



# **TWELVE URGENT STEPS** for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan

**Captain Daniel Helmer, U.S. Army**

**T**HE ATTACKS OF 9/11 originated from Afghanistan, where a decade of international neglect after the fall of the communist government allowed Islamic extremists to train and thrive. Today, the mission to resurrect the failed Afghan state stands at “a strategic fork in the road.”<sup>1</sup> Squabbling within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including threats by the Canadians and Dutch to withdraw forces in 2009, makes government and coalition victory seem far from inevitable in the eyes of the Afghan people. Their confidence in the coalition and their government has decreased, even as there has been some modest improvement in feelings about the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army.<sup>2</sup> Frustration with the state of affairs in Afghanistan has been compounded by the coldest winter on record and fast-rising food prices, which generated relatively slow responses both from the government and international community.

Over the course of the six-year international presence in Afghanistan, the country has become the largest narcotic-producing nation in the history of the world.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, civilian deaths reached an apogee in the past year. Suicide bombings, rare prior to 2005, have increased and have become more deadly. Widely publicized suicide and kidnapping attacks against foreign civilian targets have made international agencies reluctant to work throughout significant portions of Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, coalition forces failed to convince the people that they were more discriminating in their use of violence than the insurgents, while casualty rates among coalition and Afghan forces are the highest they have been since the start of the conflict. In the economic realm, instability cut direct foreign investment in half over the past year, after five years of gains.<sup>5</sup> Afghans living in the once quiet center, west, and north of the country have grown increasingly frustrated with the central government’s and international community’s focus on the south and east. In the words of one political correspondent in Mazar-I Sharif, a city in the north, “Our people are today living in a state of disappointment.”<sup>6</sup>

In the wake of such bad news, ISAF and the separate U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) have sought, with limited success, to increase the number of ISAF and U.S. advisors in the country so they can more quickly and effectively transfer security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This plan, however, is not working. Without the following 12 major and rapid changes to its structure and execution, the advisory effort will fail to arrest the growing insurgencies in Afghanistan.

## **Prepare Advisors for Afghanistan, Not Iraq**

Currently, the lead U.S. unit at Fort Riley charged with training advisors for Afghanistan and Iraq uses the same trainers for both missions. While

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**PHOTO:** Police mentor team member CPT Brian Fletcher on patrol in Baqwa, Afghanistan. Advisors are the most dispersed force in Afghanistan but have little access to either lethal or nonlethal effects. (CPT Gene Vinson, U.S. Army)

Riley has made extensive efforts to prepare teams to operate effectively in Afghanistan, the major differences between the theaters make it very difficult for those who have only been to Iraq to develop an appropriate frame of reference for Afghanistan and prepare teams accordingly. The unit should consolidate all of its trainers with Afghanistan experience into one group focused on training for counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in the mountains, deserts, and jungles of Afghanistan.

Additionally, while Fort Riley has the lead in training combat advisors, many other centers around the United States and Europe also provide training. The coalition and the U.S. military should standardize and consolidate Afghan training to the greatest degree possible. Consolidation will facilitate agreement on what advisors should do and how best to train them. Importantly, once the functions and training of advisors are agreed upon, ISAF commanders in Afghanistan will understand better how to engage and employ the advisors in their areas.

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## **End District Hopping**

Fighting in Afghanistan is like trying to respond to a mass-casualty disaster with two doctors, then measuring how many patients they treat, not how many they save. The impulse to spread advisors thinly over a wide area has resulted in police mentor teams responsible for mentoring in several districts at one time. Advisors for the Afghan Army, meanwhile, are often responsible for mentoring multiple units or several echelons of the Afghan Army at the same time (e.g., company commanders and battalion staff officers at the same time).

For CSTC-A, the advisor command in Afghanistan, this broad allocation of personnel increases the total number of districts and units in which it can claim to have advisors. Such claims, however,

say nothing about the quality or effectiveness of the assistance advisors provide to Afghan forces. It is difficult to demonstrate credibility, and build rapport—the bedrock of effective advising—if you are here today and gone tomorrow.

A good emergency responder knows that a major disaster requires triage: identifying patients who are beyond assistance, those who can be saved by immediate assistance, and those whose cases can wait for another day. Unfortunately, because of ineffective intelligence, CSTC-A lacks the information to know which of the more than 300 districts would benefit most from advisor teams. The current assignment of advisors to the ANSF has not been matched adequately against the insurgent threat. Focused District Development, a recent plan to identify important districts and completely retrain their police forces, does not deal with the continued assignment of advisors to districts of little import outside of the plan. Advisor placement and the placement of the Afghan forces they advise seems to many advisor teams to verge on randomness. On a district-by-district basis, CSTC-A should determine quickly where to assign advisor teams given its very limited resources, and then do so one team per unit.

## **Live, Work, and Fight with Mentored Units**

According to the U.S. Army's COIN doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, advisors should "live, work, and (when necessary) fight with their HN [Host Nation] units. Segregation is kept at an absolute minimum."<sup>7</sup> In Afghanistan, advisor teams generally live apart from their Afghan units. Even when they don't, they are often segregated from the Afghans by massive walls. Fewer key districts will fall to insurgents and mentoring will become more effective if we adopt FM 3-24's prescription as the rule rather than the exception. Fewer ANSF members will die unnecessarily at poorly defended district centers and outposts if the key districts are identified, mentors are pushed out to them on a permanent basis, and CSTC-A provides the logistics necessary to support them and the overall COIN effort. Also, fewer mentors will be exposed to roadside bombs if they are not required to travel constantly from their bases to police stations on the limited and predictable road network.

An Afghan unit should not be considered covered by advisor capabilities until an advisor team is embedded with it. Embedding will not only enable more effective mentoring and combat advising, it will also give coalition units greater access to human intelligence where it counts.

## **End the Individual Replacement System**

The commands in Afghanistan have adopted a de facto individual replacement system that rotates individuals rather than units into theater.<sup>8</sup> Such systems have been discredited in the past, and the U.S. Army specifically seeks to identify and deploy teams rather than individuals. Mission turbulence will inevitably result in some advisors being sent to different areas than originally planned; however, the current helter-skelter method of not telling an advisor where he will serve until the last minute dramatically slows down the learning process and doesn't develop effective, cohesive teams trained and conditioned to operate together in a difficult environment.

While constituting and training advisor teams need to happen immediately, larger regional unit deployments should replace team deployments as soon as possible. In other words, an entire regional advisor command should be trained and deployed together. A continuous unit chain of command throughout training and deployment would ensure that commanders know their subordinates and vice-versa, and it would assuage some of the feelings advisor units often get of having been abandoned. It would also allow better planning and staffing at the regional level because staffs and commanders would have trained together. While executing a regional unit rotation policy will be difficult, such detailed personnel coordination is not impossible. The advisor command should cut this Gordian knot now. Regional unit rotation could make advisory efforts more effective and improve long-term institutional capabilities, enabling us to turn over the fight to the Afghan government more quickly.

## **Identify Key Skills Among Advisors**

Effective counterinsurgents not only take on the population's security, but also provide basic economic needs, essential services, community

sustainment, and social institutions, all of which contribute to an acceptable quality of life. These areas of responsibility require the advisor command to identify people with unique skills and put them in the proper staff or mentor positions. Even in the security realm, the command needs greater expertise in areas such as computer technology; logistics; engineering; policing; and information, psychological, and media operations. Counterinsurgency theorists have often held that complex counterinsurgency is beyond the realm of reservists' skills or ability. Yet, National Guard and Reserve Soldiers have proven in their service in Afghanistan and Iraq that their unique civilian skills prepare them not only for combat operations, but also for governance and economic development. No concerted effort has been made, however, to tap this advantage by identifying unique skills of the Soldiers within CSTC-A and applying them accordingly. Given the likelihood of continued Guard and Reserve participation in the advisor campaign, the Guard command should identify individuals with critical skills, regardless of their branch, rank, and time in service, and place them in teams and units and on staffs where they can contribute the most.<sup>9</sup>

## **Develop a COIN Intelligence Capability**

Key capability gaps exist today in the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence across coalition and Afghan forces.

**Collection.** Advisor teams are the most dispersed forces in Afghanistan, and they have the most consistent contact with Afghan security forces. They have ready access to more human intelligence than any other set of non-Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan. Yet there is no effective advisor chain for intelligence collection and no widely understood obligation for advisors to collect intelligence. Once CSTC-A is able to determine the composition of teams prior to their arrival in Afghanistan, intelligence officers should be identified and trained for every team. CSTC-A must develop easy, widely dispersed systems—analog, digital, or even cell phone—to facilitate collection across its force. Immediately, even before these changes are implemented, CSTC-A and its regional commands should develop and disseminate the key questions that they need teams to answer (i.e.,

***...there is no effective advisor chain for intelligence collection and no widely understood obligation for advisors to collect intelligence.***

their priority intelligence requirements). Every mentor should be aware of these requirements and understand how to report relevant information in a timely manner.

**Analysis.** Any collection from CSTC-A currently goes into a black hole. Without a collection system, the command is limited to developing intelligence based on sources on its own secure intranet. These intelligence products serve little purpose, because there is no functional distribution system for advisor teams.

Collection from ANSF and National Directorate of Security (the Afghan intelligence service) sources gets pieced together with ISAF intelligence to a limited extent at the national level and, below that, barely at all. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a valley-by-valley fight. Yet we have only the most trivial understanding at the local level of who the insurgents are and what their narratives, networks, motivations, demands, and support structures are. We have an even poorer understanding of the human terrain, such as tribes and other networks, and their dynamics. The newly employed human terrain teams provide little actionable information to mentors on the ground because they are in a separate chain of command. Likewise, they receive little information from the mentors themselves. While we possess some national-level understanding of the insurgency, we know little about how various pieces of the puzzle fit from one region into another. We have not been

able to predict what the enemy will do, nor have we been able to disrupt his decision cycle.

At times it is easy to see why. If you look to the small city of Gardez as an example, separate intelligence cells live and work at six independent Afghan and coalition headquarters.<sup>10</sup> It does not require years of intelligence experience to guess how poorly this operates.

Intelligence assets should be reorganized to include, in a single cell, intelligence officers from the Afghan Police and Army, Afghan National Directorate of Security, and coalition forces. These cells should operate at all levels in Afghanistan. In these cells, intelligence officers from the different groups would jointly receive reports and conduct analysis, which they could forward up and disseminate down the chains of command. Colocating analysts would likely result in greater intelligence sharing and better analysis. With improved intelligence, we could target both the insurgents and the underlying causes of the insurgency much more effectively.

**Distribution.** Today, many advisor teams have little or no access to intelligence and secure intelligence systems. In a COIN fight, intelligence is vital, but



**Police mentor team Soldiers with Afghanistan National Police and Army members conduct a cordon and search in Shewan, Afghanistan, 2007. All elements employed in the operation have independent logistics, intelligence, and communications systems.**

many advisor teams remain in the dark. Current off-the-shelf solutions could solve the problem of providing secure network access to advisor teams. Months or even years should no longer pass between emplacing a remote team and providing connectivity to intelligence networks.<sup>11</sup> In Kunar and Nuristan provinces, 1-32 Infantry operated through much of 2006 and 2007 with Secret Internet Protocol Router Network access down to the platoon and even sub-platoon level. Their example is a good one for the advisor command, particularly if the command is (as professed) the Army's "number one priority."

Distribution of intelligence is further hampered because too few intelligence products are releasable to the ANSF. This makes it very difficult to operate cohesively with our Afghan partners. Much intelligence can and should be shared with Afghan officers; in fact, virtually every intelligence product should be produced in a form that can be shared with Afghans. At the very least, U.S. and ISAF intelligence officers need to be trained on what can and cannot be shared, and how to best facilitate the sharing.

## **Give Advisor Teams Access to Nonlethal Effects**

A natural tension exists between successful ISAF commanders and CSTC-A advisors. ISAF commanders seek to accomplish the greatest good they can in a 4- to 15-month tour. The best advisors seek to create Afghan units that can sustain and win combat operations for a protracted conflict with no ready end in sight. The advisor, however, is often forced to rely on ISAF units for his own support and, at times, protection. Also, depending on his location, he may receive his orders from the ISAF commander. When conflicts arise between the ISAF commander's short-term goals and the advisor's long-term objectives, the ISAF commander really has no need to consider the advisor's viewpoint. This disconnect in vision can be counterproductive; for example, using Afghan soldiers as unit auxiliaries rather than conducting joint planning with the Afghan commander undermines the Afghans' progress toward autonomous operations.

To even the playing field and spur collaborative efforts, the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)—a fund for short-term humanitarian assistance projects such as wells—should become the sole province of advisor teams. This would

provide, for the first time, direct access for Afghan commanders through their mentors to significant nonlethal effects. Access to such effects would enable Afghan Police and Army commanders to conduct planning and operations across all counter-insurgency lines of operation while helping to ensure that the ISAF commander supported the Afghan commander's operations in the Afghan commander's area of operations rather than the other way around. As with intelligence, one member of every advisor team should be trained to do civil affairs. This training requirement, too, would encourage CSTC-A to identify teams prior to their arrival in Afghanistan.

Ensuring that CERP funded projects are selected in collaboration with ANSF leaders could increase the legitimacy of government action in an area. ISAF commanders would retain access to other types of civil affairs funding through provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and other sources.

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## **Improve and Decentralize Information Operations**

If the mentor command in Afghanistan has developed information operations (IO) guidance, messages, or themes, the guidance is unknown to most mentors. A booklet containing standard themes passed out to some mentor teams seems to have been developed in a vacuum and has not evolved significantly over the course of time.

ISAF remains an IO dinosaur, with response times stretching into days and weeks and no delegation of authority to the battalion level and below. It is far easier for the media to get information from the insurgents, who respond in minutes, than from CSTC-A, ISAF, or the government, which respond well outside the window of the 24-hour news cycle. Nor does the command at times realize the problem. (One regional advisor commander told his senior IO mentor this year that he really did not see the need to develop information operations within his planning.) In a campaign for influence over the Afghan people, this state of affairs is a losing proposition.

CSTC-A has access to the most vital IO resource in the country: the soldiers and police of the ANSF. CSTC-A ought to develop an informed and effective campaign in conjunction with the Afghan government to successfully influence the people. Advisor units should be constantly reminded of the importance of IO and be given the necessary authority to implement IO initiatives (in accordance with national themes) through and in conjunction with their counterparts. To enhance the teams' IO capabilities, one member should receive in-depth IO training.

Beyond specific training for a single team member, culturally appropriate IO training needs to be a focal component of all advisor team pre-deployment training. The enemy regards IO as a decisive element in his campaign. We cannot afford to cede that fight to him.

## **Improve Logistics and Engineering Support**

CSTC-A has not properly employed its most effective weapon in Afghanistan: its money. This

shortcoming is apparent in the lack of adequate planning and strategic thought behind the provision of logistics and engineering support to advisor teams and the ANSF. At the best of times, such planning has been done poorly. One advisor assigned to a remote area told me that in order to survive, his team and the unit they were mentoring were forced to sell fuel for food between monthly or longer aerial resupply missions. Some teams are immobile for weeks as they await truck parts or ammunition. Meanwhile, separate logistics systems are being used to supply ISAF and other forces in theater. At times, two different logistics convoys will conduct separate resupply missions for CSTC-A and ISAF units along dangerous routes, even though the customers units are located at the same base. Both the planning and effectiveness of logistics support must transform drastically.

CSTC-A, ISAF, the Afghan forces, and other forces in theater need to develop a combined logistical and construction task force that



U.S. Army CPT Gene Vinson

**Police mentor team Soldiers and Afghanistan National Police mentors conduct a road patrol through the mountains of Afghanistan, 2007.**

evaluates two key issues: how to support and sustain the force, and how to support economic development, reconstruction, governance, and information operations.

There is much room for improvement in procurement, movement, and construction. Formation of a combined task force, in lieu of the current independent logistics fiefdoms, will provide greater efficiency. Simultaneously, it will broaden consideration of logistical efforts as integral components of the overall COIN effort. This task force should work in conjunction with the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan and the Afghan National Development Strategy to balance sustainability, building capacity, critical needs, and local needs with national imperatives. On the other hand, a new combined task force will not immediately meet the supply and construction needs of advisor teams. In the short term it may actually exacerbate some of the issues as we use more local contracting, local procurement, and Afghan-sustainable construction methods (e.g., mud brick or tamped earth instead of imported concrete block from Pakistan). In the end, though, more effective planning in the logistics and engineering realms could enable us to support the fight more effectively in key districts while simultaneously driving both long-term development and the exchange of guns for shovels.

## Give All Leaders Standardized COIN Training

Knowledge of COIN principles and imperatives and how to apply them varies within CSTC-A, across ISAF, and throughout the Afghan security forces and government.<sup>12</sup> Leaders in the field lack a common vision of both campaign objectives and their commanders' intents on how to achieve those objectives. Advisors, ISAF maneuver units, PRTs, and Afghan security forces can only function as part of a single campaign to defeat the insurgency if they have a baseline knowledge of the Afghan insurgency, COIN doctrine, the current campaign, the lethal and nonlethal tools at their disposal, and know how their area of responsibility fits into the whole.

The Counterinsurgency Academy in Kabul is a small step toward realizing unity of effort and a comprehensive approach to defeating the insurgency; yet it remains an ad hoc organization attended often by low-level players with little clout, and it has little buy-in from the advisor, ISAF, or Afghan chains of command. The academy, or a similar initiative, should be properly resourced and supported. Relevant, contemporary instruction must be provided in-theater to ISAF and Afghan commanders and staffs, key PRT personnel, advisor leaders, and relevant civilian leaders to ensure greater adherence to tested COIN doctrine



DOD, LCDR Samuel DeCastro

**Students graduate from the Counterinsurgency Leaders Course at the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy, 14 September 2007. Combined, joint classes help develop unity of effort and a common understanding of counterinsurgency principles, but they are rarely attended by senior coalition mentors and commanders.**

and a common understanding of what needs to be done in Afghanistan.

## Learn the Right Lessons from the Right Places

After too long a time, CSTC-A is finally beginning to incorporate some lessons from our big-brother operation to the west, but it is time to ask if Iraq really is the best place to look for guidance. While our mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan do share a number of similarities, there are enough differences in the two situations to give us pause. Iraq is a resource-rich, relatively educated country with access to the sea. Landlocked Afghanistan is one of the earth's poorest countries. It has never had a strong, stable, long-lasting central government; it has experienced nothing but war for three decades; it has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world; it has virtually no infrastructure or industry; and it has multiple ethnicities crossing nearly arbitrary international boundaries. In short, Afghanistan more closely resembles a post-conflict state in sub-Saharan Africa than it does Iraq. It is a state-building experiment being conducted in the midst of an insurgency, and the command needs to bring in assistance for the Afghan Army and Police from those who have worked in similar situations. Instead, it has brought in, at huge expense, civilian advisors on expensive contracts who have moved full steam ahead in creating systems, doctrine, and training appropriate for a developed Western army guarding the Fulda Gap and for police in the U.S. Midwest. Under this tutelage, the Afghan Army is now well on its way to having dozens of military occupational specialties and thousands of pages of word-for-word translated U.S. doctrine for a force that is barely literate. It is time to entirely reevaluate contracted civilian advisors, to fire those who are incapable of advising a non-Western force, and to hire personnel with experience in advising security forces and designing systems in the world's least developed post-conflict countries.

## Simplify the Advisor Chain of Command

The current structure of the advisory mission in Afghanistan is best described as confusing, impenetrable, and top-heavy. It is often unclear who is in charge. Even if an advisor team has been told who is in charge of it on a particular day, the unit can

use the opaqueness of authority to ignore one set of orders for another, more agreeable set. Orders, even from general officers, are regularly ignored. Similarly, staff officers at all levels routinely pass work back and forth because it is rarely clear who has responsibility for making a decision. Often, this back-and-forth staff work simply provides a way to avoid making a difficult decision.

The structure is so confusing that it is almost painful to describe. Theoretically, at the top lies the U.S.-led CSTC-A, which is not a part of the ISAF coalition and so functions independently of the overall international military effort in Afghanistan. Underneath CSTC-A is a single subordinate unit, Task Force Phoenix, headed by the National Guard. The function of a single subordinate unit with a virtually identical mission has never been sufficiently explained. The staffs of both units regularly pass work in circles, and subordinate units regularly play one staff off against the other.<sup>13</sup> Oftentimes, direction to subordinate units comes directly from CSTC-A rather than Phoenix, further confounding the units. Clear lanes of responsibility for the staffs are not well defined, and so each staff regularly describes the other as inept.

Phoenix theoretically controls five regional advisor commands throughout the country that are responsible for advising both the Afghan Army and Police. Non-American advisors, however, come from ISAF, not from CSTC-A; thus, Phoenix has no authority over them. Some of these mentors are further inhibited by national caveats, which make it impossible to devise a coordinated advisory campaign for the ANSF. In addition, many U.S. advisors come from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. They come with their own service caveats, which are as pernicious to the overall mentor effort as national caveats are to the ISAF effort, e.g., limitations on how Air Force personnel can be utilized. This lack of unity is particularly problematic with Marine advisors, who, recognizing the shortcomings of the reporting structure, have tended to act on their own rather than as members of a joint-combined team. Finally, in southeast and east Afghanistan, Phoenix has ceded control of its U.S. advisors to the U.S.-led ISAF task force responsible for those regions. In many cases, this means that a U.S. battalion commander has U.S. advisors of equivalent rank reporting to him—and these advisors must still report to Phoenix. If this all sounds very confusing, that's because it is.

For the advisor mission to succeed in Afghanistan, its chain of command must be clarified and streamlined immediately. To start with, Task Force Phoenix should be folded into CSTC-A. This would eliminate inefficient redundancies and clarify who is in charge of U.S. personnel. Several senior staff officers in both commands have told me privately that the overall advisory mission would be far more efficient and effective if the staffs, particularly those involved in operations, future planning, civil affairs, IO, and logistics, were colocated and functioned as a single entity.

Next, there must be an effort to lower overall rank within the advisor units. The current top-heaviness of CSTC-A and Phoenix inhibits effective command and control of the advisor mission. For instance, approximately 10 percent of all CSTC-A headquarters personnel are colonels or general officers, while each regional command has three colonels in its command structure. Staffs at CSTC-A need to be headed by one, and only one, colonel. The regional advisor commands should have only one colonel. Rank structure should also be pushed down on the advisor teams, so that a U.S. officer works with a unit one or two levels higher in the Afghan Army or Police than the officer would command in the U.S. military. This would be consistent with successful Marine Corps constabulary models from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The end result would be a more manageable organization that yields more boots on the ground.

Finally, advisor teams drawn from ISAF need to receive their orders from CSTC-A. While particular countries have reasons for not wanting their teams to be controlled by CSTC-A, their reluctance makes the advisory mission virtually incoherent. The best means to accomplish unity of command within the advisor mission would be to fold CSTC-A into ISAF rather than maintain an independent command in Afghanistan. Short of that, CSTC-A and ISAF must reject advisor teams offered by countries unwilling to place them under CSTC-A's control. A good place to start would be to ensure that no U.S. units in CSTC-A be allowed to operate under their own procedures and independent of the chain of command. Finally, we must clarify when advisors become subordinate to the ISAF commanders. Doing so will help ensure that advisor teams facilitate COIN operations when their Afghan units are partnered with ISAF forces.

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## Conclusion

Afghanistan is still winnable, but it is on a downward and possibly terminal spiral if we continue to operate as we are. Urgent action is needed now to repair the advisory mission to the Afghan Army and Police. Many of these changes will be politically difficult to undertake. Many others, however, are necessary because of the structure of CSTC-A, and are more easily fixed. While repairing the advisory mission alone will be insufficient for victory in Afghanistan, it will be a major start. Rapidly adopting the 12 changes discussed above would be both an effective beginning and a bold statement that the effort to build, train, and sustain Afghan National Security Forces is truly our number one priority. **MR**

### NOTES

1. LTG (RET) David Barno to the House Armed Services Committee. Federal News Service, 23 January 2008.

2. The Asia Foundation. *Afghanistan in 2007: a Survey of the Afghan People*, <[www.asiafoundation.org](http://www.asiafoundation.org)>.

3. United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan; Opium Survey 2007*. Measured on a per capita and population density basis. In absolute terms, only 19th Century China may have produced more total narcotics with a population 15 times as large and a much larger land mass. All of South America produces less cocaine than Afghanistan opium, and Helmand province alone produces more opium than Columbia produces cocaine.

4. "The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security." Report to the Secretary General. <[http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/\\_UN-Docs/\\_reports-SG/2008/08march06-SG-report-SC-situation-in-afghanistan.pdf](http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_reports-SG/2008/08march06-SG-report-SC-situation-in-afghanistan.pdf)>, 6 March 2008.

5. "Investment Slows Down in Afghanistan Due to Security Concerns." Radio Free Europe Newsline, 30 January 2008. <<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2008/01/300108.asp>>.

6. "Afghan TV commentary criticizes Karzai's administration as ineffective." AINA Television, 10 February 2008. Translated BBC monitoring. Available <<http://www.zibb.com/article/2669901/Afghan+TV+commentary+criticizes+Karzais+administration+as+ineffective>>. Accessed April 23, 2008. Authors note: AINA Television is associated with a mostly Tajik and Uzbek audience and is in opposition political figure General Dostum.

7. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), 6-17.

8. In fact, Fort Riley trains "teams" to go to Afghanistan. However, rarely are these teams kept intact. They are used mostly by the command as augmentees to fill personnel gaps created by personnel rotating out of theater or by increased demands for advisors in new areas.

9. Task Force Phoenix, the sole subordinate command of CSTC-A.

10. These are the ARSIC S2, PRT S2, Regional Police Headquarters S2, National Directorate of Security (NDS) Headquarters, Provincial Police Headquarters S2, and the ANA 203d Corps S2.

11. Oftentimes, as was the case for my team in Kabul, the original personnel on a team are long gone from the theater when some mode of secure network communications arrives.

12. Michael M. Phillips. "In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban." *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 November 2007, A1.

13. I saw this in my regular duties establishing the Counterinsurgency Academy and discussed it on several occasions with TF Phoenix and CSTC-A staff. Leaders who passed through the COIN academy regularly commented on the difficulty of drawing any decision out of these staffs, and our team at the academy on several occasions exploited divisions in order to obtain logistics and other support from one command or the other.