
As a rule, hyperbole is permissible for the “blurbs” on the jacket of books and not in reviews, but in the case of Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How This Ends, it’s a hard one to follow. Robinson’s book is among the best written about the war in Iraq. Her aim is to provide “readers with a perspective of the conflict’s entire dynamic,” and to a large extent, she succeeds. General David Petraeus is the lead character, but Robinson makes it clear that Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker operated in tandem. Each brought superb skills and perseverance to bear on what even the trendiest pundits describe as a “wicked” problem.

The book looks at the Iraq war from the “top-down” and from the “bottom-up” by including the interplay of protagonists among Iraq’s leadership, warring tribes, foreign fighters, coalition leaders, and units such as the much-traveled, well-worn Black Lions of the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry.

Although Robinson’s tone is neutral, she is not detached. Her account of the failed transition is more compelling because it is more dispassionate than the angry harangues of many earlier books, including, for example, Tom Ricks’ Fiasco. Nor is she breathlessly reporting as though she personally overheard policy being made in the way that Bob Woodward does. In two crisply written chapters, Robinson argues that there was plenty of blame to go around, and not all of it goes to the “suits.” She says Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Bremer deserve most of the discredit but that Generals Tommy Franks, John Abizaid, George Casey, David McKiernan, Richard Meyers, and Peter Pace all deserve some of the blame, as does Ricardo Sanchez, despite his protests.

The bulk of the book examines the “surge” from General Petraeus and his close advisors’ perspectives but within the context of decisions made by the president and Secretary of Defense Gates, and within the partnership forged with Ambassador Crocker. If the surge turned out badly, Petraeus would have borne the brunt of the disapproval. It is also equally clear that, contrary to the myth, Petraeus is not the sole author of the surge or the inventor of counterinsurgency. Robinson shows clearly that the surge represented not just more troops but a sea change in how policy makers saw the role of the U.S. in Iraq. Prior to 2007, the administration and its generals saw the role of the U.S. as limited to finding the means to hand over the problem to the Iraqis. In that context, as General Abizaid put it, U.S. troops were part of the problem, so reducing their presence seemed essential. The surge is also how troops are used. Coupled with persistent efforts led by Ambassador Crocker to engage the Iraqi government, the U.S. effort since 2007 has assumed the “long war” approach and a more active involvement at lower tactical echelons by U.S. troops—to both provide an economic stimulus and carry the fight to the neighborhoods.

At the tactical level, troops led by first-rate officers such as Colonel Ricky Gibbs, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Pat Frank, commander of the 4th Brigade’s 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, engaged local leaders at regional and local levels to learn what buttons to push within both the formal and informal power systems. Their troops waged and won hard tactical engagements, employing what a battalion commander in Bosnia termed “grunt” diplomacy. Other Soldiers, including Pete Mansoor and H.R. McMaster, debated the elements of the surge strategy and provided a foil for Petraeus as he considered what he had to do. Just as important, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, who led the multi-national corps, adapted rapidly to the conditions on the ground and proved an able, if junior, partner to Petraeus and Crocker. Robinson concludes that Petraeus and Crocker brought three traits to Odierno’s task that served them, the country, and Iraq well: intellectual rigor, the ability to lead, and persistence coupled with tenacity. Together, according to Robinson, Petraeus, and Crocker left Iraq better than they found it.

Robinson concludes that the story of General Petraeus is far from over. Victory in the sense of an unqualified success in Iraq seems unlikely. She argues that Petraeus either will have avoided failure as Ridgway did in Korea or will be compared to General Abrams, “whose efforts and innovations did not ultimately save the United States from defeat in Vietnam.” What she did not say is that, despite the results, Ridgway and Abrams were heroes and so, too, is Petraeus.

Colonel Gregory Fontenot, USA, Retired, Lansing, Kansas


**War correspondents are a unique breed, attracted—even addicted—to adventure and danger. Trained to passionately observe and analyze, they maintain objectivity about and emotional distance from the often-horrid events unfolding before them. Each is, in not necessarily equal measures, part voyeur, First Amendment crusader, and ambitious pragmatist out to scoop the competition, score lead stories, and attract the attention of media bosses focused on the financial bottom-line.**

Two recently published books examine in very different ways battlefield reporters’ raisons de être. For journalist and university professor Joyce Hoffmann, gender is a central defining characteristic to be exhaustively examined; for CBS Correspondent Kimberly Dozier, her sex is largely incidental, a non-issue footnote in an intensely personal story about surviving the IED blast that killed her crew and a Soldier escorting her.

Hoffmann spent more than a decade researching her vignette-laden study of female journalists, covering the Vietnam conflict from the 1950s to the war’s end in the mid-1970s. Writing in the third person, often from transcripts and library files and only occasionally from first-hand interviews with a few of her subjects, Hoffmann delves into the lives, careers, and yes, loves of dozens of women who dared enter male domains, both military and journalistic. At times, Hoffmann’s disciplined, scholarly documentation mixes uneasily with a breathless *Vanity Fair*-esque flashback-forward narrative style. However, it is fascinating to catch behind-the-scenes glimpses of how their roles as reporters and women evolved along with the conflict.

Hoffmann reveals that in pre-war, military-advisor, CIA-operative days, journalistic novices like Gloria Emerson often followed their boyfriends to Southeast Asia seeking romance, fame, and fortune. A 20-something glamour girl with scant credentials as a society page writer for New York’s *Journal-American*, Emerson arrived in Vietnam in 1956 wide-eyed and optimistic, convinced the U.S., with the help of her CIA paramour, would save the people of South Vietnam from the communist scourge to the North. At first, she filed chatty Saigon-lifestyle stories for *Mademoiselle* and other publications. In 1970, she returned as an older, wiser correspondent for the *New York Times*, chronicling the destruction of the beautiful country she had so loved in her youth.

In sharp contrast to Emerson, reporter/photographer Dickey Chapelle was already a seasoned veteran of more than a half dozen wars and assorted revolutions when she landed in Indochina in 1961. Hard-as-nails and stubbornly independent, she thrived on covering the growing conflict from the foxholes and rice paddies side-by-side with the Soldiers and Marines she admired.

Hoffmann writes, “Devoted though she was to America and its military men, government meddling in her work as a journalist taxed even Chapelle’s loyalty to the nation’s leaders. Without the press, Chapelle insisted, the military would become the sole guarantors of the integrity of history, even though they were ‘the least objective observers around.’ Substituting government press releases for eyewitness observation, she added, ‘has all the authenticity of a patent medicine ad.’”

The friction between the military and media that Chapelle experienced eventually soured the relationship and that result continues to the present day.

Marching with “my Marines” on a search-and-clear mission in 1965, Dickey Chapelle was struck by shrapnel when a young Marine on the jungle path ahead of her hit a booby-trap trip wire. According to Hoffmann, Chapelle, a sprig of pink flowers tucked into her trademark Australian bush hat, was the first American woman killed in action in Vietnam.

Forty-one years later, Kimberly Dozier narrowly escaped a similar fate in the war in Southwest Asia. In her harrowing memoir, *Breathing the Fire*, Dozier recounts the events leading up to the day a vehicle-borne IED exploded on a Baghdad street, and her torturous, ongoing physical and emotional recovery from injuries so extensive that doctors once feared she might lose her legs.

Writing in a crisp, clear, broadcast-news style, Dozier’s account of the Memorial Day, 2006, incident is both personal and visceral, describing her excruciating brain and burn injuries as well as the pain surrounding the deaths of her two CBS co-workers, a U.S. Army Civil Affairs captain, and his Iraqi translator. Treated in a succession of military facilities including Bethesda Naval Hospital, Dozier reports that her family and employers decided military medical care offered her the best hope for survival.

“The surgeons advising us at Landstuhl felt military surgeons had the most experience with blast injuries and Bethesda had the most experience with blast-caused TBI (traumatic brain injury),” she explained in an interview. “CBS News’ war insurance paid for all my treatment, throughout the stays.”

In the last third of her book, Dozier paints a vivid picture of what it is actually like to be a war correspondent. Her description of running military checkpoints and dodging Baghdad troops in the initial race to military checkpoints and dodging Baghdad troops in the initial race to Baghdad crumbles with energy and virtually leaps from the page.

Now back on the air, Dozier won a George Foster Peabody Award in April 2008 for a CBS video report about two female American veterans who lost limbs in Iraq. A few weeks later, the Congressional Medal of Honor Society presented her with the Reagan “Tex” McCrary Award for Journalism, the first woman to receive the award.

“Receiving the McCrary award was stunning,” Dozier told me in an email. “For the actual award ceremony, I walked up to the podium...”
to speak, and the 37 or so Medal of Honor winners in attendance at the Atlanta event stood up for me, and the whole crowd followed. I found it hard to speak at that point—those guys are the real deal. It was an amazing honor that they would be applauding me.”

Carol A. Saynisch, M.A., APR, former CBS News journalist, Seattle, Washington


In 1992, Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway published *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young*, a book about the November 1965 battle between American and North Vietnamese soldiers in the Ia Drang valley, the first major clash of the two armies. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colleges’ Department of Command and Leadership still uses the book to illustrate how the ability of direct and organizational-level leaders to employ the elements of battle command can result in success or failure of a unit on the battlefield. *We Are Soldiers Still* records the journey of Moore, Galloway, and other veterans back to the Ia Drang Valley in 1993 to visit the battlefields at Landing Zones X-ray and Albany and to meet with their former enemies. The journey provided the old warriors, American and Vietnamese, an opportunity to exorcise the demons that have weighed heavily on their minds for close to 30 years. This book, however, is not a battlefield analysis. Although it presents the fighting in all of its brutal and gory details, the book is about people. It celebrates Soldiers, American and Vietnamese, and laments wars. Responding to Ronald Reagan’s comment that the Vietnam War was a “noble” effort, Moore says:

“There has never been a noble war, except in the history books and propaganda movies. It is a bloody, dirty, cruel, costly mistake in almost every case, as it was in this war that would end so badly for us. However, the young soldiers can be and often are noble, selfless, and honorable. They do not fight for a flag or a president or mom and apple pie. When it comes down to it, they fight and die for each other, and that is reason enough for them, and for me.”

The organizing narrative in the book is the trip back to the battlefields, but the narrative is interrupted by short, excellently conceived histories of the various American and Vietnamese Soldiers, when each appears in the narrative. General Moore’s story should be particularly interesting to young American officers because it demonstrates that even one who had academic difficulties at West Point could have a successful military career through fierce determination and good judgment. Moore’s story ends at his present age of 86 with his tribute to his wife, also a good “Soldier,” who, among other “duties,” ministered to the families of Moore’s Soldiers who died in Vietnam.

The authors dedicate the book to their wives but address it to a new generation of American Soldiers consigned “to ‘preemptive’ wars of choice” and condemned “to carry their own memories of death and dying throughout their lives.” These Soldiers will probably never have the opportunity, as did Moore and Galloway, to meet with, come to know, and even be friends with the adversaries they, with all their skills and determination, had tried to kill. Moore and Galloway tell a worthwhile and moving story.

LTC Matthew W. Broadus, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In *The Most Dangerous Animal*, David Livingston Smith takes an original approach to examining the causes of war and proposes its origin is rooted in human nature. Smith’s unique look at war and human nature through the lenses of psychology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, sociology, and philosophy provides an interdisciplinary approach to understanding man’s inherent desire and capacity to wage war. While his work strives “to understand the irrational allure of mass violence,” it is not essentially an antiwar book. Smith peels away the misleading language shrouding war and shows it is a not senseless pursuit but a purposeful venture, and that war is not a societal anomaly but a distinctively human endeavor. He examines the intriguing dichotomy of social praise for violating society’s deepest taboos, of the Soldier’s self-perception of both hero and murderer, and of the individual’s desire to kill the enemy and its accompanying psychological duress.

The homicidal nature of man has been well documented throughout recorded history. Smith explores the creative language accompanying warfare, which is used to “insulate the general population to maintain our minds from its hellish reality.” In recent wars, bombs are referred to as ordnance, mistakenly killing your own Soldiers is fratricide, and dead civilians are collateral damage. He shows that in the minds of many, the enemy has no brave patriots or heroes and its forces are comprised of only ruthless, cold-blooded murderers committing inhumane acts of violence. Smith claims this dehumanization of the enemy attempts to justify our actions and to remove the moral stigma associated with killing another human being. Smith argues this self-deception is necessary for the general population to maintain its support for the war effort and is a mental buffer for those who actually kill the enemy. The use of this placid language serves to hide “the true human costs concealed behind fantasies of valor and righteousness.”

Smith asserts that evolution has rewarded the victors in war through natural and sexual selection, thus passing their genetic material on to future generations. Thus, long ago pacificist societies were likely removed from the gene pool. He also points to man’s intelligence and cooperative capabilities as setting
us apart from other species on the planet. These traits are used for both creation and destruction. Human beings have created both wonderful machines to help alleviate untold suffering along with the hydrogen bomb and its capability of causing untold suffering. He adds that human beings’ cooperative nature begins to develop during youth. While virtually all young mammals engage in various forms of play pitting one individual against another, only human beings play games that pit one team against another. Smith claims this play “is a rehearsal for life.” Thus, the one-on-one battles among most mammals serve to prepare the animal for its future territorial clashes, while team sports are preparing human youth for future wars.

Smith’s look into human nature and man’s propensity for war is insightful and thought provoking. The book’s multifaceted approach to explaining war certainly presents the reader with a good foundation for further study and debate. The author goes to great lengths to explain complex scientific and philosophical concepts in a concise and understandable manner, allowing readers from diverse backgrounds to understand his logic and evidence in presenting his case on human nature.

LTC Randy G. Masten, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---


Amy Chu’s, *Day of Empire*, is an intriguing look at the rise and fall of “hyperpowers.” According to Chu, hyperpowers are “remarkable societies, barely more than a handful in history, that amassed such extraordinary military and economic might that they essentially dominated the world.” She states that a hyperpower possesses supremacy that surpasses all other rivals, is clearly not inferior economically or militarily to any other power, and projects its power to an immense part of the globe. As Chu writes, “To be dominant, a society must be at the forefront of the world’s technological, military, and economic development.”

Tolerance is the most important characteristic that the great hyperpowers share. From Alexander’s conquest to the rise of the United States, Chu uses historical examples to support her premise. For example, Chu cites Genghis Khan’s assimilation of Chinese engineers into the Mongol Army. She also notes Genghis responded to Muslim envoy complaints about Christian persecution in the city of Balasagun, modern-day Kyrgyzstan. Genghis attacked and killed the Christian leader and incorporated Balasagun into his empire. Likewise, Chu describes how the Ottoman Empire’s tolerance of non-Muslims led to an “immense economic expansion” of the empire.

Conversely, Chu also points out that the lack of tolerance often led to the collapse of hyperpowers. In 1905, British viceroy Lord Curzon’s policies led to marginalizing Hindus in India’s Civil Service, a move that backfired. Although India remained under British rule for another 43 years, the seeds of dissent were sown, and eventually Britain’s racial intolerance led to large-scale demonstrations against the crown. Chu also cites intolerance in the Japanese empire during World War II. Before Japan’s invasion of Singapore in 1942, Singapore was a major international trade center. Chu writes, “As soon as they invaded, monopolies were awarded to large Japanese corporations. Hyperinflation, price gouging, and corruption soon led to economic collapse.”

Chu concludes her book with a chapter titled, “The Day of Empire,” pointing out that at the end of the Cold War widespread anti-Americanism replaced the worldwide democratic movement. Chu contends that championing of American enterprise does not “Americanize” other nations. Chu writes, “Wearing a Yankee’s cap and drinking Coca-Cola does not turn a Palestinian into an American.”

Chu’s book is a fascinating look at hyperpowers. She has carefully researched her subject and her scholarship makes *Day of Empire* well worth the read. Whether you agree or disagree with the basic thesis of her work—that tolerance is the most important characteristic successful hyperpowers share—Chu’s book is an interesting look at the history of those states.

Mike Weaver, Assistant Professor, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

---


A good biography sketches its subject’s life in a way that illuminates mysteries hidden beneath the surface. Richard Kagan’s *Taiwan’s Statesman:* Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia examines the mercurial Lee Teng-hui, who as president of Taiwan successfully transitioned the country from authoritarian to democratic governance. Kagan introduces his book as more than political analysis, labeling it a character study.

Unfortunately, Kagan’s lofty ambitions fall short. His inquiry into Lee’s character produces trite ostentation and forceful pro-Lee bias, beginning with the title. Kagan intends the title, *Taiwan’s Statesman,* to convey Lee’s “ability to create a new identity for Taiwan.” He persists with bombastic statements that the reader must blindly accept as fact, such as “Lee is a statesman because he reconceptualized Taiwan” and “through his efforts he was able to invent himself. And later, he used this self-made identity to invent a new Taiwan.” Such gratuitous praise idolizes Lee’s legacy but ignores many persistent fractures within Taiwanese society—especially over issues such as independence or reunification with China. The “new identity” that Kagan says Lee created is much less cohesive than Kagan admits.

Despite these flaws, *Taiwan’s Statesman* succeeds where the author limits his writing to Lee’s political career (exactly what Kagan
intended not to do). Here, Kagan provides cogent analysis, such as his explanation of why President Chiang Ching-kuo brought Lee into his inner circle. As “a loner without a large or significant constituency,” Lee could not “join a faction, engineer his own political power base, or pose a threat to Ching-kuo’s authority or office.” The book’s best chapters appear toward the end, as Kagan analyzes Lee’s presidential years. However, Kagan never manages to shed his pro-Lee bias. For military leaders who seek an understanding of the China-Taiwan debate and other strategic issues in Asia, Richard Kagan’s Taiwan’s Statesman provides a solid assessment of Lee Teng-hui’s career and accomplishments, but Kagan’s vigorous bias weakens his insights into Lee’s character. If Lee’s character is truly as remarkable as Kagan proclaims, Kagan should have kept to the facts and let Lee’s life speak for itself.

ILT Brian Drohan, USA, Fort Huachuca, Arizona


While tactical history can seem stilted and dry at times, Andrew Wiest, in Vietnam’s Forgotten Army, presents an enriched and dynamic history of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) by chronicling the careers of two of ARVN’s best young officers, Tran Ngoc Hue and Pham Van Dinh, as they fought in the Vietnam War. Wiest seeks to dispel the myth of the ARVN as an ineffective fighting force.

He argues that the ARVN suffered from many political and organizational obstacles, yet produced dedicated, professional, and competent officers who fought heroically for South Vietnam. Wiest uses the examples of Hue’s and Dinh’s military experiences fighting at Hue City, Dong Ap Bia, and Lam Son 719 to challenge the historical record of ARVN’s poor performance. In each case, Wiest argues that the courageous and professional leadership of Hue and Dinh provides a glimmer of insight into the capabilities of ARVN. Even so, Wiest also calls attention to the severe corruption and political nepotism in the upper echelons of ARVN’s command structure as a major cause of the ARVN’s incompetence, argues that the ARVN had become deeply dependent upon U.S. forces, especially U.S. air power and artillery, and says that the United States sought to recast ARVN in the image of its own military. Both Hue and Dinh recognized these elements as substantial obstacles to the success of ARVN and yet could not overcome them even with their dauntless efforts.

The end of the story is tragic. Both Hue and Dinh faced a bitter defeat despite their gallant efforts. Dinh defected to the North Vietnamese Army, became a mid-level aparatchik, and then retired in 1989 to become a businessman. Hue, after 13 years in reeducation camps, lived in poverty until moving to the United States in 1991. The value of Vietnam’s Forgotten Army lies in the author’s appreciation for ARVN fighting prowess and the book’s interesting perspective of the Vietnam War.

Sean N. Kalic, Ph.D.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The post-Cold War North Korean economy has been a continuous disaster interrupted by catastrophe. Through exhaustive economic forensics, Korean political and economic scholar, Nicholas Eberstadt, illuminates the full extent of North Korea’s economic situation and discusses its prospects for its future. Even though he faced North Korean government secrecy, poorly kept economic measures, quantitative data inconsistencies, self-deception of the country’s economic policymakers, and falsification of information, Eberstadt cleverly utilizes “mirror statistics”—data on foreign trade trends reconstructed through trading partners’ reports on international sales and purchases—to assess aspects of North Korea’s economic performance that could not otherwise be analyzed. He meticulously fills information and data voids with viable, sophisticated economic deductions.

The book traces the origins of North Korea’s economic troubles to its contentious, yet continuous, “military first” policy implemented in the 1970s—a policy that views military activities as securing regime survival and generating resources, not consuming them. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent loss of Soviet bloc-subsidized trade that North Korea so heavily depended upon exacerbated this misguided preservationist policy.

Eberstadt painstakingly details the macroeconomic factors believed to contribute to North Korea’s current economic situation: no statistical system, the lack of a central planning apparatus, hyper-militarization of the national economy, a compressing consumer sector, demonetization of the national economy, the lack of financial intermediation, deflation of international debts, and an apprehension of trade with “imperialist countries.” North Korea’s entire capital stock is worthless in the global marketplace, and its economic system is sustained only through external support and assistance. Even the agreement between North and South Korea to promote balanced development through economic cooperation essentially amounts to unconditional grants and subsidies from Seoul to Pyongyang.

North Korea’s post-Cold War survival strategy is military extortion of trade subsidies, debt relief, and foreign aid—the export of international strategic insecurity in return for stability appeasement to the international community. Eberstadt believes the only viable way ahead for North Korea is to discard a security policy focused on regime security and international intimidation for a
policy featuring economic growth and development along the lines of the Chinese or the South Korean models, something not likely to happen anytime soon.

This is a very insightful book, full of smartly crafted and interpreted North Korean economic data. It is also a significant contribution to knowledge of international politics and economics—and has been written for a scholarly academic audience. Prospective readers of this book should keep this in mind before choosing to read it.

LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D., USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Conventional wisdom holds that the Arab-Israeli conflict is at the heart of the broader problems of the Middle East, yet the facts concerning this conflict remain in dispute. Many Americans, raised on the idealized image of Israeli settlers as persecuted and outnumbered heroes in a prolonged struggle against hordes of malevolent Arabs, find it difficult to understand the very different images commonly held in the Arab world.

Benny Morris, like Avi Shlaim and other recent Israeli historians, seeks to provide a more balanced reassessment of this shared Israeli-Palestinian past. His most recent effort is a detailed reconstruction of the 1948 conflict that secured the newly independent state of Israel against the simultaneous invasion of five Arab armies. In the process of recounting this war, Morris meticulously analyzes a number of contentious issues between the two sides.

First, he considers the widely held Arab belief that the Western powers imposed a divided Palestine on its population. In fact, Morris argues, those Western powers not only did not enforce the UN partition plan, but repeatedly hampered Israel’s military actions, thereby saving the Arab states from defeat. He also contends that, although its foes outnumbered Israel, the Jewish state actually possessed more trained manpower and eventually more weapons than the opposing Arab armies did. While recognizing the valor of individual Arab soldiers, he notes that few Arabs actually fought in 1948, while their leaders were more interested in seizing territory than destroying Israel.

After carefully analyzing alleged atrocities on both sides, the author arrives at a disconcerting and unpopular conclusion. He asserts that, with some exceptions, the regular Arab armies obeyed the law of war, while Israeli forces murdered as many as 800 civilians and prisoners and raped a number of Arab women.

Perhaps the most contentious issue, then and now, is the problem of the Palestinian refugees who, for 60 years now, have been unable to return to their homes. Morris acknowledges that Israel encouraged this emigration, but offers a number of important caveats. First, he argues that prior to 1948, few Jews advocated such a refugee flow, whereas Arab leaders consistently demanded the expulsion of most Jews, a demand they carried out both by pressuring their own Jewish populations to move to Israel and by evacuating any Jewish settlement. Second, the author contends the initial expulsion of Palestinian residents happened only because their villages provided support for extremists who interdicted Israeli supply lines in the conflict. Even after these expulsions became routine, Israel did not enforce the policy consistently, resulting in some Palestinian groups remaining within the new Jewish state.

Over all, 1948 is a superb attempt to provide a reasoned assessment of a very contentious period. It is well worth study by anyone seeking to understand the Middle East that this war helped create.

COL Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Robert Kershaw, a British historian and veteran infantryman of the 191 Gulf War, has amalgamated the wartime experiences of German, Russian, American, British, and Italian tank crewmembers into one book. Although it includes some World War I tank history and experiences, most of the book consists of stories from newly researched personal testimonies from World War II veterans. The intent is to capture the human story from ordinary tank crewmembers, specifically focusing on the theme of the human implications of tank-on-tank technical inequalities in combat.

Kershaw begins with the genesis of the tank in the First World War, including the history of the tank’s initial design, and recollections from British and German soldiers seeing the metal monolith for the first time. Unique to this book is a vivid description of what it was like to be a tank crewmember in World War I, wearing the uniform and protective chain-mail mask, special helmet, and leather jerkin. He describes the life of the confined tank crewmember inside the early tanks, from the repressive heat and fumes to the techniques they developed to communicate between themselves over the din of battle, the roaring engine, and loud noise of tank tracks.

Kershaw discusses the tank’s continued technical development between the wars in the areas of mobility, protection, and firepower, and reports how various nations envisioned fighting with these new tanks in future wars. As World War II begins, the book turns toward “day in the life” experiences from veterans of the 1940 German blitzkrieg in France to the African desert and Russian plains in 1941–1943 and Western Europe in 1944–1945. The first-hand accounts of combat from inside the tank are captivating and alone make the book worth reading. However, Kershaw has gone beyond creating an exclusively historical study of the human dimension in tank warfare to address issues that are still quite relevant. For example,
he describes the challenges nations face when they field new systems in a hurried fashion to give their soldiers an edge over the enemy in mobility or protection. He examines morality in war, the psychological and physical trauma war causes, and the inadequate medical treatment of those who have been through the horrors of war. This is not an analysis of armored warfare in a tactical or operational sense, but instead it is a human history of men who fought inside steel machines and the issues they have had from 1916 to today.

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FROM STALINGRAD TO PILLAU: A Red Army Artillery Officer Remembers the Great Patriotic War, Isaak Kobylyanskiy, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2008, 328 pages, $29.95.

Over the past 20 years, there has been resurgence in the literature covering the Eastern Front in World War II. With the openness of post-Soviet Russia, numerous personal accounts have been published which supplement the typical battlefield narrative. From Stalingrad to Pillau: A Red Army Artillery Officer Remembers the Great Patriotic War provides the reader with a “gun sight” view.

In the last 20 years, there has also been a small outpouring of personal accounts from Russian soldiers who served during the war. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, most personal accounts were couched in party dogma, but this work avoids this problem while still exploring the full gamut of a tactical officer’s battlefield experiences.

It is not uncommon to find the commanding generals penning lengthy wartime memoirs justifying or vindicating their roles within a particular operation. All too often, the tactical echelon, where the bullet literally meets the bone, is ignored in pursuit of the big picture. From Stalingrad to Pillau is wholly based at the tactical level, offering the reader insight into one of the most under-represented combat roles, direct support artilleryman, in the war.

Isaak Kobylyanskiy served as an officer in an artillery battery designated as direct infantry support. His battery was armed with the famous 76-millimeter (mm) artillery piece. This weapon served as the backbone for the anti-tank defense of the infantry divisions. Relatively mobile, rugged, and able to penetrate most German tanks, the 76-mm gun (in several manifestations) was the bane of German maneuver elements, and Kobylyanskiy provides a vivid account of the use of this weapon system.

Kobylyanskiy presents a well-rounded work covering many of the traditional aspects one would expect to find. His detailed descriptions of his battlefield encounters, both successful and unsuccessful, provide a candid recollection including the arduous, ever present foot marches as well as the horrors of being in the midst of a battlefield rout with a heavy piece of machinery to move and no horses. Kobylyanskiy verbally recreates many of the soldiers that he served with, making this a very personal account.

Stalingrad to Pillau also covers many less common topics. His book discusses politics in the military, training, life behind the front lines, and women in the Soviet military mostly in separate chapters. Kobylyanskiy’s discussion of women in the Red Army is quite extensive. His exposure, at the regimental level, to women serving on the front lines should be interesting to Western readers for whom the experience is foreign. His brief discussions on mobilization, training, replacements, and demobilization also illuminate some of the other aspects of the Red Army with which Western audiences might not be familiar.

A reader who seeks a ground’s eye view of the war on the Eastern front will be well served by reading this book. The author’s candid coverage of both the moral and military issues provides a critical missing piece to the literature of the war on the Eastern front.

SSG Jeremy Byers, Topeka, Kansas


Michael Neiberg’s The Second Battle of the Marne fills a void in the written history of World War I. He makes a great contribution to understanding that war by casting the Second Battle of the Marne in its proper and decisive place in history.

Neiberg begins at the beginning of the German offensive in the Marne with the disastrous compromise of their plan. In the hours preceding the offensive, a German officer conducting a reconnaissance on the Allied side of the Marne River was captured, and in his possession were the plans for that campaign. This compromise allowed the Allies to make last minute preparations and defeat the German attacks.

Not surprisingly, the Germans failed to achieve their objectives. The loss of surprise, Allied preparedness, a greatly rejuvenated French Army, and the introduction of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) combined to present too great an obstacle. Neiberg describes the key events in the battle, including the defense along a section of the Marne River by the U.S. 38th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, the “Rock of the Marne.” His other descriptions encompass both Allied and German perspectives.

With this battle’s conclusion, the entire character of the war changed. Due to tremendous losses in manpower, terrain, and resources, the German Army lost the ability to ever achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies were then able to seize the initiative and transition to operations more offensive in nature.

Neiberg’s book poses new insights. He adds three new elements to the body of knowledge of the Great War: analysis of operational design; a more accurate understanding of the true character of the French Army and, more important, its leadership under General Foch; and a description of the AEF and its actions during the battle.
In his analysis of Allied and German plans, Neiberg does a good job linking strategic, operational, and tactical concepts and illuminates the lack of linkage between these concepts in German plans. His analysis helps explain why many engagements during this period had no apparent supporting relationship to one another.

Another contribution Neiberg makes is his assessment of the French Army and its leadership during the period. Rather than dwell upon the mutiny and dissent with which many are familiar, he portrays a new French Army with discipline and professionalism. His analysis of General Foche is excellent.

Finally, the author gives an assessment of the AEF. He covers its levels of training and leadership and does an admirable job describing its integration into the operational and tactical levels of war. He describes numerous actions, and shows that despite an initial lack of preparedness, the AEF quickly developed into a superb fighting force.

Neiberg’s re-casting of this epic battle and its importance in the war presents a valuable new perspective. His analysis, particularly of operational design and the French Army and its leadership, will give many readers a new understanding of this pivotal period during World War I.

LTC Thomas G. Meara, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda

LTC Thomas P. Odom, USA, Retired, author of Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda—

I certainly support study of the Rwandan civil war and genocide as a case of post-conflict resolution, reintegration, and reconciliation. As the U.S. Defense Attaché in Zaire from 1993-1994, and then Rwanda 1994 to 1996, I lived through the initial stages of that process. But the recent article in Military Review, “Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda” (AR2) by Major Jeffrey H. Powell (September-October 2008), suffers from errors of fact, superficial research, and poor analysis.

Errors of fact

“The calculated policies of Belgium, Germany, and France divided Rwanda against itself for easier colonial rule. These policies of 19th century rule had a lasting effect...”

- Germany and Belgium were the colonial powers in Rwanda, not France.
- Belgium did not become a colonial power in Rwanda until the 20th century.

“In August 1993, when regional and international actors arranged detailed peace negotiations to be enforced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a brokered reconciliation effort began.”

- The Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993; the negotiations began in July 1992.
- “UNAMIR’s mandate was: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.”’’ UNAMIR did not have an enforcement mandate and was not equipped or manned for such a mission.

“...Rwanda’s President Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, Burundi, to meet with other signatories of the accords. On his return flight, Hutu extremists in the Presidential Guard shot down his plane...”

- Dares-Salaam is in Tanzania, not Burundi.
- To date, there has been no definitive resolution as to who shot the plane down.

Depth of research

As a long time Rwanda watcher and author, I would recommend but one book as a must have for such a paper: Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story.

Cloaking reality in hyperbole and doubtful analysis

The article is a classic case of making reality fit academic theory by cloaking reality in hyperbole and doubtful analysis. I would summarize by offering my own questions to resurface the reality of Rwanda.

- Genocide as an act of “frenzy”? You don’t kill 11 percent of a population of 7 million in 100 days using small arms and machetes in a “frenzy.” The Rwandan genocide was a coldly calculated act of political murder applied on a massive scale.
- Only a “victor’s justice”? In the case of genocide committed during a civil war, as in Rwanda, exactly how and when should the post-genocide government offer amnesty? The signed Arusha Accords provided defacto and dejure amnesty for the new government that was to be formed under them.
- “Like the former Hutu regimes, the RPF killed or exiled its adversaries?” A statement that the current government is no different than the previous regime is morally bankrupt. Has the RPF reacted against its enemies? Yes. Has the RPF stacked one million bodies? No.
 ● “The policies of the current regime neither include nor forgive Hutus. They do not recognize that throughout the civil war both sides committed atrocities against each other.”? There have been and still are Hutus in the government and in the military. Paul Kagame told me personally that revenge killings had taken place. I knew RPA officers who went to prison for such events.

● “The failure to grant amnesty has mired the reconciliation process”? Frankly I was amazed at the restraint shown and my amazement grew over time. I would say that Rwanda is truly remarkable for the progress it has made since the genocide ended. One thing is relatively certain: for better or for worse no one man is more important to Rwanda than Paul Kagame. “Mired” is simply not a word I would apply to him or his leadership.

* Rwanda, UNAMIR Mandate, United Nations.

Rwanda

COL Rick Orth, USA, Retired, (Sub Saharan Africa Foreign Area Officer)—The study of Rwanda has much to offer professional military officers, especially about civil war, genocide, difficulties of peace support operations, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and lastly how a post-conflict country rebuild itself despite the good intentions of the international community. I have over 14 years working Rwandan issues, either directly or indirectly, first as an intelligence analyst covering Central Africa (1994-1996), then as the Defense Attaché to Rwanda (August 1996-October 1998), culminating as the military advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (August 2006-May 2008). I wrote three articles concerning Rwanda: “Four Variables in Preventive Diplomacy: Their Application in the Rwanda Case,” Journal of Conflict Studies, Spring 1997; “African Operational Experiences in Peacekeeping,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Winter 1996; and “Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective.” Major Jeffery H. Powell’s recent Military Review article, “Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation,” unfortunately distorts the valuable lessons Rwanda has to offer due to factual errors and flawed analysis. Detailed research might have alleviated these problems.

Factual Errors. The Rwandan case is complex and nuanced just as Rwandan society; therefore, any study requires in-depth research, which was apparently not done when writing this article: “a genocidal frenzy” the Rwandan genocide was not. Rather the Rwandan government used genocide as an instrument of counterinsurgency against the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army. The Habaryarimana government trained the militia (INTERAHAMWE) of the MRND party in insurgency and terrorist techniques. It planned on launching an insurgency/terrorist campaign against the Broad Based Government that would come to power as a result of the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993. Additionally, the government sponsored a sophisticated propaganda campaign targeting the peasant population. Furthermore, Rwanda historically is an ordered society respecting authority. The Hutu extremists who planned, then commanded, the genocide used these tools in a methodical manner.

“The Belgians, for instance, designated Tutsis as the administrators and Hutus as the workers under their rule.” The Germans and Belgians initially relied on the ruling elite in Rwanda; they did not designate, but reinforced, the Tutsi already in power. Incidentally, The Rwandan Kingdom existed centuries before the Germans colonized Rwanda in the late 1890s. In fact, the areas of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri (later to become bastions of Hutu extremism) remained Hutu controlled and the Mwami (Rwandan king), only exerted control of these areas with the aid of German colonial troops. “The genocide law passed in 1996 determined four levels of interahamwe.” The 1996 Genocide Law determined four levels of genocidaire, not INTERAHAMWE. The author failed to mention the 100,000s in Rwanda jails accused of genocide and the huge burden this had on the Rwanda justice system, the government’s use of Gacaca to ease the case back log.

Flawed Analysis. Using a model “amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation AR2,” and then trying to make the Rwandan case fit, distorted the reality of the Rwandan case presented in this article.

“The RPF also has not acknowledged facts pointing to the illegal actions of some members of the RPA during the conflict and the possible need to grant amnesty to them as well.” This sounds much like the criticism of human rights activists and does not take into account the hundreds of RPA/RDF officers and soldiers sitting in military jails or since released having served their sentences for crimes against the Rwandan people. Then there are those who were executed under the RPA Code of Military of Justice, again criticized by the International Community, for criminal acts against the population. The system is not perfect but it is not one of impunity either.

“And without amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation, Rwanda will face bleak prospects in the future, which could include another civil war. . . . The policies of the current regime neither include nor forgive Hutus.” Rwanda has had a policy of reintegration. While the policy does not fit the AR2 model and is not perfect, the Rwanda experience has proven successful. Concerning Ingando camps, in early 1998 over 1,700 EX-FAR completed reorientation training. From this group over 400 were screened and immediately joined the RPA to fight the EX-FAR and INTERAHAMWE. These new counterinsurgents knew the physical geographic and social terrain and, thus, defeated the insurgents. More recently, one of the biggest acts of forgiveness was the incorporation of a key EX-FAR Brigadier General into the Rwandan Defense Forces (the Government changed the name of the Rwandan Patriotic Army). If this is not amnesty, then what is?
Visit our websites for leadership publications, information, discussion, and more leadership links.

CAL AKO
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/376783
LeaderNet
https://leadernet.bcks.army.mil/
CAL Public Website
http://usacac/cac2/cal/index/asp
Recently, our web site changed its look and feel to provide you with greater accessibility and ease of navigation. *Military Review* is dedicated to continue offering you a world-class product in four languages that remains on the cutting edge of military innovation and information.

Yes... we Blog, and you can add your comments to featured articles on our site! To stay current with *Military Review*, we invite you to subscribe to our RSS feed. When we post new information on the website, you will be the first to know. Be the envy of your peers, *SUBSCRIBE TODAY*!

Visit us at http://militaryreview.army.mil