Counterinsurgency Operations in Baghdad:

The Actions of 1-4 Cavalry in the East Rashid Security District

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Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; and many elements of psychological operations. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements in counterinsurgency.

Arriving in November 2006, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, serving as the headquarters for Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), assessed the situation in the area of East Rashid as one that was primarily sectarian strife between Sunni and Shi’a extremists. To achieve the primary goal of restoring security, MND-B developed a strategy that focused on the protection of the Iraqi populace.1 The Division’s focus shifted from transitioning operations to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to protecting Iraqis. However, it took more than a new division strategy to bring security to this particular Baghdad neighborhood. It took a partnership that empowered the residents to work together for their families and neighbors.

One of the key elements of the MND-B plan was to use Soldiers from “surge brigades,” including those yet to arrive in theater. Other key components of the strategy included placing large numbers of barrier walls throughout the city, hiring local citizens to protect their own communities, and increasing the Soldier presence in Baghdad neighborhoods.2 By June of 2007, attacks against the city’s population decreased by 58 percent. However, attacks against coalition forces within Baghdad increased by 59 percent during the same timeframe. The new strategy required a more aggressive posture to minimize attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces as well as bring stability to the community.3

Arriving in January 2007 as part of the “surge,” the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, assumed the responsibility for West and East Rashid Security Districts of Baghdad. In mid May, the 1st Light
Reconnaissance Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (1-4 Cavalry) “Raiders,” assumed responsibility for the northeast part of the East Rashid Security District. This article chronicles how 1-4 Cavalry successfully implemented the concepts found in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in order to protect residents of East Rashid and defeat Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

In February 2006, AQI terrorists destroyed the golden dome of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shi’a mosques in Iraq. This single act of violence led to a wave of sectarian strife and widespread destruction that pitted Sunni against Shi’a. The demographics of Baghdad shifted. Armed groups began to “cleanse” their communities of anyone with differing religious beliefs. AQI and other extremist groups arose from this instability to establish a strong foothold inside many Baghdad neighborhoods. In time, the security situation in the capital grew unstable, and fear spread in the neighborhoods.

The conflict in Iraq has been referred to as a counterinsurgency. However, the classic COIN model does not completely fit. In actuality, the situation was—and still is—more dramatic and complex. The major and obvious difference was the sectarian nature of the conflict. AQI terrorized the Shi’a population with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and other forms of violence and intimidation. In retaliation, Shi’a death squads kidnapped, tortured, and expelled Sunni residents. Shi’a extremists kidnapped and killed many of the former Sunni military officers living in the Saydiyah neighborhood of West Rashid. In the Doura community in East Rashid, AQI and other Sunni extremist groups killed or expelled Shi’a residents.

In May of 2007, Doura consisted almost entirely of a Sunni population, and the community became an AQI strongpoint. Strategically vital to AQI, Doura provided AQI terrorists with a gateway from which they brought munitions and fighters into Baghdad. Al-Qaeda in Iraq maintained a robust presence in the neighborhoods and ruled with intimidation. To control the population, AQI beheaded its rivals, killed entire families, and brutalized the community. It planned on establishing an Islamic caliphate in Doura that would provide a safe haven and allow it to develop forces. To protect this valuable territory, AQI used various types of improvised explosive devices, sniper fire, rocket-propelled grenades, hand-held grenades, rockets, and mortars. The “deep-buried improvised explosive device” was one of AQI’s more powerful attack methods. To prepare deep-buried improvised explosive device attacks, AQI buried hundreds of pounds of explosives under a roadway. Because it controlled the community, AQI constructed its roadway and roadside bombs with little interference. Coalition forces found that locating an explosive device before its detonation was extremely difficult and sometimes had fatal results. On 28 June 2007, 4/1 ID lost five Soldiers from a deep-buried improvised explosive device blast in the eastern part of Doura. Upon arrival, the squadron did not have a robust intelligence picture of the AQI network.
enemy’s greatest strength seemed to be the ability to blend into the community without being recognized as part of the insurgency by coalition forces.\(^9\)

The Sunnis within Doura felt completely disenfranchised from their government. Many believed the Government of Iraq was an extension of the Iranian government and under Persian influence. To counter AQI and the community’s lack of faith in the ISF, 1-4 Cavalry worked to reconnect the local population with government institutions. Insurgent groups had become strong organizations because Sunnis did not connect to the Iraqi government. The only Iraqi security force in the area, the 3d Battalion of 7th National Police Brigade, had little constructive interaction with the community. The Shi’a-dominated National Police harassed residents at checkpoints and randomly placed small arms fire down main roadways.\(^1\) The Sunnis referred to the policemen as Shi’a militia members. The residents could not forget the early days of 2006 when 30 dead bodies a day appeared in Doura. Fear of kidnapping or sectarian violence kept many residents within their neighborhoods. Residents often described kidnappers as police or wearing police uniforms, and tensions between the police and residents had a tremendously negative impact on daily living. To illustrate this, many residents chose to buy their cooking fuel at the black market rate within their community rather than buying it at regular retail establishments for fear of having to pass through the National Police checkpoints.

Residents also lacked essential services such as electricity, clean drinking water, working sewage systems, and trash removal. Government service workers were reluctant to conduct any public works projects because security was nonexistent in the community. Without a functioning collection system, large trash piles filled the streets. Insurgents used this to their advantage to hide their improvised explosive device systems. Watery, green-colored raw sewage flowed down streets and into homes. Electricity was only available in small quantities for short periods each day. Whether real or perceived, many residents within Doura believed Shi’a neighborhoods received more government services than the Sunni neighborhoods. Sunni residents became resentful toward the government. Al-Qaeda in Iraq quickly took advantage of the lack of local law enforcement and government failures to establish a base of operations.

Clear, Hold, Build

Field Manual 3-24 acknowledges the existence of many successful methods for implementing counterinsurgency operations.\(^1\) For a “specific, high priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations,” the manual recommends the implementation of the “clear-hold-build” approach.\(^1\)

Clear. During 2006, coalition forces transferred the security responsibility of each neighborhood to ISF on completion of a deliberate cordon-and-search or clearing operation. However, 4/1 ID enhanced this approach by expecting longer-term results. Describing previous clearing methods, the 4th ID commander said, “They (insurgents) would wait two or three days after we left. Then, they come right back in behind you.”\(^1\) The squadron needed to clear AQI from the neighborhoods and then implement measures to ensure AQI did not filter back into the community.

In mid-May 2007, 1-4 Cavalry assumed the eastern half of the 2-12 Infantry’s territory. The area consisted of three neighborhoods, large palm grove areas, the Doura Oil refinery, and several major road networks. The Iraqi government maintained robust security for the Doura refinery and nearby bridges, which allowed the squadron to focus on the three neighborhoods.

Within the first 30 days (18 May–18 June) of arrival, the enemy mounted 52 attacks on coalition forces.\(^1\) “During the first 30 days, we had no freedom of maneuver,” 1-4 Cavalry commander Lieutenant Colonel James R. Crider explained. “We went where we wanted to go, but it was a deliberate move with guys on rooftops, trucks in overwatch, and moving one block at a time. It was an extremely contested area.”\(^1\) The situation called for a “clear-hold-build” approach that could separate the insurgents from the local population and set conditions for the government to reconnect to the community. Having served in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) between 2003 and 2004 as the brigade S3 operations officer, Crider understood the importance of COIN principles. In his first major tactical decision, Crider chose to have
his unit maintain a presence on the streets 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Beginning 15 June, the 24/7 presence physically demonstrated to the community that 1-4 Cavalry would not simply clear an area and move to the next objective, but was there to stay. Within a short period, the squadron significantly deterred AQI operations and their freedom of movement, slowly eliminating the threat of deep-buried improvised explosive devices. The 24/7 presence restricted the insurgent’s opportunity to dig and plant bombs in the roads.

Shortly after 1-4 Cavalry established the 24/7 presence, residents conducted business later than normal hours to shop or to visit their neighbors. No less significant than the 24/7 presence, the unit began operations to build trust within the community and to locate human intelligence sources. Upon arrival, the squadron’s greatest problems were a lack of informants and the enemy’s ability to hide in plain sight. Effective application of the COIN principles soon enabled 1-4 Cavalry to produce visible results.

Before 1-4 Cavalry arrived, 2-12 Infantry had begun Operation Close Encounters. Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Michael credited this operation with allowing him to target AQI. After assuming the area from 2-12 Infantry, 1-4 Cavalry continued Operation Close Encounters but improved the execution of this operation by conducting a more deliberate engagement with community residents. Overwhelmed by a large and significant kinetic environment, Soldiers from 2-12 Infantry often engaged with locals. However, 1-4 Cavalry had the opportunity to execute this operation more deliberately. “We took it [Operation Close Encounters] as a census operation in the United States,” explained Captain Nicholas Cook. “We sat down with them in the kitchen and just talked with them . . . As soon as we did that, we started building trust, and we inundated the community with tip cards.” Because they had a relatively small area, 1-4 Cavalry could move from one home to the next until they visited every home on the block. Once inside each home, the unit sat down with the residents and worked to make a connection. Often troops would drink hot tea and initiate a conversation.

Lieutenant Colonel Crider acknowledged that this “getting out into the community” approach entailed risk. To mitigate risks to troop safety concerns, Crider placed Soldiers on rooftops to keep a lookout for trouble and instituted other risk reduction measures. Soldiers took photos of the residents and gathered information about the household. The squadron used the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment system to put residential information into a software database. This program allowed the squadron to document who resided in each home and to record key information regarding the residents.

Operation Close Encounters helped to implement population control measures and to create a neighborhood watch program. It followed the principles outlined in FM 3-24, which states: “Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven endeavor. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host nation, and insurgents. Commanders require accurate intelligence about these three areas to best address the issues driving the insurgency. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents require an effective intelligence capability to be successful. Both attempt to create...
and maintain intelligence networks while trying to neutralize their opponent’s.”

During Operation Close Encounter interviews, the squadron discovered individuals who were willing to support the removal of AQI from their neighborhoods. Many were reluctant to do so openly because it was an invitation for a death sentence. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had demonstrated its brutality on a number of occasions. Its intimidation tactics included killing entire families and removing the heads of their victims.

To counter this tactic, the unit visited all of the residents for an entire city block, a useful engagement strategy that hindered the insurgent’s ability to detect and target coalition informants.

Impromptu group photographs of community members—with all males of military age—paid substantial dividends. Whether it was on the street or in a park, the troop asked local men to participate in a group photograph. The approach more closely resembled a tourist taking a photo on a vacation rather than an occupying force implementing a population control measure or searching for wanted criminals. The unit amassed thousands of pictures. As the information from the Soldiers in the neighborhoods began to filter into the squadron headquarters, the intelligence section developed a library of suspects to show the local sources and to help identify suspects. Within a short period of time, Operation Close Encounters proved to be a huge success. At the end of May 2007, the squadron developed approximately one dozen sources. By the beginning of June, these sources led to the removal of a five-man improvised explosive devices cell. Although AQI reseeded this cell within a month, the cell’s capture provided the squadron with breathing space to rapidly acquire additional sources and fully conduct Operation Close Encounters.

In July, the unit developed a unique relationship with a name-protected asset. By combining the strengths of this name-protected asset with information from the increasingly expanding 1-4 Cavalry covert human network, coalition forces captured several members of the vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices network. This terrorist cell had been responsible for about three-fourths of the vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in Baghdad. The detention of these terrorists provided the coalition a victory with strategic implications: it led to the decline of AQI in East Rashid. The squadron intelligence officer, First Lieutenant Travis Lee, credits these detentions with “enabling multi local-national resistance movements to stand up in the East Rashid area and the areas to our south.” By early August, with support from their robust source network, 1-4 Cavalry detained AQI insurgents on an almost daily basis, and the number of enemy attacks dropped significantly.

Before 2007, coalition units had developed a negative reputation because of harshly conducted raids or searches. With occasional support from the ISF, they would surround an area and prevent anyone from leaving, gather and transport military age males to a holding facility, then decide whether to release or process them for further detention. This tactic heightened the fears of Sunni residents because they felt coalition forces categorized all Sunnis into one group without regard to fair treatment. As they already felt targeted by Shi’a militias and the Shi’a-dominated National Police, many Sunnis believed coalition forces were overwhelmingly targeting Sunnis. This belief exacerbated the idea found in Sunni communities that the legal system targeted the Sunni population. The COIN manual recommends “minimizing the impact of combat operations on the local populace.”

To help establish its credibility, 1-4 Cavalry conducted raids focused on capturing specific, known individuals. The unit positively identified detainees before placing them into a detention center. Within a couple of days of the detention, 1-4 Cavalry visited the detainee’s family to explain the detention and charges. “They weren’t happy about it,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Crider, “but they understood and they knew that their son had been doing bad stuff.” By continuing this policy throughout the deployment and keeping their word on other matters, the squadron gained the confidence and the respect of the local population. Trust had been established.
Hold. Doura was valuable key terrain for AQI. The terrorist organization chose to reseed this area to develop a new AQI network. In early August, large numbers of AQI operatives from Arab Jabour, located immediately south of the East Rashid Security District, moved north into the area. To provide cover for their activities, these operatives brought their entire families. Widespread migration was occurring at this time throughout Iraq, so movement of families into the community did not immediately raise concerns about possible AQI infiltration. Initially, the tactic worked. However, the squadron soon began exchanging intelligence with the battalion to their south in the Abar Jabour area. Within a few weeks, the number of detentions skyrocketed—through 24/7 presence and the robust source network, 1-4 Cavalry halted this emerging AQI network.

After implementation of the 24/7 presence in mid-June, the number of enemy initiated events fell by half after two months (see Figure 1). The last effective attack against 1-4 Cavalry occurred on 9 September 2007. On 27 September, insurgents conducted their final attack against 1-4 Cavalry in the sector. During the month of October 2007, there were only two or three attacks in the Raider area of operations. Over time, the improvised explosive devices became much smaller than those the unit had observed during the summer of 2007. The squadron identified these devices as small, bottle-sized bombs designed to intimidate the local Shi’a populace from returning to their homes. Shortly after 1-4 Cavalry began the 24/7 presence, the number of AQI detentions steadily rose and the number of attacks declined.

In addition to Operation Close Encounters and a 24/7 presence, the squadron implemented and continued the following population control measures:

- Emplace concrete barriers to limit and channel movements of individuals.
- Examine documents to verify residential status.
- Ensure neighbors approved who moved into their community.

The barriers became a crucial tool in controlling the population. Forcing insurgents through established checkpoints increased their vulnerability. In time, the squadron augmented the checkpoints with local sources to help identify insurgents.

One population control method FM 3-24 espouses is introducing identification cards. However, we did not do this because to protect the local population residents needed false ID cards without Sunni-sounding names to avoid being harmed at National Police checkpoints or being targeted for kidnapping by Shi’a extremists. Also, residents could easily obtain these false identification cards, thus employing mandatory credentials for population control proved unfeasible.

FM 3-24 also notes, “another part of analyzing a COIN mission involves assuming responsibility for everyone in the area of operations. This means that leaders feel the pulse of the local populace, understand their motivations, and care about what they want and need. Genuine compassion and empathy for the populace provide an effective weapon against insurgents.” On 5 June 2007, the squadron occupied coalition outpost Banchee. Located in the center of the squadron’s territory, outpost Banchee raised the coalition presence and decreased response times for emergencies. In addition to establishing Banchee and a 24/7 presence, Lieutenant Colonel Crider spent his time in

![Figure 1. Attacks and AQI detentions by month in the 1-4 CAV AO.](image-url)
the neighborhoods to have firsthand knowledge of the community atmospherics. In describing the best location for the commander, Lieutenant Lee commented, “Lieutenant Colonel Crider being out in the community was key for us.”

Additionally, troop commanders spent a large portion of their time in the neighborhoods instead of their company command posts. As the security situation stabilized and the residents started trusting U.S. Soldiers, the squadron shifted their focus toward improving the economic situation by providing quality of life projects and key essential services within the community.

Build. Field Manual 3-24 states, “Essential services address the life support needs of the [Host Nation (HN)] population. The U.S. military’s primary task is normally to provide a safe and secure environment. HN or interagency organizations can then develop the services or infrastructure needed. In an unstable environment, the military may initially have the leading role. Other agencies may not be present or might not have enough capability or capacity to meet HN needs. Therefore, COIN military planning includes preparing to perform these tasks for an extended period.”

In May 2007, the Iraqi infrastructure in the Raider’s territory was in a dilapidated condition. The AQI bombs had destroyed a number of power, water, and sewer lines, and trash piles littered neighborhoods. Under normal conditions, repairs of essential services were the purview of the Doura Beladiyah, but due to security issues, employees of the Beladiyah refused to go into the neighborhoods and streets. In one of the first actions to help bring relief to the community, Crider persuaded the Doura Beladiyah to become involved in the establishment and repair of essential services. Within a short time, his unit began to provide security escorts for sewage pumping trucks. By removing sewage from streets and overloaded septic systems, the government provided valuable relief and some hope to the community.

The emplacement of small neighborhood generators (known as micro-generators) provided the community with improved electricity. In their news media presentation, 1-4 Cavalry wrote, “Bureaucrats who claimed that micro-generation would create too large a demand for fuel and exacerbate the problem did not understand that this was about the people who could not keep medicine cool or offer a cold drink to their kids when it was 130 degrees.”

Introduced by MND-B, the micro-generator program in Baghdad provided residents with a reliable source for low-cost electrical power. These generators became a vital part of the Baghdad revitalization plan because the Baghdad grid only provided a small amount of electricity at erratic times. Initially, the residents expected coalition forces to pay for the fuel. However, the program required residents to fund these fuel costs. After three months with the generators still not in use, the residents developed a resource system where if they contributed to the cost of the fuel, and the generators began running.

The squadron developed a variety of projects designed to improve the neighborhood quality of life or infrastructure, by upgrading the soccer fields, renovating the gyms, removing the trash, and promoting community artwork. Commanders at various levels throughout MND-B used these simple quality of life projects to install hope in the community and bring about normalcy. Other infrastructure projects were upgrading the local medical clinic and repairing electrical, water, road, and sewer networks. Upon completion, the long-term projects helped solidify a positive relationship with the local community and showed that 1-4 Cavalry kept its promises. Colorful murals, clean sidewalks, newly planted trees, and restored streetlights transformed the appearance of the community.

The squadron also began to address the economic situation, which had collapsed after the Sunni-dominated Iraqi government fell in 2003. Large numbers of unemployed, military-aged Sunni males provided the insurgency with a pool of recruits to fill their ranks, but 1-4 Cavalry understood that winning a counterinsurgency conflict meant defeating the insurgents by stopping the flow of recruits and supplies. Doura had left many Sunni males unemployed...
by the war with little means to support their families. Except for the Doura Oil Refinery, the area contained no employment opportunities. Finding ways to gainfully employ the local population became a critical component for success. The squadron used a combination of grants, contracts, and projects to spur local improvements and employment.

Entrepreneurs looked at ways to open small businesses and neighborhood stores. The micro-grant program established by Multi-National Corps-Iraq allowed Doura residents to apply for up to $2,500 in grant money to start up a small business. The 1-4 Cavalry helped locals with the paperwork and sent the applications to the brigade for further processing. By March 2008, the squadron had distributed a total of $460,000 within a 10 month period. The number of opened shops along the main streets increased from 10 stores in May of 2007 to 117 stores in March of 2008. The economic situation improved when the income stream from the Sons of Iraq entered the community. According to the command report, “There was an economic revival in Doura, sparked by the efforts of 1-4 Cavalry… Thanks to the Raiders’ hard work, there were hundreds of stores open and a thriving economy.”

By March 2008, the security situation was remarkably improved. During deployment, the squadron hosted a number of distinguished visitors, including General David Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, high-ranking Iraqi officials, and numerous reporters. Despite the security improvements, the National Police still did not venture into the neighborhoods without coalition forces present. Although reduced, the animosity between the police and the Sunni residents remained. The fallout from a potential situation in which the police angered or dishonored local residents could challenge recent security gains. When disputes between the police and residents developed, 1-4 Cavalry intervened as an honest broker between the two parties. All parties generally respected its resolutions because the squadron kept all of its promises and remained impartial.

In describing COIN practices, FM 3-24 recommends “placing host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as security situation permits.” Yet, the distrust within the community toward the National Police remained consistently high during 1-4 Cavalry’s deployment. In November 2007, 4/1 ID began hiring local citizens in East Rashid to protect their community. Copied from other programs used throughout Baghdad and within other Sunni areas in Iraq, these individuals were known as Concerned Local Citizens and later as Sons of Iraq. This group consisted of adult males aged 18–30 years from the local community who were authorized to provide static security.
The successful capture of over 250 AQI targets, 1-4 Cavalry utilized the Sons of Iraq to protect the power generators and other key infrastructure. In time, the squadron integrated them into operations and security meetings that involved the National Police and coalition forces. Transitioning these volunteers to a stable Iraqi police force remains a key element to long-term stability because the contracts are short-term solutions. To address this issue, the squadron worked to convert their Concerned Local Citizens groups into Iraqi police officers as part of the MNC-I Operation Blue Shield. This program called for an additional 12,641 Iraqi police officers in Baghdad Province.¹¹

In the Final Analysis

The 1-4 Cavalry achieved a number of noteworthy accomplishments by utilizing COIN principles:

- The successful capture of over 250 AQI targets, removing a significant number of insurgents from the community.
- Their comprehensive detention packets resulted in an 81 percent acceptance rate into Camp Cropper.¹² This high percentage rate is especially important because Camp Cropper detentions removed an insurgent for a significant amount of time.

The squadron's area of operations was described by LTC Doug Marshall, 22 February 2008, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.

Because long-term stability requires political reconciliation and compromise between the Iraqi populace and the government, cooperation between the ISF and the Sons of Iraq. Transitioning these volunteers into Iraqi police officers as part of a stable Iraqi police force remains a key element to long-term stability because the contracts are short-term solutions. To address this issue, the squadron worked to convert their Concerned Local Citizens groups into Iraqi police officers as part of the MNC-I Operation Blue Shield. This program called for an additional 12,641 Iraqi police officers in Baghdad Province.¹¹

NOTES

2. Increasing Soldier presence within Iraqi communities was made possible by placing U.S. bases or forward positions into Iraqi communities and additional troops available after “surge” brigades began arriving in February 2007.
3. Attack trends (U), MND-B Fardh al Qarnoon Weekly Assessment, 7 July 2007 (S).
6. LTC James R. Crider, Commander 1-4 Cavalry, interview by MAJ Tom Sills, 22 October 2007, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
7. COL Ricky D. Gibbs, Commander 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, interview by Sills, 25 January 2006, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
8. Gibbs interview.
9. 1LT Travis Lee, 1-4 Cavalry Intelligence Officer, interview by Sills, 22 October 2007, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
13. MNC-I modified these principles in 2007 and introduced the terms “Clear-Control-Retain-Transition” with an emphasis on control and retain. However, this essay utilizes the Clear-Hold-Build terminology and ties these principles from this FM to practices implemented by 1-4 Cavalry.
18. LTC Stephen Michael, Commander 2-12 IN, interview by Sills, 25 October 2007, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Calvary Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
19. SFC Gandon Edgy, Platoon Sergeant, 1SG Richard Strong, CPT Nicholas Cook, leaders from A Troop 1-4 Cavalry, interview by Sills, 23 October 2007, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
20. Ibid.
23. In order to keep this information at the unclassified level, the nature of this relationship cannot be described.
25. FM 3-24, 5-19.
29. Ibid.
30. FM 3-24, 7-2.
32. FM 3-24, 5-15.
33. 1-4 Cavalry OIF Counterinsurgency Brief, (U) 21 March 2008.
34. “Political and Administrative Units in Baghdad” (U), Baghdad Governance, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Baghdad, Iraq, April 2007, 3d ed.
35. 1-4 Cavalry Media Brief (U), November 2007.
36. 1-4 Cavalry OIF Counterinsurgency Brief, (U) 21 March 2008.
37. Crider and staff interview, 2008.
40. MAJ Rob Picht, 4th Brigade, 1st ID Fire Support Officer, interview by Sills, 22 February 2008, 130th Military History Detachment, oral history collection of 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
42. 1-4 Cavalry OIF V Counterinsurgency Operations Baghdad, Iraq (U), 21 March 2008.