**Featured Review**


Benazir Bhutto’s *Reconciliation* is a reasoned and impassioned plea for support for an open and democratic Pakistan. Bhutto’s book, completed shortly before her death, places Pakistan squarely in the center of an Islamic world under siege from internal forces that seek to “exploit religion for their own political agenda.” She aims to “trace the roots, causes, and potential solutions to the crisis within the Muslim world and the crisis between the Muslim world and the West.” Bhutto argues forcefully that Samuel Huntington’s oft-referred to “clash of civilizations” (*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1997*), particularly between Islamic and Western nations, is not inevitable; instead, she highlights “the need for an enlightened renaissance both within Islam and between Islam and the rest of the world.” Her work describes the tensions inherent in the current dialogue between Muslim scholars and militant fundamentalists, explains the challenges leaders faced to establish an independent Pakistan freed from colonialism and other Western interventions, and proposes new initiatives to improve the future.

Bhutto maintains that to achieve durable reconciliation, both Islamic and Western nations must acknowledge their contributions to current trends, commit themselves to achieving mutual understanding, support political and social reforms, and contribute to programs that will promote economic and intellectual development in Pakistan. For their part, followers of Islam must separate the central tenets of the religion found in the Qur’an from tribal traditions such as “the wearing of the burqa, the isolation of women in their homes, female circumcision, and the banning of girls’ education.” The latter, Bhutto claims, has “no basis in Islam.” The Prophet Mohammad, she explains, called for tolerance and respect for all monotheistic religions, valued justice and equality, and advocated military action only in the context of justified defensive war. Islam, Bhutto argues, is not incompatible with democracy, women’s equality, science, or education; indeed, the Qur’an fails to establish clerics as the exclusive interpreters of the religion. She states unequivocally, “Suicide-murder is specifically and unambiguously prohibited.” Islamic scholars must address the challenge of reinterpreting the principles of the Islamic faith from within the context of modern society. Bhutto documents the fledgling effort of scholars to do so and urges non-Muslims not only to support this dialogue, but also to promote greater tolerance and education regarding the faith.

For their part, Western nations must acknowledge their contributions to the current problems within the Islamic world. Bhutto claims that most non-Muslims fundamentally misunderstand the religion; moreover, Western support for colonialism and authoritarian rulers in support of larger strategic objectives—noncommunist dictators during the Cold War, for example—contributed significantly to the growing crises. Bhutto calls for economic development plans, personnel, and material exchanges that promote understanding, tolerance and freedom, and greater involvement from nongovernmental organizations and women’s groups as possible solutions. These initiatives, Bhutto acknowledges, should generate not only from within Pakistan itself, but also from the larger community of Islamic Gulf States and democratic Western nations. Thus, the road to a more stable Pakistan and a better life for its citizens runs directly through democracy.

Bhutto’s tragic death reminds us of what is at stake if the issues she identifies are left unresolved or are clouded by misunderstanding, prejudice, and poverty. If the primary function of the state in the 21st century is, as some scholars have noted, to enable economic opportunity and consumer market power through incentives, a democratic Pakistan represents a viable option that Americans can readily support (see Phillip Bobbitt’s *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003*). Bhutto’s discussion of the reinterpretation of Islam would almost certainly have made her a target of religious extremists had she survived. The programs she describes would be expensive, she reminds us, but so are the costs of political instability, poverty, and persistent military conflict.

Deborah Kidwell, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The author’s title tells us much about his view of the future. Colin Gray believes that the more that war changes, the more it seems to stay the same. He believes that those who think the 21st century will see a dramatic change in the nature of war will be disappointed, and he predicts a similar disappointment for those who predict an end to war. War will endure and the best guide, in fact the only reliable guide, to its future course is history. From this starting premise, Another Bloody Century
represents Gray’s attempt to reconcile the enduring truths of organized violence with those features of war that are entirely new, such as the terrorist pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the military exploitation of cyberspace.

Though the author is respectful of history, he is not a historian. Gray identifies himself, instead, as a strategist. And, though he currently serves as a professor of international politics at the University of Reading in Berkshire, he is not an academic standing afoot from the messy world of public policy. Over the last several decades, Gray has served on a variety of advisory positions within the U.S. government. This experience, along with his command of the relevant historical record and impressive writing skills, help us understand why this book won a recent Royal United Services Institute award for excellence in military literature.

Gray is especially emphatic in emphasizing what will not change. In the 19th century, Clausewitz was correct in identifying war as a political act. Though we tend to forget it, the Prussian theorist is still right. The war of the future will take place in new social and cultural contexts and will feature new technology; nevertheless, war in the 21st century will still be organized violence in pursuit of political objectives. Our own military, in particular, is guilty of ignoring this fact. Gray writes, “Americans have demonstrated notable incompetence in translating the effort and sacrifice of their soldiers into the political reward they merit.” We are also guilty of obscuring the enduring truths of warfare in buzz phrases like Network-Centric Warfare, and Effects-Based Operations. Within the U.S. military, “the market for panaceas, pretentious expert-sounding jargon, decoration and redecoration of the devastatingly obvious, and rediscovery of ancient wisdom, will never decline.” The author suggests the result of our fuzzy thinking is a form of “strategic autism” that equates targeting with strategy.

Clearly, Another Bloody Century is not a good news bedtime story. Instead, it is a bracing and well-written challenge to those who would ignore war’s past when predicting its future.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Martin Wayne delivers much more than the book’s title implies. The work is well organized, meticulously documented, and succinct, providing a thorough background on China’s challenges in Xinjiang, its westernmost province, and placing China’s insurgenacies in the context of today’s global jihad and War on Terrorism. The book begins by viewing China’s “bottom-up” approach to countering Xinjiang’s Uyghur minority insurgency and follows with an outline of the insurgent/terrorist groups in western China. Wayne also provides a detailed overview of Chinese counterinsurgency (COIN) from both theoretical and historical perspectives.

The book illuminates the genesis of Uyghur terrorism in the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s and Al-Qaeda’s rise to power. It discusses China’s role in supplying Soviet-style weaponry and, most importantly, mules to the mujahedeen efforts in Afghanistan, bringing to light an area unknown to many. Wayne is critical of Beijing’s assertion that all terrorist activities are simply a phenomenon of radical and militant Islam, arguing that Uyghur insurgency is a unique and indigenous movement. He asserts the Uyghur insurgency is based on multiple reasons, not only radical Islam but separatism and Han Chinese oppression and exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural resources.

Perhaps the most salient point of Wayne’s treatise is his discussion of China’s bottom-up approach to counter the insurgency in Xinjiang. He argues that China has been successful, whereas the American heavy-handed “top down” approach in Iraq, which favors military action, may be counterproductive. He discusses interrelated categories of targets pursued as part of a Chinese “society centric action” to COIN operations. These targets are (1) individuals, (2) organizations and groups, (3) insurgent organizations abroad, and (4) ideas and ideology detrimental to Chinese control and security.

Wayne questions official Chinese sources that raise the specter of Al-Qaeda and terrorism in connection with all Uyghur attempts to redress grievances. He questions whether China is witnessing a nascent rebellion with aims of secession and if Chinese repression is smothering legitimate dissent. The veracity of Chinese claims is hard to determine as all media is state-controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Nonetheless, society’s demand for stability has allowed the communist regime’s free approach in handling unrest in Xinjiang.

Is Xinjiang a theater of Al-Qaeda’s influence? Wayne posits that though there are Al-Qaeda ties between insurgent activities in Xinjiang, they are only a portion of the “terror-social unrest-separatism” spectrum present in the country. Al-Qaeda connections should be viewed in the entirety of terror attacks elsewhere in China growing from wide-spread unrest associated with rapid industrialization and social change.

One shortfall of Wayne’s book is his lack of discussion on China’s organized “sinicization” program. The state, through various mechanisms, has imported Han Chinese cadres loyal to the CCP to regain control of local political institutions. Through this transmigration process, the once dominant Uyghur minority has lost its dominance. (A similar process has occurred in China’s restive Tibet province.)

Uyghurs loyal to the CCP remain ensconced in the party while those overtly practicing Islam are ushered out. Purges were and are common; however authorities have to be careful to legitimize the communist presence by employing Uyghur and other minority cadres in the local level leadership.
An insurgent and real terrorist threat with links to the global jihad exists in Xinjiang. However, China’s bottom-up approach, or what Wayne terms “society-centric warfare,” has kept the insurgency at a manageable level and has even turned society against it. Indeed China’s ability to penetrate and effectively operate within Xinjiang society has hindered the insurgency’s growth. It is the responsibility of society to police itself and for families and neighbors to inform on one another. This bottom-up approach to COIN strategy has been very successful for China.

Wayne’s book is authoritative—he has researched in Xinjiang, witnessing firsthand the Uyghur insurgency and Chinese reaction. This is a relevant and timely, albeit pricey, book. Those wishing to expand their knowledge on the War on Terrorism will find it professionally interesting. Although we cannot draw too many parallels between the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Chinese War on Terrorism, Wayne does offer insights that bear consideration as we pursue operations in Iraq Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

LTC Steven Olusic, Ph.D., West Point, New York


The story of Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion in 1979 through the rise of the Taliban and their post 9/11 removal from power is an exciting tale that includes shifting clan loyalties, historic ethnic enmity, larger-than-life personalities, and good old-fashioned, bare-knuckle politics. Roy Gutman’s How We Missed the Story is a comprehensive account of each of these elements. Gutman specifically asks the question, why did the U.S. miss Osama bin-Laden’s hijacking of the Afghanistan government and acquisition of the freedom of action to plan and conduct terrorist attacks?

The book is well organized with good footnotes and a chronology of events that helps the reader follow the myriad shifting alliances and countervailing war crimes. The author’s first-hand interviews and good documentation lend authenticity to the account and provide insight into the perspective of key players both internal and external to Afghanistan.

Where the book falls short is in its failure to remember the world as it was. Gutman specifically states that the attack on 9/11 was not an intelligence or military failure. Rather, it was a strategic policy failure. Gutman holds the National Command Authority, the State Department, and the CIA responsible for failing to recognize that Osama bin-Laden had hijacked Afghanistan, that Bin-Laden’s declaration of war against the U.S. was real, and that Pakistan was complicit in supporting the Taliban (and, by proxy, Bin-Laden himself). Gutman argues that had we recognized these facts we would have supported Musharraf or invaded Afghanistan in the 1998-2000 time period.

These assertions reflect pre-9/11 amnesia. As Gutman correctly points out, it was the potential dissolution of NATO that forced U.S. engagement in the Balkans, where our distaste for supporting either side’s war criminals had kept us neutral for a prolonged period. The events in Afghanistan (Mazar-i-sharif’s massacre of at least 2000 Taliban, and the numerous massacres by the Taliban) would have required that the U.S. possess the ability to distinguish between war criminals and warlords. We still do not have this ability.

Finally, there is a qualitative difference between “missing” the story and getting it wrong. Zalmay Khalilzad did not miss the story but he did get it wrong. Michael Sheehan, Secretary Madeleine Albright’s counterterrorism aide, did not miss the story but got it wrong. The notion of a sovereign state turning over both domestic and international policy to a foreign national and leader of a terrorist organization was simply not imaginable prior to 9/11.

Nonetheless, How We Missed the Story presents an eminently readable account of the events transitioning Southwest Asia from a backwater of U.S. policy to the centerpiece of our War on Terrorism.

Steven W. Rotkoff, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


With his book Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, Antonio Giustozzi has produced the definitive volume on the resurgent Taliban for policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders involved in the ongoing Afghanistan conflict. It is a must-read given its insights into the workings of this resilient and dangerous insurgent force.

Giustozzi provides an in-depth look at Neo-Taliban insurgents—their strategy, organization, tactics, and the reasons for their successful revival. He details the role Pakistan plays with the Taliban and in Afghan politics, and highlights the efforts and shortcomings of the Afghan government and its foreign allies. Buttressed by impeccable research and analysis, largely done on the ground in Afghanistan with personal interviews, Giustozzi demonstrates that the return of the Taliban has as much to do with its own efforts as it does with the policy failures of the Afghan regime and its U.S. and foreign allies.

Giustozzi posits that the weakness of state administration is a key factor in the delegitimization of the Karzai government in the eyes of the local population. This failing, coupled with excessive tribal-based government patronage and intense corruption among the Afghan police and military forces, has alienated large segments of the population and provided a breach for the Taliban to penetrate. Equally, U.S. and NATO forces have conducted a weak psychological operations and public relations campaign directed at the
Afghan populace. Coalition military operations have compounded this deficiency through over-reliance on firepower, lack of attention to developing local understanding and familiarity, and excessive rotation of personnel—particularly at the command level, which makes continuity of policy and knowledge almost impossible.

The author illustrates that the Taliban has overcome a number of internal and external organizational challenges while at the same time developing a real strategy to prosecute its insurgency in the face of a more powerful military foe. It has slowly become a learning organization, and this adaptability has enabled it to gain the upper hand among the population in a number of key provinces.

Giustozzi has excellent credentials for this book. He is a member of the Crisis States Research Center at the London School of Economics with over 10 years of research and practitioner experience with Afghanistan. With superb notes, an index and bibliography, and excellent maps, this well-researched book should be required reading for all U.S. Army field grade officers and senior diplomats.

**Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland**

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How does one become a great leader, and what does that really mean? Jack Broughton provides superb examples of what it means to lead, and how one learns to lead. His bottom line: to be a great leader, one must be a great follower. His perspective of leaders and leadership has little to do with rank, and a great deal to do with character. Although discussion of his combat experiences are numerous, the leadership lessons that stand out in the book have more to do with moral courage than with physical courage.

Broughton has been a personal hero of mine ever since I read **Thud Ridge**. Unlike his previous writing (**Going Downtown** was published in 1988), **Rupert Red Two** examines the periods before and after the Vietnam conflict in some detail, from 1941 when he first entered the U.S. Military Academy, to the turn of the 21st century. The real meat of this book is the period from 1945 to about 1965. You don’t have to be an aviation history buff to appreciate Broughton’s personal, behind-the-scenes perspective on the rush to demobilize immediately after World War II, and the abysmal state of readiness for the Korean War. As a Thunderbird Leader from 1954 to 1957, and as an F-106 Squadron Commander on the northern tier of fighter interceptor bases at the height of the Cold War, Broughton amassed a personal treasure trove of experiences to draw from.

Broughton’s accounts of air combat in Korea and Vietnam are gripping, but his accounts of everyday peacetime leadership challenges are truly exceptional. He learned from leaders who shielded him from potentially career-ending consequences of neophyte mistakes, and also learned hard personal lessons from a few who were willing to sacrifice him and his subordinates for the sake of bureaucratic expediency. He also struggled with the all too common and challenging leadership question: “When do I cut this guy some slack, and when do I simply cut him off?” By his own account, he didn’t always get it right, but the experiences he describes are superb case studies in leadership.

His experiences with the F-106, its maintenance challenges, and its ejection seat hazards in particular, stand out as superb examples of exceptional moral courage that occasionally requires officers to “bet their oak leaves.”

This is a fun read, and it also provides a superb study of practical leadership, both good and bad. I highly recommend it, especially to aspiring young leaders—of any branch of service.

**Thomas E. Ward, II, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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This exceptionally well researched and documented history provides an overview of the growth and development of U.S. nuclear intelligence from World War II until early 2007. The straightforward text transforms deep technical details of atomic weapons manufacture into easily comprehensible language that reads like a spy novel revealing the actual story of America’s secret quest for information about the nuclear capabilities of other nations. This is an important addition to the unclassified record of the ultra-secret world of atomic intelligence and counterintelligence. It achieves its greatest value by collecting virtually all publicly available information on America’s atomic spying in one concise location.

The book explains the exigent challenges and unique solutions that America’s intelligence services faced in gathering and analyzing the atomic information that other countries did not want to reveal. Before the end of World War II, U.S. leadership enhanced and focused its spy network to determine if Nazi Germany could develop nuclear weapons. At the end of the war, the U.S. further improved and then re-directed its espionage capability at the Soviet Union. As the number of nations seeking atomic weapons grew, the U.S. increased its ability to identify atomic bomb building and detonation by using a variety of technical advances, including satellites, high altitude spy planes, atomic particle collectors, sound detectors, and seismic monitors. This richly detailed account also presents the decisions and influence of the politicians and scientists involved in developing and containing nuclear weapons.

However, this history provides no central thesis beyond a comprehensive, yet basic, story of atomic spying. Richelson does not provide an argument or attempt to persuade,
and he ends the discussion without an explicit conclusion. This informat\-ive technique powerfully impels the reader to draw conclusions free of tendentious authorial implications. Moreover, his text provides an excellent introduction to the subject and is a superb resource for additional research. For anyone interested in a pure history, unadulterated by a particular point of view, this book is a real joy.

William K. Jakola, Baghdad, Iraq


In Bankrupting the Enemy, Edward Miller painstakingly details the economic strategy the U.S. employed against Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in retaliation for its aggression in Manchuria, China, and Indochina. Miller proposes that the most devastating American action against Japan was a financial freeze, which ultimately led to the war. He uncovers and examines government records to bring to life the government leaders and their evolving decision process that led to the freeze.

Before Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Japan was America’s second largest supplier of goods (primarily raw silk) and third largest international customer (primarily oil and other natural resources). Raw silk, in fact, comprised 25 percent of all Japanese exports outside the Japanese Empire, with the majority destined for the U.S. Because the Japanese yen was convertible outside the Japanese Empire, as Miller notes, the flow and commercial use of these commodities held great significance for Japan.

Standing in the extraordinary position of controlling nearly all the world’s negotiable currency while systematically barring exports of commodities for its own defense, including—later—those needed by the Japanese military, the U.S. government went about financially isolating Japan to drive it into bankruptcy.

The instrument for such a strategy was a relic from World War I known as Section 1(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act—a single paragraph that empowered the president to freeze dollars owned by foreign countries, enemy or not. The intent was to deny Japan the means to wage war, bring it to its senses, and convince it to relinquish conquered territories. Economic victory was preferable to armed conflict.

Japan, however, was not about to forego its decade of conquests by withdrawing from Indochina, China, or Manchuria. Leaving would have meant giving up hard-fought gains that had cost the lives of 200,000 Japanese soldiers and huge expenditures of money, and had required significant sacrifices by the Japanese people.

Anticipating U.S. restrictions on vital commodity exports and the likelihood of a financial freeze on Japanese-held U.S. dollars and gold, Japan initiated clever schemes to either hide its dollars and gold reserves or spend it to purchase and stockpile strategic defense-related resources. Miller explores similarly cagey U.S. efforts to deny Japan vital resources such as oil. Without imposing an embargo, the U.S. claimed shortages in meeting domestic needs to justify withholding exports to Japan, a claim that was later proven false.

Many U.S. government experts had calculated that Japan was already heading toward absolute depletion of its gold reserves and hard currency foreign assets. Several dates were boldly projected suggesting when this might occur and, by inference, when the war in China would be over. The first date uttered was September 1939, later pushed forward to March 1941. Both were wrong. Japan had secretly secured enough U.S. dollar and gold reserves to fund a long war against China and to prepare for a possible war against the U.S.

It was to counter this possibility that U.S. leaders decided to freeze Japan’s dollar assets. An asset freeze had to be done all at one time to be effective, and it happened on 26 July 1941. By then, however, Japan had already succeeded in withdrawing most of its dollars from U.S. banks. Nevertheless, the freeze essentially bankrupted Japan, and, even though it had over $200 million by the end of 1941, it could buy nothing.

The historical insights provided in this book are intriguing and astonishing. Certainly, this is the most detailed American account on the subject to date. Miller explains the complexities of international economics and finance in such a way that novices on the subject will have no difficulty understanding the impact U.S. economic policies had on Japan.

My only criticism is that the book falls short in detailing Japan’s perspective. Nonetheless, I would recommend Bankrupting the Enemy to anyone seeking insight into how the economic instrument of national power was used against Japan, what lessons were learned from that experience, and how those lessons might be used in the future.

LTC David A. Anderson, USMC, Ph.D., Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Victory Girls, Khaki-Wackies, and Patriotutes, historian Marilyn Hegarty offers a fresh perspective on the construction of gender roles during wartime by examining the experience of women who performed morale-maintaining, or as she terms them, “sexualized services” during World War II. Hegarty’s subject is Rosie the Riveter’s more disconcerting counterpart, the “patriotute,” as she was labeled by a prominent public health official. Just as there existed a generalized cultural anxiety that the women who worked at munitions factories and joined the Women’s Army Corps would become overly masculine, so too
the military establishment and the culture at large worried that women who traded on their sex appeal in morale-boosting roles might become overly promiscuous. These women were viewed as at once necessary to the war effort and potentially detrimental to it, as they posed a threat to the health and fighting ability of our troops through the spread of sexually transmitted disease.

The armed services’ need for a morale-boosting program dovetailed with a more general public campaign to repress prostitution in order to maintain national health by controlling the spread of sexually transmitted disease in the wartime state. In this climate the civilian women who volunteered to attend dances and other organized recreational activities at military bases, or those who worked in the service industries that supported military facilities, found themselves in a precarious and suspect position.

The May Act of 1941 made prostitution in proximity to an Army or Navy base a federal crime, and by 1944 the perception was that the “noncommercial girl,” in the words of the then U.S. Surgeon General, was supplanting “the prostitute as the main source of venereal infection.” In Hegarty’s view, in a coordinated and systematic effort to control the female sexuality that had been unleashed in the service of the war, the civilian female population came under the surveillance of local, state, and federal social agencies and law enforcement. FBI statistics show a 100-percent increase in the number of women under the age of 20 who were arrested on sex-related offenses between 1941 and 1942, and tens of thousands of women were incarcerated on morals charges during the war years. Some of them were held in detainment facilities acquired by the federal government from the Army for the specific purpose of quarantining sexually diseased and promiscuous women. A lack of testimonials from detainees and “partial statistics” leave us with many questions left unanswered. In the absence of hard numbers, Hegarty relies on anecdotal evidence, which, while intriguing, does not convince the reader of her charge that the U.S. government was waging a secondary “war against women” on the home front.

**Anne Taranto, Ph.D., Manlius, New York**


More than 40 years after his death, Douglas MacArthur can still stir strong emotions. While Clayton James’s three-volume biography portrays him in all his complexity, briefer treatments have characterized him as either America’s greatest 20th-century military commander or a dangerous megalomaniac. In this brief, shrewd, and fair biography, Frank shows us that MacArthur was brilliant, deeply flawed, and endlessly fascinating. From his days at West Point, MacArthur exhibited great talents and an ego that made it difficult for him to cooperate with fellow commanders or civilian superiors. The latter led President Harry Truman to end MacArthur’s career in 1951, 52 years after he entered the Army.

Frank addresses MacArthur’s origins, his motivations, strengths, and failings. One can argue his greatest accomplishments spanned his whole career before and after World War II: his heroism and leadership in World War I, his service as West Point superintendent and as Army chief of staff, his vision as ruler of occupied Japan, and his daring Inchon landing in the Korean War.

As the chief of staff, MacArthur presided over Army experiments in mechanization that were curtailed by the Great Depression. Frank correctly identifies one of MacArthur’s great achievements as keeping the Army’s education system intact and not letting the officer corps disappear under the budgetary axe. His success in the 1930s allowed the Army to expand to 44 times its 1939 strength by 1945. Frank identifies the nadir of MacArthur’s generalship as the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 and the initial battles for Buna in 1942. He equaled these low points in his panic after the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950. His repeated instances of public insubordination that began in the Philippines brought his dismissal in April 1951.

In examining his wartime generalship, Frank explores the idea that MacArthur’s casualties were less than those of the Navy and Marine Corps in the Central Pacific. First promoted by the Hearst press during the war and perpetuated by historians afterward, Frank investigates the records and concludes that MacArthur’s forces suffered more casualties than the forces under Admiral Nimitz’s command. He also states that American forces had proportionally fewer casualties overall: for every American who died fighting Japan about nine Japanese perished.

Frank stresses that MacArthur’s powerful charisma and command presence prevented nearly all his superiors from managing him after 1941. His insubordination was overlooked until it became impossible to ignore. One reason for MacArthur’s influence and power was the length of his career. By 1941, he was senior to all of his erstwhile military superiors. It is important to note that in 1950 MacArthur had been a general since 1917, while Generals Omar Bradley and James Lawton Collins Jr. (the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the Army chief of staff respectively) had been junior officers in 1917. The only comparable military figure to parallel MacArthur’s career and longevity was George Marshall (Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense).

Ultimately, Frank demonstrates MacArthur could not accept that men he thought inferior to himself were in charge of the Army and the government. Although MacArthur’s political insensitivity did not prevent him from practicing a high level of statesmanship in the U.S. occupation of Japan, the policies he instituted were devised in Washington or on his Tokyo staff without his counsel. As Frank shows, when he was good, he was indispensable; when he was
bad, he made colleagues and superiors think of firing squads.

**Lewis Bernstein, Seoul, Korea**

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**MIDWAY INQUEST: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway**


Dallas Woodbury Isom’s *Midway Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway* attempts to answer the question of why Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo failed to launch his ready aircraft against U.S. carriers on the morning of 4 June 1942. Long a controversial issue, the failure to launch a second strike, either against the island of Midway or against the U.S. carriers, made the four Japanese carriers vulnerable. When dive bombers from the Yorktown and Enterprise attacked the Japanese carriers, the carriers had torpedo bombers and some dive bombers in the hangar decks. Three were damaged beyond repair, turning the tide in the Pacific War. When read in conjunction with another book on Midway, *Shattered Sword: the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* by Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, Isom’s book provides some tantalizing answers to this critical question.

Isom concludes that the launch of the second strike was delayed due to mechanical issues involving unloading bombs and loading torpedoes on the Nakajima B5N2 Kate torpedo planes. After extensive interviews with aircraft mechanics, Isom believes the procedure, frequently assumed to be only 40 minutes in duration, was at least 1 hour long. With this assessment, Nagumo could not have launched a strike with torpedo planes any time before the fatal attack by U.S. carrier aviation at 1030 that morning.

Isom also conducts an interesting counter-factual analysis of the battle, speculating what would have happened if the Japanese attack had been launched against the U.S. carriers.

However, Parshall and Tully’s *Shattered Sword* remains the more complete of the two books. When Isom’s account is added to the detailed analysis of the entire battle offered by Parshall and Tully, the two books together finally appear to have answered the question of why the Japanese carriers were so vulnerable that June morning. The details of analysis presented by Isom, added to the more comprehensive analysis by Parshall and Tully, offer a cautionary note to anyone who fails to account for the details of any military engagement. Without careful and comprehensive analysis, understanding of any military engagement is likely to depend on myth and legend. These authors deserve credit for their careful analyses of this critical battle of World War II.

**Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**FIRST TO THE RHINE: The 6th Army Group in World War II**


Harry Yeide and Mark Stout’s *First to the Rhine: The 6th Army Group in World War II* provides a deeply factual and objective history of one of the lesser known aspects of the War in Europe—the 6th Army Group’s campaign from the invasion of Southern France through VE Day. Yeide and Stout seek to redress the short shrift typically given to this important aspect of the war, especially given the logistic and strategic importance of Marseilles and the Rhone River valley. At least 40 fully supplied American and French combat divisions were able to enter the fight against German forces in the west through the southern French ports liberated by the French 1st and American 7th Armies. Furthermore, the authors use the larger setting of the 6th Army Group’s operations to provide the backdrop for some of the war’s most notable episodes, particularly the personal experiences and exploits of men such as Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of the war.

To detail this usually neglected and often-misunderstood aspect of the war, authors Yeide and Stout relied heavily on a wide array of primary sources that include after-action reports, award citations, unit operations journals, and personal diaries. Key secondary sources were also utilized and include unit histories and biographies of important individuals to provide pertinent background information to command decisions. The authors used a mix of the sources to present a well-balanced chronological history of the Army group’s operations from the initial stages of the Dragoon landings in August 1944 up through the German counteroffensive, Operation Nordwind, during the bitter cold of January 1945, to the final campaigns along the Danube and into Austria in April 1945.

Neither the French nor the American contributions to the campaigns are neglected and the authors even provide ample information on the German dispositions, plans, and personalities that figured prominently in the campaigns as well. Key allied command personalities, such as Generals Jacob Devers, Jean de Lattre, Alexander Patch, and Lucian Truscott, are all included but so too are the common soldiers’ contributions down to the squad level to provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the fighting on the southern edge of Eisenhower’s Great Crusade.

While meticulously researched, the authors do not get bogged down in unnecessary details; Yeide and Stout use a crisp narrative style that takes readers into the strategic and operational command decisions and yet also makes them feel the agonies and sacrifices endured by the common soldiers of both sides. The authors also take great care to place the southern operations into the larger picture of the war in Europe so that the reader understands the 6th Army Group’s purpose and contributions without taking anything away from their better known counterparts in Bradley’s 12th or Montgomery’s 21st Army Groups. *First to the Rhine* fills a long-felt void in the European
Theater’s operational histories and proves valuable to both the casual historical reader and the serious student of military history.

Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


In the contemporary context of financial fraud and abuse cases plaguing the Department of Defense, it is instructive to be reminded that unethical practices and self-serving crooks in uniform are not a modern invention. This is exactly what John K. Driscoll does in his compact biography of West Point alumnus Justus McKinstry, who eventually rose to the temporary rank of brigadier general of volunteers in the Union Army.

In the modern vernacular, to be a “rogue” most often means an underdog fighting the good fight (think Marcinko’s Rogue Warrior series, for instance, or political references to John McCain’s roguish streak). The author intends no such flattery in detailing the life of a dishonest knave, incapable of adhering to the duty-honor-country values of his alma mater.

After a tough road to graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1838 (he entered as a plebe in 1832), McKinstry followed a typical career for his generation that took him from Florida to Mexico to California, ending in 1861 with a final posting at St. Louis serving under another infamous rogue, 1856 Republican presidential candidate John Charles Fremont.

The author delivers a well-documented chronology of quartermaster McKinstry’s unseemly career of patronage and fraud at the taxpayers’ expense. Driscoll sprinkles his story with background and anecdotes on such topics as frontier business practices in California and the chaotic mobilization for war against the South in St. Louis. These add context and color to the otherwise unhappy story of a life ruined by greed and poor moral choices. Although the author occasionally takes a prosecutorial tone, I commend the story to anyone interested in the ethical stewardship of public resources.

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On 1 July 2008, Military Review’s public website will change its look. BCKS, CALL, CSI, Military Review, and CADD are now part of the Combined Arms Center-Knowledge Command (CAC-K). You will find Military Review listed under the Knowledge link in the list of subordinate organizations on the CAC-K website.

Another new feature of the Military Review website is our blog. On our blog you will be able to finally discuss in real time the articles and issues that matter most to you. You can subscribe to the RSS feed available on the blog to know when new items are posted and what new content is available.