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2009 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition “Leader Development from Initial Entry Training to the Battlefield”
NEARLY ALL MISSIONS this century will be complex, and the kind of thinking we have called “operational art” is often now required at battalion level. Fundamentally, operational art requires balancing design and planning while remaining open to learning and adapting quickly to change. Design is not a new idea. Command has always entailed responsibility for designing operations while penetrating complexity and framing problems that planners have to solve. Individual ability to learn effectively, adapt rapidly and appropriately, and to solve problems has always been self-evidently valuable to commanders. Yet, collectively, a command’s overall quality of design, learning, and adaptation is what determines results. Military leaders may value individual creativity, critical thinking, continuous learning, and adaptability in their staffs and subordinate commanders, but individual traits do not necessarily add up to collective abilities needed for the best outcomes.

Traditional approaches to imparting a collective quality to campaign design introduced in the 1980s, and more recent infusions from Joint doctrine, are no longer sufficient for achieving the best outcomes. Because operational environments evince increasingly dynamic complexity, commanders are looking for, and are in need of, help.

Operational Art in Modern Complex Conflicts

Operational artists at all levels need new conceptual tools commensurate to today’s demands. Conceptual aids derived from old, industrial-age analogies are not up to the mental gymnastics demanded by 21st-century missions.

Parallel to the development of so-called (and now discredited) “rapid decisive operations” (RDO), and as a way to facilitate RDO planning, Joint doctrine writers at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) introduced effects-based planning (EBP), operational net assessment (ONA), and system-of-systems analysis (SOSA). Intended to be tools of operational art and planning, these concepts have been nearly impotent for making any sense of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions.

The inherent logic of effects-based planning assumes a mechanistic understanding of causal chains. We can readily understand the logic of cause and effect in physical structures once we map them. Difficulty ensues when mapping social and political relationships: when we think we have a map, relationships shift. Moreover, such maps become unreliable because people need not act the way one expects they should.

Critically, SOSA attempts to map five categories of interconnected, organic structures that people create—political, economic, military, social,
and infrastructure informational constructs. SOSA undermines critical and creative thinking about these structures by assigning them a Newtonian causal logic that promotes conceptual rigidity. Human constructs are inherently fluid. Assigning mechanistic predictability to them in doctrine amounts to erecting false assumptions as dogma. As doctrine, SOSA is antithetical to a coherent operational design.

**Evolving Doctrinal Norms and Systemic Operational Design**

The last four years have seen the Army promote studies to reinvigorate creativity, critical thinking, and adaptability as intellectual norms in a collective organizational framework. This inquiry, just like the Army’s reforms of the early 1980s, has led it to examine what other disciplines and other militaries have learned about dealing with the difficulties of novel and complex challenges. In many fields, novelty limits the extent to which reasoning models derived from experience can apply to present problem settings. New systemic complexity defies the usual approaches to sensemaking.

**Complicated versus complex systems.** Merely complicated systems are composed of numerous parts and structures, all logically separable from their environment. An example would be the system for deploying units on a time table for an operation like D-day. Such a schedule could be accurately analyzed in the abstract. Complex systems are made up of dynamic, interactive, and adaptive elements that cannot be separated from interaction with their environments. The significant elements of complex systems are human beings and their relationships. An example would be the action-reaction interplay of the various actors in cooperation and contention on D-day. Analysis could never predict the relationships that were the most important part of the flow of events.

Where merely complicated systems require mostly deduction and analysis (formal logic of breaking into parts), complexity requires inductive and abductive reasoning for diagnostics and synthesis (the informal logic of making new wholes of parts). Because the elements of complex systems we care most about are human ones, making sense of relationships requires hypothetical synthesis in the form of maps or narratives. Such maps and narratives evolve as informal products that reflect a dimly perceived truth at a moment of understanding in time. To make the best sense of human relationships, interactions, trends, and propensities, military commands have to adopt a habitually skeptical approach to such non-deductive conclusions. Such habituation implies a new intellectual culture that balances design and planning while evincing an appreciation for the dynamic flow of human factors and a bias toward perpetual learning and adapting.

**Recent trends in design.** Over recent years the fruits of this inquiry have infiltrated parts of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and 5-0; into the new Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Chapter 4); and into FM 3-0, *Operations* (Chapter 6). In early 2008, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published a guide entitled *Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design* (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500), and in late 2007 the Army War College expanded emphasis on design into its *Campaign Planning Handbook*. These documents represent initial attempts at articulating new ideas (a new intellectual culture) and harmonizing them with older knowledge. Necessary revisions are underway to make needed concepts more accessible. Just as 1982’s FM 100-5, *Operations*, provided only a rudimentary treatment of operational art, these new publications represent initial efforts to evolve a competent approach for dealing with the human factor in complexity.¹

Colonel Robert C. Johnson, Director of the Futures Directorate of TRADOC’s Army Concepts Integration Center, launched and guided this study in its early years, introducing participants to the thinking of Brigadier General (retired) Shimon Naveh, Ph.D., who had developed an approach to operational art for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) called “systemic operational design” (SOD). In early 2006 the new IDF leadership rejected SOD...
in favor of effects-based operations (EBO) and SOSA. All plans based on SOD were shelved, and its proponents were retired. This rejection of SOD had dire consequences for the way the Israelis then framed the “Hezbollah problem” they faced that same summer. Instead of following the logic outlined by Naveh, they attempted to follow American Joint doctrine: EBO and SOSA. The IDF’s loss has been the U.S. Army’s gain.

The remainder of this discussion is a distillation and further development of a yet unpublished paper Naveh and I wrote jointly in August 2008 entitled “The Theory and Practice of Design.” The balance of this discussion answers four simple questions by summarizing necessary evolutions of operational art and how to institutionalize them:

- What is effective learning and adapting while campaigning?
- What is design in relation to planning?
- What is the logic and method of effective design?
- How do we institutionalize design?

Effective Learning and Adapting While Campaigning

The U.S. military is not the only institution facing the conceptual difficulties of complexity. It has been able to learn from others and adapt knowledge to its culture and missions. Adapting the learning and insights of others is always difficult, as it was during the reform era of the 1980s when America learned most from the Germans and the Soviet enemy. The following key ideas have been translated for American use.

Effective learning and adapting while campaigning, or “adaptive campaigning,” is a key part of this newly evolved approach to operational art. “Campaigning” in this sense means extended operations requiring balanced design and planning. The Australian Army has made adaptive campaigning a centerpiece of their doctrine. In one sense this is an adaptation of John Boyd’s OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop. It also reflects adaptation of Darwin’s theory of evolution to memetic ideas (rather than genetic natural selection). Adaptive campaigning is the art of continually making sense of dynamic situations and evolving designs, plans, modes of learning, and actions to keep pace.

Consciously or not, all living beings and societies follow the pattern of behavior described in the diagram below. So do America’s combatant commands, including units rotating into Iraq and Afghanistan today. They can be thought of as conducting one perpetual security campaign in pursuit of desirable change. There is no beginning and no end state. The idea of “end state” makes little sense in this context. There is a currently provisional desired state, one now believed desirable based on what is known. It may be achieved sooner than thought possible, or it may prove to be overly ambitious. What is actually attainable inevitably changes as more is known. During the current extended campaigns, each combatant command is continually adapting within the ecology of their environments, as do all living beings. Success depends on learning and adapting more rapidly than rivals in the ecosystem. This dynamic applies the same way to extended operations at their lower echelons.

Modes of understanding. The Greeks taught Western civilization to think heroically, to create a

![Figure 1. Adaptive campaigning model.](image-url)
vision of the future as an idealized “end” one desires, and to overcome any and all obstacles to force that ideal creation of one’s mind onto the real world. This temperament involves a Manichean narrative that encourages polarized and inherently simplified distinctions. It also assumes a direct correspondence of truths (mental states) to facts (physical realities).

In contrast, the foundational discourses of the Confucian and Taoist East do not frame life experience in terms of idealized ends or “visions.” Chinese sages thought it impossible to know what an idealized end could be. They did not trust the mind to have a mirror-like correspondence to external reality. Instead they thought that distinguishing “better” from “worse” was the best one could do. Life experience, in their Eastern perspective, was a perpetual and ever changing flow of events. Intellectual energy, in flowing with the way of the world, should ideally focus on understanding the forces, tendencies, and propensities of the contextual situation. In their understanding, one harmonizes with existence by enhancing the forces tending to flow toward “better” while subtly diverting and blocking those tending toward “worse.” Although this distinction amounts to oversimplification, the differences drawn are sufficient to point up the pros and cons of the intellectual heritages of East and West.3

On their own, both ways of thinking have limitations; balancing these ways is valuable in a complex world. In a longer-term sense we need to think the Eastern way. For shorter term goals we need to work concretely in planning and acting based on a problem frame derived from our best current understanding of the situation. But unlike the Greeks, we should treat our mental problem construct as a contingency. Westerners often treat goals as conceptual ideals (as immutable realities), and consequently get wedded to plans that solve expired problem frames. The advice of the Chinese sages is to treat problem frames as provisional landmarks on the road to “better.”

Acting on shared perceptions. Because operational reality is complex, dynamic, and opaque, military commands should act on provisional theories of reality (of the relation between truth and fact) that its key members share. They should collectively develop a provisional road to doing and making things better. The more comprehensive, relevant, and reliable knowledge is, the better the outcomes will be in two equally important respects: actually advancing desired goals, and gaining more relevant understanding of the situation. An important aim of “design” is to develop a more comprehensive appreciation of the situation than we as a military institution now can.

As aforementioned, operating headquarters are continually sensing to discern what has changed as a result of its various interventions in the contextual ecosystem. Getting relevant feedback is challenging, as is learning how and what to sense and how to identify useful measures of effectiveness. However, since methods and modes are the product of past lessons learned, they may not be best for gathering the most relevant information. Another important function of design is to devote attention and forethought to this sensing process. Ascribing meaning and relevance to information leading to decisions about techniques and courses of action is not difficult. In this process, the Army can easily perfect “doing things right.” The difficulty is the question of whether we are actually “doing the right thing” for the best outcomes.

Deciding whether our provisional theory of reality needs updating—i.e., are we solving the right problem, and do we have the right strategy?—is much more difficult. For this we have to depend on the experience, intuition, and creativity of our leaders. Because today we are facing both extreme novelty (primarily with information operations) and complexity combined, America’s military leaders need help in this area. The biggest decisions of command are not about how to achieve set goals but what these goals ought to be within a campaign design.

Political authorities, responding to mounting pressure to do something in a crisis, regularly assign ambiguous missions to senior military leaders. What one can understand is a function of the granularity of one’s view, often a perplexing condition. Ambiguous missions entail a cycle of understanding that turns continually and does not
conform to the abstract and linear mental models of campaign phasing established in current Joint doctrine. An adaptive campaigning model is needed for modern doctrine.

**Design in Relation to Planning**

Figure 2 shows how design meshes with planning and adaptive campaigning. The product of design is the provisional “conceptual problem frame” within which planning takes place. Whereas design sets the problem to be solved, planning solves it as set. Deciding what the problem is, and solving it are two different functions that the U.S. military conflated all through the 20th century, simply because it could. Countering the Soviet invasion of Western Europe, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the North Korean invasion of the South are structurally much the same problem.

When experience, doctrine, and commonly held paradigms are valid, design is implicit. We all have the same mental model of the problem to be solved. In this conflated approach to design and planning, a commander’s guidance to planners covers any doubtful issues of design. This comfortable situation has eroded over the last two decades under the pressure of mission demands. Changing a regime is a very different problem conceptually than countering an aggression. Lacking doctrine and experience leads to different mental constructs in different minds, even in the same command. Every time our framing of the problem changes, plans need to be updated—new problem, new solution. A way to rapidly and continually evolve and share reliable mental constructs of the problem is needed.

Dealing with design separately and explicitly before we plan imparts deliberate logic, discipline, and rigor. There is no formulaic way of presenting it. (When doctrine writers develop one, you will know we have taken a turn off the path to better understanding.) Figure 2 indicates that design does not change military planning processes as they now exist; they precede and run in parallel with it.

**The Logic and Method of Design**

The U.S. military’s comfortable, conflated design/planning paradigms need a re-think.

The interconnected operational environment of political, military, economic, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems-of-systems analysis portrayed in JP 3-0 and 5-0 is complicated, not complex. A complicated system behaves in a linear, predictable fashion. Automobiles and jumbo jets are complicated systems. These are systems that actually exist in the world. Technical missions (e.g., bombing, artillery fire, air strikes, and infrastructure repairs) deal with the logic of such systems. As aforementioned, joint doctrine encourages

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**Figure 2.** A provisional conceptual problem framing guide.

- Design sets the problem to be solved, planning solves the problem as it is set.
- The product of design should be briefed to higher authorities for their approval.
- It is a way to continually evolve and explicitly share mental constructs of the problem.
conflating what is in the mind with what is in the real world. It assumes a simple correspondence between ideas and facts, that the mind is the mirror of reality. Such a simplistic theory of knowledge assumes the world is a system and that the systemic reflection in our minds is real. It projects mental models back into the world and engineers solutions to problems it perceives to be immutable.

General Mattis at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recently acknowledged the inappropriateness of effects-based operations and effects-based planning for anything but technical missions for which causal chains are either predictable, or nearly so.* The systems-of-systems logic of JP 3-0 and 5-0 suggests that EBO/EBP is widely applicable to all current missions; more doctrinal reform is therefore necessary.

Current mission environments present complex rather than complicated systems. They are marked by self-organization and something called “emergence”—the capability to generate system changes without external input. Adding human beings to the equation adds even more to complexity. Mapping such complexity is not true to reality but an evanescently useful representation of reality. Keeping its transient quality in mind, any competent leader armed with an understanding of the logic required could “set” and “solve” mission-problems within a framework of adaptive campaigning.

**Doing the right thing.** When doctrine is sound and relevant, and experience has taught applicable lessons, leaders can recognize what “doing the right thing” is as well as “how to do things right.” When one cannot be sure of doctrine, of one’s own experience, or of the concepts generated by the Pentagon, one is sure to find operational complexity more intractable. These conditions yield a hazily imperfect knowledge of both the enemy and one’s own capabilities. Because today’s missions present novelty and complexity combined, designing components of operational art requires systematizing collective critical and creative thinking within a headquarters. Accomplishing that goal means using a systemic cognitive methodology more likely to lead to “doing the right thing.”

Such a collective design approach attains a broader, holistic, and shared understanding of the situation. It benefits from multiple perspectives introduced in a rigorous and disciplined way. The “problem” is more likely to be a shared view within the headquarters, better defined, and more rigorously documented, making re-definition easier and faster. Planning to solve the problem is likely to proceed more effectively and more rapidly. Those who protest that time and rigor invested in design is wasted effort do not understand that “doing the right thing” is more important than “doing things right” on the way to “worse” or “irrelevant” rather than “better” outcomes.

The philosophy required of sound design is very much the opposite of the “hard systems thinking” encouraged by PMESII, SUSA, and EBO in which reality is structured and predictable. Design relies on mental models to structure thinking, learning, and shifts in thinking about a reality that is fundamentally unstructured, ephemeral, and intractable.

Collaborative design is commander-led, and the commander decides key questions concerning the interpretations of facts and the acceptance of key causal theories, but the quality of the result depends on the commander’s willingness to entertain and consider challenges to his or her understanding (without considering them as a threat to authority or position). Questioning to achieve shared
understanding of facts and expected consequences is a mark of professional conduct, not a challenge to authority to decide and direct. True discipline requires honest professional dialogue between peers, with subordinates, and particularly with superiors in recognition of the markedly short-lived truth of complex realities.

Business literature has long advocated “management by walking around.” The military leadership version is called “battlefield circulation.” The understanding of leaders is greatly enhanced when subordinates one or two levels down share their understandings candidly. Learning about complex situations is very much a bottom up process. Because systems of human relationships, the ecosystem of today’s missions, are complex rather than complicated, design requires maintaining a skeptical posture. Every interpretation of facts is challengeable. Every analogous case is judged not only by the similarities but also by the differences. Every understanding is provisional. Collaborative and recursive learning is continuous. Every explanation is up for challenge.

This layer-by-layer approach of building understanding through a recursive dialectical process outlined at the bottom of Figure 4 is the empirical, inductive vehicle science employs to propose and test theories. Informal, inductive case-building is the procedural workhorse of the command’s design inquiry. This collective design methodology assumes a continual, cyclical assessment for relevance and periodically feeds new guidance to planners and subordinates.

Just as the Military Decision Making Process has a logical sequence that should not be violated even when the steps are abbreviated, operational design has a sensible and logical sequence that also can be abbreviated but not violated. Design should begin by constructing a broad conceptual frame of reference, the “system frame.” This frame aids in understanding the strategic logic and context. Conventional wisdom is to think at least two levels down when drawing up plans. Designing wisdom is to initially think two mission levels up to frame the problem context. The next stage of design is to construct a narrower conceptual frame of reference, the “operating frame.” This frame aids in understanding the systemic potentials, trends, and propensities within the situation and the way it can be transformed into a desirable, self-regulating state. From this frame of reference emerges the broader concept of “intervention”: a clear statement of the “problem” and the “whole of government” or “governments” strategy of intervention suited to the particular situation and the interests of authorities. From this understanding emerges the concept design for the command.

It will be normal for problem framing at one level of design to differ from that of a higher authority. Difference may simply result from considering different sets of facts and different interpretations of
the same facts. Different assumptions—theories of cause and effect—can also lead to different framing. Professionally, subordinate commands should challenge the understanding of the higher authority based on their own comprehensive design enquiries. Under the best of circumstances both levels will refine and harmonize their understandings and their designs. Harmonizing understandings, up and down as well as laterally, benefits all if it includes deliberate consideration of the basis for differences, not simply a lowest common denominator compromise. The commander’s decision should not gloss over differences, as they become the basis for framing priority questions to be answered on the road ahead.

The “journey of learning.” Collaborative design is a continuous and recursive “journey of learning.” Figure 5 describes and explains important aspects of the main steps so briefly outlined above.

“Reading into” the situation and higher authority guidance implies a starting point. However, this starting point should be understood as a significant new emergence in the flow of events. Such points are reached anytime there is a reason to take a fresh look at the situation. They can be deliberately periodic, as when directed to undertake a new mission, or as the commander deems useful. An important aspect of this methodology is that every product is sanctioned by the commander, otherwise it would be the design team’s product and not a command product.

The first step to constructing the system frame is to record observed reality and learn about its complex evolution. A conceptual map and written narrative can best describe and explain the command’s understanding of the emergent situation. (A map is best for economically describing and explaining relevant relationships. A narrative is best for describing and explaining the logic and sequence of how the situation evolves. Doing both is best.) If a recent system frame exists, it may have resulted from adjustments to a previous map and narrative.

All people individually reason informally in similar fashion, consciously or not. But one rarely creates a detailed, collaborative, graphic, and narrative interpretation of the relevant actors and their relationships in an emergent situation. More rarely does anyone make an explicit record of theory, of causal and influence networks, and of how a situation may evolve further if current strategy does not change. Even rarer is the likelihood that an individual, much less a group, ever conducts a logical, comprehensive, and systemic inquiry suited to setting the problem (design) as opposed to solving one (planning).

The exercise of deliberately creating, sharing, and periodically renewing such an explicit conceptual construct is an “official” reference and record of past assumptions of causal logic and provides a shared baseline for learning, and further critical thinking. In planning we make assumptions of fact, in design we make assumptions of truth in causal logic. Given current practices, we lose track of the logic that produced current efforts, especially as key staff and commanders change during the course of perpetual

Figure 5. The “journey of learning.”
In planning we make assumptions of fact, in design we make assumptions of truth in causal logic.

campaigning. In conflated design/planning we either mix the two kinds of assumptions indiscriminately or we disregard assumptions of causal logic altogether, especially if they are commonly accepted paradigms, or tenets of our doctrine.

Current doctrine needs to provide more wisdom about how to help the command think critically and creatively as a team. While they can easily identify relationships most apparent to the conventional and current way of looking at the situation, what is valuable, albeit more difficult, is to tease out relationships that exist outside the current paradigm of situational relationships.

Meta-questioning. Meta-questioning is an intellectual habit that can help one escape conceptual paradigms to tease out relationships. For example, Afghans are members of a tribal society. A meta-question would ask, “How does being a tribal member affect the way Afghans view governance, international boundaries, drug trafficking, and support for the Taliban?” While doctrinal definitions, categories, and patterns of behavior are useful for sharing understanding and organizing tactical efforts, they also confine one to current paradigms in thinking. Sound design requires one to critically test, break, and construct new and more relevant ways of understanding.

The next step is to create a mental model that defines the desired situation and outlines the strategic logic for intervention implied by higher authority guidance and as modified by any new knowledge gained thus far in the inquiry. Model creation involves creating two models of the “observed” and “desired” states that can be juxtaposed to grasp the tensions between the two. Reflecting on these two frames of reference and the tension between them leads to recognition of what actors need to behave differently and what causal and influence networks need to be altered, but not necessarily “how.”

Then begins the narrowing of the broader perspective into the narrower operating frame of reference that shapes thinking about action and the “how.” This effort produces a finer grained appreciation of the tensions between the observed system and the desired one. It also reveals the practical implications of bringing about desired systemic changes. In the end, this winnowing down leads to a broad theory of actions—actions in the context of collaborative “whole of government and alliance” efforts connected to a broader team of actors who are wholly or even partly in pursuit of the same outcomes.

Systemic changes (or disturbances) can produce an undesirable emergence. Any factor that tends to worsen prospects for a desired outcome is an undesirable emergence. Combined, the source of the change and the emergence itself can be thought of as the “system of opposition.” This system may comprise actors in full or partial alliance, tendencies of particular allies, or the character and propensities of the environment. The next step is to give this opposed system more definition and use it as a foil to reflect on the path from the observed state of affairs to that desired. This step is analogous to Sun Tzu’s dictum to “Know your enemy” but more broadly applies to the milieu of opposition. The object is to understand as much as possible about environmental tendencies and propensities. That inquiry would involve wrestling with the asymmetries between the system of opposition and one’s command as a system.

A minimal inquiry into the system of opposition would address:

- How can we learn about it.
- What are the impacts of culture, politics, economics, and social dynamics on the opposing system’s behavior.
- What is the nature and structure of its “logistical” system.
- What is its visible and invisible modes of operational maneuver.
- How might this system of opposition be disrupted.

The next logical step is to create another foil for reflecting on the asymmetries between the system of opposition and a system that hypothetically embodies all sources of potential resistance to it, specifically to the undesirable emergence. This step is analogous to Sun Tzu’s dictum to “Know yourself,”
only more broadly applied to understanding oneself as a system, and oneself as a member of a “system of collaboration” (the command and other allied agencies) toward compatible desired outcomes.

This step of the “journey of learning” addresses four important questions:

● How elements of this system can combine efforts of actors (for instance, relevant service elements, coalition contingents, non-military governmental agencies, indigenous organizations, multinational corporations, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations) to achieve comparative advantage.

● How to create a networked system of collaboration to effectively engage and sustain these varied potentials throughout the campaign, and at the same time, share information and learn effectively about the ever-evolving situation.

● How to exploit the self-defeating habits and tendencies of particular adversaries, the inclinations and propensities of neutrals, and aspects or trends of the contextual environment that oppose the undesirable systemic emergence.

● How the command itself should organize to learn, adapt, and continually re-design throughout the campaign.

The next logical step of the inquiry is a very broadly defined “logistical system”—in other words, the system for mobilizing, marshalling, delivering, and deploying the situation-changing means required to develop and sustain the campaign. The means required to change the situation may include the will and energy of allies to act, as well as various resources and military and non-military capabilities. Developing and sustaining the campaign requires overcoming systemic impediments such as barriers of time, space, and geography. This aspect focuses on the tension between what is required and what is available to actors and agencies that can be mobilized and on logistical issues of positioning, staging, timing, and geography. Sun Tzu is a good example, as *The Art of War* offers ample advice on these matters of design.

Given the specific situation, other relevant systemic perspectives also apply to further limit, scope, and shape the operating frame and form of the intervention. But each of these separate exercises in expanding our relevant knowledge leads to more revision of the cognitive map and narrative of our understanding. Each further outlines and limits the scope and form of the intervention and thus outlines the “operating frame”—the frame of reference that actually shapes our thinking about operations (e.g., where and how to apply positive and negative energy to transform the observed system into the desired situation).

What remains is to narrow a broad theory of intervention down to the role of the command itself:

● Where it will support.

● Where it will lead and be supported.

● How it will apply systemic leverage.

Abstract concepts have to be translated into clear and concise language and a logical flow of ideas to enable the formulation of guidance for the command’s planning efforts and subordinate level design efforts.

The actual products of design consist of:

● The commander’s appreciation that explains the strategic logic for the mission, the logic of the emergence that prompted it, and the logic of the operating frame.

● The concept design consisting of the restated mission, the commander’s intent, and the strategy for intervention.

The “strategy for intervention” is the central and unique idea about how to exploit the following to achieve the desired outcomes:

● The peculiar characteristics of the situation.

● The nature and tendencies of the system of opposition.

● The asymmetries between the system of opposition and the system of collaboration.

● Other systemic propensities.

A statement of the strategy will normally address:

● Parallel and sequential objectives with regard to specific system actors and relationships.

● Potential points of influence toward these objectives.

● Ways and means of learning.

● Approaches for organizing.

● Intended “message” of words and deeds combined.

This journey of learning is continuous, iterative, and reflective because whatever strategy is applied in the real world, the mental models constructed along this journey are only imperfect representations of it. New constructs must account for new
observations and new desired system states. New tensions between observed and desired states need to be reconciled. Enriched understanding then needs to translate into strategic adaptations and reformed intervention. Periodically new design guidance will flow to subordinates and planners while the operational design team continues to learn.

Institutionalizing Design

This new approach to operational art has demonstrated results superior to the alternative in every case. People who have the greatest experience of complex operations are its most ready converts. Converts have been more easily won among practitioners in actual operating environments than in sterile academic settings. Those most recently indoctrinated in EBO and SOSA and the “hard systems thinking” it promotes have been the most difficult to re-educate in this method. They keep trying to harmonize two incompatible ways of thinking or they are convinced that EBO and SOSA produce an acceptable product more quickly. Open-minded skeptics who have gained experience and understanding of the method have been brought around. Those who believe the military has no business in ambiguous missions and complex settings are its most ardent opponents. Then there are those who prefer the traditional approach to complexity: overwhelm and obliterate it.

Sometimes a culture grows from the bottom up, but there is no doubt that this new culture must be introduced at the top and directed downward. Senior leaders and higher headquarters will recognize the benefits of this approach more easily, and once a higher headquarters practices this form of operational art, subordinate headquarters will naturally follow suit.

The Army is more ready for this approach than some of its senior leaders, its proponents, now think. Those officers who cut their teeth professionally in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo, and who have more recently been serving in key leadership positions while rotating in and out of Afghanistan and Iraq should be naturally receptive. Such officers are moving into leadership at division, corps, and theater-Army levels. A sincere effort to practice this new form of operational art is underway in the 3d U.S. Army, the ARCENT component of U.S. Central Command. Key elements of the staff have invested time in immersive study and are practicing the art of collective design daily in their work. Much is being learned there to pass on to other headquarters. A corps would similarly benefit from doing a collaborative design inquiry at the front end of a rotation, well ahead of the mission readiness exercise. Commanders at all levels willing to try this approach would stand to benefit as well. But such an experiment should not be forced on an unwilling commander because going through the motions of collective critical and creative thinking and learning and adapting will be fruitless.

The introduction of new ideas that clash with sanctioned old ones is naturally more difficult in bureaucratic and conservative military academic institutions. Faculties at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle have been more resistant than their students or practitioners in the field. This may be because these faculties have had to absorb EBO, ONA, and SOSA over the last decade in order to fulfill their obligations to teach Joint doctrine and concepts. This collective inertia is analogous to the asymmetries between the irregular who thinks pragmatically about his particular world, and the regular who must be expert across a wider world and thus relies on general principles of bureaucracies to tell him how to think about particulars. The irony is that decentralizing the thinking about particulars leaves educators to concentrate on education.

NOTES

1. Other “senior mentors” involved in this effort from time to time have been: retired Lieutenant General’s Leonard D. Holder, P.K. van Riper (USMC), William Carter, James Steele, James Riley, and retired Major General Waldo Freeman.
OPERATION VALHALLA was a completely ordinary engagement, typical of the type of operation U.S. Special Forces units have participated in throughout the Iraq war. Yet, it was, if not a turning point in the war, a perfect example of the challenges fighting in Iraq—and very possibly any future conflicts against Islamist insurgencies—has presented that are new and almost impossible to answer effectively.

Valhalla was an engagement between a battalion of U.S. Special Forces Soldiers with the Iraqi Special Forces unit it was training on one side, and a Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) death squad (better known as Mahdi Army) on the other. The engagement was entirely ordinary: the U.S. forces tracked down the JAM fighters responsible for the especially brutal murders of a number of civilians and several Iraqi troops. When U.S. and Iraqi government forces reached the JAM compound, a brief firefight ensued. However, as the JAM forces engaged well-trained, well-armed Soldiers instead of unarmed civilians, their fortunes took an abrupt turn.

It was what happened after the firefight was over—in fact, after U.S. and Iraqi government forces left the area—that made this particular engagement so worth studying in detail.

Neither the battalion of the U.S. Army’s 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) under the command of then Lieutenant Colonel Sean Swindell (at the time a part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Arabian Peninsula [CJSOTF-AP]) nor the Iraqi government forces took any casualties during the fighting on 26 March 2006, beyond one Iraqi Soldier with a non-life-threatening injury. Sixteen or 17 JAM were killed, a weapons cache found and destroyed, a badly beaten hostage found and rescued, and approximately 16 other JAM members detained, at which point U.S. and Iraqi government forces left the site.

Based on his encounters with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni insurgent groups, Colonel Kenneth Tovo, the commanding officer of both the 10th Group and the CJSOTF-AP at the time, reports that a 24- to 48-hour cycle between an event and the appearance on the Internet of propaganda regarding that event had become routine to Special Forces operating in Iraq during that period. However, on 26 March 2006, by the time the SF and Iraqi forces returned to their compound, roughly an hour after leaving the site of the firefight, someone had moved the bodies and removed the guns of the JAM fighters back at their compound so that it no longer looked as if they had fallen while firing weapons. They now looked as if they had fallen while at prayer. Someone had photographed the bodies in these new poses and the...
images had been uploaded to the web, along with a press release explaining that American Soldiers had entered a mosque and killed men peacefully at prayer. All this had taken approximately 45 minutes. As Colonel Tovo said, “Literally they had their story, their propaganda, out on the wires before the assault force was back at the compound, so [in] under an hour, they had their counter-story already on the wires. That’s how brilliant [this was. It] really surprised us that first time, because we were kind of used to the Al-Qaeda and Sunni insurgent model, which was 24 to 48 hours...to get their story out...”

Needless to say, both the American and Arab media picked up the story almost immediately. Also, needless to say, the result was an investigation that took roughly a month, during which the unit was, to put it bluntly, benched. Thus, a unit that could never have been bested in actual combat by JAM forces was essentially neutralized for a month by those same forces using a cell phone camera.

Fortunately, U.S. forces had been accompanied by members of the “combat camera” units, and had themselves been wearing “helmet cams” in several cases. Thus “before” pictures were available to contrast with the “after” pictures the militia members posted to the web. This made all the difference in the investigation. (Indeed, in an interview with the author, Lieutenant Colonel Swindell noted that he would never again participate in an operation without at least helmet cams if combat camera personnel were unavailable, and in fact doubted he would ever again have an operation approved if he did not build into his planning some means for creating a visual record of what his Soldiers did and did not do in it.2)

Scholars,3 specialists,4 and the press5 have paid increased attention of late to the enormous effort Islamist groups put into producing a range of media materials (particularly, although not exclusively, on the Internet) designed to recruit, mobilize, instruct, and persuade. This attention is clearly warranted. Lieutenant Colonel Terry Guild, a U.S. Army officer specializing in information operations, put it simply: “[The enemy’s] media infrastructure is quick, it’s collaborative, it’s virtual, it’s global, it’s technical, and it’s getting better all the time.”6

However, this work has consistently ignored a key element of much of this material. While it is certainly true these materials serve an important role for the movement’s internal purposes, they also represent a sophisticated story-telling ability, producing texts that can serve more than one rhetorical purpose at a time.7 For many of these groups (although certainly not all) their center of gravity is U.S. public opinion. Certainly this is true for many groups fighting coalition forces in Iraq. In everything they do in terms of the creation of persuasive texts, they will have that audience at least partially in mind. Not every persuasive text is meant to influence audiences in the Islamic world. The U.S. military should be aware of the ramifications enemy propaganda material has for U.S. domestic opinion when considering how to respond to it.

The American Public as Center of Gravity

Many insurgent groups in Iraq have a real need to impact U.S. public opinion. For them to accomplish their goals, the U.S. has to withdraw from Iraq. The question is, how to accomplish that. What do they
think is our center of gravity? Al-Qaeda knows that the U.S. left Vietnam and has interpreted that to mean that if it creates unacceptable casualty rates and exerts enough pressure, America will leave other theaters as well.8

However, the Iraqi insurgents understand they cannot succeed only through their own efforts on the battlefield. Colonel Tovo notes:

I would say that at least for Iraq it’s almost always been a media fight. . . . When you look at insurgent movements in history, clearly there are some [insurgencies] that thought they could win militarily. But in the end, really the center of gravity is always the people. You’re always fighting a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, so I don’t think it has changed with the rise of the Internet and cameras everywhere. It’s just easier for insurgents to reach the people. But even when you go back to Algeria, . . . the media is certainly present, but it’s much less ubiquitous on the battlefield. They’re still looking to get the biggest IO [information operations] effect out of every event. . . . That’s the same with a lot of insurgencies, although I would say the thing about the one we’re fighting now is that there’s much more of an information component and much less of a military component. So whereas you look at the Vietnamese model where truly they thought that they would wear us down and somewhat beat us on the battlefield (although they did not), I think the insurgents in Iraq clearly don’t think they have any hope of beating us militarily. . . . So I’d say the information component has grown in importance over time.9

The Internet, meanwhile, is a door that swings both ways. For the first time insurgents can now monitor the way their efforts are covered in the American press—almost in real time—from thousands of miles away. This is not only the first war fought with unlimited, global access to their audience, it is also the first war fought as the global press has moved online. Even the smallest newspapers now have an online presence, and television networks all stream their coverage on their own websites, to greater or lesser degrees. Insurgents can watch the way their efforts are covered for the audiences they hope to influence and adapt strategies if they do not like what they see. At the same time, they know the Western press carefully monitors their own websites—even if they are designed and maintained predominately to recruit new members or mobilize existing support. Thus, they can use their web presence as a ready conduit through the press to the American audience.

The result is the first war in which virtually every attack is filmed by the enemy for propaganda purposes.10 So many IED attacks on convoys, suicide bombings, executions of hostages, and sniper attacks on Soldiers are filmed that it is often suggested the attacks are being staged to provide material for filming. As Susan B. Glaser and Steve Coll of The Washington Post wrote of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq: “[N]ever before has a guerrilla organization so successfully intertwined its real-time war on the ground with its electronic jihad, making Zarqawi’s group practitioners of what experts say will be the future of insurgent warfare, where no act goes unrecorded and atrocities seem to be committed in order to be filmed and distributed nearly instantaneously online.” They continue, “Filming an attack has become an integral part of the attack itself.”11

David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert who advised General Petraeus, notes the “information side of al-Qaida’s operation is primary; the physical is merely the tool to achieve a propaganda result.”12 Lieutenant Colonel Guild adds: “A U.S. Soldier does a pre-combat inspection, he checks and makes sure he’s got his bullets, his water, all that stuff. Well, our enemy is doing that, those pre-combat checks [but they] include making sure that the
video guy is there with the camera, with batteries, to either courier that video to some safe house or to get it uploaded to some web site, make sure that… that message gets out. And it’s ingrained. . . . [It] would be unusual if they did not do it.”

These “duck-blind” videos clearly serve an internal purpose for these groups, but we are missing something critical if we only analyze them from the perspective of the role they play as part of a system of persuasion between the Islamists and their constituents. The videos are also intended, and used, as a way to communicate with and persuade the American audience. Such communication is possible because American news networks, unable to obtain regular combat footage any other way, have systematically downloaded this material and integrated it into their news reports, often quite seamlessly, for years.

Sometimes the segments are used with visual and aural cues indicating they were taken from a terrorist or insurgent site, although the cues are rarely sufficient given that no effort has ever been taken to explicitly address that this is a normal journalistic practice. CNN, CBS, and NBC have begun to superimpose the words “INSURGENT VIDEO” on at least some of the material, similar to the graphic all networks use when showing material received from the Department of Defense (usually something along the lines of “DOD FILE FOOTAGE”). This practice seems to be a perfectly acceptable solution if the networks apply it consistently, and throughout the length of any footage acquired from terrorist or insurgent sites, which does not seem to be the case at present for any network. (Applying this solution inconsistently might be worse than not applying it at all, because viewers might believe that whenever the graphic is missing, the footage must by definition not come from insurgent sources.)

There should be no mistake about this. Terrorists and insurgents shot this footage of attacks staged for the explicit purpose of providing propaganda for filming. Perhaps more important, terrorists and insurgents edited the footage, even if network personnel subsequently re-edited it. It is propaganda material, not news footage. As Ben Venzke puts it, the “videos are a form of follow-on psychological attack on the victims and societies the group is targeting. They are designed to amplify the effects of attacks.”

The insurgents themselves are now the press’s primary source of news footage when it comes to the vital issue of attacks on American military personnel in Iraq. This means the authenticity of the footage is of vital importance, because it played a critical role in shaping the American public’s view of the war.

**Insurgent Manufacture of Events**

However pervasive the “duck blind” videos are, and however disturbing the networks’ use of them, they generally depict events that actually happened (although the news audience has no way of knowing or confirming how accurately). Part of the reason the networks’ use of the material is disturbing is because insurgents not only shot it but *edited* it as well: there is no way to know what happened before or after the footage posted.

A different strategy altogether involves the fabrication of events. How many of the facts have been altered and how little relationship the insurgents’ story bears to actual events varies from one incident to another. In fact, the networks have been caught up in hoaxes because of their willingness to use footage they could not validate at the time it was aired.

In one case, insurgents were successful because they “piggybacked” their hoax onto an actual event. On 1 December 2005, a single improvised explosive device (IED) killed 10 Marines and wounded 11 others. This was widely reported by the networks the next day. However, on the following day, 3 December, Al Jazeera, the Arab satellite network, aired footage provided by insurgents who claimed it was footage of that very explosion. Whatever the footage was, however, it could not possibly have been of the same attack, because that IED had exploded at night, and this footage was clearly of something that had happened in broad daylight.

Nevertheless, that night NBC aired the Al Jazeera footage. The next morning, CBS aired it, admitting that the Islamic Army of Iraq had provided it, that it was “impossible to authenticate the video,” and...
that the U.S. military was denying it was footage of the incident in question.\textsuperscript{17}

While NBC spoke to someone in the military, they chose to air the footage without officially contacting the Marines, who would certainly have tried to wave them off.\textsuperscript{18} Whoever they spoke to did try to warn them by providing them background on exactly the information the official Marine representatives would have provided, that this couldn’t be the right footage because it was filmed in daylight while the Marines were killed at night. Yet, NBC chose to air the footage anyway.

To be sure, NBC provided far more information to help its viewers assess the footage than CBS did, but what they said hardly explained their decision to use it. Indeed, NBC seemed to be proving that the footage was not legitimate, which made it unclear why they were airing it at all: “Tonight the Arab TV station Al Jazeera reported that an extremist group called Islamic Army in Iraq, which has collaborated with Al-Qaeda here, claimed this disturbing video was of the same attack near Fallujah, and also claimed responsibility for the bombing. But late tonight a U.S. military spokesman told NBC News the video did not show the actual incident—which happened after dark and not in broad daylight. But the spokesman did not deny the video showed a troubling attack on U.S. forces.”\textsuperscript{19}

NBC may not have known what it had, but clearly, whatever it was, it was not footage of the attack in question. And they knew that. No matter how many hedges or qualifiers their reporter provided, NBC was still making itself complicit in the dissemination of insurgent propaganda. The footage they did air showed a group of American troops moving forward, and then a large explosion, at which point the segment ends.

With the footage cut at that point, the strong suggestion is that the blast killed the troops, or at least wounded them grievously, and the networks cut it for the reason they always cut footage at that point, to avoid televising overly disturbing images. In fact, though, there’s no way to know what happened. If another IED had been large enough to kill

An image from video footage claimed to have been made by the Islamic Army of Iraq, broadcast by Al Jazeera television in December 2005, purporting to depict an explosion which hit a U.S. foot patrol.
that many troops, it would have been news. After all, that is why the first night-time explosion was so notable. Therefore it is doubtful that there was another equally large explosion during daylight hours that the press had simply ignored. Was this footage authentic? It likely was footage of a large explosion occurring as U.S. troops moved forward. The question is whether it is footage of the event that is implied.

The use of the footage in a story about an explosion large enough to kill ten implies that this explosion had also been large enough to kill all the troops in the scene, but there’s no basis for assuming that’s true, and actually good reason to assume that it isn’t. There’s reason, then, to doubt the association that results from showing the footage while discussing the known explosion, but the association occurs automatically, and the reporter’s qualifiers do not undercut it. Images work because we don’t generally stop to analyze the implicit assumptions and associations they create. CBS and NBC created one strong set of associations, while offering a set of qualifiers far too weak to offset those associations. This leaves the viewer believing that if the footage is not necessarily of the first IED attack that killed a large number of Marines, then it is of another IED attack that also killed a large number of Marines. Indeed, the reporter’s discussion of the possible implications of the footage leads the viewer to that conclusion.

Thus, we give the insurgents more credit than they deserve, and for millions of viewers the footage is allowed to do precisely the work the insurgents intended and hoped for it to do. The insurgents apparently did not have footage of the explosion in which ten died, so they improvised, and by so doing were able to suggest that there had been not one but two large explosions that killed U.S. personnel, when in fact there is no evidence to suggest that was the case.

To NBC’s somewhat minimal credit, the insurgent’s logo was left on the footage, so that the source was made clear—assuming that the audience was paying close enough attention and understood what the logo meant, rather than assuming it was Al Jazeera’s imprint. That doesn’t change the fact that NBC disseminated enemy propaganda, while making no effort to analyze or discuss the footage as propaganda—which leaves the enemy’s information campaign intact, uncritiqued, and therefore to at least some extent, successful.

The following day the Marines issued a press release. It was as clear and direct as possible: “A video posted to a terrorist website and aired by some media organizations purporting to show the IED attack that killed 10 U.S. Marines on Dec. 1 is disinformation. The circumstances of the IED attack near Fallujah do not match those shown on the video. While we are unable to discern whether the video shown is authentic, the statement that the video shows the Dec. 1 IED attack near Fallujah is false.”

Insurgents have sometimes gone even further, manipulating existing images to create something new and essentially fictitious and they have become increasingly sophisticated in finding ways to do so. ABC News reported that after one Soldier lost a “video diary” he had filmed for personal use in Iraq, parts of it popped up soon after on the Internet and on Al Jazeera—but with the original audio track stripped out. It had been replaced with the voice of another English speaker purporting to be the voice of the Solider, explaining to his mother, in a Christmas message home that, among other things, “The crimes by our Soldiers during break-ins started to merge, such as burglary, harassment, raping and random manslaughter,’ says the voice. ‘Why are we even here? The people hate us.’”

Those who made the video went too far when they ended their piece by saying that it was a tragedy this poor soldier had been killed in Iraq before ever making it home for Christmas. Unfortunately for the insurgents, ABC was able to verify that multiple claims made by the speaker were false (starting with the fact that it was unlikely the Soldier would have been making a “Christmas message” for his family when he had actually left Iraq six months before Christmas.) ABC therefore framed the story as being about a brazen (but ineffective) attempt at propaganda. Thus, while this may have worked with the Arab audience, it did not successfully make the jump to the American audience.

In truth, in an interview with the author, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for the 101st Airborne Division, the Soldier’s home unit, told me that the insurgent effort was actually quite effective: ABC was preparing to do a story about the tragedy of an anti-war Soldier killed in Iraq, essentially picking up the story precisely as Al Jazeera reported it. Despite the large number of inaccuracies in that story and the over-the-top nature of the claims
made, it was only by finally producing the living Soldier that the PAO was able to prevent Al Jazeera’s story from appearing on ABC News. This was, remember, a story created when a script written by the insurgent group the Islamic Army of Iraq provided the basis for an audio track subsequently added by Al Jazeera. Lieutenant Colonel Ed Loomis, the 101st’s PAO, said: the “only thing that they [ABC News] said was going to pull the plug on it was, I had to put Tucker [the Soldier in question] in front of the camera. The fact that Tucker was alive, and the fact that they got the rank wrong, and the fact that there was no way that this was a Christmas letter by Tucker to his family in that he had left Iraq six months before Christmas—lie, after lie, after lie [was not enough].23

Loomis points out that while the script was written by the Islamic Army of Iraq, “Al Jazeera did the soundtrack; reading the letter was Al Jazeera’s construct, something for which they have apologized to me over the phone,” although he doesn’t know whether Al Jazeera ever issued a retraction on the air.24

The piece has now found new life on the Internet, targeted towards Americans to demonstrate to them the cruelty of the war in Iraq both to the Iraqis and to their own troops. NBC News has reported that it is the centerpiece of an explicit strategy discussed in Islamist chat rooms, designed to have their people pose on the Internet as American Soldiers wounded in the war and use that deception to turn Americans against the war. (This was perhaps the only time the American press acknowledged that there is a battle for “American hearts and minds” underway, although of course there was no discussion of their own role in it.25)

Insurgent groups have made the Internet work for them on other occasions. Capturing trained Marines is hard. Posting claims on the Internet that you have captured Marines is easy—and it is worth the (incredibly low) investment, since the benefit is exactly the same—it just doesn’t last as long. Colonel David Lapan, the Marine Corps Deputy PAO, explains how this tactic works:

At one point during our time in Iraq, there were reports that came out that five Marines had been captured in Western Iraq. So, our initial sense is . . . this sounds like more propaganda, but we can’t say that because we have an obligation to tell the truth, and we don’t know that for certain. So I brought that to the attention of the commander who then ordered a 100 percent accountability check throughout all the units in our area to determine, did we have everybody accounted for? So that we could ultimately determine that there were not five guys who were out of our control, but that took about eight hours to accomplish. Now, considering the size and the scope, that’s pretty amazing, eight hours to account for about 25,000 Marines and Soldiers across most of Western Iraq, but the key is that for eight hours the “truth” or the perceived truth out there was five Marines had been captured. So, again, the enemy gets to throw whatever they’d like out there in terms of information, pretend that it’s truthful, it gets picked up and reported on and repeated, and then the U.S., in having to be truthful does its due diligence and then can finally later say, “This is incorrect.” But, for eight hours you’ve had a different version of what people perceived is true. And that’s one of the biggest challenges [we face as PAOs.126

The Challenge of Responding

The difference between the two sides, as explained by Lieutenant Colonel Guild, is this: “Media for them is a weapon of war. Media for us is not. And that’s kind of the line that I’ve seen over several years, is that these guys are very good at what they’re doing, and it’s a battlefield operating system [for them].”27

There is no underestimating how difficult it is for the military to come up with an effective strategy to counter terrorist and insurgent falsehoods. As Colonel Lapan, the former spokesperson for II MEF-Forward states, “Our adversary doesn’t play by rules, and we see that obviously in a number of things much more serious than release of information. But the way to think about it is the enemy has no qualms about beheading people, about torturing people, about purposefully killing women and children, any of those things, so lying isn’t really a concern of theirs. And so it’s tough when you have to tell the truth, and your adversary doesn’t. So the enemy can lie at will; there’s no repercussion to doing so, but because we have the obligation to tell the truth, it makes it difficult to counter that.”28
Colonel Lapan, to be clear, is not arguing against restrictions that prevent American personnel from lying. He is describing the challenges faced by those who, unless they are certain of the truth, cannot respond to an enemy who can continuously simply invent charges, accusations, and even events. There will always be a difference between the two sides in terms of how quickly they can produce and push out material, propaganda or counter-propaganda, for several reasons:

● Generally, the United States military responds to enemy claims, so by definition, the U.S. is in a reactive posture most of the time. (Although there is no intrinsic reason that has to be the case; the DOD, Central Command, and other relevant commands could easily be putting out press releases regarding enemy atrocities, and should be.)

● False stories can be distributed at any time, whenever the creator is ready to hit the “send” button. The initiator of the story is therefore under no time constraint.

● In this war, enemy forces are non-hierarchical. The forces creating the materials the U.S. has to respond to aren’t necessarily anything more than a “guy and a laptop.”

Even the smallest groups have media arms, and even the largest are not very hierarchical in structure. The U.S. military, by contrast, is a large, hierarchical organization that answers to civilian control. Those creating material have to have it approved by their chain of command before they can release it, and the release authority is often several layers above the creator of the material.

Additionally, the U.S. military has at times seemed to do as much as possible to slow down its responses. Although the enemy set an all-time speed record in the case of Valhalla, for example, the U.S. made no particular effort to respond in kind. The operations officer for 10th Group, part of CJSOTP-AP at the time of Valhalla, Major Chris Smith, explained the delays this way:

We launched an operation against known insurgents. In this operation, we rescued a hostage who was certain to be killed and showed signs of torture, we found weapons galore... We were shot at by the insurgents on the objective itself, we ended up killing a good amount of them, and arresting about the same amount who were not shooting at us—showing fire discipline as well. The Iraqis we were advising did this, we had an opportunity that night to speak to...the Washington Post—we also had an opportunity to get on television and describe what happened. It took us three days. That is the Army. Three days to allow any news to get out. When we did, it came from the Secretary of Defense and the briefing board that he used there at the Pentagon, the actual briefing board, the graphics that were on there, was our briefing board that had been prepared within hours of the operation. So it sat for almost 70 hours, the same [information] that was briefed three days later, sat for 70 hours. That’s our fault.

The modern media age is a digital one, and in a digital age speed is everything. Our enemy understands this intuitively. The U.S. military, at least in that case, certainly did not. Then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was giving speeches about the digital age, but briefing materials were being held back at the same time, and in this age, a 70-hour delay is an eternity, more than enough time for opinions to form and harden, all the more so for those inclined to think whatever you finally say lacks credibility, particularly if your arguments are image-based.

In fact a 24-hour delay is essentially as devastating as a 70-hour delay. One wonders why the Army didn’t show the press its “before” images as soon as it knew the enemy’s “after” images were on the web, or at least the instant they were cleared for security purposes, assuming that is the reason for the delay. (Although it is unclear what security value the pictures might have had.) And, if clearing the images was the holdup, it’s unclear why a 24-hour delay was necessary before showing the pictures to the press. Once those “after” images were on
the web, clearing the “before” images became a vital, indeed a mission-critical, task. Getting those pictures out was not about making the press happy. It was about heading off a story that could do real damage, particularly in the Arab world.

Because the military held the briefing in Washington, the reporters asking the questions were not the reporters who had been covering the story. The Pentagon press corps is generally well informed about military issues, but they are not necessarily well informed on the specifics of each story, particularly if it has not been their responsibility. A Pentagon briefing meant the reporters involved were not fully up to speed on the claims in dispute, or which questions might determine the validity of U.S. claims now that they were in a position to back those claims up with evidence. The briefers, meanwhile, were several thousand miles and several layers of rank away from the events on the ground. Questions approaching any degree of specificity derailed the briefing as the power of the military’s case—and the basis of its credibility—lost momentum when those giving the briefing had to tell reporters (as should have been entirely predictable), “We weren’t there, but we’d be glad to get you those answers.”

Thus, the following exchange took place:

Q: Sir, yesterday when you spoke at the War College you gave the U.S. a pretty bad grade for the U.S. performance in the war of ideas. And I think this latest is maybe an example of how the other side is triumphing, by turning this into an issue about a mosque. . . . How do you describe the problem, and how do you fix it?

RUMSFELD: I think it’s a tough—sure. It’s a very tough thing to do. When something happens, the people we’re up against are vicious, and they lie. And they are—obviously, they have media committees, they plan what they’re going to do, they plan how they’re going to manipulate the press, and they get out there fast and do it. And there’s no penalty for that. Indeed, there’s only rewards, because the misinformation race is around the world while, as they say, truth is still putting its boots on. Our task is to figure out what actually happened. And that means that they’ve got to go in there and talk to people, and it takes time, and it takes 24 hours, 48 hours, whatever it takes. And they end up—some cases, it takes weeks to figure out what actually took place.

And it’s just very difficult. And here we are, in the 21st century, with all these means of communication and information racing around the globe, and it just makes it a very tough thing to do.

And clearly the United States government has not gotten to the point where we are as deft and clever and facile and quick as the enemy that is perfectly capable of lying, having it printed all over the world, and there’s no penalty for having lied. Indeed, there was a reward, because great many people read the lie and believed it. [sic]

And it takes weeks and weeks afterwards to figure what actually took place. I mean, I didn’t know until this morning the details that Pete briefed here, nor did he, for that matter. And . . . I don’t know any solution to that. . . .

Yet, the briefing materials had been available for days; if there was a delay, it was a result of the decision to conduct the briefing in Washington. It may have taken 24 or 48 hours for word to filter up to the Pentagon, but the people on the ground were prepared to brief the press almost immediately. Why wait? What was the benefit of holding the briefing in Washington? The briefing material itself obviously was not improved. Indeed, it was not, apparently, changed in any way. Certainly, the actual briefing was not improved. The briefers, despite their rank, could not answer the critical questions because they had not been there:

Q: General, could you clarify something? The minaret—the building with the minaret that was in the compound, were people killed in that building? And if they were, were they armed?

RUMSFELD: You saw the pictures of the weapons in the building.

Q: Well, I know. Well, but the general also said that the fire came from outside the compound and—

PACE (CJCS General Peter Pace): There was firing from inside the compound. I cannot tell you whether or not there was actually somebody in the minaret firing
not. I can tell you that the minaret was part of the compound itself, that big rectangle you saw on the corner of the photo. That was the target area. Did not know that that minaret was there on the way in; discovered it once in there. All I’m saying is that there was a minaret, there was a prayer room in this compound. But all the other things I showed you were in the compound. Whether they were taken out of the prayer room or the minaret, I’d have to get you the details on. I do not know those facts.

Q: Do you know whether people were killed in the prayer room?
PACE: I do not.
Q: Because that seems to be the issue.
PACE: I don’t know. We can find out. I don’t know that.

And then:
Q: Did any Americans engage, or was it only Iraqis that engaged the enemy fighters? Do we know that?
RUMSFELD: I think it was briefed yesterday by the people on the spot, and I would ask them. They came out and gave a good briefing, I think.

**Conclusion**

Part of the difficulty in responding to these incidents is that the press tends to report them as “he said, she said.” In other words, when there is a conflict over what happened, the press studiously avoids taking a position about what must have or might have happened, or even who has more credibility on the question. However, these are disputes over evidence, and evidence can be weighed and evaluated and the reader given some sense as to who has the stronger case.

NBC ran a piece the morning after they aired the Al Jazeera footage ostensibly of the IED attack on the Marines—from the same reporter—on the military’s efforts to counter enemy propaganda. This is the text of that story in its entirety:

Well, as the elections approach and bloodshed here shows no signs of abating, the U.S. military here faces another war. It’s called the battle of the media, and so far, it’s the U.S. military who’s on the defensive.

U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers swept across Ramadi today, trying to secure the rest of Al Anbar Province before the vote December 15th. The first shipments of ballots for the key national elections have arrived but so has a surge in violent attacks, many accompanied by what some experts call the insurgents’ chief weapon: videos, often highly produced, powerful images that appear on Arab TV stations like Al Jazeera or on Internet Web sites associated with groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The most recent salvos, these disturbing pictures broadcast Saturday on Al Jazeera of what insurgents claimed was a roadside bomb attack on a U.S. Marine patrol outside Fallujah, killing 10. The U.S. military says the claim is false. Also false, the U.S. command says, is a report based on this unauthenticated video of armed gunmen claiming Al-Qaeda insurgents control the city of Ramadi.

ALSTON (General Donald Alston, U.S. military spokesman): That was misinformation. That is just the tactic used to try to create fear and intimidate the Iraqi people.
MILITARY REVIEW • January-February 2009

MACEDA: Just clever propaganda, say U.S. military officials, that tries to level the battlefield. The U.S. military insisted today it’s making steady gains on the insurgents but admits the war of the media is still an open battle.33

The U.S. military, the report fails to point out, is “on the defensive” because the American press keeps airing videos from insurgent and terrorist groups without bothering to report any of the actual arguments the military makes or the rationales it presents for rejecting enemy propaganda. Simply reporting that the military labels propaganda as propaganda is hardly likely to sway the public, not compared to showing the visuals themselves, because no reason is given for rejecting the images.

Images are emotional, visceral, and their impact is instantaneous. Words, however, are received and interpreted in a linear fashion, and we are far better trained to be on our guard when responding to them.34

It will never be a fair contest between the two.

The military must seek to answer visuals with visuals wherever possible, and must keep in mind that in a digital age, any semblance of the old “news cycle” has been completely obliterated. Since the beginning of the “surge”—and the implementation of the new counterinsurgency doctrine—public support for the war in Iraq has begun to rebound. To be sure, the reduction in casualty rates is probably a large part of the reason, but military spokespersons have been more visible (during those periods when the networks have bothered covering the war), while field, company, and even senior commanders are now regularly available to comment on events. As evidence for military claims, visual products are pushed out to the press with far greater rapidity. It seems safe to assume these changes may well have played a role in the change in public opinion.

Certainly, the possibility is well worth investigating further, because given the low cost of staging hoaxes by insurgents, and the high rate of return on the investment, there is no reason to believe we have seen the last of this strategy. MR

NOTES


6. LTC Terry Guild, interview with the author, information operations officer, MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida, 15 August 2006.

7. For example, see the briefing given by the President of the MEMRI Institute, Ygal Carmoon, on Capitol Hill on 19 July 2007, on Islamist web sites. In it, he argues that these sites serve two purposes, operational needs such as military training, and indoctrination. See “The Enemy Within: Where Are the Jihadist/Islamist Websites Hosted and What Can Be Done About It?” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 374, 19 July 2007, available at <http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?id=IA37407> (21 July 2007).

8. Guild, interview with the author. “One of their goals is to kick us out of Iraq, and they think by doing that they would embolden more people to join their cause, establish Shari’a law there, and expand the Caliphate using Iraq as a base. . . they always go back to the U.S. bailing out of Vietnam. And if they can put enough pressure domestically on the U.S., and show these horrible casualty rates, [they think] that eventually we’re going to pick up and leave.”

9. Tovo, interview with the author.

10. The Chechens originated the practice, to be sure, but in an age when the Internet was young—and certainly would not have been available in an area such as Chechnya. They were producing full-length videos to send back to Russia. IntelCenter, “The Evolution of Jihadi Video (EJV),” v. 1.0, 11 May 2005, 4, <www.intelcenter.com/EJV/PUB/v-1-0.pdf> (8 June 2006). They essentially had an idea that was somewhat ahead of the technology of the day. Today, individual attacks are uploaded to the web as single video segments almost immediately, a very different proposition if you are talking about the attractiveness of material to the press.


13. Guild, Interview with the author.

14. Periodic stories refer to claims made by these groups on Islamist web sites, so that the audience must be aware the networks regularly monitor such sites, but that is a far cry from discussing the practice of using them as a source of visual product treated as if it had come from the networks’ own cameramen. Sometimes there are no cues at all, but the fact is all six networks download these segments and have used them in this fashion on a fairly regular basis.

15. The argument that leaving whatever graphics the graphics themselves might have superimposed on the footage in place is sufficient seems unpersuasive given how few Americans read Arabic. For many of these videos that won’t be enough of a cue since—probably by design—these videos mimic the layout of those on a news site, for example using a news “crawl” on the bottom. With the groups’ logo either too small to see clearly or unknown to most Americans, the graphics alone will leave a viewer thinking the footage was taken from an Arabic-language news network. For the same reason, leaving up, as some do, the logo of the secondary source—often the Site Institute—is unsatisfactory, because very few nonexperts would know that the Site Institute is a source of insurgent videos. However, leaving the graphics up and then also leaving the audio track in place, and simply lowering the volume so that the reporter’s voice can be heard over it, is an alternative that networks have sometimes used to great effect, since the musical selections leave little doubt that the footage is not from a news site.

17. They were not specific about who they had spoken to in the military, simply saying, “The military is denying,” Charles Osgood, “Al Jazeera Broadcasts Alleged Attack on U.S. Patrol,” CBS Sunday Morning, 4 December, 2005, via Lexis-Nexis
The author would like to thank the following individuals for their help with this article. Colonel Stanley Taylor (retired) and then-Colonel Kenneth Tovo were kind enough to make it possible for me to visit Fort Carson to interview officers of 10th Special Forces Group (A). Major Mark McCann, then of 10th Group, was instrumental in helping me to arrange that visit; his insights, particularly into Operation Valhalla were invaluable to me. Colonel David Lapan, U.S. Marine Corps; Colonels Joseph Kilgore and William Darley (retired); and Captain Karla S. Owen were kind enough to read and comment on earlier drafts. I have interviewed a number of individuals for this project, either in person or over the phone, and this research simply would not have been possible if they had not each been so gracious with their time and giving of their insights. Research for this project was made possible by the Department of Communication Studies’ Ken and Mary Lowe Faculty Excellence Fund at the University of North Carolina.
We can help train an army, we can help equip an army, we can help build facilities for the army, but only the Afghan people can breathe a soul into that army.¹

—Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Army

SINCE THE LAUNCH of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 and the subsequent fall of the Taliban, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has made great strides towards democracy: a written constitution, a popularly elected president, a representative parliament, a supreme court, and numerous nation-building institutions. However, many parts of the country remain restive, especially the southern and eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. Even as the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) tackles a determined and resurgent Taliban, the long-term stability of Afghanistan rests on the shoulders of its security apparatus—an integral component of which is the Afghan National Army (ANA)—in light of constant Taliban reminders that “the Americans may have all the wrist-watches, but we have all the time.”²

The numerous articles and reports written on the Afghan army tend to focus on specific aspects of the organization and paint partial, skewed, sometimes negative or sometimes overly optimistic pictures of it. Even though former NATO Supreme Commander, General James L. Jones, testified that “the Afghan National Army is the most successful pillar of our reconstruction efforts to date,” it is clear that a tremendous amount of work remains to be done.³ This article offers a holistic picture of the army’s progress since its formation in November 2002. It looks at the history of national armies of the Afghan state and the Afghan army’s parameters (beginning and desired end state), provides a snapshot of the current Afghan “military balance,” and offers insight into the Afghan army’s training and operational performance.

The Past

The Afghan National Army is not Afghanistan’s first national army; one existed at the birth of the Afghan nation state in 1919. Unfortunately, its history has closely mirrored the volatile fortunes of the state. From independence to 1933, emirs and kings feared that an efficient army would attract “ambitious contenders for power to subvert sections of Afghanistan for their own political purposes” and deliberately neglected the national army. Consequently, it devolved into “little more than a collection of small infantry units and, owing
to the costs of horses and the upkeep, a declining number of cavalry units.”

The neglect of the national army was to change after World War II. Afghanistan had acted as a buffer state between British East India and the Soviet Union, but British withdrawal from South Asia disturbed the geopolitical equilibrium. Afghan rulers modernized the armed forces in order to possess a credible deterrent force against the Soviet Union, to suppress tribal revolts, and to strengthen the central government’s authority. The first hint of a modern national army came in 1937, when Afghanistan invited Turkey to reorganize Afghanistan’s 60,000-strong conscript army. The Turks formed a command structure of divisions and brigades, augmenting each echelon headquarters with supporting staff. The officer corps was regularized to ensure professional leadership, and a military academy established to institutionalize the training and education of officers. A small air force also began to take shape.

Turkey was soon followed by Germany and the United States, with the latter training Afghan army officers from 1956 to 1978. The Soviets first equipped the Afghans in 1956, and trained them in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia after 1961. By the early 1970s, ten times as many Afghan officers had been trained in the Soviet Union as in the United States. Until the eve of the Soviet occupation in 1979, the Soviets provided more than $1 billion in military aid in tandem with $1.25 billion in economic aid. The national army grew to 100,000 men, supported by a 10,000-man air force.

On paper, the national army in 1979 was a comparatively well-equipped army of conscripts, led by a professional officer corps and organized to modern standards. In many ways, the army was the most important modernizing institution of the country; however, the financial costs for this were high. The military budget took a lion’s share of the annual budget, and this necessitated further reliance on Soviet support. The performance of elite Afghan units impressed analysts, but the rest of the army was made up of illiterate and politically backward conscripts who were largely unwilling to serve, poorly trained, and suffering from low morale. An ethnic imbalance was evident. The professional officers were “largely from prosperous Pashtun farming families, and also educated Tajiks,” while the enlisted personnel were conscripts from poor (landless or peasant) classes of all ethnic groups, but frequently Hazaras and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen.

The 1979-1992 war saw Afghanistan’s army gradually disintegrate, as deserting conscripts depleted its ranks, and it relied increasingly on Soviet forces. Afghan conscripts were hesitant to suppress kinsmen at the behest of a foreign occupier, and the merciless treatment of “traitors” at the hands of mujahideen (Afghan resistance) forces exacerbated this mindset. With the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in 1992, the state disintegrated, a fate that soon consumed the once modern national army.

Parameters of the ANA

A decade later, in an attempt to rebuild a war-ravaged Afghanistan, the United States led the international effort to “establish a nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced, Afghan National Army that is democratically accountable, organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country.” Although constant conflict, harsh terrain, and hardihood have cultivated the Afghans’ abilities to soldier, building the Afghan army was not an easy task for the U.S. and coalition partners. A large pool of combat veterans existed, but almost all were guerrilla fighters and most had never served in an organized, professional army loyal to the state. They had only fought for strongmen, religious parties, and ethnic or tribal groups. The Afghan civil war of the 1990s also meant that institutions that once provided regimentation, professional training, and education to the military were now defunct. Low literacy rates, the limited influence of the central government, ethnic rivalries, and provincial strongmen also made the task of building the army quite arduous.

A former Afghan minister of interior with an intimate understanding of Afghanistan believes that “the major challenge is to create a military loyal to the state, a nationally oriented, ethnically balanced, morally disciplined, professionally skilled, and operationally coherent Afghan army.” Recognizing this, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the headquarters “responsible for manning, equipping and training
the Afghan National Army,” defined the army’s end state as “a respected, multi-ethnic, affordable, sustainable, loyal, and competent ministry of defense, general staff, and sustaining institutions capable of directing, commanding, controlling, training and supporting operational forces that have the capability to conduct internal counterinsurgency operations with limited international assistance.”

**Afghanistan’s Military Balance**

As of July 2008, the Afghan army had “63,000 troops in the field and another 9,000 in training,” halfway towards the recently revised goal of a 134,000-strong force, which would allow the Afghan government to assume the lead for security operations in the country. The ethnically balanced force of 15 brigades is geographically distributed with the 201st Afghan National Army Corps headquartered in Kabul, the 203d in Gardez, the 205th in Kandahar, the 207th in Herat, and the 209th in Mazar-e-Sharif, with the balance assigned to the ANA Air Corps (ANAAC), the Afghan Ministry of Defense, and associated institutions.

Even with these advances, the Afghan military apparatus and its sub-units are still very much a “work in progress.” With a vision of 7,500 airmen and 125 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft stationed across Afghanistan, the air corps—in partnership with CSTC-A’s Combined Air Power Transition Force—has made valuable progress toward operational readiness. With a fleet of 27 aircraft (Mi-17s, Mi-35s, AN-32s, and AN-26s) and a core of 301 veteran pilots (who, on average, are 44 years old and have individually logged 2,500 flight hours) the air corps met significant milestones in 2007, including flying the inaugural presidential flight that May and conducting heliborne missions in support of joint ANA-ISAF patrols in June.

Now, the air corps flies about 800 sorties a month; is responsible for transporting 90 percent of the army’s passenger load (compared to 10 percent in 2007); and has over 50 medical evacuation (medevac) missions under its belt. It is headquartered in Joint Aviation Facility One, a modern 57-aircraft capacity homebase. Even so, the air corps is likely to rely on coalition air assets in the near future until more pilots are qualified, additional aircraft are acquired, logistic support bases are stocked and established, and training and doctrine institutionalized. While the corps is expected to reach operational readiness for mobility missions (medevac, general logistical support, and battlefield movement capabilities) with a 61-strong fleet in 2011, counterinsurgency capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and ground attack are not expected until sometime beyond 2016.

As the Afghan army is primarily an infantry-centric force, the majority of its brigades consist of three light infantry kandaks (battalions), one combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak. In certain designated quick reaction forces, the three infantry kandaks are replaced with commando (Ranger/light infantry), mechanized infantry, and armored kandaks. When anti-government elements wage a resurgent guerrilla campaign, the army requires specialized units trained in irregular warfare. The army’s chief of operations, a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger and Special Forces schools, explained that “this is not a question of using a big force against this enemy . . . in fact, it is very important to use a smaller force, well-trained, professional for the special operations to deal with this enemy.”

To further enhance its strike capability, special combat veterans have been selected to form six 650-man commando kandaks which will be the best equipped and most highly trained in the army. Mentored by U.S. Special Forces, four Commando kandaks have been attached to ANA Corps. There is a fifth Commando kandak in training, and the establishment of a commando brigade headquarters is in the works.

The army has taken on more responsibilities in major operations, including planning joint operations with coalition forces, but it still depends on coalition forces for combat and combat service support. In 2006, retired General Barry McCaffrey highlighted the plight of the army: “The Afghan Army is miserably under resourced. This is now a major morale factor for their soldiers...Army field
commanders told me that they try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed. Many soldiers and police have little ammunition and few magazines, no body armor or blast glasses, no Kevlar helmets, no up-armored Humvees, or light armor tracked vehicles.” McCaffrey estimated that for the army to truly become a “well equipped, disciplined, multi-ethnic, literate and trained first-line counterinsurgency force,” and for America to be fully out of Afghanistan by the year 2020, it would cost about $1.2 billion annually for 10 years. Thus far, American assistance to Afghanistan from FY2001 to FY2008 totaled $26.2 billion: $17.2 billion (66 percent) for Afghan security forces; $7.7 billion (29 percent) for economic and social development; and $1.3 billion (5 percent) for governance, rule of law, and human rights. In contrast, the budget for U.S. military operations for the corresponding period amounted to $146.4 billion. Although Afghanistan has made modest economic progress, it will depend on foreign partners for financial support, especially when the Afghan security sector’s current model costs 17 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP (2004/2005), a figure unsustainable by even the richest countries, much less a developing one. Despite $822 million worth of donations from 46 coalition partners and another $194 million pending approval, the Afghan army nonetheless “suffers from insufficient fire power, the lack of indigenous combat air support and the absence of a self-sustaining operational budget.” Insufficient firepower and inadequate protection have resulted in increasing casualty rates among Afghan troops as the army takes on more responsibility. Some estimates claim that 40 to 60 Afghan soldiers perish for every coalition soldier killed in action. The army’s reliance on foreign military support for the foreseeable future is apparent on the ground. The commander of 205th Corps says, “I confess we can’t do it ourselves. We are a poor country.”

Recent escalations of violence in Iraq may have taken the spotlight away from Afghanistan, but a resurgent Taliban and internal friction among NATO members has once again drawn attention back to the impoverished state. At a congressional testimony in February 2007, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, former commander of American forces in Afghanistan, testified that while NATO had made progress in Afghanistan, a lot of work remained and much needed improvements must be made. “NATO countries must do more to fulfill their commitments to provide sufficient forces and capabilities to the mission and increase their level of support to the training and equipping of the Afghan national security forces,” remarked Eikenberry. Mary Beth Long, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for International Affairs, told the House Armed Services Committee, “Our focus in the out years will then shift to sustainment which we estimate at approximately $2 billion annually.”

Although annual Afghan army recruitment numbers have doubled from monthly averages of 1,000 in 2004 to over 2,000 in 2008, the focus has been to ensure the quality and establish the quantity of an effective army. Even so, Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak stressed that much work remained, as the enemy was emboldened with the belief “that if foreign troops suffered many more losses, the international community would leave Afghanistan.” Wardak believes that for Afghanistan to defend itself against external and internal threats, “the minimum number we can survive on within this complex, strategic environment [is] 150,000 to 200,000 [troops], well-trained and equipped, with mobility and firepower and logistical and training institutions,” a sentiment that has been echoed by the army chief of staff, the deputy chief of staff, and the speaker of the Lower House of Parliament.

With the increase in recruitment numbers and a revised goal of a 134,000-strong (from the initial goal of 70,000) army, training “had to split off from [the] Kabul Military Training Center, where most of the basic training is going on, and two more basic training areas [added].” To assist with an Afghan government directive to recruit 2,000 Afghan soldiers per month, the number of U.S.
service personnel mentoring the Afghan army was to increase from 2,900 to 3,600 by April 2007. Military commitments worldwide and the additional task of building the Afghan National Police delayed the deployment of all the required U.S. trainers, so by March of 2008 only 1,062 out of 2,391 (44 percent) billets were filled. As a result, ISAF partners, especially NATO members, were asked to take on more responsibility to help the Afghan army meet its recruitment goal. Strategically, NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer envisaged that Afghan security forces would gradually take control in the spring of 2008. In August 2008, the Afghans did take responsibility for Kabul’s security, but it was largely a symbolic move that did not alter the levels or operational requirements of ISAF troops in the capital.

Training the Afghan National Army

The training and mentoring of the Afghan army falls under the responsibility of CSTC-A, but it is not solely an American effort. Thirteen additional coalition partners—including Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK)—operate under the auspices of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, where they “mentor the ANA in leadership, staff, and support functions, planning, assessing, supporting, and execution of operations and training doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.” Most formal training is in Kabul at the military training center, the Bridmal (battle buddy) NCO Academy, the National Military Academy of Afghanistan, and the Afghan Command and General Staff College, but learning does not stop there, as soldiers and units are continually monitored and mentored by American embedded training teams and 21 coalition operational mentoring liaison teams embedded in Afghan army kandaks, brigades, garrisons, and corps HQs.

A soldier begins his career at Kabul training center where he is assigned to a kandak for seven weeks of basic warrior training under the watchful eye of Afghan army instructors and U.S. mentors. Beyond instilling military skills and teamwork, basic training attempts to forge common bonds and break down barriers between the different ethnic groups. After initial entry training, recruits with leadership potential leave the kandak to attend a UK-led noncommissioned officers (NCO) course before joining the next kandak as section leaders, while the remaining recruits will either receive
advanced infantry training, undergo another military specialty course, or be posted to their newly assigned units. At the conclusion of this initial phase of training, the recruits become Afghan soldiers and are joined by their NCOs and officers.

Because Afghan soldiers, NCOs, and officers are trained separately and by different nations, there is a need to consolidate their training so that they can perform as a cohesive kandak. Thus, Afghan army units undergo a validation process in the form of a two-week-long field exercise conducted by the Canadian Afghan National Training Center Detachment. This training exercise proves the tactical effectiveness of Afghan units as they conduct such scenarios as raids, ambushes, hasty attacks, hasty defenses, and even operations other than war. In addition, newly minted kandaks will undergo a 60-day period of individual and collective training within their higher headquarters’ (corps/brigade) area of operations before being rotated to combat operations.

The increased need for officers opened the door for 8,000 leaders—either former national army officers whose positions had once been declared redundant, or former mujahideen officers who had been disarmed after the departure of the Soviets—to join the army through competitive examinations held across the country. Interestingly, most Afghan officers now receive their training from the U.S. and Turkey, the same countries that first helped to modernize the national army in the 20th century.

“Throughout history, there has been a friendship between Afghanistan and Turkey,” said a former Turkish task force commander in Afghanistan. “Turkey has been providing training to the Afghan Army since the 1920s.”

The West Point-modeled, four-year-long military academy program provides both a university degree and a commission to highly qualified cadets, while the French Officer Academy provides an eight-week continuing education package for already commissioned officers with previous unit experience. Theoretically, the academy can commission up to 300 officers per year, but the Class of 2009, which started with 120 cadets, has only 91 remaining, and the Class of 2010, which started with 270, has shrunk to 239. As for the French Officer Academy, some critics point out that it provides only “continuation training,” that it “did not produce consistent results,” and “was training the officers to control all the aspects of the company.”

As the burgeoning Afghan army requires a rapid expansion of its junior officer corps, a six-month-long officer cadet course for university graduates, based on the British Military Academy at Sandhurst, was also introduced. This 23-week-long officer cadet course at Officer Cadet School (OCS) helps to quickly fill the army with much-needed junior officers.

India, neither an ISAF nor a NATO member, deployed a military team to Afghanistan in mid-2007 to conduct infantry training on weapons handling, map reading, and battalion-level staff work.
Formal education for senior commanders on a wide range of topics is catered through a Senior Command and Staff Course at the Afghan War College, which opened its doors on 28 October 2006. At first, Afghan army officials were alarmed by the high disqualification rate among recruits during the initial screening process, attributing it to miscommunication over pay and training, bogus promises, and recruits being “forced to join under quotas imposed by local militia commanders.”

During the inaugural recruitment drive for the army’s first kandak, “more than 500 showed up, but nearly half of them dropped out due to misunderstandings, among which were the pay rate and the belief that trainees would be taken to the U.S. and taught to speak English and to read and write. Some of the recruits were under 18 years of age and most were illiterate. Recruits who only spoke Pashto had difficulties because instructions were given through interpreters who spoke Dari.” Even OCS was not spared. “We began on day one at 0730 with 189 students, and by 1000 hours we were down to 111, give or take a few. The army decided that some of these university graduates were not up to the required education standard,” said British Army Captain Danny O’Connor, a former OCS instructor.

Another trainer added that “connecting with the Afghans is not always easy, although they are cooperative.”

Ground realities indicate “Afghan commanders and soldiers complain of poor pay, faulty weapons, ammunition shortages and lack of protective gear. U.S. trainers, while praising Afghan soldiers for their bravery, complain of slovenly appearance, lack of discipline, petty theft, mistreated equipment and infiltration of the army by Taliban spies or soldiers who sell information.” Despite the Afghan army’s stringent screening process, anti-government infiltrators were caught “trying to get information that was inappropriate for their job descriptions.” To prevent undesirable elements infiltrating the army, more stringent security checks were implemented. Today, all prospective recruits require a tribal elder or mullah (religious teacher) to personally vouch for them. Recruitment standards have also been tightened. “Previously, there was a need to produce large numbers of soldiers but now we focus on quality instead of quantity,” explained a Kabul Military Training Center commander.

Besides the initial screening problems faced by trainers, various other learning challenges included the requirement for training and familiarization on the plethora of Soviet-bloc weapons in the Afghan army inventory, such as the T-62 Main Battle Tank. At other times, instructors were faced with decrepit training aids and incompatible and incomplete equipment. For example, aiming sights for the Russian SPG-9 recoilless gun were missing, and plotting boards and aiming circles for artillery targeting were lacking. Moreover, mortar tubes, though available, were from three different countries. Such issues were not confined to early army units. By late 2005, newly minted units still lacked both the quality and quantity of equipment required, and in early 2008 only 82 of the 132 122mm D-30 howitzers utilized by artillery batteries were functional. Even higher echelons had inferior equipment. An Afghan brigade commander said he spent $250 of his $400 monthly salary on phone cards because his personal cell phone was his only reliable means of communicating with his commanders.

The other issue that transcends all facets of the Afghan army is the officer-NCO divide. U.S. Army Captain Charles Di Leonardo, who mentored an Afghan army weapons company, remembers, “The NCOs in the company had no power, and the 1st sergeant was there for making chai [tea] and bringing it for the officers. There were also trust problems between the officers and the NCOs.” This divide was apparent during a field training session. In the mortar platoon, “the platoon leader was controlling all the soldiers and . . . the NCOs would just stand there looking around like overpaid privates.” In the anti-armor platoon, “except for the platoon sergeant, there was little NCO involvement.” And in the scout platoon, “soldiers took off their helmets, boots, and blouses and went to sleep” when the platoon leader was not in their immediate vicinity. However, when it came to physical training (PT),...the platoon leader was controlling all the soldiers and...the NCOs would just stand there looking around like overpaid privates.
“not one officer showed up for PT.” However, this absence of officers at PT actually proved beneficial. The NCOs used this as an opportunity to move into leadership roles and slowly gain confidence in all facets of training. The officer-NCO divide is due to “cultural and societal problems,” remarked Command Sergeant Major Daniel R. Wood. “Typically, NCOs didn’t get a lot of respect under the old regime. Lieutenants and captains made all the decisions at the unit level, and they had captains or majors doing what we would consider NCO work at higher levels.” With such traditions seemingly immutable, “many officers remain reluctant to accept an expanded role for NCOs,” and the development of a professional NCO corps meets with initial scepticism.

A case in point is the appointment of Roshan Safi as the first Sergeant Major of the Afghan army, a move that was made “to please the Americans,” according to Command Sergeant Major Thomas Gills, formerly at CSTC-A. Since his appointment, Safi, who attended the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and graduated as the best international student, has been “fixing issues that the corps commander hasn’t been able to fix.” Living up to his name (“roshan” means “light”), Sergeant Major Safi has been a beacon in the NCO development of the army and an invaluable adviser to General Bismullah Khan.

The individual soldier also faces problems with that most basic benefit taken for granted in First World militaries: his salary. An Afghan army company commander said that he was starting to see attrition among his forces. He said that because it was a volunteer army, the soldiers would occasionally leave, never to return, and that he was currently at about 70 percent strength. He also said that many of the soldiers were barely literate, and the reason many of the soldiers were leaving was that the pay was “extremely poor.”

Recently, the Taliban have exploited this weakness and stepped up their recruiting efforts by offering almost three times the daily pay for a soldier: up to $300 a month versus the $70 a month earned by a first-year private. An Afghan official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the “basic pay of $70 a month was a lot of money in 2003, but it is harder to recruit people to fight in a bitter insurgency now.” Moving up the chain of command, the monthly salary in 2006 was $180 for the top enlisted man, $160 for a second lieutenant, and $850 for a general. By 2008, each was only $30 a month higher. In many instances, general officers have not been paid in months, but still continue to serve.

The Taliban often entice tribesmen and farmers with a variety of offers on a “seasonal” basis in different provinces, including “piece-rates of $10 to $20 a day for joining a given attack on Western forces,” $15 to launch a single mortar round into nearby coalition military bases, and $1,000 for the head of a government worker or a foreigner. A 205th Corps officer believes the Taliban’s cash comes from Pakistan and the flourishing drug trade. In addition, Afghan officials believe that certain Arab countries are also funding the insurgency.

Beyond the lure of cash, Lieutenant Colonel David Hammond of the British Parachute Regiment highlighted the intangible benefits the insurgents offered: “If you were a lad in the hills and you were offered $12 to stay local, or you could take $4 and fight miles away from home, which would you do?” Fighting miles away from home has certain operational disadvantages. Afghanistan’s minister adviser for Tribal Affairs and former governor of Uruzgan, Jan Mohamed Khan, says that certain army units have not performed well because “they are from the north” and unfamiliar with both the terrain and people of “the south” (e.g. Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar). Coalition forces, though, would argue that in many instances non-local units are the only way to combat corruption because they have no connections in the province.

Lastly, the Taliban often field better and larger caliber weapons as compared to the Afghan army, including heavy machine guns, mortars, and sometimes even recoilless rifles. In the meantime, army
units that have not received improved weapons continue to operate with “recycled” weapons taken from militias, with some rifles lacking even the basic aiming sights. \(^{86}\)

In addition to the above mentioned pay issues, there are a multitude of other reasons why army soldiers desert their posts and go absent without leave (AWOL). Often, “a reluctance to fight alongside foreigners against countrymen and a need to bring money to families in remote villages or help at harvest time,” is exacerbated by “poor conditions and fierce resistance from the Taliban [and] the absence of a banking system [that] prevents them from sending money to their families.” \(^{87}\) Besides the “monthly AWOL tendencies,” two seasonal events cause the mass exodus of soldiers to their hometowns. The first is the holy month of Ramadan, especially the week following Eid-il-Fitr (the end of Ramadan), when families gather for celebration and feasts marking the end to the fasting period. The other is winter, when the cold, inadequate supplies, and poor living conditions make living in the field intolerable. \(^{88}\) In late 2006, each 611-billet kandak had only about 428 men assigned (70 percent), and out of that reduced personnel pool, only about 300 actually showed up for formations (another 70 percent). CSTC-A, in partnership with the Afghan army, aims to improve the manning assignment rate to 85 percent with 80 percent of them turning up for duty. \(^{89}\)

To solve these problems, the Afghan army uses the carrot-and-stick approach of both inducements and discipline. One important “carrot” is a pay raise. A spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defense said that “the government had enhanced the salaries of ANA soldiers from 80 to 100 dollars per month [and] soldiers who wanted to renew their contract [three-year reenlistment for soldiers and a five-year re-enlistment for NCOs] would get another raise of $35 in their monthly salaries.” \(^{90}\) To help get reliable equipment and greater protection to field units, ISAF-partner nations have delivered substantial amounts of materiel in the forms of small arms, up-armored HMMWVs to replace the unprotected Ford Ranger pick-up trucks, howitzers, Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters, Leopard tanks, and armored personnel carriers. \(^{91}\) As for the “stick,” the Afghan army’s chief of operations acknowledged the “problems, particularly the problem of attrition and desertion,” and proposed a regimental solution to ensure that those who go AWOL are apprehended and face military justice. \(^{92}\)

With the steady delivery of aid and improvements in soldiers’ welfare, the overall absentee rate was reduced in 2007 from the peak of 38 percent to 12 percent, and by early 2008 it stood at 10 percent. \(^{93}\) Concurrently, with careful attention to soldiers’ needs, army retention rates rose from 35 percent in mid-2006 to the current year-to-date averages of 50 percent for soldiers and 56 percent for NCOs. \(^{94}\) This success can be credited to the army’s recognition of the need to adapt Western standards of discipline and concern for soldiers. In March of 2007, the army’s chief of staff proposed the creation of a flexible schedule that would incorporate active duty, training, and liberal leave to give soldiers time to visit families, stay closer to home, and maintain unit cohesion by remaining with their designated units. “In the ANA, we have a commitment to each other,” announced General Khan. “If the soldiers can learn to follow orders and do what we ask, then we must do what we can to care for our subordinates, which means finding a better way for our men to serve their country . . . It is our job to make their choice as a soldier easier.” \(^{95}\)

The Afghan army’s legal system has also been established to enforce the basic rights of soldiers. It aims to eradicate ill treatment of soldiers by officers who mete out punishment contrary to army policies. In late 2006, the former chief of staff of the 201st Corps’ 2d Brigade tested the resolve of the army’s judge advocate and ended up on the receiving end.
of a six-month jail sentence with three years’ probation for striking a soldier.96

These developments may be harbingers of good things to come. The army “has really been struggling onto its feet, and it’s probably not even now fully on them. But there is potential. The basic material is as good as I’ve seen anywhere in the world,” said Colonel Paul Farrar, a British officer with 32 years of service and no stranger to training foreign armies.97 Another officer said, “The Afghan National Army itself is growing not only in size, but it seems that they’re growing smarter in the way they do things.”98

Even though progress is underway, the development of a fully professional army requires much more patience. Staff Sergeant George Beck Jr., a U.S. military adviser, provided an apt analogy: “It’s all about crawl, walk, run. Right now, the Afghan army is at a crawl. In a few more years, it will walk, and in 10, it will run. Then we can all go home.”99 Is the Afghan army a capable force or merely a paper army? Indicators show that the army is growing steadily and material aid is flowing in, mainly from the U.S. However, gauging the army’s quality requires examining reports from the field to obtain a current operating picture.

Current Operating Picture

Today, more than two dozen Afghan army battalions and air corps squadrons are capable of “operating on their own with minimal support from U.S. or coalition forces,” while two units were validated as being operationally independent in March 2008. Two years ago, no unit was even close to that.100 Even so, despite the efforts of trainers from first-class armies, some quarters still report that the army “remains an ill-disciplined force weakened by drug abuse and desertion” and that there is a need to foster “national ethics rather than tribal belief.”101 According to these reports, “young and poorly-equipped Afghan troops have either broken under fire during battles with superior Taliban fighters or were ‘trigger happy’ soldiers who shot at the slightest excuse.”102

The British Army, the leading and largest military contingent in the restive southern province of Helmand, has taken on the dual role of training and mentoring Afghan army units in its areas of operation.103 To date, feedback on the Afghan army from members of the British operational mentor and liaison team has been mixed. In regard to Afghan soldiers, some team members have reported instances of cowardice under fire, a dislike for patrols, a tendency to extort locals, and a penchant for smoking illicit substances. A local tribal elder even claimed that on any given day, as many as half of the soldiers in Helmand are high on hashish.104 It is hardly surprising to hear one British NCO exclaim, “One guy threatened to shoot me. We had no powers to discipline them.”105 Two American service members were not fortunate enough to avoid being shot. They were fatally wounded by an Afghan army soldier outside a top-security prison at Pul-e-Charkhi (east of Kabul) in May 2006.106 Another coalition soldier said that “at the moment, the Afghan army is not trained to the degree where they can maneuver. When our troops are attacked, they aren’t in a position to come and help us.”107

Afghanistan’s internal intelligence services have also arrested several Afghan officers, including a former chief of weapon depots in Khirabad (south of Kabul) for trafficking “150 boxes of Kalashnikov rounds and other arms” from Kabul to the Taliban in the neighboring province of Logar.108 Such instances have contributed to accusations that “increasing corruption in the government and the national army are spreading the power base of the Taliban.”109

Other quarters have praised the army for its willingness to learn and its gallant performances in the field. Captain Matthew Williams found the army’s progress impressive. “The highlight of my tour has been finding out that the ANA we had helped train had captured a key Taliban leader; this really shows the progress that has been made,” said the British Royal Marine. “We trained them and then they completed the operation on their own; it is really gratifying to see.”110 Still, problems abound for future trainers, including cultural differences; misunderstandings brought on by different work
ethics applied to such things as equipment maintenance; language barriers; and the average Afghan soldier’s ability to absorb and act on information and make decisions.111

The Afghan army may be young and plagued with many problems, but it is currently the only effective tool of the central government. Prior to the presidential elections in September 2004, the army deployed two kandaks to the western province of Herat in a show of force to keep in check rival factions that threatened the pre-election stability. Two years later, army units again deployed to Herat when violent clashes erupted between militia groups commanded by Arbab Baseer and Amanullah Khan in the Shindand district. Order came after the army’s arrival, but not before 32 persons were killed and numerous others were wounded.112 An Afghan lieutenant concluded, “The Afghan National Army is the spine of this country and of our president. The central government can defend itself now.”

However, another officer provided a more somber assessment, saying, “A few months of training are not going to make an illiterate young Afghan boy a soldier. It takes time to build an army. The U.S. military is the backbone of the ANA. Without them, the ANA couldn’t stand alone.”113 The former statement highlights the optimism among the Afghan army, but the latter speaks an uncomfortable truth.

To achieve operational readiness to assume control of Afghanistan’s security, the army requires substantial and constant material aid as well as mentoring to eradicate seemingly immutable traditions like the NCO-officer divide. Thus far, ISAF partnerships and mentoring have imbued the army with valuable skills, experience, and insights into how professional militaries conduct operations. In the Afghan capital, joint operations enabled mixed ISAF and Afghan army units to man checkpoints and conduct personnel and vehicle searches.114 In Uruzgan province, the Dutch mentoring and liaison team conducted train-the-trainer programs in partnership with selected Afghan army instructors. “The ANA instructors are more than qualified to deliver and run this course,” said Dutch Major Marloes Visser. “This is another strong indication of the growing strength of the ANA.”115 In Kabul, it is not the coalition, but Afghans who train their countrymen and almost all of the classes are Afghan-led.116

U.S. and Afghan National Army Soldiers conduct a transition of authority ceremony at the district center in Bak, Afghanistan, 16 August 2008.
Meanwhile, in the southeastern province of Zabul, close cooperation between Romanian and Afghan forces have resulted in hundreds of joint security patrols and the establishment of a combined quick-reaction force able to provide immediate assistance throughout the province. “Even though there are differences in tactics, languages, equipment, and culture, our overall mission—providing a secure environment for the people of Zabul—is the same. It is this overall goal that binds us together,” says Romanian Captain Mihai Marius.117

Where mentoring has been lacking, the growth of the army has slowed, halted, and in some cases, backtracked. U.S. Army Engineers have trained Afghan sappers “with an emphasis on mine warfare, basic demolitions, and combat construction [focused on wire obstacles and survivability positions].”118 Problems began to surface when the sappers were deployed to their respective areas of operation and, due to a lack of collective training and a shortage of project management skills, their ability to contribute to the overall mission was severely restricted. The sapper companies ended up being utilized as infantry instead of engineers, a move no doubt taken because of the shortage of manpower due to staffing and AWOL issues.119

Continued mentoring is vital to the Afghan army’s maturity. The hands-on approach has allowed Afghans to gain confidence in their own army and show the locals the great strides it has taken. “If a squad of our guys goes out, a platoon of their guys goes out; if a platoon of our guys goes out, a company of their guys goes out,” said a Connecticut National Guardsman. “We will not go into a compound by ourselves. We do not kick down doors anymore; those days are over. They kick the door down or knock on the door. We’re providing the additional security—the big guns so nobody messes with them.”120 Another mentor concurred that “It’s better that the ANA do it their way than us telling them how to do it.”121

Warfighting is just one of a number of skills expected of militaries, so the army has trained for operations other than war. Early in 2006, the 203d Corps conducted the army’s first Medical Civilian Assistance Program in the eastern province of Khost to test the support system and to build trust in the army and its abilities.122 During torrential rains which led to numerous floods across Afghanistan in 2007, the army was instrumental in the success of humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Such operations are now second nature to it.

In July 2007, the army reached a milestone when Major General Abdul Khaliq, Commander of 203d Corps, became the commanding general during Operation Maiwand in the Taliban stronghold of the Andar district of Ghazni province. His mission involved over 1,000 Afghan and 400 U.S. military personnel and was the first large-scale operation the Afghans planned and executed. Afghan staff planners gained confidence and valuable experience in command and control, which today allows them to lead two-thirds of the operations in which they are involved and continue the Afghanization of military operations which “is vital if the problems of civilian casualties is to be addressed effectively.”123 American commanders praised the continued improvement of the Afghan army, but wisely cautioned against over-expectations as the army still relies heavily on coalition air, medical, and logistical support.124

Still, the confidence imbued into battle-hardened units enabled the army to build on past experiences and play key roles in myriad operations against Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan. In August 2007, the army planned and executed its first combined arms live-fire exercise, which tested the capability of its infantry and armor in a variety of challenging combat scenarios while supported by its own artillery, medical, and air assets.125 More recently, it took responsibility for printing material required for administration, training, recruitment, and logistical support.126

Unfortunately, an unprofessional and corrupt Afghan National Police has increased the army’s burden in upholding security. During the Kabul riots in May 2006, Afghan police officers reportedly abandoned their posts, with some even taking off their uniforms and joining the rampaging looters.127 While rioters took over the streets, Interior Ministry officials in charge of the police “took their phones off the hook, and [President] Karzai failed to make a public statement on TV until the riots, lasting some eight hours, had run their course.”128 Ultimately, the Afghan army’s presence calmed the situation. Kabul residents said the formation of the army was the only “decent thing” President Karzai has done thus far during his presidency. “Now the
soldiers are here. The police can’t steal and hassle people and we feel safe!” exclaimed a shopkeeper in Kabul.  

“The people fear the police more than they do the Taliban, and until we can get that fixed, it’s going to be a long road” said a U.S. captain. In the “single largest, most comprehensive public opinion poll ever conducted in Afghanistan” (by the Asia Foundation between June and August 2006), 87 percent of the 6,226 respondents indicated that they trusted the army, leading the Afghan police (surprisingly at 86 percent), electronic media (84 percent), print media (77 percent), nongovernmental organizations (57 percent), political parties (44 percent), justice system (38 percent), and local militias (31 percent). Concurrently, the public perceives the Afghan army as the least corrupt institution in the country.

Friction between the police and the army has sometimes resulted in armed confrontations between them. An accident involving their vehicles in the northern province of Parwan sparked a heated argument and gun battle, during which soldiers shot a policeman dead. A month later in the southern province of Ghazni, the soldiers and police almost came to blows when locals beat up a police officer accused of stealing from a shop keeper. The police took the side of the accused officer while the army sided with the locals. The tension escalated with the gathering of more members from both sides. Warning shots followed, and tensions rose when “the yelling increased, followed by the unmistakable sound of numerous rifles being locked and loaded.” A gun battle was narrowly averted thanks to the actions of U.S. soldiers in the vicinity.

Colonel Matiollah Khan, a fearless fighter with a wealth of experience in securing the main highways in the restive provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar, depicts the Afghan army and the police as close security partners and says there has never been any hint of friction during any operation in which he has taken part. The level of animosity between the two forces may be difficult to gauge, but the undeniable truth is that in places where a security void exists, anti-government elements create a parallel quasi-governmental infrastructure that threatens Afghan democracy and stability. When coupled with corruption in the government and the people’s ever-increasing lack of trust, the future of Afghanistan is in a perilous situation.

Afghanistan seeks closer cooperation with its neighbors as well as equipment, mentorship, and aid from international partners. During a tour of an army training installation with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in mid-2007, General Khan remarked that Afghanistan was not getting enough cooperation from Pakistan in information sharing and joint training exercises. “We have a relationship, of course, under the coordination of the United States,” Khan said, “But the cooperation that we need, unfortunately, we don’t get.” These remarks came after a joint intelligence team from NATO, Afghanistan, and Pakistan began operating in Kabul in early 2007 to enhance information sharing. With cross-border infiltration a perennial hindrance to Afghan security, Minister Wardak recently proposed the creation of a “combined joint task force for coalition, Afghan and Pakistan to be able to operate on both sides of the border, regardless of which side.”

Will the army be ready to take over responsibility for security and fulfill its role as the sentinel of Afghan democracy? The jury is still out. Reports of heroics in the battlefield and the genuine eagerness of its young recruits to make a difference in their country’s future intertwine with accusations of drug abuse and dereliction of duty, portraying the army as a trigger-happy and ill-disciplined force. Can it stand on its own without coalition support if ISAF troops withdraw? Brigadier General Tim Grant, the former Commander of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, provided a candid assessment: “Can we fix them in two years? I am not sure. We can certainly make them much better than they are in two years, and that’s where our focus is right now.”

Conclusion

The Afghan army has been a beacon of hope and a shining example of what Afghans can achieve through cooperation and ethnic cohesion. It has made phenomenal progress and tremendous
improvements since its formation, but there are still many issues to address if it is to become the protector of Afghan democracy and territorial integrity. Not surprisingly, the solutions to these issues are in the hands of both the Afghans and the international community.

The Afghans often find themselves in all-too-familiar Catch-22 situations. They want to increase the salary of their soldiers, but budgetary restrictions constrain them; they seek more operational responsibility, but find that their forces are undermanned and often outgunned. They are trying to balance the quality and quantity of the army in an environment of constrained resources.

Only the Afghans themselves can decrease absentee rates and improve the retention rates of their soldiers. Similarly, discipline and professionalism can only be instilled into an institution by the people who define the institution—the officers and the men of the army. Only Afghans can eradicate negative cultural norms such as the NCO-officer divide, inculcate loyalty to national ethics rather than tribal beliefs, and stem the seasonal exodus of personnel that reduce the army’s operational capability. Only the Afghans can breathe a soul into their army.

The international community must realize two very important truths. First, the Afghan army will require financial support, professional mentoring, and military partnerships for many years to come. Three decades of fighting have made Afghanistan what it is today, and it may take an equal number of years of peace to turn the country around. No superficial milestone or declaration of force capability will be able to hide operational deficiencies should coalition forces leave the Afghans to “go it alone.” One only has to recall the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the fate of South Vietnam during the Second Indo-China War. Mentoring the army transcends merely showing Afghans what to do: it requires developing mutual respect; preparing soldiers to be mentors; and understanding local culture, religion, and social norms. Sustaining the partnership between coalition and Afghan army requires a large amount of patience. Soldiers from militaries with long and established histories often expect an army that is only six years old to possess values that take a generation to build. But it is only through mentoring and patient partnership that the newly minted second lieutenants and the fresh-face privates of today will be able to lead the Afghan army professionally as the flag officers and senior enlisted personnel of tomorrow. Forcing the army to assume too much responsibility while it is still unprepared for it is not an exit strategy. It is a recipe for disaster and an invitation to do it all again sometime in the future.

Second, creating, mentoring, and partnering an operationally ready Afghan army is not the sole responsibility of the United States. All coalition partners must play active roles, from contributing equipment and providing education to conducting joint training with army units in the provinces. Irrelevant or non-compatible aid simply creates more friction and hinders the army’s progress. As Secretary Gates aptly explained, “Going forward, the success Afghanistan has achieved must not be allowed to slip away through neglect or lack of political will or resolve. [After all], Afghanistan is a mission in which there is virtually no dispute over its justness, necessity, or international legitimacy. Our failure to get the job done would be a mark of shame.”

NOTES

9. Amstutz, 21-22; and Hyman, 29-30.
18. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


29. Ibid. 6.


40. "Defence minister says Afghan army must be five times larger," The Associated Press (AP), 12 July 2006; Ahmad Khalid Moahid, "550 Afghan military officers awarded certificates,


48. Luis P. Valdespino Jr., "ANA graduates 700 basic trainees" and "In the lead: Mentors take back seat as Afghan drill sergeants step up to mold new recruits," The Enduring Ledger (October 2008), 8, 12.


98. Kilbride.
100. Ibid.
104. Baker.
105. Harding, “Armenian Army ‘is Weak under Fire’,” and “Armenian Army ‘Taking Drugs’ Says British Soldier.”
116. Garamone, “Pace Pleased with Progress at Afghan Training Center.”
119. Remarks by Brigadier Dickie Davis, Chief Engineer, ISAF IX, at the Joint PRT Commanders Meeting at HQ ISAF (Kabul, Afghanistan) on 13 November 2006.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
135. Author’s conversation with Colonel Matiollah Khan, during the latter’s visit to CAPS on 23 November 2006. Trans. from Pashto to English by Mr. Hekmat Karzai.
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.
—T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917

Over time, if you build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy’s networks, bringing them out into the open to fight you, and seizing the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces... in your area.

WHEN 3RD SQUADRON, 1st U.S. Cavalry Regiment, deployed to Iraq in March 2007 as part of 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the third of five “surge” brigades, the unit inherited a complex battlespace that had not been routinely occupied by large numbers of coalition forces (CF) since late 2004. Only two under-strength cavalry troops conducting economy-of-force operations for Multi-National Division-Baghdad patrolled the entire Mada’in Qada, an area east of the Diyala and Tigris Rivers approximately the size of Rhode Island. As a result, the security situation deteriorated to the extent that forces operating out of central Baghdad labeled it the “wild, wild East.” Large and well-organized extremist forces—both Shi’a and Sunni—operated with impunity and virtually held citizens and local government representatives hostage. Although the surge of American forces brought CF units there for the first time in several years, the complex environment and poor security situation made counterinsurgency progress slow and difficult. After creating forward deployed bases to better project troops into the population, 3-1 CAV had to overcome some initial challenges to make progress.

In late July, a coincidence of outside events and the application of counterinsurgency (COIN) fundamentals presented a way to improve security through the use of local nationals as security contractors to protect critical infrastructure. What started as a grass-roots movement that gained traction in one small portion of the battlespace became a fundamental part of the squadron’s COIN strategy; improved security allowed for economic, political, and social development, which won the sustained support of the people.

This extraordinarily effective strategy used “Sons of Iraq” security contractors to thicken CF lines, facilitate reconciliation in local villages,
empower Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), connect the local government to the people, and improve economic conditions.

**Wave from the West**

The idea behind the Sons of Iraq originated in the Al Anbar province of Western Iraq. During the summer of 2006, insurgents associated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) assassinated a prominent Sunni sheik and hid his body from the family for three days so that they could not arrange for its burial in accordance with Muslim customs. The outrage over this act, in combination with improved local security, encouraged a group of Sunni tribal leaders led by Sheikh Abdoul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi to form an alliance with CF against AQI. They called the movement Sahwah al Anbar, or “Awakening in Anbar.”

Supported by CF and the Iraqi government, the alliance eventually encompassed 41 tribes or sub-tribes, mostly Sunni, in the Anbar Province. The alliance conducted a highly successful counteroffensive targeting AQI. By the summer of 2007, the Anbar Awakening had largely driven AQI from the province and killed dozens of key AQI leaders. The success earned Sheik Sattar personal meetings with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and U.S. President George W. Bush. The results of the Awakening were concrete and provocative. The increased security meant that stability and reconstruction operations could begin, prosperity could return, and disenfranchised Sunnis could have a chance at returning to the polity. These tangible benefits planted the seeds for further expansion in the summer of 2008.

During the intervening year, AQI had conducted a protracted campaign to separate Shi’a areas in Baghdad from their lines of communication to Iranian support. The resulting violence had a devastating effect on prosperous areas along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. By summer 2007, deteriorating security and essential services in the Mada’in Qada made the Awakening an attractive prospect to Sunnis living along ethnic fault lines. This spread of the Awakening coincided with the surge of U.S. combat forces in Iraq and the introduction of a brigade-sized unit into the Mada’in Qada. Increased CF presence helped lift the pall of fear and strengthened the will of Iraqi Security Forces; local citizens, tired of endless violence, viewed the Awakening as a chance to end chaos.

From a military point of view, using the Awakening to solve problems in the Jisr Diyala Nahia made perfect sense. During weekly operational assessments, squadron leaders and staff discussed the development of an Awakening-type movement made up of Iraqi security volunteers to augment under-strength Iraqi police and military units in the squadron’s area of operation. It quickly became clear that the volunteers had the potential to be much bigger than just a local security augmentation force.
As Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., commander of the 3d HBCT, 3ID, stated, the security volunteer movement “may represent an opportunity to implement the art of COIN warfare by applying pressure on extremists along multiple lines of operation.”

For the COIN fight, volunteers would provide great military value. Local citizens knew most of the members of their communities and could easily pick out those who did not belong. They knew which neighbors were tacit or active supporters of insurgent groups. They knew who could provide timely and accurate information on insurgent activity, and they gave the squadron commander vital human intelligence essential to success. Additionally, the squadron’s attached human intelligence collection teams (HCTs) could develop and mature these local sources to create a more detailed, accurate picture of insurgent and criminal cell networks and organizations.

The squadron staff saw the immediate economic impact of hiring mostly young, unemployed local nationals to perform security functions in their neighborhoods. This hiring quickly injected cash into the local economy and generated additional spending and growth as local shop owners increased stocks or expanded their stores to keep up with increased demand. Additionally, the security volunteer movement reduced the insurgent and criminal pool by providing an alternate source of employment to young Iraqi males, thus making them less susceptible to enticement by insurgents, criminals, and extremists.

The movement also increased buy-in among local residents. The individual sense of pride that stemmed from taking positive action to reduce violence in their local areas would spread to entire communities. Buy-in by local communities makes them part of the solution rather than just spectators to the counterinsurgency struggle. At its heart, COIN warfare is a contest for the support of the people, and the volunteer movement seemed to provide the opportunity to make significant headway in that struggle.

Finally, the squadron’s initial planning indicated that the volunteer movement might provide a venue for political mobilization of those who felt disconnected from their government and powerless to effect change. The Iraqi security volunteer structure and organization provided networks for passing information and coordinating political activity. The new sense of involvement bled over to the political process as local citizens became more demanding of the Nahia and Qada governments. It allowed the government to connect to the people.

**From a military point of view, using the Awakening to solve problems in the Jisr Diyala Nahia made perfect sense.**

**Buy-in by local communities makes them part of the solution rather than just spectators to the counterinsurgency struggle.**

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An Iraqi security volunteer guards his street in the Adhamiya district of Baghdad, Iraq, 17 November 2007.

U.S. Army, SPC Jeffery Sandstrom
and publicize progress in restoring essential services and economic development. In short, the volunteer movement seemed to be a textbook application of COIN principles. The arrival of the Awakening in the Jisr Diyala Nahia in late July 2007 presented the squadron with an opportunity to put theoretical planning into practice.

**Humble Beginnings and Near Disaster: Arafia**

Even after several weeks of planning, using Iraqi security volunteers was still a continuous learning process. The squadron began a deliberate process of establishing the first group of local security contractors—now variously called Iraqi Police Volunteers, Concerned Citizens, Concerned Local Citizens, or Sons of Iraq—based around well-established local contacts. From the beginning, the squadron was careful to look at the security contractors from a military perspective, considering what checkpoints and staffing were required to secure critical infrastructure and local areas. The squadron’s leadership referred to this as the “New York Times test”; that is, we had to be able to justify the use of American taxpayer dollars with a military necessity that readers would understand if it were to hit the front page of the *New York Times*. With military necessity in mind, the squadron staff developed a matrix to determine manning and equipment authorizations for each proposed security group.

Each group was to be responsible for a certain number of checkpoints as determined by agreement between the Sons of Iraq leader and the ground-owning troop or company commander. We authorized up to 12 personnel to operate each checkpoint, with a quick reaction force of 12 additional personnel authorized for each group of eight checkpoints. Each Sons of Iraq group received an initial stipend for radios, Iraqi flags, and uniforms (initially hats, reflective belts, and T-shirts, but later long-sleeve shirts and trousers). The salary for each Sons of Iraq member was $300 per month (70 percent of the salary of a local Iraqi police officer) with salaries for checkpoint leaders and the overall Sons of Iraq leader slightly higher. (Sons of Iraq salaries were later reduced to $240 per person.) We paid the Sons of Iraq groups monthly with money allocated through the Commander’s Emergency Relief Fund (CERP), a funding source drawn from congressional supplemental appropriations.

Funding was an obstacle in itself, requiring several legal reviews to determine if the squadron could legally pay locals to secure critical infrastructure in their neighborhoods before work began. We told Sons of Iraq leaders that they could not use the money to buy weapons or ammunition, and because each adult Iraqi male could keep an AK47 and two magazines of ammunition in his house for self-defense, the squadron (in conjunction with the local National Police commander) authorized Sons of Iraq members to carry their personal weapons in their security areas.

Then, the squadron began the test case in a small neighborhood called Arafia, a predominately Sunni village on the northern outskirts of the city of Jisr Diyala. Proceeding deliberately, the squadron located a leader for the Sons of Iraq group. The company commander responsible for the area used his relationship with a local muktar (mayor) to provide an initial base from which to build the first Sons of Iraq group. After coordinating the scope of the project with the muktar, the company began a deliberate process of screening potential candidates. The squadron entered data about each candidate into a biometric database and the squadron S2 section screened the data for adverse information in several CF intelligence databases. (Later, the squadron provided all the names of Sons of Iraq recruits to the local ISF leader so that the Iraqi minister of interior could vet and approve them.) The recruits signed an oath renouncing violence and promising to guard the areas within their checkpoints. The new Sons of Iraq received uniforms; basic instruction on checkpoint operations, search procedures, weapons handling, and rules of engagement; and basic legal instruction. Coalition forces initially facilitated this training, but later the squadron used Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Once cleared, equipped, trained, and appropriately badged, the Sons of Iraq began constructing checkpoints and assuming control of areas. Despite logistical challenges—including legal restrictions that prevented using operational funds to purchase material for local national projects—the company created a functional Sons of Iraq group in three weeks.

On 18 August 2007, a suicide bomber attacked the house of the Sons of Iraq leader in Arafia while a CF patrol was inspecting checkpoints. Hussein Allawi, one of the Sons of Iraq members guarding
the house, tackled the terrorist and prevented him from reaching the patrol inside the compound, sacrificing his own life when the suicide bomber detonated his explosives. This tragic event could have destroyed the momentum developed by the squadron; the Son of Iraq killed in the attack was the eldest son of the Sons of Iraq leader. However, through careful consequence management and information operations, the squadron was able to turn the attack into a positive example of a courageous Iraqi citizen who took positive action to restore security for his family and his community. The sacrifice of this one man helped galvanize support among Iraqi citizens for ending the violence and cooperating with coalition forces to defeat the terrorists. Hussein Allawi’s actions saved the lives of at least four U.S. Soldiers that day, a fact President Bush noted several days later in a speech. From humble beginnings, the Sons of Iraq program overcame a major hurdle and achieved positive strategic effects within the first month of its existence.

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Expanding South: Tuwaitha

Events in Arafia provided publicity and impetus for the squadron to expand the Sons of Iraq program. Again, the squadron chose the area for expansion based on the presence of an identified leader with whom the ground-owning company commander had a strong relationship and on the need to provide security that neither CF nor ISF could provide. Unlike Arafia, however, the next area for expansion was far more contentious after the squadron’s arrival.

In the late summer of 2007, the squadron held a series of meetings that brought together members of the Nahia Council, the ISF, and key tribal leaders. Overwhelmingly frustrated with the continued level of violence in an area just south of Jisr Diyala called Tuwaitha, the leaders agreed to take a leap of faith and establish a new Sons of Iraq group. Tuwaitha was the scene of nearly continuous fighting between AQI and Iraqi and coalition forces for years. The enemy attacked with IEDs nearly every time patrols moved through the key maneuver corridor of the area. The close contact and strong presence of AQI in Tuwaitha led the squadron to use a slightly different technique to implement the Sons of Iraq program. The resulting operation, Tuwaitha Sunrise, became the model for the entire brigade to use to establish Sons of Iraq groups in unsecured, non-permissive regions. In this three-part model, ISF and CF together cleared extremists from a specific region, Sons of Iraq groups held the area, then CF in conjunction with local government started to build infrastructure and capacity aimed at winning the population.

Operation Tuwaitha Sunrise began with a deliberate area reconnaissance and clearance operation that included Sons of Iraq, ISF, and CF. After identifying a leader and deciding on checkpoint locations via map and unmanned aerial vehicle reconnaissance, the squadron developed a deliberate plan that integrated route clearance teams, unmanned aerial vehicle coverage, close combat aviation support, fixed-wing close-air support, armed reconnaissance, National Police soldiers (Shurta), and CF units equipped with armored gun trucks and tracked combat vehicles. After thorough reconnaissance overflights, CF and ISF coordinated with the new Sons of Iraq leader and many of his chosen security roles for the expansion of the Sons of Iraq program.
personnel at a predetermined point along the major line of communication. The Sons of Iraq then led ISF and CF along the road with route clearance teams to clear it of potential IEDs. During the operation, the squadron maintained constant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) overhead while also conducting terrain-denial fires against likely insurgent sanctuary areas with 120-mm mortars from a nearby combat outpost as well as with 155-mm artillery and rocket fire from AH64 and OH58 helicopters. Fixed wing aviation assets provided low-level show-of-force demonstrations. All of these terrain denial fires demonstrated the capabilities to bring operational fires to bear to prevent AQI forces from maneuvering against the Sons of Iraq, ISF, and CF involved in the operation.

As the forward elements cleared the area along the route, trailing elements began establishing Sons of Iraq checkpoints to secure the ground gained. Earth-moving equipment, supplied by the Sons of Iraq leader and paid for with a portion of the initial CERP stipend for the security contract, created barriers around each checkpoint. Overwatched by CF, ISF, and aviation assets, the newly established Sons of Iraq checkpoints were critical in retaining ground won during the clearance operation. Strengthened by ISF and CF in a quick reaction force role, the Sons of Iraq were able to fight off several counter-attacks by AQI forces over the next several weeks.

A second operation conducted several days later extended the security area and established additional checkpoints along key routes.

During Operations Tuwaitha Sunrise I and II, the Sons of Iraq, ISF, and CF cleared more than 20 kilometers of key routes. In doing so, they located and destroyed 10 emplaced IEDs and the materials to make many more; located, cleared, and destroyed four AQI safe houses; killed or captured at least six AQI leaders and fighters (the Sons of Iraq reported far more AQI killed than this but those totals could not be verified); and established 20 Sons of Iraq checkpoints, four ISF checkpoints, and one Facility Protective Services checkpoint to hold the terrain and prevent further AQI incursions.

By the end of September, a sense of normalcy had returned to Tuwaitha, with economic activity and vehicle and pedestrian traffic increasing throughout the fall. These operations also strengthened the ties between the squadron and the newly installed Sons of Iraq leader, Mahmood Jablowi. Immediately following Tuwaitha Sunrise, the squadron conducted a civil medical engagement and humanitarian aid drop at Jablowi’s house, solidifying his ability to provide for the local people of the area and enhancing his stature. With access to the city of Jisr Diyala, Jablowi became the Tuwaitha representative to the Jisr Diyala Nahia Council, a seat that had been vacant for months. He later became a key advocate for the expansion of the Sons of Iraq program south to areas around the city of Salmon Pak. Moreover, he became an important member of the Sheik’s Support Council, an improvisation by the Government of Iraq (GoI) to attempt to influence the growth and power of the “Awakening” movement. Operation Tuwaitha Sunrise represented the dawn of a new phase of Sons of Iraq expansion and was a model for implementation of the program in non-permissive areas.

**Expanding North: Qarguhliyah**

Tied as it was to the Anbar Awakening, the Sons of Iraq movement from its inception was predominately Sunni and predominately anti-AQI. The potential of the program to enhance security was universal; however, the squadron had to carefully examine further expansion into the northern area of its battlespace, the Qarguhliyah area. This area includes Four-Corners and Um Al Bid, which are more mixed in terms of Shi’a and Sunni sects than the rest of the region (57 percent Shi’a and 43 percent Sunni) and have a greater security threat from Shi’a extremists and criminal groups than from AQI. As a result, the squadron modified its approach for standing-up these Sons of Iraq groups.

The squadron developed a strong relationship with two key leaders in Qarguhliyah over a period of several months. The troop commander initially established contacts to provide information on extremist activity in the area. One of these contacts—Abu Amosh, a Sunni businessman with strong tribal connections—observed the expansion of the Sons of Iraq program with interest and began working with the troop commander in the area to bring Sons of Iraq to Qarguhliyah. He began recruiting local volunteers to serve as Sons of Iraq, ensuring that they were representative of the region’s demographics, split between Sunni and Shi’a. The troop recruited a Shi’a leader named
Abu Mohammed to assist with leadership of the new Sons of Iraq group. During the initial phases, the troop commander focused his new Sons of Iraq leaders on developing actionable intelligence on extremist groups. Significantly, these were mostly Shi’a extremists, and both the Shi’a and Sunni Sons of Iraq leaders collected extensive information on their activities, allowing the troop to detain several key leaders and disrupt indirect fire and IED-making cells in the area. Because there was less extremist activity in the area than elsewhere, the design of the Sons of Iraq checkpoints focused more on improving the checkpoint facilities and less on clearing areas around the checkpoints. Abu Amosh and Abu Mohammed proved to be very capable organizers, and the checkpoints rapidly became shining examples of security and visible improvements in the region. Abu Amosh also established a central Sons of Iraq headquarters and instituted a weekly meeting to bring together tribal leaders, Sons of Iraq checkpoint leaders, and—most important—the Nahia Council representative from Qarguhliyah. With encouragement from the troop and squadron commanders, this meeting became the basis of the highly organized local community council in Qarguhliyah, the first of its kind in the squadron area of operation.

The council served as an immediate venue for tribal leaders to bring their issues to the attention of ISF, CF, and the lowest official representative of the Government of Iraq. Over the course of several weeks, Abu Amosh organized the council to cover various departments including water, electricity, security, sanitation, and education. This organization allowed the council to address key concerns of the tribal leaders and pressure the Nahia Council for immediate improvement in Qarguhliyah. Aside from the council, Abu Amosh and Abu Mohammed created a widespread intelligence network that provided detailed information to both ISF and CF and allowed them to precisely target Sunni and Shi’a extremist leaders and locate the cache of arms and ammunition that facilitated their operations. The impact of this Sons of Iraq group and associated organizations was immediate and noticeable: intelligence reports of criminal activity associated with extremist groups increased with unprecedented alacrity; kidnapping, car-jacking, and extortion dropped to nearly zero; the local economy boomed from the increased security and injection of available cash from Sons of Iraq salaries; and the Nahia Council focused on problems with services in Qarguhliyah, resulting in Iraqi government projects to resurface a key road in the area, build a bridge to replace a damaged span across the Diyala River, and repair an irrigation pump station vital to local farmers.

The effect of this success led to the spread of Sons of Iraq groups across the brigade with an increased expectation that with Sons of Iraq would also come security, increased stability, and improvements in services and the local economy. Throughout the remainder of its tour in Iraq, the squadron would continue to strive for progress along all those lines of effort with Sons of Iraq groups, increasingly forming a hub of opportunity, and helping isolate extremists from the populace.

**Wildfire Expansion: Maintaining Balance**

On the heels of the successes in Tuwaitha and Qarguhliyah, the Sons of Iraq project branched into multiple areas in the squadron battlespace, with troop commanders often establishing several different groups simultaneously. This placed increased burdens on the ability to command, control, and sustain multiple operations. The squadron had implemented a general template for standing up Sons of Iraq groups, but each group had unique requirements and concerns that the squadron had to address. This took time and effort on the part of the troop commanders and the squadron staff—particularly for cells that handled CERP projects and money. However, the process went well, with the key considerations being establishing the right number of checkpoints for each group and picking the right leaders.

With the success of the Sons of Iraq program now apparent across the battlespace, requests to establish Sons of Iraq groups inundated troop commanders in virtually every corner of the battlespace. The squadron commander remained adamant that we would not employ Sons of Iraq where they were not needed. We would only initiate groups in areas where ISF had no presence and where checkpoints were needed. It was incumbent on the troop commanders to validate requirements with prospective groups and attain approval prior to implementation. This created some friction with local leaders, who viewed the Sons of Iraq program as a source of
income or a method of furthering sectarian agendas. Such leaders were quickly removed from the program. Troop commanders had full authority to remove local leaders who did not embrace their duties or the program. (Later, the ISF conducted this action in conjunction with the squadron.)

Since they primarily fulfilled a security function, the Sons of Iraq had to demonstrate progress in that arena. Troop and squadron commanders routinely reviewed contracts before they renewed them or made payments. The squadron staff kept close track of caches turned in, information each Sons of Iraq group provided, and attacks or reports of attacks in Sons of Iraq areas of operation. The squadron used these metrics and numbers of extremists and criminals detained to evaluate progress for each Sons of Iraq group. The command put great pressure on Sons of Iraq leaders to either continue demonstrating progress or forfeit checkpoints or their positions (and therefore money). Forfeitures led to turnover in leadership; some Sons of Iraq organizers proved more capable than others. Tribal and local citizens pressured their Sons of Iraq leaders to produce intelligence and caches to keep their programs running. Some programs progressed little until the right leader was chosen.

The Sons of Iraq program in the Jisr Diyala Nahia quickly became recognized for its non-sectarian, cooperative operations. While the Awakening in general was still associated with Sunni actions against AQI, in the squadron battlespace the Sons of Iraq stood as a bulwark against all extremist and criminal activity and provided equal opportunity employment to Shi’a and Sunni alike.

**Constant Engagement: Integrating ISF and Local Government**

As the numbers of Sons of Iraq groups and checkpoints grew rapidly throughout the winter of 2007-2008, the squadron commander and staff began to institute other management tools to help organize and control the Sons of Iraq in the squadron battlespace. Bringing the local ISF commander further into the process was critical to maintaining order and legitimacy with the Nahia Council. The primary vehicle for this integration became the Nahia Security Meeting.

The weekly meeting at the National Police brigade headquarters in Tameem brought together all the Sons of Iraq leaders in the squadron battlespace as well as the squadron and troop commanders, key members of the squadron staff, and the National Police Brigade commander, Colonel Emad, and his staff. At the very first meeting, the squadron commander empowered the police commander, giving him the chair and encouraging him to negotiate solutions to problems Sons of Iraq leaders presented. Initially these meetings focused on Sons of Iraq leader complaints about checkpoint restrictions, uniforms, or money, but Colonel Emad shaped the meetings into a venue for sharing intelligence and ideas on how to improve security. Sons of Iraq leaders began to discuss solutions rather than problems and to cooperate to work out differences or cover dead space between Sons of Iraq groups. The squadron commander began to present the metrics that the staff tracked each week, creating a small sense of competition among Sons of Iraq groups to become more productive.

Empowering the police brigade commander paid huge dividends. He began to get reports and receive intelligence directly from Sons of Iraq group leaders. National Police began responding quickly to incidents in areas controlled by Sons of Iraq groups and conducted investigations and raids based on information the Sons of Iraq provided. Throughout the battlespace, respect for the National Police as a capable fighting force and a non-sectarian arm of the Iraqi government increased.

Each troop commander also instituted council meetings in the areas under Sons of Iraq control. Held at the Sons of Iraq headquarters for each group, these meetings followed the model established in Qarguhliyah, bringing together Sons of Iraq, tribal leaders, Nahia representatives, and ISF leaders to discuss problems and to find solutions to them. The Nahia Council took advantage of these
local meetings to bring the whole council out of the government building in downtown Jisr Diyala to visit each outlying area. Members of the government began to listen directly to their constituents at these meetings. While this attention might seem a commonsense occurrence to those familiar with representative democracy, it was initially a foreign concept to the Nahia Council members and the tribal leaders.

The Nahia Council was largely unable to meet the nearly overwhelming demand for reconstruction, but, because of their increased contact with the local citizens, they did make progress in directing limited resources more precisely. During a time when CERP money for reconstruction projects was limited, the Nahia Council was able to undertake and complete several projects on its own, using Iraqi funds through the Qada and Provincial Council. The Sons of Iraq program provided a vehicle through which the Nahia Council increased its activity and responsiveness to constituents.

Sons of Iraq groups required constant supervision and engagement. Aside from the weekly Nahia security meeting, troop commanders were running weekly local community council meetings (often two or three per commander), attending security meetings with all of their Sons of Iraq leaders, and conducting daily battlefield circulation. Maintaining uniform standards at Sons of Iraq checkpoints was essential. It allowed CF or ISF units transiting the area via ground or air to recognize the Sons of Iraq as friendly—something not to be taken for granted in a complex urban battlefield. Complying with uniform standards and keeping checkpoints neat and sanitary was a struggle that required daily inspections and supervision. Platoon leaders enforced standards and made corrections while on patrol in their areas. It was evident that their constant supervision and pressure paid off, because many groups maintained better-policed checkpoints and higher uniform standards than the National Police—a fact that helped Colonel Emad motivate his battalion commanders in several meetings to bring their standards up as well.

The squadron established a joint security station from which to integrate security information and responses across the Nahia. National Police, Iraqi Police, Facility Protective Services, local emergency services, and a 24-hour CF presence staffed the station. As Sons of Iraq groups spread across the Nahia, the squadron hired additional Sons of Iraq to serve as liaisons inside the security station. These liaisons received reports from checkpoints and Sons of Iraq leaders and disseminated information that came in to the station. Ultimately, the purpose of the joint security station was to coordinate security responses
throughout the Nahia. While the station never fully realized this lofty goal during the squadron’s tour of duty, it made significant progress—particularly in integrating Sons of Iraq and establishing a tip line. While sometimes unable to contact ground-owning commanders directly, Sons of Iraq could always reach the security station to report information on extremist or criminal activity. As the National Police became more competent, the Sons of Iraq developed a reasonable expectation that the police would act quickly on the information they provided.

Constant engagement and proactive leadership on the part of the squadron with tribal, civic, and ISF leaders gave the Sons of Iraq program strength. The program itself became a ground for contest between legitimate authority and extremist influence. AQI often directly challenged Sunni groups, but many Shi’a groups faced a more insidious problem when extremist or criminal groups attempted to infiltrate or co-opt the Sons of Iraq for their own purposes. Constant CF supervision gave them the moral strength to stand up to those incursions, but on occasion, they needed physical backing to face such intimidation.

The most poignant example of this came in late March 2008, when the Iraqi government forces began offensive operations against Shi’a extremists in the southern Iraqi city of Basra. Once operations commenced, widespread violence by Shi’a extremist groups ensued throughout the country. Shi’a Sons of Iraq leaders across the squadron battlespace were intimidated, threatened, and attacked. In Saharoon and Sheshan, two of the most contentious areas surrounding Jisr Diyala, some Sons of Iraq fled their checkpoints in fear. With the assistance of the National Police, the company commander responsible for those areas was able to rapidly reinforce them and convince the Sons of Iraq to return to work. Coalition forces and ISF actions, as well as the long history of constant engagement, allowed Sons of Iraq groups to bend but not break under tremendous pressure from extremists and criminals.

The constant engagement with and empowerment of ISF and local government leaders was significant and led to progress across all of the squadron’s lines of operation. Not only did the security situation improve, but the ISF grew stronger and more capable, the government was better connected to its constituents and capable of improving services, and the local economy was booming. These developments were the result of the Sons of Iraq program. Continued success was far from certain, however.

Transition Plan: Envisioning the Future

From the beginning, it was clear that this program would not last forever in its current form. As more local areas began jumping on the Sons of Iraq bandwagon, the spread and development of the program got ahead of strategic considerations. At the national level, the Iraqi government refused to recognize the Sons of Iraq and appeared hesitant to assume control of the program, especially at the funding levels required to sustain it throughout Iraq. Multi-National Corps-Iraq set the tentative end date for the program as October 2008; at that time, all Sons of Iraq had to be in the ISF or working in civilian industries.

This presented a complex problem for the squadron. The purpose of Sons of Iraq was to enhance security in areas where the CF and ISF could not because of limited force availability. Unfortunately, it seemed that regardless of the support from ISF leaders and the esteem local successes provided, the Sons of Iraq lacked the legitimacy necessary to be the Iraqi government’s arm of security. Many Iraqis believed that the presence of a large, well-organized body of armed Sunnis threatened the national government. The only viable option seemed to be to transition them quickly into local Iraqi police forces, but it would not do for a Sons of Iraq group to stand down or join the Iraqi Police at some distant police station. This option was not appealing to men who had taken up arms to protect their own neighborhoods. It also did not fit the bill for providing local security when the Sons of Iraq were gone.

In the future, some of the Sons of Iraq must transition to ISF, preferably Iraqi Police, and each
Sons of Iraq headquarters must become an Iraqi Police substation. The Sons of Iraq wearing tan uniforms at the checkpoints one day will wear blue Iraqi Police uniforms at the same checkpoints the next day. The police would be better trained, more capable, and require fewer men to secure the same area, and therefore only need about one-third of the Sons of Iraq to become Iraqi Police. The remaining two-thirds would transition to some other form of employment or to an Iraqi civil conservation force to perform public works functions such as trash removal and municipal improvement projects under the direction of the councils, thus ensuring economic and security benefits. The conservation force would also provide a readily available local labor supply to assist with projects, potentially reducing the cost of infrastructure improvement and reconstruction. The squadron staff envisioned the program as a potential vocational technical education system in which former Sons of Iraq would learn a marketable skill or trade.

Funding was the key to transition planning for the program. Clearly, the national government was unwilling to fund the Sons of Iraq as currently constituted. However, they might be convinced to pay for additional police for the security function and possibly pay for the civil conservation force if that program’s worth could be adequately demonstrated. Unable to influence the strategic level discussion required for such a decision, the squadron had to plan for what it could affect. Therefore, the staff began pursuing other funding options for the vocational technical education model in order to extend the program’s shelf life and buy time for others to convince the government to move forward.

After many false starts, the squadron created a model vocational technical education project that had potential to qualify for Department of State funds for reconstruction and reeducation. Because the approval process continued for many weeks, the squadron commander ordered the troops to transition one-third of their Sons of Iraq to a civil conservation force immediately to jump-start the process. Under the direction of the Sons of Iraq leader and the local community council, and still paid through the CERP, the conservation forces went to work making visible improvements in the Sons of Iraq’s area of responsibility by removing trash, rebuilding schools and parks, and cleaning canals. The squadron thus reduced the number of Sons of Iraq dedicated to the security function and gained momentum for further transitions in the near future. Although not a perfect solution, the combination of CERP contracts and potential State Department funding at least provided an extended window for negotiations with the government of Iraq over the future of the public works units.

The transition of Sons of Iraq to ISF would prove more frustrating. The Iraqi government continued to resist hiring Sons of Iraq as Iraqi Police. Although the squadron held several hiring drives and put together hiring packets for more than 500 Sons of Iraq, the ministry of interior continuously delayed issuing hiring orders. Although they did not openly say so, many Sunni Sons of Iraq believed that the Shi’a-dominated ministry of interior was deliberately delaying the issuance of hiring orders for Iraqi Police in the Mada’in Qada primarily because many new Sons of Iraq applicants were Sunni rather than Shi’a. As the squadron prepared for a relief in place with an incoming coalition unit in May 2008, the government had yet to hire one member Sons of Iraq as a police officer. The goal of transition was clear, but it would remain up to the incoming unit to see the Sons of Iraq through the process. Fortunately, the progress achieved through the Sons of Iraq program in empowering the ISF, developing the local
community councils, and connecting the Nahia Council to their constituents was well established. It would likely survive even if the Sons of Iraq program withered. These gains would not have been possible, however, without the Sons of Iraq. Many local leaders recognized both the true value of the program and its limited life expectancy if the Iraqi government did not support transition efforts. To that end, by the end of April some tribal leaders in the Qarguhliyah area began to discuss ways to fund the program privately if the government failed to do so. The fact that leaders from a relatively poor area were considering dipping into their own pockets to fund the program demonstrates the importance of the program to the local population.

Effects: Results and Trends

Over the course of nine months, the Sons of Iraq program had a noticeable effect on the battlespace. The Sons of Iraq were responsible for finding, collecting, or reporting locations of literally hundreds of munitions caches which CF and ISF were able to recover or reduce. They seized hundreds of weapons, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and tons of explosives and IED-making material. They also discovered extremist propaganda and training information in these caches. They provided information leading to the capture of at least five high-value-target personnel and 100 suspected members of insurgent, extremist, or criminal groups. More importantly, the Sons of Iraq program provided key links to the local population, enhancing the squadron’s ability to collect information and human intelligence that was vitally important to COIN operations. During a community council meeting in mid-April, a Sons of Iraq informant passed along a tip about a cache to the council leader, who immediately informed the ground-owning troop commander. Less than an hour later, the National Police, CF, and Sons of Iraq were using a bucket loader to uncover an enormous cache of explosives bound for Baghdad.

In just over five months, the Sons of Iraq in the squadron’s portion of the Mada’in Qada had turned in 58 caches and 32 IEDs and had provided over 600 tips or sworn statements about insurgents. Across the entire battlespace, attacks against CF, ISF, and local nationals dwindled from nearly 35 in July 2007 to less than 10 in January and March of 2008. The Sons of Iraq program provided real security, saved the lives of countless CF and ISF Soldiers, and prevented destruction of large amounts of CF and ISF equipment.
Qualitatively, the program was also a resounding success. The Sons of Iraq helped the squadron make enormous progress along multiple lines of operation. The ISF functioned at a higher level and enjoyed enhanced prestige. The Nahia government was empowered, active, and better connected to its constituents through the local community councils. The local economy received a boost from the stabilized security situation and the injection of cash at the consumer level when Sons of Iraq members spent their salaries to support their families. The civil conservation force made immediate and visible improvements across the battlespace. The Sons of Iraq, when used to thicken the lines of coalition forces, proved decisive during a critical juncture in U.S. operations in Iraq. MR
Oil, Corruption, and Threats to Our National Interest: WILL WE LEARN FROM IRAQ?

Luis Carlos Montalván

PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT knew the insidious impact of corruption in government and society when in 1900 he said, “No man who is corrupt, no man who condones corruption in others, can possibly do his duty by the community.”

Oil production in underdeveloped countries helps feed, sustain, and deepen corruption. Part of the reason is that the cost of producing a barrel of oil is a small fraction of its price on the global market, so government coffers are full of petrodollars, and there is little or no transparency or accountability in how government funds are spent. Threats to our national security from oil-producing countries like Iran have long been on the radar screen, but now threats from other countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Sudan are on the horizon. How America deals with corruption in Iraq will likely condition our response to these impending threats.

Corruption creates conditions that lead to and sustain dictatorships and kleptocracies—both of which are contrary to our national interest and our aims of promoting democratic principles and the rule of law around the world. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 2008, a report ranking countries by the degree corruption is perceived to exist among politicians and public officials, ranked Nigeria 122d, Venezuela 158th, Sudan 173d, and Iraq 178th out of a total of 180 countries.

Indeed, corruption in Iraq is staggering and because of the encouragement received during Saddam Hussein’s reign, can be considered part of the country’s culture. Reports note, “the Iraqi government is in danger of being brought down by the wholesale smuggling of the nation’s oil and other forms of corruption that together represent a ‘second insurgency.’”

In 2007, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil estimated that $700 million of revenue is lost every month because of oil smuggling. The amount lost in 2008 is uncertain because of “the absence of a comprehensive metering system.”

Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish sects are strengthening themselves through endemic corrupt practices. These sects do not believe that federalism is the most likely outcome in Iraq, so they are trying to enhance their political, economic, and military power in preparation for what they believe will be the inevitable bloody climax once American troops leave. Petrodollar corruption is feeding, sustaining, and deepening the sectarian divide. During my two tours in Iraq, I observed rampant corruption in the Iraqi Security Forces and at the border ports of entry. Little has been done to counter this corruption...
These sects do not believe that federalism is the most likely outcome in Iraq...

militarily, politically, or economically. Our apparent indifference has led to the Iraqis effectively defrauding the American taxpayer of billions of dollars.

Overdependence on oil revenues, a lack of accountability, and the discretion leaders enjoy in spending petrodollars are characteristics of Venezuela, Nigeria, and Sudan as well. Petrodollars tend to corrode fragile states, as happened in Venezuela when oil fields were discovered in 1917. Then-dictator Juan Vicente Gómez doled out concessions to his children and close associates. That pattern of corruption has continued in Venezuela to the present day. After the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in 1958, a series of elected governments and the major political parties failed to deal with corruption. In spite of a massive influx of petrodollars, especially after 1974, more than 65 percent of the people are now mired in poverty, and the traditional political parties are discredited and have effectively disappeared, facilitating movement along the Cuba-inspired path that President Hugo Chávez appears to have chosen for that unfortunate country.

Chávez’s radicalization following his landslide victory at the polls was clearly timed to occur when America was heavily focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. Chávez has also been very active in supporting radical elected leaders in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and has developed close ties with Iran. His use of petrodollars to finance enormous arms purchases, mainly from Russia, threatens to launch an arms race in South America. Venezuelan opposition and press reports suggest Chávez’s recent support of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations, and mineral sharing agreements with Iran, could be a plan to provide them with uranium.

As in Venezuela, corruption in Nigeria is leading to an increase in poverty that foments extremism. Nigeria’s oil revenues are over $24.5 billion per year, making it one of the world’s top 10 oil producers. The CIA has described Nigeria as having a history “long hobbled by political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management.” According to 2008 World Bank estimates, despite the vast energy stores lying beneath southern Nigeria, about 80 percent of energy revenues benefit one percent of the country. Billions in petrodollars are lost to corruption, and the people in that region remain desperately poor. In 2003, Osama Bin Laden identified Nigeria as a target for liberation. With 140 million people largely split between a predominantly Muslim north and a Christian-majority south, Nigeria is an ideal place for civil war and terror.

In testimony before the House Committee on International Development, a Nigerian official declared, “The U.S. and G8 must be in the forefront of building a global coalition against corruption. Make transparency and accountability and the fight against corruption the primary basis for relating with any government. Corruption is worse than terrorism.”

The case of Sudan is similar to that of Nigeria. Since 1999, Sudan experienced sustained GDP growth from increased oil production. Oil is now Sudan’s main export, and production is increasing dramatically. Southern Darfur, like southern Sudan, is rich in oil, but corruption is such that the people live in abject poverty. The World Food Program has been engaged in emergency response to widespread famine because the Sudanese government’s response to the crisis has been woefully inadequate, despite those oil revenues.

Al-Qaeda was formed in Sudan. After his expulsion from Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden established headquarters for Al-Qaeda in Khartoum, Sudan, and Sudan’s neighbor, Chad, has reported that Al-Qaeda infiltrated refugee camps in the Sudanese region of Darfur.

Clearly, the kleptocracies and the well-entrenched cultures of corruption in Iraq, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Sudan are undermining U.S. efforts to promote stability and security in the Middle East, Latin America,
and Africa. The United States must take aggressive measures to combat corruption and terrorism by assigning more personnel, training, and resources to achieve greater stability, thus leading to a reduction of poverty and an improved climate for democracy.

To defeat extremism in Iraq and the world in the 21st century, the U.S. must: 1) prioritize anti-corruption efforts, 2) operationalize these efforts, and 3) apply lessons learned from Iraq. We ignore corruption or remain complacent about it at our own peril. Lincoln’s haunting words during the U.S. Civil War apply to our current situation: “I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country…an era of corruption in high places will follow.”

The Nature and State of Kleptocracy
The United States and other countries have led the fight against global corruption for several decades.

In 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which made it a criminal offense for a U.S. citizen or firm to offer bribes to officials of foreign governments. In his analysis, “The United States and International Anti-Corruption Efforts,” John Brandolino claimed that efforts to fight corruption gained international support during the 1980s because prior to that time, corruption was only discussed loosely among governments. However, Brandolino believes that the global stage experienced an anticorruption awakening in which many governments began to subscribe to the belief that combating corruption was important to their interests. Figure 1 depicts the principal effects of corruption. Brandolino says these effects led Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries to adopt a 1994 recommendation that criminalized the bribery of public officials and later led Western Hemisphere countries to enact the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1996.

Figure 1. The effects of corruption.

This diagram on the effects of corruption is based on Center for International Private Enterprise, “Economic Reform Issue paper No. 0409,” 22 September 2004.
SOURCE: Center for International Private Enterprise
International efforts designed to curb corruption have shined the spotlight on kleptocracies in recent years. In 2006, President George W. Bush announced the National Strategy to Internationalize Efforts against Kleptocracy, drawing attention to governments or states in which those in power exploit national resources and steal. This initiative came to the forefront of the international agenda because of other global efforts to reduce corruption, such as the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption. In a statement on kleptocracy, President Bush said:

For too long, the culture of corruption has undercut development and good governance and bred criminality and mistrust around the world. High-level corruption by senior government officials, or kleptocracy, is a grave and corrosive abuse of power and represents the most invidious type of public corruption. It threatens our national interest and violates our values. It impedes our efforts to promote freedom and democracy, end poverty, and combat international crime and terrorism. Kleptocracy is an obstacle to democratic progress, undermines faith in government institutions, and steals prosperity from the people. Promoting transparent, accountable governance is a critical component of our freedom agenda.

The strategy aims to deny kleptocrats access to financial safe havens, to prosecute foreign corruption offenses vigorously, to strengthen multilateral action against bribery, to facilitate and reinforce responsible repatriation, and to use, target, and internalize enhanced capacity.

Nonetheless, despite these international efforts to fight corruption and kleptocracy, the overall global strategies are woefully insufficient. As the dire situation in Iraq indicates, much more work needs to be done to facilitate and strengthen a framework to undermine kleptocracy and corruption before U.S. forces are withdrawn. Tao Wenzhao, a researcher with the Institute of American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, claims that recent history demonstrates that new anti-corruption and anti-kleptocracy strategies are acutely failing and believes that international cooperation is imperative: “International cooperation needs a wide range of mechanisms for sharing information, tracking down the corrupt people, and freezing their illicitly acquired assets. Only with these mechanisms in place and operating efficiently can a real escape-proof net be set up for corrupt officials.”

Wenzhao maintains that mutual trust is key to overcoming the obstacles created by different judicial frameworks and ideologies in different countries.

Accounting and Auditing in Anti-Corruption

Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, corruption in Iraq has had a debilitating effect on U.S.-led efforts (see the problem tree in Figure 2 outlining the principal causes and effects of instability in Iraq). “Iraq [is] among those countries showing the highest levels of perceived corruption… Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index highlights the fatal link between poverty, failed institutions and graft.”

The lessons of post-war reconstruction in Cambodia, Congo, and Afghanistan unequivocally demonstrate that Iraq must proactively pursue a much more transparent and accountable system. For instance, after three civil wars that ravaged the country, the Republic of Congo has made marked economic and political gains in recent years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports that between 1999 and 2003 economic growth in the non-oil sector has strengthened, fiscal performance has improved, inflation has decreased, and political stability and security have shown remarkable gains.

The Congo is still beset with civil unrest and humanitarian problems, but from 1998 to 2007 the country has “shown substantial improvements in governance…and in Regulatory Quality.” Implementing effective accounting and auditing mechanisms was the key to this progress. In an action that could serve as a model for other oil-producing countries, the authorities enhanced transparency in the oil sector by adopting innovative solutions such as publishing key oil sector information on the Internet. In addition, the Republic of Congo has been participating in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative since 2005.

On the importance of accounting and auditing, the IMF recommends that “countries take a number of steps to strengthen their public financial management systems, such as putting in place an adequate and coherent accounting framework for
tracking spending, enforcing accountability, and meeting fiduciary requirements; regular and timely fiscal reporting; and establishing a sound system of internal control to ensure that public expenditure is executed in accordance with the approved budget and the established regulatory framework.  

In the absence of effective accounting and auditing mechanisms, progress in Iraq will remain a pipedream. Accounting involves measuring and disclosing the financial information decision-makers use for effective resource allocation. Auditing, on the other hand, can be either or both internal and external. In external auditing, an independent auditor examines financial statements in order to express an opinion. In internal auditing, in-house auditors—similar to inspectors general in U.S. agencies—conduct an examination and submit the results to management. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have pursued strategies of accounting and auditing to combat corruption. (Figure 3 outlines cause and effect relationships pointing to why auditing tends to be weak in developing nations.) The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has had notable success in countering entrenched corruption by increasing transparency and accountability. In Honduras, Kazakhstan, and Russia, USAID has achieved remarkable success by strongly encouraging the adoption of audit and accounting systems and providing educational programs to citizens about how their governments work.  

In addition, the European Union (EU) has sought to reduce corruption in its member countries and institutions by urging companies to apply modern accounting standards and to adopt effective internal audit schemes and codes of conduct.

**The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has had notable success in countering entrenched corruption by increasing transparency and accountability.**
Prior to the recent Russian military incursion into contested cultural ancestral territory, Georgia was a potential gold standard in the accounting and auditing testing arena. In 2005, the Georgian government proposed a new Law on Accounting and Auditing that aimed to establish a consistent legal framework for accounting and auditing to combat corruption. The Georgian model established a statutory framework, accounting and auditing standards, and monitoring and enforcement measures. Moreover, it encouraged active engagement of accounting and auditing professionals, plus education and training.

Because of the recently signed Status of Forces Agreement, we need to take similar steps immediately to address the widespread corruption in Iraq. Accounting and internal and external auditing systems must be installed ministry-by-ministry, with appropriate information placed on the Internet. USAID’s report on anti-corruption and good governance concludes, “The skills of accounting and auditing are making an important contribution to the transparency of developing countries.”

This conclusion is particularly relevant to Iraq.

**Freedom of and Access to Information**

A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.

—President James Madison.

Dissemination of information from the government to its citizens is important to a country’s stability. President Lyndon Johnson contributed significantly to the transparency of political information when he enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) on 4 July 1966. (Ironically, Colonel(P) H.R. McMaster made use of the FOIA to show in his 1997 book, *Dereliction of Duty*, that in the Vietnam War, President Johnson was not being truthful to Congress or the American people.)

This Act gave American citizens the right to observe the process of government by granting access to information from federal government agencies. The law remains effective today. Journalists and individual citizens have access to various documents (except private personal information) through the Freedom of Information Act.

In 1974, Congress incorporated a judicial review of agency decisions that narrowed some political issues exempt from public view. This act enabled public citizens to observe most government-held meetings. Citizens could attend meetings except when the agency’s council publicly presented valid reasons for exemption of information disclosure. Government agencies publicly announce the following information before each meeting: location, time, and the name and number of the selected official responsible for responding to the citizens’ requests. In addition, agencies ensure easy accessibility to the public, including minutes and electronic recordings of discussions covered in each meeting. Since FOIA’s enactment, public information officers have played an intricate and important role in FOIA requests. They provide information
to the media and public in accordance with the standards of their profession. Public information is also protected from unlawful removal, alteration, and deterioration.

President Bill Clinton strengthened the FOIA’s foundation by implementing the Electronic Freedom of Information Act in 1994. He addressed the heads of departments and agencies in a memorandum as follows: “I remind agencies that our commitment to openness requires more than merely responding to requests from the public. Each agency has a responsibility to distribute information on its own initiative, and to enhance public access using electronic information systems. Taking these steps will ensure compliance with both the letter and spirit of the Act.”

Electronic information systems have given citizens more exposure to the process of government. The United States is not the only country that utilizes a Freedom of Information Act. Provisions of this act were promulgated internationally in 1982 once it was passed at a federal level in Australia. In addition, Turkey, Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and 60 other countries have passed laws granting access to information. Similar to the American people, citizens of other countries yearn for information about government activities. More and more countries are placing their procurement information on the Internet. Freedom of information laws continue to spread worldwide. This enhanced transparency strengthens democracies, tends to reduce conflict by promoting openness, and supports participatory development among citizens in countries around the world. Still, many countries have not yet passed and implemented freedom of information laws. Argentina, Kenya, Indonesia, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and ten other countries currently have pending legislation. Unfortunately, Iraq, Venezuela, Sudan, and Nigeria have not yet made any attempt to implement freedom of information legislation. As the saying goes, “information is the oxygen of democracy.” Government’s failure to disseminate information corrodes a nation’s economic and social wellbeing. A public’s obliviousness to its country’s political corruption helps undermine a society’s overall health, while transparency is the life blood of democracy. Little or no transparency allows not only corruption, but also leads to cynicism about democratic values. Government has a duty to report the use of public funds to its citizens.

**Successful Anti-Corruption Tactics**

Proactive law enforcement, political operations, and information operations are important strategic elements of anti-corruption that a number of countries around the world have used successfully. The governments of Hong Kong, Kenya, and South Korea have made headway in effectively reducing corruption through public information. These lessons add to the compendium of successful anti-corruption practices that offer strategies to use in Iraq and elsewhere.

Greater economic and social prosperity came to Hong Kong when the British colonial government established the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974. The mission of this organization was to vigorously enforce anti-corruption in Hong Kong. The Independent Commission against Corruption aimed to “(1) pursue the corrupt through effective detection, investigation, and prosecution; (2) eliminate opportunities for corruption by introducing corruption-resistant practices; and (3) educate the public on the evils of corruption and foster their support in fighting corruption.”

Before the ICAC’s establishment, *triad* gangs bribed, extorted, and threatened street vendors. Corrupt police and crooked government officials protected the gangs. These officials, however, were immediately terminated from their positions once the commission began operations. The ICAC used a three-pronged strategy to decrease corruption in Hong Kong: strict law enforcement, community education, and corruption prevention. The ICAC demanded free education and improved public housing to reduce the cost of living for Hong Kong citizens and thus their susceptibility to bribery. (Corrupt activities flourished because of the limited number of homes and educational opportunities...
during the 1960s.) The Hong Kong government and the ICAC also initiated an aggressive IO campaign. Anti-corruption slogans such as “corruption won’t vanish on its own. Report corruption to the ICAC and together we can build a fairer, better world” drew positive reactions from many citizens who then continued to support anti-corruption initiatives. The IO campaign and a multi-faceted strategy including innovative law enforcement techniques enabled Hong Kong to become one of the world’s least corrupt cities.

In Kenya in 2003, President Mwai Kibaki implemented a bold political strategy that became a remarkable anti-corruption success story. Kibaki established the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) to eliminate dishonest practices in Kenyan government and politics, improve education, destroy corruption, and stimulate economic growth. Kibaki was the first Kenyan president to rise to office on an anti-corruption platform. Prior to his presidency, Kenya was ranked among the world’s most corrupt countries. After enduring widespread government corruption for 39 years, most Kenyan citizens were elated to support Kibaki’s anti-corruption efforts. Soon after NARC was established, Kibaki courageously dismissed his entire advisory council for lack of dedication to anti-corruption initiatives and appointed a new council that supported NARC’s intent. Progress is slow, but steady. Kibaki and his council continue to attack corruption and enjoy the respect, loyalty, and support of citizens of Kenya.

South Korea offers an example where law enforcement countering corruption has gained momentum. According to Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index, South Korea is ranked 40th of 180 countries in transparency and anti-corruption. Failure to enforce the mandate of the Korean Independent Commission against Corruption (KICAC) in 2002 would have made South Korea’s notable accomplishment unattainable. In earlier years, transparency among government officials was almost non-existent: “Ministries operated according to vague or unwritten rules with no judicial review. The level of corruption increased and many business corporations and government officials were prosecuted for bribery and other acts of wrong-doing.” However, corruption in South Korea has decreased tremendously since the KICAC’s development.

This organization ensured that the government and its agencies implemented anti-corruption policies against money laundering, bribery, and other deceitful acts. The level of transparency of South Korea’s government continues to play a key role in the country’s success against corruption.

Moreover, a decade-old example when North and South Korea improved their relationship by pursuing the “sunshine policy of engagement” should be discussed. Formulated by South Korea’s President Kim and his advisor Lim Dong Won, the Sunshine Policy encouraged engagement and transparency among North and South Koreans. South Koreans provided North Koreans with employment opportunities, 100,000 tons of fertilizer, and 600,000 tons of food. The Sunshine Policy’s greatest achievement was the June 2000 Summit, which gave the two countries the opportunity to reunite.

A five-point joint declaration was signed by each president promising to resolve humanitarian issues promptly, promote “balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and exchange,” and independently achieve reunification. After the events of 9/11 and delays in trilateral negotiations, the Bush Administration decided to include North Korea in the “Axis of Evil.” The Sunshine Policy that had been greatly effective in increasing transparency between the two nations became strained. The increased cooperation between the two countries with opposite forms of government and ideology, which was directly due to the transparency initiatives, was halted. Nevertheless, the Sunshine Policy remains a noteworthy historical model of the possibilities of transparency initiatives in action.

Iraq

Iraq is a different story. The people of Iraq feel a great sense of despair and hopelessness largely because for many years they have witnessed a very high level of corruption, which has persisted until now. Indeed, corruption may be one of the few cultural traits that has been institutionalized in Iraq.

From 2003 to the present, Iraq’s Commission on Public Integrity, now called the Commission on Integrity, has been consistently undermined in its mission to bring forward and assist in the adjudication of corruption cases. Legal loopholes, corrupt
officials, insufficient funding, personnel shortages, lack of resources and, as reporter Matt Kelley put it, “plain ole” American negligence are among the causes. According to Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction (SIGIR), “they haven’t been able to accomplish too much over the past year because of that weak capacity.”

Coalition forces (CF) and the Iraqi government must get serious about the corruption pandemic to give Iraqis any faith in their new federal government. Great pessimism will continue if CF and Iraqi officials fail to institute effective anti-corruption measures. They must support existing anti-corruption strategies and work diligently to develop new ones. Lessons learned from anti-corruption practices in Hong Kong, Kenya, South Korea, and other countries can contribute to reducing Iraq’s rampant, debilitating corruption.

...pessimism will continue... if [coalition forces] and Iraqi officials fail to institute effective anti-corruption measures.

Beyond Iraq

In a January 2007 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the National Security Council improve its current strategy by “articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current and future resources.” In addition, the report urged the United States, Iraq, and the international community to “develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.”

A number of anti-corruption and transparency enhancing initiatives were instituted by the Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) with the support of some IGOs. However, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project, which “reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries,” presently ranks Iraq at 212 for “Control of Corruption.”

The following are recommendations for anti-corruption efforts in Iraq and beyond:

- Fully develop and implement a Combined Strategic Anti-Corruption Action Plan. In July 2006, the Office of the SIGIR, reported the need for a U.S. Embassy-Iraqi Anticorruption Program. In June 2008, the U.S. produced an anti-corruption strategy that according to the SIGIR, “lacks metrics that tie program activities to goals, as well as baselines from which progress can be measured. Consequently, the U.S. government has not established a basis for assessing the program’s impact on reducing corruption in Iraq. This leaves future program investments vulnerable to wasteful spending, ineffectiveness and inefficiency.”

- Insist that the Iraqi government fully staff, support, and fund anticorruption measures. In August 2008, the GAO reported that Iraqi officials noted “a shortage of trained budgetary, procurement, and other staff with the necessary technical skills as a factor limiting the Iraqi government’s ability to plan and execute its capital spending.” This is partially attributable to the “brain drain” of technocrats who have taken refuge mostly in neighboring countries. Many must be enticed back with guaranteed high salaries and special protection. The SIGIR stated that “weak procurement, budgetary, and accounting systems are of particular concern in Iraq because these systems must balance efficient execution of capital projects while protecting against reported widespread corruption.”

Ten million dollars in Iraq relief and reconstruction funds have been earmarked for the DOS Anti-corruption Program, but the U.S. directed that “not more than 40 percent of the funds appropriated for rule-of-law programs may be made available for assistance for the Iraqi government until the Secretary of State reports that a comprehensive anticorruption strategy has been developed, is being implemented by the Iraqi government, and the Secretary of State submits” additional information to Congressional Committees.

- Assist drafting and ratifying new Iraqi anticorruption and transparency-enhancing legislation. The Iraqi government should draft and ratify legislation similar to the U.S. Sunshine Act of 1976, with appropriate adjustments, as well as other freedom of information legislation to provide greater transparency. Similar to the IACA in Hong Kong, new legislation granting greater law enforcement powers to the Iraqi Commission on Integrity and the Board of Supreme Audits should be passed to provide more “teeth” to the commission’s investigative ability.
The Law and Order Task Force, Joint U.S.-Iraqi Task Force, and Iraqi Joint Anti-Corruption Committee, in conjunction with Ambassador Lawrence Benedict (coordinator for anticorruption initiatives), should review all laws on the books to determine what legislation is not enforced, what has worked, and what is needed.

To adjudicate cases of corruption swiftly and adequately, Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code, Paragraph 136B, written in 1971 by Saddam’s regime, must be changed. It affords ministers the ability to determine whether those indicted for corruption charges should be prosecuted or not.68

- Develop Iraqi freedom of information (FOI)/access to information (ATI) transparency initiatives. All Iraqi ministries should assign public information officers and fully support them in complying with new FOI/ATI legislation and initiatives. More open dialogue and access can mitigate mistrust among tribes, sects, and ethnic and other interest groups. Government officials and Iraqi citizenry must have more information to advance understanding and compromise.

- Expedite implementation of the Iraqi-Financial Management Information System (IFMIS). In 2008, the GAO reported that “USAID began the IFMIS system in 2003, experienced significant delays (6 years), and suspended the IFMIS system in June 2007.” In December 2006, USAID informed SIGIR that its new Economic Governance II Project included the installation of an FMIS, designed to improve ministerial budgeting, accounting, and cash management by September 2007.69 The July 2008 SIGIR report indicates that “continued slow progress on implementing the new IFMIS limits the transparency and efficiency of Iraq’s budgeting system.”70

Hardware and application software are desperately needed to enhance Iraqi accounting and auditing capacity, which is still done manually. Incompetent stewards, without sufficient accounting and auditing systems, have mismanaged billions of Iraqi and American dollars.71

In response to questions about why he implemented no systems of accountability and auditing to oversee reconstruction efforts, Retired Admiral David Oliver, former CPA Director of Management and Budget and senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, said of Iraq’s money: “Billions of dollars of their money disappeared. Yes I understand, I’m saying what difference does it make?”72 Billions of Iraqi dollars lost due to lack of accountability exacerbated the existing culture of corruption, cost American taxpayers untold billions, and contributed to the development of the insurgency.

- Assert pressure on the Iraqi government to appoint, maintain and utilize cabinet-level ministry inspectors general. In January 2008, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki labeled 2008 “the anticorruption year” for Iraq. Recently, the Iraqi government dismissed “from a handful to as high as 17” ministerial-level inspectors general.73 “Several senior Iraqi and American officials agreed that seven to nine inspectors have already been fired or forced into retirement.”74 While the Iraqi Constitution affords the Prime Minister the right to remove inspectors, moves of this kind are seemingly partisan and may even signify the worsening of corruption and the abuse of power.

- Enforce anti-oil-smuggling law with vigor. Iraq’s 19 ports of entry must be locked down. Billions of dollars of goods and hundreds of thousands of people move across the border annually. Securing the borders and ports of entry is essential for the security of Iraq and the key to reducing leakage of government revenue, reconstruction supplies, and materiel leaving the country. Oil smuggling is the most prevalent and significant problem.75

The absence of metering systems in the oil fields facilitates smuggling.76

- Fully staff and utilize advisors at all levels. According to a recent report by the SIGIR, “Certain Iraqi ministries deny U.S. advisors visibility into their budgets (e.g., the Ministry of Electricity), exacerbating the financial planning challenges caused by the volatile price of oil. The Iraqi government committed just over $20 billion for capital reconstruction projects in 2008. But lack of access to Iraqi budget data limits U.S. knowledge of actual budget execution rates.”77

American advisory teams should be part of the anti-corruption efforts at all echelons. Advisory personnel shortfalls still exist at even ministerial levels.78 At the ministerial level, complete transparency must be afforded to ministerial advisory teams or corruption will remain one of the largest obstacles to progressing autonomous governance.
Military transition teams, using a revised transitional readiness assessment with corruption metrics, should reflect the status of corruption within ISF units at all levels.

- Request more assistance from IGOs. Organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF should increase their assignments of experts to assist with the development of economic and financial planning, and these organizations should provide more projects and funding to strengthen Iraqi governance.
- Further develop anti-corruption doctrine and develop it jointly. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency and the new FM 3-07 Stability Operations only briefly discuss corruption. FM 3-07 mostly defers anti-corruption efforts to USAID. However, DOD personnel continue to staff the majority of Iraqi government advisory positions. USAID’s Anti-corruption Strategy (2005) is fairly new and should be developed further with interagency collaboration.79

Corruption corrodes democracy. If our objective is to leave a stable, democratic Iraq, we must prioritize the institutionalization of strong, sustainable anti-corruption systems. The recommendations offered above can add to the collective discussion concerning how America and Iraq proceed forward. Additional recommendations are presented in Figure 4 below. The U.S. military must rapidly evolve to deal effectively with the current situation and threat.80 As former Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, we must “work with the Iraqi government to do everything we can to provide equipment, advisors, and whatever the Iraqi armed forces need to become more competent, and to train their leaders.”

**Conclusion**

At the dawn of the 21st century, global consensus has recognized that corruption fundamentally

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**Figure 4. Anti-corruption lines of operation.**
Weakened the legitimacy of democracies and that reducing corruption is essential to enhance social cohesion and broaden participation in economic and political life. As the most powerful nation in the world, the U.S. has taken steps to develop a new foreign policy strategy for a new era. In 2001, the events of 9/11 dramatically altered our national policy and ushered in the War on Terrorism. While important, this strategy emphasizes measures to address rogue elements and governments already sponsoring terrorism.

Counteracting the message resonating with terrorists and extremists requires a comprehensive strategy in Iraq and around the world. This strategy must include measures against corruption. Corruption is a significant challenge to good governance in Iraq. The pre-existing culture of corruption in Iraq has steadily increased to endemically proportions since the 2003 invasion and is undermining our efforts to stabilize the country. The Status of Forces Agreement recently passed by Iraq’s parliament means that by 2011 we must withdraw all forces. President-elect Barack Obama made a campaign promise to extricate all troops in the first 16 months of his administration. Whichever timeline becomes reality, it is imperative that strong systems-based anti-corruption measures be made a strategic priority in order to enhance governing capacity in the current status of Iraq’s fragile state. A trend is emerging. Nations with economies overly dependent on oil have high levels of corruption and, in turn, foment extremism. To defeat extremism in Iraq and throughout the world in the 21st century, the United States must take immediate action against corruption of every kind to prevail in this long and important war.

Notes:

13. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
74. Ibid.

Us Versus Them?

wars of thoughts and beliefs
dueling ideologies
at arms length distance
ours versus theirs
so much death and devastation
when perceptions of reality do clash
untold destruction
spawned by mere thoughts
then translated into deeds
us versus them
can it be that simple?
a zero sum game
with such deadly consequences?

—Major Edward L. Bryan, U.S. Army
RECONSTRUCTION
AND POST-CIVIL WAR RECONCILIATION

Major John J. McDermott, U.S. Army

WHEN WAR IS INTERNECINE, passions run especially high. Sometimes such a war leads to mutual exhaustion or even the virtual extermination of one side. Afterwards, agreements between rival parties at such a war’s end are difficult at best. Rarely in history have these sorts of conflicts led to a return to the antebellum status quo.

History teaches us that the war’s winners often change the post-war government and its laws in an effort to heal their nation in the aftermath of internecine conflict, but it usually takes generations to obtain the desired outcome. Historically, success in healing a society has required some form of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (hereafter referred to as “AR2”): the dynamic political process that can bring about change when the military phases of civil wars end.

Creating a viable plan for AR2 has proven instrumental to achieving enduring stability in the aftermath of internecine struggles. Each situation has unique elements decisive to the success or failure of reconciliation. The societal dimensions that AR2 most affects are the military, economic, and political realms. The example of the United States during its post-Civil War Reconstruction Era demonstrates how difficult it can be to plan and execute AR2 at the national level and achieve the envisioned outcome of a peaceful, unified, prosperous country. Post-conflict amnesty, reintegration,
and reconciliation work best when the society as a whole embraces the economic and political measures needed to reconstruct it.

The failure of the United States to implement post-conflict amnesty in a non-partisan manner during the Reconstruction Era exacerbated sectional and political tensions and economic recovery problems. Continuing tensions from this flawed approach led to the near-term failure of reconciliation. That failure led to over a century of social and moral dilapidation in the South and social angst in the rest of the United States. In other words, the inadequate manner in which the U.S. implemented AR2 during Reconstruction negatively affected the quality of reconciliation after the Civil War.

The Economic Dimension

Economic opportunity for all is an important factor any AR2 process. The denial of economic opportunity often drives intra-state conflict. After a long, expensive Civil War, U.S. policy-makers sought an expeditious return to peacetime prosperity, but economic policies pursued at the state and national level did little to enable necessary political changes.

The South faced two major economic problems. The end of slavery meant that southern planters had to contend with a new expense: labor costs. The second problem was the change in wealth and capital investment due to needs of war. The southern states incurred debts while they were part of the Confederacy that inhibited post-war reforms. Reconstruction policies assumed that economic development would help transform southern institutions. President Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction initiatives focused on this idea. His policies did not foresee that economic changes in southern life would quickly compound societal problems and prevent significant progress.

In keeping with policies imposed by the North, state governments adopted proactive measures regarding bonds, land, and subsidies to encourage railroad development. But railroad development was one of the rare positive examples of government-mandated reforms during and after Reconstruction. It succeeded mainly because African-Americans and white politicians alike agreed that refurbishing the transportation infrastructure would benefit the entire population economically.

Abolition of slavery created conditions for a modern, post-colonial workforce in the former Confederate states. Independent farmers and artisans earning reasonable wages in the North provided a new economic model for the South. But the South’s quasi-feudal plantation system was not well-suited for a modern, free labor force. Assumptions that the former slaves would readily work the same fields for the same barely subsistence-level wages they had received while in captivity proved very naïve and quite mistaken. Former slaves, with varied amounts of occupational training and usually scant formal education, had understandably little inclination to return to work in the fields.

To address this problem, Congress established a Freedman’s Bureau to help protect the civil rights and provide for the welfare of former slaves and other refugees. The Freedman’s Bureau, established in March 1865 and led by Major General Oliver Howard, attempted to serve the displaced populations of the South. Howard introduced the concept of publicly funded education as a way for former slaves to cope with their new circumstances. He also used his tax-assessing authority under the Freedman’s Act to build schools. Howard assumed that education would lead to opportunities that would best enable former slaves to integrate in the workforce. He also thought the Bureau could build trust between African-Americans and whites by serving as an honest broker in labor negotiations. The Freedman’s Bureau did have some success in this area. Some businesses and laborers initially came to agreements on wages, but ultimately, those wages were not sufficient for long-term economic growth.

The new labor system became known as “contract labor.” In time, the contract labor system helped solve the problem of locating land for former slaves to live on. Initially, the Freedman’s Bureau tried to settle ex-slaves on abandoned lands in accordance with Section 4 of the Freedman’s Act of 1865. However, there was not enough of that sort...
of land to accomplish this, and some landowners later appeared with deeds and claims to properties the Bureau agents thought had been abandoned. Over time, the contract labor system evolved into the sharecropping system. Sharecropping provided tenant farmers with land in exchange for their labor and a portion of profits from their crops. To some, sharecropping seemed to solve the labor problem for planters while it provided wages for former slaves and impoverished whites, but it was almost as rife with as many problems and inequalities as slavery had been. Planters complained that they lost control of their land and the workers felt under-compensated and even exploited. This lack of economic progress contributed to failure in the political realm.

Exacerbating the issue of freedmen’s rights was the fact that the Civil War left the agrarian-based economy and the Confederate infrastructure of the South in ruins. U.S. Army Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman had been ruthless as they waged total war in the South. Rebuilding the infrastructure would help reintegrate former combatants into society, but the South did not have any capital readily available to invest in such an effort. White southerners hoped for an infusion of federal capital to rebuild their economic institutions. Many well-to-do southerners had converted their pre-war investments into Confederate currency or Confederate bonds, both of which were worthless after the war ended. This meant that there was little liquidity in the South. As a result, many property owners were unable to pay taxes on their property and the federal government seized it to satisfy the unpaid debt. The United States did
provide some economic support to the former Confederate states, but not nearly what the southerners needed or requested. In the period from 1865 to 1875, the southern states received $9,500,000 out of $100,000,000 spent nationally in federal funds for public works. The dearth of capital to invest in the South made it difficult for the government to reintegrate former combatants into society in a constructive manner.

The southern states also had a problem with banking infrastructure to finance rebuilding. The National Banking Act of 1863 set monetary reserve limits for banks based on population density. This limited the number of banks available for southerners, such that even by 1893 there was only about one bank for every 58,000 residents of the South. The lack of banks meant that outside investors only had limited abilities to invest in the region.

During the Reconstruction Era, the economy of the South suffered from neglect and exploitation. A ruined infrastructure and low levels of capital investment caused southern states to fall behind their northern counterparts and created feelings of isolation and regionally focused identities. Instead of helping them integrate into the larger national economy, these failed policies reinforced many southerners’ localized sentiments and loyalties.

The Political Dimension

The first attempt at post-Civil War political reconstruction was the Presidential Reconstruction. Named for President Andrew Johnson’s policies dictating reconstruction, this plan held that the spirit of Lincoln’s reintegration plan for the southern states was best for the country. Focusing on rapidly reabsorbing the former Confederate states back into the Union, Presidential Reconstruction was lenient and conciliatory in hopes that former adversaries would reconcile and forgive.

The assassination of Abraham Lincoln removed the man who could have been the most effective single unifying force for Reconstruction policy at the national level. Lincoln’s successor, Vice President Andrew Johnson (the former military governor of Tennessee and U.S. Senator), offered a plan that differed from Lincoln’s in that it specifically exempted certain classes of southerners from amnesty and pardon, i.e., senior Confederate officials and persons who owned $20,000 or more in taxable property. Johnson saw this change as essential to breaking the power of the South’s well-to-do planter class. President Johnson met with key radical leaders like Senator Charles Sumner and reassured them of his desire to hold those who committed treason accountable for their actions; however, Johnson maintained his belief that individual states determined voter eligibility. This assertion did little to reassure the radical leaders in Congress, but it initially placated many in Congress who viewed his plan as harsher toward the South than Lincoln’s.

Johnson also focused on rapidly reconstructing state governments. He issued his first formal Reconstruction guidance in two edicts on 29 May 1865. The first edict granted amnesty or pardon to all participants in the Civil War provided they took a loyalty oath. Doing so restored all their property rights, except the right to own slaves. The second proclamation named William Holden provisional governor of North Carolina (subsequent proclamations made similar gubernatorial appointments for other southern states). Holden was instructed to hold a state-level constitutional convention to draft a North Carolina constitution that was acceptable to the United States. In other words, Johnson wanted the southern states to have a hand in reconstructing themselves, but with federal oversight.

Under Johnson’s plan, once a state convention wrote a new constitution and ratified the 13th Amendment, that state could re-enter the Union, provided Congress approved. In addition to his lenient terms towards the states, Johnson also generously granted pardons to those who did not meet the criteria for the loyalty oath or were exempt from his amnesty. Over an 18-month period, Johnson pardoned 13,500 Confederates who were not covered by the amnesty. Such leniency, however, put him at odds with many members of Congress.

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Johnson’s amnesty proclamations and presidential pardons ultimately recognized former Confederates as fellow Americans and reintegrated them into U.S. society. Johnson intended to develop a new southern political structure that replaced the power of the planters, the main proponents of secession, with that of pro-Union yeoman farmers and the middle class. The latter two groups represented the political center of the postbellum South, although Southern zealots later described such moderates as “scalawags.”

The scalawags’ political views ranged from Democratic, to Whigish, to Unionist. The only belief they had in common was that secession was wrong. Few scalawags objected to abolition since they had no investment in slaveholding. This group also suffered the greatest war-induced economic hardship among the white population. The scalawags often coalesced around the issues of patriotism and economic hardship.

Northern immigrants to the South, termed “carpetbaggers,” also played a key role in state politics during Reconstruction. The carpetbaggers were not political operatives sent to the south, as some suspected, but rather were mostly northern military men who saw economic opportunity in areas of the South where they had served during the Civil War. Contrary to what many believed, the carpetbaggers did not make up a majority in the state constitutional conventions in 1866. However, the carpetbagger minority tended to side politically with Radical Republicans. This was especially true concerning the right to vote.

Many scalawags favored total political empowerment of former slaves. However, southern state legislatures had passed “black codes” that suppressed African-American freedom in an attempt to force ex-slaves into second-class status. The black codes succeeded largely because ex-slaves were not allowed to testify against whites in courts of law. The Freedman’s Bureau provided the only vehicle for legal recourse for ex-slaves.

The Bureau established civil rights courts to provide justice for former slaves, which served as venues where they could receive equal justice under the law. The Bureau served as a forcing mechanism on the state governments of the South, and many southern state governments did not like this parallel court system. However, General Howard appointed state court officials as deputy commissioners in the Bureau. This action ended debate about the Bureau’s constitutionality. Eventually, all state governments gave African-Americans the right to testify against whites, and the Bureau no longer had to operate these separate courts.

This development led to political battles at the state level. With his generous use of amnesty and pardons, Johnson sought to build a political coalition made up of yeoman farmers and loyal Unionists. For their part, the Radical Republicans believed that Johnson’s plan would return the southern states to the Democratic Party and lose the political gains that the Civil War achieved. Conservative southern political elements for Republicans would return to power and prevent the Republicans from carrying out their political vision.
Indeed, the state governments tended to treat former slaves harshly. Their persecution brought the states into conflict with the Freedman’s Bureau and the military officers who ran it. With only a limited ability to enforce the law, the Bureau depended on its connection to, and the strength of, the U.S. military to enforce civil rights. To rectify these conditions, Radical Republicans concluded they needed African-American voters to bring about progressive political changes. They saw an opportunity to use amnesty as a political tool.

In 1866, the Republican-dominated U.S. Congress debated a variety of bills to address civil rights, punish Confederates, and deal with secessionist debt. Republicans drafted the 14th Amendment, which would codify these ideas in the Constitution. However, three-quarters of the southern states—namely, all of the reconstructed states except Tennessee—refused to ratify the 14th Amendment. In response, the Republicans in Congress concluded that the states reconstructed under Johnson’s plan were illegitimate because prominent Confederate leaders were serving in state leadership positions and in the new congressional delegations. They drafted noble yet contentious readmission criteria which stopped the reintegration of the former rebel states on Johnson’s terms.

**A Change of Course**

When the Radical Republicans won a majority in the national election of 1866, they decided to implement their version of Reconstruction. Initially, the radicals gave Johnson’s plan a chance. However, when Congress began to receive disturbing reports about political conditions in the South, it took actions to stop those reported injustices. Prominent military figures like George Custer told Congress that Texas was essentially loyal to the Confederacy and not the United States. Army officer Russell Alger, later a Republican governor of Michigan, stated, “The preservation of the Union has cost too much to be thrown away now or given into the hands of its enemies.” Such statements from Army officers serving in the South further encouraged many Congressional Republicans to conclude that the president was out of touch with reality. Prevailing opinions held that states reconstructed under Johnson’s plan were illegitimate. This led a majority in Congress to view the states as still in rebellion, and to conclude that reconciliation was impossible under the Johnson plan.

However, Congress did not have its own plan for reconstruction at this early stage of the reconciliation process. The Republicans held a majority over the Democrats in both houses, but the Republican Party was split into two factions: the radicals and the moderates. The moderates tended to view Johnson’s plan as acceptable, as did the Democrats. Johnson believed he was carrying out Lincoln’s desires, and many moderates and Democrats agreed with this assessment. The radicals, on the other hand, did not believe Johnson’s plan went far enough in punishing Confederates, especially when the President began to grant pardons to almost any former Confederate who asked for one. Despite internal disagreements over who should control Reconstruction policy and how punitive the policy should be towards the South, once Congress began to receive reports of violence from the southern states, it realized it had to do something to enable the freed slaves to begin to make a living as free members of society and to hold former Confederates accountable for their rebellious actions.

**Introducing an Armed Reconciler**

The idea of victor’s justice also influenced radical Republicans. Congressional leaders voiced concern for loyal southern Unionist residents and ex-slaves. In March 1867, Congress passed three military acts that became known as the Reconstruction Acts, the first of which was passed over a presidential veto. With this act’s passage, the generals who commanded the military districts had the authority to hold elections, control voter rolls, enforce laws, and try citizens by tribunal. The Military Act of 2 March 1867 ended Presidential Reconstruction and began the military administration of the southern states.

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**The Military Act of 2 March 1867 ended Presidential Reconstruction and began the military administration of the southern states.**
The Republican Congress now had an opportunity to build the institutions of state government in a manner that they believed would both perpetuate Republican control in the South and serve as a model for racial integration for the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{58} The Republicans hoped to accomplish this by creating a political majority made up of former slaves and southern whites who had remained loyal to the Union throughout the Civil War.\textsuperscript{59}

The third Reconstruction Act, the Supplemental Bill of 23 March 1867, defined who was eligible to vote. This act also contained a loyalty oath that became known as the “Ironclad Oath.”\textsuperscript{60} The law’s language effectively undid the earlier amnesty granted by President Johnson. With this, Congress disenfranchised anybody who could not take the oath in good faith. Many viewed the law as federal encroachment into an area normally controlled by the states.\textsuperscript{61} More importantly, these laws sent the clear message that the South would only be readmitted into the Union on Northern terms, with little room for dialogue. The implementation of military rule forced the Army to take on many functions that were not military in nature, such as tax assessment and collection, civil law enforcement, and the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{62} To execute these tasks, the Army had 20,000 soldiers in the southern states, 5,000 of them in Texas alone.\textsuperscript{63}

Southern whites questioned the military administration’s legitimacy. The Army held military tribunals in felony cases and civil rights violations in order to keep costs to the federal government low. The military believed it was properly enforcing laws and legitimately exercising authority.\textsuperscript{64} However, many white southerners thought the military tribunal system treated them unfairly because of the severity of its punishments. They claimed that men convicted of crimes such as discouraging freedmen from registering to vote received 90 days to two years of hard labor in the Dry Tortugas, while Freedman’s Bureau agents convicted of corruption received “guilty, but acquitted” verdicts.\textsuperscript{65} Some white southerners insisted a punishment of ten years in prison for murdering a freedman was harsh, a sentiment that reflected the prevailing racism that existed in the civilian courts.\textsuperscript{66}

Such sentiments reinvigorated the southern branch of the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{67} Southerners who remained in the Republican Party found that the Radical Republicans set the agenda.\textsuperscript{68} The radicals believed that they needed African-American votes in order to be successful, and they reintroduced the 14th Amendment. Included in the amendment was Section 3, which permanently disenfranchised certain former Confederates.\textsuperscript{69} By 1872, the reconstructed southern state governments ratified the 14th Amendment.\textsuperscript{70} In doing so, they alienated the white conservative voting base in the South.

The Army rigidly enforced the laws pertaining to disloyalty to the Union and its Reconstruction efforts. District commanders and their subordinates took the issue of disloyal language very seriously. Although the First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech for individuals, especially political speech, Army officers assigned to Reconstruction duty frequently closed newspapers that wrote editorials they viewed as having a disloyal tone. Commanders often defined this disloyalty as either “conservative political thought” or “disparaging comments made about Army officers and federal agents.”\textsuperscript{71}

As much as selective censorship of the press angered white southerners, the military government’s role in taxation brought the impact of military governance directly to their doorsteps. To white southerners, a murder trial over tax assessments—the Yerger case—was an example of military dictatorship, while northern radicals saw the murder as another instance of southern intransigence. In 1869, Edward M. Yerger stabbed a U.S. Army officer to death while the officer was attempting to collect a tax bill from Yerger. The Army arrested Yerger and held a military tribunal. After Yerger sought a writ of habeas corpus from the circuit court and then the Supreme Court, the attorney general and Yerger’s counsel agreed that the Army would hand Yerger over to Mississippi authorities for prosecution. Yerger was placed in a Mississippi jail, but he secured his release by posting bail and moved to Baltimore where he died in 1875. No civilian court ever tried him for murder.\textsuperscript{72}

The new radical state governments soon established militias or state police forces.\textsuperscript{73} The establishment of state police forces was a new concept in the South. Previously, law enforcement had traditionally remained at the local level. The new Reconstruction governors were the commanders-in-chief of the militias and had the power to levy taxes to support them. This angered many southern whites, who argued that
they paid most of the taxes but had only minimal representation in state government. The state governments replied that many potential white candidates for the legislature were not qualified to hold office because they were disloyal to the United States.

Reaction and Counterreaction

The political mobilization of the freedmen by the radicals led to problems with respect to the militia and the police forces. Radical political leaders in the South created Loyal Leagues. Because many freedmen active in the Republican Party joined the new state militias, southern whites began to view the Loyal Leagues and the state militias as one and the same. Loyal Leagues conducted military style maneuvers often as a show of force to intimidate voters. This unified white southerners against the Radical Republican state governments and led them to develop their own armed organizations.

The Ku Klux Klan offered itself as the first such organization. The Ku Klux Klan was founded in 1866 in Tennessee as a social organization for Confederate veterans. Early Klansmen did not view their organization as political. They often rode at night and conducted pranks such as making ghost sounds to frighten superstitious freedmen. Many freedmen viewed the actions of the Klan as silly.

However, this early and relatively benign organization soon became a terrorist group and the Klan rapidly expanded beyond Tennessee. Disaffected white southerners joined the Klan or the Knights of the White Camellia. These groups were known as patrol groups or nightriders because they conducted intimidation operations under cover of darkness.

Radical victories at the state level in 1867 and again in 1868 convinced southerners seeking a political solution to use violence against the Reconstruction governments. The Klan began attacking specific targets such as known radical activists. The targeted people often held important positions in the local Freedman’s Bureau or were influential freedmen or carpetbagger activists. Local law enforcement often did not punish Klan members when they were caught because the local judicial and law-enforcement systems were sympathetic to the Klan or coerced by it. Klan depredations led to the rapid demise of early attempts at reintegration and reconciliation.

Concurrently, the Democrats tried a policy called “The New Departure.” The Democrats ran candidates who were disaffected with radical policies at the state level. Poor and middle-class southern whites who believed that their political power had eroded because of African-American suffrage tended to join the Democratic Party. Acting on behalf of their Republican patrons, the state militias hindered the Democrats’ political initiatives.

The re-admittance of the southern states into the Union led to an increase in political violence. The Klan engaged in political assassinations and random lynchings to dissuade Republican candidates from seeking office, suppress voter participation, and coerce political support for the Democrats. The radicals utilized Loyal Leagues and the state militia to hunt down Klansmen or to defend against the Klan’s activities. The level of violence rapidly escalated. The Klan controlled the night, and the Radical governments had limited control during daylight. Many southerners actually viewed Klansmen as folk heroes because they believed they were fighting for their political rights.

The violence in the South became so pervasive that Congress passed the Enforcement Acts of 1870 to curb it. The Act to Enforce the Provisions of the 14th Amendment became known as the Ku Klux Klan Act and outlawed conspiring or taking actions to deny someone’s civil rights or hindering attempts to enforce civil rights. The Ku Klux Klan Act allowed the president to use the militia,
Army, or Navy as an enforcement tool and suspend the right to habeas corpus if he felt it necessary to establish order. President Grant utilized this law to destroy the Klan in South Carolina. In October of 1871, Grant suspended habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties and utilized the 7th Cavalry and the 18th Infantry to arrest hundreds of Klan members. Because the federal court system could not handle this many prisoners, only five Klan leaders were tried and convicted. The court indicted but did not imprison 161 others, and released another 281 before they were tried. Nevertheless, the combined actions of Grant and the judiciary successfully ended the influence of the Klan in South Carolina.

The destruction of the Klan in South Carolina effectively ended federal involvement in enforcing laws in the southern states. Congress finally decided that political disenfranchisement was the root cause of the violence in the South and passed the Amnesty Act of 1872. This act granted amnesty to all former Confederates, except about 500 former high leaders, and negated Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.

The Amnesty Act of 1872 created the same political landscape that existed in 1866, before the passage of the Reconstruction Acts. Unfortunately, the southern political landscape of 1872 was now more violent. The population was polarized by racist attitudes and partisan politics. Reconstruction had failed to establish positive conditions for reconciliation. A hyper-stratified society now resorted to racial-economic segregation to maintain order.

The Democratic Party made some political gains because of the Enforcement Acts. Accusations of corruption and concerns over the future of reforms split the Republican Party for the 1872 election. The final Reconstruction law was the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which further guaranteed rights set forth in the 15th Amendment. The Act also attempted to outlaw segregation, but it had no enforcement mechanisms.

The End of Reconstruction Begins a Century of Stagnation

The disputed presidential election of 1876 effectively ended Reconstruction by means of a backroom deal. Candidate Rutherford Hayes lost the popular vote, but voting returns in the South were contested. Southern congressional leaders agreed to back Hayes in the Electoral College—if federal Reconstruction ended. Hayes, a Republican, was elected President with the understanding that there would be a new policy towards the southern states.

Thus, the failures of political leaders to place the national interest above partisan political agendas led to the return of sectionalism in the United States. Only nation-wide mobilization to fight the Spanish-American War—and later, two world wars—would give the nation unifying causes large enough to overcome sectionalism. The crossing of sectional boundaries for military training helped reconcile the white population.

However, “Jim Crow” laws that suppressed African-American civil rights prevented reconciliation between white and African-American communities in the South. Furthermore, the segregation of the South did absolutely nothing to enable reconciliation at the national or regional level. Institutionalized racism prevented reconciliation, and movies like Birth of a Nation that glamorized aspects of segregation and regionalism achieved box office success in the early twentieth century.

The use of federalized troops in 1957 to force desegregation of the high school in Little Rock, Arkansas, showed that it took almost a century before the U.S. government was willing to use federal power to make political changes required for true social reconciliation. In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his famous “I Have a Dream Speech,” as the nation began to see the beginnings of political success with the civil rights movement enabling interracial reconciliation, breaking down sectional barriers, and desegregating public schools and places of public accommodation. But as some degrees of sectionalism and racism linger in this country, current events sometimes lead one to wonder if reconciliation in post-Civil War United States has yet to finish. Certainly, the reconciliation that has occurred appears imperfect to many.

In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, as the nation began to see the beginnings of political success with…civil rights…
NOTES

2. Ibid, 379-80.
3. Ibid, 168.
4. Ibid, 104.
10. Ibid, 167-68.
15. Ibid, 120.
18. Wood, 104.
22. Ibid, 111.
23. Ibid, 129.
The Making of a Leader: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Colonel Robert C. Carroll, U.S. Army, Retired

If the mills of the gods grind slowly and exceedingly small, the mills of the War Department seemed to grind to no purpose whatsoever.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends

The life story of Dwight David Eisenhower as general and president is well-known. Less well-known is the story of how Ike, as a young officer, was given some not-so-elegant jobs that many might consider career-enders, but would later pay huge dividends.

This biographical essay examines his formative career as an analysis of Ike’s path as he progressed up (and down) the ranks. It is written from the perspective of how a leader is made, especially in the U.S. Army. Note my conviction that leaders are made, not born (an age-old debate). To take the argument further, Eisenhower’s life shows us that great leaders are not only made, they make themselves.

Thus, this is the story about how Ike developed his own professional knowledge and leadership abilities throughout his career. It may inspire the occasional Army officer who faces a career assignment not preordained by conventional wisdom to be on the perfect glide path to greatness.

1890–1911: The Early Years (to age 20)

David Dwight Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas, on 14 October 1890. His mother reversed his first two names to Dwight David, and he continued that format for life. The family moved to Abilene, Kansas, a few years later. Through his parents, Ike was affiliated with the Mennonites and Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it was both unusual and difficult for this religious, peace-loving family to see one of its seven sons go off to be a Soldier.

As a school boy, he did very well in math and English, but he had a special appreciation for history, which he studied at home. His mother had a sizable library under lock and key, and Ike found the key. He especially enjoyed ancient history. Studying the Punic Wars between the Carthaginians and Romans would help him later in the North Africa and Italy campaigns in World War II. His hero was Hannibal, famous for crossing the Alps with elephants, which later Ike would do in his own way. He was a fine pistol shot, not bad with his fists, and a star baseball and football player. In other words, he was excellent West Point material.
1911–1915: West Point Cadet (age 20–24)

It was almost by chance that Eisenhower even entered the Army at all. His best friend, Swede Hazlett, talked him into applying to the service academies. At that time, there was just one entrance exam for both the Naval Academy and the Military Academy. While Swede ended up at Annapolis, Ike went to West Point. Ike remained a close friend of Swede, corresponding with him throughout their careers. As president, he attended this retired Navy captain’s funeral, illustrating how Ike developed and maintained life-long friendships.

At West Point, Ike was a hard-nosed football player, playing halfback and linebacker, and recognized in the New York Herald for a “spectacular touchdown.” As a sophomore, playing against the 1912 national collegiate champions, the Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Indians, Ike tackled the legendary Jim Thorpe. Unfortunately, a later knee injury kept Ike off the gridiron squad the next two years and nearly cost him his commission. He was an excellent boxer and wore the rank of color sergeant. An excellent writer, Ike stood 10th in his class in plebe English. He graduated at 24 years of age, 61st in academics and 125th in demerits, out of the 164 in the class of 1915. This was the class the stars fell on: one out of three cadets became a general officer. Ike’s graduation came one year after the Great War started in Europe, but to his chagrin, he did not see combat in it.


At Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in addition to courting and marrying Mary (Mamie) Geneva Doud, Ike performed the routine duties of a new lieutenant in his regiment, the 19th Infantry. Reportedly, he also did quite well at poker. His soon-to-be father-in-law squashed as “too dangerous” his desire to learn to fly with the aviation section of the Signal Corps, the fledgling Air Corps. (However, while in the Philippines in 1937, Ike would take flying lessons and fly solo.) His early fascination with aviation paralleled his later interest in tank warfare, when both means of warfare were in their infancies.

The lyrics from the old cadet song “Benny Havens,” “In the Army there’s sobriety, but promotion’s very slow,” was not the case in Ike’s day. There might have been sobriety (doubtful), but promotions were very fast: he made first lieutenant in 1916, captain in 1917, and major in 1918. Of interest, George S. Patton, West Point Class of 1909, and a second lieutenant for seven years, also made first lieutenant, captain, and major in the same years as Ike did. Both Ike and Patton were promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1918 as well.

1916–1917: First Lieutenant (age 25–26)

Ike applied for service with General “Black Jack” Pershing’s Punitive Expedition to Mexico, but was turned down. This would not be the last time he would experience trouble going “to the sound of the guns.”

His assignment as inspector general to the 7th Illinois Infantry Regiment, billeted under canvas at Camp Wilson near Fort Sam Houston, gave Ike the unique opportunity to observe first-hand the
abilities and limitations of National Guard units. With the concurrence of the regimental colonel, young Lieutenant Eisenhower was made fully responsible for the training and administration of that entire regiment.

He later held the job of Fort Sam Houston provost marshal, the chief law enforcement officer on post, which provided him insight into disciplinary matters. Then Ike was assigned as the regimental supply officer of the newly activated 57th Infantry Regiment, back at Camp Wilson. The 57th would grow from a small officer cadre with no barracks, tents, or equipment to a brawny outfit with over 3,000 troops. Like Ulysses S. Grant, who was quartermaster during the U.S.-Mexican war, Ike absorbed the crucial lessons of logistics as a junior officer.

1917–1918: Captain (age 26–27)
Ike set up a program and taught candidates for infantry officer commissioning at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, and later trained newly commissioned lieutenants at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. And while these were not combat assignments in the trenches of France, they grounded him not only in the essential leadership traits required of young officers, but also in how to teach them. In spite of the meaningful contribution he was making to the war effort, he still could not help but feel he was on the sidelines of the biggest career-making event of his lifetime. Captain Eisenhower volunteered for combat duty during World War I so many times he was actually reprimanded for it.

1918: Major (age 27)
Assigned to the 65th Engineers at Camp Meade, Maryland, Ike was part of the newly formed 301st Tank Battalion, Heavy. This was his first in-depth look at tanks. He was then tasked to establish Camp Colt at the Civil War battlefield of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Under his direction, Camp Colt would grow from nothing but an idea to eventually housing the Army’s nascent tank corps, some 10,000 men. We can imagine that the lessons he learned there would pay huge dividends in establishing the pre-D-Day staging areas in Great Britain.

1918–1920: Lieutenant Colonel (age 27–29)
Ike was promoted to lieutenant colonel at Camp Colt on 14 October 1918 (on his 28th birthday and only 3 years out of West Point) with orders to go to Europe as a tank commander. Less than a month later though, the Armistice cancelled Ike’s deployment plans.
Ike got a small-scale, but painful, taste of what it is like to draw down an entire army. He moved his unit to Fort Dix, New Jersey, discharged 80 per cent

Like Ulysses S. Grant, who was quartermaster during the Mexican-American war, Ike absorbed the crucial lessons of logistics as a junior officer.

On the general topic of health, Ike had been a very good athlete in college; a strong and fit young officer at Fort Sam Houston—winning a bet by climbing the guy wires to the flag pole, hand over hand, without using his feet; and a very able equestrian, competing in Panama. Photographs of him even late in life showed a man in good shape, although he was a chain smoker, especially during the war. He took up painting at Churchill’s suggestion to help him relax, and later loved the game of golf.

As president Ike suffered a heart attack on September 20, 1955 while on vacation in Denver, Colorado. As it happens, a year and a half earlier my father had been treated for heart disease and suffered a fatal heart attack in September 1954. His doctor at Walter Reed was Paul Dudley White. When Ike suffered his heart attack a year later, White too was his doctor. Armed with that experience and relationship, the doctor was able to help Ike survive his heart attack. White is known in medical circles as one of the preeminent cardiologists of his era, famous, among other accomplishments, for saving Ike’s life by treating him by means that are now common practice.
of the troops and then took the remaining regulars by train to Fort Benning, Georgia. This experience would serve him well after the Second World War, when Ike—as chief of staff of the Army—would oversee a much more massive draw-down.

Also in 1919, Ike got an unusual opportunity: he was an observer to a transcontinental motor convoy. On the first day, they made only 47 miles in about seven hours with three breakdowns. The entire trek across the United States took several months, averaging less than six mph. This valuable exercise trained Ike for dealing with the monumental task of coordinating World War II troop and supply movements. It also likely highlighted to Ike the nation’s dire need for improved, high-speed roads and no doubt inspired the Interstate Highway System that bears the Eisenhower name.

Subsequently at Camp Meade, Ike served with Colonel George S. Patton, a five-year man from West Point’s class of 1909. (If you add his “rat” year at Virginia Military Institute, Patton actually took six years to get his commission.) Patton had come in fifth in the pentathlon during the 1912 Olympics and was a combat hero. Ike looked up to Patton and respected his combat experience with armored troops. The Pattons and Eisenhowers were next-door neighbors, and the two men became great friends, each valuing the other’s knowledge of military affairs and history.

At Meade, Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower commanded the heavier (Mark VIII) tank brigade, while Colonel Patton commanded the lighter (Renault) tank brigade. The two of them immersed themselves in the actual mechanics of mechanized warfare, disassembling their two models of tanks down to the last tread and bolt. Together they experimented with tanks and developed novel insights for how they should be used. Differing from the War Department’s conventional wisdom, they saw greater value in using tanks to create rapid breakthroughs rather than just to support the infantry at a walking speed. Though they could not have known it at the time, this peacetime tour of duty would lead to an appreciation for the armored warfare that would be waged later in North Africa and Europe and would create a friendship that would endure throughout the war, despite some very rough spots.

1920: Back to Major (age 30)

When the Tank Corps was disbanded in 1920, both Ike and Patton reverted to the rank of captain on 30 June 1920, but were then promoted immediately to major: Patton on 1 July 1920 and Ike on 2 July 1920. Patton would remain a major for the next 14 years, Ike for the next 16. Tragically, during this assignment at Camp Meade, the Eisenhowers lost their first son, Doud (Icky) Dwight, to scarlet fever. The young boy died in his quarantined room with Ike watching through the window from the porch. This tragedy would haunt Ike to his own dying day.

While at Fort Meade, Patton and Ike spent a day with Brigadier General Fox Conner, presenting their views about tanks and armored warfare. Conner had been Pershing’s operations officer during World War I and was considered one of the Army’s brains, as well as a renaissance man. Well into the night, Conner directed most of his questions at Ike, whom he viewed as the more insightful of the two.
1922–1925: Still a Major (age 31–34)

In 1922, Conner pulled some strings with his old boss, General John J. Pershing, then chief of staff of the Army (CSA), to get Ike assigned as his executive officer with the 20th Infantry Brigade at Camp Gaillard, Panama. Aside from being somewhat of an understudy to Patton, Ike had not benefited from a mentor until he arrived in the Canal Zone. Here he learned at the chair of a master. Later in his career Ike would benefit from the likes of Pershing, MacArthur, Krueger, Marshall, and Churchill. But Conner was his first and best mentor.

Over a three-year period, Conner put Ike through an intensive reading program of the world’s greatest thinkers, among them Plato, Nietzsche, and Shakespeare. Ike read the works of all the great military authors, in particular Grant’s Memoirs and Clausewitz’s On War (three times). Using the Socratic method, Conner groomed Ike’s appreciation for philosophy, history, tactics, and strategy. Conner also impressed upon Eisenhower the notion that the Treaty of Versailles made another war inevitable and that the future one would again involve coalition warfare, but with the United States playing a larger role. So instead of whiling away the balmy tropical days in Panama playing bridge and polo, Ike received the equivalent of an advanced university degree in strategy and also developed a premonition of what would occur roughly 20 years later.

The Eisenhowers’ second son was born in Panama. John Sheldon Doud would later graduate with his West Point class on the day his dad would attack across the English Channel. Bothered by the tropical heat, insects, and bats, Mamie, with John in hand, left her soldier-scholar husband temporarily for her family in Denver.

1925–1927: Still a Major (age 34–36)

At this point in his career, Ike ran a remarkable political gauntlet with the help of his mentor, Conner. As an infantry officer, Ike was not selected to attend either the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, or the Command and General Staff School (C&GS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, but was posted instead—against his wishes—back to Meade. To overcome this slight, Conner maneuvered Ike’s temporary transfer from the Infantry to the Adjutant General (AG) Corps and into a recruiting job at Fort Logan, Colorado. At the time this was a highly undesirable job, but it was close to his in-laws and thus good for his marriage. And now that Ike was a member of the AG Corps, the U.S. Army’s Adjutant General, guided by Conner, sent him to the C&GS using that branch’s quota.

The Chief of Infantry personally told Ike that, not having gone to Benning, he was unprepared and would fail at Leavenworth. But Conner assured Ike that he would excel. Ike graduated first in the class of 1926, and his study mate, Leonard T. Gerow—later his boss in War Plans—was second. When asked to approve Ike’s request to take a much sought-after teaching job at the C&GS, the Chief of Infantry declined. He instead assigned Ike, now Infantry again, to Fort Benning, to coach football and command an infantry battalion, perhaps not the best assignment for the top graduate of the C&GS who had commanded a tank battalion some eight years earlier.

1927-1929: Still a Major (age 36–38)

Once again, Fox Conner intervened in Ike’s career, getting him assigned to the American Battle Monuments Commission in France. Although on the surface this might seem like yet another deviation from a “good” career path, the Commission’s chairman was recently retired General of the Armies John J. Pershing. This posting gave Ike the opportunity to live in France with his family and to walk the battlefields of World War I, gaining a first-hand appreciation for the war he had missed and some valuable insight for the one he would soon wage.

In addition to writing a guide to American battlefields in France, Ike served as speech writer for Pershing and assisted him with his memoirs. Pershing,
not known to be an easy task-master, nevertheless lavished rare praise on Ike. Pershing’s memoirs, My Experiences in the World War, would later win the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for history.

Major Eisenhower so favorably impressed Pershing that he was even permitted to take time out from his assignment with the Monuments Commission to attend the prestigious Army War College, at the time located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.

But perhaps the most fortuitous accomplishment of this tour was to meet and to favorably impress George C. Marshall, then a lieutenant colonel. Marshall had worked for Pershing as a planner in World War I, as aide-de-camp to the CSA, and as a key advisor on the Monuments Commission. Here was the organizational genius who would later expand the Army forty-fold within three years and whose eye for talent would launch Ike into stardom.

In World War I, Colonel Marshall had been the planning officer for Brigadier General Conner, who was the chief of operations (G3) for General Pershing, the commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), Europe. These three brilliant men influenced Ike in so many ways. And soon Ike would meet another remarkable man, Douglas MacArthur, a highly decorated war hero (two Distinguished Service Crosses, seven Silver Stars, a Distinguished Service Medal, and two Purple Hearts) who was not enamored with the “Chaumont crowd,” referring to the location of the AEF Headquarters and to the staff that never ventured to the front, as he did.

Pershing, Conner, Marshall, and MacArthur have an interesting connection which speaks volumes about the internal politics of the U.S. Army. In 1930, retired General of the Armies Pershing recommended Major General Conner to be the chief of staff of the Army (CSA), but Conner was passed over in favor of the younger MacArthur. MacArthur and Marshall were truly contemporaries—MacArthur only eleven months older than Marshall, and Marshall commissioned (from the Virginia Military Institute) just 16 months before MacArthur (from West Point). But in 1930, the newly promoted MacArthur wore four stars, while Marshall wore the silver oak leaf of a lieutenant colonel. Marshall finally made colonel in 1933, but MacArthur refused to promote him to brigadier general in spite of the recommendation of General Pershing. It was a full year after MacArthur’s unusually long (five year) stint as CSA, that Marshall was finally promoted to brigadier general (1936). Conner retired a major general in 1938. A year later, Marshall jumped from brigadier to the four-star CSA job. Five years later, in December 1944, CSA Marshall, then boss of both MacArthur and Eisenhower, was promoted to five stars exactly two days ahead of MacArthur and four days ahead of Ike.

Marshall was indeed a talent scout. He ran across my father as a Captain during the Louisiana Maneuvers. In December 1944, over the fierce objections of my dad’s division commander, CSA Marshall asked for LTC Carroll to return to the States to be the operations briefing officer in the Pentagon. After 3½ years deployed from home (Iceland, England, and France), my father would have the remarkable opportunity to work for three successive and historical CSAs: Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley.

1929–1933: Still a Major (age 38–42)

Eisenhower arrived back in the United States just as the nation was entering the Great Depression. He was the executive officer to the assistant secretary of war, completing, among other tasks, a study exploring the readiness of American manufacturing to convert to military production.

Later, he became an aide to CSA MacArthur, who, unlike others during the depression, was very interested in industrialization. For MacArthur, Ike wrote a comprehensive plan for the war-time mobilization of American industry that years later would become President Roosevelt’s master plan to develop the “arsenal of democracy.” Once again, a seemingly off-track assignment would become an excellent background assignment for the future general who would delay the desired 1943 invasion of France until America produced adequate guns, tanks, airplanes, ammunition, landing craft, boots, and K rations.

Ike continued to serve MacArthur, working on reports to Congress on topics such as mechanization, mobilization, and the development of air power. Ike even accompanied his boss—wearing Sam Browne belt, riding breeches, boots, and spurs—as they led
some 600 infantrymen and Patton’s cavalry squadron from Fort Myer, Virginia, across the Anacostia River in Washington D.C. to disperse the roughly 20,000-man “Bonus Army” veterans.

When MacArthur left D.C. to become chief military advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935, he brought Ike with him. Major Eisenhower did not have much choice in this posting, but Mamie did, and she delayed their move for a year.

1936–1939: Finally, Lieutenant Colonel (age 45–48)

Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1936, Ike was delegated a great deal of authority in preparing the Philippines for an attack that would come all too soon in 1941. During this four-year stay in Manila, Ike’s tasks were as much diplomatic as military, and he gained the respect and admiration of Philippines President Quezon as he would in future years of other heads of state.

In this seven-year-long close association with MacArthur, Ike would gain from this master politician, brilliant thinker, and eloquent “American Caesar,” invaluable experience in dealing with large-scale problems, large-distance logistics, and large-ego people, all of which were necessary lessons for his future roles.

1939–1940: Lieutenant Colonel, then Colonel (age 48–49)

Returning to the States late in 1939, Ike helped coordinate a vast series of troop movements and training exercises for recently drafted troops and National Guard units on the west coast at Fort Ord, California. He then proceeded to Fort Lewis, Washington, as the executive officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment where he also commanded a battalion. Ike would rise to greatness without having commanded any military unit above battalion and none in combat. His other soldierly experiences, in addition to his own character and competence, would more than make up for that deficit, about which so many would be so vocal. Years later, Ike would visit the 15th Infantry in Korea as president-elect.

He progressed through an amazing series of assignments—all with the title “chief of staff,” the leader who plans and coordinates all staff work for personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics for the commander. As a lieutenant colonel, he was first chief of staff of the 3d Infantry Division, then chief of staff of the newly activated IX Corps, both at Fort Lewis. (In 1940, Eisenhower petitioned his good friend Brigadier General Patton to serve in the new tank corps, but CSA Marshall turned him down.)

As a new colonel, Ike then became the chief of staff of the 3d Army at Fort Sam Houston, under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, a “mustang”: a former private who later would wear four stars. In the summer of 1941, the 3d Army decisively “defeated” the 2d Army during the much-publicized training exercise created by Marshall, the Louisiana Maneuvers, and Ike was given credit for Krueger’s battle plans.

1941–1942: Brigadier General (age 50–51)

Ike’s rapid series of “chief of staff” jobs would later serve him well in North Africa and Europe in terms of understanding the roles and functions of large army units. He earned his first star on 29 September 1941. Seven months earlier, his close friend Omar Bradley had received the first star in the West Point Class of 1915, when Marshall jumped him from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general and sent him from the War Department to Fort Benning with orders to form the Officer Candidate School.

Five days after Pearl Harbor, secretary of the general staff of the War Department Colonel Walter Bedell Smith (later Ike’s chief of staff for the entire war) called Ike in San Antonio with the message that Marshall wanted him in Washington D.C. immediately. Ike’s first task from Marshall was to draw up the Pacific Strategy. A few hours later, Ike returned with a concise outline. He reasoned that, with our Navy temporarily paralyzed in the Pacific, we could not adequately supply the Philippines along our traditional lines of communication. Therefore,
we must secure a base in Australia, protect those new lines of communication, and from there supply American and Philippine troops by air and submarine as long as possible. No garrison could hold out if the Japanese attacked with a major force, but we were obliged to do everything humanly possible. Eisenhower argued, “They may excuse failure, but they will not excuse abandonment.” Marshall agreed and told him to make it happen.

For the following six months Ike excelled in planning and strategy: progressing from deputy chief in charge of Pacific defense, War Plans Division (headed by Leonard Gerow), to chief of the War Plans Division, to chief of operations. Ike dove into the full spectrum of strategy for Marshall: intelligence, special operations, logistics, mobilization, and funding. And he learned to dig into the details of issues, a lesson that would prove invaluable in his preparations for D-Day. He often went to the White House for briefings, never thinking that he would return a decade later in a much different capacity. Marshall asked for a memorandum to outline an allied strategy for the president and the combined chiefs of staff. What Ike wrote was not new, but it had clarity and compelling logic. It became the blueprint for the war in Europe.

At Marshall’s request, Ike visited the American forces in the United Kingdom and returned, giving them a failing report card. Marshall asked him to write a directive to the commanding general of the European theater of operations. On handing it to Marshall, Ike told the CSA to read it carefully because it would become the directive for the war. Marshall did read it, and three days later replaced Major General James E. Chaney with Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

1942: Major General (age 51)

On 25 June 1942, Ike left the Pentagon for the duration of the war. Marshall had launched the career of his protégé, over the objections of many who thought him to be lacking in command experience. Thereafter, Ike’s accomplishments were legion, and his promotion story is perhaps best told by simply listing his time in grade: colonel, six months; brigadier general, five months; major general, four months; lieutenant general, seven months. Understandably, this was war time, but rising from lieutenant colonel to four-star general in twenty-three months was nonetheless a remarkable feat.

For most of us, the more famous stories of Ike’s life begin here: leading the Allied forces to victory in Europe, then himself serving as CSA, then becoming president of Columbia University, then serving as the first supreme commander of allied powers in Europe, and then finally being elected president of the United States. Eventually, he retired to a small farm at Gettysburg, the place where he had built Camp
Ike organized the White House along the lines of a military HQ, with a chief of staff and a secretary of that staff. My father became the first secretary of the White House staff. He went to the White House as a colonel and was promoted to brigadier general six months later. Shortly after that he suffered a heart attack. Nine months later he suffered a second and fatal heart attack. He was replaced by Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster who held the job throughout the rest of Ike’s presidency. (President Kennedy later disbanded that organization, which prompted Ike to call it “organized chaos.”)

Colt back in 1918. He died at Walter Reed Hospital on 28 March 1969, at the age of 78. Few would argue that Ike’s temperament, character, insight, and competence—so well demonstrated during the latter part of his life—were not molded during his earlier career.

Conclusion

This case study of Eisenhower’s career illustrates the Army’s unique way of growing its leaders. Today, even as it did at the turn of the last century, the Army moves its officers into varied jobs in diverse organizations across the globe, anticipating they will assess each unique situation in short order and act decisively, while gaining valuable experience for higher and more demanding assignments. Thus, an assignment that some may think diverts an officer away from the preferred career trajectory to success may actually turn out to be the foundational assignment that makes that officer uniquely qualified for leadership at a higher level.

In such a fashion does the Army make its officers. In such a fashion do great leaders make themselves. As Ike says in his autobiography, *At Ease*, “Whenever I had convinced myself that my superiors, through bureaucratic oversights and insistence on tradition, had doomed me to run-of-the-mill assignments, I found no better cure than to blow off steam in private and then settle down to the job at hand.”

*MR*

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In May 2003, the United States began the daunting task of nation building in Iraq by rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure and reformulating its political institutions. The military’s role in modern stability operations, though seemingly new, fits into a preexisting American foreign policy formula. However, the military sees stability operations through contemporary ethical lenses. Since each case depends upon current ethical understanding about what the military should or should not do, past examples of stability operations do not necessarily provide fitting frameworks for modern efforts. This article focuses on ethical abstractions as well as the ways national and social views of how “right” and “wrong” translate into political and military application, and it examines examples of stability operations and the ethical challenges and implications such efforts raise.

Morality in Post-war Operations

Even though moral rhetoric often permeates stability operations, international stability and perceived strategic interests have overridden moral obligations as determinants for American military commitments. A study of the ethical implications of conducting stability operations today bridges a historiographic gap in the understanding of morality in warfare. Scholars have often alluded to the prevalence of the Just War Tradition in (Western) military thought. However, the Just War model is insufficient when discussing stability operations because it only describes *jus ad bellum* (rationale for going to war in the first place) and *jus in bello* (appropriate conduct during war). The moral reasons for going to war are not always the same as the reasons the victor uses to justify occupation of the defeated nation. *Jus in bello* does continue to have relevance during stability operations, particularly when armed hostilities exist between “insurgents” and the government, unarmed civilians, and occupying forces. Legal discourse that constitutes the “Laws of War” cover much of this. However, there is nothing in *jus in bello* that compels the victorious nation to provide security, rebuild infrastructure, improve public services, and see to the establishment of a democratic form of government. In the final pages of *Arguing About War* (2004), noted Just War historian Michael Walzer raises the issue of morality in post-war operations, and he suggests further scholarly inquiry into a new *jus post bellum* theory.

Sergeant Jared Tracy, U.S. Army

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Walzer argues, “It seems clear that you can fight a just war, and fight it justly, and still make a moral mess of the aftermath.” Conversely, “a misguided military intervention or a preventive war fought before its time might nonetheless end with the displacement of a brutal regime and the construction of a decent one.” Walzer’s argument highlights the need for a deeper understanding of the ethical aspects of stability operations.

**Stability Operations in American History**

The term “stability operations” is an inexact concept. It can be all encompassing or exclusionary, depending upon its usage. The 2008 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, describes stability operations as—

Encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They help to establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local governance. Stability operations must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. *Stability operations cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives.*

While the concept “stability operations” does not exclude the possibility (and necessity) of defensive operations, it prizes proactive military operations in conjunction with well-conceived civil actions to neutralize enemy resistance, reduce political opposition, and earn public favor. According to stability operations doctrine, Soldiers and Marines on the ground must accept the dual role of waging war while securing the peace. This paradoxical role stems from the American public’s and elected leadership’s understanding of what U.S. forces are legally and ethically obliged to do following successful completion of conventional combat operations.

The annals of American military history are thin on addressing its long involvement in stability operations. Lawrence Yates, a career U.S. Army historian at Fort Leavenworth’s Combat Studies Institute, condensed the vast history of the U.S. military’s role in stability operations into one succinct volume, *The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005*. In this comprehensive work, Yates concludes, “The U.S. military has not regarded stability operations as a ‘core’ mission with a priority approaching that accorded to combat operations.” According to Yates, the military has traditionally understood its role to be the executor of the nation’s will through military means—to win the nation’s wars. After examining 28 case studies from the early republic through the War on Terrorism, Yates makes five basic assessments concerning the future:

- “The U.S. government will continue to conduct stability operations.”
- Stability operations are joint-service, interagency, and multinational endeavors.
The U.S. military, and the Army specifically, will play increasingly important roles in post-combat efforts.

The military will increasingly play a large part in the “pre-execution phase” of stability operations.

Stability operations must have the same doctrinal and operational emphasis as traditional military operations.\(^8\)

Although Yates’s argument is sound, he does not address the question of why military leaders are still apprehensive when it comes to conducting stability operations. If they are such an integral aspect of U.S. military history, why do post-combat operations evoke so much apprehension in military leaders? One way to answer the question might be that commanders do not know how to plan for and execute them to the same extent they do traditional military operations. For example, despite the military’s involvement in stability operations throughout its history, it was not until 2006 that Army historian John McGrath proposed that planners use a troop-density model for post-combat security operations.\(^9\) The reason for this, at least in part, is that external entities have directed commanders’ roles. In principle, the American public (through its civilian leadership) entrusts its U.S. military commanders with responsibilities outside of their intellectual and professional comfort zones. The former decides what the latter should and will do based heavily on ethical criteria.

**Mexico.** The first test of American military government occurred during and after the U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848). Most of the scholarship on the U.S.-Mexican War focuses on the conventional military aspects of it, not on its subsequent stability operations.\(^10\) The unconventional nature of the War on Terrorism’s stability operations has sparked renewed interest in historical examples, including the Mexican War. In “Occupation and Stability Dilemmas of the Mexican War”, Latin American historian Irving Levinson concludes that President James Polk and General Winfield Scott’s approach toward stability operations revolved around just that—“stability.” The U.S. military presence following conventional combat operations did not carry with it the modern condition or requirement to establish and secure a stable democratic government. The defeated Mexican and the U.S. governments both regarded the peasant and Indian rebels bent on disrupting the established order as the opposition. They both sought to quell rebellion to secure Mexico’s oligarchic social strata, its international border, and its commerce. The U.S. military functioned as a surrogate security force because it had destroyed the bulk of Mexico’s main army. Both governments relied on American forces in Acapulco, Camargo, Mexico City, Monterrey, Tampico, Veracruz, and elsewhere to quash the rebels. The U.S.-Mexican War proved that American stability operations hinged on maintaining the societal status quo, not on ethical reform such as promoting just socio-political equality or implementing minimum human rights standards.\(^11\)

**Post-Civil War Reconstruction.** The moral criterion for stability operations entered modern consciousness after the Civil War. Texas A&M historian Joseph Dawson argues that post-Civil War Reconstruction provided the “foundation for American military government and ‘nation building’ in other eras.” Dawson agreed with Herman Belz and Lawrence Yates that there were no written plans for occupation prior to the end of hostilities.\(^12\) Dawson is not the first to acknowledge the Union “occupation” of the South as an exercise in nation building, but he goes a step further to say that it provided the doctrinal framework for future efforts.\(^13\) Dawson notes that Reconstruction differed from previous known stability and security efforts. Post-Civil War stability operations experienced a social, political, and ideological thrust that the American occupation presence in Mexico had lacked two decades earlier. While one could argue that, at least in part, Reconstruction-era occupation was a method of political retribution, one could also make the case that ethical concerns were a powerful motivator for rebuilding Southern society. Because the South belonged to the United States, the federal government naturally pushed for the reconstruction of the
physical damage wrought by four years of war. Also, since the Union cause during the war ultimately sought eradication of slave holding, there was an ethical compulsion to reintegrate the South into the greater Union. There was also need to establish and safeguard legal citizenship for millions of former slaves. Dawson’s conclusion highlights the merging of stability and moral obligation as pretexts for American stability operations.  

**Philippine Insurrection.** In the last quarter of the 19th century, the United States revisited the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 by reaffirming it as a mandate for American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. In *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, historian Michael Hunt demonstrates that, beginning in the late-19th century, the United States developed and gradually solidified an ideologically based foreign policy to deal with non-Western peoples and nations. This ideology coincided with and was influenced by the U.S. ability to outwardly project its economic, political, and military might.  

Certainly, by the turn of the 20th century, the American military had become something more than a punitive or expeditionary force: the U.S. government could use its power as a mechanism to defend or even create foreign governmental and civil constructs. Morally buttressed with a presumed altruistic (albeit deluded) notion of assuming the White Man’s Burden, America saw the idea of using the military for stability operations and nation building eventually become a foreign policy blueprint. Stability operations became the pretext for how to deal with hostile or otherwise “un-Americanized” peoples.  

From a historiographic standpoint, the American military’s involvement in the Philippines provides an instructive example of how the U.S. military flexed its muscle to secure stability where the moral dimensions of its mission held secondary consideration to the Nation’s developmental economic self-interest. An array of sources exist on American counterinsurgency and stability operations in the Philippines, with John Gates, Brian Linn, and Glenn May being among the most notable historians of the topic. More recent work attempts to extract lessons from the American role in the Philippines for potential application in the War on Terrorism.  

In *Savage Wars of Peace*, Army historian Robert Ramsey argues that stability operations in the Philippines represented a success story, despite some significant setbacks. Because American efforts to improve the country’s infrastructure and educational, political, and economic systems often could not forestall the insurgent attempts to undermine the U.S. occupation, public improvements had to occur in tandem with proactive military operations. Continued nonmilitary support to the country was essential while low-level interaction with local leaders helped isolate the insurgents from the population. Commanders at the tactical level had to make decisions always keeping strategic objectives in mind. Commanders and Soldiers felt the same...
frustrations as those in Iraq do today over the dual military and civil nature of stability operations.\textsuperscript{19}

Ramsey followed \textit{Savage Wars of Peace} with \textit{A Masterpiece of Counterguerilla Warfare}, an inside look into the leadership approach of Brigadier General Franklin Bell, an engineer and intelligence officer in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902. Using primary sources and interpreting them with a prescriptive tone, Ramsey concludes the methods Bell used to remove Philippine insurgents from their popular base of support, or rather to remove the population from the insurgents, provide an excellent model for future stability operations and pacification efforts.\textsuperscript{20}

Another recent work on the Philippines describes the American pacification of the Moro province as embodying the Rooseveltian spirit of establishing “order out of chaos.” In “\textit{Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines}”, historian Charles Byler argues that Generals Wood and Pershing conducted stability operations in the Moro province of the southern Philippines using varied approaches. They worked at improving the daily life within the province by building infrastructure and providing improved medical care, among other public services. Byler argues that the U.S. military made progress in quelling Moro opposition until it implemented “dramatic [cultural] changes,” such as outlawing slavery and weapons and changing the legal code. In short, U.S.-imposed cultural and legal changes counteracted progress made by providing and improving public services. Though Byler recognizes that Wood’s and Pershing’s military operations against militants were successful, rebel opposition remained strong because of attempted changes in Moro culture and way of life.\textsuperscript{21} In the end, the need for order superseded attempts at imposing political and cultural goals based on Western ethical considerations. The need for order proved primary over other ethical considerations.

The Evolution of a Moral Paradigm

Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson personify the two notions of order and moral obligation in stability operations. President Roosevelt believed that the United States should use its military-industrial strength to bring “order out of chaos” and police the outside world as a colonial power.\textsuperscript{22} President Wilson held that a steadfast moral component of American foreign policy was necessary (whereby the Nation would export its own spirit of liberty and sociopolitical structures through selfless acts of helping poor and struggling peoples), but using military force to impose such ostensibly altruistic assistance might also be necessary.\textsuperscript{23} Throughout the 20th century, Roosevelt’s and Wilson’s individual approaches often remained harmonious.

The mutually reinforcing ideas of order and a presumed morality in stability operations and nation building persisted beyond the 20th century into the 21st. In October 2000, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), a premier intelligence think-tank within the U.S. government, completed its assessment of the national “reorientations” that had taken place in Central Asia and the former Soviet states over the preceding decade. The NIC argues that U.S. policy regarding underdeveloped and developing nation-states in these regions should focus on effecting political and economic reform, encouraging reduced dependence on regional powers, and rewarding “intragional cooperation—all with an eye to creating an independent, generally Western-oriented, belt of stability.” Some members of the NIC warn that “democracy and civil societies must develop within the existing cultural context, not as some kind of unnatural foreign imposition.” However, the lack of a Western role in democratizing these nations is unthinkable: “The long-term implications of a generation growing up in poverty, lacking basic education, and increasingly enmeshed in semi-criminalized societies are disturbing and run directly counter to Western goals for the regions.” This paternalistic notion resembles a sociopolitical parallel to economic modernization theory. A powerful patron state ultimately benefits from increases in standards of living and economic output, higher
education rates, and stable democratic structures. From a strategic and ethical vantage point, the George W. Bush doctrine of the United States evidently views expending economic investment and utilizing military intervention (treasure and blood) as worthwhile to ensure the viability of developing democratic nation-states.²⁴

**From Injustice to Justice**

From a Just War perspective, Australian scholar Tom Frame concludes that “the 2003 Gulf War was neither manifestly just nor, it can be argued, even necessary.”²⁵ One American skeptic comments that “Iraq is not a nation, and nobody can unite its tribes. The notion that Iraq can be democratized or even civilized must be abandoned.”²⁶ Another notes that “the endeavor of forcing democracy on the faction-torn Iraqi society does not seem likely to succeed.”²⁷ These concerns echo the cultural objections of political modernization mentioned earlier, namely, that external forces cannot impose democratic idealism because governments can never truly be separated from culture.

The newly formed Iraqi government may not share the West’s long-standing parliamentary orientation just as their culture persists in tribal values at the expense of individual rights. The rapid transition from autocracy to popular rule requires drastic changes in individual ethical perspective as well as in democratic procedural norms. Timely political and economic results are imperative, for both the citizens of Iraq and those of its patron state.

While not downplaying the difficulties and frustrations of stability operations in Iraq, in *What We Owe Iraq*, constitutional law professor Noah Feldman argues that after toppling the Hussein regime, the United States had a legal and moral obligation to rebuild Iraq in its own democratic image. In
Feldman’s view, Iraqis are not only capable of, but also entitled to freedom and democracy. According to him, the United States must limit its role in Iraq to that of a temporary political trustee and not allow itself to become a permanent military occupation force. The paramount ethical objective of nation building in Iraq and elsewhere is “creating democratically legitimate states that [treat] their citizens with dignity and respect.” In short, the United States would be morally negligent if it did not see to stabilization in Iraq.28 The major obstacles to fulfilling such obligations are the aforementioned hierarchy of ethical norms among the individuals themselves and the need for order as a primary moral concern.

The difficulty is putting moral objectives into practice and sequencing them so they are practicable. A common theme in stability operations historiography is the all-too-common disconnect among American objectives. Citing the problems in postwar Iraq, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in early 2003, criticizes the American government’s relative lack of contingency planning. He does not deny the U.S.’s obligation to rebuild and establish order, but he says that stability operations and nation building were not high enough priorities in planning circles, that there had not been enough civilian-military coordination, and that despite their significant ability to do so, the Army Corps of Engineers and media outlets had made little headway in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. In conclusion, Garner does not challenge America’s moral obligations as legitimate concerns, but rather blames planning failures and unsuccessful methods for the deteriorated security situation.29

If contingency planning is a major element of stability operations and nation building, inter- and intra-agency conflicts can complicate putting a valid plan into action. In After Saddam: Stabilization or Transformation?, U.S. Army Major Shane Story highlights the contrasts among various institutional objectives during planning for and execution of the Iraq war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s efforts to transform the Cold War-era makeup of the Armed Forces complicated Lieutenant General David McKiernan and Ambassador Paul Bremer’s efforts to stabilize Iraq after Hussein’s fall.30 These contrasting objectives “reflected a self-defeating disunity of effort.” In concert with conflicting civilian and military objectives in the interagency, Iraq’s tumultuous cultural history hindered stability operations in Iraq from the outset. Story argues that Rumsfeld held long-standing “aversions to open-ended and to large-scale military operations,” both of which are requisite for successful stability operations.31 Stability operations and nation building require massive interagency planning and cooperation. Decisions to forcefully ensure security and political viability also depend heavily on ethical criteria more familiar to non-military agencies, while commanders at tactical and operational echelons often express frustration with having to assume the complexity entailed in the dual roles of leading civil and military operations. Soldiers are being asked to view stability operations through complicated ethical prisms other agencies are more attuned to, and the “problem” rests in the fact that they cannot help applying preconceived cultural and ethical notions to everyday situations in subconscious efforts to order reality. Their preconceptions have little or no currency in the moral hierarchies of the interagency and geographical cultures in which they are asked to operate. As U.S. Army Captain Porcher Taylor argues, there are invariably “circumstances in which personal and institutional value systems conflict.”32 Commanders and Soldiers on the ground will not necessarily share the same ethical convictions as others who have entrusted them with carrying out stability operations.

**A Moral Military in War’s Aftermath**

Since Vietnam, the U.S. military has attempted to address the need to instill ethical thinking at all levels. For example, during the early ‘70s, U.S. service academies started mandatory core courses on morality and war. In 1979, U.S. Army Lieutenant...
Colonel Jack Lane proposed the establishment of a single code of ethics for the United States Army. In 1985, U.S. Army Major William Diehl went a step further by suggesting one ethical code for all branches of the military. Diehl argues that a well-conceived ethical code would stand the test of time by virtue of its inherent adaptability. After all, he says, “Ethics applies common principles of value to widely differing tasks or vocations.” He argues that matters of ethics necessarily involve moral judgment. Similar. U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel James Swartz argues, “The moral leader will not merely keep his own house in order. The moral leader will not tolerate those who abridge the standard, and the moral leader will punish those who break the rules—even when such decisions are unpopular, and even when it conflicts with the wishes of others in positions of influence.” Ethical behavior “must be inculcated” and enforced by proper authorities. Only ethical instruction at the lowest levels can help alleviate the conflicting pressures of fighting a war and doing all that stability operations entail for success.

Heavy moral language laces the discourse on stability operations and nation-building efforts; however, from a strategic standpoint, security, stability, and order have always been the first priorities—they too rest on a substratum of ethical assumptions. As Michael Walzer suggests, historians should pay due attention to jus post bellum, or the moral issues involved after the cessation of conventional hostilities. Laws of war and military training and regulations guide Soldiers’ actions in combat, but there is something missing if these same Soldiers wonder “Why are we still here?” after they have defeated another country’s forces in wartime. The ethical commitment to conduct stability operations is often forced upon America’s military in the absence of understanding, leaving the individuals therein with the psychological burden of reconciling their roles as both trained killers and purveyors of goodwill, attempting to earn an indigenous population’s hearts and minds. The Soldiers so burdened have not yet been educated to that effect—the military has treated the ethics of war, peace, and occupation more as a process of osmosis than a focused effort.

Problems arise when the majority of the population, civilian leaders, and Soldiers on the ground do not share the ethical commitment to stabilize or rebuild another country. When this conviction is absent or not evenly distributed, resentment swells, tension rises, and unfortunately, often deadly, tragic, and potentially catastrophic consequences ensue.

NOTES

1. The present work accepts Merriam-Webster’s definition of ethic(s) as “the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation” and as a set or “sets of moral principles.” (Definition accessed online at <www.m-w.com/dictionary/ethics> on 12 January 2008). Furthermore, ethics have the function of identifying activities and behavior “as good or bad or somewhere in between these two extremes.” On this point, see Cloma Huffman, “Ethical Bases for Military Decisions,” Military Review (August 1961).


4. An excellent work that covers the genesis of the Law of War, to include Just War and other doctrines, can be found in David Cauley, The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005). Amistad the numerous debates concerning the practicality of 20th-century laws of war in the current conflict against terrorism, Cauley states succinctly that “the law of war in its current form is more than adequate to face the new GWOT challenges, [and it] does not warrant revision.”

5. The reason why the American media (and public) still refers to the U.S. role in Iraq as the “Iraq War” could be because that term is acceptable shorthand for “American stability operations and nation-building efforts in Iraq,” but it might be that certain rules of moral conduct are best understood in the context of a full-scale war.


9. John McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006) and The Other


16. Ibid.


31. Ibid.


Military Review is seeking quality articles written by and about Noncommissioned Officers of the United States Army. As the Secretary of the Army has declared 2009 to be the “Year of the NCO,” the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center will contribute to this initiative by publishing worthy NCO-related stories on a wide variety of topics, including the roles, norms, and values of the NCO Corps; history; leadership development; the sergeant’s role in training and current operations; and the vision for NCOs as the backbone of the Army.

See the Military Review website at http://militaryreview.army.mil for more details on how to submit articles for consideration.

SSG James Gautier reviews the operating manual for a hand-held mine detector. U.S. Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, and Iraqi soldiers from 2d Battalion, 15th Brigade, 5th Division, are preparing palm groves around Naqib, Iraq, for a controlled burn that will expose or detonate the massive amounts of booby traps, improvised explosive devices, and weapons caches that are hindering local Iraqis’ attempts to farm this Al-Qaeda stronghold, 20 December 2008. (DOD)
Major Jason M. Pape, U.S. Army

JUST AS IT RECONSIDERED its view of Army operations with FM 3-0, the Army should reassess its leadership philosophy to account for evolutions in U.S. society and the 21st century’s complex, uncertain operating environment. While Army leadership and leader development doctrine has matured in the last two years, the Army has yet to account fully for modern demands on its leaders and changes in society at large. Despite efforts by leaders like retired General Eric Shinseki to evaluate leader development programs and then examine organizational culture as it affects leadership and leader development, our doctrine and practices remain deeply rooted in historical traditions and heavily biased by relatively sophomoric assumptions about what leadership is and how it is best practiced.\(^1\) We lack critical reflection on the subject—an appreciation of other ways to look at leadership and leader development. We need to understand why our leadership doctrine is the way it is rather than simply what it is. This article examines several aspects of the Army’s view on leadership in the 21st century and sets forth some recommendations for change to better prepare Army leaders for current and future operations.

After returning from my second deployment to Iraq in less than three years, I was lucky to get a break as a young major—a chance to catch up with my
family, exchange ideas with my peers, reflect on my experiences in the Army over the past ten years, and make sense of all that I had seen, done, learned, and now believed. I spent almost a year surrounded by my contemporaries—successful mid-grade Army officers with similar backgrounds, comparable but varied recent experiences, and contrasting but complementary ideas about the military profession. We studied at one of the Army’s finest intellectual institutions with military and civilian instructors who are experts in their fields. Some were academics, some practitioners. Yet all of them taught in a way that encouraged us, the students, to find our own answers—to question our underlying assumptions, consider other perspectives on what we thought we already knew, and work collaboratively rather than competitively toward our learning goals. And while we studied many topics, the subject of leadership was at the core of our curriculum.

Most would assume I am writing about Intermediate-Level Education at the Command and General Staff School in Fort Leavenworth. Actually, I am writing about my year at West Point in the Eisenhower Leader Development Program as part of the Army’s Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) program. The leader development program, a cooperative effort between the United States Military Academy and Columbia University in New York City, prepares West Point’s Tactical Officers for their roles as mentors to thousands of future military leaders. When most people outside of West Point hear about the program, they infer by the name that it is intended to develop students as military leaders. While this is true, the inference does not capture what I think is the leader development program’s more significant goal: to make us better developers of leaders and ultimately more grounded in the subject of leadership.

As I think about leadership in the Army’s current operating environment, this distinction becomes more and more important. I learned a great deal about leadership during my year at West Point, not because the program taught me leadership, but because it helped me to better understand what I observed, practiced, and experienced as a leader in the Army prior to attending.

Despite recent evolutions in our Army’s leadership doctrine, the Army continues to practice and teach (or not teach) leadership the same way it has for decades. Most in the Army still fail to grasp the nuances of what leadership is, what it means to develop leaders, and what it means to be a leader. For example, I wonder how the concept of leadership as a “social construct” would sit with most Army leaders?

My intent is not to disparage the Army’s leadership doctrine, its leaders, or its leader development programs. Nor is it my intent to discredit the Command and General Staff College’s leadership curriculum. The institutions, people, and programs that promulgate the Army’s ideas on leadership are of the highest caliber—envied, studied, and imitated around the world and in many sectors of life. But they could be better and, in view of changes in our society and the increasing complexity of current and future operating environments, they need to be better. The Army needs to reassess its views on leadership to ensure those views remain relevant, and it needs to better express its leadership philosophy. Furthermore, the Army should consider how it might inculcate leadership in the context of current and future operating environments, rather than relying on historical tradition.

FM 3-0 articulated what had already happened in Army operations and operating environments. The Army must do the same with FM 6-22. The Army does not need to replace its previous paradigms, but it should add capabilities, skills, and knowledge to them and re-examine how it communicates its leadership philosophy across the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) domains to ensure consistency in description, practice, and reinforcement.

FM 6-22, Army Leadership, provides a modern, comprehensive view of leaders (the people and their qualities), leadership (its actions and the process), and related subjects such as counseling and team-building. However, the view is incomplete, and the message is not evident in practice throughout the
Army. Furthermore, descriptions that really define management characterize FM 6-22’s discussion of leadership. Fundamentally, the Army lacks the following:

- Critical reflection on our assumptions about leadership.
- Appropriate emphasis on leadership as a skill and subject that needs to be continually discussed and developed throughout the Army.
- Consistency of what we espouse for leadership when looking at our practice, systems, and doctrine across the Army at large.

In general terms, the Army could improve its leadership philosophy through internal discussion and dialogue, external comparison, inculcation and practical application of its leadership philosophy, and a comprehensive review of how leadership is reflected in Army systems and doctrine.

Discussion

First, we need to encourage worthwhile discussion about leadership across the Army. What leadership is, how leaders are developed, and how leaders influence people and organizations are subjects that require an ongoing conversation, and thus almost defy the notion of doctrine. The Army’s institutions fail to address the subject of leadership adequately, let alone encourage debate about its underlying assumptions or methods to improve it. As Sergeant Major of the Army Richard Kidd put it, our doctrine implies that “Soldiers learn to be good leaders from good leaders.” This is certainly true and probably one of the best ways to learn about leadership, but it assumes that every Soldier will be lucky enough to have a good leader to mentor him or her. More important, it does not recognize the importance of sensemaking—a process in which Soldiers practice leadership, learn what leaders should be, and reflect upon their practice and observation to turn experience into knowledge. Traditional biases permeate the Army’s leadership philosophy, primarily because we study ourselves and past military leaders almost exclusively as the basis for improving leadership doctrine and education. This leaves us with a socially constructed version of Army leadership.

The Army’s leadership philosophy perpetuates assumptions that carry little credence outside the military today. Its hierarchical structure and promotion system imply that age and experience automatically produce greater knowledge and ability—that a senior-ranking person is inherently superior to a subordinate. The Army’s leadership model is imbued with trait theories, emphasizing the significance of the person and qualities like “physical presence” instead of the process (e.g., communication, collaboration, and organizational change). The Army’s system values current knowledge over continued learning, promotes decision over consensus, and often describes leadership in terms that really equate to management (i.e., unilateral influence from the leader to the led, rather than an ongoing interaction that creates a relationship between people).

Discussions of leadership often turn quickly to the issue of “vision,” which many believe is lacking...
in today’s Army. While most in the Army agree that the leaders for whom they have worked displayed Army values, demonstrated leader attributes, and exhibited impressive levels of competence and knowledge, many insist that something is still missing. The why, the purpose, the intent—or more broadly—the communication of vision is vague, insincere, or absent. Given the complexity of today’s operating environment, the message has become much more important than the person. The narrowing distance between strategic vision and personal decision requires leaders at all levels to understand where they are going and why. The Army does not adequately address this reality. It relies instead on its hierarchical organization and disciplined culture, and loses much of its organic motivation and momentum.

**Comparison**

The study of leadership in the Army is more often a study of military history and biographies of great military leaders than an education on leadership itself. While the Army has produced some great leaders and its history is replete with numerous examples of strong leadership, critical examination of the subject usually stalls at the study of people, their characteristics, and their actions. It never really examines how they came to be great leaders or what made their leadership successful. In our quest to be great leaders, we try to imitate “great men.” Rather than trying to develop effective leaders, we leave the success of our future leaders up to “natural selection.” We seem oblivious to the fact that self-study alone is deficient when seeking self-improvement. Army culture is one of arrogance and exclusion when it comes to considering others’ views on leadership; it implies that other “types” of leadership are not appropriate and that the Army’s version of leadership is ahead of the curve. In fact, the study of leadership outside the military (and sometimes in the military’s “academic circles”) has so matured that many current Army assumptions about leadership are the intellectual equivalent of saying “the earth is the center of the universe.” We compensate for failings in our system by reinforcing its hierarchical structures and promoting a culture of discipline and obedience. One might ask if the Army is actually better at producing followers than leaders. Consider how much the Army’s leadership paradigm depends on people following orders. (For more on this theme, you could read “Knowing When to Salute.”)

The Army can benefit from critical reflection on leadership from some unconventional sources. In the 1920s, Mary Parker Follett presented a view of leadership that compares well with traditional military models. She believed that people are connected through ever-evolving relationships in which their differences serve as fuel for continuous growth of the individual and the group. She coined the phrase “power with, rather than power over.” Follett recognized the importance of human relations in organizations long before most others acknowledged it. She emphasized leadership’s human aspects, conflict resolution, and learning from differences. She asserted that one does not have to be aggressive to be a leader. She described power not as a zero-sum situation where one person forces another to do his will or gives up power to another person, but as a capability that increases when people work together.

Follett noted that leaders must also have vision and that leadership was the same as teaching. She believed in the invisible leader—the purpose of the organization:

There is a conception of leadership gaining ground today very different from our old notion . . . It is a conception very far removed from that of the leader-follower relation. With that conception you had to be either
a leader or a learner. Today our thinking is tending less and less to be confined within the boundaries of those alternatives. There is the idea of a reciprocal leadership. There is also the idea of a partnership in following, of following the invisible leader—the common purpose. The relation of the rest of the group to the leader is not a passive one, and I think teachers see this more clearly than most people, and therefore in their teachings are doing more than teaching; they are helping to develop one of the fundamental conceptions of human relations. Follett observed that leaders must see the whole situation and identify patterns, leading in a cooperative rather than a coercive way, helping the organization toward a collective goal, setting priorities, focusing the team, and organizing the experience of the group to meet objectives. In discussing leadership, Follett recognized followership as an understudied discipline “of the utmost importance, but which has been far too little considered.” In her mind, followers should help the leader maintain control of the situation by communicating problems and failures, telling the truth, and taking bad decisions back to leaders for resolution.

Many in the Army would question what we could possibly learn about leadership from a schoolteacher writing in the 1920s. However, Follett’s assertions, while radical and controversial in their time, are widely accepted among those who study leadership today. Yet the Army balks at such democratic and egalitarian notions of leadership. Should we not at least consider the possibilities of such a philosophy in certain situations within the Army?

There are unconventional examples within the military as well. Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, who led one of only two Marine Raider Battalions in World War II, based his leadership philosophy on observations he made while accompanying the Chinese Communist Party’s 8th Route Army during the 1930s. He promoted a leadership style based on absolute clarity of purpose, the highest of ethical standards, consensus seeking, group sensemaking, camaraderie, decentralized decision making, and initiative.

In war, as in the pursuits for peace, the human element is of prime importance. Human nature is much the same the world over, and human beings everywhere respond to certain fundamental stimuli. So, if men have confidence in their leaders, if they are convinced that the things for which they endure and fight are worthwhile, if they believe the effort they are making contributes definitely to the realization of their objectives, then their efforts will be voluntary, spontaneous, and persistent. Of course, Carlson’s leadership style was controversial—as was his life. The fact that he held such admiration for the Communist Chinese made him suspect in the days of McCarthyism following his death. But what could the Army as an institution apply from his example?

### Inculcation and Practice

The Army has yet to fully realize improved leadership doctrine in practice. Leadership continues to be inculcated through stories, personal example, and summaries in doctrine, but these methods do not offer a thorough education and deliberate practice. Leadership emerges as something that just happens as the Army operates, rather than something Soldiers must discuss and practice.

To further complicate matters, the Army does not always practice what it preaches; Army leaders do not always epitomize what they espouse. The Army espouses values-based axiological leadership, but it employs classical organizational management systems and practices. Because the Army has failed to differentiate the two subjects, most assume that leadership and management are synonymous. But leadership is ethical; management is inherently practical.

The Army esteems command decisions over consensus building as perhaps it should most of the time, but this is not necessarily true all the time. Many of the historical underpinnings for our leadership archetype are unsuitable for the complexity and uncertainty of the modern operating environment. Some of our most prolific catch-phrases expose our continued bias: “The staff exists to help the commander make decisions,” “No plan survives
first contact,” “A good solution now is better than a great solution later,” and “Lead from the front.” These platitudes reflect admiration for decision, the commander’s coup d’oeil or intuition, and heroic leadership. Might not there be times when the following phrases are more appropriate: “The commander exists to help the staff (or his/her subordinates) come to a consensus” or “Lead by purpose and vision rather than by presence”? Could “No plan survives first contact” sometimes be an excuse for poor leadership vision, allowing us to quickly revert to direct management of the situation? And what if the immediate solution has lasting strategic consequences? Perhaps consultation, deliberation, and patience have a place in decision. If the Army’s appreciation of leadership is to remain relevant, we must understand and communicate the difference between tactical maneuver decision making and complex problem solving.

Comprehensive Review

The Army ought to ensure that all of its systems, processes, and practices encourage or are consistent with our espoused forms of leadership. Of primary concern is the tendency towards management instead of leadership that modern technology brings with its increasing real-time situational awareness and its improvement of our ability to communicate. While FM 6-0 asserts that mission command is “the Army’s preferred concept of command and control,” our systems and procedures often show a proclivity towards detailed command, reinforcing real-time management rather than anticipative leadership.\(^\text{14}\)

The following story, told by Air Force Lieutenant General Mike Short (16th Air Force Commander at the time) about a conversation between an A-10 pilot (who by happenstance was the general’s son) and forward air controllers (FAC) in Kosovo, highlights just how prone the military is to micro-manage as technology improves:

About 5 o’clock in the afternoon, we had live Predator video of three tanks moving down the road in Serbia and Kosovo. As most of you know, my son is an A-10 pilot, or he was at the time. We had a FAC [Forward Air Controller] overhead and General Clark [Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)] had the same live Predator video that I had. “Mike, I want you to kill those tanks.” I quickly responded, I had something else in mind, “Boss, I’ll go after that for you.” When shift time came, [Major General] Garry Trexler was on the floor, finishing up in the daytime, and [Brigadier General Randy] Gelwix arrived to take the night shift. I was there because the SACEUR wanted those three tanks killed. We had a weapon school graduate on the phone talking direction to the FAC on the radio. Call went something like this: “A lot of interest in killing those tanks, 421. I’d like you to work on it.” “Roger.” Two or three minutes

...we must understand and communicate the difference between tactical maneuver decision making and complex problem solving.

U.S. Army military police Soldier, SGT Janet Ybarra, 18th Military Police Brigade and Multi-National Division-Baghdad, prepares her squad to depart for a mission in Baghdad, Iraq.
went by, and 421 clearly had not found those tanks. The young major’s voice went up a bit and said, “ComAirSouth and SACEUR are real interested in killing those tanks. Have you got them yet?” “Negative.” About two more minutes went by and the weapons school graduate played his last card. “General Short really wants those tanks killed.” And a voice came back that I’ve heard in my house for the better part of 30 years and he said, “God damn it, Dad, I can’t see the fucking tanks!”

This example shows how, unless we make concerted efforts to reinforce the principles of mission command, we run the risk of contradicting key aspects of a decentralized leadership philosophy as technology continues to improve. A critical self-assessment would likely conclude that the Army spends a disproportionate amount of time and resources giving commanders the ability to see and know everything that is happening within their organization and little time and resources to communicate their own intent and situational understanding to their organization.

There are of course significant improvements in Army leadership to be realized with new technology. An example today is our ability to network people together in collaborative knowledge-sharing ventures like the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) and other communities of practice. Because of systems like the BCKS, people in the Army can now assume a leadership role in one or more fields or areas of interest outside their formal hierarchical positions—unbounded by rank, geography, or duty assignment. Communities of practice facilitate discussion, learning, and collaboration that skirt our bureaucratic systems and transcend the usual boundaries between officer and enlisted, practitioner and academic, or combat arms and support. Members are generally valued more for their contributions and demonstrated expertise than their rank or position. These organizations provide an example of alternative forms of leadership that can (and do) exist within the conventional military today. Such organizations should be formally incorporated into our leadership doctrine to account for their utility in supporting and improving the Army’s leadership climate.

**Conclusion**

Army leadership in the 21st century will likely be characterized by collaboration and cooperation as much as it is by direction and decision. In addition to leading other Soldiers, we will operate by, with, and through people and organizations outside the Army. Therefore, Army leaders must recognize that there are different cultures of leadership, know how to adjust their own styles and approaches to accommodate those views, and be comfortable working within and around other-than-Army organizations.

What should our leadership philosophy be? Again, the answer is contingent on what operating environment the Army will face, what roles we will assume, and what outcomes will be expected from us. To agree on this requires a shared vision for our future—something the Army is still conflicted about despite efforts like the publication of a new FM 3-0. Perhaps this dissonance remains because, as with many things, the Army’s vision is contradicted by observation and practice across the DOTMLPF. Our leadership philosophy should reflect this future vision, describing what Army leadership should be to meet our future needs, rather than reasserting what Army leadership has been in the past.

The concept of leadership has to be understood for its multifaceted and symbiotic nature. It can no longer be thought of as a distinct or concise subject. It is much more than simply the interaction between the leader and the led, and it relies on much more than the attributes and competencies of the leader to be effective. Leadership should be distinguished from management, in principle and in practice, recognizing that sometimes the people best suited to take on a leadership role will not be those with the most rank. Our culture should be one that encourages life-long learning, diversification, and continuous self-development as the foundation.
for leadership rather than deference to authority or rank. Leadership must be considered in an organizational context—as a reciprocal and perpetual process—ideally a collective agreement between people about the purpose they are working towards. Leadership is influenced by culture—multiple aspects of culture beyond just the organization’s. It requires an appreciation of adult learning methodologies and organizational change in its education and implementation. It would be more effective if it considered things like differences in personality, group dynamics, and conflict resolution rather than assuming that we are all the same, with rank and hierarchy mediating group processes and interpersonal problems. Most importantly, leadership should be viewed in its proper context—with an understanding that what was once effective military leadership may not remain effective in the future, a realization that we are prone to self-fulfilling constructs about leadership that might hamper us in the long run, and an agreement that to truly be effective military leaders we should extend our quest to learn about leadership beyond our own profession.

The Army should conduct a thorough reassessment of its leadership philosophy across the DOTMLPF to ensure we have appropriately defined leadership and leader development within our organization and have planned, resourced, and implemented systems to encourage that leadership philosophy throughout the Army. This reassessment should be ruthless in its skepticism, rigorous in its objectivity, and it should strive for multiple perspectives. It should maintain open-mindedness to determine whether the Army’s leadership philosophy is actually as good as it can be, or just a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Army should work less to differentiate its own particular leadership philosophy and instead try to educate its people on the subject of leadership in a broader sense. In thinking about the realities of our current operating environment, we should appreciate what leadership means in a civilian, Joint, interagency and multi-national context.

Finally, it is important to note that what we often refer to simply as leadership is in fact Army Leadership, just as it appears in the title of FM 6-22. It is as effective as it is, in large part, due to the Army’s organizational culture and formal underpinnings such as command authority and the Uniform Code for Military Justice (UCMJ). In the 21st century, Army leaders cannot assume they will have things like command authority, unity of command, military protocol, military law, or even American cultural norms to facilitate the leadership process around them or within their organizations. Much of what we take for granted in leadership is lost when working with other organizations, nationalities, or cultures. Rather than insisting on a command relationship that makes our system work artificially, or imposing our cultural norms upon others to make them more suited to our style, we might just need to better understand leadership in a purer sense. Rather than rely on a command relationship that makes our system work or imposes our own cultural norms upon others, we might just need to better understand leadership in a purer sense and practice, simply, Leadership! MR

NOTES

4. Gemmill and Oakley, 113-29.
9. Ibid., 130.
THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Major Walter E. Richter, U.S. Army

In Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, published 13 February 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) states that all informational efforts must be part of a robust strategic communication capability supporting governmental activities to understand, inform, and influence relevant foreign audiences.¹

The visibility and significance of information operations (IO) and strategic communications within national policy has increased in recent years, receiving emphasis in both national defense and national security strategies. Within the combatant commands, IO supports the strategic communication plan to ensure a unity of themes and messages, emphasize success, accurately confirm or refute civilian reporting of U.S. operations, and reinforce the legitimacy of U.S. goals in the international community.²

In response to this, the U.S. Army is revising Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations, further refining the November 2003 edition. Even so, its proposed doctrinal changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary and frequently do not reflect commanders’ operational experiences, appearing at times to address Cold War-era threat models.

Will the Army’s new doctrinal definition and core capabilities of IO be adequate to support a national strategic communication plan? Will it be able to counter emergent and future threats?

Unfortunately, the current definition and core capabilities of information operations appear inadequate to support a national strategic communications plan, counter emerging threats, or meet National Defense objectives over the next 15 years.

Throughout U.S. agencies, including the military community, the concept of information operations in general and psychological operations in particular as a weapon of deception has gradually diminished. Instead, IO now seeks to influence attitudes and actions within an area of interest, providing a target audience with truthful information. Ideally, this process has the possibility of replacing violence.³

The Army has taken a more pragmatic view of IO, choosing to focus on how information best supports leaders in both “kinetic and non-kinetic” operations. This article evaluates the current core capabilities of information operations:

- Psychological operations (PSYOP).
- Electronic warfare (EW).
● Computer network operations (CNO).
● Military deception (MILDEC).
● Operational security (OPSEC).
● Public and civil affairs (PA and CA).

For the purposes of this article, the adjective “kinetic” means “relating to the motion of material bodies and the forces and energy associated therewith.” Kinetic operations involve application of force to achieve a direct effect, such as artillery, infantry, aviation, and armored offensive and defensive operations. Non-kinetic operations are those operations that seek to influence a target audience through electronic or print media, computer network operations, electronic warfare, or the targeted administration of humanitarian assistance. It is important to note that many operations do not fall neatly into one category or another. For example, a security patrol may have the power to apply force (a kinetic operation), but over time, if its consistently professional conduct earns it the respect of local populace, its presence can become a non-kinetic effect—if not a complete operation in itself.

Both JP 3-13 and FM 3-13 define IO as “the integrated employment of the core capabilities… in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting [friendly] core capabilities.” Here, the difference between kinetic and non-kinetic operations becomes ambiguous. The benefit of this ambiguity is that it allows commanders the option of focusing IO on both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, possibly using indirect fire assets to strike at information nodes, destroying command and control through computer network attack, using deceptive tactics incorporating electronics, or employing active and passive measures to safeguard friendly command and control. Conversely, commanders may also direct IO planning efforts toward non-kinetic operations: learning enemy combatant objectives through a comprehensive cultural-anthropological understanding of local leaders and their ideological underpinnings, or bolstering public perceptions of friendly forces.

While commanders must always retain the initiative to incorporate both kinetic and non-kinetic assets to establish information superiority, is it an effective allocation of assets for the IO cell to coordinate such divergent capabilities, while G3 operations already focus their actions on many of the same areas? In order to ensure that future commanders do not lose information superiority against enemies unbound by ethics or the truth, it is necessary for IO officers to become resident experts with skills in public information, marketing, and cultural anthropology.

**Consequences of Recent Military Operations**

Current Army information operations doctrine emerged from the 1996 FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, which divided IO into five core capabilities that supported the physical destruction of an enemy: PSYOP, CNO, MILDEC, EW, and OPSEC. Information operations included the ability to ensure the security of friendly information systems and to synchronize the application of force throughout hierarchical and nonhierarchical systems—linking sensors, shooters, and commanders—while degrading, disrupting, or exploiting the enemy’s command and control. Acknowledging the criticality of adapting to the changing information environment, doctrine remained focused almost solely on defeating a conventional military enemy through support of kinetic operations.

To be fair, the 1996 FM 100-6 did acknowledge the need to conduct IO across the full spectrum of military operations. Nonetheless, the previous decades’ focus on Soviet threat capabilities and the subsequent 1991 Gulf War against a conventional, Soviet-modeled force likely constrained American military thought. Despite the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, a response to the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, FM 100-6 failed to consider the rise of non-state actors or the emergence of military operations no longer wholly focused on the physical destruction of an enemy. Now, rather than only denying, defeating, or destroying an enemy, American military leaders must work to create stable and secure environments, thereby promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights.

**The Balkans**

Information operations, as an institutionalized art, showed its potential during NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia as U.S. military leaders...
responded to manipulation of the media by Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian political leaders who were igniting latent ethnic hatreds. Originaly, the Serbs used government-controlled media to target only Serb citizens with its distorted messages (rather than the international community). Government leaders sowed fear and paranoia in Bosnian-Serbs, who in turn developed a violent hatred of Bosnian and Croat ethnics within Yugoslavia, further convincing the Serbs that they were indeed struggling for their survival as a people. While these messages were highly effective among the Serbs, they found little resonance elsewhere.

Bosnian Muslim (Bosniac) leaders initially had little in the way of media assets. However, since nearly all of the international press correspondents in the former Yugoslavia were in Sarajevo, a city besieged by Serbs, the perception of Bosniacs as hapless victims rapidly spread worldwide. Since journalists and the predominantly Bosniac Sarajevans shared the same hardships, many reporters may have developed a biased perspective, focusing solely on Muslim suffering at the hands of the Serbs.

After the U.S. deployment as part of the Dayton Accord Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, and after the publication of FM 100-6 in 1996, U.S. commanders soon found that IO doctrine failed to recognize the effect that public information (PI) had on local populations. In the form of local and international news media, as well as the growing online community, public information held tremendous influence over the population that IFOR was attempting to stabilize. Given IFOR’s mission to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords and public information’s predominance on the populace, it became virtually impossible to separate public affairs completely from IO. With the assistance of the Land Information Warfare Agency, leaders from the 1st Armored Division and later the 1st Infantry Division established an IO council designed to bring together key players for information dissemination from PI, PA, G3, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs.

By obtaining input from the IO council and presenting truthful information to the populace, the multinational division countered the enemy propaganda disseminated by local media. Active throughout the planning process, IO identified target pressure points of local leaders, objectives for each target, and used a division synchronization matrix to mesh IO core capabilities. In order to convey the division’s message to Bosnian public, the IO council coordinated PSYOP radio messages with Army division press releases to prevent conflicting messages or “information fratricide.” While fratricide of this nature commonly involves casualties due to conflicts between friendly communication systems, information fratricide can also be public information that compromises OPSEC or the local credibility of a unit’s leaders and Soldiers.

The ethicality of PA and IO integration has remained a contentious debate with military officials firmly ensconced on both sides of the issue. One U.S. Army public affairs officer stated in a recent article that “the practical military value of public affairs to the operator is neither tactical nor operational, nor is it easily quantifiable. It is strategic, a concept that is difficult to perceive or stomach when one is locked into personal and savage combat at trench-knife level.” In short, PA service to the Army is an institution with its own legitimizing code of conduct that supersedes any one command or mission.

Conversely, a U.S. Air Force spokesperson stated that while credibility is an unambiguous and inflexible standard of professional conduct, it is neither a center of gravity nor an objective in and of itself. Rather, PA must support the command and its mission through accurate and timely reporting, detailed media analysis, media training, and talking points for Soldiers throughout all levels of the command.

This integration of public information with IO was employed and refined during the war against Serbia and subsequent stability and support operations in Kosovo. Command reluctance to confront the press furthered media speculation after U.S. Air Force F16s mistakenly hit a refugee convoy during the bombing campaign against the Serbian capital.
The lack of a common PA theme among commanders led to conflicting statements by NATO leaders that Serbs were responsible for the attack. The commanders later admitted that NATO had indeed fired on the convoy, but said they only targeted military vehicles. After a week without a clear military message, NATO belatedly addressed the issue openly through a PA assessment of issues that did much to quell the speculation about the incident. Unfortunately, the initial lack of a coherent response had already undermined the credibility of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo.

Throughout operations in the Balkans, Combat Camera also emerged as a powerful information tool, documenting activities and events for exploitation by PA or PSYOP. Additionally, Combat Camera supported commanders during contentious operations such as cordon and searches as a means to counter enemy propaganda rapidly.

Published experiences of commanders in the Balkans repeatedly emphasize the criticality of information dominance. While one cannot ignore the role of technology, these lessons emphasize the human dimension and the need to develop an understanding of social and cultural structures through communication, both formal and informal. However, the Army has yet to adjust its doctrinal IO core capabilities, especially the incorporation of PA and CA within IO.

**Afghanistan**

Experiences in Afghanistan further demonstrate the need to integrate public affairs and civil affairs into information operations. In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States initiated military actions in Afghanistan by means of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Early operations used land-based B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers; carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18 fighters, and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched into Afghanistan from both U.S. and British ships and submarines; and special operations forces providing ground coordination and working closely with local Afghan militias opposed to the Taliban regime. Initial military objectives were the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of Al-Qaeda leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.

Electronic warfare predominated these early IO efforts, targeting enemy communication and air defense artillery assets. Psychological or influence operations focused on convincing enemy combatants to surrender. Only later did commanders work to convince Afghans that attacks on Taliban fighters were not attacks on the Afghan populace, thus laying the groundwork for a democratic Afghan government opposed to terror and respectful of human rights. Influence operations sought to convince world audiences that despite the violence...
of its attacks on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the coalition was doing everything possible to minimize the loss of life and property of Afghan civilians.\textsuperscript{17}

While the coalition’s overwhelming military strength ensured that these initial kinetic operations were successful, they did not fully address cultural issues critical to establishing democracy in Afghanistan. The tendency of commanders to focus IO solely on supporting kinetic operations is understandable, because gauging the success of influence operations is inherently more complex than tallying a battle damage assessment of an air strike. Not surprisingly, IO lacked the doctrinal structure to address these issues. It had remained focused on physical systems and not Afghan culture, thus limiting the coalition’s ability to influence the people. In short, the exclusive use of IO to support short-range kinetic objectives is redundant and ultimately fails to support a commander’s long-range objectives.

The skills necessary for IO planners to implement successful influence operations are markedly different from those needed to destroy a combatant’s information capabilities. Creating conditions conducive for a stable government is a far greater IO challenge. Furthermore, IO planners must ensure that support is long-lasting and that desired conditions will persist long after coalition forces have left. In preparation for OEF, military planners either overlooked long-term informational consequences or, subsumed by the immediacy of their kinetic operations, paid insufficient attention to the mission’s message and effect on long-term objectives.

In order for an IO theme to be successful, it must fulfill three criteria:

- It must first recast the perception of the enemy, both locally and internationally, from that of freedom fighters or even rebels, to that of an illegitimate militant force or something else unacceptable to the local culture.
- Second, it must recast the nature of conflict, or (more important) the perception of the conflict, both nationally and internationally, so that the coalition forces are seen as liberators and not a conquering army.
- Third, it must have the ability to recast the ultimate goals of the operation as conditions on the ground meet or fail to meet planning expectations.\textsuperscript{18}

In all this, it is critical when confronting numerous threats across vastly different cultures that planners recognize that one solution will not fit every situation. In other words, a particular projected image of coalition forces may be acceptable to one society and wholly unacceptable to another.

The recent resurgence in militant and criminal activity by the Taliban may very well be due to IO planning oversights, such as eradicating poppy production without providing poppy farmers with profitable alternatives. Nevertheless, prior to this resurgence, IO had undergone refinements in the planning and execution of IO and in the areas of CA and PSYOP, along with increased interagency integration. PSYOP provided support to the interim Afghan administration as well as humanitarian de-mining operations. Civil affairs Soldiers also coordinated with non-governmental organizations as part of the State Department’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid program. The experience demonstrated the need for a fully equipped
civil military operations center, capable of entering the theater with little logistical support from theater-level special operations forces. These experiences highlight the integral role CA has already played in successful IO as a means to influence the populace. The potential of proper CA integration is not the ability to “win hearts and minds.” Rather, it is the ability to establish relationships of mutual respect and trust that foster popular support as all sides recognize the long-term benefits of cooperating with coalition forces.

Iraq

In early 2003, the United States prepared to lead an international coalition to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein. It appeared that information operations received consideration limited to kinetic operations as the coalition invaded Iraq and the Ba’athist leadership fled. Information operations again focused largely on supporting the defeat of Saddam’s regime, not establishing a stable environment or a lasting peace. Worse yet, the coalition’s practice of occupying former Ba’athist party palaces and infrequently mingling with the local populace may have prevented many Iraqis from coming to see coalition forces as something more than a follow-on regime to the Ba’athists. Frequently, inexperienced Soldiers found themselves in a dangerous situation where enemies were hard to identify, and they sometimes would “humiliate the men, offend the women, and alienate the very people who are supposed to be providing intelligence about terrorists and Ba’athists.”

Technologically focused IO planners concentrated efforts on tracking computer networks and integrating EW and CNO into division operations. They soon found themselves struggling to understand social structures, ethnic and tribal divisions, and historical factors that fed into the emerging intra-Iraqi conflict. Fortunately, information operations have received increasing consideration as the conflict has progressed. Commanders who originally saw IO as a distraction to fighting and winning soon sought to understand the ethnically diverse sectors they controlled. As they developed their understanding of IO, they created organizations at brigade, division, and corps levels to address the human dimension of the conflict.

Like others did in the Balkans and Afghanistan, Colonel Ralph O. Baker, a brigade commander in Iraq, discovered the operational significance of public information and the subsequent need for PA and IO integration. He realized that press releases, whether Iraqi or international, have immediate effects on popular attitudes and can counter enemy propaganda. To assist Baker’s IO planning, PA provided him with media analysis on popular perceptions in sector. Coordinated through CA units, organic engineer and medical assets, and maneuver units, humanitarian assistance helped establish relationships of “trust and respect” among community leaders and service members.

Despite the contentiousness of the IO-PA issue, most senior military leaders acknowledge the need for effective PA-IO integration. Joseph Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that if strategic communications in Iraq
do not improve, we will fail. He went on to add, “We are not achieving synergy and mass in our strategic communications.” After a tour as III Corps commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Thomas Metz declared that the Army needed a “broader and more aggressive, comprehensive, and holistic approach to IO—an approach that recognizes the challenges of the global information environment and seamlessly integrates the functions of traditional IO and PA—to succeed on the information-age battlefield.”

The need for leaders to understand complex social networks, not just computer or electronic networks, is a constant theme in Operation Iraqi Freedom after-action reviews. While media such as radio, television, and the Internet are invaluable in delivering messages, the greater need is for messages that will create cultural and social resonance in the local population.

Proposed Changes

In discussing information flow, it is helpful to consider how it has evolved and changed. Figure 1 demonstrates how the United States traditionally viewed the flow of information in and out of theater and to and from the military to the U.S. government, the American public, and a foreign audience. Note that while information flow has become more complex and erratic, it was never simplistic or entirely precise in nature.

As information environment models have become three-dimensional, information flows more rapidly across all boundaries. IO was previously relegated to an “adversary environment,” with PA in a “U.S./ally environment.” Now, information flows easily across four different environments:

- The direct engagement environment.
- The domestic environment.
- The allied coalition environment.
- The non-coalition/international environment.

While each environment has its own characteristics, IO can no longer consider these environments simply as friend or foe. Within each environment, there are varying degrees of trust and commonality with respect to U.S. goals and objectives. The most significant difference between these environments is how the same information will have vastly different effects from one to the next.

In analyzing the emergent effects of the new information environments (Figure 2), it may be tempting to focus exclusively on the technology
transmitting the data. However, based on commanders’ observations, controlling or stopping information flow is virtually impossible. The value of IO resides not in the technology of information transmission, but in understanding how that information affects the environment. Moreover, in response to concerns that IO must provide support to technical capabilities, resident experts in the Army’s Network and Space Operations and Forces Development Signal Corps can provide far more comprehensive support than IO. The incorporation of these assets back into G2 (for collection) and G3 (for offensive electronic measures) would better allow IO to concentrate on influence operations.

Public Affairs versus Information Operations

The integration of PA and IO is a continual theme throughout numerous after-action reviews. Incidents involving the Lincoln Group’s placement of positive stories in Iraqi newspapers demonstrate how readily information now crosses environments and raised concerns over the prospect of IO controlling PA.26 The issue here is that the stories, while factual, were deceitful in concealing their source by appearing to reflect the interests of the editorial staff of an Iraqi newspaper.27 Stories such as these undermine the credibility of any positive coverage the military receives. Proper
coordination of PA with IO must never deceive the populace as to the origin of information. Rather, coordination ensures that press releases counter enemy propaganda, do not violate OPSEC, and minimize information fratricide. If commanders are consistent in their press releases and avoid information fratricide, in time they may have greater success establishing trust and respect with the populace. Additionally, PA should provide units media analysis and media training, better enabling them to engage the media effectively, thereby further establishing and maintaining credibility.

New Information Operations Concepts

Beyond PA integration, how can IO further enhance influence capabilities of a supported command? Persistence of current conditions in future operations could provide the Army with the incentive to provide extensive training and education to IO officers in the studies of both marketing and cultural anthropology.

**IO as marketing.** Marketing tools and concepts could generate support for coalition military operations just as an advertiser promotes a commercial product. Similar to commercial products, local support for coalition operations has benefits and costs. Benefits for citizens supporting coalition operations may be humanitarian assistance projects in their towns, as well as stability and security in their neighborhoods. Costs for that cooperation may be the loss of black-market wealth and the appearance of collaboration, placing the lives of coalition supporters and their families in peril.

While applying commercial concepts to military operations may appear unorthodox, this construct could help IO planners present commanders with a clear cost benefit analysis of the conditions that commanders need the local populace to accept.

While it is difficult to predict future areas of operation for the U.S. military, the use of marketing tools to leverage humanitarian assistance and public affairs within an information operations plan to target a global audience has tremendous possibilities for future operations.

**Cultural anthropology.** In conjunction with marketing, cultural anthropology seeks to understand the motivations and desires of actors within the context of a culture and society. Cultural anthropology is the “scientific study of human culture based on archaeological, ethnological, ethnographic, linguistic, social, and psychological data and methods of analysis.” It is a social science discipline whose traditional focus has been non-Western tribal societies, some of which we now confront in current operations. Anthropological methodologies include participant observation, fieldwork, historical research, and endeavors to understand societies from their perspectives, rather than through the researchers’ personal experiences, beliefs, and values.

Within the military, a primary task of cultural anthropology would be translating knowledge gained from field experience into doctrine, an obvious benefit for military leaders seeking to understand and even predict behavior in non-Western societies. Despite such benefits, there has been little movement to incorporate anthropology into military leader training. In military terms, understanding cultural anthropology is an important step toward enabling better human intelligence. Understanding cultures through training, increased interaction with local populations during operations, and ideally living among them may help local civilians understand a unit’s values and its mission. While there is an inherent security risk in this, increased public access may create commonality between military units and a local populace.

For future operations, Soldiers will require a greater appreciation of the culture in which they operate. Knowledge about customs and courtesies is valuable, but only a beginning. Leaders, planners, and Soldiers must understand how a culture will affect operations. Forcing IO officers to focus on human rather than technical aspects of information environments will better enable IO to leverage influence and will provide combat leaders, planners, and Soldiers the necessary tools for future deployments.
Change in Definition

The current definition of IO listed in the November 2003 FM 3-13 is:

The employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making.

The U.S. Army recently approved an updated definition that replaces the previous purpose, “to affect,” with an expanded one that reads:

...to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making, while protecting our own. It includes the use of these capabilities to influence the perceptions of foreign friendly and neutral audiences.

Reassessment of Core Capabilities

While the revised purpose acknowledges the ramifications of incorporating IO into planning, it does nothing to reassess core IO capabilities, and may give commanders who previously focused IO on kinetic operations the misleading impression that technology remains the key to information superiority. On the contrary, capabilities historically associated with successful IO are PA, PSYOP, Combat Camera, and civil affairs/civil-military operations.

If current trends persist, operations focused solely on destroying an enemy, objective, or capability will occur with decreasing frequency, while missions to enable a foreign security force or empower a local civil administration will become more frequent. Beyond just accomplishing increasingly complex missions, the ability to project these successful accomplishments, either locally, internationally, or both, may well determine overall mission success.

The IO core capabilities that can effectively address future operations—PA, PSYOP, Combat Camera, and CA—should be reassessed.

The current IO core capabilities of OPSEC and MILDEC could fall under G3 operations, while EW and CNO could fall under the G6 for support, under the G2 for collection of intelligence, and under the G3 for offensive electronic measures. While this may seem a radical departure for some, it would represent an institutional acknowledgement of what is already a reality on the ground.

Implications for Future Operations

U.S. National Security Strategy calls for a “future force that will provide tailored deterrence of both state and non-state threats (including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic aggression) while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors.” As a consequence, the lines between informational environments will continue to blur.

The lessons in this subject have repeatedly presented themselves during operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but caused little change in doctrine. In light of the Army’s ongoing self-assessment and published reports, commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq must have been aware of the challenges faced in the Balkan operations. The reluctance to modify doctrine may have been the result of an unwillingness to accept the risk of diverting limited assets and personnel from the mission of destroying the enemy. However, a more likely explanation was that planners viewed lessons learned after a peacekeeping mission as invalid for high intensity conflict.

For information operations to address these threats adequately and support a national strategic communications plan, the Army must ensure its IO officers have the skills and assets necessary to provide commanders with an in-depth understanding of cultural and societal factors within any given environment. IO officers must further assess how those factors will affect operations, further enabling commanders to influence local populaces, establish relationships of trust and respect, and ultimately create legacies of stability and security. MR
NOTES

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
13. Sholtis.
27. Ibid.
31. Ibid.

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CAL AKO
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/376783
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OUR CURRENT POLICY concerning Russia is flawed and must be reevaluated. We, the United States, seem bent on a collision course with Russia, a course that should be avoided at all costs lest an accidental exchange of fire between our two nations’ military forces lead to the use of nuclear weapons. American insistence on independence of Kosovo, pursuit of agreements with bordering nations to install ballistic defense missiles, and the encouragement of proxy democracies in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe all serve notice that the United States seeks to challenge Russia in her own backyard.

In the long run, nations pursue their interests irrespective of the personalities of their leaders. It is easy to characterize the behavior of individual leaders of nations as good or bad. However, to put recent developments in perspective, one must avoid the propaganda of the quick slogan and concentrate on the strategic situation. Any Soldier who has been around a few years knows that, to paraphrase Aeschylus, the first victim in any war is truth.

Factors such as language barriers, cultural differences, and religious traditions lead our nation to misunderstand and misread Russian actions. The language barrier is self-explanatory: the Russians use a Cyrillic alphabet—we use a Latin alphabet. While an American can often interpret a French or Spanish word without knowledge of the language, such interpretation in context is impossible with languages such as Russian that use a different alphabet. Thus the language barrier makes communication between the two nations more difficult. In addition, Russia is primarily an Orthodox Christian nation whose cultural and religious attitudes are closely intertwined even to this day, despite 70 years of militant communism. Orthodox Christianity is different from Western Christianity, which has attempted since Augustine and Aquinas to divide, define, and explain Christian theology. Western Christianity has always reinvented, and to some degree changed, its religious beliefs over time, but the Eastern Orthodox Church continues to accept the early church writings (by John Chrysostom, Basil the Great, and Gregory the Theologian) as definitive and without further need of explanation. Some say the Eastern Church is therefore more spiritual. For these reasons, among many others, Russians tend to be more obedient to authority, while Americans tend to be more individualistic.

A brief history of Eastern Europe helps to explain why current U.S. policy directed at Russia is confrontational and dangerous. The history of Russia
begins with the formation of Slavic democratic city-states organized by the Varangian Rus (Vikings who traveled east). Christianization of the Kievan Rus by Prince Vladimir in 988 led to a national identity. The invasion and predation of the Mongols in the 13th century followed 200 years of relative peace. These nomadic warriors were Islamicized in the early 14th century under the Golden Horde. Gradually, resistance to the Khan centered around the Grand Duchy of Moscow. In the 15th century, after many battles and deaths, the Mongols were defeated at the Ugra river and Russia was rid of the Mongol yoke of Genghis Khan’s descendents.

Further to the south, the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453 and turned the greatest cathedral in the Orthodox Christian world, Hagia Sophia (built by the Emperor Justinian and finished in 537 AD), into a mosque. From the 15th century to the beginning of the 18th, the Grand Duchy of Moscow expanded its power base until Russia became a recognized world power under Tsar Peter the Great. To some extent, the history of Russia in the last millennium is the history of its Christian people attempting to secure its borders from outside invasion.

From 1700 to the early 20th century, Russia warred with Sweden, Austria, England, France, Germany, Poland, the Caucasus region, Central Asian Islamic tribes, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan. Russia expanded its influence thanks to the military successes of Marshals Suvorov (Catherine the Great era) and Kutuzov (age of Napoleon). (Admiral John Paul Jones, considered a founder of the U.S. Navy, served in Russia under Catherine the Great against the Ottoman Empire.) Mid 19th- and early 20th-century foreign policy focused on Russia’s self-identity as the protector of Orthodox Christians. Russia viewed herself as the continuation of the Byzantine Empire and the third Rome. This self-identification drove Russia to pursue the retaking of Constantinople to ensure the Hagia Sophia became an Orthodox Christian cathedral once again.

We should examine the current situation through this knowledge of Russia’s history. The partition of Kosovo was the first Western military action serving notice that the United States would act against Russian interests. She was at her weakest point militarily just after the collapse of communism, and there was still good feeling toward the United States. But Russia could not see any vital U.S. interest in tiny Serbia, nor could she understand why the U.S. would side with Albanian Muslim jihadists against Orthodox Christians. In addition, after 9-11, America went to war with the jihadists; why then would it continue to take the jihadist’s side in Kosovo? To this day, many Russians suspect some secret deal with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia.

Consider the larger picture. Which is more stable for Western interests in Serbia/Kosovo—Muslim jihadists looting and pillaging, or Serbia and Kosovo remaining a stable Orthodox Christian nation? From the Russian perspective, keeping Kosovo part of Serbia is definitely in her national interests.

Since the 17th century, Russia has looked upon herself as the protector of Orthodox Christians throughout the world. Russian policy since this time has been to protect the smaller Orthodox nations from Islamic attacks. Kosovo is the Serbian ancestral homeland and has been part of Serbia since 1190. The seat of the Patriarch of Serbia is Pec, in Kosovo. Prince Lazar, a saint of the Orthodox Church and one of the greatest heroes of Serbia, was killed in Kosovo in 1389 defending his country from the Ottoman Turks. Since the mid 1990s, hundreds of Orthodox Churches and monasteries have been desecrated, defaced, and destroyed (with little U.S. intervention) in Kosovo by Albanian Muslims who never lived there. Such destruction of Orthodox churches in Kosovo is offensive to Russia, and she will likely take action for all of the reasons above, at a time of her own choosing. From the Russian perspective, America has no good reason for its interest in Kosovo, but Russia does, based upon her history.

Students of U.S. military and diplomatic history are no doubt aware of the Monroe Doctrine, first proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823. It stated the United States would not allow European powers to colonize or interfere in the affairs of the nations of South, Central, and North America. This
doctrine was invoked many times to prevent France, England, and Spain from impeding U.S. economic and political interests in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine led to the U.S. war with Spain and U.S. interventions in Mexico. As recently as 1962, President Kennedy invoked the Monroe Doctrine to oppose the installation of nuclear armed missiles by the Soviet Union in Castro’s Cuba. The irony is not lost on Russians today. Clearly, we would not want Russian weapons so close to the continental United States, and most Americans view the naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962 as justified protection of our national interests.

Why then do we protest when Russia takes offense at U.S. efforts to emplace missile-defense shield weapons in Russia’s backyard—in Poland, in the Czech Republic, or even in the Ukraine? Perhaps it would be better if we put these missile batteries somewhere else in the flight path of a launch from Iran. Other locations would be far less provocative to Russia and just as effective, if not more so, than the current locations. (The missile’s range is probably intercontinental, and the payload capacity is enough to carry a nuclear weapon.) We rightly took offense when the Soviet Union attempted to put missiles in Cuba. Why should we ignore Russia’s efforts to protect itself from our forward-located missiles? Why provoke Russia when we do not have to do so?

Consider the military implications: Does America have the capacity to put missiles in Poland in defiance of Russian wishes? An ultimatum to remove the missiles is a distinct possibility. Russia has already said it will not accept U.S. missiles in Poland. America’s military is overstretched already, and any defending U.S. force would have to be a heavy one, capable of defeating a Russian attack. Such a scenario is untenable. Were it to happen, it might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Cooler heads need to prevail now, before we chart a course that would be unwise, unsustainable, and from which we would have difficulty extracting ourselves.

What will be the outcome if we make promises to Poland, the Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries that border Russia, but do not back up such agreements with treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate? Is it really a vital U.S. national interest to protect a border country of Russia at the expense of the larger relationship? Are we really going to risk a nuclear exchange because of an overweening sense of our own power and importance? Many of these countries were part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union for much of their history. Russia has already stated she would make up for American advantages in smart weaponry by using tactical nuclear weapons in any fight we have with her. However, even in a purely conventional military scenario, Russia would be operating on interior lines close to resupply areas, while we would have to project substantial military power now currently committed elsewhere.

The situation in the Caucasus is particularly risky. At this juncture, it behooves the United States to avoid jingoistic diplomacy in the region because the tribal nations there have much more in common with Russia than they do with us. The many tribes of the Caucasus have been fighting each other since before recorded time. Yes, they carry neat-looking daggers and wear some interesting military uniforms, but they would turn on us the moment it suited them, because this is the way they have been fighting for over a thousand years. More than likely, U.S. intervention in the Caucasus would result in tribal alliances with Russia against America, and we would be at an insurmountable military disadvantage. The terrain in the Caucasus is mountainous and would require substantial dismounted infantry forces along with heavy units. U.S. intervention would be problematic.

Russia is no longer a communist state, and we Americans should understand the vast changes Russia has undergone since 1988. There is freedom of religion, private property, free association, and freedom to travel. Russia is no longer our enemy; however, by treating her as one, we might push her to become one. We should recognize our two nations’ language, cultural, and religious differences and consider them in balance with what our two nations have in common. Russia is much freer now than it was just 20 years ago. She has more engineers than trial lawyers, an educated populace, and

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is blessed with great natural resources. We should not antagonize Russia in the short run, because she has a bright future in the global economy that can benefit all. We should not look for reasons to divide our two countries, but stop our unwise policy toward Russia and engage her where we find mutual interests, and work with her directly and openly, as befits her status as a great power.

Three former U.S. secretaries of state—George Shultz, James Baker, and Colin Powell—served during the Cold War. We should solicit their views on our provocative attitude with Russia. We should ask these men if the stick we are attempting to poke in Russia’s eye is worth the risk of miscalculation and war. Such a discussion would be well worth hearing. MR

Russia is no longer our enemy; however, by treating her as one, we might push her to become one.

Not long ago Xenophon’s Anabasis of Cyrus needed no introduction for the student of classics (ancient Greek and Roman civilization) or military history. Today this is not necessarily true, as the traditional pillars of a well-grounded liberal education have fallen by the wayside, victims of academic revisionism against histories written by “dead white males.” That said, readers unfamiliar with Xenophon’s famous account of the “March of the Ten Thousand” will recognize the power and appreciate the human lessons of his narrative. Books generally do not become “classics” merely because of their age; they do so because of their enduring value to succeeding generations. The Anabasis is no exception. An eyewitness account by the protagonist of the events, it continues to be of seminal importance to students of ancient Greek and Persian history.

The ancient Greek verb anabasis may be literally translated as the “ascent,” the march “upland” from the low-lying coastal area near the eastern plateaus of central Mesopotamia, the journey embarked upon by a Greek mercenary army recruited by Prince Cyrus of Persia who planned to wrest the imperial throne from his elder brother, Artaxerxes. However, this “march upland” is only the prelude to an epic return journey. After a hard-fought battle where Cyrus is defeated and killed by his brother, the Greeks remain in good order but are at a loss as to what to do next. After listening to Xenophon’s wise words, they elect him their leader. Xenophon accepts the responsibilities of command and, after encountering many difficulties, he is able to lead most of the Greeks back to their homeland.

On their return journey, the Greeks fight the pursuing Persian army and hostile tribes in the mountains of Anatolia and endure extremes of hot and cold weather and difficult terrain. Moreover, Xenophon has to survive attempts to dismember the army by leaders of the Greek cities bordering the Black Sea, Spartan envoys, and the Thracians. Finally, Xenophon and a portion of his men return to their homeland against all odds.

Xenophon’s narrative is especially valuable for the insights it offers on ancient tactics and military leadership. Contemporary military officers will recognize that many of these insights are valid even today. Indeed, the importance of clear thinking in difficult situations, leadership by example, unit cohesion, and geographical factors such as high ground and rivers are as significant today as they were in Xenophon’s time. Historians will appreciate the discussion of the relative value of competing leadership systems and the subtle negotiations that characterized politics in the ancient world. Even more interesting are the insights Xenophon provides into human nature and a contextual richness that allows for more than one reading or interpretation of his text. Despite a natural bias to highlight and justify his own actions, Xenophon admits the reader as confidante into his inner world of motivations and personal perceptions, thus offering a unique window into the mind of a thoughtful ancient Greek philosopher-Soldier.

Xenophon’s world had witnessed a “clash of civilizations” between the Persian Empire and the fiercely independent Greek city-states, the first epic struggle in the “rise of Western Civilization.” The triumphant Greeks later turned against each other in the destructive intercine struggles of the Peloponnesian Wars. These struggles led to a world in which Soldiers could make their fortune in the pay of powerful employers, be they Greek or “barbarian”—the term used by Greeks to designate all non-Greek peoples. It was also a world in which the power of reason (as in the teachings of Xenophon’s revered teacher, Socrates) was establishing itself independently of any religious or moral system.

Xenophon’s Socratic connection is significant, and it permeates his thought. As a young man from a prominent Athenian family, Xenophon became attracted to the circle of youths surrounding Socrates. Indeed, other than Plato’s famous dialogues, the only other sources on Socratic discussions were penned by Xenophon. But, unlike his master Socrates, Xenophon was a restless man with a thirst for adventure. When his friend Proxenus invited him to join an expedition to Persia in support of Cyrus, Xenophon consulted with Socrates as to the wisdom of this course of action. The philosopher advised Xenophon to consult the famous oracle at Delphi as to whether he should embark on this journey. But young Xenophon had already decided. He asked the oracle not whether the adventure was advisable, but rather to which gods he should offer sacrifices to ensure a propitious journey. Socrates chastised his pupil for the cynical and dishonest interpretation of his advice but accepted his decision as a fait accompli and counselled him to follow the advice of the oracle.

An emphasis on “just” and “noble” behavior defined as loyalty to one’s peers and companions in
arms, bravery in battle, and conventional piety before the gods, is a constant theme of Xenophon’s narrative. Xenophon’s appeals to reason, his concern for justice, his use of rhetorical questions, and his willingness to submit to the judgment of the majority show how Socrates influenced him.

Wayne Ambler’s new translation of Xenophon’s classic narrative makes the text much more accessible and comprehensible for the contemporary reader. Even though it is written in clear language and supported by extensive notes, readers not accustomed to long oratorical passages should read these with care to enhance their understanding of the text. From a strictly military point of view, one minor glitch, the translation of the hoplite’s cutting weapon as “saber” may be confusing to the reader who associates this term with the classic curved 19th-century cavalry sword. The simple word “sword” would have been better.

In conclusion, Ambler has provided a great service by dusting the cobwebs from this enduring classic and making it available in an excellent English translation for the contemporary reader. Eric Buzzetti’s introductory essay puts the events and the book itself in their historical and cultural context. This edition of Xenophon’s Anabasis belongs on the bookshelf of every serious historian, political scientist, and military professional, as well as anyone interested in a compelling human story of triumph and survival in difficult circumstances. Reading Xenophon’s Anabasis as the tale of how a tactically superior, but numerically small, western force withdraws with their lives and honor intact from a dubious entanglement in the internal affairs of an ancient Middle Eastern civilization is a profitable modern use of Xenophon’s text.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, USA, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Decoding Clausewitz, Jon Tetsuro Sumida, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2008, 234 pages, $29.95.

FM 3-0, Operations cites only three sources for the manual: Arthur Bryant’s biography on the Duke of Wellington; a 2007 speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; and the 1976 edition of Carl Clausewitz’s On War. The first two sources appear in the manual only once, while Clausewitz is quoted repeatedly in topics ranging from chaos, chance, and friction to centers of gravity and operational reach. Few would dispute the fact that Clausewitz has influenced American military doctrine for the last 30 years, but do those who read his book really understand the messages the Prussian theorist intended to convey? In Decoding Clausewitz, Jon Tetsuro Sumida suggests that they often do not.

Sumida dedicates an entire chapter to military theorists and their relationships with Clausewitz; his research is revealing and insightful. He provides an informative analysis of Antoine Jomini’s “dismissal” of Clausewitz as well as Basil Liddell Hart’s “repudiation” of the Prussian thinker. The section dedicated to Jomini, a contemporary of Clausewitz, is of particular interest because Sumida provides a clear account of each theorist’s critique of the other. Clausewitz’s well-known attacks on his predecessors and contemporaries for “arbitrary notions” and “bogus theorizing” are found in chapter six of On War. Sumida provides a helpful survey of previous scholarship by detailing Jomini’s assessment of On War, which he said contained “defective reasoning” and “pretentious and pedantic” style. Sumida’s discussion of each theorist’s position on guerrilla war is particularly enlightening and timely today.

Liddell Hart was quite critical of Clausewitz as well. An advocate of victory by using maneuver to “dislocate and demoralize” the enemy, he claimed Clausewitz’s endorsement of Napoleonic tactics and his fascination with “maximizing violence to fight and destroy the enemy’s main army” greatly influenced many World War I leaders (Foch, Ludendorff, Schlieffen), thus contributing to the war’s extreme brutality.

Sumida is even-handed and analytical in his discussion, challenging both Jomini’s and Hart’s misreading of Clausewitz when necessary. Sumida follows his chapter on theorists with one focused primarily on the vast amount of scholarly research dedicated to Clausewitz since 1976. Throughout the chapter, Sumida acknowledges the work of several scholars, but in the end, he determines that “none of these thinkers [Aron, Paret, Gallie] achieved complete command of On War.” He develops his argument by providing biographical information on each scholar and a brief summary of his main points, and then compelling analysis why each man’s conclusions were unreasonable. Some may find the focus on philosophy disconcerting. For example, Sumida’s references and discussion of Clausewitz in terms of Hegel’s dialectical reasoning reinforce the book’s ongoing philosophical bent. Is this book for philosophers, military men, or that very small group who are both?

Developing competent generals was important to Clausewitz because success in that pursuit could ensure the existence of Prussia. He criticized “using principles
derived from history as the basis of officer education,” which he saw as role-playing. Instead, he proposed historical reenactment, which would presumably reproduce both the emotional and intellectual “difficulties of supreme command.” Sumida’s discussion of the differences between reenacting and role-playing in the development of military leaders is tough reading; it comes across as pure philosophy, in many ways as dense and ponderous as Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Some military professionals might find themselves wondering whether such musing interferes with the production of an operations order.

Sumida’s title, Decoding Clausewitz, implies that Clausewitz is not well understood by those who read his work. In his introduction, Sumida admits that there is no consensus as to what On War means, which is in itself cause for concern. To further add to the confusion, Sumida concludes that Clausewitz, “like Ludwig Wittgenstein a century later, believes that words can convey little more than a crude approximation of any complex and difficult reality, especially when a large part of experiencing that reality involves the play of emotion.” Sumida hints that the imprecision of language prevents us from ever fully communicating because none of us defines words in the same way, and thus we can never capture truly complex concepts.

Questions arise. If Clausewitz’s writing is accessible to a general audience, why does it need to be decoded? On the other hand, if On War is really so cryptic that it requires special insight from a small coterie of the cognoscenti to be accessible, how is it of any use to military professionals? What does the military community know to be true, and is such information agreed upon? Worse, what are the implications if we really do not know what Clausewitz meant?

Sumida sees On War as the philosophy of a practice rather than a philosophy about philosophy, often a challenging read.

LTC James E. Varner, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The War Within, the fourth and final installment of Bob Woodward’s chronicle of the Bush administration at war, seems superfluous. Much of this isn’t Woodward’s fault: the war that caused the war within the administration has been shoved aside by a financial crash, a historic presidential campaign, and, ironically, the surge’s success. There’s emotional fatigue to blame too. After five years of the kind of lethal fumbling described by Michael Gordon, Tom Ricks, and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, many of us are glad just to take the current good news, fragile though it may be, and relegate Iraq to the back burner. Who wants to read, yet again, about impotent national leadership and earnest but often fruitless warfighting?

But, of course, there’s still some curiosity to be sated, a record to be finalized. Could Bush, whose sum knowledge of warfare often seemed to be that “it’s hard work,” really be so vacuous? According to Woodward, who had unparalleled access to the president, the answer is yes. Bush fixated on body counts—on “killin’ ‘em.” In lieu of strategy, he concocted such nonsense as, “The word that captures what we want to achieve is victory.” Far from being “The Decider,” he was decidedly a spectator, even about the surge, which his national security advisor formulated without any guidance from him. The catalogue of presidential dysfunction is lengthy: Bush cowed advisors, had no sense of urgency, couldn’t focus on key briefings, spurned analysis in favor of instinct, and failed to see neon signs of catastrophe. The president, whom Woodward praised fulsomely in his first volume, now resembles Doonesbury’s empty-helmeted caricature. As the latter might suggest, most of Woodward’s assessments don’t qualify as insights, but to hear them frequently corroborated by Bush’s own words is worth the reading time.

MR’s readers might be more interested in Woodward’s take on the generals and other military players prominent between 2005 and 2008. Petraeus aside, the four-star cadre doesn’t come off particularly well. Casey is earnest but befuddled, pace a water boy, Schoomaker and the other chiefs disregarded and bitter. There are the usual accolades for H.R. McMaster and genuine admiration for the estimable Petraeus. (The Times’s reviewer opined that Woodward has a “man-crush” on the general.) But again, there’s not a lot of insight here: Woodward reprises McMaster’s superb work at Tal Afar, and for the umpteenth time we hear about Petraeus’s physical fitness, Princeton degree, saving by Frist, etc. What readers outside the Beltway might find new is the crucial role played by a retired general, Jack Keane, in turning the war around. Suffice it to say that Americans should be very grateful that all old Soldiers don’t just fade away—especially those who can see through the smoke and report back that there’s fire.

Unless your reading budget is large or your name appears in the book, I’m not sure I’d recommend buying The War Within. In addition to its born-old mien, the book is slow reading. Woodward piles up a mountain of detail, but not all of it is relevant; his style is clunky when not strictly prosaic (“Iraqi society... was stretched to the breaking point and on the precipice of coming apart”), and what are featured as significant events—e.g., convening of the “Council of Colonels,” a collection of the military’s brightest un-starred minds—don’t go anywhere. Still, as a compendium of who-thought-and-did-what in the last three years of the war, this book has real value. It will be in every
library in the land, and in multiple copies. I’d read it there.

LTC Arthur Bilodeau, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Louisville, Kentucky


Hans Blix, former United Nations chief weapons inspector in Iraq, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1981-1997), and the current chair of Sweden’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, has authored a concise book outlining the need for renewed international efforts to counter nuclear weapons proliferation. Blix remains the preeminent expert on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; thus, this book and his commission’s findings will help to frame the international debate on nuclear disarmament. The crux of the book is the need for the current nuclear powers, primarily the United States and Russia, to set the international course for reduction, disarmament, and ultimately, the elimination of nuclear weapons. Blix asserts it is disingenuous for nuclear-weapon states to declare that nuclear weapons are vital for their national security, while simultaneously claiming other states do not have a need to possess them for their own national defense. Blix stresses that for nuclear disarmament to become a reality, “States must be ensured security without nuclear weapons.”

Blix claims nuclear-weapon states are not taking seriously their commitment to disarmament under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, non-nuclear-weapon states have become increasingly dissatisfied with the failure of those nations who have nuclear weapons to move seriously towards disarmament. Blix argues that the nuclear-weapon states, including the United States, continue to develop new nuclear weapon systems and improve the methods for their delivery and are thus fueling the desire among nations to build and maintain nuclear weapon inventories. Blix proposes the United States should take the lead on disarmament by bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force to “significantly impede the development of new nuclear weapons.” If the U.S. does not take the lead, Blix foresees a future with more nuclear weapon tests and a new nuclear arms race: “A key challenge is to dispel the perception that outlawing nuclear weapons is a utopian goal. A nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical measures.” However, Blix fails to support this statement with a substantive argument or to show how his recommendations would lead to international disarmament. Additionally, Blix’s dislike for the current U.S. administration, its nuclear policies, and its foreign relations is obvious to the reader and at times detracts from his arguments.

The final pages of the book contain the Recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (which Blix chairs), and address the prevention of nuclear proliferation, prevention of nuclear terrorism, reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, and the eventual outlawing of nuclear weapons. The ideas and recommendations of this book merit considerable thought and discussion by political leaders and military strategists; however, the nuclear disarmament debate would have been better served by providing a more detailed discussion of potential courses of action leading to nuclear disarmament.

LTC Randy G. Masten, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Military occupations are inherently risky affairs. According to political scientist David Edelstein, only seven of the 26 international military occupations conducted since 1815 have succeeded. Edelstein’s new book, Occupational Hazards, attempts to explain not only this high failure rate for military occupations, but also what distinguishes a successful occupation from an unsuccessful one. Given the challenges the United States faces in its recent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, this broad analysis is a welcome addition to the literature.

The primary controlling variable in military occupations, Edelstein theorizes, is the “threat environment,” or the geopolitical situation of the occupied country. The threat from the Soviet Union made possible the successful occupations of Japan and Germany following World War II, for example. As much as the Japanese and Germans disliked the Allied occupations, their fear of the Soviets was greater—an example of what Edelstein terms a “favorable threat environment.” During the U.S. occupation of Korea, on the other hand, many Koreans saw the American occupiers as the greatest threat to Korean sovereignty—an example of an “unfavorable threat environment.” According to Edelstein, an occupying power facing a favorable threat environment encounters less resistance from the occupied population, and thus enjoys a greater chance of success. An unfavorable threat environment, on the other hand, requires the occupiers to rely heavily on coercive strategies, leading to a much lower chance of success. This threat environment model stands in contrast to previous theories of occupation, particularly those that consider an occupation’s success to be a function of time and resources allocated.

Occupational Hazards is not a compendium of best practices for military occupations. As the author points out, the book’s purpose is not to explain how better to conduct occupations, but to ask from the outset whether an occupation is likely to succeed, and thus whether it is a wise policy option. As such, Edelstein’s work is well suited for policy makers and military professionals who wish to understand the theoretical context in which occupations take place. Those interested in
learning how to better conduct military occupations should look elsewhere, although the book’s robust data provide an excellent starting point for studying the detailed aspects of military occupations.

MAJ Jason Ridgeway, USA, West Point, New York


The provocative title of this compendium of works belies the uncontroversial nature of most of the arguments advanced in it by 13 respected political scientists, economists, and theorists. Still, this is a valuable book for anyone with a professional or personal interest in the past, present, or future of the Atlantic order.

The book seeks to determine the seriousness of the present discord between the United States and Europe, the sources of that discord, and whether the Atlantic alliance is breaking apart or simply evolving. The authors do an admirable job of addressing each of these objectives. Positions taken in the book range from Charles Kupchan’s relatively pessimistic view that transatlantic tensions are systemic and a direct result of the elimination of the Cold War as a source of cohesion, to Henry Nau’s position that the current crisis is a passing one that has been largely the result of differing approaches taken by policy-making coalitions on each side of the Atlantic. Also of note are many values-based differences separating the United States from Europe are not unique to the post-9/11 era.

The bad news is that most of the authors agree that the West is in a crisis. The good news is that none of them, including Kupchan, assert that this crisis is likely to lead to the permanent breakdown in the Atlantic order. As transatlantic relations transform, particularly in the wake of recent events in the Caucasus, this collection is of value to scholars and practitioners seeking to understand the current crisis and ensure successful evolution of the U.S.-European relationship.

CPT Jordan Becker, USA, Colorado Springs, Colorado


The War on Terrorism has renewed interest in the scholarly history of Islamic militaries. James Waterson’s history of the Mamluks contributes a concise examination of this little-known and unique military organization. Waterson concludes that not only were the Mamluks one of history’s most elite fighting forces, but also that they became the standard by which the skills of mounted warriors were judged. The Knights of Islam: The Wars of the Mamluks chronicles the evolution of Islam’s slave-soldiers into a social caste, military culture, and political powerhouse.

The Mamluks were not Arabs—most were from Inner Asian cultures that had come into contact with conquering Muslim armies. Mostly Turkic and Circassian boys, they were imported as slaves into the Muslim world from the steppes and mountains on the margins of Islam. They were purchased in Constantinople or culled from incessant conflict with Christians in the Caucasus region and with confederations of Uralic and Altaic nomads.

Ultimately, the Mamluks became Islam’s savior by checking the expansion of the Mongols and defeating them at the Battle of Ain Jalut (or Goliath’s Spring) in the Jezreel Valley of Palestine in September of 1260. It was the first time an army decisively defeated the advancing Mongols. Subsequent attempts by the Mongol Khans to invade Egypt were thwarted by Mamluk power. It is not a far stretch to say that if not for the Mamluks’ victory in 1260, the Mongols might have extinguished Islam and advanced even farther west.

The Mamluks’ golden era of power was from 1250 to 1330 when they provided the critical synergy that unhinged and then destroyed the Crusader Kingdoms in Outremer (in Palestine). Earlier, in the 12th century, Mamluk slaves had been key to Saladin’s destruction of the Crusaders at Hattin, which allowed Jerusalem to fall back under the sway of Islam.

Waterson’s history weaves an evolutionary tale of the Mamluk’s military society. The Mamluks trained rigorously to deliver accurate volleys of missile fire against their opponents, causing enemy formations to disintegrate. Having come mostly from the steppes, they were familiar with horsemanship and Inner Asian tactics. It is interesting to note that the Mamluks’ declining power was finally broken on the Ottoman Empire’s own slave-soldiers. The Janissaries, mostly Circassian slaves employed and paid by the Ottoman Sultan as a professional guard force, were the first regular army in Europe since Roman times. They eventually ended the Mamluk’s mystique and power.

Waterson’s book delivers a well-organized narrative, a superb timeline, useful maps, period plates, and a first-rate bibliography. I highly recommend The Knights of Islam for anyone interested in the history of the region and Islamic military history.

LTC Robert G. Smith, USA, Germantown, Maryland


Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective causes us to ask the following: Where do terrorists get their money?
Have we done all that we can to deny financial solvency to our enemies and degrade their ability to maneuver? What role does the U.S. military play in counterterrorism financing? "Terrorism Financing and State Responses," a collection of essays that were presented as conference papers at a 2004 conference at the Naval Postgraduate School, attempts to make a "comprehensive assessment of the state of our knowledge about the nature of terrorism financing, the evolution of terrorist strategies and government responses, and the effectiveness of both." Unfortunately, none of the essays directly addresses the large-scale sectarian insurgencies that today confront the military in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the book plumbs the murky financial infrastructures and processes of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Therein lies the book’s value, as well as tactical and strategic possibilities.

While not a manual that will teach Soldiers in the field how to target enemy financial lines of support, the book does provide terms, concepts, and historical examples for those interested in this potentially quite useful activity. Editors Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas are both associated with the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. Contributors include terrorism, criminal finance, and foreign policy experts affiliated with think tanks located in academia and government.

The first five essays constitute an overview labeled “The Nature of the Problem and the Response.” The last 11 essays are case studies of specific efforts to attack regional and ideologically based terrorist finance networks. Together, Giraldo and Trinkunas contribute introductory and concluding essays that define broad themes and offer recommendations for improving counterterrorism financing efforts.

Chapters that address Islamic terrorist finances downplay the role of crime or state-sponsorship as sources of operational funds. Conversely, they also resist the idea that ideologically driven terrorists operate financially unconstrained, or that personal vices and limitations do not sometimes degrade religious idealism. Instead, several authors describe the flow of money into terrorist hands through the channels of haalwa (informal money transfer networks) and zakat (charitable-giving practices prescribed by the Koran).

Because practices of haalwa and zakat operate virtually unmonitored by state and international agencies while stitching together native and emigrant communities, the movement of money from law-abiding citizens to violent extremists is relatively easy. Though suppressing these unregulated money-movement flows is difficult, several of the book’s authors recommend that allowing them to survive closely watched may in fact be the better alternative. To gain information about key players, processes, and planned attacks, observation and analysis of haalwa and zakat networks can, one contributor writes, “illuminate and crystallize what had hitherto been uncertain.” The implication is that terrorists’ financial operations are untapped sources of intelligence and areas of vulnerability that organizations at many levels might act on.

**LTC Peter Molin, USA, West Point, New York**


Whether China’s emergence as a global power can peacefully find a place in East Asia and the world is a major issue in today’s international political environment. Given the European historical experience and the balance-of-power model, many believe China cannot rise peacefully. Kang writes a refreshing, persuasive, and provocative book stating otherwise. He emphasizes that from a realist perspective, China’s rise should already be provoking balancing behavior by its neighbors; however, its rise has generated little of that response. East Asian states are not balancing China; they are accommodating it, because China has not sought to translate its dominant position into conquest of its neighbors. They do not see China’s relationship with Taiwan as an indicator of how it would behave toward the rest of the region. More often than not, to promote stability and harmony, China has repeatedly resolved territorial disputes with its neighbors on less than advantageous terms and even signed declarations prohibiting the use of force to settle rival claims.

East Asia states view China’s reemergence as the gravitational center of East Asia more as an opportunity than a threat—the rightful natural state of regional equilibrium—and they are rapidly increasing cultural, economic, and diplomatic ties with China to take full advantage of this quickly emerging situation. Kang highlights the huge market China’s rise has created for its neighbors, facilitating their economic development. In fact, based on the notion that China poses no military threat and that it seeks to prosper economically along with its neighbors, East Asian governmental regionalism has grown dramatically in the past few decades (e.g., forming the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association of South East Asian Nations).

Accompanying these emerging relationships are regional foreign policies more aligned with China than the United States. U.S. diplomatic and military presence in East Asia has significantly diminished with the regional rise of China. The author does not see a strong China as a threat to U.S. regional interests, pointing to a relatively aligned China-U.S. economic and foreign policy toward East Asia. However, he cautions that as the United States and Japan shape their views on China and translate them into foreign policy, military balancing between China, the U.S., and Japan will adversely affect the region as a whole and cause it to become increasingly unstable.
Kang soundly supports and articulates his thoughts in a logical and convincing manner. The book is well laid out and easy to read, and its concepts are easy to grasp. Whether you agree with the author’s reasoning and conclusions or not, the book is well worth the read for the superb analysis of individual countries within East Asia and their perspectives and pursuits with China.

LTC David A. Anderson, USMC, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Death of the Wehrmacht, Robert Citino returns to a thesis he introduced two years ago in his book, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich. The earlier book argued that, from the 17th century to the blitzkrieg campaigns of World War II, German military leaders have conducted their battles and campaigns in a manner that showed a striking continuity across the centuries. From the Great Elector to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the German “way of war” featured recklessly aggressive commanders leading rapid and decisive maneuvers against more numerous but less agile enemies. Thus, Frederick’s oblique order against the right wing of an Austrian force, double the size of his own at the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, was revisited by Rommel in his panzer sweep around the British flank at Gazala in the western desert two centuries later. Similarly, Moltke’s encirclement of the French army at Sedan was reprise 70 years later in the massive Kesselschlacht around Kiev during Operation Barbarossa.

In his new book, Citino condenses his centuries-wide perspective down to seven months—May to November 1942. During that period, he argues, the German-style of warfare reached its culmination and demise. The spring and early summer of 1942 saw German mechanized formations winning spectacular victories in the Crimea, the Ukraine, and the western desert of North Africa. However, by the fall, the unique German approach to campaigning ran up against insuperable obstacles—overtaxed and overextended logistics, massive Allied superiority in materiel, and finally, micromanagement by Hitler when the long string of victories could not be sustained. Empty gas tanks and “stand fast” orders from Hitler stripped German field commanders of both their independence and their ability to maneuver. Under such circumstances, debacles like Stalingrad and El Alamein were inevitable.

Given his thesis, the title of the book is somewhat misleading. We know that, despite the defeats of 1942, the Wehrmacht defended the Third Reich for two more bloody years. Citino’s point is that, in their tenacious defensive battles against the overwhelming resources of the Allies, the German military was no longer conducting the unique style of command and maneuver that had led to so many battlefield triumphs since the founding of the Prussian state.

Citino writes well and makes a persuasive case. Those new to the campaigns of 1942 will find an education in this book. Those familiar with Irwin Rommel’s exploits in Libya and Egypt or Fedor von Bock’s drive to the Volga will find a challenging new interpretation of these famous operations.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Dr. Mark E. Neely focuses on a unique aspect of the Civil War to challenge a basic premise of many historians: that the war’s destructiveness was unprecedented and unmatched until the 20th century. Neely compares the American Civil War to the U.S.-Mexican War, the Mexican Civil War of 1862 to 1867, and the Plains Indian wars. His central thesis is that the Civil War’s “white vs. white” racial environment was a moderating influence, operating against a tendency toward increasing levels of violence prompted by frustration over the war’s progress. The events of these comparison conflicts provide fertile ground for developing a theory that racial factors materially influenced the treatment of “enemies”—whether they were combatants or not.

If there is a weakness in his argument, it is that Neely appears to choose his examples carefully in order to support his thesis. While he examines the actions of Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley forces in some detail, Sherman’s “march from Atlanta to the sea” is barely acknowledged, except as a notable exception. Thus, one is justified in approaching Neely’s conclusions with some skepticism. Contradictory evidence is not entirely lacking, but it is scattered and relatively weak.

A less prominent theme is the role of leadership and discipline in restraining brutality. This (barely articulated) conclusion appears as a largely undeveloped adjunct to the central thesis of racism. Neely notes that key leaders such as Generals Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor were appalled by atrocious acts committed by their Soldiers in Mexico, especially those acts of the volunteers. He attributes the relative restraint of Soldiers in the Civil War largely to improved discipline, yet declines to develop an in-depth analytical consideration of the role and the example of leadership in this transformation, focusing on racial implications instead.

A factor that also appears to be at least as influential as race is the type of “enemy” and the enemy’s method of warfare. Neely only briefly examines the destructiveness and brutality that appears to emerge when regular forces combat guerrillas over an extended period. Neely’s own research points in this direction, yet he touches it only lightly, missing an opportunity to
link positive leadership to restraint of destructiveness when armed forces become frustrated and begin to see everyone other than their own comrades as "the enemy"—a consideration that has relevance in contemporary conflicts.

Nevertheless, for a student of the Civil War, this is fascinating reading. The documented personal accounts of participants are especially enlightening—even compelling. The perspective of the conflict through the lens of the racial component of the combatants provides a novel approach to the study of the Civil War. Whether the reader is convinced by Neely’s arguments is another issue.

Thomas E. Ward, II, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Professors Bruce A. Glasrud and Michael N. Searles, nationally recognized experts on blacks in the west, have compiled an anthology that chronicles the complete gambit of experiences encountered by the black Soldier in the west. The anthology presents the Buffalo Soldier’s story as told by 16 black Soldier scholars in as many essays. The authors set out to compile a history of the “African Americans in the latter years of the nineteenth and early 20th century who were primarily engaged in Soldiering in the western United States.” The book lays out the story of the Buffalo Soldiers and the honorable record they compiled despite the often-difficult circumstances and racial struggles they encountered in military service on the western frontier.

The essays provide the reader with a good understanding of the military and social history of black Soldiers in the west. Their struggles with white officers and the citizens of the towns they had sworn to defend are all chronicled. This is not, however, merely an attempt to garner support or sympathy for the Buffalo Soldier. The editors present essays that detail a variety of social struggles, but they also highlight the successful undertakings of black Soldiers, emphasizing their dedication and skill. Notable among the essays in the volume are the stories of the “Black Seminoles”; black Soldiers as improbable ambassadors; black Soldiers as military pioneers in the case of the 25th Infantry, also known as The Black Bicycle Corps; the story of Cathey Williams, the first black female buffalo Soldier; the dubious court-martial and conviction of Henry O. Flipper, the first black West Point graduate; the antagonistic relationship between black Soldiers involved in the Houston Riot and between the Soldiers of Fort Hays and the town of Hays City, Kansas.

The book is valuable to the military reader not only for its research into an all too infrequently examined chapter of our military development, but also because it examines black troops in general and the experiences of several memorable individuals in particular.

LTC Gerald F. Sewell,
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Many see Napoleon as the culmination of the French Revolution’s energy and the prototype of the new man that emerged from its turmoil. Philip Dwyer concurs and describes the ways Napoleon used the novel methods to present himself as a new leader untainted by petty partisan politics. Dwyer shows Napoleon as a serious, talented, energetic young man in his 20’s who experienced a series of reverses that destroyed his idealism but not his ambition. Napoleon’s disillusionment with his youthful goals fired his determination to rise as a Soldier, and his experiences during the Revolution schooled him in a politics that was devoid of idealism. Dwyer also demonstrates the influence of family ties and the role Napoleon’s family played in his rise to prominence. Napoleon emerges as the most skillful personal promoter of his time and the most capable general in the French army.

Dwyer builds his narrative around four significant events in Napoleon’s early life. The first was the split with Corsican nationalist leader Pascale Paoli and the Bonaparte family’s exile to France, long the object of their scorn and hatred. Napoleon’s deep attachment to Corsica was an important part of his identity. Initially the Bonaparte family wanted to join Paoli, but when he rejected them as French collaborators, they refocused their energies on France, and Napoleon remodeled himself into a French patriot, which led to his deeper involvement in revolutionary politics.

The second event was Napoleon’s rapid courting and honeymoon with Josephine. Dwyer suggests that nothing motivated Napoleon more during his first command in Italy than his desire to impress Josephine, for whom he had a fervent passion. His letters to her are legendary for their ardor, and Dwyer quotes from some of the most passionate.

The third event was Napoleon’s discovery of his military talent during the Italian campaign. Dwyer infers that Napoleon was as surprised as anyone was by his martial achievements and leadership abilities and used his gift for self-promotion to manipulate the presentation of these victories to the public to bolster his own part and minimize the role of others.

Finally, there was the Egyptian campaign, his first experience with defeat. The strategic military consequences of the campaign were calamitous—an entire French army was lost. At the siege of Acre, Dwyer shows Napoleon was a ruthless gambler willing to spend the lives of his Soldiers in a hopeless cause. The Egyptian campaign marked the public beginning of his cynicism, which began in Corsica and marked his later years.

This campaign also showed his ability to portray a humiliating
defeat positively in France. The romantic notion of the Egyptian campaign propelled him to the forefront of political leadership when he returned to France despite abandoning the army in Africa. He called the expedition a success and himself a returning hero uncontaminated by the lengthy political squabbling that occurred in his absence. In narrating Napoleon’s role in the 18th Brumaire coup, Dwyer restores indeterminacy to the event. He shows how it almost failed, thereby reminding us that nothing is inevitable and showing how much Napoleon had learned since his first political experiences in Corsica.

In this, the first volume of a two-volume biography, Dwyer writes about Napoleon’s life and times and explains the changing ways in which the French idealized their heroes. This emphasis comes at the expense of campaign history but works to explain how Napoleon began to dominate contemporary politics. Those looking to explore the details of Napoleon’s military career should consult David G. Chandler’s encyclopedic work on Napoleon’s campaigns. Dwyer argues that Napoleon’s genius lay in presentation, politics, and publicity as well as in war and generalship. Whether his victories were sweeping like Rivoli, or non-existent like Acre, he was able to convey an image of dramatic and unmitigated success that served him well throughout most of his career.

In lectures to British Army staff college students in the 1930s A.P. Wavell noted, “To learn that Napoleon in 1796 with 20,000 men beat combined forces of 30,000 by something called economy of force or operating on interior lines is a mere waste of time. If you can understand how a young unknown man inspired a half-starved, ragged, rather Bolshie crowd; how he filled their bellies; how he out-marched, out-witted, out-bluffed and defeated men who had studied war all their lives and waged it according to the text-books of their time, you will have learnt something worth knowing.” Dwyer helps us move toward this understanding.

LTC Lewis Bernstein, USA, Retired, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

Regarding “Relooking Unit Cohesion”


Van Epps’article interested me because the Army staff hotly discussed unit cohesion vis-a-vis the wide use of “filler” personnel in National Guard and Reserve units shortly before they deployed to Iraq. It was a case in which the leadership of people collided with the management of quantifiable subjects. Soldiers know of its importance, but when we cite unit cohesion to allocate resources, responsible managers demand empirical evidence of its value that we cannot satisfactorily provide. Even when we successfully make the distinction between unit cohesion and unit integrity, we cannot offer a certifying metric for unit cohesion.

An interesting element of the discussion was: What exactly builds cohesion? The immediate response was that time spent together is the key factor, but some studies claim that a group’s members are bonded through shared successes. If so, a training program of challenges conquered in rapid succession can produce cohesion in a relatively short time.

I see a link between group cohesion and appointed versus acquired leadership authority. Military officers are first appointed to be the legal leader and then acquire actual leadership authority during the process of building unit cohesion. Early American militia units usually elected their small unit officers or volunteered to enlist under a particular leader, a practice that professionally trained officers, as an article of faith, deride. However, those early militia captains were the men the community already trusted as the most successful leaders and fighters with whom the recruits probably lived for years in familiarity and kinship. It was almost a tribal environment, in which pre-existing cohesion produced the military structure. A small unit leader should ask the mirror, “Would my Soldiers vote to retain me in command?”
The smells of burning rubber, wafting with the essence, of the unspoken. Such fires burning forever, in the memories I have come to fear. And thus, days come and nights go. Never waking to the burning sun, as I lay each night, delaying sleep, each minute, laying, praying, through the endless nights, yearning, anxious for one more day. Fearing anything more would be far too greedy. Each day, a movement to contact. Each night, I lay trembling, avoiding the dreams I so fear. Thus, to be at war, is to live in the present, nothing more. Forsake the future as impossible revel in the past wake, each day knowing, believing, this could be my last.

—Major Edward L. Bryan, U.S. Army
U.S. Army War College
STRATEGIC LANDPOWER
Essay Contest 2009

The United States Army War College and the United States Army War College Foundation are pleased to announce the annual STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest.

The topic of the essay must relate to “Perspectives on Stability Operations and Their Role in U.S. Landpower.” Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of $3000 to the author of the best essay, a prize of $1500 to the second place winner, and $500 to the third place winner.

For more information or for a copy of the essay contest rules, contact:
Dr. Michael R. Matheny, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242 (717) 245-3459, DSN 242-3459, michael.matheny@us.army.mil

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest Rules:

1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 5000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Dr. Michael R. Matheny, USAWC Strategic Landpower Essay Contest, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 17 February 2009.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author will assign a codename in addition to a title to the essay. This codename shall appear: (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title in lieu of the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank/title, branch of service (if applicable), biographical sketch, social security number, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the codename. This envelope will not be opened until after the final selections are made and the identity of the essayist will not be known by the selection committee.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 1/2” x 11”. Submit two complete copies. If prepared on a computer, please also submit the entry on an IBM compatible disk, indicating specific word-processing software used.
6. The award winners will be notified in early Spring 2009. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by 1 April 2009.
7. The author of the best essay will receive $3000 from the U.S. Army War College Foundation. A separate prize of $1500 will be awarded to the author of the second best essay and a prize of $500 will be awarded to the author of the third place winner.
ANNOUNCING the 2009 General William E. DePuy
Combined Arms Center Writing Competition
“Leader Development from Initial Entry Training to the Battlefield”

While commander of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1973 to 1975, General William E. DePuy established the first Army-wide standards for NCO individual and collective training and education. In recognition of the Year of the NCO, the 2009 General William E. DePuy writing competition will focus on non-commissioned officer leader development. Submissions should be original, well-researched essays 3,500–5,000 words long.

Contest closes 2 June 2009

1st Place $1,000 and publication in Military Review
2nd Place $750 and publication in Military Review
3rd Place $500 and publication in Military Review
4th Place $250 and special consideration for publication in Military Review
Honorable Mentions $100 and possible publication in Military Review

For complete information and topic suggestions, see the Leader Development Category of the CAC-CG’s Priority Research List at http://militaryreview.army.mil