The author bases his assessments on open sources, personal interviews, and travels to key locations in Halliburton’s global operations. He marshals an impressive amount of evidence to support contentions of corruption, disregard for workers’ welfare, and the legal black hole in which the company and its many subsidiaries operate. Despite highlighting the negative aspects of Halliburton’s operations, the book is not a one-sided accusatory rant. The author acknowledges the material advantages that have accrued to U.S. military personnel because of Halliburton’s services, such as hot showers, sturdy hooches, and steak and lobster dinners at the chow line—all of which would have been impossible to achieve via the traditional military support system. Chatterjee is careful to distinguish between the always hard, sometimes deadly, and often undercompensated work that the “privates” in Halliburton’s army have done and continue to do and the unconscionable profiteering exacted by subcontractors, managers, and executives. Among the most serious ethical problems described and documented is the virtual monopoly of Halliburton over other competitors for contracts. This was achieved not necessarily through illegal means, but through the leveraging of an army of lawyers looking for just the “right” interpretation of contracting law and the appropriate loophole and an incestuous relationship between politicians and businessmen.

Perhaps even more troubling than the ethical, legal, and practical problems that reliance on “for profit” contractors and Halliburton in particular pose to the U.S. government is the fact that such reliance signifies a major step in the ongoing undermining of American democracy in favor of moneyed interests and lobbyists. For military officers and American citizens alike, Chatterjee’s exposé describes the sordid side of the transformation forced on the defense establishment by the administration of George W. Bush. LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

In the School of War


In the School of War is a superbly crafted, thought-provoking, and entertaining collection of essays that addresses the nature of warfare, illustrates the uses and applications of military history, and chronicles the author’s own intellectual journey as a military historian at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Roger Spiller brings a unique perspective to the application of military history in the U.S. Army based on his 25 years as a civilian professor in the halls of learning at Fort Leavenworth. His essays go beyond mere reminiscences and anecdotes, and offer insightful and incisive analyses and critiques to a wide range of topics—generalship, doctrine, the legacy of Vietnam, urban warfare, and the criticality and vulnerability of the human element in combat. He strongly notes the importance of this latter aspect, which traditional Army histories and campaign studies produced by mainstream historians often overlook.

With no real flaws, In the School of War offers a flowing, and often witty style. The book’s 400-plus pages were easily digested in three evenings. Spiller’s book is not a
An insurgent’s accrual of political power in the drug economy mirrors the state’s political power in the administration of legal market economies. It provides security, regulation, conflict mediation, and, in some cases, social services. Thus, when an outside power threatens to disrupt or destroy the existing economy, the people whose livelihoods depend on it have incentives to support the actor that maintains the status quo. This is especially the case when the overall legal economy is weak.

The book’s case studies cover, among others, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in Peru, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), ELN (National Liberation Army) and paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Felbab-Brown offers convincing evidence that crop eradication did not materially impact the capability of narco-belligerents. Rather, when combined with a weak legal economy, labor-intensive drug cultivation, and violent traffickers, crop eradication increased the political power (and continued financial benefit) of the narco-insurgent.

Although Felbab-Brown mentions that the “conventional view” is not so much wrong as incomplete, the book tends to overstate the conventional view as monolithic policy until the concluding chapter. Indeed, the conventional view has been contested and does not always conform to single-track means. In his book, The Other War, Ronald Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007), presents the complexity and friction of executing crop eradication among other “pillars” of counternarcotics policy, accompanied by the pressures of U.S. and Afghan domestic realpolitik and underresourced military and civilian capabilities. David Kilcullen, though admittedly of the “no eradication” camp prior to deploying to the region, observes in The Accidental Guerrilla that aggressive eradication would not alienate the majority of the population given the Taliban’s unpopular-
is accurate, insightful, and valuable. In other cases, the author of the chapter demonstrates some obvious biases and the credibility of the chapter suffers. For example, “The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni” presents little objective reporting and panders to the Taliban on several occasions. In other chapters, the authors present profound information distilled from a vast accumulation of research and experience.

“The Taliban and the Opium Trade” details the pivotal role of opium serves in propagating the insurgency through financial gain, strategic partnerships, and regional destabilization. “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History” and “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say” dovetail to provide a thorough explanation that synthesizes the strategic, operational, tactical, and individual motivations of the Taliban and the vital role opium plays in that nexus.

The book’s style of contribution by province or region is particularly helpful in ascertaining the dynamics of the subtribes in that area. It is easily deduced from the book that the Taliban have deliberately inflamed tribal animosities while simultaneously taking great effort to avoid appearing as a tribe themselves; the Taliban represent themselves as a popular uprising.

The Taliban’s command and control over the insurgency is the overriding focus of the book. Co-opting the narcotics traffickers to finance the insurgency, inciting and arming tribal conflicts to create destabilization, hiring the unemployed youth as fighters, controlling foreign jihadists, and exerting some type of unity of command is a profound accomplishment in a feudalistic society.

This well-researched book contains valuable insight on the command and control of the Taliban, tribal dynamics in the provinces most affected by the conflict, and the role of opium in furthering the goals of the Taliban. While the obvious bias of some of the contributors does introduce questions of journalistic integrity, it is important to understand what they are saying on the “other side of the fence” with or without substantiating evidence. The majority of the contributors provided unique information in an entertaining manner that benefits anyone searching for an understanding of the situation in Afghanistan.

MAJ Paul Lohmann, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


After the institution of the Army Values in the 1990s, the Army’s focus turned away from further exploration and refinement of the Army ethic. This has changed in recent years with the creation of the Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic, which has the mission to increase Army-wide understanding, ownership, and sustained development of the professional military ethic. The year 2011 will be dedicated as the Year of the Army Ethic. With the Army refocusing on its ethic, Bill Rhodes’ handbook comes at a good time. The book is an excellent introduction to professional military ethics and a valuable resource to military professionals as we begin to seriously reexamine a critical component of the Army’s foundation.

As the author makes clear, the purpose of the book is not “to stake out particular positions or to make advances in problematic conceptual areas,” but to provide “an overview of the moral challenges faced by military members and the methods and insights that ethics provides in reply.” While many of these moral challenges relate to warfighting, the book also discusses important issues concerning gender, sexual orientation, and religion. Because of its focus, the book is a good choice for those interested in exploring the topic of professional military ethics for the first time and those who want to reflect on their current views. The various topics and issues are laid out clearly and concisely and numerous examples illustrate and clarify the points being made. One can imagine a number of these examples being used in an officer or noncommissioned officer development program.

The book leads off with a chapter on applied ethics, which introduces ethics. Included is a short discussion of three main ethical approaches. Rhodes then discusses war and morality. He explains a number of key terms associated with Just War theory (or what he calls “just war thinking”). Key topics include the criteria for a just war, discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, proportionality, and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Rhodes also discusses how these traditional views can be applied to contemporary wars against nonstate actors. There are also sections on preemption and preventative war and a discussion of two alternative views to Just War theory and Realism and Pacifism.

In addition to issues surrounding war and morality, Rhodes examines other issues such as gender, military policies regarding homosexuality, and the role of religion in the military. As the author rightfully points out, the military, like any large organization “must deal with emergent ethical challenges as a product of social evolution and advances in the study of ethics.”

Rhodes provides an excellent introduction to military ethics and he stimulates further reflection and research by the reader.

LTC Brian Imiola, West Point, New York


‘Beer, Bacon, and Bullets’ is a timely and deftly written look at how soldiers of divergent cultures live and work together in a coalition environment and overcome their cultural dissimilarities — a perennial challenge, the author notes, that dates back to antiquity. The book examines the primary question “Does culture matter” and
At a time when coalition warfare has become the standard, it is reassuring to read a book that helps uncover how cultural factors such as language barriers, religion, customs, philosophy, values, stereotypes, heritage, gender rules, education, mentality, ethnic background, economic status, and social outlook affect the way militaries collaborate. However, Luft is astute to caution the reader that “this book is much more reflective of the attitudes of Western militaries towards their Asian or Muslim partners than the other way around.” Despite this acknowledged limitation, Beer, Bacon, and Bullets is a serious, balanced, and coherent scholarly study that deserves attention and is an enjoyable, informative read. Few will be disappointed by Luft’s lucid prose and judicious supporting evidence.

Beer, Bacon, and Bullets is a fascinating and well-timed study into the importance of coalition culture. Given the significance of alliances on today’s battlefields, those tasked with creating and maintaining coalitions would be wise to read Luft’s analysis and insightful conclusions. Cross-cultural cooperation, even in times of peace, has always been a daunting task; therefore, paying lip service to or underplaying another partner’s cultural needs on operations could, as Beer, Bacon, and Bullets highlights, have a disastrous outcome on a campaign’s ultimate success.

LTC Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D.,
British Army, Lichfield,
Staffordshire, United Kingdom


In a world full of books about WMD, a book-length treatment of essential security sector reforms would constitute a welcome addition to the burgeoning WMD literature. Taking the title as a guide, WMD Proliferation: Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat, promises to lead the reader on a journey which identifies (and, one would anticipate, offer specific recommendations for the remediation of) shortcomings in the security apparatuses designed to protect nations against the scourge of WMD. In this case, however, the reader may encounter some frustration as he or she seeks to identify exactly what must be done to reform the security sector.

The book is divided into two parts: “The WMD Threat” and “Reforming the Security Sector.” Part I presents a useful overview of basic concepts associated with WMD in general and with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons specifically. The uninitiated are likely to find this overview helpful and concise introduction to the phenomenology of WMD. One could imagine Part I assigned in an introductory security studies course at the undergraduate level. On the other hand, readers conversant in WMD are likely to be surprised by what seems to be a puzzlingly long preamble before getting to the ostensible “meat” of the subject identified in the title—namely, how to reform the security sector in light of the proliferation threat. Moreover, Part I’s emphasis seems to be on the threats posed by the various WMD phenomena, as opposed to the threat posed by the proliferation of these phenomena. These two concepts are not precisely the same thing.

Part II provides useful discussions on arguably warranted reforms in the strategic-level security decision making process, in the intelligence community, in legislative processes, and in interagency collaboration. Taken together, these discussions, sometimes descriptive, sometimes prescriptive, point the reader toward broad philosophical questions such as whether Western democracies are agile enough—or can be made agile enough—to respond to the most pressing security exigencies of the 21st century. However, the discussions found in Part II do not successfully argue that the most pressing security exigencies of the 21st century center on WMD; they could just as easily apply to cyber crime and multinational corporations
large enough to influence international politics.

What the reader encounters are two separate books published under one title in a way that obscures identification of the central thesis and the target audience. The first part deals effectively with WMD phenomenology, but not so much with proliferation; the second part deals with needed reforms, but not with a specific focus on either WMD or proliferation. That is not to say that specific sections of the book are without value; its chapters serve as useful individual summaries of their respective subject matter. Moreover, the book is well researched and documented, even if some of the sources cited make unclassified inference about classified matters (but many works on WMD operate under this handicap).

*WMD Proliferation* accomplishes some useful and important aims, albeit probably not the ones the author originally contemplated. Even so, it provides food for thought for the attentive reader.

**COL John Mark Mattox, Ph.D.,
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico**

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Neil Sheehan has written a readable book about the American development of the ICBM. He tells his story through the life of a single person, General Bernard Schriever. Unfortunately, this invites the author to attribute too much to a single individual and ignore the history of a military institution, its culture, and the press of external events.

When the author discusses the Air Force, he ignores the service’s history and cultural conflicts, gives insufficient weight to the bitter interservice battles over unification and their aftermath through the 1950s and beyond, and is unclear about some technical matters like the principles of inertial guidance. The author finds Schriever to be a man who did not make a wrong decision, although he points out others’ character flaws and their poor decisions. These annoyances detract from the work’s overall excellence.

The bulk of the story describes the complicated course of ICBM development through the Air Force and Defense bureaucracies; the internecine battle within the Air Force and the turf war between the Air Force, the Army, and NASA; political infighting in Congress, all in the Cold War context. Sheehan’s colorful cast of characters includes Curtis LeMay; John von Neumann, the inventor of game theory; Colonel Edward Hall, designer of the first solid-fueled ICBM and the brother of two key Soviet spies at Los Alamos; Trevor Gardner, a volatile deputy director of the Air Force; and Simon Ramo, one of the founders of TRW.

Deciding they could not compete with manned bombers, the Soviets opted to develop powerful rockets to launch satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles. Their captured German engineers and technicians were carefully segregated from classified research.

Sheehan traces the origins of the military industrial lobby and how intelligence is twisted for political and commercial purposes. He describes candidate John F. Kennedy exaggerating Soviet military strength in the 1960 election claiming the “missile gap” favored Moscow when the U.S. already had a commanding lead, and he calls Dwight Eisenhower “the last American president to believe that military spending which was not absolutely necessary was money wasted.” Schriever brought great political and leadership skills and strong drive and initiative to this important task and Sheehan relates his contributions well.

Despite its faults, this book presents a clear picture of the genesis and history of the U.S. missile program in a way that shows how critical decisions were made. Readers interested in 20th century U.S. history, military history, the history of science and technology, and the Cold War will find it both enlightening and interesting, but should read it critically.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,
Seoul, Korea**

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Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 picks up where volume 1, *To the Gates of Stalingrad* ends. The Sixth Army is pushing its way into the heart of Stalingrad. The authors draw on numerous sources, including Red Army General staff journals, the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the German Sixth Army, and the Russian 62d Army official records. All help to highlight the brutal fighting that took place on the Volga River.

As August turns into September and October, the days of blitzkrieg and sweeping envelopments are over. Advances of 20 to 30 kilometers a day are now measured in meters per day. Due to massive bombing raids by the Luftwaffe, Stalingrad is now nothing but burned-out buildings and rubble-strewn streets. The large-scale maneuvers of the summer are over and now the fight is house-to-house in a large urban and industrial setting.

The house-to-house fighting nullified the artillery and Stuka support that the Wehrmacht had come to rely on. The Russians used the “cheek to jowl” tactic, closing to less than 50 meters of the Wehrmacht’s front line, too close for the Germans to call in artillery or Stuka support. It forced close quarters combat that the Russians had trained to conduct and the Germans had not.

As the Wehrmacht advanced and tried to bypass or isolate pockets of Russians, the Russians counterattacked with ferocity. Snipers, machine gun nests, and antitank positions held up whole regiments
and divisions for days. Just as the Germans began to make some progress, Russian general Vasily Chuikov, the 62d Army commander, began to move just enough men forward to hold up the 6th Army advance. Most Russian divisions and regiments were mere shadows of military organizations. Russian units went into combat lacking rifles or ammunition. Resupply consisted of what could be salvaged from the battlefield. The Russian divisions that crossed the Volga with 10,000 men would have less than 1,000 left after 24 hours of combat. The Germans had even worse supply problems. Less than half of the required personnel replacements were allocated the 6th Army. Fuel was in short supply, as was ammunition. The Germans were forced into a war of attrition that the Russians with almost limitless manpower and weapons production in reserve were prepared to win. The final assault on the last remaining pockets of Russian resistance in the Barrikady and Krasnyi Otiabr factories within sight of the Volga forced the culmination of the 6th Army. The 6th Army was out of ammunition, food, and infantry, and armored units were at 15 percent strength. The lure of Stalingrad on Hitler cannot be minimized. Hitler wanted to occupy all of Stalingrad, not just secure it (as in the original plan). This change of plans doomed the most powerful German army ever formed.

What sets this book apart from other books on Stalingrad is the wealth of detail. The authors were granted unparalleled access to records from both Russian and Wehrmacht sources. The daily battle strength of battalions, brigades, and divisions, and tank strength is documented for both sides. This adds to the overall depth of the volume so the reader can see how combat power was drained away as each day was bloodier than the last. Whole regiments would be destroyed in less than a week of fighting in the rubble of Stalingrad. Legible maps add to the overall picture of the Stalingrad fight.

The only drawback to the book is that there are no scales associated with the maps. This makes it hard to visualize distances, which is critical when dealing in city blocks as opposed to open terrain. This drawback does not detract from the overall readability and detail of Armageddon in Stalingrad.

LTC Richard S. Vick, Jr.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Edward Drea is a military historian whose previous work has focused on the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and World War II in the Pacific. Drea previously published a book-length anthology of essays on the IJA titled In the Service of the Emperor (1998). Drea’s new book takes many of the themes of the earlier work and combines them into a coherent and complete narrative of the institutional history of the IJA. The result is an impressive and important piece of scholarship that addresses the first modern U.S. enemy to institutionalize suicide tactics as a mechanism to exhaust the will of the American people and to obtain a less-severe peace.

Drea is an accomplished Japanese scholar who has done original research in the Japanese archives and in primary Japanese sources. In this study, he also brings to bear a comprehensive knowledge of the most recent Japanese scholarship on the IJA as well as recent English language studies on the Japanese Army and polity such as Ronald Spector’s In the Ruins of Empire (2007). The result is a highly readable case study, from start to finish, of the entire life cycle of a military institution.

Drea explains how the Imperial Army developed from a group of reformist-minded Samurai oligarchs into a narrow and self-serving military culture. In the process, he provides the reader the means to understand how the IJA transformed into the brutal, militarizing agent that caused so much atrocity and suffering in Asia and, ultimately, Japan. Drea sums up this process in his epilogue: “The army responded with strategic plans that reflected narrow service interests, not national ones. Army culture increasingly protected the military institution at the expense of the nation.” The message has particular relevance for military professionals today as a means to understand how professional officers can confuse loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the institution during times of change and constant crises.

However, the book is more than just this major theme. In the process of coming to this judgment, the reader gets a strategic history of modern Japan that includes the all-important Meiji Restoration. In addition, the way Drea deals with the various wars and military campaigns and how these influenced the IJA’s development is well worth the price of the book. Drea clearly finds the IJA to be the most important elite in the Japanese polity by the 1920s, having almost a veto level of influence over all the other competing power elites (the Emperor and his advisors, diplomats, the Navy, big business, and the political parties). He also addresses any number of other fascinating issues for military professionals, from operational level discussions of intelligence and logistics, to tactics and doctrine, to professional military education.

The only drawback to the book, and it is minor, is that maps of the China-Burma-India Theater and the South Pacific are needed to better understand the text during the discussion of World War II in the Pacific. Nonetheless, this book is highly recommended for command and staff students, undergraduate survey courses on modern Japan, and anyone interested in the pathology of militarism and how it can derail national policymaking.

John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HITLER’S GENERALS ON TRIAL: The Last War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremburg. Valerie Genevieve Hebert, University of
Thus, the most time served by any of the defendants in the High Command Case was only nine years.

One of the book’s greatest insights concerns the political-military context that helps to explain the seemingly incongruous reduced sentences. The United States, in addition to conducting the Subsequent Nuremburg Proceedings, was multitasking at all levels of war—rebuilding post-war Germany, conducting denazification hearings, and balancing the burgeoning Soviet threat, which required democratic Germany’s participation in the European Defense Community. The Germans, ever eager to shed wartime vestiges, especially those indicting the highly respected Wehrmacht, made an all-court press for the release of the military prisoners as a precondition to joining in any Western defense schemes. Repeated pressures and appeals for clemency resulted in their early release. In the end, politics and national security imperatives trumped American attempts to achieve justice and educate the German people.

*Hitler’s Generals* is highly recommended to those interested in post-war Germany, the Nuremburg Trials, and international military justice. A model of organization and with extensive notes and appendices, Hebert’s highly readable narrative provides English audiences access to a previously untapped resource. **Mark Montesclaros, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Between World War I and World War II, the U.S. Army had a much bigger and more robust education system than its size would justify. Consequently, the 130,000-man, six-division U.S. Army was able to expand rapidly to over 3,500,000 soldiers in nearly 100 divisions and fight the Second World War. Organizing, equipping, training, moving, and leading this force required an officer corps with common goals, common experience, and uncommon ability. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) played a major role in producing a small cadre of effective officers who were ready to serve two or three grades above their peacetime position and create the conditions for victory in World War II. This book is about the educational process that produced this remarkable cadre—the successful division, corps, and Army commanders that led in the European and Pacific theaters.

Although the Command and General Staff College had a faculty with World War I experience, they were not preparing their students to fight the previous war. Combined arms maneuver battle, the integration of fires, and the integration of intelligence were key subjects in officer education. College graduates were well drilled in effective, thorough, fast-paced staff work and decision making. The tough, demanding two-year course allowed these select students adequate time to master their profession and the skills and processes expected of a CGSC graduate. There was no particular enemy to focus on, but the college curriculum inculcated a mental flexibility that compensated for this murkiness. True, there was always a school solution, but dissenting approaches were considered and evaluated. Even the truncated six-week wartime courses were valuable in integrating senior staff in the newly forming divisions.

Leavenworth did not do everything well. It did not produce enough graduates. It did not appreciate the evolving role of airpower, nor did it devote enough study to the major fields of logistics and mobilization. As the Soviets demonstrated in 1941, the worst time to change force...
structure is right before a conflict. The U.S. Army transitioned from the square division to the triangular division just before the war. The division’s two brigade headquarters, which each coordinated two regiments, were gone, and the commander’s span of control was now very difficult. The difficult solution to division command and control was learned during battle in North Africa and during the early part of the Sicily invasion—not at Fort Leavenworth. New equipment, new Soldiers, evolving doctrine, global logistics requirements, and a competent enemy further complicated the situation. Still, the U.S. Army was a learning organization that adapted. Fort Leavenworth can take much of the credit for that ability to learn and adapt on the fly.

Peter Schifferle has done an extensive study of officer education during the interwar years and World War II. The result is a well-reasoned, balanced study that is also a pleasure to read. Military professionals, historians, and policymakers will find it a helpful guide to a historic, successful officer education process. Along the way, the reader will bump into the Army greats and near-greats that made the difference in World War II.

Lester W. Grau, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In popular literature and perception, the common soldiers of the First World War are often portrayed as “lions led by donkeys”; the powerless victims of callous commanders and the impersonal forces of mass industrial warfare. In The Final Battle, Scott Stephenson argues that the Germans soldiers who fought on the Western Front in 1918 were far from being inanimate cogs in the military machine, but rather were active agents in crafting both the ending of the Great War and the political landscape of post-war Germany. The actions of these Fronts Schweine (front pigs) directly contributed to the collapse of the Hohenzollern dynasty and provided the government of the nascent German Republic with the military muscle to defend itself against the Spartacists and other leftist revolutionaries.

One of the seminal questions that Stephenson seeks to answer in the work is why the German soldiers of the Western Front acted so differently from their peers stationed in Germany or on the Eastern Front in late 1918. While sailors of the High Seas Fleet and veterans of the Eastern Front lent their armed might to leftist revolutionaries, the soldiers of the Western Front remained a coherent and disciplined fighting force in the weeks leading up to the armistice as well as during their march back to Germany in November and December 1918.

Stephenson notes that six major factors shaped the veterans’ response to the last Allied offensives as well as their opposition to the burgeoning revolution taking place in Germany: alienation, isolation, selection, exhaustion, cohesion, and management. These soldiers were alienated from both civilians and the military members who neither shared nor understood the ordeal that they had suffered on the Western Front. The breakdown of communications between the home and battlefronts, as well as the efforts of officers to shield their men from revolutionary propaganda, ensured that the Westheer’s soldiers were isolated from the events that had radicalized the troops in the East. Through a process of deliberate selection, the German High Command also worked to keep the most militarily and politically reliable soldiers in action on the Western Front.

The High Command was also successful in managing the Westheer by convincing its soldiers that it was in their own best interest, and that of the nation, to remain an organized fighting force during its withdrawal from the West and in its support of the Ebert government. These men, while increasingly war weary, also exhibited a great degree of unit cohesion that encouraged them to endure the Allied attacks, the withdrawal from France and Belgium, and political agitation. Lastly, the Allied hammer-blows on the German army in 1918 led to such a degree of mental and physical exhaustion that the soldiers’ thoughts turned to ending the war and going home rather than the political winds that were buffeting the homeland.

Stephenson notes that the soldiers of the Westheer played a critical role in shaping the future of Germany in late 1918 and early 1919. Their refusal to support the Kaiser and potentially prolong the war led to the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Their orderly withdrawal into Germany following the armistice would give rise to the “stab in the back” myth later used to great effect by the Nazis and helped to stoke the nation’s political crisis by encouraging the left’s fear of the soldiers’ counterrevolutionary potential. The willingness of many of the Westheer’s returning veterans to act in their self interest by supporting the Ebert government, or by joining the Freikorps and other paramilitary forces, may have prevented Germany’s slide toward bolshevism, but also introduced an acceptance of reactionary ideology and violence into the German political culture.

The Final Battle is exceptionally well written, argued, and supported. It is an essential work for anyone interested in the ending of the Great War, the social and political realities that shaped post-war Germany, or the factors that encouraged the rise of Nazism. The work is also valuable to any military professional studying issues of civil-military relations, unit cohesion under times of great duress, and the challenges of reintegrating combat veterans into society.

LTC Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D., USA, Retired
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Social Media and the Military

Major Nicole Doyle, Fort Leavenworth, KS—Chondra Perry’s article “Social Media and the Army,” (Military Review, March-April 2010) was extremely helpful. The article answers the mail and provides information that people need to know about using social networking tools.

The author also highlights various ways that communication can serve the Armed Forces. There are many avenues that must be explored to establish a dialogue with the world! This article was a great follow-up to Admiral Michael Mullen’s recommendations about how to improve strategic communication: Simply learn the meaning of “good communication!” Design of online social networks fosters a dialogue both ways. Your article was on-point, listing both the benefits of social networking to reach a global audience and the risks involved when communication is harmful or prejudiced. Effective communication considers the audience, is respectful, and follows the guidelines of best practices. Accountability is essential to keeping channels of communication open.

Finally, thank you for including Laura Brower’s and photographer Sascha Pflaeging’s When Janey Comes Marching Home: Portraits of Women Combat Veterans (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2010) in your book review recommendations. Many women choose to serve in the military and are actively engaged in protecting the freedoms that Americans sometimes forget and take for granted. Despite the advances and contributions of today’s women, it is important that we remember to communicate that women, too, are veterans. Women in foreign countries are no different from American women of years past who fought for the right to vote, among other “inalienable” rights.

Continued efforts to foster education like those in your journal will make these inalienable rights a reality across the world one day, one hopes. Thanks again for bringing important issues to print that foster professionalism in our Armed Forces.

Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare

Commander Joseph F. Penta, Group Surgeon Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan—Lieutenant Colonels Matthew S. Rice and Omar J. Jones’ article “Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency Warfare” (Military Review, May-June 2010) is both insightful and one of the few of its kind. However it fails to take into account the full potential for second- and third-order beneficial effects of medical interactions with Afghans in a COIN environment, as well as the most fundamental technique for producing a positive medical interaction with local nationals—a positive face-to-face conversation that expresses sympathy and listens to the patient.

For Marine Corps units in Helmand Province, it is accepted that in the right setting, positive atmospherics can be created in medical interactions with villages that could later save the lives of those Marines operating it that region. Whether the mission is medical, a female engagement team, or a jirga, the goal is for the locals to develop a trust in Afghan forces, not to solve their problems, medical or otherwise. The results of a positive medical operation, coordinated with Afghan forces that make public the Afghan forces’ presence, can help a village develop a trust in Afghan forces.

The authors’ point about how little actual health improvement we can make in the lives of Afghans with the medical capabilities our military brings to a combat zone is correct. However, whether it is Afghanistan or America, the impression that a patient leaves with is not the medical treatment so much as the quality of the human interaction. Medical lawsuit statistics in America bear this out—whether patients leave content with the care has more to do with whether they liked the doctor than the medical treatment they received. The failure of past medical operations to make an impact in Iraq may have been a poor understanding that good medical care in this COIN setting is not necessarily the medications dispensed, but rather the attention and sympathy provided by the physicians. Attention and sympathy result in instant gratification for all people, as much in this culture as any. And, who better to provide this interaction than medical providers who universally receive training in listening skills and psychology?

Compared to the alternative of no medical operations, the chance to create a positive interaction with the local populous using sympathetic comments through a translator, a hand on the shoulder of an ailing man, or time spent listening to a mother with a sick child may make inroads to those individuals whom our actual medications will not help. And, for a minority, our medications, especially bacterial antibiotics, may physiologically help them. These facts are as true in Afghanistan as in our medical practices back home.
UNIPATH: With the motto: “Regionally Focused, Globally Aware,” Unipath has a goal to encourage open discussion and to share ideas on topics of mutual interest with our partners in the Middle East and Central Asia region,” according to General David H. Petraeus. “Unipath will provide insightful information on defense, security, new technology, and current events. It will also highlight issues affecting countries in the region, and their diverse cultures and traditions, as they move toward greater freedom and democracy.”

Unipath is published quarterly in both English and Arabic, and subscription information can be obtained by writing the editor at: Unipath, U.S. Central Command, 7115 S. Boundary Road, MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

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