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The current landscape of persistent global conflict characterized by complex decentralized threats requires flexible and agile U.S. forces capable of deploying on short notice to conduct immediate, effective, and sustained operations anywhere in the world. The Army maintains the enduring role of protecting U.S. interests both at home and abroad while also deterring future threats. The Army, the world’s preeminent landpower, guided by creative versatile Soldiers and leaders operating under the umbrella of sound doctrine, boldly accepts this role. Traditionally, Army doctrine endeavored to provide the “how to” approach for conducting operations. Today’s conflicts require a more adaptive and progressive approach to operations rather than the highly predictable Cold War scenarios. With that point in mind, current Army operations doctrine discusses guiding principles while emphasizing “how to think” about operations and thus guide our forces.

The 2008 edition of FM 3-0, though shorter in length than its predecessors, presents the fundamental principles and concepts that guide the direction of Army operations rather than a checklist for success. Significant recent operational experience from the War on Terror, specifically the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, as well as urgent relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina and Rita, necessitated changes in doctrine. The development of this version of FM 3-0 traces back to 2005 with a series of issue papers covering unified action, the design of the war fighting functions, the continuum of operations, and the Army’s operational concept. The collective thoughts poured into and resulting from the issue papers served as a structural foundation for codifying the key concepts of the manual. The FM 3-0 issue papers were staffed to a broad audience of over 200 organizations, media groups, and individual recipients. The major organizations included the Army Staff; Army commands; Army service component commands; Army corps and division headquarters; training divisions; and TRADOC commands and centers, proponents, and staff, as well Air Force, Marine, and Navy doctrine centers. The discussion generated from the issue papers led to a draft of the content summary that served as guide for the overall layout of the themes, concepts, and chapter structure of the field manual.

The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate hosted three action-officer-level councils of colonels in an effort to synthesize and integrate over 4,000 comments from various entities in the field at large across three drafts of the manual to coalesce as much expert knowledge, thought, and current operational experience as possible. The meetings provided a separate forum for
fostering debate, gaining consensus, and resolving critical and major comments from respective reviewing agencies prior to a TRADOC commander-hosted doctrine and concepts conference.

The latest iteration of FM 3-0 is evolutionary in nature, incorporating ideas from new joint doctrine while retaining those valued pieces of Army doctrine that have stood the test of time. However, the doctrine is revolutionary with respect to its impetus and momentum to drive change. FM 3-0 provides purpose and direction to Army transformation and the application of force in complex operational environments. The current edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex era of persistent conflict. The doctrine recognizes that military force alone will not resolve this type of conflict. Dominant landpower, while vital to operations, represents only one element of a broader campaign that requires the application of each element of national power. In line with this realization and reasoning, Army doctrine now elevates stability or civil-support operations to equal importance with offensive and defensive operations.

As learned during operations following the “thunder run” to Baghdad, today’s conflict involves a strong human element with operations conducted in and among the people. Soldiers often face the ethical challenge of engaging the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other even after combat erupts. The current edition of FM 3-0 describes stability operations in terms of tactical tasks applicable at all echelons of Army forces deployed outside the United States.

Civil-support operations are also defined in terms of tactical-level tasks, similar to stability tasks but conducted in the very different operational environment of the United States and its territories. Army forces have a legal and moral obligation to the populace, underscoring the concept that winning battles and engagements is important but stable peace comes from carefully shaping the resulting civil situation. FM 3-0 emphasizes the importance of interagency collaboration and correlates the Army stability tasks to Department of State post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization technical sectors. (See figure 1.)

The Army’s operational concept—full-spectrum operations—requires continuous simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil-support tasks. In the previous version of FM 3-0, Operations, the Army’s operational concept was implied or assumed. But enough has changed in our understanding of the operational environment that it is now incumbent upon us to

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Figure 1. Stability tasks.
explicitly state our operational concept. The operational concept stands at the core of Army doctrine. The operational concept frames how Army forces exercise initiative and embrace prudent risk with a concentrated attention on creating opportunities to achieve decisive results. Commanders achieve decisive results through the effective combination and balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations across the entire width and depth of their area of operations. The concept further emphasizes the role of the commander in operations, bridging battle command and operational art in leveraging experience, knowledge, and intuition.

Full-Spectrum Operations—the Army’s Operational Concept

The emergence of full-spectrum operations drives key changes in capstone doctrine. The Army established full-spectrum operations in FM 3-0 (2001), shifting sharply from an “either-or” view of war and operations other than war to an inclusive doctrine that emphasized the congruity of nonlethal actions with combat actions. In FM 3-0 (2001) stability operations were “other” joint missions stated in an Army context. In recognition of this fact, conducting full-spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil-support operations—is a primary theme of the 2008 manual. Stability and civil-support operations are more than “military operations other than war” as derived from the joint concept that characterized non-combat operations of the past decade. Army forces must understand the potential for combining offensive and defensive tasks while simultaneously addressing the civil situation. The vein of these tasks, stability and civil-support evolved from specialized ancillary actions into a central element of full-spectrum operations equal in importance to offense and defense. The nature and complexity of the mission determine the appropriate weighting and combination of tasks. (See figure 2.)

The operational environment is characterized by uncertainty, chaos, and friction. In this environment, an offensive mindset—the predisposition to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to positively change the situation—makes combat power decisive. The high quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0 prescribes giving them the maximum latitude to successfully accomplish the mission. This effort requires a climate of trust in the abilities of superior and subordinate alike. It also requires leaders at every level to think and act flexibly, constantly adapting to the situation. In this difficult environment, commanders must draw on their education, knowledge, experience, and understanding. This edition of FM 3-0 ties together battle command and operational art, providing an integrated model for the creative application of the experience, knowledge, and intuition of the commander in full-spectrum operations. (See figure 3.)

FM 3-0 acknowledges that the Army’s primary purpose remains deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the Army will fight as part of an interdependent joint team to decisively win the Nation’s wars. America is at war in a persistent conflict against an enemy committed to U.S. defeat and the destruction of its free society. This conflict will be waged in an environment that is complex, multi-dimensional, and firmly rooted in the human dimension. This is a conflict which cannot be won by military forces alone and requires close cooperation and coordination of military, diplomatic, economic, and informational

| Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil-support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent Joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission, and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. |
Figure 2. Spectrum of conflict.

Figure 3. Battle command and operational art.
efforts. Due to the human nature of the conflict, however, land power will be the most important element of the military effort and essential to victory. FM 3-0 considers the nature of today’s enemies as well as a wide range of other potential threats. It contains doctrine for the entire Army, one that seeks nothing less than victory for the United States and its friends and allies—now and in the future.

The impact of the information environment on operations continues to increase. What Army forces do to achieve advantages across it—information superiority—has a major effect on the outcome of operations. Consequently, FM 3-0 revises how the Army views information operations and the staff responsibility for the tasks associated with them. The current age of increased information technology, interconnected global commerce, and trade exponentially increases the impact of the information environment on operations. The patient, savvy, and confident enemy wages an intense struggle in both the information and physical domains. For U.S. forces, the reality of the messages conveyed on the ground must be consistent with Soldier actions. The concept of information engagement encompasses the vertical and horizontal interaction of commanders and Soldiers operating within and among the populace. Information engagement seeks to link these messages, presenting an integrated approach to inform U.S. forces and friendly audiences while influencing neutral and enemy audiences. Information engagement is a prominent task in the struggle for information superiority. Synchronizing the components of information engagement with the overall operation ensures consistency. Commanders must use information engagement in their area of operation to build trust, communicate messages, promote support for Army operations, and influence local perceptions.

The “warfighting functions” replace the battlefield operating systems (BOS), align with the joint functions, and parallel the USMC warfighting functions. Leaders at every echelon must embrace an offensive mindset to create opportunities and positively change the situation, thus creating decisive results. Combat power is crucial; however, adaptive and creative commanders fueled by an offensive spirit apply the elements of combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information—making combat power decisive. (See figure 4.)

FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. It sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in

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The eight elements of combat power include the six warfighting functions—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, protection—multiplied by leadership and complemented by information.

Figure 4. Elements of combat power.
subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army education system curricula. The eight chapters that make up this edition of *Operations* constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land:

- Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army’s expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers who accomplish missions.
- Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. Borrowing heavily from emerging NATO doctrine, this chapter helps Army leaders to understand where diverse operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency fit and shape supporting doctrine.
- Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book, describing the Army’s operational concept—full-spectrum operations. Full-spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil-support operations. Mission command is the preferred method of exercising battle command.
- Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full-spectrum operations. It replaces the older BOS and elements of combat power with six warfighting functions bound by leadership and employing information. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.
- Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.
- Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.
- Chapter 7 addresses information superiority, particularly information operations. Information operations divide into five Army information operations tasks, with the responsibility redistributed into different staff functional cells, yet tied together by the operations process.
- Chapter 8 discusses the aspects of strategic and operational reach and how they affect deploying and employing Army forces. The chapter emphasizes how the Army capitalizes on unique expeditionary and campaign qualities to promptly deploy forces worldwide into any operational environment.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A, command and support relationships are in appendix B, a brief description of modular force is in appendix C, and a discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is at appendix D. This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes made in this edition of FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, rescinded, and modified terms in this manual.

This version of FM 3-0 provides a blueprint for the future and fully recognizes that Soldiers are the centerpiece and foundation of the Army. They are the world’s preeminent land force. At every echelon, tough, well-trained, and well-equipped Soldiers live the warrior ethos. It is Soldiers—defined by their valor, devotion to duty, and commitment to one another and the United States of America—who execute full-spectrum operations.
RESTORING HOPE

Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward

Paul A. Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation

Counterinsurgents achieve the most meaningful success by gaining popular support and legitimacy for the host government, not by killing insurgents. Security plays an important role in setting the stage for other progress, but lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope.

— U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

One of the critical factors in the counterinsurgency strategy that is demonstrating early but measured progress in increasing security in Iraq is the alignment and rapid application of economic development as security improves.

As discussed in the first part of this series on revitalization of the Iraqi economy, “A Cause for Hope” (Military Review, July/August 2007), the challenges in leveraging and applying American economic expertise, investment, and other stimuli to uplift the Iraqi economy have been numerous, ranging from policy to strategy to tactics.

Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab states with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide range of sectors, and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991-2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to meet domestic demand—United Nations sanctions prevented export of goods or international economic engagement, although some factories remained relatively modern through investments in equipment upgrades.

Following the collapse of the regime in 2003, the Iraqi workforce experienced great economic hardship with unemployment and underemployment exceeding 50 percent. These conditions directly contributed to insurgent sympathy and economically motivated violence. The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TFBSO) was established in 2006 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England to address the revitalization of the industrial economy in Iraq. What follows is a status report on this revitalization effort and the ongoing transition of the Iraqi industrial economy to a free-market state that is integrated with global financial, supply, and trade infrastructures.

TFBSO and the Overall Economic Mission in Iraq

Underlying every strategic objective of the task force is a core principle based on the size and scope of the U.S. presence in Iraq. For calendar year 2007, Iraq had a gross domestic product estimated at $55 billion. The
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) current cost of sustaining operations in Iraq is approximately $10 billion per month. Most of this cost is dedicated to sustaining the presence of our uniformed service members and civilian workforce, covering not only the direct cost of military operations, but also everything from housing to food to security at the local level.

Considering U.S. government spending as a market has underpinned the TFBSO’s economic development strategy in Iraq. Careful application of this spending with an eye on local economic development, while ensuring our forces are sustained with the best possible materiel support, has fundamentally changed the way DOD considers economic reconstruction and has led to the development of new approaches to post-conflict stabilization.

Economic reconstruction in Iraq has required an interagency operational concept that leverages the collective strengths of the various U.S. government entities in Iraq. The general framework illustrated in figure 1 represents the interagency operating model that has emerged for Iraqi economic development.

While the boundaries for the model are not firmly fixed, this general structure has informed collaboration and cooperation among involved U.S. government entities. With this basic structure defined and agreed upon, the TFBSO further defined its areas of focus.

### Framework for an Industrial Economy

From its inception, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations has operated with a broad set of focus areas, each with a dedicated team of U.S. government and business leaders engaging in all areas of the country, and has been tightly aligned to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands. While much of the public understanding of the task force has focused on enabling and automating direct contracting with Iraqi businesses and restarting idled large state-owned enterprises shut down since 2003, these two primary focus areas led to expanded emphases on economic development for each critical tier of a modern industrial economy.

A modern industrial economy must possess the following key elements:

- A fiber-optic communications backbone with corresponding local wireless access capability to enable automated transaction processing as well as broad-based access to information via the Internet.
- A banking sector and financial system infrastructure capable of automated financial management, from large-scale bank-to-bank financial transactions to personal financial transactions.
- Active industrial operations across sectors identified as competitively advantageous for economic or strategic reasons.
- Small-business and private-sector entrepreneurial activity to drive future employment.

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* U.S. Military Commanders Emergency Response Program Funds are applied primarily at the local level, with some investment in industrial capacity.

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**Figure 1. Interagency engagement model.**
Private-sector investment processes to encourage inflows of private capital to further stimulate business growth. These key elements are addressed by the TFBSO operating model in figure 2.

Review of Task Force Focus Areas

The progress and current status of the key economic elements in Iraq present an optimistic picture for the way ahead.

Communications infrastructure. To successfully integrate Iraqi industry with the global economy, a cost-competitive core fiber-optic communication backbone with robust connections to wire-line and wireless infrastructure is critical. In partnership with the MNF-I Communications and Information Services Command, the Defense Information Services Agency (DISA), and the U.S. Embassy Baghdad advisor for telecommunications, the TFBSO launched several initiatives to stimulate the creation of such a network infrastructure.

To incentivize public- and private-sector companies to build up Iraq’s fiber-optic communications infrastructure, DOD leveraged its bandwidth consumption for non-secure traffic. As of 2007, all non-secure DOD communications were being transmitted over satellite—the most costly means of broadband communication. Due to the lack of necessary low-cost terrestrial network infrastructure, and in the absence of alternatives, costly satellite-based Internet and telecommunications access has become common in Iraq. In partnership with DISA, TFBSO is working to contract with public and private telecommunications firms in Iraq to purchase bandwidth—encouraging these firms to build out communications networks. As these terrestrial networks are built out, private-sector businesses (banking, industrial transactions) can transfer from satellite communications onto them.

Communications infrastructure status. The first step in this critical effort has been establishing fiber-optic network capacity from Baghdad through Basra to Kuwait City, beginning to link to the global Internet backbone. This project, launched in January 2007, continues, although there have been delays resulting from circuit-testing failures within this first link managed by Iraq Telecommunications and Post Company (ITPC), the Iraqi state-run telecom enterprise. As this first circuit becomes active, subsequent links north through Mosul and west through Al Qaim will be pursued, with necessary spurs to key industrial centers, including Irbil, Sulaymania, and Najaf.

While these efforts to motivate construction of core terrestrial networks continued, the Government of Iraq (GOI) executed private-sector auctions for Global System for Mobile (GSM) cellular communications licenses at the national level during the summer of 2007. These license auctions, originally expected to generate no more than $400 million in total revenue for the GOI, were an astounding financial success for Iraq. Three licenses generated $3.6 billion in revenue to

Figure 2. Task Force operating model.
the GOI from regional investors. These licenses have been awarded and network consolidation within Iraq is now underway. Modern mobile data services are being offered as a result of the investments in new infrastructure, and cell phone penetration in Iraq has increased by 50 percent since the summer of 2007, with over 12 million subscribers now active.

**Direct economic stimulus through contracting.** In support of the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) commander, Major General Darryl Scott, U.S. Air Force, the task force coordinated changes to policy unifying operational control of contracting in the Iraq area of operations under JCC I/A. Changes included fielding a system to automate contracting transactions in a way that was useful to Iraqi businesses as well as to the command resources working to ensure Iraqi firms were given access to DOD contracts. This new information system, the Joint Contingency Contracting System, was fielded in September 2006 and now operates with over 1,000 active users across the DOD contracting community in Iraq and Afghanistan. It provides a central database for Iraqi and Afghan companies, their capabilities, awards to date, and contract performance.

**Direct economic stimulus through contracting status.** The JCC I/A’s “Iraqi First” program (which mandates that DOD contracts go to Iraqi businesses whenever possible) has been extremely effective. In the past 18 months, over 3,900 private Iraqi businesses have registered and received U.S. contracts at a monthly value in excess of $100 million. These contracts range from construction to material goods to professional services across a variety of sectors. This direct economic stimulus has generated more than 100,000 Iraqi jobs across the country. Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the contract dollars awarded since the Iraqi First program was conceived and launched in the fall of 2006.

**Financial infrastructure and private banking.** A key issue in the development of a modern economy in Iraq has been the absence of a well-regulated, modern banking sector. Prior to 2003, Iraqi banking was dominated by a few large state-owned financial institutions that were closed to international financial flows due to United Nations sanctions. Despite negotiations since 2003 over debt settlements with creditor nations, these large state-owned banks are still not modernized because automating and linking them to global financial networks would enable their assets to be seized by creditor nations.

Over the past several years, however, a significant number of private bank branch offices have opened in Iraq, many with links to global financial networks via rooftop satellite access that enable electronic funds transfers (EFTs) (figure 4). The expansion and growth of these EFT-capable private financial institutions is critical to stimulating sustained economic development and to moving Iraq from a cash-based society to a modern economy.

**Financial infrastructure and private banking status.** Working in close partnership with the U.S. Department of the Treasury and JCC I/A, the TFBSO launched an effort in the fall of 2007 to stimulate and develop the private banking sector in Iraq. The effort includes building a consortium of Iraqi private banks. One of the consortium’s

![Figure 3. Host-nation contracting impact.](image-url)
objectives is to establish a core shared private financial infrastructure to efficiently process payment and financial-transfer transactions. The operating model for this shared service was defined and agreed to by the private banking consortium in January 2008. A key next objective is the establishment of a transaction regulatory body, the Iraqi Payments Association, accountable to the Central Bank of Iraq for oversight. The establishment of this body is planned for the summer of 2008.

To directly stimulate the rapid capitalization and expansion of private banking, and also to stimulate the migration away from a strictly cash-based economy toward EFT and management, steps were taken to again leverage DOD spending as a market incentive. Under policy that took effect in November 2007, and as a next step in the Iraqi First program, businesses in Iraq receiving new U.S. contracts are required to open accounts with one of the EFT-enabled private banks, from which they will receive all payment from DOD. The impact of this requirement has been immediate and measurable, as shown in figure 5.

As the graph indicates, by January 2008, almost 60 percent of payments to Iraqi firms were being executed electronically instead of via cash disbursement. The benefits of this transition include reduced payment cost and improved efficiency for DOD, the migration of over 3,000 private Iraqi enterprises to modern banking practices,
and the elimination of cash-based payment and its attendant risks of corruption and violent theft. Over $100 million a month in DOD contracting actions are eligible for payment electronically. This flow of cash through private banks will improve their capitalization, enabling these critical financial institutions to begin their own private investment practices at the local level, further stimulating economic growth.

**Industrial revitalization.** As described in depth in “A Cause for Hope,” a primary area of emphasis for TFBSO was the restart of Iraq’s industrial base, largely idled or operating at a small percentage of capacity since 2003. Fielding a team of experienced business leaders, accountants, and consultants, TFBSO assessed major industrial sites across the country, as indicated in figure 6.

The restart effort struggled initially, in the absence of any appropriated funds for small capital investments in spare parts, training, or other requirements necessary to enable production in factories that had been idle for years. Between November 2006 and September 2007, 17 factories covering a variety of industrial sectors were restarted in Iraq. These operations were restarted by the direct application of demand via U.S. or Iraqi government contracts for goods or services, or through direct links to sources of demand inside Iraq. The infusion of $50 million appropriated by Congress during the summer of 2007 accelerated the industrial revitalization effort significantly—enabling TFBSO to launch 48 projects in 30 additional factories or production lines across the country.

| 1. State Company for Mechanical Industries (SCMI), Iskandariyah | 37. State Company for Hand Woven Carpets, Baghdad |
| 2. State Company for Automotive Industry (SCAI), Iskandariyah | 38. State Company for Paper Industries, Basrah |
| 5. State Company for Glass and Ceramics - Plate Glass, Ramadi | 41. Baghdad Factory for Furniture, Baghdad |
| 7. State Company for Glass and Ceramics - Ceramic Tile, Ramadi | 43. State Company for Electrical Industries (SCEI), Baghdad |
| 9. Al Sumood State Company - Steel Structures, Taji | 45. Al Monsour State Company, Baghdad |
| 10. Al Sumood State Company - Foundry, Taji | 46. State Company for Tobacco and Cigarettes, Baghdad |
| 11. Nasr State Company for Mechanical Ind. - Trailers, Taji | 47. Baghdad Electrical, Baghdad |
| 15. State Company for Drugs and Medical Supplies - Ninawah, Mosul | 51. State Company for Dairy Products, Baghdad |
| 17. Iraqi State Company for Cement, Al Qa’im | 53. State Company for Construction Industries - Marble Cutting, Erbil |
| 20. Diyala State Company for Electrical Industries - Electric Meters, Baqubah | 56. Turkish Textiles, Erbil |
| 21. Diyala State Company for Electrical Industries - Optic Cable, Baqubah | 57. State Owned Slaughterhouse, Baghdad |
| 22. State Company for Fertilizer - North, Bayji | 58. Sulymania Apparel Company, Sulymania |
| 23. State Company for Ready Hand Made Wear, Najaf | 59. UB Group Brick Factory, Dahok |
| 24. State Company for Rubber Industries, Najaf | 60. MOSUL Ready to Wear, Mosul |
| 27. State Company for Leather Industries, Baghdad | 63. Ready Made Clothing (RMC Company) Mahmudiyah |
| 28. Al Furat State Company - Chemical, Al Hindiyah | 64. Al Hamara’s Biscuit Company, Mahmudiyah |
| 29. That Al Sawary State Company for Chemical Industries - PVA, Taji | 65. Sulymania Food Processing Plant, Sulymania |
| 31. State Company for Drugs and Medical Supplies - Samarra | 67. Dakuk Dairy Facility, Dahuk |
| 32. State Company for Petrochemical Industries, Basrah | 68. Al Ikaa Metal Fabrication Plant |
| 33. State Company of Fertilizers - South, Basrah | 69. Al Shaheed Grass Plant |
| 34. Harir Tomato Paste and Fruit Processing Plant, Harir | 70. Tikrit Flour |
| 35. State Company for Construction Industries - Concrete Pillars, Mosul | 71. Taji Furniture |
| 36. State Company for Heavy Engineering Industry (HEESCO), Doura | 72. Al Az Electronic Industry (2 factories) |
| 37. State Company for Hand Woven Carpets, Baghdad |

Arrows indicate one or more active TFBSO projects underway at the site in partnership with multinational division commands.

Stars indicate factories started or with material increases in production or employment resulting from TFBSO efforts.

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**Figure 6. Assessed and impacted Iraqi factories.**
Industrial revitalization status. As a result of these efforts, the task force has restarted or materially increased production at 29 factories across Iraq as of the date of this publication, with projects underway at 18 additional sites. Over 10,000 sustained jobs have resulted from these restarts, which also generate secondary and tertiary economic activity and employment at the local level—stimulating local suppliers, service providers, and other businesses.

Wherever possible, the task force has worked to again link factories together that once engaged in commercial transactions. As described in “A Cause for Hope,” these intra-Iraqi commercial relationships were a stabilizing element of Iraqi society. When investments in raw material, machinery, or other goods or services have been made to enable factories to restart, TFBSO has sourced these goods and services between and among Iraqi factories whenever possible. This sourcing helps align industrial revitalization to the overarching objective of political reconciliation.

The TFBSO has continued to help Iraq build industrial partnerships with international firms. A recent example of this engagement is illustrated by the international agriculture firm, Case New Holland Corporation, which partnered with TFBSO to restart tractor manufacturing operations at an idled factory in Babil province.

Industrial privatization and entrepreneurial activity. The long-term intent of TFBSO economic efforts in Iraq remains Iraq’s transition to a vibrant free-market economy that is seamlessly linked to the global marketplace. TFBSO’s initial objective was to restart idled large state-owned factories, restoring employment and stimulating local economic activity. Working in support of the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM), the next step is to solicit bids from private investors for joint ventures or direct investment in operational state-owned enterprises. Such solicitations are first steps to long-term full privatization of these enterprises.

This is a transitional approach that is consistent with economic transition models successfully applied in other former command economies, especially in East Asia. As a method to introduce foreign investment and expertise from international businesses, this approach avoids large-scale displacement of skilled workers and undermines insurgent sympathies. For a post-conflict economic development effort in an industrialized economy such as Iraq, in which terror networks prey upon local economic distress to generate support, this transitional approach also reduces the threat to our uniformed men and women.

Industrial privatization and entrepreneurial status. In February 2007, MIM issued a public solicitation for investors in 13 large state-owned factories in sectors ranging from construction materials to mineral processing to industrial operations. TFBSO accountants, consultants, and legal advisors have provided direct support to MIM in order to establish transparent, auditable financial review and assessment processes, and have actively supported each stage of review of bids submitted.

On 10 January 2008, the Government of Iraq announced the first awards of joint ventures to three Iraqi-European financial consortiums for large cement-manufacturing plants in Muthanna, Al Qaim, and Kirkuk. Averaging over $100 million each in foreign direct investment, these proposals turn operational management of each cement factory over to the respective investor group while retaining ownership of the facility with the GOI. The investor will manage the facility, increasing the current average levels of 250,000 tons of cement per year to an average of 1.8 million tons per year, and receiving a majority percentage of profit over a 15 year period. Over 5,000 jobs will be created under the terms of these proposed transactions.

Given the security environment that has challenged Iraq over the past four years, these first joint ventures represent a highly desirable, and profitable, business model for both the investor and the GOI. The GOI gains world-class expertise in factory operation, as each consortium includes an international cement manufacturer, while the investor benefits because of the GOI’s stake in both security and development in the surrounding area over the period of the agreement.

These initial agreements, in final legal negotiation at the time of this publication, represent great progress for the Iraqi government and for TFBSO efforts to support revitalization of Iraqi industry as a step to private-sector development in Iraq. The notion of hundreds of millions of dollars in private foreign capital flowing into such places
as Muthanna, Al Qaim, and Kirkuk did not seem possible even a few months ago. Yet today, thanks to improvements in security that have taken place across the country under MNF-I leadership, foreign investment is starting to take place. TFBSCO is hopeful that there will be additional announcements of joint ventures and new industrial starts over the coming months—further signs of normalcy taking hold in Iraq as security improves.

Private investment. In September 2007, following the Congressional hearings in which General David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, provided a review of status on post-surge security, political development, and economic stabilization in Iraq, there was a ground-swell of interest from foreign investors regarding investment in Iraq.

This interest was unexpected. TFBSCO had emphasized the importance of foreign investment and global corporate presence in Iraq from the inception of its effort, leveraging support from organizations, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and DOD’s Defense Business Board, to solicit engagement from business in support of economic development in Iraq. These efforts resulted in business engagement with initial momentum, but new interest among U.S. corporations tapered off significantly in the late spring of 2007. The reasons cited at the time related to the decline in overall U.S. public opinion regarding the Iraq mission. TFBSCO decreased its efforts to draw U.S. businesses to Iraq as a result of this decline in interest. However, to date 15 of the 29 American and international corporations that the TFBSCO hosted in Iraq during the winter and spring of 2007 have transacted business or submitted proposals for new business that are still in review.

The emergence of interest in Iraq among investors after September appears to have resulted from a growing sense that there would be no sudden reduction or elimination of the U.S. presence, and that the surge strategy was bearing signs of progress in security. Investors began seeking information about the numerous secure areas of the country that were ready for new business development.

There is a pervasive sense among investors that Iraq has the potential for great prosperity, not only as a petroleum producing nation, but also as a diversified economy in a critical region of the world. While debates continue about necessary legal structure for Iraqi hydrocarbon sector development and associated revenue-sharing among sects and regions, there is great opportunity for investors seeking to enter the ground floor of all other industries—the point at which early investment in a developing region results in the greatest financial return.

To address this interest, TFBSCO established a foreign direct investment team in October of 2007. This group, which includes experienced investment banking professionals, facilitates engagement of foreign investors in Iraq by identifying opportunities for immediate new business in partnership with the GOI. Primary initial investor interest is in new construction, specifically hotel, retail, and office space construction and property management. As a result of the lack of real estate development in Iraq over the past 18 years, there is a large need for hotel and office space development in anticipation of business expansion as petroleum companies engage in Iraq in coming years.

Initial areas of focus include the geographic areas and associated investment opportunities as shown in figure 7. These areas were selected based on their current security status, as well as direct input from the GOI at the national and provincial level.

Private investment status. TFBSCO has already facilitated a proposal in final review and negotiation with the GOI for construction of a new, internationally branded hotel with retail space in the International Zone. Additional investment proposals are in process for hotel and office construction in Baghdad and Basra, as well as food processing, food services, and new industrial construction. Assuming security improvements are sustained and expanded over the next several months, there is reason for optimism that foreign investment will increase and that new, privately funded construction and business development will expand in the near future.

Earlier Recommendations and Status

In the earlier report, “A Cause for Hope,” three specific recommendations were made regarding revitalization of the Iraqi economy. One of these, the alignment of economic development to political reconciliation efforts, was described earlier and continues to be a part of the overall TFBSCO strategy.
A second recommendation focused on the need for standard international tariff and trade policies for Iraq. Since 2003, all tariffs on inbound goods have been suspended—essentially making Iraq a completely free open market for all international goods. This situation is unsound, especially for industries such as agriculture and food processing, which remain in a state of depressed output. As of the time of this report, the suspension of all tariffs remains in place.

The final recommendation involved the restoration of bank balances for state-owned factories seized in 2003. The cancellation of balances was a key step in shutting down state-owned factories, as it denied working capital necessary for purchase of raw material, maintenance, services, and new equipment. TFBSO took this recommendation forward in partnership with the GOI, then learned that the process to restore bank balances would be untenably slow, given the speed the industrial revitalization effort was attempting to achieve.

Instead of restoring bank accounts, the Ministry of Finance has applied an alternative strategy of allocating GOI budget to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals for the specific purpose of recapitalizing idled industrial facilities. Four-hundred million dollars has been budgeted in 2008 for the MIM, which exceeds the approximate value of the bank balances seized in 2003. The MIM is working with TFBSO to maximize the net effect of that budget. To illustrate the significance of this decision by the GOI, the total capital budget in 2007 for the MIM was approximately $30 million.

**Next Steps**

The two initial focus areas for the task force, contracting support and industrial revitalization, are now targets of new strategic direction, designed to rapidly boost the growth of private business and the ability of large industrial enterprises to adapt their operations in support of broad Iraqi economic development objectives.

In the area of contracting and direct economic stimulus, the next step is an opportunity resident in the information JCC I/A collects on Iraqi businesses. Recall that over 3,900 private Iraqi businesses have been registered, have received contracts for goods or services, and are rated on their performance as a supplier to DOD. The Joint Contingency Contracting System now has 18 months of data, representing over a billion dollars in contracting actions, for these companies. This database represents a wealth of information helpful to future business development in Iraq. With the support of appropriate DOD general counsel and advice from international financial institutions and the Government of Iraq, TFBSO is working to identify appropriate mechanisms to enable private investors to invest in these Iraqi companies. TFBSO believes that these mostly small-to-mid-sized companies could eventually

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Area</th>
<th>Initial Areas of Investor Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad – International Zone, Abu Nawas, Haifa Street</td>
<td>Hotels, office and retail construction and management, food services, food processing, construction services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Airport</td>
<td>Hotels, office and retail, convention services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskandariyah</td>
<td>Industrial assembly and fabrication, maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>Hotels and tourism infrastructure and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>Hotels and tourism infrastructure and services, agribusiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra (including Airport)</td>
<td>Hotels, office and retail, professional services, petrochemical sector support services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td>Broad-based investment across industrial sectors underway. Vibrant market economy emerging.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Foreign direct investment priority areas and opportunities.
form the backbone of one or more Iraqi growth funds, enabling individuals to invest in the future of Iraq. This would provide a channel of capital to entrepreneurial Iraqis, enabling more rapid growth and associated broad economic benefits.

In the area of industrial revitalization, the task force will apply standard business investment management practices to the process of allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate Iraqi factories. Directors general (factory managers) of individual plants are being instructed in the preparation of business plans, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans. To receive new funding, these factories must submit their plans and strategies for review. Submissions will be combined with commander requirements for reemployment and stabilization in each area of operation within Iraq, and based on this combined criteria, funds will be granted. The disciplined process for executing any funds used to date will remain—but in the next phase we will use the funding to motivate factory managers to adopt standard international business practices. In fact, many factory managers are already adept at international business practices, and for these managers this process has proven relatively easy to adopt.

This investment-based approach will prepare the state-owned enterprises for the future they will encounter as they seek capital from private funding sources, and as privatization of these factories takes place over the coming years.

Integrating the Overall Effort

TFBSO is working in partnership with MNF-I commands and the Government of Iraq to stimulate rapid establishment of the necessary elements of a modern industrial economy. A robust communications infrastructure enabling a transparent, modern, well-regulated banking sector capable of supporting vibrant small, medium, and large enterprises is the vision for the Iraqi economy set forth by the Iraqi government. Security improvements have been significant, giving rise to cautious optimism and interest in investment by foreign private financial institutions and corporations. It is early, and much difficult work remains to make this vision a reality.

This is a critical time. The opportunity for the full application of economic development in support of counterinsurgency doctrine is now. The opportunity to support the Iraqi people in their desire for prosperity in a diverse, safe, and open society is now. The opportunity for international investment with an orientation to high risk and high return in a nation with great potential for long-term prosperity is now. Seizing these opportunities remains the challenge of the day. MR

NOTES


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The author wishes to acknowledge Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno for his unwavering vision and operational support for task force economic development efforts during his command of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Major General Darryl Scott, for his visionary leadership and partnership with the task force in all aspects of applying our contracts and associated business relationships as an instrument for economic development during his service as commander, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan.
Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army; Major John Cushing, U.S. Army; Major Brandon Garner, U.S. Army; and Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army

According to current U.S. military doctrine, the path to victory in a counterinsurgency (COIN) runs through the indigenous population. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the people are centers of gravity, have driven this doctrine. But before the counterinsurgent can win the people over, he must take the necessary steps to really understand and know them.

The U.S. military clearly was not attuned to this reality at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Today, however, most Soldiers with multiple tours in theater understand that U.S. forces must consider the population first in everything they do operationally. They have discovered that any attempt to separate the insurgents from the population must be coordinated with effective efforts to win the population’s support. Soldiers know that to succeed at the latter, they need to understand the human terrain intimately: only deep understanding can point to the conditions essential for success. Therefore, the important question is no longer “why” or “if” Soldiers operating in COIN environments should seek detailed understanding of the population; “how” they obtain that understanding is the issue at hand. In other words, how can a tactical unit most effectively amass and process the information it needs to decisively influence the population in its area of operations (AO)? Using the practical experience it gained during OIF V, Task Force (TF) Dragon (led by 1-15 Infantry, part of the 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division) can help answer this question.

An Enemy Within
As many veterans and students of the current wars recognize, insurgents hold the upper hand with their better understanding of local customs and politics, their ability to speak the language, their freedom of movement within society, and their greater comprehension of the population’s interests. Moreover, as is always the case in wars of foreign occupation, the insurgent enemy in this war does not wear a uniform and can easily blend with the population.

While preparing for its current combat tour, TF Dragon looked hard at units that were enjoying success in Iraq to figure out how to cope with the difficulties of COIN warfare. Overwhelmingly, the units that seemed to be winning the fight had made significant inroads with local leaders, had found proactive ways to understand and respect local cultural norms, and had addressed specific community needs. Although the task force recognized and understood this lesson early on, when it actually arrived in its area of
operations (AO), Soldiers found that very little of the ethnographic data it needed to conduct effective operations had been collected.

The available information was sparse and spread out across the continuity files of nearly every staff section. It was also old: there had been no consistent coalition presence in the area for nearly two years, and when the staff tried to verify the little information it had received, it often found that key personalities had moved out of the area or local opinions and loyalties had changed. The task force quickly determined that the first step of its COIN fight would be to acquire an understanding of its AO in human terms.

When it deployed to Iraq in mid-2007, TF Dragon inherited a heavily populated (400,000 people) area southeast of Baghdad. The AO was volatile, in part because it straddled a Sunni/Shi’a fault-line. The majority of the Sunnis lived along the Tigris River, the task force’s western boundary. Shi’a tribes resided in the north (close to Baghdad) and along the eastern boundary (the Baghdad-Al Kut highway).

The requirement for new ethnographic information on its AO weighed heavily on the task force. Thus, the entire unit began focusing on systematically collecting and collating ethnographic information. Ultimately, TF Dragon worked the collection through a process the staff labeled “human-terrain mapping,” or HTM.

Developing the HTM process amounted to creating a tool for understanding social conditions. As it collected and cataloged pertinent information, the task-force staff tailored its plan in order to capture a broad range of details. An important aspect of the process involved putting the data in a medium that all Soldiers could monitor and understand. Once the formatting and baseline information requirements were set, TF Dragon employed the shared situational-awareness enhancing capabilities of the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) computer system. Each company was allocated a CPOF to post the results of its mapping on a common database, a matrix that included information about religious boundaries, key economic structures, mosques, and important personalities such as sheiks.

Over time, the staff mapped the boundaries of each tribe and the demographic makeup of every village, town, and city the enemy could possibly seek refuge in. It went on to add data about personalities who were known to be supporting the insurgents, and the needs and wants of the particular populations. Mapping this political, economic, and sociological information created a common human-terrain picture that enabled more proactive initiatives and faster, much more effective responses to events. For example, as incidents occurred in specific areas, the common map enabled all companies to plot the location of the incident, then identify the proper sheiks to contact for intelligence or answers to critical questions.

Human-terrain mapping thereby allowed TF Dragon to understand the population and demonstrate its commitment to improving local communities. By addressing what the people felt were their priority needs, the task force was better able to cultivate relationships of significant trust with neighborhood leaders. In turn, these relationships led to the construction of an effective biometric database of military-age males. This information resulted in improved actionable intelligence on

Mapping...political, economic, and sociological information created a common human-terrain picture that enabled more proactive initiatives and faster...responses to events.
insurgent activities, greatly improving security. These positive results validated measures prescribed by Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, for “determining who lives in an area and what they do.” In figurative terms, the human-terrain map became an outline of who the players in the current game were. Thus, the task-force commander concluded that developing a human-terrain map was crucial to simultaneously clearing out the enemy and driving a wedge between the insurgents and the population.

**Defining Tactical Human-Terrain Mapping**

TF Dragon executed its data-collection effort through systematic people-to-people contact. The staff planned decentralized platoon-level patrols, conducted during daylight hours, that sought answers to specific questions about the population. These specific “information requirements” (IR) about each separate village and town included—

- The boundaries of each tribal area (with specific attention to where they adjoined or overlapped).
- Location and contact information for each sheik or village mukhtar and any other important people (government officials, Iraqi Security Forces, etc.).
- Locations of mosques, schools, and markets.
- Identification of the population’s daily habits (when they woke up, slept, shopped, etc.).
- Nearest locations and checkpoints of Iraqi Security Forces.
- Economic driving force (i.e., occupation and livelihood).
- Employment and unemployment levels.
- Population flow (i.e., people moving in or out of the AO).
- Anti-coalition presence and activities.
- Access to essential services (fuel, water, emergency care, fire response, etc.).
- Particular local population concerns and issues.

To avoid being targeted, companies designed their terrain-mapping patrols to be “systematically unpredictable.” In this way, all areas could be covered without telegraphing to the insurgents which areas might be visited next. For example, TF Dragon’s Baker Company used the main road in its AO (running between Jisr Diyala and Salman Pak, near Baghdad) as a focal point and began with the villages on the east and west side of the thoroughfare. Each day patrols changed sides of the road or moved north or south of the villages they had visited previously. After two or three days of patrolling, they took a day off, further disrupting any patterns they may have been inadvertently setting.

Patrols were organized with specific objectives and purposes for each sub-element. The three major tasks were security, IR gathering, and relationship-building. As the composition of most patrols was centered on a mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some augmentation was required. Generally, the company commander was present on patrol to gain a firsthand look at his AO. The company fire support officer (FSO), acting as the company’s intelligence officer, accompanied the commander on every patrol. This enabled the staff to build a framework to address the three critical tasks. The commander focused on building relationships with key individuals, his FSO (augmented by part of the platoon) sought answers to IR, and the patrol’s platoon leader concentrated on security.

In addition to the three sub-element tasks, everyone within the patrol helped deliver information operations (IO) messages. These messages typically involved the rewards program (money for information about extremist activities), examples of the positive steps being taken by the local government and Iraqi Security Forces, and the benefits of cooperating with the coalition. Whenever possible, the messages took the form of pamphlets or one-page handouts given to local citizens. Prepared handouts and knowledge of current messages were considered TF Dragon’s IO basic load. They were the responsibility of every Soldier on patrol.

A typical HTM patrol required a platoon to move tactically and establish a cordon around the area to be mapped. As the perimeter was being set, the commander and FSO moved to the likely center of the town and began to talk with citizens to determine where the local sheik or village leader lived. One of the specific requests the commander would make from the sheik or village elder was permission to enter the men of the village into the biometric data system (using handheld interagency identity detection equipment, HIIDE). Depending on the reaction to this request, the platoon might establish a centralized location and begin the process. If the sheik or elder demurred, the unit would earmark the village for a return visit when they could con-
tinue to press the issue. However, most times the local leaders had no problem with the request; they viewed the biometric census as an opportunity to show their innocence and willingness to cooperate with coalition forces.

While the commander met with these individuals and Soldiers took the census, the FSO and his platoon augmentees would talk with as many of the military-age males as possible to get answers to the IR. Other Soldiers also talked to as many people as possible to pass on the day’s IO messages. On average, these patrols took about two to four hours to complete.

Oftentimes, patrols were reinforced with civil-affairs (CA) teams, human-intelligence collection teams (HCTs), psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, or additional medical personnel. These military specialists provided specific areas of expertise to assist the patrols, and the TF used their skills to enhance the perceived importance of the tactical unit. For example, having a unit medic treat a civilian with an acute problem, especially a child, provided direct evidence of the task force’s goodwill and the tangible benefits to be had by cooperating with the coalition. Special-team augmentation also increased the overall number of contacts in the village, furthering the acquisition of IR answers. Additionally, it created opportunities for TF Dragon’s “village teams” (elements combining CA, HCT, and PSYOP personnel) to reconnoiter and consider the kinds of effects they might want to produce on future visits.

Special care and planning was taken to ensure that augmentation teams did not interrupt or interfere with the relationship between the company and the population being mapped. TF Dragon emphasized the supremacy of the responsible company commander (the “land-owner”) as the primary point of contact for each village’s leaders. The task force wanted to preclude any confusion on the part of
the local leadership as to who would make decisions regarding projects or future support. This clarity was especially critical when dealing with CA teams, whom the people often saw as “money guys.” Through a deliberate effort, the task force made it clear that these teams supported the company commander, not the other way around.

After every patrol, the responsible platoon prepared a detailed analysis of the mapped area, and links were made to other villages based on sect, tribes, and terrain. The result was a census-like compilation of data collated by the task-force staff (primarily the S2, the effects/IO cell, and the CA officer). This compilation helped the staff develop and refine both its lethal and nonlethal targeting. It also produced a graphical depiction of where potential sectarian fault lines were, allowing the task force to focus its initial security efforts quickly so that all other logical lines of operation could commence early.

Task Force Dragon used this approach repeatedly to develop its human-terrain map. Balanced with other tactical missions, the overall process took about two-and-a-half months. Importantly, information contributing to the overall map was also gathered on offensive missions. During intelligence-driven raids, cordon and searches, and attacks, TF Dragon units used the same IR as on HTM patrols. Also, all military-age males found were entered into the HIIDES biometric data system, which helped the task force piece together a picture of the extremist groups operating in AO Dragon. The S2 simply checked the names of individuals taken into custody against the database built during previous HTM missions, and if someone had been in another unit’s AO earlier, he became a suspect; the task force would then investigate why he was moving from area to area. This cross-reference system enabled the S2 to begin to link individuals so identified to a possible extremist cell that lived in one part of AO Dragon, but conducted missions in another. Eventually, it allowed the task force to create a link diagram of possible extremist activities.

**HTM—A Necessary Process**

Although the value of the map itself was obvious, in retrospect, the physical process of doing the mapping might have been even more beneficial. If the type of information gathered had been available upon arrival (in a database, for example), the task force might have accepted an abstract, and perhaps false, sense of the environment. It would have done so while depriving itself of firsthand knowledge gained from building the map. By way of analogy, having a ready-made database would have been like learning to do math problems on a calculator instead of the hard way, via reasoning. In conducting HTM, the battalion learned how to square ethnographic data the hard way, a method that provided maximum benefit via direct analysis of particulars within the situation at intimate levels. From this perspective, the advantages of having Soldiers do HTM themselves appear numerous. Besides gaining greater knowledge of the AO, some of the more salient benefits follow.

- HTM provided a practical vehicle for gathering human intelligence (HUMINT). Human-terrain mapping facilitated coalition forces getting to know the leadership of the different tribes, villages, towns, and

![Sergeant Cecil Ray, B Company, 1-15 Infantry, collects biometric data by processing a citizen of the Al Ja’ara area into the HIIDES system, August 2007.](image-url)
cities of a particular AO. After earning the respect and trust of village sheiks and elders through person-to-person contact, Soldiers found the locals more willing to provide intelligence. As units moved through the various villages and towns of AO Dragon, they consistently found local citizens who had been hesitant to call the task-force tips hotline or go to its combat outposts, but were more than willing to provide information if engaged at a personal level.

- As often as possible, the task force tried to integrate its supporting human-intelligence collection teams into HTM patrols, which provided excellent opportunities to make initial intelligence contacts and develop sources. The practice also produced good inside knowledge of local citizens and a ready-made cross-reference capability, improving the task force’s ability to determine the reliability and motivation of informants.

- HTM put a human, personal face on contacts with the population, abetting the task force’s effort to enlist the population against the insurgents. One company used an interpreter to assist in getting to know the local citizens. Another conducted joint HTM patrols with local Iraqi policemen and concerned citizens. As one company commander put it: “I believe it was vital to the initial impression of the locals in our AO that they saw us out walking amongst them, knocking on doors, shaking hands and asking questions specific to that family [and] tribe. I feel it put a human face on our company and opened the door to many of the initial dialogues that we are [now] currently exploiting with great success.”

- HTM was critical to building trusted networks. The number-one tenet of the 3d Infantry Division’s COIN handbook states, “It’s all about the people.” Building a trusted network means creating personal relationships between coalition tactical leaders and the leaders of the population they secure. Once those relationships were built, task-force units were better able to deliver and assess the effects of IO messages and PSYOP products, better able to determine if local governments were talking to their constituents, and—when necessary—better able to minimize unrest among the population through consequence-management procedures.

- The patrolling required to map the human terrain was vital to the initial tone set by TF Dragon: it put coalition Soldiers in the streets immediately, sending a clear signal to the insurgents and the people about who was in charge. If the enemy tested U.S. force strength, Soldiers were out of their vehicles with gun barrels and eyes set in every direction, prepared to maneuver instantly. Soldiers conducted every HTM patrol as if the enemy was watching and assessing them. Thus, HTM simultaneously brought U.S. forces closer to the locals and deterred enemy contact.

- HTM provided unforeseen opportunities to demonstrate resolve to the population. While getting to know local leaders and meeting with them in their villages, the companies of TF Dragon often conducted hasty raids on weapons traffickers and IED emplacement cells pointed out by villagers. These raids showed the locals that task-force Soldiers were dedicated to making their village more secure. Furthermore, they proved to local leaders that when they gave Soldiers critical intelligence information, those Soldiers would act on it.

- HTM provided ground-level insight into local politics, motivations, and differences—and this served as the start point for reconciling Sunni with Shi’a. Understanding the differences between the two sects’ areas was easy; finding a nexus for reconciliation was not. However, once a unit met and befriended leaders in both areas, those leaders had something in common: a partnership with coalition forces. In one particular area, Sunni and Shi’a families lived together with different sheiks leading each sect. Unfortunately, these sheiks were not eager to work with one another to reconcile their differences. To add to the area’s problems, Al-Qaeda in Iraq often attacked both groups as a means to keep their foothold. After working numerous HTM patrols in those areas, the local company commander earned the trust of both the Sunni and Shi’a. This enabled him to initiate discussions between the two sheiks based on the common goals of security and economic development.
Nothing can replace personal reconnaissance in importance. This is a principle that has existed in U.S. Army doctrine for decades. Even though the data entered into biometric databases includes addresses and street names, this information is often difficult to include in map overlays. Furthermore, different people may refer to local areas by different names. Many roads in rural areas are difficult to travel; conducting reconnaissance during HTM operations can assist a unit in figuring this out.

As the U.S. Army continues to examine the human-terrain mapping aspect of counterinsurgency warfare, TF Dragon Soldiers would offer a caveat based on their experience: do not rely solely on a computerized, automated solution to HTM or on the creation of a singular special-staff section to provide human-terrain insight. From what TF Dragon learned, a unit would best benefit from going out and collecting this information initially on its own, or, if it inherits such information from a previous unit, by developing a process to continuously reassess that information.

**Summary**

Counterinsurgency is probably the most difficult form of warfare because it forces military professionals out of their comfort zones and into the complex realm of interacting with human beings, sometimes in very subtle ways. By developing a human-terrain map, a unit can acquire a greater sensitivity to and deeper understanding of its AO, enabling it to leverage the complex human relationships that make COIN succeed or fail. But the goodness of a human-terrain map lies not just in the “having”; the “doing” offers perhaps even greater dividends. Building the necessary human relations with the population you secure is not hard—it just takes time and effort. In short, TF Dragon’s experience has shown that making a human-terrain map is time and energy well spent. *MR*
In early summer of 2005, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was in the midst of its sixth rotation of forces in Afghanistan since late 2001. On 1 June 2005, the 1st Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division became the core of Combined Task Force (CTF) Devil and assumed command of Regional Command East (RC East). Its area of responsibility included 10 provinces and covered a mountainous region roughly the size of North Carolina. Attached to CTF Devil were 8 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 5 maneuver task forces, a forward support battalion, 2 batteries of artillery, and 9 separate companies for a total of over 5,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Special Operations Forces, to include a Special Forces battalion, and other government agencies cooperated closely with the task force, while two brigades of the Afghan National Army (ANA) served as primary partners in addressing security within the borders of RC East (see figure 1).

CTF Devil received a classic counterinsurgency (COIN) mission:

- Conduct stability operations to defeat insurgents and separate them from the people.
- Protect the people in RC East and interdict infiltrators out of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
- Transform the environment by building the Afghans’ capacity to secure and govern themselves.

In these operations, CTF Devil fought four different enemies:

- The insurgents themselves—the Taliban, the Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party) Gulbaddin (led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar), and Al-Qaeda. Each had differing techniques, tribal affiliations, and goals.
- Afghanistan’s own weak-state threats: the corruption, smuggling, drugs, and refugee problems associated with 25 years of near-constant war.
- A challenging climate: rains in the spring brought powerful floods, the summer heat limited aircraft loads, and extreme cold and snow in
the winter cut off cities and even entire provinces from the rest of the country.

- Very difficult terrain varying from high plains 7,000 feet above sea level, to densely forested mountains over 10,000 feet high (with only camel trail access), to deep valleys with raging rivers.

The AO’s strategic significance lay in the 1,500 kilometers of border shared with Pakistan, including the Khyber Pass, the main entry point into Afghanistan for commerce. To manage this sprawling battlespace, CTF Devil executed a pragmatic strategy that balanced kinetic, nonkinetic, and political actions.

**Operational Environment in RC East**

At the provincial and district levels, the government in Afghanistan was so weak in 2005 as to be nearly nonexistent, especially in the border areas where only tribal authorities were recognized. The people ignored district and governmental boundaries, and a gamut of unofficial actors filled gaps in the power base. Internal councils (shuras) governed the primarily Pashtun tribes, and carefully selected leaders and elders represented them externally. These tribal structures and shuras were de facto governments in areas where no institutional functions existed. They also represented a challenge to the emerging provincial governments because they resisted ceding their traditional authority. Mullahs gained political clout during CTF Devil’s tenure because they increasingly saw politics as their inherent sphere of influence. Surprisingly, they were relatively anti-Taliban and supported a moderate version of Islam. CTF Devil routinely worked with the mullah shuras to dispel rumors, counter extremist propaganda, and address security issues directly.

While the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA) and coalition forces represented a progressive alternative to Taliban authority, strongmen, warlords, and militia leaders were still influential, particularly in border districts. In certain cases, former warlords had become the local chiefs of the Afghan Border Police or Afghan National Police (ANP) to mask their criminal operations behind official duties.

In theory, the Afghan government is a strongly centralized system, with power mostly flowing from Kabul. In practice, the central government has limited influence in much of the country outside of Kabul. During Operation Enduring Freedom VI, this limited influence was due to a lack of financial and human resources, destroyed institutions and infrastructure, corruption and inefficiency, and the inherent difficulties of governing the fiercely independent people in the border regions.

Task force provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and maneuver battalion commanders had contact with the provincial governor who served as the coalition’s principal interlocutor with the ministries and national government. At the lowest level, a sub-governor appointed by the provincial governor administered each district and maintained close contact with company-level leadership.

The task force determined at the start that reconstruction could only move forward if coalition and Afghan army and police forces maintained an offensive posture; therefore, it made a concerted effort to synchronize capabilities. To keep the initiative, CTF Devil implemented a campaign plan that focused on four goals:

- Building Afghan capacity.
- Extending the reach of the central government.
- Blocking infiltration.
- Ensuring good governance.

A key task involved promoting and protecting the nation’s first-ever parliamentary elections. These goals drove many of the CTF’s actions during its first six months in country. Measures of effectiveness focused on positive indicators such as changes

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**Figure 1. Regional Command East and CTF Devil disposition, August–December 2005**
in infrastructure and institutional capacity (numbers of businesses opening, police manning their posts, children in school, homes with electricity, etc.) and the degree to which the people supported their local and national government (number of IEDs turned in to the police by civilians, voters registering, former Taliban reconciling, etc.).

During planning in May 2005, the CTF determined its main effort would focus on building Afghan security with three supporting lines of operation: good governance and justice, economic and strategic reconstruction, and security cooperation with Pakistan along the shared border. The task force used this focus to shape its campaign.

Killing or capturing insurgents was important when required, but this was not an essential task. The CTF’s decisive operations would focus on the people, the center of gravity. For operations to succeed, coalition forces realized the people needed to believe they were secure. The task force found itself in competition with the Taliban for the will of the people. Though both sides were trying to win over fence sitters who were waiting to see which side would bring them the most benefits, the CTF possessed two very effective means to rally support: a substantial development effort, and alignment with the popular Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. By 2005, these two factors had substantially eroded support for Taliban theocratic ideology in eastern Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban had to resort to coercion, intimidation, and terrorism.

The preferred manner of engaging Taliban insurgents was not through search-and-attack missions between mountaintops and ridgelines. Instead, the task force asked PRT and maneuver commanders to identify the most effective methods of separating the insurgents from the population. CTF Devil believed it had to give the people quick, tangible reasons to support their government. To obtain this support, perception of Afghan institutional autonomy had to improve. Expansion of U.S. cooperation with the Afghan National Security Forces helped initially. Task force leadership understood that conditions for long-term security had to be set first. Improved security had the potential to set the conditions for a wave of sustainable development that would both improve perceptions of government autonomy and undercut insurgent aspirations.

In pursuing security, U.S.-only operations aimed at eliminating insurgents did not lead to favorable outcomes. CTF leaders quickly discerned that unilateral operations were culturally unacceptable to Afghans, encouraging conditions that would perpetuate the insurgency. For instance, a paratrooper entering an Afghan building for any reason without accompanying Afghan forces brought shame to the owner of the dwelling. In addition, according to the Afghan Pashtunwali code, for every zealot-militant U.S. forces killed, no less than three relatives were honor-bound to avenge his death.

CTF Devil’s goal in this regard involved developing Afghan security capacity to a point where ANSFs could conduct and, ultimately, lead clearing operations. Just putting an “Afghan face” on missions (i.e., having token Afghans along on U.S. operations) was not sufficient. There were challenges to overcome first, though. The Afghan National Police knew their communities and the insurgents operating in them, but they feared taking action because they were often outgunned and out-manned. Furthermore, the nascent Afghan legal system was still weak, and police were reluctant to arrest insurgents because corrupt judges often released them quickly. But by working closely with the police, building trust through combined training, and showing the willingness to backup the ANP, the task force emboldened its allies. After CTF Devil established this partnership, the often ill-equipped and poorly trained ANP suddenly began discovering IEDs and willingly moved against insurgent cells in their districts.

Still, U.S.-led kinetic operations were necessary, particularly in Kunar province’s Korengal Valley.
in the north and the border districts of Lwara and Bermel in Paktika province. In areas like these, the insurgents proved to be well trained, well equipped, and able to operate in groups as large as 100. Their rocket threat against forward operating bases and a resurgence of IED cells in the interior districts presented concerns only U.S. forces were ready to address effectively. In such situations, the CTF tried to function as a shield, the idea being that the Afghan police and army could form behind U.S. forces and, eventually, take over the fight.

During CTF Devil’s tenure, transitioning Afghans to the lead proved to be an evolutionary process, not a series of revolutionary events. The task force conducted frequent combined operations with an increasing focus on cooperative security development. It did so from company to brigade level, and it included provincial security forces. In time, these efforts brought Afghan and coalition forces closer and closer together.

Combat Operations

U.S. commanders learned what every maneuver battalion has to understand when fighting a counterinsurgency: protecting the people, motivating them to support their government, and building the host-nation’s capacity are all primary objectives. In pursuing these priorities, the CTF’s maneuver battalion commanders pioneered efforts to share intelligence with their counterpart ANA brigades and police commanders. The efforts yielded immediate tactical and eventual strategic results. They cultivated the enduring trust and confidence sorely needed to protect and support the people.

While the main effort in the AO was building Afghan security capacity, the task force also conducted many deliberate combat operations that garnered meaningful results. These maneuvers ranged from air assault raids against insurgent leaders along the border with Pakistan to brigade operations in partnership with ANSF in the Afghan interior. In every case, maneuver generated intelligence, and that intelligence drove further operations, allowing the CTF to maintain the initiative and keep the militants and their insurgent leaders on the run.

Principles Guiding CTF Operations

These principles, elaborated below, governed CTF operations:

- **Commit to making every operation a combined operation.** Including the ANSF in coalition operations enabled them to gain experience and improve their skills. They participated in planning and rehearsal processes, and the CTF collocated key leaders to assist them during execution phases. CTF Devil pre-cleared all targets and operations with the provincial governors and ANA brigade commanders. Although “how” and “when” were not revealed, normally the ANA would wholeheartedly endorse the task force’s target selection and provide additional Afghan resources to help achieve U.S. objectives. CTF Devil never had an operational security leak from sharing this information with Afghan leaders, although commanders had feared such occurrences.

Combined operations provided the task force with reciprocal benefits. The regular presence of Afghan counterparts enhanced coalition combat power by increasing the number of intelligence collectors, linguists, and cultural experts working together to solve the same problems. As aforementioned, CTF Devil discovered having Afghans search a compound was much more culturally acceptable and effective than doing U.S.-only searches. Not only did the Afghan search avoid the issue of perceived sovereignty violations, but also the Afghans knew where to look, and the professionalism of their searches impressed the people. ANA soldiers or local police officers also conveyed key messages to village elders much more effectively than could U.S. soldiers using interpreters. U.S. forces thus learned to embrace their roles as advisors in a counterinsurgency.

- **Always seek to mass effects.** CTF Devil did this, for instance, by cross-attaching rifle companies from one battalion to the next to give them the combat power needed for an operation. In massing, the task force worked with governors and ANA brigade commanders to get the most Afghan support possible. CTF Devil could not task the ANA to participate in operations, but it “partnered” with them to identify missions of mutual interest. The combined force positioned itself to mass fires by emplacing artillery, mortars, radars, and observers throughout its battlespace and by creating numerous autonomous fire and counter-fire teams. The teams paired fire direction centers and counter-fire radar with two to four howitzers commanded by an experienced lieutenant. In employing these teams,
CTF Devil fired over 6,800 artillery rounds during its OEF rotation.

Artillery proved useful for defeating the ever-present rocket threat and for handling ambush situations by covering a company movement through a valley where enemy squads occupied dominating ridgelines. The task force also massed electronic warfare assets; information operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Army aviation; and close air support (CAS) to assist operations. When it had troops in contact or when actionable intelligence breakthroughs occurred, the CTF also re-tasked these assets on the fly. Just as importantly, the task force massed joint nonlethal effects, seeking to exploit every possible advantage over the Taliban insurgents.

- **Make an understanding of how local traditions influenced the battlespace and the Afghan people a significant part of operations planning.** Identifying the effects of tribes, ethnicity, religion, and weak-state threats enabled CTF Devil to better understand and respond to what was happening. Local Afghans, security forces, and government leaders contributed to our targeting processes and provided insights needed to gain operational advantages. Understanding how these cultural idiosyncrasies affected the conditions proved invaluable.

  For example, an area like Lwara was constantly in dispute for a host of reasons: the Zadran tribal territory extends across the border there, and the insurgent leader Haqqani is a Zadran elder; Lwara is a traditional crossing point from Pakistan’s Miram Shah within the federally administered tribal area into Afghanistan, and the border there has been contested for centuries; a trafficable river valley leads from Miram Shah to the nearby Lwara Dashta plains just inside Afghanistan; and the Lwara foothills contain rich deposits of chromite ore, which smugglers move across the border for resale in Pakistan. Such knowledge can be a tremendous help to U.S. planners, but it is hard to gain without involving Afghans in the targeting process.

- **Seek operational interoperability with the Pakistan military forces (PAKMIL).** Such interoperability was essential when operating along the border. CTF Devil therefore developed relationships with its PAKMIL counterparts by conducting numerous flag meetings at all levels, from company to brigade and higher. The task force sought to have Afghan commanders join these meetings too, in order to reduce border friction between the wary neighbors. Eventually, CTF Devil developed reliable communications with PAKMIL battalions and brigades across the border and began to coordinate actions to prevent insurgent forces from using the border region as a sanctuary. For example, when CTF Devil reported an ambush, PAKMIL counterparts maneuvered forces to block the insurgents’ egress across the border. Once U.S. and Pakistani leaders acknowledged they were fighting the same enemy, the task force began to share intelligence with the Pakistanis and integrate operations along the border. Cooperation did not come easily; it required a consistent effort to build trust, but it was critical to success. On one occasion, after U.S. forces had fired counter-battery artillery on a target that was close to a PAKMIL ground commander’s border checkpoint, the brigade headquarters received an angry phone call from the commander. The task force explained to him that a rocket fired from that location had destroyed a hangar the PAKMIL commander had himself visited just a week earlier. This information was sobering. He was mollified when U.S. officers explained they had certain knowledge of an insurgent rocket’s point of origin before they began to return artillery fire.

- **Treat Afghans with respect and display discipline at all times.** U.S. restraint and professionalism contrasted with coarse Taliban cruelty and capriciousness, reinforcing the CTF’s legitimacy. Mentoring, training, and supervising Afghan forces,
in conjunction with embedded training teams (ETTs), cemented that legitimacy. With the police particularly, values reform represented welcome progress in the eyes of the people; it gained the Afghan government much-needed public support. When people’s confidence in their local police grew and they saw ANA soldiers comporting themselves professionally, they began to develop a nationalistic pride in their new security forces and became more willing to turn against the insurgency. As they did so, intelligence reporting from local sources increased, leading to even more successful combined operations.

- Apply combat power, civil-military expertise, and IO simultaneously—not sequentially. For example, if CTF Devil were executing a cordon-and-search of a village to locate an IED cell, it did not wait until after completing the mission to explain its rationale. Additionally, if it searched one end of the village, it also conducted a medical civil affairs program on the other end, often treating hundreds of local villagers. This type of operation created goodwill and established excellent new sources of intelligence. Just as combat operations had an Afghan lead, so, too, did these concurrent civil-military operations. The ANA distributed humanitarian relief supplies to refugees, and its medics treated patients. In some cases, CTF Devil asked the provincial governor to broadcast a radio message to explain its mission and ask for people’s support. When the task force met with tribal elders to explain the purpose of an operation, it brought Afghan counterparts to explain their roles and their view of the threat. The CTF followed up with a PRT project for those tribes that helped solidify and consolidate the gains our maneuver battalions made. These actions enabled us to maintain good relations with the public and led to much better actionable intelligence and early warning.

**Operations in Kunar Province**

The most contested region in RC East during OEF VI was the Wahabbiist stronghold in the Korengal River Valley, in the center of Kunar province. All three battalions from the 3d Marine Regiment from Hawaii that rotated through RC East during our tenure had responsibility for this area. In the aftermath of the shoot-down of an MH-47 in this area during Operation Red Wings in July 2005, it became clear that moving tactically in the dangerous high ground surrounding the valley required detailed preparation and logistical planning. Movement through the precipitous hills and across the craggy cliffs had to be slow and deliberate. Sometimes it would take an entire day to traverse a single kilometer of the mountainous terrain.

Securing a landing zone (LZ), for instance, took hours in the mountains. Marines and paratroopers had to secure all terrain that dominated the LZ—not just the LZ’s four corners. Similarly, resupply in the mountains had to be painstakingly plotted, then carefully executed using varied means, including containerized parachute delivery systems, guided donkey caravans, hired pick-up trucks, and contracted porters from local villages.

Fully planned and coordinated artillery support was also vital to the success of missions in Korengal. Artillery was so overwhelmingly important that CTF Devil required follow-on battalions to train and certify on relevant artillery-related tasks upon arrival in country. Adjusting fires in the mountains required different approaches from those used at Fort Bragg or Grafenwoer, Germany. CTF Devil rediscovered the art of employing indirect fires for operational advantage in mountainous terrain.
In every engagement its maneuver battalions fought in Kunar province, CTF Devil had to show the Afghans it was worth the risk to support their government. Commanders learned to appreciate the provincial governor’s role and the targeting of reconstruction to contested areas as a technique for cementing security gains won in a fight. Although personalities and commitments varied, the coalition found that the Afghan authorities were uniformly dedicated to improving conditions and helping their people achieve a higher standard of living.

Building Afghan Security Capacity and Partnership

In fostering Afghanistan’s nascent security apparatus, CTF Devil forged partnerships with U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and the Afghan government. Whereas TF Phoenix’s embedded training teams mentored their ANA counterparts, CTF Devil’s battalions actually teamed with them. Teaming up meant providing infantry, artillery, engineer, combat service support, and planning opportunities the ETTs could not. After coordinating with Afghan corps and brigade commanders and their U.S. advisors, the task force aligned or “partnered” CTF Devil units with Afghan units and established habitual training and operational relationships. Rifle squads and military police platoons teamed with the ANA and routinely conducted sustained five-to-seven day training modules with ANP in the district police headquarters to reinforce training the Afghans had received at their academies.

Training in this team-oriented relationship routinely ended with an Afghan-planned and led combined operation. During these operations, the coalition strengthened trust between it and the ANSF by providing close air support, artillery support, army aviation, MEDEVAC, and infantry reinforcements. For its part, the CTF learned to be more sensitive to cultural concerns, such as evacuating soldiers killed in action ahead of the wounded, which was important to the ANSF for religious reasons. In the process of developing this relationship, coalition forces and ANA soldiers shared experiences, hardships, and operational intelligence with one another. In sum, these team-oriented interactions went far in developing autonomous capacity in the ANSF.

Partnered teamwork also engendered greater unity of effort in the AO. CTF Devil conducted frequent combined planning and strategy sessions with Afghan leaders, including targeting meetings with the ANSF and intelligence-fusion meetings with the National Defense Service (the Afghan domestic intelligence agency, similar to the FBI). These efforts all helped build a unified approach to security and reconstruction. They also prevented zealot militants and insurgents from exploiting...
seams between organizations. Most important, as CTF Devil successfully fostered Afghan security planning capacity, its leadership role gradually diminished. Afghan counterparts assumed greater responsibility for guiding these efforts. This shift came about as CTF Devil incrementally empowered indigenous leaders.

Along these lines, the commander of the 1-508th Airborne created the first provincial coordination center (PCC), in Paktika province, to focus the various Afghan security forces on addressing common threats. This PCC experiment proved a great success, and so CTF Devil replicated the effort by establishing PCCs in every province prior to the 2005 National Assembly and parliamentary elections. It resourced the PCCs with teams of talented coalition and ANSF officers and NCOs. Functioning like battalion command posts, the PCCs became a key link between coalition forces, ANSF, and often elusive district sub-governors. During the elections and later during day-to-day operations, the PCCs were a key enabler of intelligence-sharing and joint-security-related problem-solving by ANSF units, the task force, and provincial governors. Initially, CTF Devil led all the efforts and conducted all the shift updates, overcoming intelligence classification issues by describing only the “who” or “what” of the intelligence without disclosing the source. Within a few months the PCCs became nerve centers, and Afghans ran the briefs. CTF Devil then replicated the effort across the AO. Every provincial capital put a PCC into operation to coordinate security for the elections, and they eventually provided a longer-term solution to synchronizing security responses.

Because of the trust built with their ANA allies, U.S. forces continued operations during Ramadan, maintaining support from the ANA throughout the Muslim holy month. Afghan authorities even granted religious exemptions to their soldiers for Ramadan. These dispensations were important because Taliban leaders had already granted exemptions from fasting, and were maintaining a high operational tempo during those holy days. Task force maneuver battalions learned hard lessons about this period early in their tenure, but they figured out what the enemy was doing and why he was doing it. They consistently passed on maneuver-battalion best practices that addressed coping with religious complexities to units in other sectors that were grappling with similar issues.

**PRT Threat-based Reconstruction**

At our transfer of authority in mid-2005, 25th Infantry Division’s Task Force Thunder had established provincial reconstruction teams and initiated reconstruction and development efforts across RC East. In January 2005 Task Force Thunder had shifted the PRTs’ focus from emergency support to more sophisticated development and had met Afghan necessities for food, water, and shelter, although these were primitive by first-world standards.

However, CTF Devil had to address other problems:
- An antiquated medical system.
- Limited road networks.
- An insufficient power grid.
- Access to education.
- A judicial system tribal leaders ignored.

In addition, the economy, while improving, languished during the early phases of OEF VI, and high unemployment persisted. Since the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were unable to provide any form of reconstruction, development, or aid to the people, the situation was ripe for improvement. CTF Devil saw an opportunity to use intensified reconstruction operations as a nonlethal mechanism to improve security, governance, and overall economic development. The CTF, however, also realized it had to use this mechanism in a way that did not create unrealistic expectations.

CTF Devil began by re-focusing the efforts of its eight PRTs and five battalions to speed reconstruction, especially of infrastructure and roads—the high-impact and high-visibility projects. Close coordination between task force staff and higher headquarters (CJTF-76) brought increased Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funding. CTF Devil then tasked each PRT and battalion commander to develop plans with representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and State Department to invigorate “unity” in reconstruction efforts. This focus of reconstruction activity threw the insurgents back on their heels. Taliban forces simply could not compete with a well-designed reconstruction strategy. Because cleric-militants focused on otherworldly authority, they never developed anything tangibly positive to offer the population; they could not counter a community-supported project with real-world benefits.
Instead, the insurgents had to turn to religious propaganda, terrorism, and violence, the only tactics they possessed to realize their strategy of protracting the conflict.

Because of these tactics, seeking projects in contested areas became CTF Devil’s first priority. Doing so required developing community support and backing from Kabul for the initiatives. Provincial government legitimacy soared when tangible completed projects trumped insurgent exhortations and attacks. This community-investment approach, discussed below in more detail, became integral to the CTF campaign plan. However, while concentrating CERP projects in contested areas (see the high threat areas on figure 2), CTF Devil had to eschew large, unwieldy projects that had no chance of being completed, or were not sustainable, after the departure of U.S. troops, depletion of CERP funds, or loss of community support.

Ill-conceived, poorly placed, or failed projects would constitute victories for the insurgent IO campaign. When CTF Devil failed to meet public expectations, the people thought the Afghan government and the Americans were incompetent, creating openings for insurgents to wield their influence. For instance, when CTF Devil provided a power-generation capability for Sharana, the capital of Paktika province, without getting buy-in from the mayor, it created an embarrassing situation. After a single tank of U.S.-provided diesel fuel ran dry, the lights went out in Sharana. They eventually came back on, but in the interim the well-meaning PRT created frustration and resentment among the Afghans they set out to assist.

Achieving consistent success meant concentrating on sustainable projects and avoiding embarrassment for the coalition. Thus, CTF Devil avoided going against the grain and focused on contracting projects that took advantage of Afghan talents and the country’s natural resources. To illustrate, after learning that Afghans had little experience with using concrete and cement in construction, but were deft at employing stone, a raw material abundant in Afghanistan, the task force contracted to build stone bridges, rock-foundation flood control walls, and cobblestone roads.

As CTF Devil developed its pragmatic approach to reconstruction, it used weekly PRT staff calls to broaden the development discussion. During these meetings, the task force emphasized projects provincial governors and district leaders would fully support so that development efforts would reinforce their ability to govern. Setting out simply to build and improve the environment in areas of perceived need (i.e., the “red” areas on the map in figure 2), was too haphazard. Tribal leaders had to be involved with informal certification. They had to approve all projects to avoid building a project on disputed land, for instance, and to ensure realistic timetables and community relevance. CTF Devil focused initial efforts on projects that units could complete within a reasonable amount of time (three to nine months) so the populace would quickly see results.

Using techniques learned from successful non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CTF Devil also sought “sweat equity” from the community in the form of resources or labor. The CTF asked villages and tribes to contribute whatever they could afford. The resulting buy-in generated lasting community support for these projects.

As part of this process, the CTF decided to put a maximum number of Afghans to work. Major
General Jason Kamiya, the CJTF-76 commander, pioneered this approach, calling it “Temporary Work for Afghans.” If CTF Devil had a choice between hiring one contractor with four bulldozers, 30 men from India, or a local contractor with 100 Afghans wielding picks and shovels, it chose the latter. Smart Afghan general contractors adopted practical methods to exploit this situation. Not only did they hire Afghans, but also they did so from the local community, which enabled their projects to progress without attacks. Contractors who didn’t, especially foreigners, were often attacked and had their work sites destroyed. Their projects were delayed indefinitely or abandoned altogether.

CTF Devil also tasked its maneuver battalions and PRTs to work with provincial governors and IROA ministry representatives to solicit support in planning and oversight of significant projects. The intent was to encourage Afghans to build their own capacity for development planning. At the same time, the task force sought to incrementally design a longer-range vision. Its overall objective was to make each provincial government more self-sufficient, community-invested, and competent.

As noted, the enemy tried to slow the CTF’s new reconstruction effort. Setbacks typically took place in areas where the Taliban still maintained some form of influence, for example, in the Zormat district of Logar province where they attacked a recently constructed police checkpoint, and in the Puli Lam district, where they burned down a school under construction. In response, CTF Devil authorized Afghan contractors to hire local security in high-threat areas. It also sought local project protection by establishing security agreements with tribal leaders, making the latter responsible for protecting projects in their areas. So, in addition to the “sweat equity” mentioned, the populace had to commit to the projects by securing them. Completing these reconstruction endeavors marked real, tangible gains the local population could feel, but progress came only after they made a commitment. Completed projects with community buy-in weakened the Taliban and undermined any pretenses of its legitimacy.

In following through with these developments, CTF Devil also recognized the need to foster relations with international and nonprofit organizations in country. As the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and development-focused NGOs saw CTF reconstruction successes, they found more ways to communicate with the coalition, and when security improved in different areas, the international community’s organizations increased their presence. A mutual willingness to work together began to build. This cooperation was usually informal because the NGOs, fiercely independent anyway, had to preserve the perception that they were impartial. Thus, they were quick to criticize the coalition if it did something they believed adversely affected them. In its cooperation with these organizations, CTF Devil worked to make “unity of effort” more a working reality than a mere concept or discussion point.

**Systems Approach to Reconstruction**

A well-designed reconstruction effort took more than just selecting projects that villages, districts, or provinces fervently wanted. The coalition had to consider initiatives in a larger context, as a system of complementary projects. CTF Devil initially did not take this approach and, as a result, stand-alone projects in our AO did not substantially improve the economy or security or address compelling community needs. Eventually, CTF Devil moved to a systems approach to reconstruction. It required projects to be well planned and sustainable, and to complement other development efforts. For instance, road networks became favored projects because they often paved the way for a broader system of development.

In one example, CTF Devil created numerous farm-to-market systems in “red” districts and border provinces. Figure 3 illustrates the complexity of a farm-to-market system in Jalalabad that used CERP projects to complement or leverage existing NGO- or USAID-generated projects. This particular system included projects to improve productivity such as USDA classes on low-cost, modern planting techniques. It also included projects to build irrigation channels, flood control walls, and roads connecting district farms with their principal markets. Whether constructing a grain storage facility just off a new road or building a secondary road to a bazaar where the farmer could sell his product more conveniently, the task force aimed to create mutually reinforcing effects.
CTF Devil sometimes had to win over key persons or populations to this systems approach. It avoided building projects in response to requests from government officials if the endeavors would not add to existing development systems. There were exceptions, but they required the CTF commander’s approval, and he granted such exceptions only if the coalition could gain some significant operational advantage as a result.

As CTF Devil executed this intensified, systems-oriented plan, the working relationship with USAID and other agencies began to improve. The task force assessed the effects it delivered and analyzed the issues it faced in areas where traditional development was failing or simply not occurring. It realized that, in some cases, it was better to complement or set the conditions for NGO and international community development rather than try to initiate projects itself. It also found it could work with these organizations directly or indirectly. CTF Devil’s USAID representative served as a bridge between coalition forces and other U.S. aid and reconstruction organizations. Through the intercession of our representative, the task force was able to capitalize on opportunities to reinforce existing initiatives.

For instance, CTF Devil benefited from a UNAMA-brokered agreement, the Zadran Arc Initiative (named for the tribe inhabiting the region), to promote development in areas of discontent in Khowst, Paktiya, and Paktika provinces. It built on the goodwill created by this agreement, started a major road project, and then began building police stations, clinics, and schools. The area had been a safe haven for Jalaluddin Haqqani elements and Taliban forces, but no longer is, thanks to the broadly supported agreement.

In most cases, once the coalition created a more secure environment, non-governmental and international organizations soon followed. The task force encouraged the PRTs to make the most of their presence by seeking the organizations’ input to their reconstruction programs. Combined Task Force Devil tasked the PRTs to work with UNAMA and
the NGOs in their sector to start up or encourage the expansion of provincial development councils. The purpose of these development councils was to set development priorities and bring order to otherwise haphazard reconstruction efforts.

Sequencing and synchronization of reconstruction projects became a major priority. Schools, roads, administrative buildings, police checkpoints, mosques, medical clinics, and courthouses built out of sequence with, or without links to, other projects usually had little positive impact and could even be counterproductive. In one case a police checkpoint built far away from an existing road actually became a liability because its isolation made it vulnerable to attack. A few months into this heightened reconstruction effort, CTF Devil tasked the PRTs and maneuver battalions to review the timing of current and future projects, so the task force could spend subsequent reconstruction dollars more wisely.

The CTF Devil staff started this review process by conducting a seminar on the systems approach to development. The staff illustrated what a synchronized approach should look like and how it should have links to other projects in time and location. CTF Devil asked each unit to re-assess, re-evaluate, and refine reconstruction plans to reflect a systems approach. In the final planning step, unit commanders briefed the CTF commander, who approved a project only if it met one or more of four criteria:

- The project was in a red area.
- It linked directly to another system.
- The specific endeavor had buy-in from key government and tribal leaders.
- The project was sustainable.

CTF Devil denied many proposed projects because the PRTs and maneuver commands tended to invest in stand-alone projects, an outgrowth of attempts to placate local and tribal leaders with whom units engaged.

**U.S. Interagency Teamwork**

A wide array of U.S. agencies converged on Afghanistan after November 2001. Understanding what their roles were and where they operated was important to CTF Devil’s becoming an effective interagency team member.

The State Department assigned political officers (POLADs) to the eight U.S. PRTs and to CTF Headquarters in Khost province. The POLADs had four primary tasks:

- Advising and mentoring Afghan leaders to govern more effectively.
- Acting as reporting officers, tasked with providing information on political, military, economic, and social trends to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
- Serving as conduits of information about the border fight in Pakistan to help define U.S. government policies in Afghanistan at the national level.
- Promoting U.S. government policies within the provincial governments.

The POLADs accompanied CTF commanders to meetings with Afghan political and military leaders. They helped commanders prepare for bilateral meetings and carry out reviews after negotiations or engagements were complete. POLADs developed the social, tribal, political, and economic components of the counterinsurgency, allowing commanders to focus more on military concerns. Maintaining an awareness of these nonmilitary components might have otherwise been more elusive.

USAID assigned officers, designated as field program officers, to all the PRTs and to the coalition headquarters staff. These officers—

- Administered USAID projects at the provincial level.
- Advised military officers on development issues.
- Advised IRoA ministers and governors on long-term reconstruction and development strategy.
- Reported to USAID headquarters in Kabul.
- Worked with NGOs and international organizations to find ways to complement their projects with the development efforts of USAID and CTF Devil. In short, they coordinated development strategy at the provincial level.

The USAID officer in charge worked at CTF headquarters and from there managed representatives at the PRTs. Unlike the POLADs, all USAID representatives were contractors, not career employees. Successfully integrating these contractors into PRT operations depended upon a PRT commander’s ability to integrate military development efforts with those of the interagency and international community. The USAID representatives taught PRTs how to gain support for projects from tribal and government stakeholders, and encouraged the task force to seek ways to link CERP reconstruction...
efforts to USAID and international organization development projects.

Agricultural development in most of RC East proved necessary for long-term economic viability. United States Department of Agriculture officers provided development advice to the IROA, the CTF, and, to a lesser extent, cooperatives and individual farmers. Although not present in most RC East PRTs, USDA officers worked on the staffs of three key posts (task force headquarters and the Ghazni and Jalalabad PRTs) for much of CTF Devil’s tenure. These officers breathed life into USAID’s alternative livelihood programs. They provided advice on which crops to substitute for the opium poppy and focused on implementing agricultural programs like micro-credit for farmers. They also helped devise high-impact but simple projects that enhanced the value of crops grown by desperately poor farmers. That said, the relatively limited USDA presence in RC East prevented the task force from making the most of its agricultural development programs.

The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in RC East, with hub offices at Gardez and Jalalabad, worked closely with U.S. government political and military officers. UNAMA had a wide mandate, ranging from conflict resolution to human rights monitoring. It played a substantial role in organizing the National Assembly and provincial council elections. Harnessing UNAMA’s energy was imperative if CTF Devil was to reach the population effectively. Because UNAMA officers typically had been in Afghanistan for three or more years, had established trust with Afghan officials, and had developed keen insights into the motivations of district and provincial governors, they often served as the continuity in the provinces as military units rotated in and out of the battlespace.

Military CERP and USAID FY 2005 budgets for development in RC East highlighted the importance of interagency teamwork. CTF Devil had $29 million budgeted for development; USAID had 10 times that amount for the same area. Seeing the vast potential for COIN progress if CTF Devil and USAID collaborated, the task force commander directed that development planning involve a concerted effort to bring our two organizations closer together.

From early on, however, CTF Devil encountered staggering gaps in communication, cooperation, and collaboration among representatives of the various agencies. USAID bureaucratic practices also obstructed teamwork and collaboration. Part of the challenge lay in the fact that over 90 percent of in-country USAID representatives were contractors serving under the agency’s aegis and their contracts had no explicit provisions for cooperation. The larger problem, however, was the restrictive nature of USAID’s development-fund distribution rules. Given USAID’s relatively abundant resources, and the direct link between development progress and security, the agency’s bureaucratic necessities proved universally frustrating. Nevertheless CTF Devil redoubled efforts, beginning at the brigade headquarters, to forge stronger interagency bonds and increase collaboration with representatives at the PRTs.

These efforts increased interagency integration throughout the command. The CTF overcame philosophical differences and, gradually, set new standards for interagency teamwork. When the CTF’s deputy commander began including interagency representatives in PRT meetings and the executive officer started integrating them into the staff estimate process, partnership dynamics improved steadily. As CTF staff emphasized each success in their areas of responsibility, the PRTs and their interagency representatives began to develop into a stronger team. USAID, State Department, and USDA representatives increased their presence and influence in each PRT’s area of operation. In the end, these representatives became valued PRT staff members and, along with UNAMA representatives, effective partners within the task force.

Integrating IO

CTF Devil found information operations most effective when Afghans employed them without the appearance of U.S. influence. Information operations messages designed and released solely by U.S. forces often came out too late or were ill suited for the Afghan region or tribe they targeted. Messages were much more effective when Afghan leaders cooperated and spoke directly to the people.6

Thus, CTF Devil chose to promote Programme Takhm-e Sohl (“Strengthening the Peace,” or PTS), the Afghan government’s reconciliation program. Given the success achieved by those governors who actively supported PTS, the task force commander believed that this Afghan-implemented program could become a “war winner.” The task force
therefore encouraged local governors to support and manage this initiative. It yielded significant results when insurgents came down from the mountains and left Pakistan to swear allegiance to the Afghan government. One governor, Hakim Taniwal in Paktia province, experienced noteworthy success with this program. He reached out to insurgents and engaged local tribal leaders to ensure no vendettas or revenge killings would ensue after the insurgents returned. Taniwal then brought in the insurgents, ran them through a vetting process in Kabul, and returned them to the provincial seat of Gardez. There he cycled them through a carefully orchestrated, elaborate allegiance ceremony in which tribal elders swore responsibility for the reconciled insurgents’ future actions. Taniwal broadcast these ceremonies on the radio and kept track of the reconciled fighters to ensure they were not simply using the program to infiltrate the province. These reconciled insurgents typically encouraged other Taliban members to lay down their arms through the PTS program. Taniwal even employed a reconciled member of the Taliban as the director for his provincial support office of reconciliation.

Another governor, Shah Mahmood Safi in Lagman province, convinced tribal leaders to declare insurgents outside the protection of the Pashtun tradition of sanctuary, thus denying them a base from which to operate and forcing many to become part of the legitimate process. Still another governor, Assadullah Wafa in Kunar province, used PTS with IO reinforcement, often calling provincial shuras to gain the support of key tribal leaders. To make a case for peace, he regularly sent emissaries from the shuras to engage tribes that supported the Taliban and HiG (a fundamentalist faction of the mujahedeen) in the Korengal and Matin valleys. He also used radio addresses to tell the people of Kunar that specific tribes were “rebelling against the government” and that he was considering “turning loose” the coalition to defeat them if they did not reconcile.

Each provincial governor only needed a simple prod and minimal support to make his IO program work for PTS. Provinces where governors offered only token support to PTS did not yield results no matter how hard the task force worked. As a lesson learned, a successful reconciliation program like PTS should be the host nation’s program, run by a regional or provincial authority with national oversight.

Of course, the PTS program came with some risks. In addition to the possibility of revenge killings, infiltrators might have used the PTS program as a shield. Experience suggested, however, that the power of one reconciled insurgent on the radio had the potential to effect more progress and influence more people than an infantry battalion on the attack.

Measuring Success and the Way Ahead

While “metrics” of success in COIN are difficult to identify and even more challenging to track, they are nonetheless important. They serve as indicators to identify and monitor progress effectively, and they can suggest the need to modify plans. CTF Devil tracked negative indicators such as numbers of IED and rocket attacks, but it did not overemphasize them. The task force focused more on indicators of success. For instance, CTF Devil carefully cataloged when NGOs returned to a province. Their return implied security had reached the point where they felt safe enough to operate. When Afghan development ministries became involved in quality control for reconstruction projects, the CTF staff interpreted this as an indicator of growth in Afghan autonomous capacity. Similarly, unilateral operations by the Afghan army, from company to brigade level, suggested progress in military self-sufficiency. Another positive area was the number of IEDs found, reported, and turned in by Afghans. The coalition also noted that despite concerted efforts by the Taliban to disrupt national and provincial elections, over 50 percent of registered voters voted anyway.

The combined efforts of CTF Devil units, U.S. interagency representatives, Afghan government leaders, and international and non-governmental organizations were the driving force in achieving significant progress during OEF VI. Overall, the economy expanded, the government increased its reach, a successful election occurred, and the Taliban did not make appreciable gains in eastern Afghanistan.

As aforementioned, the Afghan people were and are the center of gravity in the COIN fight in eastern Afghanistan. Where the people see a tangible reason to take risk and side with their government, the Taliban will lose. The CTF’s job was to help the Afghan government enhance security and win the people’s trust. As in most countries, Afghans will
vote their pocketbooks, and if they do not perceive tangible economic benefits implying a hopeful future, they may throw out the Karzai government and side with the fundamentalists.

Education metrics will be telling as well. Democracy is unlikely to flourish in the long term if Afghanistan does not advance beyond its current, woefully low level of education, one that primarily serves religious dogma. Opportunities for a liberal arts education will have to be made available to help give the people the intellectual wherewithal to resist the Taliban’s otherworldly propaganda and scare tactics. Countering the Taliban with logic and reason may seem too obvious to suggest, but it truly is the answer for encouraging a more moderate religious influence.

Numerous problems remain, including endemic corruption, unhealthy rivalries between tribes, poor infrastructure, a growing drug trade, instability in Pakistan and attendant cross-border attacks, low government revenues, a weak economy, and, as noted, a dark-ages educational framework. Decades of work remain to rebuild Afghanistan. Strong personal relationships and a focus on building Afghan security capacity are the keys to achieving unity of effort and, by extension, longer-term success in the Afghan COIN effort.

An important take-away from CTF Devil’s year-long struggle to achieve and maintain unity of effort is that where the military endeavor is concerned, there can only be one chief within a regional command. U.S. forces should always place reconstruction and kinetic operations under the direction of one commander to prevent a constant shifting of priorities. This was the case for CTF Devil during OEF VI. With eight PRTs and five maneuver battalions all under the operational control of CTF Devil, the span of control at the brigade level was larger than some division-sized organizations, but it worked.

Experience has been the best source of practical knowledge in this regard. CTF Devil benefited greatly from lessons passed on to us by our predecessors from CTF Thunder in OEF V. In OEF VII, CTF Spartan built on the successes CTF Devil achieved but refined their plans based on changing threats and challenges. Such is the nature of coalition-forces progress in Afghanistan, where each successive CTF stands on the shoulders of those that came before. Each task force, with its varied commands (Airborne, Marine Corps, Army

Khost Governor Pathan greets the Sabari district sub-governor during preparations for Afghan provincial council elections, 6 June 2005.
National Guard, and PRTs), in cooperation with the myriad of U.S. and international aid agencies, develops experience and perspective that successive OEF iterations draw upon. Each of these contributions to evolving the COIN fight has helped to place us on the road to winning. MR

NOTES

1. LTC David Kilcullen, Australian Army, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency, Joint Information Operations Center (IO Sphere Publication), 35.

2. 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, had been deployed to Afghanistan as part of OEF III (2003-2004) under the same brigade commander as OEF VI. In OEF III, it routinely conducted coalition-only operations, mainly with attached Italian, Romanian, and French forces.

3. LtCol Jim Donnellan’s 2/3 Marines worked in the northern sector of RC East; LTC Tom Donovan’s 2-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) and LTC Tim McGuire’s 1-508 PIR in the CTF’s central sector; and LTC Orlando Salinas’ 3-141 IN (TXARNG) and LTC Dave Anders 1-325 Airborne Infantry Regiment in the west.

4. LtCol Pete Donnelly, a veteran of Operation Anaconda from OEF I, commanded the 13th Air Support Operations Squadron, and deployed with the CTF. He was instrumental in forming an exceptional joint team for combat operations by certifying joint tactical air controllers (JTACs), training units without JTACs (such as PRTs) to call in close air support, personally calling in airstrikes, and finding the best way for the Air Force to mass effects on the ground. Support from USAF A-10s, B-1Bs, B-52s, HH-60s and USN EA6Bs as well as intelligence platforms such as U2s, JSTARS, and Predator-Bs, was phenomenal.

5. Political officers like Rob Kemp, Liam Walsely, Harold Ingram, and numerous other brave Americans often accompanied commanders on patrol and air assaults to get a first-hand read of the battlefield.

6. Combined operations proved especially effective at producing IO messages and engagements that showed the Afghan people the strength and reach of their government in ways that fit culturally. Often the U.S.-produced products failed because the writers in Bagram did not understand the cultural context.

7. Twenty-four additional Taliban leaders were pending acceptance into the Afghan-run program at CTF Devil’s transfer of authority.

8. One incident during CTF Devil’s tenure perfectly illustrates the power of Afghan-delivered IO. In November 2005 (during Ramadan), a backpack bomb exploded inside Tani Mosque in Khost province, killing a popular pro-government imam and three other civilians. The imam’s killing sent shock waves throughout the country, but produced the opposite effect from the one the Taliban sought. President Karzai condemned the attack and called for a full investigation of the murder. Initially, the provincial governor, Merajuddin Pathan, insisted he would not attend the funeral because he was not a family member, but with some prompting from the PRT commander in Khost (LTC Chuck Miller), the governor changed his mind and handled the situation very differently: in addition to attending the funeral, he went to the hospital to visit those injured in the bombing, closed schools to ensure the community was fully mobilized, called for mass demonstrations in the streets, invited the press to follow him around the entire day, and held a 20-minute press interview with Al Jazeera. The city of Khost united in anger against the Taliban. With just minimal support, the governor took charge of the situation, organized thousands of people to march through the streets and condemn the Taliban, and set a classic leadership example for other Afghan governors to follow.

The authors would like to thank: COL Steve Tableman (former Gardez PRT CDR); LTC(P) Tim McGuire (former CDR, 1-508th Airborne); LTC Michele Bredenkamp (former CTF Devil S2); LtCol Robert Scott (former Executive Officer, 2/3 Marines); CPT Westley Moore (former CTF Devil IO Chief); and Mr. Robert Kemp (former POLAD for RC East) for their cogent contributions to this article.
The stunning security improvements in Al Anbar province during 2007 fundamentally changed the military and political landscape of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (and as late as November 2006), had assessed the situation in Anbar as a lost cause. The “Anbar Awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemed to come out of nowhere. But the change that led to the defeat of Al-Qaeda in Ramadi—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—was not a random event. It was the result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in Ramadi. Tactical victory became a strategic turning point when farsighted senior leaders, both Iraqi and American, replicated the Ramadi model throughout Anbar province, in Baghdad, and other parts of the country, dramatically changing the Iraq security situation in the process.

The “Ready First Combat Team”

The 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, the “Ready First Combat Team,” was at the center of the Anbar Awakening. When we arrived in Ramadi in June 2006, few of us thought our campaign would change the entire complexion of the war and push Al-Qaeda to the brink of defeat in Iraq. The Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who served in or with our brigade combat team (BCT) enabled the Anbar Awakening through a deliberate, often difficult campaign that combined traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) principles with precise, lethal operations. The skilled application of the same principles and exploitation of success by other great units in Anbar and other parts of Iraq spread the success in Ramadi far beyond our area of operations (AO) at a pace no one could have predicted.

The Ready First enabled the Anbar Awakening by—

- Employing carefully focused lethal operations.
- Securing the populace through forward presence.
- Co-opting local leaders.
- Developing competent host-nation security forces.
- Creating a public belief in rising success.
- Developing human and physical infrastructure.

The execution of this approach enabled the brigade to set conditions, recognize opportunity, and exploit success when it came, to create a remarkable turnaround.

Ramadi on the Brink

In the summer of 2006, Ramadi by any measure was among the most dangerous cities in Iraq. The area of operations averaged over three times more
attacks per capita than any other area in the country. With the exception of the embattled government center and nearby buildings held by a company of Marines, Al-Qaeda-related insurgents had almost complete freedom of movement throughout the city. They dominated nearly all of the city’s key structures, including the city hospital, the largest in Anbar province. Their freedom of movement allowed them to emplace complex subsurface IED belts, which rendered much of the city no-go terrain for U.S. and Iraqi Army (IA) forces.

The situation in Ramadi at this point was markedly different from that in Tal Afar, where the Ready First began its tour of duty. Although Ramadi was free of the sectarian divisions that bedeviled Tal Afar, it was the provincial capital, it was at least four times more populous, and it occupied a choke point along the key transit routes west of Baghdad. Perhaps recognizing these same factors, Al-Qaeda had declared Ramadi the future capital of its “caliphate” in Iraq. Local Iraqi security was essentially nonexistent. Less than a hundred Iraqi police reported for duty in June, and they remained in their stations, too intimidated to patrol. Additionally, the fledgling IA brigade nearest Ramadi had little operational experience.

In late 2005, the Sunni tribes around Ramadi attempted to expel Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) after growing weary of the terrorist group’s heavy-handed, indiscriminate murder and intimidation campaign. A group calling itself the Al Anbar People’s Council formed from a coalition of local Sunni sheiks and Sunni nationalist groups. The council intended to conduct an organized resistance against both coalition forces and Al-Qaeda elements, but, undermanned and hamstrung by tribal vendettas, it lacked strength and cohesion. A series of tribal leader assassinations ultimately brought down the group, which ceased to exist by February 2006.

A smoke plume caused by a terrorist attack at the government center in downtown Ramadi, Iraq, 13 March 2006.
collapse set the conditions that the brigade found when it arrived in late May. The assassinations had created a leadership vacuum in Ramadi and, by cutting tribal ties to outside tribal centers, had isolated the city. For their part, the tribes had adopted a passive posture, not wishing to antagonize a powerful Al-Qaeda presence in and around Ramadi. In short, as the Ready First prepared to move from Tal Afar, their new AO was essentially in enemy hands.

**Actions in Summer and Autumn, 2006**

The situation in Ramadi clearly required a change in coalition tactics. We had to introduce Iraqi security forces (ISF) into the city and the rural areas controlled by the enemy. But, even with a total of five Marine and Army maneuver battalion task forces, the Ready First did not have enough combat power to secure such a large city by itself. The Iraqi Army and at some point, the Iraqi Police (IP), had to be brought into play. They would help, but we understood that without the support of the local leaders and populace, any security gains achieved solely through lethal operations would be temporary at best. In particular, we had to overcome the fallout from the unsuccessful tribal uprising of 2005. We had to convince tribal leaders to rejoin the fight against Al-Qaeda.

**Developing the plan.** We reckoned the brigade had to isolate the insurgents, deny them sanctuary, and build Iraqi security forces, especially police forces, to succeed. The staff developed a plan that centered on attacking Al-Qaeda’s safe havens and establishing a lasting presence there to directly challenge the insurgents’ dominance of the city, disrupting their operations, attriting their numbers, and gaining the confidence of the people. We intended to take the city and its environs back one neighborhood at a time by establishing combat outposts and developing a police force in the secured neighborhoods. The plan called for simultaneously engaging local leaders in an attempt to find those who had influence, or “wasta,” and to get their support. We recognized this as a critical part of the plan, because without their help, we would not be able to recruit enough police to take back the entire city.

We also realized that in the plan’s initial stages, our efforts at fostering local cooperation were highly vulnerable. A concerted AQIZ attack on the supportive sheiks could quickly derail the process, as it had in 2005-2006. We therefore took some extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of tribal leaders who “flipped” to our side. We established neighborhood watches that involved deputizing screened members of internal tribal militias as “ Provincial Auxiliary Iraqi Police,” authorizing them to wear uniforms, carry weapons, and provide security within the defined tribal area. In the more important tribal areas, combat outposts manned by U.S. or IA forces would protect major routes and markets. In a few cases, we also planned to provide direct security to key leaders’ residences, to include placing armored vehicles at checkpoints along the major access roads to their neighborhoods.

We designed our information operations (IO) efforts to alienate the people from the insurgents while increasing the prestige of supportive tribal leaders. We also made friendly sheiks the conduits...
for humanitarian aid efforts, such as free fuel disbursements. Wherever we established improved security, we established civil military operations centers (CMOCs) and began the process of restoring services to the area. After securing Ramadi General Hospital, we began an extensive effort to improve its services and to advertise it throughout the city. Prior to our operation there in early July 2006, the hospital’s primary function had been treating wounded insurgents, with most citizens afraid to enter the facility. We also took a different IO tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change. Still, we had to prove that we meant what we were saying.

Experience in Tal Afar taught us that competent local police forces were vital for long-term success. An AQIZ intimidation campaign had all but eliminated the previous police force, and a suicide bomber killed dozens of potential recruits during a recruiting drive in January 2006, an event that caused recruitment to shut down for six months. In June 2006, the Ramadi IP force claimed approximately 420 police officers out of 3386 authorized, and only about 140 of these officers ever showed up to work, with less than 100 present for duty on any given day. We realized that new recruiting was the key to building an effective police force.

**Recruiting local security forces.** Our desire to recruit local Iraqis into the IP was the catalyst for the Awakening movement’s birth in September 2006. The way we went about it helped to prove that we were reliable partners, that we could deliver security to the sheiks in a way that broke the cycle of Al-Qaeda murder and intimidation. In the bargain, the Government of Iraq would assume the burden of paying their tribesmen to provide their security. The situation was a winner any way you looked at it. The tribes soon saw that instead of being the hunted, they could become the hunters, with well trained, paid, and equipped security forces backed up by locally positioned coalition forces.

We began the process by shifting our recruiting center to a more secure location, at one of our forward operating bases (FOBs) located closer to the tribes that had indicated a willingness to join the ISF. This shift helped to deter attacks and other forms of intimidation that had undermined previous recruiting drives. We maintained secrecy by communicating information about the recruiting drive only to sympathetic sheiks who wanted to protect tribesmen sent to join the IP. This technique resulted in a steadily growing influx of new recruits. Over the six-month period from June to December 2006, nearly 4,000 police joined without incident.

This influx taxed the brigade security forces cell, composed of the deputy commander and a small staff of highly capable officers and NCOs. The majority of the population in Al Anbar had either forged ID papers or none at all, so the recruiters had to determine the true identify and reliability of the potential recruits. Insurgent infiltration of the police force was (and still is) a problem in Iraq, and is inevitable; however, the Ready First made use of several methods and technologies to mitigate this risk.

Biometric automated tool sets (BATS) proved extremely useful in screening recruits and preventing previously caught insurgents from joining. Convincing supportive sheiks to vouch for their tribal members was a second filter in the screening process. From June to December, more than 90 percent of police recruits came from tribes supporting the Awakening, and the sheiks knew whom to trust.

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When U.S. strategy in Iraq called for pulling American forces back to large, heavily protected bases last year, Army Colonel Sean MacFarland was moving in the opposite direction. He built small, more vulnerable combat outposts in Ramadi’s most dangerous neighborhoods. ‘We did it where Al-Qaeda was strongest,’ MacFarland says. The outposts housed U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces, and civil affairs teams. It was a risky strategy that put U.S. soldiers in daily battles with insurgents.

Our ISF cell understood the importance of paying the new police to prove that they were respected and their service was valued. As a collateral benefit, the growing IP force also created a small engine for economic development by providing jobs in addition to security for the local community. Each recruit received a bonus if accepted for training. Officers also received a bonus if they served as active police members for 90 days. These boosts injected more vitality into the economy.

New Iraqi Army recruits also received incentives to join. One obstacle to recruitment was that locals were hesitant to join the IA because of the possibility of receiving an assignment far from home. To mitigate this, IA Division G-1s assigned the jundi (junior Soldiers) to an Iraqi battalion close to their homes. This “station of choice” option helped eliminate a major constraint of recruitment possibilities for the IA.

Both Iraqi Police and IA jundi assigned to Ramadi were required to attend a one-week urban combat training course run by the Ready First’s field artillery unit to ensure that they could fight and survive once they joined their units. This focused training improved their confidence and discipline in urban combat, and significantly enhanced ISF effectiveness in small-unit actions. In time, the local IA brigade took responsibility for conducting the IA and IP courses with a cadre of drill sergeants, which helped forge closer bonds between the two services and instilled an increased sense of confidence in the Iraqi security forces.

The Ready First made every effort to help unqualified Iraqi recruits become police officers or soldiers. The most frequent disqualifier of recruits was the literacy requirement. The brigade commenced adult literacy classes, on a trial basis, for the illiterate recruits. These classes also had a positive, albeit unintended, collateral benefit. As security improved, hundreds of women enrolled in the classes—about five times more than we expected. The fact that women eventually felt safe enough to seek education reinforced the impression of improved security while directly attacking Al-Qaeda’s ability to influence the population.

As the benefits of cooperation with our recruiting efforts became obvious to the various local sheiks, more and more of them expressed an interest in cooperating with us. This interest eventually resulted in an Al-Qaeda reprisal that, although tragic, was instrumental in bringing the sheiks together in the Awakening movement.

Securing the populace. Past coalition operations in Ramadi had originated from large FOBs on the outskirts of town, with most forces conducting “drive-by COIN” (or combat)—they exited the FOB, drove to an objective or patrolled, were attacked, exchanged fire, and returned to base. Because the physical geography and road network in Ramadi enabled the enemy to observe and predict coalition movements, nearly every movement into the center of the city was attacked multiple times by improvised explosive devices, RPGs, or small arms, often with deadly results. Moreover, the patrols played into the insurgents’ information operations campaign: Al-Qaeda exploited any collateral damage by depicting coalition Soldiers as aloof occupiers and random dispensers of violence against the populace.

It was clear that to win over the sheiks and their people, our BCT would have to move into the city and its contested areas. Thus, we decided to employ a tactic we had borrowed from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and used successfully in Tal Afar: the combat outpost, or COP. Our COPs normally consisted of a tank or infantry company team based in a defensible local structure in a disputed area. Eventually, the COPs included an Iraqi Army company wherever possible as they became emboldened by our presence. Later, we began to establish Iraqi Police substations at or near the COPs as well. At this early stage, the outposts provided “lily pads” for mechanized quick-reaction forces, safe houses for special operations units, and security for civil-military operations centers. In rural areas, the COPs sometimes doubled as firebases with mortars and counterfire radars.

Because we now maintained a constant presence in disputed neighborhoods, the insurgents could no longer accurately trace and predict our actions. Frequent and random patrols out of the COPs prevented AQIZ from effectively moving and operating within the local populace. At the same time, the COPs enhanced our ability to conduct civil-military operations; intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR); and IO.

These outposts also acted as “fly bait,” especially in the period immediately after a new COP
was established. Experience in Tal Afar taught us that insurgents would attack a newly established outpost using all systems at their disposal, including suicide car bombs. These attacks usually did not end well for the insurgents, who often suffered heavy casualties. During the establishment of the first outpost, in July 2006, the enemy mounted multiple-platoon assaults. The frenzy of attacks on the new outposts culminated in a citywide battle on 24 July 2006 in which AQIZ forces were severely beaten and sustained heavy casualties. By October, attacks were far less fierce, with elements consisting of a handful of men conducting hit-and-run type operations. These noticeable decreases in enemy strength indicated our plan to decimate their ranks was clearly working. Constant coalition presence, insurgent attrition, and loss of insurgent mobility freed the people from intimidation and sapped any support for AQIZ.

The COPs also allowed us to control the infrastructure in Ramadi and use it to once again support the populace. This was the case with the Ramadi General Hospital. We established a COP just outside the hospital’s walls while an IA unit secured the premises. Within days, the hospital was providing quality medical attention for the first time in a year, and the IA was detaining wounded insurgents who had come seeking treatment.

We continued to build new outposts in the city and surrounding areas until our redeployment transition began in February 2007. The strategy was not unlike the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific during World War II. With new outposts established in an ever-tightening circle around the inner city, we wrested control of areas away from the insurgents. As areas became manageable, we handed them over to newly trained Iraqi police forces (whom we kept a watchful eye on), and used the relieved forces elsewhere to continue tightening the noose. All these developments in securing the populace required an accompanying development of key alliances with tribal leaders, the history of which is inseparable from the operational story of the Anbar Awakening.

Courting local leaders. Convincing the local sheiks to join us and undertake another uprising was an immense challenge, but obtaining their support was the lynchpin of the second part of our strategy. We knew it would be pivotal when we arrived in Ramadi in June. The sheiks’ memory of their first, failed attempt at establishing the Al Anbar People’s Council (late 2005-early 2006) was the main obstacle to our plan in this regard. The Sunni tribal alliance was fragmented and weak compared to the growing Al-Qaeda forces that controlled Ramadi in those days.

At the same time, area tribal sheiks had no great love for U.S. forces or the Iraqi Army. Early in the

The police station in Ta’meen, a district of Ramadi, occupies a wreck of a building—its roof shattered by shells, its windows blown out, its walls pockmarked by shrapnel. That is not unusual in Iraq. What makes this station extraordinary is that a city in the heart of the infamous Sunni Triangle, a city that once led the anti-American insurgency, has named it after a U.S. soldier—Captain Travis Patriquin. The honor is well deserved. Captain Patriquin played a little-known, but crucial, role in one of the few American success stories of the Iraq war. He helped to convert Ramadi from one of Iraq’s deadliest cities into arguably the safest outside the semi-autonomous Kurdish north. This graveyard for hundreds of American soldiers, which a Marine Corps intelligence report wrote off as a lost cause just a year ago, is where the U.S. military now takes visiting senators to show the progress it is making.


[COL MacFarland] agreed to set up police stations in their areas, but only if the sheiks would provide 100 men to serve as police elsewhere in the city. Last year there were roughly 100 police patrolling Ramadi. Now there are about 4,000. And where there were once 4 outposts, there are 24, where Americans and Iraqis live together.

insurgency, they had directly and indirectly supported former-regime nationalist insurgents against U.S. forces, and as a result they had temporarily established an alliance of convenience with AQiZ. Many tribal members were killed or captured combating coalition forces, which diminished the sheiks’ ability to provide income for their tribes. These conditions in turn enabled AQiZ to recruit from those families in need of money. Another aggravating factor was that IA forces initially stationed in Anbar consisted largely of Southern Iraqi Sh’ites. Ramadi area inhabitants regarded them as agents of the Sadr militia or Badr Corps, with a covert agenda to kill off Sunni tribes and enable a Sh’ite takeover of Anbar.

Nevertheless, the tribal leaders were still fed up with Al Qaeda’s violence and frustrated by their own loss of prestige and influence in their traditional heartlands. The brigade staff believed that by offering convincing incentives, we could create a tribal alliance that could produce lasting security in Ramadi. To persuade the tribes to cooperate, we first needed to understand the human terrain in our AO, and that task fell to an outstanding and talented junior officer, Captain Travis Patriquin.

An Arabic-speaking former Special Forces Soldier and an infantry officer assigned as the Ready First’s S-9/engagements officer, Patriquin coordinated brigade-level local meetings and discussions. He quickly gained the sheiks’ confidence through his language and interpersonal skills and developed strong personal bonds with their families. He strengthened these bonds during meetings between the brigade commander or deputy commanding officer and the sheiks. Battalion and company commanders also worked on improving relations with the townspeople on a daily basis. Thus, the sheiks’ growing trust of the brigade’s officers led them to support our efforts to reinvigorate police recruiting.

The combined effects of the engagement efforts were eventually hugely successful. However, some staff officers outside the brigade became concerned that we were arming a tribal militia that would fight against Iraqi security forces in the future. To allay those concerns and to pass on the “best practices” we had developed in Ramadi, Captain Patriquin created his now-famous PowerPoint stick-figure presentation “How to Win in Al Anbar.” This slide-show perfectly captured the Ready First’s concept for winning the tribes over to our side.

We deliberately placed our first IP stations manned with newly recruited Sunni tribesmen where they could protect the tribes that were supplying us with additional recruits. This tactic gave the IPs an added incentive to stand and fight and effectively ended Al-Qaeda’s murder and intimidation campaign against the men serving in the ISF. In a significant change of circumstance, the newly minted IPs quickly became the hunters, arresting a number of insurgents and uncovering tremendous weapons caches. By the end of July 2006, AQiZ was definitely feeling the pinch.

In reacting to the pressure, Al-Qaeda inadvertently aided our efforts by overplaying its hand. The group launched a series of attacks against the new IP stations. On 21 August, the insurgents attacked a newly established IP station in a tribal stronghold with an immense suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED). The IPs, however, refused to be scared away. Despite offers of safe haven at a nearby coalition base, the survivors remained at their posts, ran their tattered flag back up the flagpole, and even began to conduct patrols again the same day.

Hours later, Al-Qaeda attempted to intimidate future recruits by murdering and desecrating the body of a leading local sheik who had been instrumental in our early push at recruiting tribe members into the ISF. The attack inflamed tribal sentiment against AQiZ and drove several fence-sitting tribes to support our police recruitment.

A significant leader for the burgeoning movement emerged in Sittar Albu-Risha, a younger sheik who resided on the west side of town and who was reputed to have smuggling and business connections throughout Anbar. In addition to having questions about Sittar’s true motives, some were concerned that we would be placing too much stock in a relatively junior sheik and undercutting ongoing negotiations with Anbar tribal leaders who had fled to Jordan. However, with each successful negotiation and demonstration of trustworthiness by Sittar, we were able to whittle away at these reservations.

The Tipping Point
Sheik Sittar was a dynamic figure willing to stand up to Al Qaeda. Other, more cautious, sheiks were happy to let him walk point for the anti-AQiZ
Tribes in the early days, when victory was far from certain and memories of earlier failed attempts were still fresh. In *The Tipping Point*, Malcolm Gladwell writes that three types of individuals are necessary for a radical change, or a “tipping point,” to occur: mavens, salespersons, and connectors. In brief, mavens have the goods, salespersons spread the word, and connectors distribute the goods far and wide. In Ramadi, the Soldiers of the Ready First were the mavens who had the goods—in this case, the ability to form, train, and equip ISF and new leaders. The brigade and battalion commanders acted as salesmen. We identified Sittar as a connector who could get the people to buy into the Awakening. All the elements were in place for transformation; we only had to decide if we trusted Sittar. When our salesmen decided to take a risk with this connector, the effect was amazing in its speed and reach.

On 9 September 2006 Sittar organized a tribal council, attended by over 50 sheiks and the brigade commander, at which he declared the “Anbar Awakening” officially underway. The Awakening Council that emerged from the meeting agreed to first drive AQIZ from Ramadi, and then reestablish rule of law and a local government to support the people. The creation of the Awakening Council, combined with the ongoing recruitment of local
security forces, began a snowball effect that resulted in a growing number of tribes either openly supporting the Awakening or withdrawing their support from AQIZ.

Although recruiting and establishing the neighborhood watch units was an important and necessary step to securing Ramadi, it was not sufficient to remove AQIZ influence in the city completely. We needed more police officers who would join us inside the city, which our soldiers called “the heart of darkness.” A critical agreement emerging from the council resulted in commitments to provide more recruits from local tribes to fill out requirements for police forces.

Soon after the council ended, tribes began an independent campaign of eradication and retaliation against AQIZ members living among them. Al-Qaeda’s influence in the city began to wane quickly. U.S. and Iraqi units operating from COPs killed or captured AQIZ’s most effective elements while resurgent IP and tribal forces raided their caches and safe houses. By late October, nearly every tribe in the northern and western outskirts of Ramadi had publically declared support for the Awakening, and tribes in the dangerous eastern outskirts of the city were sending out feelers about doing the same. The stage was set for a major change in Ramadi.

The Battle of Sufia

AQIZ did not sit idly as it slowly lost its dominance of both the terrain and the populace. Attacks remained high through October 2006 (Ramadan) inside the city limits while SVBIED attacks against and harassment of new COPs and IP stations located outside the city occurred regularly. These attacks often inflicted casualties on the nascent security forces. Casualties were not enough to slow the Awakening, however, and support continued to expand for the movement.

AQIZ long counted on a secure support base on the east outskirts of town in the Sufia and Julaybah areas. These rural tribal areas were some of the most dangerous in the Ramadi AO, and intelligence indicated they harbored a large support network for the insurgents operating inside the city. AQIZ learned that one of the major sheiks of the Sufia area was considering supporting the Awakening and that he had erected checkpoints to keep out insurgents. Facing a threat to its vital support areas outside of town, AQIZ acted quickly to maintain its grip there.

On 25 November, 30 to 40 gunmen in cars drove into the Albu Soda tribal area and began murdering members of the tribe. AQIZ forces took the tribal militiamen attempting to defend their homes by surprise, killing many while looting and burning their homes. A group of civilians fled in boats across the Euphrates River and reached an Iraqi Army outpost where they breathlessly described what was happening. The IA battalion relayed the information to our brigade TOC, where the operations staff reallocated ISR platforms and immediately called for Captain Patriquin to provide an Iraqi account of the situation.

Within an hour, Patriquin had gained an understanding of the situation through phone calls to the local sheiks. The brigade headquarters quickly made a crucial decision—we would support the Albu Soda tribe in defending its homes. The BCT commanders and staff cancelled a planned battalion-sized combined operation in east Ramadi that was just hours from execution. The battalion commander who was responsible for that area, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ferry of 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchus), quickly diverted his force away from the planned operations to assist the Soda tribe in defending its homes. The decision was immediate and the response rapid, underscoring the brigade’s flexibility in recognizing and adapting quickly to take advantage of opportunities, rather than following plans in lockstep.
U.S. Marine Corps aircraft arrived overhead to perform “show of force” sorties designed to intimidate the insurgents and convince them that air attack was imminent. Next, a ground reaction force from Task Force 1-9 Infantry began preparations to move to the area and establish defenses for the Albu Soda tribe. Because we were viewing the area using aerial sensors, our vision of the fight was indistinct, and we were unable to separate insurgents from the friendly tribesmen. We did not want to attack the friendly tribe by mistake, so we undertook actions to intimidate the insurgents by firing “terrain denial” missions. Explosions in empty nearby fields raised the possibility of suppressive artillery fire in the minds of the enemy. Complemented by the roar of fighter jets, the startled AQIZ forces became convinced that massive firepower was bearing down on them. They started to withdraw, separating themselves from their victims.

As AQIZ gunmen began fleeing the area, they loaded into several cars, three of which our sensors identified. Our UAV observed a body dragging behind one of the cars, evidently an Albu Soda tribesman. The insurgents obviously meant to terrorize and insult the tribe through this act of mutilation, but they also triggered a boomerang reaction by clearly identifying themselves. The Ready First TOC coordinated F-18 attacks that overtook and destroyed the fleeing vehicles in a blazing fury as M1A1 tanks maneuvered to engage. Armed Predator UAVs and M1A1 tanks in ambush positions finished off others attempting to escape. In the end, the Al Qaeda forces suffered far more casualties than the Albu Soda tribe. By nightfall, several companies of infantry and some M1A1 tanks had reinforced tribal defenders, further demonstrating coalition commitment.

Once again, AQIZ’s intimidation attempt spectacularly backfired: tribes joined the Awakening movement at a rate that proved difficult to keep up with, even expanding into the neighboring Fallujah and Hit AOIs. Within two months, every tribe in Sufia and Julaybah had declared support for the Awakening, and four new combat outposts had been constructed to secure the populations. An area previously deemed high threat and used as a staging ground for AQIZ mortar attacks became almost completely secure. Tribal

While Al-Qaeda has been driven from the city, it has not been driven from Anbar Province, nor from Iraq. But Ramadi—which the Marines thought in August 2006 was fully under control of the insurgents, is THE example of Iraqi-American co-operation. There is an economic boom taking place: there are rebuilding projects; the porcelain factory is re-opening next month, shops are re-opening, and better-quality food and goods are for sale in the markets—and salaries have risen 20 percent in the last six months. For as Mayor Latif Obaid said to me in April when I attended his 3rd Economic Development Conference, Ramadi is open for business—come visit us!

members inside Ramadi began supporting the Awakening as well, and security rapidly improved. Once a tribal area joined the Awakening, enemy contact in those areas typically dropped to near zero, as IA, IP, and U.S. forces provided security. Bases once under daily mortar and small arms attacks became secure areas and transitioned to IP control, freeing U.S. forces to pursue AQIZ elsewhere.

Overall, by February 2007, contacts with insurgents dropped almost 70 percent compared to the numbers in June 2006, and they had dramatically decreased in complexity and effect. The combination of tribal engagement and combat outposts had proved toxic to AQIZ’s efforts to dominate Ramadi.

Rebuilding

Clearing and holding are the bloody but relatively straightforward part of any counterinsurgency effort; building the infrastructure to sustain military success is the complicated part. In Ramadi, it was essential to begin building at the beginning of a clearing operation, so there would not be a gap between establishing security and implementing projects.

While civil affairs projects are obviously vital to the success of a clear, hold, build campaign, building human infrastructure, which includes installing government officials and agency directors, is just as vital. One of the keys to success in Tal Afar was the establishment of a credible local government with a mayor respected by the populace. In Ramadi, there was no local governance when we arrived. We prevailed upon the provincial council to appoint a mayor—one acceptable to the tribes—to coordinate development for the city. This appointment was important because it relieved the governor of municipal level duties and allowed him to focus on issues elsewhere in the province. We then worked with the mayor to ensure that schools, hospitals, sewers, power stations, and other infrastructure all returned to pre-war normalcy as soon as possible. In fact, the western part of Ramadi was undertaking redevelop even while combat operations in east Ramadi continued during autumn. This rebuilding effort demonstrated that normal services could function again and helped convince the people of Ramadi that local security improvements were permanent.

We wanted to encourage people living in still-embattled neighborhoods that joining the Awakening was both possible and in their best interest. To that end, we held the first “Ramadi Reconstruction Conference” in January 2007 at Sheik Sittar’s home. Sheik Sittar invited all of the local sheiks, any government officials we could find, and local contractors. Following a brief on all ongoing projects, we explained the different ways coalition forces could be of assistance in reconstruction. The participants broke down into geographically based small groups, led by our five maneuver task force commanders and their local partners, to design and refine plans for reconstruction. The commanders discussed local needs and, just as importantly, local reconstruction capabilities. Everyone was asked to return in March to brief plans. Accordingly, we were able to begin reconstruction in cleared parts of Ramadi before the fighting was over elsewhere. Maintaining the initiative in this way was the single most important thing we did throughout the campaign.

Why We Succeeded

Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective. Indeed, the level of sophistication has only improved since the Ready First departed in February 2007. Although, perhaps
This article is dedicated to the members of the Ready First Combat Team who lost their lives to make Iraq a better place and to the tens of thousands of other Soldiers and Marines who are still in the fight.

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Special thanks to Major Eric Remoy, Lieutenant Colonel Philip Mayberry, and Captain Michael Murphy who contributed to this article.

No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was capable of providing social order and control through culturally appropriate means where governmental control was weak.

Conclusion

The men assigned and attached to the Ready First paid a terrible price for securing Ramadi. In nine months, 85 of our Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines were killed, and over 500 wounded in some of the toughest fighting of the war. Only the remarkable results they achieved, and the liberated citizens of Ramadi who can now walk the streets without fear, temper the grief caused by their sacrifice. It is gratifying to see our model adapted and used elsewhere in the War on Terror. It proves once again that America’s Army is truly a learning organization. In the end, probably the most important lesson we learned in Ramadi was that, as General Petraeus said, “Hard is not hopeless.”

NOTES

3. For the purposes of this essay, the multiple insurgent groups are broken into two main categories: former regime elements (FRE), consisting of former Baathists and other nationalists, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), consisting of Islamic fundamentalist insurgent groups.

This is news the world doesn’t hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious “Sunni Triangle,” is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.


groundbreaking at the time, most of our tactics, techniques, and procedures are now familiar to any unit operating in Iraq today.

The most enduring lessons of Ramadi are ones that are most easily lost in technical and tactical discussions, the least tangible ones. The most important lessons we learned were—

● Accept risk in order to achieve results.
● Once you gain the initiative, never give the enemy respite or refuge.
● Never stop looking for another way to attack the enemy.
● The tribes represent the people of Iraq, and the populace represents the “key terrain” of the conflict. The force that supports the population by taking the moral high ground has as sure an advantage in COIN as a maneuver commander who occupies dominant terrain in a conventional battle.

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Major General Bogusław Pacek, Polish Army

IN TODAY’S POLAND, as in most European countries, there is no fear of armed aggression from neighboring states. There is, however, clear and present danger of a terrorist threat. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are indicative of this threat and point to the changed state of affairs at the turn of the new century. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and other countries reinforce the notion that in today’s world no one can feel completely safe. Consequently, many states have readjusted their defense strategies and adopted a new approach towards terrorism. Creation of specialized units for antiterrorist prevention tasks is one of a variety of measures currently underway by many nations to meet the new security exigencies. In 2004-2005, Poland took the lead in this effort by creating three military police specialized units (MPSUs).

MPSU Force Specifics

In creating Poland’s MPSUs, planners made the following assumptions based on NATO requirements:

- Units must be equipped and established at relatively low cost.
- All personnel have to be fully trained and professional.
- Training, equipment, and armament must be adequate for anticipated needs (similar to that of special operations forces and civilian special police units).
- Units must be highly mobile and able to deploy rapidly into a theater of operation.
- Unit employment requires proper legal police authority.
- Organizational structure should allow for modularity.

The MPSUs are fitted with standard and special police equipment, light weaponry (to include machine guns), modern emergency vehicles designed for anticipated needs, and basic vehicles (Land Rovers, Polish-made Boar II armored patrol vehicles, all-terrain command vehicles, and others) for transporting the basic six-man modular unit. Some MPSU sub-units are equipped with smooth-bore shotguns, antitank grenade launchers, and sharp-shooting rifles. Acquisition of electronic weapons is planned. Possession of nonlethal weapons is one important factor that distinguishes MPSUs from regular military units.

Military police specialized unit modularity gives commanders the flexibility to create smaller units that can be tailored to fit a specific mission or operation. As noted, the basic module is a 6-man section, with a platoon of 30 MPs being comprised of 5 such sections. In task organizing an MPSU force for a particular mission, existing elements (section, platoon, company,
and battalion) can be used, or several modular components can be mixed together.

Recruitment for these specialized units is accomplished through careful selection of candidates from the territorial MP units, Army units, and the Reserves. Selection criteria are delineated in a separate ministerial decision. All candidates must be at least 175 centimeters in height, in good health, and enjoy a good reputation in their area of residence. Candidates must qualify in English, be physically fit, and have the right psychological profile. Although there are many candidates for the specialized units, frequently dozens for one slot, the demanding criteria results in a low selection rate.

One military police specialized unit is already active—at Gliwice, in southern Poland—and it is the only operational NATO unit of such a type. Two of the units are in the training and development phase. The units currently employ a total of 1,500 well-trained, thoroughly professional military police (MP) personnel, but it is expected that the units will soon reach their target number of 2,000 MPs. Poland, as the “lead nation” working alongside the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Croatia, will create more such units, all of which will meet NATO standards.

**MPSU Training**

Military police specialized unit training is divided into three consecutive six-month periods. Instruction is intended to prepare Soldiers in a high tempo environment to perform police-related tasks, to include—

- Conduct patrols.
- Escort convoys.
- Control vehicles and persons.
- Participate in pretrial procedures.
- Secure accident sites and crime scenes.
- Conduct prophylactic and preventative activities.
- Capture and seizure of perpetrators (including armed criminals).
- Search for extremely dangerous criminals.
- Provide security at VIP functions.

Special MPs must also be trained to undertake tasks to combat terrorism. To prevent or respond to land-based acts of terrorism, such tasks would include intelligence gathering; securing and cordoning off incident scenes, organizing detours, and similar missions; and securing persons and facilities. In the case of airborne acts of terror, MPSUs need to be trained to conduct observation and intelligence gathering, secure aviation-incident sites, perform pretrial processing tasks, and participate in land-sweeping operations and other antiterrorism actions. During epidemic emergencies or the aftermath of biological, radiological, or chemical acts of terrorism, MPSU tasks would be similar, and the three units will train appropriately. To prepare for both such scenarios, training requires MPs to conduct observation and intelligence gathering, secure an endangered facility or area, reorganize and integrate with other forces to deal with threats, and dispatch trial-related responsibilities.

Military police specialized unit members also take skill enhancement courses in administering premedical and paramedic aid, parachuting, and scuba diving. They are prepared to enter buildings and other facilities as part of hostage rescue operations, and they are trained to deal with civil unrest and to conduct riot control.

Finally, all MPSU Soldiers undergo English language training. The intention is to familiarize the soldiers with the language so that on short notice an MPSU module can be included in a larger multinational element and function there with minimal impediment. This training is heavily emphasized, and all officers are expected to have very good command of English.

**MPSU Employment**

Given this training, equipment, and force structure, the MPSUs are ready to carry out the following duties—
• Conduct public law and order functions, such as preventive actions (which could involve the use of non-lethal weapons) that produce immediate results in the area of public safety and general order.
• Perform area of operations control tasks characterized by continuous MP presence in crucial locations. This presence requires them to monitor and verify security conditions, ensure compliance with signed agreements, and maintain and update databases dedicated to security and law-and-order issues.
• Direct counter-terrorism actions.
• Search for persons suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, terrorist acts, and other persons who constitute a threat to a given operation or to their own forces.
• Gather information (intelligence) based on contacts with local population and law and order institutions and collect information concerning security, local conditions, and crime levels.

In the performance of these duties, military police specialized units can be activated under the following five configurations:
• As a full or scaled-down force (with appropriate equipment) with its own command and control element when needed to independently perform a designated task.
• As scaled-down elements or units when needed to execute peacekeeping and stabilization missions under UN, NATO, or EU aegis, or within the Polish military contingent of a given operation. In this case, missions must be specific to enable proper tailoring of units and elements. Independent formation of military police contingents is possible under this rubric.
• As sub-elements of a predetermined size (in similar fashion as above) to execute tasks when needed within the framework of national tactical forces or as a component of multinational MP units (in accordance with NATO’s directives for the armed forces) and other international obligations.
• As operational modular formations when required to organically support regional MP units.
• As sub-elements (again, in similar fashion to the above configuration) when needed to support police forces in a crisis or other emergency.

In accord with NATO standards, the MPSU concept in Poland entailed creating mobile units with state-of-the-art training and equipment. Such units could not only support foreign missions, but also augment police activities within Poland when conditions required a greater crisis response than domestic police forces could muster. According to Article 18 of the Police Act, the prime minister has the authority to use military police within Poland if regular police forces cannot accomplish a given task. In other words, the military police have authority to intervene not only where military personnel are concerned, but also when civilians are implicated. Operational command, however, would always rest with the civilian police.

In summary, how the MPSUs will eventually be used will depend on the actual mandate of each mission. Entire units could be deployed, or the force could be structured in a modular form to fit the particular conditions.

**MPSUs Used as Contingents in Crisis Areas**

Besides their role in domestic and multinational anti-terrorism, MPSUs can also meet the increased need to deploy police-type military forces into crisis-torn areas throughout the world for peace enforcement and stability operations.

Experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Middle East has shown beyond dispute that operations conducted in those areas can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase includes massed deployment of all available forces, particularly heavy fighting equipment, to overcome any
resistance. Labeled “forcing the peace,” this phase may involve armed combat reminiscent of war. As fighting trails off, a stabilization phase ensues, and the number of monitoring and control-type activities increases. This phase, “peace-building,” is characterized by initial cooperation with local authorities, the police, and elements of the indigenous armed forces. It is dominated by efforts to identify and reinforce governmental institutions and other structures responsible for security and to neutralize any threats to the new order. The third phase, “keeping the peace,” is generally the longest in duration. It is characterized by the presence of multinational forces in the conflict region monitoring peace agreements, delivering humanitarian aid, and training host-nation police, military, and border guards. Other tasks involve securing persons and property and maintaining law and order in the event of civil unrest.

During the first phase, military police forces are present in small numbers and provide only tactical police support functions. During the second and third phases, however, the military police role increases rapidly. In phase two, MP units perform their tasks independently or alongside military forces. They coordinate with and complement the activities of local police and other international MP elements. In phase three, the MPSUs execute standard law-enforcement tasks. During this phase, and especially after authority is transferred to local governments, the challenges point explicitly toward greater deployment of military police forces.

Since operational deployment of MPSUs in phase three-type peacekeeping and stabilization operations entails their involvement in actions outside of Poland, they would function as formations specifically configured to provide the force commander with police support in the theater. As such, their organizational structure, training, and general preparedness, in combination with their operational capabilities, would be in accord with NATO’s military police doctrine.

With respect to allied forces, NATO doctrine assumes that the national forces will include military police elements that remain under the command of their units. It also gives the overall force commander the responsibility for assigning multinational units a task on behalf of the entire force. In other words, it is up to the force commander to request specialized units to meet anticipated and materializing needs for MPSUs. Such units will deploy as integral elements not diluted by augmentation from other units. The inherent teamwork capabilities of the fully trained MPSU would be degraded if the unit structure were to be violated.

In the region where a NATO-led multinational operation is underway, MP activities are based on standards defined by STANAG 2226 (Standard Agreement NATO), APP 12—Military Police Doctrine and Procedures. Otherwise, generally accepted guidelines established by the UN or the EU are followed.

Current potential of MPSUs allows for the following forms of operational usage on foreign missions—

- As an independent unit performing tasks at the behest of the commander of allied or coalition forces. The unit, at the same time, comprises the Polish military contingent. Such was the case in 2006 in Congo, where the MPSU comprised an independent contingent in Kinshasa, under the command of an MP officer. The contingent was under the authority of the French commander of multinational forces in Congo.

- As a separate force within the Polish military contingent, as a national MP component. The best example is the MP contribution (15 per cent of the force) in the Polish contingent of the Operation Enduring Freedom mission in Afghanistan.

- As a component within a multinational MP unit, present on every mission. A small number of MP soldiers would be present as a modular formation in multinational platoons and companies.
● As an MPSU performing control tasks in the area of operation, under direct oversight of the force commander. A good example is the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since 2006, the operational MPSU has taken over the mandate from a land forces unit.

Conclusion

I am the author of the military police specialized unit concept in Poland, and the creator of the units themselves. Working formerly as the commander-in-chief of the military police, I spent numerous hours in discussions with commanders of various military formations from different countries. I have observed the activities of military contingents in most missions across the world, and I am convinced that in the years to come, the necessity to deploy units such as Poland’s MPSUs will increase.

As the experience from various conflicts has shown, wherever conditions permit, it is better to persuade, stabilize, and reinforce, than to overcome. Employment of non-lethal weapons and forms of conduct typical for military police are the way of the future.

Bloodshed always leads to retaliation, and death leads to more death. Therefore, it is better to detain, to arrest, to control, to negotiate and to mediate, than it is to shoot, providing that conditions allow for such an approach. The military police specialized units are ideally suited for this role. MR

TALK VERSUS DO

Operational theories of design translated into practical applications, or not.
The journey versus the destination.
Which is more important you ask?
Well, how much time do you have?
Balancing the task,
talk versus do.
and do versus talk.
Please, don't concern yourself with time,
until you see you have no time.
Of course, by then it may prove too late.
So discourse and inquire
as if you have nothing to lose.
Deliberate and dialogue
to your very hearts desire.
Peer through that Clausewitzian fog
and examine that infinite potential.
See? There's really not that much to lose.
Explore fully that which may be inconsequential.
and ignore the tendency to do.
See? There's not so much to lose.
Only,
maybe, just maybe
that small difference,
that small sum,
inconsequential really,
which may be measured
twixt failure and victory
and quite often occurs
when the talk overtakes the do.

—Major Edward Lee Bryan, School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS
The American Occupation of Germany (1945-1949) stands as a model exercise in democratization by force. In fact, top figures in the Bush administration, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, have compared the American experiences in postwar Germany and postwar Iraq. This article examines American information control policy in Germany and Iraq (2003-2006). Comparative analysis indicates that the American information control policy was very different in the two cases. In Germany, the U.S. Army and the Office of Military Government U.S. (OMGUS) exerted rigorous control over the media to block Nazi propaganda and introduce the American political agenda of democratization. With the emergence of the cold war, OMGUS used all the avenues of mass communication and cultural affairs—newspapers, journals, feature and documentary films, posters, and radio—to disseminate U.S. strategic propaganda and messages to the German people. Consequently, from 1945 to 1949 the Americans were able to shape the content of information in the American zone and sector. In Iraq, coalition forces failed to exert a similar degree of information control. As a result of this strategic error, the insurgency and other civilian movements opposed to the American presence have been able to control information and spread anti-American messages.

The German Case

During WWII, psychological warfare played an important role in America’s military strategy against the Third Reich. As soon as the U.S. Army entered Germany, American psychological warfare experts disseminated propaganda to convince the German people of the finality of defeat and to persuade them to cooperate. At the same time, the Army shut down German newspapers, journals, and radio stations in the American zone and sector, to ensure a monopoly over information and propaganda. As a result, the information Germans received in the U.S. areas came exclusively from American information fliers (Mitteilungblätter), Army newspapers, and Radio Luxembourg.
After V-E Day, on 12 May 1945, the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAЕF) became the Information Control Division (ICD) in Germany. The head of PWD/SHAЕF, General Robert C. McClure, commanded the new outfit and kept most of the PWD/SHAЕF personnel. Initially, ICD was independent from the military government, but in February 1946 it became fully incorporated into OMGUS.

At first, ICD was primarily concerned with denazifying the media. ICD banned German journalists who were considered politically tainted by their Nazi past, and prohibited Nazi, militaristic, and nationalistic messages that could inflame pro-Nazi sympathies and encourage resistance to the American project. While this vetting process was taking place, ICD began to select and license German editors to run newspapers and journals. It succeeded in selecting a politically and ideologically heterogeneous group of individuals. By mid-1946, ICD had given press licenses to 73 Germans, including 29 Social Democrats, 17 Christian Democrats, and 5 Communists. Thus, while OMGUS imposed rigid political and ideological censorship to ban the diffusion of Nazi, nationalist, and militaristic messages, it also sought political diversity and allowed the development of a variegated political discourse.

Although ICD’s licensed German editors were committed to creating a new, democratic Germany, the division kept close watch over their publications. Initially, it exerted pre-publication censorship, but in August 1945 it switched to post-publication scrutiny. Although the German editors were free to run their operations, there was always the possibility of post-production reprimands that could lead to the revocation of licenses. Thus, ICD defined and policed the boundaries of the acceptable and the desirable in the political and cultural fields, and monitored and regulated the information that reached Germans in the American zone and sector.

During the first two years of occupation, American press policy in occupied Germany reflected the ideological profile of the ICD press officers. Many of ICD’s officers were scholars who had lived in Germany. A significant portion were New Dealers, intellectuals, emigrés, Jews, and leftists enthusiastic about the possibility of helping to build a democratic, pluralist society from the ashes of Nazism. In Berlin, the majority of ICD officers were German émigrés. Thus, many ICD officers spoke German, knew about German culture, and understood German society and history. In 1945, these press officers welcomed the collaboration of the German left with enthusiasm, as part of the process of creating a democratic German press and culture.

With the cold war, OMGUS press policy changed. Occupied Germany became the first battlefront of psychological warfare between the U.S. and the USSR. After 1946, the possibility of an independent and united postwar Germany rapidly vanished. Both the Americans and the Soviets began to use the new German media in their respective zones and sectors to attack each other and spread propaganda. For example, in March 1946 OMGUS forced *Neue Zeitung*, the flagship newspaper in the American zone, to change its editorial stance to reflect agreement with U.S. foreign policy. *Neue Zeitung* became a mouthpiece for OMGUS to counteract Soviet propaganda in occupied Germany.

By early 1947, ICD personnel had changed, and the original press officers had been replaced by cold war warriors. As a result, most publications that did not follow OMGUS’s anti-Communist directives were either terminated or had their editors replaced. In August 1947, Emil Carlebach, a Communist who had survived Buchenwald and been given a license to publish the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in 1945, was fired. *Der Ruf*, a popular political and cultural journal, was shut down because ICD considered it pro-Communist, even though the Soviet counterpart to OMGUS had denounced the publication. In October of that same year, General Lucius D. Clay, the American military governor, launched Operation Talk Back, a counter-propaganda measure designed to use the German media in the American zone and sector to respond to and combat Soviet anti-American propaganda. A strict anti-Communist line was imposed on the German press, equivalent and complementary to the line that prevailed in the Soviet zone and sector.

The Iraqi Case

The psychological warfare campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was successful because it convinced the Iraqi Army not to resist. This allowed the U.S. military to take Baghdad with a small number of troops. However, contrary to the German case, coalition forces did not continue
their psychological warfare agenda after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. No full-blown and coherent program of information control was established in Iraq; instead, the Defense Department envisioned the creation of a “Rapid Reaction Media Team” to oversee the dismantling of Iraq’s state-run media and to set up the U.S.-financed and run “Iraqi Free Media” network. This new, American-controlled network was to function as the Pentagon’s propaganda outlet for Iraq.\(^{13}\)

Saddam Hussein had understood the importance of information control and media manipulation. In 1968, after he became head of internal security, Iraqis were only able to access government-produced newspapers. When he took over the presidency in 1979, the Iraqi Ministry of Information began to appoint all of the country’s journalists (who had to belong to the Ba’ath Party) and insulting the president became an offense punishable by death. One of Saddam’s sons, Uday, became chairman of the Journalists’ Union and controlled about a dozen newspapers, including *Al-Thaura* (The Revolution), *Babil*, and *Al-Jamorriya* (The Republic). These papers published front-page photographs of Saddam every day. Uday was also in charge of several television and radio stations. In 2003, there were 13 television stations and 74 radio stations, all under state control.\(^ {14}\) The government was Iraq’s exclusive Internet provider, and access was only available in cybercafes strictly controlled by the security police. Satellites were prohibited, although the potentates of the regime had access to satellite news.\(^ {15}\) Once Saddam was toppled, the number of Iraqi publications exploded, reaching more than 200. With coalition forces failing to shut down or secure Iraqi printing presses, everyone who had access to a press began publishing. Many of the newspapers and journals that sprang up in 2003 faced financial difficulties and soon disappeared, but according to BBC estimates, there are still 50 daily newspapers published regularly in Iraq, 12 of them in Baghdad.\(^ {16}\) Unfortunately, this spontaneous explosion of media, coupled with the lack of a rigorous American information control policy, was quickly exploited by groups opposed to the coalition.

The Iraqi press became highly diversified as each political pressure group launched its own media outlet. Saad al-Bazzaz, an Iraqi journalist in exile since 1992, began publishing the Baghdad edition of *Al-Zaman*, the London-based newspaper he founded in 1997.\(^ {17}\) The Saudi royal family started publishing an Iraqi edition of the London *Al-Sharg al-Awsat*, its main publicity organ in the West. *Al-Mutamar* was published by associates of former deputy prime minister Ahmad Chalabi. Currently, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the country’s main Shi’a political group, publishes *Al-Adalah*, *Al-Fater*, and *Ida Rafideen*. *Al-Bayan* is the newspaper of Dawa, the Shi’a party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his predecessor, Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Other significant newspapers are the left-wing *Al-Mada*, and *Al-Sabah al-Jadid*, founded by the former editor-in-chief of *Al-Sabah*, Ismael Zayer. (Zayer resigned from *Al-Sabah* in May 2004 as a protest against American censorship and editorial interference.)\(^ {18}\) A single satirical journal, Habaz Booz, is published in Baghdad.

In this context, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) and the Pentagon’s media policies were ineffective. De-Ba’athification of the Iraqi press incited anti-American sentiment.\(^ {19}\) Yet the CPA did not replace the Ba’ath personnel with Iraqis eager to endorse the emergence of a liberal democracy in
their country, nor did it censor anti-liberal or anti-American propaganda. In July 2003, CPA head Paul Bremer III publicly asserted that the coalition was not limiting free speech in Iraq. Coalition spokesman Charles Heatley echoed Bremer’s words. The general idea was that the American message of “truth” would, by itself, prevail over alternative political messages in post-Saddam Iraq.

Occasionally, the CPA did exert some measure of control over radical, anti-American propaganda. For example, it shut down Al-Mustiqilla, a newspaper that published an article calling for the execution of all Iraqis who collaborated with the coalition. In March 2004, the CPA stopped production of the Baghdad newspaper Al-Hawsa, a radical Shi’a weekly, for 60 days, alleging that its publishers were inciting violence against the occupation. Coalition forces also raided a distribution center of Sadda-al-Auma newspaper in Najaf, seizing copies of an edition that ordered Iraqis to join the resistance. Yet the CPA’s attempts to control the new Iraqi press were often futile. A few days after the raid on Sadda-al-Auma, the newspaper was back in the streets inviting its readers to join the Ramadi resistance movement and spreading anti-Semitic, anti-Western, anti-female propaganda. In sum, the rare cases of post-production censorship did not amount to an effective information-control program.

Although its performance might suggest otherwise, the Pentagon actually did prepare a directive for propaganda in Iraq. Appendix 2 of Combined Joint Task Force 7’s (CJTF-7) Public Affairs Guidance (2003) breaks down “current themes” for the Iraqi press into three categories: “positive,” to promote; “negative,” to rebut or avoid; and “unclear or double-edged,” to neutralize. The first category was aimed at developing support “of and to the Iraqi people”; at emphasizing progress and security, particularly in Baghdad; and at stressing “Iraqi participation” in the country’s reconstruction. The positive message would include indicators of improvement in everyday life, such as normalization of the electrical supply, construction of new schools and hospitals, and increasing security. The second category, “negative issues,” would address such stories as “maltreatment” of Iraqi detainees; the “resurgence of resistance, lawlessness, instability, the power vacuum”; “infrastructure vulnerability”; and “delay in establishing political structures.” The last category would respond to “the lack of discovery” of weapons of mass destruction, the troubles finding Saddam, and de-Ba’athification.

The most surprising and original aspect of the U.S. propaganda policy in OIF has been the Pentagon’s reliance on private contractors to spread its strategic messages to the Iraqi public. Instead of organizing a task force comprised of psychological warfare experts from the armed forces, the intelligence community, and academia, the U.S. government outsourced the task to private corporations without prior experience in the Middle East. The Department of Defense mistook a political problem—how to radically transform a society emerging from a brutal dictatorship and rapidly falling into religious fundamentalism—for a marketing issue. It tried to sell its own vision of events to the Iraqi population as if that vision were a consumer product.

In 2003, the Pentagon’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Division, which specializes in psychological warfare operations, awarded Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) an $82.3 million no-bid contract to set up the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). By the time IMN started the newspaper Al-Sabah (Morning), there were already 20 to 30 new, independent newspapers. Al-Sabah became just one newspaper among many, and the Americans were never able to establish a monopoly over information in Iraq.

IMN had even worse luck with television. Establishing the U.S.-sponsored TV network Al-Iraqiya was a nightmare. From the very beginning, disorganization, lack of planning, insufficient personnel, and an inadequate budget hampered the project. Furthermore, the network’s physical installations were systematically destroyed by vandals and, later (by midsummer 2003), blown up by insurgents. When it finally began functioning, Al-Iraqiya failed to attract the Iraqi public because it shunned Iraqi news. For instance, the network aired cooking shows instead of covering the political violence in the country.
Satellite television has since become an integral part of the jihadists’ electronic pulpit. \textit{Al-Zawraa}, a satellite TV station in Iraq, is one of the most effective weapons of the Islamic Army of Iraq, a key Sunni resistance group that allegedly includes former members of the Ba’ath Party. \textit{Al-Zawraa} provides nonstop footage of the Sunni war against the U.S. and Muqtada Al Sadr’s Shi’ite militia. It regularly shows militants planning attacks against U.S. units, the killing of coalition soldiers by snipers or roadside bombs, and operations against Shi’a objectives. The station’s programs are broadcast across the Arab world by Nilesat, a satellite provider controlled by the Egyptian government. Recently, \textit{Al-Zawraa} announced plans to distribute its programs on European satellites; eventually, it wants to reach American viewers.

The coalition is also losing the strategic propaganda war in cyberspace. Terrorist groups use high-speed Internet, pirated video-editing software, and free file-upload websites to disseminate their products. For instance, Abu Maysara, media chief for Abu Musad al-Zarqawi, the late leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, videotaped the beheading of Nicholas Berg, an American hostage, and posted the video online. The web is also important as a mechanism to teach practical skills of resistance, such as how to build rockets, bombs, and chemical weapons.

Despite SAIC’s abysmal failure, the Pentagon continued its outsourcing policy. In January 2004, it switched its media contract from SAIC to the Harris Corporation, a producer of broadcasting equipment with no experience in psychological warfare or the Middle East. Harris subcontracted its TV operations to Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International and \textit{Al-Fawares}, a telecommunication company based in Kuwait, but took charge of \textit{Al-Iraqiya} and \textit{Al-Sabah}. One month later, the CPA changed the Iraqi Media Network’s name to Iraqia Network. The Defense Department also hired J. Walter Thompson, the Madison Avenue advertising giant, to “convince Iraqis that IMN or Iraqia was credible.” Perhaps not surprisingly, J. Walter Thompson does not specialize in psychological warfare in the Middle East—its main clients are Domino’s, Diamond Trading Co., Ford, Cadbury Schweppes, HSBC, Kimberly-Clark, Kellogg’s, Kraft, Nestle, Pfizer, Rolex, Shell, Diageo, Unilever, and Vodafone.

Also in 2004, the Bush administration instructed the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors—producers of the Voice of America—to counter \textit{Al-Jazeera}’s impact in the Middle East. The board launched the satellite TV station \textit{Alhurra} (The Free One), \textit{Radio Sawa} (Together), and \textit{Hi} magazine. \textit{Alhurra}, modeled after a conventional American station, offers cooking and fashion shows, geographic and technological programs, documentaries, and news. Although \textit{Alhurra}, with a budget of $100 million, is awash in money and broadcasts its programs in Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, it has proven to be a failure. Iraqis associate the station with the U.S. and reject its contents, particularly its news coverage. Polls indicate that Iraqis resent the lack of discussion about issues facing Iraq, the Arab world, and the Middle East. \textit{Radio Sawa} has not been any more successful with its combination of American and Middle Eastern pop music and its minimal news coverage.

Television and radio weren’t the only sites of outsourcing folly. On 30 January 2005, Iraq held elections for its Transitional National Assembly. President Bush touted the elections as a victory for Iraqi self-determination, stating in a special address that “across Iraq today, men and women have taken rightful control of their country’s destiny, and they have chosen a future of freedom and peace.” Ten months later, in November 2005, the \textit{Los Angeles Times} reported that the U.S. military was secretly paying Iraqi newspapers to publish pieces favorable to the coalition. This program had begun in early 2005, right at the time of the elections, as a covert propaganda operation to influence Iraqi public
opinion. According to the *Times*, the articles were “basically factual,” but they omitted information that could bias readers against the U.S. and the Iraqi government. The stories exalted the American occupation, denounced the insurgency, and praised American efforts in the region.\(^{35}\)

These stories were produced by the Lincoln Group, which had been contracted as part of the U.S. information surge in 2004. This newly founded corporation was set up by a group of investors from a D.C.-based company, the Lincoln Alliance Corporation. A subsidiary of Lincoln Asset Management, Lincoln Alliance describes itself as a company that provides “tailored intelligence services.” It claims to specialize in the collection of information from “diverse internal and external sources, both historical and real-time”; the “fusion” and analysis of information; and the dissemination of “actionable results.”\(^{36}\)

The Lincoln Group’s covert operation caused outrage in Iraq and further undermined U.S. credibility in the region. The American press also reacted vehemently against it, in spite of the fact that the Lincoln Group’s black propaganda actions, amateurishly executed, were actually rather modest in scope.

Black propaganda, the insertion of biased or false news stories in a target country without revealing their origin, is a classic psychological warfare ruse. It is remarkable that the Pentagon chose to rely on a private corporation without experience in the field when the CIA has a long track record of dispensing black propaganda all over the world—including the Middle East.\(^{37}\)

**Hard-Earned Lessons**

The Bush administration ignored the model of information control used by the U.S. in Germany during the period 1945-1949. Coalition forces failed to establish rigorous information control after toppling Saddam as the Pentagon became more concerned with manipulating the American press than regulating information inside Iraq. Daniel Senor, head of the CPA public relations office, did not speak Arabic, and his priority was “feeding” information to the American mass media, often to journalists sympathetic to the administration’s policies.\(^{38}\)

It is true that the revolution in communication technology has made total information control in Iraq virtually impossible. Yet the Pentagon failed to appreciate and plan for the complexity of the technological challenge. The U.S. established a military occupation ill-equipped to neutralize the information weapons available to the enemy in the 21st century. Saddam Hussein had prohibited satellite TV and controlled popular access to the Internet; the Americans did neither, and could not deal with the avalanche of anti-American propaganda that ensued. Within days of the U.S. entry into Baghdad, satellite antennas were everywhere, making it impossible to control information. Radical websites, too, sprouted everywhere without the Americans having any possibility of control.

Moreover, no positive propaganda message can be effective when the target area is not secure. To succeed as an instrument of change, a military occupation must be able to create stability in conditions of acute social turmoil.\(^{39}\) The German case exemplifies this principle. In Germany, the U.S. Army and OMGUS monopolized violence and imposed and guaranteed security. This allowed OMGUS and its German partners to begin physical reconstruction of the American zone and sector while setting in motion a political, social, and cultural revolution. In terms of information control, the Americans blocked the spread of propaganda coming from old-regime loyalists and competing groups trying to exploit the political vacuum generated by the transition. In Iraq, OIF spawned military insurgency, terrorism, sectarian violence, and civil disorder. Without security, infrastructure projects lagged and the positive American propaganda message was only marginally effective.

The Iraqi case shows how important it is to have a correct war hypothesis before launching a military conflict aimed at regime change and occupation. In 1945, OMGUS allowed the German population very limited freedom and exerted an unprecedented degree of political control. Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067), the military directive that informed OMGUS policy from 1945 to 1947, explicitly rejected the idea that the U.S. was liberating a population held captive by a dictatorship. It stated that Germany “will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation.” According to JCS 1067, Germans had to be controlled and monitored and their political, religious, and cultural activities approved by the American military authorities. JCS 1067 was explicit: “No political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized.
The Iraq fiasco is the logical result of conceiving the American mission as a liberation, not as the occupation of an enemy country. by you…You will prohibit the propagation in any form of Nazi, militaristic, or pan-German doctrine… No German parades, military or political, civilian or sport, shall be permitted.” The directive allowed freedom of religious worship and freedom of speech only to the extent that they did not jeopardize U.S. military and political priorities.

The Iraq fiasco is the logical result of conceiving the American mission as a liberation, not as the occupation of an enemy country. According to the CJTF-7 Public Affairs Guidance, OIF’s objective was “to liberate the people of Iraq from the Saddam Hussein regime.” The underlying assumption was that removing Saddam and suppressing the Ba’ath Party would lead naturally, automatically, and inexorably to a democratic, liberal, secular, pro-American Iraq. The idea of spontaneously converting the Iraqi population to democracy led the Pentagon and the State Department to underestimate the importance of postwar information control and propaganda.

Democratization of the press after radical regime change is a long-range project that requires, in the short term, the use of anti-democratic methods. Even in 1948, there was evident tension between the professed American aim of encouraging a free press and the authoritarian reality of occupation. The military government was aware of the basic contradiction, as an OMGUS report shows:

The press officers were primarily concerned with preventing former Nazi journalists from participating in the new, democratic German press. In 1945, when the occupation began, it was a major policy of the American Military government to guarantee to the German population an independent and free press. MG [Military Government] envisaged a press which would be free of any form of governmental domination. Yet, ironically, MG itself in 1945 found it necessary to exercise certain temporary controls. Many of the newspaper plants were in the hands of Nazis. The publishers, editors and personnel of the newspapers were the same persons who had been carrying out the policies of Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry. So MG set up a licensing system to place the newspapers in the hands of editors dedicated to giving the German people unbiased news coverage. Democratization by force is inherently a source of paradoxes. A military government involved in nation-building is, by definition, an authoritarian regime involved in a project of social engineering. It tries to impose, by force, new social standards and a new set of normative values. Therefore, its actions will be incompatible with the notion of democracy.

Carl J. Friedrich, who directed the school that trained military personnel for American military governments abroad and later served as General Clay’s constitutional and governmental affairs advisor (1947 to 1948), tried to resolve the contradiction. He argued that OMGUS was a “constitutional dictator aiding in the reestablishment of constitutional democracy rather than dictating democracy.” According to Friedrich, a military government run by a constitutional democracy, unlike a conventional dictatorship, progressively relaxes repression and moves toward establishing a constitutional system. Friedrich admitted that OMGUS censored and repressed, but claimed that it did so to impose restraints on antidemocratic elements and antidemocratic efforts.

The CPA did not comprehend that the construction of Iraqi democracy required the imposition of rigorous restraints on antidemocratic information outlets. Its flawed media policy led to the emergence of an assortment of information sources that included newspapers, journals, and TV stations with authoritarian, religious-fundamentalist, and other illiberal agendas. Iraqi newspapers are funded by political and religious parties, and the information they carry is often incomplete, unverified, and biased.

The deterioration of American standing in much of the so-called “Third World” is the result of abysmal failures in two areas of foreign policy: global strategy and public diplomacy. If these failures are not addressed, it is likely that the U.S. will embark on further military adventures that result in occupations aimed at radical change. Therefore, analysis of the shortcomings of the American information control policy in Iraq is not simply a matter of historical interest. The U.S. cannot afford more blunders in this key area of psychological warfare.
1. The Soviet counterpart to OMGUS, the Sovetskaya Militsiya administratsiya in Deutschland, did the same in attempting to spread Moscow’s messages to the German people.


3. By January 1947, ICD had distributed 69 press licenses. Among the licensees were 38 Social Democrats, 24 Christian-Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union supporters, and 4 German Communist Party members. The breakdown by religion was 33 Catholics, 28 Protestants, 3 Jews, and 1 Unitarian. Twenty-four licenses were issued to nonreligious organizations. Larry Hartenian, “Controlling Information in the U.S. Occupied Germany, 1945-1949: Media Manipulation and Propaganda” (Lewiston, 2003), 115-16, 127. See also Norbert Frei, Amerikanische Ländlopolitik und Deutsche Pressepolitik: Die Geschichte der Nachrichtenzeitung Suedost-Kurier (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992).


11. For further discussion, see Clare Flanagan, A Study of German Political-Cultural Periodicals from the Years of Allied Occupation, 1944-1949 (Lampeter: Wales: The Edwin Mellor Press, 2000), 151-82.


26. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, in the Washington Post, 19 June 2003, had a budget of $60 million; Chandrasekaran, 132.

27. Al-Arabiya, a 24-hour Arabic-language TV station launched from Dubai on 3 March 2003, had an estimated budget of $60 million; Chandrasekaran, 132.

28. ibid., 136.


32. Don North, statement before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee hearing “Iraq: Ignoring War on Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in U.S. government Contracting in Iraq,” March 2004. North was a former Coalition Provisional Authority contractor hired by SAIC to build Al-Iraqiya.


39. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 128-146.


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Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity characterize the contemporary operational environment (COE), requiring military professionals to continuously reflect on the roles, norms, and values of their craft. An apparent accelerated rate of change in the security environment makes it increasingly difficult to predict national security opportunities and threats, and the skills and capabilities needed to address both. Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have demonstrated the need for rapid change in tactics, techniques, and procedures and our overall approach to campaigning. They have proven that the more complex the COE, the more the body of professional military knowledge must remain in a state of purposeful instability.

One can define “professional knowledge” as information that members of the profession believe provides meaning and value in promoting understanding of how things work in their field. A profession constructs and shares its unique body of abstract knowledge through social processes. Over time, the existing body of knowledge and the ongoing socio-professional processes that create and maintain it come to constitute paradigmatic thought, a model of effectiveness. As theorist Donald Schön has observed, the network of experts and organizational leaders and the clients they serve who accept this model believe the paradigm to be so unique that laymen can neither understand nor apply it. Don Snider of the U.S. Military Academy deserves credit for renewing interest in the notion of the Army as a professional institution. Snider rightly raises a number of questions about the state of the profession. In two editions of The Future of the Army Profession, Snider and his co-authors express concern over the degree to which bureaucratic hierarchy is supplanting professionalism. Through these edited works we are reacquainted with the essential elements of professions, specifically, that they are “exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases.” It is hard to overemphasize the importance of abstract knowledge to professions. Snider argues that healthy professions deliberately control and develop their bodies of knowledge to service their clients and to compete for dominance in a professional jurisdiction.
If the military were to lose society’s trust in its ability to apply its unique form of knowledge, or if it should fail to differentiate itself from other groups that provide similar services, it would also lose some of the autonomy granted to it as a profession. In one of the classic works on professions, Andrew Abbott calls abstract knowledge the “currency of competition between professions.” Snider confirms this when he says, “The coins of the professional realm are expertise and the knowledge underlying it.” Reflective practitioners and good stewards of professions encourage habits in themselves and subordinates that develop and improve a profession’s underlying body of knowledge. In this article we examine the means by which the Army develops, maintains, and judges its body of abstract professional knowledge. Our conclusion is that practitioners and good stewards of the profession apply what Schön describes as “reflective practice.”

The military contributes to, and draws upon, several traditional repositories of professional knowledge, including doctrine, journals, magazines, published assessments, and various meetings and conferences. The advent of web-based knowledge forums and electronic mail has opened up both formal and informal collaborative opportunities. Robust interaction with peers, subordinates, and superiors engaged in training and operations, or in research and education, ensures the professional military body of knowledge remains in an ongoing state of flux and transformation.

Yet despite these visible signs of flux and transformation, few have written about how the knowledge process works. How is a professional body of knowledge transformed? How should professionals reflect on their knowledge? How should they judge the quality of the professional body of knowledge? What are the implications for the profession’s senior leaders and clients? Answers to these questions are important to military professionals and senior leaders, to research and education institutions, and to Congress in its oversight role.

How Professional Knowledge is Transformed

Educational theorist David A. Kolb developed one of the most intuitively appealing theories of knowledge to assess students’ learning styles.

Today, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College uses his archetype to promote professional military education. Kolb’s “experiential” learning model presents a complex view of knowledge formation. Although Kolb developed his model to provide insights into how normal individuals learn from experience, his theory has clear application as a vehicle for thinking about professional knowledge development. His four-stage framework recapitulates how bodies of knowledge are continuously grasped and transformed. At various levels of internalization—from a tacit state of apprehension to a consciously knowing state of comprehension—knowledge transforms through active experimentation, concrete experience, reflective observation, and abstract conceptualization. The last phase constitutes a generalization of technique to be applied to future experience.

Kolb describes four forms of knowledge that appear at various stages in the process of professional knowledge formation and reformation: divergent, accommodative, convergent, and assimilative. Let us examine Kolb’s theory and consider how social processes contribute to changes in the professional body of knowledge over time.

Divergent knowledge. Divergent knowledge is gained from reflective observations of experiences by participants who come from an assortment of disciplines, professions, and occupations. They bring diverse roles, norms, and values together for a common interest, usually motivated by a shared realization that they face complex or chaotic situations where old knowledge is no longer sufficient. In some cases the situation confronted is so different and challenging and the existing perspective is so inadequate that it necessitates a new frame of reference and model of effectiveness—a paradigm shift. In this case, the eclectic participants are linked by their thirst for new knowledge, perceived by them as necessary for setting new conditions,
perhaps for an emerging profession. They work to reconstruct reality by developing new, sometimes radical frames of reference.

At this point, new professional roles, norms, and values are only loosely defined because learning categories and their interrelationships are exploratory. Informal groupings of like-minded leaders from varying backgrounds come together, all attempting to grapple with an indefinable state of knowing. For example, the Army’s Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941 may have been a critical rally point for a group of diverse thinkers who helped transform a cavalry-based Army into a motorized Army. The quality of professional relationships at this stage is important. Non-defensive interpersonal communications, shared trust, commitment, and enduring optimism are critical to offset the stress and anxiety associated with exploratory learning and the ever present risk of surprise and failure. During this period of formation, alternative professional viewpoints emerge.

**Accommodative knowledge.** Based on shared concrete experiences and active experimentation, accommodative knowledge emerges when newly forming professional networks begin to extend more intuitive kinds of knowledge into forms that entertain new assumptions and beliefs on a broader scale. Professionals begin the process of examining the otherwise unexaminable when they combine concrete experience with action research (i.e., dynamic experimentation). This activity requires flexibility of thought (e.g., temporarily suspending disbelief in other ways to frame or make sense of the COE) while accepting more unstructured and intangible ways of active inquiry (e.g., developing awareness about dealing with an active insurgency in Iraq when known technology does not seem to be effective). In this stage, active experimentation is vital to learning. As experience with highly complex and unique situations develops from experimentation and trial and error, a growing sense develops that existing technology is inadequate.

**Convergent knowledge.** Convergent knowledge is knowledge that coalesces as the emergent network begins to make sense of the world in a collective way and passes this knowledge to other members. Thus, highly abstract concepts transform into realizable knowledge goals and objectives that can be institutionalized as technical comprehension. Institutional performance depends on this more understandable and evaluated professional knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships. The institution begins to formulate rules and structure to gain control over the growing body of knowledge so that convergent knowledge can be more efficiently shared. New specialist categories form or old ones renew. For example, the Army developed its Special Forces (SF) around divergent knowledge about fighting proxy wars in the 1950s, but it did not consider SF worthy of a separate branch until 30 years later. Case studies, readings in theory, and time to reflect on one’s current context and recent activity are helpful to test convergent knowledge in education and research endeavors.

A negative aspect of convergent knowledge is that the uncritical or naïve practitioner may help perpetuate a “cultural myth” as dogma rather than facilitate self-correction of the professional body of knowledge. Continuous professional reflection and application of good habits in critical thinking help members sustain the body of knowledge. They also help the profession’s societal clients make sense of a rapidly changing environment.

Professionals understand that convergent knowledge is a temporary state and work to prevent the body of knowledge from becoming stagnant, blinding all concerned from a more insightful future construction of reality that is always around the corner. U.S. Joint Forces Command “pre-doctrinal” pamphlets and Army interim field manuals are examples of convergent knowledge that extends beyond a shared sense of apprehension and emerges as a more interpretable, shared comprehension.

**Assimilative knowledge.** We see assimilative knowledge when it is transformed into institutionalized technology; for example, in the form of records, rules, doctrine, textbooks, approved lessons learned, programs of instruction, and other structures that begin to modify roles, norms, and values within the community. In the military’s case, tasks, conditions, and standards of work technology become routinized; they are enforced by the profession and, eventually, by the institution’s bureaucratic hierarchy and rule structure. The irony here is that an inherent inertia develops. An institution often overvalues the overt qualities of assimilative knowledge and creates bureaucratic or mechanistic structures that stifle innovation,
thereby crippling professional progress. Aspects of more intuitive divergent and accommodative knowledge explorations go orphaned.39

Overly structured training, hierarchically supervised professional military educational programs, extensive procedural rules designed to standardize job performance, and other strictures can create an intractable situation, a procrustean bed that bars divergent and accommodative knowledge from the field and leads to the dismissal of research outcomes. Programmed knowledge appeals to senior managers because of perceived certainty derived from institutionalized metrics frequently associated with technology. Routine and habit are the hallmarks of technocratic bureaucracies. Such comfortable standardization possesses an attraction that devalues divergent alternatives.

There is a way to address this propensity to engineer assimilative knowledge. Professionals should avoid scientizing and reifying assimilative knowledge at inappropriate levels of discourse.30 When reification occurs, “the way things get done around here” becomes “the only way to do things around here,” resulting in a serious obstacle to knowledge production.31 To put it still another way, professionals must be cautious not to take for granted this seemingly settled body of knowledge about technical cause-and-effect relationships. As they practice the profession, they should continuously uncover and question the unseen underlying apprehension that still exists from the divergent stage and take action to confirm or change their apparent technical comprehension. As implied by the title of this article, this continuous professional inquiry is called reflection-in-action.32

Reflecting on Professional Knowledge

Effective professionals realize that assimilative knowledge can be the most difficult to challenge because its meaning and use can appear so rational as to be technically unquestionable. Overcoming what amounts to a myopic belief in assimilative knowledge is even more difficult because intuitive logic (the hallmark of accommodative and divergent knowledge forms) can be nearly impossible to articulate.33 According to Schön, the apparent validity and infallibility of technical rationality constitute a “competency trap” in which unquestioned belief creates less effective professionals who become the “self-serving elite who use science-based technique” as their “masquerade of extraordinary knowledge.”34 Technical rationality is a perspective that assumes complete knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships based in principles originally derived from Cartesian philosophy.35 This sense of “rationality” errs by applying Newtonian scientific method to abstractions; in essence shoehorning discourses of physical science into the understanding of conceptual mental processes. George Bernard Shaw once defined this trap as a dangerous façade that can be created by use of assimilative jargon, a phenomenon he described as a “conspiracy against laity.”36 For Schön, the cure for unquestioned belief in technical rationality is professional reflection-in-action that is “central to the ‘art’ by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, and value-conflict.”37 In addition,

A practitioner’s reflection can serve as a corrective to over learning. Through reflection, he can surface and criticize the tacit understandings that have grown up around the repetitive experiences of a specialized practice, and can make new sense of the situations of uncertainty or uniqueness, which he may allow himself to experience.38

Schön makes a strong case that technical rationality can dominate professions to the point that members lose track of the interdependent complex interactions that make each case unique. Professionals become—

locked into a view of themselves as technical experts, [and they] find nothing in the world of practice to occasion reflection. They have become too skillful at techniques of selective inattention, junk categories, and situational control techniques, which they use to preserve

...the cure for unquestioned belief in technical rationality is professional reflection-in-action...
constancy of their knowledge-in-practice. For them, uncertainty is a threat; its admission a sign of weakness. Others, more inclined toward and adept at reflection-in-action, nevertheless feel profoundly uneasy because they cannot say what they know how to do, cannot justify its quality or rigor.49

Note the ironic turn in Schön’s last sentence, where he suggests a requirement to accept uncertainty while recognizing the call for quality and rigor. Schön speaks to this tendency toward dogmatic simplification as follows:

When [the professional] is confronted with demands that seem incompatible or inconsistent, [he] may respond by reflecting on the appreciations which he and others have brought to the situation. Conscious of a dilemma, he may attribute it to the way in which he has set the problem, or even the way in which he has framed his role. He may then find a way of integrating or choosing among the values at stake in the situation.40

The complexity of the COE makes each situation contextually unique. Hence, true professionals have to reflect on what the profession may otherwise take for granted and understand how to challenge assumptions. This happens naturally when one sees assimilative knowledge as ineffective; then, the more intuitive divergent knowledge process gains value. In these cases, professionals become researchers-in-action, as professional learning becomes a complex process of adaptation in the midst of epistemic paradox.41 To Kolb, real professionalism involves considering the value of all types of knowledge simultaneously, no matter how contradictory they seem.42

The professional who reflects-in-action pays attention to, and acts on, the environment through paradoxical use of divergent, accommodative, and convergent forms of knowledge, especially when assimilative knowledge does not seem to be working. In that regard, stewards of the profession want the profession’s field practitioners and de facto researchers to be able to challenge role assumptions, normative beliefs, and established values in order to determine their relevancy for the reality they are facing. This challenge demands a soft heuristic (rule of thumb) process rather than a hard scientific one since the quality or aptness of a body of knowledge cannot be scientifically deduced in the same way Descartes applied Newton’s empirical methods to philosophy. Professional judgment requires the challenging of assumptions, even those behind the paradigmatic Westernized scientific view. It necessitates a philosophical perspective that embraces the possibility of divergence rather than an ideological perspective that seems to enshrine assimilative knowledge as objective certainty.43

In that regard, we see the purpose of officer professional development as not only teaching convergent and assimilative knowledge forms, but also creating opportunities for exploring and practicing judgment on divergent and accommodative knowledge.44 Additionally, we propose that military doctrine should reorient the professional community more on collaborative inquiry and collective judgment and lessen dependence on the convenient mythology of accepted technique or “best practices” passed down by authority with the stamp of “science” on them. Relying on the dogma of received wisdom founded on closed epistemic evaluations ultimately could serve to de-professionalize the military through chauvinism.45

Professional judgment requires the challenging of assumptions, even those behind the paradigmatic Westernized scientific view.

Assessing the Body of Knowledge

In a process that parallels reflection-in-action, professionals ideally judge and make sense of knowledge across a spectrum ranging from an unquestioned belief in the certainty of assimilative wisdom to a radical, divergent form of skepticism (see figure).46 Professionals appreciate and judge expert knowledge by acting all along the spectrum. At its best, in a process that entails paradoxical thinking while acting, a judgment appreciates opposing perspectives simultaneously.47

Professionals and stewards of the profession recognize that practicing the art of professional
reflection-in-action is less risky in genuinely collaborative situations where learning is more valued than knowing. In hierarchical organizations, on the other hand, especially during crises, the pressure to conform to a professionally acceptable body of technical knowledge can be tremendous—we tend to value those who have the temerity to resist such pressures, but only if they are right. In that regard, Aaron B. Wildavsky’s concept of “speaking truth to power” can be one of the most heroic things professionals do. The profession should consider as courageous those who speak such truth to those in authority who are not receptive. It should judge as virtuous senior officials who allow and encourage the naked truth to be spoken freely to them.

Successful collaboration in a professional network across the stages of knowledge requires participants to appreciate existing opinions and arguments while striving to understand and appreciate new ones. This can be a challenge when those proposing the new approach have not yet developed sufficient language to fully describe what they are intuiting. Effective collaborative professional communities seek educated, well-thought-out judgments. They are skeptical of dogma characterized by unchallenged and unsubstantiated beliefs and equally suspicious of extreme doubting that bears no possibility of closure. Paradoxically, a professional social system supports both common and uncommon inquiry because they are the lifeblood of the profession’s body of knowledge, facilitating its accumulation and maintenance. Professionals should freely admit that they are unable to judge what they have not yet learned. Socratic wisdom rests on the admission that one does not know when and how the opportunity for learning will arise. The task of collaboratively shaping social interrelationships is anchored in the professional’s shared passion for knowledge—revealed in the sociological theory of roles, norms, and values.

As repositories of knowledge, human beings (including professionals) develop roles, norms, and values as forms of knowledge through a socially constructed process.

**Roles.** Roles are the most visible aspect of this social construction. They are standardized patterns describing the behavior required of all persons playing a given part in society. Roles can differentiate one organizational position from another. A role reflects the recurring actions of the individual playing it. It is appropriately interrelated with the repetitive activities of others so as to yield generally predictable outcomes. When individual roles are combined, people create a “social system” or “subsystem.” In the case of the military, role-playing is ubiquitous. Names like commander, staff member, family support group leader, enlisted Soldier, and staff college professor all represent visible, descriptive role categories.

**Norms.** Less visible social manifestations than roles, norms reflect the general expectations of role incumbents within a social system or subsystem. Norms imply or explicitly prescribe ethics that people interactively create and refer to in order to sanction behavior. As such, norms have a specific “ought” or “must” quality. Norms formally (through
organizational procedures) or informally (through interpersonal relationships) shape the way roles are performed. Some examples we are familiar with include “commanders ought to be honest and fair;” “all officers are leaders;” “senior NCOs should speak for the enlisted population after getting to know them personally;” and, “the military decision-making process (MDMP) is the best way to approach planning for U.S. Army full-spectrum operations.”

**Values.** The least visible of social manifestations, values are generalized ideological justifications for roles and norms. They express aspirations that inform what is required for action. Values are more culturally rooted than roles and norms, and they serve as the often unseen, frequently tacit backdrop that drives criteria for making judgments about knowledge. Like roles and norms, values may be espoused—stated deliberately and formally by the institution. The U.S. Army’s “Soldier’s Creed,” for example, is a bluff declaration of the values the Army wants its members to inculcate (“I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough…”). On the other hand, values may be in use as cultural phenomena, passed from one generation to another as deeply hidden or tacit forms of assimilated knowledge. If the espoused values approximate or are equal to those in use, the profession can approach a state of social equilibrium among itself, the institution, and clients.

**Single- and double-loop learning.** Harvard professor Chris Argyris refers to the process of sustaining assimilative knowledge, in which associated roles, norms, and values go unchallenged, as single-loop learning. In its worst form, the profession, institution, and clients all firmly believe that they will continue to be successful with the knowledge they have. Faith and certainty feed off each other in a continuous loop. Theoretically, in a more stable COE, this may be a successful strategy with which to judge knowledge (i.e., “it works, therefore why look for alternatives?”). However, this strategy is not considered viable in the midst of a perceived unstable COE with inherent fog and friction. As a remedy, Argyris describes double-loop learning, the ability to suspend deeply-held beliefs, no matter how successful they have been, in order to value alternative forms of knowledge (what Kolb termed “accommodative and divergent forms of knowledge”).

**Defensive routines.** Even when professionals and institutional leaders embrace double-loop learning as the preferred strategy for judging knowledge, defensive routines can inhibit the process. Defensive routines are emotional responses to alternative beliefs, values, and assumptions about assimilative knowledge, and they discourage all but single-loop learning. A few notable examples of defensive routines include—

- **Irony of success**, a form of single-loop learning in which a reinforcing cycle of persistence causes leaders to “bask in past successes” and increase their collaboration with those of like mind, rather than recognize the need for change.” Psychologist Irving Janis called this like-mindedness and excessive desire for cohesion groupthink. According to Chamu Sundaramurthy and Marianne Lewis, groupthink is “a pattern of collective defenses aimed at denying or suppressing tensions;” it is associated with a shared comfortable feeling about known technology. Repeated success can help build huge egos and contribute to a situation in which admitting that one can learn is tantamount to admitting weakness. In this case, Argyris concluded through his clinical research that “it can be especially difficult for smart people to learn not because they have little to learn but because they have a lot invested in appearing not to need to.”

- **Faulty attribution**, a process that works two ways: by blaming failure on a mythical belief or a scapegoat, or by taking (wishful) credit for success.
In a way that inspires overconfidence. Both cases reduce incentives to question the real causes of good or bad performance.\(^{61}\) In U.S. Army culture, for example, there is a tendency to attribute success or failure to the technologies of leadership and/or training when there may, in fact, be alternative explanations.\(^{62}\) The Army has a similar problem with non-attribution of its official doctrine (a written source of technology), which is published without proper citation of the sources of knowledge.\(^{63}\)

- **Threat rigidity.** also known as “hunkering down” or entrenchment. This mind-set occurs when already-formed beliefs are retained in the face of conflicting information or even impending failure. Denying or marginalizing such disconfirming information results in psychological inertia, which is often accompanied by escalating commitment to the failing course of action. Using outsiders to assess new information and being open to their findings can help override this type of defensive routine.\(^{64}\)

For example, the Army should seek alternatives to assimilative knowledge beyond the readily available pantheon of retired military officers engaged in defense consulting work and those associated with what President Eisenhower dubbed “the military-industrial complex.”\(^{65}\) Such quasi-insiders bring valuable knowledge about the inner workings and culture of the military, but they may find it difficult to provide the outsider’s view that could be more useful in countering threat rigidity.

- **Excessive use of bureaucratic controls,** which occurs when management overuses performance metrics, rules, and regulations that squelch professional knowledge adaptation and increase the probability of transaction-style leadership.\(^{66}\) Professional problems often call for non-routine solutions. Yet routine solutions are observable in many organizations’ excessive use of management-by-objectives-type performance evaluations as well as statistical controls found in popular concepts such as “reengineering,” “balanced scorecard,” “Lean,” and “Six Sigma.” Excessive administrative controls on the use of known technology stifle experimentation and innovation; plus, they inhibit learning essential to the production of divergent and accommodative knowledge.\(^{67}\)

- **Myopic decision-making.** When decisions are tied to an inflexible set of criteria or a set technology, the result is myopic decision-making. In this mind-set, learning usually entails comparing the results of a single course of action against potentially factitious standards, thus fueling low-risk, single-loop learning while “discouraging more frame-breaking innovations and change.”\(^{68}\) One could argue that the MDMP espoused by U.S. Army doctrine falls into this category.\(^{69}\)

- **Impression management.** In this defensive routine, the individual or organization fixates on a facade of performance. (In the case of the military, this is often a facade of readiness.) This mode privileges form over function, overlooking substantive performance. Impression management distorts communications and intensifies information asymmetries among hierarchical levels of organization, thereby inhibiting effective decision-making and fueling suspicions.\(^{70}\) Such masquerading amounts to a technology of deception.

**Implications for Senior Leaders and Clients**

When senior officials of the institution are also active members of the profession, they should function as stewards. According to Webster’s *Unabridged Dictionary,* a steward is “one called upon to exercise responsible care over possessions (time, talent, and treasure) entrusted to him.” Stewards of a profession are intrinsically motivated to act in the best interests of their clients. In the case of the U.S. military, we might describe the ultimate client as the American people constitutionally represented by elected and appointed officials. Good stewardship entails not only accomplishing assigned missions, but also propelling the entrusted profession to new heights by setting conditions for the forms of knowledge outlined above to work eclectically, simultaneously, and without encumbrance.\(^{71}\)

By providing opportunities to experiment and fail, effective stewards set the conditions for high-quality collaborative inquiry into divergent knowledge. Accepting thoughtful, open, and honest feedback, they encourage and share a passion for creativity among professionals.\(^{72}\) They appreciate the uncertain nature of divergent knowledge and the need to curtail preemptive, hierarchical-style decision-making where it is not warranted. Stewards learn to defer to and encourage those professional knowledge explorers who have the potential to be the artful framers of a transformed paradigm.\(^{73}\) The steward’s role is to help set conditions for *action research* with
other professionals in the absence of the clarity, accuracy, and precision so appealing to the technically rational mind-set. Under the right conditions, the professional practice of action research will occur naturally in the field during strategy sessions, operations, training, and educational opportunities. Action research, we argue, is essential to all levels for adaptation and survival in the COE.

One way those in senior institutional positions can best steward the accumulation of professional knowledge is by providing sufficient resources for experimentation. We should not underestimate the challenges such a goal presents. In the military, justifying budgets for exploring divergent knowledge could be considered cost-prohibitive. Moreover, the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process calls for predictions of clearly identified problems, milestones, and technical solutions. Good stewards are aware that the emergent knowledge professionals report can prompt institutional bureaucrats to converge or assimilate it, entrenching with comforting myths while paying less attention to or summarily dismissing more divergent views.

Deciding too early on a course of action in the MDMP, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, or in an acquisition system milestone approval process are examples of impulses to converge knowledge too quickly. The cultural propensity to employ analytical decision-making at early stages of knowledge development may prematurely close on possibly attractive solutions rather than allow accommodative knowledge to develop further. The wise steward fights the impulse to rush to cost-benefit analysis or ORSA-style decision-making when knowledge is in the process of being explored. Effective stewards of the military profession facilitate multiple perspectives and invite nonmilitary sources to develop theories, based on emergent forms, that enhance double-loop learning. They also convince their political clients to fight the impulse to suppress and under-resource activities in the divergent and accommodative stages of professional knowledge development. The steward’s shaping task, then, becomes a matter of not only encouraging professional action research and consideration of alternatives, but also reducing or eliminating defensive routines that might interfere with double-loop learning.

In addition to dealing with systemic or culturally embedded defensive routines, the good steward of the profession ensures that a diversity of knowledge types is working simultaneously and that multiple perspectives are available. In short, the steward shapes conditions for critical evaluation of the profession’s corpus of expert knowledge. To recapitulate, the institutional conditions necessary to sustain the professional body of knowledge exist when—

- Professional reflection is facilitated by valuing the processes that challenge assimilative knowledge (i.e., continuous truth seeking) and by embracing the inevitable conflict associated with truth seeking.
- Professionals are encouraged to “speak truth to power” despite bureaucratic pressures to conform to a body of assimilative knowledge.
- Double-loop learning and action research are institutionally valued processes whereby knowledge is created and reformed, and where the conditions are sometimes set for a complete paradigm shift.
- Stewards of the profession set conditions for an institutional climate that enables patterned, sound judgments about the condition of divergent, accommodative, assimilative, and convergent professional knowledge.
- Effective stewards help shape professional roles, norms, and values that set the conditions for all of the above.

Professional reflection-in-action requires free and open dialog, so that effective collaborative judgment across Kolb’s forms of knowledge can occur. Professionals who aspire to action-research practices should—

- Advocate positions as forthrightly as possible, but do so in a way that encourages others to question them.
- Ask for a better-supported argument whenever someone states a disagreeable position, or help the arguer better assess the position.

Effective stewards of the military profession facilitate multiple perspectives and invite nonmilitary sources to develop theories, based on emergent forms, that enhance double-loop learning.
Summary

The military profession’s health depends on no small part on the accumulation and maintenance of a specialized body of abstract knowledge. In this article we have argued that in a COE characterized by complex and rapid change, good habits of reflective practice are essential to adapt the professional body of knowledge effectively. To develop such practices, an understanding of how professional-knowledge social processes work is beneficial, especially for stewards of the profession. Good stewards of the profession set the conditions for collaborative inquiry and are appreciative of Kolb’s four-part framework of knowledge. MR

NOTES


2. We say “apparent” because there is little reason to expect today’s COE to be any more complicated than it was, for example, in 1939, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland and the United States was ill-prepared for the coming world war. The same applies to the Korean and Vietnam wars, and during the Cold War, for that matter. Nevertheless, with the advent and potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for other weapons of mass destruction, we think the world is at least more dangerous than it ever has been. For a discussion of the propensities for current generations to believe they inhabit the most turbulent environment, see Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconciling Roles for Planning, Plans, and Planners (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 203-09.

3. Adapted from Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizations and Organization Theory (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1992), 227-28. We would add (and argue in this essay) that knowledge is also about the way that things could or should work as well; hence, it can be unsettling.


8. Ibid, 9.


10. Schön.

11. For example, witness the joint community’s use of pre doctrinal publications and the U.S. Army’s use of interim field manuals, both of which signify the near-impossible attempt to keep up with learning as it occurs in the field or in the schools houses. Quoting Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Gareth Morgan provides this metaphor of flux and transformation: “You cannot step twice in the same river, for other waters are continuously flowing on,” Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), 251.

12. David A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984). The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, has used Kolb’s model and assessment instruments to inform its educational philosophy, faculty development programs, and curriculum. One of the authors recently attended a weeklong CGSC faculty development program in which Kolb’s theory was applied to the seminar-style classroom.

13. This continuum is also explained by Kolb as being linked to the left and right hemispheres of the brain—the left associated with comprehension and the right with apprehension (Kolb, 46-9). According to Michael Polyan, such tacit knowledge is “a way to know more than we can tell,” Polyan, Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 10.

14. Kolb, 121-31. Kolb describes the process of social learning as “living systems of inquiry” and even links these forms to various careers, professions, or occupations. For example, he cites research that demonstrates possible linkages between the science of ergonomics and convergent knowledge preferences (science-based professions). Chemistry is associated with assimilative knowledge preferences; historians and psychologists with divergent knowledge; and, business people linked more to accommodative knowledge structures (more contextual in nature).


16. This essentially recapitulates Kuhn’s thesis about how scientific revolutions come about.

17. For a detailed account that confirms this divergent process, see Mitchell Waldrop’s Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Touchstone, 1992). Waldrop tells the story of how scientists from diverse fields of study formed the Santa Fe Institute, which established complexity science as a legitimate field of study.

18. Generals Omar Bradley, Mark Clark, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George Marshall, and George Patton were all present.


20. Some have investigated the analogy of how ant colonies learn—where a kind of “swarm intelligence” emerges. See John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998). The concept of action research was developed in the 1940s by the late MIT social psychology professor Kurt Lewin, who turned away from a best-practices approach to solving complex social problems in favor of a dynamic, real-time method of theorizing while practicing, resulting in continuous personal and organizational development. His ideas have been further developed by a host of students of social psychology and organization theory. We see prosecuting the full range/spectrum of military operations as a corollary to solving complex social problems; hence, we suggest that action research would be an effective professional military methodology. Variations include action science, cooperative inquiry, and interactive social science.

21. Here, we incorporate an encompassing definition of technology, defined as: “all the knowledge, information, material resources, techniques, and procedures that a work unit uses to convert system inputs into outputs—that is to conduct work.” Rupert B. Brubhorn, “Introducing Advanced Information Technology into Public Organizations: Public Productivity Review 11, no. 4 (1988): 38-59. We would add the term “tactics” as well to round out the definition in military terms. This definition implies that technology is a pre-existing solution to a given problem and that “technical rationality” is the reasoned application of it.

22. Kolb, 97.

23. For example, the Army Green Berets emerged out of the Kennedy adminis- tration’s perceived need for “granted response” in the mid-1960s. The Green Berets have argued that in a COE characterized by complex war and warfare in the COE of the 1960s. Special Forces has since grown in stature and numbers, and, combined with other special-operations forces, has become part of a new unified command (U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, FL). Today, we see a resurgence of irregular-warfare doctrine from the 1960s—a brushing off of old knowledge.

24. The Army Special Forces branch was established in 1967, more than 40 years after the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in World War II recognized the need and established the beginnings of the requisite specialized knowledge. U.S. Special Operations Command was established as a joint combatant command about the same time.

25. Harrison M. Trice and Janice M. Beyer, “Studying Organizational Cultures Through Rites and Ceremonials,” Academy of Management Review 9, no. 4 (1984). Trice and Beyer define “cultural myth” as “a dramatic narrative of imagined events, usually used to explain origins or transformations of something. It is also an unquestioned belief about practical benefits of certain techniques and behaviors that is not supported by demonstrated facts” (655).


27. Kolb calls this process “organizing information” (96).

28. For example, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List, 1 July 2002, where the Joint Staff has codified tasks, conditions, and standards for four levels of war to an amazing level of detail.

29. On the other hand, one notion of success with assimilative knowledge comes

30. For example, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List, 1 July 2002, where the Joint Staff has codified tasks, conditions, and standards for four levels of war to an amazing level of detail.
32. Katz and Kahn, 43.
35. Argyris and Schön.
40. Ibid., 405.
42. Ibid., 406.
44. Paraphrasing Weick, Sensmaking in Organizations, 1995, we include, in the definition of collaborative inquiry, the concept of sensemaking—a form of imagination facilitated by, using, modifying, and creating new frameworks or mental models when dealing with situations of incoherence and disorderliness.
46. Christopher Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978). Unfortunately, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has professed the opposite consideration in Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools, 4th ed. (The Foundation for Critical Thinking). 2004. Paul and Elder claim there are “Universal Intellectual Standards” (i.e. clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic, significance, and fairness) that “must be applied to thinking” (emphases added, 7). If one accepts Koh’s typology of knowledge, these standards would be absurd, especially during the divergent and accommodative stages where the opposites of these standards may reflect a more appropriate sense of reality.
47. The latter, for example, is not the U.S. Army and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies (“SAMS”), which requires each student to publish original research in the form of a monograph.
48. See, for example, Christopher R. Paparone, “If Planning is Everything, Maybe It’s Nothing: Why We Need to Deflate the ppb in PPBE,” Army Logistician, in press.
49. For a treatise on this subject, we consider a potentially dangerous policy perspective for US Army commanders: see Christopher R. Paparone and James A. Crupi, “Rubrics Cubed: We Prisoners of ORSA-style Decision-Making?,” Defense Acquisition Review Journal (December 2005-March 2006): 420-55. There are always solutions looking for problems, and the impulse may be to go to them without realizing the problem has morphed and was never or no longer is connected to that solution. ORSA is the military’s acronym for operations research/systems analysis.
50. For example, see the many remedies described by Sundaramurthy and Lewis.
51. In correspondence with Dr. Don M. Snyder, Ph.D., professor, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 9 April 2003.
52. Argyris, 258-59.
The Charge of the Light Brigade took place on 25 October 1854, during the Battle of Balaklava in the Crimean War. The action has become a byword for stubborn heroism, devotion to duty, and steadfastness in the face of overwhelming odds—but also futility, waste, incompetence, and poor communication. We will examine the battle, the charge, and the behaviour of senior commanders as a study in leadership, using the criteria of “Eight Points of Good Leadership” from the Defence Leadership Management Centre based at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom at Shrivenham. Those points are—

1. Inspire confidence.
2. Motivate others to follow.
3. Raise the goals of others (at personal risk).
4. Build a team.
5. Provide a personal example of physical/or moral bravery, or both.
6. Achieve the task.
7. Instill and maintain discipline.
8. Delegate authority.

If the horses, colourful uniforms, swords, and lances of the Light Brigade seem far removed, it is worth remembering that the Crimean War marks the boundary between Napoleonic and modern warfare. The Crimean War saw the first use of military telecommunications, percussion rifles, railroads, and war correspondents. It was expeditionary warfare mounted by what might be termed, with only the slightest hint of irony, a “coalition of the willing.”

Background

In September 1854, a force of 51,000 British, French, and Turkish infantry, 1,000 British cavalry, and 128 guns came ashore at Calamita Bay, 30 miles north of Sevastopol in the Crimean Peninsula. The operation was a response by the great imperial powers, Britain and France, to a change in the balance...
of power in the region. Russia, seeking to expand its empire, had used the Orthodox religion of Ottoman subjects in the Balkans as a pretext to install a protectorate over them. After failed attempts at diplomacy, Russia and Turkey went to war, with the Russian Navy inflicting a serious defeat on a Turkish flotilla at Sinope (November 1853), raising the possibility that Russia would overrun the declining Ottoman Empire and gain unchallenged access through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles into the Mediterranean Sea. The prospect of the Russian Black Sea fleet sailing into the Mediterranean and disrupting their global trade routes was sufficiently alarming for Britain and France to set aside their ongoing enmity and support another former enemy, the Ottoman Turks.

Following the joint British and French declaration of war on Russia (28 March 1854), an allied expeditionary force landed at Varna to oppose the Russians in the Balkans. The Russians withdrew, and in September 1854 the allied force embarked for the Crimea. The allies’ aim was to deliver “a blow that would cripple Russian naval power . . . for a generation.” Hence, they would lay siege to (and in due course capture) the Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

Leaders

Overall command of the allied force rested jointly with the British commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Lord Raglan, and the French commander-in-chief, General François Canrobert. Prince Aleksandr Menshikov led the Russian Army, with General Pavel Liprandi as his second in command. The British cavalry division, the focus of this article, consisted of two units, the Heavy Brigade and the Light Brigade. The divisional commander was Lieutenant General George Bingham, the Earl of Lucan. Lucan’s Heavy Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Sir James Scarlett, while the Light Brigade was commanded by Lucan’s brother-in-law, Major General James Brudenell, the Earl of Cardigan. Cardigan and Lucan loathed each other, and their mutual hatred was common knowledge. They were not generally on speaking terms. This bar to effective communication would later prevent Raglan’s intentions for the Light Brigade from being conveyed accurately through Lucan to Cardigan and the Light Brigade.

All the key British leaders were from the same social group: wealthy aristocrats, they were born to lead, ferociously proud, tough, and brave. Their job was to lead their men from the front. The men would follow their officers into the very jaws of hell, unquestioningly, out of discipline and loyalty to their regiment and their leaders.

The Battle of Balaklava

The Battle of Balaklava was a Russian attempt to break the siege of Sevastopol. The battlefield consists of two valleys divided by low hills. The south valley is almost four miles in length and one mile wide. It is bordered by the Causeway Heights (300 feet high), along which runs the Vorontsov Road. The north valley runs from the Sapouné Ridge in the west to the River Chernaya in the east. It is 4.5 miles long and 1.5 miles wide. Lord Raglan and his staff were on the Sapouné Ridge with a good view of both valleys. From his vantage point, the two valleys looked like one broad plain made up of shallow valleys with low hills bordering either side. The Causeway Heights would have seemed to blend into the higher range of hills at the eastern end of the “plain.” The Fedioukine Hills on the left and Causeway Heights on the right appeared to rise so gradually that they would not have seemed to be hills. Straight ahead of Raglan, at a distance of about 4.5 miles, was a distinctive round-topped hill about 700 feet above sea level. Raglan was able to view the panorama of the battlefield, but he was unaware that this hill hampered the cavalry’s view on the valley floor.
At 0500 on 25 October, General Liprandi crossed the River Chernaya with about 25,000 men and proceeded to attack Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 redoubts on the Causeway Heights, held by Turkish troops. Lucan saw the attacks and sent an aide-de-camp (ADC) to inform Raglan. The Russians quickly “took the forts with seven guns, occupied by the Turks, who instantly ran away.” The enemy then broke through into the south valley to within striking distance of the British garrison at Balaklava.

Raglan reached the escarpment of the Sapouné Ridge at 0730 and sent instructions via his ADC, Captain Ewart, to the commander of the 4th Division, Lieutenant General Sir George Cathcart, telling him to move his division immediately to the assistance of the Turks. Cathcart, however, refused to do so, insisting that “the greater portion of my men have only [just] come from the trenches” where they were bivouacked. Cathcart declined to act even after being told that the Turks were leaving “in full flight.” It took Captain Ewart three attempts before he succeeded in getting the general to move. Cathcart clearly felt that his men were in no fit state to face the enemy; nevertheless, this is a blatant example of an officer disobeying his superior’s orders.

Raglan then ordered Lucan to move to support the Turks: “Cavalry to take ground to the left of the second line of redoubts occupied by Turks.” The cavalry was placed just beneath the unfinished no. 6 redoubt. Cossacks were then seen swarming over the Causeway Heights into the south valley. As soon as the Cossacks saw Cardigan’s 13th Light Dragoons draw swords, they were intimidated and retreated back over the Heights. Raglan then issued his second order to Lucan: “Eight squadrons of Heavy Dragoons to be detached towards Balaklava to support the Turks who are wavering.”

The Russian cavalry advanced again into the south valley and divided into two groups. Their advance was halted and turned back by two extraordinary actions.

**The Thin Red Line.** Seeing that his infantrymen were all that stood between a large force of Russian cavalry and the British base at Balaklava, Major General Sir Colin Campbell, commanding the British 93rd (Highland) Regiment, formed his men into a long line of two ranks, later immortalised as the “Thin Red Line,” to block the Russian advance. Two hundred years of experience dictated that the only way infantry in the open could resist cavalry was to form a defensive square, but Campbell shouted, “Ninety Third! There’s no retreat from here! Ye must stand!” His leadership and the Highlanders’ *esprit de corps* ensured that the 93rd stood their ground.

This should have been the first of the day’s heroic defeats. However, emboldened by their commander and armed with new rifled percussion muskets, the ’53 Pattern Enfield, the Highlanders were able to place two aimed volleys into the charging Russian cavalry, stopping them dead in their tracks. In short, Campbell’s leadership, combined with a significant advance in military technology, turned what should have been a debacle into a stirring victory.

**The Charge of the Heavy Brigade.** The second column of Russian cavalry, under General Ryzhov, was driven back by Brigadier General Scarlett’s Heavy Brigade. Ignoring conventional wisdom, the
Heavy Brigade charged uphill against the oncoming Russians, who not only had the advantage of the slope, but also outflanked the British cavalry. This time, the first seven points of leadership were combined with the element of tactical surprise, as Scarlett’s attack was what the Russians least expected. The Russian cavalry were shocked and surprised: they broke and fled back towards the north valley. As a result, the charge of the Heavy Brigade succeeded in boosting the reputation of the British cavalry in Russian eyes.

While the Heavy Brigade was engaging the enemy in the south valley, the Light Brigade was at the western end of the north valley. Fleeing the Heavies, the Russian cavalry recrossed the Causeway Heights into the north valley and thereby gave the Light Brigade an opportunity to attack them. However, Cardigan failed to take the initiative, even though one of his subordinates, Captain Morris of the 17th Lancers, urged him to. What Morris did not know was that Cardigan had been “ordered into a particular position by the Lieutenant-General [Lucan], with orders on no account to leave it, and to defend it against any attack of the Russians.” This is an obvious example of abiding by orders even though it might have seemed wiser not to do so. Interestingly, Lucan later gave a different version of his order: “Well, you remember that you are placed here by Raglan himself for the defence of this position. My instructions to you are to attack anything and everything that shall come within reach of you, but you will be careful of columns or squares of infantry.” This is not the place to discuss which man, Cardigan or Lucan, was telling the truth, but it is quite clear that Lucan had failed to delegate effectively, to build a team, or to instill discipline in his unruly subordinate, and therefore failed to achieve the task.

The Charge of the Light Brigade

By 0930, the British had stabilized the potentially disastrous situation caused by the collapse of the Turkish troops on the Causeway Heights, but they had missed an opportunity to inflict a heavy blow on the Russians as they withdrew. Campbell and Scarlett had demonstrated leadership in extremis, taking risks which, due to the quality of their troops and equipment, paid off. Cathcart and Cardigan, however, had been overcautious and lacking in offensive spirit. In Cathcart’s case, this resulted in the loss of the Turkish redoubts, in Cardigan’s, a missed opportunity to reinforce the successes of the 93d and the Heavy Brigade by striking the Russian cavalry as it withdrew.

Hence, the south valley was held by Scarlett’s Heavy Brigade, on the ridge near redoubt no. 4, and the north valley by Cardigan’s Light Brigade. A horseman in the north valley, however, could not see what was happening in the south valley. This fact is of crucial importance. Raglan, looking down from the Sapouné Ridge, should not only have been aware of this, but should have taken it into consideration when issuing subsequent orders. To his front Raglan could see the Russian cavalry re-forming at the far end of the north valley behind a battery of eight guns. Raglan’s original aim had been to use infantry to block the route to the depot at Balaklava and keep the cavalry safe. The Light Brigade was below him, underneath the escarpment close to redoubt no. 6. Raglan wished to advance Cathcart’s 4th Infantry Division along the line of the Causeway Heights, retaking the Turkish redoubts from the east. The second front was to be the Duke of Cambridge’s 1st Division, which would cross the south valley and support the 4th Division. However, by 1015 the 4th Division had still not reached the
Heights and was therefore unable to prevent the Russians from removing the Turkish guns.

Lord Raglan then issued his Third Order to Lucan, which stated, “Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the Heights. They will be supported by infantry which have been ordered. [to?] Advance on two fronts.” Raglan’s order was imprecise and did not clarify whether the cavalry or infantry were to advance on two fronts. What ensued is a good example of the confusion that can arise from imprecise orders. As orders were delivered by a “galloper,” a mounted officer, it was usual for additional explanation to be delivered verbally. Nevertheless, it is quite plain that from the outset, Raglan was unable to place himself in his subordinates’ positions, neither geographically, in terms of what they could or could not see of the battlefield, nor tactically, in terms of understanding his intent. It is possible that Lucan thought he was to wait for the infantry and that there would then be a combined advance to retake the redoubts. If so, Lucan was wrong. However, his misunderstanding was reasonable given the imprecise wording of the order, Raglan’s earlier restraint in using the cavalry, and the fact that it was against military doctrine to launch cavalry without support against fixed positions of infantry and artillery—retaking and holding defensive positions was the job of the infantry.

From Cardigan’s position at the western end of the north valley, he could see that both hills on either side were covered with Russian riflemen and artillery. He consequently sent a message to Lucan informing him of this fact. From Raglan’s perspective, the Russians could be seen preparing to remove the captured Turkish guns from the redoubts on top of the Causeway Heights. As the loss of field guns was considered a humiliation in the 19th century, it could not be allowed to go unchallenged. With the infantry nowhere to be seen, the only troops available were the cavalrymen of the Light Brigade. On Raglan’s direction, General Airey wrote the infamous Fourth Order to Lucan: “Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop Horse Artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. R. Airey. Immediate.” The Fourth Order is another example of Raglan’s badly worded orders, and its interpretation has been the subject of intense debate. Airey’s ADC, Captain Lewis Nolan of the 15th Hussars, was to deliver the message. As the C-in-C’s messenger, he was expected to understand the message and be able to explain its contents. It is probable that Nolan was fully briefed on the exact meaning of the order, or at least was confident that he understood its intent. This was a moment for decisive action, if the humiliation of losing the guns were to be avoided, and it is likely Nolan was highly excited and impatient to deliver the message. Indeed, just as he was about to set off, he was overheard by Brigadier-General Hugh Rose shouting “I’ll lead them myself, I’ll lead them out.” Raglan called after him: “Tell Lord Lucan the cavalry is to attack immediately.” Nolan held strong opinions about the correct use of cavalry and had, to the horror of other officers, published books on the subject. Nolan galloped down the escarpment and delivered Raglan’s order to Lucan. The text made no sense to
Lucan as the Russian attempts to remove the guns from the captured redoubts could not be seen from the valley floor. Raglan and his staff failed to grasp that their perspective from the top of the Sapouné Ridge was not the same as that of Lucan and Cardigan in the valley below. In addition, Raglan’s order raised a number of questions. Which front, indeed whose front, was Lucan meant to advance to so immediately? What about the infantry he had been told to wait for in the Third Order? That order had mentioned two fronts but from where he stood his view was mostly blocked by redoubt no. 4.

Unlike Raglan, Lucan could not see the Russians attempting to remove the Turkish artillery from the redoubts on the Causeway Heights. He could only see guns on the Fedioukine Hills and in the north valley. However, the captured guns in the redoubts had been firing at his troops all morning, so Lucan was certainly aware of their existence, even though he was unaware of the Russians removing them. The order had stated, “Troop horse artillery may accompany.” What was meant by “may”? Was it that Lucan could use them if he wished? Was it that Raglan was not certain whether or not the horse artillery would accompany. “French cavalry is on your left.” What was the significance of that part of the order? Had they been told to accompany Lucan’s forces? Was Lucan expected to ride over half a mile to the French cavalry and check for himself? Finally, there was the word “immediate.” If Lucan were to ride over to the French, it would take time and “immediate” obviously ruled out that possibility.

On receiving Raglan’s order, Lucan began “to urge the uselessness of such an attack and the dangers attending it.” The only enemy guns which he could see were those on the Fedioukine Hills and in the north valley. Lucan asked Nolan, “Attack, sir! Attack what? What guns?” Where are we to advance to?” Nolan, with his arms outstretched towards the Russian cavalry position behind its guns at the far end of the north valley, replied “There are the enemy, and there are the guns!”

It can be argued that Lucan, as the commanding officer of the cavalry, should have interrogated Nolan and ascertained Raglan’s intent. The fact that he failed to do so resulted in a considerable amount of blame for the outcome of the subsequent action being apportioned to him. It is possible that Lucan thought there might be some overriding reason why Raglan wanted him to send the Light Brigade down the north valley, since he knew that Raglan, being on an elevated position, had a better view of the battlefield than he did.

However, it is probable that Lucan did indeed know what he was meant to attack. This is suggested by the fact that two days later he stated in a report to Lord Raglan, “The Division took up a position with a view of supporting an attack upon the Heights when being instructed to make a rapid advance to the front to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns lost by the Turkish troops in the morning. I ordered the Light Brigade to advance in two lines, and supported them with the Heavy Brigade.” This suggests that Lucan was aware of which guns he should retrieve, namely those on the Causeway Heights. This being so, why did he order the Light Brigade to charge down the north valley?

Lord Cardigan later wrote, “The Light Cavalry Brigade was suddenly ordered to mount; and Lord Lucan then came to our front and ordered me to attack the Russians in the valley—I replied, ‘Certainly Sir but allow me to point out to you that the Russians have a Battery in the Valley in our front and Batteries and Riflemen on each flank”—Lord Lucan said ‘I cannot help that, it is Lord Raglan’s positive order that the Light Brigade attacks immediately.’ . . . We advanced directly upon and in face of the Battery which directed a murderous fire on the whole Brigade advancing.’” So why did Nolan not correct anybody when it became clear that the wrong guns were about to be charged? After all, he was within earshot of Cardigan when the latter received his orders. Was this because the excitable Nolan wished “to lead the charge out,” as he had admitted within earshot of Brigadier-General Rose?

As the Light Brigade, consisting of 5 regiments amounting to 673 lancers, hussars and light dragoons, advanced down the valley towards the Russian guns, Captain Nolan must have realized, finally, that the attack was about to go awry. He veered off toward the Causeway Heights on the right, shouting and gesticulating wildly in an attempt to wheel the brigade toward the redoubts. It seems as though he were trying to tell Cardigan and the rest of the Light Brigade that they were charging in the wrong direction. Before he could make himself understood, however, he was killed by a fragment of shrapnel.
Once again British troops ignored the military doctrine of the day, this time charging an artillery position about a mile down the valley while exposed to fire from both flanks throughout. Despite the lethal fire, Cardigan “managed to keep the line and a regulated charging pace until they were within 80 yards of the Russian guns at the far end of the valley. These guns then fired simultaneously, filling the air with thick smoke and flying metal.” He was then attacked by two Cossacks on the instructions of Prince Radziwill, who wanted Cardigan taken prisoner. Cardigan “kept his sword at the slope” and did not attempt to defend himself, as he felt it was no part of a major general’s duty to fight private soldiers. He also refused to surrender, and though he was slightly wounded in the hip, satisfied himself “that there was nothing he could usefully do without first following the Light Brigade’s retreat back up the valley.”

Lucan, meanwhile, on entering the mouth of the north valley, just in front of the Heavy Brigade, and seeing the massacre of the Light Brigade, turned to Lord William Paulet and said, “They have sacrificed the Light Brigade, they shall not have the Heavy if I can help it.” Lucan subsequently withdrew the Heavies to a position out of range of the Russians, Paget called “Halt boys! Halt front, if you don’t halt front my boys, we are done.” The two remaining regiments of the Light Brigade, now numbering less than 40 men, stood facing the enemy. The Russians then attacked them in the rear and cut off their retreat. “You must go about and do the best you can,” cried Paget to his men. The cavalrymen could not carry off the Russian guns, and without infantry support could only withdraw back up the valley under the same murderous flanking fire. In 20 minutes the Light Brigade had lost 247 men and 497 horses, and effectively ceased to exist as a fighting formation.

Guns still fired at the remnants of the Light Brigade, but thankfully only from the Causeway Heights. This was because the French 4th Chasseurs d’Afrique successfully attacked the Russian battery on the Fedoukine Hills in what turned out to be yet another uphill charge. In addition, “a party of the Chasseurs d’Afrique showed themselves menacingly [which] had the desired effect of turning the Cossacks from the purpose” of launching attacks on the retreating Light Brigade. Lucan later wrote that “had not the Chasseurs d’Afrique at this time silenced one of these batteries, it is my opinion that the Heavy Cavalry would have been destroyed.”

Raglan later blamed Lucan for the charge, claiming that “from some misconception of the order to advance, the Lieutenant-General [Lucan] considered
that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Major-General the Earl of Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade.”

Lucan blamed Raglan and the dead Captain Nolan, the deliverer of the order. His unwillingness to bear any responsibility for the loss of half his command and his attempt to blame a junior officer does not reflect well on Lucan, either as an individual or as a leader. Indeed, none of the people involved in initiating the charge appear to have acted well. Raglan’s order was imprecise; the drafting of the order was ambiguous (the fault of Brigadier-General Airey); Nolan failed to explain the order clearly to Lucan; Lucan failed to question Nolan in order to establish Raglan’s real intention; and Cardigan failed to seek adequate clarification from Lucan.

It is interesting to consider what might have happened in the absence of so many leadership failures: had Cathcart not demurred about sending the infantry; had Raglan not minded losing a few Turkish cannon or if he had issued clear and precise orders; had the volatile Nolan not been tasked with delivering the order; had Lucan paused to reflect rationally; or if both Cardigan and Lucan had not hated each other so passionately. It is surely no coincidence that the series of leadership failures at Balaklava led directly to one of the more significant tactical failures ever suffered by the British Army. All eight of the “points of good leadership” were violated sometime during the battle—generally with tragic results. The Crimean War can be seen as the beginning of the end of the era of the “gentleman amateur” in the British Army. In its aftermath, a series of reforms was put in place. However, the human failings displayed that morning in the environs of the Sapouné Hills still serve as a useful example: an example of how not to do things, and the potential cost of leadership failures. MR

NOTES

9. Lord Raglan had only one arm, having lost the other at Waterloo, and hence could not write while mounted.
10. Anglesey, 82-83.
11. Nolan was known to be of a highly volatile nature.
13. Ibid.
14. What we would now consider to be “professionalism” was a somewhat alien concept to the officers of the time. Officers’ motivation was more concerned with the immediate military virtues such as honour, duty, and courage.
16. Ibid.
17. 3rd Earl of Lucan, dispatch to Lord Raglan dated 27 October 1854, cited in Adkin, 135.
20. Ibid.
23. The Marquess of Anglesey, 94.
24. In fact, the Heavy Brigade suffered more casualties during the Charge of the Light Brigade than they had in their own charge earlier that morning.
27. Lord Raglan, draft dispatch, 28 October 1854, cited in Joan Wake, 410.
TO REBUILD IRAQ, we have to create conditions for the Iraqi people where independence is possible in a state that has quashed initiative and participative government for decades, if not centuries. One fundamental mainstay and confidence builder, among others (such as job creation), is a strong banking and financial system that supports economic growth. American leaders claim that Iraq is progressing in terms of security, but without such tangible evidence of self-determination as a sound currency and an interbank market, any appearance of progress may be illusory.

The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. Departments of Defense and State are conducting programs to foster Iraqi financial independence and pave the way for prosperity.

Multinational Corps-Iraq’s “money as a weapon” concept includes several of those ongoing programs—the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the Rewards Program, and the more recent micro-loan program—which are helping restore Iraq’s economy. The CERP, which was established shortly after President Bush declared “mission accomplished,” allows commanders to purchase goods and services for humanitarian relief and reconstruction to the benefit of the Iraqi people. The Rewards Program provides funds so that Soldiers can pay informants for information such as the locations of weapons caches. Both programs provide quick money to answer pressing needs without requiring answers to a host of questions. Moreover, when coupled with public works and infrastructure projects to restore critical services (e.g. telecommunications, water, sewer, gas, electricity), the programs create livelihoods for Iraqi citizens. The micro-loan program provides small loans to help individuals start or improve a business. Altogether, the programs should have a lasting civil-relations impact.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) commanders have emphasized the importance of such cash management. For example, the former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, Major General (now Lieutenant General) Peter W. Chiarelli, stressed the importance of “economic pluralism” in a Military Review article about full-spectrum operations. General David H. Petraeus has noted that “in an endeavor like that in Iraq, money is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real ammunition.”

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Although the aforementioned programs boost individual income, stimulate trade, and buy goodwill, on their own they cannot restore Iraq’s deteriorated economy. Without reform and modernization in the banking structure, the health of Iraq’s economy is in question. We in the U.S. Army financial community, including contracting and civil affairs specialists, are working determinedly to move the Iraqis toward a more contemporary currency and banking environment.

Banks and the New Dinar

When initial hostilities ended and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) removed most remnants of the former Iraqi government bureaucracy, military organizations (primarily U.S.) filled the voids in government agencies with officers whose professional skills best fit the functions of the vacated job. Consequently, some members of the Army Finance Corps became provincial ministers of commerce. For the most part, their duties involved resuscitating looted and bankrupt banks. Finance units facilitated salary and pension distributions for government employees, transported old and new dinars during the currency exchange, audited the books, planned bank renovations, ordered automation equipment, implemented computer training, and secured funds seized in raids (including $750,000 found with Saddam himself). The finance units held these funds in office vaults to use for Iraq’s reconstruction.

To the extent resources and the security situation allowed, military finance leaders acted as ambassadors to Iraq’s banks. Although they did their best to help bank managers solve problems, success was limited. The Western concept of banks holding customer deposits as capital from which to make profitable loans was alien to Iraqi banks. Moreover, Iraqis did not see banks as a place to keep their money—they used cash for financial transactions. Financial processing procedures were outmoded. Banks had no method to transfer funds electronically—they still maintained manual transaction ledgers. Iraq had six government-controlled banks before the invasion, and their primary function was to pay government salaries. Most of the government-maintained banks were looted after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Only two, Rafidain and Rasheed, remained solvent.

New currency. One step the CPA took to strengthen the banking and financial system was to replace the currency. The Iraqi dinar was unstable, easily forged, and had no known value. A new dinar was introduced in October 2003. A team headed by retired Brigadier General Hugh B. Tant III collected and destroyed Iraq’s old Saddam-image currency and replaced it with currency depicting Iraqi cultural sites, such as the spiral minaret in Samarra and the Hadba Minaret built in Mosul in 1172 A.D. Since its introduction, the dinar exchange rate has been stable, and inflation in Iraq has remained low.

The Central Bank. When the CPA introduced the new dinar, it also revived the Central Bank of Iraq, which Saddam had fleeced. The CPA made the Central Bank independent of Iraq’s finance ministry and assigned it authority over the country’s entire banking system, a move that gave the bank powers similar to those of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board. Operating under one authority (i.e., a central bank) and trusting it to be independent is a delicate venture under the best of circumstances. In Iraq, where family, tribe, and sect connections can supersede allegiance to the state, trusting that an independent central bank agency would be immune to political influence was a long shot. Iraq’s long history of corruption and its unstable government were also
vulnerabilities. Even so, the Central Bank has so far maintained an untainted reputation.4

Establishing Banking Procedures

In the fall of 2004, there was no way to use credit or ATM cards or obtain banking services in Iraq. Coalition forces used U.S. bills to purchase items from Iraqi vendors and workers. For large payments, Soldiers often carried money in large, Pelican™-like cases. This was not only inconvenient, but also risky for both the agent and the recipient. U.S. finance units needed to establish bank accounts from which they could write checks or electronically transfer funds for such payments. This task fell to the 18th Soldier Support Group (SSG).

To open an account in an Iraqi bank, U.S. federal agencies must receive approval from the Treasury Department.5 Treasury will only grant permission if the State Department has sanctioned the servicing bank or financial institution. Getting permission to open a bank account in Iraq would have been problematic if the only options were the reestablished Iraqi banks that had poor or unknown reputations. Fortunately, this was not the case: international banks with solid reputations had begun to develop partnerships with local Iraqi banks. One such bank was the Credit Bank of Iraq, which was majority-owned by the National Bank of Kuwait (NBK). Officials from NBK worked with the 18th SSG and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) for several weeks to gain the Treasury’s approval to open an account.

Meanwhile, the 18th SSG, in partnership with the NBK and some entrepreneurial civil-affairs Soldiers, led the initial effort to develop procedures to conduct bank transactions in Iraq. These transactions were surprisingly difficult. The 18th SSG could not wire funds directly into the Credit Bank of Iraq because the bank, like Iraq’s other banks, didn’t have the necessary technology. It needed desktop computers, routers, switches, and firewalls in a functioning data network, along with back-end office applications, databases, and the physical cabling infrastructure to connect to the wired world. In addition, the U.S. Treasury does not allow the deposit of U.S. dollars in U.S. federally owned foreign accounts. Under these circumstances, how was the finance unit to deposit money in the bank?

Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Thomas C. Steffens and Major Eric Iacobucci, both from the 18th SSG, and members of the civil affairs team formed a working group. Using a white board, they diagramed how the funds would flow from the U.S. Treasury to the Credit Bank of Iraq. According to their plan, the finance office would present a U.S. Treasury check to the New York Branch of NBK with instructions to deposit funds immediately through the Kuwait City Branch of NBK to a U.S. Army account in the Credit Bank.

Once the Treasury Department approved the account, it was only a matter of days for a U.S. Treasury check to be deposited and the first banking transaction to take place. By September 2005, the U.S. Army owned four bank accounts in Iraq, one for each of the four locations where it had finance check-signing authorities: Baqubah, Baghdad, Balad, and Tikrit.

The Buy-In

The next task was to convince reluctant Iraqi business owners and vendors to accept their U.S. payments from a private Iraqi bank. Civil affairs units bore the brunt of this difficult mandate because they interacted with local Iraqis and worked in their communities. The Soldiers tried to convince vendors that using these accounts would eliminate their exposure to extortion and murder threats each time they carried large bags of U.S. currency off military installations. They also assured the Iraqis that they would receive the Central Bank exchange rate with no additional fees imposed. To avoid revealing to others that the vendors were working with the United States, the accounts were given nondescript, generic names.

It worked to a degree; however, military financial managers, banking officials, and civil affairs specialists soon faced new obstacles. They found that checks could take at least seven days to clear. In addition, the process was cumbersome: the finance officer had to scan and fax a copy of the check to NBK, which forwarded it to the Credit Bank of Iraq.

In the fall of 2004, there was no way to use credit or ATM cards or obtain banking services in Iraq.
so that the local banker would have a copy of the check the day before the vendor approached the teller window to cash it. Even then, when vendors required immediate cash, they could not make prompt cash withdrawals due to inadequate security and technology. Furthermore, some bankers solicited fees (bribes) of differing amounts to cash the checks, or sometimes they just turned a vendor away with no explanation. Over time, vendors who did not require a quick turnaround of cash seemed to accept the system. However, there were roadblocks to its wide acceptance. These problems are yet to be solved and will take time to overcome.

The command expected cultural resistance to change from the Iraqis, but not from our own agencies. Nevertheless, it was a challenge to get some of our counterparts in the financial management and procurement communities to subscribe to our vision. The 18th SSG depended on contracting officials to “market and advertise” the Iraqi dinar checking account option to vendors, and they worked to enact and influence mandatory payment of all contracts in Iraqi currency. Although at the time the 18th SSG was not able to convince the contracting agents to mandate using banks, there was some success after the unit redeployed. When Colonel Karen Dyson, commander of the 266th Finance Command, arrived, she carried the message to field commanders, contractors, and corps-level comptrollers at every opportunity using several methods. She gave briefings, made phone calls, wrote policy statements, and sent numerous emails. Some agencies were enthusiastic about the service; others were not. The conversion would take time.

By late 2007, some significant steps were underway that indicated progress. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) worked with Joint Contracting Command so that, effective 1 October 2007, all its payments over $50,000 would be made through electronic funds transfer (EFT). The number of Iraqi banks receiving wire payments was then, and still is, steadily increasing. As of November 2007, there were up to 10 EFT-capable banks with 167 branches, yet there were reports that EFTs could take from two days to well over a month to reach a vendor’s account. Over time, and with more partnerships between the international financial community and Iraqi bankers, the situation will continue to improve and eventually modernize Iraq’s banking system.

Dinars versus Dollars

When the 266th Finance Command replaced 18th SSG, the handoff went smoothly. Not only did the 266th support and advocate the use of the Iraqi dinar check, but it also solicited banks to provide Iraqi dinar notes. The 266th wanted units to use dinars rather than dollars for all payments under $2,500, for example, small CERP, micro-reward, condolence, and detainee payments. Reward payments, as described earlier, were for information; condolence payments were to compensate for the death or injury of a relative resulting from U.S. or coalition military operations; and detainee payments were to recompense Iraqi civilians for the time they were held in U.S or coalition custody. The local unit-appointed paying agent made all these types of payments. However, similar to every other financial endeavor in Iraq, using the dinar for payments was not easy. To begin with, buying Iraqi currency outside the country was forbidden by Iraqi law. According to the “Central Bank of Iraq Law,” established on 6 March 2004, the Central Bank had the exclusive right to issue banknotes and coins intended for circulation in Iraq; thus, the new currency could not be purchased and picked up from safe havens in other countries or from international currency exchanges.

In addition, any attempt to purchase dinars directly from an Iraqi bank was difficult because of the language barrier and security issues. For instance, when the 266th tried to secure funds at the Rafidain state bank in the International Zone, the bank (at that time) did not have a representative who spoke English. When the unit brought a translator to the bank to procure dinars, the bank representative stated that they were unwilling to take the risk of bringing anything but very small amounts of dinars into their branch.

When currency was available at the banks, Finance Corps Soldiers were responsible for retrieving it. Until the 266th found a secure method to pick up and transport funds, the 101st Finance Company
made runs to pick up currency for just their sector. In addition to the usual risk to U.S. Soldiers traveling anywhere in Iraq, there was the possibility that unfriendly Iraqis or insurgents would learn of their mission and attack the Soldiers when they left the bank with large amounts of Iraqi cash. The Soldiers could not just walk into the bank, pack up the money, and leave; they had to count every note. This often took several hours, even with money counters. One reason was that the Iraqi notes were usually in terrible condition. They were difficult to count by hand and would bunch up in the money counters and jam the machine. In one case, the counters failed due to sustained use and heat. Despite these problems, the finance Soldiers were obligated to count all the currency—when signing for funds, an agent of the treasury is responsible without limit for every monetary instrument or equivalent. By regulation and law, every dollar, quarter, dime, nickel, penny, dinar, riyal, pound, or whatnot must be accounted for.

The 266th continued to struggle to find sources for dinars. They succeeded when some finance officers visited the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office for Financial and Fiscal Affairs (a State Department section set up within the International Zone). This section had employees who transported dinars to remote Iraqi public banks when the banks ran out of currency to make payroll. One of the State Department employees recommended the 266th approach the banker Tareq Muhmood, a former Iraqi expatriate who lived in Baghdad. His bank, Dar Es Salaam (DES) Investment Bank, had installed two of Iraq’s first ATMs and planned to introduce online banking within a year. The 266th was looking for banking alternatives for vendors, so it gained approval from the U.S. Treasury to open four government bank accounts with Muhmood’s bank.

At the same time, the 266th also solicited NBK and world banking giant HSBC Bank, which owned a 70.1 percent stake in the DES Investment Bank, to help the command and its subordinate battalions obtain Iraqi dinars. U.S. financial officers hoped that the incentive of earning interest on large U.S. military deposits would push one of the banks to make a proposal for obtaining dinars that would suit the 266th’s and U.S. government’s requirements. Happily, NBK’s liaison for their corporate banking group, Jassim Al Hajji, called with an offer from one of NBK’s clients, SkyLink Arabia, a security firm that claimed to have transported some of the original new Iraqi dinars into Iraq. SkyLink Arabia employed an
international mix of former special operatives and had offices in Kuwait, Iraq, and Dubai.

The finance command received a funding document from Coalition Forces Land Component Command that established a funding limit for SkyLink deliveries. When a delivery was successful, the command created a payment document and then a treasury check to pay for the service. It also received deliveries of money to the International Zone by vehicle and, more important, by small airplane to Balad, the location of the 266th Finance Command central funding office.

Thus, by June 2006, the basic framework necessary to empower Iraqis financially was in place: the 266th Finance Command had mechanisms to support all methods of payment in the local currency—by check, wire, and cash.

What Can We Do Today?

Based on the finance command’s experience and discussions with Middle East bankers and interagency partners familiar with Iraqi financial matters, there are five cash management initiatives that can make a difference in Iraq today.

• First, the language in all contracts for Iraqi vendors must specify mandatory payment by Iraqi dinar via direct deposit or check. If this language is not in the contracts, the vendors (who are building the foundations of a new Iraqi society and are the best hope for the future) will continue to ask for payment in U.S. dollars. Continuing to infuse dollars into the country delays the dinar’s acceptance in Iraq (and internationally). It also ties up significant amounts of U.S. cash reserves and U.S. manpower in deployed locations in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as DFAS resources in Rome, New York, and Indianapolis, Indiana. We will be guilty of prolonging the status quo if we do not start forcing this difficult transition.

• Second, U.S. forces, coalition partners, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) that make payments to Iraqi citizens under $2,500 should make them in Iraqi dinar bills. As of November 2007, this was still not happening. PRTs continue to make payments in dollars, primarily for convenience.

• Third, Iraqi financial institutions must move forward quickly to follow the international financial community’s technology standards. During OIF II, this author observed finance Soldiers installing desktop computers and training bank employees. However, we have not done enough in building the framework for the financial network. Many banks outside Baghdad operate as though they are on remote islands; the lack of telecommunications forces them to conduct manual operations. (As in many situations in Iraq, the infrastructure has to be built from the ground up.) In addition to computer applications, databases, hardware, and training, the Iraqi financial system needs substantial physical infrastructure upgrades to tie into the global financial network. We must help Iraqi banks build a secure financial communications network and deliver applications and training for international e-commerce banking solutions. Like our Federal Reserve, the Central Bank of Iraq must be able to act as an “automated clearing house” so that banks can electronically run check debits and credits through accounts securely and instantly. For the Iraqi financial community to match its international counterparts in banking services, the banks should all be on the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) network for administrative banking communications and operations. Once U.S. Signal Corps Soldiers, contractors, or local sources install these foundation technologies and begin to implement, administer, and maintain them, the banks can fully implement other modern banking functions such as electronic debits and credits, card barcodes, and chip technologies.

• Fourth, the local mayor’s cell (similar to the traditional garrison commander and staff), with assistance from banking liaison officers and the U.S. Treasury, must open Iraqi banks on enduring coalition military installations. These banks will allow contractors to open accounts in a secure environment that they equate with stability. Commanders and mayor cells should establish a program to encourage local and foreign-national employees who work on such military installations to direct deposit their salaries in an Iraqi bank. This change would require nothing new. We have successful examples of local banks operating on coalition installations in Afghanistan.

• Fifth, the Central Bank of Iraq should authorize or request the printing of Iraqi dinars in larger denominations. Having to carry a large number of bills discourages wide acceptance of the dinar. Titan, a U.S. systems integrator that paid Iraqi translators
and reconstruction teams working numerous local projects, reported that the amount of dinars necessary to transact business dissuaded them from using the currency. Iraqis should not have to carry around big wads of cash to make daily transactions. Since the bill with the highest denomination—25,000 dinars—is worth around $20, Iraq should produce 50,000- and 100,000-dinar bills.

The Once and Future Dinar

Before the years of dictatorship and international sanctions under Saddam, Iraq’s financial system operated under a currency board monetary policy. From 1931 to 1949, it used the British Pound Sterling, and from 1916 to 1931 the country operated under a “dollarization” policy with the Indian Rupee. Prior to 1916, when Iraq was under the Ottoman Empire, it used the Turkish Pound (with the Imperial Ottoman Bank, owned by British and French shareholders, issuing banknotes). Saddam instituted the “dinar” when he came to power in 1979. It had been the common monetary unit in early Muslim countries, and its origin was emblematic of Iraq’s rich historical legacy. The second modern reemergence of the Iraqi dinar is fundamental to the hope and success for Iraq’s future in the global economy.

Cultivating a strong, stable currency has two potential benefits for Iraq: first, it will build the people’s confidence as they become members of the world’s markets; and second, a new national currency can serve as a unifying symbol among Shi’as, Sunnis, Kurds, and other sects. So far, actions taken by private enterprises, international banking firms, U.S. agencies, and coalition forces have started the Republic of Iraq on a path toward financial independence. That path will probably be long and bumpy, given the current low levels of security, technology, and confidence in the country. But with more guidance, support, and nurturing from the U.S. Army Finance Corps, Marine finance specialists, the State Department, the Treasury Department, USAID, and America’s coalition partners, Iraq’s financial system will attain a level of service that, coupled with a stable currency, will eventually provide Iraqi society the economic stability it deserves.

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4. In similar circumstances, the International Monetary Fund, which was responsible for developing the Balkan monetary policy, chose a different method. It established a currency board and decision-making body independent from political institutions to operate for the first six years after the Bosnia and Herzegovina civil war ended.
Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired,
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STABILITY OPERATIONS have played a significant role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1800s, and the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) reiterated their importance to current U.S. global interests. During such operations, actions to spur economic development are as important as military actions. The U.S., however, despite history and the NSS, still has no formal political or military structure tasked with facilitating the planning and execution of economic-development programs in stability operations. Instead, it has tried to make do with ad hoc arrangements planned and executed by the military.

Lessons learned from current stability operations point to the benefits of using a broad strategy that structurally integrates planning for governance, economics, and security. In testimony to Congress about the inadequate planning for stability operations in Iraq, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper said the solution “calls for an interagency, deliberate planning process much like the deliberate planning process we have in the military, where formal assignments are made within the interagency to get upfront commitment to what the post-major combat operations requirements will be.”

Past stability operations, too, suggest that a coordinated interagency effort and a deliberate process would have produced faster progress in Iraq. By examining some of those operations, we can discern the significance that economics has for post-kinetic operations, as well as its implications for cooperative interagency processes in general.

Historical Examples

The 1948-1960 British campaign in Malaysia underscored the importance of economics to counterinsurgency (COIN) as well as the need for a coordinated economic plan within stability operations. In writing about the campaign, British COIN expert Sir Robert Thompson identified three forces influencing the Malaysian population: nationalism, religion and culture, and economic well-being. Of the three, he gave primacy to economic well-being, stating that “however powerful nationalist or religious forces may be, that of
Thompson also claimed that an insurgency needs an issue it can exploit to open up a seam between the people and the government, and economic inequality, either perceived or real, is one such issue. To combat an insurgency seeking to exploit economic inequality, then, requires a broad strategy that incorporates the various elements of civilian society equipped to address the problem and thereby influence the population.

We can glean additional information about the role of economics in stability operations by looking at two U.S.-led missions generally considered successes: the reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany after World War II. In both cases, the United States clearly understood how important economic development was to the recovery and democratization of its former enemies. Leaders even went beyond executive authority, the doctrinal norm prior to World War II, to establish economic policy. These cases represent successes in overcoming institutional structural deficiencies.


Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan’s trade and industry.

The U.S. employed economic measures to demilitarize Japan; however, economic policies and actions were not limited to military affairs. MacArthur understood the vital relationship between politics, economics, security, and stability. Concerned that the Japanese would not accept his democratic reforms because of desperate economic conditions at the time, he dispensed surplus military rations to the people and sent a telegram to Congress, urging it to “send me food or send me bullets.” Congress chose food, appropriating $250 million worth of subsistence products to aid the Japanese, many of whom were without adequate housing and approaching starvation. This economic aid played a major role in establishing an environment favorable to MacArthur’s democratization program.

In Germany, conflicting policies complicated economic recovery. General Lucius Clay, deputy military governor of Germany after World War II, complained that JCS-1067, *Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany*, was “extremely difficult to operate under.” Realizing that economic revitalization would play a significant role in Germany’s peaceful rehabilitation, Clay worked in a piecemeal fashion to circumvent JCS-1067’s strict provisions.

Even as Clay labored to overcome JCS-1067, Germany’s recovery was hampered by the fact that multiple nations had a hand in determining its economic policy, and they did not agree on how to proceed. France and the Soviet Union worked at cross-purposes with America and Britain, demanding reparations while the latter two were trying
to build a self-sustaining German economy. In *America’s Role in Nation-building from Germany to Iraq*, James Dobbins describes the situation:

The U.S. government forced German mines to deliver coal to France and other nearby states for free. In return, the U.S. zonal authorities provided miners with food and wages. In addition, the Soviet Union dismantled German plants in both the British and U.S. zones and shipped the equipment back to the Soviet Union as part of reparations. Thus, some of what was given was taken away by other governments.9

In short, Germany’s case highlights many of the difficulties inherent in economic reconstruction. The absence of established doctrine and standing institutions designed specifically for planning, coordinating, and executing economic actions created confusion and inefficiencies that unnecessarily hindered the nation-building effort.

While individual initiative eventually overcame systemic problems in Germany and Japan, U.S. stability operations in Haiti (1915 to 1934, 1994 to 1996, and 2004) have consistently failed, revealing the ultimate costs of not having a well-integrated economic plan. Although the 1994 Haiti mission achieved some of its goals, such as restoration of the Aristide government, it did not address long-term economic and governance problems; consequently, Haiti is still in turmoil today.10

The examples of Japan, Germany, and Haiti validate Thompson’s claim about the importance of a “systems approach” in stability operations. Institutions planning and executing economic operations within a stability operation should view an unstable nation as a system wherein failing to act in one area will cause ripples in other areas. Intervening forces cannot reform governance, economics, and security independently of one another. These functions are interdependent.

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**Iraq: Economics and the “Golden Hour”**

The relationship between economics and stability has not been lost on U.S. commanders in Iraq. In 2004, when Task Force Baghdad analyzed attacks in its area of operations, it found “a direct correlation existed among the level of local infrastructure status, unemployment figures, and attacks on U.S. soldiers.”11 Putting this analysis into practice, the task force consolidated funding in economic development projects where they believed the payoff would be greatest. After doing so, it confirmed “a direct correlation emerged between funding, when it became available to employ Sadr City residents . . . and a steep decline in the number of terrorist incidents occurring in the same area.”12

As events in Iraq have also shown, it’s not just the money that matters, but the speed with which it is disbursed. A victorious invading nation—assuming its mission is benevolent—has a “golden hour,” a limited amount of time in which it enjoys host-nation
popular support and international legitimacy. If it fails to provide immediate and sufficient economic support to begin stabilizing and rebuilding the host nation within that time, people will turn against it and the conflict will go on. Any delay in stabilizing the situation beyond the golden hour will threaten the quality of eventual success and may even make progress in stability operations impossible.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, the Washington Post’s former Baghdad bureau chief and author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, has observed that in Iraq it took too long to mobilize the resources required to demonstrate the U.S.’s commitment to reconstruction. Failure to move speedily led to disenchantment and frustration, hindering progress and setting the stage for insurgency. As has often been the case in interventions, during the golden hour in Baghdad the military was the only government agency with significant resources in-country. It had to act swiftly to gain the populace’s confidence and secure the economic initiative; history shows that it did not. The military, however, should not be expected to go it alone during the golden hour. The best way to achieve stability quickly is to have and employ a formal, institutionalized structure with built-in interagency capacity and cooperation.

The Way Ahead

The United States should establish and maintain a standing institution that focuses on economic development during stability operations, one capable of taking immediate action during the golden hour of future contingencies. Such a capability should be permanent, functioning in peace as well as war. Senior staff must develop training and doctrine and integrate this capability into doctrinal stability operations. U.S. government institutions, however, do not appear to be building a sufficient, let alone robust, capability to do this. For example, the State Department’s Active Response Corps (ARC), first responders who support U.S. missions, engage with host-nation governments, coordinate with international partners, and assess stabilization and reconstruction efforts, employ only 30 personnel worldwide. Given the nations, coalition partners, and international organizations (e.g., the World Bank Group: International Development Association, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation; United Nations agencies; and the World Trade Organization) with which the State Department will have to coordinate, ARC’s personnel requirements are closer to 1,500 than 30.

Start-up funding. President Bush’s 2005 emergency supplemental funding request included $17 million for the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Congress approved $7 million. Unfortunately, S/CRS fared no better in 2006. The president requested $24 million for S/CRS operating expenses and $100 million for a conflict response fund. He received nothing. Congress did, however, approve an amendment to the Defense Appropriation Bill allowing the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer up to $200 million to the State Department for S/CRS.

Unity of command. For economic-development activities in stability operations, unity of command is as important as unity of effort. Unity of command should not threaten any government agency’s independence: only a dedicated portion of each agency in direct support of stability operations should ever come under the authority of a unified commander. Under these circumstances, an enforcement mechanism would probably be necessary to compel agencies to attach competent people to centralized commanders or directors. While National Security Policy Directive-44 (NSPD-44) recognizes the need for interagency integration, it does not enforce unity of command. The executive branch should follow-up NSPD-44 with a presidential-level document requiring unity of command in areas undergoing stability operations. In doing so, it should dictate the various government agencies’ roles and responsibilities as well as the conditions under which any particular agency should assume overall direction.

Planning for economic operations. Prior to the onset of a stability operation, the primary players ought to be able to plan economic operations in an integrated fashion. USAID has realized the need to engage in deliberate and crisis-action planning and to send representatives to the military’s unified commands to do so. Since the military is currently the primary organization developing these types of detailed plans, USAID’s efforts are right on target. NSPD-44 directs the State Department to coordinate planning for stability operations. As such, S/CRS should aggregate the personnel requirements for
such planning and secure funding through Congress as a single program. In addition, S/CRS should organize and lead civilian planning cells within military commands engaged in building deliberate and crisis-action plans.

While economic planning should involve both Soldiers and civilians, there will be times during execution, especially in the golden hour, when civilian agencies will likely not be part of stability operations. Since the military may be the only organization in-country, it must understand economic development. The military should therefore retain reserve personnel with specialties in economics and commerce and increase the number of active-duty personnel capable of planning and executing economic operations. While this enhanced military capability would duplicate that found in civilian agencies, it would also ensure that economic development could begin before the civilian agencies arrived in-country. The Army civil affairs career field should retain economic and commerce capabilities at brigade and higher with enough force strength to supplement subordinate units when necessary. (Unfortunately, the civil affairs proponent has recently proposed reducing this specialty as part of an overall restructuring.) The civil affairs community should also assign active-duty personnel to act as advocates for economic development. These personnel would be able to—

- Facilitate continuity of purpose in developing and executing economic-development policy within the military.
- Coordinate active-duty and reserve personnel and assets for economic development.
- Liaise with other government agencies to ensure greater unity of effort in ongoing interagency doctrine development and training.

**Training military personnel.** DOD should expand the military financial career fields’ training and duties to include economic development. By training financial personnel to be economic developers and by rotating them to government agencies (like USAID) with expertise in economic development, the Army can create a corps of professionals to assume the reins during the golden hour. This expansion of duties would give commanders more—and more convenient—resources with which to solve economic development challenges. Military economic-development specialists could help units prepare for stability operations by injecting relevant experience into exercises and unique insights into the decision-making process.

Personnel whose duties have economic consequences, such as engineers and contracting officers, should also receive some training in economic development. Such training could help them anticipate the economic consequences their decisions might have during stability operations.

**Interagency cooperation.** In addition to making their personnel available during the golden hour, civilian agencies should have organic, deployable staffs to provide a capable and persistent presence during post-conflict stability operations. S/CRS estimates that it needs 3,000 additional personnel to meet such a requirement. That’s not a lot when you consider DOD’s end-strength is close to three million.

Civilians tasked to work with the military have to be capable of working with service personnel. They should therefore receive some form of professional military education. In 2006, the State Department sent three personnel to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, where students learn how the Army operates in the joint-interagency world. More should follow. Other interagency personnel could attend shorter courses designed to familiarize them with the military and such topics as its problem-solving methods. One educational venue might involve participation in a U.S. military joint and combined exercise.

**Flexible funds.** Commanders should have access to a variety of monetary instruments during stability operations, so they can spend money where it needs to be spent. For instance, they should be allowed to spend appropriated funds for stipulated purposes that directly contribute to reconstruction and development; that is to say, there should be no “funding fences” that restrict a leader’s ability to respond to the evolving environment in his area of responsibility. This level of fiscal freedom would not mean that commanders could dispense funds...
without constraint: as for every other appropriation it makes, Congress would set criteria that specifically address how funds could and could not be spent in stability operations. Furthermore, funding strictly tied to the in-theater ground portion of a stability operation should flow through the unified leader to the sub-organizations or units responsible for executing reconstruction and development. That will ensure at least some accountability.

Intelligence gathering. During the initial stages of an operation, units should look for economic intelligence that might assist in initiating and executing needed development. For Iraq, there are currently several sources from which to gather information on a local economy in a given area. One is the Department of Commerce website, which includes such things as the Business Guide to Iraq, the Overview of Key Industries in Iraq, and country commercial guides. Another source is USAID, which has economic intelligence about many of the 100 nations in which it maintains a presence. We should collect these points of contact and other economic intelligence resources at a centralized repository we can quickly access, so that government agencies engaged in economic development can share information quickly and efficiently.

Center for economic education. America should establish a center responsible for formulating and promulgating training and doctrine related to economic development and reconstruction. The two missions ought to comprise a well-defined subset of a larger stability operations curriculum. This center could—

● Develop a common terminology and format for communication.
● Offer a broad series of training opportunities that would enhance the capabilities of all government agencies involved in economic development and reconstruction.
● Offer a certification program keyed to levels of training. (Each agency would aim to have a certain number of personnel certified at each level.)
● Formulate doctrine that gives authoritative (but not restrictive) guidance, so that agencies performing economic development have a common foundation from which to proceed. Some critical issues to sort out in doctrine are common procedures, roles and responsibilities, resources and skill sets needed, and
authorities required (such as warrants for personnel contracting on behalf of the U.S. government).

This center might be located at the National Defense University, the Naval Postgraduate School, or a similar school site. One of these institutions could become a hub of activity interfacing with other institutions, both government and non-government, to ensure economic training, doctrine, and research is as advanced as possible.

Conclusion

America should develop formal economic capabilities now to improve support to future stability operations. It needs to create a well-staffed and funded organization that can act in concert with interagency efforts to develop and pursue economic objectives in support of a given operation’s overall objectives. Absent such coordinated support, the execution of economic missions during the initial stages of stability operations will remain ad hoc, and any positive outcomes will be short-lived. In developing an appropriate institutional structure to address economic development issues, the U.S. government must particularly consider the needs of a stability operation at its most critical time, during the golden hour. Taken today, in the early hours of the War on Terror, such steps could set the stage for long-term success tomorrow. MR

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3. Ibid., 65.
4. Ibid., 21.
5. State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, United States initial post-surrender policy relating to Japan, 1945, 48-59, <www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/022/022tx.html>. This document provided general objectives and policies related to Japan after its surrender.
8. General Clay was the deputy military governor of Germany under General Eisenhower following World War II. Clay then became the military governor two years later. (Encyclopedia Britannica online, 20 February 2006).
9. McKinzie.
10. Ibid., 83.
12. Ibid., 6, 12.
15. Ibid., 3.
16. Ibid., 1.
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N ORGANIC MICRO-FINANCIAL SERVICES (MFS) capability in U.S. military units should be formally established as a key mission enhancer or “force multiplier” to support stability and reconstruction operations (SRO). Both FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and the Marine Corps manual Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach specifically note the need for MFS. However, neither manual goes into any detail on what MFS actually involves or how commanders in SRO environments should use them. This article aims to fill that gap.

Prior to the recent update of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, veterans of SROs and humanitarian interventions recognized that stability ultimately hinges on the restoration and promotion of economic viability. The recent update of Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine has since acknowledged economic development as a key component of stability operations.

At the heart of current counterinsurgency doctrine is the notion that the people are the key “terrain” in SRO. Thus, Soldiers must influence the indigenous people favorably to win their approbation. To do this, they have to understand how to affect “the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating” and apply specific tailored measures derived from that understanding. Consequently, in operating environments where non-coercive skills are at least as important as coercive ones, Soldiers must bring more than mere force into play.

Close analysis of how to succeed within an insurgency framework suggests that providing immediate economic opportunities to the population is second only to providing physical security; thus, among the tools needed to cope with insurgencies is a bottom-up economic strategy linked to security measures. Such a strategy has to create the conditions for economic opportunity while also encouraging the population to participate in generating overall economic recovery.

Unfortunately, all too often these efforts to encourage economic opportunity and participation focus on large-scale economic activities such as building power or manufacturing plants. Such projects require detailed planning, take time, and often are hampered by politics and bureaucracy. Meanwhile, as the projects move ponderously along, insurgents exploit the perceived lack of economic opportunity and progress. They feed off the unmet and perhaps unrealistic expectations of the populace.

Given the above, it seems that a more effective means of dealing with the close-in economic fight is with time-sensitive, small loans to micro-businesses.
Delivery of micro-financial services to small-scale entrepreneurs during SRO can quickly stimulate economic activity, serving to undercut insurgent exploitation of economic instability. Quick, tangible results at low levels of commerce can create local buy-in and commitment from the populace. Such community investment can then serve to help garner support for government efforts to reestablish sovereignty and governance. Often underutilized or misunderstood by military forces, MFS is actually a simple but sophisticated tool that, when used properly, can deliver economic benefits to a target population at a comparatively cheap cost. Compared to grander projects that may take months and years to develop, small businesses realize economic benefit fast enough to improve stability.

Financial Problems

Challenges facing countries during SRO campaigns are similar to the problems non-governmental organizations (NGO) have handled for decades when working with large, poor populations in stressed environments. Consequently, NGO experiences provide many lessons. Among the more important that the intervening organization must understand is the limitations indigenous financial institutions may have in straitened conditions. For example, many unstable countries have long established banking institutions, such as those that currently exist in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, experience has shown that many such institutions have neither the infrastructure nor capital to meet extensive borrower needs broadly across society. They cannot handle the administrative costs of dealing with the vast numbers of small-scale borrowers upon whom economic stability actually depends. Interest returns on small-scale loans don’t cover the time and resources required to process them.

This is especially true in conflict or post-conflict zones, when a bank’s survival can depend on high-yield clients. Granting loans to large numbers of small-scale entrepreneurs becomes economically unfeasible when continuing violence is a constant threat looming over both the entrepreneur’s business and the bank’s investment. Thus, a nagging shortage of capital, combined with great insurgency-related risk, often results in banks choosing to deal with only well-connected clients in safe areas where returns on investment are likely. This unfortunate set of circumstances stunts overall economic development and usually precludes investment in areas and among populations that may be most in need of the stabilizing influence economic opportunity and development provides.

Consequently, small-scale borrowers—usually from the poorer classes—often have no other recourse but to turn to pawnshops and neighborhood moneylenders to acquire needed finances. Such lenders often lend money only as long as borrowers have a commodity to leverage. Moreover, they usually charge crippling interest fees for their services, especially in times of shortage and risk like those prevailing during insurgency conflicts. The above combination of factors compounds the economic damage that an insurgency causes by quickly depleting the cash reserves of the most underprivileged segment of a population. Disaffection, stemming from a loss of economic security compounded by insecurity and a declining quality of life, often increases sympathy for insurgent activities.

At the same time, such conditions undermine support for or confidence in the government. Straitened conditions nullify any attempts at broader SRO civic and security efforts as local populations frequently come to see SRO forces, rather than insurgents, as the source of social instability and personal misfortune and misery. The problem is complicated when insurgent groups position themselves as alternate sources of services, becoming in effect shadow governments. Such services often include economic relief for a population living in desperate circumstances. Insurgents’ perceived economic successes increase popular estrangement from the government by undermining its legitimacy. This estrangement also helps to create an insurgent recruiting pool that may potentially encompass an entire local population.

For the above reasons, establishing economic opportunity must be a key component to any SRO...
strategy. As entrepreneurs establish small businesses and create jobs, economic opportunity spreads and leads to viable, self-sustaining stability. Micro-financial services is one tool commanders at all levels can use to promote the essential economic development and opportunity at the local level.

**History of MFS**

The concept of MFS is not new. It can trace its roots to activities by medieval guilds and village social clubs, which provided low- or no-interest loans to their members in ways we would view today as micro-credit. Societies whose membership was reserved for those practicing similar occupations, or groups having an interest in promoting a specific trade for the common good of local communities, would pool their resources to help individual members establish themselves as viable businesspersons. Larger, more formal institutions developed in Ireland in the 1700s and Germany in the 1800s as altruistic organizations to help their poor escape abject poverty and the crushing debt of moneylenders. Similarly, in the 1900s, government-led institutions began providing targeted loans to protect small agricultural interests.\(^3\)

The modern incarnation of such micro-credit practices began in the 1970s via pioneering work by ACCION International, Self-Employed Women’s Association Bank, and Grameen Bank, the last of which became the model for modern micro-financial institutions. Grameen Bank’s founder, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, won the Nobel Prize in 2006 for his work there. Yunus, a classically trained economist who taught in Bangladesh in the 1970s, confronted poverty as he commuted to and from work and decided to investigate why economic practices were not dealing with it. He and his students interviewed 42 local women and discovered that the women relied on frequent loans from moneylenders to meet their supply needs to run their businesses. After paying off the interest on their loans, they had little profit left to reinvest into their businesses. Yunus found that with as little as $27 each, business owners could bypass the moneylenders and deal directly with their suppliers. He supplied $27 to each of the 42 women, and they repaid him in several weeks with each owner having enough left over to do business without the moneylenders. Yunus sought government support to establish the first Grameen Bank, which still operates today. It serves 5 million customers with a loan recovery rate of 98.9 percent.\(^4\) Grameen was unique because it created a sense of collective responsibility among its borrowers. Each member’s loan repayment increased available credit for the remaining borrowers, which created a powerful incentive for all of them to make prompt loan payments.

After the success of the micro-financial institutions of the 1970s, many NGOs have developed similar MFS capabilities and practices. Over the past three decades, the success of these efforts has demonstrated MFS effectiveness in dealing with the economic needs of disadvantaged populations. However, an understanding of the various dynamics associated with poverty, the obstacles to economic development, and how micro-credit could be best applied has taken years to develop and adjust.

In the 1980s, it became evident that micro-credit was inadequate to deal with all of the poor’s problems because it did not address the complex...
situations they faced. Aid agencies recognized that the poor needed a full-service financial approach. With proliferation of micro-credit services in the mid-1990s, a shift occurred from solely focusing on micro-credit to providing MFS more broadly. This led modern micro-financial institutions to become full-service banks. Institutions providing loans and savings services advanced to other basic financial services. In concept and practice, they now offer the same services provided by banks in developed nations. The difference lies in the amount of funds in play. Micro-financial institutions address financial needs in a given locality, and loans that some might regard as minuscule are common.

**Micro-Financial Expertise**

Military planners should study the lessons of NGOs and adopt their methods for coping with similar economic situations in financially unstable countries. U. S. military units have two organizations that deal directly with the economic conditions in unstable areas where micro-financial institutions might be effective: the civil-military operations center (CMOC) and the specialized civil affairs team (CAT).

Civil-military operations centers are ad hoc organizations that coordinate and unify the capabilities of military and civilian agencies in an area to address SRO’s human dimension. Specialized CATs work out of the CMOC and provide physical security, humanitarian help, civil administration, public institution development assistance, and economic rehabilitation and development to meet the needs of the local population.

Each CMOC has an economics officer, but CATs often outsource the delivery of financial services. Partly because of reliance on outsourcing, the military has not leveraged the benefits of providing financial services to their maximum potential.

The outsourcing habit grew from a decision the U. S. military made in the 1990s when it faced increasing SRO missions and the constraints of a shrinking budget. Consequently, the military developed doctrine calling for extensive use of outside support and expertise in a joint task force structure. Such support came from agencies both
inside and outside of government. However, the doctrine neither addressed the method and extent of military-civilian integration nor defined specific local economic-development approaches (such as MFS). This nebulous doctrine remains in effect today. Government agencies outside the military have extensive experience with MFS; the military just needs to figure out how to leverage it.

The U.S. government’s primary knowledge base for MFS expertise is in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has 30 years of experience serving micro-enterprises around the world. It normally funds local micro-financial institutes run by NGOs or charity. But there are problems with this approach. According to retired colonel Joseph J. Collins, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations—

While there have been significant exceptions, State and USAID personnel have generally been restricted to relatively secure compounds in Afghanistan and Iraq. This fact is often attributed to the ‘tyranny’ of the local regional security officers (RSOs), who appear determined to apply peacetime rules to conflict situations. RSOs will likely blame the rules that come down from Washington. In any case, too few Foreign Service officers and USAID professionals [work] in field locations. The personnel strength of State and USAID is clearly inadequate to meet their expanded roles in the War on Terror.

Consequently, MFS does not currently reach effectively out to areas where it might actually have the greatest impact on stabilization.

For example, USAID channels its MFS activities in Iraq through the Izdihar (Prosperity) Organization, which is responsible for a wide variety of financial-development activities. Izdihar issues grants to local micro-financial institutions and conducts training seminars. However, because of the RSO limitations on USAID, only a handful of such institutions have been established in Iraq. These have the capability of disbursing loans of $3,000 to $5,000.

While Izdihar’s work benefits the Iraqi people, several problems plague the current situation:

- Distance between the local micro-financial institution distributing Izdihar funds and the local Soldier on patrol helps cause a huge synchronization gap that no CMOC can surmount. The distance makes it difficult for Soldiers to target and coordinate needed funds effectively.
- No mechanism exists to guarantee that funds are distributed in a way that will help improve the local economy and to ensure that they are not misappropriated.
- The $3,000 to $5,000 range limit denies services to the entrepreneurs most in need of help and the most susceptible to insurgent influence.
- The goodwill created by MFS is not associated with the stabilization forces (which is related to the synchronization gap).

Building an MFS Team

A better approach would be to build and enable a military MFS team that could operate in outlying areas and extend the reach of USAID efforts. As charity groups and NGOs have shown, with MFS the poor can build an asset base and decrease their vulnerability to economic stress. A military tailor-made team would allow commanders to build a plan that fits the specific situation and environment and use MFS to mitigate certain situations. Such a plan would complement a CMOC vision by requiring a statement of how the team expected to deliver their services in coordination with the CMOC.

Thus empowered, the military commander could identify the work force and resources necessary to make the plan work and bring them to bear on the situation immediately if needed. Determining what specific services the local community needs, and in what priority, would be the most important factor in developing such a plan. This identification would come to depend upon military planners who clearly understood who needs MFS and how they would use economic support. For example, needs vary greatly among farmers, shopkeepers, and mechanics; as a result, MFS plans would vary accordingly. In addition, since start-ups as opposed to mature businesses looking for capital have different needs and goals, a nuanced understanding of the area would be necessary.

A better approach would be to build and enable a military MFS team…
Three Key MFS Services

The three most important services an MFS could provide are micro-credit, micro-savings, and micro-insurance. Each service can help a local population obtain a measure of financial stability in the face of a physically threatening environment.

- **Micro-credit.** Micro-sized loans are the premier offering of a standard micro-financial institution. Loan sizes can vary from $5 to $25,000. Though the lower amount may sound miniscule, such seemingly small amounts of money can be life-altering fortunes in underdeveloped countries. The simple fact is that many businesses in countries like Iraq do not actually need the large amounts of capital that Americans might expect.

- **Micro-savings institutions.** Many poor people in unstable and developing countries have no way to store their currency safely. They often hide their savings in their dwellings, sometimes converting their cash to something regarded as a stable commodity, such as jewelry. Such situations are not conducive to economic growth and are often dangerous. Unfortunately, in such cases, the poor are more likely to become victims of looting by criminal and terrorist gangs. Moreover, the victims of theft will often turn their anger against the security force they expected to protect them.

  By offering a secure place for citizens to store money safely, and even potentially earn interest on it, a micro-financial institution team can give residents a chance to safely accumulate wealth. Such conditions create goodwill for the stabilization force.

- **Micro-insurance.** In an unstable environment, insurance has utility. Terrorist attacks and criminal violence common to insurgencies, such as bombings in community markets, increase the difficulty of normalizing everyday life. Uncertainty drains the willpower of a local population. Insurance at any level works not only as a hedge against risk, but also helps the policyholder feel protected from the effects of possible unfortunate incidents. With property insurance, a policyholder can at least create a plan, knowing that if a valuable possession (e.g., house, car, donkey) is destroyed, he will be able to replace it. Life insurance can also help the policyholder take greater risks by giving him the peace of mind that family members will be taken care of. Offering any kind of insurance, however, would be risky and should involve trained professionals with enough capital to cover the expenses of a worst-case scenario.

Shaping MFS Teams

Often commanders in destabilized areas will not have the resources to build a large MFS team, but a well-targeted effort can go a long way to help in the reconstruction effort. Whatever service a team offers, the scope of the plan and customer base will dictate the resource and labor requirements the team needs. Military units ranging from battalion to division size can create and use MFS teams. A team can consist of a single reservist (perhaps a bank teller in civilian life) armed only with $250, a lockbox, a calculator, a pen, and some paper. On the other hand, a team can be a group of Soldiers with banking and financial service training operating a bricks-and-mortar bank with a vault, an information technology system, and millions in currency. It depends on the situation.

For example, an applicable model for Iraq might be the “mobile banker” prototype developed in West Africa. To meet marketplace vendor needs in West African towns, bankers travel to the vendors’ sites, often daily, to collect deposits or deliver loans. This practice provides the vendor convenient access to financial services and allows the MFS team to monitor the vendor’s business and develop personal contacts with the community.12 Similarly, Soldiers on patrol might be tasked to engage with local vendors or needy inhabitants on the street and identify them for the mobile MFS team. The goodwill generated by the initiative of military forces in helping to provide financial hope can feed the recipient’s pride as well as his stomach and those of his family members.

The Way Ahead

Micro-financial services are not a panacea for dealing with the poor’s economic needs. These services require at least a rudimentary level of economic activity.13 In situations where the local economy has been completely destroyed, food relief, grants, employment and training programs, and infrastructure improvements will be necessary before MFS can be effective. An MFS team works best in an environment where economic activity is already taking place and is capable of expanding. Electricity projects can make power available to a micro-loan customer’s storefront. Healthcare
services can help prevent depletion of one’s cash reserves during illnesses. Soldiers who hire locals to work on forward operating bases or public works projects can indirectly increase micro-loan recipients’ businesses, and MFS can produce synergies in economic development activities.

Nevertheless, the increasing potential for U.S. forces to be involved in insurgencies should provide impetus to make an MFS capability organic to CATs and available to area commanders. This organic structural capability should be possible. Funds for economic reconstruction already exist for MFS use. A reach-back capability for advice from USAID specialists is also available, and a body of free online literature already provides education on how to make MFS work. Together, these resources provide military forces a great deal of guidance on what they might need to integrate MFS successfully into their stabilization and reconstruction plan.

For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will be conducting SRO in unstable nations. Military units should have an organic MFS capability so that they have the most effective tools available to develop financial stability in these countries.

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Get Smart on COIN

The Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) has established an Army-level knowledge management system to support Soldiers and leaders in the performance of their respective operational missions. BCKS’s primary mission is to support the operational domain (deployed units) with a secondary mission to the institutional domain (schoolhouse). BCKS provides ongoing, near real-time support to the Army’s battle command, doctrine development, leader development, and education and training programs.

In January 2006 BCKS established the COIN Forum to provide an opportunity for military, government, and civilian personnel, as well as organizations, to come together to collaborate and share their professional knowledge on all aspects of counterinsurgency operations.

The COIN Forum includes the following categories:
- Translated documents (Arabic, Dari and Farsi).
- COIN articles.
- COIN lessons learned.
- COIN MDMP.
- COIN reference materials.
- COIN training materials.
- Cultural knowledge.
- Information operations.
- Negotiations in a COIN environment.
- Recommended COIN reading lists.
- Tactical site exploitation.

To participate in the COIN Forum and other BCKS professional forums please use your AKO user name and password to access the BCKS site: <https://forums.bcks.army.mil>

For questions contact Jeffery Oxendine, Knowledge Management Senior Professional, Team CSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 oxedine.jeffery@us.army.mil
Those who cannot remember the lessons of the past are condemned to repeat it.
—George Santayana

Colonel John J. McCuen, USA, Retired

WE IN THE WEST are facing a seemingly new form of war—hybrid war. Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately determine success or failure. Hybrid war appears new in that it requires simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related “population battlegrounds.” Learning from the past, today’s enemies exploit these new battlegrounds because the West has not yet learned to fight effectively on them. We still do not fully appreciate the impact and complexity of the nuanced human terrain.

One need only read our daily newspaper headlines or listen to TV and radio news about the insurgencies being fought within the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq to understand the validity of the above observations. Insurgencies rage within these conflicts’ penetrated and often alienated populations in spite of our having first defeated the enemy’s conventional forces. Our population at home usually wearies of the protracted struggles, waged, until recently, with little apparent progress. We are in danger of losing if we fail to fully understand the human terrain in these conflicts, as well as, perhaps, the even more decisive battlegrounds of public opinion at home and abroad.

In the context of hybrid wars, especially at the population level, outcomes should be approached in terms of success or failure rather than the usual military distinctions of victory or defeat. In this regard, the goal or end state sought should be something like “secure improved normalcy,” not “defeat the enemy forces” or “overthrow the enemy regime.” The critical point is that to win hybrid wars, we have to succeed on three decisive battlegrounds: the conventional battleground; the conflict zone’s indigenous population battleground; and the home front and international community battleground.

Merging Three Battlegrounds and Two Wars

In spite of the stark lessons of the past—Indochina, Vietnam, Greece, Somalia, and, most recently, Lebanon—we have not yet learned to succeed on the three combined battlegrounds of hybrid war. Military theorists have started to call those conflicts “hybrid wars” or “hybrid warfare” (to include the Army Chief of Staff when he recently announced publication of the new Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Full Spectrum Operations) but few, unfortunately, have talked substantively about how to fight such wars and achieve enduring success.
INSIGHTS

Thus, hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously—and more decisively—attempt to achieve control of the combat zone’s indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations). Hybrid conflicts therefore are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community. In hybrid war, achieving strategic objectives requires success in all of these diverse conventional and asymmetric battlegrounds.

At all levels in a hybrid war’s country of conflict, security establishments, government offices and operations, military sites and forces, essential services, and the economy will likely be either destroyed, damaged, or otherwise disrupted. To secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore security, essential services, local government, self-defense forces and essential elements of the economy. Historically, hybrid wars have been won or lost within these areas. They are battlegrounds for legitimacy and support in the eyes of the people.

In Vietnam, after a flawed beginning, we learned from our mistakes and successfully won the battle within the South Vietnamese population—although we ultimately lost the war when massive U.S. home front political pressure forced us to withdraw.

From 1968 to 1973, we taught counterinsurgency in every military service school and college. (I myself directed a course on “Internal Defense and Development” at the U.S. Army War College.) However, after Saigon fell, the cry went up, “No more Vietnams!” We dropped all of our courses on counterinsurgency and nation-building and turned our attention to the Cold War, to conventional defensive operations and the nuclear threat. Later, our armed forces would enter Afghanistan and Iraq without the benefit of a focus on asymmetric war, and with virtually nobody trained in either counterinsurgency or nation-building. After several years of failure in those arenas, we have struggled to relearn, teach, and practice the lost lessons. As our new surge strategy demonstrates, our ultimate success in current conflicts and future interventions will hinge on relearning these lessons of the past.

Fortunately, the Army and Marines have published a new Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency. But this volume deals primarily with assisting a host nation fighting an insurgency within its population. As noted above, in hybrid wars there likely will be no host government, indigenous military, or police forces at the outset; much of the political, economic, and social infrastructure will also likely have been destroyed or seriously damaged. These conditions will radically change how our military conducts counterinsurgency. As they have in Afghanistan and Iraq, our military forces will initially have to be responsible for conducting political and economic operations within the population. Until sufficient security and stability have been established to allow other government agencies to first participate and later assume responsibility, military forces will have these burdens while concurrently conducting military operations. FM 3-24 will be valuable as a source for developing hybrid-war strategy, but we will have to use historical lessons and ongoing experience to figure out how to implement strategy.

The Army is also about to issue FM 3-0, Full Spectrum Operations. This manual will be doctrinally vital to the conduct of hybrid war because it acknowledges that we must fight within populations as well as against conventional enemies: “Full spectrum operations are the purposeful, continuous, and simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability . . . to dominate the military situation at operational and tactical levels . . . They defeat adversaries on land using offensive and defensive operations, and operate with the populace and civil authorities in the area of operations using stability operations.” However, like FM 3-24, FM 3-0 will not provide the “how” for operations in either counterinsurgency or hybrid war. Dialogue in professional journals and military schoolhouses, combined with ongoing experience, will help determine the recipes for success in environments peculiar to individual hybrid wars. However, we can no longer delay filling this strategy and doctrine gap—the “how” to fight a hybrid war. That is what I propose we now do.
Use the Past to Inform the Present

Our current enemies have targeted the populations as their battleground of choice. They fully recognize that they do not have the military strength to defeat us in a conventional or nuclear war. However, past experience demonstrates to them that they can win wars within the population that we have not learned to fight. They know they can protract such wars until home front and international community discouragement over casualties and cost force us to throw in the towel and withdraw. Our enemies’ strategic and tactical objectives are thus not to destroy our conventional military forces and seize critical terrain, but to seize, control, and defend critical human terrain until we give up the fight. The decisive battles of the hybrid wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are being fought within the population battlegrounds—the populace in conflict, the home front populations of the intervening nations, and the international community.

As mentioned earlier, one of the most important reasons our enemies have chosen populations as their battlegrounds is that they know that they can protract the war there almost indefinitely. Protraction as a definitive war strategy was first emphasized in modern times by Mao Tse-tung, who promulgated the concept of “protracted revolutionary war.” As Mao describes his strategy in his treatise *On The Protracted War*, “the only way to win ultimate victory lies in a strategically protracted war.”

In my 1966-1967 book *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, I describe Mao’s protracted war strategy this way: “To win such a war, the revolutionaries must try to reverse the power relationship…by wearing down the enemy’s strength with the ‘cumulative effect of many campaigns and battles’; … by building their own strength through mobilizing the support of the people, establishing bases, and capturing equipment; … and by gaining outside political and, if possible, military support.”

These aims reflect the classic essentials of a Fabian insurgency. Our enemies have learned that in hybrid war, protraction wins, especially with its trenchantly modern, technology-enabled impact on spectator populations. Both the insurgent’s conventional and information operations are designed to protract the war and gain outside support, thereby wearing down their enemies.

As illustration, the Vietminh insurgents in Indochina knew that the French, using what was essentially an attrition strategy, would lose on both the conventional and population battlegrounds. By fighting a war of attrition, the French could never solve the “mass and disperse” dilemma—whether they should concentrate to defeat the enemy’s conventional forces or disperse to protect the population. Nor could they cope successfully with the internationalization of the war, which included enemy safe havens across the Chinese frontier and massive materiel support from the Vietminh’s major-power allies, China and (to a lesser extent) the Soviet Union. It was the resulting protraction of the war and its concomitant impact on the French home front that ultimately proved decisive.

Our enemies also know that failing to learn from the French, we initially pursued an attrition strategy in Vietnam. Although we consistently defeated our enemies on the conventional battlefield, we failed to defeat those buried within the population. We judged success by body count—the number of enemy killed or captured—rather than on how many civilians the government protected.

It was our faulty attrition strategy—our failure to orient operations on the population—that deprived the United States of success early in the Vietnam War. Fortunately, General Creighton Abrams assumed command of operations in Vietnam in 1968, and he recognized that the population was the key to success. Abrams radically changed the strategy to embrace a “one-war battlefield” where “clearing, holding, and rebuilding” the population was the critical objective of all military and civilian
forces in South Vietnam; in other words, Abrams fought a hybrid war. Significantly, there were adequate U.S. and South Vietnamese forces available, and America was not faced with the “mass and disperse” dilemma. Abrams’s new strategy had the salutary secondary effect of greatly reducing the impact of Chinese and Soviet materiel assistance to the insurgency in South Vietnam.

By the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973, the war within South Vietnam had been essentially won, even in the face of major conventional attacks by the enemy out of their Cambodian and Laotian safe havens. These attacks were defeated with heavy enemy casualties, but, as mentioned earlier, massive internal political pressure on the U.S. Government forced it to withdraw in early 1973 under the fiction that South Vietnam would never solve its problems until we withdrew. However, even though the counter-insurgency war within its population had been virtually won, South Vietnam was far from able to defend itself in a conventional war against North Vietnam’s 20 battle-hardened, regular divisions without U.S. support. By then, Congress had prohibited this support by law. Also, Washington had never allowed its forces in Vietnam to block the avenues of potential attack within/from Cambodia and Laos. The prohibition against U.S. support and our failure to seal off South Vietnam against future North Vietnamese conventional attacks assured the South’s ultimate downfall in the spring of 1975.

This summarized history well illustrates both the genesis of a successful hybrid-war strategy and the potential political pitfalls of fighting hybrid wars. Our ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the recent Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon, clearly indicate that we in the West—and I include the Israelis in this category—still do not understand how to fight hybrid wars in which the enemy strives to protract war by conducting it within the population while simultaneously attempting to erode confidence at home and abroad as a precursor to military victory. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, our initially victorious conventional attacks created chaotic conditions that allowed stay-behind and outside forces to embed themselves within the population and, seemingly, to endlessly protract the war, thus alienating both the indigenous populations and those at home and abroad. Unfortunately, we created the conditions for protracted war through our own failures, largely by not heeding the lessons of the past.

Fortunately, in Iraq, although belatedly, we have started to use both the lessons of the past and the bitter experience of the present to adopt the hybrid war strategy of securing and stabilizing critical portions of the population and rebuilding the country from the bottom, up. As a result, success has started to replace failure and, though at great cost, we may be finally succeeding or winning in this war.
Winning the Hybrid War

In a hybrid war, our strategic and operational challenges are the same: how to prevent an enemy from rising up and filling the governmental/services vacuum created behind our advancing forces. If we do not immediately fill this vacuum, we will almost certainly face a protracted insurgent war with the same chaotic features we are now facing in Afghanistan and did face in Iraq.

Of course, we should do extensive planning on how we will establish an indigenous host government, to include military and police forces, and how we will provide protection and essential services to the conflict population. The most critical initial problem in such a campaign will not be how to form a central indigenous government, but how to “clear, hold and build” (our modern doctrine has changed the Abrams-era “rebuild” to “build”).

In my book I coined the term “counter-organization” to answer the question of “how.” “Counter-organization” calls for us to destroy embedded insurgent organizations and their appeal to the populace by establishing better alternatives. The term is therefore much better suited to the hybrid-war context than anything offered in the new doctrine, which is predicated on having some form of local government and security forces in place. Thus, my proposed hybrid-war strategy would entail a “clear, control, and counter-organize the population” approach.

Counter-organization requires us to seize and maintain the initiative within the population battleground just as surely as we do on the conventional battleground. We must aggressively protect and care for the population. That means we have to “out-guerrilla” the guerrillas and “out-organize” the enemy within the population. We have to carry the war to the enemy by spreading insecurity within his ranks and avoiding it in the population and our own ranks. Clearing, controlling, and counter-organizing the population is the only way to seize the initiative in the human terrain.

In enacting this strategy, the communication of proper values will be critical. Counter-organization necessitates recruiting and training cadres from the local population and then organizing, paying, equipping, and instilling them with values adequate to their task. These values should not necessarily be our values; in fact, they should conform as much as possible to local mores. We must, however, reject the practice of patronage and its attendant corruption so prevalent in many developing societies, ensuring instead that we promote such values as reliability, fairness, and some degree of selflessness in governing, protecting, and supporting the population. We have to maintain or, if necessary, reestablish the fabric of the society the insurgents seek to destabilize. Building stability by counter-organization, not just from the top down, but, more importantly, from the bottom up, is the way to success. In counter-organization, concentrating efforts and resources at the market-and-village level of the population is essential, since it creates a sense of legitimacy.

The current military term “strategic center of gravity” is the appropriate vehicle for thinking about the elements of success in hybrid wars. Clausewitz defined “center of gravity” as the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.” What all this means for us is that to succeed in a hybrid war, we must first identify proper strategic goals (in military parlance, “strategic end states”), and then go about achieving them by directing all our energies toward accomplishing certain strategic objectives. In hybrid war, we will attain our desired end states only by—

- Conducting conventional operations that carefully take into account how destroying or neutralizing the enemy nation’s governmental, political, security, and military structures will play out in the longer term.
- Clearing, controlling, and counter-organizing the indigenous population through a values-oriented approach that fosters legitimacy.
- Winning and maintaining support for the war on the home front(s) and in the international community. Doing so means maintaining legitimacy and avoiding losses through incompetence.

The results of the Indochinese and Vietnam wars and, so far, the results of our present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, clearly demonstrate that, unless ultimately corrected, failure to succeed in any of these three strategic arenas is likely to result in overall failure.

One Battlefield

Considering the expected strategy of virtually all our potential enemies, we will have to be prepared to fight a hybrid war every time we deploy.
It matters not whether the initial conflict begins symmetrically. As evidenced in the world around us and in history, conventional wars are likely to develop major asymmetric components once one force occupies the land of another. At the same time, we will not be able to dispense with our conventional forces because hybrid war, by definition, will always contain a significant proportion of direct combat by conventional, or even nuclear force. In addition to developing greater flexibility, we will need to adopt a more holistic attitude to war, approaching the various battlegrounds as one battlefield. Clearly, the conventional aim of defeating the enemy’s combat forces has to be achieved at each stage in the campaign. But the decisive second and third objectives, predicated on the populations, must also be achieved.

Not surprisingly, the battle to achieve the third objective of gaining and maintaining public support requires different strategies, tactics, doctrine, and weapons than those used to control the physical and human terrain in combat zones. Competent strategic communications and the perception of moral legitimacy become the determining factors. Our current asymmetric enemies have, with a few exceptions, been much more successful than we have in influencing public perceptions. However, we can reverse this trend and control the moral terrain by judiciously executing our one-war “clear, control, and counter-organize” strategy.

That, of course, does not mean that success among the indigenous population is not decisive—success there is vital to establishing legitimacy and thereby maintaining home and international support. Knowing this, the enemy will often mount combat operations in the field hoping to give the impression that the intervening forces are losing, or at least not winning, and so influence both their enemy’s home front and international public opinion. They expect a country to cut its losses and retreat strategically when public opinion sours. Evidence from Vietnam and Somalia has led them to such a conclusion.

Having adopted a hybrid-war strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, our adversaries are pursuing goals that remain essentially the same as those of Mao and Fabians in other eras: wear down and wait out the enemy, any way you can. We should not forget that their methods are reminiscent of the way we broke free from Britain in the 18th century—Mao was a great student of our Revolutionary War. Had the British understood counter-organization, things might have turned out very differently here in North America. This enduring commonplace is true, and it flies in the face of assertions from some modern military theorists who try to dissociate themselves from the lessons of the past, arguing that modern wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq are different in that they are sectarian civil wars. This perspective misses the point.

The point is that all these wars were and are being fought within the indigenous, home front, and international populations at least as much as on the physical battlefields. Understanding that reality means understanding both the threat and the solution. By clearing, controlling, and counter-organizing the population simultaneously with our conventional operations, we can prevent not only insurgencies, but sectarian and civil wars as well. In all such cases, simultaneous achievement of the three strategic aims described above—target lethal force carefully; clear, control, and counter-organize...
the people; work the information operations—will lead decisively to achievement of strategic objectives and post-bellum success. Thus, from beginning to end, the focus of a campaign must be on aggressively securing and stabilizing the population in the occupied country. Secondarily, there must be constant awareness of the need to maintain the support and assistance of the home front and the world community.

Conclusion

We need to stop planning operationally and strategically as if we were going to be waging two separate wars, one with tanks and guns on a conventional battlefield, the other with security and stabilization of the population. Symmetric and asymmetric operations are critical, interrelated parts of hybrid war, and we must change our military and political culture to perceive, plan, and execute them that way. To become effective modern warriors, we must learn and retain the lessons of the past; we must strategize, plan, and conduct war under a new paradigm—hybrid war.

More than this, we have to change our political and military will. Some worry that after Afghanistan and Iraq we will not have the political and military will to execute, from the start, the sort of costly, complex strategy necessary to succeed in a hybrid war. There is certainly this danger. However, if our vital national interests are threatened, there are likely no good alternatives. Other observers have repeatedly called for negotiating settlements with our adversaries. The problem is that the most dangerous of our enemies, such as Al-Qaeda, summarily reject a negotiated settlement as a violation of their religious law, punishable by death; and most of the others have made endless negotiations, backed by hybrid war—or the threat of it—which they think they can win, a principal pillar of their strategy. Past history and present experience have vividly demonstrated how such strategies have repeatedly eroded our national interests.

Like it or not, political-military will or not, statesmen and Soldiers should understand the threat posed by hybrid war. Together, we must develop coherent strategies to avoid or counter such wars, and, if the nation’s vital national interests are threatened, we must learn how to fight one successfully. However, if we do not have the political and military will to fight the hybrid war with the right strategy and resources to support it, we had better not fight it. That is, in itself, a vital national interest. MR

NOTES

1. “Seemingly” because all wars are potential hybrid wars. Rarely in history have wars ended purely as what we today like to call “conventional.”
ALL ARMY OFFICERS need to read Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airmen’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint Doctrine, a monograph recently published by the Air University Press. In this 115-page piece, Major General Charles L. Dunlap Jr. provides an airman’s insights into the U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. We soldiers should not dismiss Dunlap because he is an Airman; in fact, we should listen closely to what he has to say in this most important argument.

Dunlap pointedly addresses the underlying assumptions of FM 3-24 and how these assumptions have been turned into principles and then into immutable laws that cannot be challenged. Why, for example, he asks, must the people always be the so-called center of gravity in a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation? Clausewitz teaches that a center of gravity is something to be discovered. The authors of FM 3-24 have done the discovering for us; we seem to be blindly obeying. This is not to say that in a given COIN operation the people might be the center of gravity, thereby requiring a large contingent of boots on the ground; but counterinsurgency does not always have to be fought that way.

After almost five years of COIN operations in Iraq and even longer in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army’s operational doctrine no longer comes from FM 3-0, Operations; it comes from FM 3-24. We have become a COIN-only force. The dominance of COIN thinking in the Army has also made us dogmatic, diminishing our ability to think creatively about strategy and operations. We are in an FM 3-24-built box and are unable to see out of it.

Consider this example. In “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF 76 in Afghanistan, Spring 2006” (Military Review, January-February 2008), brigade commander Michael A. Coss writes about his experience conducting COIN operations in Afghanistan. The article is important because it conveys a senior commander’s perspective about his unit’s conduct of operations in that country. But the article betrays the deep-seated dogmatism on counterinsurgency that has infiltrated the U.S. Army. When discussing the importance of the people in a COIN operation, Colonel Coss notes that the population is “the
center of gravity in ANY insurgency” (caps mine). Again, why must this always be the case? From a theoretical and historical standpoint, it certainly does not have to be. Moreover, from a creative operational standpoint, when trying to discover what a center of gravity might be, it doesn’t have to be—and should not always be—the people. If it is, then we have already predetermined what our response will be: many boots on the ground marching to the exact beat of FM 3-24.

The value of reading Dunlap’s article is that it lays bare the assumptions and philosophy that underpin FM 3-24 and how it has put the Army in a dogmatic box. The implications of our current dogmatism are huge for where we end up in future operations and how we rebuild the U.S. Army after Iraq.

The irony that one derives after reading Dunlap’s article is that disciples of FM 3-24 see themselves as “out of the box” thinkers when, in fact, they fit very neatly in a ground-based box, one they are unwilling to look beyond. MR
With as Many Voices: The Aeneid of Virgil

Wars and a man I sing.

With these marvelously compact words, Virgil opens his great epic with a promise to tell not of warfare alone, of great clashes of armies and heroes, but also of the very human struggles of a man entangled in war and entrapped by Fate. The poet’s fulfillment of this promise assured The Aeneid’s (Viking, New York, 2006) longevity and stature in the history of literature. A poet of dualities, Virgil presents warfare in epic and personal scope, both celebrating and questioning the Roman Empire of his day. As a result, this most acclaimed Roman poet has been characterized as both state propagandist and quiet critic of empire.

With the long-awaited publication of Robert Fagles’s new and masterful translation, Virgil’s many voices come alive to speak to our own troubled moment. Professor Fagles has now completed the trifecta of translation. His Iliad and Odyssey are the standard translations of Homer for our era. The Aeneid completes the sweeping tale that begins in Homer’s song of Troy and ends with Virgil’s tale of the Trojan exiles’ Italian “homecoming.” Fagles’s translation, perhaps more than any before, highlights Virgil’s range of voices. At appropriate times, Fagles’s verse rings with the deep resonance of Aeneas beating his famous God-wrought shield to goad on his troops:

Now up steps Clausus from Cures,
flushed with his young strength
and flings his burly spear from a
distance, hitting Dryops
under the chin full force to choke
the Trojan’s throat
as he shouted, cutting off both his
voice and his life

in the same breath, and his brow
slams the ground
as he vomits clots of blood.
. . . Like clashing winds
in the vast heavens, bursting forth
into battle,
matched in spirit, power—no gust
surrendering.

one to another, neither the winds
nor clouds nor seas:
all hangs in the balance, the
world gripped in a deadlock.

So they clash, the Trojan armies,
armies of Latins,
foot dug in against foot, man
packed against man. (10.406-426)

At other times the quiet, private voice of Virgil surfaces in bittersweet moments that lend the poem its humanity. Like the cave at Cumae where the mystic Sibyl scribbled her prophecies on leaves prone to blow about, in Fagles’s hands Virgil’s poem seems to speak from “a hundred mouths with as many voices rushing out.” (6:54)

Readers may notice that Fagles’s Aeneid shares many echoes and tonal qualities with his translations of Homer. In his “Translator’s Postscript,” Fagles is self-conscious about this, going out of his way to explain why his Virgil seems as prone to performance as was his Homer. He needn’t be concerned. This translation begs both for reading aloud and for private meditation. The echoes of Fagles’s Iliad and Odyssey are fitting reminders that Virgil reprinted and reworked Homer, translating the epics he made his own. Graced with a knowledgeable introduction by eminent classicist Bernard Knox, a pronunciation glossary, and helpful notes, Fagles’s translation is for casual readers and scholars alike. This translation will draw in readers new to the work and quickly demonstrate to them why “epic” may never describe anything on television. It is destined to be the standard edition of the Aeneid for years to come, and Fagles can only improve it by including Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics.

While the dust of 2,000 years may appear to weigh down the Aeneid, it speaks to our time. But readers must pay attention. In Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (Vintage, New York, 2003), Robert Kaplan tries to use the classics to instruct modern leaders, but he cherry-picks his way through the literature and quite remarkably ignores Virgil except to dismiss him as an Augustan panegyrist. This characterization overlooks a century of scholarship questioning Virgil’s role as state-sponsored propagandist. To hear only one Virgilian voice, instead of the multivocal Virgil Fagles highlights so well, is to miss depths of meaning. Yes, the famous image of Aeneas leaving Troy’s ruins with his beloved father on his back and young son in hand is an emblem of the Roman virtue pietas, or duty. But it is too easy to read Aeneas as a model hero, or to follow Kaplan in critiquing Virgil for pandering to his political masters. While the epic holds lessons on duty and Virgil does praise Augustus, the public voice is balanced by another—perhaps growing louder as it resonates in our present.

The private voice of Virgil, made distinct in this translation by Fagles’s tonal and rhythm shifts, is not one of outright political opposition. Rather, it quietly voices a sense of foreshadowing and sadness, undercutting triumphant proclamations elsewhere in the poem. While the public voice declares Rome imperium sine fine (empire without end), the “other” voice invites readers to sympathize with Turnus, the “Italian Achilles” opposing Aeneas (and thus Rome). Turnus, like Aeneas, is urged on by divine beings who inspire him to take up arms against the foreign invader come to claim his land and bride. However, Virgil denies readers any simple right or wrong; there
is no comforting archetypal battle of good versus evil here. Instead, Aeneas and Turnus both fight as proxies for higher powers, and are often chided for doubts or forced into actions they might spurn if not for divine meddling. Both heroes rightfully claim divine sanction for their actions. Readers, who admittedly know Aeneas will prevail, nonetheless feel disgust at the needless yet providentially sanctioned slaughter. At one point, even Jove, King of the Gods, throws up his lightning-bearing hands and withdraws, telling the bickering gods and goddesses:

Since it is not allowed that Latins and Trojans join in pacts of peace, and there is no end to your eternal clashes—now, whatever the luck of each man today, and whatever hope he follows, Trojan or Italian, I make no choice between them.

. . . How each man weaves his web will bring him to glory or to grief.

King Jupiter is the king to all alike.

The Fates will find the way.

(10.128–10.138)

It is a timely reminder that in a conflict where both sides claim the backing of God or “Providence,” both might be wrong.

Later, before the final blow is struck in the mortal realm, a deal is struck on Olympus. Jove promises there will be no second Troy, declaring that although victorious, “the Trojans will subside. / And I will add the rites and the forms of worship, / and make them Latins all, who speak one Latin tongue.” (12. 969-971). Colonizer and colonized, victor and vanquished, invader and invaded are all changed forever. The ambivalence of Virgil’s two voices culminates in the mixture of the two races and the nullification of all victory or defeat. Readers may not echo the sentiments of Turnus’s soul as “his breath fled with a groan of outrage / down to the shades below,” but they certainly feel no triumph. The final note of the epic is, as it ever was, a note of resounding ambivalence.

An odd practice grew up around Virgil in the centuries following his death, a testament to the poet’s enduring ability to speak to readers about their own day, regardless of how far removed from his time. The Sortes Virgilianae (“Virgilian Lottery”) used Virgil’s works as fortuneteller by applying random passages to tell the future. In his introduction, Knox relates the famous story of King Charles I consulting the Sortes Virgilianae during the English Civil Wars, when his kingdom was awash in religious sectarian violence and he was ousted by a somewhat misguided attempt to install a republican government. The passage he found foretold England’s struggles and his own imminent demise.

Virgil may or may not predict the future, but he certainly clarifies events past and all-too present. He and his capable translator can be trusted to speak in one breath of glory and senseless loss, to both celebrate and question, and to forcefully engage concepts of duty, destiny, and chance encounters with death.

Virgil has been called a poet of exiles. It is thus apt that a new and vibrantly alive translation has appeared when our society is exiling people at an alarming rate. Now, when many feel increasingly distant from the culture they knew, when we can no longer be sure we serve the ideals we ground ourselves on, Virgil and this moving translation may force us to recognize and deal with a growing gap between our ideals and our reality. It may even encourage us to do something—to fight our exile and raise our own quiet voice of discontent in memory of our losses: the colleagues, teachers, students, friends, and those we’ve never known and now never will no matter how often we perform our futile rites of mourning.

Fill my arms with lilies, let me scatter flowers.

Lustrous roses—piling high these gifts, at least,

On our descendant’s shade—and perform a futile rite.

(6: 1019–1021)

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While The Politics of Prostitution might seem an odd choice for review in a military journal, its selection reflects a growing awareness of the military’s recent actions to combat prostitution, an initiative that is part of a larger fight against the dangerous international scourge of human trafficking. The Department of Defense has mandated education about human trafficking, and commanders have made establishments suspected of human trafficking activities off-limits to military personnel. Also, recognizing that service members—especially those stationed or deployed overseas—are an obvious market for sex traffickers, President George W. Bush signed an executive order in 2005 to clarify that “patronizing a prostitute” is a violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, in the Manual for Courts-Martial.

These new policies have been largely influenced by an understanding that prostitution has direct links to human trafficking. Along with arms and drug trafficking, human
trafficking finances criminal organizations that support terrorism, the killing of Soldiers, and regional instability. So, to say nothing of social justice considerations, fighting human trafficking activities such as prostitution is a national security issue, one that is directly tied to the military’s mission of fighting and winning our country’s wars.

While The Politics of Prostitution does not discuss the U.S. military in particular, it does address human trafficking and its links to prostitution and prostitution policy. The book is a collection of studies by the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS) that examine prostitution policy debates in a dozen Western democratic nations: Australia, Austria, Britain, Canada, Finland, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.

The RNGS characterizes approaches to prostitution policies as abolitionist (punish the johns but not the prostitutes), prohibitionist (punish everyone involved), or regulatory (subject prostitution services to state control). These competing approaches appear both within countries and across borders. Each of the book’s chapters covers a different country; the authors give a clear and concise description of the main debates over prostitution policy in each country, and they identify the groups that helped craft the policy. The chapter on prostitution policy in Italy, for example, outlines the continued debates over the 1958 Merlin Law—debates generated largely by Catholic and feminist concerns (which are often at odds) and brought into public view because of increasing human trafficking activities in that country resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

I recommend The Politics of Prostitution with two caveats. First, the book’s social-scientific approach gives it not just an impartial tone, but a sterile one. You won’t find any personal accounts or stories of those whom the prostitution policies affect most—that is, the prostitutes themselves. The stories of such women, when they become public, sometimes cause a public outcry resulting in changes to policy. Public awareness of the plight of trafficked women in bars outside U.S. military bases in Korea, for example, forced people to examine prostitution more closely and recognize its connection to human trafficking and terrorism—and these discoveries led to policy action.

Second, the volume claims to examine the success or failure of women’s movements at influencing prostitution policy. However, the researchers narrow their focus to such a degree that the hypotheses they seek to prove seem fairly obvious. “Women’s movements in democratic states,” the argument goes, “have tended to be more successful where women’s policy agencies have acted as insiders in the policy-making process.” But surely, most people would already accept that in order to influence policy, you must have a seat at the table.

What the book does, it does well; but—as an academic work of social science—its arguments are limited. Although The Politics of Prostitution provides a good foundation for examining prostitution policy, the topic certainly merits further discussion well outside small academic circles. Here’s hoping the book inspires further thought about the philosophical ideas, religious beliefs, and practical considerations that underlie prostitution policies; additional evaluation of the consequences and effectiveness of particular policies; and more research about prostitution policies in nondemocratic states, not just democratic ones.

Overall, The Politics of Prostitution is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in the prostitution debate or policy-making in general. It provides the reader with the basic policy positions; moreover, it explains who holds these positions, how policies differ in democratic states, and which groups have had an influence on creating those policies.

LTC Karen M. Thoms, U.S. Army, West Point, New York, is a former Department of Defense Special Investigator who conducted an assessment of DOD efforts to combat trafficking in persons.


“It’s almost impossible to overestimate the impact Al Jazeera has had on the Arab world,” notes Josh Rushing, who resigned from the Marine Corps in 2006 to accept a correspondent’s post with the Arab network. On that point, I don’t think even Al Jazeera’s detractors could argue with Rushing. As a television network, Al Jazeera has enormous credibility in the Arab world, the Muslim world, and indeed the developing world.

Perhaps no player enmeshed in the current firestorm of debate about Qatar’s upstart TV network—a global competitor within a decade of its inception—is better situated to write this book. Rushing, the Washington correspondent for the English-language Al Jazeera International, considers himself a truth-seeker; a patriotic American; and first, last, and always a Marine (recruited to the Corps, incidentally, by an Egyptian-American sergeant).

Rushing’s book is neither strident nor timid as he pursues his various aims:

● A history and assessment of Al Jazeera with comparisons to Rushing’s previous employer, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters located in Qatar. (Coincidentally, the emir of Qatar founded Al Jazeera in 1996 from the remnants of the short-lived Arabic version of BBC. That same year, he built the largest airfield in the Middle East and invited the United States to use it “indefinitely.”)

● A defense of Al Jazeera as an Arab voice penetrating Mideast worlds previously closed to anything but official pronouncements and thought dictated by state religion.

● A somewhat low-key defense, but naming names, of the agonizing decision that led him from “behind the wire” as a Marine
spokesman for CENTCOM into his current role across town.

The last of these make for perhaps the book’s most compelling reading. At CENTCOM, the military spokespersons were overseen by a highly partisan Republican operative dispatched from the White House. According to Rushing, “Political issues trumped military interests every time” and personnel literally “found new ways to say nothing.”

At the time, Rushing was bothered by the use of the military to sell the politics of the invasion and spin the ensuing chaos in Iraq. Now, however, he declares, “I am . . . less conflicted by the information CENTCOM media center did not put out than I am about some of the information that we did. I was not asked to lie . . . But between truth and falsehood exists a vast grey area, and considering the spin CENTCOM was releasing, we were deep in the grey area.” His political boss, he says, consistently corrected his use of the word “spin,” urging instead that the term should be “context.”

Ultimately, Rushing came to the difficult conclusion that he had to leave the Marine Corps after he was censured for appearing (briefly) in the documentary “Control Room”—an appearance he was ordered to make. He remarks ruefully that he witnessed what often happens when wars go on longer than expected: “the military begins turning against the media.”

As for the film itself, “the film-makers made me appear like someone who, while never giving up what he believed in, really did want to understand the other side. I like to think it’s an accurate portrayal,” he says. Rushing contends that the United States missed an opportunity by not using his appearance as a voice of understanding to counterbalance the bruisant Abu Ghraib pictures that exploded at about the same time. And he believes the U.S. continues to miss the same boat in its failure to use Al Jazeera as a vehicle to get the American message into the Arab and Muslim world.

Appearing across America “in an attempt,” as he puts it, “to overcome the U.S. misperception that (Al Jazeera) represents the ultimate in terrorist television,” Rushing says he quickly learned that in the estimation of U.S. cable bosses, “Americans just don’t care about international news . . . (preferring instead) 24 hours of NASCAR, seven days a week.”

Rushing admits that he was sickened when Al Jazeera showed footage of dead Americans, but he counters obliquely that his network will continue to be less interested in the sanitized pictures of the U.S. Air Force launching “smart” bombs—highlighted endlessly on U.S. television—than in showing the carnage where they land. He also points out that Al Jazeera was the first Arab network to invite Israeli officials to appear, and the first medium in history to give a voice to Arab women.

U.S. criticism of Al Jazeera and Josh Rushing will doubtlessly continue well past the life of this book, but the author has perhaps opened the door to discussion. The voice that so inflamed the brass in “Control Room” has now been heard in appearances at West Point and the Army Command and General Staff College (where the book is on sale), in classes at the armed forces Defense Information School, before a blue-ribbon audience of Air Force generals, and on Israeli television—where Al Jazeera has replaced BBC.

George Ridge, J.D.
Tucson, Arizona

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Vernon Ruttan’s Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? examines six subjects (interchangeable parts, aviation, nuclear energy, computers, the Internet, and space industries) to analyze the military’s role in technological development. Ruttan argues that military spending has been a vital contributor to the development of technologies in each of these sectors, and postulates that American military spending has traditionally been stimulated by war or the threat of war, leading to major advances in technology. He draws excellent parallels between the items of his study, particularly in the critical role military funding plays in private-firm research.

A key component of Ruttan’s thesis is that private firms do not have enough capital to make radical innovations, and only government entities function with a sufficiently long-term view to undertake the massive development projects required by the modern military. Technologies spun off by these projects are often unintentional, but prove profitable for private firms and provide an incentive for cooperative research-and-development projects. Ruttan provides examples of key advancements made by researchers working toward other goals. Importantly, he believes that the direction of spin-offs has reversed, and that the military is now benefiting from new applications of civilian technologies. He also notes that some firms have become entirely dependent upon military contracts, and as a result, many major contractors have consolidated since the end of the Cold War.

Ruttan is a persuasive writer, but his work has several flaws: he tends to consider technological development in a vacuum and only from the national perspective; he leaves little room for the intentional transfer of ideas or parallel development of technologies in multiple locations; he focuses heavily on innovative leaps when most technological advances are incremental; and he fails to discuss “surprise” uses of technology in the private sector, many of which have contributed to the economic viability of new products. Nevertheless, his work, though not perfect, helps to illuminate the military’s role in technological procurement. It should interest any scholar of military technological development.

Paul J. Springer, Ph.D., West Point, New York

On 22 June 1944, the signing of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act produced positive, unintended consequences for thousands of veterans and post-war America. In Over There, Edward Humes, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, shows how the book’s overall virtues. Humes provides a wonderful exposition of how one government program helped transform a nation while arguing persuasively for a new bill that could lead to a more skilled workforce and a rediscovery of the values of America’s “greatest generation.”

MAJ John M. Hinck, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Consider the humble unit history, a popular genre that combines memoir, after action report, and operational journal. The Combined Arms Research Library index at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, lists 172 such offerings, from histories of national armies and strategic campaigns to the understandably more concise account of the 1139th MP Company’s recent operations in Baghdad. The collection also features three separate and lengthy bibliographies of military unit histories, suggesting there’s plenty more where the others came from.

Stephen Bourque and John Burdan’s The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, presents an important and enlightening addition to this collection. Their subject combines an appropriately significant topic and a relatively brief timeline, focusing on a divisional cavalry squadron that assumed its combat mission within weeks of its arrival in theater and later provided security to the collective pot of American dreams. Sadly, too, the current version of the bill does not make much of an economic or life difference for veterans—white, male, or otherwise. Despite the relatively small size of today’s military force, the current bill falls far short of past promises. Its provisions have not kept pace with rising inflation and increasing education costs, and Humes argues convincingly that we need a new bill for veterans, one that has the transformative potential of its predecessor and that can be adjusted to meet changing circumstances.

Appendixes featuring the actual Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 and the current GI Bill could have illuminated the arguments presented in Over There, but that’s a minor shortcoming given the book’s coalition’s ground campaign in late February. During the war’s final hours, the squadron found itself occupying the Basra Road north of Kuwait City, 30 kilometers forward of its division and in grave danger of being overrun by Iraqi units retreating from Kuwait.

Bourque and Burden tell this story with refreshing candor. The squadron’s leaders are competent and the men are brave, but vehicles still break, radios fail, Soldiers get lost, and accidents happen. Fratricide poses a particularly dangerous threat, and the authors describe several friendly-fire incidents involving neighboring units. The enemy, too, poses a significant threat, and the squadron fights several deadly engagements. Along the way, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wilson and his subordinates demonstrate considerable poise and judgment during repeated moments of crisis, reinforcing the importance of effective leadership during combat operations.

The Road to Safwan reminds us that Desert Storm was no cakewalk. Coalition forces enjoyed significant advantages in technology and firepower, but small-unit leaders and well-trained Soldiers proved to be our most effective secret weapon.

LTC Bill Latham, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Tiger Force is a disturbing book about a platoon in Vietnam and its protracted campaign of war crimes and atrocities. The authors were working for the Toledo Blade when they were tipped to the story by a fellow reporter who had been bequeathed boxes of secret documents from Henry Tufts, a former head of the Army’s Criminal Investigations Command (CID), after his death in July 2002.

One of Tuft’s files contained allegations and preliminary investigative reports against “Tiger Force,” a special reconnaissance
platoon formed in Vietnam by the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. Using the file as a start point, Sallah and Weiss conducted their own investigation into charges that the unit had gone on an appalling killing spree that was apparently sanctioned by the chain of command within the battalion. The result of their investigation, which included interviews with 43 Tiger Force veterans and several trips to Vietnam to track down elderly Vietnamese witnesses, was a four-part series for their newspaper entitled “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths.” The series won the 2004 Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting; the book is a more detailed account of Tiger Force’s crimes and subsequent efforts by a series of Army investigators to bring its members to justice.

Tiger Force was established in November 1965 by Major David Hackworth to “outguerrilla the guerrillas.” Organized to carry out reconnaissance and commando functions, it was often inserted in small, near-autonomous teams to find the enemy and conduct hit-and-run missions. The 45 men of Tiger Force were handpicked volunteers and, by most accounts, the unit enjoyed a reputation as a highly effective force; it even received a presidential citation for bravery in 1966. However, in May 1967, Tiger Force began to unravel. Led by an incompetent lieutenant who ordered his men to “kill anything that moves,” the unit, frustrated by heavy casualties and weeks of being hit by snipers in the Song Ve Valley, committed a number of “revenge” killings against unarmed civilians. In September, it was moved to Quang Tin province as part of Operation Wheeler, where its descent into chaos and near-anarchy continued. During that operation, conducted in a designated “free fire zone,” the unit committed more atrocities. They threw grenades at villagers hiding in bunkers, fired on entire villages indiscriminately, and shot unarmed farmers in rice paddies. They also began to mutilate the bodies of their victims, cutting off ears, taking scalps, and, in one reported instance, beheading a baby they had shot.

As deeply troubling as the actual war crimes was the apparent sanction of these actions by Tiger Force’s chain of command. The authors note that those in authority apparently chose to ignore warnings about what was going on; several Soldiers in the unit tried to stop the carnage, but they were ostracized by their buddies and when they tried to bring the unit’s activities to the attention of their superiors, they were ignored and some were transferred to another unit.

Tiger Force also addresses the exhaustive three-year CID investigation that resulted in a damning 55-page report that came out in 1975. The report concluded that “a total of 18 soldiers committed crimes, including murder and assault.” However, the report was promptly buried after it was sent to the secretaries of Defense and the Army. According to the authors, the allegations were deemed too similar to the My Lai massacre and too close to Richard Nixon’s resignation and the fall of South Vietnam to warrant pursuing.

The story of Tiger Force clearly demonstrates what happens when a breakdown in discipline is coupled with criminally incompetent leadership. The situation was exacerbated by a command climate that sanctioned war crimes in the interest of raising body counts. The result was a unit that went over the edge into an abyss of murder and atrocity.

This is not an easy book to read, but it is highly recommended. Although these events happened over four decades ago, the issues brought up by this book are just as timely today, particularly given the importance of public opinion, the imbalance between “foreign policy aims and military force posture,” the dangers of strategic overextension, the proper maintenance of “offensive-defensive balance” in U.S. strategy, and the “virtue of consistency in threatening and using force.” Record applies all of these lessons scathingly to the Bush administration’s War on Terror, involvement in Iraq, and measures for Homeland Defense.

However, in his critique of the Bush administration, Record is guilty of making the same errors that his predecessors made in criticizing the pre-World War II appeasers. This mistake has been called “creeping
historical determinism” by Malcolm Gladwell. In an article for The New Yorker in 2003, Gladwell explained how hindsight informs the way human beings criticize the “failures” of those in the past. The hindsight critic claims that the dots were obvious and easy to connect, and it was only criminal stupidity or negligence that contributed to catastrophe. Gladwell argued that this attitude is a logical fallacy that often ignores the larger contexts surrounding decision-making, especially decision-making based on intelligence—which was, is, and will always be incomplete.

By book’s end, Record has used everything from the U.S. invasion of Iraq to the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina as vehicles to indict the current administration for strategic negligence; the cautions of his Munich analysis seem almost forgotten. Just as the neoconservatives in Bush’s administration ignored the historical context of the Munich appeasement in justifying a “pre-emptive” war against Saddam Hussein, so Record ignores the historical context prior to the Iraq war. He overlooks systemic failures that were beyond the executive branch’s control in mounting his too-broad criticism of current U.S. strategy and foreign policy. Simply put, Record overplays his hand.

Despite its flaws, I highly recommend this little book to a broad audience. Record’s timely re-analysis of the experience at Munich continues to influence U.S. strategic thinking. Readers are, however, advised to retain their skepticism, especially for the later chapters, which border on rant.

CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FIRST TO THE RHINE: The 6th Army Group in World War II, Harry Yeide and Mark Stout, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2007, 376 pages, $27.95. Harry Yeide and Mark Stout’s First to the Rhine: The 6th Army Group in World War II is a factual and objective history of one of the lesser known aspects of the War in Europe: the 6th Army Group’s campaign from the invasion of Southern France through VE Day. Yeide and Stout seek to redress the short shrift typically given to this important aspect of the war, an oversight that is puzzling given the logistic and strategic importance of Marseilles and the Rhone River valley. At least 40 fully supplied American and French combat divisions were able to enter the fight against German forces in the west through the southern French ports liberated by the French 1st and American 7th armies.

To detail this usually neglected and often-misunderstood aspect of the war, the authors rely heavily on a wide array of primary and secondary sources that include after-action reports, award citations, unit operations journals, personal diaries, unit histories, and biographies of key individuals. This mix of sources enables Yeide and Stout to present a well-balanced chronological history of 6th Army Group’s operations from the initial stages of the Dragoon landings in August 1944, up through Operation Nordwind, the German counteroffensive during the bitter cold of January 1945, to the final campaigns along the Danube and into Austria in April 1945. Neither the French nor the American contributions to the campaigns are neglected, and the authors provide ample information on the German dispositions, plans, and personalities that figured prominently in the campaigns. Key allied commanders such as Devers, de Lattre, Patch, and Truscott are all included, but so too are the common Soldiers’ contributions down to the squad level. The result is a comprehensive picture of the fighting on the southern edge of Eisenhower’s Great Crusade.

While the authors have meticulously researched their material, they do not get bogged down in unnecessary details. Yeide and Stout’s crisp narrative style takes readers inside the strategic and operational command decisions; it also makes them feel the agonies and sacrifices endured by the common Soldiers of both sides. The authors also take great care to place the southern operations into the larger picture of the war in Europe so that the reader understands the 6th Army Group’s purpose and contributions without taking anything away from their better-known counterparts: Bradley’s 12th Army Group and Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. First to the Rhine fills a long-felt void in the European Theater’s operational histories. It is a valuable book for both the casual historical reader and the serious student of military history.

Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Colorful personalities and their bold adventures make for better wartime press than the grim reality of thousands of Soldiers in battle. During World War II, no two figures served this need better than good-natured rivals Bernard Montgomery and George S. Patton, walking caricatures of the archetypal British and American warriors. Ken Ford’s latest work, Assault on Sicily, attempts to reconcile the public personas of these leaders with the reality of the one battle in which they fought as equals: the invasion of Sicily.

Ford is British, but Montgomery comes off the worse in his comparison. Living off his fame from El-Alamein, Monty attempts to push the Americans to the sidelines in the Sicily campaign. His overly cautious nature, however, ensures that the Axis forces have ample time to organize a solid defense. Meanwhile, Patton—a bold tactician, yet also a dutiful Soldier—waits obediently during the critical days of the battle, guarding the British flank instead of seizing the initiative with his characteristic audacity. Ford seems entirely sympathetic to Patton until he gets to the slapping incidents; then, the general turns into a monster.

Monty’s and Patton’s flaws aside, Ford ultimately blames the campaign’s mismanagement on Field
Marshal Harold Alexander and General Dwight Eisenhower. Not only do they bow to Montgomery, but they bear responsibility for the poor interservice cooperation typified by numerous fratricide incidents. Ford concludes that Sicily was “coalition warfare at its worst.” Only the total collapse of the Italian forces prevented Sicily from being a much more costly lesson. Indeed, the most successful leader in Ford’s account is German General Valentin Hube, who took advantage of the Allied delays to execute a masterful defense of the island.

Despite its announced focus on leaders, most of The Assault on Sicily is given over to the kind of endless descriptions of unit movements into which campaign histories often degenerate. Without a situation map at hand, one will quickly lose track of (or interest in) just how many miles each battalion advanced each day. Additionally, much of the book seems drawn from a few—mostly official—sources, and the Monty vs. Patton aspect lacks depth and could have been better integrated with the tactical descriptions. In the end, these weaknesses tend to illustrate, if inadvertently, the gap between the media images of giant personas striding across the battlefield and the actual tactical situation.

LTC David D. DiMeo, USA, West Point, New York


I must go over the ground again.—Edmund Blunden, Undertones of War

Why do we need another book on such a time-worn topic as the Gettysburg campaign of the American Civil War? William C. Robinson’s impetus for producing a new work is straightforward: to establish definitively whether or not Jeb Stuart’s failure to appear at Gettysburg on 1 July 1863 really is one of the prime reasons Gettysburg proved a major blow to the Confederacy.

Prior to Gettysburg, Stuart’s raids on Union camps greatly aided Lee in his victory at Second Manassas; his maneuvering impeded the flow of Union General George McClellan’s forces, and he profitably kept Lee informed of the intentions or whereabouts of Union generals Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, thus facilitating Lee’s victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Lee trusted Stuart implicitly. However, the picture began to muddy around June 1863 as Stuart let the more cavalier part of his personality dominate over his operational imperative to screen Lee’s Army. Lee trusted Stuart to use the good sense and discretion he had exercised in the recent past, but the cavalry commander chose instead to embark on a deleterious raiding spree that only harassed—but did not delay—the pace of the Union forces’ march across the Potomac on their way to counter Lee. In the month prior to the battle of Gettysburg, Stuart broke contact with Lee for several critical days, even though his was the only substantive body of cavalry with the experience and resources to screen Lee from Union forces.

By the time Stuart’s men arrived at Gettysburg, it was far too late for them to make an impact on the battle. Only if “Stuart had achieved surprise and gained the Union rear ‘unhindered’ can one imagine his movement’s having an impact on the outcome on Cemetery Ridge.”

In developing his thesis, Robinson does not discount other factors affecting Stuart’s actions, such as terrain, the availability of fords across strategic rivers—major considerations for maneuverability and logistics—and whether or not Stuart’s actions were sparked by a desire to avenge his cavalry’s beating at Brandy Station early in June 1863. Nonetheless, much of “the legendary elusiveness of Lee’s army was due to Stuart’s skill at providing it with an impenetrable screen of cavalry scouts.” Had Stuart been in a tactically sound position, he could have disrupted the Union army’s excellent spy network and kept the Union commanders in the dark about Lee’s whereabouts; the battle that precipitated the Confederacy’s fall might never have happened. In the end, though, Robinson does not ignore wider factors concerning Stuart’s actions, and Lee remains accountable for the overall loss of the battle as his orders to Stuart should have been more explicit.

Robinson’s research was extensive: he culled over 145 primary and secondary sources, many of them among academic heavy hitters of Civil War history. He includes 15 pages of notes, four theater-level maps, and several photos and battlefield sketches relative to the Gettysburg campaign. It is unlikely that Robinson’s work will satisfy all Civil War scholars and students, but whatever its eventual reception in academic circles, this is an enthralling work of history.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Retired, Ramstein, Germany


Taiwan in Transformation is a lively history of the island that begins in 1895, when Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and ends in 2005, with the pressure increasing on Taiwan either to declare its independence or return to its roots as a Chinese province.

The author, Chun-chieh Huang, describes the nostalgia of the Taiwanese for their mother country, China, that was aroused by the Japanese occupation and then shattered as a result of the corruption, discrimination, and abuses of power of the Chinese Nationalist government in the 1950s. Also discussed are Taiwan’s historic transition from an agrarian to an industrial society—the “economic miracle” that led to the rise of the middle class and the creation of a middle-class intelligentsia—and the changes in culture and attitude that ensued.
It was during the great economic change, in the late 1980s and 1990s, that the Taiwanese began to resent the heavy-handed tactics of the mainland’s oppressive Communist regime. Today, the Taiwanese are faced with the challenge of developing a mature relationship with the People’s Republic that can survive the pressure for either a quick unification or a quick declaration of independence. Author Huang believes that only a solid understanding of the historical experiences of both the Taiwanese and mainland Chinese can point the way to a solution that will enable peaceful coexistence.

A recognized historian and native Taiwanese, Huang exudes a real understanding of the culture and feelings of the Taiwanese people. He evinces a depth of knowledge about the country and its transformation over the last 110 years, a transformation that ultimately increased the availability of information and educational opportunities for working-class Taiwanese, thereby accelerating the process of democratization. According to Huang, it was Taiwan’s educated citizenry and their commercial contacts with Western businesses, educational institutions, and governments that pushed the island toward a Western political-economic model.

Taiwan in Transformation is a well-written, interesting book, albeit a bit redundant in places. It presents a wealth of historical and cultural material that explains how Taiwan transformed itself into one of the most powerful and efficient technology centers in the world, and why China and Taiwan seem to be bent on a collision course. With the U.S. still committed to safeguarding the island’s autonomy and the People’s Republic now a great power on the international stage, Taiwan in Transformation has much to offer those in the defense and policy establishments.

**MG Ralph O. Doughty,**
**Retired, Ph.D.,**
**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Empires, Wars, and Battles is a lively and compelling historical narrative that describes the origins and advances of the Middle East. Its author, T.C.F. Hopkins, presents the complexities, traditions, and history of the region in a balanced, uncomplicated style. In five short chapters, he takes the reader on a journey that starts in the Ancient World and concludes with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Along the way, he covers such fascinating topics as Roman expansion, the Byzantine Empire, the Crusades, and the War of the Black and White Sheep Turks. Despite the book’s unrelenting pace and the vast period of history it covers, the reader is reassuringly left with a basic, if abridged, understanding of the character, nuances, and rivalries of many of the ancient societies of the Middle East.

While Empires, Wars, and Battles provides insights into the origins and intricacies of conflict in the Middle East, readers will be frustrated that Hopkins avoids linking past events with contemporary challenges: an explanation as to why historical occurrences continue to play such a critical role in world affairs would have been helpful. Likewise, for those unfamiliar with the geography and episodes of the region, the seven black and white maps intended to assist the reader to understand cultural, national, and other environmental factors fail to deliver; they are confounding and irritatingly basic. A series of high-quality maps, carefully annotated, would have assisted the reader enormously. There would also have been merit in including a number of pictures or representations of the key characters introduced throughout the book, since many will be unfamiliar to the lay reader.

Despite these shortcomings, Empires, Wars, and Battles is an absorbing and cleverly researched history of the Middle East. Focusing principally on the social, political, and monetary motivations of conflict, Hopkins articulates the historical struggles of the region and, importantly, its relationship with Europe. He also posits a number of profound observations worthy of contemplation. For example, while describing the Roman period, Hopkins notes: “Rome had discovered an important truth about war as a result of their clashes with the Carthaginians: that war and conquest are not the same thing and that the success of a war is ultimately judged by what comes after it. As one Roman general of this period quipped, ‘Wars are won in the peace.’”

In sum, Empires, Wars, and Battles is an enjoyable and absorbing study. While not a must-read for those deploying to the Middle East, it will appeal to many who wish to gain an overview of the region’s history and its complexities. Despite a number of minor deficiencies, few will be disappointed by the book’s fast pace and straightforward, well-written accounts.

**MAJ Andrew M. Roe,**
**British Army, Bulford, United Kingdom**
Learning From Modern Wars

LTC Craig Collier, Baghdad—LTG Peter Chiarelli’s advice to “embrace the requirements for full-spectrum operations” in his article, “The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future” (Military Review, September-October 2007), has been accomplished. In fact, the belief in our Army that the war in Iraq will be won through primarily non-kinetic/non-lethal means has become the ascendant philosophy. What is frustrating is that a “brutal” assessment of the non-kinetic lines of operation—especially the economics line of operation—is absent from the discussion.

Contrary to what LTG Chiarelli implies in the article, there are very few officers in our Army who believe solely in brute strength and ignorance as the path to victory in Iraq. What I have witnessed are quite a few officers at the field- and company-grade levels who have diligently worked the economics line of operation and found it lacking in effectiveness, especially when compared with lethal operations. They resent being told that they “Don’t get it,” and dismissed like the armor enthusiasts prior to World War II that LTG Chiarelli mentioned in his article.

Prior to this year’s surge, projects and services were supposed to lead us out of the Iraqi wilderness, eliminating the economic incentive to join the insurgency and making potential insurgents content with their jobs rather than lay IEDs. The result should have been a reduction in the level of violence, but that didn’t happen. In spite of billions of dollars spent on projects and essential services, the violence continued to increase as if that money was never spent. If “...we must embrace the concept of nation-building, not just rhetorically, but entirely,” then understanding what our money spent on projects and services achieved is critical.

We faithfully track measures of performance such as how much money we spent and how many projects we completed, but not measures of effectiveness. How much did violence drop in an area after we completed a project or spent tens of millions of dollars on an essential service? What is the correlation between the amount of money we’ve spent in a province or district and the level of violence there? In this corrupt environment, too much money pumped into an area too fast is just as likely to fuel violence as it is to curb it.

The events on the ground in Iraq that have recently given us hope are decidedly kinetic. Al-Qaeda’s brutality, their disruption of historic smuggling networks, and coalition and ISF effectiveness at attacking them brought the Anbar sheiks into our camp. Al-Qaeda is on the run in Anbar because they are being killed by the locals, who decided that eliminating them was in their own selfish best interests. The Sunnis in Anbar Province are on our side at least for now because “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

A similar change could be happening in Baghdad. Muqtada al Sadr has temporarily ordered his Mahdi Army to refrain from attacking coalition forces, and the violence has dropped significantly as a result. Sadr didn’t come to this decision because we finally turned on the improved sewer system in Sadr City. As he’s done in the past, Sadr is going to ground to consolidate and reorganize based on the internal Shia power struggle and because since January we’ve killed or captured dozens of his lieutenants and even more of his foot soldiers.

In Baghdad neighborhoods, the keys to limiting the violence have been the erection of barriers and the establishment of Combat Outposts and Joint Security Stations. The barriers separate the neighborhood residents from those outside who seek to terrorize its inhabitants, while the COPs and JSSs demonstrate our commitment to their security.

What all of these recent successes have in common is that kinetic actions provided the most effective solution to what a year ago appeared to be an unsolvable problem. Current events in Iraq seem to contradict the popular belief that “the decisive elements of power required to prevail may, more often than not, be non-kinetic.”

Improving the Iraqi economy is certainly a worthy goal that could go a long way in consolidating victory. However, proponents of projects and essential services as the path to peace often speak about it with a religious zeal, as if its effectiveness is somehow beyond scrutiny. We’ve been at this now for four years, so we have the hard data; polling results are not a brutal assessment. Without an honest assessment of what our money spent on projects bought us, we’re poised to learn the wrong lessons about what worked and what didn’t in this insurgency.

Mounted Vertical Maneuver—Today; When We Need It: Use Existing U.S. Army M113 Gavin Light Tanks

Mike Sparks, Air-Mech-Strike Study Group—in reading BG (Retired) Robin P. Swan and LTC (Retired) Scott R. McMichael’s pro article, “Mounted Vertical Maneuver: A Giant Leap Forward in Maneuver and Sustainment,” and LTC (Retired) John Gordon IV and COL (Retired) David E. Johnson’s anti-article, “Air Mechanization: An Expensive and Fragile Concept” (Military Review, January-February 2007), I found embedded factual errors that were either to justify new
Ongoing debates about the viability of air-mech units or [to show] that what we have or want is not good enough. BG Swann argued that we don’t have any equipment to perform air-mech with and must buy new 27-ton FCS tracks and giant tilt-rotor JHL airlifters to obtain air-mech capabilities; he claims we don’t have and never had. RAND’s retired LTC David Johnson argued against this concept, saying all we have to perform air-mech with is road-restricted 20-ton Stryker trucks that are okay but somehow open-terrain; cross-country mobile, 27-ton FCS tracks that are too vulnerable; and the JHL, which is too easy to shoot-down while implying that air-mech has never worked in past combat operations.

The truth is we already have 15,000+ air-transportable, amphibious, closed-terrain, cross-country-mobile 11-ton M113 Gavin light tank/APCs that have been used for years in successful air-mech operations by several allied armies—including the U.S. Army.

We have 500+ C-130s, 180 C-17s, soon C-27J fixed-wing transports and 400 CH-47 Chinook helicopters to airdrop or airland Gadins; the former at higher speeds and altitudes to avoid enemy air defenses than any non-existent tilt-rotor. MVM air-mech combat operations have already been successful beginning with the German Me-323s airlanding SP assault guns into North Africa, British Hamilcars glider-landing Tetrarch and Locust light tanks on D-Day and the Rhine river crossing, Russian assault guns and BMDs airdropped into Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1978 the Soviets did the first heliborne MVM, into East Africa, a feat they repeated in Afghanistan later that year. The Israelis airdropped M113s at Entebbe, the Australians into East Timor in 1999, the British CH-47 air-meched Scimitar light tanks into the Balkans to avoid land mines and fly over the Sava river blocking our non-swimming medium-to-heavy vehicles. American Airborne units were the first to parachute drop M551 Sheridan light tanks into combat to link up with M113 Gavin APC task forces to collapse the PDF and prevent Noriega from escaping Panama in 1989. In 2001, M113 Gavins of General Meig’s IRF-Medium were denied being flown into Camp Rhino in Afghanistan because it would make the Stryker truck purchases look unnecessary (they are). Resultantly, we didn’t fan-out closed-terrain mobile forces to block Bin-laden’s escape, and he remains free today. In 2003, the IRF-M was slowly C-17-airlanded into Northern Iraq when it should have parachute-inserted M113 Gavins immediately and fanned out to block Saddam/subordinates from escaping to Tikrit to start the rebellion against us.

Air-mech by high altitude delayed low opening (HALO) parachutes at 10,000 feet above enemy MANPADS solves shoot-down fears and was done in 1972 to resupply An Loc during the Vietnam war—another inconvenient fact not reported by either MVM author’s group. The Russians jump with drogue chute deployed parachutes with delay devices to effect HALO capabilities—we could easily emulate by switching the new T-11 parachute from obsolete static-line and d-bag deployment means. Ram-air parachutes opening at high altitudes make M113 Gavin platform loads into de facto 25-mile stand-off gliders but with precision landing guidance. All we have to do is field the new parachutes and practice with them to get HALO/HAHO air-mech capabilities.

It’s the quality of the vehicle’s armor that counts not its parking weight—a 10-ton M113 Gavin hull of thick aluminum is far more protective than a road-bound Stryker truck with a thin steel box at twice the weight—this means superior armor layering can be added that coupled with v-hull shaping makes the Gavin not only more air-transportable for 3D maneuvers by C-130—it is superior in armor protection than a flat-bottom Bradley that is supersized carrying a turret armoring dead air. 27-ton FCS has turret inefficiency and cannot fly by C-130s nor drive through closed, vegetated terrain and cannot swim like Gavins can to strike at where enemies hide. High technology Gavins with land-mine resistant armoring, band-tracks, hybrid-electric drive are stealthy for 60-mph speeds. M113 Gavins can be reduced in size to roll-on/off from inside Army operated CH-47s and C-27Js to air-mech now by either airdrop or airland and should be supplied to every airborne, air assault, or LBCT infantry battalion; Delta Weapons Company; and/or HH&C anti-tank and mortar sub-units to replace vulnerable Humvee trucks. The M113 was originally designed for light units by General Gavin for as-needed all-terrain, amphibious armored transport, and with TOW ATGMs can act as light tanks blasting enemy vehicles and strongpoints for the dismounting infantry. A sapper squad makes them Engineer Cavalry Troops able to breach mines with probing and towed-rocket line charges. Modularity LBCTs don’t need or get 27-ton FCS or 20-ton Stryker trucks—they air-maneuver into closed terrains; it’s high time they be equipped with M113 Gavin light tracks needed to fight better than M16 versus AK47 and RPG at a foot-slog.

A New Strategic Paradigm

LTC Scott Tousley, USA, Retired—I would like to offer a few thoughts on Sean McFate’s article, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?” (January-February 2008 Military Review).

First, I suggest that new strategies and operational concepts matter much more than a new DOD command organization, as Africa’s substantial problems will be less affected by a more coherent DOD organization than by truly revolutionary changes in approaches to those problems. The implicit thinking in the article is that a focused DOD organization addressing Africa will help develop more successful approaches to its problems by the entire U.S. interagency and government. But a better DOD organization held to the same kinds of legacy approaches will effect little or no change to the status quo in Africa.
This leads to my second observation—a true “new strategic paradigm” is not the creation of AFRICOM, but rather would have been the creation of AFRICOM along with a forced synchronization of parallel organizations in both the Department of State and USAID. DOD’s AFRICOM may be able to spark some synchronization of efforts across the interagency, but this positive change will likely be measured in decades rather than years or months, a cycle far slower than the evolution of the problems bedeviling Africa. It is perhaps telling that the establishment of AFRICOM was a DOD rather than Administration initiative.

Finally, concerning the creation of AFRICOM, there is a (small) elephant in the room that is not mentioned in the article—what about the predecessor known as SOUTHCOM? We have several decades of experience in Central and South America with a mission unlike that of CENTCOM or PACOM or even EUCOM, a mission focused substantially on development and relationships and institutional strengthening. One could argue that AFRICOM should look to follow the relevant lessons of its elder sibling SOUTHCOM, and consider this “old strategic paradigm” and what has and has not worked there.

...The Author Responds

Sean McFate—Scott Tousley raises three excellent points in his letter regarding my article on AFRICOM. I agree with LTC Tousley’s suggestion that a truly revolutionary change in approach toward Africa would be preferable than a new Unified Command. Such an approach might include boosting civilian agency capacity, such as USAID or State, and instituting interagency mechanisms that synchronize a “whole of government” approach to conflicts on the continent.

However, such an approach would require substantial reorganization and realignment of national security architecture and strategy, requiring Goldwater-Nichols-caliber legislation. This is no mean feat, and the creation of AFRICOM—assuming it avoids legacy approaches, as I recommend—is a relatively easier way to at least consolidate DOD’s focus on the continent, and perhaps serve as a model for other Unified Commands, if successful. Alternatively, if we wait for Goldwater-Nichols II, we may be waiting decades. That said, there are projects underway investigating how the interagency should be transformed to address new security threats of the 21st Century, such as fragile and failing states. One such initiative is the Project for National Security Reform at Washington, D.C.

Lastly, AFRICOM planners did utilize SOUTHCOM as a blueprint, but aspirered to take this model to “the next level.” AFRICOM staff members have remained in communication with SOUTHCOM to glean lessons learned and adapt them to the African context. However, many (most?) aspects of AFRICOM’s strategy and structure are significantly enhanced compared to its SOUTHCOM sibling, from its planned employment of “soft power” to its unprecedented civilian-heavy leadership. The sum of these and other radical developments ultimately makes AFRICOM a unique Unified Command mandating a unique strategic vision. Only time will tell if AFRICOM is an evolution or devolution of the SOUTHCOM model.

The New Legs Race

MAJ Raymond Farrell, Canadian Army—In Andrew Hom’s “The New Legs Race: Critical Perspectives on Biometrics in Iraq” (Military Review, January-February 2008), he comments on initiatives to establish so-called “identity dominance” in Iraq or indeed, anywhere. He raises some fair objections. Nevertheless, even without any technical knowledge of biometrics, a dispassionate reader will note that Mr. Hom’s conclusion does not automatically flow from his arguments.

Mr. Hom’s main argument is that biometric technologies are intrusive and humiliating and would therefore be counterproductive in the Iraqi context. He points especially to the importance of female purity in Arab concepts of honor. Mr. Hom notes that as currently practiced, U.S. TTPs for biometric data collection are often insensitive, and sure enough, the article is accompanied by a photo of an American Soldier taking a footprint from an apparently unhappy Iraqi man. Mr. Hom deduces that biometrics causes more harm than benefit.

My own deduction is that biometric technologies must not be intrusive or humiliating. It would be easy to amend TTPs to ensure this, albeit at some cost to capability. By limiting collection to non-intrusive methods, Mr. Hom’s basic objection could be met without entirely sacrificing the very significant benefits of identity management.

For example, Mr. Hom notes that collecting facial recognition images from women would require them to uncover their faces. Fair enough. Then why not simply dispense with facial recognition for women? Fingerprint and iris data are far more reliable in any case. Even if we decided to forego collecting data on women entirely, we would still be mapping the male population from which the large majority of insurgents are drawn. The basic idea being that we accept a limitation on our own use of biometrics to mitigate very real cultural concerns, but that we retain many of the benefits.

Mr. Hom also makes the argument that U.S. identity dominance would render conventional human intelligence networks redundant and therefore cause them to atrophy. First, I do not share his faith in any single technology as a panacea. Even quite comprehensive identity management would only be partially effective, and in a population as fragmented as that in Iraq (or most failed/fragile states) incomplete data is the best that may be hoped for. In such a case, identity management is only one tool in the box. Traditional human networks would remain another important one, the more so since they can provide many types of information that identity management cannot.
One might argue that perceptions are what matter, and that a population that believed itself to be perfectly tracked, rightly or not, would abandon HUMINT. I personally doubt this, but even if it were true, the deduction is again that identity management must be unobtrusive, or even imperceptible. TTPs for biometrics should ensure that the system should have as low a profile as possible. Its extent, scope, and perhaps even existence should be secret. Conceptually, biometric data could be collected only forensically or covertly. In such a case, the entire system could operate covertly, and yet still be quite effective for intelligence and counter-intelligence. This is, after all, the way many other human and technical intelligence capabilities are employed.

In general, most of Mr. Hom’s objections to the use of biometrics can be addressed simply through wisdom and prudence exactly as we do for other capabilities such as firepower. Mr. Hom does, however, raise one very important concern that is not so easily answered. He correctly points out that in the wrong hands a good identity database could be a tool for repression or even mass murder. This is an argument that ought to give pause.

I see two responses: First, limiting the scope of the system to perceived threats, rather than large portions of the population, would greatly mitigate the danger, since a small database would be of scant use to a would-be tyrant. This limitation would also be coherent with the preference for an unobtrusive system already described. If, however, the entire civil population were to be mapped (insofar as possible) then that data would be best erased at the conclusion of the campaign. Data on potential enemies will of course be retained after the campaign is over.

Second, data must be treated as any other military secret and shared only with trusted allies in limited circumstances. Mr. Hom rightly points out that we cannot guarantee what future decision-makers will do, but I feel it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. and other like-minded states would think twice before sharing potentially dangerous data with a tyrant.

I personally think biometric technologies have a great deal to offer us in counterinsurgency, so I am glad that this paper has prompted me to examine my own views and even amend them in some respects. Thank you, Mr. Hom.

**Fighting Identify**

Chaplain (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson, USAR, Puerto Rico—In Michael Vlahos’ article, “Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars” (Military Review, November-December 2007), he states that “We lack a holistic approach to human conflict. We have no access to the religious dimension of war, and so no way to assess the inner dynamics of wars of identity.” For those who desire information on the religious aspects of contemporary conflicts, I recommend contacting the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina. USACHCS houses a world religions library that routinely answers religious information requests from the field. Also located there is the Combat Developments Directorate, which contains world religion database resources. Unit chaplains can use these resources to advise their commanders on the religious aspects of current military conflicts. The Army Chaplain School can be contacted at 803-751-8900 or accessed at <www.usaches.army.mil>.

**Understanding the Problem**

Bruce Stanley, Fort Leavenworth, KS—Dr. (LTC) Tom Clark’s timely and relevant article “Army Planning Doctrine: Identifying the Problem is the Heart of the Problem” (Military Review, November-December 2007) offers a teachable problem-identification method. His three-step method to identifying a problem and three-step method to developing a problem statement will benefit military instructors and students alike.

The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate should consider this article as they update Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The inclusion of the identification steps and problem statement format into the military decision-making process, specifically the mission-analysis step, will be a valuable addition to the Army’s decision-making model.

The article should further the discussion of why problem identification is key at all levels of command (tactical through strategic). The Command and General Staff School, particularly the Center for Army Tactics, has recently included instruction on identifying and writing a tactical problem into the course curriculum. Student feedback acknowledges that when a tactical problem is clearly defined and articulated, staffs are able to clearly focus when they are developing solutions to problems presented during practical exercises.

Dr. Clark’s tactical problem model provides staff officers and commanders a useful tool to help reduce uncertainty and better focus operational planning. Adding this framework to doctrine will promulgate the framework throughout TRADOC, ultimately resulting in a common understanding of the importance of identifying the problem.
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