NARROWING THE GAP: DOD and Stability Operations

Colonel David W. Shin, U.S. Army

The Department of Defense (DOD) should challenge the assumption that it must prepare to perform all stability lines of operations as a “core mission” as specified in Directive 3000.05 and subsequent Army operations doctrine FM 3-0 because it does not have sufficient resources to accomplish all the assigned tasks on its own. Instead, DOD should focus on its strengths—providing civil security and control—and work to create conditions for civilian counterparts to operate more effectively on the ground to fill the gap.

This requires general purpose forces (GPFs) to focus on security-related tasks, while a “specialized training brigade” is created to institutionalize DOD capabilities to train foreign military, police, and border guards. Without investing significantly more in the capacity for supporting governance and economic and infrastructure development, DOD can mitigate risk by adopting more innovative ways to employ civil affairs (CA), other non-GPFs, and by leveraging Africa Command (AFRICOM) to build whole-of-government approaches. In fact, AFRICOM can be the laboratory, testing the whole-of-government approach in stability operations. Finally, DOD can partner with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), its private sector partners, and others in industry to fill the gap. This requires DOD to determine new ways to manage contractors in high-paced operational environments.

Background

In recent years, many observers have concluded that the United States excels at winning wars, but has failed to develop interagency capabilities to win the peace.1 In July 2004, this concern led to the formation of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The department gave its new office a broad mandate “to develop policy options to respond to failing and post-conflict states.”2 However, Congress has yet to provide S/CRS with the resources needed to perform its mandate. Despite continuous urging from DOD and the signing
of National Security Presidential Directive 44 in December 2005, Congress failed to achieve consensus to resource S/CRS properly. Although making some progress by initiating strategic planning, and engaging with allies, regional, and international organizations, S/CRS only had about 10 active and 90 standby corps members in March 2008, who could deploy quickly in response to a crisis. Upon passage of proposed legislation this capacity could be expanded by adding 500 volunteers to the Civilian Reserve Corps for the near term.

Many in DOD have concluded that, while building civilian capacity for expeditionary capabilities remains a top priority, DOD must assume doing so “will take years, if not decades, and require revolutionary Congressional action with respect to budgets and authorities.” This means, “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all [stability] lines of operations when civilians cannot do so.” However, after DOD Directive 3000.05 (November 2005) made stability operations a “core mission” on par with combat operations for the U.S. military, DOD has not decided how much capacity is needed to fill the civilian gap and whether doing so requires a standing stability operations force. The Directive says stability operations tasks include—

- Rebuilding host-nation institutions including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems.
- Reviving the private sector, including promoting economic activity and infrastructure development.
- Developing representative government institutions.

The assumption that DOD should perform all of the stability operations tasks identified in the Directive as a “core mission” should not go unchallenged. DOD should instead focus its efforts on the two security-related tasks of the Army’s five stability lines of operations. It should accept limited risk by being judicious in investing in GPFs and avoid the temptation to build capabilities that the DOD is not best suited to perform.

To mitigate risks inherent in this strategy, DOD should consider more innovative ways to employ Civil Affairs and leverage AFRICOM to build whole-of-government approaches that prevent fragile states from failing or relapsing into instability. DOD should take bold steps to institutionalize lessons learned from experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by creating a “specialized training brigade” for training foreign security forces. To narrow the gap further, DOD should aggressively promote interagency cooperation by supporting non-DOD members operating in insecure environments and partnering with private industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. This will require building a significant capability within DOD to manage contracts. It appears USAID is best positioned to help DOD partner with the private sector. More DOD-USAID cooperation could narrow the civil-military gap and improve U.S. stability operations planning and execution.

Why DOD Directive 3000.05?

The trend in recent years indicates that our foes do not want to compete with the U.S. military in conventional combat so our future success will largely depend on conducting operations in the midst of civilian populations. A recurring theme during U.S. military operations throughout the 1990s and our current campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly demonstrate the need to improve the U.S. military’s stability operations capabilities. While promoting an increased deployable civilian capacity is a top DOD priority, many believe it would take years to develop this capacity. In the meantime, DOD would work to “mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity by preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks.” The need for developing stability operations capability becomes even more urgent when one considers that from 1990 to 2006, the U.S. military sacrificed four times the lives and treasure during stability operations than they had in conventional combat operations. In 2006, the Defense Science Board concluded DOD could successfully implement the Directive without “expensive technology, new weapons acquisition, or massive re-organization.” The board also determined that the key is to change mind-sets that no longer apply, but will that be enough?
Stability Operations Tasks and Solutions
As the need for developing stability operations capability gained momentum, the U.S. Army identified the following five stability operations tasks in February 2008:

- Provide civil security.
- Provide civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

Arguably, the U.S. military is trained and equipped to execute many of the security-related tasks, however it lacks the capacity to follow through on the governance and development-related tasks. In light of this capability gap, the U.S. military should take the lead in providing civil security and control that creates the conditions for the interagency to operate on the ground and avoid expanding DOD’s capacity for governance and development. What are some implications of this strategy?

Civil Security
The Department of Defense taking the lead on U.S. government security missions means that GPFs must provide civil security to protect the local population from both domestic and foreign threats, and assist helping the host-nation’s security forces to fight terrorists, criminals, and other obstructionist groups. In cases such as Kosovo, where there are no police, judges, or jails, the U.S. military will have to exercise full policing authority and perform other functions essential to establishing the rule of law (i.e., operating a court system and corrections facilities). This will require more military police units and a commitment to train brigade combat teams to support civil law enforcement. This effort must include tasks commonly associated with constabulary forces.

The 1969 military manual Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict states the reason for a constabulary force is “to create order in an unstable situation while assisting in and encouraging the development of social organizations and public attitudes that are conducive to long-term stability.” While some may question this requirement, history shows that the U.S. military has habitually filled this role “by conducting operations as a trained constabulary force or in a constabulary role until the creation of permanent civilian institutions or the transition of operations to a competent authority.”

For example, the U.S. military has historically performed some constabulary duties in the following: the post-Civil War reconstruction effort, U.S. intervention in the Caribbean in the early 1900s, post-World War II Germany and Japan, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and finally Iraq.

Furthermore, today’s Army doctrine calls for civil support operations, which suggests that the Army’s traditional constabulary role remains a mission essential task. Doctrine states that when required, the Army will “provide support to local, state, and Federal law enforcement officers. In extreme cases, and when directed by the President, Regular Army forces [will] maintain law and order.”

Nevertheless, the goal is to transition to either international or locally trained host-nation police forces. Training host-nation security forces should remain DOD’s primary role in promoting “government and participation.” DOD should take the lead in training the host-nation’s military, police, and border guard forces. DOD can expect other elements of national power to participate in stability and reconstruction tasks only when it provides a secure environment through policing and border protection. When civilian officials arrive in insecure environments, DOD must protect them so they can operate to shape conditions for improved stability and civil support. To achieve this civil-military synergy, DOD must be willing to provide dedicated military escorts for civilian officials. Instead, DOD provides security support on an ad hoc basis or forces civilian government agencies to rely on private security firms for protection. In Iraq, outsourcing security soon became “prohibitive” and ad hoc approaches caused inevitable delays, schedule adjustments, and a DOS-DOD debate over “whether to use military or contract guards and who should pay for them.”

If DOD is unwilling to provide security for civilian officials, it should not expect U.S. government civilians to assume the risks associated with operating in an unstable environment. Furthermore, without protection, a fully resourced civilian corps will be ineffective, even if they are on the ground in sufficient numbers.

The most significant gap within the security sector appears to be DOD’s lack of capacity to operate a judicial system. Civil affairs can help fill
some gaps. Army doctrine states that CA units are capable of providing modular packages to plan and enable rule-of-law development as it pertains to fair, competent, and efficient enforcement applications “of the civil and criminal laws of a society through impartial legal institutions and competent police and corrections systems.” This CA capability includes judge advocates and related specialists trained in international and comparative law. USAID and its partners can also assist in filling the gap, but as Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli reminds us, USAID currently has only about 3,000 employees (compared to 15,000 during the Vietnam War) and is “little more than a contracting agency.”

Like many U.S. government organizations, including DOD, USAID experienced personnel cuts over the years and relied upon the private sector to fill the gap. Despite this setback, USAID still manages to maintain its presence in many fragile, failing, and developing states around the world. USAID personnel and their partners have the developmental expertise, local knowledge, and contracting capacity to be true force multipliers for DOD. In fact, USAID is probably in the best position amongst all the U.S. government agencies to leverage their knowledge about private sector support for stability operations. This includes insights regarding indigenous private sector capabilities and capacity. In the end, closer DOD-USAID collaboration has the potential to narrow the civil-military gap and improve U.S. government stability operations planning and execution.

For example, USAID has “indefinite quantity” contracts and other contracting arrangements with the private sector (for-profit companies, nongovernmental organizations, and universities) for “strengthening rule of law and respect for human rights.” These involve eight primary contractors and approximately 33 sub-contractors. DOD can coordinate with USAID to access this rule-of-law private sector and fill the gap.

**Civil Control**

According to Army doctrine, civil control “regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups.” The population’s activities are channeled “to allow provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force conducting [stability] operations,” and it may include “crowd control.” This suggests civil control could be a subset of civil security. If the military is capable of providing civil security, it should be able to manage civil control. However, without this capability, the Army must rely on civil capacity that currently is incapable of responding to crisis in a timely manner. For example, the UN called for a crowd control capability in Kosovo because of civil disturbances, and the international special police units took almost a year to deploy to Kosovo.

**Restoring Essential Services**

While restoring essential services is another critical component of stability operations, restoring electrical power is not included in Army doctrine. Army doctrine emphasizes providing emergency medical care, preventing disease epidemics, providing food and water, and providing emergency shelter and basic sanitation such as sewage and garbage disposal. The military can perform many of these tasks with medical, CA, engineer, and general purpose forces. Restoring electricity or
building additional electrical capacity can also be contracted through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Although we should be careful not to promise something we cannot deliver, the indigenous population can perceive our failure to provide adequate electricity as a general failure to restore order and stability as was the case in Iraq.

As a result, from October 2003 to March 2006, a significant part of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was spent on restoring the electrical grid for the nation of Iraq.

- The U.S. Army Transatlantic Programs Center contracted with Odebrecht-Austin company to maintain a Gas Power Plant for $38.66 million.
- Shaw Centcom Services to rehabilitate a transmission line and substation for $15.42 million.
- Washington International/Black and Veatch to rehabilitate a generator for $64.29 million.
- Joint Contracting Command-Iraq-Afghanistan contracted with Fluor to construct an electric power plant for $4.5 million.
- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—Gulf Region Division contracted with KEC-OZDIL to design and reconstruct a transmission line for $23.86 million and with “Iraqi Company I” to build an electrical complex for $2.87 million.

The military can maintain the capacity for restoring electricity by partnering with industry to ensure this capability is available when needed, similar to the way USAID uses its indefinite quantity contracts.

Support to Governance

The U.S. Army doctrine for supporting improved governance includes—

- Developing and supporting host-nation control of public activities, the rule of law, and civil administration.
- Maintaining security, control, and essential services through host-nation agencies (includes training/equipping security forces and police).
- Supporting indigenous efforts to normalize succession of power (elections).

This effort is a natural extension of civil security, civil control, and essential services tasks, which is the foundation for supporting governance. As noted earlier, the military should play a leading role in security by helping to rebuild “indigenous institutions including various types of security...
forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.” However, other agencies like USAID can and should take the lead in developing “representative governmental institutions.”

Organizing, training, equipping, and advising foreign militaries, police, and border guards have become key tasks for our GPFs, thus potentially ending U.S. Special Forces (SF) monopoly on training of foreign security forces. The U.S. Army should institutionalize this non-SF capability by establishing a “specialized training brigade” to train foreign military, police, and border guard units. Some argue that training police and border guard units risks DoD efforts to promote civilian capacity building and DoD could end up holding the bag for these tasks. However, DOD must realize that doing all it can to provide a secure environment for others in the interagency to operate on the ground is the key to success, and that success is unlikely to occur without building a host-nation police and border guard capability. Worse yet, DOD will most likely be left holding the bag. For example, 400 Navy reservists from hospital corpsmen to explosive ordnance specialists were recently mobilized to undergo six weeks of customs inspection training to perform these duties in support of the Army in Iraq.

Until U.S. government civilian partners arrive, CA units can fill gaps and are capable of “creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society is governed, protected, and also prospers.” This work can initially be done by “CA specialists in public administration, environmental management, and public safety areas.”

To narrow the gap further, DOD should again look to USAID and its partners. USAID has approximately 15 primary contractors for governance, 150 sub-contractors, and 20 affiliates. Rather than building additional capacity for governance, DOD should focus on providing security to keep the experts safe on the ground.

**Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development**

The final Army stability operations task, “support economic and infrastructure development,” includes helping host nations develop both the capability and capacity to support these areas. Army doctrine does not say what to do to accomplish the task. However, doctrine does acknowledge DOS technical sectors in this line of operation to include: reconstituting power, transportation, communications, health and sanitation, fire fighting, mortuary services, and environmental control. When these basic needs are restored, the task shifts to stabilizing the economy: providing employment opportunities, overseeing monetary reform, and rebuilding public structures.

The Department of Defense’s capability to provide essential services is critical to infrastructure development. Given the current gaps in DOS capacity to contract and oversee infrastructure development, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other organizations with contracting capabilities such as USAID may have to take the lead on larger infrastructure development projects, particularly in the short-term.

Even though civilian agencies should have the lead for economic development, the military has some effective tools like the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The program is used to promote local economic activity, and in some cases (such as Iraq), allows DOD to play a significant role in economic development. For example, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Iraq helps revitalize Iraq’s economy by leveraging DOD’s current $10 billion per month cost of sustaining operations in Iraq. This level of spending can have a significant impact on local economic development across several sectors.
Civil affairs units can also provide expertise in economic development, civilian supply, food and agriculture, public transportation, public works and utilities, and public communications. Private industry for this sector includes AECom, Louis Berger, URS, Fluor, Washington Group, Perini Corporation, Parsons Iraq JV, KBR, Black & Veatch, Parsons Delaware, Lucent, and Contrack.

Success in narrowing the civil-military gap requires innovative use of GPFs and non-GPFs in close coordination with USAID, its private sector partners, and others in private industry. How can DoD make this work more effectively?

**Thoughts on Stability Operations**

Some analysts have proposed much larger investments in stability operations, while others support the status quo or oppose investing much at all in the effort. Andrew F. Krepinevich, has argued it is time for DoD to create “a standing capability for training and advising indigenous and allied military forces.” He has also pushed for converting a “substantial” number of Army brigades to stability operations.

Krepinevich contends that post-Cold War conventional combat—the 1991 Gulf War and Second Gulf War in 2003—demonstrated the “enormous overmatch” U.S. forces have over enemies that challenge them in conventional warfare. He notes that despite this dominance in conventional warfare, the U.S. Army plans to create six additional brigades, and the Marines will “add a regimental combat team to round out their three division-wing teams” with the 92,000 personnel increase in our ground forces.

Krepinevich also stresses that the conventionally focused U.S. military failed to respond effectively to irregular challenges in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

On the other hand, General Chiarelli believes that DoD simply does not have the luxury to divide forces into combat and stability units. He has argued for “developing full-spectrum capabilities across” the armed forces. He acknowledges that the Army may need to expand some “specialized units,” like “civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that play critical roles in stability operations.” Chiarelli does not think GPFs should train indigenous security forces. He says they should have the “inherent flexibility” to perform this mission when Special Forces lack the capacity to meet expanding requirements.

According to Chiarelli, these requirements should be resourced from units already operating in the battle space, instead of cherry-picking personnel to augment externally resourced training teams.

Colin S. Gray concurs with Chiarelli’s assessment and goes further by suggesting stability operations should not be viewed as a “separate matter,” but as a part of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy. Gray predicts that since “protracted irregular warfare will not prove domestically sustainable [in the U.S.], it has to follow that there will be only a modest policy demand for stability and reconstruction operations.”

Perhaps even more than Directive 3000.05 itself, AFRICOM’s establishment suggests that security and development are inexorably linked and the U.S. is making a long-term commitment to stability operations.

Though Krepinevich’s call to create a standing force to train foreign security personnel has merit, it is not realistic to create several brigades solely for stability operations when DoD is under constant pressure of budget constraints, rising operating tempo, and the whole-of-government approach is a less costly way for DoD to conduct stability operations.

The proposed strategy allows U.S. departments and agencies to exercise their core competencies instead of building redundant capabilities to guard against self-fulfilling prophecies. (“Civilians will not be there to help.”) Chiarelli is correct to suggest that standing forces are not required for stability operations, but specialized units should be expanded, such as civil affairs, engineers, military police, and others to fill critical gaps. However, it is unrealistic to suggest GPFs should only train foreign security forces when Special Forces lack the capacity to do so. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military is unlikely to have enough Special Forces to satisfy all foreign training requirements. Now is the time to institutionalize this capability by creating a “specialized training brigade” before we lose it yet again.

**Africa Command (AFRICOM)**

The AFRICOM model has significant implications that can enhance DoD stability operations capabilities and further refine DoD’s role in the
whole-of-government approach. In 2007, 8 of the 10 most fragile states were in sub-Saharan Africa, up from 6 in 2006. AFRICOM offers a new way to respond to crises and to prevent fragile states in Africa from relapsing into instability. On 6 February 2007, President Bush declared, “This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa.” He went on to say that the command “will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, and economic growth in Africa.”

AFRICOM offers a new way to respond to crises…

The Department of Defense should initially commit the “specialized training brigade” in support of AFRICOM to address its security-developmental challenge. As AFRICOM’s mission requirements mature and the brigade demonstrates its capability, other COMs could also be supported. It should also create a new, fifth civil affairs command to augment AFRICOM’s mission requirements. Instead of the new civil affairs command being entirely from the reserves, the Army should make at least one of the new CA battalions an active component. If the U.S. Military can afford to dedicate the only active CA brigade in the Army to the Special Operations Command, then DOD should be able to resource a CA battalion for AFRICOM, the only non-warfighting combatant command in DOD.

However, CA is not a “silver bullet” for filling the civil-military gap. Some analysts have recently called for ending “the practice of using CA soldiers to
fill civilian vacancies where highly skilled civilians are required.” Additional CA capacity is needed, but to have more credibility, CA must recruit the right kinds of professionals and properly train them to perform their missions, because CA will continue to be called upon to fill critical civilian jobs during stability operations.

Civilian U.S. government agencies should not fear AFRICOM, but embrace it. AFRICOM offers the opportunity to work with DOD on a day-to-day basis to secure and develop Africa. Assuming AFRICOM eventually becomes the model for whole-of-government approach to stability operations, it is in the genuine interest of all with a stake in stability operations to send their very best talent to help shape AFRICOM.

**Need for Effective Contract Management**

Finally, it is clear DOD must rely on private industry partners to fill gaps during stability operations. To strengthen rule of law, restore electrical power, support governance, and other civilian oriented tasks, DOD must create a more flexible and responsible contract management system. While private industry can provide high quality and specialized services at lower cost, inadequate DOD contract oversight has resulted in overcharges for services. One of the better-known incidents is KBR’s overcharging DOD by $28 million for food services that were not provided in Iraq. Corruption is another issue. Some have been tempted to take small kickbacks from local sub-contractors, which auditors have often failed to detect. KBR employees in Kuwait received $6 million in kickbacks from a local firm. Lack of accountability is another problem. Several DynCorp contractors were “implicated in sex crimes, prostitution rackets, and illegal arms trafficking” but escaped prosecution because the U.S. lacked jurisdiction in Bosnia. Contractors may not always be dependable. Some may choose to abandon their contracts, and it may be difficult to replace them since contractors work in dangerous environments.

Nonetheless, it is almost impossible to operate without contractors today. DOD should create a CONUS contracting office with contract management specialists and subject matter experts who can ensure efficiency and security in out-sourcing. DOD must train select military personnel to manage and integrate these contractors better into the force structure. DOD can no longer afford to rely on ad hoc contractor management systems.

The Department of Defense should also consider creating a contracting command to support AFRICOM. Not only would the unit support AFRICOM’s contracting requirements, it could be the training ground for a corps of DOD contractors dedicated to stability operations. There may also be a need to designate a lead agency at the national level to manage U.S. reconstruction and stabilization contracting by establishing a code of conduct for industry standards for contracting, and overseeing all reconstruction and stabilization contracts. USAID already has contracting expertise for development-related services, so it may be able to lead or support this effort.

**Conclusion**

The Department of Defense should not assume its civilian counterparts will not be there on the ground. Although DOD is capable of performing some tasks across all stability lines of operations, it must do more to establish a secure operating environment. DOD simply does not and will not have sufficient resources to accomplish all the tasks related to stability operations on its own; as a result, it must commit to protecting its civilian counterparts, while filling gaps until they build their capacity on the ground.

To do this, DOD should employ most of its GPFs for security-related tasks, while creating a “specialized training brigade” to institutionalize non-SF capabilities to train foreign security forces. DOD should also expand CA capabilities in the active Army and build more capacity for military police, engineers, and other specialized units to fill the gaps. Even without building significant capacity to support governance and economic and infrastructure development, DOD can mitigate risks by partnering more effectively with USAID, its private sector partners and others in industry. DOD can also do a better job managing its relationship...
with industry by creating contracting management organizations at DOD and COCOM-levels, and by training key personnel at all levels to manage contractors more effectively on the battlefield. Lastly, the U.S. government should make AFRICOM a laboratory for nurturing a whole-of-government approach to stability operations that goes well beyond Africa. If done right, that is, with the full support of the interagency community, AFRICOM will not only respond to crises more effectively, but also it will be able to prevent fragile states from failing or relapsing into instability. AFRICOM’s success could affect the missions of other COCOMs and how they are organized.  

NOTES

3. President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) in December 2005. The purpose of NSPD-44 is to “promote the security of the U.S. through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” It designates Secretary of State (SecState) as the lead for coordinating USG efforts to prepare, plan, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. It specifies SecState and Secretary of Defense will “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”
7. Ibid., 6.
9. Ibid., 2.
12. Ibid., 9.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 3-13.
18. Ibid., 4.
19. Ibid., 12-25.
20. FM 3-0, 3-17 to 3-18.
24. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 27-33.
29. Ibid., 2-9.
30. Ibid.
31. Jock Covey et al., The Quest for Viable Peace, 181.
32. Ibid., 3-13.
35. DOD Directive 3000.05, 2.
38. FM 3-05.40, 2-4.
39. Ibid.
41. FM 3-0, 3-16.
43. FM 3-05.40, 2-4.
46. Ibid., 10.
47. Ibid., 5.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 2-9.
50. Chiarelli and Smith, 7.
51. Ibid., 7.
52. Ibid., 7-8.
56. Ibid., 10.
57. Ibid., 10-16.
58. Perito, 10.
60. Ibid., 23-33.
61. Ibid., 34-35.
62. Ibid., 28.