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SPECIAL EDITION

INTERAGENCY READER

COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates on interagency cooperation

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development…Civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises.

—Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, quote from Landon Lecture at
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 26 November 2007

PHOTO: Brian McCarthy (right front), a solid waste advisor and Scottish contractor with the Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team, explains to the site construction manager (left front) how to fix the grade of the leachate system in a landfill to meet environmental standards, Taza, Kirkuk Province, Iraq, 16 December 2007. (U.S. Air Force, SSGT Samuel Bendet)

Preface

The current and foreseeable national security challenges facing the Nation grow directly out of globalization and the increasingly interdependent relationships among the international diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements of power. To respond to this complex new situation, the Army's emerging doctrine outlines in some detail the principles underlying the conduct of effective full-spectrum operations in a multipolar and diverse world. In many cases, effective operations will require more than the military alone can, or should, deliver. We will have to bring to bear the awesome, synergistic weight of our other elements of national power, particularly those vested in the interagency.

Our current involvements in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, the Far East, Eastern Europe, and Latin America suggest that garnering the support of foreign populations is increasingly being singled out as our operational center of gravity. To facilitate greater consideration among leaders of how all the elements of power can be employed to influence this center of gravity, the editors of *Military Review* have assembled this volume of selected journal articles. Just as the new field manuals, FM 3-0 (Operations) and the forthcoming FM 3-07 (Stability Operations) and FM 3-28 (Civil Support), are aimed at guiding leaders to ask the right questions, this complementary collection of articles is intended to provide readers answers for a given time and place.

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Military Review

Combined Arms Center Special Edition—Interagency Reader

PREFACE

BACKGROUND AND FOUNDATION

Cover Photo: John Schnittker, a member of the Department of State Agriculture Provincial Reconstruction Team, stands outside a skeletal building at a grain mill in Riyadh, Iraq, 26 September 2007. (U.S. Army, SPC Laura M. Buchta)

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America's Frontier Wars:
Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts

Congressman Ike Skelton

Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear's battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow's conflicts.

IN JULY 1755, Major General Edward Braddock, commander in chief of all British forces in North America and a 45-year career soldier, was killed along with 900 of his men by a smaller French and Indian force. On his way to capture Fort Duquesne, Pennsylvania, Braddock had split his force into two divisions. Because of the difficulty of crossing the wilderness, they opened a distance of 60 miles between the "flying column" division of rapidly moving soldiers and a support column hauling "monstrously heavy eight-inch howitzers and twelve-pound cannons" completely unsuited to the terrain.

The lead column stretched a mile in length and was attacked on the far side of the Monongahela River by Indians streaming along either British flank and hiding within the forest they had long used as hunting grounds. The British responded using traditional tactics—continuously trying to form companies and return fire but only concentrating their number further for Indian attack. Braddock ordered forward the main body of his troops, which then collided with retreating elements ahead. In the resulting confusion, 15 of the 18 officers in the advance party were picked off. Still, the remaining forces continued to fight the way they were taught: maintaining platoon formations and firing together even as they drew heavy fire to the line from well-hidden

Indians. It was not until Braddock himself was shot in the back that the British broke in retreat, carrying off the body of their commanding officer.[1]

Asymmetric Warfare: Yesterday and Tomorrow

Why do I begin an article addressing tomorrow's conflicts with an account of a battle fought two and a half centuries ago? As an avid student of history, I believe it is critically important for us to understand that asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it has been a recurring theme of American military history and is familiar to many of today's military officers. Many of its best historical examples come from the series of conflicts we collectively refer to as the Indian Wars. Braddock's defeat highlights as many useful insights as contemporary examples of asymmetric action, like Russian battles with the Chechens. Overcoming future challenges will require that we both understand the lessons from the past and develop strategies and tactics appropriate to tomorrow's battlefield.

While asymmetric warfare is not something new, it is very much in vogue today in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Given America's resounding success in that conflict, potential adversaries have learned Iraq's lesson that it is foolish to try to match us conventionally. Instead, they are seeking ways to

turn our strengths against us. This is the heart of the concept of asymmetry, broadly defined by Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson of the US Army War College as: "In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action."[2]

Asymmetry on the Future Battlefield

In operational terms, asymmetry derives from one force deploying new capabilities that the opposing force does not perceive or understand, conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of its opponent, or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defense— or a combination of these attributes.[3] The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) now thinks of ways to characterize tomorrow's asymmetric challenges.[4] In considering its arguments, I was struck again by the utility of lessons learned from earlier campaigns against Native Americans such as Braddock's defeat. So I have matched TRADOC's insights for the future with asymmetric examples from the past. Only by studying the lessons of history are we likely to adapt to asymmetric challenges.

TRADOC's analysis begins by stressing the differences between our current perception of the future operational environment and what is likely to be true. Today we think of close combat as involving deliberate actions conducted at a tempo decided by the United States and characterized by the application of technology and systems that leaves opponents virtually helpless to respond or retaliate. Therefore, the public expects military operations to involve few casualties and precision attacks, secure our homeland and be short-lived. On the contrary, potential adversaries will likely choose to fight in ways that negate these expectations. Future close combat will be much more dynamic and lethal, marked by greater intensity, operational tempo, uncertainty and psychological impact. We cannot expect the experience of the Gulf War to be repeated.

Likely Characteristics of Adversaries

With this as a starting point, TRADOC has discussed attributes a potential enemy is likely to possess: greater knowledge of the physical conflict environment, better situational awareness, a clearer understanding of US military forces and an ability to adapt quickly to changing battlefield conditions. These attributes strongly mirror challenges for British, and later American, soldiers in Indian campaigns of yesteryear.

The physical environment remains the defining variable of close combat. For US military forces, it is almost certain that future conflicts will occur in regions where the enemy has a greater understanding of the physical environment and has better

We think of close combat as involving deliberate actions conducted at a tempo decided by the United States and characterized by the application of technology and systems that leaves opponents virtually helpless. . . . Potential adversaries will likely choose to fight in ways that negate these expectations. Future close combat will be much more dynamic and lethal, marked by greater intensity, operational tempo, uncertainty and psychological impact.

Opposing forces will also have greater situational awareness. . . . We should expect them to have human networks operating over telephone lines or with cellular phones and using commercial imagery systems. . . . Even with its sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, [the United States] will have difficulty in complex settings unless it builds a more effective human intelligence

optimized his forces to fight. A common characteristic of many Indian campaigns was the Indians' superior knowledge of the terrain. A great example of this was the attack on the forces of Colonel Henry Bouquet during his march to relieve Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania, during Pontiac's War in August 1763. The Indians attacked in an area of old growth forest, offering limited fields of fire, around Bushy Run. They forced Bouquet's forces back into a defensive position on a hilltop, attacking the position repeatedly but without waiting for a counterattack. Their detailed knowledge of the area allowed them to simply fade into the forest, suffering few casualties.[5] This is but one example of the advantages that accrued to many Indian tribes through the late 1800s.[6]

Opposing forces will also have greater situational awareness in future conflicts. We should expect them to have human networks operating over telephone lines or with cellular phones and using commercial imagery systems. This will be critical, not only because the adversary can distribute information quickly but also because crucial information will only be available through human interaction. The United States, even with its sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, will have difficulty in complex settings unless it builds

During the Second Seminole War, Major Francis L. Dade and all but three soldiers of his 110-man detachment were killed on 28 December 1835 during an ambush near Ocala, Florida.

Museum of Florida History, Tallahassee, Florida

The Seminole Indians adapted continuously during the second Seminole War of 1835-1842. . . . Where other eastern Indians could usually be depended upon to follow the rules of the game—to defend a fixed position and be routed—the Seminoles . . . regularly rejected pitched battles and instead relied on ambushes and raids to bleed the Army, sap its strength, and generally discourage its leadership. In the future, such an adaptive enemy would put additional pressure on the United States' ability to respond, as their battlefield successes would be covered instantly by the global media.

a more effective human intelligence capability in strategically important regions. Moreover, these new adversaries will learn not only how to adapt technology but also tactics, formations and operations in light of changing battlefield conditions during the course of operations. Such adaptations will help them counter a precision warfare strategy by creating uncertainty while also trying to control the nature and timing of combat engagements.

During the war in Chechnya, the Chechens fought using few prepared positions, preferring instead, as Chechen Vice President Yanderbaijev said, to "let the situation do the organizing."[7] They would move from city to city to deny Russian maneuver and fire superiority and would use the local population as cover for their activities.

Similarly, the Seminole Indians adapted continuously during the second Seminole War of 1835-1842. One noted historian puts it this way: "The second Seminole War did not follow the precedent set in earlier Indian wars by producing a single daz-

zling stroke by a spectacularly brilliant leader. No fewer than seven American commanders would try and fail to bring the war to a successful conclusion. When confronted with superior firepower and at a tactical disadvantage, the Seminoles simply dispersed into small bands and continued to fight a guerrilla war . . . best suited to the terrain and their own temperament. Where other eastern Indians could usually be depended upon to follow the rules of the game—to defend a fixed position and be routed—the Seminoles . . . regularly rejected pitched battles and instead relied on ambushes and raids to bleed the Army, sap its strength, and generally discourage its leadership."[8]

In the future, such an adaptive enemy would put additional pressure on the United States' ability to respond, as their battlefield successes would be covered instantly by the global media, instantaneous communications and media coverage.

Finally, our future adversaries will almost certainly have greater knowledge of US forces than we will of theirs. We are the most studied military in the world. Foreign states have regular military features and, in some cases, entire journals (most notably Russia's *Foreign Military Review*) devoted to the assessment of US military force structure, doctrine, operational concepts and capabilities. All major US Army field manuals (FMs) and joint doctrinal publications are freely available on the Internet, and many foreign organizations access them regularly. As an example, in April 2001 alone, the Center for Army Lessons Learned recorded 5,464 sessions on its website from Europe and 2,015 from Asia. This access, combined with their knowledge of battlefield terrain, greater situational awareness and adaptability, will make future adversaries far more menacing.

How Will They Fight?

The essence of future asymmetric warfare is that adversaries will seek to offset our air, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and other technological advantages by fighting during periods of reduced visibility and in complex terrain and urban environments where they can gain sanctuary from US strikes. This will also deny these areas and their inherent protective characteristics to US forces, keeping us exposed and on the defensive.

US forces will have to contend with greater uncertainty in the field as adversaries mask the size, location, disposition and intentions of their forces. They will seek to convince US commanders that they are using conventional tactics while making us vulnerable to unconventional, adaptive and asymmetrical actions.

Geronimo (*in front of horse*) with some of his warriors during negotiations with General George Crook in 1886. During this period, telegraph linemen (*inset*) and Apache warriors were antagonists in a 19th-century precursor to 21st-century cyberwar.

National Archives

National Archives

There is a relevant Indian war complement to today's challenges. . . . By 1882, the Apache had learned [the telegraph's] function and its method of operation. When they jumped the reservation, they would cut the lines and remove long sections of wire, or they would remove a short piece of wire and replace it with a thin strip of rawhide, so cleverly splicing the two together that the line would appear intact and the location of the break could take days of careful checking to discover. This disruption foreshadows the potentially far greater problems from cyberattacks.

At the same time, adversaries will use both old and new technologies to great effect on the battlefield. They may use older technologies in unique ways as the Chechens did by buying commercial scanners and radios to intercept Russian communications. They will also try to acquire advanced niche technologies like global positioning system jammers and systems for electronic attack to significantly degrade our precision strike capabilities. Moreover, we must be prepared for adversaries to upgrade software capabilities in the middle of an operation, potentially allowing for a more networked opposition.

While some of the technology may be new, the Indian campaigns again provide useful insights. Many Indian campaigns demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetric tactics in countering larger and better-armed British and American forces. In fact, "Indian skulking tactics—concealment and surprise, moving fire, envelopment and, when the enemy's ranks were broken, hand-to-hand combat—remained the cardinal features of Native American warfare" over a period of 140 years.[9] The longevity of their effectiveness shows how important it is to develop appropriate responses to asymmetric tactics.

One of the most successful Indian tactics was the ambush. Captain William Fetterman's massacre in 1866 near the Lodge Trail Ridge in Wyoming left 92 American soldiers dead in a classic ambush some believe was masterminded by Sioux leader Crazy Horse. A lesser-known battle, almost a century before, shows the effectiveness of the ambush, particularly when matched with reckless leadership. At the Battle of Blue Licks in August 1782, a group of 182 Kentucky militiamen, led by Colonel John Todd and including Daniel Boone and members of his family, was in hot pursuit of Indians who had attacked an American fort. Boone noticed the Indians were concealing their numbers by sharing tracks, yet making the trail easy to follow. He smelled an ambush by a force he estimated at 500 and advised

breaking off the pursuit until reinforcements could arrive. A more junior officer yelled, "Them that ain't cowards follow me," and recklessly charged across the river toward several decoy Indians, with much of the force following him. The remaining Indians were waiting in ambush, as Boone had feared, and delivered a devastating defeat to the rangers.[10]

Like Blue Licks, the Battle of Bushy Run not only shows the efficacy of Indian raids until defeated by Bouquet's brilliant feigned retreat and flanking maneuvers; it also shows how an enemy can use deception effectively. The official history of Bushy Run says Bouquet's forces were engaged and surrounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian

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recreators, who have studied the battle extensively from the Indian point of view, maintained that the Indians numbered no more than 90 and that the tactics they used in the forest made their numbers seem larger. This disparity is a good example of attempts to confuse conventional forces so that the size of the opposing force is impossible to discern.

Finally, the Indian campaigns provide some excellent examples of the role of technological advances in asymmetric campaigns. Noted historian Armstrong Starkey emphasizes that the Europeans arrived in North America during a time of military revolution in Europe: "European soldiers brought the new weapons and techniques of this revolution with them to North America and by 1675 had provoked a military revolution of a sort among Native Americans, a revolution that for 140 years gave them a tactical advantage over their more numerous and wealthier opponents."[11]

Specifically, King Philip's War (1675-1676) was the first conflict in which the Indians had modern flintlock firearms. This proved an important advantage because some of the American militias were only equipped with matchlocks and pikes, and because the Indians were excellent marksmen.[12] More than 200 years after the Civil War, the same faulty assumptions were still at work—namely, that the US military retained unmatched technical advan-

tages over its more primitive adversaries. At that time, the US government rearmed its forces with breechloaders in place of magazine rifles—due to a bias against unaimed shots and excessive use of ammunition—while the Plains Indians acquired such weapons by direct purchase and thus, in some cases, had superior arms in the 1870s. We must be on the lookout for technological matches like these in our own future conflicts.

New Threats

We have seen the great utility of examining historical conflicts between Europeans and Native Americans to learn lessons about possible future conflict. Yet there are two additional dimensions to asymmetric warfare that must be mentioned—the threat of weapons of mass destruction, potentially used against the American homeland, and of cyberattacks on US military, government and private information systems.

At the heart of asymmetry is the assumption that an adversary will choose to attack the weakest point. In the case of the United States, asymmetric tools may well entail terrorist acts—with or without nuclear, biological or chemical weapons—on the US homeland designed to disrupt deployments, limit access, erode public support and take the fight to the American people. In some respects, this homeland tactic is not new. Beginning with King Philip's War, the New England Indians abandoned their traditional restraints and "prepared to wage total war on all of the colonists, making no distinction between combatant and non-combatant."[13] Attacks on Americans using weapons of mass destruction take these homeland tactics to a new level. Because of the devastation of these attacks and the interest of many potential adversaries in acquiring these capabilities, the United States must develop strategies for preventing and responding to such an occurrence.

The cyberthreat now facing the United States is equally compelling and risks both the effectiveness of US forces on the battlefield and the safety of private and government systems throughout the United States. Recent Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed cyberwarfare exercises like *ELIGIBLE RECEIVER* and *ZENITH STAR* showed how vulnerable command and control networks are to cyberattacks, a prime asymmetric target given the US military's continued reliance on information technology. Moreover, there are now approximately 30 nations that have developed "aggressive computer-warfare programs."[14]

Again, there is a relevant Indian war complement to today's challenges. Indians of the Southern Plains disrupted American efforts in the West through unconventional means. "The telegraph line, which once had commanded their awe, no longer was mysteri-

ous. By 1882, the Apache had learned its function and its method of operation. When they jumped the reservation, they would cut the lines and remove long sections of wire, or they would remove a short piece of wire and replace it with a thin strip of rawhide, so cleverly splicing the two together that the line would appear intact and the location of the break could take days of careful checking to discover."[15] This disruption foreshadows the potentially far greater problems from cyberattacks if we do not design strategy and tactics for dealing with this as part of an asymmetric campaign.

Preparing for Asymmetric Attacks

The first step in preparing to better meet tomorrow's challenges is to learn from the past. As the examples drawn here indicate, there is a rich history to be tapped in the early American experience. But there are many other examples as well—Yugoslav partisans fighting the occupying Nazis or Afghans against the Russians and Serbs in the recent NATO operation in Kosovo. Military commanders must study history. Modern, technologically sophisticated warfare—with the asymmetric challenges that accompany it—makes that requirement more true, not less.

Our forces must also be adaptive. Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we be able to counter them through continuous adaptation. If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past. "While European military revolutions provided states with the means to project power into the interior of North America, they did not provide troops

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with appropriate training and tactics to succeed on the frontier."[16] Therefore, our forces, doctrine and tactics must continue to embrace agility and adaptability and prepare for a range of missions. The Army continues to do so in its most recent doctrinal publications, FM 1 and FM 3-0.[17] Efforts to address asymmetric threats must also retain the unique American strengths—superior training, leadership and technology—that give us an edge against any potential adversary.

Finally, we must guard against arrogance. An account at the time of Braddock's defeat noted the irony that his preparations for the march to Fort Duquesne were precise. He attended to every minute detail except "the one that mattered most: Indian affairs."[18] He dismissed those Ohio Indian chiefs who might have been allies for his expedition as savages who could not possibly assist disciplined troops. We must not fall into the same trap of underestimating a potential adversary because of his different culture or seemingly inferior capability. To do so would be to repeat the errors of the past with potentially devastating future consequences. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 94-107.
2. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, January 2001), 5.
3. This operational definition of asymmetry is drawn from my conversations with General Montgomery Meigs, Commander of US Army Forces, Europe, who is an excellent source for insights on operational art.
4. I am deeply indebted to General John Abrams and his staff, especially Colonel Maxie MacFarland at TRADOC for many of the ideas presented here. In addition, I would like to thank Professors Graham Turbiville and William Robertson at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for their assistance with the historical examples. Their help was invaluable in constructing this article. I am also grateful to Erin Conaton, professional staff member with the House of Representatives' Committee on Armed Services, for her assistance with researching and writing this article.
5. See Anderson, 547-63.
6. Jack Lane's biography of General Leonard Wood notes that as a new surgeon in the Army Medical Department, Wood "learned why the Apaches . . . proved to be the army's most impervious foe in the 1870s and 1880s. Perfecting guerrilla warfare to a fine art, the Apaches operated in small raiding parties rarely numbering more than 100 braves. The hardy warriors had developed incredible stamina and a seemingly unlimited ability to endure with only the bare necessities for long periods in the almost impenetrable, barren mountains and deserts of southern Arizona and northern Mexico. Organizing themselves into small bands, they roamed the Arizona ter-
ritory at will until, pursued closely by the army, they retired into the strongholds of the Sierra Madre Mountains. To defeat such an enemy required exceptional leaders and men." See Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 4.
7. "Chechen Commander on Modern Separatism," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* (22-28 January 1999), 2.
8. John D. Waghelstein, "The Second Seminole War: Lessons Learned, Relearned and Unlearned," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* (Winter 1992), 4.
9. Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 167.
10. Isaac Newton Skelton III and Earl Franklin Skelton, *Ike, This is You* (Washington, DC: 1995), 132-41. The author's great-great-great grandfather, Squire Boone, was wounded during this battle.
11. Starkey, viii.
12. Ibid., 71-72.
13. Ibid., 72.
14. James Adams, "Virtual Defense," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2001), 102.
15. Odie B. Faulk, *The Geronimo Campaign* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 46.
16. Starkey, 169.
17. US Army FM 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], June 2001); FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2001).
18. *The Journal of Captain Robert Chomley's Batman*, 20 and 23 May 1755, cited in Anderson, 94. The rest of the account of Braddock's defeat is largely drawn from Anderson's work; see 94-107.

The Honorable Ike Skelton, US House of Representatives, Democrat, Missouri, has represented Missouri's Fourth Congressional District since 1977. He is the ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee. He has written several articles for Military Review over the years. His most recent contribution, "Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion," appeared in the July-August 1999 issue of Military Review.

Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq

Major Ross Coffey, U.S. Army

IN NOVEMBER 2005, the National Security Council published its *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* [hereafter called *National Strategy*]*,* articulating the broad strategy President George W. Bush set forth in 2003 and providing an "update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining."[1] The report—

● Describes conditions for victory in the short, medium, and long term.

● Describes the three integrated political, security, and economic tracks.

● Defines eight strategic pillars with associated lines of action, subactions, and objectives for military and civilian entities.

● Presents a three-tiered "organization for victory" to achieve the strategy.

Three-Tiered Organization for Victory

According to the *National Strategy,* weekly strategy sessions at the highest levels of the U.S. Government ensure that Iraq remains a top priority. At the operational level, the "team in Baghdad—led by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and General George Casey—works to implement policy on the ground and lay the foundation for long-term success."[2] Each of the eight pillars have corresponding interagency working groups to coordinate policy, review and assess progress, develop new proposals, and oversee the implementation of existing policies.

The multitracked approach (political, security, and economic) to counterinsurgency in Iraq has historical parallels with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program of the Vietnam War era. Established in 1967, CORDS partnered civilian and military entities engaged in pacification of Vietnamese rural areas. The program enhanced rural security and local political and economic development and helped defeat the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency. Significantly, CORDS unified the efforts of the pacification entities by establishing unity of command throughout the combined civil-military organization.

Lack of unity of effort is perhaps the most significant impediment to operational-level interagency action today. The victorious conditions the *National Strategy* describes might be unachievable if the interagency entities present in Iraq do not achieve unity of effort. To help achieve unity of effort, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) and the Nation should consider adopting a CORDS-like approach to ensure integrated action and victory.

The Impediment

The lack of unity of effort is the principal impediment to operational-level interagency integration. Simply put, no one is in overall control of the efforts. Matthew F. Bogdanos writes: "According to *Joint Vision 2020,* 'the primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of participating organizations.'"[3] Joint doctrine suggests that the cause of our inability to achieve unity of effort is the wide-ranging backgrounds and values of the agencies involved. Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,* states: "If the interagency process is to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. . . . *The essence of interagency coordination is the interplay of multiple agencies with individual agendas. . . . Each agency has core values that it will not compromise* (emphasis in the original)."[4]

Because of the agencies' different backgrounds, values, and agendas, unifying command appears to be the only approach to efforts at the operational level. Bathsheba Crocker says: "As with any mission . . . , the key question for post-conflict operations is who

is in charge. To date, true unity of command between civilians and the military in Iraq has so far proved elusive in American operations."[5] More so than the wide-ranging backgrounds of interagency entities, lack of unity of command at the operational level has been the most significant factor in failing to achieve unity of effort. Interagency coordination is centralized only at the strategic level. In Iraq, while unity of effort is a useful phrase, lack of an effective mechanism has thus far failed to solve the problem of lack of decisive authority. This causes a lack of cooperation by agencies across the U.S. Government and, ultimately, the absence of unity of effort in Iraq overall. The result is no accountability for integration of interagency efforts outside of Washington, D.C., and thus, no unity of command during their execution.

In remarks to the 2004 Eisenhower National Security Conference, General Peter J. Pace, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the overarching problem with interagency integration is found at the operational level: "The problem comes after [the President of the United States] makes the decision. The various parts of the government take their various pieces and go back to work on them. No one below the president has control over the totality of the process. And if there are disagreements among the various players, it has to go back to the president for resolution."[6] Strategic-level entities must resolve operational-level problems because current interagency organizations have no mechanisms to resolve issues at the operational level. The *National Strategy* describes the roles played by each of the eight working groups, but does not articulate how issues will be resolved in-theater.[7]

Achieving unity of effort in practice requires more than identifying common purposes and establishing working groups; instead, "unity of effort . . . refers to collapsing political and military authority in the same hands [and requires] a complete overhaul of the entire division of labor."[8] Unity of effort requires accountability, which is only achieved through unity of command. Michéle Flournoy says: "Perhaps the most significant determinant of success in interagency planning is the degree to which participants are held accountable for meeting U.S. objectives and for the roles they play in the process."[9] Therefore, unity of command at the operational level in Iraq is absolutely essential for achieving interagency unity of effort.

Counterinsurgent Warfare Principles

The concept of unity of effort is relevant today because counterinsurgent warfare requires coordinated interagency action. History indicates that separating insurgents from the population is the only meaningful method of pursuing a COIN strategy. To achieve this end, integrated interagency action is necessary. Early 20th-century British military author and theorist General Sir Charles Gwynn laid out these principles in *Imperial Policing*.[10] They include—
- The primacy of civil power.
- The use of minimum force.
- The need for firm and timely action.
- The need for cooperation between civil and military authorities.

When pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy, matters of policy must "remain vested in the civil Government" regardless of the degree to which military forces actually control the conduct of operations.[11] Similarly, the use of military force must be kept to an absolute minimum because "the military object is to reestablish the control of civil power and secure its acceptance without an aftermath of bitterness."[12] Interagency coordination, specifically the cooperation of civilian and military entities, is fundamental to success in the COIN campaign.

French military theorist David Galula describes similar challenges in his 1964 work *Counterinsurgency Warfare*.[13] Tasks required in counterinsurgent warfare require the combination of military, police and judicial, and political operations, whether destroying or expelling guerrilla forces; identifying, arresting, or interrogating noncompliant political agents; or doing "the constructive work needed to win the wholehearted support of the population."[14]

Integrating efforts and achieving results require consolidation of direction. Galula says: "Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from the beginning to the end."[15] Galula offers five associated principles:
- The primacy of political over military power.
- The coordination of efforts.
- The primacy of territorial command.
- The adaptation of the armed forces to COIN warfare.
- The adaptation of minds to the special demands of this form of warfare.[16]

To adapt armed forces and minds as Galula suggests, military historian Andrew Birtle offers practical advice for military officers in *Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1860-1941:* "The best preparation officers can have for such duty, barring personal experience, is to study previous historical situations to sensitize themselves to the kinds of dilemmas that counterguerrilla, civil affairs, and contingency operations typically pose."[17] The Vietnam-era CORDS program provides a relevant historical situation for study by today's student of COIN warfare.

The CORDS Program

The CORDS program partnered civilian entities with the U.S. Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV). The program established the position of Deputy to Commander MACV (COMUSMACV) for CORDS and filled the position with a senior civilian. Similar partnerships existed at subordinate commands across the country. This arrangement, which contributed to stemming the Viet Cong insurgency and to helping pacify the countryside, addressed the principal impediment to integrated interagency action—lack of unity of effort—and addressed Gwynn's and Galula's principles of COIN warfare.

CORDS achievements. In its 4-year existence, CORDS contributed to the defeat of the Viet Cong by influencing the decline of popular support for the insurgency, by helping pacify rural provinces of Vietnam, and by strengthening South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. The Viet Cong suffered after Allied counterattacks post-Tet and could not reassert itself. CORDS-enabled nationbuilding and pacification prevented effective recruiting efforts. In the Kien Hoa province in the Mekong Delta—the birthplace of the National Liberation Front—Viet Cong strength fell from more than 12,000 insurgents in 1967 to 9,000 in 1968 to less than 2,000 in 1971. The monthly rate of insurgent and criminal incidents in the province fell to 2 or 3 per 100,000 inhabitants by 1971, a crime rate that would be welcomed in any U.S. community today.[18]

Other observers concur. According to Thomas Thayer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis–Southeast Asia, "there was widespread evidence and agreement that the government of Vietnam

Sir Charles Gwynn	David Galula
• The primacy of civil power. • The use of minimum force. • The need for firm and timely action. • The need for cooperation between civil and military authorities.	• The primacy of political over military power. • The coordination of efforts. • The primacy of territorial command. • The adaptation of the armed forces to COIN warfare. • The adaptation of minds to the special demands of this form of warfare.

exercised a predominant influence over the vast majority of South Vietnamese people."[19] Raymond Davis, a U.S. Army noncommissioned officer assigned to the CORDS program made a similar, firsthand assessment: "CORDS, a thorn in the side of the Viet Cong, has been frequently denounced by the VC. Some officials in Saigon believe the program's progress since 1967 might have been a factor in North Vietnam's decision to launch major military operations in 1968 to halt joint pacification efforts in rural areas."[20]

The CORDS approach. The CORDS approach was initiated after years of other unsuccessful attempts to achieve unity of effort through mere coordination. The initial stages of the U.S. Government's pre-CORDS response are case studies in the lack of unity of command causing disunity of effort. In the early 1960s, no one agency in the government possessed the capability to oversee and discipline the entire, multipillared pacification mission. In its early stages of involvement in Vietnam, the United States did not provide its existing institutions the structure, the authority, or the incentives to adapt to the situation.[21]

At the outset of the Vietnam War, the government attempted to resolve the situation in Vietnam through its normal institutions and processes. The typical response was characterized by decentralized decisionmaking and delegation of authority to each individual agency with little accountability for results. U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick E. Nolting conceded to participating agencies the

"full authority over their operations within agreed programs and policies—in effect, management by committee."[22] To complicate matters, the MACV nominally controlled civilian agencies, but, in reality, civilian agencies reported either directly to their superiors in Washington, D.C., or to the ambassador.[23]

There were scattered efforts to coordinate the response to the Vietnam situation in 1961-1962, but little centralized direction. Part of the problem was tied to the statutory obligations of each agency to remain responsible to its headquarters in Washington and to heed the expressed will of Congress.[24] This approach, later termed the Country Team, was typical of early attempts to achieve a balance between Washington-based direction and Vietnam-located execution.

The Country Team concept was a loose, poorly defined description of the relationship between the ambassador and the heads of the civilian agencies in-country. Although the ambassador remained technically in charge of all agencies in the country, in reality no one was in charge because each agency went its own way. President John F. Kennedy supported the concept throughout his administration, but the loose collection of agencies did not achieve the integration Kennedy desired. Furthermore, the Viet Cong insurgency continued to increase in size, influence, and effectiveness.[25]

The Country Team structure was modified when Maxwell Taylor became the Ambassador to Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson empowered Taylor with "sweeping delegation of authority" to coordinate military and civilian activities.[26] However, he left military matters to the hands of General William Westmoreland, the COMUSMACV. Taylor renamed the structure the Mission Council and attempted to prepare a common agenda and a detailed follow-up of action.[27] However, each agency continued to retain separate responsibility for its operations, and, similar to previous integrative attempts, the Mission Council did not achieve effective interagency action. The Pentagon Papers describe the tensions and situation between the disparate civilian actors.[28] The unidentified author of the chapter titled "Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967" wrote: "Each agency

had its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communications channels with Washington, and its own personnel and administrative structure."[29]

From late 1964 to early 1965, agencies began fielding their own structures for operations in the provinces. These agencies acted under wholly separate chains of command. Unified effort did not exist because the Americans in the provinces did not work together and received conflicting and overlapping guidance from Saigon and Washington.[30]

To better coordinate the civilian entities' nation-building activities, Robert W. Komer, the recently appointed Special Assistant to the President (for supervision of nonmilitary programs relating to Vietnam) argued for the creation of the Office of Civil Operations in Saigon.[31] The office would consist of functional divisions that he would organize along regional lines, including placing directors at regional and provincial levels.[32] When William Porter assumed duties as the Deputy Ambassador to the Saigon Mission, he became the second-ranking civilian in the U.S. hierarchy. His responsibility was to coordinate the civil side of the pacification effort, and he devoted himself to the task.[33] Under his control were three major agencies: the CIA, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Three field operating agencies (the Chieu Hoi Defector Program, Manpower, and Economic Warfare) reported directly to him.[34]

The military took parallel steps to centralize its pacification efforts by establishing a section in its headquarters, named Revolutionary Development

President Lyndon B. Johnson meeting with Robert Komer in the Oval Office.

Support, to focus the attention of its subordinate echelons toward pacification. The military also emphasized the roles of military advisory units that had been assigned to territorial security sectors apart from regular Vietnamese Army formations.[35] However, these attempts, made in 1966, did not result in pacification, the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency, or the withdrawal of its popular support. Splitting responsibilities between military and civilian entities to pursue pacification left the interagency entities with, in reality, no responsibility.[36]

In response, Komer continued to adamantly insist that Vietnam vitally needed a centralized authority to direct interagency pacification efforts. He asserted that a unified, integrated civilian-military structure would achieve decisive collective effects as opposed to the existing system of individual and unconnected efforts that were by themselves indecisive. In "Clear, Hold, and Rebuild," Komer states: "We realistically concluded that no one of these plans— relatively inefficient and wasteful in the chaotic, corrupted Vietnamese wartime context—could be decisive. But together they could hope to have a major cumulative effect."[37]

The energy Komer brought to his role as the president's special assistant precipitated the formation of CORDS. Consensus developed among the president, the secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs, that because the overall mission could not achieve integrative effects, unifying the pacification efforts (civil and military) was necessary.[38] Integrating the two efforts (the Office of Civilian Operations and the Revolutionary Development Support program) and establishing unity of command ultimately resulted in success.

To emphasize his personal interest in the combined pacification efforts, Johnson appointed Komer as the deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS and gave him ambassadorial rank. On 1 May 1967, Komer pulled together all U.S. civilian and military pacification programs into CORDS under MACV control.[39] Komer now had status equivalent to a three-star general and ranked third in the MACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his military deputy, General Creighton Abrams.[40] Although Komer possessed ambassadorial rank, he was not a diplomat; he was a member of Westmoreland's military staff and enjoyed direct access to Westmoreland, an access enjoyed by only one other person, Abrams. In itself, Komer's position reflected the unique nature of CORDS as a civilian-military approach to integration.

CORDS-Partnered Civilian-Military Entities

The CORDS approach directly addressed the principal impediment of lack of unity of effort by partnering civilian and military entities. CORDS did so by placing one person in command of the combined entities and supporting him with appropriate civilian and military personnel under a consolidated staff directorate in MACV.[41] The ensuing organization "represented the formation of an ad hoc civil-military hybrid," not a military takeover of the pacification mission but, instead, an organization that maintained Gywnn's and Galula's "primacy of civil and political power and, thus, a civil as well as military process."[42]

The partnership in the MACV headquarters of a civilian CORDS deputy and the military commander was also replicated throughout subordinate echelons of the command; each of the four corps commanders partnered with a CORDS chief performing similar functions. Provincial and district military advisers were transferred to CORDS, and the appointment of personnel to CORDS positions was based on merit and experience without regard to either civilian or military status.[43]

To achieve unity of effort throughout Vietnam, CORDS also created unified civilian-military advisory teams down to district level. Eventually CORDS created teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces in South Vietnam to ensure cooperation of military and civilian entities, a principle that both Gwynn and Galula articulated, and to recognize the "primacy of the Territorial Command" Galula had suggested.[44] Komer said: "Each U.S. corps senior adviser had a civilian deputy for CORDS and the province senior advisers were roughly half-and-half civilian and military."[45] At peak strength, military personnel comprised nearly 85 percent of personnel assigned to the CORDS program (6,500 military to 1,100 civilian).[46]

CORDS was the one program specifically tailored to the environment in Vietnam. No conventional organizations in the U.S. Government had the raison d'etre for or the political, military, and social capabilities to address counterinsurgency. The CORDS program filled the gap; it was a deliberate attempt to

As part of the village self-help program in Vietnam, civilian adviser Chuck Husick shows the people of a hamlet, located about 60 miles southwest of Saigon, how to construct a concrete span of a bridge with their own labor and materials.

break the mold of governmental form and function. In Komer's eyes it was the right thing to do at the time. He later wrote: "If institutional constraints . . . are such an impediment to adaptive response, then it would seem better to adapt the organizational structure to fit the need."[47]

The de facto subordination of pacification efforts to military control was unprecedented. However, Komer quickly recognized the value of its placement within MACV: "Since most available resources were in Vietnamese and U.S. military hands by 1967, since pacification first required the restoration of security in the countryside, and since what little GVN [Government of Vietnam] administration that existed outside Saigon had been military-dominated, it was also logical for the new pacification program to be put under military auspices."[48] Placement of the pacification programs under military command and control became necessary because the military controlled the practical resources.

Not surprisingly, the military was generally pleased with the arrangement. Westmoreland graciously accepted the "unprecedented grafting of a civilian/military hybrid onto his command" and supported Komer in his dealings with the MACV staff, even into strategic plans and policy matters where military advisers opposed civilian-led initiatives.[49] Westmoreland was both careful and politically savvy enough not to stand in the way of Komer's efforts. He did not want to be an obstacle to CORDS and thus be forced to face the prospect of its failure because of a lack of sufficient resources or support. His attitude was quickly replicated throughout the military and greatly enhanced CORDS' early effectiveness and the integration it aimed to achieve.

Initial Reservations

Many civilians, on the other hand, were initially less confident in the new command relationship. Ever fearful of being subsumed by military authority, civilian agencies had serious reservations about an arrangement that would reduce their autonomy.[50] Civilian reservations had some merit; thus far, the military had demonstrated little interest or enthusiasm for nationbuilding activities. Military operations to date had convinced civilians that they would be relegated to cleaning up the battlefield after poorly conceived search-and-destroy operations.

To address this initial uncertainty, Komer developed a clever compromise to the civilian-military cooperation problem and the reservations of civilian agencies. Understanding that a single manager was required, Komer established deputies for CORDS throughout the command with civilians as leads to reassure the civilian agencies.[51] This allied pacification and COIN operations under a single strategy and enabled the consolidation of authority for all aspects of pacification.

Unlike operations of the early 1960s, civilian programs could not be subordinated to military operations to seek out and destroy the enemy, thus realizing Gwynn's primacy of civil power and use of minimum force and Galula's primacy of the political over the military power. Similarly, the military penchant for unity of command could not be breached because programs and problems could be addressed in Vietnam instead of in Washington. The CORDS organization retained civilian attributes and control from within the military structure without being subsumed by it.[52] The structural "takeover" of the pacification effort by the U.S. military had little effect on civilian agencies' individual identities or

Providing resources, manpower, and organization to civilian entities enabled them to make progress by improving cooperation between civilian-military entities and combining the function of civilian policymaking with the military's overwhelming people, money, and resources.

any real control over civilian programs. Aggressive civilian leadership, bureaucratic skill, and presidential interest ensured that the disparate U.S. civilian foreign policy agencies could achieve a remarkable degree of harmony.[53]

Subordinating civilian capabilities to the military chain of command actually realized the principle of the primacy of civil power. This unique placement gave civilian entities greater influence than they ever had before because it provided resources they did not previously have. According to Komer: *"Paradoxically, this [partnership] resulted in even greater U.S. civilian influence over pacification than had ever existed before;* it also powerfully [reinforced] pacification's claim on U.S. and GVN military resources, which constituted the bulk of the inputs during 1967-1971 (emphasis in original)."[54] He goes on to say: "If you are ever going to get a program going, you are only going to be able to do it by stealing from the military. They have all the trucks, they have all the planes, they have all the people, they have all the money—and what they did not have locked up, they had a lien on."[55]

Providing resources, manpower, and organization to civilian entities enabled them to make progress by improving cooperation between civilian-military entities and combining the function of civilian policymaking with the military's overwhelming people, money, and resources. CORDS gave civilians direct access to resources like transportation, military engineers for horizontal construction (roads, for example) and vertical construction (such as buildings), and Department of Defense (DOD)-allocated funds, enabling firm and timely action and coordination of efforts.[56] Much of DOD's monetary contribution went to support Regional and Popular Forces, but the U.S. Department of State and the CIA no longer needed to support U.S. civilians assigned to GVN military development out of their relatively small

budgets.[57] As evidence of the new cooperation the civilian-military interagency community achieved, the terms "other war" and "nonmilitary actions" fell out of the lexicon, another example of adherence to Gwynn's principle of the primacy of civil power.[58]

CORDS Contributions

Like the *National Strategy,* the CORDS approach addressed the political, security, and economic tracks. The CORDS program's principal contribution was how it complemented allied security operations.[59] Davis noted: "The key to CORDS [was clearly] protection [of the populace]."[60] By denying villages and hamlets to the Viet Cong, civil-military operations enabled the U.S. Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military forces to concentrate on North Vietnamese main forces. Also, CORDS fostered the creation of an organized People's Self-Defense Force composed of local inhabitants who could defend their villages and hamlets. Furthermore, CORDS created a grassroots political support mechanism for the government and, as a matter of routine, helped with community development.[61]

Regional Force units, equivalent to federalized U.S. Army National Guard forces, deployed throughout the country to deny sanctuary to North Vietnamese Army units or known VC sympathizers. Once Regional Force units forced the withdrawal of VC units, Regional and Popular Forces, advised by the CORDS program, maintained continual security while other CORDS advisory teams fostered development of villages and hamlets, thereby denying the insurgents a recruiting base.[62]

CORDS also affected political and economic progress, attempting to touch "the lives of the Vietnamese on every social level."[63] CORDS enhanced local protection and area security and fostered significant gains in nationbuilding. Other major CORDS achievements included the revival of a functioning rural administration; an economic revival to parallel USAID land reform programs; and health and human services functions, including medicine, education, and refugee care.[64] CORDS also facilitated the rebuilding of roads and waterways, which military forces had ignored during the early years of the war.[65]

The results of this multitracked approach appeared almost immediately. By 1969 CORDS had accelerated the pacification of the country, and by 1970,

Black smoke covers areas of Saigon in 1968 as fire trucks rush to the scenes of fires set by the Viet Cong during the Tet holiday.

later director of the CIA William Colby said: "The attack of 1972 and the final attack of 1975 were pure North Vietnamese military attacks. There were no guerrillas in those operations because in the interim our program actually won the guerrilla war by winning the guerrilla to the government. They were all on the government side."[69]

Curiously, the Viet Cong shared Colby's viewpoint. A VC official, who out of frustration and dejection, surrendered to the CORDS-strengthened Regional and Popular Forces in 1971, reported that recruiting became nearly impossible in his region after the pacification program reached full operating capacity in 1969.[70] In his private notebook, another VC colonel wrote: "If we are winning while the enemy is being defeated, why have we encountered increasing difficulties? Last year we could attack United States forces. This year we find it difficult to attack even puppet forces. . . . We failed to win the support of the people and keep them from moving back to enemy controlled areas. . . . At present, the [South Vietnamese and U.S. forces are] weakened while we are exhausted."[71] By the early 1970s, adopting a pacification strategy had enabled the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency.[72]

The interrelationship of U.S. civilian and military functions and South Vietnamese counterpart functions permitted a more efficient application of resources, enabling firm and timely action.[73] The interrelationship was far more cost-effective than other parts of the war effort. It entailed "only a modest fraction of the enormous costs of the Vietnam war" and was tailored directly to the needs of the environment.[74]

Observers suggest that CORDS was a successful program: "By the time Komer left [in the late 1960s], CORDS did seem to be pacifying the South Vietnamese countryside."[75] U.S. "Ambassador [to South Vietnam] Ellsworth Bunker [insisted] that this essential and integral part of the war [the counterinsurgency campaign] had been won by 1971."[76] Evidence suggests that CORDS worked better than even its advocates expected because of two things. First, CORDS ensured unity of effort among both

CORDS contributed to the departure of an estimated 300,000 foreign troops and the prevention of South Vietnamese capitulation even as the North increased its pressure at every attempt.[66]

Programs to destroy the VC infrastructure achieved great success. David R. Palmer said: "An enhanced security situation, along with increased peasant ownership of property and steadily increasing economic conditions, certainly constituted major dampeners to communist appeal, while plainly diminishing chances of success likewise abetted defections in insurgent ranks."[67] The VC insurgency that had battled the MACV during Tet in 1968 was virtually eliminated by 1971.[68]

CORDS' Success

The North Vietnamese's decision to rely on conventional means to conquer South Vietnam suggests that CORDS and the pacification program were successful. With the help of U.S. forces and air and logistics support, South Vietnamese forces were able to repulse the 1972 North Vietnamese ground offensives. Former CORDS adviser to Abrams and

military and civilian entities because it unified command. Second, it adhered to both Gwynn's and Galula's principles for counterinsurgent warfare.

Criticism of the CORDS program is generally founded on its limited duration and scope. Komer attributes its failure to have greater effect on the overall Vietnam situation to too little, too late.[77] For example, the CORDS program could not affect the capabilities of regular forces the North Vietnamese defeated in 1975. According to Komer: "Even after 1967, pacification remained a small tail to the very large conventional military dog. It was never tried on a large enough scale until too late. . . ."[78]

The scope of the CORDS program did not allow it to address the ineffectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government. Focused on defeating the VC insurgency, CORDS did not possess the personnel, organization, or structure to enhance the legitimacy and thus the popularity of the South Vietnamese government. A former CORDS analyst stated: "CORDS was a great program and a good model—with one caveat. Under the Hamlet Evaluation System, we collected lots of data indicating the security of the regions and provinces but nowhere did we find any evidence or indication of popular support of the [national-level] government."[79] This perspective implies that future CORDS-like approaches should include governmental legitimacy as an objective. This coincides with Komer's assessment of the program: "Perhaps the most important single reason why the U.S. achieved so little for so long was that it could not sufficiently revamp, or adequately substitute for, a South Vietnamese leadership, administration, and armed forces inadequate to the task."[80]

Lessons for Iraq

The formation of CORDS enabled unity of effort among the civilian and military entities in Vietnam and provides a model for achieving unity of effort in Iraq. Commenting on command and control in Vietnam, Major General George S. Eckhardt stated that a prerequisite for command and control "will be unity of command, to ensure both tight control of the overall U.S. effort by American political authorities and effectiveness of military and advisory activities."[81] He recognized the value of this approach in counterinsurgent warfare: "An organization like CORDS should be established as soon as possible."[82] He explicitly stated that civil affairs, counterinsurgency, and pacification could not be adequately coordinated without doing so.

The Nation is once again attempting to achieve unity of effort in its counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq. Therefore, MNF-I should consider adopting a CORDS-like approach to ensure integrated action to achieve victory in Iraq. In addition to adhering to time-tested principles of counterinsurgent warfare and addressing the lack of unity of effort, this approach would also provide an organizational model to implement the *National Strategy,* which articulates three broad tracks: political, security, and economic.

The objective of the political track is "to help the Iraqi people forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic government, thereby isolating enemy elements from the broader public."[83] Along the political track, the government aims to isolate hardened enemy elements, engage those outside the political process, and build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions.

The security track's objective is to develop "the Iraqis' capacity to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency."[84] Three associated actions are clearing areas of enemy control, holding areas freed from enemy control, and building Iraqi Security Forces.

The economic track's objective is to provide assistance to "the Iraqi government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services."[85] The *National Strategy* aims to restore Iraq's neglected infrastructure, reform Iraq's economy, and build the capacity of Iraqi institutions.

As indicated, a program similar to the CORDS program, which principally affected security of rural areas, could enable the interagency community in Iraq to achieve security and enhance already existing institutions and commands such as the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I). Clearing, holding, and building, as articulated in the *National Strategy,* requires coordinated action from civilian and military entities. Adopting a CORDS-like approach would also enable MNF-I to resolve interagency issues in-theater instead of requiring resolution at the national level.

"[CORDS] was a better way then, but it came too late for the American people, whatever its successes on the ground. We cannot afford to stumble again before some new challenge." —William Colby

The CORDS program also affected economic progress. By reviving rural administrations, implementing land reform, and rebuilding public infrastructure, the CORDS program enhanced the rural populace's economic well-being. Like the *National Strategy's* security track, the economic track also requires coordinated civilian-military action. Military forces are not well-suited to reforming Iraq's economy or building the capacity of Iraqi institutions, but the military possesses resources that can aid in restoring Iraq's infrastructure. A CORDS-like approach adopted by the MNF–I would ensure the primacy of civil power, firm and timely action, and the coordination of civil-military actions along the economic track.

Last, the CORDS program enhanced political progress, although only in rural areas. The scope of a CORDS-like approach in Iraq would need to be expanded to effect political progress and contribute to the appropriate isolation, engagement, and building of Iraqi entities. The promising voter turnout in recent Iraqi elections indicates that this track is well along toward the political benchmarks the *National Strategy* describes; a CORDS-like approach could further that progress along with progress in the other two tracks. As the Coalition eventually pacifies the four remaining noncompliant provinces in Iraq, a future CORDS-like organization should focus on national-level governmental legitimacy so Iraqi political structures can maintain the security that military, police, and border control forces have established.

Implementing a CORDS-like approach in Iraq, however, might not directly mirror the approach adapted to Vietnam. For example, subordinate CORDs-like organizations in Iraq must reflect the nature of MNF-I's major subordinate commands because one command—the Multi-National Corps-Iraq—controls the majority of the spatial battlespace as compared to MACV's four subordinate corps, each of which controlled a quarter of Vietnam. Nevertheless, subordinate CORDS-like organizations in functional commands like MNSTC-I, which require the capabilities of civilian judicial and border control institutions, will also benefit from the unity of effort achieved by adopting a CORDS-like approach.

Implementing this approach in Iraq also requires a historical perspective of two other topics. First, personal contributions by key figures and personnel are paramount.[86] Accordingly, implementing such a program in Iraq will require identifying and appointing the right people to the program. Second, recognizing that CORDS required a presidential decision for implementation is important. As a "field experiment directly tailored to the need," CORDS had little legislative authority in terms of appropriations or authorizations.[87] Adopting this approach requires decision by the appropriate entity—either executive or legislative—and the provision of accurate public information to decisionmakers and the American people.

The *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* is intended to help "the Iraqi people defeat the terrorists and build an inclusive democratic state."[88] These two aims also enhance our own national security, and they will influence the Middle East and the global community. To achieve the victorious conditions the *National Strategy* describes, the MNF-I and the U.S. Government should consider adopting a CORDS-like approach to achieve unity of effort. As William Colby, the program's second director said: "[CORDS] was a better way then, but it came too late for the American people, whatever its successes on the ground. We cannot afford to stumble again before some new challenge."[89] Iraq is just that challenge. ***MR***

NOTES

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what I regard as an extremely important problem area. The 'other war'—it was all one war, as [General Creighton] Abrams used to say, but it was being run by all sorts of different agencies. There was no unified management of the whole war." Frantz asked: "You had a dozen or more quarterbacks, huh?" Komer said: "Exactly. And that made it very difficult. The only guy fully in charge was the President, and that is not the optimum way to do things" (interview AC 94-2, transcript, Oral History Collection, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, 26-7).

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47. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 168.

48. Thompson, 214-15.

49. Blaufarb, 240.

50. Colby, 207.

51. Ibid.

52. Blaufarb, 239.

53. Krepinevich, 217.

54. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*, 114.

55. Nagl, 165.

56. For the military, the formation of CORDS was innovative. U.S. Army commanders, who in 1965 would have organized for combat with military forces to the exclusion of all else, began to cross-assign forces to the U.S. Department of State, USAID, CIA, and the U.S. Information Service (USIS) beginning in June 1967 with the establishment of CORDS. (See James K. McCollum, "CORDS: Matrix for Peace in Vietnam," *Army* [July 1982]: 49.) Similarly, military commanders received cross-assignment of civilian agency personnel for conducting their operations, which was a sharp contrast to military-only search-and-destroy operations like those conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Division in 1966 and 1967. (See Krepinevich, 222-23.)

57. Scoville, 80-81.

58. Ibid., 80.

59. Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "Speaker Notes," Command Briefing, March 1972, Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, part 1, microfilm, reel 2, frames 578-79.

60. Davis, 34.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Hunt and Schultz, 57.

65. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*, 116.

66. Palmer, 285.

67. Ibid., 287.

68. Ibid.

69. Paul Seidenmann, "Pacification: A Winning Combination that Came too Late?" *Armed Forces Journal International* 114 (January 1977): 25.

70. Palmer, 286-87.

71. Ibid., 288.

72. Note that for all of its success, CORDS could not contribute to the defeat of the main North Vietnamese invasion force. In 1982, McCollum wrote: "CORDS defeated the insurgency in Vietnam, but it could not defeat the main-force invasion. Since nations in the Western Hemisphere are not likely to be threatened by outside invasion, the defeat of the insurgency should therefore be the primary concern. In subsequent attempts at pacification in any nation threatened by insurgency, it seems essential that a matrix organization [such as CORDS] be set up to ensure the local efforts are properly directed and coordinated" (53). Establishing the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq appears to have addressed this deficiency.

73. Headquarters, MACV, frame 579.

74. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*, 118.

75. Sheehan, 731.

76. Bruce Palmer, *The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 116.

77. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*.

78. Komer, quoted in Palmer, 164.

79. Ambassador David Passage, interview by author, 18 January 2006.

80. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 160.

81. George S. Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950-1969* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974), 86.

82. Ibid.

83. *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Key figures and personnel included Robert W. Komer; General Creighton Abrams, General William Westmoreland's successor as COMUSMACV; Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam; William Colby, Komer's successor; and the personnel of the CORDS organization.

87. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*.

88. *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*.

89. Colby, 373.

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THE MOST IMPORTANT THING:
Legislative Reform of the National Security System

James R. Locher III

*Don't confuse enthusiasm
with capability.*

—General Peter J. Schoomaker,
Commander, USSOCOM, 2000

James R. Locher III is currently the executive director of the Project on National Security Reform, a nonpartisan initiative sponsored by the nonprofit Center for the Study of the Presidency. Mr. Locher was a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that modernized the military system along joint lines. He subsequently was involved in passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

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PHOTO: Wreckage of a Sea Stallion helicopter burned up during Desert One, the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages from Iran in April 1980. Problems among the services during the mission would eventually lead to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols reform bill, six years later. (Courtesy 1st Special Operations Wing historian)

THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM that the president uses to manage the instruments of national power, and the manner in which Congress oversees and funds the system, do not permit the agility required to protect the United States and its interests in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. From 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and emerging threats to the homeland, 21st-century national security challenges demand more effective communication across traditional organizational boundaries. Meeting these challenges requires a common vision and organizational culture and better integration of expertise and capabilities.

The current national security system was based on lessons from World War II and was designed to enable the president to fight the Cold War. Many of the assumptions underpinning this system are no longer valid. The world has moved on, and the United States needs to adjust commensurately to the new realities impinging on its security. The current system gives the president a narrow range of options for dealing with national security affairs and causes an over-reliance on the military instrument of national power. The cost of not changing this system is fiscally unsustainable and could be catastrophic in terms of American lives. To make needed changes, the U.S. government requires comprehensive reform of the statutory, regulatory, and congressional oversight authorities that govern the 60-year-old national security system. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) was founded in September 2006 as a public-private partnership to support this reform process.

Origins of the National Security System

America's national security system was devised for a different era, when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by one department. At the time the National Security Act of 1947—legislation that established this system—was written, the U.S. had recently emerged from World War II as a virtually unchallenged industrial and economic giant. The main threat to the United States was the Soviet Union, with its emerging nuclear ballistic missile arsenal and its conventional forces parked on the borders of the U.S.'s European and Japanese allies.

With major combat operations and nuclear deterrence the principal focus of national security strategy, the national security system required only

> *Where was America's national security system? As the floodwaters recede and the dead are counted, what went wrong during a terrible week that would render a modern American metropolis of nearly half a million people uninhabitable and set off the largest exodus of people since the Civil War, is starting to become clear. Federal, state, and local officials failed to heed forecasts of disaster from hurricane experts. Evacuation plans, never practical, were scrapped entirely for New Orleans' poorest and least able. And once floodwaters rose, as had been long predicted, the rescue teams, medical personnel and emergency power necessary to fight back were nowhere to be found. Compounding the natural catastrophe was a man-made one: the inability of the federal, state, and local governments to work together in the face of a disaster long foretold. In many cases, resources that were available were not used, whether Amtrak trains that could have taken evacuees to safety before the storm or the U.S. military's 82d Airborne Division, which spent days on standby waiting for an order that never came. Communications were so impossible the Army Corps of Engineers was unable to inform the rest of the government for crucial hours that levees in New Orleans had breached.*
>
> —Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald,
> "The Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos,"
> *The Washington Post*, Sunday, 11 September 2005

limited coordination between vertically structured departments and agencies. The architects of the national security system gave little thought to structures and processes that might be needed between departments. The National Security Council, the only body that could coordinate the activities of different departments, was an afterthought in the 1947 National Security Act.

Managing National Security in the 21st Century

Whatever its adequacy in a former era, today's national security system is a clumsy anachronism not suited for the current strategic environment. The stovepiped structure designed to mobilize industrial resources against a single peer competitor has been rendered dangerously inadequate. As noted in the Center for the Study of the Presidency's *Comprehensive Strategic Reform,* "The structures and doctrines the nation developed to win the Cold War have in some cases become weaknesses, many of their assumptions no longer valid."[1]

From global terrorism, cyber attacks, and challenges to the neutrality of space, to armed horsemen in Sudan, transnational religious leaders in Iraq, and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, the challenges to national security today defy traditional categories. National security now involves a wide array of issues that can be addressed only with a broader set of highly integrated and carefully calibrated capabilities.

The economic and social interdependence of the contemporary global system requires the United States to be able to act globally with more precision and with fewer unintended consequences—the latter because collateral damage can now incur major strategic liability. Globalization also facilitates the spread of disease, technology, ideas, and organizations at previously unimagined rates.

The political environment requires the United States to be able to deal with the actions and intentions of many more states, as well as newly empowered sub-state and non-state actors. Our world is much more fluid today than during the Cold War, when friends and foes were neatly arrayed in fixed alliances. These alliances made it easier to predict how states would act in any given situation; hence, the military contingencies we had to plan and train for were limited in number. Today, the demise of a single threat and the rise of diffuse threats have weakened alliances. It is often difficult to predict how states will react in any given crisis. We have to be prepared for a much wider array of contingencies. At the same time, sub-state and non-state actors can wield much greater influence through enabling technologies that allow much greater coordination

> *Whatever its adequacy in a former era, today's national security system is a clumsy anachronism not suited for the current strategic environment.*

"Real Problems; Real Consequences"

In October of 2000, FBI Agent Ali Soufan was investigating the attacks on the USS Cole. Working around the clock in Yemen, Agent Soufan found a possible connection between the bombing and Al-Qaeda in the person of a one-legged jihadi named Khallad. Over the course of the following months, Agent Soufan would send multiple entreaties to the CIA asking for more information about the terrorist organizer Khallad, specifically in conjunction with an alleged meeting of Al-Qaeda agents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The CIA had information that could have led Agent Soufan to discover that two of the future 9/11 hijackers had attended that meeting. He could have placed them at their current location: the United States. Three times Agent Soufan was denied the information that he—and the American people—so desperately needed. As a result, a combination of turf wars between national security agencies, an unwillingness to share information, a failure to identify credible threats to U.S. national security, and even personal animosity contributed to the success of one of the most destructive terrorist attacks in history. For nearly two years, two Al-Qaeda operatives lived in the United States with the CIA's knowledge. Had that information been shared with the FBI, American citizens might be living in a different world today. Agent Soufan didn't know it at the time, but he was the nation's best chance to stop the 11 September 2001 attacks. Our national security system prevented information critical to America's safety from reaching the people who needed it most. As a direct result of this national security failure, more than 2,000 people lost their lives on American soil.

of their activities and increase the destructive impact of their actions. Many of these same technologies are weakening the ability of nation-states to exercise traditional sovereign responsibilities.

The emerging security environment is being shaped by demographic pressures not present in 1947. Exploding populations in undeveloped states, and their rising expectations for achieving economic prosperity and security, threaten conditions of stability in the developed world. Greater individual mobility across borders and access to information on the Internet highlight economic disparities. Perceptions of economic exploitation have fueled widespread resentment among underdeveloped states when they compare themselves to the advantages enjoyed by the developed world.

As a result, America will face dynamic and perhaps unpredictable enmity. Inflammatory issues as well as vulnerable geographic areas can catapult from obscurity to strategic significance (e.g., energy, cultural clashes, effects of global warming, food shortages, and diseases). The United States will frequently be unable to anticipate the exact capabilities needed to address the next crisis.

Today, the U.S. lacks the agility to meet these evolving strategic priorities. The weaknesses inherent in the contemporary national security system are now much graver than ever before. Pandemics could threaten large parts of the population if, for instance,

Health and Human Services and state and local governments fail to communicate effectively. Terrorists could more easily employ weapons of mass destruction inside the country if the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense (DOD) continue to allow the foreign/domestic divide to rigidly define their areas of responsibility. If a nuclear device is detonated on American soil, who would be in charge of managing the consequences? How will the government handle contamination, domestic disintegration, and the inevitably chaotic economic immobilization that would likely lead to famine? Consideration of such an unfortunately probable scenario should catalyze us and focus us on the urgency of national security system reform.

System versus Leadership

Many say that leadership is central to solving these problems. There is, of course, no substitute for good leadership, and without it no system will be adequate. But a good leader alone is not enough, and we do not need to choose between the two. We need both. Leaders cannot by themselves effectively deal with the complexities emerging from 21st-century challenges. We need a *system* that can bring coherence to how our national government understands and responds to these challenges. The numerous bureaucracies involved in national security today all operate through

the lens of their own organizational culture. There is no common national government culture that facilitates the development of common national objectives and a shared vision. There is also no mechanism the president can use to enforce the implementation of his or her decisions by the departments.

When the president is able to effect cooperation between departments, it usually occurs only by the accident of compatible personalities serving in the right posts at the right times. Such instances of cooperation-by-exception are laudable, but the nation and its security cannot depend upon such happenstance.

Reform in the 1980s and Reform Today

The challenges of integrating and coordinating the instruments of national power today are analogous in some ways to the problems DOD faced during the 1980s, when, in the wake of failures in Vietnam, Beirut, Grenada, and Iran, it became clear that the United States needed to reform the way its military services operated together. Unfortunately, internal Pentagon efforts to encourage voluntary joint operations made little meaningful progress. Advocates of "jointness" were often ostracized within the ranks by service chiefs who viewed such initiatives as threats to their budgets, power, and prestige. Senior service leaders often unsubtly pursued the interests of their own branches above efforts intended to achieve better economy of resources and more focused joint efforts benefiting the common defense. Ultimately, it took congressional action to force the Defense Department to ensure cooperation and compatibility among the services.

Today, numerous government departments and agencies continue, both subtly and openly, to resist efforts to integrate them formally and institution-ally into an overall system of national security. This hampers the Nation's ability to meet evolving security requirements. The multifaceted, nuanced security threats facing America demand better cooperation and synchronization. Many of the good efforts to improve our ability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as Defense Directive 3000.05, National Security Presidential Directive 44, and the Interagency Management System, have been frustrated by bureaucracies that were not designed to work together in this fashion. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which is making terrific progress under its "500-day Plan" to reorganize and train for the challenges of the 21st century, is nevertheless finding it difficult to integrate and align the different parts of the intelligence community. At every turn, organizational cultures and independent budgets resist collaboration.

In other ways, the problems we face today are very different from the problems we faced in the 1980s. Interagency reform involves a much broader scale, stretching across slices of the many departments and agencies and involving the executive office of the president. There are important constitutional issues to consider. The problem is also more complicated in the sense that it involves numerous congressional committees, departments, and agencies whose main "day jobs" do not include national security.

The need for national security reform is also not limited to other departments and agencies or the interagency system. It must include the Department of Defense.

While the strategic environment of the future promises to be dynamic and difficult to predict, there is consensus that certain threats are much more likely than others. America has not succeeded in substantially reorienting DOD's main functions toward these probable threats. For instance, even though DOD has increased its attention to planning for missions involving ethnic insurgencies and failing states, most large acquisitions are still focused on a major symmetric foe. While the United States needs to hedge strategically against the emergence of peer competitors, the near-term probability of major symmetrical warfare is insignificant. On the other hand, the military has assumed—or been forced to assume—some mission areas for which

Soldiers, USAID personnel, and local Iraqis walk through a market during a mission in Taji, Iraq, 8 February 2008.

it is ill suited. Support to public diplomacy and developmental assistance have been mixed together with counterinsurgency and stability operations. Now DOD is discussing the need for a "civilian reserve system." Such an approach to meeting gaps in our national toolbox will prove to be enormously and unsustainably expensive. The current defense budget supplemental spending process will likely be subject to new fiscal constraints and scrutiny in the near future. This will likely curtail the military's ability to prepare for and execute such non-core missions. These missions, however, are essential for security, and America must be prepared to find other ways to execute them.

At the same time, however, the government under-resources other departments such as the Department of State, whose core competencies include diplomacy and foreign assistance. As a nation, we remain locked in a mind-set that views international relations more or less as they have been for hundreds of years: formal, high-level relations between the governments of unitary nation-states, each of which has a conveniently similar way of interfacing with other states. This world no longer exists. While relations between states remain

an essential aspect of the international system, the effects of globalization have created innumerable ways by which states and societies communicate, interact, and respond to events. Actions directly affecting national security and international stability often occur at levels below traditional official bilateral or multilateral discourse.

These same effects of globalization have also added new international dimensions to the jurisdiction of traditionally domestic U.S. government departments and agencies. The Environmental Protection Agency deals with climate change throughout the world. The Department of Health and Human Services must be heavily engaged with health organizations around the world to responsibly protect the health of American citizens at home. Yet, despite this trend, the government remains focused on crisis-management in international relations, only dealing with problems when they can no longer be ignored. By then, leaders have perversely limited their options, often leading them to respond with military force. The national security system does not readily facilitate the formulation and execution of long-term, comprehensive national security policies that could diminish the probabilities of threats before they materialize.

On the whole, America faces major challenges in ensuring it is able to capably, constructively, and efficiently project power and influence in the 21st century. If the United States does not reform its system to meet the needs of a new era, it will run the risk of disastrous consequences. Because of the nature of bureaucracies, it is not reasonable to expect that the institutions themselves will initiate successful reform—and even if they were able to, such reform would not be sustainable without substantial changes in oversight from Congress. The whole system needs an overhaul from the top down, and only Congress can effect that sort of change.

The Project on National Security Reform

To meet the need for reform, concerned citizens from many diverse professional and political backgrounds have joined together to create the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). Project members are united in thinking that the government does not have the ability to resource and integrate the instruments of national power well enough to meet current and future security needs.

This public/private cooperative effort is engaged in carefully studying the national security system, in order to make recommendations on how to improve it and make it more responsive to current and future strategic and operational challenges. The project will also be active in supporting the implementation of these recommendations. PNSR is taking a comprehensive approach to national security reform, both in terms of the expanding and evolving nature of national security, and in terms of the interrelationships between the executive branch and Congress.

The effort is expected to last two years. Its goal is to get approval of a new national security system shortly after inauguration of the next president. The PNSR anticipates that three sets of reforms will be necessary:

● A new national security act replacing many provisions of the 1947 act.

● New presidential directives to implement changes that do not require statutory prescription.

● Amendments to Senate and House rules to provide sufficient support for and oversight of interagency activities.

PNSR is sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization led by Ambassador David Abshire in Washington, D.C. The project has over 300 members situated in government, the military, academia, law firms, foundations, and private industry.

The Guiding Coalition, a group of 21 distinguished Americans with extensive service in the public and private sectors, sets strategic direction for the project. These individuals ensure a careful, bipartisan consideration of major issues, and they will help communicate the project's ultimate findings and proposals to national-level constituencies and the general public. PNSR has also recently created a board of advisors and a government advisory council to ensure broad input into the reform process. PNSR is working closely with the House National Security Interagency Reform Working Group, co-chaired by Congressman Geoff Davis (R-KY) and Congresswoman Susan Davis (D-CA). This bipartisan group has 13 members. They come from many different committees involved with national security affairs.

PNSR has received private foundation support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the General Atlantic Corporation, and the McCormick Tribune Foundation. Additional pro bono support has been provided by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institute, the Hoover Institution, the Hudson Institute, the Heritage Foundation, MPRI Inc., SAIC, and SRA. The Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of State, and the National Defense University are also helping to advance PNSR's objectives. PNSR has collaborative relationships with the Office of Personnel Management and the Interagency Strategic Planning Group.

The Conference Report for the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008 requires an evaluation of the national security system by an

The whole system needs an overhaul from the top down, and only Congress can effect that sort of change.

Recommendation 75: Iraq Study Group Report

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies— Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

independent organization, for which it authorized $3 million. The Defense Appropriations Act for 2008 allocated $2.4 million for this purpose. In February 2008, DOD concluded a $2.4 million cooperative agreement with PNSR, which will conduct the evaluation and present a report to Congress and the president by 1 September 2008. This report will include a comprehensive set of alternative solutions and recommendations, as well as a straw-man National Security Act to initiate discussion about the need for new legislation. PNSR will also issue an interim report on 1 July 2008 focused on interagency problems, their causes, and their consequences. Both of these reports will be available for public examination and comment on the PNSR website (www.pnsr.org).

With separate funding (still to be raised), PNSR will turn the recommendations from the 1 September report into a full legislative proposal with accompanying draft presidential directives. After the presidential election of 2008, PNSR will make these products available for consideration by the president-elect and his or her team. At the same time, the project will send draft amendments to Senate and House rules to congressional leaders.

The Project's Approach

PNSR will attempt to benefit from some of the models employed in the development of the historic Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986. As a result of that legislation, DOD was transformed from a system in which parochial service interests dominated resource allocation and strategy decisions, to today's system, in which joint participation, with vital input from regional warfighting commands, drives strategic and resource decisions. The reformed system has given the Nation an unprecedented, world-class capability to develop, train, equip, and deploy forces. The battlefield successes

of Desert Storm and the early stages of operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are in part attributable to the jointness mandated by Goldwater-Nichols. In stark contrast, the lackluster and in some cases dismal execution of follow-on stability operations in OEF and OIF reflect the complete lack of a similarly resourced, disciplined, coordinated, and synchronized process throughout the national security system.

PNSR will also seek to leverage some of the methodology employed in developing Goldwater-Nichols. That legislation was the end result of a long analytic process that focused on defining problems and understanding causes before moving to solutions and recommendations. While many people come to reform initiatives with personal views of what the problems and solutions are, ultimate success results from employing a rigorous, transparent, and collective process to define and understand problems.

USAID, Ben Barber

A U.S. Soldier chats with Andrew Passen, leader of the Baghdad PRT, on a visit to the Abu Nawaz district of the city where many small business loans sparked a rebirth of commerce, 28 August 2007.

> *…implementing change in the national security system will undoubtedly entail a long-term, sustained effort that will require leadership, collaboration, and a shared vision.*

The project is currently engaged in analyzing obstacles to national security system performance. It is primarily investigating the linkages between the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, cabinet secretaries, and congressional oversight committees. Theories of change management suggest that bureaucracies and organizational cultures can begin to evolve organically if they first change output requirements and oversight processes. However, implementing change in the national security system will undoubtedly entail a long-term, sustained effort that will require leadership, collaboration, and a shared vision.

The project is looking at the national security system through the lens of organizational effectiveness theory and its standard elements. Analytical working groups are configured around these elements, which include human capital, resourcing, structures, processes, oversight, vision, and knowledge management. The project will not approach its task thematically or according to mission areas. Such approaches risk prejudicing the outcome of the study, and they may identify only some of the systemic reforms that are required. Instead, the groups will analyze a series of historical case studies to identify recurrent problems across issue areas and across different presidential administrations. Shared findings from the studies will inform the analytic groups' ongoing work. A legal working group will address national security reform from a legal perspective and construct the project's legislative proposals. A congressional affairs working group will establish collaboration with Congress. A public affairs working group will engage in dialogue with the public about the need for national security reform. Finally, an implementation working group will support reform implementation.

Initial Observations

Unsurprisingly, PNSR's analysis shows that the U.S. government has had great difficulty integrating the instruments of national power—although it tends to do better in some circumstances than others. Moreover, the project has found that, in general, the integration of government agencies is becoming increasingly difficult even as it becomes increasingly important.

A threshold question in PNSR's analysis has to do with the scope of national security. The definition of the overall problem is heavily contingent on how one defines national security. The project has thus far agreed that the scope of national security is broadening but still has ill-defined limits. Progress on resolving interagency problems depends in part upon an emerging political consensus on the definition and scope of national security.

The project is also analyzing where past problems concerning cooperation and synchronization have originated: with national-level policy makers or with the regional and country teams tasked with implementing policies. Some blame regional and country teams for poor implementation of good national-level policies. Others contend that regional and country teams work well but have been ineffective because they receive insufficient guidance from national decision-makers. PNSR analysis shows, however, that cooperation and synchronization failures have occurred and continue to occur at every level—national, regional, and country-team. Failures cannot be attributed solely to deciders at the national level or to actors at regional or country-team level; rather, they seem to be inherent in the system.

The architects of the National Security Act of 1947 were not concerned with interagency collaboration. At the time, the country needed a massive industrial mobilization of its assets. It also appears that some of those involved in developing that legislation actually wanted to prevent too great a concentration of power, whether to protect the interests of their individual organizations or as a safety mechanism against tyranny. As a consequence, the inability of the interagency system to compel individual cabinet agencies and departments to collaborate short of personal involvement by the president was, and continues to be, a serious weakness. The president simply does not have the time to direct and manage the more numerous, complex,

and pressing issues arising today. Delegating the authority to organize interagency national security missions has not worked: the process has been ad hoc and ineffective.

Additional preliminary observations include the following:

● The civilian national security system does not effectively train or cultivate leadership in a sustained and systematic manner.

● Leadership is a critical factor in the performance of the national security system, but it is not the only one, and it is not necessarily the dominant one either.

● The organizational cultures of the different components of our national security system do not reward collaboration and information sharing, nor are they conducive to the development of shared vision, values, and objectives.

● The lack of strategic planning for the human resources needed for national security affairs encourages many departments to outsource work beyond their oversight capacity and beyond what would be considered efficient.

● The current national security policy development and execution process does not adequately integrate nontraditional government departments and agencies into the national security system. Nor does it provide an effective formal link between strategic policy and operational planning.

● There is no established process to monitor and assess the execution of national security policies and plans.

● There is no common interagency planning process, methodology, or lexicon. Thus, it is highly difficult to link strategy to resource allocation decisions.

● Government undervalues knowledge (and more generally human capital), and in this respect is out of step with both business trends and the global environment.

● No matter how well integrated the elements of national power are, if America is not able to resource a mission at the right level and make rapid adjustments to account for changing circumstances, it will not succeed.

● There is inadequate capacity in civilian national security organizations, especially, but not only, for expeditionary and post-conflict operations.

● Currently, there are insufficient mechanisms to reprogram or transfer resources easily and quickly within the national security system.

No matter how well integrated the elements of national power are, if America is not able to resource a mission at the right level and make rapid adjustments to account for changing circumstances, it will not succeed.

Summary

The national security system is showing its age: stovepiped, slow, and lacking flexibility, it continues to hobble the president by narrowing the range of options available for dealing with national security affairs. The tools for managing national security were forged in the 1950s and 1960s, when the world was more predictable; they are not suited to addressing contemporary challenges. To provide for our security today, we need sweeping reforms that create a much more agile, nimbler national security system. Such changes will broaden the president's options, lead to increased efficiency in an era of shrinking resources, and perhaps decrease the Nation's reliance on military force to solve global problems. It is highly unlikely that such reform will occur unless it is brought about through new legislation. Such legislation will also require presidential directives, as well as leadership with a common vision dedicated to the long-term process of reform. *MR*

NOTES

1. Center for the Study of the Presidency, *A Panel Report for the President and Congress: Comprehensive Strategic Reform* (Washington: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2001), 1.

Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power

Remarks as delivered verbatim by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, 26 November 2007

IT IS BOTH AN HONOR AND A PLEASURE to be part of the Landon Lecture series—a forum that for more than four decades has hosted some of America's leading intellectuals and statesmen. Considering that, I at first wondered if the invitation was in fact meant for Bill Gates.

It is a pleasure to get out of Washington, D.C., for a little while. I left Washington in 1994, and I was certain, and very happy, that it was the last time I would ever live there. But history, and current events, have a way of exacting revenge on those who say "never." I've now been back in the District of Columbia for close to a year, which reminds me of an old saying: For the first six months you're in Washington, you wonder how the hell you ever got there; for the next six months, you wonder how the hell the rest of them ever got there.

Looking around the world today, optimism and idealism would not seem to have much of a place at the table. There is no shortage of anxiety about where our nation is headed and what its role will be in the 21st century.

But I can remember clearly other times in my life when such dark sentiments were prevalent. In 1957, when I was at Wichita High School East, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, and Americans feared being left behind in the space race and, even more worrisome, the missile race.

In 1968, the first full year I lived in Washington, was the same year as the Tet offensive in Vietnam, where American troop levels and casualties were at their height. Across the nation, protests and violence over Vietnam engulfed America's cities and campuses. On my second day of work as a CIA analyst, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. And then came the 1970s—when it seemed that everything that could go wrong for America did.

Yet, through it all, there was another storyline, one not then apparent. During those same years, the elements were in place and forces were at work that would eventually lead to victory in the Cold War—a victory achieved not by any one party or any single president, but by a series of decisions, choices, and institutions that bridged decades, generations, and administrations. From—

● The first brave stand taken by Harry Truman with the doctrine of containment; to
● The Helsinki Accords under Gerald Ford; to
● The elevation of human rights under Jimmy Carter; to
● The muscular words and deeds of Ronald Reagan; to
● The masterful endgame diplomacy of George H.W. Bush.

All contributed to bring an evil empire crashing down not with a bang but with a whimper. And virtually without a shot being fired.

In this great effort, institutions, as much as people and policies, played a key role. Many of those key organizations were created 60 years ago this year with the National Security Act of 1947—a single act of legislation which established the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the United States Air Force, and what is now known as the Department of Defense. I mention all this because that legislation and those instruments of national power were designed at the dawn of a new era in international relations for the United States—an era dominated by the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War, and the attacks of September 11, marked the dawn of another new era in international relations—an era whose challenges may be unprecedented in complexity and scope.

In important respects, the great struggles of the 20th century—World War I and World War II and the Cold War—covered over conflicts that had boiled and seethed and provoked wars and instability for centuries before 1914: ethnic strife, religious wars, independence movements, and, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century, terrorism. The First World War was, itself, sparked by a terrorist assassination motivated by an ethnic group seeking independence.

These old hatreds and conflicts were buried alive during and after the Great War. But, like monsters in science fiction, they have returned from the grave to threaten peace and stability around the world. Think of the slaughter in the Balkans as Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s. Even now, we worry about the implications of Kosovo's independence in the next few weeks for Europe, Serbia, and Russia. That cast of characters sounds disturbingly familiar even at a century's remove.

The long years of religious warfare in Europe between Protestant and Catholic Christians find eerie contemporary echoes in the growing Sunni versus Shi'a contest for Islamic hearts and minds in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia.

We also have forgotten that between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, two American presidents and one presidential candidate were assassinated or attacked by terrorists—as were various tsars, empresses, princes, and, on a fateful day in June 1914, an archduke. Other acts of terrorism were commonplace in Europe and Russia in the latter part of the 19th century.

So, history was not dead at the end of the Cold War. Instead, it was reawakening with a vengeance. And, the revived monsters of the past have returned far stronger and more dangerous than before because of modern technology—both for communication and for destruction—and to a world that is far more closely connected and interdependent than the world of 1914.

Unfortunately, the dangers and challenges of old have been joined by new forces of instability and conflict, among them—

● A new and more malignant form of global terrorism rooted in extremist and violent jihadism;

● New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world;

● The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

● Failed and failing states;

● States enriched with oil profits and discontented with the current international order; and

● Centrifugal forces in other countries that threaten national unity, stability, and internal peace—but also with implications for regional and global security.

Worldwide, there are authoritarian regimes facing increasingly restive populations seeking political freedom as well as a better standard of living. And finally, we see both emergent and resurgent great powers whose future path is still unclear.

One of my favorite lines is that experience is the ability to recognize a mistake when you make it again. Four times in the last century the United States has come to the end of a war, concluded that the nature of man and the world had changed for the better, and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important to our national security—in the process, giving ourselves a so-called "peace" dividend. Four times we chose to forget history.

> *…September 11, marked the dawn of another new era in international relations— an era whose challenges may be unprecedented in complexity and scope.*

Isaac Barrow once wrote, "How like a paradise the world would be, flourishing in joy and rest, if men would cheerfully conspire in affection and helpfully contribute to each other's content: and how like a savage wilderness now it is, when, like wild beasts, they vex and persecute, worry and devour each other." He wrote that in the late 1600s. Or, listen to the words of Sir William Stephenson, author of *A Man Called Intrepid* and a key figure in the Allied victory in World War II. He wrote, "Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of any people, when the function of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible it is in a future too far distant to foresee."

After September 11th, the United States re-armed and again strengthened our intelligence capabilities. It will be critically important to sustain those capabilities in the future—it will be important not to make the same mistake a fifth time.

But, my message today is not about the defense budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power, both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former director of CIA and now as secretary of defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use "soft" power and for better integrating it with "hard" power.

One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described.

So, we must urgently devote time, energy, and thought to how we better organize ourselves to meet the international challenges of the present and the future—the world you students will inherit and lead.

I spoke a few moments ago about the landmark National Security Act of 1947 and the institutions created to fight the Cold War. In light of the challenges I have just discussed, I would like to pose a question: if there were to be a "National Security Act of 2007," looking beyond the crush of day-to-day headlines, what problems must it address, what capabilities ought it create or improve, where should it lead our government as we look to the future? What new institutions do we need for this post Cold War world?

As an old Cold Warrior with a doctorate in history, I hope you'll indulge me as I take a step back in time. Because context is important, as many of the goals, successes, and failures from the Cold War are instructive in considering how we might better focus energies and resources—especially the ways in which our nation can influence the rest of the world to help protect our security and advance our interests and values.

What we consider today the key elements and instruments of national power trace their beginnings to the mid-1940s, to a time when the government was digesting lessons learned during World War II. Looking back, people often forget that the war effort–though victorious–was hampered and hamstrung by divisions and dysfunction. Franklin Roosevelt quipped that trying to get the Navy, which was its own cabinet department at the time, to change was akin to hitting a featherbed: "You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted," he said, "and then you find the damn bed just as it was before." And Harry Truman noted that if the Navy and Army had fought as hard against the Germans as they had

> *…if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must…create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power*

fought against each other, the war would have been over much sooner.

This record drove the thinking behind the 1947 National Security Act, which attempted to fix the systemic failures that had plagued the government and military during World War II—while reviving capabilities and setting the stage for a struggle against the Soviet Union that seemed more inevitable each passing day.

The 1947 Act acknowledged that we had been over-zealous in our desire to shut down capabilities that had been so valuable during the war—most of America's intelligence and information assets disappeared as soon as the guns fell silent. The Office of Strategic Services—the war intelligence agency—was axed, as was the Office of War Information. In 1947, OSS returned as CIA, but it would be years before we restored our communications capabilities by creating the United States Information Agency.

There is in many quarters the tendency to see that period as the pinnacle of wise governance and savvy statecraft. As I wrote a number of years ago, "Looking back, it all seem[ed] so easy, so painless, so inevitable." It was anything but.

Consider that the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947—the Department of Defense—was meant to promote unity among the military services. It didn't. A mere two years later the Congress had to pass another law because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anything but joint. And there was no chairman to referee the constant disputes.

At the beginning, the secretary of defense had little real power—despite an exalted title. The law forbad him from having a military staff and limited him to three civilian assistants. These days, it takes that many to sort my mail.

Throughout the long, twilight struggle of the Cold War, the various parts of the government did not communicate or coordinate very well with each other. There were military, intelligence, and diplomatic failures in Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Grenada, and many other places. Getting the military services to work together was a recurring battle that had to be addressed time and again, and was only really resolved by legislation in 1986.

But despite the problems, we realized, as we had during World War II, that the nature of the conflict required us to develop key capabilities and institutions—many of them *nonmilitary*. The Mar-shall Plan and later the United States Agency for International Development acknowledged the role of economics in the world; the CIA the role of intelligence; and the United States Information Agency the fact that the conflict would play out as much in hearts and minds as it would on any battlefield.

The key, over time, was to devote the necessary resources—people and money—and get enough things right while maintaining the ability to recover from mistakes along the way. Ultimately, our endurance paid off and the Soviet Union crumbled, and the decades-long Cold War ended.

However, during the 1990s, with the complicity of both the Congress and the White House, key instruments of America's national power once again were allowed to wither or were abandoned. Most people are familiar with cutbacks in the military and intelligence—including sweeping reductions in manpower, nearly 40 percent in the active army, 30 percent in CIA's clandestine services.

What is not as well-known, and arguably even more shortsighted, was the gutting of America's ability to engage, assist, and communicate with other parts of the world—the "soft power," which had been so important throughout the Cold War. The State Department froze the hiring of new foreign service officers for a period of time. The United States Agency for International Development saw deep staff cuts—its permanent staff dropping from a high of 15,000 during Vietnam to about 3,000 in the 1990s. And the U.S. Information Agency was abolished as an independent entity, split into pieces, and many of its capabilities folded into a small corner of the State Department.

Even as we throttled back, the world became more unstable, turbulent, and unpredictable than during the Cold War years. And then came the attacks of 11 September 2001, one of those rare life-changing dates, a shock so great that it appears to have shifted the tectonic plates of history. That day abruptly ended the false peace of the 1990s as well as our "holiday from history."

As is often the case after such momentous events, it has taken some years for the contour lines of the international arena to become clear. What we do know is that the threats and challenges we will face abroad in the first decades of the 21st century will extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency.

The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War—from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—make clear we in Defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called "asymmetric warfare." As I told an Army gathering last month, it is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms—at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos.

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America's nonmilitary instruments of power.

So, what are the capabilities, institutions, and priorities our nation must collectively address—through both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the people they serve?

I would like to start with an observation. Governments of all stripes seem to have great difficulty summoning the will—and the resources—to deal even with threats that are obvious and likely inevitable, much less threats that are more complex or over the horizon. There is, however, no inherent flaw in human nature or democratic government that keeps us from preparing for potential challenges and dangers by taking far-sighted actions with long-term benefits. As individuals, we do it all the time. The Congress did it in 1947. As a nation, today, as in 1947, the key is wise and focused bipartisan leadership—and political will.

I mentioned a moment ago that one of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success.

The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past, although new resources have permitted the State Department to begin taking on a larger role in recent months. Still, forced by circumstances, our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils—usually in a language they don't speak. They have done an admirable job. And as I've said before, the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities—something the ROTC cadets in this audience can anticipate.

But it is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise.

A few examples are useful here, as microcosms of what our overall government effort should look like—one historical and a few contemporary ones.

However uncomfortable it may be to raise Vietnam all these years later, the history of that conflict is instructive. After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the United States shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action, and economic development. The CORDS program, as it was known, involved more than a thousand civilian employees from USAID and other organizations, and brought the multiple agencies into a joint effort. It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, putting "all of *us* on one side and the enemy on the other." By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam.

The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police— once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned—the hard way—through the effort to staff provincial reconstruction teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development—to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground—even in small numbers—we have seen tangible and often dramatic changes. An Army brigade commander in Baghdad recently said that an embedded PRT was "pivotal" in getting Iraqis in his sector to better manage their affairs.

We also have increased our effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside the government—untapped resources with tremendous potential.

For example, in Afghanistan the military has recently brought in professional anthropologists as advisors. *The New York Times* reported on the work of one of them, who said, "I'm frequently accused of militarizing anthropology. But we're really anthropologizing the military."

And it is having a very real impact. The same story told of a village that had just been cleared of the Taliban. The anthropologist pointed out to the military officers that there were more widows than usual, and that the sons would feel compelled to take care of them—possibly by joining the insurgency, where many of the fighters are paid. So American officers began a job training program for the widows.

Similarly, our land-grant universities have provided valuable expertise on agricultural and other issues. Texas A&M has had faculty on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003. And Kansas State is lending its expertise to help revitalize universities in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, and working to improve the agricultural sector and veterinary care across Afghanistan. These efforts do not go unnoticed by either Afghan citizens or our men and women in uniform.

I have been heartened by the works of individuals and groups like these. But I am concerned that we need even more civilians involved in the effort and that our efforts must be better integrated.

The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned— the hard way…

And I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institutions to rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the future. The examples I mentioned have, by and large, been created ad hoc—on the fly in a climate of crisis. As a nation, we need to figure out how to institutionalize programs and relationships such as these. And we need to find more untapped resources—places where it's not necessarily how much you spend, but how you spend it.

The way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions of the past such as AID or USIA. On the other hand, just adding more people to existing government departments such as Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and so on is not a sufficient answer either—even if they were to be more deployable overseas. New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.

For example, public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, "How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world's greatest communication society?" Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications.

Similarly, we need to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills, a need that President Bush called for in his 2007 State of the Union address, and which the State Department is now working on with its initiative to build a civilian response corps. Both the president and secretary of state have asked for full funding for this initiative. But we also need new thinking about how to integrate our government's capabilities in these areas, and then how to integrate government capabilities with those in the private sector, in universities, in other non-governmental

> **New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.**

organizations, with the capabilities of our allies and friends—and with the nascent capabilities of those we are trying to help.

Which brings me to a fundamental point. Despite the improvements of recent years, despite the potential innovative ideas hold for the future, sometimes there is no substitute for resources—for money.

Funding for nonmilitary foreign-affairs programs has increased since 2001, but it remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities. Consider that this year's budget for the Department of Defense—not counting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—is nearly half-a-trillion dollars. The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department is $36 billion—less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. Secretary Rice has asked for a budget increase for the State Department and an expansion of the foreign service. The need is real.

Despite new hires, there are only about 6,600 professional foreign service officers—less than the manning for one aircraft carrier strike group. And personnel challenges loom on the horizon. By one estimate, 30 percent of USAID's foreign service officers are eligible for retirement this year—valuable experience that cannot be contracted out.

Overall, our current military spending amounts to about four percent of GDP, below the historic norm and well below previous wartime periods. Nonetheless, we use this benchmark as a rough floor of how much we should spend on defense. We lack a similar benchmark for other departments and institutions.

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We

must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.

Now, I am well aware that having a sitting secretary of defense travel halfway across the country to make a pitch to increase the budget of other agencies might fit into the category of "man bites dog"—or for some back in the Pentagon, "blasphemy." It is certainly not an easy sell politically. And don't get me wrong, I'll be asking for yet more money for Defense next year.

Still, I hear all the time from the senior leadership of our Armed Forces about how important these civilian capabilities are. In fact, when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen was chief of naval operations, he once said he'd hand a part of his budget to the State Department "in a heartbeat," assuming it was spent in the right place.

After all, civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises.

A last point. Repeatedly over the last century Americans averted their eyes in the belief that remote events elsewhere in the world need not engage this country. How could an assassination of an Austrian archduke in unknown Bosnia-Herzegovina effect us? Or the annexation of a little patch of ground called Sudetenland? Or a French defeat at a place called Dien Bien Phu? Or the return of an obscure cleric to Tehran? Or the radicalization of an Arab construction tycoon's son?

What seems to work best in world affairs, historian Donald Kagan wrote in his book *On the Origins of War*, "Is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose."

In an address at Harvard in 1943, Winston Churchill said, "The price of greatness is responsibility . . . The people of the United States cannot

escape world responsibility." And, in a speech at Princeton in 1947, Secretary of State and retired Army general George Marshall told the students: "The development of a sense of responsibility for world order and security, the development of a sense of overwhelming importance of this country's acts, and failures to act, in relation to world order and security—these, in my opinion, are great musts for your generation."

Our country has now for many decades taken upon itself great burdens and great responsibilities—all in an effort to defeat despotism in its many forms or to preserve the peace so that other nations, and other peoples, could pursue their dreams. For many decades, the tender shoots of freedom all around the world have been nourished with American blood. Today, across the globe, there are more people than ever seeking economic and political freedom—seeking hope even as oppressive regimes and mass murderers sow chaos in their midst—seeking always to shake free from the bonds of tyranny.

For all of those brave men and women struggling for a better life, there is—and must be—no stronger ally or advocate than the United States of America. Let us never forget that our nation remains a beacon of light for those in dark places. And that our responsibilities to the world—to freedom, to liberty, to the oppressed everywhere—are not a burden on the people or the soul of this nation. They are, rather, a blessing.

I will close with a message for students in the audience. The message is from Theodore Roosevelt, whose words ring as true today as when he delivered them in 1901. He said, "As, keen-eyed, we gaze into the coming years, duties, new and old, rise thick and fast to confront us from within and from without… [The United States] should face these duties with a sober appreciation alike of their importance and of their difficulty. But there is also every reason for facing them with high-hearted resolution and eager and confident faith in our capacity to do them aright." He continued, "A great work lies ready to the hand of this generation; it should count itself happy indeed that to it is given the privilege of doing such a work."

To the young future leaders of America here today, I say, "Come do the great work that lies ready to the hand of your generation."

Thank you. **MR**

Learning From Our Modern Wars:
The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future

Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, with Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army

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PHOTO: Role players and U.S. military personnel hold a mock meeting for Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and U.S. Army SGM William J. Gainey, Fort Riley, Kansas, 9 August 2007. The training focused on cultural awareness. (DOD, Cherie A. Thurlby)

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

SINCE RETURNING from my second tour in Iraq in December 2006, I have had time to reflect on how our collective experiences in that war, along with those in Afghanistan and our wider War on Terrorism, have affected our military, government, and Nation. Although we are still heavily committed in all of those operations and continue to adjust our approaches to ultimately achieve our objectives, I believe it is time to start looking more broadly at how our experiences in modern warfare should help shape our national security institutions in the years to come. This essay highlights the most significant lessons I have learned in the post-9/11 world and how I think they could be applied to better prepare us for the full range of challenges we will likely encounter in the future.

This article began as an effort to identify challenges the U.S. Army must prepare to face, but I soon realized that many of those challenges are connected to the other armed forces, the interagency, and the broader U.S. Government. Therefore, I address elements of our national power beyond just the military. The complexities of today's national security environment demand that we reevaluate missions across the U.S. Government, embrace the requirements for full-spectrum operations, and preserve our most important military principles while adjusting our organizations and values development to best meet the challenges ahead. This article is in no way an effort to propose answers to all of our potential challenges; rather, it is an attempt to join the conversation.

How We Got Here and Where We Should Go

The rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational factors, and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic interdependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges remarkable for their complexity . . . .

—General Charles C. Krulak,1999[1]

> *…much of our government and interagency seems to be in a state of denial about the requirements needed to adapt to modern warfare.*

As the cold war faded into memory and new security challenges emerged at the beginning of the 21st century, military visionaries were promoting a view of future warfare characterized by increased complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity. Others, less prescient, viewed concepts such as *low-intensity conflict*, *operations other than war*, and *nation-building* as anathema to our military's warrior culture. Despite repeatedly conducting such operations in the 1990s, we tended to quickly revert our intellectual capacities back to our traditional core competencies of synchronizing combat power on a symmetrically aligned battlefield.

The inevitable result was that the United States, even after an extraordinary round of initial military transformation efforts, entered the War on Terrorism after the 9/11 attacks with armed forces well suited to defeat opposing armies and topple political regimes, but significantly lacking the depth suited to the longer term requirements of stabilizing and rebuilding nations. In essence, we went to war with a military and interagency construct that was not prepared for the imperatives of full-spectrum operations and counterinsurgency warfare.

Since 9/11 and our experiences on the modern asymmetric battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has learned hard lessons and forced itself to make significant generational leaps of adaptation. Meanwhile, much of our government and interagency seems to be in a state of denial about the requirements needed to adapt to modern warfare. Collectively, we must internalize and institutionalize the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure they truly become "learned" rather than merely "observed." We must also broaden our scope to include imperatives across our government—imperatives that will help us prepare for a future in which we will almost certainly encounter situations of equal or greater complexity than those we face today.

As events in our Nation's history have repeatedly demonstrated, it is virtually impossible to anticipate with any degree of certainty exactly what future battlefields will look like, or for that matter, where they will be. The only constant is change. Predicting future policy decisions is even more hazardous. However, it is possible to identify some of the trends that are likely to shape future conflicts. These include the increasing chasm between the developed and developing worlds, a population explosion in underdeveloped regions, the rise of ideologies and organizations that don't recognize national borders, a dramatic increase in ethnic and sectarian self-identification, and increasing global competition for energy resources. There have also been dramatic improvements in technologies that allow instantaneous global transmission of information—and thus provide the potential to create weapons of almost unimaginable destruction. All of these characteristics point to the complex, ambiguous nature of future conflict.

Some might seek to avoid the hard choices complexity entails by concluding that we are ill-suited to employ our national power in such multidimensional environments. They would argue that we cannot afford to intervene in another Iraq. But this argument is like those made against entering into another of Europe's wars after the experience of World War I: while tempting, it is unrealistic and invites risk. In the increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and dangerous world we live in, the U.S. cannot assume that it will be able to retreat from other nations' problems for very long. At some point in the not-too-distant future, our national interests may require us to engage in situations even more complicated than the ones we face today.

To meet the national security challenges of the future, we must create the capacity to engage in the full range of military and interagency operations, and we must embrace the concept of nation-building, not

just rhetorically, but entirely. The potential to lose the momentum of change in this emerging reality of conflict through the diffusion of funding, political positioning that takes a short-term view, and the natural reluctance of our forces to intellectually engage beyond the linear construct of warfare is real. Additionally, while we attempt to improve our capabilities in non-linear warfare, we must maintain our ability to defeat conventional military threats and deter the emergence of near-peer competitors. The challenge is to find the right balance without trying to attain competence in so many potential missions that we can't do any of them well.

Developing Our Cultural Mind-Sets

Transformation is not just about technology and platforms—"transformation takes place between the ears." The cultural and intellectual factors of transformation are more important than new ships, planes and high-tech weapons.

—Colonel M.E. Krause[2]

Perhaps the most important thing we need to do to prepare for a dangerous future is change the cultures of our national security organizations and increase our efforts to educate the U.S. public. Americans have traditionally viewed warfare as a struggle between friend and enemy, with both sides clearly identified and engaged on a delimited battlefield where outcomes result in verifiable winners and losers. In other words, we have been very comfortable with the idea of a symmetric battlefield. In fact, for the first 20 years of my Army career, spent as an Armor officer, I trained to defeat the Soviet 9th Combined Arms Army on the plains of Europe by reducing their formations to 60 percent strength so they would surrender. This kind of warfare was easy to understand and to translate into military organizations, equipment, and training. It was clean. The end of the cold war and the blitz victory of Desert Storm hindered our ability to grasp, as a Nation and a military, what would come next. Even to this day, some see conventional battle as the only way to fight. They believe that all we have to do to win our modern wars is kill and capture enough of the enemy.

To maximize our ability to succeed in current and future conflicts, we must change this mind-set. Warfare has evolved, and both the Nation and

the military must adjust accordingly. Part of this change must include a brutally honest assessment of what the U.S. must do to optimize its chances for success when it decides to go to war. The U.S. as a Nation—and indeed most of the U.S. Government—has not gone to war since 9/11. Instead, the departments of Defense and State (as much as their modern capabilities allow) and the Central Intelligence Agency are at war while the American people and most of the other institutions of national power have largely gone about their normal business.

A tangible example is the relatively slow procurement and fielding process we use to get new armored vehicles into combat. In a conflict that has lasted longer than World War II, the majority of our personnel in overseas combat zones still operate in armored HMMWVs—early 1980s technology not well suited to the hazards we face. Although the military rapidly fielded numerous upgrades to improve the performance of the HMMWV, the idea of a replacement vehicle better suited to the evolving threat was not, until recently, part of the debate. Thus, significantly improved alternatives are only now being fielded in large quantities to our troops in harm's way. In short, our industrial base has largely been operating on a peacetime footing compared to some earlier conflicts in which we accelerated our production capacity and quickly generated new equipment.

Of course, it must be understood that one of the causes of our industrial inertia was a series of incorrect assumptions about how long U.S. forces would be committed in Iraq. In the early years of the war, civilian and military leaders repeatedly assumed that force levels would steadily decrease over time, and they made many resourcing decisions accordingly. This highlights the peril in being overly optimistic about essentially unpredictable military operations. It clearly points out that strategic planning should include greater consideration of potential worst-case scenarios.

Our current problems raise the legitimate question of whether the U.S., or any democracy, can successfully prosecute an extended war without a true national commitment. History is replete with examples of countries that tried to fight wars in the absence of popular support and without committing their national resources. These countries often found themselves defeated on battlefields far from

home. After one such experience—Vietnam—the U.S. military was restructured so that it could never go to war again without relying heavily on reserve-component forces. We should now consider whether we can ever successfully go to war for an extended period of time without the informed support of the American people and the full commitment of all the elements of our national power.

The history of war is a history of change. The modern battlefield—a multidimensional, ill-defined place where a nation's ability to apply non-kinetic elements of national power is as important to victory as the application of firepower—is so revolutionary it demands that we educate our citizens to its consequences. Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated that wars will likely be longer and more expensive, with victory and defeat much more difficult to determine. We as a Nation must understand this the next time we decide to commit ourselves to war.

Organizing and Training the National Security Team

I don't think the U.S. government had what it needed for reconstructing a country. We did it ad hoc in the Balkans, and then in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq.

—Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice[3]

Redefining roles and missions. To improve its ability to succeed on the complex modern battlefield, the U.S. desperately needs to conduct a top-down review of the roles and missions of all of its elements

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice listens to a question during a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing in Washington, D.C., 27 February 2007. The hearing was to request additional funding for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

of national power. The latter include every organization that contributes to our diplomatic, information, military, and economic influence. In every overseas intervention the U.S. has undertaken since the end of the cold war, an integrated approach and an understanding of each organization's missions and capabilities have been woefully lacking. For years some in the military have criticized their interagency partners for not contributing enough to our efforts overseas, while some in the interagency have criticized the military for not providing enough security for them to do their jobs. What I've come to realize is that this finger-pointing wastes time and misses the mark. The real problem is that we lack a comprehensive overview of what each military and interagency partner should contribute in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, there is a large gap between what we optimally need to succeed and the combined resources our government can bring to bear. This "capabilities gap" is not the fault of any single agency, but is the result of our government not having clearly defined what it expects each instrument of national power to contribute to our foreign policy solutions. Lacking such guidance, we have failed to build the kinds of organizations we need today.

You need only look at the State Department to prove this point. Charged with implementing the foreign policy of the greatest power on earth in our relations with some 180 countries around the world, State has only 11,000 employees in the foreign service, a miniscule number compared to the more than 2,000,000 uniformed personnel in the U.S. military. Whereas the Pentagon's budget is almost half a trillion dollars per year, the 2007 State Department budget request was $9.5 billion.[4] During the Vietnam era, there were approximately 15,000 employees in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Today there are roughly 3,000, making this once-robust organization little more than a contracting agency. Similarly, the United States Information Agency (USIA), so successful in public diplomacy during the cold war, was abolished as an independent agency in 1999 and its remnants incorporated into the State Department.

An interagency review undertaken by Congress in conjunction with the executive branch and the armed forces could help reduce the shortcomings in our current system. As a Nation, we must decide

what role each of our institutions should play in the implementation of our foreign-policy objectives and then resource them accordingly. For example, when required to increase indigenous-nation viability, should we send an agricultural expert from the Department of Agriculture, a governance expert from the State Department, and a rule-of-law expert from the Department of Justice, or should these experts come from the military, since it is most capable of mobilizing and compelling personnel to deploy to dangerous locations? Whatever the answer is, it needs to be codified and understood so that the responsible organizations can prepare properly for future contingencies.

Once the responsibilities beyond traditional warfighting and immediate post-conflict consolidation are established, each member of the interagency team must adjust its organization to meet the requirements that should be nested into the broader governmental structure. Such adjustments will likely entail increasing the resources allocated to the nonmilitary elements of our national power, such as the State Department and USAID. It might also be determined that we need to restore the capabilities of institutions such as USIA. What is clear, though, is that in this type of conflict, where the majority of our success will be determined by the non-kinetic aspects of our national power, we must substantially increase the resources provided to the organizations most capable of projecting that power.

Paul A. Brinkley, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Business Transformation, presents a check for more than $6 million to employees of the Bayji Fertilizer Plant, in Bayji, Iraq, 7 August 2007. The facility will use the money to buy new equipment and hire employees.

We should also consider how to better employ some of our most effective nongovernmental elements of national power, such as the universities, businesses, and industries at the heart of our global economic influence. Our universities, for example, are filled with agronomists, engineers, and economists who, if asked and supported, would deploy to assist in advancing non-military development and ministerial capacity in targeted nations, just as they are doing today in some cases. Although implemented several years into the conflict, the Department of Defense's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Iraq has attempted to bring business leaders from the United States together with leaders of failed or faltering industries in Iraq in an effort to improve Iraq's economic potential. We should look to apply similar models of private sector/government integration in future operations when the critical means of achieving our objectives fall outside traditional military roles. Our Nation's economic power is often more important than its military power in ensuring strategic security; furthermore, the prosperity of our Nation and its people is what others covet—not our military power. We must continually look at ways to creatively leverage this influential element of national power to support our security objectives abroad.

Military imperatives. Once the decision to employ the military has been made, those of us in uniform must accept that in most modern conflicts, the decisive elements of power required to prevail may, more often than not, be non-kinetic. While we must maintain our core competency to defeat enemies with traditional combat power, we must also be able to offer the populations of countries affected by war the hope that life will be better for them and their children because of our presence, not in spite of it. In other words, in contrast to the idea that force always wins out in the end, we must understand that not all problems in modern conflict can be solved with the barrel of a rifle.

Another reality the uniformed forces must accept culturally is that, like it or not, until further notice the U.S. Government has decided that the military largely owns the job of nation-building. Although the Nation, its political leadership, and its military have routinely dismissed this mission since the end of the cold war, we have repeatedly decided to commit our national power to it. Today, the U.S. military is

the only national organization able to conduct some of the most critical tasks associated with rebuilding war-torn or failed nations. Indeed, since the end of the cold war, the capabilities of some of the interagency organizations that have traditionally played a large role in nation-building have decreased dramatically, even as the requirement to conduct these operations has multiplied. Unless and until there is a significant reorganization of U.S. Government interagency capabilities, the military is going to be the Nation's instrument of choice in nation-building. We need to accept this reality instead of resisting it, as we have for much of my career.

Flattening our organizations. Our national security organizations, and especially the military, must continually look at ways to flatten their organizational structures while increasing internal horizontal integration. This is the way many of our enemies operate, and it can put our more traditionally "stovepiped" organizations at a disadvantage. We don't want to break our structures, or make them suited only for asymmetric warfare, but they need to be modified.

Unfortunately, many of our most important capabilities are implemented at bureaucratic speed, not at the speed required by those at user level. We have the technology to share information much faster, but our legacy stovepiped approval processes can slow down the transfer of that information. Our enemies do not operate under such constraints. Thus, they often run circles around us, especially in the information environment, but also on the rapidly evolving battlefield.

One way to help flatten our military organizations would be for leaders and commanders to expand their focus both up and down the chain of command. Traditionally, military ground commanders have understood their superior's intent two levels up and conveyed their intent two echelons down. I firmly believe that on the modern battlefield, leaders need to expand their focus to three or more levels in each direction. I'm not suggesting that we should bypass the chain of command

We don't want to break our structures, or make them suited only for asymmetric warfare, but they need to be modified.

or micromanage subordinates, but I have learned from recent battlefield experience that our operations are so decentralized and each area of operations so different that leaders need to expand their understanding of operations beyond what has traditionally worked for us on the conventional battlefield.

We can also help flatten our organizations by doing more to enable unconstrained horizontal integration and rapid knowledge transfer. Sometimes the most critical information on the battlefield doesn't come from the chain of command, but from external sources. We must enable those most in need of that information to access it without the filters a chain of command traditionally imposes. Closely related is the need to continually review how we classify and control information. I believe we in the military have a tendency to over-classify information that either perishes quickly or is not worthy of classification at all. This sometimes limits critical information to classified channels that small-unit leaders can't routinely access. Technologically, this problem can be addressed by increasing the number of tools available to disseminate classified information, but culturally, we can help solve it by using more common sense in deciding what truly needs to be classified in the first place.

Splitting the force is not the answer. Because of the complexity of our current wars, some believe we should reorganize our forces into two types of units: those that work only at the high-intensity level of a campaign, and those designed and equipped for the low-intensity fight and classic nation-building. Having done their jobs, the high-intensity force would hand off responsibility to the low-intensity force. This solution is both unsustainable and unaffordable: we simply don't have the resources to divide the military into "combat" and "stability" organizations. Instead, we must focus on developing full-spectrum capabilities across all organizations in the armed forces. Having said that, as the Army and Marine Corps increase their active-duty end strengths, we should consider increasing the number and adjusting the proportion of specialized units such as civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that play critical roles in stability operations.

We should apply the same thinking to how we train foreign armies and other security forces. I don't believe it is in the military's best interest to establish a permanent "Training Corps" in the conventional

military to develop other countries' indigenous security forces (ISF). The Special Forces do this mission well on the scale that is normally required for theater security cooperation and other routine foreign internal defense missions. Rather, we should ensure our conventional forces have the inherent flexibility to transition to ISF support when the mission becomes too large for the Special Forces. If requirements exceed Special Forces capabilities, then training and transition teams should be internally resourced from conventional U.S. or coalition units already operating in the battlespace.

There are two significant advantages to taking trainers from military units assigned to the battlespace. First, the partnership has unity of command and effort built into it: the trainers belong to the unit; they know where to go to get the operational, training, and logistical support they need; and most importantly, they get the latter much more easily. Additionally, trainers and warfighters will have already established the personal bonds that are optimal for this type of mission. This is no small advantage. In Iraq, I heard from one training-team leader who said he had an easier time developing rapport with his Iraqi counterparts than he did with the leadership of his U.S. partner unit.

Second, unit-sourced ISF training addresses the criticism, so often leveled at the way we have resourced teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, that we haven't consistently assigned our best leaders to these teams. If commanders on the ground know that the quickest way to complete their mission is to transition their operations over to the ISF, then they will be sure to assign their best people to ISF training. Should we take this approach, we may have to assign additional combat units to the theater, but that would only be the cost of doing business the right way. Furthermore, this sourcing strategy would eliminate the current requirement to cherry-pick units for officers and NCOs with special skills and experience to serve as individual augmentees on externally resourced training teams. Over the last three years, this practice has degraded units preparing to deploy and helped make it impossible to ensure OPTEMPO (operating tempo) equity across the force.

Unity of command. Unity of command has been an oft-violated principle of war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The unintended consequence of this lapse has been risk of mission failure and unnecessary casualties. Whereas technological advances have given us unheard-of battlefield situational awareness and significantly lowered our number of fratricides, failure to ensure unity of command has stifled our ability to execute coordinated and synchronized campaign plans while making it easier for the enemy to inflict casualties on our forces and on civilians.

I believe that most of these unity-of-command violations are the unintentional result of institutional rivalries, coalition-building at any cost, and sometimes just failure to effectively organize and manage for these complex types of missions.

For example, the current command and control (C2) arrangement in Afghanistan is beyond comprehension even to military professionals. Political necessity may require such an arrangement, but the C2 in Afghanistan tends to support the axiom that the only thing worse than going to war with allies is going to war without them. Exacerbated by the national caveats of some coalition members, our Afghan C2 sacrifices unity of command and obviates theater operational awareness and meaningful strategic communications.

U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 2d Class Christopher Perez

U.S. Special Forces and Iraqi Army soldiers practice map-reading skills during their weekly training in Suwayrah, Iraq, 28 July 2007.

Road construction workers cross a stream while Afghan National Police officers and U.S. Army Soldiers of the provincial reconstruction team from Forward Operating Base Kalagush patrol Balik, in the Nuristan province of Afghanistan, 14 June 2007.

If NATO is to continue to be relevant, especially in an asymmetric security environment, real transformation is a necessity. Command and control is also a challenge we must address with other allies, as there are likely to be more cases in which we go to war with "coalitions of the willing" constituted largely outside of existing treaty organizations. Because coalition-building will almost always be required, even if only to reinforce the legitimacy of our operations, we must develop solutions for increasing our unity of command and effort.

While NATO and coalition operations in general are easy targets when discussing unity-of-command issues, purely U.S. military-interagency operations, so essential to our modern campaigns, can be just as problematic. We in the military are taught the necessity of unity of command; therefore, we can see violations of the principle in situations where our civilian counterparts may not. In peacetime, such violations may lead to nothing more than bureaucratic squabbles driven by budget considerations or turf battles. In combat situations, however, they undeniably cost lives and reduce our chances of success. For instance, few people I know argue against the value of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet we suffered excruciating delays in

implementing them—delays that were a function of disagreements over everything from how they would be staffed and funded to who would control their activities. Unquestionably, there is a direct correlation between how well we organize and integrate our operations at the military-interagency level and how successful we are in accomplishing our mission and minimizing casualties. Nevertheless, we continue to struggle with this fundamental challenge. The PRTs are only one example, but our problems in setting them up reinforce the call for the U.S. to conduct a top-down review of the roles and missions of all its elements of national power.

Exploiting the Information Environment

Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerilla and terrorist operations.

—Colonel (Retired) T.X. Hammes[5]

Perhaps the most decisive factor that will determine who emerges victorious in current and future wars is which side can gain consistent advantage in the holistic information environment that plays out across the globe, near and far from the "front

lines." In short, the commander who prevails in the information war is almost certain to win the war itself. Perception has a nagging tendency of determining how our enemies, our allies, and our own societies view war, often regardless of what is actually happening on the ground. If we are unable to do a better job than our enemies of influencing the world's perception, then even the most brilliantly conceived campaign plans will be unlikely to succeed. This is not a new phenomenon, as the U.S. found out in Vietnam when the Western world perceived the tactically disastrous North Vietnamese defeat in the Tet Offensive as a strategic victory for the North. What makes the information environment even more challenging today is the explosion of technology that connects the world at near real-time speed, making it increasingly difficult for democratic governments and militaries that value accuracy and truth to compete with enemies who do not.

Now, more than ever, it is essential for leaders at all levels to understand not only how the actions they and their subordinates take will impact the immediate situation they are trying to influence, but how the results of those actions could resonate with local, national, and international audiences. Of course, the old maxim that "nothing succeeds like success" still applies, and the best way to succeed in the information war is to succeed in the war itself, but that is no longer enough. We in the military must significantly improve our ability to compete in the information arena. This can be done by upgrading our capabilities in the two traditional areas of information operations (IO) and public affairs (PA), and by insuring that our leaders develop the critical skills and intuition required to understand the complex second- and third-order effects of their decisions and how they may play out before many different audiences. Although IO and PA officers, effects coordinators, and others provide critical staff support to the information campaign, commanders must take the lead and be intimately involved in ensuring that the information aspects of military operations are considered in every action we undertake. It is that important to our success.

To better understand the information environment we are operating in, I offer a vignette from an action in early 2006, when a coalition and Iraqi special operations force raid killed 17 insurgents in Baghdad. After the raid, the enemy dragged the bodies of the dead insurgents into a nearby prayer room and staged it to look as if we had executed them. Although it only took the coalition about eight hours to confirm the original version of the story and discredit the insurgents' version, eight hours was too long and the "massacre" story carried the day both on the streets of Iraq and in much of the Western media. In a national, and indeed a global information community, where people generally believe the first story even if presented with convincing contrary evidence later, this tactically successful raid by our forces nonetheless translated into a strategic defeat. Not even the testimony of a freed hostage was enough to discredit the insurgents' story. Similar situations occur daily in Iraq. Sometimes the event receives national or international attention, but more often than not, enemy IO targets much smaller, local areas. Not bound by the same rules we work under, the enemy's information attacks are very effective. Too often we have failed to take the initiative or even effectively defend ourselves in the information environment. We must look at ways to improve our competitiveness in this critical area.

Information operations. For many in the West, information operations that include any elements of deception or propaganda are anathema to a democracy and a threat to a free press. While this can rightfully be a hot-button issue when a government or military misuses information, IO is nonetheless an essential element of our information strategy, and we must continue to improve it. We should also recognize that the term *psychological operations* is an anachronism that should be replaced by the less offensive *information operations*. Regardless of the value we place on IO, the enemy has made it clear that his key to victory is the domination of this most critical line of operation.

In his book *The World Is Flat*, Thomas L. Friedman outlines what the proliferation of cheap and almost universally accessible information technology has meant for the world economy.[6] According to Friedman, information once available only to the world's elites is now easily obtainable by anyone, anywhere, with a computer and an Internet connection. As if to prove Friedman's thesis, our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan are using the Internet and associated technology to feed their sophisticated information campaign and to build better improvised explosive devices faster than we can field counter-measures or train service members to defeat them.

We have consistently underestimated the importance the enemy places on the IO campaign. To improve our standing in this area will require creative thinking and solutions well beyond what I have discussed here, but there are a couple of steps we can take to start moving in the right direction. First, we must implement policies that recognize the need for IO. These policies should provide safeguards to prevent abuse, but not be so restrictive that commanders cannot effectively counter enemy IO or are kept from mounting their own information offensives. For their part, commanders absolutely must maintain a firewall between IO and PA to prevent IO products from coloring the information we provide the media. A firewall would not prevent the two functions from coordinating their operations, but media press releases and interviews must always be based fully on the truth as we know it at the time and never be approved for release or amended by those working in IO.

Second, we must improve both our technological and organizational capability to disseminate IO and counter enemy propaganda. Currently, we do not respond well enough to deal effectively with enemies who can say whatever they want without retribution. We need professionals who can design information campaigns and develop rapid-response capabilities that surpass those of our enemies.

As aforementioned, we must also streamline, or eliminate where possible, the bureaucratic processes we have been using to approve our IO messages. Hierarchical organizations with well-developed bureaucracies often erect effective barriers to the instantaneous passing of information. They tend to enforce approval and coordination protocols that were developed before the explosion in information technologies. Unfortunately, as was the case with the Baghdad raid "massacre," information continues to flow uninterrupted to the rest of the world; it does not wait for bureaucracies to catch up. This means that decision-makers who can benefit most from information, or who can disseminate information most quickly to counter spurious enemy claims, are often denied permission to access or release information when it's most vital. Our enemies do not have this crippling constraint and are making much better use of new information technologies. Thus, we must flatten our organizations, reduce bureaucratic impediments, and improve the attendant flow of information—both within our units and from us to the media—to allow leaders at all levels to make the most advantageous, efficacious decisions.

Public affairs and media relations. Independent local, national, and international media coverage of our military operations and our enemies' activities is critical to our success in the global information environment. This is particularly true in today's 24-hour news environment. Unfortunately, our enemies in Iraq have won a significant victory by forcing most Western media to report only from secure compounds, to use embeds with coalition forces, or to retail second-hand information gained from local Iraqi stringers, some of whom have questionable agendas and loyalties.[7]

To address this situation, we must develop solutions for improving media access to the battlefield and to our activities without compromising the media's independence or our operational security. This could include relatively simple actions such as making it easier for journalists to get accredited and transported to the combat zone, and offering increased logistical support to help defray escalating costs. It could also include more sophisticated approaches, such as soliciting media assistance in designing information policies and erecting firewalls that address their concerns about IO influencing PA. It is important, too, despite what we may sometimes perceive as unfair treatment from the media, that we understand and support the crucial role they play in reporting the realities of our combat operations to the world.

U.S. Army, SPC Davis Pridgen

The commanding general of the 9th Iraqi Army Division, right, speaks with a journalist from the Al-Arabiyah news channel, left, as they walk with General David Petraeus through the Al Shurja market in East Baghdad, Iraq, 11 March 2007.

In our dealings with the media, we must also become more sophisticated than we have sometimes been. First and foremost, we must always be truthful and forthright when talking to the press. In some cases, PA officers and commanders have chosen to use the media as an outlet for IO, or have put out inaccurate statements in the hope of shaping public perceptions. When this occurs it weakens our bond of trust not only with the media, but with the American population we serve and the indigenous populations whose trust and confidence we are trying to gain. Any short-term gains achieved by such strategies merely serve to weaken our institution in the long run.

Finally, since IO and PA are as important on the modern battlefield as Congressional Affairs is on the home front, it might be time to consistently assign some of the best and most qualified officers to these positions. Perhaps the top two officers in a battalion, brigade, or division should be PA and IO officers. Public affairs officers should be assigned down to battalion level and even company level for certain missions, and when they are, we need to give them latitude to publish news releases quickly and the support they need to overcome mistakes. We must ensure PA officers and NCOs develop fully by giving them opportunities early in their careers to train with private-sector print and broadcast news organizations. If we make this kind of investment in our information professionals, maybe someday we will trust one of them to lead the public affairs field rather than a general officer who has spent his career in the combat arms. In the same vein, we might also recognize the need to authorize a position for an Army chief of strategic communications, one who has the same three-star rank and clout as the chiefs of operations, intelligence, logistics, and other Army-level staffs.

Training and Leader Development

We must develop the confidence to grant authority to those we send to conduct these complex operations commensurate with the responsibilities laid on their shoulders…This confidence will only come with the selection and training of the right people.
—General Rupert Smith[8]

In today's complex, constantly changing climate where the levels of war are increasingly interwoven—when they are even relevant at all—we must develop leaders at all levels, from small-unit to strategic and political, who are agile and sophisticated enough to make adjustments. We must ask ourselves why our current system has produced some leaders who seemingly have adapted well to the complexities of modern warfare and created others who have not, and what we can do to improve the quality of leadership required at all levels. We must also ensure that the value we place on broader experience (versus traditional tactical military experience) is truly reflected in those leaders we select for continued advancement.

Training critical tasks. Prior to September 2001, much was written about asymmetric warfare, the nonlinear battlefield, and the need to train leaders who could synchronize combat power under uncertain, inchoate conditions. In many Army units the concept of mission essential task lists, or METLs, institutionalized by former Chief of Staff of the Army Carl Vuono, had been weakened. Commanders at all levels felt pressured to train for any and all contingencies they could face, ranging from high-intensity warfare to peacekeeping operations. They forgot that the METL concept demanded that we train to standard and not to time and that if a commander, after analyzing his mission, identified more METL tasks to train in a year than he could train to standard, he was required to go to his boss and ask for relief.

In some units, commanders refused to face the realities of the post-cold-war period and continued training regimes adopted during the height of the Soviet threat. Training in these units was kinetic, and those who tried to insert non-kinetic events into the training plan were thwarted by commanders who feared "mission creep" into roles they didn't think belonged to the military. A prime example of such intransigence occurred when the Army went to great expense to develop gunnery trainers. Leaders who wanted to give back portions of their yearly ammunition allocations in order to generate dollars to buy more gunnery trainers—which in turn would buy back time to train other tasks—were considered heretics rather than progressive thinkers who were trying to leverage the huge investments the Army had made in leap-ahead technologies.

Modern METLs must contain kinetic and non-kinetic tasks, but not so many that leaders are forced to train to time and not to standard. In units where training to standard is resourced and enforced, subordinates gain confidence in their leaders and learn

how to adjust to the dynamic, uncertain asymmetric battlefield. Units lacking METL discipline are never sure that their leaders know what right looks like, and they are less able to adjust to warfare that includes tasks they have not trained—especially non-kinetic tasks. As the Army emerges from today's conflicts, it must focus hard on returning to METL-based training programs.

Education. Our armed forces must continue to update and expand their educational programs. This means broadening the curricula of formal schools to reflect the complexity of the modern operating environment, and increasing opportunities—and rewards—for leaders to serve in assignments outside the traditional military structure. Although I have spent the majority of my 35-year career serving in traditional, "muddy boots" Army organizations, the experience that best prepared me for division and corps command in Iraq was the 5 years I spent earning a masters degree and teaching in the Social Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy. "Outside" assignments should include those in executive branch agencies, think tanks, media organizations, businesses, and similar entities that can help military leaders increase their agility. Further, we should consider expanding opportunities for interagency team members to work routinely with military organizations. These members would increase their understanding of what the military can and cannot contribute to our national security solutions. To the argument that this type of cross-training damages "warrior culture," I say that a broad exposure to experiences outside the traditional military can only help our leaders as they operate in an increasingly interconnected world.

Evaluations. Closely tied in with how we develop our military leaders is how we evaluate them and promote them to positions of greater responsibility. It has been said that an individual can fool his superiors most of the time, his peers some of the time, and his subordinates none of the time. This is somewhat of a simplification, but there is certainly some truth to it. Yet, our current military evaluation systems consider only the evaluations of superior leaders in judging competency for career advancement. The time is long overdue to implement a military evaluation system for NCOs and officers that formally considers the input of peers and subordinates. The opinions of superiors should

remain predominant, but it is important to get the unique perspectives that peers and subordinates can contribute. They will allow us to make a more complete evaluation of our leaders.

Preserving excellence. Our current generation of junior military officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel has answered our Nation's call during a time of crisis and has done what few in our history have done: volunteered to serve multiple high-stress combat tours. However, with the prospect of unending deployments on the horizon, we may be approaching a point where even the most patriotic Americans will find themselves unable to continue to serve. As we look to grow the next generation of the Army and Marine Corps, we must be very careful to recruit and then retain only those Americans who have the potential to succeed in today's and tomorrow's complex operating environments. If we fall into the trap of lowering recruiting and retention standards to meet numerical goals and near-term requirements, our Nation will pay for it dearly.

Many proposals have been presented for maintaining the quality of the force, but if none of those work, we may not know until it is too late. The executive branch, Congress, the armed forces, and indeed the American population need to look now at the type of military we want for the future and the price we are willing to pay to ensure our national security.

Within the military, perhaps the most important thing we can do to help secure the future of our institutions is to ensure that those junior leaders and service

The next generation: members of the West Point class of 2011 cross the bridge to Thayer Hall, where they will receive basic training classes.

members who are bearing the brunt of the fighting in today's wars have a significant say in how we reshape our armed forces for the future. A recent biography recounts the story of how General Dwight Eisenhower wrote a controversial article in the late 1920's about the emerging importance of tanks in warfare.[9] Eisenhower's views contradicted conventional Army doctrine and were considered so heretical that he was verbally reprimanded and even threatened with court martial if he continued to air them. Such intellectual obtuseness in the interwar years helped ensure that the U.S. Army was not optimally prepared for battle in the initial stages of World War II.

This story should serve as a cautionary tale as we engage in contemporary discussion about how to best prepare ourselves for the future. To maximize our chances for success, we must ensure all views are welcomed to the debate and that junior leaders have no fear of career retribution for freely stating their opinions about what is needed to make our leaders, organizations, and doctrine better.

Moral and ethical imperatives. There are troubling indicators from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that some military leaders and service members have not internalized the moral and ethical codes that define who we are as an armed force and Nation. Our moral conduct in extreme situations when others fail has helped make us an exceptional Nation. When we fail, our actions can damage our credibility as a fighting force, our mission, and indeed our standing in the world. One need only look at the global backlash against our national interests from allegations made against U.S. forces in places like Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and Mahmudiyah to see how necessary ethical leadership and conduct is at all levels.

We must reinforce the importance of proper ethical conduct with our organizations at every opportunity. When we do fall short of our ethical and moral standards, we must candidly admit our wrongdoing, hold individuals up and down the chain of command accountable, and move forward. Too often, we are reluctant to admit mistakes, which only serves to further antagonize those whose support we rely on so much. Leaders must also be careful not to set "ethical traps" for subordinates by asking them to do too much with too little—a caveat we haven't always heeded in our recent operations. One of the military's greatest strengths is its can-do attitude, but that attitude can be a liability when it causes us to take ethical and moral shortcuts to accomplish our mission.

Reviewing jointness. An area of career military officer development that deserves continual review is how we approach jointness. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) appropriately requires officers with senior-rank potential to complete joint assignments. Responding to interoperability problems encountered during the invasion of Grenada, the act effectively forces the services to work in integrated teams; thus, wherever there are U.S. forces engaged in operations, they almost always consist of multiple services working together in joint or combined commands. What has not always kept pace with this reality, however, is how we acknowledge and track officers serving in positions that clearly allow them to demonstrate their understanding of joint operations. Congress and the Department of Defense have realized this, and the resulting Joint Qualification System (JQS), to be implemented 1 October 2007, will ensure that we recognize officers' joint experiences. The JQS will enhance the basic tenets of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the JQS is that it will allow joint experiences gained while serving in various non-joint positions to count toward joint qualification. This change acknowledges the fast tempo of our military operations around the world and the fact that many duty positions, especially in deployed environments, are inherently joint even if they are not validated as such in an official document.

For example, an Army brigade commander and his staff who have subordinate Army and Marine battalions attached, along with Navy electronic-warfare officers and Air Force forward controllers, may now earn joint-qualification points for that experience. As the new system is introduced, criteria will be developed to assess such joint situations.[10] It will be important for military leaders to monitor this new program and to ensure that officers are properly credited toward joint qualification.

A second area that needs close review is how we select officers for joint assignments. Simply put, in our quest for equitable jointness, we have not always assigned the right people to the right jobs. We have created joint headquarters to ensure each service's capabilities are maximized, but in the name of jointness, we sometimes fill those headquarters staff positions according to service,

not to skill set. This is why Goldwater-Nichols can be deemed a success while the performance of our military in the numerous interventions since the legislation was passed appears, if we assess it honestly, to have been "disjointed."

It can be argued, for example, that the senior operations officer or plans officer at the strategic level in a predominately ground, naval, or air campaign should come from the dominant service in that specific fight. Right now, they don't. Whether stated or not, equity seems to require that each service get a fair share of these important positions in order to ensure no service is at a disadvantage when competing for senior joint billets. The combatant commander might have the greatest weight in choosing his command's primary staff officers, but it seems that certain staff positions tend to go to the same service for every rotation. We must be cognizant of this "heir apparent" succession for key positions and be willing to make the necessary changes to eliminate it.

An unintended consequence of Goldwater-Nichols is the sentiment that there is "no such thing as being too joint," which sometimes leads commanders to put some officers in positions for which they are not optimally qualified. We must change this "ticket punch" mentality and put the best qualified into critical positions regardless of their branch of the armed forces.

Looking to the Future

Americans had learned, and learned well. The tragedy of American arms, however, is that having an imperfect sense of history, Americans sometimes forget as quickly as they learn.

—T.R. Fehrenbach[11]

Given our Nation's inconsistent track record when reorganizing its forces following periods of national crisis, the time is now to start discussing how the military and interagency organizations that emerge from Iraq and Afghanistan will prepare for a dangerous future. These are not Army or military challenges alone; they are national imperatives that we must address to ensure our future national security. The ideas discussed in this essay will, I hope, contribute to the necessary discussion all serious national-security professionals should be having now on how best to prepare for the future.

Undoubtedly, some people would like to forget our recent conflicts. They would have us extricate ourselves rapidly from overseas and never involve our country in another complicated engagement again. Unfortunately, our Nation's history is full of examples in which we have fallen into this very trap and not been prepared the next time our interests were threatened. Indeed, we have been involved in many more of these so-called "small wars" than major conventional struggles, and there are few indications to suggest this trend will change. We must therefore prepare our military and other elements of national power to conduct the full range of operations against enemies who have proven to be every bit as adaptive as we are and sometimes even better than us at exploiting modern technologies. This is our primary challenge as we learn from our recent wartime experiences.

In 1983, when the military was undergoing a period of self-examination following the Vietnam War, an Air Force colonel wrote: "It has been said that Mars (the god of war) is a cruel and unforgiving master. We in the military do not have the luxury of choosing the wars we will fight—and the days of clean 'declared wars' may be forever behind us."[12] Indeed, those of us in the military and the other institutions of national power don't have the luxury of choosing when we will be called and where we will be sent to defend or advance our Nation's interests. We do, however, have the opportunity to help decide how our national-security structures will be organized to deal with an increasingly dangerous world. It is important now that we accelerate the conversation on how we can best prepare ourselves for this future. ***MR***

NOTES

1. General Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines* (January 1999).

2. Colonel M.E. Krause, "Transformation During War," *Joint Force Quarterly* 38 (July 2005).

3. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, "How a 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad," *The New York Times*, 12 August 2007, 1.

4. Information collected from <www.state.gov>, the official Department of State webpage.

5. T.X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," *Military Review* (May-June 2007): 14.

6. Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).

7. Stringers in Iraq are mainly local Iraqis who are paid by news organizations to gather news in locations that are too dangerous for Western journalists to report from without military escort.

8. General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 414.

9. See Mark Perry, *Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace* (London, England: Penguin Press, 2007), page 43, for a discussion of how generals Eisenhower and Patton understood the importance of the emerging role of tanks in the early 1930s, but were intellectually stifled by their superiors.

10. For more information on changes in this system, consult the *Department of Defense Joint Officer Management Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan*, 30 March 2007.

11. T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1963), 303.

12. Colonel Kenneth Alnwick, "Strategic Choice, National Will, and the Vietnam Experience," *Air University Review* (January-February 1983).

FM 3-0 OPERATIONS
The Army's Blueprint

General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army

THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE of persistent global conflict characterized by complex decentralized threats requires flexible and agile U.S. forces capable of deploying on short notice to conduct immediate, effective, and sustained operations anywhere in the world. The Army maintains the enduring role of protecting U.S. interests both at home and abroad while also deterring future threats. The Army, the world's preeminent landpower, guided by creative versatile Soldiers and leaders operating under the umbrella of sound doctrine, boldly accepts this role. Traditionally, Army doctrine endeavored to provide the "how to" approach for conducting operations. Today's conflicts require a more adaptive and progressive approach to operations rather than the highly predictable Cold War scenarios. With that point in mind, current Army operations doctrine discusses guiding principles while emphasizing "how to think" about operations and thus guide our forces.

The 2008 edition of FM 3-0, though shorter in length than its predecessors, presents the fundamental principles and concepts that guide the direction of Army operations rather than a checklist for success. Significant recent operational experience from the War on Terror, specifically the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, as well as urgent relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina and Rita, necessitated changes in doctrine. The development of this version of FM 3-0 traces back to 2005 with a series of issue papers covering unified action, the design of the war fighting functions, the continuum of operations, and the Army's operational concept. The collective thoughts poured into and resulting from the issue papers served as a structural foundation for codifying the key concepts of the manual. The FM 3-0 issue papers were staffed to a broad audience of over 200 organizations, media groups, and individual recipients. The major organizations included the Army Staff; Army commands; Army service component commands; Army corps and division headquarters; training divisions; and TRADOC commands and centers, proponents, and staff, as well Air Force, Marine, and Navy doctrine centers. The discussion generated from the issue papers led to a draft of the content summary that served as guide for the overall layout of the themes, concepts, and chapter structure of the field manual.

The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate hosted three action-officer-level councils of colonels in an effort to synthesize and integrate over 4,000 comments from various entities in the field at large across three drafts of the manual to coalesce as much expert knowledge, thought, and current operational experience as possible. The meetings provided a separate forum for

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fostering debate, gaining consensus, and resolving critical and major comments from respective reviewing agencies prior to a TRADOC commander-hosted doctrine and concepts conference.

The latest iteration of FM 3-0 is evolutionary in nature, incorporating ideas from new joint doctrine while retaining those valued pieces of Army doctrine that have stood the test of time. However, the doctrine is revolutionary with respect to its impetus and momentum to drive change. FM 3-0 provides purpose and direction to Army transformation and the application of force in complex operational environments. The current edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex era of persistent conflict. The doctrine recognizes that military force alone will not resolve this type of conflict. Dominant landpower, while vital to operations, represents only one element of a broader campaign that requires the application of each element of national power. In line with this realization and reasoning, Army doctrine now elevates stability or civil-support operations to equal importance with offensive and defensive operations.

As learned during operations following the "thunder run" to Baghdad, today's conflict involves a strong human element with operations conducted in and among the people. Soldiers often face the ethical challenge of engaging the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other even after combat erupts. The current edition of FM 3-0 describes stability operations in terms of tactical tasks applicable at all echelons of Army forces deployed outside the United States.

> Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
>
> —DODD 3000.05

Civil-support operations are also defined in terms of tactical-level tasks, similar to stability tasks but conducted in the very different operational environment of the United States and its territories. Army forces have a legal and moral obligation to the populace, underscoring the concept that winning battles and engagements is important but stable peace comes from carefully shaping the resulting civil situation. FM 3-0 emphasizes the importance of interagency collaboration and correlates the Army stability tasks to Department of State post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization technical sectors. (See figure 1.)

The Army's operational concept—full-spectrum operations—requires continuous simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil-support tasks. In the previous version of FM 3-0, *Operations,* the Army's operational concept was implied or assumed. But enough has changed in our understanding of the operational environment that it is now incumbent upon us to

Figure 1. Stability tasks.

explicitly state our operational concept. The operational concept stands at the core of Army doctrine. The operational concept frames how Army forces exercise initiative and embrace prudent risk with a concentrated attention on creating opportunities to achieve decisive results. Commanders achieve decisive results through the effective combination and balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations across the entire width and depth of their area of operations. The concept further emphasizes the role of the commander in operations, bridging battle command and operational art in leveraging experience, knowledge, and intuition.

Full-Spectrum Operations— the Army's Operational Concept

The emergence of full-spectrum operations drives key changes in capstone doctrine. The Army established full-spectrum operations in FM 3-0 (2001), shifting sharply from an "either-or" view of war and operations other than war to an inclusive doctrine that emphasized the congruity of nonlethal actions with combat actions. In FM 3-0 (2001) stability operations were "other" joint missions stated in an Army context. In recognition of this fact, conducting full-spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil-support operations— is a primary theme of the 2008 manual. Stability and civil-support operations are more than "military operations other than war" as derived from the joint concept that characterized non-combat operations of the past decade. Army forces must understand the potential for combining offensive and defensive tasks while simultaneously addressing the civil situation. The vein of these tasks, stability and civil-support evolved from specialized ancillary actions into a central element of full-spectrum operations equal in importance to offense and defense. The nature and complexity of the mission determine the appropriate weighting and combination of tasks. (See figure 2.)

The operational environment is characterized by uncertainty, chaos, and friction. In this environment, an offensive mindset—the predisposition to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to positively change the situation—makes combat power decisive. The high quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0 prescribes giving them the maximum latitude to successfully accomplish the mission. This effort requires a climate of trust in the abilities of superior and subordinate alike. It also requires leaders at every level to think and act flexibly, constantly adapting to the situation. In this difficult environment, commanders must draw on their education, knowledge, experience, and understanding. This edition of FM 3-0 ties together battle command and operational art, providing an integrated model for the creative application of the experience, knowledge, and intuition of the commander in full-spectrum operations. (See figure 3.)

FM 3-0 acknowledges that the Army's primary purpose remains deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the Army will fight as part of an interdependent joint team to decisively win the Nation's wars. America is at war in a persistent conflict against an enemy committed to U.S. defeat and the destruction of its free society. This conflict will be waged in an environment that is complex, multi-dimensional, and firmly rooted in the human dimension. This is a conflict which cannot be won by military forces alone and requires close cooperation and coordination of military, diplomatic, economic, and informational

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Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil-support operations **simultaneously** as part of an interdependent Joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.

They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission, and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment.

Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Increasing Violence →

Stable Peace	Unstable Peace	Insurgency	General War

Figure 2. Spectrum of conflict.

Lead

PMESII-PT

• Principles of war
• Operational themes
• Experience and judgment

METT-TC

Understand

The Problem

• Operational Environment
• Enemy

Visualize

The End State and the Nature and Design of the Operation

• Offense
• Defense
• Stability
• Civil Support

Describe

Time, Space, Resources, Purpose, and Action

• Decisive Operations
• Shaping Operations
• Sustaining Operations

Direct

Warfighting Functions

• Movement and Maneuver
• Intelligence
• Fires
• Sustainment
• Command and Control
• Protection

Running estimates

Elements of operational design

• Initial commander's intent
• Planning guidance
• Commander's critical information requirements
• Essential elements of friendly information

• Plans and orders
• Branches and sequels
• Preparation
• Execution

Assess

Figure 3. Battle command and operational art.

efforts. Due to the human nature of the conflict, however, land power will be the most important element of the military effort and essential to victory. FM 3-0 considers the nature of today's enemies as well as a wide range of other potential threats. It contains doctrine for the entire Army, one that seeks nothing less than victory for the United States and its friends and allies—now and in the future.

The impact of the information environment on operations continues to increase. What Army forces do to achieve advantages across it—information superiority—has a major effect on the outcome of operations. Consequently, FM 3-0 revises how the Army views information operations and the staff responsibility for the tasks associated with them. The current age of increased information technology, interconnected global commerce, and trade exponentially increases the impact of the information environment on operations. The patient, savvy, and confident enemy wages an intense struggle in both the information and physical domains. For U.S. forces, the reality of the messages conveyed on the ground must be consistent with Soldier actions. The concept of information engagement encompasses the vertical and horizontal interaction of commanders and Soldiers operating within and among the populace. Information engagement seeks to link these messages, presenting an integrated approach to inform U.S. forces and friendly audiences while influencing neutral and enemy audiences. Information engagement is a prominent task in the struggle for information superiority. Synchronizing the components of information engagement with the overall operation ensures consistency. Commanders must use information engagement in their area of operation to build trust, communicate messages, promote support for Army operations, and influence local perceptions.

The "warfighting functions" replace the battlefield operating systems (BOS), align with the joint functions, and parallel the USMC warfighting functions. Leaders at every echelon must embrace an offensive mindset to create opportunities and positively change the situation, thus creating decisive results. Combat power is crucial; however, adaptive and creative commanders fueled by an offensive spirit apply the elements of combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information—making combat power decisive. (See figure 4.)

FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. It sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in

The eight elements of combat power include the six warfighting functions— movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, protection—multiplied by leadership and complemented by information.

Figure 4. Elements of combat power.

subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army education system curricula. The eight chapters that make up this edition of *Operations* constitute the Army's view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land:

● Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army's expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers who accomplish missions.

● Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. Borrowing heavily from emerging NATO doctrine, this chapter helps Army leaders to understand where diverse operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency fit and shape supporting doctrine.

● Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book, describing the Army's operational concept—full-spectrum operations. Full-spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil-support operations. Mission command is the preferred method of exercising battle command.

● Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full-spectrum operations. It replaces the older BOS and elements of combat power with six warfighting functions bound by leadership and employing information. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.

● Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.

● Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.

● Chapter 7 addresses information superiority, particularly information operations. Information operations divide into five Army information operations tasks, with the responsibility redistributed into different staff functional cells, yet tied together by the operations process.

● Chapter 8 discusses the aspects of strategic and operational reach and how they affect deploying and employing Army forces. The chapter emphasizes how the Army capitalizes on unique expeditionary and campaign qualities to promptly deploy forces worldwide into any operational environment.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A, command and support relationships are in appendix B, a brief description of modular force is in appendix C, and a discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is at appendix D. This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes made in this edition of FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, rescinded, and modified terms in this manual.

This version of FM 3-0 provides a blueprint for the future and fully recognizes that Soldiers are the centerpiece and foundation of the Army. They are the world's preeminent land force. At every echelon, tough, well-trained, and well-equipped Soldiers live the warrior ethos. It is Soldiers—defined by their valor, devotion to duty, and commitment to one another and the United States of America—who execute full-spectrum operations. *MR*

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations:
UPSHIFTING THE ENGINE OF CHANGE

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV
and Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Leonard

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Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard, an Army strategist, is the chief of operational-level doctrine for the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at CAC, and the author of Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations. A 1987 graduate of the University of Idaho, he holds masters degrees from Murray State University and the School for Advanced Military Studies. LTC Leonard has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Europe, and Iraq.

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PHOTO: SGT Matt Radcliffe, 3d Special Troops Battalion, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, and an Iraqi Army soldier from the 42d Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, provide security at an Iraqi army patrol base in the Sadr City District of Bagdad, Iraq, 19 April 2008. (U.S. Air Force, TSGT Adrian Cadiz)

THE RELEASE OF Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, in the coming months will acknowledge and stress the criticality of the "whole-of-government" approach essential to achieving sustainable success in an era of persistent conflict. This approach is the key to operating in the uncertain future before us. The new doctrine will also represent a number of important firsts. It will be the first stability doctrine—service or joint—to answer the immediate needs of the force already actively engaged in ongoing operations. It will be the first doctrine of any type to undergo a comprehensive joint, service, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental review. It will also mark the first time any service has attempted to capture and define a national approach to conflict transformation in doctrine, and to do so with the broad support of the agencies, organizations, and institutions that share in that approach.

The publication of FM 3-07 will fill a critical void in our knowledge base at a key moment in the history of our Army and our Nation. At a time when we find ourselves engaged simultaneously in the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America, the new manual will provide the intellectual underpinnings needed to deal comprehensively with the uncertainty, chance, and friction so common to operations conducted among the people.

A Brave New World

The forces of globalization and the emergence of regional economic and political powers are fundamentally reshaping the world we thought we understood. Future cultural and ethnocentric conflicts are likely to be exacerbated by increased global competition for shrinking natural resources, teeming urban populations with rising expectations, unrestrained technological diffusion, and rapidly accelerating climate change. The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.

America actually possesses a rich and proud history of success and learning in wars among the people—what we recognize today as stability operations.

However, from our colonial roots, when Congress appointed military commissioners to negotiate peace treaties and land purchases with Native American tribes, to our contemporary experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our most enduring tradition has been an inability or unwillingness to institutionalize the lessons of those experiences. In a cruel twist of fate, the answers we so desperately sought in recent years were collecting dust on bookshelves half a world away; the distant lessons of a remarkably successful Vietnam-era civil-military program sat largely forgotten, save by those few who had lived those experiences.

CORDS: A Classic Approach to a Modern Challenge

At the height of the Vietnam War, we faced an enemy who hid among the people. That enemy had evolved from the one first confronted by American ground forces in 1965 to become a complex mix of guerrilla forces, political cadre, and conventional regulars. In a few short years, the enemy had adapted, changing from a strategy focused on main-force engagement to one that stressed insurgency, guerrilla tactics, and, most important, patience. The enemy had learned the hard-fought lessons of jungle warfare against a better equipped, technologically advanced opponent. By the time General Creighton W. Abrams assumed command of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in the summer of 1968, the enemy had evolved, and so had the war.

Two years earlier, General William C. Westmoreland, Abrams's predecessor as MACV commander, had recognized that a fundamental shift in effort would be necessary to achieve any lasting degree of success. Ultimately, that success could only be attained through deliberate integration of the various political, military, security, and economic programs ongoing in South Vietnam. To that end, President Johnson signed National Security Action Memorandum 362, *Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)*, on 9 May 1967, thus establishing the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. Through CORDS, the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense were integrated under a "single manager concept" that empowered Ambassador Robert W. Komer as the

deputy for pacification within MACV. Komer's appointment effectively unified the civil-military effort in South Vietnam.

The CORDS program leveraged an unprecedented ability to project significant manpower and resources into the Vietnamese countryside. It targeted the growing insurgency at the local level while focusing on the security and well-being of the people themselves. By 1969, with over 7,600 advisors assigned to pacification teams and economic assistance flowing into key programs and the provinces, CORDS began to hit its stride. The program's advisory effort was instrumental in fielding significant numbers of trained Regional and Popular Forces, which maintained security in villages and hamlets. USAID land reforms orchestrated through CORDS were accompanied by an economic revival spurred by the reestablishment of effective rural administration.

But for all its success, CORDS was too little, too late. Limited in scope, it was not engineered to bolster the legitimacy and effectiveness of the central government, a need critical to consolidating and sustaining the transitory effects of programs at the local level. Moreover, even as the pacification effort achieved broad success across South Vietnam and, by all indications, brought the Viet Cong insurgency to its knees, American popular support for the war had evaporated. The national will necessary to maintain the momentum gained through CORDS could not be regained; the initiative was lost and so, eventually, was the war.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, we failed to capture and integrate the most important lessons of the war into our training and education. We turned away from the bitter experiences of that time and left behind a rich body of lessons learned, especially the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to conduct successful counterinsurgency. The remarkable insights concerning the necessity and efficacy of unity of effort would never be institutionalized in doctrine or law, and the lessons of that experience would soon be lost to time and a far more insidious threat to national security, the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan and Iraq: New Versions of an Old Song

Winning wars is easier than winning the peace. This became abundantly clear following combat

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where initial, overwhelming victories against organized enemy forces were not consolidated in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In Afghanistan, remnants of the decimated Taliban and Al-Qaeda were able to withdraw across the porous border with Pakistan, from where they vowed to continue the fight. A seemingly glacial coalition response to the needs of the Afghan people allowed the Taliban to reconstitute and reemerge as active, aggressive opponents of the government. In Iraq, de-Ba'athification policy and demobilization of the national army sowed the seeds of a popular insurgency more complex than any in our history. The coalition failure to quickly contain rampant looting became symptomatic of a lethargic and disorganized approach to civil administration, an approach that left vast swaths of the population without dependable power, health care, and basic civic services. Unemployment, black marketing, and corruption soared while the economies collapsed.

In the wake of *shock and awe*, we faced disenfranchised populations neither shocked by our victory nor awed by our presence. We failed them in many ways, and much of our focus remained on applying the lethal and destructive aspects of our military might rather than the nonlethal, constructive capabilities so vital to success in operations conducted among the people. Our inability to exploit time effectively ceded the initiative to a course of events already spinning out of control. We won the war, but were quickly losing the peace.

As the Iraq insurgency continued to evolve, haunting parallels from South Vietnam grew difficult to ignore. Then, the threat came from a dangerous combination of guerrillas, political cadre, and North Vietnamese regulars. Now, the threat reflects a complex mix of outside foreign influences epitomized by Al-Qaeda irregular forces, sectarian militias, and terrorist extremists supported by a "third wave" of self-recruited fundamentalists who exploit the information domain to garner additional support and sympathy for their adopted cause.[1] However, in sharp contrast to the jungles of Southeast Asia, this insurgency was spawned in one of the world's most volatile cultural fault zones, where ethnic cleansing and genocide have long been inherent to the human dimension of the landscape.

Doctrine: The Engine of Change

As the insurgency in Iraq began to gain momentum in 2004, the Army's leadership recognized the need for a different approach. But without a shared recognition of this need by the various agencies of the U.S. government, devising that approach would prove challenging. An important step in the process of building that interagency understanding came when Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 in November 2005, fundamentally changing the military's concept of, and approach to, stability operations. No longer secondary to combat operations, stability operations were recognized as an essential capability on par with the traditional destructive cornerstones of military strength, offense and defense. The directive emphasized that stability operations were no longer secondary to combat operations:

> Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all Department of Defense (DOD) activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.[2]

As stability operations gained in emphasis and focus over the next two years, the Army became the first of the services to institutionalize the tenets of DODD 3000.05 in doctrine.

A new generation far removed from the Vietnam experience understood that war's lessons and the need for change, and it initiated efforts to resuscitate a counterinsurgency doctrine relegated to obscurity for more than three decades. The publication of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006 launched a doctrinal revival that resounded across the force.[12] Counterinsurgency became the coin of the realm, and the hard-won lessons of the Vietnam War gained a new foothold in the twenty-first century. Even as the Army's new counterinsurgency manual gained popularity with the military forces of other nations, a single vignette on the CORDS program from that manual revived a memory of another time and another place, where effective interagency integration—

a true whole-of-government approach—offered the best solution to insurgency and best hope for lasting success.

While FM 3-24 drove changes that proved critical in stemming the tide of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have learned since that any doctrine focused solely on a narrow band of activities cannot begin to address the seemingly insurmountable challenge of rebuilding a fragile state. Stability operations are lengthy endeavors, and they must be approached with a focus toward long-term sustainment rather than short-term gains. They aim not necessarily to reduce the military presence quickly, but to achieve broader national policy goals that extend beyond the objectives of military operations. The more effective those military efforts are at setting the conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national power, the more likely it is that a long-term commitment of the military will not be required.

With the February 2008 publication of FM 3-0, the Army formally elevated stability operations to coequal status with offensive and defensive operations, thus acknowledging that the effects attained through stability tasks are just as important, if not more so, to securing enduring peace and stability in areas torn by conflict. In effect, the Army recognized that shaping the civil situation through stability operations is often more important to lasting success than winning battles and engagements.[3]

In many ways, this recognition reflected similar observations made by General Westmoreland years earlier, when he noted that offensive actions alone could not secure the future of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, Westmoreland chose to pursue a strategy of attrition rather than leverage the constructive capabilities of his forces to launch a pacification campaign like the one that would prove so successful under General Creighton Abrams.[4] Four decades after Westmoreland's departure from MACV, military and civilian leaders were relearning the same lesson he had ignored at the height of the Vietnam War.

This lesson—that forces "must address the civil situation directly and continuously" while simultaneously conducting combat operations against enemy forces—now forms the core of Army doctrine, the operational concept posited by FM 3-0.[5] It is fundamental to full-spectrum operations.

FM 3-0 is our Army's "blueprint for an uncertain future." It focuses on human solutions to the challenges of tomorrow, emphasizing that "Soldiers will consistently operate in and among the people of the world, conducting operations in an environment fundamentally human in character."[6] In this environment, the military must focus its efforts primarily on the local populace. These efforts—stability tasks—improve the people's safety, security, social well-being, and livelihoods. In a contemporary parallel to the CORDS program, they shape a whole-of-government approach that integrates interagency efforts toward a common goal.

The manual also sets the context for the broad definition of stability operations set forth by DOD:

> Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, [and] provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief effort.[7]

Just as CORDS realized unity of effort through interagency integration, FM 3-0 forges unity of effort by directly linking the Army's primary stability tasks (establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development) with their complementary U.S. government stability sectors as set forth in the State Department's *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* (see figure 1).[8] This ensures that the execution of stability tasks is fundamentally linked to a broader interagency effort, fulfilling the spirit–if not the letter—of DODD 3000.05. FM 3-0 recognizes the effort required to fully implement the broad goals of the directive; it paves the way for further development of stability operations in doctrine and concepts.

Forging a Whole-of-Government Approach

FM 3-0, *Operations*, continued a doctrinal renaissance that is reverberating across the Army and setting in motion forces that will fundamentally alter our concept of stability operations. In turn, FM 3-07 will effect sweeping change in approach, knowledge, and

Establish Civil Security	Security
Establish Civil Control	Justice and Reconciliation
Restore Essential Services	Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well Being
Support to Governance	Governance and Participation
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development	Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

Figure 1. Linkage between Army Stability Tasks (left) and U.S. Government Stability Sectors (right).

understanding; when implemented, it will achieve the broad changes in doctrine so essential to establishing the cooperative, collaborative environment that enables the success of the other instruments of national power. Ultimately, FM 3-07 will be the driving force behind our ability to forge a whole-of-government approach to stability operations.

Today, the Army is undertaking the most comprehensive revision of stability operations doctrine it has ever attempted. Ultimately, it will publish not just a typical Army field manual, but a single-source, "how-to" guide for stability operations. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, will contain information that the joint force, sister services, interagency and intergovernmental partners, nongovernmental community, and even the private sector can refer to and put to use. It will be the first such publication to thoroughly address the broad spectrum of activities required to conduct successful stability operations.

In the current conflicts, our inability to achieve interagency unity of effort, to forge a whole-of-government approach founded on shared understanding of a common goal, is the single most significant obstacle to our attaining sustainable, enduring success. *Unity of command* has long been central to exercising the military instrument of national power. More than just a principle of war, it is fundamental to coordinating the actions of all military forces, regardless of service, toward a single objective. In the absence of such command authority, leaders strive for *unity of effort* through coordination, negotiation, and consensus building. Appropriately resourcing and integrating the

diverse activities of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—requires a collaborative environment in which individual agendas are subordinated to a common goal. Such is the challenge of achieving unity of effort.

We began writing FM 3-07 with the ambitious aim of developing doctrine that not only provides the intellectual underpinnings needed to leverage the constructive capabilities of the force, but also sets the foundation for unity of effort across all forces, agencies, and organizations involved. Such a goal is only attainable with the consent and support of those stakeholders, and gaining both requires investing time and patience to build trust and confidence among diverse and often divergent personalities. We began with just 12 months to achieve this goal. Time was a resource in short supply.

Writing and coordination proceeded along parallel lines of effort. The endeavor began in earnest in October 2007, after an agreement brought together the other government agencies and several nongovernmental organizations. This collaborative network facilitated the sharing of concepts, products, and lessons from a broad community of practice with a range of experience that spanned the spectrum of conflict. Although Army doctrine authors would serve as the lead writers, they worked with fundamentals and principles representing a substantial body of people and knowledge.

The new FM 3-07 places engagement and intervention activities on a spectrum (figure 2) adapted from the precepts presented in *Fragile States Strategy*, published by USAID in 2005. In

FAILED	FAILING	RECOVERING

VIOLENT CONFLICT ←————————————————→ NORMALIZATION

Figure 2. The Fragile-States Spectrum.

doing so, FM 3-07 aligns Army doctrine with the National Security Strategy, which addresses the threat to national interests posed by failed and failing states. The spectrum defines a state according to two quantifiable, related factors: the amount of violence within its borders, and the degree of normalcy otherwise apparent in the country and its government.

Intervention can occur at any point along the spectrum, regardless of the conditions of the operational environment. The state of conflict within the country may be irrelevant; what we are now concerned with primarily is the viability of the host-nation, i.e., Is this state on the verge of falling apart and falling prey to actors hostile to the United States? If it is, then our intervention is warranted.

As a heuristic, the fragile-states graphic is simple, but it provides leaders and planners a way to think about what an intervention in a particular state ought to look like. After gauging the conditions of an operational environment, planners can formulate an engagement methodology and then begin to consider what progress toward success might look like.

The graphic also underscores the importance of security. In his book, *Losing the Golden Hour*, former USAID Mission Director James Stephenson notes, "Security trumps everything. It does little good to build a school if parents are afraid to send their children to that school because they may not come home."[10]

Stephenson further emphasizes the need to make quantifiable improvements in the security situation within the "golden hour" –that limited amount of time in which we enjoy the forbearance of the host-nation populace. Thus, we must plant the seeds for effective civil security and civil order *during*, not after, a conflict. The military instrument, with its unique expeditionary capabilities, is the sole U.S. agency with the ability to affect the golden hour *before* the hourglass tips.

In other words, the military can take decisive action before security collapses altogether and the civil situation completely deteriorates. The military can leverage both its coercive and its constructive capabilities to establish a safe and secure environment; promote reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; reestablish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to legitimate civilian authority. Military forces perform stability operations to establish the conditions that enable all the instruments of national power to succeed. By providing security and control to stabilize the situation and restore civil order, military forces provide a foundation for transitioning control to interagency civilians and eventually to the host nation.

In *Post-Conflict Essential Tasks*, the State Department breaks down post-conflict stability operations tasks into three categories: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. These categories encompass the full range of military missions, tasks, and activities conducted in conjunction with the other instruments of national power during stability operations. However, while adopting the same task framework, FM 3-07 redefines initial response tasks as actions taken during conflict to influence conditions before hostilities end. Such anticipatory actions are essential to enable the success of the other instruments of national power and to secure space and access for nongovernmental organizations already operating in the area. These actions enable military forces to focus on maintaining security and civil order and facilitate the ability of civilian agencies and organizations to reduce the force's humanitarian issues burden.

FM 3-07 lists essential stability tasks that the force must execute to accomplish the mission. Conducting such operations requires a combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and cultural acumen. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply to essential stability operations tasks. Essential stability tasks

Iraqi construction workers build a new police station in Zaidon, Iraq, 19 November 2007.

lay a foundation of security and civil order so that the other instruments of national power can come in and do their work. This foundation must also support the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the sustained future viability of the host nation.

Security Sector Reform: First Among Equals

According to James Stephenson, "Establishing security involves domestic security, secure borders, and relatively accommodating neighbors… Domestic security is the most important and often the most difficult to achieve."[11] A decorated Vietnam veteran well acquainted with the challenges of stability operations, Stephenson often highlights the necessity of security for lasting success. But even the largest occupation force cannot provide sustained security across nations as vast as Afghanistan and Iraq; in such situations, establishing domestic security depends on the early, continual involvement of the host-nation's security forces. Just as in Southeast Asia, developing

host-nation capacity for civil security and control requires a dedicated advisory effort focused on organizing, training, and equipping indigenous security forces.

This is the essence of "security force assistance," a relatively new term for a concept that pre-dates even the CORDS effort. FM 3-07 introduces security force assistance into Army doctrine under the umbrella of security sector reform, which is the reestablishment or reform of the institutions and key ministerial positions that provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its people. The advisory effort central to security sector reform extends beyond the military training teams that conduct security force assistance. It encompasses police training teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and civil affairs functional area specialists, all engaged in a broad effort to reform the entire security sector.

Of the myriad activities conducted in a stability operation, security sector reform requires the sustained integration of the instruments of national power, and it depends wholly on unity of effort for success. Because the security sector is closely tied

to each of the other sectors, efforts to reform it create ripples that affect the entire stability operation; typically, activities that reinforce progress in security contribute to success in the others. While sustaining successful development in the other sectors is not possible without an established foundation of security, persistent security is not possible without effective rule of law, a transparent judiciary, legitimate governance, economic prosperity, and a contented host-nation populace whose essential needs have been satisfied.

Ultimately, successful security sector reform is the proving ground for an effective whole-of-government approach. It requires the active, dedicated participation of all U.S. agencies to achieve success. Such success is not attainable without unity of effort across multiple lines of operations. It requires a willingness and ability to share limited resources—financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications–while working toward a common goal that supports U.S. interests.

Institutionalizing Hard Lessons

In the years after the fall of South Vietnam, we failed to institutionalize perhaps the most important lesson learned: the need for broad unity of effort among all agencies of government in operations conducted among the people of a foreign nation. Instead, we turned away from the bitter experiences of that time, and in many respects abandoned the rich body of lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures that we assumed we would never need again.

To that end, the new FM 3-07 institutionalizes the enduring successes of our past and embraces the hard-won lessons of our contemporary operations. It recognizes that military force alone can never win the peace, even if we win every battle and engagement. The new doctrine aims to bring the efforts of military forces together with the other instruments of national power to form a whole-of-government approach to engagement in an era of persistent conflict. In doing so, it holds the key to operating in the uncertain future before us. *MR*

NOTES

1. Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2008): 37.

2. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," 28 November 2005.

3. FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 28 February 2008), vii.

4. Dale Andrade and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (March-April 2006).

5. FM 3-0, vii.

6. General William S. Wallace, "FM 3-0: Resetting the Capstone of Army Doctrine," *Army Magazine,* March 2008, 37.

7. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (*Washington, DC: GPO, 4 March 2008).

8. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks" (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2005).

9. Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003), 23.

10. James Stephenson, *Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Potomac Press, 2007), 98.

11. Ibid., 21.

12. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, was developed under the direct guidance of then-LTG David H. Petraeus, who commanded the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS. In a unique approach to doctrine development, Petraeus assembled a select group of writers from the Army, the Marine Corps, academia, and the civilian sector. The development of FM 3-0 followed in an even more robust fashion, with the writing team assembled from among recent combat veterans educated through the School of Advanced Military Studies, with very thorough vetting done within the interagency, media, and think tanks. The writing of FM 3-07 has been shaped by even more extensive interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizational involvement, and it will undergo the most thorough vetting of any Army field manual.

A CAUSE FOR HOPE
Economic Revitalization in Iraq

**Paul Brinkley,
Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense
for Business
Transformation**

Paul A. Brinkley is Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation. In June 2006, he was tasked by the deputy secretary of defense to lead the Task Force for Business and Stabilization Operations, Iraq. Mr. Brinkley holds bachelor's and master's degrees in industrial engineering from Texas A&M University and has completed coursework for a Ph.D. in operations research from North Carolina State University. The holder of four U.S. patents for systems and process technologies, he was a senior executive with several successful international companies prior to joining the Department of Defense in 2004.

PHOTO: Women working in a ready-to-wear factory in Najaf, Iraq (photo courtesy of the author).

I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

—George C. Marshall

THESE WORDS, spoken before the commencement of Harvard graduates in June of 1947, captured the distress of postwar Europe and the challenge of helping the average American comprehend the import of events of the day. Weary of sacrifice after four years of global war and motivated to focus on domestic prosperity, most Americans in 1947 were unmoved by appeals to assist in new international challenges.

George C. Marshall and his fellow statesmen recognized the absolute necessity of restoring economic vitality to stabilize postwar Europe and stop the further spread of Soviet communism. Similarly, the U.S. recognized the need for economic reconstruction and development in Iraq following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. That recognition of need, however, is where similarities end between the two eras and their respective reconstruction efforts. The Marshall Plan focused intently on revitalization of industry, restoring factory capacity and associated employment, wealth generation, and intracontinental trade among nations that had recently been at war with one another. It required European leaders to define their own economic and industrial revitalization plans, promising massive amounts of U.S. financial assistance in return for progress in economic restructuring and integration. This

approach facilitated the reestablishment of effective government in war-torn, demoralized nations and laid the groundwork for the future economic integration of Europe now embodied in the European Union.

In contrast, Iraqi reconstruction has primarily consisted of U.S.-financed and U.S.-managed construction programs to rebuild damaged basic infrastructure. Financial incentives to encourage political and economic development have not been part of the strategy for reconstruction.

The differences in the effects of these approaches are stark. Iraq today faces ongoing sectarian violence and an insurgency that threatens the elected government. This continuing violence is in no small part a result of economic distress. Our armed forces face an increasingly difficult situation—attempting to secure areas that, four years after the hope and promise of liberation, lack any improvement in economic fortunes. The nonmilitary arm of the U.S. Government has yet to fully support our armed forces with effective economic engagement so that security, once established, can be sustained.

Today in Iraq, we confront challenges and opportunities similar to those faced by Marshall. We have the imperative opportunity to invest additional American effort, creativity, and treasure to uplift the economic fortunes of ordinary Iraqis—not by building things for them, but by re-enabling them to build for themselves. To understand this opportunity, we have to grasp what has already occurred and then confront inaccurate presumptions about Iraq that continue to hinder progress in establishing economic vitality and security.

Reconstruction in Iraq

Following the fall of the Hussein regime, the U.S. Congress appropriated $2.48 billion via the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1) followed by an additional $18.2 billion (IRRF 2) to support the reconstruction of Iraq. The planning associated with this investment allocated percentages among six key sectors (Table 1).

The $20.7 billion in total IRRF appropriations was only a fraction of the $60 billion the World Bank estimated Iraq would need to fully modernize its infrastructure. However, it does represent a sizeable down payment on what will be an ongoing effort to rebuild damaged Iraqi infrastructure—an effort that will take many years to complete.

IRAQI RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING ALLOCATION I & II	
Electricity	30 percent
Public Works and Water	23 percent
Security and Justice	7 percent
Oil	10 percent
Buildings, Health, and Education	6 percent
Transportation and Communications	3 percent

Table 1.

This investment was managed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003 and 2004. It transitioned to Department of State oversight in August 2004.[1] Under the IRRF, hundreds of projects were completed across all areas of Iraq—a legacy of goodwill that has received little positive acknowledgement in the media. Employing Iraqis was one desirable aspect of these projects, but it was not the main aim. The goal was to establish a basic infrastructure capable of supporting a stable society and economy.

To augment the IRRF, the CPA in 2003 created the Brigade Commander's Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People, since renamed the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Beginning in 2004, Congress, appropriated a total of over $1.7 billion in CERP funding to enable unit-level military commanders to quickly fund local construction projects.[2] Over the past three years, an increasing percentage of CERP investments has been focused on creating employment as a primary objective via small construction and service projects.

Noticeable in its absence in reconstruction is a focus on restoration of sustained employment through revitalization of Iraqi industry. There are a number of reasons for this, most of them the result of well-intended presumptions that have proven inaccurate and a failure to adjust policy when these inaccuracies became apparent.

Iraqi Industry

Prior to 2003, the Iraqi workforce was generally acknowledged as among the most diverse, educated, and broadly skilled in the Middle East. Many presumed that UN sanctions imposed from

1991 to 2003 had negatively impacted this position, yet there was a widely held opinion among Western leaders that Iraq had the potential to become a unique nation in the Middle East—not simply a model for democratic government, but also a model for a diversified economy in a region too long dependent strictly on oil for revenue. That vision remains unrealized.

Upon their arrival in Iraq, CPA economic leaders presumed that, under the Ba'athist Hussein government, the Iraqi economy was typically Soviet in its structure. There was ample evidence to support this presumption. Ministries were highly empowered, decisions were heavily centralized, and industry was largely state-owned, with over 200 factories covering a range of industrial sectors. According to the World Bank, over 500,000 people worked in state-owned enterprises prior to 2003. Most factories were overstaffed with workers, and payrolls served in many cases as reward funds for political patronage or corruption. Based on these facts, the CPA assumed that Iraqi factories were incapable of manufacturing goods that would be competitive in the world market.

Given this situation, CPA economic leaders applied policy successfully employed in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Lessons from Eastern Europe seemed clear: nations that were more aggressive in their divestiture and disempowerment of state-owned industry, either through rapid privatization or shutdown of operations, experienced the most rapid growth, while nations that were more socially sensitive in their approach generally lagged behind those that applied "shock therapy" to their state-owned industrial sectors. At the root of the shock-therapy approach was the assumption that a free market of new, naturally competitive industries would thrive best in the absence of competition from existing subsidized public-sector operations.

In 2003, U.S. forces were welcomed as liberators. The Iraqi diaspora indicated a strong desire to invest in their home country, and there was an image of Iraq as ripe for private investment—a place with a long-constrained skilled workforce ready to move out of staid public industries and into vibrant new private businesses. It is easy to understand the assumptions that a free market would rapidly emerge and create full employment in Iraq.

Based on these assumptions, a series of decisions were made that, in retrospect, sowed the seeds of economic malaise and fueled insurgent sympathies. Because of fears of potential theft, corruption, or transfer of funds to terror networks, each state-owned factory's cash balance in state-owned banks was seized and transferred into the Development for Iraq (DFI) fund as a contribution to infrastructure reconstruction projects. Cash-receivable balances were cancelled for each factory, essentially stopping all cash flow and starving factories of the working capital necessary to sustain operations. The economic portion of the CPA reconstruction plan explicitly prohibited commanders and diplomats from doing any business with state-owned industries. De-Ba'athification stripped the government of the central planning staff formerly responsible for managing industrial demand, and as a result, orders to many factories essentially dried up. Finally, the CPA implemented a new salary structure, turning the salary of the average worker in an Iraqi factory into a stipend worth 40 percent of that worker's pay under the Hussein regime. The goal of this salary structure was to ensure that workers could meet basic needs for food and shelter, but also to encourage them to take new jobs quickly in the private businesses that would arise in the new Iraqi free-market economy.

The effect of this combination of policies was swift. Industrial production collapsed across sectors. Importation of goods increased dramatically. Food processing factories were idle, depriving farmers of markets for produce and grain. Fertilizer factories experienced production declines of over 90 percent, which transformed Iraq from a regional net exporter of urea-based fertilizer to a nation with significant shortages of fertilizer. Net agricultural production in Iraq has decreased by over 50 percent since 2003.

Heavy industry experienced similar declines. Factories manufacturing a variety of industrial products, including trucks, tractors, buses, pipeline equipment, pressure vessels, cement, construction material, and basic machining experienced reductions in production in excess of 80 percent. Many essentially shut their doors.

As industrial output declined, imports of goods increased exponentially. In an effort to open the Iraqi market to goods long denied to Iraqi consumers

Courtesy of author

Workers assembling a bus in the SCAI bus and tractor factory, Iskandariyah, Iraq.

under UN sanctions, the CPA allowed and encouraged open international trade. This resulted in a burst of consumption by Iraqis and a corresponding rapid expansion of the retail sales sector, but had a wide range of other impacts—including further depression of economic activity in Iraqi factories, over-consumption of electrical power on a strained national electrical grid, and the near-crippling of Iraqi agriculture as cheap produce and foodstuffs poured across the border from neighboring states, especially Iran. This open trade situation has remained largely unchanged over the past four years.

Initial post-occupation unrest discouraged private investment. With Eastern Europe, the European Union had been ready to make investments to take advantage of a lower-wage skilled workforce, but the absence of such a bloc in Iraq made the post-Soviet shock-therapy approach ineffective there. The U.S. Government's focus on large construction contracts without incentives for Iraqi managerial capacity development did result in improvements in infrastructure, and Iraqis were employed for the duration of those projects; however, those projects did not create sustained employment or managerial competence, and upon project completion, associated jobs ceased. The failure to recognize

the negative effects of these initial policies and to adjust accordingly represents a major shortcoming of economic development efforts to date.

Unemployment in Iraq

Unemployment in Iraq today is very high by any standard, and is a major contributor to instability.[3] It is measured by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, the Iraqi agency responsible for social statistics in partnership with the UN. Categories of unemployment are defined, based on perceived humanitarian risk, as segments of the workforce at risk of hunger or homelessness. The measurements are unemployment (no job, no income), 18 percent; underemployment (employed less than 15 hours per week and at humanitarian risk), 38 percent; and total unemployment/underemployment, 56 percent.

Because workers at state-owned industries continue to receive approximately 40 percent of their pay, they are not viewed as being at humanitarian risk, and therefore are not counted in the unemployment/underemployment statistics. In any other nation, these workers would be counted as unemployed and on social welfare. Adding this estimated population of 500,000 workers to the statistics increases effective unemployment/underemployment to over 60 percent.

The impact of unemployment in Iraq is exacerbated by family dynamics. In the West, a single worker supports, on average, four dependents, but in Iraq, a single worker supports eight.[4] Thus, losing a job has twice the negative impact on family well-being in Iraq than in Western nations.

This level of unemployment among a formerly skilled workforce would cause massive social upheaval in any culture. At the peak of the Great Depression in the United States, unemployment reached 25 percent, and social unrest was widespread. In a culture already targeted by terrorist networks and violence, a 60 percent unemployment rate contributes greatly to sympathy for the insurgents. Every military command in Iraq has examples of captured insurgents engaging in acts of violence for cash. In the absence of any economic opportunity, young Iraqi men are easily tempted to engage in violence for hard currency.

After four years of postwar economic strife, average Iraqis no longer believe America has their

best interests at heart. Conversations with Iraqi businessmen invariably include conspiratorial accusations about America's desire to subjugate the Iraqi workforce.

It is regrettable that the net effect of U.S. policy was to shut down Iraqi industry. This had immediate direct effects on employment and continues to have negative secondary effects on agriculture, small business, and society at large. Our men and women in uniform face an immeasurably difficult task attempting to establish and maintain security in such an environment.

There is one final statistic to consider. While today Iraqi unemployment is at crisis levels, 40 percent of the Iraqi population is under the age of 15. These young Iraqis are a large pool of future recruits for terrorist networks. Creating economic opportunity and hope for a future in Iraq is therefore absolutely essential to our national security. We ignore this problem at our peril.

An Opportunity Recognized

In the fall of 2006, coalition commanders, to include Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, then commanding Multi-National Corps-Iraq, forced a policy debate within the U.S. Government regarding state-owned industry. At the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations—Iraq (TF-BSO) was established, placing a team of highly qualified American and international manufacturing leaders and business analysts in Iraq. The task force supports commands by providing civilian expertise in industrial operations and factory management—skills not previously found in the American presence in Iraq. Detailed on-site assessments of industrial operations in Iraq began in November 2006 under the security of, and in partnership with, civil affairs commands within deployed divisions across all of Iraq.

Restoring Iraqi state-owned factories is now a key economic element of the strategy of General David Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), for stabilizing Iraq. This strategy applies Petraeus's counterinsurgency doctrine of following the establishment of security with rapid economic development to restore normalcy in areas subjected to violence.

The TF-BSO serves as a civilian resource for MNF-I and is command-aligned with the Deputy

Commanding General for Strategic Effects. Task force resources work under the operational control of a variety of subsidiary organizations within MNF-I, including Joint Contracting Command (JCC) for Iraq/Afghanistan, the economic lines of operation within Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and each multi-national division (North, Baghdad, Central), as well as Multi-National Force-West. These command relationships ensure that every activity of the task force is aligned with the overall command intent of MNF-I as well as with the localized objectives of subordinate organizations.

To date, the TF-BSO has assessed 64 major industrial operations all across Iraq (see map and table 2). Much has been learned about the nature of these factories, their capabilities, and their relationships with the central government before and after regime change. Based on these assessments, many presumptions about the state of Iraqi industry have been revisited.

Presumptions and Facts

As aforementioned, the core assumption driving the application of shock-therapy economic policy to Iraqi industry was that Iraq was a classic Soviet-style central economy. The reality, however, is more complex. The old Iraqi economy could best be described as a semi-centralized kleptocracy. Many factories operated in a near autonomous manner, managing their own day-to-day affairs, selling their products directly to customers, and simply donating a portion of their profits to the Hussein regime. Others were highly controlled by the regime and were given classic central plans for production of goods, which were then shipped to other ministries for distribution.

There are geographic and industrial sector correlations to these different relationships between factories and the central government, and variations on these two primary models exist across the factories in Iraq. Each factory had a unique relationship with Baghdad that was largely dependent on the local population's relations with the Hussein regime, the plant manager's relationship with the Ba'ath party and the Hussein regime, and the nature of the factory's product. Heavily subsidized, noncompetitive factories were more centrally managed. The more profitable a factory was, the more

1. State Company for Mechanical Industries (SCMI), Iskandariyah
2. State Company for Automotive Industry (SCAI), Iskandariyah
3. Iraqi State Company for Cement, Fallujah
4. Iraqi United Gypsum, Fallujah
5. State Company for Glass and Ceramics - Plate Glass, Ramadi
6. State Company for Glass and Ceramics - Consumer Glassware, Ramadi
7. State Company for Glass and Ceramics - Ceramic Tile, Ramadi
8. State Company for Glass and Ceramics - Ceramic Fixtures, Ramadi
9. Al Sumood State Company - Steel Structures, Taji
10. Al Sumood State Company - Foundry, Taji
11. Nassr State Company for Mechanical Ind. - Trailers, Taji
12. Nassr State Company for Mechanical Ind. - Foundry, Taji
13. Nassr State Company for Mechanical Ind. - Machine Shop, Taji
14. Northern Cement State Company - Badoush, Mosul
15. State Company for Drugs and Medical Supplies - Ninawah, Mosul
16. Northern Cement State Company - Sinjar, Sinjar
17. Iraqi State Company for Cement, Al Qa'im
18. State Company for Phosphate, Al Qa'im
19. Diyala State Company for Electrical Industries - Transformers, Baqubah
20. Diyala State Company for Electrical Industries - Electric Meters, Baqubah
21. Diyala State Company for Electrical Industries - Optic Cable, Baqubah
22. State Company for Fertilizer - North, Bayji
23. State Company for Ready Hand Made Wear, Najaf
24. State Company for Rubber Industries, Najaf
25. State Company for Textile Industries - Hilla, Hilla
26. State Company for Cotton Industries, Baghdad
27. State Company for Leather Industries, Baghdad
28. Al Furat State Company - Chemical, Al Hindiyah
29. That Al Sawary State Company for Chemical Industries - PVA, Taji
30. That Al Sawary State Company for Chemical Industries - Resins, Taji
31. State Company for Drugs and Medical Supplies - Samarra
32. State Company for Petrochemical Industries, Basrah

33. State Company of Fertilizers - South, Basrah
34. Harir Tomato Paste and Fruit Processing Plant, Harir
35. State Company for Construction Industries - Concrete Pillars, Mosul
36. State Company for Heavy Engineering Industry (HEESCO), Doura
37. State Company for Hand Woven Carpets, Baghdad
38. State Company for Paper Industries, Basrah
39. Ur State Company for Engineering Industry, Tallil
40. Northern Company for Furniture, Ninawah
41. Baghdad Factory for Furniture, Baghdad
42. State Company for Cotton Industries, Baghdad
43. State Company for Electrical Industries (SCEI), Baghdad
44. State Company for Vegetable Oils Industry, Baghdad
45. Al Monsour State Company, Baghdad
46. State Company for Tobacco and Cigarettes, Baghdad
47. Baghdad Electrical, Baghdad
48. State Company for Batteries Industries, Baghdad
49. State Company for Construction Industries - Stone Cutting, Baghdad
50. State Company for Woolen Industries, Baghdad
51. State Company for Dairy Products, Baghdad
52. Al Furat State Company - Detergent, Hindiyah
53. State Company for Construction Industries - Marble Cutting, Erbil
54. Southern State Company for Cement - Sedda, Sadat al Hindia
55. Kani Bottling, Kani
56. Kurdish Textiles, Erbil
57. State Owned Slaughterhouse, Baghdad
58. Sulymania Apparel Company, Sulymania
59. UB Group Brick Factory, Dahok
60. Mosul Ready to Wear, Mosul
61. Ahram Foodstuff Manufacturing Company, Dahok
62. National Metal and Bicycle Plant, Mahmoudiyah
63. Ready Made Clothing (RMC Company) Mahmoudiyah
64. Al Hamara's Biscuit Company, Mahmoudiyah

Table 2. Iraqi factories assessed to date by the Task Force for Business and Stabilization Operations.

independent the management was. In some cases, profitability led to greater independence; in others, independence from the ministry led to greater profitability. There was no fixed rule. Generally, factories in the southern (predominantly Shi'a) areas of Iraq were more centrally managed while factories in the west and north were more autonomous. But again, exceptions to this generalization have been found in each region.

The CPA's second primary assumption was that all Iraqi factories could never compete effectively in a market economy. As a general statement about Iraqi industry, this is simply inaccurate. Assessments have revealed many factory operations, idled now for four years, that had skilled workers, Western-educated management, modern equipment, and robotics and automation (less than five to ten years old in some cases). It is clear, based on the state of equipment in many Iraqi factories, that during the period of UN sanctions (1991-2003) significant investments in manufacturing capacity took place. Without question, some Iraqi factories are out of date and should not reopen, but they are the exception, not the rule. There are factories in Iraq idled today that could easily manufacture goods for consumption in Western markets if they were situated in other countries.

The CPA's third assumption about Iraqi business was that private companies would quickly make up for lost employment in the public sector. However, the shutting down of Iraqi public-sector factories negatively impacted the private sector. Under UN sanctions, private Iraqi companies could not sell goods internationally; they sold their goods inside Iraq, often serving as suppliers of goods and services to large state-run factories. Many state-run factories are surrounded by small businesses—machine shops, service businesses—similar to the industrial parks one finds anywhere in the world. Thus, shutting down state-run industries crippled the existing Iraqi private sector. While most future job growth will result from small private firms, the private sector cannot get off the ground as long as the core industrial base remains depressed.

The TF-BSO's mission is to revitalize Iraqi industry by restarting factories wherever possible. This should restore economic vitality and hope to the workforce and simplify the job of our armed forces by lessening economically motivated violence.

Approach to Industrial Revitalization

The task force is currently taking the following steps in its efforts to serve as a catalyst for the revitalization of Iraqi industry:

● *Contracting for goods and services to support U.S. forces*. To sustain U.S. forces in Iraq, we currently contract for several billion dollars a year in materiel, goods, and services, much of it imported from regional suppliers outside of Iraq. The task force is partnering with JCC-Iraq/Afghanistan and its commander, Air Force Major General Darryl Scott, to enable JCC to direct contracts to Iraqi private- and public-sector businesses. As a result of these efforts, supply and service contracts worth over $100 million a month are now being awarded to Iraqi firms, generating jobs for almost 42,000 Iraqis—a significant economic stimulus.

● *Reestablishing intra-Iraqi demand*. The task force is actively working to reestablish business connections between sources of demand in Iraq and potential Iraqi factory suppliers. This has major social implications that have been ignored to date. As Iraqi factories were idled, vital business relationships between Iraqis were severed. Under UN sanctions, Iraqi factories did not export goods; they sold to other Iraqis. Sunni sold to Shi'a, Shi'a sold to Kurd, and so on. These commercial ties are critical in all cultures; they form a web of beneficial relationships that stabilize society. Severing these ties has fueled social destabilization and sectarian biases. Recreating mutually beneficial economic ties among Iraqi sects, tribes, and regions is critical to establishing a stable, prosperous Iraq.

● *Linking Iraqi industry to the global economy*. The task force has successfully engaged, and continues to engage, senior executives from American and international industry to provide support for Iraqi industrial revitalization. International businesses receive the following appeal: "If your firm is acquiring a good or service internationally, and an existing Iraqi business can demonstrate capacity to provide that good or service, consider adding that business to your base of suppliers." The response has been encouraging. Within American industry there is an untapped reservoir of goodwill for our armed forces and a strong willingness to assist when asked. To support the military surge strategy with a corresponding economic surge, these efforts must accelerate.

The effort to link Iraqi businessmen to global economic relationships has potentially far-reaching strategic implications. Almost without exception, business leaders across Iraq have expressed a strong desire for access to the business opportunities that are driving economic growth and prosperity across eastern and southern Asia. Estimates place the Iraqi gross domestic product in 2007 at $40 billion, with most of this coming from oil and gas production. Gross domestic product in the United States, by contrast, exceeds $12 trillion. Shifting a small percentage of the demand we currently place for goods and services from nations such as China and India to Iraq would improve the livelihood of every Iraqi worker, creating goodwill and partnership in place of disappointment, frustration, and their attendant violence.

Creating a diverse, globally integrated economy in Iraq would send a powerful signal of inclusion to the entire Middle East. It would undermine the radical messages of terror networks that prey on perceptions that the Middle East is being left behind economically due to sinister intent.

Upon restarting factories, the task force will provide the Iraqi Government with privatization plans for each operation with restored production. Privatizing factories that are viable, operating entities is far easier than holding a fire sale of idled plants and equipment. The task force has received significant statements of interest from Iraqi, regional, and international businesses eager to invest in Iraq once stability takes hold.

Progress to Date

In assessing Iraqi factories, TF-BSO has found that each factory has a unique set of needs to fulfill before it can restore full production and employment. These include spare parts, equipment maintenance, workforce training, generators to ensure sustained electrical power, working capital for raw materials, and in some cases, simply market demand for products. Where equipment or training is required, funding is needed in small amounts. Typically, the restart costs for an Iraqi factory do not exceed $1 million.

The task force has developed a prioritized list of factories eligible for restoration of employment and has aligned this list with commanders' priorities and the requirements for economic stabilization driven by the Baghdad Security Plan.

To date, six factories have restored production operations. These factories include major industrial operations in Iskandariyah, a town thirty miles south of Baghdad on the "fault-line" of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide and a hotbed of insurgent sympathies resulting from economic depression. In Najaf, a large, modern clothing factory has been restarted, restoring employment to over 1800 employees. Over 70 percent of these employees are women, including supervisors and engineering staff. The six factories represent only a small beginning. With modest sufficient funding, the task force believes it can restart dozens of factories in calendar year 2007, restoring employment to tens of thousands of Iraqis and creating significant economic uplift in wide areas of the country.

U.S. Army/SFC Robert C. Brogan

The author (in sunglasses) discusses operational details with the director of plant operations during a tour of a fertilizer plant in Bayji, Iraq, 28 February 2007.

Challenges and Issues

The total funds required to restart Iraqi industries that are viable (that is, have not been looted or damaged) is estimated at less than $200 million. Until the 2007 Defense Supplemental Budget appropriated $50 million to the task force to fund industrial revitalization, there were no provisions in the U.S. Government budget to support this initiative. Under CPA orders that are now Iraqi law, the Iraqi budget cannot be invested in state-owned factories; thus, the Iraqi budget does not include funds to restart idled industries. This leaves us with a $150 million shortfall.

Given these constraints, the TF-BSO has partnered with the Iraqi Government, specifically the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, to establish a low-interest loan program run by state-owned banks. The Iraqi Government subsequently approved issuing $26 million in loans to restart over 20 factories. Regrettably, after several months of negotiation over this relatively small amount of funding, as of the time of publication no loans have been made to factories. Ongoing debates among various U.S. and Iraqi governmental organizations about the legality of these loans, philosophical discussions about the appropriateness of state-owned banks making loans at below-commercial terms, and a general lack of urgency within layers of bureaucracy have hindered the funding of factory restarts via loans. As a result, less progress can be reported than was expected at this stage of the effort.

The TF-BSO plans to quickly apply its $50 million in congressionally appropriated funds to restart as many factories as possible. Its goal is to provide the minimum materiel, training, or other tangible support needed to get a factory started again. This effort is about restoring employment lost in 2003 and giving Iraq's business community a chance to develop. It aims to lift the core industrial base out of depression, with multiplying benefits to other sectors, especially agriculture, retail sales, small businesses, and other secondary economies that idled industries have negatively impacted.

What Must Be Done

To achieve an economic awakening in Iraq, we must reengage Iraq's large base of skilled workers. To achieve political reconciliation among sects, we must reenergize mutually beneficial economic relationships. These universal truths applied to postwar Europe, and they apply to postwar Iraq as well. Iraqi business leaders want the same things business leaders in every other part of the world want: a secure home for their families, education for their children, and access to economic opportunity in which hard work brings prosperity.

The time to provide that access is now. A comprehensive plan for industrial revitalization should include three new actions:

● *Restoration of factory bank account balances in state-owned banks.* Factories assessed by the task force to date that have a competent management team and are viable for restoration of production should be told what conditions to meet to have their balances restored. At a minimum, they should have to establish a viable business plan, a profit-and-loss-based management structure, a compensation plan that provides incentives for business growth, and a capital investment strategy. Task force accountants would monitor each transaction against the restored funds for a period of one year to ensure that business plans are followed and funds are expended only on factory operations or capital investments.

Restoring the bank-account balances would empower management teams to make decisions, cutting out the non-Iraqis who currently decide which investments to make and which spending plans to execute for the minor equipment, training, and raw material purchases needed to support restarts. Most important, restoring the balances would immediately stimulate economic activity as factories made rapid capital investments and acquired materiel to restore normal production.

● *Implementation of fair trade practices for the Iraqi economy*. Establishing standard tariff and trade policies with neighboring countries would create breathing room for many sectors of the Iraqi economy, including industry and agriculture. If the United States had to operate under the trade practices currently in place in Iraq, it would lose every textile mill and most of its farms to international competitors. Iraq must be placed on a fair trade platform with its neighbors if its economy is to recover.

● *Alignment of economic development with political reconciliation efforts*. The loss of economic ties among segments of the Iraqi population has removed the mutually beneficial relationships between tribes and sects that help stabilize society.

WHAT MUST BE DONE

- **Restore factory bank account balances in state-owned banks.**

- **Implement fair trade practices for the Iraqi economy.**

- **Align economic development with political reconciliation efforts.**

Our efforts at political reconciliation must include necessary economic motivators—the reestablishment of economic ties that are mutually beneficial to different sects, creating motivators for stability. The absence of these economic incentives make political reconciliation far more challenging.

Overall, we need to apply lessons learned from Iraq to better support our security and political objectives. The U.S. Government is designed to project two primary instruments of foreign policy: diplomacy and force. We must identify the key actions necessary to leverage the U.S. economy more effectively as a vital tool for post-conflict stabilization. An operating model for interagency collaboration that leverages the industrial expertise of the Department of Defense, the policy guidance of the Department of State, the monetary policy and fiscal discipline of the Department of the Treasury, the development expertise of the Department of Agriculture, and the business relationships of the Department of Commerce is missing today in Iraq. Defining that model and putting it to work is a critical step if we are to leverage our greatest national asset—our economic strength—in future conflicts.

A Challenge for Our Time

The American economy is an engine of prosperity not only for the American people, but for the world at large. Idealized images of our lifestyle saturate the world through television and the Internet. These images, constant reminders to the disenfranchised

of the challenges within their own societies, foster the resentment on which terrorist networks feed. The United States has yet to use its most potent weapon—its economy—in support of its armed forces, whose mission grows more difficult as Iraq's economic malaise worsens. Again, George C. Marshall best articulated the situation we face:

I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?

—George C. Marshall, June 1947

As liberators of the Iraqi people, we have an obligation to seek remedies to Iraq's postwar depression. This depression puts our armed forces at risk today, and our children at risk of violence tomorrow. It is the challenge of our time. How will we respond? *MR*

NOTES

1. *Report to Congress of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*, April 2007.
2. President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.
3. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Employment Participation and Unemployment in Iraq* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO]), May 2007.
4. USAID, *Household's Average Monthly Consumption by Quintiles* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2007).

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan

Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army

Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose . . . Focus on the population, further your game plan, and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.

—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army[1]

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PHOTO: CTF Devil, TF Koa, and an ANA brigade commander meeting with sub-governor, police chief, and elders in Chapadara, Kunar province, 14 November 2005. (U.S. Army, LTC Trevor Bredenkamp)

I N EARLY SUMMER OF 2005, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was in the midst of its sixth rotation of forces in Afghanistan since late 2001. On 1 June 2005, the 1st Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division became the core of Combined Task Force (CTF) Devil and assumed command of Regional Command East (RC East). Its area of responsibility included 10 provinces and covered a mountainous region roughly the size of North Carolina. Attached to CTF Devil were 8 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 5 maneuver task forces, a forward support battalion, 2 batteries of artillery, and 9 separate companies for a total of over 5,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Special Operations Forces, to include a Special Forces battalion, and other government agencies cooperated closely with the task force, while two brigades of the Afghan National Army (ANA) served as primary partners in addressing security within the borders of RC East (see figure 1).

CTF Devil received a classic counterinsurgency (COIN) mission:

● Conduct stability operations to defeat insurgents and separate them from the people.

● Protect the people in RC East and interdict infiltrators out of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

● Transform the environment by building the Afghans' capacity to secure and govern themselves.

In these operations, CTF Devil fought four different enemies:

● The insurgents themselves—the Taliban, the Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party) Gulbaddin (led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar), and Al-Qaeda. Each had differing techniques, tribal affiliations, and goals.

● Afghanistan's own weak-state threats: the corruption, smuggling, drugs, and refugee problems associated with 25 years of near-constant war.

● A challenging climate: rains in the spring brought powerful floods, the summer heat limited aircraft loads, and extreme cold and snow in

Figure 1. Regional Command East and CTF Devil disposition, August–December 2005

the winter cut off cities and even entire provinces from the rest of the country.

● Very difficult terrain varying from high plains 7,000 feet above sea level, to densely forested mountains over 10,000 feet high (with only camel trail access), to deep valleys with raging rivers.

The AO's strategic significance lay in the 1,500 kilometers of border shared with Pakistan, including the Khyber Pass, the main entry point into Afghanistan for commerce. To manage this sprawling battlespace, CTF Devil executed a pragmatic strategy that balanced kinetic, nonkinetic, and political actions.

Operational Environment in RC East

At the provincial and district levels, the government in Afghanistan was so weak in 2005 as to be nearly nonexistent, especially in the border areas where only tribal authorities were recognized. The people ignored district and governmental boundaries, and a gamut of unofficial actors filled gaps in the power base. Internal councils (shuras) governed the primarily Pashtun tribes, and carefully selected leaders and elders represented them externally. These tribal structures and shuras were de facto governments in areas where no institutional functions existed. They also represented a challenge to the emerging provincial governments because they resisted ceding their traditional authority. Mullahs

gained political clout during CTF Devil's tenure because they increasingly saw politics as their inherent sphere of influence. Surprisingly, they were relatively anti-Taliban and supported a moderate version of Islam. CTF Devil routinely worked with the mullah shuras to dispel rumors, counter extremist propaganda, and address security issues directly.

While the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA) and coalition forces represented a progressive alternative to Taliban authority, strongmen, warlords, and militia leaders were still influential, particularly in border districts. In certain cases, former warlords had become the local chiefs of the Afghan Border Police or Afghan National Police (ANP) to mask their criminal operations behind official duties.

In theory, the Afghan government is a strongly centralized system, with power mostly flowing from Kabul. In practice, the central government has limited influence in much of the country outside of Kabul. During Operation Enduring Freedom VI, this limited influence was due to a lack of financial and human resources, destroyed institutions and infrastructure, corruption and inefficiency, and the inherent difficulties of governing the fiercely independent people in the border regions.

Task force provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and maneuver battalion commanders had contact with the provincial governor who served as the coalition's principal interlocutor with the ministries and national government. At the lowest level, a sub-governor appointed by the provincial governor administered each district and maintained close contact with company-level leadership.

The task force determined at the start that reconstruction could only move forward if coalition and Afghan army and police forces maintained an offensive posture; therefore, it made a concerted effort to synchronize capabilities. To keep the initiative, CTF Devil implemented a campaign plan that focused on four goals:

● Building Afghan capacity.
● Extending the reach of the central government.
● Blocking infiltration.
● Ensuring good governance.

A key task involved promoting and protecting the nation's first-ever parliamentary elections. These goals drove many of the CTF's actions during its first six months in country. Measures of effectiveness focused on positive indicators such as changes

in infrastructure and institutional capacity (numbers of businesses opening, police manning their posts, children in school, homes with electricity, etc.) and the degree to which the people supported their local and national government (number of IEDs turned in to the police by civilians, voters registering, former Taliban reconciling, etc.).

During planning in May 2005, the CTF determined its main effort would focus on building Afghan security with three supporting lines of operation: good governance and justice, economic and strategic reconstruction, and security cooperation with Pakistan along the shared border. The task force used this focus to shape its campaign.

Killing or capturing insurgents was important when required, but this was not an essential task. The CTF's decisive operations would focus on the people, the center of gravity. For operations to succeed, coalition forces realized the people needed to believe they were secure. The task force found itself in competition with the Taliban for the will of the people. Though both sides were trying to win over fence sitters who were waiting to see which side would bring them the most benefits, the CTF possessed two very effective means to rally support: a substantial development effort, and alignment with the popular Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. By 2005, these two factors had substantially eroded support for Taliban theocratic ideology in eastern Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban had to resort to coercion, intimidation, and terrorism.

The preferred manner of engaging Taliban insurgents was not through search-and-attack missions between mountaintops and ridgelines. Instead, the task force asked PRT and maneuver commanders to identify the most effective methods of separating the insurgents from the population. CTF Devil believed it had to give the people quick, tangible reasons to support their government. To obtain this support, perception of Afghan institutional autonomy had to improve. Expansion of U.S. cooperation with the Afghan National Security Forces helped initially.[2] Task force leadership understood that conditions for long-term security had to be set first. Improved security had the potential to set the conditions for a wave of sustainable development that would both improve perceptions of government autonomy and undercut insurgent aspirations.

In pursuing security, U.S.-only operations aimed at eliminating insurgents did not lead to favorable outcomes. CTF leaders quickly discerned that unilateral operations were culturally unacceptable to Afghans, encouraging conditions that would perpetuate the insurgency. For instance, a paratrooper entering an Afghan building for any reason without accompanying Afghan forces brought shame to the owner of the dwelling. In addition, according to the Afghan Pashtunwali code, for every zealot-militant U.S. forces killed, no less than three relatives were honor-bound to avenge his death.

CTF Devil's goal in this regard involved developing Afghan security capacity to a point where ANSFs could conduct and, ultimately, lead clearing operations. Just putting an "Afghan face" on missions (i.e., having token Afghans along on U.S. operations) was not sufficient. There were challenges to overcome first, though. The Afghan National Police knew their communities and the insurgents operating in them, but they feared taking action because they were often outgunned and out-manned. Furthermore, the nascent Afghan legal system was still weak, and police were reluctant to arrest insurgents because corrupt judges often released them quickly. But by working closely with the police, building trust through combined training, and showing the willingness to backup the ANP, the task force emboldened its allies. After CTF Devil established this partnership, the often ill-equipped and poorly trained ANP suddenly began discovering IEDs and willingly moved against insurgent cells in their districts.

Still, U.S.-led kinetic operations were necessary, particularly in Kunar province's Korengal Valley

Afghan National Police in Nuristan, Afghanistan, 30 September 2005.

U.S. Army, LTC Trevor Bredenkamp

in the north and the border districts of Lwara and Bermel in Paktika province. In areas like these, the insurgents proved to be well trained, well equipped, and able to operate in groups as large as 100. Their rocket threat against forward operating bases and a resurgence of IED cells in the interior districts presented concerns only U.S. forces were ready to address effectively. In such situations, the CTF tried to function as a shield, the idea being that the Afghan police and army could form behind U.S. forces and, eventually, take over the fight.

During CTF Devil's tenure, transitioning Afghans to the lead proved to be an evolutionary process, not a series of revolutionary events. The task force conducted frequent combined operations with an increasing focus on cooperative security development. It did so from company to brigade level, and it included provincial security forces. In time, these efforts brought Afghan and coalition forces closer and closer together.

Combat Operations

U.S. commanders learned what every maneuver battalion has to understand when fighting a counterinsurgency: protecting the people, motivating them to support their government, and building the host-nation's capacity are all primary objectives. In pursuing these priorities, the CTF's maneuver battalion commanders pioneered efforts to share intelligence with their counterpart ANA brigades and police commanders. The efforts yielded immediate tactical and eventual strategic results.[4] They cultivated the enduring trust and confidence sorely needed to protect and support the people.

While the main effort in the AO was building Afghan security capacity, the task force also conducted many deliberate combat operations that garnered meaningful results. These maneuvers ranged from air assault raids against insurgent leaders along the border with Pakistan to brigade operations in partnership with ANSF in the Afghan interior. In every case, maneuver generated intelligence, and that intelligence drove further operations, allowing the CTF to maintain the initiative and keep the militants and their insurgent leaders on the run.

Principles Guiding CTF Operations

These principles, elaborated below, governed CTF operations:

● *Commit to making every operation a combined operation*. Including the ANSF in coalition operations enabled them to gain experience and improve their skills. They participated in planning and rehearsal processes, and the CTF collocated key leaders to assist them during execution phases. CTF Devil pre-cleared all targets and operations with the provincial governors and ANA brigade commanders. Although "how" and "when" were not revealed, normally the ANA would wholeheartedly endorse the task force's target selection and provide additional Afghan resources to help achieve U.S. objectives. CTF Devil never had an operational security leak from sharing this information with Afghan leaders, although commanders had feared such occurrences.

Combined operations provided the task force with reciprocal benefits. The regular presence of Afghan counterparts enhanced coalition combat power by increasing the number of intelligence collectors, linguists, and cultural experts working together to solve the same problems. As aforementioned, CTF Devil discovered having Afghans search a compound was much more culturally acceptable and effective than doing U.S.-only searches. Not only did the Afghan search avoid the issue of perceived sovereignty violations, but also the Afghans knew where to look, and the professionalism of their searches impressed the people. ANA soldiers or local police officers also conveyed key messages to village elders much more effectively than could U.S. Soldiers using interpreters. U.S. forces thus learned to embrace their roles as advisors in a counterinsurgency.

● *Always seek to mass effects*. CTF Devil did this, for instance, by cross-attaching rifle companies from one battalion to the next to give them the combat power needed for an operation. In massing, the task force worked with governors and ANA brigade commanders to get the most Afghan support possible. CTF Devil could not task the ANA to participate in operations, but it "partnered" with them to identify missions of mutual interest. The combined force positioned itself to mass fires by emplacing artillery, mortars, radars, and observers throughout its battlespace and by creating numerous autonomous fire and counter-fire teams. The teams paired fire direction centers and counter-fire radar with two to four howitzers commanded by an experienced lieutenant. In employing these teams,

CTF Devil fired over 6,800 artillery rounds during its OEF rotation.

Artillery proved useful for defeating the ever-present rocket threat and for handling ambush situations by covering a company movement through a valley where enemy squads occupied dominating ridgelines. The task force also massed electronic warfare assets; information operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Army aviation; and close air support (CAS) to assist operations. When it had troops in contact or when actionable intelligence breakthroughs occurred, the CTF also re-tasked these assets on the fly.[5] Just as importantly, the task force massed joint nonlethal effects, seeking to exploit every possible advantage over the Taliban insurgents.

● *Make an understanding of how local traditions influenced the battlespace and the Afghan people a significant part of operations planning*. Identifying the effects of tribes, ethnicity, religion, and weak-state threats enabled CTF Devil to better understand and respond to what was happening. Local Afghans, security forces, and government leaders contributed to our targeting processes and provided insights needed to gain operational advantages. Understanding how these cultural idiosyncrasies affected the conditions proved invaluable.

For example, an area like Lwara was constantly in dispute for a host of reasons: the Zadran tribal territory extends across the border there, and the insurgent leader Haqqani is a Zadran elder; Lwara is a traditional crossing point from Pakistan's Miram Shah within the federally administered tribal area into Afghanistan, and the border there has been contested for centuries; a trafficable river valley leads from Miram Shah to the nearby Lwara Dashta plains just inside Afghanistan; and the Lwara foothills contain rich deposits of chromite ore, which smugglers move across the border for resale in Pakistan. Such knowledge can be a tremendous help to U.S. planners, but it is hard to gain without involving Afghans in the targeting process.

● *Seek operational interoperability with the Pakistan military forces (PAKMIL)*. Such interoperability was essential when operating along the border. CTF Devil therefore developed relationships with its PAKMIL counterparts by conducting numerous flag meetings at all levels, from company to brigade and higher. The task force sought to have Afghan com-

manders join these meetings too, in order to reduce border friction between the wary neighbors. Eventually, CTF Devil developed reliable communications with PAKMIL battalions and brigades across the border and began to coordinate actions to prevent insurgent forces from using the border region as a sanctuary. For example, when CTF Devil reported an ambush, PAKMIL counterparts maneuvered forces to block the insurgents' egress across the border. Once U.S. and Pakistani leaders acknowledged they were fighting the same enemy, the task force began to share intelligence with the Pakistanis and integrate operations along the border. Cooperation did not come easily; it required a consistent effort to build trust, but it was critical to success. On one occasion, after U.S. forces had fired counter-battery artillery on a target that was close to a PAKMIL ground commander's border checkpoint, the brigade headquarters received an angry phone call from the commander. The task force explained to him that a rocket fired from that location had destroyed a hangar the PAKMIL commander had himself visited just a week earlier. This information was sobering. He was mollified when U.S. officers explained they had certain knowledge of an insurgent rocket's point of origin before they began to return artillery fire.

● *Treat Afghans with respect and display discipline at all times*. U.S. restraint and professionalism contrasted with coarse Taliban cruelty and capriciousness, reinforcing the CTF's legitimacy. Mentoring, training, and supervising Afghan forces,

Colonel Patrick Donahue and Lieutenant Colonel Michele Bredenkamp confer with a Pakistani brigadier general during a flag tri-partite meeting in Lwara Bazaar, Pakistan, 8 February 2006.

in conjunction with embedded training teams (ETTs), cemented that legitimacy. With the police particularly, values reform represented welcome progress in the eyes of the people; it gained the Afghan government much-needed public support. When people's confidence in their local police grew and they saw ANA soldiers comporting themselves professionally, they began to develop a nationalistic pride in their new security forces and became more willing to turn against the insurgency. As they did so, intelligence reporting from local sources increased, leading to even more successful combined operations.

● *Apply combat power, civil-military expertise, and IO simultaneously—not sequentially*. For example, if CTF Devil were executing a cordon-and-search of a village to locate an IED cell, it did not wait until after completing the mission to explain its rationale. Additionally, if it searched one end of the village, it also conducted a medical civil affairs program on the other end, often treating hundreds of local villagers. This type of operation created goodwill and established excellent new sources of intelligence. Just as combat operations had an Afghan lead, so, too, did these concurrent civil-military operations. The ANA distributed humanitarian relief supplies to refugees, and its medics treated patients. In some cases, CTF Devil asked the provincial governor to broadcast a radio message to explain its mission and ask for people's support. When the task force met with tribal elders to explain the purpose of an operation, it brought Afghan counterparts to explain their roles and their view of the threat. The CTF followed up with a PRT project for those tribes that helped solidify and consolidate the gains our maneuver battalions made. These actions enabled us to maintain good relations with the public and led to much better actionable intelligence and early warning.

Operations in Kunar Province

The most contested region in RC East during OEF VI was the Wahabbiist stronghold in the Korengal River Valley, in the center of Kunar province. All three battalions from the 3d Marine Regiment from Hawaii that rotated through RC East during our tenure had responsibility for this area. In the aftermath of the shoot-down of an MH-47 in this area during Operation Red Wings in July 2005, it became clear that moving tactically in the dangerous high ground surrounding the valley required detailed preparation and logistical planning. Movement through the precipitous hills and across the craggy cliffs had to be slow and deliberate. Sometimes it would take an entire day to traverse a single kilometer of the mountainous terrain.

Securing a landing zone (LZ), for instance, took hours in the mountains. Marines and paratroopers had to secure all terrain that dominated the LZ—not just the LZ's four corners. Similarly, resupply in the mountains had to be painstakingly plotted, then carefully executed using varied means, including containerized parachute delivery systems, guided donkey caravans, hired pick-up trucks, and contracted porters from local villages.

Fully planned and coordinated artillery support was also vital to the success of missions in Korengal. Artillery was so overwhelmingly important that CTF Devil required follow-on battalions to train and certify on relevant artillery-related tasks upon arrival in country. Adjusting fires in the mountains required different approaches from those used at Fort Bragg or Grafenwoer, Germany. CTF Devil rediscovered the art of employing indirect fires for operational advantage in mountainous terrain.

U.S. Army

A 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry paratrooper pulls security near the crash site of an MH-47 in the hills of the Korengal Valley, July 2005.

A combined U.S./Afghan patrol preps for a mission, Khost, Afghanistan, 5 June 2005.

In every engagement its maneuver battalions fought in Kunar province, CTF Devil had to show the Afghans it was worth the risk to support their government. Commanders learned to appreciate the provincial governor's role and the targeting of reconstruction to contested areas as a technique for cementing security gains won in a fight. Although personalities and commitments varied, the coalition found that the Afghan authorities were uniformly dedicated to improving conditions and helping their people achieve a higher standard of living.

Building Afghan Security Capacity and Partnership

In fostering Afghanistan's nascent security apparatus, CTF Devil forged partnerships with U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and the Afghan government. Whereas TF Phoenix's embedded training teams mentored their ANA counterparts, CTF Devil's battalions actually teamed with them. Teaming up meant providing infantry, artillery, engineer, combat service support, and planning opportunities the ETTs could not. After coordinating with Afghan corps and brigade commanders and their U.S. advisors, the task force aligned or "partnered" CTF Devil units with Afghan units and established habitual training and operational relationships. Rifle squads and military police platoons teamed with the ANA and routinely conducted sustained five-to-seven day training modules with ANP in the district police headquarters to reinforce training the Afghans had received at their academies.

Training in this team-oriented relationship routinely ended with an Afghan-planned and led combined operation. During these operations, the coalition strengthened trust between it and the ANSF by providing close air support, artillery support, army aviation, MEDEVAC, and infantry reinforcements. For its part, the CTF learned to be more sensitive to cultural concerns, such as evacuating soldiers killed in action ahead of the wounded, which was important to the ANSF for religious reasons. In the process of developing this relationship, coalition forces and ANA soldiers shared experiences, hardships, and operational intelligence with one another. In sum, these team-oriented interactions went far in developing autonomous capacity in the ANSF.

Partnered teamwork also engendered greater unity of effort in the AO. CTF Devil conducted frequent combined planning and strategy sessions with Afghan leaders, including targeting meetings with the ANSF and intelligence-fusion meetings with the National Defense Service (the Afghan domestic intelligence agency, similar to the FBI). These efforts all helped build a unified approach to security and reconstruction. They also prevented zealot militants and insurgents from exploiting

A Navy Corpsman with 2/3 Marines (TF Koa) provides medical aid to a wounded ANA soldier during a partnered operation in Pech River Valley, Kunar province, August 2005.

seams between organizations. Most important, as CTF Devil successfully fostered Afghan security planning capacity, its leadership role gradually diminished. Afghan counterparts assumed greater responsibility for guiding these efforts. This shift came about as CTF Devil incrementally empowered indigenous leaders.

Along these lines, the commander of the 1-508th Airborne created the first provincial coordination center (PCC), in Paktika province, to focus the various Afghan security forces on addressing common threats. This PCC experiment proved a great success, and so CTF Devil replicated the effort by establishing PCCs in every province prior to the 2005 National Assembly and parliamentary elections. It resourced the PCCs with teams of talented coalition and ANSF officers and NCOs. Functioning like battalion command posts, the PCCs became a key link between coalition forces, ANSF, and often elusive district sub-governors. During the elections and later during day-to-day operations, the PCCs were a key enabler of intelligence-sharing and joint-security-related problem-solving by ANSF units, the task force, and provincial governors. Initially, CTF Devil led all the efforts and conducted all the shift updates, overcoming intelligence classification issues by describing only the "who" or "what" of the intelligence without disclosing the source. Within a few months the PCCs became nerve centers, and Afghans ran the briefs. CTF Devil then replicated the effort across the AO. Every provincial capital put a PCC into operation to coordinate security for the elections, and they eventually provided a longer-term solution to synchronizing security responses.

Because of the trust built with their ANA allies, U.S. forces continued operations during Ramadan, maintaining support from the ANA throughout the Muslim holy month. Afghan authorities even granted religious exemptions to their soldiers for Ramadan. These dispensations were important because Taliban leaders had already granted exemptions from fasting, and were maintaining a high operational tempo during those holy days. Task force maneuver battalions learned hard lessons about this period early in their tenure, but they figured out what the enemy was doing and why he was doing it. They consistently passed on maneuver-battalion best practices that addressed coping with religious complexities to units in other sectors that were grappling with similar issues.

PRT Threat-based Reconstruction

At our transfer of authority in mid-2005, 25th Infantry Division's Task Force Thunder had established provincial reconstruction teams and initiated reconstruction and development efforts across RC East. In January 2005 Task Force Thunder had shifted the PRTs' focus from emergency support to more sophisticated development and had met Afghan necessities for food, water, and shelter, although these were primitive by first-world standards.

However, CTF Devil had to address other problems:
- An antiquated medical system.
- Limited road networks.
- An insufficient power grid.
- Access to education.
- A judicial system tribal leaders ignored.

In addition, the economy, while improving, languished during the early phases of OEF VI, and high unemployment persisted. Since the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were unable to provide any form of reconstruction, development, or aid to the people, the situation was ripe for improvement. CTF Devil saw an opportunity to use intensified reconstruction operations as a nonlethal mechanism to improve security, governance, and overall economic development. The CTF, however, also realized it had to use this mechanism in a way that did not create unrealistic expectations.

CTF Devil began by re-focusing the efforts of its eight PRTs and five battalions to speed reconstruction, especially of infrastructure and roads—the high-impact and high-visibility projects. Close coordination between task force staff and higher headquarters (CJTF-76) brought increased Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funding. CTF Devil then tasked each PRT and battalion commander to develop plans with representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and State Department to invigorate "unity" in reconstruction efforts. This focus of reconstruction activity threw the insurgents back on their heels. Taliban forces simply could not compete with a well-designed reconstruction strategy. Because cleric-militants focused on otherworldly authority, they never developed anything tangibly positive to offer the population; they could not counter a community-supported project with real-world benefits.

Instead, the insurgents had to turn to religious propaganda, terrorism, and violence, the only tactics they possessed to realize their strategy of protracting the conflict.

Because of these tactics, seeking projects in contested areas became CTF Devil's first priority. Doing so required developing community support and backing from Kabul for the initiatives. Provincial government legitimacy soared when tangible completed projects trumped insurgent exhortations and attacks. This community-investment approach, discussed below in more detail, became integral to the CTF campaign plan. However, while concentrating CERP projects in contested areas (see the high threat areas on figure 2), CTF Devil had to eschew large, unwieldy projects that had no chance of being completed, or were not sustainable, after the departure of U.S. troops, depletion of CERP funds, or loss of community support.

Ill-conceived, poorly placed, or failed projects would constitute victories for the insurgent IO campaign. When CTF Devil failed to meet public expectations, the people thought the Afghan government and the Americans were incompetent, creating openings for insurgents to wield their influence. For instance, when CTF Devil provided a power-generation capability for Sharana, the capital of Paktika province, without getting buy-in from the mayor, it created an embarrassing situation. After a single tank of U.S.-provided diesel fuel ran dry, the lights went out in Sharana. They eventually came back on, but in the interim the well-meaning PRT created frustration and resentment among the Afghans they set out to assist.

Achieving consistent success meant concentrating on sustainable projects and avoiding embarrassment for the coalition. Thus, CTF Devil avoided going against the grain and focused on contracting projects that took advantage of Afghan talents and the country's natural resources. To illustrate, after learning that Afghans had little experience with using concrete and cement in construction, but were deft at employing stone, a raw material abundant in Afghanistan, the task force contracted to build stone bridges, rock-foundation flood control walls, and cobblestone roads.

CERP Projects
● Civil infrastructure
● Power generation
● Agriculture and water
● Sanitation
● Roads
● Education

Low Threat
Medium Threat
High Threat

Figure 2. CTF Devil reconstruction projects and threat assessments, January 2006.

As CTF Devil developed its pragmatic approach to reconstruction, it used weekly PRT staff calls to broaden the development discussion. During these meetings, the task force emphasized projects provincial governors and district leaders would fully support so that development efforts would reinforce their ability to govern. Setting out simply to build and improve the environment in areas of perceived need (i.e., the "red" areas on the map in figure 2), was too haphazard. Tribal leaders had to be involved with informal certification. They had to approve all projects to avoid building a project on disputed land, for instance, and to ensure realistic timetables and community relevance. CTF Devil focused initial efforts on projects that units could complete within a reasonable amount of time (three to nine months) so the populace would quickly see results. Using techniques learned from successful non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CTF Devil also sought "sweat equity" from the community in the form of resources or labor. The CTF asked villages and tribes to contribute whatever they could afford. The resulting buy-in generated lasting community support for these projects.

As part of this process, the CTF decided to put a maximum number of Afghans to work. Major

General Jason Kamiya, the CJTF-76 commander, pioneered this approach, calling it "Temporary Work for Afghans." If CTF Devil had a choice between hiring one contractor with four bulldozers, 30 men from India, or a local contractor with 100 Afghans wielding picks and shovels, it chose the latter. Smart Afghan general contractors adopted practical methods to exploit this situation. Not only did they hire Afghans, but also they did so from the local community, which enabled their projects to progress without attacks. Contractors who didn't, especially foreigners, were often attacked and had their work sites destroyed. Their projects were delayed indefinitely or abandoned altogether.

CTF Devil also tasked its maneuver battalions and PRTs to work with provincial governors and IRoA ministry representatives to solicit support in planning and oversight of significant projects. The intent was to encourage Afghans to build their own capacity for development planning. At the same time, the task force sought to incrementally design a longer-range vision. Its overall objective was to make each provincial government more self-sufficient, community-invested, and competent.

As noted, the enemy tried to slow the CTF's new reconstruction effort. Setbacks typically took place in areas where the Taliban still maintained some form of influence, for example, in the Zormat district of Logar province where they attacked a recently constructed police checkpoint, and in the Puli Lam district, where they burned down a school under construction. In response, CTF Devil authorized Afghan contractors to hire local security in high-threat areas. It also sought local project protection by establishing security agreements with tribal leaders, making the latter responsible for protecting projects in their areas. So, in addition to the "sweat equity" mentioned, the populace had to commit to the projects by securing them. Completing these reconstruction endeavors marked real, tangible gains the local population could feel, but progress came only after they made a commitment. Completed projects with community buy-in weakened the Taliban and undermined any pretenses of its legitimacy.

In following through with these developments, CTF Devil also recognized the need to foster relations with international and nonprofit organizations in country. As the United Nations Assistance Mis-

sion to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and development-focused NGOs saw CTF reconstruction successes, they found more ways to communicate with the coalition, and when security improved in different areas, the international community's organizations increased their presence. A mutual willingness to work together began to build. This cooperation was usually informal because the NGOs, fiercely independent anyway, had to preserve the perception that they were impartial. Thus, they were quick to criticize the coalition if it did something they believed adversely affected them. In its cooperation with these organizations, CTF Devil worked to make "unity of effort" more a working reality than a mere concept or discussion point.

Systems Approach to Reconstruction

A well-designed reconstruction effort took more than just selecting projects that villages, districts, or provinces fervently wanted. The coalition had to consider initiatives in a larger context, as a system of complementary projects. CTF Devil initially did not take this approach and, as a result, stand-alone projects in our AO did not substantially improve the economy or security or address compelling community needs. Eventually, CTF Devil moved to a systems approach to reconstruction. It required projects to be well planned and sustainable, and to complement other development efforts. For instance, road networks became favored projects because they often paved the way for a broader system of development.

In one example, CTF Devil created numerous farm-to-market systems in "red" districts and border provinces. Figure 3 illustrates the complexity of a farm-to-market system in Jalalabad that used CERP projects to complement or leverage existing NGO- or USAID-generated projects. This particular system included projects to improve productivity such as USDA classes on low-cost, modern planting techniques. It also included projects to build irrigation channels, flood control walls, and roads connecting district farms with their principal markets. Whether constructing a grain storage facility just off a new road or building a secondary road to a bazaar where the farmer could sell his product more conveniently, the task force aimed to create mutually reinforcing effects.

Northern Access System (Nangarhar)

Medical School Dining Facility– $85K
Hospital Public Latrine– $75K
University Chicken Raising Facility– $6K
South JAF Road Construction– $61K
Shewa to Dari Road– $199K
Asadabad
USAID road
Kabul
UN Road
Cold Storage Facility USAID
J'Bad Agricultural Cooperative– $50K
Research Station Irrigation Scheme– $12K
USAID Rd
Ghosta Irrigation– $300K
Highway 1 Road– $175K
Jalalabad
Olive Oil Factory– $100K
Chparhar
Khogyani to Chapahar– $148K
Pacir Wa Agam to Chapahar– $148K
Qatargay Irrigation– $150K
Shahi Kot to Highway 1 Road– $148K
Torkham
UN Road
Khogyani
Pacir
Farm to Market Orchard Roads– $350K
DAI Orchard
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Subtotal $1.934M

Figure 3. "Farm to Market System" briefed to CJTF-76 commander, Fall 2005.

CTF Devil sometimes had to win over key persons or populations to this systems approach. It avoided building projects in response to requests from government officials if the endeavors would not add to existing development systems. There were exceptions, but they required the CTF commander's approval, and he granted such exceptions only if the coalition could gain some significant operational advantage as a result.

As CTF Devil executed this intensified, systems-oriented plan, the working relationship with USAID and other agencies began to improve. The task force assessed the effects it delivered and analyzed the issues it faced in areas where traditional development was failing or simply not occurring. It realized that, in some cases, it was better to complement or set the conditions for NGO and international community development rather than try to initiate projects itself. It also found it could work with these organizations directly or indirectly. CTF Devil's USAID representative served as a bridge between coalition forces and other U.S. aid and reconstruc-

tion organizations. Through the intercession of our representative, the task force was able to capitalize on opportunities to reinforce existing initiatives.

For instance, CTF Devil benefited from a UNAMA-brokered agreement, the Zadran Arc Initiative (named for the tribe inhabiting the region), to promote development in areas of discontent in Khowst, Paktiya, and Paktika provinces. It built on the goodwill created by this agreement, started a major road project, and then began building police stations, clinics, and schools. The area had been a safe haven for Jalaluddin Haqqani elements and Taliban forces, but no longer is, thanks to the broadly supported agreement.

In most cases, once the coalition created a more secure environment, non-governmental and international organizations soon followed. The task force encouraged the PRTs to make the most of their presence by seeking the organizations' input to their reconstruction programs. Combined Task Force Devil tasked the PRTs to work with UNAMA and

the NGOs in their sector to start up or encourage the expansion of provincial development councils. The purpose of these development councils was to set development priorities and bring order to otherwise haphazard reconstruction efforts.

Sequencing and synchronization of reconstruction projects became a major priority. Schools, roads, administrative buildings, police checkpoints, mosques, medical clinics, and courthouses built out of sequence with, or without links to, other projects usually had little positive impact and could even be counterproductive. In one case a police checkpoint built far away from an existing road actually became a liability because its isolation made it vulnerable to attack. A few months into this heightened reconstruction effort, CTF Devil tasked the PRTs and maneuver battalions to review the timing of current and future projects, so the task force could spend subsequent reconstruction dollars more wisely.

The CTF Devil staff started this review process by conducting a seminar on the systems approach to development. The staff illustrated what a synchronized approach should look like and how it should have links to other projects in time and location. CTF Devil asked each unit to re-assess, re-evaluate, and refine reconstruction plans to reflect a systems approach. In the final planning step, unit commanders briefed the CTF commander, who approved a project only if it met one or more of four criteria:

● The project was in a red area.
● It linked directly to another system.
● The specific endeavor had buy-in from key government and tribal leaders.
● The project was sustainable.

CTF Devil denied many proposed projects because the PRTs and maneuver commands tended to invest in stand-alone projects, an outgrowth of attempts to placate local and tribal leaders with whom units engaged.

U.S. Interagency Teamwork

A wide array of U.S. agencies converged on Afghanistan after November 2001. Understanding what their roles were and where they operated was important to CTF Devil's becoming an effective interagency team member.

The State Department assigned political officers (POLADs) to the eight U.S. PRTs and to CTF

Headquarters in Khost province. The POLADs had four primary tasks:
● Advising and mentoring Afghan leaders to govern more effectively.
● Acting as reporting officers, tasked with providing information on political, military, economic, and social trends to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
● Serving as conduits of information about the border fight in Pakistan to help define U.S. government policies in Afghanistan at the national level.
● Promoting U.S. government policies within the provincial governments.

The POLADS accompanied CTF commanders to meetings with Afghan political and military leaders. They helped commanders prepare for bilateral meetings and carry out reviews after negotiations or engagements were complete.[4] POLADS developed the social, tribal, political, and economic components of the counterinsurgency, allowing commanders to focus more on military concerns. Maintaining an awareness of these nonmilitary components might have otherwise been more elusive.

USAID assigned officers, designated as field program officers, to all the PRTs and to the coalition headquarters staff. These officers—
● Administered USAID projects at the provincial level.
● Advised military officers on development issues.
● Advised IRoA ministers and governors on long-term reconstruction and development strategy.
● Reported to USAID headquarters in Kabul.
● Worked with NGOs and international organizations to find ways to complement their projects with the development efforts of USAID and CTF Devil. In short, they coordinated development strategy at the provincial level.

The USAID officer in charge worked at CTF headquarters and from there managed representatives at the PRTs. Unlike the POLADs, all USAID representatives were contractors, not career employees. Successfully integrating these contractors into PRT operations depended upon a PRT commander's ability to integrate military development efforts with those of the interagency and international community. The USAID representatives taught PRTs how to gain support for projects from tribal and government stakeholders, and encouraged the task force to seek ways to link CERP reconstruction

efforts to USAID and international organization development projects.

Agricultural development in most of RC East proved necessary for long-term economic viability. United States Department of Agriculture officers provided development advice to the IRoA, the CTF, and, to a lesser extent, cooperatives and individual farmers. Although not present in most RC East PRTs, USDA officers worked on the staffs of three key posts (task force headquarters and the Ghazni and Jalalabad PRTs) for much of CTF Devil's tenure. These officers breathed life into USAID's alternative livelihood programs. They provided advice on which crops to substitute for the opium poppy and focused on implementing agricultural programs like micro-credit for farmers. They also helped devise high-impact but simple projects that enhanced the value of crops grown by desperately poor farmers. That said, the relatively limited USDA presence in RC East prevented the task force from making the most of its agricultural development programs.

The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in RC East, with hub offices at Gardez and Jalalabad, worked closely with U.S. government political and military officers. UNAMA had a wide mandate, ranging from conflict resolution to human rights monitoring. It played a substantial role in organizing the National Assembly and provincial council elections. Harnessing UNAMA's energy was imperative if CTF Devil was to reach the population effectively. Because UNAMA officers typically had been in Afghanistan for three or more years, had established trust with Afghan officials, and had developed keen insights into the motivations of district and provincial governors, they often served as the continuity in the provinces as military units rotated in and out of the battlespace.

Military CERP and USAID FY 2005 budgets for development in RC East highlighted the importance of interagency teamwork. CTF Devil had $29 million budgeted for development; USAID had 10 times that amount for the same area. Seeing the vast potential for COIN progress if CTF Devil and USAID collaborated, the task force commander directed that development planning involve a concerted effort to bring our two organizations closer together.

From early on, however, CTF Devil encountered staggering gaps in communication, cooperation, and collaboration among representatives of the various agencies. USAID bureaucratic practices also obstructed teamwork and collaboration. Part of the challenge lay in the fact that over 90 percent of in-country USAID representatives were contractors serving under the agency's aegis and their contracts had no explicit provisions for cooperation. The larger problem, however, was the restrictive nature of USAID's development-fund distribution rules. Given USAID's relatively abundant resources, and the direct link between development progress and security, the agency's bureaucratic necessities proved universally frustrating. Nevertheless CTF Devil redoubled efforts, beginning at the brigade headquarters, to forge stronger interagency bonds and increase collaboration with representatives at the PRTs.

These efforts increased interagency integration throughout the command. The CTF overcame philosophical differences and, gradually, set new standards for interagency teamwork. When the CTF's deputy commander began including interagency representatives in PRT meetings and the executive officer started integrating them into the staff estimate process, partnership dynamics improved steadily. As CTF staff emphasized each success in their areas of responsibility, the PRTs and their interagency representatives began to develop into a stronger team. USAID, State Department, and USDA representatives increased their presence and influence in each PRT's area of operation. In the end, these representatives became valued PRT staff members and, along with UNAMA representatives, effective partners within the task force.

Integrating IO

CTF Devil found information operations most effective when Afghans employed them without the appearance of U.S. influence. Information operations messages designed and released solely by U.S. forces often came out too late or were ill suited for the Afghan region or tribe they targeted. Messages were much more effective when Afghan leaders cooperated and spoke directly to the people.[6]

Thus, CTF Devil chose to promote Programme Takhm-e Sohl ("Strengthening the Peace," or PTS), the Afghan government's reconciliation program. Given the success achieved by those governors who actively supported PTS, the task force commander believed that this Afghan-implemented program could become a "war winner." The task force

therefore encouraged local governors to support and manage this initiative. It yielded significant results when insurgents came down from the mountains and left Pakistan to swear allegiance to the Afghan government.[7] One governor, Hakim Taniwal in Paktia province, experienced noteworthy success with this program. He reached out to insurgents and engaged local tribal leaders to ensure no vendettas or revenge killings would ensue after the insurgents returned. Taniwal then brought in the insurgents, ran them through a vetting process in Kabul, and returned them to the provincial seat of Gardez. There he cycled them through a carefully orchestrated, elaborate allegiance ceremony in which tribal elders swore responsibility for the reconciled insurgents' future actions. Taniwal broadcast these ceremonies on the radio and kept track of the reconciled fighters to ensure they were not simply using the program to infiltrate the province. These reconciled insurgents typically encouraged other Taliban members to lay down their arms through the PTS program. Taniwal even employed a reconciled member of the Taliban as the director for his provincial support office of reconciliation.

Another governor, Shah Mahmood Safi in Lagman province, convinced tribal leaders to declare insurgents outside the protection of the Pashtun tradition of sanctuary, thus denying them a base from which to operate and forcing many to become part of the legitimate process. Still another governor, Assadullah Wafa in Kunar province, used PTS with IO reinforcement, often calling provincial shuras to gain the support of key tribal leaders. To make a case for peace, he regularly sent emissaries from the shuras to engage tribes that supported the Taliban and HiG (a fundamentalist faction of the mujahedeen) in the Korengal and Matin valleys. He also used radio addresses to tell the people of Kunar that specific tribes were "rebelling against the government" and that he was considering "turning loose" the coalition to defeat them if they did not reconcile.

Each provincial governor only needed a simple prod and minimal support to make his IO program work for PTS. Provinces where governors offered only token support to PTS did not yield results no matter how hard the task force worked. As a lesson learned, a successful reconciliation program like PTS should be the host nation's program, run by a regional or provincial authority with national oversight.

Of course, the PTS program came with some risks. In addition to the possibility of revenge killings, infiltrators might have used the PTS program as a shield. Experience suggested, however, that the power of one reconciled insurgent on the radio had the potential to effect more progress and influence more people than an infantry battalion on the attack.[8]

Measuring Success and the Way Ahead

While "metrics" of success in COIN are difficult to identify and even more challenging to track, they are nonetheless important. They serve as indicators to identify and monitor progress effectively, and they can suggest the need to modify plans. CTF Devil tracked negative indicators such as numbers of IED and rocket attacks, but it did not overemphasize them. The task force focused more on indicators of success. For instance, CTF Devil carefully cataloged when NGOs returned to a province. Their return implied security had reached the point where they felt safe enough to operate. When Afghan development ministries became involved in quality control for reconstruction projects, the CTF staff interpreted this as an indicator of growth in Afghan autonomous capacity. Similarly, unilateral operations by the Afghan army, from company to brigade level, suggested progress in military self-sufficiency. Another positive area was the number of IEDs found, reported, and turned in by Afghans. The coalition also noted that despite concerted efforts by the Taliban to disrupt national and provincial elections, over 50 percent of registered voters voted anyway.

The combined efforts of CTF Devil units, U.S. interagency representatives, Afghan government leaders, and international and non-governmental organizations were the driving force in achieving significant progress during OEF VI. Overall, the economy expanded, the government increased its reach, a successful election occurred, and the Taliban did not make appreciable gains in eastern Afghanistan.

As aforementioned, the Afghan people were and are the center of gravity in the COIN fight in eastern Afghanistan. Where the people see a tangible reason to take risk and side with their government, the Taliban will lose. The CTF's job was to help the Afghan government enhance security and win the people's trust. As in most countries, Afghans will

Khost Governor Pathan greets the Sabari district sub-governor during preparations for Afghan provincial council elections, 6 June 2005.

vote their pocketbooks, and if they do not perceive tangible economic benefits implying a hopeful future, they may throw out the Karzai government and side with the fundamentalists.

Education metrics will be telling as well. Democracy is unlikely to flourish in the long term if Afghanistan does not advance beyond its current, woefully low level of education, one that primarily serves religious dogma. Opportunities for a liberal arts education will have to be made available to help give the people the intellectual wherewithal to resist the Taliban's otherworldly propaganda and scare tactics. Countering the Taliban with logic and reason may seem too obvious to suggest, but it truly is the answer for encouraging a more moderate religious influence.

Numerous problems remain, including endemic corruption, unhealthy rivalries between tribes, poor infrastructure, a growing drug trade, instability in Pakistan and attendant cross-border attacks, low government revenues, a weak economy, and, as noted, a dark-ages educational framework. Decades of work remain to rebuild Afghanistan. Strong personal relationships and a focus on building Afghan security capacity are the keys to achieving unity of

effort and, by extension, longer-term success in the Afghan COIN effort.

An important take-away from CTF Devil's year-long struggle to achieve and maintain unity of effort is that *where the military endeavor is concerned, there can only be one chief within a regional command.* U.S. forces should always place reconstruction and kinetic operations under the direction of one commander to prevent a constant shifting of priorities. This was the case for CTF Devil during OEF VI. With eight PRTs and five maneuver battalions all under the operational control of CTF Devil, the span of control at the brigade level was larger than some division-sized organizations, but it worked.

Experience has been the best source of practical knowledge in this regard. CTF Devil benefited greatly from lessons passed on to us by our predecessors from CTF Thunder in OEF V. In OEF VII, CTF Spartan built on the successes CTF Devil achieved but refined their plans based on changing threats and challenges. Such is the nature of coalition-forces progress in Afghanistan, where each successive CTF stands on the shoulders of those that came before. Each task force, with its varied commands (Airborne, Marine Corps, Army

2d Battalion, 504th Infantry paratroopers leaving a landing zone, Patika province, Afghanistan, 25 May 2005.

National Guard, and PRTs), in cooperation with the myriad of U.S. and international aid agencies, develops experience and perspective that successive OEF iterations draw upon. Each of these contributions to evolving the COIN fight has helped to place us on the road to winning. ***MR***

NOTES

1. LTC David Kilcullen, Australian Army, *Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,* Joint Information Operations Center (IO Sphere Publication), 35.

2. 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, had been deployed to Afghanistan as part of OEF III (2003-2004) under the same brigade commander as OEF VI. In OEF III, it routinely conducted coalition-only operations, mainly with attached Italian, Romanian, and French forces.

3. LtCol Jim Donnellan's 2/3 Marines worked in the northern sector of RC East; LTC Tom Donovan's 2-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) and LTC Tim McGuire's 1-508 PIR in the CTF's central sector; and LTC Orlando Salinas' 3-141 IN (TXARNG) and LTC Dave Anders 1-325 Airborne Infantry Regiment in the west.

4. LtCol Pete Donnelly, a veteran of Operation Anaconda from OEF I, commanded the 13th Air Support Operations Squadron, and deployed with the CTF. He was instrumental in forming an exceptional joint team for combat operations by certifying joint tactical air controllers (JTACs), training units without JTACs (such as PRTs) to call in close air support, personally calling in airstrikes, and finding the best way for the Air Force to mass effects on the ground. Support from USAF A-10s, B-1Bs, B-52s, HH-60s and USN EA6Bs as well as intelligence platforms such as U2s, JSTARS, and Predator-Bs, was phenomenal.

5. Political officers like Rob Kemp, Liam Walsley, Harold Ingram, and numerous other brave Americans often accompanied commanders on patrol and air assaults to get a first-hand read of the battlefield.

6. Combined operations proved especially effective at producing IO messages and engagements that showed the Afghan people the strength and reach of their government in ways that fit culturally. Often the U.S.-produced products failed because the writers in Bagram did not understand the cultural context.

7. Twenty-four additional Taliban leaders were pending acceptance into the Afghan-run program at CTF Devil's transfer of authority.

8. One incident during CTF Devil's tenure perfectly illustrates the power of Afghan-delivered IO. In November 2005 (during Ramadan), a backpack bomb exploded inside Tani Mosque in Khost province, killing a popular pro-government imam and three other civilians. The imam's killing sent shock waves throughout the country, but produced the opposite effect from the one the Taliban sought. President Karzai condemned the attack and called for a full investigation of the murder. Initially, the provincial governor, Merajudin Pathan, insisted he would not attend the funeral because he was not a family member, but with some prompting from the PRT commander in Khost (LTC Chuck Miller), the governor changed his mind and handled the situation very differently: in addition to attending the funeral, he went to the hospital to visit those injured in the bombing, closed schools to ensure the community was fully mobilized, called for mass demonstrations in the streets, invited the press to follow him around the entire day, and held a 20-minute press interview with *Al Jazeera*. The city of Khost united in anger against the Taliban. With just minimal support, the governor took charge of the situation, organized thousands of people to march through the streets and condemn the Taliban, and set a classic leadership example for other Afghan governors to follow.

COMMITTING TO AFGHANISTAN:
The Case for Increasing U.S. Reconstruction and Stabilization Aid

Captain Craig C. Colucci, U.S. Army

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PHOTO: An Afghan boy waves as a U.S. convoy passes by in Panjuay, Afghanistan, 2004. Is he still waving in 2007? (courtesy of the author)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN as a successful nation-state is at grave risk, and its failure could have a resounding strategic and economic impact on the United States and, indeed, the entire world. This summer will be a critical time, as increasing instability threatens to unravel the initial successes achieved after the U.S. invasion in 2001.

Four major, interconnected problems threaten the stability of the country: a strong resurgence of the Taliban, a substantial increase in violence, an alarming growth in opium production, and a demoralized population with little faith that their quality of life will improve and serious misgivings about the conduct of the Afghan Government and NATO forces.[1] At the same time, the United States has decreased its contributions for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) aid.[2] Over the course of the War on Terrorism, R&S funding for Afghanistan has been minimal in relation to overall war costs and meager compared to those of past U.S. nation-building efforts. This "bare bones" spending policy is one of the factors threatening the stability of Afghanistan. Should the Afghan state fail or the government weaken, this shortsighted approach will have caused economic woes for the United States.

We should not lose hope, however, for there has been a renewed focus on Afghanistan by President Bush's administration. In January, President Bush announced he is seeking $10.6 billion in aid to Afghanistan over the next two years. This funding allocation would designate $8.6 billion for training and equipping Afghan forces and $2 billion for reconstruction.[3] However, do not break out the "mission accomplished" signs yet, because two problems exist with this funding. First, Afghanistan needs the aid right now—not later—to fight against another spring and summer Taliban offensive. Second, $2 billion is not nearly enough to address Afghanistan's reconstruction requirements. The United States should increase R&S funding for Afghanistan immediately to

combat the increasing number of serious challenges that threaten its stability and to prevent future economic problems for America.

Increasing Instability

The Taliban is making a violent resurgence throughout Afghanistan.[4] Last October, Afghan President Hamid Karzai attributed this resurgence to the "lack of a proper police force, lack of a proper military force, and because of the general inability of the country, weakened by years of destruction, to provide that kind of protection to the public."[5] In September 2006, two *Newsweek* correspondents met with a Taliban leader residing just a two-hour drive south of the capital, Kabul. They reported, "Ridge by ridge and valley by valley, the religious zealots [Taliban] who harbored Osama bin-Laden before 9/11—and who suffered devastating losses in the U.S. invasion that began five years ago–are surging back into the country's center."[6] Recently, Taliban leaders said that they have 10,000 fighters and suicide bombers ready to fight.[7]

Violence is accompanying the resurgence of the Taliban. Civilian and military casualties are mounting at alarming levels.[8] U.S. combat-related casualties in and around Afghanistan have doubled since February 2005 (see figure 1).[9] The increasing use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers prompted the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit Afghanistan in September 2006 to address the situation.[10] The violence has greatly hindered Afghanistan's reconstruction. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which leads reconstruction in Afghanistan, notes, "Security remains the greatest obstacle to development in Afghanistan."[11]

The increasing drug cultivation adds to the problems. President Karzai said that the country needs to destroy opium, or opium will destroy Afghanistan.[12] In that case, the 49 percent annual increase in opium cultivation (6,100 metric tons) in 2006 might be an early sign of impending disaster.[13] The drug trade is equivalent to more than 50 percent of the country's gross domestic product and accounts for 90 percent of the world's supply of opium, with an estimated export value of $2.7 billion in 2005.[14] Ayesha Khan, an expert on Afghanistan and associate fellow at the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs, explains, "Poppy cultivation

map courtesy of Air Force link www.af.mil

is also a major problem, as is the power of regional warlords which is sustained by the opium economy, and which undermines Karzai's writ across the country. The warlords and drug economy have a profoundly destabilizing effect."[15]

The most damaging trend has been the population's growing discontent with and lack of confidence in the government and in U. S. and NATO forces. The number of civilian casualties from violence has been so great that NATO's top commander, U.S. General James L. Jones, apologized

49 percent increase in U.S. combat-related deaths in Afghanistan from February 2006 to February 2007 —205 percent since February 2005.

Source: U.S. DoD Casualty Reports

Figure 1. Cumulative totals of U.S. military killed in action in and around Afghanistan, February 2004 to February 2007.

Soldiers provide medical aid to a child in Maywand, Afghanistan, 2004.

for the deaths caused by fighting between NATO and the Taliban.[16] In October 2006, NATO forces bombed a village that housed Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan, killing anywhere from 12 to 85 civilians, depending on the source. In response to the bombing, a local Afghan leader was quoted as saying, "At the moment there is very little public support for NATO, but it is not the end of the world. If NATO wants cooperation from people they should change their strategy and stop fighting and build roads and schools."[17]

Besides violence, Afghans suffer from inadequate public services, poor transport infrastructure, limited access to health care, and widespread human rights abuses.[18] The United Nations World Food Program claims that almost half the population of Afghanistan suffers from malnutrition.[19] According to the World Bank, "only 13 percent of Afghans have access to safe water, 12 percent to adequate sanitation, and just 6 percent to electricity."[20] Summing up the mood of the Afghan population, Jabar Shigari, a member of the Afghan Parliament from Ghazni, noted, "We have patiently waited five years for change, for an end to official corruption and abuse of power and for economic development. But we've received nothing."[21]

Decreasing R&S Commitment

U.S. R&S spending in Afghanistan falls short of the commitment necessary to achieve stability and develop the country. Although the United States remains the greatest contributor to Afghanistan, its R&S funding levels are insignificant compared to

the costs of the overall War on Terrorism and past nation-building endeavors.

The Congressional Research Service divides U.S. R&S aid into four categories and by percentage of total budget allocated: reconstruction (41 percent), foreign aid programs (37 percent), training security forces (17 percent), and new embassies (5 percent).[22] The U.S. Department of State and USAID manage the reconstruction, new embassies, and foreign aid program categories, while the Department of Defense (DOD) controls funding for training security forces and a small-scale ($400 million) reconstruction fund called the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, a discretionary fund used by military leaders to help the population.[23]

Both DOD and USAID have an important role in stabilizing Afghanistan—USAID through reconstruction, which can reduce the problems that plague Afghanistan's infrastructure, economic development, and health and education systems, and DOD by training security forces, which will strengthen the Afghan police and military. President Bush's $8 billion will be crucial for security assistance, but additional funds for reconstruction must follow.

Despite the need, reconstruction funds for Afghanistan have been declining. Over the last four years, USAID contributed about $3.5 billion for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, but from 2005 to 2006, its contributions declined 60 percent, from $1.5 billion to $617 million. Although USAID projects an incremental increase in funding for FY 2007, upping the allocation to $802.8 million, overall spending for the country has declined 29 percent since 2004.[24] In addition, the dollar amount USAID received for reconstruction has fluctuated so much that it has been extremely difficult to program reconstruction projects: in 2005, USAID's budget proposed $1 billion for FY 2007, but the agency only received $802.8 million (see figure 2).[25]

The decline in spending for R&S in Afghanistan is consistent with a decline in R&S funding for the War on Terrorism. In testimony before Congress, the U.S. Comptroller General reported that the difference between military and R&S spending was $20 billion in 2004, but military spending rose by almost 90 percent in 2006, while R&S spending decreased 64 percent (see figure 3).[26] President

Source: USAID 2007 Program Summary Data

Figure 2. USAID reconstruction spending in Afghanistan.

Source: Congressional testimony of U.S. Comptroller David Walker

Figure 3. Total GWOT spending FY 2001–2006.

Bush's additional $10.6 billion for FY 2007 seems like an attempt to close the gap, but a 25 percent increase in military spending, bringing it to $150 billion for 2007, suggests otherwise.[27]

Moreover, Afghanistan R&S aid represents only a tiny portion of the cost of the War on Terrorism. The Congressional Budget Office reports that the United States will have appropriated $26 billion for Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008 for indigenous security forces, diplomatic operations, and foreign aid. Although this is a huge sum of money, $26 billion is a mere 3.5 percent of the $746 billion cost of the War on Terrorism during this period and not even a true reflection of how lean reconstruction spending really is.[28] The $802.8 million budgeted by USAID for 2007 reconstruction is one-half of one percent of the $150 billion cost of the War on Terrorism.

The Vital Importance of R&S Funding in Afghanistan

In October 2006, NATO's General Jones said efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and establish the rule of law posed the biggest challenge. He stated, "I'm confident that we can take on any military challenge that there is and be successful, but the real challenge in Afghanistan is how well the reconstruction mission—the international aid mission—is focused."[29] A commitment to reconstruction is vital to Afghanistan's existence, and increased funding is necessary to complete this task.

Studies have shown that time and resources are necessary for successful nation building. In 2003, the Rand Corporation analyzed U.S. and international military, political, and economic activities in post-conflict situations since World War II to determine principles for success and implications for future U.S. military operations. One of the key lessons learned was that time and resources lead to nation-building success. The study concluded: "What distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, on the one hand, from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, on the other, are not their levels of economic development, Western culture, or national homogeneity. Rather, what distinguishes these two groups are the levels of effort the international community has put into their democratic transformations. Successful nation building, as this study illustrates, needs time and resources. The United States and its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops per capita into post conflict Kosovo than into post conflict Afghanistan (see figure 4). This higher level of input accounts, at least in part, for the higher level of output in terms of democratic institutions and economic growth."[30]

Although more R&S aid has been spent in Afghanistan since Rand's 2003 study, it has been insufficient. The international community has committed $15 billion, but the pledges still fall significantly short of the $24.7 billion the Afghan government estimates it will need through 2010 to rebuild the country, and actual contributions from the international community have been less than half the amount promised.[31] Last September, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said, "We need more in terms of

Figure 4. Total assistance during first two post-conflict years.

investment in Afghan infrastructure. We need more resources for road building, counternarcotics, good governance, and a justice system."[32]

U.S. military doctrine clearly explains the dire need for R&S aid in nation building. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, states, "Most valuable to long-term success in winning the support of the populace are the contributions land forces make by conducting stability operations. Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions . . . to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 1-02)." It continues, "Success in stability operations enables the local populace and HN [Host Nation] government agencies to resume or develop the capabilities needed to conduct COIN operations and create conditions that permit U.S. military forces to disengage."[33]

Increased Funding Needed Immediately

Combating the instability caused by the Taliban, violence, drugs, and demoralization of the population will take more money than forecasted for R&S. In 2004, Afghanistan released its National Development Strategy, which estimated external funds needed for its capital and development budget at $24.678 billion (see figure 5).[34] Last year an agreement between Afghanistan and the international community identified three broad priorities for the country's continued development: security; governance, the rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development.[35] These priorities are in line with Afghanistan's National Development Strategy and coincide with USAID's more focused priorities for development: agriculture and alternative livelihoods; basic education and health; infrastructure, democracy and governance; and economic growth.[36] The priorities both meet the demand of Afghanis and address the destabilization factors and significant human welfare problems. Figure 6 shows what USAID spent addressing these priorities from 2001-2006.[37]

The Plan

Afghanistan needs another $12 billion for FY 2008-2010 in addition to President Bush's $10.6 billion. Bush's $8.6 billion for security forces would be spent at $4.3 billion per year for the remainder of FY 2007 and 2008 and an additional $2 billion per year for FYs 2009 and 2010. Thus,

Pillar 1: Human and Social Protection	6,896
1.1 Refugee return	155
1.2 Education	2,703
1.3 Health and nutrition	1,368
1.4 Rural livelihoods and social protection	2,272
1.5 Culture/media/sports	400

Pillar 3: Security and the Private Sector	4,353
3.1 Trade and investment	690
3.2 Public admin. and eco. management	1,092
3.3 Justice	93
3.4 Police, law enforcement	645
3.5 National Army	1,043
3.6 DDR	216
3.7 Counter Narcotics	164
3.8 Mine action	420

28%

54%

18%

USD million – Total Commitments	
GRAND TOTAL	**24,678**

Pillar 2: Physical Infrastr. & Nat. Resources	13.429
2.1 Transport	6,136
2.2 Energy, mining, telecommunications	3,606
2.3 Natural resources	1,849
2.4 Urban management	1,839

Figure 5. Capital and development budget from the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

Figure 6. Breakdown of USAID funds ($3.5 billon) in Afghanistan, 2001–2006.

the stabilization total would be $12.6 billion from FY 2007–2010.

For reconstruction, $1 billion of Bush's $2 billion commitment would be spent in the remainder of FY 2007. The other billion, plus an additional $2 billion, would be spent in FY 2008. FY 2009 and 2010 would have $3 billion each. Thus, the reconstruction total for 2007-2010 would be $10 billion (see figure 7). Of the $3 billion per year for reconstruction funding, $2.5 billion should be used to continue USAID's current spending program, which follows the priorities set by the Afghan Government. The remaining $500 million should be CERP funds, to be utilized by military commanders on the ground through provincial reconstruction teams and individual task forces.

This two-pronged approach— reconstruction and security forces—addresses infrastructure, economic development, and health issues through USAID, while simultaneously having an immediate and positive impact on Afghan military forces. CERP funds are essential because they encourage the population to support the government and NATO forces. Increased reconstruction would decrease instability, while funding for security forces training

	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	*TOTALS*
Reconstruction	1	1	2	3	3	*10*
Stabilization	4.3	4.3	2	2	*12.6*

President Bush's proposed	10.6
Recommended increase	12

Figure 7. Proposed FY 2007–2010 Afghan R&S Budget.
(in billions)

would empower the Afghan police and military to eliminate the Taliban and help bring stability and peace to the country.

Perhaps most important, these funds would become calculable cash flows for Afghanistan, USAID, and NATO. Similar to any business, a reliable cash flow will allow Afghanistan and USAID to plan and institute a more thorough development plan because they will know when funds will be available in the future. In the Afghanistan Compact, signed this past February, international donors (including the United States) committed to "increasingly provide more predictable and multiyear funding commitments or indications of multiyear support to Afghanistan to enable the Government to plan better the implementation of its National Development Strategy and provide untied aid whenever possible."[38]

It is crucial that the United States live up to its obligation and provide sufficient funding so that the Afghan Government can implement its strategy for stability and growth.

Importance of a Stable Afghanistan

If, as some say, winning is no longer a possibility in Iraq, then a loss in Afghanistan in which the Taliban gains its old training grounds back to stage future terrorist attacks would mean the United States has lost the War on Terrorism.[39] Such a failure would embolden and empower Al-Qaeda, and the staggering costs of attacks similar to that of 11 September 2001, plus the increased security measures to prevent further attacks, would lead to direct costs and indirect effects that influence the U.S. economy.

Before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda were in the country working closely with Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban. The August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the October 2000 USS *Cole* bombing, and the 11 September 2001 attacks were all planned in Afghanistan.[40]

Now, once again, the Taliban is operating in some areas of Afghanistan. If Al-Qaeda is not there already, it soon will be. A failed Afghan state or even one with a weak government would allow Al-Qaeda to establish planning, operations, training, and recruiting nodes in the country. Military historian

Stephen Tanner claims that it would be dangerous for the United States to abandon Afghanistan. He writes, "Instant global communication with its consequent accessibility to weapons technology can make even the poorest or most remote nation a threat to the world. . . After a half-century of cold war, the United States suffered the greatest foreign attack in its history not from the gigantic armaments of Russia or China, but at the hands of a small group based on Afghan soil."[41]

Besides the loss of life, the economic costs resulting from the 11 September 2001 attacks were astounding. The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) estimates that the property damage and lost production of goods and services was over $100 billion. Moreover, "including the loss in stock market wealth—the market's own estimate arising from expectations of lower corporate profits and higher discount rates for economic volatility—the price tag approaches $2 trillion."[42] The $2 trillion estimate is 166 times greater than the $12 billion proposed for Afghanistan R&S aid from FY 2007 to FY 2010. According to New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson Jr., the attacks cost up to $95 billion and caused the loss of 146,000 jobs to the city alone.[43] On the conservative side, the economic cost of one day of a coordinated terrorist attack planned in Afghanistan, $95 billion, is almost 8 times the proposed R&S amount. Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff asserts that "another atrocity on the scale of September 11 would wreak havoc on energy prices, stock markets, and consumer confidence, slamming the brakes on today's global economic recovery."[44]

The economic impact of antiterrorism efforts can have a significant negative effect on the American and global economy. The hindered free flow of goods, services, and individuals across international borders can slow economic growth. U.S. immigration restrictions imposed after 9/11 are a case in point, for they prevent the influx of science and engineering knowledge from abroad. Innovation through science and research leads to U.S. economic growth and global competitiveness. When you consider that foreign-born immigrants account for more than one-fifth of America's scientists and engineers, you can understand the impact immigration restrictions may have on the Nation's growth. In addition, over 43 percent of America's Ph.D.'s are foreign born. First-time international student enrollment in graduate level science and engineering programs dropped by 13 percent from 2001 to 2003 (the latest year statistics were available). This decline may be the result of immigration restrictions.[45] If Rogoff is right that, "the U.S. economy grows in no small part by skimming the cream off of the rest of the world's workforce," the hidden costs of anti-terror efforts are great indeed.[46] Another example of antiterrorism measures slowing growth would be increased scrutiny of goods at American and international ports. As trade and the pace of goods through ports slow, costs will skyrocket and product innovation will be stifled. Rogoff sums up the effects thusly: "Any abatement of the competitive pressures of globalization or any reduction in the free movement of people and ideas would surely undercut growth–not to mention raise prices sharply at your local Wal-Mart."[47]

The Bottom Line

It is crucial that the United States increase R&S aid in Afghanistan immediately so that Afghanistan does not become a staging ground for terrorist operations. A failed Afghanistan will pose direct risks to U.S. strategic and economic interests. The resurgence of the Taliban, increased violence, the growth of opium production, and, consequently, a population with too little faith in their government and NATO forces, threaten the stability of the nation. The decreasing U.S. R&S commitment to Afghanistan is most likely fueling these factors. Reconstruction funding decreases of 60 percent will not lead to a more stable Afghanistan. Although President Bush has committed $10.6 billion, it is not enough to accomplish the mission. The United States must commit $12 billion in additional R&S aid to Afghanistan for 2007 to 2010 so the country and the international community can plan for and work toward stabilization. In the long run, a $12 billion investment for a stable and democratic state in Central Asia could save America and the world trillions of dollars in losses from terrorist attacks and the measures to prevent such attacks. True Afghanistan development must continue this summer with increased R&S funding. *MR*

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14. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 14 March 2006, *Top UN official in Afghanistan class on country to do utmost to meet Assistance Compact benchmarks.* Press Release, UNSC/8660, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8660.doc.htm>.

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This article is dedicated to the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Mike McMahon, squadron commander of 3-4 Cavalry, who made the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan in November 2004. His focus on reconstruction and civil-military operations made a difference in the lives of thousands of Afghanis. LTC McMahon's untiring efforts and progressive-minded leadership will not be forgotten.

Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations

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and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wallen, U.S. Air Force**

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STABILITY OPERATIONS have played a significant role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1800s, and the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) reiterated their importance to current U.S. global interests. During such operations, actions to spur economic development are as important as military actions. The U.S., however, despite history and the NSS, still has no formal political or military structure tasked with facilitating the planning and execution of economic-development programs in stability operations. Instead, it has tried to make do with ad hoc arrangements planned and executed by the military.

Lessons learned from current stability operations point to the benefits of using a broad strategy that structurally integrates planning for governance, economics, and security. In testimony to Congress about the inadequate planning for stability operations in Iraq, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper said the solution "calls for an *interagency, deliberate planning process* much like the deliberate planning process we have in the military, where formal assignments are made within the interagency to get upfront commitment to what the post-major combat operations requirements will be."[1] Past stability operations, too, suggest that a coordinated interagency effort and a deliberate process would have produced faster progress in Iraq. By examining some of those operations, we can discern the significance that economics has for post-kinetic operations, as well as its implications for cooperative interagency processes in general.

Historical Examples

The 1948-1960 British campaign in Malaysia underscored the importance of economics to counterinsurgency (COIN) as well as the need for a coordinated economic plan within stability operations. In writing about the campaign, British COIN expert Sir Robert Thompson identified three forces influencing the Malaysian population: nationalism, religion and culture, and economic well-being.[2] Of the three, he gave primacy to economic well-being, stating that "however powerful nationalist or religious forces may be, that of

material well-being is as strong if not stronger."[3] Thompson also claimed that an insurgency needs an issue it can exploit to open up a seam between the people and the government, and economic inequality, either perceived or real, is one such issue. To combat an insurgency seeking to exploit economic inequality, then, requires a broad strategy that incorporates the various elements of civilian society equipped to address the problem and thereby influence the population.[4]

We can glean additional information about the role of economics in stability operations by looking at two U.S.-led missions generally considered successes: the reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany after World War II. In both cases, the United States clearly understood how important economic development was to the recovery and democratization of its former enemies. Leaders even went beyond executive authority, the doctrinal norm prior to World War II, to establish economic policy. These cases represent successes in overcoming institutional structural deficiencies.

In Japan, State War Navy Coordinating Committee memorandum 150/4, *Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan*, gave General Douglas MacArthur this guidance:

> Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander: (a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and (b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.[5]

The U.S. employed economic measures to demilitarize Japan; however, economic policies and actions were not limited to military affairs. MacArthur understood the vital relationship between politics, economics, security, and stability. Concerned that the Japanese would not accept his democratic reforms because of desperate economic conditions

Lieutenant General Lucius Clay (right), deputy military governor of Germany after World War II, talks with General Dwight D. Eisenhower during the Potsdam Conference, 20 July 1945.

at the time, he dispensed surplus military rations to the people and sent a telegram to Congress, urging it to "send me food or send me bullets." Congress chose food, appropriating $250 million worth of subsistence products to aid the Japanese, many of whom were without adequate housing and approaching starvation.[6] This economic aid played a major role in establishing an environment favorable to MacArthur's democratization program.

In Germany, conflicting policies complicated economic recovery. General Lucius Clay, deputy military governor of Germany after World War II, complained that JCS-1067, *Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany*, was "extremely difficult to operate under."[7] Clay explained that "if you followed [the directive] literally you couldn't have done anything to restore the German economy . . . When we were ordered to put in a currency reform, this was in direct contravention of a provision of JCS-1067 that prohibited us from doing anything to improve the German economy."[8] Realizing that economic revitalization would play a significant role in Germany's peaceful rehabilitation, Clay worked in a piecemeal fashion to circumvent JCS-1067's strict provisions.

Even as Clay labored to overcome JCS-1067, Germany's recovery was hampered by the fact that multiple nations had a hand in determining its economic policy, and they did not agree on how to proceed. France and the Soviet Union worked at cross-purposes with America and Britain, demanding reparations while the latter two were trying

to build a self-sustaining German economy. In *America's Role in Nation-building from Germany to Iraq*, James Dobbins describes the situation:

> The U.S. government forced German mines to deliver coal to France and other nearby states for free. In return, the U.S. zonal authorities provided miners with food and wages. In addition, the Soviet Union dismantled German plants in both the British and U.S. zones and shipped the equipment back to the Soviet Union as part of reparations. Thus, some of what was given was taken away by other governments.[9]

In short, Germany's case highlights many of the difficulties inherent in economic reconstruction. The absence of established doctrine and standing institutions designed specifically for planning, coordinating, and executing economic actions created confusion and inefficiencies that unnecessarily hindered the nation-building effort.

While individual initiative eventually overcame systemic problems in Germany and Japan, U.S. stability operations in Haiti (1915 to 1934, 1994 to 1996, and 2004) have consistently failed, revealing the ultimate costs of not having a well-integrated economic plan. Although the 1994 Haiti mission achieved some of its goals, such as restoration of the Aristide government, it did not address long-term economic and governance problems; consequently, Haiti is still in turmoil today.[10]

The examples of Japan, Germany, and Haiti validate Thompson's claim about the importance of a "systems approach" in stability operations. Institutions planning and executing economic operations within a stability operation should view an unstable nation as a system wherein failing to act in one area will cause ripples in other areas. Intervening forces cannot reform governance, economics, and security independently of one another. These functions are interdependent.

Institutions planning and executing economic operations… should view an unstable nation as a system wherein failing to act in one area will cause ripples in other areas.

Iraq: Economics and the "Golden Hour"

The relationship between economics and stability has not been lost on U.S. commanders in Iraq. In 2004, when Task Force Baghdad analyzed attacks in its area of operations, it found "a direct correlation existed [among] the level of local infrastructure status, unemployment figures, and attacks on U.S. soldiers."[11] Putting this analysis into practice, the task force consolidated funding in economic development projects where they believed the payoff would be greatest. After doing so, it confirmed "a direct correlation emerged between funding, when it became available to employ Sadr City residents . . . and a steep decline in the number of terrorist incidents occurring in the same area."[12]

As events in Iraq have also shown, it's not just the money that matters, but the speed with which it is disbursed. A victorious invading nation—assuming its mission is benevolent—has a "golden hour," a limited amount of time in which it enjoys host-nation

A U.S. Marine with Task Force Tarawa surveys some of the damage done to the city of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 31 March 2003.

popular support and international legitimacy.[13] If it fails to provide immediate and sufficient economic support to begin stabilizing and rebuilding the host nation within that time, people will turn against it and the conflict will go on. Any delay in stabilizing the situation beyond the golden hour will threaten the quality of eventual success and may even make progress in stability operations impossible.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, the *Washington Post*'s former Baghdad bureau chief and author of *Imperial Life in the Emerald City,* has observed that in Iraq it took too long to mobilize the resources required to demonstrate the U.S.'s commitment to reconstruction. Failure to move speedily led to disenchantment and frustration, hindering progress and setting the stage for insurgency. As has often been the case in interventions, during the golden hour in Baghdad the military was the only government agency with significant resources in-country. It had to act swiftly to gain the populace's confidence and secure the economic initiative; history shows that it did not. The military, however, should not be expected to go it alone during the golden hour. The best way to achieve stability quickly is to have and employ a formal, institutionalized structure with built-in interagency capacity and cooperation.

The Way Ahead

The United States should establish and maintain a standing institution that focuses on economic development during stability operations, one capable of taking immediate action during the golden hour of future contingencies. Such a capability should be permanent, functioning in peace as well as war. Senior staff must develop training and doctrine and integrate this capability into doctrinal stability operations. U.S. government institutions, however, do not appear to be building a sufficient, let alone robust, capability to do this. For example, the State Department's Active Response Corps (ARC), first responders who support U.S. missions, engage with host-nation governments, coordinate with international partners, and assess stabilization and reconstruction efforts, employ only 30 personnel worldwide. Given the nations, coalition partners, and international organizations (e.g., the World Bank Group: International Development Association, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation;

United Nations agencies; and the World Trade Organization) with which the State Department will have to coordinate, ARC's personnel requirements are closer to 1,500 than 30.

Start-up funding. President Bush's 2005 emergency supplemental funding request included $17 million for the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Congress approved $7 million.[14] Unfortunately, S/CRS fared no better in 2006. The president requested $24 million for S/CRS operating expenses and $100 million for a conflict response fund. He received nothing.[15] Congress did, however, approve an amendment to the Defense Appropriation Bill allowing the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer up to $200 million to the State Department for S/CRS.[16]

Unity of command. For economic-development activities in stability operations, unity of command is as important as unity of effort. Unity of command should not threaten any government agency's independence: only a dedicated portion of each agency in direct support of stability operations should ever come under the authority of a unified commander. Under these circumstances, an enforcement mechanism would probably be necessary to compel agencies to attach competent people to centralized commanders or directors. While National Security Policy Directive-44 (NSPD-44) recognizes the need for interagency integration, it does not enforce unity of command. The executive branch should follow-up NSPD-44 with a presidential-level document requiring unity of command in areas undergoing stability operations. In doing so, it should dictate the various government agencies' roles and responsibilities as well as the conditions under which any particular agency should assume overall direction.

Planning for economic operations. Prior to the onset of a stability operation, the primary players ought to be able to plan economic operations in an integrated fashion. USAID has realized the need to engage in deliberate and crisis-action planning and to send representatives to the military's unified commands to do so. Since the military is currently the primary organization developing these types of detailed plans, USAID's efforts are right on target. NSPD-44 directs the State Department to coordinate planning for stability operations. As such, S/CRS should aggregate the personnel requirements for

such planning and secure funding through Congress as a single program. In addition, S/CRS should organize and lead civilian planning cells within military commands engaged in building deliberate and crisis-action plans.

While economic planning should involve both Soldiers and civilians, there will be times during execution, especially in the golden hour, when civilian agencies will likely not be part of stability operations. Since the military may be the only organization in-country, it must understand economic development. The military should therefore retain reserve personnel with specialties in economics and commerce and increase the number of active-duty personnel capable of planning and executing economic operations. While this enhanced military capability would duplicate that found in civilian agencies, it would also ensure that economic development could begin before the civilian agencies arrived in-country. The Army civil affairs career field should retain economic and commerce capabilities at brigade and higher with enough force strength to supplement subordinate units when necessary. (Unfortunately, the civil affairs proponent has recently proposed reducing this specialty as part of an overall restructuring.) The civil affairs community should also assign active-duty personnel to act as advocates for economic development. These personnel would be able to—

● Facilitate continuity of purpose in developing and executing economic-development policy within the military.

● Coordinate active-duty and reserve personnel and assets for economic development.

● Liaise with other government agencies to ensure greater unity of effort in ongoing interagency doctrine development and training.

Training military personnel. DOD should expand the military financial career fields' training and duties to include economic development. By training financial personnel to be economic

> *The military should…retain reserve personnel with specialties in economics and commerce…*

developers and by rotating them to government agencies (like USAID) with expertise in economic development, the Army can create a corps of professionals to assume the reins during the golden hour. This expansion of duties would give commanders more—and more convenient—resources with which to solve economic development challenges. Military economic-development specialists could help units prepare for stability operations by injecting relevant experience into exercises and unique insights into the decision-making process.

Personnel whose duties have economic consequences, such as engineers and contracting officers, should also receive some training in economic development. Such training could help them anticipate the economic consequences their decisions might have during stability operations.

Interagency cooperation. In addition to making their personnel available during the golden hour, civilian agencies should have organic, deployable staffs to provide a capable and persistent presence during post-conflict stability operations. S/CRS estimates that it needs 3,000 additional personnel to meet such a requirement.[17] That's not a lot when you consider that DOD's end-strength is close to three million.

Civilians tasked to work with the military have to be capable of working with service personnel. They should therefore receive some form of professional military education. In 2006, the State Department sent three personnel to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, where students learn how the Army operates in the joint-interagency world. More should follow. Other interagency personnel could attend shorter courses designed to familiarize them with the military and such topics as its problem-solving methods. One educational venue might involve participation in a U.S. military joint and combined exercise.

Flexible funds. Commanders should have access to a variety of monetary instruments during stability operations, so they can spend money where it needs to be spent. For instance, they should be allowed to spend appropriated funds for stipulated purposes that directly contribute to reconstruction and development; that is to say, there should be no "funding fences" that restrict a leader's ability to respond to the evolving environment in his area of responsibility. This level of fiscal freedom would not mean that commanders could dispense funds

U.S. Army engineers from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, construct a guard shack and repair a bridge to allow foot and vehicle traffic with the hope of increasing commerce in Al Raoud, Iraq, 27 December 2007.

without constraint: as for every other appropriation it makes, Congress would set criteria that specifically address how funds could and could not be spent in stability operations. Furthermore, funding strictly tied to the in-theater ground portion of a stability operation should flow through the unified leader to the sub-organizations or units responsible for executing reconstruction and development. That will ensure at least some accountability.

Intelligence gathering. During the initial stages of an operation, units should look for economic intelligence that might assist in initiating and executing needed development. For Iraq, there are currently several sources from which to gather information on a local economy in a given area. One is the Department of Commerce website, which includes such things as the *Business Guide to Iraq*, the *Overview of Key Industries in Iraq*, and country commercial guides. Another source is USAID, which has economic intelligence about many of the 100 nations in which it maintains a presence. We should collect these points of contact and other economic intelligence resources at a centralized repository we can quickly access, so that govern-

ment agencies engaged in economic development can share information quickly and efficiently.

Center for economic education. America should establish a center responsible for formulating and promulgating training and doctrine related to economic development and reconstruction. The two missions ought to comprise a well-defined subset of a larger stability operations curriculum. This center could—

● Develop a common terminology and format for communication.

● Offer a broad series of training opportunities that would enhance the capabilities of all government agencies involved in economic development and reconstruction.

● Offer a certification program keyed to levels of training. (Each agency would aim to have a certain number of personnel certified at each level.)

● Formulate doctrine that gives authoritative (but not restrictive) guidance, so that agencies performing economic development have a common foundation from which to proceed. Some critical issues to sort out in doctrine are common procedures, roles and responsibilities, resources and skill sets needed, and

authorities required (such as warrants for personnel contracting on behalf of the U.S. government).

This center might be located at the National Defense University, the Naval Postgraduate School, or a similar school site. One of these institutions could become a hub of activity interfacing with other institutions, both government and non-government, to ensure economic training, doctrine, and research is as advanced as possible.

Conclusion

America should develop formal economic capabilities now to improve support to future stability operations. It needs to create a well-staffed and funded organization that can act in concert with interagency efforts to develop and pursue economic objectives in support of a given operation's overall objectives. Absent such coordinated support, the execution of economic missions during the initial stages of stability operations will remain ad hoc, and any positive outcomes will be short-lived. In developing an appropriate institutional structure to address economic development issues, the U.S. government must particularly consider the needs of a stability operation at its most critical time, during the golden hour. Taken today, in the early hours of the War on Terror, such steps could set the stage for long-term success tomorrow. *MR*

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The Role of USAID
and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism

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PHOTO: A displaced person picks up plastic sheeting to construct a shelter in a camp in Darfur. (USAID)

S INCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has played an increasingly prominent role in the War on Terrorism.[1] The agency's humanitarian and development assistance programs, especially those directed toward at-risk populations and regions, have been recognized as critical components in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and its accompanying National Implementation Plan.[2] These programs can play a crucial role in denying terrorists sanctuary and financing by diminishing the underlying conditions that cause local populations to become vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Moreover, USAID programs directed at strengthening effective and legitimate governance are recognized as key tools with which to address counterinsurgency.

Historically, USAID supported national security objectives by providing humanitarian assistance and fostering long-term economic and political progress in the developing world. However, as a result of a changing international environment, USAID was increasingly tasked to respond not only to humanitarian crises such as floods and famines, but also to complex emergencies in places like Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and, more recently, to crises in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Government-wide recognition of the importance of development in shoring up states prone to instability and vulnerable to terrorism has led to its designation as the third "D" in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS).[3] This designation makes development—along with diplomacy and defense—one of the key pillars of national security. The National Security Strategy noted that "development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies."[4]

Addressing Risk Factors

This change in doctrine led to internal and external changes at USAID. Internally, a white paper identified instability and conflict—present in many countries where USAID operates—as conditions terrorists seek to exploit. The paper noted the need for short-term, conflict-sensitive programming to stabilize these environments before USAID could implement its long-term, traditional development programs. In 2003, USAID established the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) to lead efforts to better identify the underlying causes of instability, conflict, and extremism and to design programs to ameliorate them.

The 2002 NSS also emphasized a "whole-of-government" approach to the War on Terrorism. Although various USAID offices, such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives, have worked with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies to conduct humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and reconstruction operations, the new strategy determined that a more holistic, integrated development-defense-diplomacy approach was required. Recognizing the need for a USAID specific entity to support this integrated interagency approach, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in 2005 to serve as the focal point for interactions between USAID and DOD, to improve USAID's capacity to work with governmental agencies and other actors in synchronized national-security programming, and to help develop USAID positions on national security issues. The office is staffed by former military officers, Foreign Service officers, and subject-matter specialists.

These internal and external changes have already produced a number of interagency initiatives to thwart terrorism. Some examples include the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and the newly planned joint counter-extremism projects in the Horn of Africa.[5]

Launched in 2004, TSCTI targets extremism, instability, and violence in the Sahel region of Africa. Supported by USAID's West Africa Regional Mission and several country missions and embassies, the State Department, USAID, and DOD's European Command (EUCOM) conducted joint assessments in several Sahelian countries to identify causes of extremism and terrorist recruitment. The assessments identified a number of factors, including remoteness, porous borders, proximity to known terrorist groups, large marginalized and/or disenfranchised populations, and exclusion from political processes, as key causes of instability in the region. Recommendations from the assessments led to targeted interventions in Mali, Niger, and Chad. Examples of such intervention include youth development, former combatant reintegration, education, rural radio and media programs, peace building/conflict management, and small-scale infrastructure projects such as drilling wells and constructing schools. USAID's TSCTI advisor maintains regular contact with EUCOM regarding the implementation of these programs.

In the Horn of Africa, USAID, the State Department, and the Combined Joint Task Force for Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) are collaborating on a number of counter-extremism projects based on a USAID funded assessment that examined the causes of extremism and identified the most unstable areas in the region. To implement these initiatives, CJTF-HOA is building or rehabilitating essential infrastructure such as schools, clinics, and wells (hardware), while USAID is providing educational and medical training and resources, developing instructional materials, and building institutional capacity (software).

As an illustration, USAID's East Africa Mission based in Nairobi teamed with CJTF-HOA to rehabilitate 10 clinics and hospitals in the urban and district capitals of Djibouti. CJTF-HOA carried out the physical rehabilitation, and USAID provided health care training to local health care providers. This integrated programming is facilitated by improved interagency communication. Examples of this integration include CJTF-HOA staff regularly participating in USAID project planning meetings and USAID representatives accompanying civil affairs teams in their planning and programming activities.

In addition, OMA and CMM, along with other USAID offices, are developing a Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) for the U.S. military to use in conflict zones. The TCAF, grown out of CMM's conflict assessment framework methodology, is intended as a practical tool to identify the root causes of conflict in a particular area of responsibility and as a guide to determine what adjustments should be made in the program to resolve those causes. The TCAF will contain both the diagnostic questions that target the local populations' potential incentives for violence and the detailed directions for military personnel on how to collect answers to these questions. It will also provide illustrative project examples and information on funding sources for possible follow-on interventions, as well as a cultural awareness guide.

The TCAF was initially field-tested in late June 2006 as part of a field training exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This was the first time USAID had trained with U.S. Army civil affairs personnel, and it provided a valuable opportunity to bring development-oriented, conflict-sensitive

fragile states. USAID senior development advisors are already in place at EUCOM and U.S. Southern Command. A senior development advisor has been selected and will soon be posted to U.S. Pacific Command.

Although this level of collaboration is relatively new, it is rapidly moving forward, and many joint interventions, tools, and strategies are being molded into shape. It will take time for joint collaboration to fully develop between the agencies, and surely the relationships will continue to evolve as time progresses and needs change. USAID welcomes these opportunities to partner with relevant government agencies and offices within agencies, such as the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Together, the agencies will be able to fulfill their mandate in the War on Terrorism and help link development, diplomacy, and defense to create a safer world for everyone. ***MR***

LTC Kevin McGlaughlin, of the Asadabad Provincial Reconstruction Team, speaks to a group of district and provincial leaders in Zabul, Afghanistan, during the opening of a newly renovated health clinic on 30 August 2006. The refurbished clinic is one of nearly 600 clinics being renovated throughout Afghanistan with USAID funding.

approaches into an integrated interagency planning process. Representatives of all offices in USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) participated in the exercise. As a result of the exercise's success, we anticipate that USAID and the State Department will participate in future exercises with the U.S. Army.

Fostering Communication and Understanding

On 29 June 2006, the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the assistant administrator of DCHA signed a memorandum of understanding for the exchange of liaison officers between USAID and CENTCOM, the objective being to foster communication and understanding between the two organizations and to strengthen planning and operations through improved coordination.[6] USAID liaison officers, called senior development advisors, will share what USAID has to offer in terms of resources and capabilities for stability operations, conflict/crisis situations, humanitarian assistance, and long-term programs for weak,

This article is based on research conducted by James Derleth, Senior Strategic Planner and Conflict Specialist, USAID Office of Military Affairs; and Adam Reisman, Conflict Specialist, USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

NOTES

1. USAID is similarly engaged with others in the interagency on the issue of counter-insurgency (COIN) and how development is part of the full-spectrum COIN response.

2. White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], September 2006), online at <www.white-house.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>, accessed 18 January 2007; White House, The National Implementation Plan, 2006.

3. White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: GPO, September 2002), online at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, accessed 18 January 2007.

4. Ibid.

5. GlobalSecurity.org, "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)," online at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm>.

6. Field-based interagency discussions have concluded that extremism is a greater threat than terrorism in the Horn of Africa, where internal concerns and conditions are the primary targets of terrorism. Links to the War on Terrorism are tenuous, whereas extremism threatens regional stability.

COUNTERINSURGENCY DIPLOMACY: Political Advisors at the Operational and Tactical Levels

Dan Green

In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propaganda, and economic pressure, is generally the principal way to achieve the goal. Politics as an instrument of war tends to take a back seat and emerges again—as an instrument—when the fighting ends . . . The picture is different in the revolutionary war. The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. In this case, consequently, political action remains foremost throughout the war. It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.

—David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*.[1]

That's something the State Department is supposed to handle, but I was the Marine platoon commander, and I had to decide.

—Iraqi war veteran Nathaniel Fick on whether or not to support a local mullah and distribute fresh water to a Baghdad neighborhood.[2]

Dan Green works at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He served a year as a political advisor to the Tarin Kowt provincial reconstruction team in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, for which he received the DOS's Superior Honor Award and the U.S. Army's Superior Civilian Service Award. He also received a letter of commendation from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bush administration or the DOS. Mr. Green is currently mobilized by the Navy and will be serving in Iraq as a tribal liaison officer. He can be contacted at dantkprt@yahoo.com.

PHOTO: The author observing the counting of ballots for the Uruzgan Provincial Council and Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan in 2005. (courtesy of the author.)

FAILURE TO INCORPORATE political goals and requirements into military action has often slowed or even prevented the timely resolution of conflicts. This has especially been the case in the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we initially proceeded as if military power alone could achieve our aims. Political activity in concert with military operations, especially at the operational and tactical levels, will play a huge role in any favorable resolution of these conflicts and any future conflicts that fall under the rubric of unconventional warfare. The insurgencies we face today are, in part, a result of the sweeping political changes wrought by globalization and the relative decline of the nation-state as the basis for international order. Consequently, conventional military force alone will not achieve victory—there will be no battles between massive armies leading to a final resolution of the conflict. Nor will typical state-to-state diplomacy, in which conflict is resolved through a peace treaty, help stanch such insurgencies. In order to succeed, we must try a new approach.

In order to maintain our status as a leading nation and to defend and extend our interests, the United States must integrate military strategies with other

national capabilities to create a robust counterinsurgency capacity comprised of all elements of national power—economic, political, information, and military. Additionally, we must deploy these elements of national power at a much lower level and with a consistency that we have not yet seen in our present conflicts. If we do less than this, we will handicap ourselves in a fight against enemies whose borderless "state" is an ideology, ethnic or tribal identity, or religious viewpoint. The enemy does not, unfortunately, make the same clear distinctions we do between political and military strategies and tactics. He does not fight one-handedly, and neither should we.

The Counterinsurgency Challenge

Counterinsurgency efforts have taken on an increasingly important role in the U.S. strategy to defeat global terrorism.[3] Since 2001, the budget of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the command specializing in counterinsurgency, has increased from roughly $3.8 billion to $6.6 billion, and the number of its personnel has increased by 6,000, to 51,411.[4] Special operations forces (SOF) are deployed in well over a hundred countries, and in March 2005, President Bush put SOCOM in charge of "synchronizing" anti-terrorism efforts. With these additional resources, SOCOM has significantly increased the number of its Special Forces (SF), civil-affairs, and psychological operations units—all units deeply involved in counterinsurgency operations. Within the U.S. Army, the recent release of a revised counterinsurgency manual and the creation of a panel of counterinsurgency advisors and a counterinsurgency school in Iraq serve to underscore how much unconventional warfare has also affected the thinking and strategy of the conventional military.

With this shift in military priorities has come a concomitant, though tentative, movement in diplomatic priorities for the U.S. Department of State (DOS). DOS personnel are serving on provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) located throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, helping to facilitate reconstruction, development, and good governance while improving security. Some of these personnel are attached to U.S. conventional forces and are sometimes, along with members of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),

United States Department of Agriculture, military civil-affairs units, and contract police advisors, collocated with SOF units. As of 2 October 2006, there were 20 DOS representatives in Afghanistan and 29 in Iraq advising PRT military commanders or leading PRTs and furthering U.S. foreign policy goals.[5] In Afghan provinces such as Uruzgan, the homeland of Taliban founder Mullah Omar and the site of an active Taliban insurgency, DOS personnel have played an integral role in a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. What follows are some thoughts on how the DOS may want to incorporate its priorities more fully into a military effort. They are gleaned from the author's one-year tour as the PRT political advisor (POLAD) in Uruzgan.

Providing Political Leadership

In many conflict and post-conflict situations, a viable, effective government has all but disappeared. In some cases, it may have never existed at all. At the tactical and operational levels, a trained DOS employee can approximate many of the functions of a nascent government or extend the reach of an existing central host government by facilitating effective governance. Understanding how a local government functions as a viable and effective institution for the community, and knowing how a community operates, are critical to winning a counterinsurgency. To a significant degree, SF units have already incorporated these kinds of considerations into their counterinsurgency planning. However, the type of information that SF units typically collect in the field focuses largely on finding, fixing, and finishing the insurgent rather than specifically on improving governance for the long term. While the SF recognize that good governance, coupled with informed and targeted reconstruction and development projects, is integral to a successful counterinsurgency effort, they generally do not have experts

> *…a trained DOS employee can approximate many of the functions of a nascent government or extend the reach of an existing central host government…*

who can implement durable programs. Because his training, background, experiences, and purpose are different from those of many SF members, a DOS employee focusing on political development can become a significant asset to a deployed SF unit. His contribution to the counterinsurgency effort can be as beneficial as kinetic operations, if not more so.

Decisions made by military units at the tactical level can often impact the strategic foreign policy goals of the U.S. Government. This tendency has been amply demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Aware of the government's policy priorities, a deployed DOS employee can provide increased direction to a unit as it confronts political, diplomatic, and civil-affairs problems. His guidance and input can be especially useful and important because the quick pace of military operations, especially during combat, often requires on-the-spot decisions that a U.S. embassy would be slow to make. Absent an embassy's presence, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom respectively, formal embassy decisions would be impossible to obtain. Because the DOS employee would be aware of the situation on the ground, this would also immeasurably improve the situational awareness of the U.S. embassy, once one had been established, and of policy makers in Washington, D.C. And finally, because the chain of command for a DOS employee is considerably flatter than that of most military units, a field employee is perhaps one or two layers away from the ambassador and only an e-mail away from the embassy's staff; he can therefore quickly affect a host government's policies on key issues by persuading the embassy to engage with that country's president or relevant ministers. This capability is also useful to a host government, which can use the DOS employee to check up on its own forces or government employees, thus extending its own reach.

Building and Empowering Local Institutions

Like members of the SF community, DOS personnel have received extensive cultural, regional, and language training and are skilled at interacting with citizens of other countries. However, as a civilian and a member of the DOS, I had diplomatic priorities that diverged somewhat from those of the warfighter. In Uruzgan Province, my political objectives were to develop governance, improve public administration, and facilitate successful parliamentary and provincial council elections. At the same time, I presented U.S. foreign policy views to local leaders. To these ends, I focused my efforts on building the institution of the provincial shura, a traditional Afghan meeting of tribal elders, which had been reestablished in March 2005 after the Taliban had banned it 11 years earlier. With over 35 members drawn from each of Uruzgan's five districts, the shura was the closest thing to a representative body in the area prior to the fall parliamentary and provincial council elections. By regularly attending its meetings and interacting with its members, I was able to act as an intermediary between tribal and district leaders and the SF and PRT on a range of issues.

One of the key benefits of engaging with the provincial shura, working with its members from various

Afghan women line up outside a voting place during the successful parliamentary and provincial elections held on 18 September 2005.

tribes, and bolstering it as a representative institution was the positive effect it had on our security operations. Whenever the SF detained an Afghan, for example, shura members would typically ask me to intervene on his behalf, often telling me the background of the person and why he was a community member of good standing. That said, given a chance, the Afghans will use the SF against personal rivals and against rival clan interests, and so I had to be circumspect. I was extremely careful not to come across as trying to tell the SF why they should release someone; instead, I merely gave them the added information to provide some local perspective on why a person might have been detained for reasons other than their being a member of the Taliban. This approach proved particularly successful in helping to release a prospective parliamentary candidate who had been detained largely based upon information from a political opponent.

The shura also functioned as an excellent means of controlling rumors and allowing the community to vent about U.S. military operations. The information we gathered enabled SF and coalition forces to take the pulse of the community and, if needed, to alter their operations with local views in mind. In sum, the shura was useful because it allowed the Afghans to exert some influence on military operations in their community, pass information to the SF on Taliban movements, and give voice to community frustrations about the security situation.

One key goal the PRT had for the shura was developing its ability to hold provincial government leaders accountable for their actions. On the third and final day of the meeting, provincial directors were invited to speak about their programs, policies, and concerns. The presentations usually followed a two-day session in which shura members would discuss the area's various public issues. For example, because shura members were very concerned about security in Uruzgan, they were interested in getting the local police to go on more patrols in the area, to hold criminals for their full prison term, and to set up more security checkpoints.

As a political officer, I worked behind the scenes to make sure local officials attended the shura and were ready to address its members' complaints. I also made sure that representatives from the PRT, SF, and the Afghan National Army, along with local elections officials, attended and were prepared to deliver presentations on their activities. I gave the local radio reporter, who had been badly injured fighting the Russians, a ride to the shura, and I provided him with a tape recorder, fresh tapes, and, once a month, a box of fresh batteries. My goals were to empower the shura as a legitimate voice of the people, democratize decision making in the province, connect the shura to the people by radio, and continue to incorporate accountability into local governance. The relationships I created with these men helped the PRT and SF gain a better understanding of local politics and the relationships between different tribes and individuals. DOS personnel, and civilians in particular, are well qualified to conduct these types of activities, and the information gathered from the shura helped improve coalition planning immensely.

The PRT also focused on facilitating the development of civil society in Uruzgan Province, worked to attract non-governmental organizations to the area, and sometimes took the initiative to

DOS

An Afghan man waits to receive a ballot from an election worker during the 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections.

create non-governmental institutions. Regarding the latter, I met with local public officials and business leaders about their interest in creating a chamber of commerce for the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt. Because many locals were familiar with such an institution from their experiences in Kandahar City, they supported the idea. The inaugural meeting of the chamber took place in the Tarin Kowt mayor's office in spring 2005 and included merchants, bazaar shop owners, fuel distributors, building contractors, and taxicab and jingle truck drivers. (A jingle truck is a brightly painted cargo truck whose panels and bumpers are elaborately decorated with chimes, bells, and other ornaments.)

The meeting allowed us to gain a better understanding of how the local economy functioned. It was also a useful tool for pressuring local officials to respond to the complaints of business leaders. Eventually, it became a monthly event, with members of the provincial council and parliament attending, and it gained the support of the Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce, which offered advice and financial assistance. Engaging with the local community, identifying community needs, and facilitating the creation of institutions to represent local interests are the kinds of work that can often be best done by a DOS civilian. Though not often viewed as the type of activity considered integral to a successful counterinsurgency strategy (bolstering indigenous security forces and the local government being the usual means), the creation of a viable civil society that can improve living conditions and government responsiveness is a useful supplement to kinetic operations.

Improving Governance

Because local leaders are sometimes more willing to speak with a civilian than a member of the U.S. military, I was often able to gain a better understanding of tribal disputes, personal animosities, and local government functions than my military colleagues. This enabled me to help the military increase its situational awareness; to keep coalition forces from being dragged into tribal or personal disputes; and to assist in identifying insurgents in the general population. Such information was especially useful to Uruzgan's PRT during the fall 2005 provincial council and parliamentary elections. By talking with local officials, I determined who had

relatives in government; what the tribal affiliations and home districts of all provincial council and parliamentary candidates were, as well as some of their personal histories; whether they supported the governor or the police chief (the two major political figures of the province); and whether they had been members of the Taliban or the Communist Party in the 1970s to early 1990s. Consequently, I was able to give the SF a political overview of the province, one that helped security elements ensure that rival candidates didn't attack one another and that kept us from being drawn into factional disputes. This information was also useful in assessing whether the candidates were broadly representative of the community and what capacity they might have at good governance. After September's election, I was able to use this information to work with the newly elected officials to improve local governance.

I also conducted a formal assessment of the provincial government's directorates (which are the local government agencies for the host government's central ministries). I interviewed each of the directors about his personnel, resources, and policies while evaluating his individual abilities to lead. Because of these assessments, we were better able to determine whether good governance was taking place and better able to direct the development spending priorities of the PRT, the U.S. Army's civil affairs team, and USAID. By working with local officials and integrating them into our civil affairs missions, the PRT improved the officials' ability to govern and their directorates' capacity to function while better focusing the PRT's reconstruction and development projects. The PRT worked with these officials to develop their long-range planning, help them prioritize their projects, and facilitate their connections to the ministries of the central government. Eventually, these assessments enabled me to make pragmatic recommendations to the embassy, and thus to the government of Afghanistan, about which officials should be removed for incompetence or corruption and how to better direct the spending of limited development resources to improve local governance. As my experience illustrates, these formal assessments had the collective effect of getting the local government to work more effectively, thereby making it a viable institution for the community. A DOS employee is uniquely suited to enable this crucial complement to kinetic operations.

The Way Ahead

As David Galula pointed out, in a counterinsurgency, units that take part in large-scale military operations will have to perform a myriad of nonmilitary tasks to win the support of the population. When there is a shortage of civilian political and administrative personnel, "making a thorough census, enforcing new regulations on movements of persons and goods, informing the population, conducting person-to-person propaganda, gathering intelligence on the insurgent's political agents, implementing the various economic and social reforms, etc.—all these will become their primary activity. . . Thus, a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed wire, clerks more in demand than riflemen."[6] If we have sufficient DOS personnel—experts in political and administrative matters—to perform such tasks, soldiers would be free to perform essential military functions.

> *…a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more useful than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed wire…*
>
> from Galula

Identifying, training, and staffing military units with DOS personnel is a significant challenge–but not an impossible one. Like much of the U.S. Army before transformation, the DOS is organized to operate in a world of nation-states. We must make a second, complementary, effort to put diplomats in the field to help combat a global insurgency that does not recognize national borders. The ongoing difficulty of staffing PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq with POLADs underscores the problems the foreign service faces in staffing a worldwide counterinsurgency effort.

Placing DOS personnel on PRTs is a first step toward integrating a diplomatic approach into counterinsurgency efforts. The next step should be placing DOS personnel with as many deployed military units in post-conflict *and* conflict situations as possible, so

that their diplomatic training might benefit the overall effort. Although I was ostensibly charged with working for the PRT of Uruzgan Province, I also had the good fortune of being collocated with the command element of an SF unit at the forward operating base. My advice and the relationships I had developed with local leaders helped SF leaders understand many provincial issues, including tribal, factional, and personal relationships. If the DOS could, as a start, attach one of its employees to the command element of each globally deployed SF unit, our counterinsurgency effort would improve considerably.

Unfortunately, the foreign service is not well structured to man PRTs with the right kind or required number of personnel; therefore, attaching DOS employees to conventional and SF units in the field will be an even more difficult task for the personnel system.[7] Therefore, I recommend that SOCOM agree, on a trial basis, to create 10 slots for DOS personnel to deploy with SF units throughout the world. (This would be similar to the arrangement that pairs a POLAD with each regional combatant commander). In conjunction with SOCOM, the DOS would identify its personnel and place them in these 10 slots. DOS employees would undergo a stripped-down version of military training to ensure they meet some basic physical requirements, have a degree of weapons proficiency, and acquire a basic knowledge of military operations. Each DOS employee would join an SF team as it prepared for deployment, stay with it during its entire deployment, and upon completion of the tour work at SOCOM as a POLAD. Over time, these personnel would move into leadership positions at SOCOM, in embassies, in the civil service (in such places as the Political-Military Bureau and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism), and in the foreign service.[8] These kinds of tours would not just be a brief interlude from a normal foreign service career path; rather, they would be part of a dedicated profession in which DOS personnel work with SOCOM and make counterinsurgency work in conflict and post-conflict situations a career.

The United States should create a separate service called the Diplomatic Field Service (DFS) that would largely consist of DOS civil service members supplemented by foreign service personnel on rotation. Foreign service officers outside the DFS would have the opportunity to work in the DFS with the expectation

> *The United States should create a separate service called the Diplomatic Field Service (DFS) that would largely consist of DOS civil service members supplemented by foreign service personnel on rotation.*

that most employees of the service would progress in this specific line of work during their careers. If the trial program is successful, it could be expanded into conventional forces, and SOCOM could create more slots for DOS employees. In some respects, the DOS has already recognized the need for an expanded civilian component in post-conflict situations similar in mission to that explained above. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) already envisions a version, similar to the ideas presented earlier, of a deployable civilian corps to "guide post-conflict efforts." My proposal is slightly different in the following ways, not only from what S/CRS would like, but from what we usually expect of our POLADs. First, it envisions DOS personnel actually working in conflict situations, not just post-conflict situations, and serving solely with military units as opposed to being members of a robust interagency PRT or civilian corps.[9] Second, instead of functioning as a reserve component that would be called upon when needed, the DFS would work in the field of counterinsurgency full time, with its officers undertaking a clearly defined career path. And finally, instead of being solely a reporting officer, a DFS POLAD would be actively engaged in the local political scene, facilitating and coordinating programs and policies that would further the goals of the U.S. Government and the host nation.

Conclusion

Counterinsurgency efforts will continue to be a major component of national security planning, with the DOS having a unique and crucial role to play in these efforts. PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq have already demonstrated that a DOS employee can add immense value to stability operations by facilitating reconstruction, improving governance, and increasing security. By working to build local government institutions, improve public administration and governance, and provide political leadership and advice, DOS personnel can add enormous value to counterinsurgency efforts in conflict situations as well. Attaching DOS personnel to PRTs is the first step to incorporating diplomatic specialists into post-conflict situations. Assigning DOS personnel to combat units and letting them serve with U.S. military forces as they conduct military operations is the logical extension of this concept. This type of tactical and operational diplomacy is vital to winning the counterinsurgency fight, particularly because most of the elements of a successful counterinsurgency strategy are non-kinetic. Policy makers should recognize the value of this new approach and take appropriate steps to make the DOS a more central player in our efforts to defeat global terrorism. *MR*

NOTES

1. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964; reprint, 2006), 4-5.
2. Bay Fang, "A 'Reluctant Warrior' in Iraq," *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 January 2006, 18.
3. Paul De La Garza, "Special Ops' Expanding Role," *St. Petersburg Times*, 24 September 2005.
4. Ibid.
5. On 11 January 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the number of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq would increase from 10 to at least 18 in the coming year.
6. Galula, 66.
7. PRTs are just one aspect of the civilian-military environment that will necessitate transformation of the Department of State (DOS). The DOS is considering ways to help the entire Foreign and Civil Service become a more flexible, expeditionary entity.
8. DOS employees should also have a voice at the senior, strategic level at the Department of Defense and SOCOM to ensure that military operations are planned with sufficient knowledge of the broader political environment in the region and so that special and conventional forces can coordinate and leverage civilian tools of government as far as possible.
9. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization envisions advance civilian teams, or ACTs, embedding with the military at division or brigade level to begin reconstruction and stabilization activities as soon as possible. They could remain attached to the military unit or break off when conditions call for or allow a decentralized presence.

Control Roaming Dogs:
Governance Operations in
FUTURE CONFLICT

Major Troy Thomas, U.S. Air Force

While the security threats of the 20th century arose from powerful states that embarked on aggressive courses, the key dimensions of the 21st century—globalization and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—mean great dangers may arise in and emanate from relatively weak states and ungoverned areas. The United States and its allies and partners must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders.

——U.S. National Security Strategy[1]

GOVERNANCE OPERATIONS are integral to all military campaigns where establishing a local government over an ungoverned or disrupted political space is required to secure an intended strategic end state. Despite the inseparable role of governance throughout war's history, the United States has been reluctant to embrace a military role for establishing civil government. Aversion is rooted in concerns about military involvement in a fundamentally political activity, which seems to threaten the principle of civilian control, and the military's unwillingness to divert attention from its combat arms. As a result, governance operations have been treated as tangential postconflict missions, leaving field commanders ill-prepared for governance tasks and delaying consolidation of a conflict's political aims.[2]

Reluctance must give way to reality. Governance operations are integral to most phases of war, and their relevance to future conflict is increased by the interplay of globalization, transnational threats, and failing states. Military commanders will continue to serve as provincial governors and city mayors in conflict zones. To meet the evolving security challenge of ungoverned space, a more developed concept of operations for governance is needed to improve the ability of military forces to deliver basic public services while simultaneously developing an indigenous capacity for good, democratic governance.

Governance operations are the activities of military commanders to provide basic public services while developing an effective, participatory local public management capacity to consolidate operational objectives. Governance operations at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the ultimate transition to civil authority. Specifically, governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not wholly reside within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD); however, they must be conducted in austere, insecure, uncertain environments that demand military forces. Therefore, governance operations require blending expanded interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by improved social intelligence.

Back to the Future

Throughout the history of warfare, militaries have assumed the powers of a sovereign governing authority. The United States is no exception. The Army first established a military government in Mexico from 1847 to 1848. It gained further experience during the reconstruction of the Confederate States after the Civil War and in the Philippines and Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898. But these experiences were not institutionalized, and the Army was not ready to govern in the German Rhineland during World War I. According to a seminal 1920 report by Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the Third Army, "The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty."[3] Not until 1940 did the Army formalize its doctrine on military government.[4]

To meet the evolving security challenge of ungoverned space, a more developed concept of operations for governance is needed to improve the ability of military forces to deliver basic public services while simultaneously developing an indigenous capacity for good, democratic governance.

During the interwar period, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) assumed the governance mantle as part of small wars in Latin America, including Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.[5] The hard-learned lessons of the so-called Banana Wars made their way into the highly regarded, but rarely read, 1940 *Small Wars Manual*.[6] Chapter 13, "Military Government," provides doctrine and techniques for associated tasks while highlighting the reality that governance operations exist across the spectrum of conflict, including cases "where the inhabitants of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was neither declared nor contemplated."[7] Among other influences, the manual reflects tenets of the emergent body of international law governing "belligerent occupation."[8]

Armed with experience and doctrine, the military remained reluctant to prepare for the inevitable occupations of friendly and enemy territory during World War II. In fact, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's view of military government as "strange and abhorrent" was consistent with General Dwight D. Eisenhower's desire to turn responsibility over to civilian authorities as soon as possible.[9] Nonetheless, deliberate planning for governance operations began in earnest in 1942 with the establishment of a Military Government Division on the Army Staff and the opening of the first School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. Planning accelerated in 1943 when Roosevelt reluctantly shifted responsibility for occupation from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to the U.S. Department of War. On the European front, theater planning culminated in December 1944 with the publication of a draft of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*.[10] Genuinely successful occupations of Germany and Japan and an expansion of the laws for belligerent occupation in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 portended a strong future for military governance operations.

During the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods, however, focus shifted from wars of occupation to nuclear war, revolutionary war, and peace operations. Officially, Army Civil Affairs (CA) gained responsibility for governance. In reality, training and doctrine withered while Civil Affairs prepared for the humanitarian-assistance role. Training disappeared entirely, while guidance shrank to a few paragraphs in field manuals and joint doctrine.[11] As a result, military commanders performed governance tasks on an ad hoc basis during operations in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Operation Iraqi Freedom offers the most recent and compelling case for renewed attention to governance operations. The ability of military commanders to simultaneously combat insurgents and govern communities after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 is more a testament to their flexibility and problem-solving skills than it is to deliberate planning. Civil Affairs teams prepared to deliver humanitarian relief were instead opening banks, setting up school boards, and clearing out roaming dogs.[12]

Military commanders governed Iraqi provinces and towns for several weeks before the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and, later, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were established. These initial local efforts were not guided by theater-level policy or doctrine, however, nor were they linked to an overall concept of governance for Iraq. For example, Special Forces Major Jim Gavrilis's only guidance during his administration of a Sunni city and the western portion of the Al Anbar province in March and April 2003 was Central Command's mission statement. Gavrilis's initial successes were ultimately reversed "because no real guidance ever materialized, and there was no CPA representative at that level to take over once he departed."[13] The limited civil-military planning generated false starts, wasted resources, and ultimately delayed the translation of operational victory into strategic success.[14]

Ungoverned Space

Governance operations are not confined to wars of occupation. They also emerge from ungoverned political space. As described in the *United States National Defense Strategy*, "The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents.

Many states are unstable, and in some cases, unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation."[15]

Tomorrow's threats breed and prosper in the ungoverned space of failing states where terrorists find sanctuary, humanitarian crises grow, and the illegal trade of drugs, guns, and humans flourishes. As a result, military operations across the spectrum of conflict, including humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, counterinsurgency, and others, will include a governance component. Among many contemporary examples, the ongoing Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, established in October 2002, combines intercepting Al Qaeda operatives with operations "designed to strengthen the ability of local governments" to improve social conditions and undercut the spreading influence of Islamic extremism.[16]

Across the security landscape, the problem of ungoverned space is growing. A recent World Bank study of governance in 196 countries cautiously asserted "evidence is suggestive of deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions such as control of corruption, rule of law, political stability and government effectiveness."[17] Further analyses from the Institute for National Security Studies indicates approximately 50 percent of the 196 countries evaluated by the World Bank qualified as weak, very weak, or failed.[18] Not surprisingly, these states are concentrated in the strategic ghettos of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Of the remaining states, a quarter rated as fair, leaving only about 20 percent of the surveyed countries in the categories of excellent and good.[19] Out of 90-plus failing states, "terrorist groups, as well as insurgent and criminal organizations, are located in the remote parts of more than 20 countries."[20] Over the last 20 years, U.S. military deployments have been with few exceptions to very weak or failed states.[21] This is an unremitting trend that carries with it a burden of governance.

Trends in governance also provide clues to the characteristics of the future operating environment. The battlespace for governance operations will be turbulent, creating uncertainty for planners and commanders because of complexity and rapid change. Complexity refers to the number of battlespace features relevant to a governance line of operation.[22]

While uncertainty cannot be eliminated, it can be mitigated with a clear concept of operations.

Battlespace clutter is increased for governance operations since they most often occur in messy urban terrain with its associated decaying infrastructure, impotent public service capacity, and wide range of actors vying for control of resources. The governance battlespace is also dynamic; features change rapidly over time. Given the inherent political character of governance, allegiances shift, resources dry up, and public support oscillates. Moreover, persistent media scrutiny, pressure to deliver services, and high stakes associated with political transitions elevate uncertainty. While uncertainty cannot be eliminated, it can be mitigated with a clear concept of operations.

Concept of Operations

Governance operations provide public management of disrupted political space, enabling other stabilization tasks such as infrastructure recovery, humanitarian relief, and public security. Governance is a distinct type of operation that builds on past and existing doctrinal concepts. From the World War II era, governance draws on the military government experience and Army and USMC doctrine. From the post-Cold War period, governance draws on service and joint civil affairs doctrine for civil administration and postconflict reconstruction. Future governance operations will entail activities and competencies that deliver short-term results while developing an enduring local capacity. Finally, governance operations set the conditions and facilitate the transfer of local public authority to another agency or to local officials—they win the peace.

Governance is the capacity to deliver essential public services. It encompasses the institutions and rules for the effective allocation of resources in a target community; it is a political decisionmaking process. Public management is the function of governance at the local level and is considered effective when local governments have the "technical knowhow, capacity, and financial resources to sustain delivery of public services at levels satisfactory to citizens."[23] Governance is participatory, or democratic, when the political process is competitive, civil society is active, and government institutions are transparent and accountable. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), governance is "good" when a government

is able to "maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, promote or create conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum level of social security."[24]

Applying the definitions to the military, governance operations are *the activities of military commanders to provide basic public services while developing an effective, participatory local public management capacity in order to consolidate operational objectives.*[25] In ungoverned situations, communities are primarily concerned with execution—the effective short-term delivery of public services. Because of persistent violence and limited access, the military is often the only potent authority until civil capabilities can be brought to bear or built. At the municipal level, commanders are at once the mayor, city council, magistrate, and city manager.

Practical necessity, as well customary international law, require commanders to provide for public

> *Increasingly, the operation's strategic end state goes beyond* effective *governance to include the added expectation for* good, participatory *government.*

order and the general welfare of the population.[26] Even so, there is a necessary distinction between governance operations in friendly versus hostile or occupied territory. The former is more likely to occur pursuant to humanitarian or stabilization missions that have the support of the national government(s) involved and/or with international sanction in the case of collapsed states. In these cases, governance operations will seek to restore the legitimate local governing authority. In hostile or occupied territory, international law guides governance operations, and they are subject to the occupying power's authority. Most likely, the military will work to establish local governance but will not be empowered to determine the final governing authority.

Increasingly, the operation's strategic end state goes beyond *effective* governance to include the added expectation for *good, participatory* government. Therefore, military commanders must also be prepared to initiate and support the civic process for constituting accountable institutions,

building government capacity, and ensuring broad participation in reconstruction.[27] Commanders reestablish the presence of the state while pursuing the demilitarization of local politics.[28] On the socioeconomic front, commanders restore or oversee the restoration of basic services and revive economic activity. For example, in 2003-2004, 1st Armored Division brigade commanders governed Baghdad suburbs while the division's governance support team implemented a Baghdad Citizen Advisory Council System in cooperation with the CPA.[29] Governance operations that focus only on execution at the expense of developmental work risk the campaign's overall objectives.

Governance operations involve execution and developmental activities, which enable and align other stabilization and reconstruction tasks. During execution, the first governance task is to determine and prioritize the needs of the local community. The needs assessment is a structured process that involves a technical assessment of recovery needs and provides "a platform for national and international actors to agree on joint principles, define their commitments, and prepare their activities."[30] More important, it demands direct involvement from the community. Former military governor of Karbala province, Iraq, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lopez, the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, highlighted this point in July 2003: "I have many groups telling me what all the problems are: crime, security, unemployment, food. What I'm looking for is leaders in the community who can also help me to solve these problems."[31]

Translating needs into solutions is the job of public management. Public management encompasses all the activities to develop, implement, and enforce the administrative laws, regulations, and policies that guide the delivery of services. The first days and weeks are the most critical to avoiding negative ripple effects. Early governance operations are personnel and resource intensive and might require military units to act in unfamiliar roles. Rapid results to build momentum and demonstrate potency require the ability to quickly distribute resources across multiple communities in an area of operations. Moreover, one of the military commander's first acts should be a public statement that at a minimum clarifies intentions, jurisdiction, applicability of local laws, the role of

indigenous institutions, and penalties for violating ordinances.[32] Other pressing implied tasks include the preservation of public records; identification of civil administrators; initiation of media relations; and the opening of financial institutions, markets, hospitals, and schools. Over the long term, public management includes budgeting and cost analysis, urban planning, civil service management, and public-sector quality control. As capacity is built, the military commander increasingly delegates these tasks to other agencies and local officials.

Commanders can facilitate speed to transition and consolidation of political aims through three inter-related developmental imperatives: decentralize, build capacity, and democratize. The commander has a role in setting these in motion and supporting progress, but is unlikely to see the end results.

Decentralization. Decentralization, probably the most politically charged activity, involves handing over power from the central to local government along political, financial, and administrative lines.[33] The process brings government closer to the problems and its constituents, allowing for tailored solutions while holding officials accountable.[34] Decentralization also carries risk. As witnessed in Iraq as part of a program to extend local participation, the Citizen Advisory Council System empowered local elites, but also generated corruption and conflict over scarce resources.[35] USMC military governors were dealing with similar problems before the CPA initiated its governance programs. Within the first 2 weeks of July 2003, the first postwar Iraqi governors of Karbala and Najaf were ousted for misappropriation of funds and kidnapping.[36] Striking the right balance between a controlled, yet slow process and early success is the greatest challenge. Of course, decentralization is only meaningful if the central government has capacity to transfer. In failing states (Somalia and Haiti) the government is impotent at federal and local levels.

Building capacity and democratization. The long haul of decentralization is complemented by building local capacity and expanding participation. In addition to linking resources with training, capacity is built by expanding revenue-generating authority and engaging local officials and citizen groups in policymaking. The latter buttresses democratization at the local level, which seeks to increase transparency, accountability, and responsiveness by—

- Creating opportunities for citizen participation.
- Establishing a legal basis for local government associations.
- Opening public meetings, records, and information to the media and citizens.
- Strengthening media relations.
- Expanding the net of participation to include women and minorities within a cultural context.
- Promoting partnerships among local government, civil society, the private sector, and other groups.[37]

Developing effective, good, participatory local governance enables progress in other stabilization and reconstruction areas. In turn, garbage removal, clean water, and public security strengthen governance—a reinforcing cycle the military initiates and sustains.

Preparing for Governance

The governance experience the United States is currently gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan can serve as a foundation for future operations in ungoverned space. Preparing the force requires initiative in three areas: developing governance competencies in the right organizations for the right tasks, integrating skills sets through improved civil-military planning, and placing increased emphasis on social intelligence.

Developing competencies. Proficiency in governance operations requires the military to update past programs and the civilian sector to adapt existing expertise to a new battlespace. For the military, the way forward begins with recognizing the central role of governance in consolidating objectives and continues with emphasis on leadership. The commander is sovereign under law and by necessity until transition.[38] Former Central Command commander General Anthony Zinni clarifies: "On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; on the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build an economy, restructure the infrastructure, and build the political system. And there's some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with nongovernmental organizations and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand."[39]

In addition to problem-solving skills, commanders need a deep understanding of the local battlespace, insight to working with civilian organizations, and basic public management knowledge. Minimal areas of expertise include those described earlier with

emphasis on the exercise of military law, supervision of local officials, collection and expenditure of revenues, and preservation of personal and property rights.[40] Know-how should be combined with practice in solving municipal problems as part of professional education and staff training programs. More important, the commander must provide a clear statement of intent to guide street-level decisionmaking and the alignment of other stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

Concentrating all the expertise of governance in the commander is neither desirable nor feasible. Functional responsibility for advising the commander and running governance programs has traditionally belonged to and should remain with Civil Affairs. However, changes in structure, numbers, and training must be addressed. Regarding structure, 96 percent of Army and 100 percent of USMC CA personnel were in Reserve units as of 2005.[41] One implication of the limited activation period for Reservists is the rapid exhaustion of a specialty that is required well beyond its 2-year commitment.[42] Additional CA Active or Reserve units are being created to meet the pressing and growing demand.

We should also revive governance training. Reflecting the peace operations focus of the 1990s, CA training in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom focused primarily on humanitarian relief. Training programs are already being adapted; however, it is not clear that they are taking full advantage of the curriculum from the World War II-era School of Military Government, the doctrine and techniques captured in the *Handbook for Military Government* or *Small Wars Manual*, and the lessons of past experience.[43] In addition to general governance training, each CA unit should recruit and develop a core cadre with public management (city/county managers, municipal administrators, public utility mangers) expertise. Finally, CA units must participate in service, joint, and interagency exercises. We can avoid overreliance on CA units by leveraging complementary skills among functional specialties that enjoy greater numbers, such as engineers, judge advocates, comptrollers, and medical personnel.

The need to significantly expand military Civil

In addition to general governance training, each CA unit should recruit and develop a core cadre with public management (city/county managers, municipal administrators, public utility managers) expertise.

Affairs can be offset in part by developing an expeditionary civilian capacity. Among U.S. agencies, USAID offers a repository of expertise commanders can tailor for governance operations. Specifically, a decade's worth of expertise in the Office for Democracy and Governance (DG) should be matched with the flexibility of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).[44] Prior to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the DG worked primarily in transitional countries that had secure, receptive programming environments.[45] In addition to relying primarily on private-sector contractors with minimal conflict-zone experience, a cumbersome and unresponsive spending authority hindered the effectiveness of the DG.[46] Nonetheless, the DG knows governance development and has established relationships with core private-sector organizations with in-demand governance skills.[47]

Enter OTI. This USAID office is specifically chartered to deliver quick results in dynamic situations, including postconflict reconstruction. In addition to a "culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift response," OTI has a unique budgeting authority that allows immediate spending through rapid, competitive contracting and direct grants to local organizations.[48] The future for USAID lies in finding the right balance between an organic, expeditionary governance capacity and a pool of readily available contracting expertise that can be integrated with military operations. Even with organizational change, the security situation will likely constrain civilian capability during the first days and weeks. This reality, as well as the mix of civil-military expertise, supports a military emphasis on execution during initial intervention complemented by a civilian focus on development over the long term.

Improving civil-military planning. Integrated civil-military planning is required to link civilian expertise with the military's capacity for early action in ungoverned space. Progress is underway at the national level. In November 2005, DOD released Directive 3000, establishing stability operations as a core military mission that includes developing local governance.[49] The directive charged the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with developing policy

and identifying required capabilities. Within DOS, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established in July 2004 with a broad mandate from the U.S. Secretary of State to "manage resources, planning, and development of policy options to respond to failing, failed, and postconflict states."[50] Its meager 30-member staff includes officials from USAID, the CIA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Forces Command. Among S/CRS's ambitions is the ability to "deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response," suggesting a need to significantly expand its staff.[51] National-level coordination is essential to coherent policy, clear political objectives, and coordination with a wide range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Healthier interagency coordination is an important first step toward improving civil-military planning and execution at the operational level. The next steps include deploying S/CRS teams with governance expertise to regional combatant commands in order to participate in campaign planning and interagency participation in joint military exercises with a governance component. During execution, experience with Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Governance Support Teams in Iraq validates embedding civilian expertise with CA personnel and military units. When security does not allow embedding, information technology offers a reachback option for CA units to tap subject matter expertise.

Emphasizing social intelligence. Pervasive local knowledge, or social intelligence, is a critical enabler for governance. The battlespace is unique for every operation. Social intelligence goes beyond culture to include collection and analysis of socioeconomic conditions, political institutions and affiliations, and demographic characteristics. Cultural analysis is gaining prominence; however, most current efforts mistake insight to customs for actionable intelligence.

Instead, culture should be operationalized to address the underlying value system enacted as behavioral norms. Not eating with your left hand is a custom; loyalty to one's family over personal needs is a value.[52]

Political analysis looks at the tradition of local governance as well as the web of relevant stakeholders. A community's history with local governance, including the degree of decentralization, extent of participation, and existing capacity, are all prerequisites to planning. An analysis of the individuals and organizations with a stake in the outcome helps commanders navigate the complex social network of relationships that exert influence on the development process and end state. Demographic and socioeconomic analysis addresses the changing composition of the population in relationship to relevant identity-based characteristics (religion, ethnicity, age) and human security concerns (unemployment, health care, education). Finally, social intelligence must be scalable from the theater to the neighborhood.

Forging a Capability for Governance

Governance operations reconcile political ends with civil-military means.[53] The dark dynamics of globalization are eroding state sovereignty and expanding the terrain of ungoverned space. The U.S. military is obliged to forge a capability for governance to consolidate political aims across the emergent security landscape. To this end, this concept of governance operations focuses on delivering basic public services and building local capacity in anticipation of transition to a civil administration.

Preparing the force begins with the commander and continues by reviving and updating governance expertise in Civil Affairs and creating a complementary civilian expeditionary capacity. More important, the new mix of competencies must be integrated through coherent, street-smart civil-military campaign planning. *MR*

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 March 2005), 1.

2. Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 85. Schadlow, the first to articulate the concept of governance operations, argues that "governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate a state's final political aims in war."

3. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1990), 3.

4. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-5, *Military Government* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1940).

5. For a history of U.S. military involvement in small wars, see Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), and Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).

6. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1940; reprint, Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 2004), chap. 13, sec. 1, 1.

7. Ibid.

8. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention, 18 October 1907, requires the occupying power to "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country" (W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds., *The Laws of War* [New York: Random House, 1994], 232).

9. Schadlow, 88. For the most complete compilation of World War II primary sources on military government, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964).

10. U.S. Department of War, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* (Washington, DC: draft, 1940).

11. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 February 2000), has two pages on civil administration. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 20 February 2003), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine on Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 February 2001), offer only a few paragraphs each. For an excellent history of occupation-related doctrine, see Wally Z. Walters, "The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the Peace against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq," U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 9 April 2002, on-line at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/walters.pdf>, accessed 25 January 2006.

12. William Booth, "Ad-libbing Iraq's Infrastructure," *Washington Post*, 21 May 2003, A01.

13. MAJ Jim Gavrilis, U.S. Army Special Forces, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2005.

14. For an accounting of the interagency planning process for Operation Iraqi Freedom, see James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004). See also Edwin F. Connerley, Democracy Officer; Julie Werbel, Senior Democracy Fellow; and Pat A. Fn-Piere, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 14 October 2004.

15. *National Defense Strategy*, 3.

16. Stewart M. Powell, "Swamp of Terror in the Sahara," *Air Force Magazine* (November 2004): 54.

17. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," World Bank, 20 June 2003, 32. The trend was reconfirmed by Kaufmann in "Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World," *Global Competitiveness Report 2004/2005*, World Bank, September 2004, 84; "Revisiting the long-term trend evidence, . . . we find that, overall, this stagnating trend does not appear to have been reversed over the past year." In addition to the four dimensions of governance this article mentions, states were also evaluated in the areas of "voice and accountability" and "regularity quality."

18. Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, *Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority*, Occasional Paper 57 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004), 55.

19. Ibid., 55.

20. Ibid., 8.

21. Ibid., 58.

22. Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the joint force in time and space in relation to the adversary.

23. USAID, *Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook,* Technical Publication Series (Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, May 2000), 12.

24. Ibid., 12.

25. Gavrilis introduces a related idea he terms "operational follow-through" and says "that it is critical for military commanders to be able to transition rapidly from combat operations to civil administration. The speed and depth of operational follow-through on the part of the military in most cases will exponentially increase the success of civilian stability and reconstruction efforts later."

26. JP 3-57, I-19.

27. "Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., January 2003, 13.

28. Gavrilis suggests that "we have to help show [other countries] the details of democracy" at local levels. In his view, "it may be the military commander that is in the best position to do so, and in many cases the military commander may be the only one to do so." See also Linda Robinson, "Ready or Not," *U.S. News and World Report* (14 February 2005).

29. According to Scott Callwell, 1st Armored Division Civil-Military Affairs Officer, the Division's Governance Support Team worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to establish 88 neighborhood and 9 district advisory councils for the city of Baghdad (interview by author, Arlington, Virginia, 25 October 2004). See also CPA, *The Baghdad Citizen Advisory Council Handbook*, 3d ed. (Iraq: 7 November 2003).

30. Uwe Kievelitz, Thomas Schaef, Manuela Leonhardt, Herwig Hahn, and Sonja Vorwerk, "Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations," Joint United Nations Development Group, United Nations Development Program and World Bank Guide, on-line at <www.undg.org/documents/4937-PCNA_-_Practical_Guide_to_Multilateral_Needs_Assessment_in_Post-Conflict_situations.pdf>, accessed 25 January 2006.

31. SPC Benjamin R. Kibbey, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Coalition Force Land Component Command, "Political freedom flourishes in Iraq," on-line at <www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ mcn2000.nsf/4863526af38d7aa85256feb00436338?OpenDocument>, accessed 25 January 2006.

32. The *Small Wars Manual,* 13-9, outlines the minimum requirements that a commander should address in his public statement. The 1944 *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, 145, echoes the *Small Wars Manual*.

33. USAID, "Decentralization," 7. The political dimension involves the transfer of political authority to the local level through the establishment or reestablishment of elected local government, electoral reform, political party reform, authorization of participatory processes, and other reforms. The financial dimension refers to the shifting of financial power to the

local level and involves increasing or reducing conditions on the intergovernmental transfer of resources and giving jurisdictions greater authority to generate their own revenue. The administrative involves the full or partial transfer of an array of functional responsibilities to the local level, such as health care service, the operation of schools, the management of service personnel, the building and maintenance of roads, and garbage collection.

34. Ibid., 5.

35. According to Callwell, corruption was a persistent problem at the neighborhood level where he primarily worked, which led commanders to dismiss many officials who consulted with the CPA. The *Citizen Advisory Council Handbook,* 18, outlines specific prohibitions as well as penalties with which to fight corruption.

36. "Picked Governor of Karbala Resigns," *New York Times*, 8 July 2003.

37. USAID, "Decentralization," 36-39.

38. Per the *Small Wars Manual*, "Military government may be said to be exercised by the military commander, under the direction of the president, with the express or implied sanction of Congress. The president cannot, of course, personally administer all the details, so he is regarded as having delegated to the commander of the occupying forces the requisite authority. Such commander may legally do whatever the President might do if he were personally present" (13-15).

39. GEN Anthony Zinni, remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute and U.S. Marine Corps Association, Annapolis, MD, 4 September 2003, on-line at <www.usni.org/Seminars/Forum/03/forum03zinni.htm>, accessed 25 January 2006.

40. *Small Wars Manual*, 13-8, 13-13.

41. Marine units include the 3d Civil Affairs Group (CAG) at Camp Pendleton, California, under Marine Forces Pacific, and the 4th CAG aboard Naval Station Anacostia in Washington, D.C., under Marine Forces Atlantic. The only active duty Army unit is the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) with six companies. There are 4 Reserve CA commands, 7 Reserve CA brigades, and 24 Reserve CA battalions.

42. In Iraq, the rapid exhaustion of a specialty has proven less problematic for the Army than for the Marines. With only two 60-plus-person units, the 3d and 4th CAGs had served a full 2-year activation period by 2003. See LTC O.R. Lovejoy, After Action Report, MAFORPAC G-3, 31 October 2003.

43. *Handbook for Military Government* or *Small Wars Manual*.

44. Both the Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) are in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.

45. USAID Congressional Budget Justification 2004 Program Highlights says: "USAID implements democracy and governance activities in nearly 80 country and regional programs that help nations develop and consolidate effective, authoritative, and legitimate democratic governance. The highest funding allocations have recently been directed to Serbia, Indonesia, Egypt, Gaza and the West Bank, Ukraine, Russia, Haiti, Nigeria, and Armenia," on-line at <www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/highlights.html>, accessed 25 January 2006.

46. Edwin F. Connerley, Democracy Officer; Julie Werbel, Senior Democracy Fellow; and Pat A. Fn-Piere, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 14 October 2004. K. Scott Hubli, Senior Advisor for Governance Programs, and Jim Delia-Giacoma, Senior Advisor for Citizen Participation, National Democratic Institute, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 18 August 2004.

47. In an interview by the author with Carol Bartle, Program Manager, on 23 September 2004, Bartle said that existing and potential partners include the National Democratic Institute, Research Triangle Institute, Chemonics, Management Systems International, and the International City/County Management Association. For example, the International City/County Management Association sent nine staff members to Iraq from June 2003 to March 2004 to provide training, technical assistance, and policy analysis in the areas of city management, public administration, utilities management, public finance, and others.

48. See USAID, Funding Legislation, "Transition Initiatives," on-line at <www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_ initiatives/index.html>, accessed 25 January 2006, which says: "For necessary expenses for international disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance pursuant to section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, $50,000,000, to remain available until expended, to support transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis: Provided, That such support may include assistance to develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and processes, revitalize basic infrastructure, and foster the peaceful resolution of conflict: Provided further, That the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations at least 5 days prior to beginning a new program of assistance."

49. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," Washington, D.C., 28 November 2005. On-line at <www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002755.html>, accessed 30 January 2006.

50. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ((S/CRS), DOS, presentation at the Joint CSIS-Woodrow Wilson Center Event, Washington, D.C., 20 October 2004, slide 6.

51. S/CRS, slide 8.

52. Margaret K. Nydell, *Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Westerners* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1987), 17.

53. The core idea for governance operations—that they reconcile political ends with civil-military means—is applied to all stabilization and reconstruction tasks, but is particularly relevant to governance. For further discussion, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004), 19.

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Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs

Colonel Eugene V. Bonventre, U.S. Air Force

If you took all the bricks in the Pentagon and laid them end to end, they would reach around the earth four and a half times.

—Pentagon tour guide, 7 December 2006

Colonel Gene Bonventre, U.S. Air Force, is senior international health policy advisor in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy. He served with Joint Forces Command from 2004-2006 and with humanitarian assistance teams in Sierra Leone and Pakistan. COL Bonventre planned and helped execute 30 humanitarian assistance exercises in 16 countries and has deployed to 6 countries. He earned a B.S. from the University of Notre Dame and an M.D. from Loyola-Stritch School of Medicine. A board-certified general surgeon and flight surgeon, COL Bonventre is also a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College.

PHOTO: Two young Afghan boys overlook a USAID/Afghanistan-funded medical clinic in Wardak Province, 2005. The project was implemented by USAID partner "Shelter for Life." (Shelter for Life International, William R. Billinglsey)

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) executes humanitarian activities primarily through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program. The OHDACA program includes three sub-activities: the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program, the Humanitarian Mine Action program, and Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response. Activities funded by the OHDACA appropriation are intended to mitigate the effects of natural and man-made disasters, to shape the environment in which DOD operates by providing access to critical areas and by influencing civilian populations, and to improve the capacity of vulnerable nations to better prepare for disasters. The ultimate beneficiary of OHDACA activities is the civilian population, and the activities should always have an appropriate and positive influence. For instance, renovating a school should positively impact primary education, and renovating a clinic should positively impact the civilian health sector.

Civilian U.S. Government agencies evaluate the effectiveness of their programs through monitoring and evaluation (M&E), but equivalent analyses of DOD humanitarian assistance programs have been either ad hoc or entirely lacking.[1] "Monitoring" is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and use of data during the course of a project.[2] "Evaluation" is the periodic review of program activity, outcome, and impact, with an emphasis on lessons learned.[3] This article presents the case that DOD should institute both monitoring and evaluation of HA activities in order to assess their effectiveness.

The "How" and "Why" of Measuring HA

Every organization currently involved in humanitarian assistance faces the challenge of how to measure the impact of its work. Despite nearly 40 years of experience in M&E, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) still struggles to quantify, and demonstrate to decision-makers, the impact that its programs have. While DOD has extensive experience with battle damage assessment, its M&E methods for humanitarian assistance are in their infancy. The Pentagon has instituted "measures of effectiveness" (MOE) for virtually every DOD program but HA. The Defense Department need not develop monitoring and evaluation methods in a vacuum, however. USAID's several decades of experience is a great start point. Other agencies' experiences and lessons learned can likewise serve as a base for development of M&E techniques.

Why should DOD measure the impact of HA programs? There are several important reasons. First, doing so can allow planners to make mid-course corrections on current projects, and it can provide them with information to improve the quality of future activities. By creating a feedback loop of lessons learned, the M&E process in HA would improve efficiency and ensure that projects contribute to operational objectives. Planners could then emphasize activities that are more cost-effective, which is especially important because every year the number of projects that combatant commands apply for exceeds the funds available. Second, collecting and sharing data would increase planners' ability to deconflict activities with other agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Third, data analysis helps to showcase quantifiable results, thereby minimizing the chances of negative press surrounding HA activities.[4]

But most importantly, DOD should measure HA programs because transparency is a core strength of our democracy. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and even Al-Qaeda engage in prima facie humanitarian and social service activities, but ultimately their true motivations become apparent: the manipulation of people toward violent ends. In contrast, DOD's humanitarian programs should have a demonstrably quantifiable humanitarian impact.[5] Since terrorist organizations will usually be able to act more quickly than DOD (because they are not impeded by bureaucracy, ethical norms, and legal restrictions), any demonstrable positive benefit to the civilian sector offers DOD the chance to prevail in the long term over extremist propaganda.

As a point of contrast, in Vietnam, DOD spent $500-$750 million on MEDCAPS (medical civic aid programs) that provided medical care to 40 million civilians. However, in the absence of data, analysts have failed to reach any significant conclusions about the results of those programs.[6] Now is the time to avoid having to encounter the same situation in the future, since we stand to gain much by accurately assessing our HA activities.

DOD should measure HA programs because transparency is a core strength of our democracy.

DOD's initial attempts at measuring HA effectiveness will very likely be less than perfect. But merely attempting to quantify results will gain the department credibility. The resulting goodwill and improved civil-military relationships may even result in cooperation to refine future evaluation efforts. Regardless, the only way to ensure that we have long-term access to the areas we can affect, far beyond the short period of time that DOD personnel are on the ground, is to ensure that good civil-military relations continue. If the population feels abandoned at the completion of a project, all will have been for naught. For similar reasons, the best way to ensure positive influence is to quantify the benefits that the civilian population enjoys as a result of a given project and then feed that information back to the host nation.

Common Terminology

Because agencies often use the same words to mean different things, any discussion of monitoring and evaluation requires a common understanding of terms. The definitions in this article were taken from sources within DOD and other agencies:

● A "standard" is a reference point that allows comparisons. It is a set of criteria, guidelines, or best practices. The SPHERE Project publishes a handbook of minimum standards in humanitarian assistance and disaster response commonly used by civilian agencies.[7]

● A "goal" is an overall statement of intent. It is broad, timeless, and unconcerned with particular achievement within a specified time period.

● An "objective" is exactly what will occur, how it will be accomplished, and to what standard of performance.

● "Indicators" are quantitative or qualitative measures of standards and are used to correlate or predict the value or measure of a mission, program, system, or organization.[8] Indicators should have "SMART" (specific, measureable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) characteristics.

"Specific" means focusing on a narrowly defined aspect of a unit's mission. "Measurable" means showing progress and providing data for mid-course adjustments and improvements. "Achievable" relates to focusing on realistic targets rather than vague end-states. "Relevant" indicates that a strategic goal, major initiative, or core service has

been measured. "Time-bound" means it applies to a specific time frame. All indicators should complement one another. The SPHERE handbook contains a variety of indicators that might be helpful to military planners.

● "Performance indicators" (also known as "process indicators" or "achievement indicators") describe the output of an activity or how well that activity functioned. Performance indicators are important to measure, but they don't tell the whole story.

● "Outcome indicators" (also called "impact indicators") measure the extent to which an activity contributed to the overall goals of a program.

● "Measures of effectiveness" are combinations of key indicators from multiple sectors (or functions) used to determine overall progress toward attaining mission objectives. In joint doctrine, MOE are well described for large operations, and they are often used to determine transition strategies or redeployment milestones.[9] In the case of HA activities, MOE should measure access, influence, sectoral impact, and capacity building.

● "Baseline data" are measures of specific indicators that exist prior to project implementation. The partner nation, USAID, international organizations, or NGOs will usually have baseline data, although it may be very limited in conflict zones. If no baseline data exists, it may be prudent to collect it at the beginning of large projects.

To illustrate how these terms should be used, a project could be designed with a *goal* to improve village health. A possible *objective* would be to distribute, within one deployment, mosquito bed-nets to 95 percent of the village's residents. A *process indicator* would be the number of bed-nets distributed. An *outcome indicator* would be the percentage of villagers who actually use bed-nets. And a *measure of effectiveness* would be the decrease in the number of new cases of malaria in that village. Some indicators can be measured during or immediately after the project, and others will require one or more follow-up visits.

Roles and Perspectives

Project designers should monitor individual projects by developing both performance indicators and outcome indicators. In many instances, designers can tap into existing sources for baseline data and specific indicators. The host nation is usually the

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ultimate source, since most governments, even in resource-poor countries in conflict, will have some idea of what data they should collect and what has been collected in the past. Moreover, the host nation should be involved in, central to, and ultimately the owners of, every DOD HA project.

However, an easier source to access for data collection is the in-country or regional USAID office. USAID is not always an integral member of the country team at the American embassy, so planners may have to seek them out. A pre-planning conversation with USAID can often be a one-stop shopping event in which project designers access international organizations and NGOs in the sector of interest and identify competent and talented host-nation personnel. When using these sources, it is far better to collect your own data in the same format as the host nation or USAID than to create an ad hoc system.

In the data collection process, project officers measuring an impact on specific HA sectors or functions should also attempt to measure indicators that relate to DOD-specific goals. For instance, an HA project might be designed to improve a nation's capability to respond to a disaster or to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, and that could factor into Soldier readiness. Similarly, if a school is to be renovated, project goals may include "positively influencing a village that is prone to insurgent manipulation." Project designers in such circumstances may need to create new measures to look at these DOD-specific goals, but even then, examples can be gleaned from sources outside DOD.

Although DOD-specific goals would be important to the combatant commander, he need not be involved in data collection, except perhaps to share lessons with other project designers.

Combatant commanders' HA managers should provide oversight of individual projects, but should also be interested in evaluating overall programs. A "program" might be a multiple-year series of

related projects, each of which individually might not directly achieve theater goals, but taken together should contribute to realization of the theater strategy. Such a series of related projects might warrant development of specially tailored MOE. This process is usually labor-intensive, but it can be made easier if individual project metrics are designed to feed into them. A strategically holistic approach from the beginning would help designers implement that process. The combatant commander could transmit the resulting qualitative information to DOD senior leadership, describing program impacts that are difficult to quantify. Security cooperation assessments serve this same purpose for military-to-military activities.

Data collected should actually affect decision-making. The data reported by the tour guide at the beginning of this article is interesting, but what decisions would be changed by knowing the number of bricks in the Pentagon? Before collecting data, project planners should consider the target audience whose decisions rest on what is collected. For HA activities, the primary user of the data is the project designer, who needs to know if the activities he or she planned actually had the intended effect, so that they can improve the planning process for future activities. The designer can then summarize the data and pass it along to higher headquarters, where it can be used by program managers to assess the effectiveness of the whole program.

Partnerships

DOD cannot, and should not, monitor and evaluate humanitarian assistance missions in isolation. Certain goals of HA activities overlap with goals of other agencies. Both the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and DOD, for instance, have an interest in improving host-nation capacity to respond to disasters. USAID and DOD may each want to make a positive impact in the health sector in an area vulnerable to extremist influence. Since DOD HA activities must be done in partnership with the host nation, some of DOD's and the host's goals presumably should overlap. Therefore, rather than duplicate effort, a project designer's first step should be to find out if the host nation already collects similar data. If it does, the host's data may serve as a guide for formatting other or additional data collection, and it may provide baseline data for comparison.

Workmen at the Panjsad Family High School in Kabul, Afghanistan, battle the cold but keep on with renovations under a USAID grant, preparing for the return of 10,000 students after winter break, 21 January 2006.

The designer's second step should be to query other agencies, which normally require their implementing partners (NGOs and contractors) to collect data. For health projects, the Uniformed Services University and the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine have operational expertise and can provide advice and support to both project designers in the field and combatant commanders' HA managers. Occasionally, one can find common ground for disaster preparedness with organizations outside the U.S. Government. For instance, the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction may already measure a country's disaster response capabilities.

Yet another data source is academia. Johns Hopkins University developed a "balanced scorecard" method for assessing the capabilities of health

> *DOD cannot, and should not, monitor and evaluate humanitarian assistance missions in isolation.*

facilities in Afghanistan.[10] Harvard, Tulane, and the University of South Florida have significant experience in program and project design and evaluation. Leveraging any of these efforts will save DOD time and money, and it will facilitate data-sharing with other agencies and organizations. This sharing also increases DOD's credibility with other agencies and allays fears that the department is encroaching on other agencies' territory.

Where DOD goals are unique, project designers will need to develop their own indicators. Development from whole cloth will likely be the case at the program level if DOD chooses to quantify the impact of HA programs on "access" and "influence." However, even this process can benefit from methodologies already well-developed in other agencies and academia. Some quantitative analogy somewhere will almost certainly serve as a heuristic for developing new indicators.

Project monitoring is best done in-country through a collaborative effort with the country team and USAID. Program evaluation is best done at the combatant command level—preferably periodically, and possibly by an independent contractor. Given the significant number of HA projects implemented by contractors, precautions ought to be taken to avoid having contractors evaluate each others' efforts, especially when they are competing or belong to the same company. Academic institutions or NGOs could have a role at either level, although they may bring their institutional biases to evaluations. Nonetheless, they can be a cost-effective way of adding an independent, and possibly more credible, view from outside.

Resources

According to both the Department of State (DOS) and USAID, collection and analysis of data usually consumes from 8 to 10 percent of a project's total cost. These numbers provide a reasonable starting point for planning purposes. In developing an overall budget for worthwhile M&E in HA projects, combatant command HA managers may choose to develop a pilot project. Measuring a small number of moderate-sized HA projects in secure, accessible areas may be the best option. Projects undertaken in well developed civil societies with potential academic partners, some willing personalities in USAID, and relatively little corruption in the host-

nation government would seem to offer the best possibilities. Pilot projects in developed countries like South Africa or other stable developing countries might demonstrate the utility of M&E for humanitarian assistance. The present OHDACA appropriation should be adequate to start this process, and if the process succeeds, it can be used to demonstrate the need for additional funds from Congress. The ultimate goal is a wider implementation of project M&E and a subsequent increase in the number of projects funded.

Occasionally, combatant commands fund HA activities in a "tier 3" (lowest priority) country simply because there is no other significant U.S. activity there, or just because they want to spread their influence throughout their area of responsibility. A recent review of medical projects conducted during a 12-month period in all combatant commands found that fully two-thirds of project proposals were in tier 3 countries. This only makes sense if resources are virtually unlimited and tier 1 (highest priority) and tier 2 countries are completely saturated with activities. Neither is likely to ever be the case for OHDACA. There may be good reasons for doing occasional activities in tier 3 countries, but they should be the exception, not the rule. A Defense Security Cooperation Agency review of HA activities in tier 3 countries would indicate the magnitude of the current involvement, and it may identify a potential source of funds that would be better spent on monitoring and evaluation.

The Example of Afghanistan

The following project, though running into challenges in the execution phase, nonetheless shows that it is relatively painless to develop interagency indicators that quantify the effects of DOD humanitarian activities on stability and security.

In 2006, Afghanistan's Minister of Public Health (MoPH) noted that the people of the Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman border provinces routinely cross over into Pakistan, ostensibly to receive healthcare unavailable in their own provinces. During these excursions, they take drugs into Pakistan and return with guns. The provinces were too unstable to permit NGOs to establish enough clinics, so the minister asked the Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-A) leadership for assistance in fielding mobile health clinics staffed

by local Afghan personnel. CSTC-A funded an Afghan NGO, Sozo International, which got buy-in and security guarantees from local tribal leaders in exchange for hiring local personnel. Sozo agreed to provide the provinces with medical training and free medical care. CSTC-A coordinated this with the in-country USAID team and the European Commission (both being major donors to the Afghanistan health system). The Secretary of Defense's Partnership Strategy office coordinated with the State Department Afghanistan desk, USAID's Asia Near-East Bureau, Health and Human Services, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) to select a menu of health indicators based on the "Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan."[11] MoPH developed the package with USAID assistance, so the menu contains no new indicators.

Since MoPH requires all NGOs in Afghanistan to collect these metrics, Sozo International is comfortable with the process and with sharing data with USAID, MoPH, and the European Commission. MoPH will provide baseline data. Existing security indicators, already measured by CSTC-A with Joint Staff (J-5) assistance, will be compared in three provinces with clinics and three without. Project funds will be used to add several questions about

…even in a complex operation in an insecure environment, one can design M&E without undue burden.

the clinics to a monthly population attitude survey conducted by a Kabul-based organization. Attitudes in the three provinces with mobile health clinics will be compared to attitudes in three adjacent provinces without the clinics. The implementing NGO hired a project manager to oversee metrics. CSTC-A mentors this person, collects security indicators, and provides progress briefs to senior leadership. Data will be used to improve the quality of healthcare in less secure provinces, garner the cooperation of other stakeholders, determine whether similar projects should be launched in other provinces, and determine whether or not additional funding is justified.

The mobile health clinics were scheduled to begin operation in September 2007, but have been delayed due to changes in the tactical situation; M&E results will be published when available. Since this is a large project ($1.25 million to field three clinics) in a sensitive area within a named operation, a formal, government-wide method of metrics development, including partnering with academia, was justified. Nonetheless, the M&E portion was designed by a USUHS student (a U.S. Air Force captain) with mentorship from the Partnership Strategy office (the author). Support from every relevant U.S. government agency was obtained with a few phone calls and two meetings. Since the project used health indicators previously developed by MoPH and USAID, local buy-in was straightforward. Tapping into existing population surveys and security indicators will quantify the impact that health activities have on security. This example demonstrates that even in a complex operation in an insecure environment, one can design M&E without undue burden.

USAID, Ben Barber

A U.S. Army doctor speaks to a patient through an interpreter at a special clinic set up by the provincial reconstruction team in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, 2006.

Training

Although the principles outlined here are not complicated, they are unfamiliar to most military operators. Formal education and training on monitoring and evaluation would be time well-spent, and it would pay dividends down the road in a military officer's career. Virtually every DOD directive that mandates new tasks and responsibilities also requires use of measures of effectiveness. Perhaps "M&E" will ultimately become a mission-essential task for which DOD personnel will receive baseline formal education and routine refresher training. Until that time, however, conducting basic M&E for HA activities is bound to yield benefits.

Combatant command humanitarian assistance managers meet annually in Washington, D.C. for a conference sponsored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and funded by the OHDACA account. We hope to devote half a day to formal education on M&E techniques using basic principles taught by DOS and USAID, but modified to include DOD-specific requirements. DOS and DOD personnel or contractors could conduct this type of training, or one of several academic institutions could do it. Attendance should be required for all new DOD HA managers and be optional for current HA managers, some of whom could also serve as faculty. A similar course, funded by OHDACA, could be held at annual HA conferences in each combatant command.

For refresher training, M&E should be built into selected joint and service exercises that contain a humanitarian assistance scenario, particularly if other government agencies are involved. Such training would also help refine and customize theater M&E techniques, enhance familiarity with existing databases, and train a larger number of project officers.[12]

Conclusion

The complexity of today's security environment requires a new, sophisticated analysis of the efficacy of DOD humanitarian assistance programs. Assumptions should be replaced by formal attempts to quantify the effects of HA projects. That such measurements will never be perfect and causal relationships will never be definitively proven should not preclude attempts to develop practical assessment techniques. Merely attempting to quantify what has previously been thought unquantifiable will pay dividends in the quality of project design

USAID

USAID-supported health care clinics provide medical care to mothers and children, Afghanistan, 2005.

and implementation. Even if such attempts fail to achieve perfection, they will increase the credibility of DOD HA programs. Moreover, the interagency cooperation necessary for such a process will increase each agency's knowledge of the other agencies' principles and techniques and take them a step closer to a holistic, government-wide approach to addressing critical issues. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Jeff Drifmeyer and Craig Llewellyn, "Measuring the Effectiveness of DOD Humanitarian Assistance," Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, 1999; Doug Lougee, "Can We Build a Better Medical Civic Assistance Program? Making the Most of Medical Humanitarian Civic Assistance Funding," *The DISAM Journal* (February 2007); Derek Licina and Ken Schor, "Developing a Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity for the U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Program," *Military Medicine* 172, no.4 (April 2007): 339-45.

2. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, *Foreign Operations Guide,* version 4.0, September 2005.

3. Ibid.

4. CNN, "Audit: U.S. Lost Track of $9 billion in Iraq funds," 31 June 2005; ABC News, "$80 million Believed Wasted in Iraq Police Training Camp," 30 January 2007; Voice of America, "Officials: Billions in U.S. Iraq Reconstruction Money Wasted," 19 January 2007.

5. Even though DoD HA activities are carried out to gain access and influence, activities are also intended to benefit the civilian population. This distinction is not without controversy: by the internationally promulgated definition of "humanitarian," activities must take into account only the needs of the affected populations, without ulterior motives. For this reason, a more rigorous nomenclature for activities carried out as HA would be "civil-military operations," since additional motivations include attaining DOD operational and strategic objectives. However, the "benefit" to the civilian population must always be present as well.

6. Robert Wilensky, "The Medical Civic Action Program in Vietnam: Success or Failure?" *Military Medicine* 166, no.9 (September 2001): 815-19.

7. The SPHERE Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Geneva: The SPHERE Project, 2004), <www.sphereproject.org> (30 July 07).

8. Frederick (Skip) Burkle (Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired) has written extensively about measures of effectiveness and monitoring and evaluation. See Skip Burkle and P.G. Greenough, "Measures of Effectiveness in Disaster Management," in *Disaster Medicine,* 3d edition, ed. G.R. Ciottone (Philadelphia: Mosby/Elsevier Publishers, 2006), 333-35.

9. Joint Publication 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 August 2001, and Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 February 2001, page III-9 (both are in revision).

10. David Peters, Ayan Ahmed Noor, et al., "A balanced scorecard for health services in Afghanistan," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 85, no.2 (February 2007): 146-51.

11. "A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan," Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Health, 2005.

12. One example is the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters database (based in Brussels) used by the State Department. See <www.cred.be>.

Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA

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"Who has anything against life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?"[1]

—attributed to an Iranian citizen

FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS of the United States were on the decline in the Muslim world prior to the attacks of September 11th. Operations Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom in Iraq have not helped change those perceptions, particularly with religious extremists. Accordingly, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of State (DOS) to reassess its public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim regions. DOS then established an advisory group, which produced a report in September 2003 with recommendations calling for a "transformation of public diplomacy" through increased funding. The aim was to establish a new strategic direction for public diplomacy, and the report recommended that the president and Congress lead this new initiative.

This article reviews public diplomacy as a form of "soft power," shows how it can be used to promote U.S. interests in the Arab-Muslim world, and assesses DOS's public diplomacy efforts since the advisory group published its report. It concludes by calling for a more effective organization, one similar to the old U.S. Information Agency (USIA), so that public diplomacy can once again be employed as an effective instrument of national power.

Soft Power

When one thinks of sovereign state power, the first thought is likely that of military capabilities. But the sovereign state has many instruments of power available to it, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments. In *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Joseph Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a recognized expert on international affairs and the effects of soft power, provides some useful observations on power and its relationship to the sovereign state. Power, Nye says, is "the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want."[2] Influence can be accomplished through forceful means, or hard power, such as military action or economic restrictions. Nye then describes an alternate source of power: soft power. He explains that soft power uses attraction to "get the outcomes you want without the tangible threats or payoffs."[3]

According to Nye, a state derives its soft power from three sources: culture, political values, and foreign policy.[4] The strength of the state's soft power depends on the attraction or repulsion its culture, political values, and foreign policy generate in the citizens of the targeted country. To make soft power work effectively, a state must carefully select the methods that will attract others to its interests. Soft power, it must be said, is not an exclusive replacement for hard power; rather, it can strengthen applications of hard power, and it may be less expensive. Soft power can be directed at either an opposing state or at its individual citizens. Public diplomacy is one form of soft power employed

by the United States. The Nation used it during the cold war to communicate American values to the populations of Communist countries (and to neutral countries and allied populations as well).

Public Diplomacy

The United States Information Agency Alumni Association (USIAAA), formed by members of the old USIA, provides information on public diplomacy. According to the group, the term "public diplomacy" was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The USIAAA cites a brochure from the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Fletcher that offers this definition: "Public Diplomacy…deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications."[5]

By distinguishing public diplomacy from other common terms used for information exchange, the USIAAA has contributed to a better understanding of the term. The group compares public diplomacy with public affairs by suggesting that public affairs focuses primarily on domestic audiences, whereas public diplomacy focuses on foreign audiences. It then distinguished public diplomacy from diplomacy. The latter focuses on government-to-government relations, while public diplomacy focuses on influencing foreign publics. USIAAA does not attempt to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda. Instead, it candidly admits that public diplomacy is a form of propaganda based on facts.[6]

In June 1997, the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information

The U.S. Information Service library in Lahore, Pakistan, was one of the earliest successful U.S. public diplomacy missions. Membership peaked at 10,000 in the '80s and '90s.

Agency into the State Department provided its own definition of public diplomacy: "[It] seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences."[7]

The 1987 *U.S. Department of State Dictionary of International Relations Terms* states that "public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television." DOS does, in fact, use a variety of media in its efforts to convey U.S. national values to foreign publics. They include information exchanges, English language education programs, student exchange programs, collaboration with indigenous or nongovernmental organizations, and radio and television.[8] Newer media such as the Internet and satellite broadcasting have also become effective tools for employing soft power. DOS uses them to provide direct information exchange to remote areas.

Public diplomacy is one of the national instruments of power employed to implement the U.S. National Security Strategy. By winning over the hearts and minds of individuals within a state, public diplomacy can help the U.S. Government move a state toward more democratic forms of government. If the United States can successfully use public diplomacy for this purpose, then it achieves one of the National Security Strategy objectives: to "expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy."[9]

Despite—or perhaps because of—the success it had conveying enduring U.S. values to the people in Communist countries, USIA was downsized after the cold war, and its functions were eventually merged into DOS. With these actions, the United States relegated public diplomacy to a lesser priority and effectively marginalized its ability to brandish soft power.

After 9/11, the United States declared war against religious terrorists originating in Muslim countries. In many of these

A USIA-sponsored Van Tac Tu drama troupe arrives at a Vietnamese village in 1967. Fifteen such troupes traveled throughout South Vietnam dispensing propaganda via song and dance.

countries, there is a general lack of understanding and, in some cases, a total rejection of Western ideals; U.S. interests are often misunderstood. Nye suggests that unrest in the Middle East lies at the heart of this terrorism, and that the unrest is symptomatic of a struggle between Islamic moderates and extremists. He claims that the United States and its allies will win the war on terror only if they adopt policies that appeal to the moderates and use public diplomacy effectively to communicate that appeal.[10] While all elements of national power can be used to counter religious extremists, public diplomacy can be especially effective in winning over moderates and reducing the influence of the extremists. The U.S. Government, in its national policy decisions, should give increased emphasis to the use of public diplomacy as an instrument of national power.

Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy

In a June 2003 supplemental appropriations bill, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee directed DOS to "engage the creative talents of the private sector…[in order] to develop new public diplomacy approaches and initiatives…[and to] establish an

While all elements of national power can be used to counter religious extremists, public diplomacy can be especially effective in winning over moderates and reducing the influence of the extremists.

advisory group on public diplomacy for the Arab-Muslim world to recommend new approaches, initiatives, and program models to improve public diplomacy results."[11] In response, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell established the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab-Muslim World, in July 2003.

Chaired by Edward P. Djerejian, the former Ambassador to Syria and Israel, the Advisory Group consisted of a core group of 13 people with a variety of backgrounds—foreign service, academia, medicine, news media, public affairs, law, and business. Between July and September of 2003, the group expanded on the work of at least seven other studies that had been conducted since September 2001. Its members met with many specialists, both domestic and international, in the public, private, and nongovernmental arenas. They visited Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Senegal, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and France, and had teleconferences with key individuals in Pakistan and Indonesia. In October 2003, the group produced a report of its findings that offered recommendations to DOS regarding public diplomacy.

The report, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab-Muslim World" (frequently referred to as "the Djerejian Report"), begins by claiming that at a time when it is needed most, U.S. public diplomacy capability is inadequate due to outmoded techniques, insufficient resources, and too little strategic direction. The report flatly asserts that "the U.S. today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation, and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim World."[12] Although the report focused on Arab-Muslim areas, the Advisory Group claims that many of its recommendations apply to public diplomacy in general.

The Djerejian Report emphasizes that state-to-state diplomacy isn't changing Arab-Muslim attitudes and that public diplomacy is needed. Although the aforementioned U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and U.S. moves vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict have certainly affected how Americans are perceived in the Arab-Muslim world, the Advisory Group thinks that the fundamental problem is a lack of understanding of American culture. It claims that Arabs and Muslims are exposed to heavily filtered

media (e.g., limited TV stations, restricted and filtered access to the Internet) that typically deliver messages in native languages with the American viewpoint rarely represented. Although globalized technologies such as satellite TV and radio are breaking down these barriers, and although the Group was frequently told by Arabs and Muslims that they like American values and technologies, the same Arabs and Muslims said that they do not like the policies and actions of the American government. The report concludes that public diplomacy can reconcile this dichotomy through more effective communication of American policies.

Current public diplomacy techniques are not getting the word out. The Djerejian Report observes that even though Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, Egyptian citizens give more credit to the Japanese for developing an opera house in Cairo than to the United States for funding critical infrastructure development in Egypt's cities. The report found that even though broadcast media, specifically television, are the most effective means to disseminate ideas, U.S. policies or positions are usually absent from Arab-Muslim media programs.[13]

Citing information from a September 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on public diplomacy, the Djerejian Report provides statistics collected by several opinion research firms on favorable public opinion of the United States.[14] The data summarized in table 1 below indicate that favorable public opinion has been declining over the past several years. The Djerejian Report also refers to an April 2002 Zogby International survey (mentioned in the GAO report) showing that Arabs and Muslims had a favorable view of American movies, television, science and technology, and education, but were opposed to American policy toward Muslim countries.

The Djerejian Report provides detailed information on current public diplomacy activities as well as specific organizational, financial, and programmatic recommendations to transform DOS's public diplomacy efforts. It suggests that all public diplomacy programs should have some demonstrable measures of effectiveness before being implemented (although it does not make specific recommendations on such measures). Some current creative ideas, it says, need to be expanded. Among these are the "American Corners" program, which establishes cultural centers that provide free Internet access, books on American culture, and English language classes to citizens in Arab-Muslim cities; several Arabic-language radio programs (e.g., Radio Sawa) and magazines (e.g., *Hi*); and an Arabic-language TV network (Alhurra) that offers regional programming. The report also approves of a new initiative, the American Knowledge Library, which will translate en masse books related to science, democracy philosophies, and American culture.

Despite these DOS efforts, the report concludes that U.S. public diplomacy is not making enough of an impact. It goes on to make its recommendations about increased funding and a new strategic direction (the latter led by the "political will" of the president and Congress).[15] The report also sets up the "Ends" (better understanding of U.S. national values among Arab-Muslim populations), "Ways" (establish and execute a strategic plan), and "Means" (increased levels of funding) to increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy in the Arab-Muslim world.

	% Favorable in 1999/2002	% Favorable in 2003	Change
Indonesia	61 (2002)	15	-46%
Saudi Arabia	7 (2002)	0	-7%
Pakistan	23 (1999)	12	-11%
Turkey	52 (1999)	12	-40%
Jordan	25 (2002)	1	-24%
Egypt	6 (2002)	0	-6%

Table 1. Change in favorable views of the United States between 1999/2002 and 2003.

Reporters from the Voice of America and *Newsweek* interview BG Steven Hawkins of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at the Dawrah power station in Baghdad, Iraq, on 14 April 2003.

Agencies Using Public Diplomacy

A variety of organizations use public diplomacy to promote U.S. interests, many of them sponsored by DOS, to include the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Other independent organizations, such as a small Syrian group called Dar Emar, contribute to this effort.

The BBG, an independent federal agency that supervises all U.S. Government-supported non-military international broadcasting, is verifiably an effective public diplomacy instrument. The BBG oversees radio and TV stations (e.g., the Voice of America, Radio Sawa, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) that broadcast in 65 languages to over 100 million people around the world. The BBG's Radio Sawa, transmitting in over fifteen Arab-Muslim countries, is considered one of the most innovative public diplomacy initiatives, according to the BBG website.[16]

Both the Advisory Group and the recent 9/11 Commission have recognized that effective public diplomacy can influence moderates within Arab-Muslim countries. The 9/11 Commission claims that "the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to

the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences."[17] The Commission has also emphasized that the BBG needs to run programs that counteract religious extremist movements in the region because "local newspapers and the few influential satellite broadcasters—like Al-Jazeera—often reinforce the jihadist theme that portrays the United States as anti-Muslim."[18]

The BBG has claimed that "Radio Sawa, a 24/7 station, has garnered large audiences of young people in the region with its mix of news, information and Western and Arabic music," but the Djerejian Report criticized the station for simply appealing to youthful Arab musical tastes and not influencing the larger public.[19] The BBG countered that the Advisory Group doesn't understand its (the BBG's) role, which is to offer examples of high-quality American journalism that promote and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and information about the United States.[20] The BBG might also have cited a February 2004 ACNielsen report which found that "the percentages of adults (age 15 and older) listening to Radio Sawa on a weekly basis are 73 percent in Morocco, 42 percent in Kuwait, 35 percent in UAE, 27 percent in Jordan, 11 percent in Egypt and 41 percent in Qatar."[21] Further, 80 percent of Radio Sawa's listeners consider it a reliable news source, and another ACNielsen survey, in October 2003, found that Radio Sawa's listeners view the United States more favorably than do non-listeners.[22] Nor is that all. The age demographic in many Middle Eastern countries is heavily skewed toward the younger generation, with over 50 percent of the populations in many countries under the age of 20.[23] Appealing to a youthful audience appears to be the right way to go.

Despite criticisms in the Djerejian Report of the effectiveness of the BBG, both the Advisory Group and the 9/11 Commission recommend increasing the BBG's funding for new broadcasting programs. The Middle East television station Alhurra, created

in February 2004, is a recent result of new funding. Alhurra directs its programming at Arabic-speaking viewers in 22 countries across the Middle East.[24]

Another organization contributing to public diplomacy is USAID. An independent government agency under the direction of the secretary of state, USAID provides humanitarian, developmental, and democracy-building assistance to developing countries and countries affected by disaster and afflicted with poverty.[25] USAID relies on partnerships with voluntary organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, and other U.S. and foreign governmental agencies to improve the lives of people in developing countries. By helping to expand democracy and the free-trade market, it plays a key role in carrying out U.S. foreign policy.

The Djerejian Report criticizes a legal restriction that prevents USAID from promoting the good work it is doing. Prohibiting "USAID…from using program funds to disseminate information about its activities" overlooks the fact that "a great deal of [US]AID's work is public diplomacy."[26] USAID has since established an Office of Public Diplomacy within its Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs. According to an April 2004 USAID press release, "The Office of Public Diplomacy helps to coordinate and infuse the development and humanitarian message of USAID to the U.S. Government, the American People and the Arab world."[27] The release also introduced Walid Maalouf as the new Director for Public Diplomacy for Middle Eastern and Middle East Partnership Initiative Affairs.

Maalouf has international-affairs experience, having served as the alternate U.S. representative to the United Nations' 58th General Assembly. Another USAID press release highlights his credentials: "He was an integral part of the Middle East team at the Mission and the first U.S. Representative to deliver a speech at the U.N. in Arabic. Maalouf's new Office for Public Diplomacy (in USAID) has taken quick action to engage Arab communities."[28] At a media summit in May 2004 with key Arab press correspondents and Arab-American publishers, Maalouf

declared, "USAID's new diplomacy initiative is committed to presenting a more accurate image of America to the greater Middle East and promoting a better understanding of the policy goals of Presidential Initiatives and the mission of USAID."[29] A press release noted that "this media summit was the largest exchange between Mideast-American correspondents and U.S. officials and was the first of several outreach events to the Arab and Moslem communities in the United States."[30]

Besides government-sponsored public diplomacy, private citizens seek to establish better relations between Muslims and Americans. In an article in *The Jerusalem Report*, Yigal Schleifer describes how Syrian Ammar Abdulhamid is using his nongovernmental organization, Dar Emar, to promote a better understanding of American culture and democracy in Syria. Dar Emar is translating appropriate English texts in an attempt to educate Syrian citizens about American culture and the philosophical foundations of democracy. Abdulhamid says, "When you have an intense project of translation, it leads to dialogue and questioning and hopefully a renaissance will come out of that…. If you want positive change in Syria, there is no substitute for positive engagement."[31]

Dar Emar's website provides specific details of many proposed programs. One program, Project Etana, attempts to bridge the knowledge gap between the Western and Arab worlds and provide insight into Western culture. The effort will translate into Arabic many classical and modern Western works, especially in history, science, and the humanities. Speaking about his efforts, Abdulhamid admits, "This is not easy, nor should it be…my first idea was that we don't understand America, even Muslims living in America don't understand it, so forget about Syrians living in Syria under a socialist government."[32]

Assessments of Progress

Much has been written about soft power, public diplomacy, and the Djerejian Report, with discussions about the pros and cons of recent efforts in these areas. The Council on Foreign Relations, founded

…in general, current U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts are deficient.

after the 1919 Paris Peace Talks to promote knowledge of foreign policy, focuses on broadening America's understanding of the world and U.S. foreign policy. Through its magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, and its various sponsored forums, the Council encourages a wide range of views while avoiding advocacy for specific policies.[33] The Council's website provides a question-and-answer page on terrorism that discusses the implications of public diplomacy and its recent impact on terrorism. Citing a 2002 Gallup survey conducted in nine Muslim countries, the Council concludes that America has an image problem abroad that could hinder the war on terrorism.[34]

The Council's website acknowledges some of the recent attempts to reach Arab and Muslim audiences, such as appearances by Colin Powell, then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Al-Jazeera, and it credits former Ambassador to Syria Christopher Ross for appearing on Al-Jazeera and speaking Arabic; however, it claims that, in general, current U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts are deficient.[35] To improve the U.S. public image in the Arab-Muslim world, the Council suggests that public diplomacy should be integrated into U.S. foreign policy development processes. Apparently, it believes that embedding public diplomacy within DOS isn't working, and that public diplomacy needs more attention at the strategic level.

Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, an associate professor of communication at DePaul University, has addressed the ways soft power enhances other instruments of national power. "As a nation," she argues, "we may have the mightiest military and the most sophisticated technology, but such strengths ultimately will not matter if we fail to capture the minds and hearts of people around the world with the enduring story of freedom and democracy."[36] Fitzpatrick points out that we must first educate ourselves about other countries before we attempt to change their views. She too recognizes that for public diplomacy to be effective, it must be considered when developing foreign policy. She also warns against the dangers of "diplomatic chaos"—the confusion experienced by foreign citizens when U.S. policies and goals shift each time a new president is elected. Says Fitzpatrick: "[It's] no wonder foreign citizens get confused about what this country really stands for."[37]

John Brown, of the Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds, assesses the Djerejian Report in his article "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: Reconsidering the Djerejian Report."[38] He claims that the report was too easy on DOS, and asserts that many of the public diplomacy challenges discussed in the report have been around since World War II. Brown recognizes that accurate measurement of the effectiveness of public diplomacy is difficult, if not impossible, but claims the report does not make any specific recommendations to address the problem. The report's recommendations are unimaginative, he says, and simply call for continuation of existing programs, more bureaucracy, and more funding. Nevertheless, Brown proposes that program assessment is not as important as acknowledging that public diplomacy programs are inexpensive and life would be more dangerous without them. He recommends that foreign officers be empowered to implement public diplomacy solutions that they feel will work in their regions, and that Americans be reminded that cultural differences play a significant part in foreign policy, so public diplomacy should be considered in development of foreign policy.[39] Again, there is the suggestion that public diplomacy is not emphasized enough at the strategic level within DOS.

In a June 2003 article in *Foreign Policy*, Nye claimed that anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, while U.S. soft power has been reduced.[40] One of the goals of the National Security Strategy is the promotion of democracy; however, Nye stated, "democracy…cannot be imposed by force."[41] Nye therefore proposed a time-phased strategy to develop effective public diplomacy. First, there should be a short-term focus on communicating current events through broadcast media. Nye believes that Radio Sawa is working, but thinks the United States needs a larger voice in such Arab media as Al-Jazeera television. In the near term, he argues, the United States should develop and communicate strategic themes or messages that depict it as a democratic nation interested in helping Muslim nations. He cites Bosnia and Kosovo as examples of American intervention on behalf of Muslims. Nye also advocates long-term efforts in cultural and educational exchanges. He believes that partnerships with governments, businesses, universities, and foundations can be exploited to encourage cultural understanding and exchange of information. In Nye's estimation,

the biggest problem affecting United States public diplomacy is its underfunding.[42]

Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies for the American Enterprise Institute, has argued that democracy is on the rise in Arab countries. "Democracy is the talk of the Arab world," she claims, "…democracy is now at the center of debate in Arab capitals."[43] Asserting that change is underway, Pletka notes that "the Arab League has embraced a series of…reforms; the Saudis have announced plans for municipal elections starting in November; and the Bahrainis and Qataris are making real changes to their political systems."[44] She warns that politically restrictive governments and low literacy rates in the region are obstacles to the expansion of democracy, but she provides evidence that some Arab citizens want reform and are looking to outside organizations to impose it.[45] Likewise, she notes that Palestinian scholar Daoud Kuttab has argued that "Arab democrats have failed to reach their goals through their own efforts," and they should welcome support from outsiders "irrespective of the messenger."[46] Although Pletka claims that President Bush is making "headway" in the promotion of democracy in Arab countries, she charges that he hasn't been aggressive enough. Many of the concerns she raises can be addressed by doing a better job of directly articulating U.S. values to Middle Eastern citizens. Public diplomacy initiatives can help to secure the recent democratic gains against extremists who violently oppose such change.

> *…the United States should develop and communicate strategic themes or messages that depict it as a democratic nation interested in helping Muslim nations*

DOS Activities

In testimony before Congress, DOS officials have defended the public diplomacy efforts they have undertaken since the Djerejian Report. But Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Margaret Tutwiler told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 2004 that U. S. Government public diplomacy efforts "must do a better job reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials." She described the effort to improve America's image as a difficult challenge that will "take years of hard, focused work."[47] Patricia Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, offered testimony regarding public diplomacy efforts focused on Arabs and Muslims to the House International Relations Committee in August 2004. Citing DOS's strategic ends for public diplomacy, she stated, "The foundation of our public diplomacy strategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics in order to increase understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives." Harrison asserted that the ways to achieve these ends are "through traditional programs and all the tools of technology, involving both public and private sectors" along with "daily briefings and public outreach by our missions around the world."[48]

Tutwiler's and Harrison's testimonies describe many new efforts to improve U.S. public diplomacy. These include changes in funding and organization and new programs for exchange, education, information, and broadcasting. For example, public diplomacy funding has been refocused to aim at the heavily Muslim regions of the Middle East and South Asia, so that 25 percent of all funding for exchange programs is now aimed at this region, as compared to 17 percent in 2002. Organizational changes include establishment of the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and an interagency Policy Coordinating Committee on Muslim Outreach focused on strengthening coordination with the Department of Defense and other agencies. Elsewhere, the Fulbright Scholarship program is now operational within Iraq and Afghanistan (the program was absent in Afghanistan for 25 years); USAID is working to ensure that recipients of its programs know that they are being assisted by the United States; thirty public diplomacy officers have been assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, making it the largest public diplomacy operation in the world; and the Alhurrah television network is now broadcasting to a huge Middle Eastern audience.[49]

Persistent Problems

Clearly, the United States has taken great pains to expand its influence in the Arab-Muslim world through public diplomacy efforts. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy provides some of these details in its 2004 report, which concludes that "significant progress has been made in many areas."[50] However, the report goes on to say that "there is still much that can be accomplished" and "the agencies and structures of public diplomacy need to be properly coordinated to achieve maximum efficiency."[51] While asserting that U.S. public diplomacy is making an impact, it suggests that public diplomacy still needs more strategic-level influence.

Despite being one of the four DIME instruments of national power, the information element does not get enough attention at the strategic level. DOS has cabinet-level influence and execution responsibility for the diplomacy element, but only recently, with the creation of the White House Office of Global Communications, has the information element attained strategic-level policy attention. Although DOS employs public diplomacy to execute the information element of national power, it does not give public diplomacy the same top-level attention as diplomacy or international development.

In October 1998, USAID and USIA were merged into DOS. The old USIA promoted U.S. national interests through a variety of international information, education, and cultural programs. Today, the functions and authority of the former USIA have been assigned to the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In contrast, USAID remains an essentially intact organization within DOS, receiving only overall foreign policy guidance from the secretary of state. Interestingly, USAID retained its old public diplomacy functions within the Office of Public Diplomacy under the Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs. Hinting at a need for reform, DOS recently established a Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy to ensure synchronization between the two DOS organizations.

According to Edgar Schein, a prominent organizational theorist, coordination of effort is one of the four essential elements necessary for effective organizational performance.[52] The Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy is an attempt to achieve this coordination of effort within DOS. Another of Schein's essential elements is "authority structure"—having an organizational structure or chain of command that gives one the right to direct the actions of others.[53] DOS, however, has split the public diplomacy functions between organizations with different chains of command. Without a proper authority structure, it will be difficult to coordinate public diplomacy effectively.

A New-Old Recommendation

To address these persistent shortfalls, the U.S. Government should resurrect within DOS a construct similar to the old USIA. This new agency, which might be called the Public Diplomacy Agency, should be tightly coupled to DOS in both policy and management, just as USAID is. In a tripartite relationship with DOS and USAID, an organization like the Public Diplomacy Agency could wield the information instrument of national power very effectively to help us achieve our national objectives. If the president appointed its director and Congress appropriated funding, this independent agency would have the agility to execute its mission and the authority structure needed to coordinate public diplomacy in the most effective manner—all while remaining accountable to national security policy and the public.

Summary

Since the Advisory Group published its report on the use of public diplomacy to influence the hearts and minds of Arab and Muslim people, DOS has made some improvements. The BBG's broadcasting efforts, in particular, have been a real success. Probably the most difficult challenge for DOS will be to develop feedback mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of its myriad public diplomacy programs. In the face of this challenge, we should remember that without any public diplomacy efforts, the world would be a more dangerous place.

Although DOS has made improvements in wielding the information element of national power, public diplomacy initiatives continue to lack adequate funding, they aren't being properly coordinated with other foreign affairs agencies, and they need more strategic direction. Nevertheless, DOS has shown through the recent expansion of U.S. influence in the Arab-Muslim world that it has the necessary knowledge and processes to execute a truly effective public diplomacy program.

DOS does, however, need a better organizational structure to provide strategic focus. One solution would be to stand up an agency within DOS—something along the lines of the old USIA—that is specifically charged to prosecute public diplomacy. Doing so would ensure that public diplomacy policy is effectively coordinated at the department level and would allow for greater influence at the cabinet or strategic levels. The DOS-USAID model worked exceptionally well during the recent tsunami relief efforts in Asia; it could certainly be used to create a more effective organization for employing the information element of national power. Now is the time. To win the war on terror, we have to ensure that the Arab-Muslim world hears a consistent, positive U.S. message. We need a public diplomacy agency. **MR**

Editor's Note: The military in general and the Army specifically are wrestling with the development of an as-yet unsatisfactorily defined capability for influencing foreign populations at the cultural level of engagement. This capability has been variously described as "public diplomacy," "strategic communications," and "information operations." Whether this is even an appropriate mission for the military continues to be heatedly debated in many quarters of the military and the government. Ironically, the government at one time had within its structure an organization dedicated to just such activities—the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). The USIA served in this role from the onset of the cold war to 1999, when it was officially disestablished. It ran a wide variety of programs aimed at promoting goodwill through respectful, culturally sensitive foreign engagement, as well as activities aimed at promoting among foreign peoples an understanding of U.S. institutions, society, and culture. During times of military crisis, the USIA became part of the country-team, performing the very functions of public diplomacy and cultural engagement that the military now appears to be trying to develop. Overall, the USIA played a dominant role in winning the values dimension of the cold war. It did this not through propaganda and bombast, but by focusing on the contrast between communism and democracy and using a policy of openness and exposure to America with all its positive aspects as well as its flaws. More information about the USIA and its functions can be obtained at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/ or http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf.

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The Sole Superpower in Decline:
The Rise of a Multipolar World

Shri Dilip Hiro

WITH THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States stood tall—militarily invincible, economically unrivalled, diplomatically uncontestable, and the dominating force on information channels worldwide. The next century was to be the true "American century," with the rest of the world moulding itself in the image of the sole superpower.

Yet, with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of American supremacy—Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode American hegemony, not confront it singly or jointly.

How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, over-extending itself. To the relief of many—in the U.S. and elsewhere—the Iraq fiasco has demonstrated the striking limitations of power for the globe's highest-tech, most destructive military machine. Regarding Iraq, Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to two U.S. Presidents, concedes in a recent op-ed, "We are being wrestled to a draw by opponents who are not even an organized state adversary."

The invasion and subsequent disastrous occupation of Iraq and the mismanaged military campaign in Afghanistan have crippled the credibility of the United States. The scandals at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantanamo in Cuba, along with the widely publicized murders of Iraqi civilians in Haditha, have badly tarnished America's moral self-image. In the latest opinion poll, even in a secular state, and member of NATO like Turkey, only 9 percent of Turks have a "favorable view" of the U.S. (down from 52 percent just five years ago).

Yet there are other explanations—unrelated to Washington's glaring misadventures—for the current transformation in international affairs.

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These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe's leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.

Many Channels, Diverse Perceptions

During the 1991 Gulf War, only CNN and the BBC had correspondents in Baghdad. So the international TV audience, irrespective of its location, saw the conflict through their lenses. Twelve years later, when the Bush administration, backed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, invaded Iraq, Al Jazeera Arabic broke this duopoly. It relayed images—and facts—that contradicted the Pentagon's presentation. For the first time in history, the world witnessed two versions of an ongoing war in real time. So credible was the Al Jazeera Arabic version that many television companies outside the Arabic-speaking world—in Europe, Asia and Latin America—showed its clips.

Though, in theory, the growth of cable television worldwide raised the prospect of ending the Anglo-American duopoly in 24-hour TV news, not much had happened due to the exorbitant cost of gathering and editing TV news. It was only the arrival of Al Jazeera English, funded by the hydrocarbon-rich emirate of Qatar—with its declared policy of offering a global perspective from an Arab and Muslim angle—that, in 2006, finally broke the long-established mould.

Soon France 24 came on the air, broadcasting in English and French from a French viewpoint, followed in mid-2007 by the English-language Press TV, which aimed to provide an Iranian perspective. Russia was next in line for 24-hour TV news in English for the global audience. Meanwhile, spurred by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Telesur, a pan-Latin-American TV channel based in Caracas, began competing with CNN in Spanish for a mass audience.

As with Qatar, so with Russia and Venezuela. The funding for these TV news ventures has come from soaring national hydrocarbon incomes—a factor draining American hegemony not just in imagery but in reality.

Russia, an Energy Superpower

Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has more than recovered from the economic chaos that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. After effectively renationalizing the energy industry through state-controlled corporations, he began deploying its economic clout to further Russia's foreign policy interests.

In 2005, Russia overtook the United States, becoming the second largest oil producer in the world. Its oil income now amounts to $679 billion a day. European countries dependent on imported Russian oil now include Hungary, Poland, Germany, and even Britain.

Russia is also the largest producer of natural gas on the planet, with three-fifths of its gas exports going to the 27-member European Union (EU). Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia get 100 percent of their natural gas from Russia; Turkey, 66 percent; Poland, 58 percent; Germany, 41 percent; and France, 25 percent. Gazprom, the biggest natural gas enterprise on Earth, has established stakes in 16 EU countries. In 2006, the Kremlin's foreign reserves stood at $315 billion, up from a paltry $12 billion in 1999. Little wonder that, in July 2006 on the eve of the G8 summit in St Petersburg, Putin rejected an energy charter proposed by the Western leaders.

Soaring foreign-exchange reserves, new ballistic missiles, and closer links with a prospering China—with which it conducted joint military exercises on China's Shandong Peninsula in August 2005—enabled Putin to deal with his American counterpart, President George W. Bush, as an equal, not mincing his words when appraising American policies.

"One country, the United States, has overstepped its national boundaries in every way," Putin told the 43rd Munich Trans-Atlantic conference on security policy in February 2007. "This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations . . . This is very dangerous."

Condemning the concept of a "unipolar world," he added: "However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it describes a scenario in which there is one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making. It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And this is pernicious." His views fell on receptive ears in the capitals of most Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

The changing relationship between Moscow and Washington was noted, among others, by analysts and policy-makers in the hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf region. Commenting on the visit that Putin paid to long-time U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar after the Munich conference, Abdel Aziz Sagar, chairman of the Gulf Research Centre, wrote in the Doha-based newspaper *The Peninsula* that Russia and Gulf Arab countries, once rivals from opposite ideological camps, had found a common agenda of oil, anti-terrorism, and arms sales. "The altered focus takes place in a milieu where the Gulf countries are signaling their keenness to keep all geopolitical options open, reviewing the utility of the United States as the sole security guarantor, and contemplating a collective security mechanism that involves a host of international players."

In April 2007, the Kremlin issued a major foreign policy document. "The myth about the unipolar world fell apart once and for all in Iraq," it stated. "A strong, more self-confident Russia has become an integral part of positive changes in the world."

The Kremlin's increasingly tense relations with Washington were in tune with Russian popular opinion. A poll taken during the run-up to the 2006 G8 summit revealed that 58 percent of Russians regarded America as an "unfriendly country." It has proved to be a trend. This July, for instance, Major General Alexandr Vladimirov told the mass circulation newspaper *Komsolskya Pravada* that war with the United States was a "possibility" in the next 10 to 15 years.

> *A strong, more self-confident Russia has become an integral part of positive changes in the world.*
>
> —Foreign policy document released by the Kremlin, April 2007

Chavez Rides High

Such sentiments resonated with Hugo Chavez. While visiting Moscow in June 2007, he urged Russians to return to the ideas of Vladimir Lenin, especially his anti-imperialism. "The Americans don't want Russia to keep rising," he said. "But Russia has risen again as a centre of power, and we the people of the world need Russia to become stronger."

Chavez finalized a $1 billion deal to purchase five diesel submarines to defend Venezuela's oil-rich undersea shelf and thwart any possible future economic embargo imposed by Washington. By then, Venezuela had become the second largest buyer of Russian weaponry. (Algeria topped the list, another indication of a growing multipolarity in world affairs.) Venezuela acquired the distinction of being the first country to receive a license from Russia to manufacture the famed Ak-47 assault rifle.

By channeling some of his country's oil money to needy Venezuelans, Chavez broadened his base of support. Much to the chagrin of the Bush White House, he trounced his sole political rival, Manuel Rosales, in a December 2006 presidential contest with 61 percent of the vote. Equally humiliating to the Bush administration, Venezuela was, by then, giving more foreign aid to needy Latin American states than it was.

Following his re-election, Chavez vigorously pursued the concept of forming an anti-imperialist alliance in Latin America as well as globally. He strengthened Venezuela's ties not only with such Latin countries as Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and debt-ridden Argentina, but also with Iran and Belarus.

By the time he arrived in Tehran from Moscow (via Minsk) in June 2007, the 180 economic and political accords his government had signed with Tehran were already yielding tangible results. Iranian-designed cars and tractors were coming off assembly lines in Venezuela. "The cooperation of independent countries like Iran and Venezuela has an effective role in defeating the policies of imperialism and saving nations," Chavez declared in Tehran.

Stuck in the quagmire of Iraq and lashed by the gusty winds of rocketing oil prices, the Bush administration finds its area of manoeuvre woefully limited when dealing with a rising hydrocarbon power. To the insults that Chavez keeps hurling at Bush, the American response has been vapid. The reason is the crippling dependence of the United States on imported petroleum which accounts for 60 percent of its total consumed. Venezuela is the fourth largest source of U.S. imported oil after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia; and some

refineries in the U.S. are designed specifically to refine heavy Venezuelan oil.

In Chavez's scheme to undermine the "sole superpower," China has an important role. During an August 2006 visit to Beijing, his fourth in seven years, he announced that Venezuela would triple its oil exports to China to 500,000 barrels per day in three years, a jump that suited both sides. Chavez wants to diversify Venezuela's buyer base to reduce its reliance on exports to the U.S., and China's leaders are keen to diversify their hydrocarbon imports away from the Middle East, where American influence remains strong.

"The support of China is very important [to us] from the political and moral point of view," Chavez declared. Along with a joint refinery project, China agreed to build 13 oil drilling platforms, supply 18 oil tankers, and collaborate with the state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA), in exploring a new oilfield in the Orinoco Basin.

China on a Stratospheric Trajectory

So dramatic has been the growth of the state-run company Petro China that, in mid-2007, it was second only to Exxon Mobil in its market value among energy corporations. Indeed, that year three Chinese companies made it onto the list of the world's most highly valued corporations. Only the U.S. had more with five. China's foreign reserves of over $1 trillion have now surpassed Japan's. With its gross domestic product soaring past Germany's, China ranks number three in the world economy.

In the diplomatic arena, Chinese leaders broke new ground in 1996 by sponsoring the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), consisting of four adjoining countries: Russia and the three former Soviet socialist republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO started as a

With its gross domestic product soaring past Germany's, China ranks number three in the world economy.

cooperative organization with a focus on countering drug-smuggling and terrorism. Later, the SCO invited Uzbekistan to join, even though it does not abut China. In 2003, the SCO broadened its scope by including regional economic cooperation in its charter. That, in turn, led it to grant observer status to Pakistan, India, and Mongolia—all adjoining China—and Iran which does not. When the U.S. applied for observer status, it was rejected, an embarrassing setback for Washington, which enjoys such status at the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In early August 2007, on the eve of an SCO summit in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, the group conducted its first joint military exercises, code named Peace Mission 2007, in the Russian Ural region of Chelyabinsk. "The SCO is destined to play a vital role in ensuring international security," said Ednan Karabayev, foreign minister of Kyrgyzstan.

In late 2006, as the host of a China-Africa Forum in Beijing attended by leaders of 48 of 53 African nations, China left the U.S. woefully behind in the diplomatic race for that continent (and its hydrocarbon and other resources). In return for Africa's oil, iron ore, copper, and cotton, China sold low-priced goods to Africans, and assisted African countries in building or improving roads, railways, ports, hydro-electric dams, telecommunications systems, and schools. "The western approach of imposing its values and political system on other countries is not acceptable to China," said Africa specialist Wang Hongyi of the China Institute of International Studies. "We focus on mutual development."

To reduce the cost of transporting petroleum from Africa and the Middle East, China began constructing a trans-Burma oil pipeline from the Bay of Bengal to its southern province of Yunan, thereby shortening the delivery distance now travelled by tankers. This undermined Washington's campaign to isolate Myanmar. (Earlier, Sudan, boycotted by Washington, had emerged as a leading supplier of African oil to China.) In addition, Chinese oil companies were competing fiercely with their Western counterparts in getting access to hydrocarbon reserves in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

"China's oil diplomacy is putting the country on a collision course with the U.S. and Western Europe, which have imposed sanctions on some of the countries where China is doing business,"

> ***China's oil diplomacy is putting the country on a collision course with the U.S. and Western Europe…***
>
> *—William Mellor, Bloomberg News*

comments William Mellor of Bloomberg News. The sentiment is echoed by the other side. "I see China and the U.S. coming into conflict over energy in the years ahead," says Jin Riguang, an oil-and-gas advisor to the Chinese government and a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council.

China's industrialization and modernization has spurred the modernization of its military as well. The test-firing of the country's first anti-satellite missile, which successfully destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite in January 2007, dramatically demonstrated its growing technological prowess. An alarmed Washington had already noted an 18 percent increase in China's 2007 defence budget. Attributing the rise to extra spending on missiles, electronic warfare, and other high-tech items, Liao Xilong, Commander of the People's Liberation Army's general logistics department, said: "The present day world is no longer peaceful, and to protect national security, stability, and territorial integrity we must suitably increase spending on military modernization."

China's declared budget of $45 billion was a tiny fraction of the Pentagon's $459 billion one. Yet, in May 2007, a Pentagon report noted China's "rapid rise as a regional and economic power with global aspirations" and claimed that it was planning to project military force farther afield from the Taiwan Straits into the Asia-Pacific region in preparation for possible conflicts over territory or resources.

The Sole Superpower in the Sweep of History

This disparate challenge to American global primacy stems as much from sharpening conflicts over natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas, as from ideological differences over democracy, American style, or human rights, as conceived and promoted by Western policymakers. Perceptions about national (and imperial) identity and history are at stake as well.

It is noteworthy that Russian officials applauding the swift rise of post-Soviet Russia refer fondly to the pre-Bolshevik Revolution era when, according to them, Tsarist Russia was a Great Power. Equally, Chinese leaders remain proud of their country's long imperial past as unique among nations.

When viewed globally and in the great stretch of history, the notion of American exceptionalism that drove the neo-conservatives to proclaim the Project for the New American Century in the late 20th century—adopted so wholeheartedly by the Bush administration in this one—is nothing new. Other superpowers have been there before and they, too, have witnessed the loss of their prime position to rising powers.

No superpower in modern times has maintained its supremacy for more than several generations. And, however exceptional its leaders may have thought themselves, the United States, already clearly past its zenith, has no chance of becoming an exception to this age-old pattern of history. ***MR***

This is a critical time. The opportunity for the full application of economic development in support of counterinsurgency doctrine is now. The opportunity to support the Iraqi people in their desire for prosperity in a diverse, safe, and open society is now. The opportunity for international investment with an orientation to high risk and high return in a nation with great potential for long-term prosperity is now. Seizing these opportunities remains the challenge of the day.

—Paul A. Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, quoted from "Restoring Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward," *Military Review*, March-April 2008.

PHOTO: Vendors stand behind their displays while waiting to sell their products in a market in Baghdad, Iraq, 27 January 2008. The market is the site of an economic development project aimed to stimulate growth in the area. (U.S. Army, SPC Nicholas Hernandez)