THE SWORDBEARERS: Supreme Command in the First World War

Officers in positions of high-level command have often found their responsibilities to be a heavy and lonesome burden. Dwight Eisenhower, who knew a few things about such command, once told a newly commissioned officer, “Let me give you some good advice. Don’t become a general. Don’t ever become a general. If you become a general you just plain have too much to worry about.” During the Second World War, Eisenhower had discovered from first-hand experience that the scope and intensity of those worries increase dramatically when a commander must lead the military forces of his country (and others) in a major war in which the survival of the nation is at stake.

When the character and duration of that war evolves in a totally unexpected way, as in the First World War, then the load must become nearly unbearable. In The Swordbearers (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1963), British author Correlli Barnett considers four men—two Germans, a Frenchman, and a Briton; three generals and an admiral—who bore such a burden during the Great War. The first is Helmuth von Moltke, the unhappy general charged with executing Schlieffen’s flawed concept for winning a two-front war against great odds. The second is John Jellicoe, the man responsible for leading the British Grand Fleet at Jutland in the last great duel of battleships. According to Winston Churchill, Jellicoe was “the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.” Barnett’s third subject, the dour general Henri Pétain, led French troops through the furnace of Verdun and took command of the entire army as mutiny threatened to bring its dissolution. The final study is of Erich Ludendorff, who became First Quartermaster General of the German Army and virtual dictator in the last two years of the war.

Barnett shows that, along with the challenge of leading a national war effort, each man wrestled with almost crippling personal demons. In Moltke’s case, it was a sense of self-doubt magnified by the knowledge that he owed his position as much or more to his family name than to any personal merit. Suffering from an ailing heart and shaky nerves, Moltke knew he lacked the steady decisiveness of his famous uncle, Moltke the Elder.

Jellicoe, by contrast, demonstrated an impressive coolness at Jutland, even when the fate of nations might have been determined in a period of hours. Yet, as Barnett recounts, the British commander agonized over the structural deficiencies of his warships and their vulnerability to the asymmetric weapons of naval warfare, submarines and floating mines. As the fleet’s preeminent technocrat, Jellicoe knew better than anyone else that the Germans had been building a fleet that was superior, if not in numbers, then in such crucial factors as armor protection, fire direction, and damage control.

A year after Jellicoe’s trial at Jutland, Henri Pétain took command of the French Army when it appeared that mutinies at the front would leave the road to Paris open to the Germans. Although the new commander mastered the crisis, a year later, when German armies ripped open the Allied front in three consecutive offensives, Pétain’s deep-seated pessimism led him to announce the war was lost.

Finally, despite consuming ambition and an inexhaustible appetite for micromanagement, Ludendorff was blind to the fragility of the German army he led into the last year of the war. When his great offensives failed and a series of stunning Allied counteroffensives revealed the rot in Germany’s fighting forces, the overstressed Ludendorff suffered a nervous breakdown.

The burden of command led to tragedy in the lives of each of the four men. Moltke died a year after leaving his command, broken in spirit by his failure to lead Germany to a quick victory. In the months after Jutland, critics hounded Jellicoe for failing to trap and destroy the German fleet. They accused the admiral of a timidity that betrayed the bold, Nelsonian spirit that was supposedly embodied in the Royal Navy. He was kicked upstairs and his fleet given to his more dashling and less reflective subordinate, David Beatty. Pétain’s brooding pessimism in the last year of the war cost him the confidence of France’s prime minister, Georges Clemenceau. During the spring crisis of 1918, the Allied leaders jumped General Ferdinand Foch over Pétain as chief of the Allied armies on the Western Front, and it was Foch who received the lion’s share of the credit for final victory. Twenty years later, Pétain disgraced a noble career by becoming Hitler’s apparent puppet as the head of the Vichy government. During the last weeks of the war, Ludendorff threatened to resign when he did not get his way. The Kaiser called his bluff and accepted the resignation, promising Ludendorff to flee to Sweden in order to avoid the approaching revolution. After the war, the embittered general further sullied his reputation by establishing close relations with Hitler and the Nazis.

Barnett, however, is interested in more than individual failings and personal tragedies. He argues that failure in command reflected failings in societies as well. Thus, Moltke’s inept handling of the opening campaigns reflected a German

In Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, Mia Bloom lays out a theory of suicide bombing as a modern, non-Islamic phenomenon used by groups “when other military tactics fail, and when they are in competition with other terrorist groups for popular or financial support.”

Bloom is sure of a few things. Military overreaction is bad if we want to stop terrorists or suicide bombers. Also, suicide bombing should not be associated with Islam. Other than these hackneyed insights, Bloom never articulates an argument on how to address the phenomenon. “Suicide terror will either be sanctioned or prohibited by the civilian population. The use of violence will either resonate effectively with the rank and file or will be rejected and, eventually, abandoned by the groups.” Angry men will either strap bombs to their chests and explode themselves, or they won’t.

Bloom covers suicide bombing in the Palestinian territories, Turkey, and Sri Lanka. She also explores the phenomenon of female suicide bombers. Astonishingly, the book lacks information about the origination of modern suicide bombing by Hezbollah. By ignoring Hezbollah’s politicization of martyrdom within the context of a revitalized Shi’ism, Bloom ignores the Islamic context within which modern suicide bombing was born.

This shortcoming is painfully apparent in a chapter on the Tamil Tigers. For those with little background on the bloody eruptions of Sri Lanka, the chapter provides a good overview. Yet, for the study of suicide bombing, the Black Tigers are most notable because, unlike the majority of suicide bombers, they are not Muslims. “Thus,” Bloom tells us of the Tigers, “it is not unreasonable to have expected terrorist organizations engaged in conflict after 1983 to use suicide bombings as part of their arsenal of terror after it had been so successful in expelling the Americans and French from Lebanon.” How did a tactic developed by Muslims (justified within Islamic law through Islamic arguments) come to be adopted by a non-Muslim group? That would be an important concern, but it’s one Bloom never addresses.

Bloom also illogically and naively concludes that suicide bombing caused increased support for a Palestinian group in 2001. All she cites is a coincidental occurrence of the employment of suicide bombing and the increased popularity of the group; she does not show real causal connections.

On some points, Bloom’s conclusions are more plausible. For instance, “Heavy-handed counter-terror strategies” do “inculcate a greater sense of outrage and anger, making a formerly inhospitable environment accepting and approving of mounting violence against civilians.” In Dying to Kill, however, a book that is about suicide terrorism, the author fails to deal with suicide bombing as a unique phenomenon. Are there specific means of addressing suicide bombing that are different from simply addressing the underlying political causes of conflict? Those interested in the answer will need to wait for another attempt at the subject.

CPT Dan Helmer, USA, Afghanistan


As a company commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom, I was responsible for the security of a small
Robert D. Kaplan, May-June 2008

a result, satisfy your numerical cravings. As is enough statistical data here to If, on the other hand, without detracting from his analysis. carefully selected charts and graphs may blithely ignore Krueger's sends a shiver up your spine, you can devise solutions. Krueger's book, with its focus on data and analysis, is an excellent contribution to understanding the last of these.

MAJ Jason Ridgeway, USA, West Point, New York


In Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts, Robert Kaplan continues his journey as an embedded reporter that began with Imperial Grunts. With these two books Kaplan has become the premier interpreter of America's 21st-century military. A keen observer of human nature, he assures us that "as always, people are more interesting than hardware." Kaplan does not conceal his admiration for the members of today's military—especially NCOs and junior and mid-level officers who constantly adapt and improvise to "make things happen" on the ground, aboard ship, or in the air. Especially revealing are his observations about the larger military culture of today's volunteer armed forces and the peculiarities of the various "tribes" or subcultures that make up the military, such as the Marines, Army Special Forces, Navy submariners and surface sailors, and Air Force "stealth bombers" and "Hogwart drivers." He contrasts the military's can-do pragmatism with the ideological mentality of political appointees.

Kaplan also tackles the issues of America's continuing involvement in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. He addresses how the intense focus on the Middle East is eroding America's military capabilities and preventing more robust engagement in areas that promise to be of greater strategic significance later in the century, such as South and Southeast Asia, South America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Kaplan also highlights the importance of the regional combatant commands as the bearers of a significant portion of America's "imperial" responsibilities, the increasing role of military contractors, and the promise and challenge of new technologies. Especially intriguing is his chapter on how Air Force pilots at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, fly unmanned aircraft in "combat" over Afghanistan and Iraq and the curious psychological stresses this produces.

Kaplan's new book and his ongoing reporting work well at many levels. Perhaps most importantly, they honestly explain military culture to a general public that is increasingly becoming alienated from its own military forces and those who serve in them. Kaplan's work also explains the inextricable relationship between military action, both in war and peace, and American policy. And, importantly, it explains the military to the military. In a world where joint operations will be the norm, this enterprise is by no means the least of his contributions. As an officer with over 22 years of service in the Army, this reviewer learned a great deal about peers in the other military "tribes" of the Navy, Marines, and Air Force, and even Army Special Forces. As with all previous books by Kaplan, Hog Pilots Blue Water Grunts is highly recommended.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE REAL ALL AMERICANS: The Team that Changed a Game, a People, a Nation, Sally Jenkins, Doubleday, New York, 2007, 343 pages, $24.95.

Sally Jenkins's The Real All Americans is a fascinating history of the U.S. Army-founded Carlisle [Pennsylvania] Indian Industrial
School and its stellar turn-of-the-century football team. The book describes the origins and development of Carlisle football through the lens of important individuals at the school, particularly founder and first director Brigadier General Richard Henry Pratt, coach Glenn “Pop” Warner, and an assortment of students and players, including Delos Lone Wolf, Bemus Pierce, Albert Exendine, Gus Welch, and the legendary Jim Thorpe. The research on these subjects is impressively deep. Jenkins mined the appropriate archives, interviewed the available descendents of key figures, and cited important secondary sources on the events and characters specific to her story. But for all its depth, the work lacks breadth.

There are several examples of this shortcoming, ranging from the superficial to the essential. Jenkins asserts that Carlisle revolutionized the game of football with trick plays and the forward pass, but her descriptions of how the Indians’ style departed from the rest of the sport lack key specifics to make the point clear. She paints a negative, brief, and largely uninformed portrait of Theodore Roosevelt, simply because her protagonist Pratt did not like the president. And her descriptions of the Indian Wars of the late 19th century tend to rely too heavily on the perspectives of individual Indian participants, and thus it suffers from the biases common to autobiographical accounts.

Most importantly, Jenkins never engages fully with the questions of tribal, Indian, and American identity that are at the core of understanding Carlisle’s history and legacy. For sure, some of her individual characters expressed their dismay over lost identities and incomplete assimilation, while others embraced the way Carlisle gave them new and productive lives in America. But Jenkins never attempts to synthesize the various experiences into a more coherent whole, balancing what was gained and lost and putting those summations into the context of changes wrought by the modernization, industrialization, and national-ism of the progressive era.

For all that, The Real All Americans is still informative and highly readable. And possibly Jenkins’s ambivalence on the most important matters is instructive for the contemporary military. Because she writes from the more narrow perspective of the participants, one gets a clear feel for the struggles in the relationships among the United States, the Army, and the conquered Indians. Any attempts to democratize those who have no experience with democracy, particularly in the aftermath of war, are bound to yield glaring failures and quiet successes, the loss of traditions, good and bad, and the acquisition of habits, destructive and productive. All of this should sound familiar—a cold comfort, perhaps, but a comfort nonetheless.

Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr., Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Books sometimes promise more than they deliver. Despite the contemporary hook in its title, The Long War is not about the global War on Terror, nor is it really about the Cold War. Consisting of a collection of essays, some by significant scholars, it mainly reprises old ideas and posits conventional partisan disagreements with Bush administration policies in Iraq and in the War on Terror.

The estimable Andrew Bacevich, compiled the essays in Long War but their quality is extremely uneven. The first, by Arnold A. Offner, purports to assess the Bush administration policy espoused in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) in light of American foreign policy since the founding of the republic. Instead, it roughly characterizes more than 200 years of history, and then attacks the 2002 NSS over three pages that owe more to the op-ed section of the New York Times than to reasoned historical assessment. The very next essay, entitled “The American Way of War,” by James Kurth, simply fails to prove its case that the American way of war has gone through four major transformations since World War II.

The book continues with essays on a wide variety of national security issues. Thought-provoking and informative essays on U.S. strategic forces, paying for military forces, universal military service, conscription or voluntary service, and moral dissent from national security policies are of value primarily as short introductions into these subjects. Other essays, not as useful, include pieces on U.S. civil-military relations, the evolution of the national security state, intelligence, and the military-industrial complex. The last essay in the collection continues the theme of Bush-bashing in a biased analysis of the media and American security policy from 1945 to the present.

Although of some utility as a single-volume source of essays on significant national security issues since World War II, the uneven quality of its essays keeps this book from being really useful as a source for military officers or others interested in these subjects.

Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DANGER CLOSE: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq. Steve Call, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2007, 272 pages, $29.95.

Service parochialism and institutional bias often degrade the role of close air support (CAS). Leading up to and during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), United States Air Force tactical air control parties (TACPs) were caught in the middle of political fights, differences in warfighting ideology, and interservice rivalries. The Air Force has often neglected CAS and TACPs in favor of counter-air and air interdiction operations. At the same time, while TACPs are Air Force personnel who live, eat, sleep, fight, and die alongside Soldiers, many Army units habitually keep them at arms length.

In Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq,
Steve Call provides a history of the TACP’s role in OEF and OIF. He suggests that as America’s “secret weapon” during these operations, TACPs helped transform modern warfare through their determination and ingenuity. Danger Close includes firsthand accounts of how TACPs armed with little more than M4 rifles, radios, intelligence, and a bit of creativity worked with Army special operations forces and conventional ground maneuver units to deliver Air Force high-tech ordnance with pinpoint accuracy onto an elusive enemy. Call augments these accounts with maps, diagrams, interviews, and statistical data. He emphasizes that lessons learned about CAS coordination from OEF were rapidly transformed into joint operational procedures for OIF that integrated intelligence, unmanned aerial systems, fire support, and TACPs during conventional operations at Army corps and division levels. Most notable of these is the kill-box interdiction/CAS concept.

Call goes well beyond a simple recounting of CAS operations. For relevant background material, he provides easily understood descriptions of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, operational design, targeting methodology, munitions technology, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance planning, the tactical air control system/Army air-ground system, CAS allocation and apportionment, and Army unit organization. Call describes Operation Anaconda in almost as much detail as Sean Naylor does in Not a Good Day to Die, and he provides detailed descriptions of the Battle of Najaf and the famous “Thunder Run” into Baghdad.

Danger Close has some shortcomings. A consistent theme throughout the book is the negative impact of bureaucratic, institutionalized partisanship on CAS doctrine development and effectiveness; however, Call fails to include any interviews with Army personnel, which would have reinforced the authority of his claim. Also, he asserts that during OIF, the 3d Infantry Division experienced “two miraculous brushes with near disaster” only to be saved solely by TACPs, and in two instances implies that 3-7 Cavalry would have suffered repeats of Little Big Horn had it not been for the TACPs. Certainly the TACPs played a crucial role in integrating CAS into the fight, but Call’s overly dramatic assertions are not fully supported by the plethora of after-action reviews on the operations.

These shortcomings do not dilute Call’s message: that fully integrated TACPs are not only combat-power enablers for Army units, but are also catalysts for synchronizing air support with intelligence, imagery, target acquisition, munitions technology, fires, counterinsurgency, and ground force maneuver. Overall, Danger Close is a fascinating and worthwhile book for military professionals, strategists, historians, and interested civilians.

Brian Leakey, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


For the American military, China is an old story reaching back to Treaty Port days and the Boxer Rebellion, and yet today Pentagon planners ponder the perplexing problem of China rising—friend, ally, or enemy? In Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World, Margaret MacMillan describes an important chapter in the story of China-U.S. relations: the February 1972 meeting between President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Perhaps MacMillan claims too much by stating that Nixon’s meeting with Mao wobbled the world, but certainly it was a risky venture that propelled the United States and China in a new direction, ushering in a protracted state of wary cooperation.

MacMillan’s profile of Chiang Kai-shek is refreshing as she credits the generalissimo with successes and argues that had it not been for the Great Depression, he might have prevailed over Mao in the Chinese civil war. Her description of the rise of the Communist Party includes incisive portraits of Chou En-lai, Mao, and Mao’s vituperative wife, Jiang Qing. Mao is shown to be indifferent to others, including his own family. He is a crafty, amoral, womanizing, power-driven individual who effectively used murder to advance his career. How Mao and Chou survived the Byzantine world of communist politics is an enthralling story. How the unflappable Chou survived Mao by becoming the sophisticated sycophant and an indispensable master of foreign affairs in a largely insular China is a convincing tale of political deftness.

Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, and other key participants are all brought to life by MacMillan’s lively prose. The complex Nixon-Kissinger relationship is the centerpiece, but MacMillan really captures the delicate, calculated, diplomatic T’ai Chi Ch’uan of the Nixon-Mao tête-à-tête with telling anecdotes. The Nixon-Mao verbal exchanges and the comments each made about the other out of earshot, like Mao’s comment that he “liked rightists,” add color.

To Chou’s and Mao’s perplexity, Kissinger insisted that his exploratory trips to Beijing be kept secret. Secretary Rogers and the State Department’s relegation to the shadows recalls Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secret trip to meet Churchill at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in 1941, a trip of which Secretary of State Cordell Hull knew nothing.

So amidst all the hoopla, what did Nixon and Mao accomplish? While U.S.-China relations were put on a new footing, which was no small accomplishment, neither man got what he wanted from the summit. The U.S. did not convince China to push the Vietnamese into war-ending negotiations, and China did not get Taiwan and a U.S. withdrawal from Asia. The world has changed in ways neither leader could foresee, but Taiwan remains like a bone lodged in a dog’s throat. In 2007, the questions swirling around China rising—friend, ally, or enemy?—are still unanswered. But Nixon and...
**Mao** is a good place to start on the path to resolving this conundrum. It is highly recommended.

**Hal Wert**,  
Kansas City, Missouri

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In *Nato’s Gamble*, Dag Henricksen, a European airpower expert, analyzes Operation Allied Force, the confusing brawl that became NATO’s gamble in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. With significant insights into American and European perspectives on the application of airpower, Henrickson exposes the frailties apparent in NATO even during this limited operation. Military leaders involved in future planning for Afghanistan, the Balkans, or other NATO areas of interest should carefully consider the political realities Henricksen has detailed.

As armed confrontation with Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic loomed, many Europeans felt that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the U.S. had pushed them into the middle of a civil war for which they had no appetite. At a minimum, they wanted UN authorization before they struck another sovereign European nation. General Wesley Clark and diplomat Richard Holbrooke then sold them on a short air campaign that almost evolved into a full-scale ground war in tough terrain. Throughout the operation, the U.S. maintained a unilateral command structure, hitting targets the other NATO nations were unaware of. As a result of all these U.S. machinations, European loyalty to this transformed Cold War institution was sorely tested, and the effects of 1999 are still being felt today.

Henricksen gives a voice to Lieutenant General Walter Short and other airpower enthusiasts frustrated by NATO political decision-making. Nineteen nations were struggling to achieve consensus concerning targets. Interestingly, Donald Rumsfeld also criticized NATO during the war. He preferred the shock-and-awe technique he would later use in Iraq. Clark was skeptical of Rumsfeld’s approach and wanted to attack Serbian ground forces in Kosovo instead. NATO clearly had the means to compel Milosevic, but the “gamble” was mustering the will to prosecute an ever-bloodier operation. As the British Defence Committee assessed after Kosovo, NATO is not a precise instrument to support diplomacy. NATO consensus has been made even more complex since the Kosovo intervention by the addition of seven more nations.

In this early historical look into Operation Allied Force, Henriksen has mined many of the best unclassified sources from both sides of the Atlantic. More deserves to be written on this subject as classified sources become available, since airpower will continue to be an attractive choice to send diplomatic messages. I applaud Dag Henricksen for providing an important early contribution to this discussion.

**James Cricks,**  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Pham Xuan An was a stringer and then reporter for several important news organizations, ending with *Time Magazine*. American educated, he was extremely well connected in both Vietnamese and American circles in Saigon. He was a friend to virtually every journalist who covered the war, and was the source for some of the most crucial press reporting of the war.

An was also a Communist spy. He had joined the party in 1953, and before long was chosen for a special mission: he was to go to the United States to learn journalism and familiarize himself with the American people and their culture. From 1957 to 1959, An attended Orange Coast College, interned on the *Sacramento Bee*, and traveled around the U.S. He was then ordered back to South Vietnam, where he was accredited as a reporter by the U.S. military.

An’s language and networking skills proved invaluable to the cause. Over the years, he became acquainted with a wide range of influential people, to include journalists David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan; CIA officers Lucien Conein, Edward Lansdale, and William Colby; South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem; and General Duong Van Minh. An’s numerous contacts gave him both classified and unclassified information that he passed to his handlers. He provided intelligence that contributed to the defeat of South Vietnamese forces at the famous battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, and information that helped plan the targets for the 1968 Tet Offensive. In 1975, as Ban Me Thuot fell to the People’s Army of Vietnam, An helped persuade the North Vietnamese leadership, which believed that final victory lay at least a year away, that the time was ripe for the final push, and that they could march on Saigon uncontested.

When the war was over, An abandoned his double life; he was given the uniform of a North Vietnamese colonel and proclaimed a national hero. Ironically, however, it appears that he was never completely trusted by his superiors in the postwar years because of his close ties to the Americans during the war. He died in 2006 of emphysema, a major general in the Vietnam People’s Army.

Professor Larry Berman, who teaches at the University of California at Davis and is the author of several books on Vietnam, tells An’s incredible tale in a sympathetic manner, basing his account on hours of interviews with An conducted over a five-year period. He also draws on lengthy conversations with many of the influential Americans who had come into contact with An during his career. What emerges is an interesting story of a complex man who was torn between his fondness and respect for his American friends and his passionate dedication to the reunification of Vietnam. Berman
has used his remarkable access to An to produce a highly readable account of an enigmatic figure who had a significant impact on the outcome of the war in Southeast Asia. I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Vietnam War. 

LTC James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Few 20th-century figures have inspired more scholarly commentary than Joseph Stalin, particularly concerning his wartime and postwar relationships with Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Over a decade ago, the broadening of access to Russian archives (if only temporary) crowned the end of the academic version of the Cold War and generated a series of new offerings on Stalin and his legacy. Still, Stalin remains a more challenging subject than most wartime leaders by virtue of the secretive nature of the Soviet system, the enormity of events in which he participated, and his own distinctly cryptic behavior. At the same time, Stalin’s American counterparts have been the objects of scholarly dispute, in part because of the extraordinary richness of the public record. Indeed, a study of the policies and personalities of FDR and Truman, and above all their readings of Stalin’s intentions, continue to define our understanding of the Cold War’s origins.

Geoffrey Roberts’s latest work, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953, is a well written and carefully researched volume that focuses on Stalin as wartime leader and strategist. Roberts pointedly strives to offer an appraisal independent of his subject’s record of crimes against humanity; in fact, he advises the reader that the latter are not his subject. Some compartmentalization of topics is reasonable in this instance. But we cannot evaluate Stalin as a strategic decision-maker and diplomat without considering the intellectual processes and predispositions that marked the systematic brutality of his rule. The man who won the war, after all, was also the same man who grievously weakened his country in the preceding years through catastrophic purges, unproven economic schemes, and establishment of an atmosphere of paranoia.

Roberts, however, flatly asserts that ideology, more than personal utility, offers the key to reading Stalin’s intentions. Projecting from this conclusion, he draws extensively from Stalin’s own published remarks as well as records of meetings and conversations. This approach, though necessary and indisputably valuable, leans heavily on its implicit assumption that Stalin’s words speak louder loudly than his actions.

Stalin seldom lost sight of political context or his overarching aims. He was far more likely to say what needed to be said to facilitate a particular objective than to bare his soul. Thus it seems that the author’s attribution of great credence to Stalin’s conversations with men such as Georgi Dimitrov, leader of the Comintern, is fraught with risk. Roberts describes Dimitrov’s diary as “the most important source on Stalin’s private thinking during the war years”; however, the extent to which Stalin confided in Dimitrov—or anyone else for that matter—is subject to doubt. In all probability, Stalin left posterity to assemble a puzzle from among a pile of intertwined facts and lies.

Like many larger-than-life leaders and politicians, Stalin saw himself as a man playing a role on the stage of history. If he enjoyed adulation, he did not, as Roberts aptly points out, take it too much to heart. Indeed, Stalin was perhaps the least likely of men to accept expressions of devotion at face value. Almost incapable of sincerity himself, he hardly expected it from others. Thus, even his most loyal sycophants lived in fear for their lives.

Roberts’s appraisal of Stalin as a leader and strategist is a favorable one with which even many of Stalin’s severest critics would probably concur. After the German invasion of 1941, Roberts’s Stalin was far sighted, judicious, adaptable, and discerning in his strategic and military judgment. He was, in important respects, the architect of victory. Moreover, Roberts senses that Stalin genuinely desired a generally equitable resolution to the question of the postwar European order as long as it met certain essential conditions for the preservation of Soviet security. Thus, he contends that the advent of the Cold War, as laid out in Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, was really a self-fulfilling prophecy brought on by the West.

In From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War, Wilson Miscamble offers a different view: he sees the Soviet leader’s personality as fundamental to understanding the origins of the Cold War. Summarizing Truman’s relationship with Stalin, Miscamble concludes, “It was simply not within Harry Truman’s power as a decent and responsible democratic leader to offer terms that would soothe Stalin’s anxieties and insecurities.” As he came to understand Stalin and Soviet behavior, Truman gave up hope of finding a modus vivendi and instead organized policies that put the theory of containment into practice.

In detailing the transition from Roosevelt to Truman, Miscamble looks closely at the influence of central actors such as Joseph Davies, the U.S ambassador to the USSR from 1936 to 1938, who shaped Roosevelt’s perception of Stalin as a man with whom it was possible to seek mutual accommodation. But for Davies’ impact in softening the American view of Stalin, more
skeptical realists such as George Kennan, who would author containment doctrine under Truman, might have held sway years earlier.

Thus, it was the composite influence of international circumstances, domestic politics, and key players in competition for the president’s ear more than any predisposition on Truman’s part that molded presidential decision-making. Ultimately, Truman found that U.S. policy objectives could not be reconciled with Stalin’s. In Miscamble’s estimation, Cold War revisionism, which would assign equal or greater responsibility to the United States for the outbreak of the Cold War, simply cannot withstand patient analysis of Truman’s earnest search for a way to deal with the Soviet dictator. The consequent handling of American security policy was on the whole rational, measured, and essential.

My Dear Mr. Stalin, a compilation of correspondence between Roosevelt and Stalin edited, with comment, by Susan Butler, offers yet another thoughtful glimpse at the most important political relationship of World War II. Both leaders seem to have understood from the beginning of their long-distance partnership that it was necessary to look beyond the defeat of Germany and Japan to prepare for a new postwar order. Roosevelt sought a security system based on the combined might of the U.S., USSR, Britain, and China. Stalin, too, wanted a stable order, but one that ensured preeminent position for the USSR in European and Asian affairs. Driven together by wartime imperatives, Roosevelt and Stalin forged a common language of sorts. Each could be remarkably charming in person, and their correspondence reflects a sense of how to get along while deftly pursuing political aims that were often divergent.

For instance, in a message to FDR dated 7 April 1945, just a month before Germany surrendered, Stalin voices confidence in the faithfulness of the president and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, yet goes on to explain at length the disturbing inferences that a thoughtful observer could make from German behavior. In particular, a suspicious Stalin points out that German resistance is feeble in the West, while in the East, where 147 divisions remain, the Germans fiercely defend every inch of ground: “They continue to fight savagely with the Russians for some unknown junction Zemlianitsa in Czechoslovakia which they need as much as a dead man needs pulitches, but surrender without any resistance important towns in central Germany . . .” Without making any explicit accusations, Stalin went on to observe that intelligence provided by General Marshall about German intentions in February 1945 proved entirely false.

That this letter came in the immediate wake of personal assurances from Roosevelt is indicative of the fragile state of relations between the two allied powers. In a message on 4 April, the president had stated categorically that no secret negotiations with the Germans had taken place and that General Eisenhower would accept no military solution short of “unconditional surrender.” The rapidity of American advances he attributed to “the terrific impact of our air power resulting in destruction of German communications, and to the fact that Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of German forces while they were still west of the Rhine.”

Given the profound differences in Soviet and American perspectives, the preservation of the coalition until the surrender of Japan serves as testament both to the fundamental importance of the allied partnership and the ability of each side to communicate its commitment and concerns.

Robert F. Baumann, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Kevin C. Holzimmer’s biography of General Walter Krueger fills an important gap in the history of fighting in the Pacific during World War II. Equally important, it enables readers to deepen their understanding of how MacArthur managed his command and how an important subordinate, Krueger, operated. Holzimmer’s work not only helps explain important events that happened more than 60 years ago in the Pacific, but also discusses generalship and leadership at the operational and theater-strategic levels.

Born in Prussia and educated in part at home by a demanding German immigrant stepfather, Krueger excelled as a scholar/translator of German texts on tactics and operations. While just a lieutenant, he taught at Leavenworth. That he and George Marshall were the only lieutenants on the faculty suggests the measure of Krueger’s excellence as a student of the art of war. He would go on to graduate from both the Army War College and the National War College.

Krueger served as chief of war plans during MacArthur’s tenure as chief of staff of the Army. Later, he was a candidate for the post of chief of staff of the Army, but finished behind George Marshall. Subsequently, Marshall chose Krueger to organize and command 3d Army and support the development of an operational doctrine for the Army.

In January 1943, MacArthur asked Marshall to send Krueger and 3d Army to command U.S. ground troops in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific area. Although Marshall sent Krueger, he did not send 3d Army. Krueger became commanding general of 6th Army and for the second time during the war had to organize a field Army headquarters. He led the charge for MacArthur through to the Philippine invasion until he was joined in the field by Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger’s 8th Army. Krueger cased the colors of 6th Army on 25 January 1945, departed for his home in San Antonio, Texas, and retired the next day aboard the USS New Jersey.

As Holzimmer points out, comparatively little has been written about Krueger, and what there is tends to show him in a bad light. Holzimmer lays out the historiogra-
phy and suggests this is so for four reasons: the war in Europe tended to overshadow the war in the Pacific, MacArthur overshadowed his subordinates, Krueger avoided publicity, and Eichelberger (who craved publicity) had little good to say about either MacArthur or Krueger. Eichelberger’s memoir, published in 1950, and his edited diaries and letters, published in 1974, to a large extent set the tone for what has been written about Krueger.

Holzimmer’s account is succinct, fact based, and well documented. Like most biographers, he develops a bias for his subject, but he still manages to spot and illuminate Krueger’s foibles. The general was taciturn and remained a very private man all of his life. On the other hand, from his years in combat as a private, he had learned what it was like to be afraid and hungry. That experience colored how he thought about the fate of his Soldiers and what he expected of commanders in the field. Holzimmer weaves the story of Krueger’s growth as a Soldier and a man, effectively capturing Krueger’s character, concern for troops, meticulous approach, and conviction about the necessity of education and learning.

Holzimmer’s first-rate book suggests a number of questions that require more study—which seems surprising since more than 60 years have passed since World War II. What judgments can be made about Krueger, or for that matter Eichelberger and MacArthur, with what is published now? What may be said about the quality of the corps commanders, both Army and Marine, who fought under MacArthur’s command? How did the theater and operational commands meet the complex requirements of sustaining multiple operations sometimes spanning a thousand miles more than 5,000 miles from home? Perhaps this fine biography will open the door to more research.

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Rekindling U.S. Holistic Power in the 21st Century

Captain Charles Chao Rong Phua, Singapore Armed Forces—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s article, “Beyond Guns and Steel” (Military Review; January-February 2008), seeks to rekindle the holistic power that the U.S. possessed and applied after World War II, but gradually forgot about after the Cold War. Gates’s call for “strengthening our capacity to use ‘soft’ power and for better integrating it with ‘hard’ power” is a necessary mindset-change if the U.S. is to deal with asymmetric warfare (terrorism), the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the transformation of national strategy. Gates rightly highlights the American institutional-financial-military power complex that has sustained U.S. world leadership in the 20th century. Indeed, it is only with combined soft-hard power that the U.S. can deter terrorism at its roots and shape sustainable global defence postures.

Stability in Iraq and Afghanistan can only be restored with “reconstruction, development and governance” led by a coordinated civil-military complex. The use of civilian expertise and interagency cooperation to improve the lives of the local population is a creative twist to the traditional uniformed military institution. Perhaps the marriage of a disciplined, efficient, and effective military with diverse civilian expertise will become the cornerstone of the U.S. civil-military war complex—a necessary change to deal with a sophisticated operational environment, especially when the technology-savvy warrior-thinker-diplomat-humanitarian worker ideal of the new Soldier may be realistically unattainable.

Gates writes with a laudable blend of great-power realism and idealism. After reiterating the political realities of terrorism, conflicts, failed states, and global instability in the post-Cold War world, he concludes by reminding Americans of their great responsibility to the world. Throughout history, hegemons have always kept the peace; for example, ancient Chinese empires spent heavily to guarantee peace for their satellites against external enemies in return for piecemeal annual tributes as a token of respect.1

Today, there are compelling reasons to believe that China and India are rising faster than expected.2 However, in military terms, for instance, China’s fighter jets, submarines, and destroyers are 1980s weaponry; China will not achieve information transformation before 2050.3 In economic and institutional terms, it may gradually catch up by 2050, but the U.S. will remain the world’s economic powerhouse and pace-setter. Till then and thereafter, the U.S. must continue to lead the world “[as in Iraq] to uphold the prestige, influence and credibility of its security guarantees.”

NOTES

5. Yew.

Captain Charles Chao Rong Phua is a staff officer in the Singapore Armed Forces. He holds a BSc (Honours) and MSc (Research) with Merit in International relations from the London School of Economics. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
Had he and I but met
By some old ancient inn,
We should have set us down to wet
Right many a nipperkin!

But ranged as infantry,
And staring face to face,
I shot at him as he at me,
And killed him in his place.

I shot him dead because—
Because he was my foe,
Just so: my foe of course he was;
That's clear enough; although

He thought he'd 'list, perhaps,
Off-hand like—just as I—
Was out of work—had sold his traps—
No other reason why.

Yes; quaint and curious war is!
You shoot a fellow down
You'd treat, if met where any bar is,
Or help to half a crown.

—Thomas Hardy