
A modern classic. The quintessential war memoir. An incredibly prolific writer, Robert Graves penned more than 140 literary works during his life, ranging from expressive poetry to acclaimed fiction to revered translations of Classical Latin and Ancient Greek. Yet none of these was as influential, captivating, or enduring as his autobiography, Good-Bye to All That, which recounts his early life in England, his experiences in the trenches of France during World War I, and his insatiable quest for meaning in life.

There is a sense throughout Good-Bye to All That suggesting the strong influence of Dante Alighieri, whose literary sway was resurgent during this period. Robert Graves conveys the epic flavor of The Divine Comedy, chronicling his life in three distinct periods—pre-war boyhood (Purgatorio), wartime manhood (Inferno), and post-war enlightenment (Paradiso). Graves' "coming of age" journey through life is eerily reminiscent of Dante's description of his passage to salvation, as the author grapples with the complexities of social class distinctions, the horrors of war, and the emergence of the liberated mind.

Graves began his journey in his boyhood home of Wimbledon, embarking on a wholly unremarkable and, at times, seemingly aimless pursuit of youth. For readers, this period of the author's life is easily overlooked; the writing often seems disjointed and the flow pointless. But for Graves it symbolized a significant time, when life was fresh and the road before him uncharted. In a coming-of-age tale, his youth represented an existence without defined purpose, his own Purgatory.

Within days of the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Graves began his descent into the Inferno, accepting a special reserve commission with the Royal Welch Fusiliers. The posting to such a historic regiment was a matter of great pride for Graves, who remained class conscious throughout his life. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were one of the most honored regiments in the British Army, earning "twenty-nine battle-honours on its colours" since being formed in 1689 under the reign of William III. But the stark reality of the Western Front soon set in upon Graves, as the horrors of war surrounded him.

During this period, his realistic, often graphic wartime poetry earned him a reputation as a soldier's poet; Graves published his first collection of poems, Over the Brazier, in 1916. On 20 July 1916, Graves' descent culminated with the Battle of the Somme, where he was gravely wounded in an artillery barrage. His lung pierced by a shell fragment, Graves lay near death—official reports listed him as killed in action during his initial evacuation from the front. His description of his journey from the field hospital to England can be interpreted to represent his ascension from the Inferno; other than a brief return to France, the war was over for Graves.

During what could loosely be interpreted as the beginning of Graves' enlightenment period, he continued his exploration of life. In 1918, he married his first wife, Nancy Nicholson, and fathered four children in the next five years. Professionally unsuccessful, Graves was "continuously and depressingly dependent upon hand-outs" while apparently suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. In 1926, he accepted a position as a poetry professor at Cairo University, and set sail for Egypt with his family and the American poet Laura Riding Gottschalk. Upon their return less than a year later, Graves took up residence with Riding; her influence on Good-Bye to All That is unmistakable. Their relationship, and the writing of the memoir, marks Graves' shedding of his former life and the start of life anew.

Graves retells his service during the war with remarkable clarity. Sparing no details, Graves describes the horrors of the trenches so vividly that readers can almost feel the mud suck at their boots and taste the stench of death around them. The prose is crisp and articulate, and Graves' world comes to life with palpable realism. Through his eyes, Graves draws the readers deeper into his war, his personality, and the lives of the men around him. More so than any other aspect of the book, his ability to create a literary diorama of war-torn France makes Good-Bye to All That an unforgettable memoir.

Few writers can weave their words into such a vivid tapestry of life and death; Graves does this with a singular skill that readers will appreciate. However, readers should also be forewarned that there are different versions of Good-Bye to All That available for purchase. The original manuscript was remarkable for Graves' raw honesty, his willingness to recount his experiences while they were still fresh in his mind. He significantly revised Good-Bye to All That over the years, publishing another version in 1957 that excised good portions of the original while adding new material that created deep suspicions among his colleagues. His reasons for revising the classic memoir vary, but are likely a reflection of "a decisive new alignment of ideas, thoughts and feelings" and the simple fact that his tumultuous relationship ended years earlier. In 1995, Berghahn Books republished an annotated version of the original manuscript, returning...
Graves’ masterpiece to bookshelves around the world. Following the First World War, the exploits of the Royal Welch Fusiliers were widely chronicled by those who served with the regiment in combat. In addition to Graves’ manuscript, medical officer James C. Dunn penned the epic The War the Infantry Knew, while fellow special reservist Frank Richards published Old Soldiers Never Die.

Together, these works capture the nightmare of the trenches in the Great War, casting the dark shadow of death over the futility of the conflict’s static warfare. Good-Bye to All That is a rarity among modern literary works, remaining in print continuously since Graves first published his memoirs in 1929. This is as much a testament to the quality of the writing as the author’s candor. As a master of English literature, Graves was capable of crafting his life’s tale with grace and skill. In doing so, he merged a coming-of-age story with a startlingly frank war memoir, all set against a backdrop of a lifelong search for personal identity. The result was a symphony of life that resonates with many readers regardless of background or experience.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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In Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State, Garry Wills examines the gathering clouds of secrecy that now enshroud the executive branch of American federal government. According to Wills, these clouds began forming with the creation of the Manhattan Project, a program perceived as so critical to national security that Roosevelt kept it a secret from his own vice president. From that point forward, Wills traces the growth of executive power throughout the years of the Cold War, when its defenders hid mistakes from Congress and the public behind a shroud of national security that rarely fooled our enemies. According to Wills, the entire edifice derived from “bomb power,” the presidential authority to employ nuclear weapons. The author contends that during an era of impending doom, such power was too important and time-sensitive to share with Congress.

Wills focuses on the growing tendency of American presidents to abandon their constitutional obligations in favor of “executive privilege.” For support, the author assembles a series of historical anecdotes, ranging from plots, coups, and assassination attempts to domestic spying, legalized torture, and undeclared wars. This is familiar ground for students of Cold War history. Wills, however, presents these events in a fresh light, demonstrating how presidential power has expanded to such a degree that White House lawyers have repetitively insisted, with a disturbing degree of success, that the executive branch is exempt from restrictions clearly stated in the Constitution. In his final chapter, Wills presents the now-familiar excesses of the most recent administration, from renditions to domestic spying to torture, as proof that this trend is getting worse.

The author’s breezy narrative gallops through these well-worn tales in engaging fashion, but his rapid survey leaves no time to dwell on other, relevant perspectives. How, for example, did the emergence of the presidential “bomb power” influence the strategy of our Cold War enemies? Wills briefly mentions Castro’s desire for nuclear missiles while discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis, but makes no mention of how “bomb power” influenced other leaders, such as Mao and Khrushchev. The author also ignores contrarian examples, such as the 1975 abandonment of Vietnam and the congressionally imposed restrictions on President Clinton’s deployment of American troops to the Balkans in the mid-1990s.

Presented in context and subjected to serious analysis, this litany of ambition, arrogance, and stunning incompetence would constitute a compelling indictment of the modern American political system. Too often, however, Wills seems to settle for low-hanging fruit, generally avoiding such complex topics as arms control or the Arab-Israeli wars in favor of familiar episodes such as the Bay of Pigs, the secret bombing of Cambodia, and the Iran-Contra scandal. These examples illustrate the scope of presidential power and prevarication, but their familiarity echoes the unresolved disputes of the past, occasionally overshadowing Wills’ larger argument about the Constitution.

If Wills’ writing leaves readers hungry for more, he nevertheless offers a thoughtful introduction to the malignant side effects of victory in the Cold War. As America pursues victory in another “long war,” these issues will demand further examination. Bomb Power offers an interesting place to start.

LTC William C. Latham, Jr., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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THE CLAUSEWITZ DELUSION: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward), Stephen L. Melton, Zenith Press,
What will the U.S. military take away from its painful experience in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will it learn the appropriate lessons or will it return to dysfunctional thinking that has cost so much blood and treasure over the last eight years? This is the central question Stephen Melton seeks to answer in his new book, *The Clausewitz Delusion*. As a retired Army officer and tactics instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Melton brings more than a little credibility to the issue. He also holds a personal stake in getting the answers right. Along with teaching tactics to the officers who must lead U.S. troops into battle, Melton sent two sons to fight a war in Iraq that he finds mishandled from its very conception.

What needs to be done, Melton says, is to stimulate a debate “about the true nature of warfare based on empirical evidence (generally historical) and scientific methods, insofar as possible” in order to chart a course for the Army and the rest of the U.S. military—a course that allows us to benefit from our recent bitter experience. Melton believes we must take a sober, hardheaded look at our military past to draw out what works and what doesn’t in the “American way of war.” He argues that we must recognize that past successes usually came from “attrition” and the nation’s willingness to apply money, men, and munitions to inflict casualties and destruction on enemies who will not understand defeat in any other way. He says we need to be ready to apply military resources and expertise to the thorny problem of governing those we have defeated.

Melton writes well and with passion, and in reviewing the lessons of the American military experience, he makes some telling points. However, these are undermined by some fairly significant inconsistencies in his argument. These include an egregious misreading of Clausewitz (and a misunderstanding of the old Prussian’s influence on the U.S. Army), a highly selective use of history (which sometimes causes Melton to mix types of operations with political objectives), and a lack of argumentative focus that leads him to spend the last three or four chapters denouncing neocon military adventurism (a horse that may be too dead to endure additional beatings). He thus leaves the reader wondering who Melton’s intended audience really is.

Nevertheless, Melton deserves credit for involving the Command and General Staff College faculty in the debate about what the Army should look like after disengagement from our current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope this book becomes one of the first of many articles, blogs, and letters that will make the Leavenworth faculty a key player in the critical debate to come.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The war in Afghanistan does not stop neatly at the impossible border with Pakistan. Al Qaeda and the Taliban take sanctuary just over the border in Waziristan where they rest, heal, rearm, train, and plan before they again launch into Afghanistan. Osama bin-Laden is rumored to have taken sanctuary in the area. Tribesmen and nomads wander freely over the putative border with little constraint. The area itself is rugged and hard to govern. Yet, it once was governed effectively. The British Indian Army and political administration dealt with this troubled area, where they suppressed several uprisings and defeated an invasion. They brought effective governance to the fractious inhabitants.

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Roe, Ph.D., is a seasoned soldier of the British Green Howards, and a two-tour veteran of Afghanistan. He has the career infantryman’s appreciation of terrain, time, and distance. He also has the historian’s grasp of the interaction of events and culture. He further has a good understanding of us “Yanks,” since he graduated from both the Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Roe has provided an excellent account of British tribal management through subtle containment, not direct control.

British governance in the frontier region with Afghanistan relied on indigenous forces, indigenous leadership, incentives, and the occasional application of armed intervention and punishment. Political officers (foreign area officers), who had served with the British Indian Army and had undergone intensive university and on-site education in language, history, geography, and culture served for lengthy periods to keep “their” area quiet and to influence tribal politics. Their tours of duty could involve a decade or more and the political officer actually became the expert on his area. The author is a first-rate guide throughout this process.

Then there are the fights—the insurrection of 1897, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the Fakir of Ipi rebellion, and the numerous raids and ambushes. Lurking in the background are agents of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, the Russian (later Soviet) Empire, the German Empire and the Third Reich, and the Persians and the Turks. Roe weaves this all together in a well-told account. He provides the military historian’s perspective to this period with a reasoned view and an easy reading style.

The book is a must-read that has application for coalition planners and governments, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan. I strongly recommend his book to planners, historians, and military professionals alike.

LTC Lester W. Grau,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: Challengers, Competitors, and the Threats to America’s Future**, Bruce Berkowitz, Georgetown

Bruce Berkowitz, an accomplished U.S. national security affairs author, writes another timely and thought-provoking book about how to overcome some of the more prevalent U.S. national security issues. The author argues that the United States is losing its global strategic edge to competitors (other countries, organizations, and movements) in a world increasingly filled with varied and frequently disconnected threats that further complicate national security. Before developing his argument, the author provides a well-researched historical perspective on how nations such as colonial Britain and France went about establishing and maintaining their strategic advantage (e.g., devising such things as the elaborate national census that counted everything from cattle and horses to another nation’s ships, and the development of sophisticated tax regimes that provided for national defense and colonial expansion).

The author says it is essential the U.S. remain the preeminent global power, not only to protect its national security interests, but also the mutual interests of its Allies. He advocates increasing U.S. agility, decision making speed, and efficiency in the utilization of the instruments of national power as the “way ahead” to decisively meet the aforementioned challenges.

In support of his position, Berkowitz details the technological, geopolitical, economic, military, developmental, and demographic trends shaping the security environment. He notes that while government spending as a percentage of the U.S. economy has remained constant over the years, the portion spent on defense has declined. Historically, post-conflict defense spending settles between 10-15 percent below expenditures predating the conflict years; he adds that this tendency will have to change.

In the end, increasing defense expenditures must coincide with an expanding economy. This will require the U.S. to invest extensively in advanced education in order to produce high value-added jobs that maximize GDP growth.

Furthermore, in light of the ever-shrinking pool of qualified 18-year olds to meet its military requirements, the United States will increasingly depend on technology and soft power approaches to problem solving. As a means of illustrating the need for a more rigorous soft power approach, Berkowitz notes that the State Department’s budget is a mere $500 million to promote America’s image around the world, while the U.S. movie industry’s annual worldwide revenue is $25 billion. His concern is whether this is the image we want to project.

He also believes government officials have devolved into indecisive and risk-averse people in an era when decision speed has become critical. An extension of this phenomenon is that the U.S. government has become increasingly slow in filling the staffs of new presidential administrations. They now average eight months to fill the top 500 positions. Finally, he believes threats are changing faster than our ability to develop the means to counter them. “When you try to forecast threats two decades ahead because your weapon takes twenty years to develop, it is not analysis. It is fortune telling.” All of the aforementioned vulnerabilities must be rectified.

Although the book comes up short in detailing a tangible approach to overcome these challenges, it certainly mounts a well-supported argument that they exist. This fact, coupled with the historical perspective provided early in the book, the way the author develops his argument, and the ease in which the reader can follow it makes this a worthwhile read, particularly for those interested in strategic and security studies matters or serving in a like capacity.

LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D., USMC, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


Gregory D. Koblentz, as deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program and assistant professor of government and politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, has the background and insight to provide a comprehensive analysis of biological warfare and its complex role in international security. Koblentz’s book is well organized, well researched, and written in a way that allows readers to follow his analysis with little or no background in the biological sciences or international security. The book includes a list of acronyms and scientific terms to facilitate understanding of the writing for those who are unfamiliar with the terminology.

Koblentz used UN reports, articles published in scientific journals, and intelligence agency reports to support his analysis. He provides a brief background of biological weapons and their relationship to international security and presents events that led to the argument for Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction program. Koblentz reminds the reader of the importance of biological warfare as it pertains to international security.

Through discussions of the international verification process and limited civilian oversight, Koblentz makes an argument for the complex nature of biological warfare. One challenge in verifying the weapons is the difficulty in differentiating between offensive, defensive, and multi-use programs. Also, there is the issue of limited civilian oversight of biological warfare research and development because of the secretive nature of biological weapons programs. Examples from the former Soviet Union, Russia, and Africa, show how difficult it is for civilians to oversee programs that tend to be managed autonomously by the military.

Human error and misinterpreted information can cause the true nature of a biological weapons program to be inaccurate even though much time and energy has been spent iden-
tifying the adversary’s capabilities. The process the United States and its Allies used to identify the former Soviet Union’s and Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities showed the complexity in which information is gathered, shared, and analyzed.

Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security is an insightful book that meets its objective in educating the reader about the significance of biological warfare and its relationship to international security. Major Chi K. Nguyen, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The title of The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia is a bit misleading. Only three or four chapters directly address the military aspects of August 2008. Over half the book covers the historical background of the conflict or the consequences of the conflict for other parts of the world, in particular for European security.

The book’s historical background is essential. It enables the reader to better understand the complicated affairs that led to the war, and more importantly, how anger grew and spread on both sides. The background develops and demonstrates the growing power of Russia’s military to creatively develop an intervention scenario. Russian Andrei Illarionov notes that “it is remarkable how detailed, precise, coordinated, and secretive was the Russian planning for military action.” The scenario offers an intervention model that Russia could possibly use in other parts of the world as well.

The Guns of August 2008 examines Russian pressure on Georgian decision makers and, in that regard, is pro-Georgian even though 2 of the book’s 12 authors are Russian. Niklas Nilsson offered the most dissenting view on Georgia, noting that from 2005 to 2007 Georgia alternated using peace plan proposals with threats of force to alter the status quo. He believes Russia recognized that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s top priority was territorial integrity, which meant the outright acquisition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. James Sherr pointed to President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s restoration of the state, feeling of national pride, and removal of a sense of humiliation as reasons for Russia’s actions. Russia was also emboldened by NATO actions in Kosovo, which “removed any pretense from Russia’s democrats that NATO was a defensive alliance.”

As relations worsened between Russia and Georgia, Saakashvili was the one on the diplomatic offensive, one which Russia worked around or ignored. Johanna Popianevski notes that the “premeditation argument” of who planned the conflict points to Russia as does “who fired the first shot” and “who carries the burden of proof.” Georgia has record of Russian advances on 7 August into South Ossetia (which Russia has not refuted), and Russia breached Georgia’s sovereign border. Russian Pavel Felgenhauer notes that Georgia’s parliament has scrutinized events but that no public hearing on the conflict has occurred in Russia. Russia planned the conflict in such a way that it would be viewed as a Georgian aggression by the international community.

The Guns of August 2008 is a well-written examination of the many aspects of the conflict and one that will be found on the book shelves of those studying the conflict for years to come. It remains to be seen whether the Russians will hold public hearings on the conflict and thus offer more insights.

Tim Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Ralph Peters writes books as fast as other mortals write newspaper articles. This is not surprising when we realize that his nonfiction books are generally anthologies of articles, most of which had already been published in popular magazines or newspapers. This is not to say that his work lacks interest. On the contrary, because he has taken on the role as the curmudgeon of the foreign policy and military establishments, you are sure to find some stimulating and politically incorrect ideas, mostly directed against the “liberal” wing of the government and the press, but sometimes at what he almost always perceives as a tradition-bound and inflexible military bureaucracy.

As always, Peters’ sympathies are clear. He takes the side of the Soldier or Marine in the foxhole who attempts to carry out orders as best he or she can despite indecisive leaders and contradicting policies while encumbered by restrictive rules of engagement, foreign alliances, and legal entanglements. This current crop of readings lacks substance, and each reading is on average only two or three pages long, long enough to state an opinion but not enough to provide a reasoned argument based on clear facts.

Perhaps the most provocative offerings are “Wishful Thinking and Indecisive Wars,” “Learning to Lose,” and the “Geezer Brigade,” respectively on the problems posed by a lack of understanding of the realities of warfare and especially of Islamist terrorism; a somewhat confused rant against military education, which nonetheless calls for linguistic expertise in the operational force; and an interesting appeal for the creative use of retired military personnel—not contractors—to augment the active force. Articles about the civilizational conflict between Christendom (now “The West”) and Islam provide a historical perspective, which today is often ignored or misunderstood. Unfortunately, Peters’ analysis takes the form of broad-brush generalizations that gloss over important qualifiers.

One of Peters’ pet peeves is his distaste for what he sees as an out-of-touch academic establishment, which might explain his complete lack of documentation. This is fine
if the only goal is to provide an opinion, but in the struggle for ideas, there are few truly new things under the sun and citations provide proof that you have properly done your homework, that you have engaged an existing body of knowledge and other thinkers, both in depth and breadth before formulating your argument. This effort, of course, is time consuming and painful nuts-and-bolts work, but it’s necessary.

Endless War will undoubtedly be purchased by Peters’ loyal fans. But at the suggested retail price, others would do well to read the essays in their original publication venue, or check the book out of the local library for casual and occasionally stimulating reading.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Hawk and the Dove is an engaging history and biography about two major players in the Cold War: Paul Nitze and George Kennan. Born just three years apart, these two Cold War protagonists lived long enough to witness the dissolution of the Soviet Union and die just months apart (Nitze in 2004 at age 97; Kennan in 2005 at 101).

Throughout his long career in and out of government, Nitze was known as a man of action rather than a deep thinker. His credits include serving as vice chairman of the Strategic Bombing Survey during and after World War II, director of Policy Planning for the U.S. State Department (the second person to hold the post; Kennan was the first, with Nitze serving as his deputy); principal author of National Security Council Report NSC-68, which shaped U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War; and cofounder of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Kennan, by contrast, was almost universally regarded as a sage, even by those who disagreed with him politically. His greatest source of fame was his authorship, under the pseudonym “X,” of a 1947 Foreign Affairs article titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” though his reputation in the State Department had been established a year earlier with his writing of the “long telegram” from Moscow, which presaged some of the arguments that would later appear in the “X” article. Both writings offered incisive historical and psychological analysis of the Soviet Union, its history and leaders, and it earned Kennan his next job as director of Policy Planning. It was in this position that he, along with Nitze and others, designed a program of post-war European aid that would come to be known as the “Marshall Plan.”

The author, Nitze’s grandson, presents a well-balanced perspective of both Nitze and Kennan, their friendship and rivalry, spanning six decades, and their variously converging and diverging views on national strategy that earned Nitze the appellation “Hawk” and Kennan “Dove.” As evidence for these labels, the author notes how Kennan regretted the popular interpretation of his word “containment” as being military in nature, whereas Nitze argued that the “doing” of containment must be through the application or threat of military force.

The Hawk and the Dove is well researched and well written. Thompson’s access to both Nitze’s and Kennan’s private papers reinforces a historical narrative that is far from dry history. There are a number of surprising anecdotes that garnish the story. For example, Nitze’s uncle, Paul Hilken, was involved in a German sabotage incident in New York’s Black Tom Harbor in 1916, and Kennan’s uncle, also named George, traveled to Russia in the 19th century and authored several books on Tsarist Russia.

This engaging and readable book is recommended for anyone who wants to better understand the history of the Cold War and the issues that endure from that time.

Clark Capshaw, Ph.D., Alexandria, Virginia


Cora Sol Goldstein’s Capturing the German Eye is ostensibly about American propaganda in occupied Germany. The book focuses on the discussions and forming of American policy regarding Germany, its war guilt, how to combat Communism, and the role of the military government in Germany. The occupation of Germany is a success story. Goldstein argues that American propaganda had a vital role in countering German militarism and virulent nationalism (though it should be noted that the 8th Air Force and the Red Army also helped).

Goldstein’s emphasis is on film, print and artistic expression, and propaganda during the brief period between World War II and the Cold War. Immediately after the war, simply being anti-Nazi was enough for the Office of Military Government U.S. in Germany to license and allow a German artist or author to work. This changed by 1948 and 1949 as the freedom was not extended to Communist artists and writers who were denied the materials to publish anti-American works.

Much of the book discusses disagreements about denazification. The Truman administration and the Army felt the Germans should be confronted with their guilt and held collectively responsible for the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes. This attitude led to an aggressive policy of publishing photographs of concentration camps and films like Mills of Death (Todesmühlen).

However, the policy was not popular among Germans, particularly as the Soviets were blaming capitalists for Germany’s misery rather than popular support of the Nazi party. The Germans even expressed a preference for Soviet-run Radio Berlin over the BBC and Radio Luxemburg because Radio Berlin was not as “unfriendly.” American propagandists soon backed off.
blaming Germany in order to rally support against the Soviet Union. Germans didn’t really start to blame themselves for the Holocaust until war trials for atrocities on the Russian front in the early 1960s.

Visual propaganda emphasized and informed the ideal values of the United States. Only films that gave a positive look at American culture were allowed into German theaters. Goldstein looks at some interesting test cases, including a short cartoon titled *The Brotherhood of Man*. This film proclaimed that all races were equally gifted and could excel if given the same opportunities. Interestingly, the film was prevented from being shown, because, as undersecretary of the Army William Draper, Jr., bigotedly argued, the film was scientifically flawed and untrue.

The most glaring flaw in the book, which happens to be about visual propaganda, is the low quality and number of illustrations. There are only 16 pages of black and white photographs (mostly pictures of concentration camps, generals, and artists). More pictures would have been useful, particularly as the text frequently discusses and analyzes works of art that are not depicted in the book.

*Capturing the German Eye* is interesting from a historical standpoint and useful for a psychological warfare and nation building perspectives. Its short length and narrow focus prevent it from being the definitive work on the occupation of Germany, but it does shed light on the use of visual propaganda. The book also shows how governmental policy can change the use of propaganda and how informal relationships between soldiers and artists can shape the cultural scene of an occupied nation.

This is an important lesson for an Army that is trying to influence a largely illiterate Afghanistan.

**John E. Fahey, Fairfax, Virginia**


Nicholas Evan Sarantakes’ *Allies Against the Rising Sun* covers a period in World War II history that has not received much attention. In his book, he explores British and Commonwealth strategies against Japan from the perspectives of the Allies. The author, a U.S. Naval War College professor, has written two previous books about the end of World War II in the Pacific. He extensively researched the subject and has delivered a superb history and analysis.

Sarantakes sets out to answer three questions. Why did the Commonwealth nations wish to contribute forces to the defeat of Japan when their people were tired of war and desired other options? Why did the United Kingdom want to participate in the operation against Japan? And, why did the United States agree to British and Commonwealth participation even though it meant displacing American units that had more firepower? Sarantakes answers these questions with his analysis.

The book’s strength lies in the author’s portrayal of the principal civilian and military decision makers. He believes “most histories present individuals as ‘plastic figures’ and want to present the people as ‘human beings’ with real lives and emotions, living and working under some of the most trying conditions imaginable.” In this aspect, he succeeds brilliantly. The major players come alive in the book as Sarantakes discusses their strengths and weaknesses and how they affected the decision makers. The reader realizes that even with high-stake decisions, people are not beyond human frailties. Despite policy and political differences, the author shows that the nations in fact were united.

*Allies Against the Rising Sun* is thus an examination of coalition warfare. Sarantakes makes extensive use of notes, diaries, and autobiographies of the decision makers. The book offers an excellent portrayal and study of strategic decision making, the complexity of national interests, and the interplay between the main players. The author looks at both sides of the issues and confronts some previous conclusions about this period of history, in particular the use of the atomic bomb and the invasion of Japan. These decisions have always sparked controversy and Sarantakes offers his analysis based on the evidence he uncovers.

In the end, this book is about civil military relations, the compromises leaders make, and how political interests can affect military operations. The price nations are willing to pay to further their interests is especially telling. The author is frank and pulls no punches. For example, he labels “stunningly irresponsible,” Australia’s decision to remain on good terms with General Douglas MacArthur even if it meant sending Australian troops on a dubious operation. Overall, the book is an engaging history that covers operational, political, and diplomatic problems. I recommend it to all readers.

**LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT, Anthony P. Tully, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2009, 352 pages, $27.95.**

During the Pacific War, the Japanese navy followed its prewar plans and pursued a decisive encounter with the American fleet. There are numerous examples of Japanese commanders’ operational and tactical improvisational brilliance from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the Battle of Tassafaronga. However, the prewar plans deserted them in the final period of the war. The pursuit of a decisive naval victory led to the destruction of their naval air power in the Philippine Sea and the devastation and isolation of their surface fleet at Leyte Gulf.

The battle of Leyte Gulf unfolded in three parts: the battle in the Surigao Strait, the battle to protect the transport ships, and Halsey’s pursuit of the Japanese aircraft carriers. Surigao Strait, a confusing night action, is portrayed as the last...
clash of the battleships. The defense of the transports is presented as an example of American bravery against great odds helped along by the Japanese naval commander’s tactical indecision. Halsey’s pursuit of the Japanese decoy fleet is proclaimed an error.

Tully expands his study of Surigao Strait through the use of original Japanese records and the testimony of Japanese survivors. He also uses U.S. Navy records to provide strategic and operational justifications and a balanced view of the battle. By comparing American and Japanese records he has eliminated some of the discrepancies in the historical accounts of this confused battle. As at Midway, the Japanese were plagued by a plan that was too intricate, orders that were constantly changing, and communications that posed intractable problems.

The Americans had their own confusions resulting from divided commands and troubled communications. Nevertheless, through all the confusion, both American Admiral Oldendorf and Japanese Admiral Nishimura concentrated on their respective missions, which led to the battle in Surigao Strait. As Tully reconstructs the operational and tactical levels of warfare on both sides, it becomes obvious that the Americans had only partially figured out the Japanese navy’s goal, which was the destruction of American transports as they were landing troops on Leyte. The U.S. did not fully understand that Japan was taking a bold, if not foolhardy, gamble.

Tully’s narrative is clear and clarifies a confused night battle in restricted waters. He disputes several perceived truths about the battle by giving the reader a complete record of what each ship was doing at each stage of the battle. In the end, Nishimura had only one destroyer remaining as the sole survivor of his force. Tully’s careful battle reconstruction sheds light on the way ships were lost and also on the way U.S. and Japanese navies thought through their planning processes.

The Battle of Surigao Strait sheds light on the tactical and operational levels of the battle and helps explain the Japanese military’s opposition to surrender after the fall of the Marianas. In many parts of their empire—China, Korea, and Southeast Asia—they had not been defeated.

The U.S. did not fully understand what Japan was taking a bold, if not foolhardy, gamble. That Japan was taking a bold, if not foolhardy, gamble.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea**

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On 3 February 1945, Myron King and the crew of a B-17 Flying Fortress known as *Maiden USA* set out to bomb targets in Berlin. *Maiden USA*’s crew was able to get bombs away, but shortly after, ran out of luck. Badly hit by flak and with two engines out, King had to decide whether to try to make it to Sweden or head east for the approaching Russians. He chose the latter.

McDonough’s narrative is told as a flashback from his decision to head for Russia. It is also a history of the *Maiden USA*’s aircrew and its capable leader. King and his crew survived 21 combat missions including their ill-fated 21st mission. Eventually, the entire crew returned to the States, but not without tribulations that were beyond getting shot down. The U.S. Army tried and found King guilty of interfering with Russia, an American ally. King’s crime was that he admitted onto his aircraft a person who he believed to be a Russian translator but who turned out to be a Pole fleeing for his life. The story has the twists and turns of a good mystery and reveals a little-known tale of U.S. air operations and the theft of Europe’s art treasures during World War II Allied efforts. Actual campaigns and battles serve as a backdrop to the search and recovery of the stolen treasure.

The theft of art is an old war itself and continues to be relevant in today’s crises. The authors make extensive use of first person interviews; public and private historical collections; and books, articles, and other research. As the title indicates, *The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History* tells the story of the birth and maturity of a little-known World War II Allied unit called the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) section, which was eventually comprised of personnel from both British and American commands. MFAA drew its staff from fine arts academia and servicemen from across America whose expertise included museum directors, curators, art scholars and educators, artists, architects, and archivists. The telling of their remarkable stories is long overdue.

The Nazis planned and executed the theft of Europe’s art treasures to satisfy Adolf Hitler’s vision of Germany as the world’s center of great art. Even though the Nazis were anti-Semitic, it did not prevent them from making their first theft target the great European Jewish art collections. In the end, the Monuments Men were successful in recovering and returning a significant amount of treasure to the rightful owners. However, many priceless pieces have still not been recovered and some were unfortunately destroyed (including the fabled Russian Amber Room).

Recent experiences of looting at the Iraqi National Museum in 2003 seem to support creating a permanent U.S. Department of Defense organization similar to the MFAA. At a minimum, protecting cultural treasures and artifacts would require


Reading more like a whodunit novel than historical nonfiction, Robert Edsel’s *The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History*, tells the story of the Nazis’ theft and concealment of Europe’s art treasures during World War II and the subsequent Allied recovery efforts. Actual campaigns and battles serve as a backdrop to the search and recovery of the stolen treasure.

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increased emphasis during oper- 
tional planning and execution as part 
of full spectrum operations.

The Monuments Men reads like 
a contemporary mystery novel. The 
story is fact-based and well worth 
the reader’s time and attention.

James Burcalow, 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

KAMIKAZES, CORSAIRS, AND 
PICKET SHIPS: Okinawa, 1945, 
Robin L. Rielly, Casemate Books, 
Philadelphia, PA, 2008, 449 pages, 
$34.95.

Robin L. Rielly’s Kamikazes, 
Corsairs, and Picket Ships: Okinawa, 1945 is a book about Amer-
ica’s military defense against a 
fanatical suicide campaign in the 
seas around Okinawa in the waning 
days of World War II. This relevant book discusses the U.S. military’s 
wartime response against a highly 
organized suicide campaign that was 
mounted using the latest weapons 
and technology and orchestrated by Japan’s government and mili-
tary. The U.S. Navy learned from 
this experience—and the resulting 
discipline for fleet air defense has 
changed little since.

Rielly, a specialist in Japanese 
udies and author of a number of 
books brings a scholar’s attention to 
to the task. The book is organ-
ized in a military history fashion; it 
introduces a topic then proceeds to 
descriptions of men and machines 
before addressing the campaign 
proper. By the time readers arrive 
at the chronological operational 
narrative of the campaign, they will 
be completely familiar with the 
intimate details and organizations of 
the opposing sides. This makes the 
book extremely useful as a reference 
resource.

In Chapter 3 the narrative takes 
off from an accountant-like discus-
sion of tactics, techniques, men, 
and equipment. Rielly provides a 
day-to-day/blow-by-blow nar-
rative of the entire campaign. In 
the final chapter, he takes a retro-
spective look at the campaign in a 
crisp “lessons-learned” fashion and 
highlights critiques raised earlier in 
the narrative. The author concludes 
that the Americans, given the shock 
of the size and organization of the 
Japanese campaign, performed 
credibly in adjusting their tactics 
and procedures to meet the new 
threat. The problem is the chapter 
is too short and neglects to offer 
any criticisms of Japanese errors. 
Rielly also makes it clear that the 
Japanese did not see their actions 
as “suicidal” but rather as a form of 
special tactics—a perspective that 
has particular poignancy for today.

The book has minor flaws. Princi-
pal among these is the failure to fully 
discuss U.S. fighter tactics. In par-
cular is the famous “Thach Weave” 
two-plane tactic that became the 
standard fighter tactic for all Allied 
air forces after 1943. The only 
inkling of an Allied advantage in 
tactics comes from a Japanese pilot’s 
quote that says the two-plane tactic 
was “hard to beat.” That said, the 
book provides a gritty combat nar-
rative. However, for a Japanese per-
spective of the operational analysis 
of the campaign, readers will have to 
go elsewhere. Reilly’s book will 
naturally appeal to naval officers and 
aviators, but its insights on how to 
combat terror warfare has relevancy 
for a much broader audience.

CDR John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., 
USN, Retired, 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AMERICAN COURAGE, 
AMERICAN CARNAGE: 7th 
Infantry Chronicles: The 7th 
Infantry Regiment's Combat 
Experience, 1812 through World 
War II, John C. McManus, Tom 
Doherty Associates, New York, 
2009, 534 pages, $35.00.

I think one of the most difficult 
tasks any historian can take on is 
to write a definitive regimental 
history and maintain objectivity. 
John McManus takes this on with 
gusto and produces an extremely 
readable account of the 7th Infantry 
Regiment.

McManus refers to the regiment 
by its nickname “Cottonbalers,” a 
name earned in the Battle of New 
Orleans in 1814, where, firing from 
behind cotton bales, they decimated 
the attacking British regulars. His 
account of the 7th in the Mexican 
War demonstrates that it was no 
“walkover” but a hard fought, bitterly 
contested affair. McManus relates the 
7th’s Civil War service, especially 
the major battles of Fredericksburg, 
Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, as 
well as the 7th’s campaign against the 
Nez Perce in the Battle of Big Hole. 
In addition to defeating the Spanish 
in combat, the “Cottonbalers” had 
to fight the effects of heat, spoiled 
ration, and malaria.

McManus relates numerous first- 
hand accounts of combat in his treat-
ment of World War I and World War 
II. However, in an attempt to show 
the horror of combat, his history 
starts to sound like historical fic-
tion (e.g., “20mm anti-aircraft guns, 
inflicted terrible wounds on infan-
trymen, shredding abdomens until 
guts hung out and trickled halfway 
down walls, sawing off arms and 
legs too.”). The book is technically sound with a few minor exceptions. McManus questions the nickname “Cottonbalers” based on the fact that British cannonballs bounced off the cotton bales in the Battle of New Orleans. Contrary to his view that the cannonballs would have set the bales on fire, probably the vast majority, if not all the British cannonballs, were the solid, non-exploding type. Likewise, he says later that grape shot was “a weapon designed more for wounding than killing.” A hit by even one of a golfball-size shot would have killed. Finally, his description of the Higgins boats used in the World War II landings is puzzling. He talks about the plywood nature of the “early Higgins boats” and says that later boats used in the Allied victory in World War II were made of steel. At least the ones I saw in Normandy (used on D-Day) were still made of plywood.

Regardless of these oddities, 
McManus’s research appears first 
rate, using the National Archives, 
memos, and assorted sources from the 
U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning. However, I question the book’s jacket description that the
author’s work is based on “personal interviews of countless 7th Infantry soldiers.” I can find only intermittent personal interviews through the entire work.

McManus’s American Courage, American Carnage, 7th Infantry Chronicles pays tribute to an Infantry Regiment whose history spans the most important events of our national military history. It demonstrates how heroism is not the monopoly of one caste but rather the entire citizenry of our Nation.

The book is a must-read for military historians and anyone interested in American military history.

LTC Thomas Christianson, USA, Retired, Moffett Field, California

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**We Recommend...**


When Lieutenant Matt Gallagher first arrived in Iraq in 2007, it was all too surreal. In the midst of a shift in U.S. policy from lethal operations to counterinsurgency, he encountered a world where nothing was as it appeared. Friends were enemies, reconciliation was war, roads were bombs, and silence was deadly. But it was all too real, and there was nothing left to do except learn to “embrace the suck.”

And write about it...

*From the Publisher.*


No published work examines General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s role in depth during the Pacific War of 1944-1945, in the context of planning for the destruction of Japan. In this new study, Herman S. Wolk, retired Senior Historian of the U.S. Air Force, examines the thinking of Hap Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces (AAF), during World War II. Specifically, Wolk concentrates on Arnold’s leadership in crafting the weapons, organization, and command of the strategic bombing offensive against Japan, which culminated in Japan’s capitulation in the summer of 1945, ending the Pacific War.

*From the Publisher.*


Spanning 3,500 years from the early Egyptians to the end of the Roman Empire, *Warriors of the World: The Ancient Warrior 3000 BCE-500 CE* describes the armies that fought on battlefields as far flung as Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The book shows how the tactics and technology of those armies changed as different cultures expanded and declined.

*From the Publisher.*