
At what is arguably the most significant crossroads in recent military history, The Fourth Star is a roadmap that guides its readers from the ghosts of the recent past to the promise of America’s future. In the most basic terms, it chronicles the journeys of four iconoclastic leaders, men who emerged from the last days of the Vietnam War to assume prominent, influential roles in reshaping the Army into a “flexible, modest, and intellectually nimble force” confronting the uncertainties of 21st century conflict. This is a book for the modern age of conflict, decidedly focusing on the human dimension in recounting a tale that is universally appealing.

The Fourth Star is also a remarkable study in contrast and parallel. Each man—Generals George Casey, John Abizaid, Peter Chiarelli, and David Petraeus—followed a uniquely individual path to success and rose through decades of service to transform the Army together. They came from different backgrounds, had different leadership styles, and possessed vastly different opinions on how best to combat an insurgency amid mounting sectarian violence in Iraq. Ironically, these differences were instrumental in shaping a new direction for the Army when it mattered most.

In sharp contrast to their predecessors at the height of the Vietnam War, these men accepted, even encouraged, intellectual dissonance among their staffs, a trait that ensured a vibrant and powerful dialogue over key issues. Their beliefs and ideas often stirred intense debate, but in true iconoclastic fashion they were able to build rapid consensus and achieve unheralded success. They were leaders cut from different molds, but they were ideally suited to the unique challenges posed by a generational conflict that could span decades.

With The Fourth Star, authors David Cloud and Greg Jaffe offer an epic of intertwined careers, of four special leaders fighting a common enemy in an uncommon era. Together, the authors weave a captivating story of the ascension of four of the most influential men in modern military history. All four defy convention while at the same time defining a paradigm for contemporary wartime leadership. Equal parts candor and conscience, the book presents each man as a human being at the apex of his profession and as a leader in a modern mold.

What makes The Fourth Star unique is its intimate, revealing portraits. While many contemporary military biographies can seem sterile or even distant, Cloud and Jaffe introduce each leader in detail, drawing on extensive interviews, research, and analysis. The raw honesty with which the authors present these paragons of military leadership is at times provocative. The Fourth Star introduces these leaders not as stoic characters but as thinking, feeling men who faced the same adversity and personal challenges in life shared by other Army officers. The book is thus more a reflective study on the human condition than most other military biographical literature.

Cloud is a senior policy advisor to Ambassador Karl Eikenberry in Kabul. From 2005 to 2007, he served as the Pentagon correspondent for the New York Times and was a national security reporter for the Wall Street Journal from 1997 to 2004. Jaffe is the senior Pentagon correspondent for the Washington Post and previously held the same position at the Wall Street Journal. He shared a Pulitzer Prize in 2000 for his series on defense spending and won the Raymond Clapper Award in 2002 and 2005 for Washington coverage. In 2002, he won the Gerald R. Ford award for defense coverage.

For military readers, The Fourth Star is a book with great professional relevance.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Richard Haass accomplishes what he set out to do as per his title: he has written a memoir. His success in this regard is exactly what makes the book a disappointing read. The majority of this book is simply a record of Haass’s personal observations of his service as a member of the National Security Council staff in the first Bush presidency and as head of the State Department’s policy planning staff in the second Bush administration. As a memoir, the book succeeds. Haass dutifully recalls events from the two conflicts such as Bush Sr.’s administration’s efforts to form a coalition against Iraq, the efforts by the United States to keep Israel out of the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s efforts to shape the plan for Iraqi Freedom in such a way that would bring about his own vision for the American military’s transformation, intelligence errors regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction in 2003 Iraq, and the difficulties the United States faced in occupying Iraq. All of this is recorded in clear prose that makes for an easy read.

Richard N. Haass
In fact, readers may find themselves nodding in agreement, not in support of anything Haass has written, but simply because they have heard it all before. This is the crux of the problem with this book; there is little in it that one hasn’t heard before. In retelling events, Haass favors historical narrative over detailed analysis of the events he witnessed and played a part in.

As a historical narrative, the book’s organization is unsurprisingly chronological. It moves from the lead up to and execution of the Gulf War, through the Clinton Administration (during which Haass worked at a number of Washington think tanks), the 9/11 attack, and ultimately the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Within the narrative, there is little to no effort to compare and contrast the War of Necessity and the War of Choice. It is not until the final nine-page chapter entitled “Takeaways from Two Wars” that one sees a break from historical narrative and an attempt to provide analysis. Unfortunately, this is a matter of too little too late for readers who want more than a retelling of events they are likely familiar with.

The final chapter of the book brings out quite a few interesting points that are well worth thinking about. Among them are the distinction between preventative and preemptive war, a discussion of the correlation between the quality of the “process” and the quality of the foreign policy it produces, and the tension between realism and idealism in approaching foreign policy and international relations. Given Haass’s experience, one is ultimately left wishing that he hadn’t felt it a necessity to limit himself to historical narrative but instead had made a choice to develop these points in his book.

LTC Brian Imini, USA, West Point, New York


Challenges posed to the United States over the last two decades give rise to an ever-more complex security situation. In National Security Dilemmas Colin Gray provides a sound argument for the need for a coherent and inclusive national strategy that orchestrates power and political aims. In doing so, he correctly shows history as a reasonable, instructional guide for 21st century conflict. He shows the role of national power, its use and threat of use, and how to achieve its desired aims.

Gray has collected and retooled National Security Dilemmas from his U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute publications between 2002 and 2007. With new opening and closing chapters, the book presents a view of the current era in regard to the dominant dilemmas, challenges, and opportunities associated with strategy and policy.

Much of the book’s discussion centers on current conflicts with terrorist networks and other nonstate actors and, it highlights the imperative for strategy to link policy to action when the battlegrounds are in the midst of populace. Through this backdrop Gray tackles a series of related topics including identifying “decisive victory,” modern roles for deterrence, the role of strategic surprise as a condition to be managed, what constitutes a revolution in military affairs, regular and irregular warfare’s strategic implications, preemption and prevention and what they imply, and the role of morality or ethics in developing strategy. Each topic is addressed in detail and in context, creating a clear picture of the global security situation and the challenges strategists and policymakers face.

Gray provides a historical record of America’s traditional voids in strategy development and claims a number of reasons for these shortcomings in “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy” where he introduces the characteristics of the American way of war. He discusses American historical traits in the development of strategy and conduct of war. Gray articulates 13 well-resourced points and the fact that in order to overcome the strategic void, America must acknowledge the existence of these preconditions and move beyond them.

On reading National Security Dilemmas, perhaps the greatest questions are those that arise from the level of understanding Gray provides. His arguments make it clear there are definitive strategic possibilities in countering current and future challenges, not through technological advancement or superior firepower, but through cognizance of their true nature and our ability to adapt to meet them. That being said, it may not be in the best interest to solve each problem, diffuse each conflict, or assist whenever the perceived need arises. As the author points out, “there will be so many dangers anticipated for the future that the United States may well find itself engaged in more wars than it can afford or conduct effectively.”

For military readers and policymakers, National Security Dilemmas provides a complete view of the roadblocks to crafting an effective, coherent strategy in light of current challenges and discusses how the challenges may be met. The book’s arrival coincides with the pending release of “design” in Army doctrine. Gray’s comments strike at the heart of the reason for the inclusion of design in terms of problem identification and concept development, linking guidance to action.

For policymakers, the book provides insight into the difficult question of what the role of military power should be in the 21st century. The answer may be much different than what it can be.

MAJ Matthew Eberhart, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Two hundred years ago, only three percent of the world’s population lived in cities. Today, nearly half of the globe’s seven billion inhabitants live in urban areas, and the rate of urbanization is rapidly increasing.
Much of the growth is occurring in the developing world, and as much as we may wish to avoid it, a significant portion of the fighting in the 21st century will occur in and around these urban areas. Baghdad and Kabul are the most obvious examples, but cities like Mogadishu, Kinshasa, and Monrovia have likewise seen their share of conflict in the past decade. In Policing Post-Conflict Cities, Alice Hills, professor of conflict and security at the University of Leeds, attempts to unravel the complicated relationships between order, security, and policing in urban areas wracked by recent violence.

Although the terms order, security, and stability are often used interchangeably, Hills explains that there are key, if subtle, differences. While the West often sees security as the most vital public good to be provided in post-conflict cities, Hills argues that order is really the more significant factor. Security, while important, is only one of several variables that influence the order that emerges after violence subsides. Western attempts to improve security in post-conflict cities inevitably focus on reforming indigenous police according to Western models of democratic policing, even though these models are often inappropriate for the circumstances. These reform models, according to Hills, frequently ignore such important factors as the influence of culture on police behavior, differing notions of the value of life and property, and the social roles that police traditionally play in the developing world.

If Hills is right that Western-style policing is often unsuited for post-conflict cities, then organizations like the UN may be wasting billions of dollars on security sector reform that will ultimately fail. Indeed, Hills points out that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that democratic policing in such environments produces the desired results. Those reform programs that manage to produce some limited success generally see only temporary gains, and long-term change generally requires more than a generation to effect. In Hills’s analysis, security sector reform programs frequently fail to acknowledge the specific needs of post-conflict cities, and unsurprisingly often produce disappointing results.

Policing Post-Conflict Cities is a well-considered and comprehensive look at the ways in which urban order reemerges after periods of violence. It is, however, an academic work intended for academics. Its narrative is theoretical and descriptive, rather than practical and prescriptive, and its dense, scholarly style makes for slow reading. Few military professionals will find it to be a page-turner, although the case studies will strike a familiar chord with those who have served in Iraq or in urban areas of Afghanistan. Despite these minor cautions, Hills’s work provides a strong and welcome intellectual challenge to our assumptions about how urban order and security are reconstructed following conflict.

MAJ Jason Ridgeway, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The format for this RAND study, familiar to anyone who has read or written a research thesis, conducts a thorough review of the existing literature, covers in painstaking detail the definitions used, and explains the parameters of the study, outlining what it is and is not. This differentiation is necessary to avoid confusion between measures of political liberalization, which the study examines, and actual democratic government, which the authors readily admit does not exist among any of the six case studies reviewed.

The meat of the research covers Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco. While military readers might have an interest in their analysis of Iraq, Lebanon, or Palestine, the authors clearly explain that those areas have been excluded precisely because their situations are considered ongoing and still unresolved. The authors use Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) ratings to gain an objective measure of political freedom among the nations considered, and compare them with acts of political violence in those countries over the time periods examined. They make a bold attempt to empirically analyze this topic and are able to draw some interesting and valuable lessons from the nations studied.

The six nations vary in their level of authoritarianism, but they all use varying degrees of accommodation and repression to ensure the survival of the regime and to control the dissenting elements of their populations. The study reveals that accommodation through political liberalization measures can co-opt extremists and give voice to genuine political dissent. It also expresses some surprising, counterintuitive conclusions. Increased political freedom through reforms can exacerbate tensions between political groups instead of promoting tolerance. Conflict between the Muslim and Coptic communities in Egypt and the Sunni and Shi’a communities in Bahrain are cited as prime examples.

The study finds that political liberalization can be effective in the short term in reducing political violence but that tangible, long-term benefits must be seen by the people, or returns to violent expression become more likely. Further, reversals of freedoms can result in swift returns to violence.

The study gives due credit to rule of law and strong security services for preventing political violence. Perceptions matter, however, and disrespect for human rights in the execution of law enforcement can serve to motivate extremists. The perceived legitimacy of the regime by the populace is a determining factor in the level of violence.

The study is valuable for anyone deploying to the current theaters of operation and involved in the building of civil society and the management of political dissent. Political liberalization can be an
effective tool to provide nonviolent outlets for dissent and some degree of self-determination. It can be a double-edged sword if implemented improperly.

MAJ Joseph G. Edwards, USA, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri


Out of Captivity: Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle explores the extraordinary endurance and tenacity of three men motivated by survival, friendship, love of family, and a resolve to maintain dignity in the face of adversity. Americans, Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Tom Howes, recount the harrowing story of their capture, survival, and repatriation following five and a half years as hostages of one of the world’s most notorious criminal terrorist groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. More than a story of survival, the book is important because it provides an example of how these men continuously adapted to their ever-changing environment while remaining steadfast in their commitment to each other and loyalty to America. Further, it describes an often overlooked aspect of conflict, the hierarchy and psyche of child soldiers, and provides a firsthand account of the Colombian Army’s rescue mission.

Written in a chronological, alternating, three-part narrative, Gonsalves, Stansell, and Howes begin by progressively introducing members of the Northrop Grumman team, tasked with conducting aerial surveillance missions in support of joint U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics operations. Next, they describe the crash of their Cessna Grand Caravan aircraft and subsequent capture on 13 February 2003. The rest of the book focuses on examining details of their daily fight for survival, their rescue, and repatriation in July 2008.

All three men discuss aspects of the physical, emotional, and spiritual challenges they endured during captivity highlighting significant events including the numerous forced marches and camp moves, proof of life interviews, and hostage group “integrations.” Acknowledging their breaking points, different approaches to situations, and disagreements, these men learned and gained strength from each other.

Throughout the book, the authors provide interesting perspectives on the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the other hostage groups. Their descriptions of the exceptional endurance and ability to live off the land demonstrated by the young male and female guerrillas is balanced with descriptions of surreal moments like yo-yo and peashooter contests and “popcorn and movie nights” under the jungle canopy. All three men describe how captivity strips away all the layers to reveal the essential nature and character of a person. Each man offers a perspective on how this “effect” manifested itself in the behavior of some of the political prisoners, especially, Ingrid Betancourt.

One of the most illuminating parts of the book focuses on how the Colombians took advantage of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia’s deteriorating leadership structure, infiltrated their communication network, and set up a hostage exchange using a team of highly trained volunteers posing as humanitarian aid workers and reporters. Gonsalves’s description of what went on inside the helicopter during the rescue on 2 July 2008 highlights the audacity and courage of the rescue team.

Out of Captivity offers a unique opportunity for both the general reader and military professional to examine not only the extremes of human endurance, but adds new elements to the body of knowledge on the insurgency in Colombia—the continuing growth and use of child fighters, and American hostage perspectives during Colombia’s Operation Checkmate. The book contains a useful reference list of select Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia guerrilla names, numerous photos of the authors, their primitive living conditions, as well as various terrorist equipment and weapons that enable the reader to better visualize the harsh jungle environment and the visible physical changes of these men.

The story provides a great example of how resilient individuals can survive adversity, learn from the experience, and continue to lead a productive life. This is especially relevant for today’s Army leaders continuing their efforts to educate the operational force and their families on aspects of the U.S. Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program.

LTC Edward D. Jennings, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Korean War is all but forgotten even though 20 members of the United Nations sent troops and medical contingents to fight invading North Koreans and Chinese Communists alongside the United States and South Korea. There were dramatic reversals of fortune in its first year before it settled into a stalemate in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. William T. Bowers narrates the events of January to February 1951 from a foot Soldier’s perspective using U.S. Army historian post-combat interviews.

General Matthew Ridgway had just taken command of Eighth Army after General Walton Walker’s death in an automobile accident. General Douglas MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs of Staff it might be necessary to evacuate Korea in light of the Chinese intervention. Ridgway’s ability to restore Eighth Army’s morale, using his personality and self-confidence shows how strong leadership can affect a situation, but January was too early for Ridgway’s influence to be felt. The desperate situation was saved by his commanders’ resourcefulness and his Soldiers’ stubborn courage.
Bowers concentrates on the fighting in the Hoengsong—Chipyong-ni area; east–west and north–south road junctions. If the enemy seized the area he could move south to capture Taejon, Taegu, and Pusan, drive the UN off the peninsula and unite Korea under Kim Il-Sung. The Eighth Army stopped the Chinese offensive.

Although the book’s interviews deal with the experiences of individuals, platoons, and companies, Bowers uses division and regimental command reports to explain the larger tactical situation. As he compares the interviews with other primary sources he shows that the confusion of combat is still there after the fighting ends. He highlights the crucial shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers and the apparent reluctance of American troops to engage in close action with the enemy.

Bowers’ reconstruction of events summarizes the difficulties of waging war in a combined environment as he deals with operations of Republic of Korea divisions and French and Dutch contingents. He shows how UN forces used artillery and air power to overcome manpower shortages. China and North Korea emerge as skillful and tenacious adversaries who exploit every possible advantage. The centerpiece of Bowers’ account is the siege of Chipyong-ni, held by the 23d Infantry Regimental Combat Team and its attached French battalion. UN forces relied on air power and concentrated artillery fire to destroy enemy forces.

The 23rd Infantry Regiment was ordered to hold its position on 12 February, after skirmishing for two weeks with the Chinese in the area. Wonju and Chipyong-ni were held against overwhelming odds until relieved by Eighth Army units and marked the first time UN forces halted a Chinese offensive. These two months of fighting caused a change in the American Soldier’s attitudes. After Chipyong-ni and Wonju, talk of evacuation and abandoning Korea ended as UN troops defeated a hitherto unbeaten enemy.

Although strong leadership was exerted on the operational and tactical levels, important UN advantages lay in firepower, especially air power. Strategic and tactical air support was an important part of these victories, logistically starving the Chinese and killing them in the open. UN air power might isolate the battlefield, but only ground troops could destroy the enemy. UN troops who fought in Korea in January through February 1951 overcame bitter cold weather, rugged terrain, poor training, leadership failures at the highest levels of government, and a formidable enemy to achieve battlefield success. The actions described here changed Eighth Army from a defeated force to one determined to destroy the enemy.

Weaving together the account of the fighting at different tactical levels gives the reader a new account of a particular military aspect of the Korean War, casting new light on a hitherto neglected part of a forgotten war. It is well worth reading.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea


David K. Vaughan has written a highly accessible and enlightening study of wartime poetry. Coming under his purview are poets Karl Shapiro, Randall Jarrell, John Ciardi, William Meredith, Howard Nemerov, Louis Simpson, James Dickey, Richard Hugo, and Lincoln Kirstein. His erudite and enthralling commentaries make for incisive interpretations as he couples his own ample piloting experience with his knowledge of wartime aviation history to enhance his expositions in ways almost unique among poetry expositors. His interviews with those who served with the poets during the war provide unique perspectives that redden our understanding not only of the poems, but the poets themselves. Vaughan’s work will be of interest to historians as well as students of wartime literature.

Vaughan’s purpose is to review the “circumstances that brought these men into the war and examine the most important poems . . . through the perspectives of their tasks, experiences, and attitudes,” while comparing their achievements “through an assessment of their overall success in representing the American wartime experience.” He denotes two broader groups emerging when looking at the lives and works of these poets. The first group focuses on the failures of wartime societies, the second focuses on individual survival and the creation of myths to explain survival in the face of mass destruction.

Karl Shapiro became known as the poetic voice of the American fighting man. He found himself attacking rigidities of the military system in which he participated, using a freedom of style and imagination to describe both combat and noncombat situations. One of his main concerns was for disintegration of the individual during combat—the ultimate damage of war.

Randall Jarrell developed an intense sense of the blind forces of war in his writing. He affected the individual serviceman through “sardonic, ungenerous poems, with their insistent messages of waste and futility.” Yet his lines were evocative and memorable, as he often spoke to the lost childhood of his wartime subjects and the moral conundrums war thrust them into, like the bombing of civilian populations.

Poet Jon Ciardi often places himself as the central figure in his masterful collection of poems, Other Skies. A heightened sense of the casualties suffered reigns throughout his poems. His verse is keenly informed by the knowledge of real combat losses. As with other wartime poets, Ciardi’s primary focus was the gunner—his own aircrew position on the B-29 bomber. He weaves beligerency and wit through classical literature and common experience of wartime to write eloquently complex and disturbing poems.

William Meredith did not enter the war as an established poet. Like Ciardi, he served in the Pacific theater and often wrote of the vast region’s geographical and emotional
strangeness. Thus evident throughout his poems is the consuming affect of overwhelming sublimity—the terror of the natural world. He did not just speak to his own experiences in his poems, but spoke vicariously through other service men, often accomplished through the juxtaposition of natural beauty with a store of literary heritage.

Howard Nemerov wrote personal and compelling poetry of the war, particularly from the stance of aviation, though he likely didn’t grasp the significance of the war until it was well behind him. The ironicstances of his early poems were later configured through personal visions of war, mistrust of war’s leadership, and the damages of war upon other servicemen.

Louis Simpson was a paratrooper who witnessed close-in combat. He suffered combat fatigue and once stated he used poetry to restore a sense of mental balance. He often wrote in ballad style of the shock, panic, and violence of combat. One of Simpson’s most studied poems is “The Runner.” Vaughan spends considerable time providing an expanded exposition of this monumental poem that chronicles the deleterious effects of tactical-level combat.

James Dickey served in the Pacific theater as a radar observer in a night-fighter. Dickey often wrote about his wartime experiences from the contemporaneous perspectives of the post-war day. This often meant focusing on isolation of the individual in combat. As with other wartime poets he struggled to articulate the vast impact of war. His monumental poems, “The Firebombing,” a poem Vaughan explicates at length, and “The Liberator Explodes,” underscore that for this reviewer. To accomplish this, Dickey often drew from contrasting elements of combat flying, employing various comparative literary tropes.

Richard Hugo served as a bombardier aboard an Italy-based B-24 bomber. As with other poems in this work, Vaughan offers extended commentary on key poems, and in this case, Hugo’s opus magnum, “Mission to Linz.” As such, Hugo attempts to relay the incomprehensible through visual details of horrific aspects inherent in bombers engaging flak and enemy fighters. Most of Hugo’s wartime poetry is in his 1969 compilation, Good Luck in Cracked Italian, an eloquently emotional retelling of wartime Italy, where he juxtaposes the war-torn country with a renewed and rebuiding one. That is, he must see post-war Italy against the backdrop of his wartime experiences there.

Although Lincoln Kirstein was not a combatant, the war became intellectually refracted through his Harvard-educated mind, one that produced a comprehensive book of World War II verse, Rhymes of a PFC. It became a popular collection because the poems were expressed from the view of the common Soldier. As such, he wrote from the perspectives of a variety of participants in the war. He moved freely behind the front lines of Europe, encountering Soldiers who formed the focal story lines of Rhymes. By doing this, wartime sensations of combatants were relayed in a highly accessible manner. In sum, Kirstein reaffirmed poetry as a valuable mode of expressing wartime experience. But his most valuable contribution may be in illustrating, as his other fellow war poets did, the Soldier’s inability to comprehend his wartime experiences. In the course of that apprehension, Kirstein began to include the effects of war’s destructiveness in his verse, something man is singularly ill-equipped to deal with.

The book’s conclusion strikes this reviewer as a bit superfluous. Nonetheless, Vaughan makes valuable summations. This book comes with the highest recommendation of any this reviewer has evaluated.

Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Retired, Tucson, Arizona

WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOSEN: Master of the German Air War, James S. Corum, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2008, 428 pages, $34.95.

Wolfram Von Richthofen: Master of the German Air War is not a book about Manfred von Richthofen, known as the “Red Baron.” Rather it’s about his cousin, Wolfram, also a World War I aviator who rose to the rank of Field Marshal of the Luftwaffe during World War II. Wolfram, a brilliant air tactician and operator, was instrumental in working out and fine-tuning the air-ground coordination that made Blitzkrieg possible.

Many biographies have been written about World War II German ground commanders Rommel, von Manstein, von Rundstedt, Kesselring, Student, Keitel, Model, and Guderian, but little has been written about German air commanders other than Goering and Milch, and neither of them was a field commander. Jim Corum is correcting this lapse. With his open access to the von Richthofen family records, papers, letters, and journals, he was able to combine these resources into a comprehensive, balanced account of the life of a leading air commander. His background as a Germanist and an air power historian (as author of The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 and The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform) also give Corum an informed perspective.

The book is as much a history of the Luftwaffe as it is the history of von Richthofen. The histories entwine when the young lieutenant of the 4th Silesian Hussars learns to fly. He was an ace with eight kills in World War I. He received a doctorate in mechanical engineering from the Technical University of Hannover (which played a key role in the development of German air power).

As a general staff officer who spoke Spanish and Italian, he was chief of staff and commander of the Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War (whose name is forever linked with the bombing of Guernica). He commanded the same aviation division during the attack on Poland, the battle for France, the battle of Britain, the battle for Greece, and the battle for Crete. He commanded two separate aviation fleets on the Eastern Front and unsuccessfully tried to stave off the
defeat at Stalingrad, which he lost because he failed to convince Hitler that the Luftwaffe could not resupply a surrounded Stalingrad. Wolfram’s last hurrah was as commander of an aviation fleet in Italy, where he tried to stem the allied invasion of Sicily and Italy and their advance up the peninsula. Von Richthofen died of a brain tumor while in U.S. captivity. He was buried with military honors.

Wolfram made vital contributions to the Luftwaffe and was a pioneer in developing air-ground cooperation and coordination. He pushed forward air controllers to the point of contact in armored vehicles so they could accurately coordinate close air support. He integrated air liaison officers into army planning staffs. He convinced the German Air Force and Army to work from map sheets with a common grid for ease and accuracy during battle—something U.S. armed forces still do not do. He pioneered the use of aviation to resupply fuel and ammunition to army panzer units. In all of this, he was central to the development of blitzkrieg tactics.

This is a good book and a good read, but it needs a bibliography and a better index. With that aside, I recommend it for military historians and ground and air military practitioners.

Lester W. Grau, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


America is acutely familiar with suicide bombers of the 21st century, from New York to Iraq to Madrid to London to Afghanistan. Increasingly though, stories and memories of the World War II Japanese Kamikaze (Divine Wind) are being lost or superseded by this century’s horrors. Maxwell Kennedy is bringing back the memory of the kamikaze within the context of the May 1945 attack on the Essex class aircraft carrier, USS Bunker Hill, which killed 363 American Sailors and Marines. Aside from telling the story of the carnage of the Bunker Hill, Kennedy tells the story of the Japanese pilot who flew his plane into the U.S. ship.

Kennedy juxtaposes the story of the Bunker Hill with that of Kiyoshi Ogawa, a young Japanese college student who would soon be a Kamikaze pilot. Based on extensive first-hand accounts and personal interviews, the book tells an all-too-familiar story of the young men who were taught to hate Americans, promised eternal glory, and then sent on one-way missions of death. What is striking is that these young Japanese men accepted their fates, even though some had doubts of the sacrifice their leaders and country were asking of them.

From the American perspective, the Bunker Hill’s story is compelling, not only for the horror of the attack itself, but for the heroism that was common among the ship’s crew. Kennedy takes the Bunker Hill from design to launch to transit to its initial operational missions in spring 1945. American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will understand the stress of the Bunker Hill’s unending missions, punctuated with monotony and terror against Japanese forces on Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Japanese home islands.

Kennedy’s book reminds us that what is old is new, not only for suicide bombers, but also for the horrors experienced by the victims and the valor they showed in the face of such dangers.

James Burcalow, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


As World War I British Major General Alfred Knox observed, the Imperial Russian command for some unknown reason always seemed to choose a bog to drown in. Indeed, this is the case for most of the war. Timothy C. Downing’s The Brusilov Offensive explores one of the few successful Russian ventures of the Great War that did not follow the “swamp” pattern. Surprisingly little is written about the Eastern Front of the war. This book helps reduce the deficit in World War I literature by focusing on probably the worst combat crisis faced by Austria-Hungary and Germany on the front with Russia.

Dowling’s well-written book gives insight into Imperial Russia’s most outstanding World War I commander, Alexsei Brusilov, and chronicles the successful, albeit bloody, offensives in 1916 that bear his name. Brusilov pioneered a crude form of combined arms operations and stressed proper planning and training for his troops. His performance and advanced thinking stand in stark contrast to the incompetence and desultory results of his fellow army commanders and superiors—many of whom were palace appointees with little merit. While his offensive almost threw the Austro-Hungarian Empire out of the war until strong German intervention prevailed, the longer-term impact was to hasten the decline of the Imperial Russian Army and relegate Austria-Hungary to a fully subordinated ally of the German High Command. Although not a biography, the book sheds insight into the personality and character of Brusilov—a man of both honor and integrity.

The author holds a Ph.D. from Tulane University and a specialization in modern German and Russian history, so he is well qualified to write this gem. He uses extensive sources and is objective in his handling of all involved parties. One major flaw is the book’s insufficient maps. Given the mammoth scale and movement in this theatre, I struggled to link a critical corps movement to its objectives or direction of attack. The book wholeheartedly deserves a place on the shelves of those interested in great commanders as well as all students of World War I and the Imperial Russian Army.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland

Punitive War merits discussion on several levels. Mountcastle disagrees with recent works on the Civil War that take exception to the view that Northern military actions in the South consisted of rape, pillage, and indiscriminate destruction. They argue the Union Army waged hard war, not total war, on the South. Mountcastle thinks Union attacks on the Southern population were brutal and too-often indiscriminate, and he provides examples from the Kansas-Missouri border war, fighting in the Mississippi valley, General William Sherman’s march, and General Philip Sheridan’s Shenandoah campaign. Mountcastle develops the historiography of the Civil War in a narrow way. He cannot go back to scorched earth tactics or call it total war, so he makes the case for harder war. However, he calls it punitive war, which goes to another angle on the book.

Mountcastle argues that guerrilla warfare waged by Confederates frustrated Union soldiers, which in turn led to attacks on Southern property and civilians. On this point, Punitive War becomes less convincing as it goes. The fighting in Kansas and Missouri manifests the anger of the border region where Union reprisals, especially localized ones, were driven primarily by the desire to punish anyone in the area of guerrilla activities. The antagonism of the Mississippi Valley campaign was not as clear, and the causes of retaliatory destruction were more complicated than Mountcastle suggests. Guerrillas did harden General Ulysses Grant’s attitude toward the Southern population, but those activities were not the only motivator. The bloodshed of the Battle of Shiloh and intransient civilians in places like Memphis also led Grant to believe he was engaged in a war with a people, not just armies, and that he would have to adjust accordingly.

That is not how it happens in Punitive War. The punitive war Mountcastle describes is unthink-
alone recognition, and the chances of British intervention were virtually nil.

Furthermore, Caution and Cooperation extends the Anglo-American relationship to a still larger stage. He demonstrates that British military withdrawal from Canada, and the dawn of confederation there, took place with an awareness that not only was Canada largely indefensible, but also there was little probability that the United States would invade it.

As for the other European power upon which the South placed its hopes, France was not about to intervene unless Britain did so first, especially as many of its own forces were tied up in Mexico.

Caution & Cooperation is a well-documented and equally well-reasoned work on an aspect of the Civil War that is crucial yet misunderstood and neglected. Going against the grain of accepted wisdom, it is a revelation, and well worth attention.

Jim Werbaneth, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


In this well-researched and perceptive history, Matthew H. Spring puts paid to the hoary myth of the British army fighting in Revolutionary America. Popular imagination conjures well-dressed lines of pipe-clayed, red-coated automata advancing elbow-to-elbow, led by elegantly dressed, but amateurish fops fit only for dining and dying well, or by sadists whose cruelty presaged that of the Waffen SS and its ilk. Reinforced by simplistic morality plays like The Patriot (2000), the British army becomes little more than a caricature in the common American memory. In truth, the British army was an adaptive and formidable institution led by tactically astute and imaginative officers seeking to provide the battlefield successes that might translate into a political solution.

With Zeal and with Bayonets Only examines the mechanics of infantry combat. The story is of army leaders who believed battlefield success was the key to swaying popular loyalties. Significantly, senior leaders recognized that their ability to prosecute the war was constrained by the realities of domestic, imperial, and international politics, economics, logistics, and demography. Thus the army’s ability to project and maintain power over any great distance or for any appreciable length of time was limited by a host of factors beyond the army’s scope or ability to control.

Strategic and operational limitations imposed by imperial overreach forced the army’s adaptation to the American environment. While King George’s small professional army fought in a theater that was stretched thin, it was rarely bested by its enemies. Nonetheless, successive British commanders were unable to gain a decisive victory. Britain’s small numbers translated into an overriding but necessary concern with force preservation.

The need to preserve their limited manpower forced the redcoats into a reliance on the bayonet to decide the contest more quickly than the attraction associated with a close-ranged, damaging, firefight. Given the short effective range of the musket, the time it took to reload, and the ability of advancing infantry to close that range quickly, bayonet charges became the favored means of British commanders—an irony given their preference for firepower over cold steel in the Seven Years’ War.

In the end, Britain’s overstretched army proved incapable of winning the peace in a struggle that was fundamentally a people’s war, both within the empire and within the colonies. Spring notes the “resilience of the Continental Army was central” to British failure, but while “British military successes impressed the undecided, they did not intimidate inveterate rebels.” In short, British political and military leaders “appear simply to have overestimated the political worth of military success” in such a contest. Over time American forces improved, even to the occasional point of equaling or besting British regulars. Rarely outdone in battle, the British army was the sharp edge to an otherwise dull imperial policy.

With Zeal and with Bayonets Only is a welcome and important addition to Revolutionary American and early-modern military history. It deserves to be read by historians and those interested in imperial ventures.

Ricardo A. Herrera, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Empathy: A True Leader Skill

COL George M. Schwartz, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania—LTC(R) Garner has started to fill an important void in our leadership doctrine with his piece, “Empathy: A True Leader Skill” (November-December 2009 Military Review). There is no doubt that empathy should be an essential attribute of our leadership model. In the series of books Daniel Goleman has published on Emotional Intelligence—which has strongly influenced our current leadership doctrine—empathy is frequently touted as an emotional domain to be mastered.

However, I submit that the focus in FM 6-22 Army Leadership and Garner’s article is too narrow. It is critically important that our leaders possess empathy when leading their subordinates, but in the contemporary operating environment, our leaders should utilize empathy when dealing with members of the
local populace too, especially in a counterinsurgency fight.

Empathy should be recognized as a critical skill for Stability Operations, particularly when utilizing the Stability Mechanisms of Influence and Support. To function effectively with people of other cultures, it is not only important to acquire some understanding of those cultures, leaders with cultural empathy are able to understand what people from a different culture are feeling and then better identify with their thoughts and behaviors. In Primal Leadership (2004), Goleman describes empathy in action as taking another’s feelings into thoughtful consideration and then making intelligent decisions that work those feelings into a response.

Samuel Huntington wrote, “The great division between mankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” Empathy beyond the boundaries of one’s unit furthers cross-cultural understanding, builds resonance between military and local leaders, and helps provide insights into the motivation of those fighters we now consider to be “accidental guerrillas.” Efforts to develop empathy in our leaders deserve much more effort.

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