Foreword

The core of the Army profession is our ethic. The Army ethic, however, is paradoxical. It must be sufficiently foundational to anchor the Army culture across time, yet adaptive enough to respond to changing environments. The Army has been in transition since 2001, and General Dempsey has recently noted that it is important that Soldiers and leaders refine their understanding of what it means to be professionals—expert members of the profession of arms—after nine years of war and to recommit to a culture of service and to remember the responsibilities and behaviors of our profession as articulated in the Army Ethic. He has asked CAC to lead this important discussion for the Army.

To help inspire the needed discussion about our Army profession and its ethic, the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) and the Military Review have partnered to offer this anthology of recent writings. This collection is no mere academic exercise. Only through knowledge can we improve ourselves as an organization, and Army-wide efforts to reinforce our ethic must begin with senior leaders. The authors of these articles have thought long and hard about what they have to say. Their experiences, their educations, and, in many cases, their lifelong work validates the observations they make. Some have won awards for what they express here. The contributing thinkers, including officers and Soldiers in the field, have experienced and examined the Army’s ethical successes, as well as failures and contradictions, and have highlighted some institutional shortcomings that we, as a profession, must address. As the leaders of our profession, we have the undeniable duty to come to grips with these issues, weighing them, and giving them their due with energized and renewed examination.

General Casey has recently challenged us to answer two questions: What does it mean for the Army to be a Profession of Arms, and what does it mean to be a professional Soldier after nine years of war? Answering these questions will require that we look at not just our expertise as a profession, but the nature and character of our Army ethic. We will need to work together to better articulate what makes up our ethic and how it is reinforced so that we can lead the organizational change required to reinforce our profession during this time of persistent conflict. We need to discuss both the nature and character of our ethic and what it means to be an Army professional Soldier of character. One place to start is here.

Ultimately, Army leaders at all levels have to be able to express the moral traditions of the profession of arms and of warfare and how, as a foundational bedrock, those traditions connect to the superstructure of the Army profession. Being able to recite rules of engagement or the law of land warfare is not good enough for Army professionals who must apply discretionary judgments in complex situations. Thus, our professional military ethic derives from a second paradox: the obligation to win wars through the use of proportional force while at the same time minimizing the suffering and destruction associated with warfare. This collection of writings is a good start on achieving the understanding we need to begin a robust dialogue on these topics. That is our aim here.

Army Strong!

ROBERT L. CASLEN JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
FEATURED ARTICLES

3  Owning Our Army Ethic
Major Chris Case, U.S. Army; Major Bob Underwood, U.S. Army; and Colonel Sean T. Hannah, Ph.D., U.S. Army
The Army’s ethic must reconcile possible tensions between action and duty by providing guidance for both why we fight and how we should fight.

11  On the Road to Articulating Our Professional Ethic
Lieutenant Colonel Brian Imiola, Ph.D., U.S. Army and Major Danny Cazier, U.S. Army
Any exploration of a serviceable professional ethic must take into account the objectivity of our moral tradition.

19  Warriors, the Army Ethos, and the Sacred Trust of Soldiers
Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Fromm, U.S. Army, Retired
We expect American Soldiers to be much more than what the term "warrior" suggests.

27  Discipline, Punishment, and Counterinsurgency
Scott Andrew Ewing
Vague regulations encourage NCOs to disguise arbitrary punishments as extra training. This ubiquitous practice may be contributing to abuse of civilians during operations.
Originally published in the September-October 2008 edition of MR.

38  Competency vs. Character? It Must Be Both!
Lieutenant Colonel Joe Doty, Ph.D., U.S. Army and Major Walter Sowden, U.S. Army
The Army should abolish stand-alone ethical or character development training and embed it into all its training and education experiences.
Originally published in the November-December 2009 edition of MR.

46  Moral Disengagements: When Will Good Soldiers do Bad Things?
Christopher M. Barnes, Ph.D., and Keith Leavitt, Ph.D.
When Soldiers avoid applying an ethical framework to a situation, they rationalize their conduct as a moral choice.

52  The Inclination for War Crimes
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rielly, U.S. Army, Retired
An Army inquiry into the My Lai Massacre 36 years ago provides today’s leaders with ways to determine if units are tempted to commit war crimes.
Originally published in the May-June 2009 edition of MR.

59  The Embedded Morality in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency
Lieutenant Colonel Celestino Perez, Jr., Ph.D., U.S. Army
Army doctrine tells us to respect the other’s dignity and, hence, the other’s life.
Originally published in the May-June 2009 edition of MR.

Cover Art: Vercingetorix Throws Down his Arms at the Feet of Julius Caesar (1899), Lionel-Noël Royer; Crozatier Museum at Le Puy-en-Velay, France.
68  Legitimacy and Military Operations
Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hammond, Canadian Forces
In America’s rush to war, it forgot that legitimacy, whether real or perceived, is paramount. The author argues that to achieve success, the U.S. must conduct all military operations with legitimacy in mind.
Originally published in the July-August 2008 edition of MR.

80  The Need for Discretion in Resilient Soldiering
Lieutenant Colonel (Chaplain) Robert Roetzel, U.S. Army
While Soldiers understand that discretion is essential in applying deadly force, employing it is far more difficult than most imagine.

86  Automatic Ethics: What We Take for Granted Matters
Keith Leavitt, Ph.D., and Major Walter J. Sowden, U.S. Army
Recent behavioral research suggests that many of our automatic moral assumptions might be inaccurate and possibly even harmful.

90  What Does Contemporary Science Say About Ethical Leadership?
Christopher M. Barnes, Ph.D., and Lieutenant Colonel Joe Doty, Ph.D., U.S. Army
Ethical leadership requires emphasizing the importance and significance of ethics.

94  At What Cost, Intelligence? A Case Study of the Consequences of Ethical (and Unethical) Leadership
Major Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army
The “intelligence at any cost” mind-set led some in our Army in Iraq to systemically violate the laws of war. We must prevent its recurrence.
Originally published in the May-June 2010 edition of MR.

110  Reconnecting With Our Roots: Reflections on the Army’s Ethic
Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Erik Anderson, U.S. Army
The authors ask if we are a better Army today than we were nine years ago and suggest that now is as good a time as any to reflect on the Profession of Arms.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
117  Black Hearts: A Study in Leadership
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Christopher, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired
At the vortex of Jim Frederick’s Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death (Harmony Books, New York, 2009) is a gripping account of a single incident involving some of the most despicable actions by U.S. Soldiers since the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam.
Originally published in the May-June 2010 edition of MR.

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