


The INFLUENTIAL LEADER



**Major Enrique Silvela,
Spanish Army**

The sheik brings more sheiks; more sheiks bring more men. Joe realizes that if he'd done this three years ago, maybe his wife would be happier, and he'd have been home more. Mohammed gets to meet the Sheiks. They realize he's not such a bad guy, which is good for Iraq. Joe grows a moustache, because he realizes that Iraqis like people with moustaches and have a hard time trusting people without one.

—Captain Travis Patriquin, "How to win in Al-Anbar."¹

A COALITION BRIGADE COMMANDER grows increasingly frustrated at his inability to make progress. He thinks he is a competent military leader. He knows his job, his weaponry, his tactics, and his Soldiers. Nevertheless, he is frustrated over his inability to make progress. Things he is not in charge of are spinning out of control. He is in a "three-block" war.² He must consider rebuilding infrastructure, schools, and hospitals in a "clear-hold-build" mission.³ He studies cultural awareness to pursue his mission. He asks for, and receives, the necessary interpreters. His staff is augmented with a civil affairs specialist, and he understands the full array of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active in his area of operations. Yet in spite of such assets and knowledge, all measures of effectiveness indicate that things are getting worse.

He has to accept the support of a host-country brigade whose dubious commander bears all the qualities of an opportunist, a known bully who uses a heavy hand with his own population. He has to work around this local sheik to get things done. The officer at the head of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team has "gone native," making things even worse.⁴ He is supporting the indigenous commander even when it is evident that the thug is favoring his own tribe at the expense of the most elementary principles of good governance.⁵

The coalition brigade commander must devote extraordinary time and attention to analyzing and prioritizing projects: a new school for girls tops the list, followed by a new hospital, and then a few new wells. There are disagreements with the reconstruction team commander over these priorities. In connection with the school, the local authorities contend they are unable to staff it when it is completed. (They want him to build a new office for them instead).⁶

Fortunately, the enemy in the area is tactically clumsy, allowing the commander to make incremental gains. The brigade produces a number of

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successes. It catches a local insurgent commander trying to extort a local telecommunications company by using his cell phone.⁷ It solves the kidnapping of three international hostages because of the amateurish way the insurgents conducted the negotiations.⁸ However, the insurgency is still active, waiting for better weather to launch their spring offensive. The coalition brigade commander wants to cope with this coming situation, but he does not command the NGOs, the local authorities, or the local military and police units. Worse, he does not direct the operational management liaison team or the American provincial reconstruction team.⁹ All seem at cross-purposes with him. None follows a common line of effort, and each has a different understanding of the situation. The coalition brigade commander thinks they all are wrong and that he is right.

The above hypothetical situation all-too-commonly plays itself out in the current operating environment (COE). This is a fictitious scenario, but it is true to many situations that happened in Iraq and are happening in Afghanistan. It could happen again elsewhere in the world. The story illustrates a new characteristic of the COE, the presence of multiple agents in the same area, all with a similar purpose but each with different mandates and approaches to what they consider the best solution. In this kind of environment, a commander cannot impose his vision and solution to the problem.

The new COE places extraordinary demands on leaders to exert influence that goes beyond the traditional limits of military command authority in the leaders' areas of responsibility. Today's military professionals have to understand how to influence without authority and how to achieve desired results within the constraints of a cooperative environment.

Exploring Influence

Influence is an essential component of leadership, which Field Manual 6-22, *Leadership*, defines as

The new COE places extraordinary demands on leaders to exert influence that go beyond the traditional limits...

“the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”¹⁰ This definition implies leading by influencing others who share a common purpose and direction within an organization. The word “influence” in this definition has limited scope, referring only to those in one’s immediate proximity. However, FM 3-0, *Operations*, affirms, “Leaders influence not only Soldiers, but other people as well.”¹¹

Field Manual 3-0 presents the concept of influence, as one of four stability mechanisms: compel, control, influence, and support. These are the alternatives when there is no enemy opposition to defeat.¹² Influence “means to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population through information engagement, presence, and conduct.”¹³ Field Manual 6-22 also extends leadership influence beyond the chain of command.¹⁴ In contrast with FM 3-0, it considers not only the civilian population but also every agent affecting or interested in the environment. Field Manual 3-24 simply states that “commanders must influence directly and indirectly the behavior of others outside their chain of command.”¹⁵ This is where influence receives its full significance. People affected by our leadership will share part of our purpose, but will have their own ambitions. They will not follow our direction but will take our decisions into account. Our mission as leaders includes influencing the decisions of those very different agents within our environment.

Stability mechanisms work across full spectrum operations in every operational theme. They range from coercion to support. The question is how to select the best choice of legitimate military actions, which range from the measured use of violence to cooperation, with a special emphasis on influence.

The working definition for *influence* may be “the ability to persuade or stimulate other individual or collective agents in our environment to act in accordance with our purpose.” Field Manual 6-22 offers good guidance on how to understand and exert this influence. The principal context for this approach will be operations other than major combat.¹⁶ We can analyze this from the perspective of a military unit performing an operation as well as from the

point of view of those present within or affected by our area of operations.

From a military unit's perspective, the first consideration is that our organization is only one of multiple stakeholders in a crisis environment; but it is *our* organization. We want to influence the environment for our own purpose. As a military unit, our purpose will normally be to accomplish our mission; from the leadership point of view, we add the purpose of improving our organization. This point of view is, and ought to be, selfish. Our purpose is not to improve the environment within our area of operations, but to accomplish our mission. We will try to influence the environment only in order to better accomplish our mission. We assume our mission is legitimate, effective, and has a purpose. We will interpret it within the latitude we are allowed. We must be aware that our unit may not be the only one present in the area. Indeed, we may find other units from our own forces with different tasks, outside of our immediate chain of command. The issue is to choose the best point along the continuum. This may vary from simple coercion to military actions, ranging from a measured use of violence to any level of cooperation.

The second consideration points to the full spectrum of operations. Major combat operations require a broad application of directed violence. In this context, the use of force will be the military commander's main tool, reducing the importance of influence and increasing the effectiveness of coercion. In other types of operations, influence will have a very important place. The operational environment in peacetime military engagements, limited interventions, peace operations, and irregular warfare may contain neutral noncombatants such as NGOs, or impartial observers that will not respond well to coercion.¹⁷ It may be necessary to influence the environment rather than coerce it during such missions. The use of coercion to influence an agent depends on the situation.

From the leadership perspective, the operational environment contains many agents, each with different qualities within a continuum from conflict to cooperation. Those agents can be local or international.

On the local side, we find—

- Political representatives at various levels.

- Local informal power structures.
 - Local security forces.
 - Irregular activists from criminals to insurgents.
- On the international side we can point out—
- Nongovernmental organizations.
 - International organizations.
 - International military forces in coalition with ours.
 - Other security forces.
 - International police or private companies.
 - Private contractors.
 - The media.
 - Other national governmental agencies: economic, political or cultural.

As soon as any group is designated as an enemy, actions affecting this group will rely on violence much more than on influence. For all those not considered the enemy, a group which may even include criminals, a commander must convey ways to influence their behavior without necessarily resorting to coercion.

Those agents have a great variety of features:

- Many will have different ends, purposes, and interests.

- *Some will not share our culture and values.*

- Others will have distinct skills and habits.

These features are applicable through different strategies. Of all those who are not considered the enemy, some share common ground because of their purpose and our own unit's mission. The search for peace and prosperity through security, freedom, and justice will define this common ground. However, the interpretations of peace or justice will likely be different among the various players. Some agents will have a mandate, and others will have broad autonomy. In any case, our military unit will not be in a position to force a mission on these players, nor will it have the power to "coordinate" their actions. Despite these limitations, a military commander must influence the actions of all those organizations to best accomplish his assigned mission.

As soon as any group is designated as an enemy, actions affecting this group will rely upon violence much more than on influence.



U.S. Army, SSG Bronco Suzuki

American Army officers and Iraqi National Police talk after observing an insurgent observation post being destroyed by 2,000-pound guided bombs dropped from an F-15 Eagle in the Salman Pak, Iraq, 14 January 2007.

Why Influence?

The working definition of influence implies that our military unit will not use coercion to control every action of the agents in our environment. As military leaders, we will have a defined mission, whose fulfillment, in most cases, will be affected by the agents' behavior. What are the possible courses of action that we—as military leaders—have when interacting with these other agents? We can simply ignore them; we can just do our job without considering them and just follow our orders. We may perform within our standards; apply our tactics, techniques, and procedures; and treat them with military courtesy. Will this attitude benefit our mission? By acting alone, we will not receive any help from the other actors and may even perhaps alienate them. On the other hand, if their cooperation would enhance our effectiveness, why not seek this cooperation?

Another possibility is for us to assume the non-cooperative agent tasks that we deem necessary for the success of our mission. That is, do what should be done by others. That attitude may lead to conflict with these agents, but it may be the better

course of action. If the locals are not able to provide essential services, if the NGOs reject contact with the military, we can perform local administration and humanitarian assistance on our own. Beyond the risk of drawing the anger of the agents on ourselves, we may cause their disengagement in the future, making them dependent on our extended presence in their country.

We can simply persuade the agents to do our will through sheer force. The local population and authorities can be forced to do our will. International organizations and NGOs do not have our resources of labor and equipment. We can coerce them when they need our support.

The opposite is possible as well; we can try to make everyone happy by doing exactly what the agents expect from us. The interpretation of our mission may be “re-engineered” to satisfy all agents. In the short term, in front of the media, our unit may receive big applause. But is it what we are looking for? Is there another way? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this course of action? Is it feasible? At what price?

The use of noncoercive influence is another option. The main advantage to this, the third and best course of action, is that it will confer legitimacy to our mission within the realities of our capabilities.¹⁸ First, it will establish a common ground for cooperation with outside agents: if they do not feel threatened or ignored by our actions, then they will be more prone to look for common ground. Second, it will enhance mutual trust. Exerting positive noncoercive influence requires contact and engagement; if this engagement remains sincere, without each party renouncing its position, it will build confidence and the possibility of concerted action. Third, the effects of cooperative agreements last longer than those of coercive actions. This is significant because, even if other agents perform less efficiently than our force, they will learn, improve, and take full responsibility over time. Finally, as history proves repeatedly, military decision-making has not always been correct.¹⁹ A cooperative approach allows each agent to take responsibility for its own mistakes; there is less likelihood of mistakes when each agent is performing its own responsibilities.

Of course there is a price. Efficiency and effectiveness may suffer in the short term. Military capabilities and resources are often much more effective than those of other agents in short-term actions. But taking on other agents' tasks may reduce their legitimacy and that of our own mission as well.²⁰ Second, things may take more time to accomplish. Again, in the short term, military resources may get immediate results, but in isolation, this does not help build confidence with other stakeholders. The worst case is that influence simply may not work. The different agents may pursue their own interests and objectives in a manner that may prove incompatible with our mission. In these circumstances, if the alternatives are coercion or substitution, the result may be a different kind of the same evil. However, if we consider not only our own unit, but also the

...even if other agents perform less efficiently than our force, they will learn, improve, and take full responsibility over time.

whole operation, with different units like ours, some of those units may actually attain their objectives. In general, looking for influence may not work 100 percent of the time, but it promises to be better than simply relying on brute force. Looking at the big picture from a strategic point of view, in the mid- to long-term, influence may be superior to coercion in situations other than major combat operations.

Finally, there are other legitimate questions. Will an orientation to exert influence on the commander's part affect combat capabilities of our unit? Will it affect our own will to fight? If so, would it be better to prepare ourselves for major combat operations? The old argument that there is no need to train for nation building because excellent combat skills will translate into excellence in stability operations has been proven wrong. We have to train for all tasks. A Soldier always has competing demands on his time, and training for stability operations will not erode combat skills. Accepting new demands for competency will not necessarily erode former capabilities. Our Soldiers have the ability to train for full spectrum operations, so we must conduct the necessary preparations for any contingency.

How to influence

Influence is a quality of leadership. Field Manual 6-22 provides the best guidance on how a leader may extend his influence beyond his chain of command. Good leaders will be able to influence events in their environment by the simple rule of Be-Know-Do.²¹ The current operational environment is very complex. It is more demanding than operations in the past. Leadership requirements certainly deserve a closer look.

An influential leader needs the quality of restraint. Arrogance is the worst enemy of influence and therefore an obstacle. Aggressive thinking leads to anticipation. However, restraint must control aggressiveness.

Patience is another basic quality. An energetic command is either followed immediately or disobeyed; there is little room for foot dragging, but influence leaves plenty of time to analyze options, check trustworthiness, and assess alternatives. The influential leader assumes that implementing his measures will take time. Time and perseverance build trust.



U.S. Army, SSG Curt Cashour

U.S. Army LTG Ray Odierno addresses Soldiers at Patrol Base Hawkes in Arab Jabour, Iraq, 21 October 2007.

That is why coherence is an additional requirement. Maintaining coherence over time is not easy when a leader has competing demands. Coherence will require sacrifices in short-term goals to benefit long-term purposes not yet defined, but it will prove its value. Arbitrariness is the opposite of coherence; it will undermine trust in order to achieve short-term gains. An influential leader is adaptable and agile, too.²² His or her adaptability does not go against coherence, it builds on it. Adaptability means being able to change one's approach to meet the requirements of every situation while remaining loyal to one's principles and commitments. In order to be adaptable, the leader needs to make decisions by following a battle command decision-making process based on a situational understanding of his own analysis, not a checklist. The basis for these decisions is knowledge and professional judgment developed from experience.

An influential leader requires a special orientation to knowledge. First are his professional responsibilities: the tactics, techniques, and procedures of his unit, which are common to any situation. After one gains professional expertise, the next essential step

is to gain knowledge of oneself. By simply being present in a theater, a military force has a tremendous influence on events. This influence will range from the local environment to international public opinion. Self-knowledge springs from a thorough awareness of one's own capabilities, physical and moral, as well as a clear understanding of our civilization and the legitimacy of our mission. One should measure moral capabilities in terms of trust, credibility, and will; physical capabilities depend on our equipment and the graduated violence we can exert. Any leader has to be aware of his place; he is never behind the scenes, but always in the public eye.

The need to influence people of varied backgrounds places an extraordinary demand on the leader. The influential leader must be familiar with a quite complex environment and the different agents that populate it, their characteristics, names, purposes, mandates, interests, and structure. On the one hand, to be trusted, the leader must appear knowledgeable to the leaders of other organizations; on the other hand, he needs to consider all aspects of the situation in regard to his own decisions. His knowledge base about the agents contains more than facts an

intelligence cell might provide. It implies a thorough understanding. Those agents are formed and led by persons. The influential leader must understand these people and their basic needs, ambitions, and habits. This kind of knowledge relies heavily on education.

The demands of technology have made our education highly specialized, increasing the depth of our thinking in a narrow field at the price of losing perspective and breadth of understanding. In operations other than major combat, success is not just the precise application of technical knowledge, be it flying aircraft or conducting planning. It depends on interpersonal relations with a broad variety of people. A good leader has to know human nature, instincts, and motivation. He has to do more than just respect a religion; he must demonstrate knowledge of its basic principles. Collective decision-making involves ideological and religious considerations. A leader who aspires to exert influential leadership in a complex environment must have a basic understanding of philosophy and political science. Cultural awareness is not enough. A leader knows that other people have cultures; to be effective, he must be familiar with the culture.

***Cultural awareness is not enough....
to be effective, [the commander]
must be familiar with the culture.***

The study of the physical environment is also a useful factor in interpersonal relations because the interaction of people with their physical environment shapes their behavior. A leader must know about agriculture in a rural environment, be able to value production in an industrial area, and understand changing social relations in an urban setting. The influential leader must know how to react in any situation, whether meeting with traditional peasants or having a working lunch in a downtown hotel with politicians and international officials. He must use skills and natural abilities to communicate his intellectual resources and environmental awareness, but he must also improve his communication capabilities through study and preparation.

Influence is all about communication. The influential leader must be able to reach out to other agents,

establish a climate of dialogue when possible, and engage them with honesty and sincerity and without arrogance. Cooperation is easier once a communication channel is established.

Of course, the question arises: what to communicate? First, the leader has to clarify his position, his mandate, and his mission to all agents.²³ An influential leader is not a negotiator, although sometimes he may need to negotiate. His point of departure is his mission. He needs to open a field for cooperation with imagination and generosity. He should employ his capabilities and resources as leverage. His actions affect other agents, and they may improve the situation or make it worse. In order to remain coherent and trustworthy, the influential leader balances each agent's demands and interests.

The first steps in influential communications should build trust between the leader and his counterparts. The leader should be involved personally, preferring to communicate primarily with leaders who are at an equivalent level to use his prestige and authority as leverage. Morality is paramount: the influential leader's actions and words must be beyond reproach, serving as a "moral compass" to the environment.²⁴ The beginning of a relationship needs patience; taking small steps helps to establish trust before addressing greater projects. There will be time to take calculated risks later. Sometimes those risks will materialize. If risks have been properly calculated and likely results anticipated, the one who will suffer from failure will be the unreliable counterpart, not the military unit. Future successes will compensate for some errors. The influential leader seeks good fortune, but luck is not a question of chance. As Major David Cummings has written, good luck is a combination of preparation, control, and confidence with opportunity.²⁵ A good influential leader "jumps on" an opportunity with confidence because of his knowledge and preparation.

Engaging with other agents means that the leader may need to revise some efficient military procedures. Military planning capabilities tend to be far better than interagency or NGO capabilities. Their agility allows NGOs to respond quickly, but not always following established procedures. Flexibility in military procedures may allow short-term successes, which in turn help to establish

trust. Furthermore, many procedures are designed to improve efficiency. Outside of the military system, this efficiency is often in doubt. In order to provide the other agents a sense of ownership and responsibility, sometimes a leader should discard efficiency in order to allow other agents to execute actions even if they do not do so in the most effective manner. Leading through influence is costly, but effective. There is a need to trade efficiency for effectiveness. Being flexible in procedures will enable the stakeholders to reach a consensus.

On the other hand, the military leader commands a lethal force, not a group of Boy Scouts. He needs to be aware of the capability of his force and use it with moderation according to the circumstances. Military force is a powerful tool; its coercive power is the essence of military action. When an armed military unit has been deployed, except in peacetime military operations, it is because force is needed in some way. Influence is reinforced and directed with dialogue, but it is based in force. Prudence and determination are the key attributes for the successful use of force. Prudence is needed to decide the moment and intensity required in the application of force. Determination is needed to carry out the decision.

A proportionate use of force reinforces one's prestige, authority, and trust. Employing too little force may not accomplish the desired results, but an excessive use of force will break the trust of friends. The need for prudence and sound judgment in the use of violence is imperative. Once excessive violence is unleashed, there will be no way back. However, once the commander has decided to use force, it has to be successful. Decisive action has to be carried out with determination and positive control.²⁶

Future Leader Development

Military leaders at all levels, except when engaged in major combat operations, will find themselves surrounded by a very complex human environment. The actors in this environment are intelligent and willing human beings who make their own decisions. They are not enemies, nor are they strictly neutral. They have an interest in the solution of the crisis that brought them there.

The chances to compel those agents to play by our rules are weak, and trying to do so may even be counterproductive. We must find common ground on which to operate for a common purpose. Military power and capabilities mean that any military unit deployed to an area will have a robust influence on the environment. The role of a military leader is to make the best use of this influence to accomplish the mission.

The COE places an extraordinary demand on future leader development. Leaders will conduct their tasks heavily constrained by their operational environment. In order to be successful, leaders should be able to influence this environment to fulfill the mission. This is not an easy task.

Influential leaders should be adaptable. They must be able to restrain their energy and be patient and coherent. They must be aware of their own capabilities and possibilities. They need basic general knowledge to improvise adaptive and practical solutions to unforeseen problems. The book for success in this environment is not yet written. Influential leaders must have much more than cultural awareness; they must have cultural familiarity. Knowing what they know and knowing who they are, influential leaders will engage and communicate personally within their environment. This communication should build trust and credibility among all parties, make cooperation possible, and create common ground to find practical solutions. Influential leaders will assume risks, taking advantage of opportunities and demonstrating flexibility with their procedures. They will use force with prudence, but with determination, once committed. Influential leaders are adaptable and can operate anywhere in the world when there is a requirement for stability operations. They are active participants in the desert during the blinding sunlight of day and in the cool moonlight throughout the night.

*As the stars gradually fade into the light of day, the brigade commander finally begins to understand the foundations of his frustration. He was trying to solve everything by himself, putting an inordinate amount of pressure on his unit, and creating mistrust within the environment. Yet, it is not too late, he has learned from his past mistakes. It is going to take more time, but patience is now on his side. **MR***

NOTES

1. Captain Travis Patriquin, "How to Win in Al-Anbar," 2006 Microsoft PowerPoint slides, <www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=CAPT+Travis+Patriquin&btnG=>, (19 March 2009).

2. The term "Three Block War" was coined by former Chief of the Marine Corps, GEN Charles Krulak. Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas" presented at National Press Club, Washington, DC, 10 October 1997. Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, 139, cited by Major Phillip W. Boggs. *Joint Task Force Commanders and the "Three Block War,"* SAMS Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 May 2000. [Three Block War—a concept to describe the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by Soldiers on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous city blocks Soldiers may be required to conduct full-scale military action, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian relief.]

3. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], December 2006), 5-18.

4. Ideas extracted from Greg Jaffe, "A Camp Divided," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 June 2006.

5. Patriquin. His famous PowerPoint presentation is a good example of an honest approach to tribalism.

6. International Security and Assistance Force Civil Military Cooperation in 2004 moved from humanitarian assistance to direct support of governance during my deployment to the International Security and Assistance Force Headquarters in Kabul.

7. An idea extracted from Barnett Rubin, "Rubin: Taliban and Telecoms --." Secret Negotiations Just Got Easier and at a Price You Can Afford!" *Informed Comment: Global Affairs: Group Blog on Current Events*, entry posted 31 March 2008, <http://icga.blogspot.com/2008/03/rubin-taliban-and-telecoms-secret.html>, (18 March 2009).

8. An idea extracted from the kidnapping incident of three international workers on 28 October 2004, during my duty deployment to International Security Assistance Force Headquarters.

9. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT): An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services.

10. FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: GPO, October 2006), 1-2.

11. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, February 2008), 4-2.

12. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. FM 3-0, 6-10.

13. Ibid.

14. FM 6-22, 7-11.

15. FM 3-24, 7-9.

16. FM 3-0, 2-3.

17. *Peacetime military engagement*: all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. *Limited interventions*: executed to achieve an end state that is clearly defined and limited in scope. *Corresponding limitations*: imposed on the supporting operations and size of the forces involved. These operations may be phased but are not intended to become campaigns. *Peace operations*: A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. *Irregular warfare*: a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.

18. FM 3-0 clearly asserts that influence requires legitimacy, acknowledging the risk of a misuse of force to this legitimacy. FM 3-0: 6-10.

19. The entire intervention of the United States in support of UNOSOM II in Somalia deserves a close look. As an example, the Abdi House raid in Mogadiscio, 12 July 1993. Robert F. Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, "My Clan Against the World" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 116.

20. The Afghan government has asked repeatedly of the International Community to let the Afghans be in the "driver's seat" of their own reconstruction, <www.embassyofafghanistan.org/04.06embnewsscrrp.html>, (3 April 2008).

21. FM 6-22, v.

22. Harold Wiffen, "Becoming an Adaptive Leader," *Military Review* (November-December 2007): 108-14.

23. A United Nations official explained to me that Afghan local authorities do not recognize that civil authorities maintain supremacy over the military. When touring the recently established northern International Security and Assistance Force PRTs, in 2004, local authorities always first saluted the military commander. This gesture holds great significance for Afghans.

24. FM 3-24, 7-2.

25. David Cummings, "On Luck and Leadership," *Military Review* (January-February 2008): 104-7.

26. At the same time, when using force over irregular agents who are not the main enemy, it is good practice to keep an honorable escape route in order to "save face." A group defeated with honesty and clarity but without arrogance may become an ally in the future, whether the fight is over words or with weapons.

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