . . components of post-war rehabilitation and development.”33 In the case of Northern Ireland, this political development was embodied in the GFA, to which amnesty was central. Below follows separate examinations of Northern Ireland’s political amnesty and weapons decommissioning.

**Political amnesty.** Amnesty is always an important part of conflict resolution. As Gormally and McEvoy discovered in their 1995 survey of the release and reintegration of politically motivated prisoners across the world, “the issue of the early release of politically motivated prisoners was critical to any peace process which follows a political conflict. Whatever the particular positions taken up by negotiating parties at any given time, we would argue that, until the question of prisoners is agreed then nothing, that will create a final solution, is agreed.”34 Prisoner amnesty in Northern Ireland was important for two reasons: it was an important trust-building measure on the part of the U.K. Government, and many of the key players needed to lead the reconciliation and reintegration processes were behind bars and would have been excluded from the process. Amnesty was, necessarily, a precursor to reconciliation and reintegration in Northern Ireland.

A further point to note is that amnesty often appears as a concession, one side to another, in this case the U.K. Government to insurgents and terrorists. To many, this concession was and remains

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**Amnesty is always an important part of conflict resolution.**
unpalatable. However, the U.K. Government had neither won the COIN fight nor defeated the IRA, as the authors of *An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* conclude: “It should be recognized that the Army did not ‘win’ in any recognizable way; rather it achieved its desired end-state, which allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation.” It had, as mentioned above, brought the various belligerents to the point where a negotiated solution was more attractive than continued resistance. By the same token, clearly the U.K. Government had also reached the point where a negotiated solution was in its own best interests, and to that end, in entering the process, it had to be prepared to concede ground in the same way as the other parties.

One can also argue that, in ending violent armed struggle, the U.K. Government had a moral obligation to provide for the future of those they had “put out of work.” There had to be at least partial recognition of an obligation to incorporate into the new society those who had fought for two generations to unite Ireland and get the British out by whatever means. Jonathon Moore espouses this view: “A random sweep through the thousands of individual cases that have led to conviction [of insurgents] reveals a complex picture in which the individual offender is caught in a cycle of violence. It is one of the most common remarks to be heard in both unionist and republican [nationalist] circles, that most of the young people who ended up in prison would not have been there but for ‘the troubles.’ Statistically at least, this is a tenable view.”

Amnesty was not a novel concept to the British in Northern Ireland. As Moore writes, “Britain has often found it expedient to release Irish political offenders before they have served their full or even a significant proportion of their sentences. Political realism suggested to British politicians that continued incarceration of ‘patriots’ was an impediment to and not an aid to achieving political stability.” Indeed, there were several amnesties during the “troubles” in response to ceasefires. For example, 36 prisoners received amnesty following the first ceasefire in 1994, and a further 25 between July 1997 and April 1998. However, the already politically sensitive issue of amnesty was raised to another level when, at the 1994 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, nationalist prisoners tabled a motion asserting that “the release of all political prisoners is a republican demand based on the merits of justice—there would be no prisoners but for the conflict caused by Britain’s usurpation of Irish sovereignty.” In effect, this statement put the U.K. Government in a difficult position. By suggesting that any future general amnesty would be tantamount to Britain admitting it had usurped Irish sovereignty, it created pressure that might have hindered further progress. Fortunately, the U.K. Government was able to rise above the rhetoric, and it agreed to a rapid general amnesty in the GFA. Granting general amnesty in the face of such provocative talk probably served to enhance the trust the nationalist parties had in the U.K. Government.

In the GFA, the U.K. and Irish Governments committed to establishing “mechanisms to provide for an accelerated program for the release of prisoners.” They noted that those included in the provisions of the agreement should, subject to individual review, be released within two years of signing the agreement. However, while a general amnesty is necessary to begin the processes of reconciliation and reintegration, it also proved divisive, as expected, in Northern Irish society. Given that a considerable majority of those to be freed were nationalist, one can understand the concern felt by the unionist community over the release of such a large number of prisoners (approximately 150). As Prime Minister Blair said: “The early release of paramilitary prisoners . . . reached deep into people’s emotions.” Ian Paisley has been particularly vehement in his opposition.

On the other hand, the amnesty also had two key effects on the political process. First, the influence of paramilitary prisoners, which hitherto had been considerable, was significantly reduced, and former militants were led to work through legal political parties in order to achieve their desired ends. Fitzduff points to the emergence of several new political parties in the late 1990s that recruited significant numbers of former paramilitaries (for example, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party). Second, many of the paramilitaries have been directly involved in furthering the peace process. They have done so either by being politically active or by taking leading roles in the processes of reconciliation and reintegration. Probably the best example is Martin
McGuinness, a convicted senior IRA terrorist who became the chief Sinn Fein negotiator of the GFA. McGuinness currently holds office as the deputy first minister of Northern Ireland.

**Weapons decommissioning.** Recognizing that the surrender of huge quantities of weapons would be a vital part of the general peace process, the U.K. Government forced “decommissioning” as a major condition for negotiation, particularly with the IRA and Sinn Fein. There was, however, a disparity between the conditions leveled on the nationalist paramilitaries and those demanded of the unionist groups. The IRA steadfastly refused to surrender its weapons without evidence of reciprocal action on the part of the unionists. As we have seen, in the end, the condition was dropped under the “Mitchell Principles.” Decommissioning instead became a part of the GFA amnesty. Nevertheless, it has remained a contentious issue. While the IRA claims to have decommissioned much of its arsenal, its refusal to provide photographic evidence of the destruction remains a unionist concern.

Two positive lessons emerged from decommissioning in Northern Ireland: flexibility among concerned parties ultimately allowed for a drop in the initial demand; and, as with the political process in general, involvement of international players aided the decommissioning process. As The Honorable Mitchell B. Reiss, Special Envoy of the President and Secretary of State for the Northern Ireland Peace Process, has written, “The GFA established a process for paramilitary weapons decommissioning that is verified by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD). This process allowed the paramilitary groups to avoid the perception that they were surrendering weapons to the British government by interposing an international body to handle the weapons issue.” Nevertheless, while the decommissioning process did gain credibility from the presence of an external broker, it remains a contentious issue with the potential for future problems.

**Reconciliation**

As defined above, “reconciliation” entails the coming together of opposing political agendas to the point where progressive and meaningful dialogue can become possible. This form of reconciliation, resulting in a peace agreement, appears necessary for the success of the AR2 process in general and reintegration in particular.

Social reconciliation is probably the most difficult of the AR2 processes to transact. As Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink write: “We suggest that it is the process of reconciliation itself that builds stable and lasting peace.” Reconciliation calls for genuine societal change, which explains the intransigence toward it. Bar-Tal and Bennink continue: “Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict.” Thus, reconciliation is particularly difficult to achieve in societies in which separate identities have evolved.

In Northern Ireland these identities have coalesced around ritual and symbology. Throughout the “troubles,” murals and landmarks gained added significance and came to mark the territory of rival groups. Parades, in particular the unionist ones in Portadown and South Belfast, became iconic symbols serving to divide the society. But subordinating group concerns to the interests of the wider community is what undergirds the reconciliation process.
While the main parties in Northern Ireland were not prepared to forgo what they saw as rights, the security forces played a valuable role by attempting to mitigate, through negotiation or the use of barricades and crowd control obstacles, the friction caused by the marches. Besides keeping public order, these interventions aided the process of reconciliation by limiting confrontation between the opposing sides. Attention was diverted from the marches’ confrontational messages to antipathy for the security forces who attempted to deny them their “rights.”

If the ultimate aim of reconciliation is to build the basis of a common narrative and develop a shared identity, then the marches indicate that the process is far from complete in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the main sides see the GFA and its resulting dialogue as an opportunity to continue to seek their own agendas under the framework of their separate narratives. There appears to be little interest in developing a common identity, and so one can conclude that, as long as this remains the case, the prospects for peace in the long term are slim.

Interestingly, in their article “Reconciliation as a Dirty Word: Conflict, Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland,” Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy, and Kirsten McConnachie argue that the term “reconciliation” inappropriately describes the process in Northern Ireland. For many of those involved, “reconciliation” is too closely associated with community relations and the implication that their own identities are impediments to progress. Furthermore, particularly for nationalists, the term is suggestive of the programs instituted by the U.K. Government. In their view, the U.K. should have been involved in the process, not dictating it.52

The same article also highlights the vital role played by ex-combatants in the reconciliation process: “Some of these men and women have been at the forefront of taking forward the most difficult issues of the peace process including working on interface violence at flashpoint areas; negotiations concerning contentious parades; the decommissioning of paramilitaries’ weapons; engagement with the victims of political violence and other ex-combatants; and promoting and encouraging the emerging debate on truth recovery in the jurisdiction.”53 From these comments, one discerns a clear link among the amnesty granted the ex-prisoners, their reintegration into society, and their subsequent work in the field of reconciliation.

Finally, as mentioned above, security forces can contribute to reconciliation by providing an environment in which it can take place. In this case, that is exactly what has happened. In generally keeping the peace, and specifically by preventing the marches from spawning greater conflict, the military set the conditions for the early stages of reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

Reintegration

Reintegration has also taken place on several different levels in Northern Ireland: reintegration of the region itself, reintegration of the Catholic and Protestant communities, and reintegration of ex-prisoners in society at large. In examining reintegration as a concept, one should understand that it is a two-way process requiring decisiveness and effort by the party being reintegrated and the accepting society. This distinction is important since the ground has to be prepared on both sides.

Regional reintegration. Northern Ireland’s regional reintegration, both politically and economically, not only drew it into closer ties with the rest of the U.K. and Ireland, but also more widely with the rest of the European Union and even the world. This type of reintegration was stimulated by economic ties and bound together by political negotiations and agreements. As such, it was arguably instrumental in extending horizons for many of the groups in Northern Ireland beyond what one may see as parochial issues (without trivializing them). While it is difficult to substantiate, one could conclude that rather than feeling locked in a mortal battle with either the U.K. or each other, many of the political parties and paramilitaries realized that the eyes of the world were on them. They could therefore use this high visibility to their advantage to pursue their goals through peaceful means, in particular by leveraging the support of other nations to influence the U.K. and Irish Governments to recognize their positions.

Community reintegration. One of the most effective methods security forces can use to de-escalate violence is to construct physical barriers to keep warring factions apart. In Northern Ireland, the division these “peace walls” created was enhanced by
the marking of territory, usually by painting murals, erecting curbstones, or hoisting party flags. As the conflict progressed, however, communities became increasingly isolated and entrenched, not only physically but also psychologically. To reintegrate, the communities therefore needed to overcome both physical and mental barriers.

In Northern Ireland, it is possible to see that, over time, effective policing offset the need for the physical barriers. The mental obstacles to reintegration were more significant; in fact, most of the community relations work in Northern Ireland was predicated on the assumption that “while such physical and mental separation exists between communities, fears and misunderstandings about each other’s ultimate intentions will continue, and will thus make the achievement of any agreed political solutions between the communities even more difficult, and more difficult to sustain.”

Over the course of the conflict, the U.K. Government launched community-relations initiatives at national, regional, and local levels. Perhaps chief among them was the Community Relations Council (CRC), established in 1990 and intended as “an independent agency dedicated to improving relationships between communities and fostering conflict resolution in Northern Ireland.” Fitzduff, who was the first director of the CRC, points to two significant elements that enabled such programs to begin to achieve a level of social reintegration. The first was an emphasis on education, that is, giving participants the necessary knowledge and skills with which to begin or continue dialogue. The second was the use of “partials” as facilitators. Having concluded by experiment that it was virtually impossible for both sides to consider a facilitator completely neutral, work began to develop a cadre of “partials” or “insiderpartials,” people whose loyalties were known to both sides but who were trusted to lay their interests aside for the duration of community dialogue. These individuals were able to “model openness about their own upbringings, their fears and their political convictions, while at the same time ensuring a productive process for discussion.” This mechanism has proved to be very successful, and it has often involved ex-prisoners, thereby aiding their reintegration into the community.

Reintegration of political prisoners. This aspect of reintegration follows directly from amnesty and is another vital step in the AR2 process. According to Gormally, “Prisoner release and reintegration are an indispensible prerequisite for the building of an inclusive society.” Of course, the ground for such reintegration has to have been prepared. Preparation happens on both sides of the process; on the one hand, the ex-combatants need to be prepared to play their part as responsible citizens in a democracy; on the other hand, the society receiving them must be prepared to recognize that change has occurred and accept them on those terms.

The significant role that political prisoners played, not only as partials but also throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland, helped with their reintegration. Again, Gormally addresses this significance: “The active role of prisoners
and ex-prisoners in the peace process opened their way to political reintegration. Virtually all of the negotiators representing paramilitary-aligned parties during the peace talks were ex-prisoners. In essence, having conceded that further violence would not bring them closer to their goals, many of the insurgents sought to pursue their cause in political forums.

The ex-combatants were given the opportunity to work through forums sponsored by the U.K. Government, whose attitude in this regard helped. Having adopted an intentionally permissive attitude, the government created conditions that allowed those most closely associated with the paramilitary organizations to reintegrate into democratic society. This situation helped to further the political process by enabling ex-prisoners and supporters alike to play an active, nonviolent political role and by ensuring that paramilitaries influenced their supporters in actively supporting the process.

At the same time, the reintegration of political prisoners into Northern Ireland society has not been without its problems. Most of them stem from the economic conditions ex-prisoners face as they begin the reintegration process. Because of a lack of job skills (due to prison time), employer aversion to anyone with a “bad reputation,” and various legal reasons, many have found employment elusive. This point also highlights the importance of society being prepared to receive ex-prisoners. Returning to Gormally: “Long-term peace is hardly to be consolidated by excluding former combatants from mainstream employment.”

Conclusion

The U.K. Government’s actions in resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland reveal some of the difficulties inherent in attempting to appropriately balance the political, economic, and security dimensions in a society to set the conditions for AR2. The following observations illustrate lessons from that AR2 process.

● The U.K. Government’s internalizing of the problem and the characterization of the situation as a zero-sum game in the early years of the conflict prevented meaningful political dialogue for decades.

● In lieu of substantive dialogue, it is possible to argue that security operations became an end in themselves (and so were detrimental to overall efforts at AR2).

● One can also argue that progress was not realistic until Sinn Fein was brought into the political process, with significant economic incentives, along with international brokers. These measures should have been taken in the intervening 25 years of military struggle.

● While the U.K. Government can assert that it took 25 years to set the conditions for what followed, one can also conclude that the military struggle continued for such a long time precisely because the above steps had not been taken earlier. In the meantime, the conflict served only to increasingly divide and impoverish society in Northern Ireland.

● The effectiveness of outside mediation (for political and economic reasons) should have been deduced earlier in the process. Notwithstanding issues of sovereignty, the impartiality of an outside broker clearly offers benefits, particularly when the government has such a close association with, and perceived interest in, one side.

In conclusion, any approach to setting the conditions for AR2 needs to be inclusive, balanced, and responsive. It should seek to advance political, economic, and security processes in a way that avoids one area having an adverse effect on the others. Only by achieving results in all dimensions simultaneously will the ground for successful AR2 be prepared.

As part of the security forces, the military has a key role to play in laying the foundations for AR2. Chiefly, it can persuade the opposing sides that the benefits to be gained (economic, political, and social) via AR2 outweigh the potential benefits of continuing the struggle. Military forces have to act as a threat to
the paramilitary organizations to keep their political representatives in negotiations. Military forces—indeed all security forces—should be mindful of the negative effects their operations can have. Military operations should not be seen as an end in themselves, or even purely as a way to support a legitimate government, but rather, in terms of their contribution to the vital processes of AR2.61

NOTES

2. The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus defines "reconcile" variously as 1. make friendly after an estrangement, 2. make acquiescent or contentedly submissive to, 3. settle [a] quarrel etc. 4. a harmonise; make compatible; to show the compatibility of by an argument or in practice. The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, ed. by Sara Tulloch (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), s.v. "reconcile.
3. A reconciliation accords with the understanding of Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie who write, "The successful negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 has seen the Irish peace process widely lauded as an example of the "nationalist-republican" reconciliation as a Dirty Word: Conflict, Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland," Journal of International Affairs 60, no.1 (Fall 2006): 81.
5. Ibid., 3.
7. There are many different political parties and paramilitaries with diverse agendas who are loosely bound together by a common desire to preserve the union with Great Britain. Most of them are labeled as either "unionist" or "loyalist." In the interest of clarity, in this article, I will use the term "unionist" to refer to all of these groups.
8. Again, there are many different political parties and paramilitaries with diverse agendas who are loosely bound together by a common desire to unite Ireland under one government and so for Northern Ireland to cede from its current union with Great Britain. Most of them are labeled as either "nationalist" or "republican." In the interest of clarity, I prefer to use the term "nationalist" to refer to all of these groups.
12. Ibid., 28.
15. The other key event that in many ways enabled and arguably forced Prime Minister Blair towards this measure was President Clinton’s move to legitimize Gerry Adams and by association to give the IRA an official platform, by inviting him to the White House in 1994.
16. An Army of Military Operations in Northern Ireland actually argues that the Irish Government was actively hostile to the UK: "The Government of Ireland, which had cooperated with Stormont [the seat of government of Northern Ireland] during most of the period 1957-1962, was deeply anti-British in the late 1960s and 1970s. Initially, therefore, there was virtually no cross-border cooperation." Operation BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, Army Code 71842, July 2006, 3-6.
17. Bloomfield, 38.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2003), x.
28. Ibid.
29. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was the police force in Northern Ireland between 1922 and 2001 and was considered by many in the Catholic community to be dominated by and loyal to the Protestants, and protective of unionist paramilitaries.
30. The Patton Commission conducted an independent review of policing in Northern Ireland and made 175 recommendations on subjects ranging from the composition, size and structure of the police service to the creation of new account-
A popular saying holds that the purpose of the Army is to “kill people and break things.” While this is cute and crisp, it runs counter to the Army’s stated mission and current practices. Today, the complexities of combat extend well beyond the lethal emphasis of the past. The current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan require a sophisticated mix of lethal and nonlethal operations that range from conducting combat operations to constructing health clinics and schools. Former commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak famously referred to this kind of war as a “three-block war,” one in which troops simultaneously “[provide] support to the indigenous population, [help] restore or maintain stability, and [fight] an armed foe in force-on-force combat.”

It is perhaps intuitive for Army officers to consider Krulak’s “three block war” as being comprised of at least two distinct, separate parts: combat operations, executed by combat units to defeat armed insurgents; and stability operations, performed by civil affairs units and civilian agencies like the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to support, stabilize, and reconstruct fragmented societies. Such thinking flows naturally from the Army’s past experience, doctrine, and organizational structure. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have rendered the distinction between fighting and fixing obsolete. Today, all Army units constantly engage in a full spectrum of operations, from stability to high-intensity combat. What binds these seemingly disparate missions is the Army’s overall objective: to instill rule of law.

Having overthrown indigenous regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is responsible for establishing post-conflict stability in both countries. This has been hard to do. In such tenuous situations, chaos incites the greatest threats to stability. It invites crime and provokes fragmentation by disenfranchising certain groups. Chaos represents the societal antithesis of rule of law. In a stable environment, the rule of law functions as the adhesive that brings order. Clearly articulated and enforced codes apply equally to all and thus govern society. Absent the rule of law, chaos prevails: police are openly defied; citizens are arbitrarily punished; corruption runs rampant; business grinds to a halt; and
the government is stripped of power and respect. In congressional testimony, the inspector general for the State Department asserted that “effective rule-of-law strategies are essential for the functioning of a democracy and are central to protecting the rights and liberties of individuals. Specifically for Iraq, effective rule of law will serve to promote democratic reform and enhance stability.”

Even if we recognize the importance of the rule of law, we are still left with some very fundamental questions: How do you define “rule of law”? What is the Army’s role in developing it in the post-conflict phase of operations? What is the combat commander’s role in promoting it in the midst of chaos? This article attempts to answer these three questions.

**Rule of Law Defined**

Defining “rule of law” is a thorny exercise in jurisprudence and philosophy. As one legal commentator noted (in a 26,000 word discourse), “The meaning of the phrase ‘rule of law’ . . . has always been contested.” Nevertheless, when we examine how different organizations have defined the phrase and then identify common elements that might serve as the basis for an operational definition commanders can use, we find there is enough commonality to draw some useful conclusions.

The definitions discussed below are either formalistic or substantive. Formalistic definitions focus on the procedural aspects of the rule of law, such as the organizational structure that supports it (independent courts, for instance). Substantive definitions, on the other hand, “incorporate certain substantive requirements such as human rights or democratic principles.”

The State Department has traditionally taken the lead in promoting rule of law; in fact, doing so is part of its mission statement. The department offers two brief formulations:

- “Rule of law includes the entire legal complex of a modern state, from a constitution and a legislature to courts, judges, police, prisons, due process procedures, a commercial code, and anti-corruption mechanisms.”
- “Rule of law means that no individual or private citizen stands above the law.”

The department uses a third definition that combines the first two and adds substantive aspects (italicized for emphasis):

- “Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights law. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”

USAID has concocted a similar definition comprised of both formalistic and substantive elements. For the agency, rule of law encompasses “the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law, fairness, and both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights.” At the same time, it “ensures that individuals are subject to, and treated equally according to the law, and that no one is subject to arbitrary treatment by the state.”

The Army, too, has weighed in. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, identifies several “key aspects” necessary for the rule of law to function: the state’s government “derives its powers from the governed,” the state’s security institutions are sustainable, citizens enjoy fundamental human rights, etc. The Center for Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College provides a lengthy definition of the rule of law as it applies to peacekeepers. Its definition includes “application of the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, human rights law, military law, criminal law and procedure, and constitutional law.”

The Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps *Rule of Law Handbook* acknowledges that “there are divergent, and often conflicting, views among academics, various USG [U.S. Government] agencies, U.S. allies and even within the Department of Defense (DOD), on what is meant by the ‘rule of law.’” The handbook does not provide a single definition, but instead lists criteria that must be met for the rule of law to exist.

Oddly, the Army’s FM 3-07, *Support Operations and Stability Operations*, neither defines nor describes the rule of law at all.

For commanders, an operationally useful definition ought to meet two criteria: it must be easy to understand and explain and it must be quantifiable.
Ease of understanding is important because, to engage the rule of law effectively, all soldiers in a unit need to understand the basic concept. It should be quantifiable because commanders have to apply objective metrics to gauge the success or failure of their efforts. A definition that fails to meet these criteria is of no practical use to the Army, however academically accurate it may be.

Given the above, we might best define the rule of law as a situation marked by a transparent judicial system in which all persons and organizations are equally accountable to publicly promulgated laws.

The Army, Iraq, and the Rule of Law

As noted above, the State Department has traditionally had the lead for establishing and fostering the rule of law in foreign countries. In practice, however, the Army has always played a major part, although largely unofficially. Now, it’s official: rule-of-law operations in a post-conflict environment are a subset of broader reconstruction and stability operations, and DOD has incorporated stability operations into the U.S. military mission.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, dated November 2005, declares that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission.” According to the directive, “Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.”

By designating security an immediate goal and rule of law a long-term goal, the directive implies that the two goals should be temporally separated—first we get security, then we pursue rule of law. However, as current operations in Iraq suggest, the two goals are too closely connected, both logically and empirically, to be separated. In fact, any temporal separation between them could be dangerous.

“National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44,” published in 2005, validates the State Department as the lead coordinating agency for stabilization and reconstruction, but also mandates that the secretaries of state and defense “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.” Thus, “NSPD 44” acknowledges the reality of most post-combat environments: that a security “gap” exists after open hostilities end. That gap opens the door to low-grade violence in a setting of immature domestic security apparatuses and weak governmental organizations. Such conditions make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for nonmilitary organizations such as the State Department and USAID to operate effectively. Ironically, it is also during this time that the rule of law is of the utmost importance.

A Bad First Step: No Security

On 9 April 2003, when Baghdad fell and a wave of looting and anarchy spread across Iraq, the direct connection between security and rule of law became obvious. Anarchy reigns in the absence of any functioning rule of law (e.g., enforceable laws, police, judicial institutions, jails). Looting is anarchy’s natural companion. In response to a question about looting in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “Stuff happens . . . Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.”

Rumsfeld’s flippant remark soon proved to be grossly mistaken.

Noah Feldman, a law professor and the Coalition Provisional Authority’s senior advisor on constitutional law in Iraq, noted, “The key to it all was the looting. That was when it was clear that there was no order. There’s an Arab proverb: ‘Better forty years of dictatorship than one day of anarchy.’” Professor Feldman’s and others’ concerns have since been confirmed by a number of studies linking security and rule of law. A RAND Corporation report on the reconstruction of health infrastructure in post-conflict environments has concluded that “protection of power generation and transmission...
systems from bombing and, even more important, looting, should be one of the highest priorities.”

Kenneth M. Pollack, director of research at The Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy, found that “as no orders were issued to the troops to prevent looting and other criminal activity—since it was mistakenly assumed that there would not be such problems—no one did anything. The result was an outbreak of lawlessness throughout the country that resulted in massive physical destruction coupled with a stunning psychological blow to Iraqi confidence in the United States, from neither of which has the country recovered.”

Clearly, freedom, as applied to a flourishing society, has a correlation with the rule of law that is not in any sense untidy.

According to another RAND study, “The breakdown of law and order enabled [insurgents] to travel freely, and to train with the foreign fighters who were flowing in across unprotected borders.”

In Jane’s Intelligence Review, Gordon Corera concluded that “the first week after 9 April was dominated by looting and a breakdown in security in the Iraqi capital, a problem that had serious consequences for the way in which the Iraqi people perceived the new administration. The failure to plan and execute sufficiently well in the security field has probably been the coalition’s greatest failing.” Not only was there a spiral of violence stemming from the breakdown of order, but there was also a related loss of confidence propelling the situation still further into chaos.

A UN study has similarly found that “rebuilding governance institutions, promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law, and fostering participatory dialogue are critical in driving forward peace-building and nation-building processes.”

In a separate report to the secretary general, the UN Security Council warned that “restoring the capacity and legitimacy of national institutions is a long-term undertaking. However, urgent action to restore human security, human rights, and the rule of law cannot be deferred.” It “cannot be deferred” because it is the essence of civilization, and bringing freedom and democracy means nothing good if it does not bring order.

Plainly, quickly establishing and enforcing the rule of law in a post-conflict environment is critical. Equally obvious is the direct correlation between the rule of law and security: the two objectives must be pursued concurrently, not sequentially.

Commander’s Role in Fostering Rule of Law

Establishing the rule of law in Iraq is requiring enormous effort across the full spectrum of operations. In 2003, 19 organizations involved in various rule-of-law programs spent over $400 million in Iraq. In a 2005 report to Congress, the State Department reported well over a billion dollars spent for myriad programs at all levels, from UN-organized national elections to soldiers on the ground talking to citizens about voting and democracy.

Without a doubt, tactical commanders in Iraq must be involved in fostering the rule of law. They can do this primarily by interacting with their Soldiers and the population in their area of operations. Such fostering will happen when they protect and encourage local institutions and people who support the rule of law. Their involvement will perhaps be most
obvious when they are neutralizing organizations and individuals who seek to undermine the law.

The manner in which commanders have their troops conduct missions can also influence the local population’s acceptance of the rule of law. In a post-conflict environment, occupying forces have tremendous powers. Commanders or their civilian counterparts can promulgate laws, set up checkpoints, outlaw weapons possession, declare martial law, designate certain geographic areas off-limits, set curfews, cordon and search at will, and detain freely. These measures might be legitimate and vitally important to stabilizing the environment, but how Soldiers implement them can have significant consequences. Senior commanders in Iraq have repeatedly noted that ultimate success depends on co-opting the small percentage of “fence-sitters” who have not cast their lot with any side in the conflict. Winning over the undecided is made all the more difficult when units apply heavy-handed force, violate the law of war, or disrespect indigenous culture. Such actions run counter to or undermine the basic principles of the rule of law.

Where troops understand the consequences of their actions, they can better articulate the importance of the rule of law to the people they see on the streets every day. Soldiers who have seen military justice administered fairly in their own units and have learned to respect the rule of law understand the concept’s importance. When they see discipline bring order to a military organization, they realize that some form of discipline has to operate in any society. Moreover, if Soldiers receive basic training on the tenets of indigenous rule-of-law mechanisms and procedures, as well as human rights, democracy, and related concepts, they will be more likely to respect a country’s inhabitants and will better understand their own missions. Regardless of how archaic the indigenous system may seem, Soldiers who show respect and abide by the Law of Armed Conflict are less apt to violate local laws and more apt to enforce the rule of law. They will set a strong example for the people they need to influence.

It may even be helpful to purposefully engage the people at certain times, such as prior to a local election. Commanders could encourage Soldiers to talk with the local population, explaining the election process and answering questions, to constructively demonstrate respect for both the people and the rule of law.

Commanders and Soldiers who understand the importance of the rule of law will also understand the strategic consequences of looting and take measures designed to mitigate or stop the problem. If, for example, a Soldier watches a local national grab a pair of shoes from a store, he may not regard this as anything more than a simple act
of petty theft. But if he understands the importance of the rule of law and how such acts can create a strategic ripple of chaos, he will take action. Similarly, a commander observing criminal behavior across an area of operations might be wary of enforcing another nation’s laws, but if he is aware of the long-term strategic ramifications of not taking action, he will likely intervene. The Army is not a police force, does not train all of its Soldiers in law enforcement techniques, and does not expect them to understand the intricacies of local criminal laws; nevertheless, commanders can adjust unit and resource priorities when there is a clear connection between acts of lawlessness and security.

The last two ways in which commanders can play a significant role in establishing the rule of law are by supporting those who uphold the rule of law and by neutralizing those who undermine it. While this sounds commonsensical, in practice, units frequently pursue strategies at odds with these goals. In Iraq, for instance, commanders often seek out local power brokers such as sheiks and imams rather than deal with official representative bodies.29 They do this because the power brokers, thanks to custom and tradition, are important personages with actual power and influence.

Iraq, however, has functioning government institutions, although commanders are often unwilling to deal with them because they believe them to be powerless, incompetent, corrupt, or obstructionist. The latter might sometimes be true, but the unofficial power brokers are equally suspect. While there may be a cultural precedent for working with sheiks, there is also a cultural precedent for working with government agencies that have existed for decades. When commanders seek to address local issues by going outside the official framework, they should understand the long-term, strategic consequences of their decisions. Every substantive interaction outside the official framework undermines the overall effort to establish a stable society.

Take, for instance, a routine reconstruction project in Iraq: building a health clinic. When a unit announces such a project, it is inundated by bids from local contractors. One bid will very possibly be from a construction firm associated with a powerful sheik who has made it known that he will support the coalition and encourage his people to do the same if he gets the contract. Regardless of the merits of the bid, awarding the contract to the sheik leaves the population with the impression that what transpired was business as usual. We may build the clinic, but we may also degrade respect for the rule of law.

We can find an analogous example in the practice of arming various groups and deputizing them to act as pseudo law-enforcement officers operating checkpoints, providing intelligence, and capturing insurgents. We can call this strategy “gray-market” security—something that is neither “white market” (official), nor black market (illegal)—but it counterenances perhaps the boldest subversion of the rule of law: it gives non-governmental actors the one power the state traditionally reserves to itself—the legal use of violence. This practice simultaneously undermines Iraqi security forces and encourages vigilante justice. While some units have had success with the practice in Al Anbar province, the long-term effects of such gray-market security are unclear. One day we will have to un-deputize these officers and persuade them to abide by the system we previously encouraged them to undermine. Doing so may prove difficult.

Conclusion

Writing off the rule of law as an abstraction more suited to academic philosophy than warfighting or nation building is understandable, given the term’s complexities and its relative absence from mainstream Army doctrine. However, recent operations clearly demonstrate that the rule of law is inextricably tied to security and therefore to enduring stability. These objectives are related, and commanders have to work toward them concurrently. Rule of law means a functioning system of justice, which in turn produces long-term stability. Gray-market fixes may lead to short-term successes, but they inevitably end in failure. MR

1. See, for example, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Para 4.1 (28 November 2005). This directive notes that “stability operations are a core U.S. Military mission.”


3. See also, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 17 September 2006). This publication divides operations into three categories: offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.


6. Dan E. Stigall, “The rule of law: a primer and a proposal,” Military Law Review 189 (Fall 2006). This article provides a very extensive discussion of the definitions of rule of law.


16. Ibid.


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NOTES

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SLAVERY WAS WIDESPREAD and legally sanctioned for most of human history. Chattel slavery—the legal ownership of one person by another—was its most common form. Gradually, and especially in the 19th century, the growing condemnation of chattel slavery and the slave trade by an increasing number of individuals, groups, and eventually states culminated in widespread legal prohibitions against it. However, non-chattel slavery, including practices such as involuntary child labor and the trafficking of women for prostitution, continued in various places and guises. The persistence of these forms of involuntary servitude into the 20th century led to international agreements and efforts to eradicate them. Nevertheless, human trafficking remains a problem, one that often arises in areas of lawlessness and armed conflict and thus is of concern to military professionals.

A Short History of Slavery

The historian John Keegan notes that no one knows how and when slavery and the slave trade began, but he speculates that it was probably a common part of the social order for early pastoralists and steppe peoples, and it likely intensified with the advent of the war chariot in the second millennium BCE. Slavery was prevalent throughout the ancient world; the Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Chinese, Greek, and Roman civilizations developed laws and customs to legitimize and regulate it. Slavery was also extensively practiced in northern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, pre-Islamic Arabia, Southeast Asia, and Japan, and it existed, though was not widespread, in the Western Hemisphere until the modern colonial era.

Ancient laws and customs deemed that a slave was the legal property of another person. Identification of the slave as the property of the slave owner is chattel slavery. This characteristic distinguished slaves from other persons whose freedom may have been formally limited, such as prisoners of war or felons. (Through much of this period, however, felons and prisoners of war were sent or sold into slavery.) The power of the owner over chattel slaves was often unlimited; owners of slaves could resell, free, and even kill their slaves without legal restrictions. On the other hand, in some ancient societies
such as Greece and Rome, slaves did have limited legal rights, including the right to own and transfer property, to marry, and to be protected against unreasonable treatment, although these rights were in all respects inferior to those of free persons.

Slavery in the ancient world served primarily military and economic purposes. The military frequently forced individuals into service as soldiers or galley slaves. Slaves also labored in public works construction in ancient Greece or in agricultural or mine work in Mesopotamia and in the Roman Empire. Others were personal and household servants for wealthy families and often provided sexual services to their masters or mistresses.

As Europe transitioned from the Roman Empire to the modern era, slavery persisted. One could become a slave, as before, by being taken prisoner during wars and invasions, or by being born of a slave parent. It became increasingly common for destitute parents to sell their children into slavery and for slavery to be the penalty for committing a crime or failing to pay a debt. The slave trade was a significant economic activity in many towns along the Scandinavian, English, and Italian coasts. During the feudal period, Europe’s population was comprised of freemen, serfs, and slaves, and both secular and Church authorities recognized slavery as a natural, if regrettable, institution. They justified this view by quoting Biblical sources and emphasizing humankind’s moral sinfulness and slavery’s economic benefits.

With the demise of European feudalism, conditions became increasingly unfavorable to the institution of slavery: maintaining slaves was expensive, and a growing population increased the availability of cheap labor, making slavery economically less desirable. Consequently, slavery declined in many parts of the continent during the Renaissance, especially in northern areas, although household slaves worked in wealthy London and Paris homes as late as the 1700s, and slaves were openly sold in Paris until 1762. In areas near the border with the Islamic world, Muslim captives were household servants or workers on large private estates. The tradition of using prisoners of war as slaves also continued: slaves continued to man naval vessels and work in other military enterprises.

When European states began to explore and colonize areas outside the continent, especially in the Western Hemisphere, they deemed slavery and the slave trade to be especially well-suited to the economic exploitation of these regions, and slavery thrived on plantations and in mines throughout the Americas from the 16th to the 19th centuries. Sub-Saharan African slaves arrived in Europe beginning in the mid-15th century, after European crews seized them, or North African Muslim traders and sub-Saharan African tribal chiefs sold them to European merchant ships. The English, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and French acquired African slaves and transported them across the ocean in ships. They soon regularly sold African and Native American slaves throughout the West Indies and along the North and South American coasts. The export of African slaves rapidly increased as the number of Native American slaves declined because of disease and maltreatment; English ships alone transported two million African slaves to North America between 1680 and 1786.

A 19th century engraving of slaves being transported in Africa.
In the Middle East, the advent of Islam did not abolish the institution of slavery, but it did moderate it, first in Arabia and then in other areas the Arab armies conquered. Like their counterparts in Europe, the Middle East’s religious and legal institutions sanctioned slavery.

The Islamic Sharia contains rules governing slavery. The rules stem from two primary sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna. Devout Muslims believe that the Qur’an is the written word of God spoken through the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad and recorded in its final form within a few decades of his death. The Sunna was compiled during the first few centuries after Muhammad’s death and contains the reported words and deeds of Muhammad and (for Shi’a Muslims) those of the Imams. Regulations enacted by various Muslim caliphs, sultans, shahs, and other rulers at various times and places were also valid as long as they did not contradict the primary sources, and this is generally the case today.

Muslim culture did not require slavery, but it recognized and regulated it. Slaves could be either the offspring of slaves, or non-Muslim prisoners of war purchased by wealthy individuals or local rulers. Muslims could not enslave other Muslims or non-Muslims living under Muslim governments, and slaves who converted to Islam could eventually gain their freedom. Slaves in the Islamic world were usually either household or military servants, although slavery supported some agricultural and other non-household economic activity. Sharia law contains numerous rules concerning the rights and duties of slaves in such matters as marriage, judicial testimony, property ownership, and criminal punishments. It prohibits mistreatment of slaves and encourages their emancipation. Nevertheless, slavery and the slave trade in Islamic Asia and Africa remained prevalent through the 19th century.

The military use of slaves by various Muslim dynasties increased during the early modern era. “Slave dynasties” on the Indian subcontinent and the Mamluk dynasty in Syria and North Africa organized large slave armies, and the Janissary Corps, an elite slave army established in the 14th century, became the standing army of the Ottoman Empire. The janissaries remained a powerful military force until the early 19th century. Comprised of young non-Muslims taken from areas conquered by the Ottomans and subsequently educated and trained within the Empire, the janissaries were subject to the unfettered direction and control of the Sultan, who “owned” each soldier; nevertheless, members of this slave army rose to positions of great wealth and power within the Empire.

Slavery was prevalent elsewhere in the world throughout this period. Sub-Saharan Africa, India, and China practiced slavery from ancient times to the modern era. Slavery existed in Japan until the 16th century, when the central government banned both it and the slave trade, deeming the practice of little economic value. Slavery was also common throughout Southeast Asia, which was more ethnically diverse and open to trade (including the slave trade) than Japan.

The Legal Prohibition of Slavery

From this brief review, it is clear that slavery was widespread throughout the world from ancient times until relatively recently, owing to its military and economic benefits. During the 18th century, however, an increasing number of individuals and religious and civic groups in Europe, among the latter the Methodist Church in England, began to call for the elimination of slavery. This effort, reflecting the Western Enlightenment’s focus on individual rights, gained momentum during the first half of the 19th century, which saw the first domestic legal limitations on slavery and the slave trade. Multilateral international agreements that addressed persistent forms of slavery more comprehensively followed in the 20th century. Their effectiveness, however, depended on their recognition and the elimination of the economic and military factors that continued to support slavery. Although this developing legal regime gradually resulted in the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade as jus cogens (a preemtory norm of international law from which no state can derogate), it has been only partially successful in eliminating slavery in all its permutations, especially its more modern forms of human trafficking.

Domestic Laws

In Europe and North America, the initial legal measures to abolish slavery were constitutional mandates and statutory legislation arising from the growing moral outrage against slavery, its declining economic advantages to European states, and
In Europe and North America, the initial legal measures to abolish slavery [arose] from the growing moral outrage against slavery, its declining economic advantages...and the...states’ rejection of their colonial past. the new Western Hemisphere states’ rejection of their colonial past. Portugal abolished slavery in 1773 (but not immediately in its colonies), while Denmark eliminated slavery completely in 1792. France ended slavery both at home and in its colonies in 1794, although provisions of the Code Napoleon restored it for a period in the colonies. Spain abolished slavery in its 1812 constitution, and the former Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere followed suit when they gained their independence. Sweden abolished slavery in 1813, and the Netherlands did so in 1814.

In England, rising sentiment against slavery resulted in a 1772 judicial decision from the lord chief justice, based on the ancient writ of habeas corpus, that any slave who entered England was a free person. By 1808, Parliament had dictated that no ship could carry slaves to or from any British port, and in 1833, it abolished slavery in all British territories. Slavery became illegal in Russia in 1861 and in Brazil (a former Portuguese colony) in 1888. By the end of the 19th century, most other European states and their former colonies had also banned slavery under their domestic laws.

Although the lawful importation of African slaves ended in the United States in 1808 and slavery was outlawed in a number of states by the beginning of the 19th century, it continued for primarily economic reasons in mostly southern areas until the 1860s, when the 13th Amendment to the Constitution declared that “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” This amendment and the equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment authorized Congress to pass legislation prohibiting practices that were “incident” to slavery, such as the incapacity to enter into contracts, although little was done in this area until the mid-20th century.

In the Islamic world, Western (especially British) colonialism and influence created internal and external pressures to eliminate the slave trade and to reduce slavery (as it did in other areas of the European empires). In contrast to Europe, these efforts necessarily combined governmental decrees with the opinions of Islamic legal scholars. Reformers in the Ottoman Empire were successful in closing the Istanbul slave market in 1846, and the government imposed limits on and eventually prohibited the trade in African slaves in 1857, except in some limited areas such as the Hijaz region of Arabia.

Initially, commercial and religious authorities in the Empire strongly resisted efforts to reform slavery, because the practice had a long, profitable pedigree in the Middle East and North Africa. The limits imposed on slavery did not apply at first to the thriving Circassian slave trade in the northern area of the Empire; trade there declined only incrementally during the century. Overall, the 1857 ban was ineffective and had to be renewed in 1877. Gradually, however, these measures were successful in reducing slavery throughout the region.

Since governmental decrees to eliminate slavery in the Muslim world needed to be consistent with Sharia, the opinions of legal scholars were critical to the success or failure of any reforms. In some areas, such as the more conservative Arabian Peninsula, many scholars were reluctant or outright opposed to a reinterpretation of the sources of law that had permitted slavery for many centuries.

In other areas, after reviewing provisions of the Qur’an and Sunna that opposed holding slaves, scholars encouraged their emancipation. For example, the 19th-century Indian Muslim scholar Sayyid Ahmad Kahn advocated reinterpretation of the sources of Islamic law in light of reason and the laws of nature. On this basis, he argued that the verse in the Qur’an dealing with prisoners of war (“So when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, smite their necks; then when you have overcome them, make them prisoners but afterwards set them free, whether as a favor or through ransom, so that the toils of war may be ended”) should be read as a mandate to free not just prisoners of war, but all slaves (since most slavery in the early years of Islam originated from wartime capture). Most of
these reformist scholars thus supported government decrees against slavery, and as a result, the institution of slavery slowly retreated and the official slave trade declined, though not as rapidly as it did in the West.

**International Law**

Measures to abolish the slave trade in the 19th century were almost exclusively the domain of domestic law. After Napoleon’s defeat and the Congress of Vienna, the victorious European powers condemned the slave trade because of moral objections and concerns that the export of slaves would give some regions an unfair economic advantage in cheap agricultural labor. Britain proposed economic sanctions against any state that did not abolish slavery, but this was rejected by other states because they were afraid boycotts against slave traders would strengthen Britain’s maritime dominance. Britain did conclude a number of bilateral agreements allowing signatory states to stop and search for slaves aboard other states’ private vessels.

After World War I ended, a renewed concern for human rights, exemplified in the League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy, led to international agreements concerning the slave trade and, for the first time, slavery itself. (Slavery had formerly been a domestic issue outside the proper scope of international regulation.) This regime continued after World War II because of the widespread forced (slave) labor conducted by the Nazis, and it has since commanded nearly universal acceptance. Because Islamic law recognizes the validity of international agreements, including those with non-Muslim states, the provisions of international law that prohibit slavery are fully compatible with the principles of Sharia, as reinterpreted by legal scholars.

Universal and regional declarations confirmed slavery’s illegal status, helping establish its prohibition as part of customary international law and *jus cogens*. The next set of treaties refined the definition of slavery to address its more modern manifestations. They also specifically outlawed slavery, making it a crime with universal jurisdiction. Thus, any state that obtains custody of a person who has engaged in slavery or slave trading must prosecute that person, regardless of his or her nationality, or turn the person over to the authorities of another state for prosecution.

**Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the [UN] General Assembly in 1948, states that “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”**

Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, states that “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” Article 8 of the 1966 UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights, signed by 140 states, says that “No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.”

Neither of these documents contains enforcement mechanisms, however. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the convention, but stipulated that it required enabling domestic legislation to be enforceable in U.S. courts. Nevertheless, the widespread agreement of the international community to these documents has helped cement a normative prohibition on slavery.

Regional documents affirm this prohibition. Article 6 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (not ratified by the U.S.) states, “No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women.” The American Convention takes a slightly broader approach than the UN documents, and by establishing an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate violations of the convention, as well as an Inter-American Court of Human Rights to impose sanctions on erring states, it has the enforcement mechanisms that the UN approach lacks. In Africa, Article 5 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter) declares that “all forms of exploitation and degradation (sic) of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.” It too allows for the means to prosecute those who violate its provisions. In Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, enacted in 1950 and adhered to by 40 states, stipulates that “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude,” and includes forced or compulsory labor within its prohibition. The convention also established the European Court of Human Rights to prosecute violators. However, unlike the American and African courts and commissions, the European court has been active in hearing and deciding cases brought by individuals against parties to the convention, which binds the parties to the court’s decisions.

Aside from UN declarations and regional agreements, a number of multilateral treaties address the subject of slavery. Article 13 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, and Article 99 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, require that “Every state shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag, for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free.” The provisions extended the board-and-search regime to stem slave trafficking begun by Britain and other states in the previous century.

Several international agreements have been more comprehensive. The 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery updated and expanded an earlier effort, the 1919 Convention of St. Germain. The 1953 Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery followed. The most recent multilateral agreement addressing the subject is the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).

Although these agreements include reporting and monitoring requirements, with the exception of the Rome Statute they do not contain robust enforcement authority. Perhaps their most significant provisions are those that expand the definition of slavery. Article 1 of the 1953 Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” This reflects the idea of chattel slavery that was dominant through most of history, although it does not require legal recognition of ownership to exist—only some of the attributes of such ownership. The 1956 Supplementary Con-

vention expanded on this concept. It specifically includes within the scope of slavery such situations as “(a) debt bondage; (b) serfdom; (c) any practice whereby a woman is given in marriage without the right to refuse, on payment of consideration, or one whereby her husband or a member of his family has the right to transfer her to another person, or one whereby a woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person; or (d) the exploitation of children or their labor.” The convention clearly recognized (as noted below) that women and children constituted the preponderance of slavery and human trafficking victims.

More recently, the 1998 Rome Statute makes enslavement and sexual slavery a crime against humanity. Article 7 of the statute states, “‘Enslavement’ means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.” Significantly, Article 8(2)(b) makes it a war crime to engage in sexual slavery. The elements of this offense are that “the perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending, or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.” The perpetrator’s action must have caused the victim or victims to engage in one or more sex acts in the context of an international armed conflict. The article includes trafficking in persons, especially women and children. Had this law been in force at the time, it would have covered such activities as the alleged enslavement of Chinese and Korean women as sex slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II, acts for which the women and several governments, including that of the United States, are still seeking an apology from the Japanese Government.

Although the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, these provisions and the other conventions noted clearly define slavery as a crime against humanity and a grave breach of the law of war. Therefore, acts of enslavement during an international armed conflict are war crimes, which any state with custody of the perpetrator can try. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, for example, the United States could prosecute by court-martial any individual in its custody for
the crime of slavery if he or she committed the crime during an international armed conflict. Of course, authorities can prosecute such acts not committed during war, regardless of the offender’s nationality, in U.S. courts with jurisdiction over the offender.

The Continuing Problem of Slavery

Concerning slavery today, three facts are particularly pertinent:

- State-sanctioned chattel slavery is virtually nonexistent today.
- No state officially condones slavery or participates in active slave trading.
- Treaty definitions of slavery have evolved to include practices involving slave-like conditions and practices, even without formal (legal) recognition of ownership of the person, especially those involving human trafficking for economic profit (such as the sex trade). The concept of slavery has gradually expanded to recognize these unofficial practices as a form of slavery.

In consonance with these developments and to address the most prevalent current forms of slavery and human trafficking, the United States in 2000 enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. The act established within the State Department the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (the TIP Office), which publishes an annual report to Congress on the state of human trafficking in the international community and efforts to counter it. The act defines human trafficking as “a. Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or b. The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.”

The act calls on governments to eliminate human trafficking and to punish offenders for severe forms of trafficking or enslavement. The annual TIP Office report lists countries that fail to do so, and those that fail to address especially severe forms of slavery are subject to U.S. sanctions, including limits on foreign aid, reduced funding for cultural and educational visits by state officials, and U.S. opposition to their continued participation in international financial organizations.

According to the U.S. Office, traffickers use force or fraud to enslave over 800,000 people annually and transport them across international borders; and they enslave many more in their own countries. Of the 800,000, approximately 80 percent are women, and 50 percent are minors. TIP Office and news media reports claim that within the past several years, hundreds of people, mostly children, worked under slave-like conditions in brick factories in Shanxi Province and elsewhere in China. The children were unpaid and prevented from leaving the factory grounds. In Brazil, a prominent bean grower was arrested on charges of keeping several hundred slaves; the Brazilian Government estimates that about 25,000 people work as debt slaves on plantations and farms in remote areas of the country, particularly in the Amazon region. In the United Arab Emirates, the camel-racing industry reportedly engages as many as 5,000 children, purchased for between $300 and $600, to work unwillingly and without pay as camel jockeys and on camel farms. In the Persian Gulf (and in diplomatic residences in various parts of the world), women have been lured into domestic household service and then forced to work without pay or freedom to leave the house. In 2003, a Macedonian court convicted a man for enslaving young Ukrainian, Romanian, and Moldovian women for purposes of forced prostitution. The Balkan region, especially Bosnia, is a major hub for the trafficking of Eastern European female sex slaves throughout Europe and across the Atlantic. Forced prostitution and sex trafficking is also widespread in Southeast Asia, with Cambodia a noted focal point for the trade. Uzbeki men who have migrated to Russia in search of work have...
reportedly been captured and sold for slave labor in parts of central Russia.\textsuperscript{21} In the United States, several cases of slave labor on farms have been investigated and tried in courts in Florida.\textsuperscript{22}

There are numerous problems hindering effective measures to eradicate these modern forms of slavery. Aside from obvious ones, such as the political unwillingness of many states to allocate resources to combat the crime, efforts to expand the meaning of slavery can be problematic. The international agreements all limit the definition of slavery to conditions similar to ownership, although the state does not have to prove such ownership. Even the Trafficking Victims Protection Act requires force, fraud, or coercion for U.S. law to apply to human trafficking.

Some groups seeking to expand the meaning of modern slavery argue that military conscription is a form of slavery and therefore contrary to international law. This argument is addressed in a number of the international agreements (and in reservations to them) that expressly exclude military conscription from the definition and scope of the law. However, the argument that military conscription is a form of slavery does highlight the problem of the forced recruitment of child soldiers, which may fall within the ambit of slavery. A number of documents address this issue separately. The United Nations Optional Protocol on the Use of Children in Armed Conflict establishes a minimum age of 18 for compulsory military service.\textsuperscript{23} The United States ratified this protocol in 2002. According to the U.S. Office, in early 2006 a national court sentenced a commander of a rebel army in the Congo to five years in prison for war crimes, including the use of child soldiers. In the same year, the Congolese Army apprehended Thomas Lubanga and turned him over to the International Criminal Court for using children under the age of 15 as soldiers.

Other groups argue that all forms of prostitution are essentially slavery because they entail the subordination and oppression of women; therefore, all forms of prostitution fall within the scope of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. However, under this definition of slavery, several local governments that currently allow limited forms of prostitution (in Nevada, the Netherlands, and Germany) would violate international law. This argument is unlikely to be widely accepted.

Despite problems enforcing the prohibitions on slavery, one can take measures to reduce this grave crime. Aside from sanctions such as those available under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, criminalization of slavery can be effective. In the United States, transporting a person across state lines for the purpose of prostitution, even if they acquiesce, is a criminal violation of the Mann Act.\textsuperscript{24} Other countries have similar laws. Forced prostitution can occur in areas of military conflict or where contingents of armed forces are present. For American military forces, patronizing prostitutes is now an offense chargeable under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Civilian contractors for the Department of Defense must meet certain requirements to avoid becoming involved in human trafficking of local national personnel, and the contractors must provide training on the subject to employees. According to the TIP

Office, the United Nations is changing its regulations to address sexual exploitation and involvement by peacekeepers in situations of forced labor and prostitution.

The legal regime developed to prohibit chattel slavery and to address more recent forms of human trafficking has attracted nearly universal official adherence, but we should not take past successes in efforts to suppress slavery for granted. For example, Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl notes that during the first Gulf War, in the early 1990s, a Saudi jurist issued a fatwa stating that slavery is legal in Islam and should be made lawful in Saudi Arabia. He added that those who state otherwise are both wrong and heretics. While Professor El Fadl asserts that most Muslim legal scholars now believe that slavery is no longer legitimate under Islamic law, he adds that some Muslim fundamentalists view its abolition as a Western imposition on the Muslim world and an attempt to give women more rights. He notes that legalizing slavery would legitimize current widespread exploitation and subjugation of foreign women who work as the Gulf region’s domestic servants.

Conclusion

Despite nearly universal moral and legal condemnation of slavery, modern forms of the slave trade persist because they accord with local cultural and religious beliefs and are economically beneficial in certain parts of the world. Although the development of an extensive legal regime consisting of both national and international legal prohibitions has been partly successful in eliminating slavery, enforcement of the laws against human trafficking remains difficult in many places. Relatively recent legal mechanisms cannot displace slavery, which has a long history. Success will require coordinated efforts to identify and suppress the practice wherever it occurs. Understanding slavery’s history, its current manifestations, and the legal regimes now in place to combat it will help legal, political, and military leaders move toward that goal. MR

NOTES

2. R.V. Knowles, ex parte Sommersett (1772), 20 State Tr 1.
4. UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) 1948.
8. 312 UNTS 221.
9. 13 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (U.S.T) 2312; 21 ILM 1261. The United States has not ratified the latter convention.
11. 182 UNTS 51 and 212 UNTS 17; 266 UNTS 3.
12. 37 ILM 999.
24. 18 U.S. Code 2421 (2001). “Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”
Colonel Eugene V. Bonventre, U.S. Air Force

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) executes humanitarian activities primarily through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program. The OHDACA program includes three sub-activities: the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program, the Humanitarian Mine Action program, and Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response. Activities funded by the OHDACA appropriation are intended to mitigate the effects of natural and man-made disasters, to shape the environment in which DoD operates by providing access to critical areas and by influencing civilian populations, and to improve the capacity of vulnerable nations to better prepare for disasters. The ultimate beneficiary of OHDACA activities is the civilian population, and the activities should always have an appropriate and positive influence. For instance, renovating a school should positively impact primary education, and renovating a clinic should positively impact the civilian health sector.

Civilian U.S. Government agencies evaluate the effectiveness of their programs through monitoring and evaluation (M&E), but equivalent analyses of DoD humanitarian assistance programs have been either ad hoc or entirely lacking.1 “Monitoring” is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and use of data during the course of a project.2 “Evaluation” is the periodic review of program activity, outcome, and impact, with an emphasis on lessons learned.3 This article presents the case that DoD should institute both monitoring and evaluation of HA activities in order to assess their effectiveness.

The “How” and “Why” of Measuring HA

Every organization currently involved in humanitarian assistance faces the challenge of how to measure the impact of its work. Despite nearly 40 years of experience in M&E, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) still struggles to quantify, and demonstrate to decision-makers, the impact that its programs have. While DOD has extensive experience with battle damage assessment, its M&E methods for humanitarian assistance are in their infancy. The Pentagon has instituted “measures of effectiveness” (MOE) for virtually every DOD program but HA. The Defense Department need not develop monitoring and evaluation methods in a vacuum, however. USAID’s several decades of experience is a great start point. Other agencies’ experiences and lessons learned can likewise serve as a base for development of M&E techniques.
Why should DOD measure the impact of HA programs? There are several important reasons. First, doing so can allow planners to make mid-course corrections on current projects, and it can provide them with information to improve the quality of future activities. By creating a feedback loop of lessons learned, the M&E process in HA would improve efficiency and ensure that projects contribute to operational objectives. Planners could then emphasize activities that are more cost-effective, which is especially important because every year the number of projects that combatant commands apply for exceeds the funds available. Second, collecting and sharing data would increase planners’ ability to deconflict activities with other agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Third, data analysis helps to showcase quantifiable results, thereby minimizing the chances of negative press surrounding HA activities.

But most importantly, DOD should measure HA programs because transparency is a core strength of our democracy. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and even Al-Qaeda engage in prima facie humanitarian and social service activities, but ultimately their true motivations become apparent: the manipulation of people toward violent ends. In contrast, DOD’s humanitarian programs should have a demonstrably quantifiable humanitarian impact. Since terrorist organizations will usually be able to act more quickly than DOD (because they are not impeded by bureaucracy, ethical norms, and legal restrictions), any demonstrable positive benefit to the civilian sector offers DOD the chance to prevail in the long term over extremist propaganda.

As a point of contrast, in Vietnam, DOD spent $500-$750 million on MEDECAPS (medical civic aid programs) that provided medical care to 40 million civilians. However, in the absence of data, analysts have failed to reach any significant conclusions about the results of those programs. Now is the time to avoid having to encounter the same situation in the future, since we stand to gain much by accurately assessing our HA activities.

DOD’s initial attempts at measuring HA effectiveness will very likely be less than perfect. But merely attempting to quantify results will gain the department credibility. The resulting goodwill and improved civil-military relationships may even result in cooperation to refine future evaluation efforts. Regardless, the only way to ensure that we have long-term access to the areas we can affect, far beyond the short period of time that DOD personnel are on the ground, is to ensure that good civil-military relations continue. If the population feels abandoned at the completion of a project, all will have been for naught. For similar reasons, the best way to ensure positive influence is to quantify the benefits that the civilian population enjoys as a result of a given project and then feed that information back to the host nation.

Common Terminology

Because agencies often use the same words to mean different things, any discussion of monitoring and evaluation requires a common understanding of terms. The definitions in this article were taken from sources within DOD and other agencies:

- A “standard” is a reference point that allows comparisons. It is a set of criteria, guidelines, or best practices. The SPHERE Project publishes a handbook of minimum standards in humanitarian assistance and disaster response commonly used by civilian agencies.
- A “goal” is an overall statement of intent. It is broad, timeless, and unconcerned with particular achievement within a specified time period.
- An “objective” is exactly what will occur, how it will be accomplished, and to what standard of performance.
- “Indicators” are quantitative or qualitative measures of standards and are used to correlate or predict the value or measure of a mission, program, system, or organization. Indicators should have “SMART” (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) characteristics.

“Specific” means focusing on a narrowly defined aspect of a unit’s mission. “Measurable” means showing progress and providing data for mid-course adjustments and improvements. “Achievable” relates to focusing on realistic targets rather than vague end-states. “Relevant” indicates that a strategic goal, major initiative, or core service has...
been measured. “Time-bound” means it applies to a specific time frame. All indicators should complement one another. The SPHERE handbook contains a variety of indicators that might be helpful to military planners.

- “Performance indicators” (also known as “process indicators” or “achievement indicators”) describe the output of an activity or how well that activity functioned. Performance indicators are important to measure, but they don’t tell the whole story.

- “Outcome indicators” (also called “impact indicators”) measure the extent to which an activity contributed to the overall goals of a program.

- “Measures of effectiveness” are combinations of key indicators from multiple sectors (or functions) used to determine overall progress toward attaining mission objectives. In joint doctrine, MOE are well described for large operations, and they are often used to determine transition strategies or redeployment milestones.9 In the case of HA activities, MOE should measure access, influence, sectoral impact, and capacity building.

- “Baseline data” are measures of specific indicators that exist prior to project implementation. The partner nation, USAID, international organizations, or NGOs will usually have baseline data, although it may be very limited in conflict zones. If no baseline data exists, it may be prudent to collect it at the beginning of large projects.

To illustrate how these terms should be used, a project could be designed with a goal to improve village health. A possible objective would be to distribute, within one deployment, mosquito bed-nets to 95 percent of the village’s residents. A process indicator would be the number of bed-nets distributed. An outcome indicator would be the percentage of villagers who actually use bed-nets. And a measure of effectiveness would be the decrease in the number of new cases of malaria in that village. Some indicators can be measured during or immediately after the project, and others will require one or more follow-up visits.

Roles and Perspectives

Project designers should monitor individual projects by developing both performance indicators and outcome indicators. The host nation is usually the ultimate source, since most governments, even in resource-poor countries in conflict, will have some idea of what data they should collect and what has been collected in the past. Moreover, the host nation should be involved in, central to, and ultimately the owners of, every DOD HA project.

However, an easier source to access for data collection is the in-country or regional USAID office. USAID is not always an integral member of the country team at the American embassy, so planners may have to seek them out. A pre-planning conversation with USAID can often be a one-stop shopping event in which project designers access international organizations and NGOs in the sector of interest and identify competent and talented host-nation personnel. When using these sources, it is far better to collect your own data in the same format as the host nation or USAID than to create an ad hoc system.

In the data collection process, project officers measuring an impact on specific HA sectors or functions should also attempt to measure indicators that relate to DOD-specific goals. For instance, an HA project might be designed to improve a nation’s capability to respond to a disaster or to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, and that could factor into Soldier readiness. Similarly, if a school is to be renovated, project goals may include “positively influencing a village that is prone to insurgent manipulation.” Project designers in such circumstances may need to create new measures to look at these DOD-specific goals, but even then, examples can be gleaned from sources outside DOD.

Although DOD-specific goals would be important to the combatant commander, he need not be involved in data collection, except perhaps to share lessons with other project designers.

Combatant commanders’ HA managers should provide oversight of individual projects, but should also be interested in evaluating overall programs. A “program” might be a multiple-year series of
related projects, each of which individually might not directly achieve theater goals, but taken together should contribute to realization of the theater strategy. Such a series of related projects might warrant development of specially tailored MOE. This process is usually labor-intensive, but it can be made easier if individual project metrics are designed to feed into them. A strategically holistic approach from the beginning would help designers implement that process. The combatant commander could transmit the resulting qualitative information to DOD senior leadership, describing program impacts that are difficult to quantify. Security cooperation assessments serve this same purpose for military-to-military activities.

Data collected should actually affect decision-making. The data reported by the tour guide at the beginning of this article is interesting, but what decisions would be changed by knowing the number of bricks in the Pentagon? Before collecting data, project planners should consider the target audience whose decisions rest on what is collected. For HA activities, the primary user of the data is the project designer, who needs to know if the activities he or she planned actually had the intended effect, so that they can improve the planning process for future activities. The designer can then summarize the data and pass it along to higher headquarters, where it can be used by program managers to assess the effectiveness of the whole program.

**Partnerships**

DOD cannot, and should not, monitor and evaluate humanitarian assistance missions in isolation. Certain goals of HA activities overlap with goals of other agencies. Both the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and DOD, for instance, have an interest in improving host-nation capacity to respond to disasters. USAID and DOD may each want to make a positive impact in the health sector in an area vulnerable to extremist influence. Since DOD HA activities must be done in partnership with the host nation, some of DOD’s and the host’s goals presumably should overlap. Therefore, rather than duplicate effort, a project designer’s first step should be to find out if the host nation already collects similar data. If it does, the host’s data may serve as a guide for formatting other or additional data collection, and it may provide baseline data for comparison.

The designer’s second step should be to query other agencies, which normally require their implementing partners (NGOs and contractors) to collect data. For health projects, the Uniformed Services University and the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine have operational expertise and can provide advice and support to both project designers in the field and combatant commanders’ HA managers. Occasionally, one can find common ground for disaster preparedness with organizations outside the U.S. Government. For instance, the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction may already measure a country’s disaster response capabilities.

Yet another data source is academia. Johns Hopkins University developed a “balanced scorecard” method for assessing the capabilities of health...
facilities in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{10} Harvard, Tulane, and the University of South Florida have significant experience in program and project design and evaluation. Leveraging any of these efforts will save DOD time and money, and it will facilitate data-sharing with other agencies and organizations. This sharing also increases DOD’s credibility with other agencies and allays fears that the department is encroaching on other agencies’ territory.

Where DOD goals are unique, project designers will need to develop their own indicators. Development from whole cloth will likely be the case at the program level if DOD chooses to quantify the impact of HA programs on “access” and “influence.” However, even this process can benefit from methodologies already well-developed in other agencies and academia. Some quantitative analogy somewhere will almost certainly serve as a heuristic for developing new indicators.

Project monitoring is best done in-country through a collaborative effort with the country team and USAID. Program evaluation is best done at the combatant command level—preferably periodically, and possibly by an independent contractor. Given the significant number of HA projects implemented by contractors, precautions ought to be taken to avoid having contractors evaluate each others’ efforts, especially when they are competing or belong to the same company. Academic institutions or NGOs could have a role at either level, although they may bring their institutional biases to evaluations. Nonetheless, they can be a cost-effective way of adding an independent, and possibly more credible, view from outside.

Resources

According to both the Department of State (DOS) and USAID, collection and analysis of data usually consumes from 8 to 10 percent of a project’s total cost. These numbers provide a reasonable starting point for planning purposes. In developing an overall budget for worthwhile M&E in HA projects, combatant command HA managers may choose to develop a pilot project. Measuring a small number of moderate-sized HA projects in secure, accessible areas may be the best option. Projects undertaken in well developed civil societies with potential academic partners, some willing personalities in USAID, and relatively little corruption in the host-nation government would seem to offer the best possibilities. Pilot projects in developed countries like South Africa or other stable developing countries might demonstrate the utility of M&E for humanitarian assistance. The present OHDACA appropriation should be adequate to start this process, and if the process succeeds, it can be used to demonstrate the need for additional funds from Congress. The ultimate goal is a wider implementation of project M&E and a subsequent increase in the number of projects funded.

Occasionally, combatant commands fund HA activities in a “tier 3” (lowest priority) country simply because there is no other significant U.S. activity there, or just because they want to spread their influence throughout their area of responsibility. A recent review of medical projects conducted during a 12-month period in all combatant commands found that fully two-thirds of project proposals were in tier 3 countries. This only makes sense if resources are virtually unlimited and tier 1 (highest priority) and tier 2 countries are completely saturated with activities. Neither is likely to ever be the case for OHDACA. There may be good reasons for doing occasional activities in tier 3 countries, but they should be the exception, not the rule. A Defense Security Cooperation Agency review of HA activities in tier 3 countries would indicate the magnitude of the current involvement, and it may identify a potential source of funds that would be better spent on monitoring and evaluation.

The Example of Afghanistan

The following project, though running into challenges in the execution phase, nonetheless shows that it is relatively painless to develop interagency indicators that quantify the effects of DOD humanitarian activities on stability and security.

In 2006, Afghanistan’s Minister of Public Health (MoPH) noted that the people of the Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman border provinces routinely cross over into Pakistan, ostensibly to receive healthcare unavailable in their own provinces. During these excursions, they take drugs into Pakistan and return with guns. The provinces were too unstable to permit NGOs to establish enough clinics, so the minister asked the Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-A) leadership for assistance in fielding mobile health clinics staffed
by local Afghan personnel. CSTC-A funded an Afghan NGO, Sozo International, which got buy-in and security guarantees from local tribal leaders in exchange for hiring local personnel. Sozo agreed to provide the provinces with medical training and free medical care. CSTC-A coordinated this with the in-country USAID team and the European Commission (both being major donors to the Afghanistan health system). The Secretary of Defense’s Partnership Strategy office coordinated with the State Department Afghanistan desk, USAID’s Asia Near-East Bureau, Health and Human Services, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) to select a menu of health indicators based on the “Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan.” MoPH developed the package with USAID assistance, so the menu contains no new indicators.

Since MoPH requires all NGOs in Afghanistan to collect these metrics, Sozo International is comfortable with the process and with sharing data with USAID, MoPH, and the European Commission. MoPH will provide baseline data. Existing security indicators, already measured by CSTC-A with Joint Staff (J-5) assistance, will be compared in three provinces with clinics and three without. Project funds will be used to add several questions about the clinics to a monthly population attitude survey conducted by a Kabul-based organization. Attitudes in the three provinces with mobile health clinics will be compared to attitudes in three adjacent provinces without the clinics. The implementing NGO hired a project manager to oversee metrics. CSTC-A mentors this person, collects security indicators, and provides progress briefs to senior leadership. Data will be used to improve the quality of healthcare in less secure provinces, garner the cooperation of other stakeholders, determine whether similar projects should be launched in other provinces, and determine whether or not additional funding is justified.

The mobile health clinics were scheduled to begin operation in September 2007, but have been delayed due to changes in the tactical situation; M&E results will be published when available. Since this is a large project ($1.25 million to field three clinics) in a sensitive area within a named operation, a formal, government-wide method of metrics development, including partnering with academia, was justified. Nonetheless, the M&E portion was designed by a USUHS student (a U.S. Air Force captain) with mentorship from the Partnership Strategy office (the author). Support from every relevant U.S. government agency was obtained with a few phone calls and two meetings. Since the project used health indicators previously developed by MoPH and USAID, local buy-in was straightforward. Tapping into existing population surveys and security indicators will quantify the impact that health activities have on security. This example demonstrates that even in a complex operation in an insecure environment, one can design M&E without undue burden.

A U.S. Army doctor speaks to a patient through an interpreter at a special clinic set up by the provincial reconstruction team in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, 2006.
Training

Although the principles outlined here are not complicated, they are unfamiliar to most military operators. Formal education and training on monitoring and evaluation would be time well-spent, and it would pay dividends down the road in a military officer’s career. Virtually every DOD directive that mandates new tasks and responsibilities also requires use of measures of effectiveness. Perhaps “M&E” will ultimately become a mission-essential task for which DOD personnel will receive baseline formal education and routine refresher training. Until that time, however, conducting basic M&E for HA activities is bound to yield benefits.

Combatant command humanitarian assistance managers meet annually in Washington, D.C. for a conference sponsored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and funded by the OHDACA account. We hope to devote half a day to formal education on M&E techniques using basic principles taught by DOS and USAID, but modified to include DOD-specific requirements. DOS and DOD personnel or contractors could conduct this type of training, or one of several academic institutions could do it. Attendance should be required for all new DOD HA managers and be optional for current HA managers, some of whom could also serve as faculty. A similar course, funded by OHDACA, could be held at annual HA conferences in each combatant command.

For refresher training, M&E should be built into selected joint and service exercises that contain a humanitarian assistance scenario, particularly if other government agencies are involved. Such training would also help refine and customize theater M&E techniques, enhance familiarity with existing databases, and train a larger number of project officers.  

Conclusion

The complexity of today’s security environment requires a new, sophisticated analysis of the efficacy of DOD humanitarian assistance programs. Assumptions should be replaced by formal attempts to quantify the effects of HA projects. That such measurements will never be perfect and causal relationships will never be definitively proven should not preclude attempts to develop practical assessment techniques. Merely attempting to quantify what has previously been thought unquantifiable will pay dividends in the quality of project design and implementation. Even if such attempts fail to achieve perfection, they will increase the credibility of DOD HA programs. Moreover, the interagency cooperation necessary for such a process will increase each agency’s knowledge of the other agencies’ principles and techniques and take them a step closer to a holistic, government-wide approach to addressing critical issues.

NOTES

3. Ibid.
5. Even though DoD HA activities are carried out to gain access and influence, activities are also intended to benefit the civilian population. This distinction is not without controversy; by the internationally promulgated definition of “humanitarian,” activities must take into account only the needs of the affected populations, without ulterior motives. For this reason, a more rigorous nomenclature for activities carried out as HA would be “civil-military operations,” since additional motivations include attaining DOD operational and strategic objectives. However, the “benefit” to the civilian population must always be present as well.
12. One example is the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters database (based in Brussels) used by the State Department. See <www.cred.be>.
ORGANIZED CRIME SYNDICATES are modern enemies of democracy that relentlessly engage in kidnapping and assassination of political figures, and traffic not only in addictive and lethal substances, but also increasingly in human beings. To create an environment conducive to success in their criminal interests, they engage in heinous acts intended to instill fear, promote corruption, and undermine democratic governance by undercutting confidence in government. They assassinate or intimidate political figures and pollute democratic processes through bribes and graft in cities along both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. In the long term, such actions erode individual civil liberties in America and Mexico by undermining both governments’ abilities to maintain societies in which the full exercise of civil liberties is possible. This danger is ominously evident on the Mexican side of the border, where 86 percent of those responding to a poll in Mexico City in 2004 said they would support government restrictions of their civil rights in order to dismantle organized crime, and another 67 percent said militarizing the police force would be the only way to accomplish this. These views suggest that an extremely unhealthy sociopolitical environment is evolving at America’s very doorstep. We should see this not as a collateral issue associated with the War on Terrorism, but as a national security issue deserving of the same level of interest, concern, and resourcing as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This article provides an ethnographic analysis of narco-terrorism, narco-corruption, and human trafficking in the northern states of Mexico, and an overview of Mexican organized crime and its destabilizing effect on Mexico’s attempts to create a functioning, uncruptocracy.

The Legacy of Spanish Conquest and Revolution

Mexico’s territorial confines were the site of advanced Native American civilizations dating from well before the beginning of what archeologists now refer to as the Common Era. “Mexico” itself comes from the Aztec word *mejica*. The Aztecs were a relatively late-developing indigenous civilization that came to dominate the key central region of the area. From the late 15th century they aggressively expanded their territory through military conquest until the arrival of a Spanish military contingent in 1530. Almost immediately after the arrival of the Spanish, the Aztec’s hegemony in the region collapsed. Disease, dissatisfaction among the Aztecs with their monarchy, and superstitions regarding the arrival of white Europeans (seen
as returning gods) combined to undermine Aztec religious and political authority. In an astonishingly short time, the conquerors became the conquered, succumbing to the technologically superior Spanish forces led by Hernando Cortez. Shortly thereafter, Spain absorbed Mexico into the Spanish empire, and Mexico remained under Spanish rule for nearly three centuries. Although Spanish became the national language and Roman Catholicism the virtual national religion, Mexican culture evolved as a liberal mix of Spanish practices, indigenous customs, and native religious traditions.

Inspired by the Enlightenment ideals behind the American and French revolutions, Mexico declared independence from Spanish colonial rule at the end of the 18th century, and in 1810, it won its autonomy. However, political stability proved difficult to achieve, and Mexico underwent a series of revolutions, rigged elections, and other political misadventures. The nation was victimized by a war of expansion waged by the U.S. in 1848 and lost a significant amount of territory. French forces then occupied and annexed Mexico in 1863, holding dominion until they were thrown out in 1867. The Mexican people once more attempted to establish an independent state ruled by a pluralistic democracy, but suffered another setback when Porfirio Diaz came to power in 1876. This strongman assumed dictatorial powers and ruled for 35 years.

In 1910, Diaz was finally overthrown by a bloody revolution, one that saw the emergence of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), a political power that would finally stabilize Mexico. The PRI dominated Mexican politics for the next 70 years without any true opposition. Unfortunately, although it began with a lofty nationalist vision, the PRI quickly degenerated into an autocratic oligarchy. One-party rule led to an authoritarian regime in which Mexico’s elite used the institutions of government to consolidate power and wealth into their own hands. The PRI especially employed the police forces at federal, state, and local levels to help maintain rigid socioeconomic inequities. The Mexican majority, who remained hopelessly mired in poverty, effectively became the helots of the PRI.

Unchallenged one-party rule also engendered widespread official corruption and political scandals. Poorly paid members of the police began accepting bribes and committing graft to supplement their incomes. As a result, the nation’s domestic security forces became dependent on institutional bribery in exchange for services and party loyalty. This ingrained tradition persists today as an accepted convention in some quarters of Mexican law enforcement.

Born in a struggle to overthrow a vicious dictator for lofty social and political objectives, the PRI became little more than a tool successive presidents and party leaders used to protect the property and privileges of the ruling class at the expense of the Mexican masses, mainly persons of indigenous or mestizo descent.

During the PRI’s long period of dominance, the methods it used for maintaining its power remained somewhat obscured from international public view. However, its ruthlessness in dealing with perceived threats to its power emerged with special ferocity during the Plaza de Tlatelolco massacre in October 1968. In a government operation coordinated by the PRI and executed mainly by presidential police death squads and the Mexican military, hundreds of student protestors from the University of Mexico were assaulted, abducted, and murdered in cold blood. The massacre permanently undercut the PRI’s international standing and legitimacy. Even today, lingering public bitterness, suspicion, and resentment over this event undermines public confidence in Mexico’s security forces.

### Changing Political Currents

The PRI tolerated token political opposition for years in Mexico, mainly to maintain the illusion of pluralistic democracy. For decades it employed an assortment of tactics to ensure that real political opposition never coalesced. However, the PRI-dominated, one-party system grip on Mexican politics loosened with the forced devaluation of the Mexican peso in late 1994. That crisis generated popular discontent with the government and plunged the country into economic turmoil by triggering the nation’s worst recession in more than 50 years. Recession resulted in demands for reform backed by a real threat of domestic violence that the PRI feared it could not control. The party also faced international condemnation for massive corruption, economic mismanagement, and the peso’s collapse—a collapse that adversely affected the global economy through worldwide money markets.
To make matters worse for the PRI, many linked the peso’s collapse to the 1994 assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, who had run on a political platform vowing to reform the PRI. Although the authorities jailed a reputed trigger-man for this crime, they never satisfactorily explained his links to those who were working to defeat Colosio and his plan for reform.

All this bad news led to the 2000 election of Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN). His election marked the first time since the Mexican Revolution of 1910 that an opposition party defeated the incumbent political party in a free and fair election. President Fox became Mexico’s first chief executive to take the reins of government power in a peaceful transition from one political party to another.8

Unfortunately, enthusiasm for Fox was short-lived. He proved unable to deal with a sagging economy or to obtain the political cooperation necessary to govern effectively. The people blamed Fox for continuing high unemployment, economic stagnation, and continuing widespread corruption in the government. Moreover, his lack of success in persuading the United States to liberalize restrictions against “illegal aliens” crossing the border to find work resulted in public accusations that Fox was “licking the boots” of the Bush administration. Fox left office widely viewed as having presided over a failed presidency. Mexico’s seemingly intractable and growing problems of poverty and de facto disenfranchisement of large segments of the population through low wages, massive unemployment, and class-based inequities exacerbated tensions with the United States over trade agreements and immigration issues.

In summary, due to a long legacy of historical, social, cultural, political, and economic challenges,
Mexico’s current sociopolitical and economic environment is fertile ground for organized criminal activities and revolutionary social movements. Both have taken root and are thriving. Exploitation of Mexico’s plight by more overt enemies of the U.S. Government and people is both possible and conceivable.

Distribute, and transship drugs; launder money; and make legitimate economic investments using illegally obtained funds.\(^{10}\)

By cooperating in law-enforcement and military drug-interdiction operations, Mexico and the United States have created substantial difficulties for traffickers. However, organized crime has responded with great resourcefulness. It has developed sophisticated smuggling and concealment techniques for use on commercial air, land, and sea transport; purchased light aircraft and built clandestine airfields; acquired advanced, military-grade encrypted wireless telecommunication systems; and constructed vast and elaborate tunnel networks.\(^{11}\)

Narco-trafficking crime groups. Evidence of the success drug traffickers have had in circumventing law-enforcement efforts is apparent in the emergence of several powerful criminal organizations that have established themselves as virtual governments within some regions of Mexico. As early as 1995, about a half-dozen \textit{patrones} (bosses) dominated Mexican drug trafficking. These cartel leaders were sometimes allied, sometimes at war with each other, but always competitive and active.\(^{12}\) Currently, the most prominent Mexican groups fueling drug trafficking into the United States are headed by Arellano-Felix, Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, Armando Valencia, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and Osiel Cardenas-Guillen.\(^{13}\) Named for the senior leaders who organize and run them, these five organizations are responsible for the majority of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and, increasingly, methamphetamine smuggled illegally into the United States.

The Family Cartel’s Infrastructure

Modern criminal enterprise, especially in the world of narco-trafficking, takes the form of cartels. English-speakers know the word “cartel” from its wide use in the 1960s to describe the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), an alliance formed by a group of oil-producing nations to control the production and distribution of petroleum products, in effect creating a powerful cooperative monopoly over the world’s oil supply. Subsequently, the word entered Spanish in the late 1970s when it was applied to family-based drug trafficking rings in Colombia, most...
notably in the cities of Medellin and Cali. These cartels cooperated with each other in a relatively organized way to avoid strife, resolve differences, and monopolize drug trafficking, principally to the United States and to a lesser extent Europe. The Academy Dictionary of the Spanish Language has since accepted cartel and its “organized criminal enterprise” definition. This definition does not, however, recognize the importance blood ties have in establishing such syndicates in Latin America.

The Latin American notion of cartel is informed by the idea that social status, money, and power are best located, distributed, and maintained within families of blood-relatives. Family ties allow for economy of effort; they minimize friction within and between criminal groups. Of course, the concept of a criminal family cartel is neither new nor unique to Latin American crime syndicates, as the history of the Italian Mafia and many similar organizations suggest.

With their solid family foundations, it is no accident that Hispanic cartels have exhibited enduring strength and great resiliency. While there are many differences between the various Latin American nationalities, Latin Americans in general tend to live in extended families in close proximity to each other and have frequent social contact, unlike in the United States. Thus, when criminal enterprise takes root as a family business in Latin America, it benefits from the stability of a ready-made culture of loyalty and obligation among extended families that tend to be large in number and whose members are on close personal terms.

Family loyalty, a value instilled in Latin American families from childhood on, often forbids betrayal of another family member, no matter what the reason. Similarly, each family member has an obligation to support other family members, whatever the circumstances, and must react violently towards any family member who betrays
the family by such actions as cooperating with law-
enforcement authorities, especially if the coopera-
tion resulted in a family member’s imprisonment
or execution. As a result, Hispanic drug lords’ most
trusted partners and henchmen are usually members
of their own families.

The mores that establish the rules for family
structure in Hispanic society also help mitigate
competition among family members. In Mexico,
powerful traditions define who is in charge of
extended families, establish succession rights, and
define the role of each individual in the family.
Thus, the eldest son has guaranteed leadership rights
to the family cartel, unless he proves incompetent
or is arrested by police and jailed. In either event,
tradition calls for him to cede his power to another
sibling, and the business goes on. So strong is the
respect for family in Latin America that compet-
ting drug cartels, in so far as they cooperate, do so
in large measure because they identify with and
approve of the manner in which their competitors
choose their leaders.

Within the cartel, family conventions shape
perceptions of what constitutes a threat to the busi-
ness and what justifies retaliation. For example, the
entire family has an obligation to avenge a fellow
member who has become a “victim” of the law.
It is not unusual for anyone who goes to the law
or whom the families believe has used the law to
dishonor, disrespect, or threaten a family member
to become the target of retaliation. The family con-
siders affronts to its members to be affronts to the
entire family and views them as justification even
for killing police authorities.15

At the top of cartels, senior leaders maintain close
relationships. At the operational level, however, the
cartels compartmentalize narco-trafficking among
cells that have relatively little direct contact with
each other. Because of this decentralized structure,
it is difficult for one cartel cell to compromise
another should police infiltrate or take down the
first cell. Such cells cultivate the product, smuggle
it across borders, and distribute it at destination
points. Other cells specialize in promoting and
exploiting corruption; counterintelligence; security;
and even assassination.16

The decentralized organizational structure of
drug trafficking organizations below the senior
leadership has also proven to be a key factor in
facilitating the cartels’ survival since the cells can
function autonomously regardless of who is at the
top of the cartel structure. If senior cartel leaders are
incarcerated, removed for incompetence, or killed,
the cartel can continue operations relatively unaf-
fected until it settles the question of succession.17
For this reason, arrests of key leaders often end
up being irrelevant or even counterproductive to
defeating the cartel because its new leader quickly
takes effective measures to avoid the mistakes
that resulted in his predecessor’s demise. In many
cases, supposedly successful raids only prompt
drug-trafficking gangs to compartmentalize and
decentralize even further, making future efforts
to track, identify, infiltrate, and dismember them
more difficult.

Narco-Terrorism, Narco-
Corruption, and Drug Money

Drug cartels have the power to undermine popu-
lar trust and confidence in the government and even
the sovereignty of the government itself. This effect is precisely what narco-traffickers aim to accomplish in order to reduce or eliminate official pressure against their activities. To do this, they generally pursue two lines of operation: narco-terrorism and narco-corruption. Effective use of these two functions may bring an entire community or region under de facto control of a drug cartel.18

Narco-terrorism. Basic terrorism is best understood as raw violence—sometimes applied precisely and other times arbitrarily—aimed not only at killing adversaries but also at intimidating the population into permitting the terrorists to operate unopposed. Terrorist groups commonly use kidnapping, murder, bombings, stylized execution—even such gruesome acts as public disfigurement and desecration of bodies—to achieve their objectives.

Differences among terrorist groups lie in their objectives, not their techniques. Political terrorists select targets that support a political agenda, while narco-terrorists select targets to further a profit-making agenda. Consequently, narco-terrorists choose their targets to establish or enforce drug-trafficking boundaries between competing groups, to eliminate competition from rival criminal organizations altogether, or to neutralize key witnesses or government authorities that pose obstacles to their illegal business.

Narco-terrorism is best understood as the organized employment of violence against the local populace, the security forces, and the government to intimidate anyone contemplating resistance to drug trafficking. These actions include assassination of governmental officials who attempt to dismantle drug trafficking organizations. Narco-terrorism often aims to force the government to change policies or counter official activities that adversely affect its businesses. For example, narco-terrorists attempt to frighten government officials into denying other countries’ or states’ requests to extradite detained drug traffickers for criminal prosecution.

Narco-trafficking violence is often sustained, public, and spectacular. In 2004, Mexico ranked second in Latin America for kidnappings, which reached an epidemic level of 3,000 incidents.19 (This was behind only Colombia, which reported 4,000 kidnappings.) Such kidnappings often involve demands for large ransom or rescue fees from family members. In 2004, kidnappers probably grossed almost $1 billion from their crimes.20

Demands often accompany packages containing the victim’s body parts. This brutality is meant to terrorize the family into cooperating, expediting payment of the ransom demands, and forgoing contact with the police.

Drug-related kidnappings and murders often involve singularly horrific acts of torture in which the bodies are severely beaten, severed into several parts, or burned in ways intended to serve as a signature of a specific organized crime group. For example, drug dealers in Mexico developed a trademark execution called entambados, which consists of placing the victim, sometimes alive, into an industrial barrel and filling it with fresh cement.

When the cement hardens, the drug dealers dump the barrel on a roadway near the victim’s residence. The authorities must chisel the concrete away to identify the victim.21

Brazen attacks against law-enforcement officials continue to be closely associated with organized drug trafficking. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Nuevo Laredo reported drug traffickers murdered, kidnapped, or wounded 18 police officers in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas alone during 2003.22 Narco-terrorists targeted a top state prosecutor and his bodyguard in 2004 and shot them dead in a popular nightclub in Tijuana. The executioners scattered unspent ammunition cartridges around his body to signal, “There is plenty of lead waiting for any followers.”23

Journalists who produce unfavorable media coverage of organized crime syndicates are also at great risk of being killed. Francisco Ortiz Franco, founding editor of the Zeta weekly, routinely published articles exposing the activities of the Arellano-Felix drug cartel. In retaliation, hooded gunman executed Franco in front of his children as he picked them up from school in June 2004. The murder occurred within 300 yards of the Tijuana police ministry’s and attorney general’s offices.24

Narco-corruption. In contrast to narco-terrorism, which aims to intimidate and instill fear, narco-corruption aims to change the nature of the government by creating covert ties, dependencies, and even bonds of loyalty through subterranean social support networks that come to favor and protect the criminal organization embedded among the targeted population. Through bribes, substantial
monetary contributions to political candidates, and gifts or infrastructure improvements to communities such as roads or schools, it entices government officials and community members to adopt neutral or sympathetic attitudes toward drug-traffickers.

In contrast to narco-terrorism, which aims to intimidate and instill fear, narco-corruption is an effort by drug traffickers to ingratiate themselves with the community and blend into it through well placed bribes and graft.

Because the government pays its officials poorly, they are particularly vulnerable to such techniques. They often face the choice of either cooperating with organized crime by accepting bribes or becoming, along with their families, targets of violence. Successful narco-corruption, backed up by the threat of narco-terrorism, poses a difficult challenge to law-enforcement agencies. It makes it extremely difficult to gather intelligence, conduct investigations, and find or arrest organized crime figures.

The life of Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar provides an enduring example of the lasting and pernicious influence that narco-tactics can produce. Prior to his death at the hands of Colombian police in 1993, Escobar’s Medellín Cartel controlled as much as 80 percent of the cocaine trafficked into the United States. Escobar was a brutal crime boss responsible for dozens of assassinations, including those of prominent politicians and other public figures. He and his men committed innumerable other murders and frequently tortured their victims. Reputedly, Escobar popularized the “Colombian necktie,” “a form of mutilation whereby victims have their tongue pulled through a slit in their throat.”

Although clearly a horrific criminal and an enemy to the Colombian and U.S. Governments, Escobar achieved a virtual cult following, becoming widely regarded as a hero by the people of Medellín, including many in law-enforcement and the government. He accomplished this by routinely using a portion of his profits to provide gifts and
housing for the poor and to fund the construction of community recreational facilities such as little league baseball stadiums. He also liberally distributed money gifts to key leaders. Similarly, Escobar ingratiated himself with Colombia’s rural peasants by building schools, hospitals, and roads in some of the poorest areas of the country, which the government had long neglected. These deeds earned him the affectionate name of “Don Pablito.” Few in Medellin and its surrounding area were willing to disclose information about him to the authorities. To demonstrate just how enduring narco-corruption of this kind can be, Escobar’s gravesite has become a virtual shrine, visited by many members of the community and regularly adorned with candles, flowers, and incense.27 Some Colombians even claim that miracles take place at his tomb.28

Corruption versus terrorism. Escobar’s effectiveness in co-opting large numbers of people suggests that narco-corruption can be much more effective than narco-terrorism. A “business” that relies mainly on violence will eventually defeat itself. Terrorized communities will, sooner or later, withhold the support that any criminal organization depends on, leading to reduced monetary returns, reduced receptivity to narco-terrorist propaganda, fewer recruitment prospects, and unfavorable national and media coverage. They will also begin to cooperate with law-enforcement agencies.29 In other words, narco-terrorism may actually establish or reinforce the perception of drug traffickers as aliens to the community, while narco-corruption tends to make the criminal enterprise an accepted and even valued part of the community in some important quarters.

Human Trafficking and Child Slavery

As criminal enterprises expand their portfolios, a new and especially unsavory enterprise has emerged. It utilizes the same trafficking routes and supporting organizations developed by the illicit drug trade, but traffics in human beings. Increasingly, criminal enterprises in Mexico have begun diversifying by smuggling human beings across the border and by engaging in the slave trade. Although some use the terms “human smuggling” and “human trafficking” interchangeably, they are actually very different crimes. A smuggled person pays for his journey abroad. The smuggler makes money by transporting clients across the border, where he leaves them to their devices. In contrast, human trafficking is kidnapping; it entails bondage (monetary, emotional, physical) and involuntary servitude after the victim has arrived at a destination point. Human trafficking is prevalent throughout the world, but is especially common among the Native American populations in Mexico. Extreme poverty in some areas has resulted in a relatively recent phenomenon of enormous human rights concern.

In the Oaxaca Mountains near the interior of Mexico, sources report that women driven to live in extreme poverty now often sell their children and ask few questions about what will become of them. Depending upon the child’s complexion and the client’s wealth, the cost to purchase a child can reportedly run from $25,000 to $45,000.30 At the high end, these children are used to supply the overwhelming demand in the European and American adoption markets.31 According to one source, a white man traveling in rural Mexico can often have his choice of young Indian mestizas to sleep with because the desperate women hope the brief union will result in bearing a child with “high value.”32

To adopt a Mexican child, extensive documentation is required, including powers of attorney, birth certificates, and adoption contract agreements. But instead of hindering child trafficking, the adoption process encourages the practice by escalating the monetary reward for all those involved. Bad actors include doctors, judges, lawyers, and traffickers, all of whom require a “fee” from the buyer at each step of the process.33 Despite the sordid nature of the Mexican adoption mill, children subjected to it might be considered lucky in comparison to the darker-skinned children whom traffickers sell into a life of slavery within rich Mexican families. Even unluckier are those sold to pimps, pedophiles, Internet child pornographers, and other human traffickers.34 Additionally, missionaries often comment that the major economic export in the Oaxaca region is children auctioned to handlers who exploit them as beggars. Oaxacan children, some as young as three, are routinely seen begging for money in the tourist areas of Ensenada, Rosarito, and Tijuana. On a good day, a begging child can net as much as $100 dollars from tourists.35
While many Mexicans openly discuss the problem, there is no consensus about what to do. Recently, storefront flyers lined the street shops of Ensenada, warning tourists that money given to child beggars and peddlers goes directly into the pockets of child exploiters. The Integral Familiar Development, a Mexican Government program set up to meet community social needs, developed this plan to diminish the profits associated with child trafficking and exploitation in Mexico.

The exploitation of Mexican children does not stop at the U.S. border. A promise of legitimate labor or educational opportunities often lures young Mexican children into the United States, where they end up as servant-slaves, brothel prostitutes, or sweatshop employees. Violence, intimidation, and starvation are used to control and manipulate these children. As early as 1997, police in New York City discovered 55 deaf-mute children brought from Mexico by a criminal organization specializing in selling children into slavery. Sign language interviews with the children found that they worked up to 18 hours a day and were paid nothing. Similar cases have turned up in Florida, Texas, and South Carolina. One case involved 20 women from Mexico, some as young as 14. These women traveled all across the United States, on prostitution circuits, “servicing” migrant workers in agricultural camps. The women received $3 for each sex act performed, while their captors pocketed $17.

In addition, although Mexican authorities deny it, “baby farms” are said to exist along the Mexican-U.S. border. In these places sick, weak, and abandoned children are reportedly killed for their body parts. Many believe organ trafficking to be a hoax, the stuff of urban legend, but the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime has issued a “trafficking in persons” protocol in which the definition of criminal exploitation includes “forced organ removal” (among prostitution, forced labor, and slavery).
Insurgency and Organized Crime

Armed political movements that actively oppose the government often create the conditions for the emergence of organized crime. Among such political movements are guerrillas and terrorist groups.

Some use the term guerrilla interchangeably with the term terrorist. However, the words mean different things. Guerrilla comes from the Spanish term meaning “little war,” which described the Spanish rebellion against French troops after Napoleon’s 1808 invasion of the Iberian peninsula. Guerrilla groups usually concentrate in rural areas and often evolve into quasi-armies or militias capable of attacking conventional police and military forces in raids and ambushes. Guerrilla forces can evolve into large formations of combatants that begin by attacking outlying vulnerable military or economic targets in raids or ambushes but aim to overthrow the government by promoting widespread military and political action. In other words, guerillas, if they do not engage in terror tactics, are legitimate combatants under the just-war tradition.

In contrast, terrorists are criminals. They typically function in urban areas and conduct covert operations in relatively small groups or cells that target civilians to undermine confidence in the government. Such groups normally target property (such as airplanes or ships) or unarmed civilians (as in the attacks on the World Trade Center). They aim to exploit a government’s vulnerabilities by promoting possible overreaction in the form of inhumane, harsh, or oppressive retaliation, and to expose the government’s inability to secure the people against attacks on its public transportation or infrastructures. Both guerrilla and terrorist actions promote conditions of instability conducive to organized criminal enterprise.

Defeating the Cartels

Initially the authorities thought that public cooperation was the key to success in areas afflicted by narco-terrorism. Accordingly, they sought the assistance of locals by placing bilingual reward posters on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border with names and photos of notorious cartel leaders. Posters offering rewards of up to $5 million are visible at major transportation centers, border entry points, bus stations, and airports throughout northern Mexico. This aggressive campaign has resulted in numerous arrests, many occurring without violence. Unfortunately, for reasons already discussed above, these arrests appear to have had little or no long-term effect in slowing the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States.

The most effective method for attacking a drug-trafficking organization is not decapitating its leadership but attacking its operational infrastructure and the key components that impact on its profits. In other words, the key is to take away a cartel’s means of making money. Doing so weakens the cartel enormously and could even cause it to collapse. In contrast to the traditional law-enforcement strategy that attacks such organizations from the top down, the better method is to defeat cartels from the bottom up via the “source-control” approach, by targeting and destroying the drug crops and manufacturing facilities that sustain the cartels and by eliminating the need for local officials to solicit bribes and engage in other corrupt actions.

For example, Mexico is now the leading source of “black tar” heroin, which has gained a major foothold in the American drug market. The opium fields most important to the production of this drug are concentrated in remote areas in the northern Mexican states of Durango, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Sonora. Estimates suggest the illegal cultivation of opium in these states is seven to nine metric tons annually. Acaparadores (or gatherers) purchase harvested opium gum and then transport it to clandestine laboratories for refinement. Three days later, burreros (agents) transport the refined heroin through points of entry along America’s southern border. The drug lords pushing black tar take shrewd, calculated risks: they export a high volume of heroin knowing that law-enforcement officials will intercept some of it, but betting that the majority will get through and more than compensate for any losses.
This strategy has been working. In addition to flooding the U.S. with black tar, it has had the secondary effect of overwhelming U.S. law-enforcement and overloading the court system. The government now must choose between sending thousands of minor participants in the drug trade to overcrowded, expensive prisons or releasing them back into society to join the army of couriers moving small amounts of drugs across the border.48

Again, a better method for dealing with this strategy would be to attack the drug trade not in transit, but at its agricultural source, while simultaneously providing legal jobs to people in drug-producing areas, extra money to law-enforcement officers (to steel them against bribes and graft), and security for those who refuse to cooperate with drug traffickers.

The above noted, what needs to be done versus what can be done are two very different things, especially given perceived infringements on cultural sovereignty, migrant worker issues, and historical territorial grudges. Any effective strategy for dealing with the problem at its source will require the U.S. to cultivate greater political ties with Mexico, offer increased economic aid, and provide military trainers and advisors to Mexican law-enforcement agencies (as is done in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia). However, such arrangements may not be possible because the Mexican community is generally suspicious of U.S. intentions.

Conclusion

As America continues to grapple with the multiple threats to democracy emerging in the War on Terrorism, it should not ignore the situation in Mexico. The United States must aggressively, but respectfully, cultivate Mexico as a key partner in the war. In the absence of such priority interest, Mexico could become an even more dangerous staging area for elements that regularly enter the U.S. for malevolent purposes. MR

NOTES

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47. Abadinsky, 273.
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The United States military faces a dual challenge in stability operations currently underway in Iraq. First, it must meet an immediate need by securing its own forces against an increasingly active and effective insurgency. Second, it must pursue the long-term political objective of state building, or democracy promotion and construction, transforming Iraq into the first domino of the heretofore elusive democratic peace in the region.1 Unfortunately for the military, the proposed solutions to maintaining force safety in a dangerous political setting and fundamentally altering that setting are often mutually exclusive.

Biometric technologies represent, at best, a one-dimensional solution that not only fails to take into account one side of the dilemma, but also inhibits progress on the other side. Biometric technologies address the compressed timeframe under which the U.S. military operates in Iraq by bringing vanguard human identification and tracking capabilities to bear on a highly fluid and increasingly sophisticated insurgency operating among a population of over 26 million civilians. However, several political and social theories, including critical, realist, and structuration, suggest that the introduction of biometric identification and surveillance in Iraq will produce dubious results that make democratization less likely. These results range from a wider gap in civil-military relations in Iraq to the haunting prospect of a biometrically facilitated mass slaughter.

I propose that biometric solutions to U.S. stability operations requirements highlight a fundamental paradox of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Mounting time constraints, caused by both the speed of the insurgency and American domestic political pressure, force the military to choose short-term tactical expediency over long-term political success. Biometrics offer a symptomatic nexus of the military’s dilemma from which to analyze the paradox posed by larger, longer-term American political goals and the more temporally and spatially limited contexts in which they are to be achieved.

**Smaller and Faster**

Over time, U.S. stability operations objectives have changed very little. In operations in Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, recurring themes have included “population control in general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems, infrastructure repair and institutional reform.”2 While in contemporary discourse “democracy promotion” and the “battle for hearts and minds” have been liberally substituted for more explicit lists, the fundamental ends of stability operations remain the same.3
What distinguishes the current generation of operations from prior incarnations is the greater compression of temporal and spatial contexts in which U.S. forces operate. Iraq’s densely populated cities, such as Baghdad, Fallujah, and Najaf, provide havens for insurgents who can move with great fluidity through urban environments. More historically distinctive, the ubiquity of cell phones and increased Internet access also facilitate faster coordination and communication among all Iraqi inhabitants. The nature of asymmetric attacks, mainly by suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), inherently constrains the time the military has to assess and meet the insurgent threat. Constructing bombs in backrooms can be done individually and with scant indication of imminent danger compared to massing troops and weaponry along a front. Furthermore, since they can blend in with the citizenry in a highly populated urban setting, insurgents effectively shrink the military’s space—an attack can come from any one person anywhere.

**Biometrics: Promise, Problems, and Body Parts**

From a tactical perspective, biometric technologies offer a tantalizing chance to check the enemy’s temporal and spatial flexibility—to know where he or she is at any time. Such technologies can help identify and separate insurgents from the population, both digitally and physically, thus increasing the security of Soldier and civilian alike. Proponents believe that biometric technologies can provide the U.S. with “identity dominance” in the War on Terrorism and in stability operations such as those in Iraq. One proponent, John Woodward Jr., defines identity dominance as the ability to “link an enemy combatant or similar national security threat to his previously used identities and past activities, particularly as they relate to terrorism and other crimes.”

Biometric identification technologies include but are not limited to fingerprinting (in use since the 19th century), iris and retinal scanning, face and voice recognition, gait analysis, and implantable radio frequency identification devices (RFID). While each are powerful advances in their own rights, these technologies are most effective when combined to construct multimodal profiles of humans that can be stored in “interoperable, networked databases” like the Department of Defense Biometric Enterprise Solution. Such databases allow faster and more accurate identification of individuals by any affiliated personnel possessing a scanner and a data connection. Distributing biometric scanners and surveillance devices—RFID receivers and digital cameras, for instance—throughout a territory would allow for identification of individuals at any node in the network as well as tracking of “tagged” persons as they move through the network. Thus, the time and space in which insurgents can exist and move undetected would shrink significantly. Coupling networked databases with handheld scanning and processing devices such as the Biocam system could make biometric profiling and tracking ubiquitous, given adequate resources.

The development and adoption of these technologies represent a new kind of race for the military and its opponents. In previous eras, the U.S. engaged in arms races by building up its destructive capabilities. But biometrics are less about material destruction than compression of time and space through identification and tracking; they are the technological antidote to cellular insurgencies that achieve speed of attack through anonymity, tactical simplicity, and sophisticated coordination. Thus, the pursuit of tactical success through technology, both high and low, no longer contributes to a conventional “arms” race—meant to augment strength—so much as it signifies a new kind of contest: a “legs” race whose objective is to augment speed.

Without a doubt, biometric technologies hold the potential to change the way the U.S. military monitors and filters the inhabitants of Iraq. But the degree and scope of that change is debatable, due in part to the uncertain appropriateness or effectiveness of many of the technologies. For instance, iris and
retina scanning, while reliably accurate, require that individuals move past a scanner at a slower-than-normal pace while gazing into the scanner—a process easily circumvented by unwilling participants.8

Face recognition is even more contentious. Woodward wants facial data collected on enemy combatants as well as anyone who has contact with U.S. forces. The profiles would be housed in a single, networked database.9 But others believe that facial recognition software is still too immature to be reliable, especially in a highly populated, fast-paced urban setting. Roger Clarke, an industry consultant, goes so far as to call facial recognition “rubbish.”10

There is also a sampling problem inherent in using biometrics in a region of recent or ongoing conflict. As Russell Farkouh points out: “Living conditions experienced in the field can make fingers and handprints difficult to read . . . The very body parts necessary to prove identity may now be damaged too severely to offer an accurate read.”11 Given the collateral damage associated with war, this point also applies to Iraq’s civilian population. As a very rough illustration, the antiwar group Iraq Body Count estimates that there were 8,000 nonmilitary casualties (excluding fatalities) in Baghdad from the onset of combat operations on 19 March 2003 to 7 August 2003—an average of 56 injuries per day during that period.12 Many of those injuries likely occurred to parts of the body that could be useful in identification, meaning that combat operations reduced the available biometric data in Baghdad every day.13

Finally, optimism about biometrics usually relies on the assumption that the borders surrounding the monitored territory are secure. In this way, every person entering or exiting the territory can be scanned, profiled, and tracked (while within the territory) in a systematic fashion. But Iraqi borders remain porous. Thus, biometrics proponents cannot be sure that every individual within the territory has already been processed, which seriously diminishes the capacity for surveillance ubiquity and saturation (everywhere and everyone).

**Critical Theory and Biometrics**

The immediate objective of applying biometric surveillance to Iraqi society is to bring greater stability to the population by identifying and separating insurgents from civilians—to bring order by ordering. This task, using a network of pervasive sensors, may be understood as the digitized incarnation of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a design for prison discipline based on constant surveillance from a central tower. The Panopticon was the architectural precursor to Michel Foucault’s system of modern state discipline.14 Foucault based his analysis of state power on the rational division and “treatment” of plague-afflicted towns in the 17th century. His writings on the topic resound when considered in our current biometric climate.

Foucault described the control of plague victims as proceeding “according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal); and that of coercive assignment, of differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way, etc.).”15 This control is generalizable to “all forms of confusion and disorder,” including counterinsurgencies and stability operations.16

Biometric technologies have collapsed Foucault’s double mode into a single one that divides and distributes nearly instantaneously: persons are digitally branded in a variety of ways that simultaneously determine their metrics of recognition and...
place them under constant surveillance. Databases enrich and sometimes replace the central monitoring station’s “penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life.”

At their maximum effectiveness, the new technologies produce a dominion that Foucault predicted with precision: “This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded…in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings…all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. . . . its function is to sort out every possible confusion . . .” (emphasis mine). It seems as if the only distinction between the 17th-century plague town and the postmodern insurgency-plagued city is that the space is no longer “frozen”: partial mobility occurs under constant monitoring.

Critics point out that biometric technologies equate to extending state power and the logic of technology into human bodies, blurring a traditional boundary between the state and the individual. Michael Dartnell says that new information technologies (IT) impact “events by transgressing, re-articulating, and re-shaping the boundaries of identities, power, and security.” James der Derian describes a “totalizing tendency” of IT that threatens to “envelope public ways of being from within and from without,” a “techno-fundamentalism” in which “information technology has come to dominate…our most profound image of being in the world,” collapsing any distinction between metaphysical being and technological method.

The tragedy embedded in the triumph of technology is the reduction of human identity to algorithms and data sets. This is the digitization of bio-political life, where, according to Francois Jacob, “Biology has demonstrated that there is no metaphysical entity hidden behind the word ‘life.’” Michael Dillon writes that biometrics and IT amount to virtual security, which “radically technologizes human existence—turns it into raw material.” The biologization of social identity represents an “ontological resource” that threatens to reduce human existence to Giorgio Agamben’s “bare life”—the instrumental and life-or-death logic of the concentration camp. The population of Iraq possesses a long, rich, and diverse tradition of identity based in part on tribal, ethnic, and religious affiliations and historical narratives. Imposing singular identities achieved by applying biometric identification to such a society may be tantamount to ontological and epistemological imperialism—the hegemony of technological rationalism and computer code over social history and semantic meaning.

**Humiliation and Public Relations**

Critics of biometrics pose a significant challenge to the bio-political assumptions upon which the technologies rest. But if the critical theorists are correct, how will we know? U.S. forces will not crumble because of a theoretical transgression. The practical outcome of a theoretical failure will likely manifest more in the psychological and public-relations aspects of U.S. stability operations. An increased sense in the Iraqi citizenry of alienation from U.S. forces would be one manifestation that would retard the infusion of democratic values in that citizenry. Current literature demonstrates that alienation is already significant and that the U.S. is far from winning the public relations battle for Iraqi hearts and minds.

U.S. forces have been less than adequately educated about Iraqi traditions and notions of honor and shame, with detrimental effects on the relationship between U.S. forces and Iraqi citizens. Iraqi concepts of honor revolve around sharaf (noble birth), ihtiram (respect derived from coercive power), and urd (female purity). Urd also implies familial honor, since responsibility for the purity of the woman rests with her family. Thus, rape victims are often killed or physically punished by their own families to “cleanse” the evidence of the inability of the men of the family to keep urd. The potential for less-violent affronts to feminine—and therefore
familial—honor is a daily reality under stability operations that may involve bodily and house searches as well as isolated interrogation. Victoria Fontan claims that the U.S. military often misses the early warning signs of the populace’s increasing humiliation. Introducing biometric technologies like facial scanning may necessitate removal of the hijab, the woman’s headscarf. Similarly, implantation of RFIDs in clothing or under the skin might require a violation of the Shi’ite prohibition against exposing any body part other than a woman’s face to strangers. The presence of transmitters on a woman’s body or clothing and the knowledge that she was being monitored and tracked by foreigners could also exacerbate a sense of exposure. Any of these possibilities threaten to aggravate the sense of shame that Iraqis—and therefore Iraqis—feel as a result of American actions.

Any additional shame would further strip the sensibility of honor from a society already deprived of ihtiram. Since the military possesses a preponderance of destructive power, U.S. operations amount to a regular reminder of the loss of ihtiram—a loss exemplified by the fact that Iraqis could not depose the Hussein regime themselves but needed an outside force to do so. Furthermore, the U.S. censored Iraqi media during the war instead of trying to encourage standards of responsible journalism. Without those standards, the Iraqi media today is free to reinforce a view of U.S. forces as foreign interlopers. In this context, it is unsurprising that 89 percent of Iraqis polled in 2004 viewed the U.S. as an “occupier” instead of a liberator.

Winning hearts and minds is a more nebulous undertaking than preventing offenses against traditional honor, although it must certainly include eliminating those offenses. A prescription for effective U.S.-Iraqi public relations is far beyond the scope of this paper; I seek only to suggest that biometrics will affect Iraqi perceptions of the merits of American objectives, and that the effect will not necessarily be positive. Biometric technologies bear no relationship to more traditional notions of identity based on race, religion, or tribal bonds, and may seem a uniquely American or Western means of identification. Imposing biometrics on Iraqis thus implies the abrogation of their preferred identity attributes. So biometrics may be perceived as one more example of how the American way of doing things ignores Iraqi customs—a result not at all conducive to convincing a citizenry to adopt American governmental customs.

**Realism on the Left and Democratic Cross-purposes**

In addition to arousing critical ire and potentially alienating the targets of their technology, biometric applications confound the conventional wisdom and expectations of two disparate entities: classical realist thinkers and American Democratic politicians. A close reading of classical realism and an illustration from the maneuvers of American Congressional Democrats show how biometric technology forces realism to the “left” and exposes contradictions in recent Democratic tactics.

Classical realism stands as the theoretical hegemon of international relations studies. Typically, classical realism is understood simply as the idea that all politics devolves, by way of avaricious human nature, to power capabilities. Such an understanding usually leads to the conclusion that the “strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” (This finding seems consistent with the implementation of biometrics in Iraq.) According to Michael C. Williams, Thomas
Hobbes’s “state of nature,” a fundamental tenet of most classical-realist accounts of international relations, has conventionally been interpreted as a state of perpetual insecurity, “the outcome of materially self-interested rational actors competing for the same scarce goods within a condition of epistemic agreement.” But Williams’s incisive reading of Hobbes’s epistemological skepticism demonstrates that the Hobbesian state of nature is characterized by “precisely the lack of any such commonality” (emphasis in the original)—by an inability to agree on how we can verify knowledge claims.

It is this epistemic rather than physically insecure state of nature that necessitates a sovereign state, whose primary contributions to society are that it “underpins social structures of epistemic concord, provides authoritative (and enforceable) interpretations and decisions in contested cases, and creates conditions of predictability that minimize fear and allow rational cooperation.” This “willful realist” understanding of Hobbes’s Leviathan as a facilitator of the social construction of knowledge, rather than as simplistic monopolizer of violent force, relies on a contract between the government and the governed based on legitimacy. As Williams notes, “Hobbesian individuals never give up their right to judge situations for themselves in the sense that, if they believe their self-preservation to be threatened, they retain (via the right of nature) the right of rebellion against the Sovereign.” Thus, the populace must embrace the epistemic claims that the government seeks to enforce.

Willful realism, combined with critical theory’s exposition of the epistemology that inheres to biometric technologies, provides a cautionary argument with regard to Iraq. If biometrics include intrinsic knowledge claims that tend to biologize political life, and governmental stability relies primarily on the popular legitimacy of such claims, then the crucial question becomes whether or not a significant portion of Iraqis accept the replacement of their traditional identities by technological practices. If they do not, U.S. stability operations lose the legitimacy needed to fertilize Iraqi self-government in the future.

As discussed above, there is little to suggest that biometrics will increase the legitimacy of U.S. operations in Iraq. Thus, biometrics risk running afoul of another “supreme virtue” of classical realism, prudence, defined as “the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions.” If the demands of legitimacy and therefore prudence are ignored in the implementation of biometrics in Iraq, U.S. decision-makers risk a “worst-case scenario” where “out of their fear of future harm rather than the calm appraisal of current realities…they create the very conditions of distrust that they fear.”

To graft my particular subject onto Williams: “[Techno]logic, so necessary for prediction and preservation, becomes the source of a destructive self-fulfilling prophecy.”

Just as confounding as finding classical realism in opposition to biometric applications implemented by the powerful is the discovery that House and Senate Democrats have maneuvered themselves into a circular scenario reminiscent of Williams’s and Hobbes’s self-fulfilling prophecy. Democrats have supported biometric initiatives with regard to homeland security, but recent efforts in Congress place two Democratic pillars of Iraqi policy—a timetable for the war and transferring responsibility for Iraq to Iraqis—in opposition to each other. One focal point of this opposition is biometric identification and surveillance.

Democrats have been calling for a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq for some time, and made it a centerpiece of their Congressional takeover in the 2006 mid-term elections and of their platform in the new Congress. The demand corresponds with a belief that the Bush administration’s war-making capabilities must be severely constrained. Growing domestic momentum for timetables further shrinks the U.S. military’s window within which to effect U.S. objectives in Iraq. This can only amplify the aforementioned conundrum in which U.S. military planners must conduct limited operations “with one eye on the clock . . . [and it] suffuses the campaign with the sense that American forces must move quickly if they hope to take the initiative and take control of the situation.” In other words, the natural compression of stability operations timeframes, combined with calls for withdrawal dates, encourages the U.S. military to trade long-term effect for tactical expediency. The momentum for biometric technologies is just such a tradeoff.

It is therefore ironic that biometrics promote an outcome that is anathema to the Democrats’
Biometric technologies will not only alienate the Iraqi populace. Their promises of scientific superiority and ubiquity will also relieve civilians of any duty to report what they see…

other primary objective in Iraq: the retrocession of responsibility to Iraqis.41 Biometric initiatives not only make U.S. forces responsible for identifying and detaining insurgents, they usually insist on the necessity of U.S. proprietary rights to database access.42 In counterinsurgencies and stability operations in pre-biometric eras, U.S. forces often relied in part on indigenous populations providing identification and intelligence regarding insurgents. Biometric technologies will not only alienate the Iraqi populace. Their promises of scientific superiority and ubiquity will also relieve civilians of any duty to report what they see since they can assume that U.S. scanners have already identified, logged, and tracked suspicious persons. Thus, one Democratic initiative has hamstrung another party objective. While a timetable bill has been passed, it is unlikely to correlate with increased Iraqi responsibility.43 Instead, a timetable makes biometrics more attractive to the military. Biometrics in turn reinforce the idea that U.S. Soldiers, not Iraqis, are responsible for stabilizing Iraq.

Structuration Theory and Democide Promotion

Biometric proponents advance a particular narrative about the implementation and application of the technology, moving from technical capabilities to identity dominance to managed and monitored populations to increased stability and greater security for both U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians. But this narrative is overly deterministic. Is there any point where the linear progression could veer off course and take an unforeseen path to unexpected destinations? A structurationist view of technology suggests that such a point will follow immediately after the installation of biometric technologies in Iraq. A few strategic scenarios will demonstrate just how undesirable some of the unanticipated outcomes could be.

Based on the work of Anthony Giddens, a structurationist theory of technology considers the relationship between users and technology as a co-constitutive dynamic in which technological capabilities affect user preferences and actions, and those actions and preferences in turn alter how technologies are perceived. Changed perceptions of technology then modify user preferences, and the cycle repeats in perpetuity.44 Particularly important in structuration theory is the reflexivity of users (their ability to self-monitor current and potential uses of technology), the direct (either intended or unintended) and indirect (almost always unintended) effects of technology use on a social environment, and the idea that, no matter how permanent or accepted its use seems, a technology is always “evolving [in society] uncertainly according to innumerable ad hoc judgments and assumptions.”45 What results is an ever-changing relationship between technological capabilities and human users wherein technology is always “interpretively flexible” and therefore never fully determined in its uses by and effects on society.46 Such an analysis of technology casts doubt upon the optimistic outcomes assumed by advocates of biometric surveillance. Could there be any other permutations caused by introducing biometrics into a dynamic, increasingly insecure, oftentimes uncooperative, and frequently hostile sociopolitical setting?

Structuration theory suggests that from the moment the technology is introduced into Iraqi daily life, outcomes will be less reliable than biometric advocates hope. In the following paragraphs I discuss two possibilities, one a worst-case scenario, the other having to do with foreseeable logistical difficulties. Both scenarios merit consideration by planners before biometrics are accepted for stability operations uses.

The worst-case result would be a biometrically facilitated democide in which the Iraqi Government or sectarian factions within the police and military forces utilize identification and tracking techniques to cleanse areas of tribal, religious, and/or political opponents.47 Such a possibility is not without precedent. Argentina, one of the earliest adopters of fingerprint technology, used the Digicom biometric system to “track down so-called dissidents in the streets of Buenos Aires,” contributing to 30,000 “disappearances” between 1976 and 1981.48
While in all proposed biometric scenarios the U.S. would initially control and secure database access, the chance that this would continue indefinitely seems slim. Whether it takes 5, 10, or 20 years for the U.S. to cede database rights to the Iraqi Government, can we be sure that factionalism and civil war will have been erased from the sociopolitical landscape? If they have not, then the existence and control of various identification technologies will make the violent settling of old scores all too efficient.

Identity security often equates to physical safety in Iraq today. For instance, in Baghdad, “fearful Sunnis and Shiites are hiding their identities to survive. Their differences . . . have become matters of life or death in ways never before seen in modern Iraq.” The March 2007 Shi’ite police massacre of Sunnis in Tal-Afar stands as a stark warning. Biometric scanners and databases would eliminate identity secrecy in Iraq. The U.S. cannot consider their installation without taking into account the most nefarious possible uses for the technologies.

Far less dangerous than biometric-assisted cleansing, immediate command-and-control quandaries should still vex stability planners. Even under U.S. auspices, biometric surveillance in Iraq will require some decentralization to be truly pervasive. As the U.S. grants greater authority to trained Iraqi Army and police forces, these groups will need, at a minimum, access to identification databases if they are to do their jobs competently. Denying Iraqi Government forces biometric capabilities would surely make Iraqi-controlled areas much more attractive to highly adaptable insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. military has had less success than Iraqi militias in some stability-related operations, and retrocession of the right of some Iraqi groups to use force in certain situations has already been suggested, as in the case of the Mahdi Army’s protection of Shi’ite pilgrims. The presence of biometrics would force U.S. commanders to choose between granting high technology to a factional group or being vulnerable to the charge that they had not fully facilitated the group’s protection capabilities. Retrocession and shared stability operations are inherently challenging issues. Biometrics would only make them more difficult.

The two scenarios described above are far from the only alternative futures that biometrics might initiate. I mean for them merely to illustrate the strategically sensitive implications of biometric technologies when viewed from a structurationist perspective. Such possibilities deny the panacean image of biometrics and suggest that they may in fact do more harm than good in Iraq.

**Scan the Sin, Not the Sinner**

The tragedy of an un-debated and unmitigated acceptance of a biometric solution to stability problems in Iraq is that there are viable alternatives that might better support the military in accomplishing not only the expedient objective of securing personnel and forces, but also the long-term end of promoting democracy to Iraqi civilians. I will briefly discuss two such alternatives: tagging of goods and commodities to remove illicit sources of income from insurgents, and weapons detection using broadband-over-power-line interference.

RFIDs, at their most fantastical, lie in wait beneath the skin, activating proximal sensors as
the wearer travels through space. RFIDs, at their most practicable, can be attached to cargo containers, palettes, and even individual products so that goods can be quickly identified at points of entry and tracked to points of delivery. This less-futuristic application of RFIDs could inhibit smuggling, money laundering, and other activities that amount to illicit economies from which insurgents are often funded.52

A biometric siege of insurgents, using high technology to choke off their resources instead of tracking their (and every other Iraqi’s) every movement, would constrain insurgent capabilities without intrusive human sensing.

The second technology, broadband-over-powerline interference remote detection and identification (BPLI RAID), allows for the detection of metallic weapons signatures potentially anywhere on the electric grid.53 Using natural background radio noise from the transmission of broadband over powerlines to create a “scanned” area, along with special receivers housed in electricity transformers, BPLI RAID identifies the presence of weapons in a given space by their reflected frequency signatures.54 BPLI RAID holds the potential to detect weapons only a few centimeters long. Instead of identifying individuals deemed threatening, it can alert U.S. forces to the presence of imminent threats.55

This technology also promises benefits more consistent with U.S. democracy-building objectives and Iraqi notions of honor.56 Because it can be installed anywhere there is electricity, BPLI gives the U.S. extra incentive to build up the Iraqi infrastructure while also making U.S. Soldiers more secure. And because it passively scans objects instead of people and requires no processing of individuals prior to detection and monitoring, BPLI RAID will disturb Iraqi daily life and customs much less than biometric surveillance.

With the potential to increase the security of U.S. forces to a degree at least equivalent to biometrics while reducing Iraqi alienation, RFID commerce tracking and BPLI RAID more adequately address the U.S. military’s temporal and political dilemma in Iraq. They deserve careful consideration. They also call attention to the existence of alternatives to biometric solutions that respect the complex nature of U.S. stability operational needs without sacrificing speed. The U.S. military clearly intends to win the legs race against insurgents and terrorists. It deserves the opportunity to do so with appendages that will move it further along the path to a democratic Iraq instead of with ones that may only run in place.

NOTES


2. Roger Farkouh, “Incorporating Biometric Security into an Everyday Military Work Environment,” SANS GIAC GSEC Practical Version 1.4b, Option 1 (2004): 4. A “multimodal” profile is built from more than one “metric.” The combined metrics are then used to create a more robust and distinctive profile (Douglas).


6. Russell B. Farkouh, “Incorporating Biometric Security into an Everyday Military Work Environment,” SANS GIAC GSEC Practical Version 1.4b, Option 1 (2004): 4. A “multimodal” profile is built from more than one “metric.” The combined metrics are then used to create a more robust and distinctive profile (Douglas).


13. I acknowledge the methodological flexibility and lack of precision of this estimate, but it include it simply to illustrate the idea.


15. Ibid., 199.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 198.

18. Ibid., 197. For a more expansive Foucauldian critique of biometric surveillance,


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 533.

24. For more on this point, see ibid; Gillian Fuller, “Perfect Match: Biometrics and Body Patterning in a Networked World,” Fibreculture Journal 1, no. 1 (2003): 543.


26. Ibid., 223.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid., 224-25.

30. Congressional Democrats were forced into contradictions in terms of the critical stance they took toward biometric applications, as the ensuing argument in the text shows. In short, their push for a timetable is one factor that has caused U.S. forces to opt for expedients like biometrics. But the use of biometrics then undermines the Democrats’ other demand: that Iraqi forces be pushed to assume responsibility.


33. Ibid., 24.

34. Ibid., 40-41.

35. Morgenthau, 12. As Morgenthau remarks, there “can be no political morality without prudence.”


37. Ibid.


41. For examples of calls for Iraq to take responsibility for itself, see Nancy Pelosi, “Floor Remarks on Amendment to the Defense Appropriation Bill” (House of Representatives, 2005); “Press Release: Stupak Renews Calls for Iraqi Accountability Plan” (House of Representatives, Office of Congressman Bart Stupak, 3 August 2006).

42. For examples of biometrics proponents’ views on database security, see Douglas and Woodward. For a critical appraisal of the need for data encryption, see Bonditti, 470.


46. Orlikowski, 405.

47. I use the term democide to capture the wider possibilities of slaughter than genocide, which is typically defined as the mass extermination of a certain religious, ethnic, tribal, or national group. Democide, on the other hand, refers to any instance of violence directed against citizens by government authorities.


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.
IRAQI DICTATOR SADDAM HUSSEIN was an irritant to the United States and defied the international community over his weapons programs for a decade, causing some U.S. leaders to push for removing him and transforming Iraq into a democratic state. Unfortunately, few of those leaders thought seriously about how to accomplish the second half of their aim; thus, we are going on our fifth year in Iraq with no end in sight. One lesson we should learn from this mistake is that we must plan now for stability operations in countries where the risk of regime collapse is greatest.

North Korea has been a U.S. adversary responsible for the deaths of thousands of American service members over the past 55 years, and it is the only country in the world that holds a commissioned U.S. naval vessel hostage. It also possesses stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, has an advanced ballistic missile program, and recently detonated a nuclear weapon. The nations within range of its medium-range missiles include 3 of the world’s top 11 economies; combined, the 3 nations contain one-fourth of the world’s population and are responsible for nearly one-fifth of the world’s trade volume. Today, North Korea faces the very real threats of internal collapse or forced regime change. Either event would create one of the greatest humanitarian crises of modern times overnight. Infectious diseases, severe economic burdens, and even weapons of mass destruction could spread across the borders North Korea shares with some of the world’s greatest economic and military powers.

Background
After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Soviet troops occupied the Korean peninsula north of the 38th parallel while American troops occupied the area south of it. The Soviets installed dictator Kim Il-sung in the north and oversaw establishment of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the south, the U.S. installed Princeton-educated Korean exile Rhee Syng-man, who established the Republic of Korea (ROK) and became its first president. After the Americans and the Soviets withdrew nearly all of their forces from Korea in 1950, Kim Il-sung’s DPRK invaded the ROK and nearly unified the peninsula by force. An American-led UN intervention averted South Korea’s extinction and almost reunified Korea under a democratic government, but China entered the war, producing a stalemate that continues to this day.

During the 55 years since the end of the Korean War, the United States has kept troops in South Korea to maintain the UN-brokered armistice that
ended the conflict. Over 36,000 American Soldiers died during the Korean War. North Korea has killed more than 750 others since the signing of the armistice.

In recent years, the North Korean regime has defied the United States and the international community with its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. The U.S. and North Korea nearly went to war over the latter’s nuclear program before the countries signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was supposed to impose a freeze on the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. North Korean bellicerence continued, however. Soon after it signed the Agreed Framework, the DPRK began a secret uranium enrichment program in violation of that agreement, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a 1992 Inter-Korean Denuclearization Agreement. Under the leadership of Kim Il-sung’s son, Kim Jong-il, who took over upon his father’s death in 1994, the DPRK has continued to expand its missile program. In 1998 it fired a missile through Japanese airspace, and in 2006 it carried out additional tests over the Sea of Japan. Its ultimate act of defiance was an October 2006 nuclear test detonation.

**Humanitarian Costs of Defiance**

The DPRK’s defiance of the international community and expansion of its military capabilities has come at a great human cost. Since the mid-1990s, North Koreans have lived through a series of famines that various scholars estimate have killed between 600,000 and 2.5 million people (mostly between 1994 and 1998). Many factors have caused the famines, but the main ones are the loss of Soviet subsidies, the allocation of funds to weapons instead of food imports, politically motivated discrimination in food distribution, poor centralized farming management, and massive flooding brought on by deforestation of many North Korean mountains. Numerous refugees have confirmed reports of cannibalism in the DPRK.

North Korea watchers viewed the regime’s 1997 decision to accept international food aid as a sign of desperation or even potential collapse. Because the regime had long prided itself on its juche (“self-reliance”) philosophy, accepting international food aid meant abandoning its guiding principle. However, while the international community was spending money and resources to end the North Korean famine, Kim Jong-il was busy consolidating his power by implementing a *songun* (“military-first”) policy, which effectively supplanted juche. Under songun, Kim gave much of the donated food aid—and additional funding as well—to the military before any North Korean civilians got it. Perversely, in the midst of one of the worst famines the world had seen in decades, North Korea began to expand its military.

**Signs of Collapse**

In a recent article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, author Robert Kaplan imagines how the collapse of North Korea might look. In his view, it will not be a single event, but rather a process with seven identifiable phases:

- Depletion of resources.
- Failure to maintain infrastructure around the country due to resource depletion.
• Rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government.
• Attempted suppression of these fiefs by the regime once it feels that they have become too powerful.
• Active resistance against the central government.
• Fracture of the regime.
• Formation of a new national leadership.\textsuperscript{10}

Kaplan argues that North Korea reached phase four in the mid-1990s but was prevented from reaching phase five—insurrection—by the international food assistance, which effectively stopped the famine by 1998. However, in \textit{Rogue Regime}, journalist Jasper Becker documents numerous phase-five acts of resistance against Kim Jong-il’s regime, the most significant of which occurred in 1995 when senior officers of the North Korean VI Corps, based in Chongjin, North Korea’s third-largest city, hatched a plan to capture key governmental facilities, gain support from the VII Corps further south in Hamhung, and march on Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{11} The plot failed, but it clearly showed cracks in Kim’s control.

The growing flood of refugees from North Korea is another sign of impending regime collapse. When governments cannot govern properly, their citizens search for better alternatives. This is happening in North Korea today, even though defecting from the country poses daunting challenges. Despite the rough ocean waters surrounding the country on two sides, a few North Koreans have successfully defected by boat.\textsuperscript{12} An even smaller number, mostly soldiers, have defected across the heavily fortified demilitarized zone into South Korea.\textsuperscript{13} Most North Koreans who escape their homeland, however, do so by crossing the cold waters of the Yalu or Tumen rivers into China, even though Chinese and North Korean border guards heavily patrol both rivers. These geographical barriers and the authorities’ efforts notwithstanding, the flow of North Korean refugees into China continues.

North Koreans who succeed in crossing into China can attempt to survive there, but under the terms of an agreement between Beijing and Pyongyang, China returns any North Koreans it catches to the DPRK, where they face terms in prison camps or execution. When defectors began entering foreign embassy compounds and consulates in China and claiming refugee status, Chinese authorities increased the security around the diplomatic facilities. Defectors seeking a more accommodating place of refuge usually try to cross through China into Thailand, Vietnam, and Mongolia and thence into South Korea. In 2004, Vietnam permitted the ROK to airlift 468 North Korean refugees to Seoul.\textsuperscript{14}

Since the end of the Korean War, 8,740 North Koreans have successfully defected to South Korea. Over 7,000 of those defections occurred during the last four years despite increased Chinese and North Korean efforts to crack down on the flow, and many expect this pace of defections to continue through 2007.\textsuperscript{15} The United States recently began accepting North Korean defectors for the first time under the new North Korean Human Rights Act.\textsuperscript{16}
Because defectors hide from Chinese authorities, there is no way to know how many there are in China. Groups that aid defectors estimate the number at 100,000 to 300,000. If even the lowest estimate is accurate, approximately 1 out of every 230 North Koreans has defected to China. The continuing flow of defections suggests that the regime is already losing control at the periphery of the country.

Other signs of the regime’s loss of control are mass defections by border guards, jailbreaks, a rise in trading to replace the dysfunctional rationing system, a proliferation of cell phones and DVDs that bring in information from abroad, and even reported mass escape from one of North Korea’s notorious concentration camps. Several journalists have reported on hunger, dissent, and isolated acts of resistance inside North Korea, a noteworthy fact given the extraordinary secretiveness of Kim’s regime. Defectors still flow out of the country, and massive floods have wiped out many of North Korea’s food crops. All these events are having an impact on regime stability. Without dramatic reforms, which appear unlikely, conditions will only worsen. How much longer will it be before the regime loses all control of the country?

A desperate fear of regime collapse may best explain why Kim Jong-il ordered ballistic missile and nuclear tests within months of each other in 2006. Arguably, the tests were less for international consumption and more about domestic politics. With the regime showing signs of cracking, Kim may have felt compelled to shore up military support for it. The North Korean military has long wanted the prestige and security it believes nuclear weapons would bring. In addition, of course, nuclear weapons would give the DPRK a tactical advantage in any conflict with South Korea. Despite the huge size of its armed forces, North Korea has no conventional advantage over South Korea now because its aging tanks and aircraft are nearly at the end of their service. By allowing the military to advance its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, Kim Jong-il has secured his generals’ continuing loyalty and thus internal security. Additionally, as the nuclear and missile programs advance, the DPRK will gain the ability to deter any external threat of regime removal.

Missiles and nuclear weapons may help Kim Jong-il win the military’s loyalty, but that does not mean he and his regime will win the people’s admiration. Missiles and nuclear weapons do not feed families or develop economies. Only economic reform can change the plight of North Korea’s people. Kim Jong-il tried reforms in 2002, but reversed himself when it became apparent that they were accelerating the decay of state control.

As long as starvation, economic decline, and defections continue, the regime’s collapse is inevitable. Increasingly clear signs suggest that the collapse could begin at any time. Because regime collapse carries with it the terrifying risk of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, it is imperative that the United States thoroughly prepare for such a possibility now.
The Northeast Asia Project

The fact that China is preparing for North Korea’s collapse is one of the clearest indications of how real the threat is. After last year’s North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear tests, the Chinese carefully avoided any punishments that could trigger the regime’s fall. In recent years, the Chinese have deployed thousands more soldiers to fortify their border with North Korea. Although the conventional explanation for this is China’s desire to keep refugees and defectors inside North Korea, Kaplan argues that China is deploying the soldiers to provide a quick-reaction force to occupy North Korea if the regime falls.

In fact, the Chinese have been busy laying the political, diplomatic, and historical foundations for an occupation and perhaps even an annexation of North Korea. Over the past few years, China has funded what it calls “the Northeast Asia Project.” The goal of this project, as with similar efforts to reclaim the histories of Tibet and East Turkestan in the west, is to turn the history of the ancient Korean Koguryeo kingdoms into Chinese history. Thus, Beijing has registered Koguryeo historic sites with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) while formulating its own historical accounts of the kingdoms. At the same time, it has tried to block North Korean attempts to register Koguryeo sites inside North Korea as Korean. The Chinese have even claimed Mount Paekdu, on the Sino-Korean border, as a Chinese UNESCO site. The significance of this is hard to overstate: Mount Paektu is the mythical birthplace of the Korean people, a site of enormous historical, spiritual, and political significance to Koreans. For example, North Korea’s official mythology claims that Kim Jong-il was born on Paektu.

The ancient Koguryeo Kingdom once encompassed a large portion of northeast China as well as the entirety of North Korea. In tandem with its historical gambit, China has also been settling more Han Chinese in its northeastern territory, particularly in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, which has a large population of ethnic Koreans who still speak Korean. The attempt to “Han-ify” Yanbian has been so successful that Beijing recently suggested it might disband the autonomous zone. In reality, then, as well as in history, China seems to be trying to supplant the North Koreans.

Whatever its aims are, China clearly takes the risk of a North Korean collapse seriously and is making plans either to mitigate the ensuing calamity or seize an opportunity.

Considering the poverty, chaos, infrastructure decay, and humanitarian problems North Korea faces, one might ask why China would want to occupy it. First, China does not want refugees carrying a massive humanitarian crisis across its borders, particularly before or during the 2008 Olympics. Second, China wants to shape the region’s political geography in its favor, and it is not in China’s interest to have a free, united, prosperous, and pro-American Korea as a military or economic competitor combining cheap North Korean labor with South Korean technology. Third, China wants to develop its landlocked, economically backward northeast by gaining access to nearby North Korean seaports. China could achieve all this by establishing a puppet state or by fully incorporating North Korea into China proper as a new Korean autonomous area. If China follows the same model it did in Tibet—first incorporating Tibet’s history and then its territory—it is difficult to imagine a country that would be in a position to stop it. In short, the United States needs to take the threat of regime collapse in North Korea as seriously as China does.

A New Strategy

American military and political thinkers today are focused on creating policies to govern stability operations, but this invariably presumes the deployment of American Soldiers to advance U.S. interests. Direct stability operations are needed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but are they always necessary?

I propose the United States should adopt a new stability operations strategy, one based not on the deployment of American Soldiers but, rather, on setting conditions and providing logistical support for a third country to conduct stability operations that advance U.S. interests. For several reasons, the Korean peninsula is an excellent candidate for such a strategy.

The United States should begin creating the diplomatic conditions now to justify and support a South Korean-led occupation of North Korea. The best way to begin is by winning the information war inside North Korea. A widespread and persistent, although increasingly discredited, view holds that North Korea is belligerent because it really wants
normalization and engagement with the rest of the world. A more believable theory, strategic disenagement, suggests that Kim Jong-il really wants to isolate his people from the rest of the world because allowing them to engage with it would expose the fraudulence of his propaganda and destabilize his regime. The U.S. must therefore challenge the Kim regime’s control of information by increasing radio broadcasts into the country and helping move more radios across North Korea’s borders. Until recently, radios available inside North Korea were fixed to receive a single, government-controlled frequency. Today, more radios that people can tune to stations outside North Korea are being smuggled into the country.

By creating a radio audience now, the U.S. can begin building the legitimacy of the South Korean Government in the minds of North Koreans. Radio broadcasts could also combat the official North Korean media’s ferocious anti-American propaganda. When the inevitable regime collapse happens, the North Korean people will use their radios to seek information. Through their already established radio audience, the U.S. and South Korea would be able to pass information about humanitarian relief operations to the citizens of North Korea.

We know that radio broadcasts from the outside world already influence the North Koreans. The best single example of this is prominent author and former North Korean labor camp survivor Kang Chol-hwan, who decided to defect after listening to South Korean and Japanese broadcasts on an illegal radio. If radio broadcasts are influential enough to encourage North Korean citizens to defect, they can be equally effective in setting conditions for an occupation of North Korea.

Congress has already authorized key parts of this strategy with unanimous passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act, which authorizes the president to fund private and nonprofit groups to “promote human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the development of a market economy in North Korea.” The act also states that “the President is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to increase the availability of information inside North Korea by increasing the availability of sources of information not controlled by the Government of North Korea, including such sources as radios capable of receiving broadcasts from outside of North Korea.” Thus authorized, the U.S. recently provided funding to increase radio broadcasts in North Korea to up to 10 hours per day.

We can and should do more than this. For starters, Congress should fund 24-hour radio broadcasting to build the widest possible audience in North Korea. We should also consider cultivating, organizing, and funding some of the dissident organizations and media that have already begun operating inside North Korea. Such groups publish anti-regime flyers and posters, interview residents and file news reports, smuggle religious literature, and even take clandestine video. With more resources, they might be able to provide U.S. military planners with essential intelligence that could help them anticipate the population’s post-collapse needs for food, drinking water, medical care, and other essential services.

Even as the United States fights an information war to shape a post-Kim Jong-il North Korea, the U.S. military must prepare urgently for the inevitable regime collapse. Military leaders who will be called upon to help stabilize North Korea do not have the option to forego planning for things they hope will not happen. However, there are few signs that United States Forces Korea has been planning or training for Kim’s fall.

This is not due to a lack of vision. In 2006, U.S. military planners wanted to start preparing a
detailed operational plan (OPLAN) with the South Korean military to prepare jointly for the possibility of a North Korean collapse. However, the ROK Government was afraid such planning might offend North Korea, so the two nations reached a compromise: they would develop a contingency plan (CONPLAN) instead of a full-fledged OPLAN. CONPLAN 5029-05, to be completed by the end of 2007, focuses on controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction and handling refugees fleeing the country in the event of a collapse. CONPLAN 5029-05 might be the beginning of planning for the possibility of a North Korean collapse, but it is still woefully inadequate. Stopping nuclear weapons dissemination and the exodus of refugees is extremely important, but as the U.S. military’s experience in Iraq has taught us, providing for security, the rule of law, and government services immediately after a conflict is also essential. Who will stop the inevitable looting that will begin after a regime collapse? Who will prevent North Koreans from taking revenge against regime security forces and others who had oppressed them? The North Koreans rely on government food rations. If the regime collapses, who will provide food for the country’s 23 million citizens? Several infectious diseases—scarlet fever, measles, typhoid, paratyphoid, and typhus—are reportedly spreading inside North Korea now. Who will enforce quarantines and treat the sick? Who will establish law and order in a country filled with small arms and explosives? Who will stand up a government that the citizens of North Korea will accept after a collapse? These are just a few questions that need answers. The virulent anti-American indoctrination of the North Korean people complicates matters enormously. This is why it might be better for South Korea to reestablish basic services and order in post-Kim Jong-il North Korea, not the United States. The Republic of Korea, not the United States, is best prepared to occupy North Korea. South Korean soldiers can cross the DMZ with the advantages of having a shared language and culture, as representatives of a legitimate, prosperous Korean nation. American Soldiers should not enter North Korea except under the most limited of circumstances. Everything the United States does after a North Korean collapse should be in the context of building up the South Korean Government’s legitimacy in the eyes of North Koreans. Moving large U.S. troops formations into North Korea with the ROK military would create the perception that the South Koreans are American puppets, which is what DPRK propaganda has taught North Koreans since their birth. The United States must avoid taking any actions that could validate such a belief. Keeping U.S. forces out of North Korea would also strengthen the U.S. diplomatic case for preventing Chinese forces from moving into the country.

Putting a South Korean face on the occupation may come with some costs, but it is essential for building the ROK Government’s legitimacy. The ROK military must prepare a detailed, city-by-city plan to provide the same essential services the North Korean regime (sometimes) provides today, beginning with security and food supplies. The ROK military has roughly 600,000 active-duty troops available and can activate hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers and members of the Korean Service Corps. With a population nearly twice that of North Korea, South Korea has plenty of manpower to execute an occupation. Only its logistical infrastructure needs some improvement. The ROK military must stockpile rations, medicine, blankets, clothing, and other humanitarian relief supplies and be ready to deliver them instantly in the event of regime collapse. Japan may be able to assist South Korea in this humanitarian crisis. It too should be involved in post-collapse planning, but its role must be even more carefully limited than that of the United States. With its great resources and ideal location near Korea, Japan could support the occupation and reconstruction of North Korea with funding, airlift capacity, and additional stockpiles of humanitarian aid. Koreans, however, have long been hostile toward Japan because of its occupation of the Korean peninsula before and during World War II. For this reason, Japanese nationals—and above all, Japanese military personnel—should stay out of North Korea during the initial reconstruction phase. Japan can reduce historical animosities toward Korea and make an important goodwill gesture to the Korean people by spearheading a major humanitarian relief operation in which Koreans deliver the aid. Japan’s ensuing influence in a unified Korea could help offset any Chinese effort to achieve hegemony over the peninsula.
The U.S., for its part, could also provide some of the logistical assistance needed to ensure a quick, effective response to the Kim regime’s fall. The U.S. military has a logistical network in South Korea to conduct the reception, staging, and onward movement of troops and equipment into South Korea in anticipation of any potential conflict. It should adapt this network to transport humanitarian aid to designated ROK military logistical locations near the DMZ.

The United States could also reduce the cost and pain of North Korean reconstruction by preparing Koreans to rebuild their own nation. The U.S. should begin training the north’s future doctors, teachers, journalists, and political and business leaders now. North Korean defectors accepted into the United States can be taught essential nation-building skills. The United States allowed the first such defectors asylum in 2006, but the numbers so far have been small. Accepting and training more North Korean defectors will help create an educated class of citizens that will be critical in shaping the former North Korea’s future.

In the final analysis, however, South Korea must bear most of the burden of reconstruction. A failure to prepare for this monumental task risks losing the Korean dream of reunification to Chinese hegemony. If South Korea cannot occupy the DPRK immediately and effectively, China will.

Paving the way for South Korea’s successful occupation and reconstruction of North Korea requires urgent planning and action now. The United States can begin by—

- Escalating the information war.
- Developing a detailed city-by-city OPLAN.
- Persuading South Korea (with Japanese and U.S. logistical support), to take a leading role in a post-collapse North Korea.

South Korea’s readiness to occupy and stabilize North Korea will determine whether the Korean people will ever achieve their dream of a unified, democratic Korean peninsula. If not, the world may see the creation of yet another Chinese autonomous area. MR
1. Mitchell Lerner. The USS Pueblo Incident (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, October 2003). North Korea is the only country in the world that currently holds a commissioned U.S. Navy vessel hostage, the USS Pueblo. The North Koreans seized the ship from international waters in 1968, killed one crewmember, and held the remaining 82 crewmembers hostage for 11 months in North Korea before returning them. The USS Pueblo remains to this day as a propaganda trophy in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.


7. Gordon Cucullu, Separated at Birth (Guilford CT: The Lyons Press, September 2004). This chapter offers an insightful look at the North Koreans’ nuclear defiance, with Cucullu interviewing former national security advisor Richard Allen.

8. Oberdorfer.


13. “Three North Koreans Flee to South,” Chosun Ilbo, 17 June 2005, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events/20050620/100000000020050620054191FE46>. Kim, now in South Korea, is an active member of the North Korean Freedom Coalition and Liberty in North Korea human rights groups. Among other North Korea-related issues, he has testified before the House International Relations Committee about the need to increase radio broadcasts to North Korea.


17. Onishi.


24. In addition to northern Korea, the boundaries of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo dynasty included much of China’s northeast.


29. Russell Richardson, DPRK Studies, <www.dprkstudies.org/2006/07/06/north-koreans-strategic-disengagement-explained.html>, accessed 30 January 2007. North Koreans believe Kim Jong-il to be equivalent to a living god. He is able to keep this cult of personality alive by controlling the media and all information entering the country. Allowing his citizens to engage with the rest of the world would erode his control over the people.


34. Ibid., Section 104.


Major David Cummings, Jamaica Defence Force

A
n ancient taoist parable, transmitted by a 13th century Japanese poet, tells the story of a Chinese farmer’s son who falls off a horse and breaks his arm. “How unlucky the farmer is,” his neighbors think as they pay their condolences. A year later, an army marches into the village and conscripts every able-bodied youth—except for the farmer’s son, whose arm is useless. The army takes them all off to war, and they all die. The villagers wonder at how lucky the farmer is.1

Napoleon Bonaparte once said he did not want to work with any generals unless they were lucky. He ignored experienced generals in his quest to find so-called lucky generals.2

I have often wondered how luck has factored into the success of military leaders. How many times in our careers as professional soldiers have we heard individual officers described as being lucky? What is this thing called luck? In one instant, what appears to be bad luck suddenly becomes good. Is luck just a word we use to describe success or failure in the absence of any other explanation? Is luck something we can control? Is luck a question of probability or is it merely a fantasy?

Defining Luck

According to the Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary, one definition of luck is “the events or circumstances that operate for or against an individual.”3 But what makes events or circumstances work for or against an individual? In Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, Peter L. Bernstein explores the fascinating subject of risk and, to some extent, luck.4 His largely scientific approach examines decision theory, probability, and risk-taking, and he argues that “a decision should involve the strength of our desire for a particular outcome as well as the degree of our belief about the probability of that outcome.” So for Bernstein, in testing luck or tempting fate, one’s desire factors into a decision’s outcome in some significant relation to one’s reasoning about its likelihood.

LITHOGRAPH: The retreat of Napoleon from Russia, 3 November 1812. (Victor Adam)
Bernstein tells us that both strength of desire and level of experience should play major roles in determining the possible outcome of future events. Unfortunately, things are never that simple in military operations because the enemy’s actions also influence outcomes. Therefore, we cannot take a purely scientific approach to the study of luck in the hope that some consistently reliable formula will materialize.

The word “luck” does not appear in the Army’s most recent field manual (FM) on leadership, FM 6-22, Army Leadership. It occurred only twice in FM 6-22’s predecessor, FM 22-100 (also titled Army Leadership)—once in a discussion on organizational leaders, where it states that “failing through want of experience or luck is forgivable”; the other, in an example used to illustrate implied missions. The old leadership FM seems to imply that, in the absence of success, an officer might claim bad luck as a plausible excuse. However, it does not recognize luck as a value, attribute, skill, or action officially associated with an officer in the U.S. Army. Nor does luck appear in the Army Leadership Framework (Be, Know, Do). This lack of recognition stems from the Army’s and everyone else’s inability to supply or prepare luck. By any definition, luck is not something quantifiable.

Many successful leaders in another field that involves fierce competition, sports, have discussed how luck affects success. Legendary Green Bay Packers football coach Vince Lombardi wrote that he never talked about luck with his players; he talked about preparation. He added, “Luck doesn’t favor the lucky; it favors the prepared, and the difference between success and failure is player control.” Lombardi’s statement, backed up by his resounding record of success, suggests that preparation and control (of variables) are major contributors to outcomes that appear to be the result of luck.

Another football icon, Darrell Royal, former head coach of the University of Texas, says that “luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity.” Although not all sports leaders share Lombardi’s and Royal’s views, we can conclude that two of the most successful football coaches in the United States thought or believe that they had a large degree of control over the amount of luck (or successful outcomes) they received. One can view their experiences as paradigmatic for conditions in which two sides oppose each other.

Luck, then, appears to be influenced by a combination of confidence (desire, belief, and experience), control, preparation, and opportunity. Therefore, my definition of luck is successful or unsuccessful outcomes that appear to result from the convergence of confidence, control, preparation, and opportunity. (See figure 1.) Where and when these factors converge is usually where and when “good luck” occurs. The larger the total input of these factors, the more likely one is to experience good luck (i.e., success). Figure 2 shows what I call the good-luck curve. By maximizing the input of good-luck parameters, a leader stands a good chance of having good luck.

What About Bad Luck?

Sometimes, too much confidence works against a Soldier, and too many opportunities can lead to confusion. Also, we all know someone who has defied logic to achieve his objectives without much confidence, control, preparation, or opportunity. However, such cases are simply standard deviations or outliers.

What happens when opportunity is present, but the result is still “bad luck”? Is the cause a deficiency in some of the factors that lead to good luck, or can bad luck override even the best input? The
simple answer is that if we believe luck itself is an input, unpredictable outcomes will occur because luck is an unknown variable. My model does not regard luck as an input factor; it regards luck as an indicator that the conditions necessary for good luck to occur were in place. In battle, the best outcomes, or the greatest luck, will probably occur when all input factors are maximized. Good luck might also result if one or more enemy input factors are absent or only partially present. (In other words, good luck for one person might merely be the result of his capitalizing on the bad luck of another.)

**Cases in Point: Napoleon, Custer, Lee**

History records many battles won or lost because a leader failed to prepare the grounds for good luck. In *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret tells us that Napoleon often misinterpreted enemy intentions or actions, misjudged the possibilities of his own troops, and—especially in later years—could be deceived by his hopes and gigantic ambitions. By the time Napoleon decided to invade Russia, his desires, beliefs, and past successes had clearly made him overconfident. Overconfidence can remove good luck from one’s grasp. (See figure 2.) Napoleon caused his luck to run out when he invaded Russia, and it led to his defeat.

Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer’s defeat at Little Big Horn was another result of insufficient input. Custer erred in breaking up his regiment into small units and scattering them so widely that he could not reassemble them when concerted action was required to avert disaster. Historian Edgar Stewart argues that the Indians won not because they employed an overmastering strategy, but because they simply took advantage of Custer’s mistakes. Custer’s lack of preparation for this battle presented his opponents with an opportunity that materialized as good luck for them and bad luck for Custer. The Indians were prepared to take advantage of the opportunity and so were able to control the battle and defeat Custer. This example shows that if one party is more confident, better prepared, and reacts to opportunity faster, luck will favor him.

In *As Luck Would Have It*, Civil War scholars Otto Eisenschiml and E.B. Long argue that if Confederate Major General J.E.B. Stuart had received clear instructions as to what General Robert E. Lee expected of him, the Battle of Gettysburg would probably have been fought at Cashtown, where Lee had an almost impregnable position. Stuart’s unnecessary attempt to ride around Union General Joseph Hooker’s army rendered Lee blind to the Union army’s whereabouts, forcing him to leave his excellent position at Cashtown and seek battle on less favorable terrain. The brilliant Lee was confident, in control, prepared, and awaiting the opportunity to defeat General George Meade at Cashtown, but Lee did not have control over one critical factor: Stuart’s actions.

**Luck and Military Leadership**

How does luck affect military leadership? According to FM 6-22, leadership is “influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” A military leader who wants good luck must have confidence and exercise control, and he must be prepared to exploit opportunities. Napoleon only wanted to work with lucky officers, and Soldiers like to go into battle with lucky leaders, but this puts the cart before the horse.

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**Figure 2: The good luck curve.**
Luck is an outcome, good or bad; trying to evaluate it as a contributing factor makes no sense. Luck is not a factor that can have measurable effects on leaders, but leaders can clearly affect the luck they experience. Still, it is worth noting that when soldiers perceive a leader to be lucky, the leader will likely have additional influence over them, and in this way the perception of luck will have second-order positive effects.

A Great Believer in Luck

Former U.S. President Thomas Jefferson reportedly said, “I’m a great believer in luck, and I find the harder I work, the more luck I have.” The examples of luck I present here indicate that Bernstein, Lombardi, Royal, and Jefferson certainly knew what they were talking about. Good luck occurs when one is confident, in control of all or most variables, well prepared, and ready to exploit opportunities. A good leader experiences good luck not because he is lucky, but because he applies the factors in the good-luck model to set favorable conditions. Napoleon, who obviously did not understand this model, treated luck as a kind of innate personal attribute.

There will always be some uncertainty about the future, but while some are willing to leave things for the gods to decide, others will use the factors discussed here to chart their path toward success. Clearly, we should not use the phrase “good luck” to explain success or “bad luck” to describe failure because these terms obscure or mystify otherwise knowable factors that contribute to success or failure. To me, good luck looks like something that is earned, and good leaders can affect the amount of luck they receive. Military professionals should heed this more practical explanation of luck and work to set the conditions for what might, post-battle or war, be attributed to luck. It behooves them to do so, for no taxpayer or politician will listen to a general who says, “We lost this battle because of bad luck.”

NOTES
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 1-3, fig. 1-1.
9. The reader should note that I am equating a lucky output with a successful outcome.
10. Because confidence is based on desire, belief, and experience, I refer to the three terms together as confidence.
14. Ibid., 82.
15. FM 6-22, 1-2.
Lieutenant Colonel Fredric W. Rohm Jr., U.S. Army, Retired

This article represents my personal observations and opinions and does not reflect the official views of the PSYOP community, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the U.S. Army.

I propose merging the IO functional area (FA) and the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) branch into one specialty under the umbrella term “information operations.” Combining resources, training, and functions can only help the overall DOD effort in the information war.

Instead of the two specialties competing for scarce personnel resources, the Army should create a single entity containing officers who are culturally trained, well grounded in marketing and influence, and knowledgeable about all IO elements. Some argue that we need to change PSYOP’s name because it is associated with propaganda, lying, and misinformation, but those critics are missing the larger issue: what we actually need is a paradigm shift in the way we conceptualize information operations.

IO Elements

There seems to be a lot of confusion in the Army as to the exact nature of information operations. Under current doctrine, IO has five elements:

- Computer network operations (CNO).
- Electronic warfare (EW).
- Military deception (MILDEC).
- Operations security (OPSEC).
- Psychological operations (PSYOP).

In my experience, the Navy and Air Force have most of the CNO and EW expertise. From 2002 to 2005, I was in the IO section at U.S. Central Command. Almost all of the CNO and EW officers and subordinate units I worked with came from the Navy or the Air Force.

All of the services practice OPSEC and MILDEC at some level. In some ways, the two are opposites. OPSEC secures information about our capabilities, plans, and operations while MILDEC may deceive the enemy about them.

Of the five IO elements, PSYOP is the Army’s biggest contribution by far to the joint effort. About 5,000 Soldiers comprise one active duty and two reserve PSYOP groups as well as the Joint PSYOP Support Element. Soldiers also fill staff positions in conventional and special operations forces (SOF) units. The PSYOP branch’s active duty officer corps numbers around 200, about the same as the number of active duty IO officers in the Army.
Confusing Terms

We often hear military commanders incorrectly refer to traditional PSYOP activities and products as information operations. Leaders do not seem to want to use the term “PSYOP,” possibly because they do not understand it or because of its negative association with propaganda. “Information operations” has been so widely used in and outside the military that it has become the common term to describe the process of using information to influence. Often, we hear something like this: “Let’s conduct an IO campaign by dropping IO leaflets on the enemy to influence his to surrender.” If leaders are going to call such an endeavor IO, perhaps that is what we should name it. “Information” certainly has a less threatening sound than “psychological.” Moreover, we already refer to PSYOP teams that support U.S. embassies as military information support teams (MISTs).

The evolving concept of strategic communication, which no one has been able to define yet let alone practice, adds to the confusion. Most define strategic communication as “information and actions designed to influence at the strategic level.” Based on this definition, however, strategic communication is nothing more than PSYOP at the strategic level. Consider this excerpt from Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations: “Strategic PSYOP are international information activities conducted by U.S. Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives during peacetime and in times of conflict. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize [DOD] assets.”

Many articles are now being published that discuss IO and strategic communication and how to influence foreign audiences. Unfortunately, the writers of these articles sometimes confuse IO with PSYOP. For example, in a recent Military Review article, “Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations,” two officers with firsthand experience of tactical information operations say, “Information operations have the same goal as marketing communications: to influence a target audience to respond positively to a message.” In my opinion, they were not describing IO; clearly, they were talking about PSYOP. The writers completely disregard the PSYOP discipline, yet they say, “A significant shortfall in military operations continues to be insufficient knowledge about the local populace and how to influence it. The Army should acquire skilled marketing professionals by... providing marketing training for military IO practitioners.”

Unfortunately, perception can become reality. If battalion, brigade, and division commanders do not see the PSYOP community’s marketing expertise, then PSYOP officers are not doing their jobs well. If the PSYOP community is failing to explain its discipline to the rest of the Army, is it any wonder that it is losing relevance?

Migration of PSYOP Roles

PSYOP units and Soldiers perform five traditional roles. They—

- Influence foreign audiences.
- Advise the commander on the psychological effects of actions and operations.
- Provide public information to foreign audiences.
- Serve as the commander’s voice to foreign populations.
- Counter enemy propaganda.

The PSYOP community informs and influences foreign audiences fairly well. Still, many in DOD’s upper echelons seem to be trying to box it into tactical operations only (creating face-to-face and loudspeaker communications and print, radio, and some TV products).

It is not immediately apparent that anyone really understands counterpropaganda or how to conduct it. Leaders often react to what they hear in intelligence reports or see on TV about the enemy’s information products. They want to know immediately what we are going to say in response, and they usually favor direct refutation; this, however, is only one form of counterpropaganda, and often not the best. Commanders must not forego the...
analysis that can determine the best way to counter propaganda. Unfortunately, commanders often fail to ask PSYOP officers and NCOs for advice about the psychological effects of actions and operations, so their expertise is wasted.

The PSYOP community has abdicated the role of advising the commander to the IO/strategic communication function, and it has given up to the public affairs (PA) community the role of serving as the commander’s voice to foreign populations. In my experience, PSYOP officers rarely talk directly to commanders. Communication usually goes through the IO officer or strategic communication officer to the operations officer or chief of staff and then to the commander. Too often, the commander talks directly to foreign populations without the aid of PSYOP units.

Over the past four years, I have witnessed battalion, brigade, and division commanders using public affairs officers (PAOs) to help them speak directly to Iraqis via public and private meetings, radio broadcasts, and press conferences without asking PSYOP units’ help. Brigades have even commandeered radio stations and run them.

At present, strategic communication (sometimes called “effects”) staff sections are coming to the fore in all combatant commands. Sometimes, these sections are merely converted IO sections or, worse, a cobbled-together bunch of non-PSYOP and/or non-PA officers and noncommissioned officers untrained in any form of communication. These sections and their PA counterparts perform the traditional PSYOP roles of advising commanders on the effects of actions and operations and serving as the commander’s voice to foreign populations. Often, commanders defer IO issues to the IO officer even if an issue relates to PSYOP because they have given IO officers planning and supervisory responsibility for all five IO disciplines. As I noted earlier, commanders tend to think in terms of IO, not PSYOP.

**Competition Between IO and PSYOP**

PSYOP is about influence, specifically via marketing. The IO career field is moving into this area. The nine-week IO Qualification Course includes instruction in marketing, culture, and negotiation. An FA30 (IO officer) recruiting brochure notes that the IO officer should have—

- Specific marketing and international media skills.
- The ability to plan, prepare, and execute influence activities.
- Cross-cultural communications expertise and cultural awareness.
- Face-to-face engagement skills (using translators for the simple purpose of communication).
- The ability to apply cultural awareness and human factors throughout the full spectrum of operations.

Compare this to the description of a PSYOP officer’s skills, knowledge, and responsibilities as listed in U.S. Department of the Army pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management:

- “Psychological Operations officers possess expertise in assessing foreign target audiences; developing PSYOP plans, programs, and products; disseminating PSYOP products; and synchronizing PSYOP activities in peacetime and combat operations.
- “PSYOP officers must maintain proficiency in critical skills associated with a specific region of the world to include foreign language competence, political-military awareness, and cross-cultural communications.
- “Conducting PSYOP requires interaction with host nation military, civilian officials, the general populace, displaced civilians, and internees; as well as interagency coordination within the U.S. government.”

It seems that skills in marketing are no longer the sole purview of the PSYOP community; information operations officers are now being encouraged to obtain degrees in public relations and related academic disciplines such as marketing and international relations. Meanwhile, the IO and PSYOP officer communities are competing for scarce personnel resources while the Army is assigning both IO and PSYOP officers to the same units and sections. Why do we need an IO and a PSYOP lieutenant colonel at a division or an IO and a PSYOP major at a brigade or Special Forces group?
The secretary of defense has mandated that functional IO components, including PSYOP, merge into one field. So why are the two communities still separate? Perhaps one reason is that “the complexity and technological growth in EW, PSYOP, and CNO tend to isolate the specialists who practice these disciplines from one another.” But as the IO Roadmap goes on to say, “To be successful, an IO career force will have to break some cultural norms. Isolated communities of personnel [i.e. PSYOP] should begin to think of themselves as IO personnel rather than personnel participating in a core component of IO.”

The IO Roadmap recommends the development of IO capability specialists who are functional experts in one or more of the highly specialized core capabilities of CNO, EW, or PSYOP. It also recommends that these IO capability specialists alternate between assignments in their specialized core capability and assignments as IO planners. In other words, PSYOP officers and NCOs should serve in IO billets.

Recommendations

The time has come to merge the IO functional area and the PSYOP branch. General officers and other commanders already refer to PSYOP activities as simply information operations. There are many parallels between the two specialties, and both communities compete for the same scarce personnel resources. With only negligible adverse effects, the Army stands to benefit greatly from a merger of IO and PSYOP activities. It will achieve economies of scale by not doubling up IO and PSYOP officers in the same unit, and IO officers will gain better marketing and cultural training as well as become members of a branch. Moreover, PSYOP officers will gain better access to commanders, and the IO force will gain enlisted members and an NCO corps from the PSYOP community. All of this will ultimately improve the professionalism and technical expertise of new IO Soldiers.

NOTES

2. Still, the PSYOP community’s apparent image problem must be addressed. One of the special operations force imperatives is to “ensure the legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations [SO]” because “without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not gain the support of foreign indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the international community.” In the discussion under “SOF Imperative: Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations,” in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33.05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 15 April 2005), 1-9 through 1-10, legitimacy is seen as “the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition in international law. The people of the nation and the international community determine its [special ops] legitimacy based on collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, special operations will not gain the support of foreign indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the international community.”
3. The Joint PSYOP Support Element, a relatively new organization assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command, has approximately 60 assigned personnel, about half of them civilians.
4. The term “propaganda” originated with the Roman Catholic Church in the 1600s and meant “a congregation for propagating the faith.” Webster’s Dictionary defines propaganda as “the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person,” and “ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause,” <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/propaganda>.
8. Ibid., 72, 74.
9. For more about the five traditional PSYOP roles, see FM 3.05.30, 1-3.
11. In many commands, information operations and/or strategic communications sections are called “effects cells or sections.”
16. Ibid., 34.
Introduction

Last year at this Honors Convocation, I discussed the national strategy that produced the current situation we now face in Iraq. What I didn't do then was explain how to best resolve the Iraqi dilemma. Today, then, I'll describe what I believe to be the way ahead to produce the best possible outcomes in Iraq.

Initial Goal

America's original goal in Iraq was a unified and democratic nation with a strong central government. Our expectation was that such a country would serve as a shining example for the rest of the Middle East, a beacon of hope. But, contrary to assumptions under-girding our invasion, it now seems clear that Iraqi Arabs, the product of a tribal society, have little interest in establishing an American-style democracy or a Middle Eastern version of Switzerland where German, French, and Italian speaking citizens live in harmony. As Marc Wilson wrote in The State, "This is the lesson: Heretofore oppressed people do not automatically default to democracy. It is not axiomatic that freedom will... step in to fill the gap created when subjugated people become free." We can now conclude that because of sectarian hatred fueled by decades of Sunni oppression, because of an inadequate sense of national identity on the part of the Iraqis, and for other reasons I'll explain—our original goal is no longer attainable.

Proposed Solutions

Two primary solutions to the Iraqi problem are being advanced by the politicians, pundits, and policy makers in Washington: the "surge" and "quit and come home."

The surge. The surge, a temporary increase of an additional 30,000 troops, began last February. It took nearly six months for them to be deployed. The objective of the surge was to suppress sectarian violence in and around Baghdad by establishing combined Iraqi-American outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods. Presumably, this would buy more time to train the Iraqi armed forces and police while providing time for Iraqi politicians to create a functioning government.
Thus, the surge focuses primarily on nationwide solutions. There are two problems with this approach. First, both the national police force and the national military have proven ineffective, rife with corruption and sectarian strife. Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware commented on the Iraqi police force: “It is zero; it’s worse than zero. They’re death squads.” The centralized, multi-ethnic armed forces are not much better.

The second problem with the surge is there’s little evidence that Iraqi national leaders have either the willingness or the ability to forge a political consensus around a strong central government.

Quit and come home. The second option, proposed by so-called peace activists, is to declare the entire Iraqi operation a colossal failure, pack up the troops and our huge embassy staff, and come home. A number of politicians have also called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The quit and come home option is, of course, nonsense. The long-term consequences for American national interests would be disastrous. In all probability, Iraq would implode in an orgy of killing and sectarian slaughter. Chaos would ensue. The only order would be imposed by local sheiks and clerics. Throughout the Middle East, and the world, America would be blamed for the carnage. Our prestige in world opinion would be even lower than it is now.

Politicians who advocate immediate withdrawal are either grandstanding for uninformed voters or demonstrating an appalling ignorance of history, economics, international relations, and national security affairs. The quit and come home approach is not a solution; it’s the absence of a solution. So, neither of these two strategies seems viable. For the surge, we can’t sustain high numbers of troops in Iraq indefinitely. Our Army and Marine Corps are far too small and the ground forces are unable to stanch the hemorrhage of experienced professionals who are leaving the service after two, three, and even four tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor can we summarily withdraw because of the chaos and genocidal slaughter that would follow and the likelihood that Turkey, Iran, and perhaps Saudi Arabia would be drawn into the ensuing maelstrom.

The Current Situation

Before describing what our goal in Iraq should be, let me say a few words about the current situation.

Ineffective Iraqi government. The Iraqi central government is ineffective and split almost wholly along sectarian lines. This government, headed by a Shiite Prime Minister, has been slow to demonstrate initiative and shown little ability to reach consensus or govern. The majority Shiites, for decades oppressed by the minority Sunnis, see America as determined to protect their rule over a strongly united Iraq. As a result, there is little incentive for them to compromise or share power with the Sunnis and Kurds.

Both the Iraqi armed forces and the centralized police forces have been infiltrated by militia and insurgents. As one reporter noted, “In nearly every area where Iraqi forces were given control, the security situation rapidly deteriorated. The exceptions were areas dominated largely by one sect and policed by members of that sect.”

Civil war, refugees, and ethnic cleansing. The power vacuum created in Iraq when we destroyed the Saddam Hussein regime unleashed a civil war where the warring sects seek to avenge centuries of abuse or hold on to their positions of power. Ancient hatreds are being fueled by a savage al-Qaeda who slaughter indiscriminately and the Iraqi government which funds and arms extremist Shiite elements.

Ethnic cleansing is now moving apace, driven by this sectarian violence. You don’t have to rape and murder too many of my neighbors before I figure out it might be a good idea to pack up my family and move.

As a result, every month, between 50,000 and 150,000 Iraqis flee their homes, about half to neighboring Jordan and Syria. In general, those who leave Iraq are the most educated who have the means to start anew. Thus, Iraq is losing the moderate middle-class so necessary for reconciliation. Thousands more move from areas where they are the minority to regions where they are in the majority. Consequently, inside Iraq there are over 2 million displaced persons, in addition to the 2 million refugees outside Iraq.
Current security status. Let me review the current security conditions in Iraq. The Kurdish north is relatively peaceful. It has enjoyed virtually autonomy for years. The central government in Baghdad has acknowledged the Kurdish parliament, ministries, and their 100,000-strong army. But trouble brews on Kurdistan’s northern border. Kurdish rebels, supporting their ethnic brethren in Turkey, have been fighting a low level insurgency in Turkey for decades. Rebel attacks last month killed 47, including 35 Turkish soldiers. Turkey is now reinforcing the 200,000 troops already in the border region and threatens to invade northern Iraq to eliminate the rebel strongholds. However, the coming winter may postpone till spring the Turkish incursion.

The Sunni center of the country, particularly in the ethnically pure Anbar Province, has been the area of greatest success. Sickened by the savagery of local al-Qaeda, tribal chieftains, armed and financed by the U.S., united to expel the insurgents from their towns and cities. Employing local security forces and police, the Sunni sheiks restored order. This model has been expanded to Diyala Province. As a result, there has been an enormous reduction in violence in this region.

The Shiite south has seen Shia-on-Shia violence as contending militias battled for control. But overall, violence in Basra, the provincial capital and scene of the worst fighting, has dropped precipitously. U.S. commanders on the scene credit local security and police forces for the new level of stability.

Baghdad is a composite of neighborhoods that formerly were mixed. Today they are almost exclusively either Shia or Sunni—the minorities in each having been driven out or killed. This is the region of greatest uncertainty. Using some of the techniques which proved so successful in Anbar Province, U.S. forces are working to stabilize the city and its suburbs by granting local neighborhood autonomy and establishing local neighborhood security forces.

In summary, while violence has been significantly reduced throughout the country, these improvements are not the result of an increasingly able national police and military or a more effective government. Instead, they are the consequences of ethnic cleansing having run its course and the significant increase in autonomy in matters of local security. As local chieftains, militias, and police forces gain control, they are most successful in rooting out the insurgents and restoring order to their neighborhoods. The important point is that these forces which have proven so successful in establishing stability are both local and homogeneous along sectarian lines. They are not multiethnic units representing the central government in Baghdad.

A Third Option: Soft-Partitioning

Ultimately, the most significant problem in Iraq is neither al-Qaeda nor radical insurgents. It’s the culture and psychology of the Iraqi people, divided into three distinct ethnic groups, which have oppressed and slaughtered each other for decades. Any solution which does not take into account these cultural and psychological factors has little chance of success. Instead of fighting the natural impulses of the Iraqi people, we should work to harness them to a strategic goal.

A strategy which does this represents a third alternative to the surge or quit-and-come-home options. Gaining increasing support amongst policymakers in Washington, it’s called “soft-partitioning.” Soft-partitioning refers to dividing Iraq into three semi-autonomous regions with a weak, central government in Baghdad. In other words, a federal system. The term soft-partitioning is used to distinguish it from hard-partitioning which entails the outright division of Iraq into three separate, independent countries.

To envision a softly partitioned Iraq, think “Shia-stan” in the south, “Sunni-stan,” in the central part of the country, and Kurdistan in the north. Baghdad

Soft-partitioning refers to dividing Iraq into three semi-autonomous regions with a weak, central government in Baghdad.
would remain the capital with a primary function of managing the distribution of oil revenues. Baghdad would be a de facto fourth region, much as the District of Columbia is not a part of any state.

Americans err when they think of Iraq as a unified state. As one Egyptian diplomat noted, “Egypt is the only nation-state in the Middle East. The rest are tribes with flags.” These tribes, “communities with language, sect, and locality in common, have survived Rome, Byzantium, the Arab empire, the Crusader states, the Mamelukes, the Ottomans, Zionists and, more recently, local nationalist and religious zealots.” They’re not going away. One commentator explained, tribal members see themselves as “at most a collection of nations in a nation, but not of it.” Another observed that “even the mind-bogglingly brutal Saddam Hussein had trouble handling the tribes of Iraq.” In other words, while Americans have regional allegiances and often identify with a particular state, these in no way resemble Arab allegiances. An Arab is first a member of his family, then his clan, then his tribe, then his sect. For most Iraqis, allegiance to a remote, central government is a distant fifth.

Furthermore, the Iraqi people are increasingly in favor of partitioning. An ABC News survey revealed that 59 percent of the Shia believed Iraq should be partitioned and 73 percent believe they will be partitioned. Nationwide, 57 percent say Iraq will be partitioned. In the constitution ratified in August 2005, 78 percent voted in favor of an autonomous Kurdish region and the creation of other similar regions. These polling and electoral data suggest that Iraqi elections have not been an exercise in democracy, but rather examples of sectarian politics.

This is not to say there are no fervent Iraqi nationalists. There are. The issue is, “Are there enough of them and are they powerful enough to overcome the countervailing forces?” The evidence suggests not.

Obviously, the U.S. could not dictate a soft partitioning of Iraq by fiat. The Iraqis would have to embrace the idea as well. But rather than allowing partitioning to occur through ethnic cleansing or leaving the Iraqis alone to feel their way, we need to encourage and support them in the process. Let me explain how.

**Implementing policies.** First of all, it’s important to understand that partitioning is already taking place without our assistance. The Kurds have enjoyed autonomy for years. Sunnis and Shiites have been purging each other from their respective villages, towns, and regions since the ouster of Saddam.

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...partitioning is already taking place without our assistance.

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Of the estimated 100,000 Iraqis who flee their homes every month, most seek refuge in areas where they are the ethnic majority, or outside the borders of Iraq. This growing segregation has produced increasing security and a decline in sectarian murders. In other words, the worst of the ethnic cleansing may be over as de facto partitioning is occurring.

Furthermore, U.S. forces are already assisting in partitioning Baghdad. As part of the operational plan, the surge divided Sunni from Shia neighborhoods, producing the urban Arab version of gated communities. U.S. military are also helping internally displaced families occupy previously vacated homes and helping them swap homes. As one reporter noted, “Iraq’s mixed neighborhoods are sliding toward extinction.”

A key requirement for soft partitioning is to establish local and regional governments. In part, this is also happening spontaneously as self-rule by tribal sheiks and local clerics is emerging from the vacuum produced by the weak and inept central government.

To formalize it, soft partitioning would require negotiations with the existing Iraqi administration, a new constitutional framework, and buy-in by regional neighbors. This means that a diplomatic effort, supported or even led by the international community, including the United Nations, must be launched. The scope of that diplomatic effort must match the energy and focus of our military initiatives.

Syria and Jordan are likely to support any move to restore order in Iraq. As stability is established, the 2 million refugees in those countries will be able to return home.

To facilitate soft-partitioning, the U.S. would also have to assist minorities who want to move to areas where they feel more secure. Clearly this would have to be a voluntary program. Some might argue
that it’s unethical to facilitate mass relocations. However, insisting that people remain in danger to bolster a central government lacking popular support is far worse.

As part of the partitioning process, we would continue to work with sheiks and their tribes to improve local security. Security would be followed by improvements in jobs; services such as water, electricity, and phones; and infrastructure including roads, bridges, schools, and sewage treatment.

We have a pretty good model for how a federal system in Iraq might work. It’s our own country. The U.S. began as a collection of semi-autonomous states with a weak central government. Ultimately, differences in culture between the states were so great that in 1861 they went to war, much as the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds have fought each other. Following the Civil War, the process of reconciliation took generations, during which time the United States became increasingly cohesive with a centralized government growing steadily stronger.

A three-state federalized system in Iraq could work much the same way. Over time, perhaps generations, the three ethnic groups in Iraq may be able to resolve their differences and evolve a stronger central government.

Summary

In summary, while significant mistakes have been made in the planning and conduct of this war, the American people and the U.S. military can be proud of their effort. We overthrew a savage dictator who ravaged the country for decades. And we have expended enormous sums of money and blood to bring freedom to a foreign nation. But, in the end, the majority of the Iraqis have shown that they prefer theocracy to democracy, tribal domination to tolerance, and revenge to forgiveness.

A partitioned Iraq with three semi-autonomous regions and a weak central government was not our original goal in Iraq. But it’s now the best possible outcome. It’s a feasible alternative to the other two solutions being advanced in Washington—stay the course while policing a sectarian war, or precipitous withdrawal with consequent chaos. Soft partitioning offers the possibility, not a guarantee, of stability upon the drawdown and eventual departure of U.S. forces. It will not be easy. But unlike our original goal, it appears to be achievable—a viable way to restore a modicum of stability to Iraq. Clearly such an outcome is superior to the murderous dictator we overthrew, superior to an occupation with no seeming end in sight, and superior to the mayhem that would ensue if we summarily abandoned Iraq. **MR**


REDEFINING INSURGENCY

Lieutenant Colonel Chris North, U.S. Army, Retired

“OH, NO! Not another suggestion on how to define insurgency! Now we’ll have to change all our counterinsurgency doctrine as well!”

Yes and no. Yes, “insurgency” needs a better definition to fit circumstances today. We say the word, but it no longer applies in most areas. But, no, “counterinsurgency” and counterinsurgency doctrine may not require change—if we get the “insurgency” definition right.

The current Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 definition of insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” is too narrow in scope to apply to current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, we continue to label those conflicts as insurgencies, even though the environments are more complex than what this simple definition involves.

The current JP definition worked well in the late 20th century, when anti-colonial and communist movements were competing with sitting governments for political power. Today, however, it is hard to identify such an organized movement; there are not only movements, but extremists, tribes, gangs, militias, warlords, and combinations of these. These groups are certainly not “an organized movement.” They have different motivations and objectives. Some are networked with only loose objectives and mission-type orders to enhance their survival. Most are divided and factionalized by area, composition, or goals. Strike one against the current definition of insurgency.

It is not relevant to the enemies we face today. Many of these enemies do not currently seek the overthrow of a constituted government. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, weak government control is useful and perhaps essential for many of these “enemies of the state” to survive and operate. In some cases, the enemies are members of government political parties and alliances. In most cases, they have infiltrated government security forces. In other cases, these enemies do not seek to replace the constituted government. Merely destroying it or rendering it ineffective will serve their purpose. Most enemy actors do not have a countrywide power base. Their purpose may be to promote civil war, anarchy, and a resulting division of the spoils. Strike two against the current definition.

Clearly, there remains a strong case for better defining current conflicts. We should borrow from Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3’s definition of irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and/or influence over the relevant populations.”

The Army should make this the new definition of insurgency. It is a great description of current conflicts and broad enough to encompass aspects of the current conflict that the current JP definition of insurgency does not.
The Combined Arms Center is now drafting the “Joint Counterinsurgency Manual.” A great improvement would be to redefine “insurgency” using the U.S. Air Force definition of “irregular warfare.” Another option is to keep the definition of insurgency the same but slightly modify the definition of “counterinsurgency” to read “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken [by a government] to combat irregular warfare and promote stability operations.” Either way, two major benefits would accrue. We would have a better, more inclusive definition of current and relevant conflicts, and we would not have to change counterinsurgency doctrine.

Apologies to Pogo, but we have met the “insurgency”—and it is us. We propose to overthrow the constituted definition of “insurgency” using common sense and telling it like it is. Let’s pitch that third strike and start a new inning for better defining conflict in this decade. MR

A Question of Trees

If a tree in the forest falls, do the other trees in the forest care?

30 JUN 07

And back in the States? Paris Hilton. The beat goes on....

If a man gives his life in the service of his country, do his countrymen care?

And perhaps more importantly, what does it mean if they do not?

And now, tonight, more bad news. Another tree has fallen.

Here, too, the beat goes on....

—Major Mike Matthews, U.S. Army Special Forces
The Quiet American, The Ugly American
Counterinsurgency from the Fifties

In a recent speech highlighting what might happen if the U.S. should withdraw quickly from Iraq, President George W. Bush alluded to Graham Greene’s Vietnam-era novel The Quiet American (William Heineman, London). Greene’s book is arguably the yin to the yang of William Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s The Ugly American (Fawcett Crest, New York) in the American counterinsurgency (COIN) Tao. Much noticed at the time they were published (1955 and 1958 respectively), both novels deserve to be reread for the two diametrically opposed views they offer of the role the U.S. should play in confronting insurgency abroad.

Obviously, the context of insurgency then and now is different. When these novels first arrived on bookstands, the optimism America felt at the end of World War II had evaporated. The U.S. and its former allies, fresh from a near-pyrrhic victory over fascism, immediately split into bi-polar, mutually antagonistic democratic and Communist blocs. Almost immediately, the world was back on the brink of war, and a nuclear one at that. Empires were breaking up, too. France and the U.K., exhausted by World War II, either gave up their colonies or fought losing struggles against nationalist insurgencies. These transitions created battlegrounds for the new war between democracy and communism. Like President Bush would do 40 years later in calling for a global war against Islamic terrorism, President John F. Kennedy declared Communism a direct threat to U.S. interests in Asia, Europe, Cuba, and South America—an assessment that is even now understandable.

Both The Ugly American and The Quiet American consider how and whether the U.S. should confront communism in Vietnam, or anywhere else for that matter. The Ugly American is not really a novel at all, but a series of vignettes designed to show how the U.S. might fail in Vietnam and what it might do that could work. Lederer and Burdick believed the U.S. could defeat communist insurgents and should attempt to do so. In their view, success would come if the U.S. followed the lead of pioneers in counterinsurgency. Greene, however, turned a jaundiced eye on America’s effort in Vietnam, observing that U.S. COIN practitioners were boorish and clumsy and meddled unnecessarily in the host country’s affairs. The book’s obvious parallels with the initial U.S. stumbling in Iraq, coupled with Greene’s overt hostility toward the U.S. and its government minions, may account for why it has been recently republished.

Greene’s chief protagonists are a burned-out, alcoholic British reporter named Fowler and a dangerously naïve American named Alden Pyle. Fowler, bitter with loss and yet convinced of his inherent superiority, reeks of the decaying British Empire. Pyle, clearly an Ivy League product, is well heeled and well educated, but ignorant and hopelessly foolish. For Greene, Pyle is post-war America, stupefied by power and righteousness—and therefore dangerous. There are more metaphors, all as obvious and heavy-handed, perhaps none more so than the love interest, Phuong, a sexually exploited beauty whose name means “phoenix” in Vietnamese. But as Fowler observes, “Nothing nowadays is fabulous, and nothing rises from its ashes.”

Both Lederer-Burdick and Greene may have modeled their protagonists on Edward Geary Lansdale, an advertising and marketing specialist who joined the Air Corps in World War II and was an early recruit to the OSS. Lansdale epitomized the good and the bad in American COIN efforts. On one hand, he applied his considerable talent in marketing and advertising to support Ramon Magsaysay’s successful effort against the Huk insurgency in the Philippines; on the other, he played a part in some of the more dubious behind-the-scenes machinations in Vietnam and Cuba. Many, however, perceived Lansdale to be the best COIN warrior of the Cold War, either in or out of uniform. Greene denied he modeled Pyle on Lansdale—Lansdale didn’t enter Vietnam until 1954 and Greene finished The Quiet American in 1952—but the idea that he did has stuck. Lederer and Burdick, however, clearly had Lansdale in mind.

Two biographers, Cecil B. Currey (Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American, 1988) and Jonathan Nashel (Edward Lansdale’s Cold War, 2005) have examined Lansdale’s life as a Cold War operative. Currey found Lansdale to have been an admirable if flawed man. Nashel, who links his subject to Alden Pyle, finds Greene’s depiction of “a destructive do-gooder abroad” to be “so accurate and powerful in exposing America’s self-deluded mission”—and thus Lansdale’s—“that it shadowed Lansdale for the rest of his life.” In short, Nashel, like Greene, cannot imagine a role for the U.S. in any counterinsurgency. In his epilogue, Nashel asserts that the many ills plaguing Vietnam today have more to do with the lingering effects of massive U.S. destruction than bad decisions made by Vietnam’s leaders. He also argues (convincingly) that Lansdale was a “Cold War liberal”—a predecessor...
to Bush’s neoconservative interventionists—who believed America had a special mission to spread its democracy and market economies throughout the world. Nashel’s characterization doesn’t seem to be too far off the mark.

So what might we learn about COIN from rereading Greene’s and Lederer-Burdick’s novels in 2007? Conditions today are far different than they were 50 years ago, but the threat posed by Islamic fascism is as daunting as communism’s ever was. In confronting this threat, the U.S. will likely have to support COIN operations in foreign countries while fighting a battle of ideas internationally; in other words, it will have to wield both military and soft power judiciously, and with nuance. Above all, it must not be as clumsy and naïve as Alden Pyle.

A character in The Ugly American says, “You don’t know the power of an idea.” This is perhaps Lederer-Burdick’s main lesson for our current COIN situation. As Lansdale himself said, “Those who would wage counterinsurgency must be able to address both the idea and the narrative of the insurgent.” There is much more to confronting insurgency than winning tactical engagements. To be successful, the counterinsurgent must understand the insurgency he is facing. Like Homer Atkins, a U.S. field engineer in The Ugly American, the successful counterinsurgent must also bend his back alongside the people his country wishes to help. Counterinsurgency cannot be fought from afar, as Lansdale noted on the last page of his 1972 autobiography, In the Midst of War: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia. “The poorest view of an insurgency,” he opined, “is from an office desk.” I would argue that he may be right, but that we can at least prepare ourselves for what we must do by reading and studying back here, before we go, thoughtful and relevant works on the difficulties of COIN and nation-building abroad.

Colonel Gregory Fontenot, USA, Retired, served as chief of the Commander’s Planning Group, TRADOC; Director of SAMS; and Commander, BCTP. He is currently director of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
and gripping account of front-line Soldiers on the “sharp end” of the war in Iraq. The book is intensely recommended.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Where do terrorists get their money? Have we done all we can in the global War on Terrorism to deny our enemies’ financial solvency and the ability to maneuver? What role does the U.S. military play in counterterrorism financing? These are questions prompted by *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, a collection of essays first presented as papers at a 2004 conference at the Naval Postgraduate School. The book attempts, in the editors’ words, a “comprehensive assessment of the state of our knowledge about the nature of terrorism financing, the evolution of terrorist strategies and government responses, and the effectiveness of both.” Unfortunately, none of the essays directly addresses the large-scale sectarian insurgencies that confront the military today in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book does, however, plumb the murky financial infrastructures and processes of such terrorist organizations as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Herein lies the book’s value.

Terrorism Financing and State Responses is not a manual for teaching Soldiers in the field how to target enemy financial lines of support, although it does provide terms, concepts, and historical examples for those interested in such a potentially useful activity. Editors Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas are both associated with the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. Contributors include terrorism, criminal finance, and foreign policy experts affiliated with think tanks located in both academia and the government. The first five essays constitute an overview labeled “The Nature of the Problem and the Response.” The last 11 essays are case studies of specific efforts to attack regional and ideologically based terrorist finance networks. Giraldo and Trinkunas provide introductory and concluding essays that define broad themes and offer cautious recommendations.

Essays on Islamic terrorist finances downplay crime and state sponsorship as sources of operational funds and debunk the idea that ideologically driven terrorists operate without financial constraints. They suggest that personal vices and limitations sometimes degrade the terrorist’s religious idealism.

Several authors describe the flow of money into terrorist hands through the channels of *ha’alwa* (informal money transfer networks) and *zakat* (charitable giving practices prescribed by the Qur’an). Because *ha’alwa* and *zakat* practices are virtually unmonitored by state and international agencies, they enable the relatively easy movement of money from law-abiding citizens to violent extremists. Suppressing such unregulated money movement is difficult. Several authors recommend allowing the networks to survive, but putting them under close observation in order to gain information about key players, processes, and planned attacks. As one contributor writes, observation and analysis of *ha’alwa* and *zakat* networks can “illuminate and crystallize what had hitherto been uncertain.” The suggestion is that terrorist financial operations are untapped sources of intelligence and areas of vulnerability that organizations at many levels might exploit.

**LTC Peter Molin, USA, West Point, New York**


“Since the end of the Cold War, failed or failing states and ungoverned territories within otherwise viable states have become a more common international phenomenon. The collapse or absence of state authority produced many of the crises that have required intervention by U.S. or international forces. These ungoverned territories generate all manner of security problems, such as civil conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drug smuggling, piracy, and refugee flows.”

Such is the world that we live in, according to the authors of Ungoverned Territories, a RAND study commissioned by the U.S. Air Force to explain “the conditions that give rise to ungoverned territories and their effects on U.S. security interests” and to develop “strategies to allow the U.S. to mitigate the effects—specifically to reduce the threat posed by terrorists operating from these territories.”

Ungoverned territories are “areas in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control.” The book covers eight such areas: the Pakistani-Afghan border, Arabian Peninsula, Sulawesi-Mindanao arc, East African corridor, West Africa, North Caucasus, the Colombia-Venezuela border, and the Guatemala-Chiapas border. In most of these territories, fundamentalist Muslims want to establish a caliphate. A secondary issue is drugs. If left unchecked, the combination of militant religious extremism and drugs will destroy our way of life.

The first five chapters analyze the areas and how they affect U.S. interests. The authors evaluate “indicators of ungovernability” and “indicators of conduciveness to terrorist presence,” give them scores, and then evaluate the scores. They finish by recommending actions to defeat or mitigate the problems they describe.

So why is the book relevant? The areas it examines affect the U.S. in general and they are, or will be, battlefields for the U.S. military in the future. Each of the services can draw its own conclusions on how to counteract the problems identified in the eight territories.

Utilizing their military, academic, and defense-industry experience, Alan Stephens and Nicola Baker provide a concise but insightful overview of how past and present wars have been waged. In the process, they introduce the reader to emerging theory and strategy and to concepts in political-military thought that have endured for the past 2,500 years. This carefully crafted and well-researched book draws on Clausewitz, Jomini, Machiavelli, and Sun Tzu and uses relevant historical events as examples. The authors skillfully articulate military concepts while linking the levels of war and ends, ways, and means to the national instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) and grand strategy.

The book’s breadth far exceeds its depth, which limits its utility for the military professional who has other reading material at his disposal. I was particularly disappointed in the superficial treatment of “War in the 21st Century,” the book’s short (13 pages) last chapter. Overall, however, Making Sense of War would be an excellent text for an undergraduate or even graduate course on the military as political instrument, or for the military novice interested in a thoughtful, “wave-top” understanding of military strategy and its implications.

LTC David A. Anderson, USMC, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Of all the books written on the war in Iraq this year, The End of Iraq is one of the few to actually chart a way ahead for what is arguably the world’s most prominent failing state. A former ambassador with nation-building experience, Peter Galbraith concludes his landmark study of a nation on the edge of collapse with a definitive solution: separate Iraq into ethnically centric, semi-autonomous regions governed by a central, broad-based confederation.

According to Galbraith, our efforts to hold the Iraqi state together by force are themselves destabilizing. Our policies in Iraq fail to acknowledge a national history rife with massive armies, repressive governments, internal genocide, and unrequited aggression throughout the region. America’s efforts to unify a fundamentally fractured society have merely served to spawn an insurgent training ground and a Shi’ite theocracy. The only solution, in the author’s opinion, is partition: partition brought stability to Kurdistan, partition will ease sectarian violence, and partition will allow the majority of coalition forces to withdraw having succeeded in their mission. Partitioning the country will also allow the force to focus military strength appropriately, and it will increase the options available to address other threats in the region. The alternative is a prolonged and potentially disastrous presence in an attempt to preserve a society that has no vested interest in unity.

Before presenting this conclusion, however, Galbraith provides the reader with a superb analysis of political, cultural, and ethnic conflict in the region. He then describes a U.S. national policy and strategy “undone by arrogance, ignorance, and political cowardice.” The result, according to the author, is what we see today: insurgency, civil war, Iranian strategic triumph, the implosion of Iraq, an independent Kurdistan, and a deepening military quagmire.

Iraq is now the first Shi’ite-ruled Arab state, the heart of a Shi’a crescent that spans from southeastern Iran to the gulf coast of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain—and rests atop the most strategically vital oil reserves in the world today.

Galbraith places the blame for this reshaping of the Middle East firmly on the shoulders of the Bush administration and its myopic, misguided neoconservative mentors. He describes the strategic failure in Iraq as the “outcome of a disorganized policy-making process where ideology counted for more than analysis and where a speechwriter had more influence than the secretary of state did.” By failing to set effective policy and strategy for post-conflict Iraq, the administration created the environment of chaos that breeds the very terrorists we went to war to stop.

For military readers, The End of Iraq offers a stark reminder that even the best military strategy cannot overcome inherently flawed policy. National policy and strategy inform and guide the development of strategic objectives and military strategy; in the absence of a clear, focused, and feasible policy, success is virtually unrealizable. Readers of political, social, or cultural history will find Galbraith’s work a crisp, concise, and well-written study with rich analysis and insightful conclusions. His understanding and experience are evident on every page, and his observations, like his conclusions, are well informed and critically sound. Although The End of Iraq does not present the level of detail found in Cobra II, Hubris, or State of Denial, it emerges with a superior utility, providing meaningful answers offered by no other author.

Arguably the definitive analysis of the war in Iraq produced to date, Galbraith’s book will be a worthwhile addition to any military or civilian library.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TAKE DOWN: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad, Jim Lacey,

According to author Jim Lacey, “What the soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division collectively accomplished [during Operation Iraqi Freedom] should be ranked as one of the greatest military achievements of all time,” and his combat narrative, Take Down, sets out to prove his point. Lacey convincingly demonstrates that, far from achieving easy victories against a poorly trained, overmatched enemy, the 3d ID had a difficult time fighting and defeating fanatical and even suicidal Iraqi forces.

The book relies on interviews, after-action reports, and many first-person accounts to describe the complex fighting. Despite overwhelming U.S. intelligence capabilities, not all went smoothly and according to plan during many of the battles, which came as a surprise to the U.S. forces involved. The division’s units did not expect to fight much until they reached the Republican Guard, and they never expected resistance all along the line of advance. In the end, Lacey concludes that 3ID succeeded by simply outfighting the Iraqis.

Lacey also provides a detailed look at the battle from Iraq’s perspective, shedding light on the reasons behind Iraqi plans, the effects of operations on Iraqi forces, and the actions of Iraqi commanders.

Take Down shows how a well-trained division overcomes numerous obstacles and adjusts to changing conditions to defeat a fanatical enemy in close combat. An easy-to-read story of leadership, battle command, ingenuity, and determination, it provides excellent descriptions of the fighting in the words of the participants. I highly recommend it to all readers.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Former intelligence analyst John Schindler has written the book about the Bosnian war that other analysts only talked about writing. Schindler’s detailed exposé recounts the tragedy of the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and highlights its links with the world of terrorism.

Many analysts were frustrated by a perceived anti-Serb bias in the upper ranks of President Bill Clinton’s administration. From my vantage point, I could see the disparity between the reporting being sent to U.S. leaders and how they described the war to the American public. Even when situations were murky at best, they would often point at the Serbs to keep the story simple. In fairness to Richard Holbrooke and others, keeping the narrative simple helped to maintain an interest in the subject, which was a peripheral concern for most Americans. Still, analysts often remarked that there were few good people among the parties involved and plenty of blood on everyone’s hands.

Unholy Terror challenges those who support the idea that Bosniacs were only innocent victims of religious hatred stirred by Slobodan Milosevic. Schindler describes the beliefs and actions of SDA leader Alija Izetbegovic, beginning with Izetbegovic’s membership in the Young Muslims. When Izetbegovic declared Bosnian independence in 1992, he was a gambler desperate for support. He dredged the depths to find Al-Qaeda, Iran, and Saudi extremists willing to help with arms, funding, and mujahideen fighters. These beginnings have left a residue of extremism in Bosnia and Bosnian threads to terrorist activities around the world.

Schindler is at times heavy-handed, writing in the style of a prosecutor from the Rush Limbaugh school of conservatism, calling witness after witness to make his case against Izetbegovic, “Clintonistas,” and the liberal media. In contrast, Richard Holbrooke, General Wesley Clark, and David Halberstam downplayed Islamic support in their books. However, Holbrooke, demonstrating his awareness, ensured the Dayton Accords stipulated that freedom fighters and volunteers should be withdrawn from Bosnia because he was aware of this external threat.

Schindler does acknowledge that Bosniacs are generally secular and other Muslims consider them lax in their faith. Xavier Bougarel, a leading expert Schindler cites, comments it would be unjustified and dangerous to present Balkan Islam and its current evolutions as a threat to Europe. So although this book offers a significant contribution to an underdeveloped perspective in the West concerning Bosniacs, it is too one-sided to stand alone.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


They have made war till we were dead from weeping.
—The goddess Iris to Helen, The Iliad

In Behind the Lines: War Resistance Poetry on the American Homefront since 1941, English professor and poet Philip Metres discusses how war-resistance poetry on America’s home front in wartime made the moral ambiguities of war and its detrimental effects historically discernible. Metres rightly credits the contributions of both the American Soldier-poet (as first-person witness) and the poetry of war’s other tragic victims, including all “who live at the end of the missile trajectory.”

Why is war-resistance poetry relevant? Situated in what has been known loosely as the peace movement, it contributes to society’s broader pattern of literary and journalistic expression, deconstructing the official narrative of our wartime presidential administrations to offer a “collective subjectivity other than the nation-state” with its state-sanctioned patriotic lyric. Moreover, “No other literary genre has been as conducive to a performative, immediate, and often homespun symbolic” medium. It thus becomes poetry not only of published anthologies, but of
the street and the subway as well. Metres clarifies how the poetry of the past is useful as “a vital resource for social change.”

In Part I, Metres covers the wartime internment and poetic activities of major American poets Robert Lowell, William Stafford, and William Everson—all conscientious objectors during World War II. These men used their poetry to extend ethical and artistic principles of the suffering individual and give voice and expression beyond dissent as they worked out their resistance to war “in their own idiosyncratic ways.”

The focus of Part II is the Vietnam War era, and Metres redresses the belief that antiwar poetry produced during that era was somehow unmemorable. On the contrary, he writes, it confronted “the increasingly technological and bureaucratic formation of modern war itself.” Poetry readings made concrete the abstract and bureaucratic language of the U.S. Government and military.

Part III opens with the Gulf War. Of special interest to current readers is Metres’ discussion of book-length poems on the Gulf War, especially Barrett Watten’s odd but telling work, Bad History. Separate chapters on the war-resistance contributions of poets Denise Levertov (1923-1997) and June Jordan (1936-2002) enhance Metres’ thesis, arcing the timeline between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. Today’s readers will take special note of Metres’ study of the post-9/11 poetry of grief and conspiracy, writing that continues apace today. In 2003 alone, the Iraq war saw the publication of four war-resistance anthologies. Organizations such as Poets Against the War were born, giving common Americans a venue for war resistance.

To be most effective, war-resistance poems should be joined, when and where possible, with “placard writing, media press releases, writing to government officials, and song writing,” along with various modes of theatrical expressions. War-resistance poetry is, above all, a populist movement. For the current reviewer, its most vital purpose is to render “the poem as an instant memorial against the hegemonic version of a clean war.”

Metres culled hundreds of sources and includes excerpts of dozens of poems to illustrate that war-resistance poetry serves American society by producing “counter narratives, images, and linguistic play in ways that create afterimages as powerful as the photographs that alter public opinion” about the morality of war. Metres does not encourage uncritical acceptance of all such poetry, for some of it “seems too often shrill and veers into a circular address.” In the end, he goes beyond giving us a chronology and description of America’s war-resistance poetry: he offers an incisive cultural critique. I highly recommend his book to those interested in poetry and to students of literary and sociological studies of war and peace.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Retired, Ramstein, Germany


Only weeks after 9/11, Brandon Friedman, a rifle platoon leader and a heavy weapons company executive officer with the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division, deployed first to Pakistan, then Afghanistan, where he engaged Al-Qaeda fighters. Later, he found himself in Iraq fighting Al-Qaeda foot soldiers.

A Louisiana State University graduate with a degree in history, Friedman was a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. His tragically compelling memoirs of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002 and the invasion of Iraq and subsequent insurgency in 2003 begin as a quest for glory. However, he proceeds to give an honest account of his combat experiences, specifically the terrors and disillusionment of war as the insurgency in Iraq continues to mount. Combat, Friedman finds, falls far short of the fantasies he had deployed with. This is a “coming-of–age” book, a lieutenant’s transition from having illusions about war to genuine knowledge. He writes: “Man, I spent over two years dealing with those fucking wars, and I never saw any real combat—not the way I always envisioned it as a kid at least.” His work is fresh, angry, cynical, and riveting.

Before his departure from Iraq, Friedman’s valor emerges under fire. His raw, honest account of his fears, lack of knowledge, and his mental road to recovery brings laughter and tears to the reader. The Army’s doctrinal manual, FM 6-22, Leadership, defines personal courage as “overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing one’s duty.” Friedman’s story personifies personal courage. The “war he always wanted” sends him home from the front lines to begin a struggle for recovery.

This book will particularly appeal to those experiencing post-traumatic stress, offering encouragement and consolation. No matter what one believes about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this work is something any veteran can relate to and learn from. “The idea that war changes people is cliché, but it’s true. Going into it, I always thought I’d be above that—immune to it, too well trained for it to affect me, too professional. I thought we were beyond all that Vietnam/post traumatic stress shit. But now I’m in on it. I have been enlightened.”

This book is highly educational for all who have not experienced combat. Soldiers have to come to terms with their experiences; once they do, they are, in Friedman’s words, “enlightened.” In short, this book is pretty darn good and well worth the read.

LTC Michelle Miller, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Rising Tide is the first of three historical novels Jeff Shaara intends to write about the North African and European campaigns of
World War II. As both a novel and a history, the book is a compromise, and as with most compromises, it ends with acceptable but not memorable results. The history is superficial, and the novel does little to develop characters of interest. Shaara advances the story by focusing on his primary characters, some of them famous and others composites of several soldiers. Generals Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and Erwin Rommel represent the former, and Private Jack Logan and Sergeant Jesse Adams the latter.

Quite heavy-handed at times, Shaara never misses a chance to mention General Bernard Montgomery’s tendency to be hesitant and cautious. Since Shaara tells much of the story through Patton’s experiences, there is no shortage of commentary regarding Montgomery’s timidity, but the author piles on by having Rommel make the same observations regarding “Monty’s” lack of audacity.

There are some strengths to the book. Shaara makes the point that Rommel would have won his North African campaign had he received the ammunition and gasoline he requested, suggesting that what a commander wants to do and what he can do are limited by fuel, ammunition, and equipment, an obvious point often forgotten by armchair generals.

Like Wikipedia, *The Rising Tide* is a decent place to start, but not a good place to finish. Someone who knows almost nothing about the early stages of World War II might find the book adequate as an overview of significant events. A person who likes fiction will likely find the book’s thin character development frustrating.

The most exciting sections of the book are the chapters detailing the battles fought by Logan and Adams, but the people involved seem like strangers. Shaara spends so little time introducing the reader to members of Logan’s team that the death of a tank crewmember seems more like the death of a stranger than that of a friend. A good novel should lead one to lament the loss of a character, but this does not happen here. It is possible that Shaara is making some sort of statement about the anonymity of death in combat, but if so, he has certainly been discreet about it.

**LTC James E. Varner, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


The key to H. Michael Gelfand’s book on the U.S. Naval Academy lies in the double entendre in the book’s title, not in its misleading subtitle. The work is not a history of Annapolis over the past half-century, but rather focuses on just a handful of key social transitions within the Brigade of Midshipmen. Gelfand argues that the Academy, while steeped in tradition and convention, has acted as an institution of social progress through its integration of racial minorities, enrollment of women, and elimination of mandatory religious service.

Using a wealth of sources, including several hundred oral histories, this study chronicles the cultural transitions’ highs—the successes of recruiting African-American candidates and eliminating mandatory chapel services—and the lows—the awkward integration of female midshipmen. Gelfand also compiles a unique “catch-all” chapter on such facets of Academy culture as the honor code, student pranks, and instances of midshipmen engaging in liberal social protests—all of them tied to the volatile social changes occurring beyond the Academy walls.

While Gelfand connects the changes in Annapolis to the broader social movements in America (civil rights, women’s rights), his argument might be better served within cultural contexts closer to the Academy such as the armed forces or the nation’s university system. Juxtaposing Annapolis’s transitions with those of broader American society may be a bridge too far. To be sure, a more inclusive admissions policy and elimination of compulsory church attendance can be identified as “progressive,” given the rigid traditionalism of the Academy, yet they were implemented under political duress and decades after they occurred in the broader military and in other colleges. In actuality, they might represent institutional backwardness rather than enlightenment. However, this book provides a much-needed study of how the values of the federal service academies compare to those of broader American society and the obstacles that potentially separate them from national, social, and ethical mores.

**Bradford A. Wineman, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


When studying the struggle between the Soviets and the Germans on the Eastern Front, it is all too easy to get lost in the titanic size and scope of the conflict. Personal and individual experiences of the war tend to be lost in the sweep of fronts and army groups. In the Soviet case, this submersion of first-hand accounts has been exacerbated by language barriers, state censorship, and Cold War tensions. Fortunately, two recently translated Soviet memoirs, **800 Days on the Eastern Front** and **Red Partisan**, help to fill in some of the gaps in our understanding of the Russian experience in the Great Patriotic War.

In **800 Days**, Nikolai Litvin chronicles his service as an antitank gun crewman, machine gunner, and commander’s jeep driver in such crucial clashes as the Battle of Kursk, Operation Bagration, and the capture of the German fortress city of Stettin. Litvin’s lively narrative offers a fascinating window into the life of the common Soviet soldier, and his honesty and eye for detail make the book a quick and
captivating read. His description of his service in a penal battalion after being convicted for failing to obtain a proper written order before transferring himself to a new unit is one of the more interesting parts of the work. The Soviets established penal battalions to punish soldiers who were guilty of crimes or offenses against military order and discipline. These units were assigned the deadliest missions, and the Red Army expected wrongdoers like Litvin to “redeem” their honor and status by blood sacrifice or conspicuous bravery on the battlefield. Given the high casualties in these units, Litvin’s account is indeed rare and enlightening.

Equally rare are English-language narratives of Soviet partisans. In Red Partisan, Nikolai I. Obryn’ba recounts his fighting during the chaotic first months of the war, his time as a prisoner of the Germans, and his eventual escape and ensuing service with a band of Soviet guerrillas. A student at the Moscow Arts Institute when the war started in June 1941, Obryn’ba volunteered for military duty only to be captured by the Germans shortly after he reached the front. In captivity, Obryn’ba’s artistic skills proved to be the key to his survival. He painted portraits of his jailors to gain extra food, better shelter, and medical care. His descriptions of life in a German POW camp offer unique insights into a little-discussed aspect of the Eastern Front.

Obryn’ba’s account of fighting with the partisans comprises the most thought-provoking part of the book. His depiction of the realities of the partisan war—the no-quarters aspects of the combat, the efforts to gain and maintain the support of the local population, and the use of terror by both sides to further their political and military goals—offer current military leaders a provocative historical perspective on the nature of insurgencies. Unfortunately, Obryn’ba chose to end his narrative in October of 1943. Because the Soviet state doubted the political reliability of returning POWs and all too often sent them to labor camps, it would have been interesting to know how well Obryn’ba fared in the postwar Soviet Union. Litvin spent four years in the Gulag after the war for possessing a captured German pistol. Was Obryn’ba also incarcerated?

Neither Litvin nor Obryn’ba shrinks from showing their readers the brutality of war on the Eastern Front. Both men freely admit to having shot prisoners and observed or participated in brutal acts against civilians. They remind us that while war can bring out such admirable traits as resourcefulness, courage, and selfless sacrifice, it can also lead good, honorable, and ordinary men to explore the darker recesses of the human soul. As events at Abu Ghraib and Haditha demonstrate, this reality of war transcends time, place, and nationality. Anyone interested in World War II on the Eastern Front or in the human dynamics of warfare should read these books.

LTC Richard S. Faulkner, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Oh, to be fourteen again! This book is about being a fourteen-year-old male in urban combat in Hungary during fall and winter. It is about fighting against overwhelming odds and about being sick, wounded, dirty, and a reluctant virgin. Many combat memoirs of World War II were written by ordinary people with much the same tale to tell, but Boy Soldier is a unique and extraordinary story.

Ervin Galántay was a junior cadet in the aristocratic Royal Hungarian Army’s military school in Kőzeg in October 1944 when the Red Army advanced on Budapest. The adolescent Ervin kept a detailed diary that survived the war and the Soviet occupation. Today’s Ervin has recreated that diary backed by vivid memories and knowledge of the bigger political and military situation that the boy only vaguely comprehended. Galántay has written not just a personal history but also a history of the Vannay Battalion—a pick-up force of Hungarian patriots and off-the-street conscripts. Ervin was the battalion runner and translator, a position appropriate to a boy with a remarkable command of German. Thirsting for glory and fame, he found comradeship and endured hardship in a partially trained but well-led unit that doggedly fought and refought the Red Army over the same piece of ground—but was eventually destroyed.

The 102-day battle of Budapest is not that well known to American readers. The German and Hungarian resistance to the Red Army advance is not studied like the other great city battles of World War II—Aachen, Berlin, Eindhoven, Leningrad, Manila, and Stalingrad. Yet, Budapest was a remarkable contest that decided the fate of the countries on the Danube for the next five decades. The book provides a look into certain aspects of a major urban fight: the care of the trapped civilian population; the collapse of social and city services with resultant disease and starvation; the recruitment and training of irregular forces and militias; the coordination and cooperation problems between irregular forces and foreign military forces; the control of movement and supplies within a beleaguered city; the tactics of urban combat; and the attempt to maintain normalcy in the midst of chaos and carnage. It is the story of a boy, his family, his battalion, and his city at war. This second edition has benefitted by the addition of many photographs and maps as well as some additions and corrections to the original text.

For those studying urban combat and the human condition in war, Boy Soldier is a good introduction. For those studying the history of World War II, it is a welcome addition to the collection of histories of the Battle for Budapest.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

This very readable book is a collective biography of three five-star generals identified in the subtitle. It concentrates on World War II, when they jointly acquired those fifteen stars, although it also covers the generals’ prewar backgrounds and postwar careers. 15 Stars mixes portraits of the men and a cast of surrounding characters with discussions of high strategy: the cross-channel invasion into Normandy vs. Mediterranean operations, and the central Pacific pathway towards Japan vs. the New Guinea road through the Philippines. George Marshall comes off the best because he was selfless. According to author Stanley Weintraub, Marshall was virtually a martyr, refusing to ask for his heart-felt desire to command the Northwest Europe Theater. Douglas MacArthur comes off the worst, relentlessly pursuing his personal agenda for military glory. Dwight Eisenhower falls somewhere between these extremes. While praised for being what MacArthur was not, “genial and unpretentious,” Ike spends too much time in luxurious quarters in rear areas and pays too much attention to Kay Summersby, his beautiful chauffeur. One could think that Weintraub also pays too much attention to her (eight lines in his index), if this were not a book on personalities as well as matters of policy.

Truth be told, Weintraub slams a host of Anglo-American figures: Franklin Roosevelt is manipulative; Winston Churchill is duplicitous and stubbornly resentful when his power ebbs vis-à-vis Roosevelt; Alan Brooke, Mark Clark, Bernard Montgomery, and George Patton can seem as self-centered as MacArthur; and Omar Bradley and Courtney Hodges, despite their purported modesty, often don’t come off a great deal better. According to the author, “cronyism, corruption, and incompetence” ran rampant while common Soldiers suffered at the front. One might wonder if the Allies won only because they were a larger force or, bad as they were, the axis was even worse, were there not an alternative explanation: even deeply flawed individuals can make substantial contributions to victory.

Whatever motivated MacArthur, he conducted a brilliant campaign between Buna and Manila, minimizing casualties by bypassing Japanese strongpoints. Weintraub himself, midway through this book, quotes a trenchant observation about MacArthur from two newspapermen who “agreed we had never met a more egotistical man, nor one more aware of his egotism, and more able and determined to back it up with deeds.”

Many general officers and politicians recorded derogatory remarks about associates in their diaries, staff journals, and memoirs, but they were not publically revealing information that could endanger the endeavor to defeat the enemy. They were simply venting frustrations inevitable in a stress-filled war. In the final analysis, the generals proved their worth. The enemy was formidable, but the Allies won the war.

15 Stars also proves its worth as a lively chronicle of the senior leadership that will appeal to a broad base of readers interested in what can drive those holding key positions at key moments in history. Michael Pearlman, Ph.D, Lawrence, Kansas

CIVIL WAR LEADERSHIP AND MEXICAN WAR EXPERIENCE, Kevin Dougherty, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 2007, 193 pages, $50.00.

Kevin Dougherty’s Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience analyzes several of the Civil War’s controversial command decisions by framing them within the Mexican-American War experiences of the men who made them. A balanced work, the book provides brief snapshots of 26 leaders divided evenly between Confederate and Union officers at all levels of command. Along the way, it reprises many well-known anecdotes about the experiences and educations of such officers as Pope, Kearny, Halleck, Beauregard, Bragg, and Armistead, but it does so in stylish, engaging prose.

As a scholarly analysis of command decisions, however, Dougherty’s work is dubious at best. While he provides abundant source citations for his anecdotes, they are almost entirely derived from secondary works that do not cite their own sources. For example, Dougherty relies heavily on Bruce Catton’s popular histories and the Time-Life Civil War series, neither of which cites primary sources. A critic would be perfectly correct in asking why a historian doesn’t go to primary sources when he quotes officers’ observations. It’s not just the scholarship that’s questionable: the book contains some errors and inconsistencies. Dougherty, for instance, incorrectly states that Lincoln placed John Pope in field command of the Army of the Potomac for the second battle of Bull Run (p. 54), and yet in a later chapter correctly designates Pope’s command as the Army of Virginia.

These criticisms, however, pale in comparison to the book’s greatest fault. Dougherty’s central thesis links the Civil War actions of senior commanders with their junior experiences in the Mexican War, and this leaves much open to question. Besides not taking into account other events that may also have helped form the leaders’ Civil War personas, such as the 12 years of interwar experience spent protecting the Overland Routes or attempting to quell sectional bloodlettings in Kansas, Dougherty makes some incredible leaps to conclude that Mexican War events were relevant to Civil War operations. Case in point: he links future Union general Jefferson C. Davis’s witnessing of a confrontation between his Mexican War regimental and brigade commanders to Davis’s shooting of General “Bull” Nelson during Bragg’s 1862 Kentucky invasion. Dougherty produces no source, either primary or secondary, that
speaks to how the junior Davis felt about the Mexican War incident. Given his lack of source material, the connection seems to be merely supposed.

While Civil War Leadership is quite readable and recounts a wide variety of tales in its brief chapters, Dougherty’s work falls a bit flat. Given the book’s hefty price tag of $50 and its failure to provide anything original to the field, serious students of Civil War history would be better served to stick to James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom, Douglas Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants, or Ezra Warner’s biographical contributions in Generals in Gray and Generals in Blue.

Dan C. Fullerton, PhD.,
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