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OVER THE PAST six years, the U.S. Army has shown an extraordinary ability to adapt to the evolving environment in Iraq. As the fight shifted from combat operations, to a brief peacekeeping operation, to classic counterinsurgency, the Army has had to profoundly adapt its tactics, structure, and most importantly, its mind-set for each phase of the operation. Our shortcoming has often been our inability to adapt fast enough to the changing operating environment. The implementation of the security agreement in January 2009 and the ensuing agreement to move out of major cities have heightened Iraqi nationalism and the desire to assert their sovereignty. Once again, the Army is in a period where rapid and widespread adaptation to U.S. force mind-set is imperative to safeguard recent gains.

Understanding the nature of this new environment and then anticipating the changes to doctrine, tactics, and mind-set required is the preeminent challenge facing our deployed and deploying forces. Defining this change in mind-set, Secretary Gates stated in a 2007 address to Army leaders that “Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.”

As U.S. forces gradually hand over security responsibilities to the host nation, success becomes less about what we can achieve than what we can encourage and promote our host nation partners to achieve. The doctrinal framework for this type of approach is “Security Force Assistance Operations.” Field Manual 3-07.1 defines security force assistance as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. This article offers some insights and lessons learned from one brigade’s experience while conducting a security force assistance-type mission in southern Iraq between 2008 and 2009.

In June 2008, the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, arrived at Contingency Operating Base Adder in southern Iraq and assumed responsibility for a temporary operating area that encompassed three provinces previously controlled by British forces: Muthana, Dhi Qar, and...
and Maysan. All three were under “provincial Iraqi control” and, because of the British focus on Basra, had seen very little coalition force presence in the past two to three years. Maysan in particular was rife with violence and lawlessness. Due to the unique political and geographic limitations of operating across three provinces about the size of South Carolina, our brigade’s main effort from the outset was to improve the effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces already present in the region. The lack of any tangible sectarian strife in Southern Iraq also helped to make this effort possible.

In essence, 4th Brigade Combat Team started its 12-month campaign as a security force assistance force and maintained that focus for the duration of the deployment. Performing the mission of a prototype advise and assist brigade (AAB), 4th BCT developed operational partnerships with the 10th Iraqi Army Division and its four maneuver brigades, three provincial police forces, and the 11th Brigade of the Directorate of Border Enforcement. Over time, 14 externally sourced transition teams augmented 4th BCT, dramatically enhancing our ability to partner with the Iraqi Security Forces.

Team leaders quickly discovered that security force assistance requires a different mind-set and focus from the traditional counterinsurgency mission of previous tours. We could no longer define our success by the number of insurgents we detained or the local population’s sense of security. Rather, the quality of the host nation security forces we left behind ultimately defined the success of our campaign. The brigade learned many hard lessons conducting these operations in southern Iraq.

One important caveat to remember is that this is one BCT’s experience in one corner of Iraq for a brief and evolving period of history. Because of the lack of sectarian violence in southern Iraq, we could rely on the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population in ways that may not be applicable to Baghdad, Mosul, or Kandahar. With that in mind, we list 16 principles, gleaned over a year of operations that we offer to help define the new environment for units training for this unique mission.
1. The AAB is a mission, not a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).²

The modular BCT design is six years old and has demonstrated its success in two wars and virtually all forms of combat operations. The brigade combat team is an agile, flexible organization that provides a diverse toolbox of complementary skills, weapons, and organizations that a commander can use and adapt to specific missions. Our experience in southern Iraq has shown that the modular BCT is the right organization to form the core of security force assistance operations in Iraq. When properly augmented with senior level advisory capability, this organization can simultaneously train and mentor large host nation formations while protecting and sustaining itself in a hostile territory. The inherent flexibility of the BCT allows it to shift from security operations to counterinsurgency to major combat as the environment evolves during the deployment. We believe that discussions to develop a custom-designed advisory force structure to replace the BCTs are moving in the wrong direction. With the proper training focus and enabler augmentation, the BCT structure has the built-in flexibility to perform any mission assigned. There is no need for wholesale force structure redesign.

2. Security force assistance requires full spectrum tactical proficiency.

In April 2009, 2-7 Cavalry executed a combined arms live-fire exercise with partnered elements of the 38th Iraqi Army Division. This exercise employed Iraqi helicopters, artillery, and mounted and dismounted forces with Air Force and Army aviation synchronized in a live-fire offensive scenario. The purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the Iraqi Army’s growing deterrence capacity and increase the interest in full spectrum training. Planning, training, and executing this complex live-fire exercise required every bit of tactical and technical expertise that 2-7 Cavalry could draw upon. Master gunners laid out surface danger zone diagrams and battalion staff officers worked their execution checklists just like they would preparing for the live-fire breach through Drinkwater Valley at the National Training Center. This exercise fully tested battalion and BCT proficiency at basic major combat operations Mission Essential Task List activities. The lesson learned was that we must maintain our ability to conduct full spectrum operations. In the security environment, you can’t teach what you don’t know. As Iraqi forces grow in maturity, they increasingly perform both population security and traditional deterrence operations. The U.S. forces that train these forces must be proficient in full spectrum operations to perform their security mission effectively and to be prepared to shift to major combat operations should the operational environment unexpectedly change.

3. Understanding the Iraqi security bureaucracy is essential.

The decisive mission during security force assistance operations is developing the host nation’s security infrastructure. This infrastructure forms the conceptual terrain upon which the U.S. forces conduct their operations. A detailed understanding of the host nation security bureaucracy is as important to mission success as knowing the terrain in traditional combat operations. The Iraqi security bureaucracy has expanded rapidly over the last six years, and the Army has not kept pace with the changes. The Phoenix Academy and recent Center for Army Lessons Learned publications on the Iraqi and Afghan force structures are good first efforts but we need more detailed and current information. We struggled to learn the complex relationships among entities such as the Iraqi Provincial Police, National Police, Border Forces, Port of Entry Directorate, National Intelligence, and the like. Within the Iraqi Army partnerships, our logisticians tasked with teaching effective sustainment operations had to sort out how the Iraqi system worked as they went along. Teaching a U.S.-centric process does not help host nation forces. Units in training to conduct these missions should learn as much as possible about host nation systems and processes prior to deployment. Embedded transition teams can assist in this effort by providing the most current information.
4. Key leader relationships are the tactical center of gravity in security force assistance operations.

In May 2009, an unfortunate Iraqi fatality during U.S. combat operations in a neighboring province received wide media coverage and generated considerable hostility against coalition forces. Partners we had worked closely with for months immediately declined to support any future combined training or operations. Fortunately, relations improved after a relatively short period, and we realized the importance of a positive relationship with Iraqi Security Forces leaders. Without that strong relationship, we would have been unable to complete our mission. Those relationships were our tactical center of gravity. In post-deployment interviews we were often asked, “How much of your time was taken up in relationship building?” The question implies that “relationship building” is a distraction or, at best, a critical housekeeping duty. In security force assistance operations, relationship building is the mission. A commander’s most valuable contribution to his unit is a productive and mutually trusting relationship with his host nation counterpart, because it is the foundation for the unit’s partnership.

5. Transition teams and partnered units have complementary and mutually supporting roles.

As we transitioned to security force assistance operations, we were often asked the question, “If all your leaders in the brigade are doing advisory duty, what are the other 4,000 Soldiers doing?” The answer is that an advisor and the partnered unit perform complementary and reinforcing roles (Figure 1). As we integrated our transition teams into our formations, the importance of these separate and reinforcing roles became apparent to us. Soldiers perform advisory duties at all levels. An advisor spends time embedded in the host nation unit, observing their processes and decision making and offering assistance or expertise where appropriate. However, the advisor does not have access to combat enablers and lacks the staff to organize large training events or demonstrate what right looks like. This is the role of the partnered unit. On any given day, our brigade had hundreds of Soldiers training or mentoring security force partners across every BCT functional area. Figure 1 depicts some of these training events and the daily force protection and sustainment duties of a brigade operating across three forward operating bases and eight joint security stations. This work was more than sufficient to fully employ the brigade’s Soldiers each day.

6. For advisors, talent is paramount, access is second, and rank is third.

Most of us appreciate the value of talented and capable advisors to the security force assistance mission. However, we often overlook the importance of access. To maintain credibility and influence, an advisor must demonstrate his ability to produce resources. Even the best advisor will not retain his influence for long if he depends solely on the value of his own sage advice. Host nation security force leaders are astute observers and quickly recognize that both resources and power flow through the ground maneuver chain of command. To retain his credibility and relevance, the advisor must demonstrate he has a close and reliable relationship with the maneuver commander. For this reason, we attached our Iraqi brigade military transition teams directly to the maneuver battalions responsible for those brigades. Not only did this give
the maneuver battalion commander direct control over his own main effort, but it also eliminated a redundant chain of command. As expected, battalion commanders took great care of the teams they owned and integrated them into their security force assistance mission. This relationship also worked well because brigade-level advisors were majors who fit neatly inside an existing battalion structure.

7. The first step of every battle drill is to call the local host nation security forces.

On 20 January 2009, insurgents fired a rocket at Contingency Operating Base Adder. A Q36 radar detected a point of origin inside dense urban terrain. We dispatched a patrol immediately, and it was on site within 23 minutes. Within two hours, we had captured both rocket rails and a suspect from our top ten enemy list. This would have been a successful mission by most traditional standards. What was truly amazing about the incident was that no U.S. forces entered the city. Upon impact, brigade tactical operations center personnel passed the Q36 acquisition to a combined command post at the Provincial Joint Coordination Center, which forwarded it to the local police for action. The Iraqi forces in the city were well-led and motivated to prevent the insurgents from using their neighborhoods as launching pads for attacks. We could rely on them to be the action arm for our operations. They appreciated this trust, and we discovered we could achieve great synergy by combining our technical intelligence capabilities (in this case, counterfire radar) with their responsiveness and cultural intuition. Building on this success, the brigade combat team eventually established three combined command posts within the Iraqi Security Forces headquarters. These command posts enabled us to rapidly fuse intelligence and maintain Iraqi and U.S situational awareness.

8. Effective targeting starts with intelligence sharing between host nation and U.S. forces.

Our first step toward effective intelligence sharing was to overcome the institutional dogma that classified all high-value target lists as “SECRET US Only.” If our partner host nation security forces are ultimately responsible for security in an area of operations, then we have an obligation to share with them all releasable information about criminals operating in their area. We had to educate ourselves and our leaders rapidly on the limits and constraints of foreign disclosure operations. We discovered that under the security agreement, we had to share intelligence if we expected to remain effective and relevant. Background checks and polygraphs for selected key leaders within the Iraqi Security Forces enabled us to both disclose and release some classified material to these leaders. We had to move from a targeting model that brought U.S. and host nation forces together only during the operational phase (combined operations) to a model that embedded us in the Iraqi Security Forces targeting process from initial intelligence development through capture, exploitation, and prosecution (combined targeting).

9. U.S. forces are often the glue that binds the host nation and interagency together.

As Iraqi elections approached in January 2009, it was essential that the Iraqi people saw their own security forces establishing security for the elections. Our first attempts to inspect security preparations at polling stations misfired badly. It became clear to us that U.S. HMMWVs and body armor were counterproductive near polling booths or ballot warehouses. However, we could make a tremendous contribution as the honest broker bringing together Iraqi government agencies and provincial reconstruction teams. Instead of inspecting polling stations, we hosted a bi-weekly meeting with all involved agencies from the Iraqi Army to the police to the local representatives of the Iraqi High Electoral Commission and provincial reconstruction teams. We created the venue for the collaboration and then allowed the process to unfold as the Iraqis desired. In this way, we discovered our unique position as the glue in the host nation’s interagency process. We did not impose U.S. solutions on this process. Instead, we created the conditions for interagency collaboration and problem solving.

10. The security agreement represents the Iraqi desire for dignity and sovereignty.

It is critical for every leader to understand the legal authorities and prohibitions in the security
agreement, but this alone is not enough. Leaders must understand and appreciate what the agreement means to the local population. The security agreement restores dignity to the Iraqi people. It establishes limits to what a foreign army can do to Iraqis on their own soil. It has a tremendously important psychological effect. So long as we fully comply with the agreement, the Iraqi people perceive us as a protecting and stabilizing force rather than a threat to their honor and dignity. This is why unilateral, time-sensitive raids, while often enormously successful in the short term, so often generate long-term setbacks. Technical compliance is often not enough. The local people must see and hear us deferring to the authority and the spirit of this agreement.

As an example of this, leaders in the brigade discovered that a midgrade Iraqi police officer had a Central Criminal Court of Iraq warrant issued against him for the murder of British soldiers in 2003. Under the security agreement, we were well within our authority to arrest the officer and transport him to Baghdad to stand trial. When we presented the warrant to the local police chief, he suggested that he provide an escort to travel with our forces and the officer to Baghdad to hand him over to the Iraqi court. In this way, no U.S. force ever had exclusive custody of the suspect. This process allowed the police chief to show his commitment to the rule of law without suffering the indignity of a foreign army arresting his officer.

11. The host nation judicial process is the central component of targeting.

Over the last six years, we have built a truly phenomenal intelligence architecture in Iraq. From company support teams to fusion cells at divisions and corps, we created a process for intelligence sharing that was light years ahead of where we were in 2003. However, the security agreement and the emergence of an independent Iraqi legal system forced a fundamental redesign of this system. While good intelligence is essential to anticipate and preempt enemy action, it is often insufficient
to remove a hostile actor from the battlefield. In today’s environment, we need more than good intelligence. We need evidence. Classified source reports are not enough to secure a warrant. The source must now present himself to an Iraqi judge and provide a sworn statement admissible in an Iraqi court. Intelligence and targeting officers now need to become familiar with the articles of the Iraqi antiterrorism laws. Leaders must understand the difference between the inquisitorial Eastern judicial system and the adversarial system common to most Western nations. To help manage this transition, we made extensive use of law enforcement personnel detailed to the BCT. With over 100 years of combined law enforcement and prosecutorial experience, these seasoned officers were tremendous assets to the S2s who were trying to assemble district attorney-quality cases on suspects while also trying to predict tomorrow’s rocket attack, all with a paltry five-person staff.

12. No nation wants to see foreigners detain its citizens.

The security agreement provides a procedure for U.S. forces to detain Iraqi citizens under certain circumstances. Our experience, however, uncovered a huge difference between what was legally permissible and what was tactically and culturally appropriate. Regardless of the legal authority we retained, most Iraqis understood the security agreement to mean that foreigners would no longer arrest them. Unilateral arrest of an Iraqi citizen was seen as an affront. We found that it was usually possible to recruit the assistance of a local host nation security unit to perform the arrest and then deliver the detainee to an Iraqi detention facility where we had an established relationship and a degree of access and oversight. The host nation jails then became our key terrain. This was often where we did much of our intelligence collection.

The competency and availability of Iraqi investigative judges varies widely from location to location, but most investigating judges were much more willing to order long sentences for Iraqi criminals when their detention and prosecution appeared to be an Iraqi-led process instead of an American-led one. While we provided substantial support to host nation investigators as they assembled their cases, it was important that the host nation led the affair and that the detainee remained under host nation control throughout the process. Too many U.S. “fingerprints” on the case often undermined the credibility of the process and led to a reduced sentence.

13. Rapidly exploit the information component of enemy and friendly actions.

Westerners underestimate the power of the spoken word to shape the minds of host nation populations. Rumors travel hundreds of miles in hours by word of mouth and cell phone. Bizarre and implausible conspiracy theories can crop up on the most unlikely pretense and spread across a province in an afternoon. Our forces must constantly and rapidly tell our story through every available venue, including through host nation forces and their media. Anything likely to generate “buzz” in the local community, from a school opening to an air strike to an enemy rocket attack, requires an immediate information campaign to explain what just happened and why. The best “counterfire” is often a timely press release. We must engage the host nation media, local websites, public affairs officers in local security forces, and any other prominent opinion makers. They must be on our “short list” to call during a crisis.

14. Killing an insurgent, while sometimes necessary, is usually counterproductive.

The killing of enemy combatants is often a necessary component of warfighting and peace-making when local security forces are incapable of maintaining order. As the local forces become more capable, however, the tactical value of an enemy kill drops precipitously. In a security force assistance environment, the role of the advisory force is to enable the host nation forces to secure their population and defeat the insurgents. Every time U.S. forces kill a local insurgent, regardless of the circumstances, we aggravate a deep wound that often leads to revenge and ultimately more violence. Killing insurgents was a necessary reality when sectarian violence and lawlessness threatened to tear Iraq apart. As security conditions improve and the host nation forces demonstrate
growing capability, we should expect increased hostility and resentment to U.S. unilateral operations. While tactical conditions may sometimes warrant violent action against a hostile force, these actions usually prove counterproductive to long-term success and can undermine security force assistance campaign objectives.

15. A coward is a better enemy than a martyr.

An insurgent who has fled his operational area to seek sanctuary elsewhere makes a mockery of his cause and increases the freedom of maneuver for the counterinsurgent. When he hides in his sanctuary, the insurgent no longer competes for the support of the population and becomes irrelevant to the struggle. A dead or detained insurgent, on the other hand, often achieves the status of a martyr and this encourages increased violence in support of the cause, particularly if his fate came at the hands of an outside force.

Our goal should not be to capture or kill the enemy, but to render the enemy irrelevant by whatever means available. Billboards, wanted posters, and targeted information operations all help to create the image of the insurgent as a fugitive on the run instead of a leader of a noble cause. Most important, effectively portraying the insurgent as a fugitive of the local security forces can make him the enemy of his own people.

16. Empathy is a combat multiplier.

Perhaps the best predeployment training is to sit for an afternoon with a thoughtful citizen of a different culture. Our own Western narrative has so insulated us that we often fail to see how other cultures perceive events. Not only do they see events differently, but our host nation partners often pursue goals, strategies, and approaches that can baffle even the most culturally attuned advisor.

We in the U.S. Army are fortunate to live in a relative meritocracy where we can reasonably expect that the success of our unit or our mission will lead to our personal and professional success. This is not the case in many other cultures—particularly in the Middle East. Personal loyalty and nepotism are enormous factors in these societies, and they shape the behavior of leaders just as much as the mission-first mind-set in our military drives our behavior. In order to understand and influence the behavior of these leaders, we must first understand how they perceive events and how they calculate their own prospects for success. Without this insight, we often struggle to understand their behavior and grow frustrated with what we cannot understand. Empathy, the ability to see and understand the world through the eyes of another, is perhaps the greatest skill a leader can cultivate in the security force assistance environment.

Conclusion

The 16 insights we have listed above offer a perspective on the unique characteristics of security force assistance operations as experienced by one brigade combat team, in one corner of Iraq, for one short year. As we discovered, security force assistance is a fundamentally different mission from traditional counterinsurgency operations and requires a shift in mind-set, focus, and approach. Traditional counterinsurgency places the security of the population as the preeminent goal. Security force assistance seeks the same end state but focuses instead on enabling host nation security forces to achieve that security. In cases where the local forces lack the capacity or motivation to provide basic security, then a more traditional counterinsurgency approach is appropriate.

The challenge for today’s leaders is to understand the human terrain in their assigned area well enough to perceive which approach is appropriate. If conditions support a focus on security force assistance operations, then the key metric of success is no longer criminals captured or networks disrupted. In Security Force Assistance operations, the only real way to measure your success is by the quality and capacity of the host nation security forces that you leave behind. MR

NOTES

1. Taken from a speech by Secretary Gates to the 2007 AUSA convention on 10 October 2007. As quoted by Fred Kaplan, “Secretary Gates Declares War on the Army Brass,” Slate Magazine, 12 October 2007. 2. This principle is a direct quote from LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., commanding general of I Corps and MNC-I during an Operations and Intelligence update brief given by the authors at Forward Operations Base Garry Owen, Maysan Province, in April 2009.
THE UNITED STATES has been less than effective in employing the instruments of national power in recent conflicts. While the military has been an unparalleled expeditionary warfighter, our diplomatic, information, economic, and governance efforts have failed to fulfill stability operations and reconstruction requirements. Ad hoc military organizations, national-level federal agencies, and contractors have tried to meet the demand, but they are not structured, resourced, or trained to fill the need.

Analysts have called for revolutionary changes in the way the United States conducts foreign engagements, but thus far, no practical models have emerged. Policymakers need to eschew established conventional thinking and determine commonly understood, easily articulated, and fundamentally supportable national security and economic strategies using civilian as well as military capabilities.

Not only must the United States win in Afghanistan, it must win there in a new way. We need skills found primarily at the state and local levels of government or in the private sector if we are to succeed in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Moreover, although we are in phase IV of Operation Enduring Freedom, we are in phase zero—shaping operations—everywhere else. The United States should institutionalize the idea of phase zero operations and build capacity to execute them in future foreign endeavors. Policymakers must abandon legacy mechanisms impeding progress and harness instruments of power across the whole of government, the whole of industry, the whole of information, and the whole of American resolve.

President Obama, in his role as the commander in chief, has emphasized that economic development and engagement are the tools we will use to defeat terrorism in Afghanistan.\(^1\) We should use these tools more effectively by employing civilian experts with the skills needed to perform post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. These experts, such as civil engineers, city planners and managers, agronomists, business administrators, conservationists, and hospital administrators, exist at the state and local levels, not at the national level where policy and resourcing experts dwell.
The United States needs to develop near- and long-term solutions to organize and employ those civilian resources. We should organize, train, deploy, and employ these experts to properly take advantage of the Nation’s global engagement strategy. The National Guard is best suited to create this civilian capability.

**Benefits of Using the Guard**

A civilian reserve force modeled like the National Guard will fill these critical needs, and tangible benefits will accrue from involving the American citizenry in national security strategy. **Gain support of the people.** The American public is becoming disconnected from the effort and sacrifice associated with our current conflicts. As Active Component forces are increasingly concentrated on fewer installations in the United States, the National Guard and other Reserve Components offer most citizens their only connection with the Nation’s defense establishment. Citizen Soldiers and Airmen have inextricable links in 3,300 communities, creating tangible, local connections between those communities and the national-level effort. **Provide essential skill sets.** In addition to providing a vital connection to the American people, employing civilian skill sets brings critical capabilities needed for stability operations to the warfighting commander. The Obama administration’s call for a civilian surge has significantly increased the number of U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan; however, the much-touted civilian surge is not new. This effort has been underway for decades, but it has recently gained prominence during overseas contingency operations in the form of the National Guard and Reserve Components. Reserve Component troops have always used their civilian skills to achieve military success during engagement activities, but this effort has been unorganized and often happenstance. Today’s civil-mobilization efforts barely tap the capacity of the National Guard, the citizen skills portion of the Citizen Soldier equation. As an example, the United States does not have a national-level police force providing an expeditionary, sustainable, professional civilian law enforcement capability for use in a deployed environment. Similarly, it does not maintain a standing capability to conduct forward-deployed civilian law enforcement training. The French gendarmerie and the Italian carabinieri fulfill both those roles for their countries. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program have these roles; still, neither organization is robust enough to meet the Nation’s requirements. The U.S. military must rely on military police and security forces to fill this gap in stability and reconstruction missions. Because these Active Component forces tend to be young and inexperienced, National Guard and other Reserve Component forces with the requisite knowledge are a logical choice to assume this task. There are approximately 20,000 state and local law enforcement jurisdictions in the United States. As it stands now, the only way to access the wealth of civilian law enforcement education and experience is to rely on the National Guard and other Reserve Component forces with a law enforcement background using ad hoc police transition teams or other temporary organizations. **Provide a permanent force structure.** Our Nation is employing the Reserve Components as a uniformed “civilian surge” capability in a manner that wastes expertise and erodes efficiency. To address today’s challenges, the Department of Defense should discard the notion of applying temporary solutions ad hoc to a problem that generations of our citizens will face. The Nation requires a national security apparatus with permanent structures and established doctrine. A fixed solution mutually benefits federal, state, and local
government and provides enormous residual benefit to the private and public sectors. The essential, much-sought capability needed to win overseas contingency operations—provisional reconstruction teams, police training teams, agribusiness development teams, U.S. Southern Command’s New Horizons operations, and the National Guard State Partnership Program—are all ad hoc formations. There is no formally recognized force structure. All draw from our fighting formations. All remain unsupported by the established doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities process.

Provisional reconstruction teams are unquestionably centerpiece organizations in the current tactical, operational, and strategic efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet, six years into Operation Iraqi Freedom, provisional reconstruction teams still do not come together for rigorous, focused predeployment preparation and training. Mission requirements are often unclear or ill defined; sometimes individuals with little real-world development experience are assigned to these teams relatively late in the process. Teams often do not develop synergy. In addition, they do not routinely conduct predeployment training with the military organizations (most often brigade combat teams or regimental combat teams) sharing their battlespace. The people of Iraq and Afghanistan expect the United States to improve the post-conflict environment, but the ad hoc pick-up teams fail to deliver.

The organization and employment of land-power formations (brigade and regimental combat teams and their subordinate battalion and company commands) stand in sharp contrast. Despite force structure changes driven by transformation and technological advances, the building-block formations of land power are comparatively fixed and enduring. The protocols for preparing these forces for deployment are time-tested and rigorous.

In addition to the need for warfighters, combatant commands require skilled civilians as engagement tools during phase zero operations. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program, which links U.S. states with foreign nations in support of U.S. security cooperation objectives, remains one of
the most efficient, enduring engagement tools, but again, it has no fixed force structure and minimal resourcing. Southern Command’s long-running, highly successful New Horizons program to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance exercises also relies on task-organized forces to achieve its effects.

**Enhance the civil-military partnership.** Interagency partnership is the key to effectively employing a civilian surge capability, but most Active Component forces and Reserve Component forces not part of the National Guard do not routinely interact with numerous interagencies in a collaborative environment. On the other hand, the National Guard operates daily as an interagency partner under exactly those conditions.

Under the command and control of the governors, the Guard regularly participates in complex civil-military operations during domestic emergencies. It does not demand to lead those efforts. Rather, the Guard expands the capacity of the civilian instruments of government at the state and local level, bringing organized, equipped, and disciplined military capability to extend the reach of civilian authorities. This civil-military partnership has been a core capability of the National Guard since the Guard’s inception.

In contrast, Active Component forces have little requirement to plan, coordinate, or conduct operations in conjunction with civilian leaders. In fact, they have limited authority to interact officially with state or local governments, even in emergency response. The Army and Air National Guard are the only components who conduct interagency operations with few constitutional or statutory restrictions. Most other forces routinely conduct interagency operations only in a foreign engagement, and then without the benefit of extensive preparation or any taming of cultural bias toward partnering with civilian agencies. However, the National Guard routinely coordinates and executes operations with interagency partners around the globe. For decades, even preceding the Partnership for Peace and State Partnership Programs, the National Guard and its interagency partners have executed multiple nation-building missions in South and Central America. In addition, National Guard leaders have organized and led Joint interagency task forces participating in the New Horizons program exercises. These task forces have provided combatant commands with civilian expertise to efficiently and effectively conduct humanitarian and civic assistance in underdeveloped nations.

![Missouri Governor Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, center, visits the Nangarhar (Afghanistan) Province Director of Agriculture, Mr. Mohammad Hussain Safi, and the Soldiers and Airmen of the Missouri National Guard’s second Agri-business Development Team at Forward Operating Base Finley-Shields in July 2009.](image-url)
The U.S. inability to organize and employ the necessary civilian skill sets to support contingency operations has led to an overreliance on foreign or domestic contractors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is not robust enough to provide the depth and breadth necessary to meet global demands. In many instances, USAID simply manages contracts instead of fielding government employees with the requisite skills. The considerable operational role currently assumed by contractors ignores the persistent nature of ongoing conflicts and amounts to institutionalizing a temporary solution to a near-permanent problem. There are inherent challenges with contractors concerning cost containment, compensation, treatment of workers, and basic humanitarian issues.

Overreliance on foreign or domestic contractors erodes the capacity of government, diminishes confidence in America’s resolve, and disconnects the American people from U.S. strategic efforts.

Proposed Civilian Reserve Corps

A number of proposals have called for establishing a civilian reserve corps composed of experts in economic development, the rule of law, governance, agriculture, police training, and other critical areas necessary for stability and reconstruction. As a long-term program, these proposals are especially attractive because such a corps could offer tangible, personal connections between the American people and the persistent conflict and bring skills not found in the military to U.S. foreign endeavors.

Policymakers have proposed differing models for establishing a civilian reserve corps within the Department of State to organize and employ a civilian surge capability. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau offers a more workable solution: a civil branch of the National Guard similar to the Army Corps of Engineers. This structure perhaps could attract civilians from across the government and private enterprise to a truly national “reserve” institution. The organization could be structured and trained along the lines of the Nation’s most successful model for interagency application of power—the National Guard.

A civilian reserve corps modeled after and administered by the National Guard would reach out and embrace the civilian capabilities found in local- and state-level government across the Nation. This branch of the guard should encompass the land-grant universities and their extension services and partner with state and local associations such as the Farm Bureau and school board associations.

The National Guard is especially well suited to build a civilian reserve corps branch. Each of the 54 National Guard organizations has a U.S. property and fiscal office capable of accepting and disbursing federal funds. They also have existing structures that man, care for, organize, train, equip, and mobilize forces. Once we remove the artificial hindrances to deploying civilians, the National Guard will have the inherent, organic capability to prepare and process personnel for overseas deployment. Most important, the National Guard has inextricable, constitutionally based ties to state government. No other organization in the United States has these unique capabilities.

Numerous models are available to help design a civil branch of the National Guard. This branch, doubling as a Reserve Component of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security, could be trained, organized, and implemented to meet virtually any design parameters with few statutory changes.

Train for unity of purpose. The National Guard is the best organization to train a civilian corps. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command accredits all 54 National Guard regional training institutes. When compared to national-level, one-location schools, the National Guard educational institutions are better training options because they are located in every state or territory and have

Overreliance on foreign or domestic contractors erodes the capacity of government, diminishes confidence in America’s resolve, and disconnects the American people from U.S. strategic efforts.
the organic capability to provide quality control oversight to a variety of training courses. In addition, each National Guard has a premobilization training and assistance element that provides independent, third-party verification and certification of training. These formal training organizations already have the capability and capacity to meet the common core predeployment training needs of a National Guard civil branch.

**Provide reliable, robust capabilities.** An organized and trained civil branch of the National Guard creates a reliable, robust capability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations. The United States has a critical need for this capability so it can reorganize its approach to address the five common requirements for stabilization and reconstruction: the rule of law, a safe and secure environment for indigenous populations, a sustainable economy, a stable governance, and social well-being. Currently the military component focuses on security tasks almost to the exclusion of reconstruction tasks. This approach of “security first” becomes “security only” if commanders lack the necessary tools to design, develop, complete, and maintain reconstruction tasks. The Nation’s approach to stability and reconstruction operations should provide a permanent base to solve persistent problems.

Much as the armed forces embraced counterinsurgency in 2007, both the armed forces and government agencies must fully embrace and implement stability and reconstruction, incorporating interagency civilians as full and equal partners throughout the military command structure. Many of the skill sets in highest demand—public works, city planning, judicial organization—do not reside comfortably in uniform. Military commanders can set the conditions for stability and reconstruction by focusing on security tasks, but skills found at state and local levels of government or in the private sector are what rebuild societies and make permanent peace.¹⁰

**Use technology and reach back.** In the current operational environment, bandwidth limitations, combatant command restrictions on civilian experts entering the theater, and countless other factors artificially constrain the Nation’s ability to
bring the correct skill to the right place and time to achieve the most decisive effect.

Returning to the example of agricultural development teams, we note that reach back (the capability to use video teleconferencing or other means to communicate) from Afghanistan to subject matter experts at land-grant universities or other organizations should be the cornerstone of the program. At this time, connectivity is unnecessarily difficult. We lose a significant opportunity when subject matter experts who are eager to volunteer their unique skills cannot deploy, while demand for their expertise goes unfilled.

Here again, the National Guard is well postured to connect deployed forces with the subject matter experts at home. The Guard has existing non-secure voice and data links in more than 3,000 communities in the United States. Moreover, the Guard routinely procures commercial off-the-shelf technology for disaster response that can easily be adapted to a civil branch of the National Guard.

Near- and Long-Term Recommendations

Pending longer-term policy and statutory changes to implement some of the recommendations in this article, the National Guard offers a near-term, robust solution to today’s challenges of conducting stability and reconstruction operations. The capability exists to organize and implement a civilian surge. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program offers a model for the civilian surge for Operation Enduring Freedom. While conventional forces pursue counterinsurgency operations, the National Guard should develop on-going, state-to-province partnerships.

The Missouri National Guard deployed the first agricultural team to Nangarhar in 2007. The fifth rotation of the Missouri teams will deploy in late spring of 2011. This type of long-term commitment builds trust and creates bonds critical to reconstruction efforts. State-to-province partnerships strengthen conditions for the whole-of-government approach. The Missouri National Guard teams connect Missouri’s Department of Agriculture and Department of Conservation to Nangarhar’s provincial Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. By expanding this concept to enduring state-to-province partnerships, connections can be made throughout government and the private sector.

At the same time, we should release the National Guard teams conducting these state-to-province partnerships from one-size-fits-all restrictions on U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan and in other

The Missouri National Guard’s second Agribusiness Development Team arrived in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, in November 2008. Transfer of authority took place on 15 December. Surprisingly, Nangarhar had over 100 fish farm facilities, which were located throughout the province. The facilities were in varying stages of disrepair, and the only fish hatchery was semi-functional. Team leaders initiated a project to revitalize and reinvigorate this key industry. The team had skilled project managers and plant and large animal specialists, but little expertise with fish hatcheries. However, the team had a strategic partner in the Missouri Department of Conservation. Using reach-back capability to Missouri and existing relationships, the team and the Department of Conservation completed initial fish hatchery development planning by early January 2009. Due to restrictions on civilian travel to Afghanistan, the Missouri Department of Conservation selected a subject matter expert with a Reserve Component affiliation to travel to Nangarhar to conduct on-the-ground assessment and planning. He mobilized for 60 days deployment and arrived at Forward Operating Base Finley-Shields in mid-February. A functional Kunar Fish Hatchery design was complete within 30 days, and the Department of Conservation’s expert was back at his civilian job in Missouri by early April. This vignette demonstrates that an effective method to employ the instruments of national power at the state and local level is to use civilian experts deployed through the National Guard.
locations outside the United States. Within the constraints of the security situation, these teams should be flexible enough to adapt to the local cultural environment. We should permit the teams to conform to cultural norms in, for instance, dress and grooming. The special operations framework may be a favorable standard. States should have the flexibility to rotate members of these teams incrementally to avoid the “everyone-in, everyone-out” rotation of conventional forces because continuity considerations and longevity of operations are critical for success.

**Engagement teams.** The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has considered a proposal to build military engagement teams of approximately 480 Soldiers. However, a fixed force structure approach creates an inflexible organization. Instead, engagement teams should be configured to accommodate the unique needs of each province. These teams should also include civilian subject matter experts, as appropriate. The current National Guard Joint Force Headquarters Table of Distribution and Allowances has a paragraph of positions originally designed to facilitate the staffing of embedded training teams. This fixed, yet flexible approach is the correct way to build such teams.

This proposal mirrors the current procedures used in conducting engagements under the State Partnership Program. Long-term relationships at the basic execution levels of government speed stabilization and development. State-to-province, city-to-city, town-to-town, and village-to-village relationships shaped according to similarities and common understandings are key. This program mirrors the highly successful “sister city” program. Central Command, in conjunction with the National Guard Bureau, could solicit similar relationships for all provinces and then resource associated activities appropriately. This bottom-up strategy will be more successful than the top-down strategy of the past.

**Conclusion**

The United States does not effectively bring all the instruments of national power to bear in its global engagements. Currently, ad hoc military organizations and national-level federal department representatives or contractors attempt to deliver the on-the-ground expertise necessary to conduct stability operations in regions of conflict. The United States needs to prioritize resources and build a civilian engagement capacity. The combatant commands could use this capability to conduct exercises that achieve theater engagement goals. Exercising this capability in regions of interest is a smart, powerful, proven, cost-effective, and efficient method to achieve engagement requirements.

Many areas marked by marginal or fragile governance, yet with more permissive security environments than Iraq or Afghanistan, should be engaged through training exercises supporting theater security cooperation programs directed by combatant commanders. Southern Command’s New Horizons exercise model is adaptable to civilian skill sets and expandable to other regions of the world. Africa Command and Pacific Command both have extensive engagement requirements that military forces alone cannot fulfill. The lure of overseas peacetime deployment retains military members and will have the same effect on civilian members of the civilian branch of the National Guard.

The proposal outlined in this article is affordable and effective. The National Guard is the best organization to create this civilian capability. In the long term, a National Guard civilian corps is the optimal solution to a number of problems, including Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) dwell-time issues. In the near term, creating a partnership program and expanding available tools to employ citizen Soldiers and civilians will meet the demands of a new dynamic American foreign policy strategy for counterinsurgency and beyond. **MR**
1. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 December 2009. President Barack Obama’s statement included, “We’ll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffectve or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas—such as agriculture—that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.”


3. For a detailed discussion of the civilian law enforcement training capability gap in the U.S. military, see Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 119-21.


5. General Stanley McChrystal, Special Address to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1 October 2009, 4. His comments included the following: “Along with the arrival of coalition forces, they (the Afghan people) expected a positive change. They saw that initially and then waited for other changes—economic development and improvements in governance—that, in many cases . . . were unmet.”

6. See the ongoing work of the Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight led by Chairman Claire McCaskill and ranking member Bob Bennett.

7. James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Iraq Study Group Report, 100. The Iraq Study Group Report statement included, “The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complete stability operation outside the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.”

8. Information Memorandum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, subject: The Role of the National Guard in “A Balanced Strategy”

9. Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond of Missouri emphasizes the primacy of civilian, not military, leadership in writing, “The strategy . . . to be successful . . . must emphasize economic opportunities and assistance in local projects that local people believe are high priorities. This effort is to be supported by military operations, not the other way around.” Christopher S. Bond and Lewis M. Simmons, The New Front: Southeast Asia and the Road to Global Peace with Islam (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2009), 259.

10. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) draft working paper briefing, “Applying Sustainable Forces to a Persistent Challenge.”

Let’s Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Geoff Demarest

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is not written from a perspective of classic strategy or strategic principles. Most of the standard terms of military strategy are wholly absent, and where present they are used outside the confines of traditional military usage. While rejecting classic terms, a new conventionalism appears in the manual with lessons from the French experience in Algeria featured favorably in that convention. Together, the words Algeria, France, French, and Galula (surname of a French officer and author frequently referenced in the manual) are used at least 42 times. The FM’s annotated bibliography includes several books on the Algerian counterinsurgency.

But, to what end? Why do the manual writers put so much emphasis on that French experience, given that the French failed strategically, engaged in immoral conduct during the war, provoked a civil-military crisis in France, and tolerated genocide and mass population displacement in northern Africa after the withdrawal of French forces? It seems that the French government could not have achieved a worse set of results, nor could U.S. doctrine have chosen a worse model to admire, if admiration it is.

Publication of FM 3-24 understandably sparked some pushback by interested commentators. Armed Forces Journal articles and subsequent blogging debates produced a slew of important questions. What exactly are the supposed French “lessons learned?” What is it about the Algerian case that earns special emphasis in U.S. military instruction or about David Galula that the FM should anoint him as a counterinsurgent guru? What French lessons have entered recent U.S. doctrine, and are they the right ones? Did the French view of counterinsurgency accelerate a U.S. move away from classic strategy to another set of counterinsurgent principles? Was this switch warranted?

Galula or Trinquier?

A 1965 International Affairs book review of Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare and David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare (both published in English in 1964) asserts, “Galula has a much wider view of the problem,
partly no doubt because his professional experience is wider.” Available English-language biographic information about Trinquier and Galula, however, indicates that Trinquier was older, more experienced, much more widely known in the French military and in France than Galula, and a more prolific writer.⁵ Alistair Horne, in his 1977 A Savage War of Peace (widely considered the seminal English-language work on the war) indexes Trinquier heavily, but Galula not at all. Jean Lartéguy modeled characters in his novels The Centurions and The Praetorians after Trinquier heavily, but Galula not at all. One finds it hard to believe that Lieutenant Colonel Galula did not know Colonel Trinquier, at the time a chief of intelligence in Algeria. Still, Galula does not cite Trinquier in either of his own works, although he almost certainly read Trinquier’s Modern Warfare before working on his own 1963 Pacification in Algeria (from which his less-revealing Counterinsurgency Warfare was then derived). The absence of citations of Trinquier might suggest professional jealousy, personal differences, or intentional silence on Galula’s part.

Regardless of their interpersonal or professional relationship, it does not seem reasonable to assert that Galula’s life or experiences impressed him.⁶ One finds it hard to believe that Lieutenant Colonel Galula did not know Colonel Trinquier, at the time a chief of intelligence in Algeria. Still, Galula does not cite Trinquier in either of his own works, although he almost certainly read Trinquier’s Modern Warfare before working on his own 1963 Pacification in Algeria (from which his less-revealing Counterinsurgency Warfare was then derived). The absence of citations of Trinquier might suggest professional jealousy, personal differences, or intentional silence on Galula’s part.

Does The Algerian Case Apply Elsewhere?

The Algerian War naturally draws American attention today given that its principal insurgent group was Islamic, and the counterinsurgent a western power with a technological, logistical, and financial advantage. Like Iraq and Afghanistan, Algeria’s geography features a dominant urban area surrounded by a harsh hinterland. However, beyond these similarities, the differences are considerable. The distances challenging French logistics were one-tenth what the United States faces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the cultural barriers to effective French counterinsurgency (notably the language barrier) were not nearly as severe as those Americans face in Iraq and Afghanistan.

France’s objectives were inherently different from U.S. objectives in Iraq or Afghanistan. The French government and people, and most of the citizens of Algerian northern Africa, believed Algeria to be part of France. The French government’s aim, at least at the outset, was to maintain the territorial status quo. American goals do not include long-term settlements of colonists.⁸ In other words, for the French Army, theirs was truly a counterinsurgency, while U.S. Army involvement is counterinsurgency by proxy with the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Because counterinsurgent operational design should have a close relationship to strategic objectives, we may attach some significance to differences and commonalities of purpose in counterinsurgent strategies, and it appears that U.S. doctrine writers did not compare U.S. objectives to those of the French in Algeria. Any comparison of French objectives in 1950s Algeria with those of U.S. efforts outside of Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to be weaker still. Comparing the Algerian case (as to counterinsurgent objectives, basic physical geography, social identities of the contenders, etc.) to Colombia’s insurgent conflict, for instance, would require a tremendous logical stretch.

The basic laws or principles of counterinsurgency that Galula offers to replace the classic military principles are—

- The objective is the population.
- The support of the population is not spontaneous. Only a minority within the population can obtain the support that the counterinsurgents need.
- A pro-counterinsurgent minority among the population will emerge, but only if the counterinsurgent is seen as the ultimate victor. An early success is necessary.

…it appears that U.S. doctrine writers did not compare U.S. objectives to those of the French in Algeria.
Effort must be concentrated area by area. We must ask, “Which side threatens the most, and which offers the most protection?”

This list may be descriptive of the Algerian case and useful in other conflicts, including Iraq, Afghanistan, or even Colombia, but the list’s heft is questionable. Galula’s assertions inspire questions about how, when, and where. It appears from his writing that French successes in Algeria were related as much as anything to the construction of physical barriers and checkpoints, the use of informants and interrogations, the commitment of large numbers of troops, and the employment of helicopters.

Moreover, like Trinquier, Galula asserts that dominance by the counterinsurgent of the psychology of fear is centrally important, so even Galula’s advice about the importance of psychological operations should cause reader uncertainty regarding exactly what messages Galula felt should be sent to a population. It is hard to read Galula carefully without inferring that he agrees with Trinquier that the counterinsurgent force must be harsh in order to instill a generalized respect born of fear.

**Does the United States Apply French Methods in Counterinsurgency?**

We can dispose of the ugliest possibility quickly. The French used systematic torture, which some have since justified. It is important to underscore and repeat that the U.S. manual FM 3-24 is explicit, emphatic, and unequivocal about the illegality and immorality of using torture. A typical sentence on the subject states—

> Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is never a morally permissible option, even if lives depend on gaining information. No exceptional circumstances permit the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

In part, the incident at Abu Gharib may have occasioned this emphasis against torture in an American manual. The fact that such pointed text exists in the manual is at odds with the manual’s admiration of French counterinsurgency practices, however.

Even so, some critics of the manual point to its pedigree and its admiration for individuals who perpetrated torture. They see these as reasons to suspect the attitudes of the FM’s proponents, and note that French military writers list torture and terror as significant factors in the limited success the French achieved. In a final section of *Pacification in Algeria*, Galula attributes counterinsurgency’s failure in Algeria to three principle causes, one of which was “lack of firmness toward the population.” Galula asserts that “it is necessary to punish in exemplary fashion the rebel criminals we have caught…The rebels’ flagrant crimes must be punished immediately, mercilessly, and on the very spot where they took place.”

Leaving the question of torture aside, what are some of the positive elements of the French counterinsurgency experience in Algeria? One might be the overall strength of French counterinsurgency forces in theater. It is difficult to compare the numbers to American troop strength in Iraq or Afghanistan, given the many French national identities inside Algeria. Algerian French troops, French Foreign Legionnaires, Francophone Algerian police, and so on populated the battlespace.

Nevertheless, the numbers seem to indicate that in relation to the local, potentially insurgent population, French counterinsurgent troop strength was greater than U.S. troop strength in Iraq, and it was much greater than U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan, at least early on. Although the number of boots-on-the-ground has been a source of debate
since the outset of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, FM 3-24 does not compare this factor to the Algerian case.

Another missing lesson of the Algerian case concerns questions of equity and efficiency in land use and ownership, and inequities in the tax burden. The French did not act to quell insurgent energy over the basic unfairness of the Algerian social contract. Americans appear to be oblivious to the questions of real estate ownership and taxation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Field Manual 3-24 barely touches on these subjects. The Algerian case demonstrates that real estate ownership and taxation matters may well be basic issues to resolve in counterinsurgency, and that the French did not do so. Nevertheless, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine does not contemplate the problem.

Additional areas of interest include the use of physical barriers to isolate the battlespace, population control, materiel movement, and census taking. The French spent considerable sums fencing borders, and both Trinquier and Galula stress the importance of detailed knowledge about the population. Field Manual 3-24 does note the importance of census data, but is considerably less clear about the benefits of physical barriers (though they have been used extensively in Iraq).

A preferred FM 3-24 “lesson” from Algeria concerns the use of nonmilitary forces. From the manual:

David Galula wisely notes, ‘To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become... a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.’

Galula’s last sentence is important. Military forces can perform civilian tasks, but often not as well as the civilian agencies with people trained in those skills. Further, military forces performing civilian tasks are not performing military tasks. Diverting them from those tasks should be a temporary measure, one taken to address urgent circumstances.

Considering how many aspects of counterinsurgent efforts *Pacification in Algeria* touches upon, the above seems a relatively minor point. The weight FM 3-24 gives to it may be a clue as to why the Algerian case gets the play that it does; the notion of broad American interagency involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has enjoyed some recent popularity. Whether it is really a good idea to involve multiple U.S. federal agencies in foreign interventions is another matter, but attaching the Algerian case to either side of the argument does no good.

For one thing, Algeria was part of France proper. “Civilian agencies” would not be “expeditionary” in nature, just assigned. They were *in France*. The idea that some degree of multi-agency French participation (or lack thereof) either caused the immense failure in Algeria or delayed it is implausible. Galula does not attribute French failure to the decision to not attack insurgent sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the failure to address land ownership inequities, or the ultimate resolve of Charles de Gaulle to release Algeria. These three factors are immense compared to whether or not enough civilians were involved administratively, or whether the Muslim population was sufficiently threatened. It remains open whether there is anything in the historical record that shows why Galula’s comment on appropriate soldier roles and tasks was “wise” rather than gratuitous and tangential.

### Does the French Model Endanger Classic Strategy?

The United States should not have dismissed many of the classic principles of warfare so completely. The supposed principles Galula and some other French writers offer are an insufficient replacement, stemming as they do from a completely failed counterinsurgency operation. Field
Manual 3-24 seems to make the implied argument that the French succeeded to the extent that they applied Galula-esque principles and failed to the extent they did not. This is an argument with little historical support. Galula was a small cog in a failed enterprise. His critical observations afterward, while well-stated and in some instances useful, are participatory and not yet attuned to the scale of the disaster then unfolding. Note that the term “lines of communication” appears about 26 times in the text of FM 3-24 but is almost never used in relation to the insurgent’s lines of communication. Neither is the word “pursuit” nor the term “culminating point” found at all, even though one expects the counterinsurgent to pursue the insurgent. It seems, however, that the Galula way of war so displaced classic strategic thought that the terms attending those classic principles disappeared. The French identified widespread use of the helicopter, which extends the counterinsurgent’s culminating point during the pursuit, as helpful in Algeria.

Favorable mention in American doctrine of the French experience in Algeria is justifiable when a specific tactical or operational example applies to operations. Otherwise, the total strategic failure of the French counterinsurgent campaign and its leaders’ actions with regard to captured enemy combatants argue that references to the Algerian episode be made economically.

This article admittedly simplifies available U.S. doctrinal literature on “low intensity warfare” by using FM 3-24 as a single guiding reference and foil. It also shortchanges the richer set of influences that the development of FM 3-24 itself enjoyed.

However, the point of this article is not to malign U.S. “low-intensity” warfare doctrine or even FM 3-24, or to discourage study of the French experience in Algeria. Rather, it is to suggest we temper our enthusiasm for drawing lessons from this particular conflict. Better that we respect the wider communicative consequences that its inclusion entails. Nothing from experiences in Algeria should compel us to supplant still-applicable lessons of classic strategy. We should study the insurgent war in Algeria, but when it comes to including lessons drawn from it in our counterinsurgency doctrine—if the choice of lessons to include is so thin, and the best lessons overlooked—we might do better to just leave it out altogether.
NOTES


2. Among the titles missing from the bibliography in FM 3-24, and which express the spectacular French failure, see Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1950-2000 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture (New York: Enigma Books, 2005); Gérard Chaliand, ed. Guerilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Edgar O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1977); and Irwin Wall, France, The United States and the Algerian War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). In The Battle of the Casbah, Aussaresses, who had worked directly for Trinquier, confessed the widespread use of torture. Gérard Chaliand is easiest the most prolific and personally knowledgeable French writer on issues of guerilla warfare and insurgency, so absence of mention of this author is by itself a curiosity. Wall’s book lends a missing ally knowledgeable French writer on issues of guerrilla warfare and insurgency, so the widespread use of torture. Gérard Chaliand is easily the most prolific and person.


5. See Wikipedia, “Roger Trinquier” online at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Trinquier>; according to Wikipedia, Trinquier’s publication list is much greater than that of Galula, and Trinquier was born about 10 years earlier (1908) than Galula (1919).

6. As the Wikipedia article and many other sources note, characters in Jean Larteguy’s novels, including The Centurions (referenced in FM 3-24) The Praetorians, and the Hounds of Hell, were based in part on the life of Roger Trinquier.

7. Galula may have simply been more coy than Trinquier. Note for instance, the comment “Under the pressure of a press campaign against ‘tortures’ (in my view 90 percent nonsense and 10 percent truth), a special unit was created in the fall of 1957 under the name of D.O.P.” Galula, 153.

8. This assertion bars the contentious argument of some radical Islamists that Israel constitutes an American or at least Western colony analogous to the Francophile population in northern Africa.


11. Of this there has been little doubt. See Aussaresses, 4.


14. Ibid., 268. I use the term “apparently” because the sentence comes from an appendix, a letter written by Galula in 1956 when still a captain.


17. Personal investigation into the question of how much knowledge existed within the Defense Intelligence Agency regarding land ownership and taxation in Iraq revealed that such knowledge was, institutionally speaking, nil as of late 2006.

18. On the use of barrier fencing see Galula, 62, 149, 180, and 181. It is no small detail that the fencing was heavily land-mined. As for census-taking see, Galula, throughout.


20. Mention in FM 3-24 of the word “helicopter” centers around medical evacuation and occasional airdrop of supplies to remote bases (8-8, 8-9, E-1). There is also mention of fire support (E-2), but the only, indirect reference to the use of the helicopter for movement and positioning of troops is in a paragraph on building host- nation airpower capability (E-5).
THE UPCOMING YEAR will prove pivotal to the U.S. Army. The modified priorities of the current administration, rapidly evolving civil-military engagements overseas, two ongoing campaigns, spiraling technologies development, the need for recapitalization, and declining resources will require decisions from Army leaders in a compressed time frame. Almost any course of action chosen in response to previous priorities will affect force structure (the size and balance between the operational and institutional Army) and the organizational design of the operational Army (the composition and command and control structure of our operational forces). By definition, these experimental modifications related to force structure and design will reduce capacity. The Army’s leadership must make choices that optimize its ability to accomplish the mission with less manpower.1

Several recommendations for changes to the Army’s organization have already been identified. The most pivotal change has been the configuration of the brigade combat team (BCT) as the unit of action. Some advocate reorganizing the Army’s artillery into a more traditional division artillery-like structure to support the BCTs. Such recommendations are far-ranging, and the method of analysis supporting this “divarty” concept involves an inductive method of identifying problems through experimentation and then reverse engineering corrective measures. However, deductive recommendations typically serve best during a time of constricting resources like the one we now face. Deductive methods provide greater efficiency and consistency by accounting for conditions that are prevalent rather than through experimentation examining possibilities. Deductive analysis in this case suggests that the organizational design of the unit of action, the BCT, would perform best with an organic field artillery battalion. Given current and anticipated conditions, retaining the organic artillery battalion in the BCT would be a better option for the BCT unit of action.

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Build Teams the Way They Fight

The maxim that Soldiers fight not for ideology or glory, but for their comrades, has long been accepted. Accordingly, one logically expects that the configuration of a unit should reflect the way it will deploy and fight in order to increase its cohesion. This logic has not always been the case for the Army. However, in 2004, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker implemented the conversion that changed the Army’s unit of employment. Implementing this tenet down to the brigade level allowed for inherent combat arms and services to become part of a standing organization. The codification of this unit of action concept resulted in new tables of organization and equipment (TO&E) for maneuver brigades. Under this table of organization, unit of action brigades (hereafter referred to as brigade combat teams, or BCTs) now had—

- Three maneuver battalions (heavy brigade combat teams have multiple combat arms companies within the battalions).
- An artillery battalion.
- A logistics battalion.
- Several enabling combat service support companies assigned to a special troops battalion.

Before this change, the Army’s central unit of employment was the division. Soldiers worked in one of the division’s three infantry or armor brigades or in the aviation, logistics, or artillery brigade. A comparatively small number of Soldiers filled billets in separate battalions such as signal or military intelligence, or in separate companies like the military police. When deployed, each maneuver brigade (except aviation) typically reorganized its force for operations upon receiving attachments from each of the other formations. When the unit returned to garrison, all attachments reverted to their parent unit’s control.

The Army as a Learning Organization

As a profession, the Army cannot lose sight of the purpose behind organizational design. In an effort to retain their corporate identity, leaders cannot stand as a special interest bastion defending jurisdictional dogma; their collective charge is ensuring that the Army serves the Nation. No organizational design can be sacrosanct. The Army’s organization of combat forces adapts, as required, so that it can best achieve its mission. The Army’s organizational adaptations since World War II serve as a clear indicator of this dynamic. A brief review of its modern organizational changes (1946 to 1992) and those in the postmodern era (1993 to present) provides a clear picture of the essential factors that drive organizational change, many of which apply today.

Modern organizational changes. The modern Army is traditionally composed of several types of combat forces—such as airborne, air assault, light infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor—each organized as part of a division. Within each of these categories, there are further variations. The armored cavalry regiment is distinct from the armor brigade. Air assault infantry is distinct from light infantry. Since World War II, the division has served as the Army’s central combat organization, the baseline formation for deployment and action. Since the 1950s, the Army’s heavy division has seen several organization modifications intended to improve its effectiveness by increasing its size, incorporating new technology, or mitigating a reduction in resources. Whether the change was driven by new capabilities, such as the fielding of the Apache helicopter, or a big reduction in manpower as a cost savings, the result was largely an increase in the size of the division to create economy of scale.

Concurrent with these changes were changes in the echelon of command between battalion and division; these intermediate organizations were iteratively regiments, brigades, combat commands, battle groups, and with the Reorganization of the Army Division (ROAD) program in the 1960s, brigades yet again. Since then, brigades have remained the intermediate formation, although their size has expanded and contracted with each change in the division’s organization. However, the essential premise behind the brigade’s organization was nesting it within the division structure, as the division remained the base Army unit for deployment. A heavy brigade’s...
organization had a headquarters company and a combination of three armor or infantry battalions. When deployed, it received habitual support from a logistics and artillery battalion and would routinely have an attached engineer battalion, all from separate parent brigades. On a mission-by-mission basis, the division headquarters would briefly attach small, specialized units such as military police, air defense, and military intelligence to subordinate brigades. This transient organizational arrangement reduced the unity of command and complicated operational synchronization.

These division-centric designs reflected a doctrine and a strategy that envisioned multiple corps campaigns against a Cold War, Soviet-type enemy. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the division organization underwent several small modifications. While few considered these latter changes as an improvement, those who did considered the changes a peacetime necessity to free monies for research and meet the practical personnel levels of an all-volunteer force. The division-centric paradigm produced two significant systemic outcomes: the brigade entered combat with a formation distinct from garrison and training, and the brigade had limited capability to operate independently from its parent division.

Postmodern organizational changes. Serious attempts to address these two shortcomings did not begin in earnest until the 1980s, despite requests from combatant commanders for formations below the division level that could operate independently in a Joint service environment. Some attribute this lethargy to an institutional desire to focus on the Cold War paradigm of conventional warfare. Even so, professional scholarship ultimately enabled the chief of staff to effect a design change in 2004 while conducting two campaigns. The increasing commitment of the Army across the spectrum of conflict, the emergence of transnational enemies, and the necessity of Joint service operations compelled a bold adjustment to the basic organization of the Army.

In the post-Desert Storm period, Colonel Douglas Macgregor evaluated several land campaigns to determine how organizations adapted their structure in response to rapid changes in the methods and tools of warfare. While these adaptations to the formations varied widely, a consistent pattern emerged: once deployed to combat, self-contained,
robust, brigade-size units were the optimal solution for employing new technology, weapons, and doctrine. They proved most adaptable. With this as a start point, Macgregor used computer modeling to test kinetic capabilities and strategic lift requirements. The results led him to design a six-battalion formation of combat arms and combat support units, which he called a “combat group.” He argued that the “combat group” should replace the division as the Army’s base organization, with echelon-above-corps organizations possessing discrete capabilities reconfigured as augmentation.\(^{11}\)

Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Sinnreich worked towards the same end by considering the changing nature of the threat and a significantly increased mission set. They concluded that—

The defining quality of the current operational environment is the growing convergence of military challenges once associated with distinctly different kinds of contingencies. Because of this gradual but accelerating convergence of military challenges, it is becoming infeasible to design military forces, especially ground forces, to deal uniquely with one aspect of the conflict spectrum or another. Instead, the emerging operational environment will place a premium on Army forces that are organized, equipped, and trained to shift rapidly and smoothly from any point on the conflict spectrum to another, precluding the need to improvise for any mission that diverges in scale or character from a single preconceived design requirement.\(^{12}\)

Put differently, the era of hyper-specialization of Soldiers assigned to specialized maneuver units has passed. While this assessment provided a compelling reason for changing the Army’s operational design, it did not indicate the echelons affected.

Subsequent analysis produced two additional conclusions. First, “recent wargames repeatedly revealed that much of the load on strategic mobility assets, especially in the early phases of conflict, is associated with organizational overdesign—the inclusion in basic tables of organization and equipment of capabilities and resources that are essential to combat performance only in certain conditions or at certain stages of battle.”\(^{13}\) Thus, by modularizing units at lower levels, Army forces could be tailored for specific missions and thus reduce the strategic transportation requirements. This first conclusion, while pragmatic, also supports their second operational conclusion:

Army formations must be inherently adaptable to a broad range of operational tasks without forfeiting the cohesion essential to effective combat performance. That cohesion is most essential at the tactical level of engagement, where both soldiers and units are under the greatest stress, and where rapid combined-arms synchronization is most vital. [Accordingly], the Army will require stable combined-arms formations at the smallest level capable of independent operational commitment.\(^{14}\)

Clearly, many of Macgregor, Wass de Czege, and Sinnreich’s conclusions are shared. Moreover, where their respective conclusions differ, they are not contradictory.

Organizational design principles. When compiled, the above pre- and post-9/11 research on Army organizational design provide patterns and conclusions that partially account for the Army’s success to date with the unit-of-action BCT. Great Soldiers and leadership will always have a preeminent role in any Army organization’s success. With regard to ground combat forces, a synthesis of the above provides five organizational design principles that can provide evaluation criteria for assessing proposed organizational changes in a resource and time-constrained environment:

- **Mission.** Mission accomplishment and the protection of Soldiers are the two foremost considerations in organizational design.
- **Adaptiveness.** The Army changes its organizational design in response to the enemy and new technology. Composite brigades are most capable of integrating changed doctrine, technology, and weapons.
- **Cohesion.** Cohesion is the cornerstone of a unit’s combat effectiveness; more is better. The degree of cohesion in a unit is proportional to the training and time Soldiers spend together at all levels. Standing brigades, comprised of combat and support units, achieve better cohesion and as a result produce battlefield effects greater than the sum of their parts.
● **Full Spectrum Capabilities.** The contemporary environment demands composite units below the division level, as they are most capable of adapting to the rapidly changing spectrum of conflict found within a single area of operations.

● **Joint Operations Capabilities.** Joint operations benefit from composite brigades as they enable mission specific force structure and avoid overburdening strategic lift with excessive or redundant capabilities.

These five principles are not inclusive; others may exist. However, compelling reasons should accompany any organizational design proposal that does not meet these proven five principles.

**Organizational Design Today**

The Army’s current emphasis on the BCT design suggests there is alignment with the aforementioned criteria. The Army’s 2008 strategy explains that the Army will continue to operate across the spectrum of conflict with state and nonstate actors increasingly employing technology with long-term force implications. The Army campaign plan applies this strategy by increasing the size of the Army to create a larger pool of brigades that are cohesive, agile, and can integrate among components, other services, and nations. The Army follows these guidelines in its modernization policy: “The Army must continually review its structure and capabilities to ensure it remains adaptive and responsive to the evolving world security environment.”

Clearly, the Army sees the implementation of the modular brigade design as a significant improvement and does not intend to revert to the division-centric paradigm.

This continued commitment is significant. Organizational theorists assert that the natural tendency of the Army in the wake of such significant change would be to dismiss the relevant lessons of recent combat experience and “fall prey to the willful amnesia to which the Army succumbed after Vietnam.” H.R. McMaster’s recent assessment of the initial U.S. strategy in Iraq underscores this institutional behavior as a significant concern.

The Army’s synchronized commitment to the BCT speaks volumes about the success of modular formations in combat to date. However, while the Army appears to have overcome its institutional tendency...
to revert to a previous organizational design, it does not acknowledge a need for further adaptation.

Rather, some are calling for an increase in the number of modular “fires brigades” with habitual relationships to maneuver brigade combat teams similar to the division artillery paradigm. Proponents argue that this change is necessary because of—

● A decline in artillery competence at training centers.

● Low morale from a reduction in senior officer billets and decreases in Field Artillery branch (FA) missions.

● A loss of technical knowledge within the branch.20

In a resource-constrained environment, such a change would require moving the field artillery battalions from the BCTs to new fires brigades. While the FA branch observations may be valid, such concerns violate the five organizational design principles and rely on unstated, questionable assumptions.

Without question, FA skills typically found at Grafenwoehr in the mid-1980s are not apparent today, but the same condition also exists with Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and air defense artillery gunnery. Should we correct these latter weapon deficiencies by reverting to brigade-pure formations for each? Obviously, this makes no sense for the modular BCT, when armor and infantry skills have also atrophied. Moreover, this recommendation implies that there are no successful FA units—that principles one (mission) and two (adaptiveness) were not being met in the BCT concept—so a categorical change is required. This logic does disservice to the accomplishments of units like 1-82 Field Artillery of 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, which fired thousands of rounds in support of combat operations without incident, combat-tested Excalibur for the Army, and conducted counterinsurgency operations near Taji, Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08.

With such unit-to-unit disparities, it seems more accurate to conclude that FA battalions in the modular BCT can be effective if properly led and trained. Gian Gentile makes a strong case for more emphasis on core mission essential task lists, but that discussion is outside the scope of this article.21

Some observers attribute low morale among junior FA officers to the loss of senior officer billets under the unit of action design and to the atypical missions FA units have had to perform. For this argument to be compelling, we have to conclude that principle three (cohesion) does not apply in this case. The morale and cohesion of the fighting unit have remained definitive combat multipliers throughout history. While FA officers deserve a competitive chance for advancement, an artillery career path under a division artillery-like design should not come at the expense of a brigade’s cohesion. Organizations in the Army are designed foremost to accomplish the mission (principle one), not to self-perpetuate. Moreover, other branches have had significant reductions in senior billets but have not seen a corresponding decline in junior officer morale or branch effectiveness. Many units—from a variety of branches—have had to conduct atypical missions and have been successful.

Is a loss of technical skill within a branch a reason for changing the current modular BCT design? Armored cavalry regiments have a long history of successfully integrating artillery, maneuver, and aviation. Their field artillery assets are assigned as batteries at the squadron level. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s success in Tal Afar further demonstrates the effectiveness of combined arms brigades that include FA units. It seems plausible that there are other ways to preserve artillery institutional technical knowledge (such as force generation and professional military education modifications) without implementing changes that violate the principles of cohesion and utility.

Summary Analysis

While the next five years will challenge the Army with operational requirements, declining resources, and new priorities, the Army’s actions during the last ten years with regard to organizational design have positioned it to adjust efficiently. Demonstrating that

The morale and cohesion of the fighting unit have remained definitive combat multipliers throughout history.
it is a learning organization, the Army has adopted a modular brigade-centric organizational design that meets current and anticipated mission requirements. A review of the literature on this topic suggests five principles to use to assess proposed changes to this organizational design. These principles demonstrate that a recent proposal to change the artillery organization inappropriately attributes perceived FA branch problems to the BCT design. They also indicate that further analysis of the utility of the armored cavalry regiment’s table of organization and equipment is warranted. The armored cavalry regiment’s long established table of organization and equipment (with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, with mortars at the troop level and with artillery at the squadron level) may justify the permanent assignment of tank and infantry platoons within the maneuver companies to improve cohesion and codify tactical employment patterns that have existed since World War II. This same logic suggests that a comparison of lessons learned from the armored cavalry regiment’s table of organization and equipment to the lessons learned under the BCT’s current table of organization and equipment may provide compelling reasons to retain other companies—such as engineers—within the brigade’s combined arms battalions rather than assigning them to the BCT’s special troops battalion.

In the interim, the current unit-of-action BCT is a significant improvement over the divisional design and remains the most effective formation for the Army. MR

NOTES

1. The author is most appreciative of the comments provided by reviewers and the insight of Colonel Greg Reilly.
3. TOE: Table of Organization and Equipment. A resource document that specifies the personnel and equipment required for each echelon of subordinate command. Also expressed with small changes as an MTOE for Modified TOE.
7. Ibid.
8. The logistic, engineer, and field artillery battalions would each come from a distinct brigade-size unit, commanded in garrison by a branch-affiliated lieutenant colonel.
9. Force XXI, implemented in the late 1990s, reduced the number of infantry and armor companies in a battalion from four to three, and added a reconnaissance troop to the brigade. It compounded the challenges of cohesion and task organization by consolidating most of the logistical personnel in the division support command.
THE USE OF indigenous forces in U.S. military operations is an important topic to military professionals. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have reemphasized the importance of developing the security capacity of host states. This article examines territorial forces in the Vietnam War to provide insight for officers in the field today who are attempting to accomplish similar missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Hau Nghia was only one of the 44 provinces in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Its history was not typical of what U.S. commanders experienced in Vietnam, but Hau Nghia’s narrative captures many of the triumphs and disappointments of the use and misuse of territorial forces. The struggle in the province was a war unto itself. In this microcosm, the members of U.S. Advisory Team 43 lived, fought, and died while advising and supporting South Vietnamese forces. The problems that plagued the advisory team and South Vietnamese forces seem strikingly familiar to those following the work of U.S. forces working alongside Iraqi and Afghan troops. The difficulty of instilling discipline, developing competent leaders, and providing the resources to accomplish the mission remain formidable challenges to American officers charged with establishing competent and capable institutions at the local level in these insurgent conflicts.

The Regional Forces in Hau Nghia were not successful because their capabilities required the presence of larger U.S. and Vietnamese forces to eliminate enemy threats beyond their engagement capabilities. Once U.S. forces departed, there were no forces capable of filling the vacuum. The United States had given primacy to establishing immediate security by using U.S. forces over training and developing Vietnamese Regional Forces. Consequently, the Regional Forces never developed into a force capable of providing security in the province without U.S. forces in support, and the physical security of the province decreased, along with the possibility of reestablishing the legitimacy of the government. The U.S. focus on short-term solutions to security, while neglecting preparations for their eventual withdrawal, meant that success was improbable, even before the impact of troop withdrawals rendered the flaws of the American
strategy clear. The U.S. military’s focus on operations and the elimination of enemy units reduced resources and shifted emphasis from the decisive objective—the establishment of a legitimate South Vietnamese government.

The United States and Vietnam: 1965-1967

The arrival of U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam in 1965 signaled a shift from the limited advisory effort initiated under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. U.S forces under the command of General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), focused on the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) as it initiated attacks into South Vietnam in order to overthrow the South Vietnamese government (GVN). By 1966, U.S. forces had prevented the collapse of the GVN, and Westmoreland continued to implement his strategy which aimed to pacify South Vietnam in three successive phases.

The first phase consisted of securing bases from which to conduct operations and secure South Vietnam. The second phase focused on targeting and eliminating enemy base camps and sanctuaries to prevent communist forces from attacking the South Vietnamese population. The third and final stage directed U.S. military forces against the remaining communist forces to either eliminate them or drive them out of the provinces. Westmoreland stated that pacification operations and the strengthening and development of South Vietnamese military forces, including territorial forces, had “to be pursued throughout all three phases.”

Without the ability to target the logistical base of the NVA and the Viet Cong insurgents in North Vietnam, MACV was limited to defeating enemy forces as they appeared in force in South Vietnam. By 1967, President Johnson was encouraging Westmoreland to gradually reduce the need for U.S. military power in South Vietnam by shifting the major military operations to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Although not labeled “Vietnamization” by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird until 1969, the chief motives for the policy stemmed from the apparent ineffectiveness of MACV’s strategy and declining support for Westmoreland’s request for increases in combat troops in Vietnam. Vietnamization required the South Vietnamese forces to take over the mobile offensive operations conducted by U.S. forces as well as the pacification operations already delegated to them by MACV.
Prior to 1967, numerous military and civilian agencies participated in pacification operations, including the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To better manage the pacification process, Westmoreland established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program and the position of Deputy Commander U.S. MACV for CORDS. Ambassador Robert W. Komer acted as the head of CORDS. Each corps command had a CORDS deputy responsible for coordinating the civilian and military pacification advisers operating at the province and district level. Despite U.S. forces and agencies providing resources and oversight of pacification operations, the major role of conducting pacification operations in the provinces and districts fell to Regional Forces and Popular Forces. Even though Regional Forces and other South Vietnamese territorial forces carried the brunt of pacification operations prior to the implementation of Vietnamization policy, the number of Regional Forces increased dramatically from 1969 to 1970.

The development of CORDS accelerated pacification operations throughout South Vietnam. The 1968 Tet Offensive temporarily halted those pacification operations, but the communist offensive also signaled the weakening of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. The most significant development and operations of Regional Forces in Hau Nghia occurred under the influence of the Vietnamization policy, the number of Regional Forces increased dramatically from 1969 to 1970.

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Pacifying South Vietnam: Extraordinary Measures

The National Liberation Front’s (NLF’s) communist infrastructure in South Vietnam had widened the gap between the South Vietnamese government and the rural population throughout the 1960s. The government could not build its legitimacy if communist forces retained the ability to influence the population or attack government programs. Pacification operations conducted by the U.S. Army and the government sought to eliminate communist influence and build legitimacy. Building legitimacy required “extraordinary measures applied over a long period of time” in order to “[turn the population] towards actual allegiance of a nationalist government” due to the de facto control of Hau Nghia by communist forces. Ridding South Vietnam of communist influence and establishing the legitimacy of the government required the pacification of the population and a presence in the countryside. Many social and economic programs were used to pacify the provinces, but the use of military force by the United States and South Vietnam was always the principal means for achieving a lasting political victory. In short, the success of the social and economic programs used to build government legitimacy depended on the physical security provided by military operations.

Although the military operations conducted by the U.S. Army and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam dominate the history of the Vietnam War, the territorial forces also played an important role in securing the population from the NLF. Territorial forces enlisted and operated at the district and province level in which they lived. The Regional Forces were company-sized territorial forces assigned at the province level to secure the population from communist forces. Over time, the Regional Forces developed into an organization that was larger and endured more casualties than the ARVN. Studying the Regional Forces’ operations in the Hau Nghia Province from 1968 through 1970 uncovers the complexity and challenges of using territorial forces to combat an insurgency.

The Regional Forces were part of a series of security rings that protected the people. The MACV established a system of three rings of protection in...
Hau Nghia and South Vietnam’s provinces to provide security. The first and largest ring consisted of U.S. and ARVN forces tasked with eliminating large enemy formations (roughly battalion-size or larger). The Regional Forces were the second ring, and they operated at the province and district level to prevent enemy units (roughly company-sized or smaller) from infiltrating villages and hamlets. The Regional Forces’ task was to eliminate NLF units that had slipped past the larger protective ring of U.S. and ARVN units. Popular Force, National Police, and other units made up the third and final ring. Their task was to infiltrate and destroy the communist infrastructure at the village and hamlet level. These three security rings were intended to destroy NLF counter-pacification operations in Hau Nghia.

In theory, Regional Forces contributed to province security by protecting the population. They protected the population by attacking NLF units that attempted to influence the population and destroy pacification programs. Specifically, the Regional Forces conducted tactical operations, such as patrols and ambushes, to stop NLF movements and operations in the province. These operations increased the risk of death, capture, and relocation for NLF members, decreased the communists’ ability to reach the population, and forced them to either engage U.S. and South Vietnamese forces or withdraw from the area. However, incompetent execution, enemy capabilities, and an overly defensive posture hindered the Regional Forces ability to secure the population. The Regional Force companies’ incompetent execution of tactical operations failed to destroy NLF units and prevent them from infiltrating the local villages and hamlets. The failure of the outer ring of U.S. and ARVN forces to stop large enemy units required the Regional Forces to engage enemy units that overwhelmed their capabilities. Finally, the defensive posture of most Regional Force companies decreased their ability to engage and destroy NLF units. As a result, the offensive operations needed to prevent NLF units from infiltrating the villages and hamlets did not occur. These factors allowed NLF units freedom of movement among the population of Hau Nghia. In turn, this prevented the population from supporting governmental pacification operations because there was no guarantee of security from NLF and other communist reprisals.

**Regional Force Operations in Hau Nghia: A Shield for Pacification Operations**

In 1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem organized the province of Hau Nghia by detaching and then combining four districts from neighboring provinces. Diem created Hau Nghia because he wanted greater administrative control over the area which was strategically important due to its location between Saigon and the Cambodian border. After the creation of the province, U.S. forces increased as did the development of pacification programs in Hau Nghia. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support group leaders supervised pacification operations in South Vietnam. To increase government control in Hau Nghia, province officials developed the 1968 Hau Nghia Pacification Plan during the final months of 1967. The plan “aimed at defeating NVA/VC forces in order to restore the country and to build a free nation” and was largely executed by provincial Revolutionary Development teams. The Regional Forces played a key role in supporting the pacification plan.

The 1968 pacification plan used Regional Forces to secure Hau Nghia by eliminating NLF units and preventing the enemy from infiltrating the hamlets and villages. These two tasks required the Regional Forces to perform a variety of missions to contribute to securing the province. The pacification plan had three stages. The purpose of stage one was to clear enemy forces from the areas surrounding population centers. Although the U.S. forces dealt with larger enemy forces, the Regional Forces had the task of clearing areas that were not strongly held by the NLF. Stage two was designed to eliminate the communists’ influence by destroying their infrastructure and providing security to the population. This stage required Regional Forces to destroy enemy units and infrastructure while securing key facilities and routes within the province. Stage three operations encompassed continuing to develop pacification programs and conducting a census. Regional Forces protected the teams as they carried out their mission to maintain the government’s presence in pacified hamlets as well those not under government control.
The success of the pacification campaign depended on the ability of allied forces “to provide a shield against larger enemy units behind which pacification can progress.” This required the destruction or displacement of enemy units in Hau Nghia. The removal of enemy forces was vital because their operations disrupted the pacification programs. Standing between the pacification plan and the population, the allied forces targeted over 3,000 enemy troops in various areas of the province. As the pacification plan became final as 1967 came to a close, the number of enemy units in Hau Nghia increased due to North Vietnam’s preparations for the 1968 Tet Offensive.

A Sharp Setback in Security: Tet 1968

The 1968 Tet Offensive halted all pacification operations in Hau Nghia until the spring of 1968. Highway 1, which ran from Saigon to the Cambodian border, was a key avenue of approach that enemy units used to attack the capital. The large number of enemy units passing through and occupying the province during Tet decreased the security of Hau Nghia. The relocation of the 2d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division outside of the province also caused a decrease in security. This vacuum allowed NLF units more freedom of movement, and they began to target Regional Force companies during the second phase of the Tet Offensive in Hau Nghia.

This had two effects on the Regional Forces. First, the large number of enemy units forced them into a defensive posture, preventing the Regional Forces from conducting offensive operations to clear enemy units from the hamlets and the villages in Hau Nghia. The second effect was the Regional Forces’ inability to shift to offensive operations. The strength of the enemy units in the province required Regional Forces to wait for larger U.S. and ARVN units to clear out the enemy units before they could resume security operations. The Regional Forces’ operations after Tet and until the end of 1968 focused on regaining their offensive capabilities and reorganizing to provide security to Hau Nghia. The NLF had seized the initiative and forced the Regional Forces to deviate from their original task.

The failure of the outer ring of U.S. and ARVN forces to stop NLF units from infiltrating into the Regional Force companies’ sectors reduced provincial security. In most cases, this infiltration was not due to the failure of U.S. and ARVN forces but to the placement or absence of these forces in Hau Nghia. The large number of NLF units operating in Hau Nghia continued to keep the Regional Forces in a defensive posture until late March 1968. The Regional Forces’ inability to provide security for the Revolutionary Development teams and programs created limited results in pacification operations.

The Tet Offensive, and the corresponding influx of VC units in Hau Nghia, revealed the flaw in the use of territorial forces. Their dependency on large screening units, such as U.S. and ARVN battalions, limited their usefulness. This deficiency was true for much of the war as U.S. units shifted locations according to the needs of higher commands and not the needs of province security.

Regional Force operations in 1968 did not affect pacification operations as much as those of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division, but the Regional Forces possessed certain qualities that U.S. units lacked. Captured enemy documents revealed that U.S. forces were not effective in halting VC operations in Hau Nghia because they were unfamiliar with the terrain. U.S. forces often used predictable routes or did not make the best use of terrain when sweeping for enemy units, and they often became the victims of ambushes. Regional Force companies, based in their home province, were very familiar with the areas in which they operated. However, the lack of proper equipment and aggressive leadership negated this strength whenever U.S. units did not support Regional Force units. Patrols and ambushes led by unmotivated or incompetent leaders resulted in noise and light indiscipline. This prevented the Regional Force units from effectively engaging the NLF units operating in their area. Advisors described Regional Force patrols in one monthly report as “tactical walks” that served the sole purpose of meeting the quota required of each unit.

The presence of large enemy units, most often a result of a momentary absence of U.S. forces from the province, also restricted Regional Force units to operations near their outposts, with most consisting of a quick clearing of the area within sight of the outpost. Cooperation between U.S.
and Regional Force units, however, balanced the strengths and weaknesses of each unit.

Although U.S. Army and Regional Forces were interacting in limited incidents, both units increased their performance when conducting joint operations. Province senior advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Carl F. Bernard, reported that the “operations of the joint U.S.-VN task force in Trang Bang and Cu Chi Districts [consisting of one U.S. company and Regional Force and Popular Force units] have proven highly successful.” Despite the benefits of cooperation, joint operations between the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and Regional Forces were not the norm throughout 1968.

While the Tet Offensive had “brought a sharp setback in security” in the early months of 1968, by September, U.S. province and district advisors reported increases in pacification. The progress was due to more U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations aimed at enemy units and the stand down of VC and NLF units in preparation for future offensives. Only one of the four district advisors credits the stand-down of enemy units as the sole reason for the success of pacification operations in the fall of 1968. The other district advisors credit the increase in operations by U.S. and territorial forces as the reason. Although the district commanders did not agree on what led to the decline of the NLF, every district report showed that pacification success was directly related to the absence of enemy forces and their ability to destroy people and property in the province. This observation validated the need for territorial forces as a long-term security force in Hau Nghia. However, the gains in security did not lead to a similar increase in the legitimacy of the government. The role of Regional Forces was important, but operations in 1968 had not uncovered all the flaws of the system. Pacification operations in 1969 showed the successful, yet constrained, implementation of Regional Force companies.

**Military Force in Pacification: Always the Key Component**

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign of 1969 relied on military force to increase pacification in Hau Nghia by “[expanding] territorial security as rapidly as possible.” The pacification plans of 1969 emphasized the successful pairing U.S. units with Regional Force companies in the final months of 1968 and incorporated it into the plan. Pairing the U.S. and Regional Forces combined the training and leadership of U.S. units with the Vietnamese units’
knowledge of local terrain and the language. The presence of five battalions of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia had reduced the freedom of movement of VC units in the final months of 1968, and the 1969 pacification plan called for an increase in U.S. and Vietnamese forces throughout the province. Based on the 1969 pacification plan, the number of Regional Force companies in Hau Nghia increased from 12 to 32 by the end of the campaign. Pacification of Hau Nghia reached a high mark in 1969, and the doubling of Regional Force companies played a role in this success.

Proper training and supply of Regional Forces also increased the capabilities, and confidence of the units in Hau Nghia. The 12 Regional Force companies organic to Hau Nghia received M-16 rifles beginning in November 1968. Before they received the M-16s, Regional Force companies carried WWII-era M-2 carbines and Browning Automatic Rifles as compared to the AK-47 assault rifles issued to most NLF units. Province records reported increased confidence of Regional Forces after they successfully engaged enemy units with their new weapons. However, the limited number of mobile advisory teams hampered the amount of training Regional Force units received on weapons such as the M-16 and tactics. The shortage of training caused by the lack of sufficient resources affected Regional Force units after they successfully engaged enemy units with their new weapons. However, the limited number of mobile advisory teams hampered the amount of training Regional Force units received on weapons such as the M-16 and tactics. The shortage of training caused by the lack of sufficient resources affected Regional Force units after they successfully engaged enemy units with their new weapons.

Problems in operations continued to necessitate strong support and the protective outer ring of large U.S. and ARVN forces. The lack of training and the high tempo of operations were not the only factors that affected the performance of the Regional Forces. NLF units launched their post-Tet offensive on 22 February 1969. The resurgence of attacks, after the calmer months at the end of 1968, decreased security, according to the Hamlet Evaluation System report. More important, “[U.S. and Vietnamese forces] credibility as defenders [was] seriously threatened.” The enemy units relied on terror tactics to target specific individuals or projects because the presence of friendly units in or around population centers prevented the NLF from taking decisive action. The new offensive also led to the relocation of several U.S. units outside the province. This shifted the burden of security towards the Regional Forces and played an important role in the regression of pacification. The post-Tet offensive of 1969 was not as violent or disruptive as the 1968 offensive, but it removed the initiative from U.S. and Vietnamese forces. Regional Forces remained understrength and under-supported until late spring due to their organizational weaknesses and the enemy’s offensive.

Hau Nghia once again experienced an increase in security and pacification in April 1969 with the return of U.S. units and an increase in the number of Regional Force companies. Allied units established physical security and restricted enemy attacks and movements. By the end of September, 32 Regional Force companies were operating in Hau Nghia. A large portion of them relocated to Hau Nghia from other provinces in South Vietnam. Recruitment had been difficult in Hau Nghia, as in other provinces, because the risks of serving in the Regional Forces outweighed the benefits. Regional Force members stayed near their homes while they served, so the local guerrillas knew who they were and where their families lived. This led to Regional Force members increasing the defensive posture of the force by keeping their families inside their outposts because they were unwilling to expose them to danger. The addition of extra Regional Force companies from other provinces, however, gave the Regional Forces the manpower to carry out aggressive operations against NLF units. The
presence of an overwhelming number of U.S. and Regional Force units increased security and once again demonstrated that “force [in pacification operations] was always the key component.”

By November 1969, enemy activity was increasing but the presence of the 2d and 3d Brigades of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division provided Regional Forces support in the form of eight U.S. battalions and advisors. Under the Dong Tien program, U.S. commanders provided two infantry sections to each Regional Force company, increasing the territorial force’s effectiveness on ambushes and night patrols. The December province report gives an example of a successful joint operation between U.S. and Regional Forces and shows the benefit of reliable intelligence and combining the capabilities of both units: “On 15 December [1969] the 773 RF company combined with C Troop, 3-4 U.S. Cavalry, picked up 332 enemy weapons in two caches pointed out by two hoi chanh [VC deserters].” While other provincial reports highlight the lack of local knowledge by U.S. units and the incompetency of Regional Forces, this report shows the benefit of Regional Forces operating with U.S. units. Aided by enemy deserters, the Regional Forces understood the area and population and were able to destroy a resource used to support enemy operations. However, successful joint operations like this were the exception rather than the norm in Hau Nghia because Regional Forces often lacked capable commanders.

The absence of competent leadership contributed to the ineffectiveness of Regional Force operations. December province reports recorded an increase in enemy activity and that “aggressive local security measures by RF/PF [Regional and Popular Forces] could have reduced the effect of VC activity.” Leadership problems continued to plague the Regional Forces in Hau Nghia, and the lack of aggressive operations was due to the lack of leadership. Other than the advisors attached to the Regional Force companies with the mobile advisory teams, Regional Force company commanders did not have an experienced leader to mentor and develop them. More often than not, the mobile advisory team advisors had roughly six months of service in country and no experience as advisors, which limited their ability to coach, mentor, and train the Regional Force units.

An enemy attack on a hamlet in June 1969 highlights the lack of leadership. During an attack on the edge of the Trung Hoa hamlet, the 36th Regional Force Group Commander refused the guidance of Captain Wolfgang May, the leader of the Trung Lap advisory team. May urged the commander to send a platoon-sized reaction force to recover enemy bodies and equipment left on the battlefield before the enemy retrieved them. The commander refused, stating that the situation was too dangerous, even though May exposed himself to danger throughout the operation in an attempt to motivate the Regional Forces to action. The inability of the Regional Force commander to aggressively pursue the enemy resulted in the loss of battlefield intelligence and contributed to the insecurity of the hamlet. Although leadership problems persisted, the influx of additional Regional Force companies and U.S. units in Hau Nghia improved security until the increase of enemy activity in late December. However, the high tide of pacification reached in 1969 could not continue. Even with the overwhelming presence of Regional Force companies, the slow withdrawal of U.S. units from Hau Nghia in 1970 exposed the Regional Forces’ weakness—lack of proper support.

Vietnamization in Hau Nghia: An Extremely Precarious Position

Vietnamization and the struggle to increase the performance of Regional Force companies characterized Regional Force operations in 1970. The enemy limited their activity within the province for most of that year. The U.S. and Vietnamese attacks on VC sanctuaries adjacent to Hau Nghia in Cambodia overshadowed the terrorist tactics that the VC had relied on for the past year. Pacification operations continued in the province and Regional Forces increased their operations to

Regional Force company commanders did not have an experienced leader to mentor and develop them.
take advantage of the vacuum created by VC units withdrawing and regrouping after the destruction of their bases at Ba Thu and Dia Gai. However, the steady withdrawal of U.S. units increased the realization among province officials that the Regional Forces would soon be assuming greater responsibilities in securing the province.

Although Regional Forces proved adequate in their assigned mission, the U.S. Army units still determined the level of security in Hau Nghia. Regional Forces continued to conduct joint operations with U.S. forces, mostly clearing lines of communications within the province. However, evaluations by senior province advisors still rated the Regional Forces as “marginal” in performance, even though Regional Forces made progress in clearing province roads without U.S. assistance.

The withdrawal of the 2d Brigade of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division in February 1970 overshadowed the small victories of the Regional Forces. This reduced the number of U.S. battalions in the province from eight to four. When the U.S. 25th Infantry Division left Hau Nghia in September 1970, the ARVN 25th Division took over the base camp at Cu Chi, leaving Regional Forces to fill the gap in the province’s security cordon. The withdrawal of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division left Hau Nghia without any U.S. combat forces for the first time since 1966. The absence of the outer ring of security provided by the U.S. units eased the pressure on enemy units in Hau Nghia. This led to an increase in enemy operations to disrupt pacification operations.

The Regional Forces continued their efforts to secure the population, even though they lost their main source of support. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division had conducted various training programs with the Regional Forces before it left, but limited four- to six-day training sessions could not turn around an organization beset with leadership and supply issues. Senior commanders started to relieve subordinates that did not perform, such as the unfortunate commander of the 52d Regional Forces Group who was “neither imaginative or aggressive.”

Night operations also increased with greater focus on patrols instead of the usual static ambushes. However, the final months of 1970 did not bring any great changes in operations or performance.

The lack of leadership and tactical training over the years, combined with high casualties, prevented the Regional Forces from taking over the increased security responsibilities required by the enemy situation in Hau Nghia. The lack of support for the Regional Forces did not immediately destroy security in Hau Nghia. However, the lack of progress in unit effectiveness over the years meant that without an influx of combat power similar in quality to the U.S. 25th Infantry Division the government’s control of Hau Nghia would continue to decline. The presence of an undefeated enemy and the withdrawal of U.S. military support created “an extremely precarious position” for the government in Hau Nghia.

Assessing the Regional Forces’ Performance in Hau Nghia

Regional Forces in Hau Nghia left much to be desired in mission performance, but the concept of territorial forces as a major contributor to securing the population proved useful under the right conditions. Colonel C.R. Truman reported in August 1968 that Regional Forces “represent the greatest potential . . . for finding and destroying” the enemy. Regional Forces made positive contributions to pacification in Hau Nghia, but examining the internal and external factors that affected the Regional Forces reveals their critical weaknesses. The internal factors of inadequate leadership and training only added to the more important external factor of the lack of continued U.S. military support. Even though Regional Forces operated within the sound concept of three security rings, the conditions present in Hau Nghia and Vietnam from 1968 to 1970 created factors that destroyed the interdependent rings.

Contributing to the breakdown of the security system was the lack of aggressive leadership and proper training. While reviewing the performance of Regional Forces in Vietnam, Colonel C.E. Jordan, Jr, noted that “lack of aggressiveness and training in command and control” limited the usefulness of Regional Forces. The mission of the Regional Forces required them to aggressively interdict and destroy enemy forces attempting to infiltrate the hamlets and villages of Hau Nghia. Inadequate leadership at the junior officer level resulted in operations characterized as “walks in the
sun” that did not affect enemy forces significantly. The inexperience of Regional Forces due to poor training also contributed to poor performance. Even though the number of mobile advisory teams increased throughout the war, they could not compensate for a lack of tactical training. The small number of advisors in each team (three to five) as well as a lack of training resources prevented them from conducting effective in-place training. The need for Regional Forces to operate in the province often prevented the units from conducting regular rotations at training areas. The internal factors did not significantly affect the security of Hau Nghia in 1968, but at the end of 1969, the slow withdrawal of U.S. Army units increased the responsibility of the Regional Forces.

The location and strength of U.S. forces ultimately determined the level of security, and by extension, progress in pacification. The eventual withdrawal of U.S. Army forces resulted in the breakdown of the security rings which the allied forces used to protect the population. Colonel C.E. Jordan reported that “[U.S. Army and Regional Force units] must be integrated for the purpose of accomplishing the common mission.” Closer interaction with more competent and disciplined U.S. Army units resulted in an improvement in Regional Force operations. The function of U.S. Army units as a shield against large enemy units was also an important factor in the success of Regional Forces. Colonel Amos A. Jordan observed that “if enemy main force units [can be] suppressed, the key combat role has passed to territorial forces.” When the 2d and 3d Brigades of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division operated in Hau Nghia, the Regional Forces performed effectively because the conditions allowed the Regional Forces to operate in the environment intended for their mission and capabilities. The opposite was true when large enemy formations bypassed U.S. forces during the Tet Offensive of 1968. If large enemy forces penetrated the outer security ring, the Regional Forces lost their offensive capabilities and were ineffective. Although Regional Forces were an integral part of the security system, U.S. Army and NLF units were the decisive forces for pacification operations in Hau Nghia, not Regional Forces.

The performance of Regional Forces in Hau Nghia highlights the potential strengths and weaknesses of territorial forces fighting an insurgency. The knowledge of the local populace and terrain enhanced the operations conducted by the U.S. 25th Infantry Division when it executed Joint operations with Regional Forces. The low cost and maintenance of territorial forces also allowed the government to locate a large number of troops in populated areas to provide security. The necessity of support when facing large enemy forces, however, was a critical weakness. Expecting Regional Forces in Hau Nghia to secure the population without adequate support by U.S. Army units was not realistic given the situation in Hau Nghia. The withdrawal of U.S. Army units in accordance with the U.S. Vietnamization policy signaled the official breakdown of the security system in Hau Nghia.

In 1968, Colonel C.E. Jordan Jr. argued that the Regional Forces’ ability to provide territorial security “may prove decisive in the conduct of the war.” The pacification operations conducted from 1968 to 1970 support Jordan’s assessment; however, the discontinued support of Vietnamese forces by the better supplied and more disciplined U.S. Army proved to be much more decisive in determining military victory. Pacification operations, and the security they sought to provide, had centered on the application of military force to eliminate the NLF’s influence in Hau Nghia. Jordan noted that—

Complexities and obvious weaknesses notwithstanding, the government’s organization for pacification is a compromise tailored to meet the complexity of the enemy threat and the existing political situation in RVN [Republic of Vietnam] . . . There is no simple solution. The basic system can be made to work.

He was correct only in his estimate of territorial forces; unfortunately for the government, the enemy threat and political situation were
such that the system could not be made to work. The withdrawal of U.S. military forces and the breakdown of the security system they supported meant that any hope of reestablishing government legitimacy through social and political means was unrealistic. *MR*

NOTES

3. Ibid., 7.
4. Ibid., 8.
5. Ibid., 8.
6. Ibid., 265.
8. Eric M. Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in the Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 5. Bergerud argues that the South Vietnamese government’s lack of legitimacy among the population (especially rural population) required the United States and other forces to eliminate the National Liberation Front (NLF) in order to allow the government to operate freely without the influence of a communist infrastructure in the population.
9. MACCORDS (Military Assistance Command) Fact Sheet, subject: Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF), 17 December 1968, CMH HPF.
10. Bergerud, 45, 141. Before the official commitment of U.S. ground forces in 1965, the NLF had firm control of parts of the province. After the influx of U.S. troops, clearing operations carried out by units of the 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia characterized the years 1966 to 1967.
11. Advisory Team #43, *Hau Nghia Pacification Plan 1968, Annex C (Revolutionary Development)* Box 27, RG 472, NARA II. The pacification plan describes Hau Nghia as having “great strategic importance as it is immediately adjacent to the Saigon—Can Tho capital area.”
12. Bergerud, 45, 141. Although the official commitment of U.S. ground forces in 1965, the NLF had firm control of parts of the province. After the influx of U.S. troops, clearing operations carried out by units of the 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia characterized the years 1966 to 1967.
13. Advisory Team #43, *Hau Nghia Pacification Plan, Box 27, RG 472, NARA II. The North Vietnamese Army consisted of main force units while the Viet cong units ranged from main force battalions to small squad elements located at the village level.*
14. Ibid.
15. Advisory Team #43, *Hau Nghia Pacification Plan 1968, Annex K (Regional and Popular Forces), Box 27, RG 472, NARA II.*
16. Advisory Team #43, *Hau Nghia Pacification Plan 1968, Annex C (Revolutionary Development), Box 27, RG 472, NARA II.*
17. C.E. Jordan, Jr., RF/PF: 1968 (July-December) File, Debriefing Report, 8, CMH HPF.
18. Advisory Team #43, *Hau Nghia Pacification Plan 1968, Annex B (Communist Forces), Box 27, RG 472, NARA II.* Three were four VC battalions (2,130 troops); three Local Companies (370 troops); four Municipal Platoons (130 troops); and more than 700 guerrillas in the various hamlets and villages of Hau Nghia. 
19. Ibid., 4.
20. HQ, III Corps, MACCORDS Provincial Report, February 1968, 3, CMH.
22. Ibid., 27.
23. Ibid., 33.
24. Ibid., 43.
26. Ibid. See also, MACCORDS Provincial Report, August 1968, subject: District Monthly Narrative Report (July), 3 August 1968, CMH.
27. MACCORDS Provincial Report, July 1968, 6; the Province Senior Advisor, LTC Carl F. Bernard, reported that “The operations of the Joint U.S.-VN task force in Trang Bang and Cu Chi Districts have proven highly successful. The force consists of one U.S. company, a company from the 34th Ranger Battalion (government), and RF and PF units from either Trang Bang or Cu Chi Districts, depending on which area the operations occur. Such joint operations have provided excellent experiences and training for district staff officers as well as the RF/PF soldiers.”
28. Ibid.
33. MACCORDS RAD/R Province Profile, Hau Nghia, 30 September 1969, 46.
34. Memo for Record, subject: issue of M16 Rifles to RF/PF, 1, Box 27, RG 472, NARA II.
36. Ibid., 1.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., February 1969; the HES reports rated villages and hamlets as pacified, contested or under VC control U.S. advisors used a list of different criteria to evaluate the presence and influence of VC and NLF units on the villages and hamlets.
40. Ibid.
41. MACCORDS RAD/R, Province Profile, Hau Nghia, April-June 1969 and Province Profile, 31 May 1969, CMH.
42. MACCORDS RAD/R, Province Profiles, Hau Nghia, 30 September 1969, CMH.
43. Bergerud, 224.
44. MACCORDS Provincial Report, November 1969, 1.
45. Ibid., December 1969, 2.
46. Ibid., 1.
47. Memo to Province Senior Advisor from District Senior Advisor Cu Chi, subject: Memorandum for record—failure to react in a critical situation by the 36th RF Group Commander, 16 June 1969, Box 30, RG 472, NARA II.
49. Ibid., May 1969, 1.
50. Ibid., February 1969, 70.
52. Ibid., March 1970, 1 and 3.
54. Ibid., October 1970, 1.
55. Ibid., September 1970, 3.
56. Ibid., July 1970, 1.
57. Advisory Team #43, Subject: U.S. Forces Assistance to RF/PF, Box 37, RG 472, NARA II.
59. Ibid.
60. Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 327. Birtle argues that “The decision by the United States and South Vietnam’s other allies to withdraw their combat forces in the early 1970s without having first evicted the North Vietnamese from South Vietnam thus left the Saigon government in an extremely precarious position.” Although the government’s position in Hau Nghia did not immediately deteriorate, the withdrawal of U.S. forces signaled to both the government and the NLF that it was only a matter of time until the imbalance of forces resulted in the collapse of the government.
61. COL Corbie R. Truman, RF/PF: 1968 (July-December) File, Debriefing Report, 1 August 1968, CMH.
63. Ibid.
64. COL Amos A. Jordan, Jr., *Territorial Security (RF/PF/PSDF)*: General File, Memorandum for Record; subject: Qualitative Observations on Territorial Security, Annex H to the Report of the USMA Summer Research Team entitled “An Effectiveness Model for Territorial Forces.” Compiled by COL Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Professor and Head of the Department of Social Sciences, USMA, October 1969, CMH.
65. MACCORDS Provincial Report, February 1969, 70.
67. COL C.E. Jordan, Jr., RF/PF: 1968 (July-December) File, Debriefing Report, 9, CMH.
68. Ibid., 1.
2003 Iraq, 1945 Germany, and 1940 France: Success and Failure in Military Occupations

Cora Sol Goldstein, Ph.D.

The Iraq War brought the issue of military occupations to the forefront of American foreign policy. For the first time since 1945, the United States became engaged in a full-blown military occupation aimed at democratization by force. Key figures in the Bush administration, including Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, drew parallels between the American occupation of Iraq and the American occupation of Germany, the paradigm of a successful American exercise in radical regime change. In both cases, the United States had similar objectives: the removal of an authoritarian, criminal, and antagonistic regime by force and its eventual replacement with a friendly democratic government that would adhere to the tenets of liberal democracy and capitalism. Many policies implemented by Paul Bremer, III, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, were purportedly modeled on the American occupation of Germany.

Yet the differences between Germany in 1945 and Iraq in 2003 made the American occupation of Germany an implausible model. The levels of destruction and mayhem were incomparable. By the end of World War II, 3.5 million German combatants and 2 million civilians had been killed—about seven percent of the total German population. The war had reduced most German cities to rubble, and the collapse of the Nazi party and the elimination of its leaders had left an ideological and political vacuum. By the end of the war, the Allies had annihilated the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS, and the Gestapo and crushed the German will to fight. American occupation forces did not face active armed resistance. As a result, American troop levels in Germany decreased with time. In 1945, 1.6 million U.S. troops were in occupied Germany, but by the end of 1946 there were only 200,000.1 Even after the hardships of the 1991 Gulf War, the sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the 2003 war, the situation in Iraq did not come close to the humanitarian crisis that engulfed Germany in 1945. Operation Iraqi Freedom caused minimal military and civilian casualties and scant urban destruction—less than 6,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed.2

Furthermore, the destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime released Shi’ites and Kurds from the shackles of Sunni dominance, and this translated into retributive violence and tribal confrontations. The Americans never faced this issue in Germany. True, the pre-occupation regimes in Germany and Iraq
embraced hypernationalist tenets, but religious, political, and ethnic schisms fragmented Iraq. Hitler had tried to convince Germans of the unity of the *volk*, and based his nationalist agenda on the exclusion of unwanted minorities and the simultaneous attempt to strengthen German collective identity. Nazi propaganda, the Holocaust, the war, defeat, and military occupation cemented the perception of national unity. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, did not succeed in homogenizing Iraq, and Iraqi nationalism did not suffice to unite Shi’as, Sunnis, and Kurds under a single imagined community. Even anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism have not proven to be unifying currents strong enough to overcome the religious, ethnic, and political schisms in current Iraq.

However, another development was even more significant than the above. The Bush administration did not remember an important lesson of the American occupation of Germany. For a military occupation targeted at radical regime change to be successful, the occupiers must have an accurate understanding of the political situation in the occupied country to develop their agenda without alienating its population. The occupying power must be able to navigate the political waters carefully and garner the support of the occupied population. The ultimate objective is the conversion of the former enemy into an ally, an objective that the United States failed to achieve in Iraq.

1945 Germany

Planning what to do with Germany after the collapse of the Third Reich proved difficult and contentious. The War Department, under Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and the State Department, under Secretary Cordell Hull, favored a “soft peace.” They put a high priority on the reconstruction of the German economy, suggested that Germany pay moderate war reparations, and lobbied for German political unity. In 1944, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the Secretary of the Treasury, became involved in the debates on the future of postwar Germany. Morgenthau rejected the plans of the War Department and the State Department. Morgenthau championed a “hard peace.” He believed that to ensure a lasting peace it was essential to destroy German heavy industry, arguing that “Germany’s road to peace leads to the farm.” Furthermore, he considered denazification a long-range project, and thought that to overcome Nazi ideology a whole generation of Germans would have to be educated in a new political atmosphere. The tension between the two approaches was not fully reconciled by the time of the occupation.³

The initial American agenda was punitive, inflexible, and harsh. During the war, American propaganda insisted that the similarities between Americans and Germans were only skin deep, and that they hid irreconcilable moral differences. In December 1944, the Office of War Information—the American directorate for strategic propaganda during World War II—insisted that the primary task of the American occupation was to make Germans realize that they were guilty. Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, the first military directive that informed American policy in 1945 Germany, explicitly rejected the idea that the United States was liberating a population held captive by a dictatorship. The directive stated that Germany “will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation.”⁴ In March and April 1945, as the U.S. military discovered concentration camps scattered across Germany and liberated those held captive there, the U.S. Army forced Germans to see Nazi atrocities. The U.S. military organized the confrontation policy, bringing German civilians to the sites of murder, slave labor, and torture, thereby exposing them to evidence of Nazi criminality.

Yet, the Office of Military Government, United States, in Germany adapted its policies to the circumstances on the ground. The American occupation authorities quickly realized that the punitive agenda was alienating the German population and ran the risk of making the Germans susceptible to Soviet propaganda. The confrontation policy was
short lived—it ended before V-E Day. The Office of Military Government also revised its collective guilt agenda, its nonfraternization policy, and the way in which it carried out denazification. Prompted by the initial successes of Soviet cultural policy in occupied Germany, the Office of Military Government became engaged in cultural warfare and propaganda. With the advent of the Cold War, the limits of American tolerance were redrawn and American strategic propaganda and censorship became focused on anti-Communism. By 1947, the American objective was no longer punishing Germany but rather transforming the former enemy into an ally. In 1948, currency reform set West Germany on a path towards economic recovery.

2003 Iraq

In 2003, the coalition forces created more problems than they solved. The military blitzkrieg failed to secure Iraq’s arsenals of conventional weapons, and insurgents gained access to armaments and ordnance. From that moment on, security in Iraq was in jeopardy. Without security, reconstruction and economic development were virtually impossible. This experience stands in stark contrast to the effectiveness with which the Allied occupation forces disarmed Germany, where the absence of insurgency allowed the U.S. military government to begin reconstructing the American sector in 1945.

Equally important, the rigid de-Baathification policy carried out by the Coalition Provisional Authority was a political disaster. In May 2003, Bremer banned the Baath Party, removed all senior Baathists from the government, and dissolved Iraq’s 500,000-member military and intelligence services. He dismissed military officers above the rank of colonel as well as all 100,000 members of Iraq’s various intelligence services. The dismantling of the Iraqi army and security services created massive unemployment and engendered discontent, hostility, and resistance. With these Sunni officers dismissed, the Shi’a dominated the new Iraqi security forces; in fact, the new Iraqi security apparatus was a barely disguised Shi’a death squad. In April 2004, the Americans changed their strategy and tried to reincorporate some senior ex-Baathists into the security forces. Yet the displaced Sunni minority became the kernel of the insurgency. Furthermore, de-Baathification crippled U.S. capabilities in counterinsurgency. Without the collaboration of the Iraqi
army and security services, the coalition forces were operating virtually blind, and insurgency erupted. The Coalition Provisional Authority was not able to change the basic structure of Iraq’s economy, and could not fulfill a basic requirement of successful regime change: job-creation on a large scale. Underemployment and unemployment plagued Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as it did other oil-based economies. In 2003, 28 percent of the labor force was idle, and women (52 percent of Iraq’s population) were just 23 percent of the formal workforce. Unemployment and underemployment did not change significantly from 2003 to 2008. In 2007, 57 percent of Iraqis between 18 and 24 years old—the potential recruits of the insurgency movements—were unemployed. In 2008, unemployment still predominantly affected younger men and uneducated women. 

The political and humanitarian quagmire in Iraq was a result of the occupation, not a product of the 2003 war. The fight against the insurgents resulted in the destruction of whole cities, as illustrated by the fate of Fallujah. The occupation of Iraq and the subsequent attempt to pacify the country also brought about a massive health crisis, accompanied by a dramatic rise in malnutrition and infant mortality. Many factors contributed to this catastrophe, including the exodus of health professionals, the collapse of the sanitation system, the shortage of electricity and clean water, and the destruction of housing. The U.S. military government solved problems in Germany, but the Coalition Provisional Authority created them in Iraq. It was unable to provide the security to make the reconstruction of the country possible or to foster effective collaboration between Iraqis and coalition forces.

1940 France

The Coalition Provisional Authority tried to apply the American experience in Germany in 2003 Iraq, but the context required something else. Paradoxically, the situation in Iraq in 2003 and France in 1940 have some interesting points in common. Both countries were occupied after a short war that did not damage their infrastructure and did not affect the civilian population greatly. Their armies were defeated, but certainly not annihilated. Furthermore, long-seated religious, regional, and ideological antagonisms divided both countries. The German occupation of France could have provided some insights on how to approach the American occupation of Iraq.
The Nazis exploited the preexisting divisions in French society to structure their dominion and limit the use of force. They took advantage of the deep anti-Semitic and anti-Republican currents that pervaded French society and used them to garner support and create compliance with Nazi policies. The Germans divided France into two zones and maximized French involvement in the day-to-day management of the country. Instead of antagonizing the French, the Nazis tried to gain their collaboration. From 1940 to 1942, the authorities did not have to confront large-scale insurgency, and German repression was somewhat moderate except, of course, for the persecution of the Jews. The first two years of the German occupation of France were a success for Germany.

At the time of the “Strange Defeat,” the Nazi invasion of France in 1940, France was deeply divided politically, polarized between the right and the left. The French right was Catholic, anti-Semitic, fanatically anti-communist, and anti-socialist. It had a long history of grievances against the Republic, dating all the way back to the French Revolution and peaking with the Dreyfus Affair. The right was eager to abolish liberal parliamentary democracy and replace it with a strong state based on obedience, discipline, and respect for authority. The French left was the minority—a heterogeneous group of communists, socialists, anarchists, republicans, and liberal democrats. The French elected Leon Blum, a Socialist and a Jew, Prime Minister in 1936 as the head of the Popular Front, a coalition among the left, the syndicates, and the Republican center. Yet by 1937, the Popular Front government was on the brink of collapse.

The French military defeat offered the anti-Republican majority a chance to imagine a radically new country freed from the shackles of parliamentary democracy. After the defeat of the French army by the Nazis, the majority of the French parliament gave Marshall Philippe Pétain, the reactionary Catholic hero of Verdun, full political power. The Germans abolished the French parliament, eliminated political parties, and ended what the French right wing considered the moral corruption of democracy. The French right wing welcomed the Nazis, and many French politicians were eager to collaborate with the Germans to restore France to its “greatness.”

The Wehrmacht occupied Paris and the north and west of France, and left the south in the hands of Pétain, who established a pro-Nazi regime in Vichy. For the Germans, controlling Paris had symbolic meaning—it was the jewel of Europe. The rest of the occupied zone was key because it included 67 percent of the French population, 66 percent of the cultivated land, 75 percent of the industry, and most of the financial capital. Moreover, anti-Republican feeling ran deep in the zone, making the area amenable to German control. In Vichy, Pétain led a right wing, paternalist, and autocratic regime, controlled by a technically efficient, modern bureaucracy. The Vichy government was eager to reform the French state, creating a corporatist economic model closely integrated with the German economy. Nominally, all France was under the governance of Vichy, but the Germans were the supreme arbiters and decision-makers.

The German occupation zone, which included the nucleus of the French economic, industrial, financial, and intellectual power, was subject to a system of indirect rule. “King” Otto Abetz, the German ambassador in France, followed the ideas of Werner Best, an SS intellectual. Best developed the concept of “supervisory administration” to govern the Western European countries occupied by the Wehrmacht. According to Best, supervising the operation of a complying French state would achieve a peaceful occupation while reducing psychological stress on the occupied. The Nazis did this by creating a sense...
of normalcy. They usually did not interfere with the day-to-day affairs of the French bourgeoisie. They left the French bureaucracy, police, and intelligence services essentially untouched, as long as the French followed German directives.

The Germans supervised a rigorous anti-Semitic policy both in the occupied zone and in Vichy. They barred Jews from participating in French society, systematically expropriated Jewish properties, and made plans for the deportation of French Jews and Jews residing in France. The French population accepted these policies. Even some French Jews were comfortable with the ideas of expelling nonassimilated (foreign) Jews from France. The Germans let the French bureaucracy, the French security services, and the French police perform the task of rounding up Jews (native and expatriates), communists, and anti-German activists. The French police, following German directives, were involved in the massive repression in Marseille and in the destruction of the Vieux-Port.

In the cultural field, the Nazis allowed compliant French artists and intellectuals some level of freedom. Of course, the Germans did not tolerate criticism of the Third Reich and its leaders and excluded Jews, Marxists of all stripes, and Freemasons from French cultural life. Yet the Germans enticed French intellectuals to participate in the cultural construction of a new Europe led by the Third Reich. German military administrators actively organized art exhibits, concerts, and conferences with prominent German intellectuals, and promoted French cultural life. Thus, occupied Paris, even in the midst of deprivation and anxiety, was a thriving intellectual center where book publishing, theater, cinema, and fashion flourished.

The two years of indirect German rule in France under the Vichy government and outright military occupation suggest that the Nazi strategists had a reading of the political situation in France. This allowed them to take advantage of three preexisting ideological patterns in French society: anti-Semitism, anti-Republicanism, and anti-liberalism. The Germans also respected French nationalism as long as it helped them accomplish the Nazi agenda in Europe and in the French colonies in Africa. Above all, the Nazis were able to recruit the French bureaucracy, police, and security services to enforce law and order, thus reducing the need for German occupation troops in France.

Lessons to be Learned from 1940 France and 1945 Germany

Occupations aimed at regime change are cultural and political wars. The ideology of the occupiers is irrelevant to the fact that, to succeed, they must win the hearts and minds of the occupied populations. The occupiers must provide security in the aftermath of the war, and they need to convince the local population that the occupation is providing a better future. In short, the occupiers must win a battle of perception. Furthermore, the occupiers must be selective in their choice of enemies because they cannot antagonize all sections of the population at the same time and with the same intensity. Lastly, the occupiers must utilize the native security apparatus to advance their agenda.

The Bush administration did not read the Iraqi political landscape correctly, nor did it accurately gauge the American capacity to occupy a country in the Middle East. It is one thing to win a war against a weak enemy, and another to set up a military government aimed at regime change. The Pentagon and the State Department had mistaken expectations concerning Iraq. They believed that Iraqis would greet the coalition troops as liberators and that Iraqis would want to emulate the American model of society. Because of these faulty assumptions, the American strategic planners drew a scenario in which the democratization of Iraq would occur by default. With the removal of Saddam Hussein, they predicted, Iraqis would automatically embrace liberal democracy. The Americans did not realize that it would require a huge amount of political work to convince Iraqi society that the United States was not acting exclusively on the basis of self-interest, and that the American model was desirable, attainable, and worth pursuing.
The Pentagon and the State Department failed to recruit their potential allies—the Baathists, the remains of the left, and the Iraqi army and security services. The survival of these sectors depended on the containment of Islamic fundamentalism, both Shi’a and Sunni. It should have been evident that it would be impossible to reconcile the objective of democracy with the existence of an antidemocratic majority bent on establishing a theocratic state. Had the planners of the occupation considered the fact that Iraq was a bitterly divided country torn by animosities between sectors of society, they could have designed an occupation strategy that exploited the existing social fractures separating the theocratic, fundamentalist Shi’a, the Baathist Sunnis, and the Kurds. This could have led to the partition of Iraq and to the possibility of success. The United States should have focused its democratization efforts on the center/north of Iraq, and left the south in the hands of the theocratic majority.

We can envision this hypothetical scenario:

● The partition of Iraq along geographic, political, and religious lines into two zones—the south, predominantly Shi’a, and the center/north, predominantly Sunni and Kurdish.
● The partition of Baghdad into two sectors, one Shi’a and the other Sunni.
● The concentration of the coalition’s political, economic, and financial efforts in the center/north zone and in the Sunni sector of Baghdad. The center/north zone is rich in oil, and it has a strong secular influence. It was therefore potentially receptive to democratization and modernization. The highly successful experience of the American military government in Germany would have been invaluable in the transformation of the center/north zone and the Sunni sector of Baghdad.
● A very limited de-Baathification program, restricted to the upper echelons of the Saddam Hussein regime involved in the planning and execution of genocidal campaigns against Shi’a and Kurds.
● The suppression of insurgents in the center/north zone by Iraqi armed forces, security services, and police supervised by coalition personnel.
● The concentration of coalition forces on the Iraq-Iran border, to seal the frontier and to block the infiltration of Iranian weapons, money, and personnel into Iraq.
● The emergence of a theocratic autocracy in the south.

Conclusion

Democratization by force can only succeed if the occupying force is able to garner the collaboration of the occupied population. In 1940 France, the Nazis were able to carry out a successful occupation because they relied on the anti-democratic and anti-Semitic French majority. In this case, collaboration arose from fear and ideological affinity. In 1945 Germany, the United States was able to exploit the physical and psychological destruction of Germany and the German population’s fear of the Soviets. Many elements contributed to the pro-Americanism of Western Germany in the immediate postwar period. The United States guaranteed security and order, while encouraging economic and social reconstruction. The Americans not only provided plenty of consumer goods, but they were able to convey a sense of partnership to the West German population, epitomized by the Berlin Airlift. With all its difficulties, life in the American zone and sector appeared to be a better alternative than the dreariness of the Soviet zone and sector. Of course, in Germany, there was no religious fundamentalism to overcome, and the population was highly educated, secular, and eager to participate in the construction of a prosperous and democratic Western Europe aligned with the United States. Even though the Germans did not relinquish their identification with Nazism in 1945, the reality of unconditional defeat and the overwhelming presence of Allied troops made resistance virtually impossible.

In 2003 Iraq, the United States faced a very difficult challenge because the war had not destroyed the country, and the elimination of the Saddam Hussein regime allowed Iraq to spontaneously fragment into three rival population groups with incompatible agendas. In this political context, the United States should have secured the collaboration of the Sunni and Kurdish minorities, helped them build a model liberal democracy in the Middle East, and then left the Shi’as to their own devices while using military means to effectively block any connection between the Shi’a zone and Iran. The partition of Iraq and Baghdad would have allowed the United States to do what it did in postwar Germany with great success:
outshine its competition. No Shi’a regime modeled on the Ayatollahs’ Iran would have been able to compete with an American-driven development project in central and northern Iraq if the United States guaranteed security, stimulated the Iraqi economy, and energized Iraqi cultural life. MR

NOTES

2. CBC News, "Iraq: Casualties in the Iraq War" (updated 5 February 2007), <www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/casualties.html>. It is hard to determine the exact number of Iraqi civilian casualties during Operation Iraqi Freedom; but the number is likely between 1,000 and 10,000, <www.iraqbodycount.org>.
10. This, for example, was the opinion expressed in 1940 by the eminent French historian Marc Bloch, a member of the Resistance, tortured and killed by the Gestapo in 1944, two weeks before the liberation of Paris. See Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 178.
IN APRIL 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates addressed the Air War College at Maxwell Air Base and lauded the introduction of unmanned aerial systems into the Air Force arsenal as a less risky and more versatile intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset. He prodded the Air Force to provide more unmanned aerial systems in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation and asked Air Force officers to rethink which missions unmanned aviation assets could gradually assume from manned aviation assets.¹

At the time of the secretary’s speech, I was a Shadow unmanned aerial systems platoon leader for a brigade combat team deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although I took pride in the Nation’s civilian military leader promoting the area for which my Soldiers deployed to combat, I wondered why the secretary felt we needed more unmanned aerial systems. I thought that rather than purchasing more systems, the Army and the Air Force should make more of an effort to improve the planning and execution of missions for unmanned aerial systems that already exist.

Troubles with unmanned aerial systems employment have not gone unnoticed. Since 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has produced multiple reports recommending that the Department of Defense (DOD) improve various aspects of unmanned aerial systems operations. The GAO geared the majority of these reports toward improving joint interoperability of unmanned aerial systems, adjusting acquisition plans for future unmanned aerial systems, and ensuring safe expansion of unmanned aerial systems into national airspace.² However, one report, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advanced Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, aimed to improve the planning and execution of combat operations.³ This report recommended that the DOD develop qualitative and quantitative metrics to measure the effectiveness of unmanned aerial system coverage for troops on the ground. The same report also recommended that DOD develop a systematic process to capture feedback from intelligence and operations communities to assess how effectively intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets were meeting warfighters’ requirements.

The department has relied on organizations such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned to obtain feedback on unmanned aerial systems operations.
and stood up an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assessment division to develop metrics for such operations. However, the metrics the assessment division developed are predominately quantitative and do not encompass missions flown by tactical unmanned aerial systems, which often collect imagery in support of division and corps level operations.4

My personal observations at the division and brigade levels made me believe that measures the department implemented because of GAO recommendations were not effective in improving unmanned aerial systems employment from the warfighter’s perspective. I did not observe any metrics measuring the effectiveness of unmanned aerial systems coverage from Shadow platoons nor did I see any consistent, immediate feedback between brigades and battalions requesting unmanned aerial systems coverage and the unmanned aerial systems operators who performed a particular mission.

The reality was that most of my platoon’s missions in Iraq were repetitive and not adequately synchronized with the current operations and intelligence situation. My platoon flew the same missions day after day, and so did many of the higher-echelon unmanned aerial systems supporting our brigade. My platoon received feedback only through direct, informal communication between the platoon’s leaders and the ground commanders who requested unmanned aerial systems coverage. The lack of progress in using unmanned aerial systems at the division and brigade level has encouraged me to recommend ways to improve the planning and execution of such missions. Although the Army will soon begin to withdraw forces from the Iraq theater of operations, the lessons to learn from unmanned aerial systems operations during this conflict could significantly help troops in Afghanistan and in future asymmetric conflicts.

**Observations**

Each morning of the deployment, I asked my Soldiers which missions we needed to accomplish in the next 24 hours. Most of my questions elicited a similar response: “The same missions we’ve flown for the past month.” The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance target decks, which are tables of the named routes and tactical areas of interest for the systems to observe during a particular mission, rarely changed from day to day despite intelligence updates from the brigade intelligence officer (S2). Subordinate units seldom updated their target decks so the systems could either confirm or deny the most recent intelligence gaps or provide direct overwatch for maneuver units in offensive operations.

A Shadow unmanned aerial system vehicle launches to conduct a surveillance mission, in Baghdad, Iraq.
My platoon sergeant and my platoon’s unmanned aerial systems technician assisted me tremendously in our efforts to work with brigade and battalion intelligence shops to seek out missions that would benefit from our Shadow platoon’s imagery collection and aerial communications retransmission capabilities. We achieved success on a case-by-case basis. We convinced units to retask the unmanned aerial systems to support offensive operations in search of high-value individuals, and we sometimes persuaded units to use the unmanned aerial systems to collect imagery of areas unfamiliar to troops on the ground. However, too often we found that when we did not prod a unit to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning, our missions would revert to their normal, repetitive nature.

The problem of optimizing the effectiveness of unmanned aerial systems in theater was not just a local phenomenon. While visiting a nearby corps-level unmanned aerial systems battalion, I heard similar complaints from operators and saw many of the same intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance target decks that my platoon used. However, too often we found that when we did not prod a unit to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning, our missions would revert to their normal, repetitive nature.

The most common problem was the propensity of maneuver units to task unmanned aerial systems to observe the same routes and the same named areas of interest each day. One particularly disturbing trend was that battalion intelligence officers often used unmanned aerial systems to detect and report improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during route reconnaissance missions. No imagery-collection unmanned aerial system, whether Raven, Shadow, Hunter, Predator, or any other asset, will have success observing IEDs on a regular basis. Even observing personnel emplacing IEDs is very difficult to do. It requires the unmanned aerial systems to be in the right place at the exactly the right time and the owning ground unit to apprehend individuals suspected of emplacing IEDs.

Having unmanned aerial systems repeatedly observe identical named areas of interest produced similar lackluster results. On the rare occasions when the unmanned aerial system observed seemingly “suspicious” activity, the unit requesting coverage decided whether to act. Some potentially criminal actions went unchecked when units were unable or unwilling to respond to unmanned aerial system reports. Likewise, whether performing a route reconnaissance or an observation mission,
neither the unmanned aerial systems platoon nor the supported unit observed and analyzed the coverage carefully enough to establish enemy patterns of behavior or significant changes in the landscape suggesting enemy activity. We typically tasked unmanned aerial systems to conduct route reconnaissance and named area of interest observance missions at the expense of better uses for imagery collection platforms.

The trend of units submitting identical or similar target decks on a regular basis came about because brigades and battalions wanted to maximize unmanned aerial systems coverage to increase the likelihood of having a system in their area of operations in the event of significant, unexpected enemy activity. This sort of “just-in-case” theory is logical. An unmanned aerial system should always be prepared to dynamically retask to provide imagery of critical events, such as troops in contact with the enemy or troops searching for a time-sensitive target. However, this “just in case” use of the systems is also risky because requiring unmanned aerial system units to provide continuous coverage significantly strains their manpower, maintenance, and logistical capacities. In other words, the Army cannot afford that kind of redundancy.

The Shadow, for example, was only meant to provide 12 hours of on-target coverage per 24-hour period. The Hunter can support an operational tempo of 12 hours of daily coverage for six days, followed by a maintenance day of zero flight hours. Exceeding these limits increases the likelihood of a mishap due to mechanical failure from overuse of the systems or even a mishap due to human error by overworked pilots and mechanics. Good leaders and dedicated Soldiers can mitigate most of the human and mechanical risks associated with increased coverage, but no commander wants to be responsible for a mishap that occurred while the system was only flying “just in case” something happened.

Admittedly, increasing the number of unmanned aerial systems in theater will allow units to receive more coverage with less strain on resources, but it will not necessarily improve the overall effectiveness of systems employment. In a large city, for example, airspace restrictions alone prevent unmanned aerial systems from being able to constantly observe every potential intersection or suspected enemy hideout. Units must establish a method for disseminating information to systems operators so that they know where to look and when. Rather than submitting identical target decks each day, units should task the systems to fly missions only to confirm or deny the presence of persons, events, or activities within named areas of interest that are tailored to the current operational and intelligence situation.

In addition, some units that displayed a willingness to synchronize their target decks with current operations did not always have the ability to do so because the process for requesting coverage was so time-consuming. The process had to be complete 72 to 96 hours prior to the actual unmanned aerial systems coverage time, in large part due to the planning cycle at the corps and division level. Units were not likely to submit a target deck that reflected the current intelligence situation if they could not be certain which operations were going to take place four days in advance. Considering commanders’ desires to keep unmanned aerial systems in the air and the difficulty of predicting three to four days in advance which operations would require unmanned aerial systems coverage, it is not hard to understand why commanders typically emphasize the quantity of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage much more than its quality.

**Short-Term Recommendations**

To make intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance quality just as important as quantity, Army commanders at the division level and below should focus on three areas. First, they must repeatedly stress to their intelligence sections...
the importance of continually updating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance target decks to reflect the current operations and intelligence situation. Second, collection managers must work with unmanned aerial systems leaders to determine how to simplify the target decks and enable battalions to submit coverage requests 24 hours before missions so that, with the exception of dynamic retasks, they can finalize the target decks 12 hours later. Third, Army and Air Force unmanned aerial systems leaders must educate leaders and staff officers on systems capabilities and limitations and establish a system of feedback between aerial systems leaders and supported units to improve the planning and execution of such operations.

The most effective way to counter scanning the same routes and collecting on the same areas of interest day after day is for commanders to ensure that collection managers update intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance target decks to reflect the current operations and intelligence situation. Throughout each 24-hour period, divisions and brigades will receive information from signals intelligence, human intelligence, and the Joint surveillance and target attack radar system moving target indicator collection; patrol debriefs; and other intelligence sources that require corroboration before becoming intelligence to act on. Unmanned aerial systems cannot corroborate some of these reports with imagery collection capabilities only. Unmanned aerial systems will not be able to convey the name of an insurgent cell leader or identify the location of an IED emplaced a week earlier. However, an unmanned aerial system might be able to identify the bed-down location of a cell leader if a brigade has only a description and general location of the cell leader’s house. They can also confirm whether people are crossing a river using a footbridge that is submerged just under the water. However, for unmanned aerial systems to identify such information, its operators must have current, refined intelligence that tells them where to look and when and what to confirm or deny.

It does a brigade no good to have unmanned aerial systems observe for potential enemy activity based on the reporting of events that occurred several months before. Intelligence shops must use reports from other collection platforms to develop and update their target decks on a daily basis. Commanders should not allow
their S2 officers to request intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage for the same area day after day without significant justification.

In addition, collection managers and unmanned aerial systems leaders must work together to determine how to simplify intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance target decks to minimize busy-work for brigade and battalion S2s, decrease lead-time for aerial systems coverage requests, and establish priorities that reward units employing the systems effectively. Unmanned aerial systems operators typically do not require all the information and details contained in most target decks. An operator needs to have a standard mission statement, and that mission will be more effective with a refined intelligence report, which can easily be derived from unit summaries, and important special instructions (e.g. “avoid audible detection”).

Collection managers and unmanned aerial systems leaders must also make a concerted effort to simplify the request process to decrease the time it takes for battalion S2s to submit new target decks. The goal should be intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requests submitted 24 hours before their use and finalized, not including retasks, 12 hours beforehand. Although this will give unmanned aerial units less time to plan their missions, they will receive more accurate and current intelligence. Likewise, collection managers at the corps, division, and brigade level should give full-motion video coverage priority first to units requesting support for ground operations and then to units attempting to confirm or deny information from other sources or collect imagery for upcoming missions.

The third technique units can adopt immediately is to educate platoon and brigade level staff and leaders on the capabilities and limitations of unmanned aerial system platforms and seek feedback on their operations. The Commander of 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, has noted that Soldiers must understand the importance of all weapons systems on the battlefield to improve performance in combined arms combat.6 For Soldiers and leaders to adequately understand unmanned aerial systems capabilities, training must go beyond stale “how to use unmanned aerial systems” briefings. Consistent feedback from the leadership on the unit’s ability to plan coverage and communicate with operators is necessary to fully understand unmanned aerial system capabilities.

Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, emphasizes the link between intelligence collection and ground operations: “Because intelligence and operations are so closely related, it is important for collectors to be linked directly to the analysts and operators they support.”7 Unmanned aerial systems leaders must coordinate directly with intelligence sections and ground commanders, work with intelligence shops to improve target decks and provide better information to aerial system operators, and coordinate with ground commanders and tactical operations centers during the planning and execution of missions. Before every mission in which unmanned aerial systems directly support ground troops, they should talk directly with the ground commander to coordinate the final details: When is standoff required? What areas, objects, or activities should the unmanned aerial systems identify before troops arrive?

After the mission, unmanned aerial systems leaders should elicit the ground commander’s feedback on coverage: When was the unmanned aerial system audible? Did the ground unit directly observe the system feed or did they receive radio reports on it from the system operators or the tactical operations center? Leaders should also tell the supported unit how well they communicate with aerial system operators and suggest how to improve communication for future missions. Adequate feedback requires direct communication between aerial system leaders and the supported unit. It will not suffice to have the supported unit fill out a form or submit an online questionnaire. Coordinating directly with the ground commander immediately before and after a mission only takes a few minutes and is beneficial to both aerial system operators and the troops on the ground.

Intelligence shops must use reports from other collection platforms to develop and update their target decks on a daily basis.
Missions Done Well

In certain cases, divisions and echelons below divisions are already implementing these recommendations. Divisions and brigades employ the Shadow aerial system’s imagery collection and retransmission capabilities in support of Soldiers conducting signal and human intelligence-driven raids. When my unit conducted such raids in theater, the brigade and supported battalion provided operators access to the latest intelligence packets to ensure they understood the scheme of maneuver for troops on the ground. During human intelligence missions, for example, the operators knew the target house, which routes troops would use to approach the target house, and when standoff was required. During signal intelligence missions, aerial system operators knew the target’s general area and received near real-time updates on target activities.

Brigade collection managers and battle captains also implemented measures allowing subordinate units to direct and retask unmanned aerial systems quickly. The brigade collection management team helped identify the most likely areas where ground assault forces would act. The collection manager then ensured that the systems supported imagery collection requests in areas within 20 minutes flight time to the assault force in the event of a retask. Tasking the systems to collect imagery near the assault force’s area of operations allowed communications retransmission support between the brigade tactical operations center and ground troops as soon as a raid began.

Successful unmanned aerial systems support to offensive raids also required systems leaders to coordinate with ground units and battalions before, during, and after the mission. Our unmanned aerial systems platoon and collection management trained the supported battalions on how the Shadow and other assets could best support offensive raid missions. Battalions knew how to optimize key Shadow laser pointer and communications retransmission technologies and keep operators informed of the current situation without violating operations security. The unmanned aerial systems platoon also sought feedback from supported ground commanders and the brigade and battalion. This enabled operators to understand better how their performance helped the troops and how they could improve their tactics for future missions.

The successful use of the Shadow while conducting offensive operations suggests some Army units have already implemented the recommendations I discussed above. However, we can do more. Divisions and brigades must work with subordinate units to find offensive missions that benefit from unmanned aerial system coverage, and we must remember that these systems perform missions that do not directly support troops on the ground. Units require intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to confirm or deny enemy actions, collect recent imagery for upcoming missions, and survey areas not adequately covered by ground troops. To optimize the use of imagery collection assets during such missions, Army intelligence and aerial system sections must continually update target decks, shorten system-planning time, and provide continuous feedback to units receiving the coverage.

Recommendations

The Army must focus on the research and development of future unmanned aerial systems even as it implements immediate changes to improve the effectiveness of systems already in theater. This is particularly important because the recent economic downturn and likely reduction in the defense budget will compel the Army and the Air Force to transfer manned aviation missions to more economical unmanned assets. During a recent Military Officers Association of America symposium, General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted that a short-term solution will be to increase emphasis on equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles. The Department of Defense will probably find great benefit in improving the capabilities and increasing the production of aerial signal-intelligence platforms, air attack platforms, and communications retransmission platforms.
In Iraq, our aerial signals-intelligence platforms were generally well employed and never at a loss for a mission. Every asset had a target list that was rarely exhausted. A shortage of aerial coverage meant that ground units only received support if they could send ground forces to apprehend an identified target. Having additional platforms would allow units to further develop a target’s pattern of life before attempting to apprehend him, thus allowing the unit to narrow a target’s potential hiding locations. Furthermore, including signals intelligence payloads on more unmanned aerial systems with imagery collection capabilities will give the units the ability to observe the terrain of a tactical area of interest and help identify dynamic targets.9

The Air Force and Army should also research the possibilities of adding signals intelligence payloads to other unmanned aerial systems not currently used in that capacity. If each brigade combat team, for example, had one Shadow equipped with a signals intelligence package, then it could conduct signal intelligence raids with organic assets. Equipping Shadow vehicles with a signals intelligence payload is not an easy task; it requires adjusting the airframe to allow it to carry a larger payload while emitting a smaller audible signature. However, if the Army can overcome such hurdles, brigade combat teams will significantly improve their lethal targeting capabilities.

Another long-term objective of the Army and the Air Force should be to continue research and development of new unmanned, weaponized systems. The Predator, Sky Warrior, and certain versions of the Hunter can already carry a weapons payload to support by direct fire in the place of manned attack aviation elements like the Air Force’s A-10 Thunderbolt II or the Army’s AH-64 Apache. One advantage of weaponized unmanned aerial systems is their ability to conduct relatively silent reconnaissance but still act in a support-by-fire role when necessary. This ability already plays a vital role in U.S. Army operations in Afghanistan. Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan, has credited Predator strikes in Waziristan for disrupting insurgent border crossings at the Pakistan border.10

Given the success of unmanned aerial systems already equipped with aircraft, the Air Force and the Army should research ways to install weapons on smaller unmanned aerial systems, such as the Shadow or the Hunter, without removing their imagery payloads.

Installing weapons on unmanned aerial systems will benefit troops on the ground. This does not negate one of the key advantages of manned attack aviation—the fact that it is easier for ground troops to communicate directly with pilots conducting close air support missions than it is for them to communicate with unmanned aerial system operators. In January 2009, Colonel Daniel Ball, chief of G3 aviation, U.S. Army Forces Command, led a panel of Army aviation commanders in a discussion of the commander’s perspective of Army aviation in the field. All of the panelists at this conference agreed that there is no substitute for the direct interaction of ground forces and air crews during a reconnaissance mission.11 Such person-to-person communication does not have to be limited to ground troops communicating with manned aviation crews. The Predator unmanned aerial system, for example, has the ability to perform aerial retransmission, although only when Joint tactical air controllers talk directly to Predator operators to deliver munitions. Some Shadow and Hunter systems have aerial communications retransmission packages that allow troops to communicate directly with system operators or use the systems as a retransmission platform.

In addition to creating direct communication between the ground troops and the unmanned aerial system operators, retransmission packages can also significantly improve the communications range between two ground units operating in different areas. The Army has done a good job of equipping most Shadow systems in theater with a communications relay package that can act as an aerial retransmission site for units up to 200 kilometers apart. However, the Army must work to expand the Shadow retransmission capability so that all Shadow and Hunter systems have it. The Army should also work with Shadow and Hunter contractors to improve the capabilities of the current retransmission package, in particular, to transmit secure communications on both frequency-hop and single-channel frequencies. Thus far, this technology has only been able to transmit securely on single-channel frequencies.
Increasing the size of the U.S. military’s unmanned aerial arsenal will take time, and even when complete, it will yield benefits only if Army planners at the division and brigade levels make a concerted effort to optimally employ each system.

Efforts to Optimize Use

Regardless of how the Army and the Air Force appropriate funds for future unmanned aerial systems development, both services will benefit from efforts to optimize use of the systems currently in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of operations. Nine months after his speech at Maxwell Air Base, Secretary Gates was still promoting the increased production of unmanned aerial systems. In an article for Foreign Affairs, Gates stated that DOD must determine when “it makes sense to employ lower-cost, lower-tech aircraft that can be employed in large quantities and used by U.S. partners.” At the strategic level of war, this emphasis is extremely beneficial; the transition from manned aircraft to unmanned aircraft will reduce human casualties and budget requirements.

However, at the operational and tactical levels of war, commanders must also emphasize the need to improve the use of unmanned aerial systems already in theater. Increasing the size of the U.S. military’s unmanned aerial arsenal will take time, and even when complete, it will yield benefits only if Army planners at the division and brigade levels make a concerted effort to optimally employ each system. If Secretary of Defense Gates and his combatant commanders do not compel their subordinate commanders to lead such an effort, then endeavors to increase production of unmanned aerial systems could prove futile. MR

NOTES

4. This was from the Department’s Comments to the GAO recommendations in GAO 07-836 (Appendix II to GAO 07-836) and from a 16 March 2008 phone conversation with Matthew Ullengren of the GAO.
9. The assertions in this paragraph were based on extensive discussion with CPT Shawn Lonergan, the 2d SCR SIGINT OIC during 2d SCR’s deployment to Iraq from August 2007 to November 2008.
11. Hames.
A Primer on Developing Measures of Effectiveness

Major Shon McCormick, U.S. Army

To understand the operational level of war, students must appreciate the newest Joint doctrine. At the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an important doctrinal concept is elements of operational design. As an instructor at the college, I have observed that “measures of effectiveness” are a difficult aspect of operational design for students to understand. Because my own knowledge of the concept was lacking, I conducted some research on the topic by scanning existing Joint doctrine and asking around the school. My only success came from individuals at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center, who provided a NATO manual on best practices for assessing command and control systems. This manual is informative about measures of effectiveness, albeit not in the context of operational design, and it is too technical and specialized for most staff officers.

The dearth of knowledge surrounding measures of effectiveness extends beyond the college student population. This conclusion is not meant to disparage anyone or any institution but to highlight the general lack of understanding surrounding the concept of measures of effectiveness. This article reflects my efforts to describe a practical but rigorous method to develop measures of effectiveness that a nonspecialist can employ. The article will cover—

● Examining the utility of metrics in general.
● Analyzing how current Joint doctrine portrays measures of effectiveness as part of the elements of operational design.
● Exploring how fields outside the military deal with concepts like measures of effectiveness.
● Mining those other fields for insights to help bridge some of the gaps in current military doctrine.
● Providing observations on the implications of my findings on the emerging Army doctrine of design and related concepts.

Metrics

Why should we care about measures of effectiveness? The answer is that current Joint doctrine says so. However, this is a circular argument, and the question warrants a better answer. Pragmatic military leaders should care about measures of effectiveness if for no other reason than that the American people’s representatives in Congress care about them. The requirements to brief Congress on progress in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples. An article by Patrick Cronin notes that congressional members from both parties have indicated that continued support for efforts in Iraq is contingent on “credible evidence of tangible military progress.”

In addition, a series of recent U.S. Joint Forces Command studies reinforce the utility of assessment tools such as measures of effectiveness. Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices cites the use of assessment measures as “an important best practice whose need is reinforced time and time again in operational headquarters.” The study makes measures of effectiveness especially important in today’s complex operating environment, which challenges planners’ abilities to predict the outcome of their plans accurately.

Current Doctrine

One logical place to begin is by surveying existing doctrine for some guidance on how to develop measures of effectiveness. The authoritative doctrinal references for measures of effectiveness are Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and its companion manual, JP 3-0, Joint Operations. These two manuals combine both measures of effectiveness and measures of performance under the general title of Assessment Measures and direct staffs to develop assessment measures during mission analysis. Other than that, Joint doctrine provides no insight on the actual mechanics of developing suitable measures of effectiveness.

In the absence of doctrinal guidance, research beyond military publications becomes necessary. In that regard, I will explore three fields:

● The basic tenets of social science research methodology. This field has long dealt with the very issues that the design element of measures of effectiveness tries to address.

● Policy and program evaluation, which covers the same ideas as measures of effectiveness in the arena of domestic public policy.

● Emerging Army doctrine on campaign design and how these emerging concepts deal with the challenge of assessment.

Social Science

First, an explanation of social science as opposed to physical science is in order. In simple terms, social science involves the behavior of people. One attribute of the study of social science is the inability to conduct research in controlled experimental environments; we cannot conduct social research in an environment where we can control all influences. Both practical and ethical considerations prevent us from experimenting on human groups the same way as on lab rats. As a result, when we do social science, we accept that a certain amount of error, both random and systematic, is inevitable.

Although current doctrine often conflates causation and correlation, social science treats the concepts very differently. Correlation means that two events tend to occur together with some frequency. The classic example is that of a rooster crowing at dawn. One can observe that almost every time the sun comes up, a rooster crows. The two events display a high degree of correlation. However, correlation does not equal causation. Falsely attributing causation is the post hoc fallacy. Based on our simply observing the sun and the rooster, we cannot determine whether the rooster’s crowing causes the sun to rise, the sun’s rising causes the rooster to crow, or even if the two events have any causal relationship. How
to determine the degree of causation between two correlated activities is the essence of science. Since both physical and social science have been wrestling with causation for a long time, an accepted body of knowledge has emerged. While the body of knowledge is vast, a few key points are relevant here:

- Correlation does not equal causation.
- One can only determine causation by employing a hypothesis.
- One can never absolutely determine causation; one can only reduce uncertainty.

**Hypothesis**

A hypothesis is simply a proposed causal relationship between two activities that lends itself to testing. For example, the concept of the “surge” in Iraq was essentially a two-step hypothesis that tested whether increasing the number of coalition troops in Baghdad would reduce insurgent violence, and whether this reduction in violence would lead to reconciliation between Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite political factions. We can never be certain that an increase in troop strength truly led to a reduction in violence. Instead, we can only reduce our uncertainty by applying a number of techniques to determine if other causal factors are at play. The actual procedures to do this are beyond the scope of this article.

A hypothesis is necessary to test for causation, so the next challenge is to develop the hypothesis. Our doctrine is vague in this regard, but science offers three alternatives: employ a hypothesis developed by someone else for similar circumstances, develop your own, or employ a combination of the two previous approaches. The simplest way to find existing hypotheses is to consult the existing body of knowledge on the topic of interest. To determine the link between security force presence and insurgent violence, a good place to start would be studying research done by others on that same topic. However, no two situations are exactly alike. Even the most similar circumstances can have important omitted factors. Should we arm the Afghan tribesman with the same weapons we gave the Awakenings Council in Iraq? Will what worked in Iraq work in Afghanistan, given the two nations’ very different histories and levels of development?

If there is no suitable existing hypothesis, then one has to create a hypothesis from original research. In simple terms, creating a hypothesis requires one to speculate on a causal relationship between two activities or variables. The source of this casual relationship can simply be a hunch or some other form of insight. After an initial hypothesis, the researcher must then test it against suitable cases from history. This is difficult because no two cases from history are completely alike or have the same casual factors. The goal of the researcher is
to determine which factors across several cases are general and which are specific to one case. Regardless of the source of the hypothesis, the next step is to employ the hypothesis to predict future events. In simple terms, if an idea seemed to work in the past, it may work in relatively similar circumstances in the future. In light of the already established caveat that the past is not a perfect predictor for the future, our hypothesis at best provides an educated guess on some unknown outcome. Since we must accept that our hypothesis has some degree of error, our task is to determine when our hypothesis has failed, or is false. Unfortunately, we may already have our plan in execution before we can reach any conclusion on our hypothesis. This is where measures of effectiveness become important.

To better explore the role of measures of effectiveness in testing hypotheses, we turn away from social science and enter the field of program evaluation. A quick internet search of the term “program evaluation” reveals a broad discipline with a large body of research. Nonmilitary agencies have been dealing with ways to assess the effectiveness of various programs in a formal way since the mid-1940s. Recent programs like “No Child Left Behind” or even President Obama’s stimulus package are simply efforts to influence some system in a desirable way.

**Programs**

Before exploring the field of program evaluation, a few definitions are in order:

- A program is a “set of resources directed toward one or more common goals,” or a hypothesis that “if followed, then the expected results will follow.”

- An input is simply that which goes into the program.

- An output is the “products, goods, and services” that come out of the program and are then provided to the intended recipients.

- Finally, the outcome is a “change or benefit resulting from the outputs.”

The definition of the elements of program evaluation is similar to the military doctrinal terms of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. A measure of output is analogous to a measure of performance and a measure of outcome is analogous to a measure of effectiveness. In light of this similarity, measures of outcomes from program theory should prove useful in helping explain measures of effectiveness from military doctrine.

“Logic models,” or “modeling” are concepts that are central to the field of program evaluation. They clarify the relationship between a program’s inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Implicit in a logic model is its program theory, the causal hypothesis that links the model’s elements. Program theories predict outcomes in the development of the program and determine causal relationships between inputs and outcomes after program implementation.

Comparing outcomes requires some measurement of those outcomes. Operationalization is the process of creating metrics for inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Some outcomes lend themselves to measurement more easily than others. Examples of easily quantifiable outcomes are financial costs or casualties.

**Measuring Problematic Variables**

However, not all outcomes are so easily measurable. Examples of more problematic variables related to the military are outcomes such as security or democracy. In the case of these more abstract concepts, the researcher must employ indicators or proxies. While seemingly straightforward, the selection of indicators is complex. For example, how does one measure democracy? The difficulty in developing valid measures for more abstract outcomes often requires reviewing the existing research literature and consulting experts and practitioners within the field of interest.

A return to social science methodology is useful at this point. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba advise researchers to determine as many “observable implications” of their hypothesis as possible in order to create more cases for testing the hypothesis. Their thought is that more testing of more implications will more likely reveal any problems with the proposed indicators.

**Inputs, outputs, and outcomes.** Once the program is in execution, a comparison of inputs, outputs, and outcomes informs the program manager of the validity of the underlying program logic. If this program logic is flawed, then the manager must reexamine and perhaps refine the model. At this point, the military staff seeking to employ program logic theory would need someone trained...
in statistical analysis to determine which of the elements is flawed. Two common methods are randomized experiments and quasi-experimentation. The basic difference between the two methods involves the degree of control the analyst maintains over the environment. The actual mechanics of conducting randomized experiments or quasi-experimentation are beyond the scope of this article.

A military example of measures of effectiveness development is in order. Given ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the military’s emerging focus on stability operations, this example will focus on the challenge of establishing security in a post-conflict environment.

The setting for this example is a planning staff responsible for conducting a stability operation in a post-conflict environment. This operational environment has an unacceptably high degree of violence, which threatens the ability of the fragile host nation government to establish authority. The problem facing the planning staff is to strengthen the capacity of the host nation government to effectively control its own territory. (Notice that the problem is not to simply reduce violence. To define the problem as reducing violence is to assume there is a causal relationship between a reduction in violence and increased host nation governance capacity.) For this example, assume that the staff has reducing violence as the objective, i.e., the outcome sought. The next challenge for the staff is to determine what resources are available and how to employ them to achieve the desired outcome. This step requires adopting a program theory that proposes a causal relationship between inputs, outputs, and outcomes.

The staff elected not to conduct its own independent research due to time constraints and therefore had to rely on existing research. One obvious source is doctrine. However, as Christopher Paparone has noted, one of the problems with doctrine is that it never cites its sources. For example, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, offers good general guidance on how to conduct the stability task of “Establish Civil Security,” but readers are unaware of which specific historical cases actually influenced this generalization. Since doctrine is insufficient, the staff must broaden its research.

The commanding general of the Afghan National Army 215th Corps and his English-speaking linguist address local leaders and U.S. Marines during a regional security meeting at Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan, 13 May 2010.
One potential source of causal hypotheses is *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. This book serves as the basis for the State Department’s “Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix,” which influenced FM 3-07. According to Scott Feil’s chapter on enhancing security capabilities, establishing security is a prerequisite for any development or reconstruction activity. Successful security efforts consist of a combination of defensive and offensive protection activities that “remove the capacity for groups and individuals to engage in illegitimate violence.” With respect to defensive measures, the general populace is one element requiring protection. With Feil’s research in mind, we hypothesize that protecting the general populace leads to a reduction in illegitimate violence. However, this hypothesis does not tell us how to secure the general populace, so we have to continue our research. In *The Quest for Viable Peace*, Ben Lovelock reports that increasing foot patrols in populated areas was a successful technique to secure the general populace in Kosovo in the 1990s.

Combining Feil’s and Lovelick’s hypotheses produces the following logic narrative: If an organization increases foot patrols (inputs), then the general populace will be more secure (output). If the general populace is more secure, then illegitimate violence should decrease (outcome).

**Elements of the program model.** Having determined program logic theory and created a logic model, the next step is to determine measures of effectiveness for the various elements of the program model. Measurement of foot patrols is relatively easy. In this case, a measure of performance derived from Army doctrine would be appropriate. Metrics could include number and duration of patrols as well as the area covered. Measurement of the outputs of population security is more challenging because “security” is more abstract. As a result, we rely on proxies or indicators. Neither Feil nor Lovelick, our sources for our program theory, provide indicators, so further research is necessary.

One work that does address indicators for security is the recent RAND Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations, which lists a number of indicators for population security, such as the number of people fleeing their homes. Measurement of the outcome of reduced illegitimate violence could involve measuring reported crimes and violent death. In this case, the analyst would be relying more on intuition than existing theory to choose the metric. However, the RAND guidebook offers some guidance on employing crime data as a metric. The guidebook offers the caveat that the most likely source of this information is police data, which only reflects reported violence. In addition, the guidebook cautions that successful reconstruction projects often serve as lucrative targets to insurgents and may actually lead to an increase in violence. The analyst wishing to measure violence accurately would have to accept diminished accuracy due to unreported acts of violence and increased violence near reconstruction projects.

Once the analyst has created an accepted program logic model and employed it, the staff will need to determine the security program’s effectiveness. The first step is to actually conduct measurements. The United States Institute for Peace offers four primary methods for collecting measurement data. These methods are—

- Content analysis of local media products.
- Consultation of a panel of experts.
- Statistical analysis.
- The use of polls and surveys.

The next step is to establish the relationship between the measurements. According to the program theory, an increase in foot patrols should ultimately lead to a decrease in reported violence, which indicates an increase in overall stability. If this chain of hypotheses does not hold true, then the analyst must reexamine the logic model. We relied upon models of past events, and there is no guarantee that our program logic is entirely valid in the current environment. Perhaps increased foot patrols served only to further alienate the populace and increase the perception of the coalition forces as occupiers. If so, the situation calls for a more appropriate program theory. Perhaps the program theory and even the logic model itself are valid, but the indicators of security are not. In this case, the analysts must develop better indicators.

For a good real-world example of the application of the principles addressed in this section, see the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s working draft of *Guidance on Evaluation Conflict and Peacebuilding Activities*. This document
is a highly readable guide for both government and nongovernment practitioners who employ program logic theory during stability and reconstruction activities. Annex 6, “Understanding and Evaluating Theories of Change,” has a tabulated summary of major theories suitable for use as program logic.21

The Future

The complexity of today’s operational environment has led to a number of initiatives to improve military planning through the concept of design. The Army has incorporated the tenets of “systemic operational design” through the publication of FM 5-0, The Operations Process.22

The language of design expressed in FM 5-0 seems remarkably similar to that of program logic theory, which has been extant since the 1940s. Both constructs accept that initial solutions may not be valid. Both focus on explicit hypotheses linking inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Methods to create measures of effectiveness under the emerging framework of design are similar to those found in this article and in the Functional Area 49 Operations Research Systems Analyst community. The Army’s systems analysts have long employed metrics in complex environments and can provide useful input into emerging planning processes. As the Army continues to discard mechanistic and deterministic planning methods associated with the defunct “effects-based approach” and incorporates tenets of design into doctrine, it should not neglect these existing bodies of knowledge.

Emerging doctrine suggests that measures of effectiveness and associated concepts of operational design are not going away. A basic understanding of measures of effectiveness and how to create them will remain a fundamental skill for commanders and their staffs as long as the Army employs the elements of design. The concept of measures of effectiveness should not intimidate us. All but a few facets of constructing measures of effectiveness are within the capabilities of a typical field grade officer. MR

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4. Ibid, 35.
10. Ibid., 9.
11. Ibid., 10-11.
17. Ibid., 42.
Persistent Security, Then Development

Captain Jonathan Pan, U.S. Army

“It may be time to focus American national efforts on a different approach—a collective approach involving all elements of national power—an approach focused on exportation of security rather than projection of military combat power. At the center of this proposal is the necessity to establish a reasonable level of security in such a way that all aspects of national power can be applied near-simultaneously...”

—General William Wallace, U.S. Army, Retired

It is the frequent experience of coalition forces in southern Afghanistan that security precedes development. Nonetheless, the debate between security and development has become akin to the chicken or the egg debate. It is time to unscramble this puzzle. Persistent security must be established before development can begin.

A field grade commander operating in Afghanistan effectively captured the gist of the issue: “They want us to Sun Tzu the enemy with everything besides committing forces, but it doesn’t work.” Evoking the name Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese general, strategist, and author of The Art of War, suggests that one does not necessarily need to fight to secure victory: “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

Insightful strategists understand that while some stratagems are timeless, others are not. Some apply to all situations; some do not. In the case of southern Afghanistan, where there are areas with substantial numbers of enemy fighters ideologically determined to return the Taliban to power, it will take far more than the promise of development projects to effect their return to civil society and their reconciliation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The following process advocates persistent security, followed by stabilization, followed by development. However, while persistent security precedes development, a good counterinsurgent plans for development and all other lines of operations throughout the process. Furthermore, development can actually improve security, but this happens only if persistent security is first established.
Persistent security is an approach introduced by retired General William Wallace to establish a “reasonable level of security in such a way that all aspects of national power can be applied near simultaneously.” Units may achieve persistent security through offensive and defensive operations during their rotations; however, once they have successfully conducted such initiative-creating operations, many do not follow-up with timely stability operations to retain the initiative. Therefore, the next unit arrives and, before conducting stability operations, it has to reestablish a security environment that has already been purchased, quite literally, with blood, sweat, and tears. Persistent security is the sufficient condition for stability operations and, in turn, stability operations are required to sustain persistent security.

For example, abandoned or ruined schools litter the landscape of southern Afghanistan. There is the often-told example of the provincial reconstruction team that confidently builds a village school. During the celebratory ribbon cutting ceremony, the provincial reconstruction team commander, the battle-space commander, and a handful of Afghan officials are all smiling for public relations pictures. That very night the Taliban slips into town, deposits a few well-placed night letters, and, sure enough, on the next day no teachers or students are present at the school. A few sheets of A4 European letter-size paper effectively undermined and embarrassed the provincial reconstruction team, the military unit, and the GIRoA in one fell swoop. The lesson of the story is simple, inescapable, and fundamental: persistent security must be present at the moment development begins. The corollary, of course, is that one must have planned development activities (i.e., have shaped the environment) so that they can be executed as soon as persistent security is established.

Stabilization versus Development

There are significant differences between stabilization and development. According to the Department of Defense, stability operations “help establish order that advances United States interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore Afghan National Army and International Security Assistance Forces rest during an early morning dismounted patrol supporting Operation Mostarak, Badula Quelp, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 19 February 2010.
essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.”

Development can be measured by the increase in quality of life for the average citizen. There are multiple spheres of development. Governance, healthcare, education, gender equality, infrastructure, economics, human rights, and the environment are common examples. All of those elements of development are necessary for a self-sustaining Afghanistan, but few, if any, are achieved without the precursor of stability.

In many military circles, stability operations are an uncomfortable topic. Part of this discomfort is due to the lack of formalized stability operations training available to units in predeployment. Given the difficulties most military units have in executing them, some even claim that stability operations are not a military task. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense is the only instrument of national power with a responsive and substantial stabilization budget in the form of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), whose funding in Fiscal Year 2010 amounted to $1.2 billion. In southern Afghanistan, senior decision makers have realized the necessity of a “CERP machine” due to the paucity of spending: only $37 million has been committed for execution as of late May 2010. However, blind spending and haphazard projects have to be avoided. The military lacks the expertise necessary for stabilization, to include its Civil Affairs Corps, which has been torn apart by frequent deployments and inadequate training. Many civil affairs companies coming into southern Afghanistan report that they have never received training on how to administer CERP. The answer to these difficulties is to tap into civilian expertise resident in the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A framework common to both civilians as well as the military must be established and used for such unified, synchronous efforts to occur.

A complementary method to achieve civil-military synergy is to assign a senior civilian representative to the brigade combat team. My unit was fortunate to have a State Department foreign service officer assigned through the first two-thirds of our deployment. The officer had two roles. He

The current attempt to achieve this unity is the “tactical conflict assessment and planning framework” (TCAPF). USAID recently created this framework, and in the past few years, the Army has made the TCAPF part of its doctrine, as confirmed by its inclusion in Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations. The TCAPF conceptual model identifies three main factors that foster instability:

- Grievances (frustrated people).
- Key actors with means and motivations (Taliban).
- Windows of opportunity (presidential elections).

The underlying notion is simple: achieve stability by removing the sources of instability.

While the intellectual concept of the framework is solid, two prerequisites for successful practical application are predeployment training and total battalion and brigade staff buy-in.

One problem with TCAPF is that its trainers advocate that units adopt it as their only targeting methodology, in lieu of the other doctrinal targeting and planning processes (e.g., the Military Decision Making Process and the “decide, detect, deliver, and assess” process). After adopting and operationalizing TCAPF in Afghanistan, my battalion commander, a former corps-level targeting officer, described it as “an incredible assessment tool, but no substitute for our traditional targeting methodology.” Another problem is that TCAPF lures staffs to focus in on one source of instability at a time, when the truth on the ground is that there are many sources of instability at the local level, and they must be targeted simultaneously. Finally, tactical units may not have the capability to target the source of instability. A State Department official once quipped to me that the “local” source of instability across all of southern Afghanistan is Quetta, Pakistan.

A complementary method to achieve civil-military synergy is to assign a senior civilian representative to the brigade combat team. My unit was fortunate to have a State Department foreign service officer assigned through the first two-thirds of our deployment. The officer had two roles. He
Served as the brigade’s traditional political advisor, accompanying the brigade commander to key leader engagements and meetings with our NATO and GIRoA partners. Even more critical was his role as the integrator of the nonmilitary instruments of national power into brigade plans and operations. The senior civilian representative regularly tapped into his rolodex of contacts to bring agricultural, rule of law, governance, and other experts into the discussion to solve complex problem sets. Senior civilian representatives at the brigade level seem to be a waning trend in southern Afghanistan. After serving 14 months in Afghanistan, our senior representative returned to the United States. He was replaced briefly by another foreign service officer, who was quickly reassigned to another province, leaving the brigade without a senior representative for our final four months in combat. It does not appear that any of the four U.S. brigades deploying to Regional Command South this summer will be assigned senior civilian representatives.

Some development organizations believe that providing the local population with schools, hospitals, and money will generally lead to better security as well. If one follows that line of thought, it is certainly conceivable that development could occur side by side with offensive and defensive operations. After all, those are security-achieving activities. However, many experts disagree with that argument. Amitai Etzioni, a leading American intellectual, thinks the argument that “development is essential for security and hence must precede it, is erroneous because without basic security, development cannot take place.”

I will argue the following sequence of events:

● First, the unit conducts offensive and defensive operations to regain the initiative and establish persistent security.
● Second, the unit conducts stability operations to maintain the initiative and sustain persistent security.
● Third, when persistent security is sustainable, development starts.

We must not neglect development experts while we execute offensive and defensive operations. In fact, planning for all phases of this framework (or shaping and clearing the environment) must occur throughout the whole sequence so that development can “hit the ground running” once persistent security is established. Regrettably, there are numerous cases in southern Afghanistan where persistent security...
was established but development was never realized, all because adequate planning did not occur or scarce development resources were wasted in areas that did not have the level of persistent security needed to allow success.

Regaining the Initiative

The commander of the 5th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), Colonel Harry D. Tunnell, deliberately entered areas that previous coalition force units had avoided. Consequently, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in select districts of Kandahar Province (for example, Spin Boldak and Maiwand) have just finished their first continuous year with coalition force presence. Therefore, judging these operations as a continuation of a series of operations that has stretched for years would be short-sighted. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates seemed to agree as he considered Afghanistan to have had two wars. The first war was in 2001, and the coalition prevailed. The second war started in late 2005, and its outcome is still very much in doubt. According to Mr. Gates, “the United States really has gotten its head into this conflict in Afghanistan, as far as I’m concerned, only in the last year.”

The fact that some units in southern Afghanistan are entering new territory makes it difficult to fully comply with the International Security Assistance Force commander’s COIN guidance. As he has stated, “Strive to focus 95 percent of our energy on the 95 percent of the population that deserves and needs our support.” The best way to accomplish his guidance is to live among the population in combat outposts, making daily access to the population possible. This reasonable notion is complicated by the fact that limited engineer resources in southern Afghanistan cannot keep pace with the demand for many new combat outposts. These outposts are in accordance with the International Security Assistance Force COIN operations guidance.

These facts should sound a note of caution to those who wish to promote development in areas that do not have persistent security. For instance, a primary area needing development in Kandahar is the Arghandab River Valley. As important as this area is to Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), coalition forces, and insurgent forces, the problem remains that parts of the Arghandab are still being contested, and persistent security has yet to be established.

Despite remarkable kinetic efforts on the part of coalition forces, those with a little knowledge of the area’s history will not be surprised to know that the issue is still in doubt. According to an article in Small Wars Journal, “Armies from at least three countries have ventured into the Arghandab River Valley: British, followed by Soviets, and more recently Canadians; all were unsuccessful.” At present, the first successful unit to contest and hold the Arghandab was the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, which entered the valley in August 2009. In what some might consider a counterintuitive operational move, the 2d Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, replaced them in December 2009 instead of augmenting them. An often-heard argument supporting the presence of more than one battalion was expressed by Carl Forsberg:

> The regiment’s experience in Arghandab has demonstrated that a battalion-sized unit is insufficient to reverse the Taliban’s entrenched control over the strategically critical Arghandab District in the time available.

In the event that the whole district tips decisively toward ANSF, coalition forces, and the national government, stability operations can start and development can follow. Having the tactical and political patience to establish persistent security leads to a more stable and enduring peace, and ultimately a self-sustaining secure environment.

The only way to gain the initiative in areas with limited prior coalition forces and government presence is to conduct offensive and defensive operations. Yet, COIN has become so indoctrinated that such operations are highly scrutinized. A series of geographically and temporally disconnected successful COIN anecdotes—building a retaining wall in one village turned the whole village...
Building retaining walls and drinking cups of tea can only do so much.

to the coalition or drinking three cups of tea with a fence-sitting tribal leader turned his tribe to the coalition—has some senior decision makers convinced that combat should be avoided at all costs. Recent suicidal attacks on Afghanistan’s largest bases demonstrate that there are still ideologically driven men who are willing to fight to the death. Building retaining walls and drinking cups of tea can only do so much.

Offensive and defensive operations should not be constrained or needlessly pressured by a timetable, but should proceed with shaping, clearing, holding, and building activities across the security, governance, and development lines of operations. All these ambitious COIN activities must be done with the GIRoA and ANSF leading the coalition of international civil-military organizations as often as possible.

Maintaining the Initiative

Stability operations should start by enhancing traditional systems that worked. For example, instead of entering the temptingly easy but actually murky business of “well digging” and “karez-cleaning” (karezes are ancient underground irrigation systems), units should find and engage the village or community mirah bashi (water master) to see what has traditionally worked, and start from there. Kai Wegerich, a development researcher, writes—

There is a danger that externally funded projects, involving either construction of intakes or maintenance work, might weaken collective action within the canal communities or increase already existing inequity in maintenance work requirements...It is recommended that prior to rehabilitation of intakes the communities agree on the future sharing of water and of maintenance tasks. These agreements should be presented to the irrigation departments, which then would have the responsibility to enforce them.

In areas where water is an issue, grievances usually arise due to water management and distribution issues rather than lack of wells or clogged karezes. Digging more wells lowers the water table and does not always alleviate the grievance. In some cases, there are legitimate reasons to dig a well or clean a karez. Whatever the case may be, units tend to find that addressing most grievance-related issues through the traditional tribal mechanisms of shuras and jirgas will provide solutions:

The shura and jirga are both traditional Afghan conflict resolution and community decision-making bodies. The main difference between the two, according to scholars, is that a shura meets in response to a specific need, especially during wartime, whereas a jirga is more egalitarian and meets on a consistent basis—which is why the jirga has become a national political structure, whereas the shura has not.

These decision making bodies need to be engaged prior to most, but not all, activities. These engagement processes take time, but sometimes the “by, with, and through” concept can be taken to the extreme as time is running out. Nevertheless, if a community is vested in a particular activity or project, there is a significantly higher chance that they will protect it.

For example, a survey conducted by Human Rights Watch found that schools built by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s National Solidarity Program were less likely than other schools to be targets of Taliban vandalism and destruction. Because such mobilized communities elect their own community development councils to identify, plan, manage, build, and monitor these schools, they tend to survive better. The dynamic demonstrates the “sweat equity” concept rather than the utility of the highly regarded program, which has been silent and absent for the last year in Kandahar province. Furthermore, some experts caution that these councils may be good for attracting and administering donor contributions of funding and projects, but they are “not necessarily] equipped to resolve inter- or intra-community disputes.” Others take criticism of the program a step further and assert it does not work at all in southern Afghanistan due to poor security and widespread corruption. Ultimately, upcoming district council elections will negate the necessity for an artificially created system existing side by side with
a constitutionally established system: the district council. Despite these upcoming changes, both the shura and jirga system remain viable processes for dealing with internal community and local issues. Meanwhile, project management and administration would be better placed in the hands of the elected district councils, which will be the face of Afghan governance. Using shuras, jirgas, and, ideally, district councils (district elections were not held in the last elections), local communities will provide their own “sweat equity” and district officials will put their names on the line, which makes it more likely they will defend their projects with their lives. This is the definition of maintaining the initiative. The combination of ANSF and coalition forces security and local community investment sustains security until more civilian-led, sophisticated, and ambitious development activities and projects enter the scene.

Development

Development should only begin when persistent security is established and the area stabilized. In September 2009, the district development jirga of Arghandab District, just northwest of Kandahar City, consisted of about 10 to 12 village elders. Identifying the elders’ village on a map led to the discovery that all the elders came from the very eastern edge of the district. Coalition leaders informed the district leader that there could be no development until there was a truly representative jirga with representatives coming from across the district. The district leader acknowledged the lack of representation, but in the absence of district-wide security, he could not muster the requisite representative shura. However, after only two months of ANSF and NATO clearance operations, a level of persistent security resulted in more elders attending the shura. At the beginning of November 2009, over 50 elders showed up when the provincial governor visited the district. This increased participation is a metric to measure persistent security and indicated that the time was right for development.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states, “Military forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as the civilian agencies with people trained in those skills. Further, military forces performing civilian tasks are not performing military tasks.” However, with persistent security obtained in the Arghandab District, other instruments of national power, such as USAID, could safely and consistently bring to the area their multi-million dollar programs and projects. For example,
the Afghanistan Voucher for Increased Productive Agriculture Plus Program, which has a budget of $240 million, was introduced into the Arghandab River Valley. This program is widely considered by many in the military, including select commanders of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand as well as select stabilization officers of Task Force Stryker in Kandahar, to be the top-performing USAID program.

With a sizable budget, quick and flexible funding, and proactive staff, the program provides—

- Immediate cash for work programs to decrease unemployment.
- Small grants for farming cooperatives giving them the equipment, saplings, seed, and fertilizer they need.
- Agricultural voucher programs to “wean” farmers from poppy production.
- Training to improve agricultural output through simple techniques and knowledge previously unknown to local farmers.

In Kandahar alone, as of late May 2010, 40,555 fighting-age males have been hired, 57,046 vouchers redeemed, 82 small grants signed or disbursed, and 28,079 farmers trained.

Success along either or both the security and development line of operations is not enough. Governance plays an equally important role. Andrew Wilder, a research director at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, writes,

In an ethnically and tribally divided society like Afghanistan, aid can easily generate jealousy and ill will by inadvertently helping to consolidate the power of some tribes or factions at the expense of others—often pushing rival groups into the arms of the Taliban.16

Development activities in the absence of good governance can actually lead to situational deterioration.

In the Arghandab District, this lesson was heeded and additional effort went to establishing good governance. The results have been rewarding. For example, at first, the Alokozai tribe questioned their leaders’ support of the government and coalition forces. Arghandab has a population estimated at 115,000 and the Alokozai tribe makes up 60 percent of that. In terms of wealth and power, the Alokozais had once been one of the big four tribes of southern Afghanistan, the Popalzai, the Barakzai, the Mohammadzai (a subtribe of the Barakzai), being the others. However, since the 2001 invasion, the Alokozai tribe began to lose its significance. President Karzai belongs to the Popalzai tribe, and Gul Agha Sherzai, former Governor of Kandahar, belongs to the Barakzai tribe. The provincial governor and the Kandahar City mayor are Mohammadzai. These tribes gain tremendous wealth and power from coalition force contracts while the other tribes see little benefit. Consequently, while establishing persistent security, coalition forces shared many cups of tea with the Alokozai tribal leaders. After achieving adequate security and starting development, the Alokozai leaders began making decisions on the what and where of development projects for their people. The emphasis on the governance lines of the operations permitted the successful establishment of the conditions necessary for this previously affected tribe to reenter the governance dialogue. The three lines of the operation are security, governance, and development.

Synchronization of effort is the solution to many of the challenges of development. Without thoughtful movement along all three main lines of operations, development can disrupt stability and jeopardize persistent security. In the recent history of Afghanistan, both civilian and military entities have failed at stability and development. Perhaps the most glaring example of military failure is indiscriminate distribution of humanitarian assistance, which should be distributed for humanitarian reasons, period. Very often, well-intentioned units think that humanitarian assistance is primarily a means for winning the population’s “hearts and minds,” and distribute it without reference to the population’s actual need. An anonymous writer in the Small Wars Journal wrote, “Hearts and Minds is a wonderful name for a teen romance novel, but I’ve always thought it to be a poor name for a counterinsurgency concept.”17 During a regional governor’s conference in August 2009, a provincial governor requested that coalition forces stop distributing humanitarian assistance, because it was creating an image of him as a government official who could not provide for his constituents.

An example of a civilian-led effort gone amiss involves a provincial reconstruction team that decided to distribute humanitarian assistance in 2008 during Eid-Akhter (breaking the fast) in observance
of zakat, which calls for charity to poor and needy Muslims. The team wanted to distribute humanitarian assistance to the 200 poorest families in the city. What started as a worthy and noble effort turned out to be anything but. All of the humanitarian assistance ended up in the hands of the town’s local powerbroker who distributed the items to his powerbase, not those with the greatest need. Sometimes even the best attempts to win over hearts and minds can fail.

**The Way Forward**

There is a clear, logical sequence of events that units should execute in the shape-clear-hold-build-transition continuum. The first step—shape and clear—is to conduct offensive and defensive operations to gain or regain the initiative and establish persistent security. The second step—hold and build—is to conduct stability operations to maintain the initiative and maintain persistent security. The third and final step—transition—is to support properly planned and executed civilian-led developmental efforts leading to self-sustaining, transferable security.

Proper planning must occur throughout the process so that once persistent security is established, the initiatives of governance and development are not lost. Long-term development combined with Afghan-led security is the key to transitioning the war to the Afghans. Once persistent security is established, development must occur alongside governance for efforts to be sustainable. *MR*

**NOTES**

1. See www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html.
IN LATE MARCH 2009, Iraqi Security Forces arrested Adel Mashadani, a popular Sunni Sons of Iraq leader, in the Al Fadil area of east Baghdad. While U.S. forces had anticipated this action, they did not know how the people of Al Fadil would react to the arrest. The brigade combat team (BCT) worried that the locals would see Mashadani as a popular Sunni leader arrested at the direction of the Shi’a prime minister, Nuri Al Maliki. If so, the potential for violence was strong. U.S. forces had worked tirelessly over the past year to stop sectarian violence in the area, an effort that culminated in an Iftar celebration during which Sunni and Shi’a neighbors broke the Ramadan fast together. Now the concern was that the local Sunnis would turn against the U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces working in the area, causing a setback to the U.S. goal of reconciliation in Baghdad.

Commanders from the brigade to the cavalry troop level recognized they needed a better understanding of the people’s views of the arrest. How the people reacted would ultimately determine the brigade’s course of action. For the previous two months, a human terrain analyst from the BCT’s human terrain team had worked with the cavalry troop during routine patrols in the Al Fadil neighborhood. Two days after Mashadani’s arrest, the commander took the team member out again to assess reactions to the event. By talking to Iraqis throughout the Al Fadil neighborhood, she learned that, instead of contemplating a popular uprising against the Government of Iraq, most were glad to see Mashadani arrested and were impressed with the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces because of the professionalism they exhibited in limiting collateral damage.

Once the BCT understood the attitudes of the people on the ground in Al Fadil, it immediately began working with the Government of Iraq to bring in humanitarian assistance and medical services. Remaining Sons of Iraq turned themselves in and Iraqi Security Forces disarmed them with few incidents. By talking to regular Iraqis on the street, the human terrain team played a critical role in helping the brigade understand the operating environment and
execute a course of action to strengthen support for the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces.

Army counterinsurgency operations doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, stresses that successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on understanding the local society and culture in the area of operations. Soldiers and Marines must understand the—

- Organization of key groups in the society.
- Relationships and tensions among groups.
- Ideologies and narratives that resonate with groups.
- Values of groups (including tribes), their interests, and motivations.
- Means by which groups (including tribes) communicate.
- Society’s leadership system.¹

Collectively, these factors define the human terrain in the operating environment. Undoubtedly, as many Soldiers and Marines have completed successive tours they have developed a basic understanding of Iraqi, Arab, and Muslim culture. However, the cultural education that units receive prior to deployment is not sufficient to provide the depth of understanding required to properly know the human terrain in the area to which they are about to deploy. In addition, the human terrain is a dynamic element that is constantly changing and moving. Even if Soldiers returned to the same area where they worked in a previous tour, the human terrain would be different due to such factors as refugee movements, sectarian cleansing, and other socioeconomic stresses. Units must conduct in-depth studies on the people in their particular area and constantly update them. In fact, FM 3-24 states that successful COIN operations require Soldiers and Marines at every echelon to possess the following:

- A clear appreciation of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict.
- An understanding of the motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgents.
- Knowledge of the other roles of other actors in the area of operations.

Without this understanding of the environment, intelligence cannot be understood and properly applied.²

Clearly, comprehension of the human terrain is as important as understanding the insurgent threat.

The BCT has a variety of resources to use to comprehend the human terrain. These assets include attached civil affairs teams and the tactical psychological operations detachment. Both of these elements directly engage the people on a continual basis. However, both focus on developing projects or influencing the population rather than understanding the people.

In 2004, military commanders defined a requirement to capture information on local social and cultural factors so that incoming units would not have to relearn these factors every time a unit rotation began. Shortly afterwards, unit commanders found a need to have sociocultural experts at the BCT level. Thus, in 2006, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began developing a capability to provide social science research at this level. This was the beginning of the Human Terrain System as a proof of concept project. In 2007, the first human terrain team deployed to Afghanistan, and was followed soon by teams going to Iraq.³ The Human Terrain System rapidly expanded to provide support to most BCTs and U.S. Marine Corps regimental combat teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, the Human Terrain System developed human terrain analysis teams for divisions and a corps-level team for Multinational Corps-Iraq. The Human Terrain System continues to field human terrain teams and human terrain analysis teams in both theaters to provide relevant sociocultural knowledge to the commands.

Human terrain teams at the BCT level are the key element of the Human Terrain System. With an academically qualified social scientist on board, the human terrain team provides relevant social science research capabilities to the BCT commander, his staff, and subordinate commanders. The team provides a capability previously unavailable at this level of command. While higher echelon units have had cultural advisors, BCTs have had to create this capability out of hide. However, as FM 3-24 notes, “Many important decisions are not made by Generals.”⁴ At BCT and lower levels of command, Soldiers regularly engage with local citizens in all venues. As both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, the actions of small units, junior leaders, and Soldiers can have strategic implications. While no one would debate that senior commanders must understand the key leaders of the population in their
area of operations, Soldiers on the ground must understand the populace. The human terrain team is a key element in allowing these Soldiers to gain the required sociocultural knowledge.

The Human Terrain System is not without controversy. In academia, the American Anthropological Association has raised ethical concerns about putting anthropologists into the field to work for the U.S. military. The primary concern is that the social science research will be used to conduct lethal targeting of individuals. Even in military circles, the need and effectiveness of the system is controversial; one example is the article “A View from inside the Surge” by Lieutenant Colonel James C. Crider in the March-April 2009 Military Review, which debated the teams’ effectiveness.

This debate centers on who is best suited and most effective at providing research. Despite the debate, most BCT commanders have a human terrain team as an additional enabling element in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article follows the employment of one human terrain team working in eastern Baghdad in support of 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division (4/10) and subsequently, 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division (3/82). I was the team leader for Human Terrain Team IZ5 from September 2008 through June 2009, so I can describe how the team contributed to the counterinsurgency fight in a very complex, diverse, and difficult area of Baghdad. Indeed, the human terrain team enabled BCT and subordinate battalion- and company-level commanders to gain a clearer picture of the human terrain. As a result, they could factor the dynamic of the local populace into military decision making. Without this embedded social science research capability, commanders would have had a more difficult time understanding the people.

Background

The human terrain team has five to nine personnel assigned to it. It is a mix of military and Department of Army civilians. A typical human terrain team consists of four elements:

- Team leader—bridge between the command and the civilians on the team. Typically, this is an active duty field grade officer or a retired officer.
- Social scientist (one or two per team)—develops the research plan and research design to answer unit information requirements. Social scientists have either a Ph.D. or a master’s degree in a relevant field such as anthropology or political science.
- Human terrain analysts—execute the social scientist’s research design. Most fall into one of two categories: naturalized U.S. citizens that came from Middle-Eastern countries or persons with special skills such as advanced degrees in Middle-Eastern studies or military intelligence analyst skills.
- Research manager—catalogs the team’s research and disseminates it to appropriate sections of the BCT staff, subordinate commands, and the Human Terrain System project.

The team’s task is to conduct operationally relevant social science research, allowing commanders to make astute sociocultural decisions. The team provides a unique social science research capability that includes collection methods such as informant interviews and polling. The Human Terrain System also provides longer-term research capabilities in “research reachback centers” and the “social science research and analysis” function, which conduct quantitative and qualitative research to support the collection efforts of the teams. The human terrain team does not replace civil affairs or psychological operations units’ products or skills, but complements their missions and allows the commander to understand the effects of operations on the local populace. In fact, Human Terrain Team IZ5 colocated with both civil affairs and psychological operations staff in the BCT headquarters and worked closely with these staff sections and the supporting civil affairs company.

The initial area in which we operated consisted of three political districts within Baghdad: Rusafa, Karada, and 9 Nissan. Although the geographical area was relatively small, the human terrain in these districts was unusually diverse and complex. The operating environment was predominantly Shi’a...
with strong connections and influences from neighboring Sadr City. Still, the Shi’a population was not politically homogenous. In the more middle-class areas, streets were adorned with election posters of Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Closer to Sadr City the posters were of the Sadr family, including Muqtada Al Sadr. Shi’a connections also ran to the southern parts of the country since tribes from the southern marshes moved north to Baghdad decades ago. They retained their culture (and in extreme cases their traditional ways of life and their water buffalo) as well as tribal connections with families remaining in the south. Additionally, there were concentrations of Sunni Arabs in the western parts of the area, close to the Tigris River. There was also a small but significant Christian population and an isolated Palestinian community.

Most of the region was urban, with rural areas on its southern, northern, and eastern edges. The previous regime and the current Government of Iraq neglected 9 Nissan. Essential services in much of that area, especially electricity and water, were severely lacking during this period. The northeastern neighborhood of 9 Nissan contained the Baghdad city garbage dump, which was nothing more than an open landfill. Many destitute poor lived in the garbage dump, building their homes from the refuse. During this period, 9 Nissan was riddled with corruption, making local governance ineffective.

Also part of IZ5’s area of operations was a region called Zafaraniyah. The Karada political district contained the Zafaraniyah area, which was in the southern part of the district. Like 9 Nissan, Zafaraniyah was neglected by the government and had a lower socioeconomic base.

**Initial Research Design**

The two areas comprised 13 total neighborhoods or *hayys*. The neglect of the Government of Iraq and limited coalition force involvement outside of lethal operations led to a power vacuum filled by sectarian (mostly Shi’a) militias and local criminals. The BCT deputy commander said these areas would fall apart if the BCT pulled out, and tasked IZ5 to figure out why that was the case and what could be done about it. (There was little knowledge of the human terrain in these areas).

The human terrain team provides the unit with a unique capability, but that capability only adds value when the team answers operationally relevant
questions. The key is that the research must be operationally relevant. While general in nature, the guidance must be clear enough to allow the team to construct a sound research design.

For IZ5, the general guidance for 9 Nissan and Zafaraniyah led to the next step in the process, the development of the research plan. The team leader, working with the two social scientists, developed a two-phase plan to answer the brigade’s questions. The team realized that the research project would be time-intensive because of the complex terrain and the dearth of knowledge about it. The team also knew that these areas were non-permissive due to a high level of enemy actions. This limited freedom of movement during the initial months of research.

Phase I of the plan involved developing a baseline of information through interviews of coalition personnel with operational experience. In addition to the maneuver units, Team IZ5 interviewed transition teams, civil affairs teams, and PSYOP teams that understood key problem areas and then compiled all the information into a database. This served two purposes. First, it established a knowledge baseline, what the BCT collectively knew (or in the words of one of the social scientists, what they thought they knew) and second, it identified gaps in information. Filling in these gaps would be phase II.

While building the baseline in phase I, the team members spread out into the affected areas to interview units operating there. Starting with battalion commanders and staffs, the team members worked to collect reports and conduct interviews. The next step was interviews at the company level and of the Soldiers who walked the streets daily. The team analyzed the compiled information to see what gaps existed. This activity produced written reports on each hayy with added questions that guided future research for phase II. Phase I took about five weeks to complete. The team then submitted their research reports to those who had been interviewed to check their accuracy. These reports focused BCT discussions on the way ahead.

**Decentralized Operations**

To collect the information for phase II of the plan, team members went out two at a time or individually and spent four to six weeks at the company level immersing themselves in operations. Embedding down at this level and living and working out of the combat outposts or joint security stations permitted direct access to Iraqis from numerous positions. This decentralized approach for collecting information was different from human terrain systems training. The training stressed keeping the team altogether so that the individual skills and talents of each team member could contribute to the massed effort.

Because of the general nature of the brigade’s information requirement and the relative lack of information across a wide area, the team leader determined that the decentralized approach was necessary to allow broader coverage and to collect as much detailed information as possible. One team moved to the Zafaraniyah (southern Karada) Government Center. This site was beneficial because it was a hub of activity for Iraqis, private citizens, Iraqi security forces, and government officials who appeared there on a daily basis. During this time the rest of Team IZ5 focused on 9 Nissan, moving around the resident company’s battle spaces to collect data.

The decentralized approach was novel. Concentrating the team in one area theoretically allowed the combined skills to create a synergy for maximum benefit. The social scientist closely supervised the research conducted by the human terrain analysts and then tied everything together. Keeping all team members together did allow the team to focus and get a good depth of understanding, but concentrating the team proved to be impractical in light of the mission. Decentralized operations allowed the team to spread out across the area and gain a better understanding of the districts faster than if the entire team had focused on one neighborhood at a time. Decentralized employment also reduced the burden on companies providing the team’s life support. It was much easier to provide living space, work areas, transportation, and security for one or two team members than to provide for five or six.

After I arrived as the team leader in September 2008, I maintained the decentralized employment of the team. Even after phase II was completed, team members remained working with their respective battalions. The teams were able to maintain important personal relationships they had fostered with key local leaders, a requirement for the teams as they prepared for the upcoming BCT relief in place/transfer of authority.
Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority

Human terrain team rotations are purposely scheduled to not coincide with the relief in place so that team members on the ground can help new units understand the human terrain in their areas. The team maintains the human terrain database on separate systems so that information collected year after year is not lost as units transfer and depart.

Human Terrain Team IZ5 supported the BCT relief in place in two phases. First, to prepare for 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division’s arrival, I wanted to update and complete a human terrain assessment of the entire area of operations. This entailed expanding the team into the Rusafa political district. There was no history of human terrain team collection in this area. Since the team was focused on 9 Nissan and Zafaraniyah, working in Rusafa would have overstretched the team’s capabilities. However, with the research plan mostly complete in those areas, I managed to dedicate a single human terrain analyst to work with the outgoing unit in Rusafa. The work that she completed would become very important a few months later when the Iraqi Security Forces arrested Adel Mashadani.

Another key task in phase I was to update our reports on 9 Nissan and Zafaraniyah. One of the team’s social scientists interviewed other team members to update conditions since the previous spring and summer. The team also built social network charts to show links. This was our first attempt to build a operating environment network diagram showing how key leaders connected to each other through religious, tribal, family, political, and social connections.

Passing information to the incoming BCT entailed two key steps. The first step was linking up with BCT leadership at the Multinational Corps-Iraq Counterinsurgency Academy at Taji Airbase. As the team leader, I spent five days with the BCT commander, his leaders, and key staff members. I provided copies of our recent reports to all commanders so that they could understand the human terrain within their respective areas. I further provided an information and capabilities briefing. Since the BCT had worked with a team during their predeployment exercises, they were familiar with the human terrain team concept. I was able to provide the commanders with actual products to show not only what we could do but also how we did it.

The second step was maintaining the team’s decentralized employment in 9 Nissan, Zafaraniyah, and Rusafa. The team received the new battalions only when they entered these sectors to complete the relief in place. Essentially, the human terrain analysts became human terrain advisors to the battalion commanders; I fulfilled the same role at the BCT headquarters. We introduced the commanders to the key Iraqi leaders. As operations in the area shifted to mostly nonlethal ones, key leader engagements were very important to the incoming unit. Our team provided valuable introductions for many key leaders. Team members worked with the battalions throughout the next few months.

Operations for 82d Airborne

Significant changes in operating conditions quickly followed. These included the implementation of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement, provincial council elections, major religious events, several BCT and battalion boundary realignments, and the movement of U.S. forces out of Baghdad. Because each change affected the Iraqi people, the team played a major role in BCT operations. This relationship dictated a shift in how the team worked. With changing conditions in the operating environment, the team began to conduct research on more specific issues.

Under 4/10, Team IZ5 worked for the effects coordinator and participated in all effects cell meetings. Then the command relationship changed. The human terrain team became a special staff section of the BCT and a full participant in BCT military decision making and targeting. Integration into the BCT’s targeting cycle was critical to provide support. While receiving specific tasks in the commander’s guidance, I also had to determine the implied tasks we needed to accomplish, and then allocate resources to answer the information requirements. Often, this involved the team looking into more than one neighborhood or area at a time. As a special staff section, the team had to answer specific BCT information requirements, which dictated a more centralized approach. Because most of the information requirements involved gathering
information from across the entire area of operations, the team continued to operate with one or two team members in each battalion area. However, their research priorities shifted to answering BCT questions first.

Team IZ5 became involved with support to key leader engagements. Working with the S9 and S7 (information operations) officers, the team conducted key leader assessments before the commander or his deputy met with these leaders. We identified the social networks in which the key leaders circulated and their connections to other political, religious, tribal, and business leaders. Building these networks was an ongoing process. The team worked closely with battalion fire support officers who coordinated many of the battalion-level key leader engagements. The team also provided information gathered from its own sources to the battalions so they could double check it. Realizing that information from local Iraqis might be tainted, the team wanted to make sure that its findings were similar to what the battalions were seeing in their areas. Working back and forth with the battalions, IZ5 was able to build comprehensive social network charts.

The team also maintained the BCT’s biographical cards (commonly called baseball cards) on the key leaders. These one-page documents provided the commander and his staff with relevant background information on individuals. The team worked with the battalions to update this information. Frequently, battalion commanders had met with the key leader before anyone from the BCT had, and they possessed the latest information on these individuals. These short biographies became an important part in building the key leader preparation packets.

Team IZ5 conducted many of these engagements in conjunction with other elements of the BCT, including the civil affairs company, battalions, and transition teams. One goal during these meetings was to gain an understanding of how key leaders felt about certain issues of importance such as the elections, what they meant for Iraqis in the area, how they viewed the security agreement, and how the local people felt about its impact on their lives.
Social networks, biographical cards, and engagement reports were all included in the commander’s preparation packet along with any relevant S2 information regarding connections to persons of interest. Even with the centralized collection plan in place, the team still worked closely with battalions and companies, because they were the best avenues for team members to use to get out and talk with the Iraqi people.

The team had no outside resources and was dependent on other elements for life support, transportation, and security. Thus, team members decided it was important to provide value to these lower echelon commands. This resulted in closer cooperation with lower echelon commanders. Prior to going out on a mission, we asked what information they needed. In Rusafa, a troop commander submitted a list of information requirements through his squadron leaders. These questions were valuable in letting us know what the command needed to know so we could focus our efforts accordingly. We included information requirements from all echelons of command in our research design.

Team members used many different methods to collect the information. They engaged people on the street or in teahouses while accompanying U.S. patrols and attended district and neighborhood council meetings. Because we relied on the supported element for security and transportation, we coordinated every meeting with the unit. The decentralized employment with a centralized collection method proved effective.

**Key Points**

In East Baghdad, Team IZ5 provided valuable understanding to two successive BCT commanders. As military operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, human terrain teams will continue to support the BCT by providing an excellent social science research capability. Following are some key points that will help enable effective use of human terrain teams.

**Clear objectives.** Commanders must provide a clear objective or information requirement that enables the human terrain team to focus its efforts. This does not necessarily mean a restricted focus.

The two brigades used Team IZ5 in different but equally effective ways. The initial guidance from 4/10 to IZ5 to gain an understanding of 9 Nissan and Zafaraniyah was clear enough for the team to design research that answered the BCT’s question. Under 3/82, the guidance tended to be more specific, such as assessing how people viewed the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. In both cases, the team was able to conduct its research effectively. Clear guidance ensured operationally relevant research. Both BCTs viewed IZ5 as a valuable contributor to the brigade combat team fight. Clear guidance made the difference.

**Conditions of the operating environment.** Conditions of the operating environment dictate how to employ the human terrain team on the ground. The choice between breadth or depth of coverage is critical. The conditions in our area and our research objectives allowed the team to operate in a decentralized fashion. The nature of what we were looking at was broad in terms of geographical space, so working across the operating environment allowed us to see a larger picture. However, certain missions required a consolidated effort. One such mission was a deputy commander specified task to interview persons attending a BCT-sponsored community soccer tournament. With soccer teams and people from all areas arriving for the tournament, the entire team came together to collect data.

Team research tends to be time-intensive. The time available to answer BCT questions also plays a role in determining how to deploy the team. Finally, the team’s effectiveness in answering BCT information requirements is proportionate to the access it has to the local people. In other words, the team accomplishes little of value sitting in the BCT headquarters. No matter how high the level of their expertise, team members need to conduct...
extensive fieldwork. The academic background of the team’s social scientist may give him some initial credibility, but no classroom education can take the place of being on the ground talking to the people. The human terrain team and the BCT staff should look at all resources that enable the team to talk to people.

Team IZ5 used many different venues to talk with people, including—
- Accompanying BCT, battalion, and company leaders to local council meetings.
- Patrolling with platoons and transition teams.
- Working with the civil affairs and psychological operations assets.
- Participating in engagements at the forward operating base.
- Embedding at the company level.

Embedding at the company level proved to be IZ5’s most effective and lasting means to gain access. Clearly, the company mission, threat environment, and time available determine the extent to which the team members have access to the people. By whatever means, the team needs to be on the ground talking to locals.

**The Future**

The Human Terrain System will continue to deploy human terrain teams to BCTs for the foreseeable future. A team can provide the commander with a unique research capability that will allow a greater understanding of the vital human terrain in the BCT’s operating environment.

Supporting two separate BCTs in East Baghdad, Team IZ5 provided this capability and allowed both commands to understand the people and factor their importance into military operations.

If it has guidance on research priorities and access to the people, the human terrain team can be a valuable asset to the BCT in the ongoing operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. *MR*

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**NOTES**

2. Ibid, 1-23.
5. See <www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/Human-Terrain-System-Statement.cfm>.
7. During my term as team leader, Team IZ5 had between five to nine personnel, with one team leader, one research manager, one or two social scientists, and three to five human terrain analysts. Personnel turbulence was a constant issue, with close to 100 percent turnover of members during my time as team leader.
8. Research design is the development of tasks on how the team will collect data and develop products to answer the BCT information requirements. It is more specific than a research plan, which provides a general focus on what the team will do.
9. Practically speaking, most Human Terrain Team deployments now are as individual replacements, not entire teams. A typical rotation for a team member is nine months. During my time as team leader, I experienced an almost 100 percent turnover, so in addition to training new units on the operating environment, I had to continuously educate team members. However, during the BCT relief in place, most of my team had been in the operating environment for several months.
ADVERSARIES THREATENING OUR national security in the modern era will be hostile states, violent extremists, and even criminal syndicates. What fundamental principles should guide our security policies in meeting these threats in the cyberelectromagnetic dimension of global conflict? What strategic logic of deterrence, defense, and attack should guide the military doctrines of advanced industrialized nations like the United States and its allies? Would such logic be similar to that of warfare in general, or is it counterintuitive in some important ways? The purpose of this article is to explore possible answers to these kinds of questions by engaging in an excavation of the conditions in which vital information infrastructures of modern industrial states are at stake.

Relevant Factors
The principle issues are these:
- Determining who would want to attack critical information infrastructures and why.
- How such adversaries would attack “by Internet.”
- How a state could deter such attacks.
- How a state should defend against and defeat such attacks.
- Whether offense by Internet is a viable way to change an undesirable status quo.

More questions requiring answers rise from thinking about these concerns. Causing a temporary disruption of a nation’s critical cyber nervous system to provide an advantage in other dimensions of conflict is one thing, to leverage that disruption alone into anything more than a punitive act is quite another. From such dubious aspirations, it follows that creating offensive formations of “cybersquadrons” and “cyberfleets” to control the cyberdomain or the “global commons” of cyberspace will not be the greatest concern. For the wired community of advanced industrial states, enacting the more mundane yet challenging recommendations of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission will be more important.

Techno-capable
outcast nations, extremist political movements, and criminal syndicates stand to benefit more from current conditions. Therefore, the way military thinkers approach doctrine relevant to the potential for Internet warfare must change. The Internet is a global commons to which the “cyberspace” metaphor is useful from the standpoint of political and legal approaches to sharing its utility with global allies. From the perspective of denying its benefits to adversaries, the cyberspace metaphor gets in the way of clear thinking.

Cyberspace as a “Domain”

William Gibson, the cyberpunk science fiction author, originally coined the term cyberspace (from cybernetics and space) in 1982. This now ubiquitous term has become the conventional way to describe anything associated with computers, information technology, the Internet, and the diverse Internet culture. In the 1980s, the term cyberspace started to become a de facto synonym for the Internet. During the 1990s, it was the same for the World Wide Web. Author Bruce Sterling, who popularized this meaning, credits John Perry Barlow as the originator who referred to “the present-day nexus of computer and telecommunications networks.”

The term cyber is rooted in a forerunner to current information theory and computer science—the science of cybernetics and Norbert Wiener’s pioneering work in electronic communication and control science.

Cyber is used metaphorically to refer to objects and identities that exist largely within the communication network itself, so that a website, for example, might be said to “exist in cyberspace.” According to this metaphor, events taking place on the Internet are not therefore happening in the countries where the participants or the servers are physically located, but “in cyberspace.” This is understandable because the Internet and computer and communications systems permits people to be at any location while communicating with other entities or people that are “connected” at another location somewhere else in the world. People can be made to believe they are having a virtual interactive experience within cyberspace regardless of their real geographic location. They can exchange ideas and otherwise act within cyberspace. This metaphor suggests new ways of thinking about computer-mediated communications.

First, it describes the flow of digital data through the network of interconnected computers as not real since one cannot spatially locate it or feel it as a tangible object. However, such communication clearly has real effects. The “space” in cyberspace does not have the physical duality of positive and negative volume. Internet users cannot enter the screen and explore the unknown part of the Net as an extension of the space they are in. Metaphorically, the spatial meaning in the term is analogous to the relationship between different pages of books inhabiting the web servers, considering the unturned pages to be somewhere “out there.”

The concept of cyberspace, therefore, refers not to the content presented to the web surfer, but rather to the possibility of surfing among different sites, with feedback loops between the user and the rest of the system creating the potential to always encounter something unknown or unexpected.

Second, the cyberspace metaphor posits an alternative virtual world where online relationships and alternative forms of online identity exist. Before cyberspace became a technological possibility, many philosophers suggested the possibility of a virtual reality similar to cyberspace. Common descriptions of cyberspace contrast it with the “real world.” Some people think of cyberspace as a culturally significant social destination in its own right, one in which they can be whoever or whatever they want to be.

Finally, this metaphor also suggests that cyberspace provides new opportunities to reshape society and culture through hidden identities and borderless communication and culture. Although the more radical consequences of the global communication network predicted by some cyberspace proponents (i.e. the diminishing of state influence envisioned by John Perry Barlow) have failed so to far materialize, their possibility remains current.
By the mid-1980s, use of computers, the Internet, and popular culture began to inspire a new generation of military strategists around the world to think about cyberspace and cyberwar. By the mid-1990s, thinkers in militaries everywhere were looking through the lens of warfare among advanced states, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They saw modern nation-states becoming as dependent on information infrastructures as the most advanced 20th-century states were on industrial and transportation infrastructures. The broadcast media of an enemy state came to be viewed as a worthy target of disruption and manipulation. It was tempting to think of analogies to airpower theories. For example, by 1993, two scientists of the Rand Corporation, John J. Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, wrote an influential article titled “Cyber War Is Coming,” published in Comparative Strategy. They, and many others, contend that the information revolution has transformed both international relations and warfare.

Since then, the cyberdomain metaphor, first championed by the U.S. Air Force, has not only entered military thought but also has established a firm foothold. For example, the Defense Department’s “The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations” defines cyberspace as a “domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.” On 2 November 2006, the secretary of the Air Force announced the establishment of the Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional). In a 28 February 2007 posting on the official web site of the U.S. Air Force, the new commander commented on his understanding of Cyber Command’s mission and approach. He said, “First, we must control the domain,” then he stated that his command would conduct offensive operations in cyberspace in much the same way as its adversaries.

On the one hand, the term cyberspace suggests boundlessness. The modern system of
communications may seem boundless to the uninitiated, but it is not. The Internet can be mapped and understood. While there may be many pathways for a packet of information to travel a modern network, the number is finite, and bounded by the existing physical structure. Operations in a “space” suggests a space apart and invites reasoning by analogy to air or naval operations in which the chief aim is controlling or dominating a domain. The translucent qualities of the space in such domains lead to certain kinds of tactics and modes of operating that do not translate well to the labyrinthine and opaque world of modern computer-mediated networks. For instance, in the translucent air, naval, and outer space domains, advances in sensors and high-speed missiles enabled mutual deterrence, boosted the power of defenses, and, in relative terms, challenged the power of offenses when adversaries were roughly on par in capabilities. Gaining a physical position of advantage was mostly a matter of maneuvering in a true commons by means of speed, stealth, and power.

While cyberspace can be similarly understood to be a kind of global commons, the things that make it appear so are owned by private persons, corporations, institutions, or governments. Much of it is physically located in the sovereign territory of states and actually has very little in common with other traditional domains of war. These and many other unique properties of vital cybernetworks transform some crucial aspects of the logical workings of deterrence, defense, and offense in this dimension.

American cybersecurity experts beyond the military play down the metaphorical sense of a space or domain. Instead, they replace that sense by scientifically sounding descriptive language. The term “cyberelectromagnetic” combines “cybernetics,” the root of modern information and computer science and “electromagnetics,” the root of modern electronic communications and all so-called information technologies. The more recent Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency similarly downplays the virtual space or domain metaphor and simply defines cyberspace as “all forms of networked, digital activities.”

War in the Cybernetic Age

There are more useful ways for military experts to think about this modern warfare phenomenon. For instance, in February 1999, two Chinese officers, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, framed the problem of conflict, or warfare, in the modern world differently:

In terms of beyond-limits warfare, there is no longer any distinction between what is or is not the battlefield. Spaces in nature including the ground, the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but social spaces such as the military, politics, economics, culture, and the psyche are also battlefields. And the technological space linking these two great spaces is even more so the battlefield over which all antagonists spare no effort in contending. Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military, or it can be non-military. It can use violence, or it can be nonviolent. It can be a confrontation between professional soldiers, or one between newly emerging forces consisting primarily of ordinary people or experts. These characteristics of beyond-limits war are the watersheds between it and traditional warfare, as well as the starting line for new types of warfare.

These Chinese authors see “the technological space as an integrative “space” that is “technological” in nature but linked to actions in other “spaces.” They stress the centrality of conflict and that modern warfare is no longer restricted to “traditional” spaces or dimensions.

The nervous systems of modern nations. Our economy and national security are fully dependent upon information technology and infrastructure, the “nervous system” of the critical functional sectors of the nation. These critical functional sectors are productive today because we lead the world in the adoption of information technologies, just as we led the world in developing the industries and their supporting circulatory system during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This nervous system is a vital national interest and is comprised of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables, the software that makes it work, and the data and services stored within and provided by this system. At the core of it is the Internet, that
today connects millions of other computer networks making most of the nation’s essential services and infrastructures work.

America’s enemies (hostile states, violent extremists, and criminal syndicates) can invade this nervous system anytime to conduct espionage on our government, university research centers, and private companies. They may map it to identify key targets for later attack and lace its computers with back doors and other means of access. In wartime or crisis, adversaries may disrupt key economic functions and critical operations, cause loss of revenue and intellectual property, or loss of life, and even threaten the continuity of government. Ensuring the speed, efficiency, and integrity of the interconnected cyberelectromagnetic nervous system of modern industrial nations ought to be the aim of military doctrine and the foundation for its logic rather than controlling cyberspace.

Both cyberspace and the “cyberelectromagnetic dimension” are merely conceptual formulations rather than physical realities. Neither exists except in our minds. The important question is which is the more useful conception?

Air and naval campaigns can be autonomous from land campaigns, linked only at the level of the overall war. This was a useful way to think about warfare in the 20th century. However, this way of thinking has diminished as the interdependence of the services has increased. Contests within one dimension could affect all other dimensions and are thus inseparable from the operation as a whole.

The macro logic of warfare by Internet. Offense and defense have a reciprocal but asymmetric logic. Offenses have the privilege of specializing, and defenses are often forced to generalize. Offensive operations are uniquely defined by their purposes. The end of an offensive campaign is to somehow change the existing status quo a particular way. For instance, a cybernetic act of terror has to carry a strong message. A regime about to be overthrown by force can attack the cybernetic infrastructures of its aggressors to save itself. Offensive warfare by Internet must adapt offensive warfare theory, in general, to the peculiarities of the Internet and to the nature and aims of the parties in conflict.

The purpose and logic of cyberdeterrence. Military capability-in-being deters others from committing acts of war. The mere existence of such capabilities can guarantee a status quo, freeing the state from coercion by the violent threats of others. Deterring an act of war is based on understanding certain fundamentals:

- Deterrence is perceptual. An image must count as a judgment of deterrence. In other words, deterrence is wholly psychological.
- The audience must appreciate the deterrent value of the image.
- Implications must exceed the audience’s threshold of acceptable cost in light of anticipated gain.
- One must appreciate that some people, in some circumstances, simply cannot be deterred. Some attitudes (e.g., otherworldly teleological aims) confound the usual logic of deterrence.

In every case, a deterrent has to be tailored specifically to those people who are most likely to decide whether to act or not. It is best to err on the side of too much rather than not enough, because there is no scientific way of knowing what deterrence value the audience will assign. Nor can one predict the price an adversary may be willing to pay in this complex and veiled transaction. The art is to know how to project the right image so that it is properly appreciated and sufficiently appropriate.

If this is the general law of deterrence, how does cyberdeterrence work? How does one project the right image of cybercapabilities so that it is properly appreciated by decision makers contemplating acts of war and sufficient to deter such acts?

First, we need to make explicit what is unstated in the general law: the “act of war” we wish to deter. For cyberdeterrence to work, the parties to what is already a “complex and veiled transaction” under the very best circumstances, must at least be clear what acts count as “acts of war.” So, what cybernetic acts count as war, and how do we convince potential adversary decision makers that they count? If we have not reacted sharply to certain kinds of acts up to now, how do we now convince them that we will? Where do we draw the line between criminal acts, whether they are committed by private individuals...

...some people, in some circumstances, simply cannot be deterred.
(for monetary or political gain) or by agents of a state (for economic or political gain), and true acts of war? The best policy may be to treat most of the cybernetic activities committed by the agents of states as crimes, rather than acts of war. That is, we should treat all hostile cybernetic activity by private persons, whether by criminals or terrorists, that way. For one thing, it is a way to control the escalatory process. It also promotes a law-and-order approach to bad behavior. Expanding the efficiency of apprehending, convicting, and punishing criminals will deter the agents of states as well. Having an agent exposed is bad public diplomacy.

However, if a state cyberattack crippled critical services in another state, which then influenced the attacked leaders to yield to the attacker’s will, that would be “using force to advance hostile ends,” and it would be widely accepted as an “act of war.” There would be little quibbling over whether the force used was physical or cybernetic. Acts that produce widespread damage and suffering are violent acts of force. Hostile state decision makers would then understand what is considered an act of war. This would fulfill the first requirement for a functioning system of deterrence—that the parties understand what effects are likely to trigger a counterstrike.

The second requirement is that those contemplating cybernetic acts of war must fear reprisal. For reprisals to be feared, cybercounterstrikes need to be sufficiently drastic: they need to be acts of war themselves. For a reprisal of that scale to be credible, it is essential to assign unequivocal blame in a relatively short span of time. It is difficult to deter an aggressor who believes he can remain hidden. No rational state decision maker will respond with an act of war without a high degree of certainty about the source of attack.

Any actual attack on American or allied networks can use unsuspecting civilian computer networks, assembled into “botnets,” as intermediary surrogates, making it appear they came from an innocent third state. There are now many ways to mask an attack. For example, the 2007 attacks on Estonian networks were widely attributed to Russia, as were the August 2008 attacks on Georgian networks, yet there was no way to “prove” these theories. The attacks on Estonia appeared to come directly from computers in Europe, China, the United States, and elsewhere. A counterstrike against the attacking computers would have damaged innocent networks in many countries without affecting those responsible for the attack.
During the more recent Georgian–Russian conflict, anyone who wanted to participate in these attacks was invited to download certain pages from public web sites that could cause the volunteer cybersoldier’s browser to launch thousands of targeted queries to the most important Georgian sites, overloading them. Mobilizing such proxy swarms masks forensic attempts to identify the real source of attacks.\(^6\)

For reprisal to be feared, not only must its strength and power be feared, but cyberforensics must be able to attribute blame quickly. Without this, fear is not rational.

Another requirement for a system of cyberdeterrence to function properly and reliably is that cybercounterstrikes must not only be effective acts of war but also must be sufficiently precise to do more good than harm. In other words, they must control the collateral damage they may cause. When American political authorities choose to respond in kind to a cyberstrike, they will be concerned about collateral damage. Powerful and feared cybercounterstrikes will need to be precise and controllable to deter reliably, because a counterstrike that inflicts harm to friends and allies is just not credible.

These concerns represent difficult challenges indeed. However, cyberdeterrence need not be based on similar cybercounterstrikes. Assuming blame can be attributed quickly, counterstrikes could be any other feared, effective, and precise act of war. This means that the only real impediment to a credible system of cyberdeterrence against other states is being able to attribute blame quickly and reliably.

Cyberdeterrence may work in an unconventional way as well. As much as both sides in World War II anticipated the use of gas warfare, its use was mutually deterred in practice. Neither side would unilaterally give it up, but neither side would chance initiating its use because the clouds of gas could drift over their own troops and gas droplets contaminating the ground was a great hazard to subsequent friendly maneuver. In other words, beyond-first-order effects were considered unpredictable. These weapons became more trouble than they were worth.

Suppose nation-states come to realize that controlling the collateral damage from cyberstrikes is so problematic and so feared that even the launching state incurs unacceptable penalties, especially if cyberstrikes are not very effective in achieving political aims as recent attacks on Estonia and Georgia seem to have been. Rather than intimidating Estonians and Georgians, they seem to have stirred them up instead. If anything, these efforts spurred the development of cybersecurity, raising the bar for the next round of cyberattacks. This fundamental logic of deterrence also applies to nonstate actors up to a certain point—potential counteractions must be feared, effective, and precise. However, threatening to commit cybernetic acts of war against nonstate actors is a very tricky business:

- There is the challenge of finding targets to attack that might add up to an “act of war.”
- There is the problem of precision and containing collateral damage.
- The act may violate the sovereign space of another nation-state.
- There is the problem of deterring people who do not fear reprisal.

What would it take to deter Al Qaeda from committing a cybernetic act of war against the Western country of its choice, assuming it could? A sound system to deter cybercriminals and cyberterrorists is possible in theory, but very demanding. It would more likely not be based on cyberstrikes. As a foundation for this system of deterrence, the fear of apprehension, conviction, and punishment must be much higher than they now are. Nation-states will need to cooperate with each other far more than they currently do.

...threatening to commit cybernetic acts of war against nonstate actors is a very tricky business.
States are at a disadvantage and will have more difficulty using cyberstriking capability to deter other states and terrorists than the terrorists themselves, especially when the terrorists have no cybernetic infrastructure at risk and care less about the precision of deterring strikes. This ragged asymmetry should be of great concern.

In summary, cyberdeterrence appears a complex matter, and a reliable system of cyberdeterrence based either on assured retribution or swift and sure legal action is still some distance off. For potential counteractions to be feared, effective, and precise, states first need to make clear what kinds of actions will merit counter actions. Identifying and communicating what are potential acts of war should not be that difficult. However, in the shorter-run, states may avoid substantial attacks against other states for fear of unpredictable second- and third-order effects that could harm their own interests as well. The more that states apply expertise and collective efforts against cybercrime and cyberterrorists, the more such attacks will be deterred. Even when systems of deterrence become credible to most, they will never be credible to all. Violent stateless actors, who become cybercapable, can credibly threaten states and thereby modify the states’ behavior. Even the best systems of deterrence need to be underwritten by solid defenses; solid defenses need to be underwritten by solid cybersecurity provisions and practices.

The purpose and logic of cyberdefense. 
Defenses are tested only when deterrence fails. This permits defenders to concentrate resources and strength against threats least likely to be deterred. In the near term, because of the challenge of forensics, this is not a very discriminating criterion. Any weakness in an outer layer of defense imposes additional burdens on the layers beneath it.

Defense has its own peculiar logic and economy, as aforementioned. As a general proposition in warfare, denying success to an offensive is cheaper than employing offensive aims, all other things being equal. The defender merely has to cause the attack to fail. While deterrence is wholly psychological, defense physically defeats attack or thwarts its aim. The design of cyberdefenses depends on knowing what the aim of an attacker might be and finding ways to confound such aims.

When the potential aims of attackers are many, the design of defenses becomes complicated, and when the aims are obscure, defense becomes difficult indeed. Knowing who the attacker is could help reveal possible aims. Without reconnaissance to find the line of least expectation and least resistance to discover a key vulnerability, attacks will be rare. Counter-reconnaissance coupled with reliable and quick forensics can aid the defense.

Sound practice would be to always begin with a thorough systemic self-assessment. Cyberdefense operates on this same principle. What the cyberdefender chooses to label “essential functions and decisive terrain” depends on who wants to harm the country, the aims of the potential attacker, and the scheme of the offense:

- What would yield the results this adversary would pursue?
- What are the “acts of war” that should top the list?
- What would be attractive to undeterrable adversaries?
- What are the functions most critical to prosperity, stability, and power at the national and international level under crisis conditions?
- Which of these are most enabled and controlled by cyberelectromagnetic networks?

Active defenses are always more potent than passive ones, and there is no reason to believe that it is otherwise for network defenses. Another historic military practice is to arrange defenses in depth to gain early warning, cause delay, reveal the aim, and to adjust, respond, and thwart an attack. Such defenses in depth, incorporating active and passive elements, demand coordination and unity of command.

What does depth mean in a cyberdefense, and how can early warning be obtained when attacks arrive from many directions at the speed of light? The purpose of delay in historic defenses is to provide time to reoptimize the disposition of defensive forces or set conditions for a counterstrike. Sound defensive dispositions and decisions force the attacker to commit the bulk of his forces early and thus reveal the nature and direction of his main effort, revealing the aim of the attack, and a vulnerable flank.

How can cyberdefenses be designed for such defensive maneuver? Challenging as it might be,
achieving the design aims of traditional defenses in depth is possible for network defenses. Whereas the elements and functions of the traditional defensive system are dispersed geographically, those of a network defense are dispersed throughout the integrated and cooperating elements of the global network. The difficulty is that the positioning of a dispersed network defense requires access to network nodes that are not owned by the defender. How do these achieve coordination if not by unity of command? It would also be valuable to adapt the logic of defensive integrated strike networks to cyberdefenses.7 “Integrated strike networks” are specifically designed to engage an enemy with an optimized strike for recurring patterns of threats in a number of common mission settings. Strike networks synergistically integrate: various combinations of sensors, distributed digital information processors, human decision makers, and various lethal, destructive, and suppressive weapons, which are all served by robust automation enhanced networks tuned to a specific purpose. Such automated systems of defense operate on the principle that if they can recognize a hostile intrusion rapidly enough, and with adequate reaction time, then they can intercept and defeat it. Designers should expect attackers to employ swarming tactics designed to overload the capacity of defensive strike networks, and they should design their defenses to learn and adapt in the midst of an assault to thwart their attackers.

The challenge, and the major preoccupation, of the defense during a sustained offensive is to seize the initiative from the attacker and to cause the attack to culminate before it succeeds. However, what does causing “culmination” mean in the cyber dimension? Is there such a thing? The notion of “causing culmination” may still be a useful mental construct, but the mechanics of it will be logically different. The “tooth-to-tail” ratio of a cyberattack is very high compared to attacks in the physical dimension. Not all of the advantages of historical defenses apply to cyberdefense, but there is no doubt that time-tested defensive theory can guide the design of systems of cyberdefense. Whether the cyberdefense is inherently stronger than cyberattack is in doubt for a number of reasons. The attacker can always choose the time and place of concentration, and the cyberattacker can do this at the speed of light. Coordinated defenses in depth will depend on international cooperation throughout global

networks. Sovereign nations, including Russia and China, will eventually see the need to cooperate, as they are now encountering some terrorists bent on cybernetic sabotage.

Cyberdefenders also have several other challenges traditional defenders may not have encountered. Knowing one’s own cyber vulnerabilities at the national level can be problematic. Infrastructures that count toward prosperity, stability, and national power are not all in public hands, and those that are, are not centralized at the federal level.

In addition, no defense can guard against all attacks. Desperate and intelligent adversaries will always try to find the line of least expectation and least resistance to the vulnerability most productive for their greater purposes. We will often not know what they intend. The most important attribute of network defenses is that they are designed to learn and adapt, just as attackers are constantly learning and adapting.

The purpose and logic of cyberoffensives. Can offensive warfare by Internet compel an aggressor to submit to a new status quo, one that has greater strategic value than costs? How can states make offensive cyberstrikes undeterable and strategically useful at the same time? These are questions properly addressed by imagining a cybernetic offense used in defending against a physical aggressor by employing the traditional logic of military operations. Attacking along the line of least expectation and least resistance to a vulnerability, the attacker has the advantage of deciding when and where initial engagements will be fought. The aggressor—once forced onto the defense—is obliged to react, losing the initiative. The power to set the terms for subsequent action is an advantage that the attacker must fiercely press if he is to keep it. The real enemy of an attacker entails culminating before achieving desired ends.

Cyberattacks can press some offensive advantages much more efficiently because the product of reconnaissance and intelligence can be optimized far more speedily. As complicated as the Internet is, it is a real structure that can be mapped and understood, as aforementioned, and its defenses can be understood and mapped as well. Second, once defenses are understood, attacks can proceed at such speed that the defense has little time to change its nature and configuration before it is overcome, and the immediate destructive purposes of the attack can often be achieved in seconds.

One major practical difficulty of cyberoffensives is that precision, stealth, and power are difficult to achieve in combination. Offensive acts must be powerful enough to influence the decisions of aggressors in some way, yet be precise and controllable enough not to inflict harm to friends and allies. Any attempts to punish a hostile regime could easily spill over into affecting society and its economy at large. As previously noted, damaging key economic infrastructures in a foreign country may have costly repercussions for our allies and for American businesses as well. In fact, all members of the Group of Twenty most wealthy industrial countries (G-20) would be concerned about such difficulties.

The actions, words, or images of cyberoffensives may be intended to shape decisions and elicit desired responses, but to compel adversaries to act in the intended way that we want, they must perceive the message, understand it, interpret it, and act predictably. To punish bad behavior and deter a repeat of it is hard enough, but to predictably compel other human beings to act a certain way is a fool’s errand, as they are not susceptible to mechanical closed-system causal chains. Since human beings act for reasons having intentions made up of beliefs and desires, the realm of human activity possesses complexity inaccessible to scientific predictability. Warfare by Internet alone provides no way to force the desired change in the status quo regardless of the decisions or actions the opponent may take.

This logic should not be surprising. Between February 2003 and today, we have learned that physically toppling an undesirable Iraqi regime was easy compared to causing a constructive outcome, one not complete seven years later. The recent cybernetic attacks on Estonia and Georgia caused considerable damage, but they did not cause the effects desired by the cyber aggressor.
Similarly, any efforts to derive strategic advantages from “wars of choice” fought chiefly by Internet would be ill-conceived, regardless of whether they are preventive or preemptive. Consider the practical utility of a future NATO cyberoffensive aimed at halting the invasion of an ally or stopping a genocide in progress. Disrupting the cybernetic nervous system of the offending country could be quite simple to do, but how that destruction could cause the specific behavior changes the alliance desires is ineffably more problematic. Inducing pain is one thing, expecting enemy leaders to make the right choices is another.

This example also fails to address the difficulty of avoiding fratricidal collateral damage if any member of the G-20 nations, which includes all the major advanced industrial democracies as well as Russia and China, were to initiate warfare by Internet against any other member. These economies are so intertwined, and their information infrastructures so interlaced, that it would be difficult to translate the intended destruction into useful influence and favorable decisions by leaders on the opposite side without fratricidal collateral damage.

However, cyberstrikes intended merely to terrorize are excluded from this logic. Terrorists are not out to shape behavior; they merely want to punish and to strike fear. They have no need to conceal the authorship of a strike after the fact and have few concerns about collateral damage. For instance, it is not difficult to imagine a repeat of the 2001 Al-Qaeda strikes, but try to imagine it this time in cyberstrike form. To serve a terrorist’s purpose it must strike fear in the population, signal the helplessness of the government, portray the relative power of the terrorist movement, and communicate a clear message to a number of audiences. The terrorists would want the results of their strike to appear sudden, surprising, dramatic, and spectacular. They would desire vivid media images that could impress and fixate global audiences around the world. No silent, invisible, and slowly but surely crippling financial system meltdown would do.

Under what conditions can offensive warfare by Internet possibly produce greater strategic value than costs? I think there is one fairly certain case. It is also easy to see the utility of a regime-preserving cyberstrike capability to a country threatened by a war of aggression or “regime change.” Would the Hussein regime have liked to have the capacity to strike with crippling cyberstrikes against the sources of power within the homelands of the coalition approaching Baghdad in the spring of 2003? They would want to have had an immediate effect on the physical war-waging capabilities of their aggressors and also an immediate restraining effect on political decision makers arrayed against them. They would not be satisfied with punitive measures that arrive too late or stimulate even greater efforts against them.

Such conclusions do not mean that investing in a robust capability to conduct warfare by Internet is unwise. The previous paragraphs illustrate the potential defensive value of an offensive cyberstrike capability. It is also easy to appreciate the utility of offensive cyberpower alongside other forms of military power. Just as air, land, sea, and space power are naturally useful complements to one another, so would cyberpower advance advantages from the cyberelectromagnetic dimension into all the others. This would not be warfare by Internet; it would just be combined arms and services warfare.

Thinking Realistically Rather than Metaphorically

This article is not an attempt to promote “warfare by Internet” but rather a genealogy of the logic of deterrence, defense, and attack in the global cyberelectromagnetic dimension of modern conflict. Understanding this logic requires understanding that, unlike “space,” the Internet is finite. How it relates to military operations for national defense requires this realistic view rather than the boundless perspective encouraged by currently dominant metaphors. We have to think realistically about the Internet to become as serious as we need to be to assure the speed, efficiency, and integrity of our vitally necessary cyberelectromagnetic networks.

The international and national cyberspace networks we use to such advantage are only a “commons” in the sense that all can send packets of information across the cooperating elements of it without regard to ownership or territorial borders. The databases, websites, and other services accessible on the Internet can serve customers across borders in far off cities at the speed of light, but the nodes, servers, routers, and communications links of the Internet exist on sovereign territory, and are most
likely the property of private persons, businesses, governments, or educational institutions. One has to try to understand the uniqueness of this phenomenon to make sense of it. Any theory or analogy borrowed from some other context to help make sense of this dimension needs to be rigorously tested not only for valid parallels, but also for invalid and incomparable ones.

Assuring the speed, efficiency, and integrity of modern cyberelectromagnetic networks against attacks by cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, cyberspies, and hostile state regimes, and thus protecting the host of advantages modern industrial states gain through their functioning, bears a great price. This price is well worth bearing when the cost of protecting these advantages can be far less than the value of benefits derived. Reducing that price to a minimum depends on a comprehensive layered system in which serious attacks first confront a system of deterrence, then those not deterred face a sound defense, and those that penetrate defenses are blunted and confined by effective systems of cybersecurity measures. Finally, we must ensure that damage-limiting design features and practices mitigate those attacks that penetrate security. In exploring how these elements work together, and the unique logical requirements of each, this discussion has aimed to demonstrate the real and theoretical difficulties and uniqueness of this challenge.

Where in the traditional case the defense is the stronger form of war, in the cyber dimension, because of the uniqueness of the conditions, offense tends to be more effective than defense. This situation is further aggravated by the possibility that the normal attacker may be better educated and more motivated than the normal defender in this environment. It is also aggravated because the layered and active defenses possible in the traditional domains of war are extremely difficult to erect within the Internet. They require negotiation among layers of governments and with private bodies within sovereign states. Effective coordinated defenses of vital global networks require sovereign states to band together.

On top of a robust system of cybersecurity and mitigation, modern democracies like the United States should invest in the capabilities that provide a balanced distribution among cyber deterrence, defense, and offense, guided by a forward looking and logical doctrine that bridges established military theory and the uniqueness of the Internet. Such doctrine should recognize the wisdom that modern military power has many interacting dimensions, and that the cyberelectromagnetic dimension needs more brainpower and attention than it is getting. MR

NOTES

9. The “we” are military professionals; national, state, and local politicians and civil authorities; international civil authorities; corporate executives; and all other educational and nongovernmental leaders.
M OT AMERICANS VIEW U.S. Army interrogations in Iraq in 2003-2004 through the lens of Abu Ghraib. As Douglas Pryer points out in *The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–April 2004* (CGSC Foundation Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), this view is distorted and potentially dangerous. In this well written and thoroughly researched book, Pryer examines the shortcomings of U.S. Army interrogation doctrine, the deficiencies of its counterintelligence force structure, and the inadequate training that led to the promulgation of harsh interrogation policies and the abuse of detainees in Iraq during the first, crucial year of the conflict. Pryer, an active duty counterintelligence officer who served in Iraq during the conflict’s first year, is well qualified to analyze these matters. The mistakes made in Iraq during this period, epitomized by the criminal actions of U.S. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison, have had long-term consequences for the international image of the United States and its military forces. Pryer reminds us that Americans should and must aspire to higher ideals. His excellent study is an essential step along a journey of understanding to repair the damage to the U.S. Army and its core values and to ensure that such policies and practices that led to prisoner abuse in Iraq do not occur again.

Intelligence is the coin of the realm in counterinsurgency warfare, and the best intelligence is normally gained from human sources. Yet despite the fact that a well-trained interrogator can elicit information willingly from most prisoners, far too many U.S. military personnel in Iraq thought that harsh treatment would somehow lead to better results. This attitude reflected outright ignorance of the basics of interrogation doctrine—a specialized area routinely ignored in pre-command courses and at the Army’s combat training centers. Ironically, the one school that many Army leaders attended in this regard was the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School—a course intended to teach military personnel how to resist interrogation by an enemy that did not follow the Geneva Conventions regarding the ethical treatment of prisoners.
America’s political leaders were even less well informed in these matters. They increasingly advocated for brutality in the name of saving American lives, aided by the dubious opinions of a coterie of legal advisers who had spent the majority of their careers inside the Beltway. The administration redefined torture to enable interrogators to inflict temporary physical and psychological pain, and then adopted interrogation techniques used at SERE schools. These techniques were first used at Guantanamo Bay, soon migrated to Afghanistan, and from there transferred to Iraq.

Pryer details the moral descent of the U.S. Army in Iraq in 2003 as frustration and casualties mounted. In August 2003 Combined Joint Task Force 7, the highest military headquarters in Iraq, encouraged subordinate units to “take the gloves off” and treat detainees harshly in an attempt to pry additional and more useful information from them. The astonishing fact is that some interrogators approved of this order to engage in harsh interrogation practices despite reams of historical evidence that harsh treatment rarely results in good intelligence. Regardless of the tactical information gained, the strategic cost of these policies was certainly not worth the price of obtaining it. Regrettably, some leaders did not see the irony in their attempts to turn U.S. human intelligence personnel into the 21st-century version of the Gestapo.

Pryer details instances of detainee abuse by some capturing units as well as the broader context of ethical conduct by the vast majority of combat units in Iraq. Inconsistent Army doctrine, vague and changing guidance, and lack of effective training contributed to massive variations in interrogation standards, and in some cases to abuse of detainees. Some interpretations of approaches such as “Fear-up (Harsh)” led to mental and physical abuse and even death. To complement this sad tale of woe, there is no evidence that these abusive interrogation procedures actually worked. No intelligence of value came out of the criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib. Abusive approaches led to strategic consequences, most often with nothing to show for the effort other than damaging photographs and a few broken corpses.

Ethical decision making, in Pryer’s view, is one of the foundations of a unit’s strategic effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. One can sum up the key difference between those units that maintained the moral high ground and those that faltered in a single word—leadership. Few units were immune to detainee abuse, but the best commanders dealt with such abuses as did occur firmly and rapidly.

Pryer offers sensible recommendations to improve U.S. Army detention and interrogation doctrine and procedures. He argues that the Army must increase the number of HUMINT analysts and interrogators with the requisite language and cultural skills to make a difference. The Army must also address the ethical education of its officers and noncommissioned officers. He also offers a stark warning regarding what will happen if the Army fails to do so. “If uncorrected,” Pryer writes, “high operational tempo coupled with poor ethical training will once again fertilize the darkest embryo of the human soul, and one of history’s greatest armies will give birth to yet another Abu Ghraib or My Lai. When this occurs, we Army leaders will have only ourselves to blame.” Pryer’s warning should be a wake-up call to the Army leadership. I highly recommend that every officer read this book for the lessons and warnings it offers. At the very minimum, The Fight for the High Ground should be part of professional military education curriculum. The alternative to better education—to bump merrily along hoping that Army values instruction will prevent future abuse—is unacceptable. MR

In this sobering and incisive book, investigative reporter Pratap Chatterjee describes how the desire to streamline the U.S. military bureaucracy in the name of an ever-elusive “military transformation” created tremendous opportunities for private companies to take on many of the logistical and equipment support functions traditionally performed by military personnel and consequently to garner enormous profits. The Global War on Terror—and especially the war against Saddam Hussein and the subsequent occupation of Iraq—combined with the military’s divestment of its organic logistics capabilities—resulted in an unprecedented increase of contracts between the Pentagon and private companies. Most of these were awarded to one firm—Halliburton. Incidentally, the then-Vice President Richard Cheney had been the firm’s CEO for five years.

Chatterjee’s narrative goes beyond the accusations of political cronyism, corporate corruption, and the convictions of a few mid-level managers in the news headlines, and traces the history of the rise of “Halliburton’s Army” and its intimate connection with both Cheney and Texas politics. He then explains the complex personal relationships that developed between Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the Bush family through the years. Their careers and influence culminated under the presidency of the younger Bush, who allowed them the opportunity to implement their long-standing agenda.

The author bases his assessments on open sources, personal interviews, and travels to key locations in Halliburton’s global operations. He marshals an impressive amount of evidence to support contentions of corruption, disregard for workers’ welfare, and the legal black hole in which the company and its many subsidiaries operate. Despite highlighting the negative aspects of Halliburton’s operations, the book is not a one-sided accusatory rant. The author acknowledges the material advantages that have accrued to U.S. military personnel because of Halliburton’s services, such as hot showers, sturdy hooches, and steak and lobster dinners at the chow line—all of which would have been impossible to achieve via the traditional military support system.

Chatterjee is careful to distinguish between the always hard, sometimes deadly, and often undercompensated work that the “private” in Halliburton’s army have done and continue to do and the unconscionable profiteering exacted by subcontractors, managers, and executives. Among the most serious ethical problems described and documented is the virtual monoply of Halliburton over other competitors for contracts. This was achieved not necessarily through illegal means, but through the leveraging of an army of lawyers looking for just the “right” interpretation of contracting law and the appropriate loophole and an incestuous relationship between politicians and businessmen.

Perhaps even more troubling than the ethical, legal, and practical problems that reliance on “for profit” contractors and Halliburton in particular pose to the U.S. government is the fact that such reliance signifies a major step in the ongoing undermining of American democracy in favor of moneyed interests and lobbyists. For military officers and American citizens alike, Chatterjee’s exposé describes the sordid side of the transformation forced on the defense establishment by the administration of George W. Bush.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

In the School of War, Roger Spiller, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2010, 403 pages, $21.95.

In the School of War is a superbly crafted, thought-provoking, and entertaining collection of essays that addresses the nature of warfare, illustrates the uses and applications of military history, and chronicles the author’s own intellectual journey as a military historian at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Roger Spiller brings a unique perspective to the application of military history in the U.S. Army based on his 25 years as a civilian professor in the halls of learning at Fort Leavenworth. His essays go beyond mere reminiscences and anecdotes, and offer insightful and incisive analyses and critiques to a wide range of topics—generalship, doctrine, the legacy of Vietnam, urban warfare, and the criticality and vulnerability of the human element in combat. He strongly notes the importance of this latter aspect, which traditional Army histories and campaign studies produced by mainstream historians often overlook.

With no real flaws, In the School of War offers a flowing, and often witty style. The book’s 400-plus pages were easily digested in three evenings. Spiller’s book is not a
SHOOTING UP: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs

The impact of illicit economic activity, specifically narcotics production and trafficking, is of great relevance to ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Insurgents deriving financial benefits from the drug economy and government counternarcotics policy may unintentionally strengthen a narco-insurgent’s political legitimacy and support among the people.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Foreign Policy Program fellow at the Brookings Institution, presents a commensurate and thorough analysis in Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. She critiques resource-based counternarcotics theories, of which the policy exemplar is crop eradication, questioning whether destroying the narco-insurgency’s drug resources will lead to its eventual defeat.

Felbab-Brown asserts an alternative theory, called “the political capital model of illicit economies,” based on her fieldwork in Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. The political capital model predicts that belligerent groups—her umbrella term for terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and warlords—derive not only financial benefit from the narcotics economy but also political legitimacy and support.

An insurgent’s accrual of political power in the drug economy mirrors the state’s political power in the administration of legal market economies. It provides security, regulation, conflict mediation, and in some cases, social services. Thus, when an outside power threatens to disrupt or destroy the existing economy, the people whose livelihoods depend on it have incentives to support the actor that maintains the status quo. This is especially the case when the overall legal economy is weak.

Felbab-Brown’s political capital model offers convincing evidence that crop eradication did not materially impact the capability of narco-belligerents. Rather, when combined with a weak legal economy, labor-intensive drug cultivation, and violent traffickers, crop eradication increased the political power (and continued financial benefit) of the narco-insurgent.

Although Felbab-Brown mentions that the “conventional view” is not so much wrong as incomplete, the book tends to overstate the conventional view as monolithic policy until the concluding chapter. Indeed, the conventional view has been contested and does not always conform to single-track means. In his book, The Other War, Ronald Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007), presents the complexity and friction of executing crop eradication among other “pillars” of counternarcotics policy, accompanied by the pressures of U.S. and Afghani domestic realpolitik and underresourced military and civilian capabilities. David Kilcullen, though admittedly of the “no eradication” camp prior to deploying to the region, observes in The Accidental Guerrilla that aggressive eradication would not alienate the majority of the population given the Taliban’s unpopularity and the geographic alignment and scale of the problem, i.e., the “largest pockets of cultivation” are in the “least populated areas of Afghanistan.” More problematic is the political capital model’s reliance on the efficacy of economic and institutional development to thwart the structural conditions that underpin a narco-insurgent’s potential for freedom of action in an illicit economy. Unfortunately, the recent literature on development economics shows that field to be in a crisis of no consensus.

Nonetheless, Felbab-Brown’s view may be vindicated. In late June 2009, U.S. Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke announced that the United States was “not going to support crop eradication.” But to focus on a single technique of policy is to miss the systemic understanding that Felbab-Brown’s political capital model offers to interagency policymakers and planners, and that is, in her words, “why and how government policies toward the illicit economy hamper or enhance government military efforts against belligerents.”

LTE Richard Paz
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DECODING THE NEW TALIBAN: Insights from the Afghan Field

As the United States “doubles down” in Afghanistan, the adaptive and resilient Taliban will evolve to counter this threat. In Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, Antonio Giustozzi has assembled a collection of essays from a variety of journalists, researchers, consultants, and others with legitimate field experience in Afghanistan. The book does an excellent job of dissecting the country by province or region, as appropriate, and presents an exceptional introduction to the tribal aspects of the country.

Each chapter is written by a subject matter expert on that province, region, or subject. In most cases, the material

MAJ Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland

Jominian cookbook of military history essays. Its goal is to coax the reader into critical thinking about man, warfare, and military history based on the author’s experience at the “School of War.” This experience, which flows readily into the book, derives also from the countless officers that he encountered and educated over the years.

Given its unique viewpoint and stylistic approach, I highly recommend this book to serving officers, military educators, and historians of all flavors.
is accurate, insightful, and valuable. In other cases, the author of the chapter demonstrates some obvious biases and the credibility of the chapter suffers. For example, “The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni” presents little objective reporting and panders to the Taliban on several occasions. In other chapters, the authors present profound information distilled from a vast accumulation of research and experience.

“The Taliban and the Opium Trade” details the pivotal role opium serves in propagating the insurgency through financial gain, strategic partnerships, and regional destabilization. “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History” and “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say” dovetail to provide a thorough explanation that synthesizes the strategic, operational, tactical, and individual motivations of the Taliban and the vital role opium plays in that nexus.

The book’s style of contribution by province or region is particularly helpful in ascertaining the dynamics of the subtribes in that area. It is easily deduced from the book that the Taliban have deliberately inflamed tribal animosities while simultaneously taking great effort to avoid appearing as a tribe themselves; the Taliban represent themselves as a popular uprising.

The Taliban’s command and control over the insurgency is the overriding focus of the book. Co-opting the narcotics traffickers to finance the insurgency, inciting and arming tribal conflicts to create destabilization, hiring the unemployed youth as fighters, controlling foreign jihadis, and exerting some type of unity and control over the insurgency through financial gain, strategic partnerships, and regional destabilization. “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History” and “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say” dovetail to provide a thorough explanation that synthesizes the strategic, operational, tactical, and individual motivations of the Taliban and the vital role opium plays in that nexus.

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As the author makes clear, the purpose of the book is not “to stake out particular positions or to make advances in problematic conceptual areas,” but to provide “an overview of the moral challenges faced by military members and the methods and insights that ethics provides in reply.” While many of these moral challenges relate to warfighting, the book also discusses important issues concerning gender, sexual orientation, and religion. Because of its focus, the book is a good choice for those interested in exploring the topic of professional military ethics for the first time and those who want to reflect on their current views. The various topics and issues are laid out clearly and concisely and numerous examples illustrate and clarify the points being made. One can imagine a number of these examples being used in an officer or noncommissioned officer development program.

The book leads off with a chapter on applied ethics, which introduces ethics. Included is a short discussion of three main ethical approaches. Rhodes then discusses war and morality. He explains a number of key terms associated with Just War Theory (or what he calls “just war thinking”). Key topics include the criteria for a just war, discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, proportionality, and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Rhodes also discusses how these traditional views can be applied to contemporary wars against nonstate actors. There are also sections on preemption and preventative war and a discussion of two alternative views to Just War theory and Realism and Pacifism.

In addition to issues surrounding war and morality, Rhodes examines other issues such as gender, military policies regarding homosexuality, and the role of religion in the military. As the author rightfully points out, the military, like any large organization “must deal with emergent ethical challenges as a product of social evolution and advances in the study of ethics.”

Rhodes provides an excellent introduction to military ethics and he stimulates further reflection and research by the reader.

LTC Brian Imiola, West Point, New York


Beer, Bacon, and Bullets is a timely and deftly written look at how soldiers of divergent cultures live and work together in a coalition environment and overcome their cultural dissimilarities—a perennial challenge, the author notes, that dates back to antiquity. The book examines the primary question “Does culture matter” and
if so, in what ways? By investigating cross-cultural tensions among aligned militaries, Gal Luft uncovers how such organizations address the diverse problem of cultural variation, and identifies which techniques and measures mitigate cultural tension. The underlying and irrefutable thread of the study is that no two cultures are alike and that different cultures pose fundamentally different challenges. Reassuringly, the study concludes that these can be skillfully “managed,” if enough attention is given to the partner’s cultural sensitivities.

The author’s analysis takes the reader through seven skillfully written chapters, including five informative and balanced historical case studies. While there are few surprises in Luft’s analysis of the U.S. military’s mission in China from 1941 to 1945 or the association between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the First Gulf War, his investigation of the little-known Anglo-Japanese World War I Alliance or the relationship between Israel and the South Lebanon Army between 1985 and 2000 are particularly edifying. In the case of the latter, Luft argues convincingly that the Israelis’ failure to fully understand their Lebanese allies resulted in an ill-fated ending.

Throughout the case studies, Luft cleverly highlights the limitations of imposing far-reaching organizational changes on a partner, the correlation between the home society’s general attitude toward the coalition partner’s culture and the degree of cross-cultural tensions, and the differing cultural attitudes toward the future and planning. The underlying message is that cultural understanding profoundly affects whether a coalition can achieve success; cultural blunders or a lack of empathy can have strategic magnitude. In the epilogue, Luft subtly cautions that “only a deeper look into the cultural background of our prospective allies can make us able to better forecast the problems that might emerge in the course of our common work with them. Hopefully they will do the same.”

At a time when coalition warfare has become the standard, it is reassuring to read a book that helps uncover how cultural factors such as language barriers, religion, customs, philosophy, values, stereotypes, heritage, gender rules, education, mentality, ethnic background, economic status, and social outlook affect the way militaries collaborate. However, Luft is astute to caution the reader that “this book is much more reflective of the attitudes of Western militaries towards their Asian or Muslim partners than the other way around.” Despite this acknowledged limitation, Beer, Bacon, and Bullets is a serious, balanced, and coherent scholarly study that deserves attention and is an enjoyable, informative read. Few will be disappointed by Luft’s lucid prose and judicious supporting evidence.

Beer, Bacon, and Bullets is a fascinating and well-timed study into the importance of coalition culture. Given the significance of alliances on today’s battlefields, those tasked with creating and maintaining coalitions would be wise to read Luft’s analysis and insightful conclusions. Cross-cultural cooperation, even in times of peace, has always been a daunting task; therefore, paying lip service to or underplaying another partner’s cultural needs on operations could, as Beer, Bacon, and Bullets highlights, have a disastrous outcome on a campaign’s ultimate success.

LTC Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Lichfield, Staffordshire, United Kingdom


In a world full of books about WMD, a book-length treatment of essential security sector reforms would constitute a welcome addition to the burgeoning WMD literature. Taking the title as a guide, WMD Proliferation: Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat, promises to lead the reader on a journey which identifies (and, one would anticipate, offer specific recommendations for the remediation of) shortcomings in the security apparatuses designed to protect nations against the scourge of WMD. In this case, however, the reader may encounter some frustration as he or she seeks to identify exactly what must be done to reform the security sector.

The book is divided into two parts: “The WMD Threat” and “Reforming the Security Sector.” Part I presents a useful overview of basic concepts associated with WMD in general and with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons specifically. The uninitiated are likely to find this overview a helpful and concise introduction to the phenomenology of WMD. One could imagine Part I assigned in an introductory security studies course at the undergraduate level. On the other hand, readers conversant in WMD are likely to be surprised by what seems to be a puzzlingly long preamble before getting to the ostensibly “meat” of the subject identified in the title—namely, how to reform the security sector in light of the proliferation threat. Moreover, Part I’s emphasis seems to be on the threats posed by the various WMD phenomena, as opposed to the threat posed by the proliferation of these phenomena. These two concepts are not precisely the same thing.

Part II provides useful discussions on arguably warranted reforms in the strategic-level security decision making process, in the intelligence community, in legislative processes, and in interagency collaboration. Taken together, these discussions, sometimes descriptive, sometimes prescriptive, point the reader toward broad philosophical questions such as whether Western democracies are agile enough—or can be made agile enough—to respond to the most pressing security exigencies of the 21st century. However, the discussions found in Part II do not successfully argue that the most pressing security exigencies of the 21st century center on WMD; they could just as easily apply to cyber crime and multinational corporations.
large enough to influence international politics.

What the reader encounters are two separate books published under one title in a way that obscures identification of the central thesis and the target audience. The first part deals effectively with WMD phenomenology, but not so much with proliferation; the second part deals with needed reforms, but not with a specific focus on either WMD or proliferation. That is not to say that specific sections of the book are without value; its chapters serve as useful individual summaries of their respective subject matter. Moreover, the book is well researched and documented, even if some of the sources cited make unclassified inferences about classified matters (but many works on WMD operate under this handicap).

*WMD Proliferation* accomplishes some useful and important aims, albeit probably not the ones the author originally contemplated. Even so, it provides food for thought for the attentive reader.

**COL John Mark Mattox, Ph.D., Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico**

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**A FIERY PEACE IN A COLD WAR: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon, Neil Sheehan, Random House, New York, 2009, 560 pages, $32.00.**

Neil Sheehan has written a readable book about the American development of the ICBM. He tells his story through the life of a single person, General Bernard Schriever. Unfortunately, this invites the author to attribute too much to a single individual and ignore the history of a military institution, its culture, and the press of external events.

When the author discusses the Air Force, he ignores the service’s history and cultural conflicts, gives insufficient weight to the bitter interservice battles over unification and their aftermath through the 1950s and beyond, and is unclear about some technical matters like the principles of inertial guidance. The author finds Schriever to be a man who did not make a wrong decision, although he points out others’ character flaws and their poor decisions. These annoyances detract from the work’s overall excellence.

The bulk of the story describes the complicated course of ICBM development through the Air Force and Defense bureaucracies; the internecine battle within the Air Force and the turf war between the Air Force, the Army, and NASA; political infighting in Congress, all in the Cold War context. Sheehan’s colorful cast of characters includes Curtis LeMay; John von Neumann, the inventor of game theory; Colonel Edward Hall, designer of the first solid-fueled ICBM and the brother of two key Soviet spies at Los Alamos; Trevor Gardner, a volatile undersecretary of the Air Force; and Simon Ramo, one of the founders of TRW.

Deciding they could not compete with manned bombers, the Soviets opted to develop powerful rockets to launch satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and antiaircraft missiles. Their captured German engineers and technicians were carefully segregated from classified research.

Sheehan traces the origins of the military industrial lobby and how intelligence is twisted for political and commercial purposes. He describes candidate John F. Kennedy exaggerating Soviet military strength in the 1960 election claiming the “missile gap” favored Moscow when the U.S. already had a commanding lead, and he calls Dwight Eisenhower “the last American president to believe that military spending which was not absolutely necessary was money wasted.” Schriever brought great political and leadership skills and strong drive and initiative to this important task and Sheehan relates his contributions well.

Despite its faults, this book presents a clear picture of the genesis and history of the U.S. missile program in a way that shows how critical decisions were made. Readers interested in 20th century U.S. history, military history, the history of science and technology, and the Cold War will find it both enlightening and interesting, but should read it critically.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea**

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**ARMAGEDDON IN STALINGRAD: September-November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, volume 2), David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2009, 896 pages, $34.95.**

Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 picks up where volume 1, *To the Gates of Stalingrad* ends. The Sixth Army is pushing its way into the heart of Stalingrad. The authors draw on numerous sources, including Red Army General staff journals, the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Russian 62d Army official records. All help to highlight the brutal fighting that took place on the Volga River.

As August turns into September and October, the days of blitzkrieg and sweeping envelopments are over. Advances of 20 to 30 kilometers a day are now measured in meters per day. Due to massive bombing raids by the Luftwaffe, Stalingrad is now nothing but burned-out buildings and rubble-strewn streets. The large-scale maneuvers of the summer are over and now the fight is house-to-house in a large urban and industrial setting.

The house-to-house fighting nullified the artillery and Stuka support that the Wehrmacht had come to rely on. The Russians used the “cheek to jowl” tactic, closing to less than 50 meters of the Wehrmacht’s front line, too close for the Germans to call in artillery or Stuka support. It forced close quarters combat that the Russians had trained to conduct and the Germans had not.

As the Wehrmacht advanced and tried to bypass or isolate pockets of Russians, the Russians counterattacked with ferocity. Snipers, machine gun nests, and antitank positions held up whole regiments...
and divisions for days. Just as the Germans began to make some progress, Russian general Vasily Chuikov, the 62d Army commander, began to move just enough men forward to hold up the 6th Army advance. Most Russian divisions and regiments were mere shadows of military organizations. Russian units went into combat lacking rifles or ammunition. Resupply consisted of what could be salvaged from the battlefield. The Russian divisions that crossed the Volga with 10,000 men would have less than 1,000 left after 24 hours of combat. The Germans had even worse supply problems. Less than half of the required personnel replacements were allocated the 6th Army. Fuel was in short supply, as was ammunition. The Germans were forced into a war of attrition that the Russians with almost limitless manpower and weapons production in reserve were prepared to win. The final assault on the last remaining pockets of Russian resistance in the Barrikady and Krasnyi Otiabr factories within sight of the Volga forced the culmination of the 6th Army. The 6th Army was out of ammunition, food, and infantry, and armored units were at 15 percent strength. The lure of Stalingrad on Hitler cannot be minimized. Hitler wanted to occupy all of Stalingrad, not just secure it (as in the original plan). This change of plans doomed the most powerful German army ever formed.

What sets this book apart from other books on Stalingrad is the wealth of detail. The authors were granted unparalleled access to records from both Russian and Wehrmacht sources. The daily battle strength of battalions, brigades, and divisions, and tank strength is documented for both sides. This adds to the overall depth of the volume so the reader can see how combat power was drained away as each day was bloodier than the last. Whole regiments would be destroyed in less than a week of fighting in the rubble of Stalingrad. Legible maps add to the overall picture of the Stalingrad fight. The only drawback to the book is that there are no scales associated with the maps. This makes it hard to visualize distances, which is critical when dealing in city blocks as opposed to open terrain. This drawback does not detract from the overall readability and detail of Armageddon in Stalingrad.

LTC Richard S. Vick, Jr., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Edward Drea is a military historian whose previous work has focused on the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and World War II in the Pacific. Drea previously published a book-length anthology of essays on the IJA titled In the Service of the Emperor (1998). Drea’s new book takes many of the themes of the earlier work and combines them into a coherent and complete narrative of the institutional history of the IJA. The result is an impressive and important piece of scholarship that addresses the first modern U.S. enemy to institutionalize suicide tactics as a mechanism to exhaust the will of the American people and to obtain a less-severe peace.

Drea is an accomplished Japanese scholar who has done original research in the Japanese archives and in primary Japanese sources. In this study, he also brings to bear a comprehensive knowledge of the most recent Japanese scholarship on the IJA as well as recent English language studies on the Japanese Army and polity such as Ronald Spector’s In the Ruins of Empire (2007). The result is a highly readable case study, from start to finish, of the entire life cycle of a military institution.

Drea explains how the Imperial Army developed from a group of reformist-minded Samurai oligarchs into a narrow and self-serving military culture. In the process, he provides the reader the means to understand how the IJA transformed into the brutal, militarizing agent that caused so much atrocity and suffering in Asia and, ultimately, Japan. Drea sums up this process in his epilogue: “The army responded with strategic plans that reflected narrow service interests, not national ones. Army culture increasingly protected the military institution at the expense of the nation.” The message has particular relevance for military professionals today as a means to understand how professional officers can confuse loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the institution during times of change and constant crises. However, the book is more than just this major theme. In the process of coming to this judgment, the reader gets a strategic history of modern Japan that includes the all-important Meiji Restoration. In addition, the way Drea deals with the various wars and military campaigns and how these influenced the IJA’s development is well worth the price of the book. Drea clearly finds the IJA to be the most important elite in the Japanese polity by the 1920s, having almost a veto level of influence over all the other competing power elites (the Emperor and his advisors, diplomats, the Navy, big business, and the political parties). He also addresses any number of other fascinating issues for military professionals, from operational level discussions of intelligence and logistics, to tactics and doctrine, to professional military education.

The only drawback to the book, and it is minor, is that maps of the China-Burma-India Theater and the South Pacific are needed to better understand the text during the discussion of World War II in the Pacific. Nonetheless, this book is highly recommended for command and staff students, undergraduate survey courses on modern Japan, and anyone interested in the pathology of militarism and how it can derail national policymaking.

John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HITLER’S GENERALS ON TRIAL: The Last War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremburg. Valerie Genevieve Hebert, University of
Thus, the most time served by any of the defendants in the High Command Case was only nine years.

One of the book’s greatest insights concerns the political-military context that helps to explain the seemingly incongruous reduced sentences. The United States, in addition to conducting the Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings, was multitasking at all levels of war—rebuiding post-war Germany, conducting denazification hearings, and balancing the burgeoning Soviet threat, which required democratic Germany’s participation in the European Defense Community. The Germans, ever eager to shed wartime vestiges, especially those indicting the highly respected Wehrmacht, made an all-court press for the release of the military prisoners as a precondition to joining in any Western defense schemes. Repeated pressures and appeals for clemency resulted in their early release. In the end, politics and national security imperatives trumped American attempts to achieve justice and educate the German people.

*Hitler’s Generals* is highly recommended to those interested in post-war Germany, the Nuremburg Trials, and international military justice. A model of organization and with extensive notes and appendices, Hebert’s highly readable narrative provides English audiences access to a previously untapped resource.

**Mark Montesclaros, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Between World War I and World War II, the U.S. Army had a much bigger and more robust education system than its size would justify. Consequently, the 130,000-man, six-division U.S. Army was able to expand rapidly to over 3,500,000 soldiers in nearly 100 divisions and fight the Second World War. Organizing, equipping, training, moving, and leading this force required an officer corps with common goals, common experience, and uncommon ability. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) played a major role in producing a small cadre of effective officers who were ready to serve two or three grades above their peacetime position and create the conditions for victory in World War II. This book is about the educational process that produced this remarkable cadre—the successful division, corps, and Army commanders that led in the European and Pacific theaters.

Although the Command and General Staff College had a faculty with World War I experience, they were not preparing their students to fight the previous war. Combined arms maneuver battle, the integration of fires, and the integration of intelligence were key subjects in officer education. College graduates were well drilled in effective, thorough, fast-paced staff work and decision making. The tough, demanding two-year course allowed these select students adequate time to master their profession and the skills and processes expected of a CGSC graduate. There was no particular enemy to focus on, but the college curriculum inculcated a mental flexibility that compensated for this murkiness. True, there was always a school solution, but dissenting approaches were considered and evaluated. Even the truncated six-week wartime courses were valuable in integrating senior staff in the newly forming divisions.

Leavenworth did not do everything well. It did not produce enough graduates. It did not appreciate the evolving role of airpower, nor did it devote enough study to the major fields of logistics and mobilization. As the Soviets demonstrated in 1941, the worst time to change force...
structure is right before a conflict. The U.S. Army transitioned from the square division to the triangular division just before the war. The division’s two brigade headquarters, which each coordinated two regiments, were gone, and the commander’s span of control was now very difficult. The difficult solution to division command and control was learned during battle in North Africa and during the early part of the Sicily invasion—not at Fort Leavenworth. New equipment, new Soldiers, evolving doctrine, global logistics requirements, and a competent enemy further complicated the situation. Still, the U.S. Army was a learning organization that adapted. Fort Leavenworth can take much of the credit for that ability to learn and adapt on the fly.

Peter Schifferle has done an extensive study of officer education during the interwar years and World War II. The result is a well-reasoned, balanced study that is also a pleasure to read. Military professionals, historians, and policymakers will find it a helpful guide to a historic, successful officer education process. Along the way, the reader will bump into the Army greats and near-greats that made the difference in World War II.

Lester W. Grau, Ph.D.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In popular literature and perception, the common soldiers of the First World War are often portrayed as “lions led by donkeys”; the powerless victims of callous commanders and the impersonal forces of mass industrial warfare. In The Final Battle, Scott Stephenson argues that the Germans soldiers who fought on the Western Front in 1918 were far from being inanimate cogs in the military machine, but rather were active agents in crafting both the ending of the Great War and the political landscape of post-war Germany. The actions of these Fronts Schweine (front pigs) directly contributed to the collapse of the Hohenzollern dynasty and provided the government of the nascent German Republic with the military muscle to defend itself against the Spartacists and other leftist revolutionaries.

One of the seminal questions that Stephenson seeks to answer in the work is why the German soldiers of the Western Front acted so differently from their peers stationed in Germany or on the Eastern Front in late 1918. While sailors of the High Seas Fleet and veterans of the Eastern Front lent their armed might to leftist revolutionaries, the soldiers of the Western Front remained a coherent and disciplined fighting force in the weeks leading up to the armistice as well as during their march back to Germany in November and December 1918.

Stephenson notes that six major factors shaped the veterans’ response to the last Allied offensives as well as their opposition to the burgeoning revolution taking place in Germany: alienation, isolation, selection, exhaustion, cohesion, and management. These soldiers were alienated from both civilians and the military members who neither shared nor understood the ordeal that they had suffered on the Western Front. The breakdown of communications between the home and battlefronts, as well as the efforts of officers to shield their men from revolutionary propaganda, ensured that the Wes theer’s soldiers were isolated from the events that had radicalized the troops in the East. Through a process of deliberate selection, the German High Command also worked to keep the most militarily and politically reliable soldiers in action on the Western Front.

The High Command was also successful in managing the Westheer by convincing its soldiers that it was in their own best interest, and that of the nation, to remain an organized fighting force during its withdrawal from the West and in its support of the Ebert government. These men, while increasingly war weary, also exhibited a great degree of unit cohesion that encouraged them to endure the Allied attacks, the withdrawal from France and Belgium, and political agitation. Lastly, the Allied hammer-blow on the German army in 1918 led to such a degree of mental and physical exhaustion that the soldiers’ thoughts turned to ending the war and going home rather than the political winds that were buffeting the homeland.

Stephenson notes that the soldiers of the Westheer played a critical role in shaping the future of Germany in late 1918 and early 1919. Their refusal to support the Kaiser and potentially prolong the war led to the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Their orderly withdrawal into Germany following the armistice would give rise to the “stab in the back” myth later used to great effect by the Nazis and helped to stoke the nation’s political crisis by encouraging the left’s fear of the soldiers’ counterrevolutionary potential. The willingness of many of the Westheer’s returning veterans to act in their self-interest by supporting the Ebert government, or by joining the Freikorps and other paramilitary forces, may have prevented Germany’s slide toward bolshevism, but also introduced an acceptance of reactionary ideology and violence into the German political culture.

The Final Battle is exceptionally well written, argued, and supported. It is an essential work for anyone interested in the ending of the Great War, the social and political realities that shaped post-war Germany, or the factors that encouraged the rise of Nazism. The work is also valuable to any military professional studying issues of civil-military relations, unit cohesion under times of great duress, and the challenges of reintegrating combat veterans into society.

LTC Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D., USA, Retired
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Social Media and the Military

Major Nicole Doyle, Fort Leavenworth, KS—Chondra Perry’s article “Social Media and the Army,” (Military Review, March-April 2010) was extremely helpful. The article answers the mail and provides information that people need to know about using social networking tools.

The author also highlights various ways that communication can serve the Armed Forces. There are many avenues that must be explored to establish a dialogue with the world! This article was a great follow-up to Admiral Michael Mullen’s recommendations about how to improve strategic communication: Simply learn the meaning of “good communication!” Design of online social networks fosters a dialogue both ways. Your article was on-point, listing both the benefits of social networking to reach a global audience and the risks involved when communication is harmful or prejudiced. Effective communication considers the audience, is respectful, and follows the guidelines of best practices. Accountability is essential to keeping channels of communication open.

Finally, thank you for including Laura Brower’s and photographer Sascha Pflaeging’s When Janey Comes Marching Home: Portraits of Women Combat Veterans (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2010) in your book review recommendations. Many women choose to serve in the military and are actively engaged in protecting the freedoms that Americans sometimes forget and take for granted. Despite the advances and contributions of today’s women, it is important that we remember to communicate that women, too, are veterans. Women in foreign countries are no different from American women of years past who fought for the right to vote, among other “inalienable” rights.

Continued efforts to foster education like those in your journal will make these inalienable rights a reality across the world one day, one hopes. Thanks again for bringing important issues to print that foster professionalism in our Armed Forces.

Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare

Commander Joseph F. Penta, Group Surgeon Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan—Lieutenant Colonels Matthew S. Rice and Omar J. Jones’ article “Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare” (Military Review, May-June 2010) is both insightful and one of the few of its kind. However it fails to take into account the full potential for second- and third-order beneficial effects of medical interactions with Afghans in a COIN environment, as well as the most fundamental technique for producing a positive medical interaction with local nationals—a positive face-to-face conversation that expresses sympathy and listens to the patient.

For Marine Corps units in Helmand Province, it is accepted that in the right setting, positive atmospheres can be created in medical interactions with villages that could later save the lives of those Marines operating it that region. Whether the mission is medical, a female engagement team, or a jirga, the goal is for the locals to develop a trust in Afghan forces, not to solve their problems, medical or otherwise. The results of a positive medical operation, coordinated with Afghan forces that make public the Afghan forces’ presence, can help a village develop a trust in Afghan forces.

The authors’ point about how little actual health improvement we can make in the lives of Afghans with the medical capabilities our military brings to a combat zone is correct. However, whether it is Afghanistan or America, the impression that a patient leaves with is not the medical treatment so much as the quality of the human interaction. Medical lawsuit statistics in America bear this out—whether patients leave content with the care has more to do with whether they liked the doctor than the medical treatment they received. The failure of past medical operations to make an impact in Iraq may have been a poor understanding that good medical care in this COIN setting is not necessarily the medications dispensed, but rather the attention and sympathy provided by the physicians. Attention and sympathy result in instant gratification for all people, as much in this culture as any. And, who better to provide this interaction than medical providers who universally receive training in listening skills and psychology?

Compared to the alternative of no medical operations, the chance to create a positive interaction with the local populous using sympathetic comments through a translator, a hand on the shoulder of an ailing man, or time spent listening to a mother with a sick child may make inroads to those individuals whom our actual medications will not help. And, for a minority, our medications, especially bacterial antibiotics, may physiologically help them. These facts are as true in Afghanistan as in our medical practices back home.
UNIPATH: With the motto: “Regionally Focused, Globally Aware,” Unipath has a goal to encourage open discussion and to share ideas on topics of mutual interest with our partners in the Middle East and Central Asia region,” according to General David H. Petraeus. “Unipath will provide insightful information on defense, security, new technology, and current events. It will also highlight issues affecting countries in the region, and their diverse cultures and traditions, as they move toward greater freedom and democracy.”

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