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Cover Photo: Soldiers of B Company, 82d Special Troops Battalion run through the snow after exiting a UH-47 Chinook helicopter as another lands in Shaykh Ali District, Parwan Province, Afghanistan, 19 December 2009.
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What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s disposition can only be obtained from other men.¹

—Sun Tzu

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PHOTO: A U.S. Sailor assigned to the Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion stands watch over a cell block at U.S. Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 30 March 2010. (U.S. Navy photo by MCS3 Joshua Nistas)

The United States is searching for ways to lawfully glean information from persons detained during the War on Terror.³ The issue is thorny and politically sensitive. While much of the debate has been about the interrogation tactics of the Central Intelligence Agency and other government agencies, there has been a strong move toward restricting the military interrogators. Some recent changes to Army and Department of Defense (DOD) interrogation policies reflect a less than intellectually rigorous approach that is neither effective nor legally sound. This article examines the Army’s interrogation policy as set forth in Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, from both a legal and “effects-based” perspective and offers some recommendations for change.

When formulating an interrogation policy, we must recognize and address the following:

• Human behavior is very complex, and interrogation, which involves establishing a relationship between the interrogator and the subject, requires imaginative, skilled, and trained interrogators who are free to accomplish their mission successfully and lawfully.

• Limiting DOD interrogators to an artificial list of techniques may prevent abusive and coercive interrogations, but it inhibits their ability to create relationships and manipulate them effectively.
The Obama administration based its decision to close the DOD detention facility at Guantánamo Bay (Gitmo) and limit the scope of interrogation techniques on a blend of political, policy, and legal concerns about the treatment of detainees.

While most Americans want our intelligence officers to extract accurate, time-sensitive intelligence from dangerous terrorists in order to avert imminent attacks, the use of “enhanced interrogation methods,” including waterboarding, is at the core of the debate. On an emotional level, particularly after experiencing the effects of a terror attack on our soil, many Americans might pray that there are rough Americans like the fictional TV character Jack Bauer out there protecting the flock. However, no one has established that waterboarding or other enhanced interrogation techniques produce accurate or reliable intelligence. Moreover, such activities cause America to lose the moral high ground and have a corrosive effect on the morale and discipline of the interrogators themselves. This is especially true of military interrogators who are subject to more stringent guidelines than their counterparts in other government agencies.

The Law
An attorney providing operational legal guidance to a commander should ensure that the commander understands the advice and that the advice is free from personal bias. While we have consistently and strongly advocated that military interrogators should be prohibited from using enhanced interrogation techniques such as waterboarding, we also believe that the rules adopted should be based on law and reason and not on emotion. Unfortunately, conjecture, ill-defined information, and emotion form the basis for much that has been written and said on this topic, both in the media and in professional circles.

Recently, some legal scholars and essayists have gone to extremes in condemning the Bush administration’s policy on enhanced interrogation techniques. For instance, they have pointed to the prosecution of Japanese captors for use of water torture as a basis for outlawing the U.S. use of “waterboarding.” Or, they say waterboarding is the moral or legal equivalent of the torture the North Vietnamese inflicted on John McCain and his fellow prisoners of war or the torture inflicted on our Soldiers today by our current adversaries. These arguments are disingenuous.

The Japanese were prosecuted after the war for the systemic, repeated, and long-term starvation, mutilation, and killing of Allied POWs: their use of water torture was merely a small part of their repertoire. Nothing in the way the United States treats captured terrorists today can compare with the Japanese cruelties of World War II. Performing a 15-second simulated drowning upon an individual—the same type of interrogation technique to which some of our own special operations forces and aviators have been subjected in Survival Evasion Resistance Escape training—should not be equated to the wanton burning, flailing, breaking of limbs, and decapitations that jihadists routinely impose upon their captives.

The inability of some lawyers to see these disparities is troubling. We should ignore the rhetoric masquerading as legal analysis from those who politicize this issue. It only obscures the mundane ground truth surrounding the operational application of legal doctrine. Many attorneys, including some affiliated with the services’ legal centers and schools, declare that we should charge some Bush administration employees and certain judge advocates with war crimes for their policies on interrogation. Such rhetoric distracts us from critically thinking about what interrogation techniques work and are lawful.

The truth is that the military’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques would, indeed, violate the protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions and related Laws of Armed Conflict.

Examples of enhanced interrogation techniques include the following:

- The Attention Grab: The interrogator forcefully grabs the shirtfront of the prisoner and shakes him.
- The Attention Slap: An open-handed slap aimed at causing pain and triggering fear.

We should ignore the rhetoric masquerading as legal analysis from those who politicize this issue.
The Belly Slap: A hard open-handed slap to the stomach. The aim is to cause pain, but not internal injury. Doctors advise against using a punch, which could cause lasting internal damage.

Long Time Standing: This technique is described as among the most effective. Prisoners are forced to stand, handcuffed with their feet shackled to an eyebolt in the floor for more than 40 hours. Exhaustion and sleep deprivation are effective in yielding confessions.

The Cold Cell: The prisoner is left to stand naked in a cell kept near 50 degrees. Throughout the time in the cell, the prisoner is doused with cold water.

Waterboarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the level of the feet. A wet towel is placed over the prisoner’s mouth and nose and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a halt.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether such techniques would be legal in situations not governed by the Laws of Armed Conflict or where a special presidential finding overrides previous executive orders banning such practices. What is clear is that the U.S. military may not use these techniques. This being the case, what are the allowable legal limits for interrogations of detainees conducted by military personnel?

The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

Two legal questions affect the detainee treatment debate: the status of the detainee under the Geneva Conventions, and the applicable law governing the treatment of the detainee based on this status. The issue of detainee status has been discussed extensively since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

In early 2004, reports alleged U.S. troops had abused Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. A formal DOD investigation ensued. Reports of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, and other military detention facilities caused a public outcry and a congressional inquiry into the tactics and legal justification used by the Bush administration in executing the war in Iraq.

In response, the U.S. Senate approved an amendment to the Department of Defense appropriations bill for 2006 that set forth interrogation techniques approved for use on detainees. It made clear that geographic considerations did not limit the prohibition on the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. President Bush signed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) into law on 30 December 2005.

The confusion generated by the approval of different interrogation tactics for detainees depending on their classification led to a decline in the overall standards of interrogation and confinement. Many detention facilities contained a mixed group of interrogators—civilian, military, and contractor—with differing guidelines. At the strategic level, debates about what constituted torture and the extent of restrictions on it under domestic criminal statutes and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment led to further confusion.

The DTA sought to solve these problems by making the U.S. Army’s standards of interrogation apply to all DOD agencies and by prohibiting “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of any person under the custody or control of the U.S. government. It specifically cited the U.S. Army field manual on interrogation, FM 34-52 (since replaced by FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations) as the authoritative guide to interrogation techniques. Since the Department of Defense controls the contents of the field manual, DOD is the executive agency that decides whether to permit or prohibit a given technique.

For a time, government agencies outside the Department of Defense were then free to define for themselves what constituted “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” To close this loophole, Congress passed legislation in 2008 to constrain the entire intelligence community to the field manual’s techniques. Both chambers of Congress voted for the bill, but President Bush vetoed it on 8 March 2008. However, on 22 January 2009, President Obama effectively reversed this veto by signing a new executive order banning all enhanced interrogation methodologies by all agencies of the government.
In retrospect, we can see that the inconsistent application and interpretation of domestic and international law by members of the Bush administration may have led to ambiguities in the standards, resulting in poor treatment of detainees. However, it was not trained military interrogators but prison guards and others—including contractors—who committed most of the alleged DOD abuses. This fact is noteworthy. Moreover, the proximate cause of the abuse was not the interrogation policies, but dereliction of duty by those in charge of certain facilities.

The behavior of American military interrogators at Gitmo was a triumph—although it did not garner the press highlights that the “bad news” story of Abu Ghraib did. President Obama’s executive order also directed Secretary of Defense Gates to review detention conditions at Guantánamo to ensure that no individual was held there “except in conformity with all applicable laws governing the conditions of such confinement, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.” The relevant portion of the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum, Review of Department Compliance with President’s Executive Order on Detainee Conditions of Confinement, dated 2 February 2009, is set forth below, and bears careful scrutiny:

After considerable deliberation and a comprehensive review, it is our judgment that the conditions of confinement in Guantánamo are in conformity with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

In our view, there are two components in the scope of the compliance review taken from Common Article 3: the first is the explicit prohibition against specified acts (at any time and at any place). Any substantiated evidence of prohibited acts discovered in the course of the review would have warranted a finding of “non-compliance” with Common Article 3. We found no such evidence.

President Barack Obama signs a series of executive orders, including one closing the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in the Oval Office of the White House, 22 January 2009.
Additionally, determining conformity with Common Article 3 requires examination of the directive aspect of the Article, this being that “Persons . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.” This element of the effort demanded that the Review Team examine conditions of detention based upon our experience and professional backgrounds, informed and challenged by outside commentary. As a result of that effort, we find that the conditions of confinement in Guantánamo also meet the directive requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

While we conclude that conditions at Guantánamo are in conformity with Common Article 3, from our review, it was apparent that the chain of command responsible for the detention mission at Guantánamo consistently seeks to go beyond a minimalist approach to compliance with Common Article 3, and endeavors to enhance conditions in a manner as humane as possible consistent with security concerns.

These findings are all the more remarkable in light of the fact that many scholarly legal analyses and opinions believe that stateless terrorists and other similarly situated bad actors are not entitled to the protections afforded them pursuant to Common Article 3:

As the eminent military historian Sir Michael Howard argued shortly after 9/11, the status of Al-Qaeda terrorists is to be found in a distinction first made by the Romans and subsequently incorporated into international law by way of medieval and early modern European jurisprudence. According to Mr. Howard, the Romans distinguished between bellum (war against legitimus hostis, a legitimate enemy) and guerra (war against latrunculi, pirates, robbers, brigands, and outlaws).

Bellum became the standard for interstate conflict, and it is here that the Geneva Conventions were meant to apply. They do not apply to guerra. Indeed, punishment for latrunculi, “the common enemies of mankind,” traditionally has been summary execution.16

We must understand this legislative and policy history well if we are to shape effective and lawful administrative guidelines.

However, regardless of their legal or political rationales, both the DTA and the new executive order authorize only those interrogation approaches and techniques set forth in FM 2-22.3. There are two major problems with this: little science supports the approved techniques, and the requirements imposed by the FM are so restrictive that they are ineffective and nonsensical.

Field Manual 2-22.3

In the manual, two interrogation methods routinely used by law enforcement on domestic criminal suspects require approval by the first colonel in the interrogator’s chain of command. Use of the restricted interrogation technique “Separation” requires the approval of a combatant commander. Interrogation plans require the approval of the first flag officer in the chain of command, and coordination with command, security, legal, or other personnel within the command structure.17 Requiring a trained military interrogator who wants to use simple law enforcement questioning techniques to seek combatant commander (4-star general equivalent) approval is akin to requiring an FBI agent to seek the FBI director’s approval or a city cop to seek the police commissioner’s imprimatur. Once again, the military has responded to a perceived crisis by formulating mandatory training requirements focused on the least common denominator.18 This approach is anathema to an effective interrogation program. Such a program requires creativity, imagination, and critical analysis, not the imposition of rigid, unimaginative, and poorly focused requirements.

A more reasoned solution would be to:

- Make the selection process for military interrogators more discriminating by making it a

**Once again, the military has responded to a perceived crisis by formulating mandatory training requirements focused on the least common denominator.**
non-accession military occupational specialty, like Special Forces and Criminal Investigation Division.

- Provide rigorous, standardized, and comprehensive training to ensure successful and lawful interrogations.
- Continue to mandate that only trained and certified interrogators question detainees.

The History and Future of Interrogation

Currently, military interrogators come from basic military training with no truly discriminating assessment and selection processes in place. This is not to say there are no effective, motivated, and high-quality military interrogators, but rather that there are not enough. A more rigorous assessment, selection, and recruitment process—plus some retention incentives—would keep the bar high in order to run a world-class interrogation program.

During World War II, America possessed a highly qualified, multilingual interrogation corps, often utilizing experienced law enforcement officers. This was not novel. The art of questioning resistant individuals in order to gain useful information has a very long history. World War II perhaps demonstrated the epitome of the art.

After World War II ended, the U.S. military conducted few combatant interrogations. Our experiences in Korea and Vietnam included relatively few U.S.-run interrogations. In fact, because of the treatment of captured U.S. personnel in Korea, the U.S. military put more effort into studying how to train resistance to interrogation than it did into interrogation techniques. As the U.S. military began to neglect interrogation, the Central Intelligence Agency began a study into various interrogation methods, but much of that study has become the focus of controversy.

In 2006, the Intelligence Science Board released *Educing Information*, an important book on the state of our scientific knowledge on gathering information from other human beings. What is perhaps most remarkable is the limited knowledge that currently exists in this area. After thousands of years of interrogation, there is very little scientific underpinning of our current military doctrine. Any student of the science, the art, or the politics of interrogation should read this book, as it is an extremely comprehensive review of what we know, and more definitively, what we do not know. Some of its general themes are relevant here.

The first is that most individuals who have studied interrogation—including interrogators, historians, and scientists—believe that abusive and coercive interrogations are not reliable in gathering accurate information. The second theme is contained in one of the chapter abstracts:

Essentially none of the interrogation techniques used by U.S. personnel over the past half-century has been subjected to scientific or systematic inquiry or evaluation, and the accuracy of educed information can be compromised by the way it is obtained. By contrast, a promising body of social science research on persuasion and interpersonal influence could provide a foundation for a more effective approach to educing information in intelligence-gathering contexts. There is a great deal of scientific knowledge on persuasion and interpersonal influence that has not been used in the formal development of interrogation strategies and techniques.

What then can we say about the actual interrogation techniques allowed by FM 2-22.3? There is little history concerning the origins and development of these techniques. It is believed they were first listed following the end of World War II. Essentially, the field manual sets forth certain rudimentary prescribed techniques—direct questioning, limited incentives, and “false flag”—on which there has been no social science research assessing their effectiveness at gathering useful, accurate information.

The unimaginative strictures of the FM prohibit other techniques for conducting effective interrogations that are within the framework of democratic values, such as the creative yet benign “negotiation theory.” Negotiation theory is an effective tool in building interpersonal trust and communication, but it requires a patient interrogator who has the training, skills, and authority to negotiate with a detainee.

Police departments around the world are implementing newer, less coercive techniques. The following article from the *New York Times* gives one example:

Until recently, police departments have had little solid research to guide
their instincts. But now forensic scientists have begun testing techniques they hope will give officers, interrogators and others a kind of honesty screen, an improved method of sorting doctored stories from truthful ones.

The new work focuses on what people say, not how they act. It has already changed police work in other countries, and some new techniques are making their way into interrogations in the United States. . . But the science is evolving fast. [Scientists] at Göteborg University in Sweden are finding that challenging people with pieces of previously gathered evidence, gradually introduced throughout an investigative interview, increases the strain on liars. And it all can be done without threats or abuse, which is easier on officers and suspects.27

More dramatically, in their initial successful interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, the FBI agents on-scene used a version of the negotiation method: Zubaydah was stabilized at the nearest hospital, and the F.B.I. continued its questioning using its typical rapport-building techniques. An agent showed him photographs of suspected Al-Qaeda members until Zubaydah finally spoke up, blurting out that “Moktar,” or Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, had planned 9/11. He then proceeded to lay out the details of the plot. America learned the truth of how 9/11 was organized because a detainee had come to trust his captors after they treated him humanely.28

Unfortunately, most of the effective and lawful techniques employed by the FBI will be unavailable to military interrogators under the current constraints of the field manual and executive order. A final reason to change FM 2-22.3’s prescriptive approach is that simply adding prohibitions does little to stop potential abuses from occurring. Such rules often do not affect those bent on abusing prisoners or the conditions that give rise to their doing so. As repeated investigations into alleged abuses demonstrate, military interrogators are rarely the source of the problem. Poor leadership, bad morale,
lack of oversight, and simple “bad actors” are the root of such problems. We should mandate that all agencies in all our countries do not subscribe to the mantra ‘What would Jack Bauer do?’

Justice Scalia responded with a defense of Agent Bauer, arguing that law enforcement officials deserve latitude in times of great crisis. “Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles . . . He saved hundreds of thousands of lives,” Judge Scalia reportedly said. “Are you going to convict Jack Bauer?” He then posed a series of questions to his fellow judges: “Say that criminal law is against him? You have the right to a jury trial? Is any jury going to convict Jack Bauer?”

“I don’t think so,” Scalia reportedly answered himself. “So the question is really whether we believe in these absolutes. And ought we believe in these absolutes.”


15. Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Conclusion 19: “The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few Soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate them appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 2 December 2002 authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques and subsequent interrogation policies and plans approved by senior military and civilian officials conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody. What followed was an erosion in standards dictating that detainees be treated humanely…” <http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/>.


17. FM 22-3, para. 8-3.

18. In “U.S. Weighs Special Team of Terrorism Interrogators,” Gorman indicates that professional interrogators find FM 2-22.3 less relevant for their work with high-value targets. “That’s good for 18-year-olds who need an operator’s manual in the field,” an official told Gorman, “but you want to have a spectrum of things, and to know what the borders are—what you can’t do.”


22. Ibid., xiv.

23. Ibid., 17.

24. Ibid., 18.

25. Ibid., xii.

26. Ibid., 267, Daniel L. Shapiro, Ph.D., “Negotiation Theory and Practice: Exploring Ideas to Aid Information Education” (Harvard University, February 2006).


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HOW DO YOU measure economic development progress in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign? Clearly, one should conduct some sort of rigorous assessment to answer this imposing question. Everyone up the chain of command, all the way to congressional appropriators, demands assessments of COIN actions—and rightfully so. In simple terms, we all want to know if what we are doing (and paying for) is working.

When the 25th Infantry Division served in Iraq as the headquarters for Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) from December 2008 to December 2009, the staff implemented a new concept known as OTES. Pronounced “Otis,” it stands for Operations, Targeting, and Effects Synchronization.\(^1\) Division staff members worked in one of four “enduring effects work groups,” one group for each line of effort in the campaign plan: security, governance, economics, and Iraqi Security Forces. The economics work group, charged with developing the commercial landscape of northern Iraq, grappled with how to assess economic progress and gauge the impact of our command’s initiatives.

We thought about assessments from the U.S. and Iraqi perspectives: was U.S. money spent on U.S. initiatives making a difference for Iraqis; and, was U.S. money, coupled with Iraqi money and effort and spent on Iraqi initiatives, making a difference for Iraqis? As we began to think about the problem, we speculated on Iraqi perceptions. If an Iraqi made more money in the present than in the past, would he consider himself better off economically? The easy answer would seem to be “yes.” However, what if the Iraqi’s salary went up 10 percent but the prices of consumer goods rose 20 percent? Or fuel prices rose 20 percent? Or the extortion costs to stay safe in business rose 20 percent? Clearly, the friction of war makes the difficult job of assessing economic health even harder. What pieces of information are most important—actual costs? attitudes? safety? job availability? access to job training? Measuring such things in a country emerging from regime change, wrestling with democracy, sitting on the world’s fourth largest oil reserve, suffering in the midst of sectarian violence, and lagging behind the rest of the world in education and training was concerning.\(^2\) We postulated that these

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PHOTO: A Baghdad restaurant owner thanks MAJ Sharon Falke for the $2,500 grant that restored his business, 8 August 2007, U.S. Army.

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**Measuring Economic Development in a COIN Environment**

**Lieutenant Colonel Nancy E. Blacker, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Charlie H. Kim, U.S. Army**
outside, yet real, factors would skew the results of our actions, even though the same initiatives are the ingredients for positive results in COIN doctrine.\textsuperscript{3} The friction cannot be underestimated. It makes the task of assessment quite complex.

The most difficult task in measuring economic development is simply gaining access to reliable data. In the United States, researchers often commission a survey designed to gather the target data (such as a written survey, personal interview, focus group discussion, phone survey, etc.) All of these methods become more difficult in a foreign country where travel and trust are major issues. Throw in the dynamics of COIN, sectarian violence, and hostility, and one has a recipe for unreliable results. Thus, determining if a certain economic strategy is working requires patience, tolerance of ambiguity, and collaboration across cultural chasms between the Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies.

\textbf{Operational and Tactical Measures of Economic Progress}

Organizations that survey extensively (such as Gallup) are not common in the Middle East, so contractors are often hired to perform necessary survey-related functions in COIN environments. The division staff had little control over how it received data, except for that collected through busy subordinate units. We relied on data pushed to us from the corps headquarters, which contracted Gallup workers, and we sought data from our U.S. interagency partners. This proved difficult.

The hurdles to gain access to data from our interagency partners grew as we navigated through the U.S. bureaucracy. For example, we wanted to contact the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to find out how many jobs they created across MND-N. We first posed the question using military liaison officer channels, but were told such information did not exist. We then asked USAID contacts we had cultivated while working with provincial reconstruction teams. We learned that USAID had at least eight (if not more) implementing partners. Each partner had different rules governing the release of information outside the reporting channels agreed upon in their respective government contracts.

This is not a criticism of USAID but rather of U.S. government bureaucracy. USAID has done superb work in Iraq and has achieved tremendous tangible results. The problem lies mired in a lack of policy at the national level. While much of the national security strategy speaks of cooperation and coordination among government agencies, the execution of this strategy is not well developed. No central hub for economic information sharing exists, so we were unable to access economic development data representing the work of all U.S. government entities operating in Iraq.\textsuperscript{4}

The Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division and attached units (Task Force Lightning) provided or enabled a secure environment in northern Iraq that supported projects of USAID and numerous other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. Indeed, they could not have completed their projects without our help. Task Force Lightning was jointly responsible for creating the conditions to enable jobs. To provide higher headquarters accurate assessments of the effects of military engagements, we needed a picture of all U.S. government efforts to create employment in MND-N. We did not endeavor to take credit for the jobs created by USAID or any other U.S. government entity, but to give an accurate picture, we needed the sum total of success between Task Force Lightning and interagency partners. However, the opacity of employment data in the battle space from those partners precluded this. Obtaining accurate data through collaboration with other agencies proved difficult, if not impossible.

We based our assessments largely on the polls conducted by higher headquarters; however, corps did not afford us transparent knowledge of...
the polling method or data we received. Corps had contracted with an international polling organization, which subcontracted down through several levels and ended up employing local Iraqis as pollsters. Under prevailing wisdom, using Iraqis to gather data from other Iraqis would engender the trust necessary for candor in answering questions. While we certainly saw the logic in this argument, we had no information to gauge whether the conventional wisdom was correct. Too many factors were uncontrollable and likely unknowable. How were the pollsters trained? What kind of quality control did the polling contractor exercise? What kind of quality control did corps exercise? Clearly, Iraqi answers might be different depending on how the subcontractors posed the questions, but were the subcontractors savvy enough to have taken cultural norms and biases into account?

We were concerned not only with how the poll was conducted, but also with its timing. If the survey followed an incident involving loss of Iraqi life (intended or not), the responses might be biased. For example, if an insurgent bombed a marketplace, besides killing innocent victims, damaging physical structures, and disrupting commerce, the event could also quell activity at nearby markets. Because of the bombing, shopkeepers might change their hours and residents might change their route to work and corresponding shopping habits.

We were also unsure if the respondents were a demographically representative sample. Was there an appropriate mix of urban and rural citizens? Did pollsters survey citizens in their homes or at a central hub?

We anticipated that all hostile acts, large or small, taken in total, would have a chilling effect on consumer behavior, business development, and the economy writ large. Did the survey accurately capture total effects?

Our analytical process also looked at subjective data gathered by provincial reconstruction team partners from the State Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and from other U.S. government agencies such as the
Department of Energy. Unlike the Department of Defense (DOD), which is partial to objective data, the Department of State seems to prefer subjective prose. Both departments’ methods have advantages and disadvantages. No consensus existed on how to merge the data.

Additionally, the various cabinet departments and their representatives doing work in Iraq reported their accomplishments through separate channels. While every agency seemed to be doing yeoman’s work, it was not always coordinated. Agencies at all levels tried to be more collaborative, but these efforts were not officially mandated until late in our deployment. Even then, the collaboration was embryonic and somewhat erratic. It was like a football team conducting pregame warm-ups with several offensive configurations. Each offensive unit might perform an effective pregame routine, but when the game starts the team can only win with one well-coordinated offense and one head coach.

For example, when USAID spent U.S. dollars through one of its many programs to benefit a particular economic sector, it did not always communicate this to DOD or other U.S. agencies (nor was it required to). When our brigades gathered data about economic progress, they might report the results of a USAID project through military channels without knowing the source of its funding. Consequently, the results were rolled into military reports and were double-counted through separate channels. While the results were good, the accounting methodology was not.

We colloquially called this phenomenon “informational stovepiping.” Each agency gathers and analyzes data and makes recommendations to its respective superiors. Interestingly, multiple agencies analyze the same common data sources and produce reports with the same data, filtered through different people, determining different results, with no “honest broker” to note discrepancies. Officials in theater and Washington made decisions bearing on our mission in Iraq using this imperfect system. Recommendations flowing through the division commander to U.S. Central Command may have resulted from a slightly different analysis of the same or similar information as recommendations that went to the U.S. ambassador. This situation risks different decision makers in Washington receiving different (or perhaps worse—double counted) information stemming from the same events on the ground.
A political advisor assigned from the U.S. embassy could have helped in overcoming the informational stovepiping, but did not arrive at MND-N until several months into our deployment. The previous division in command of MND-N, 1st Armored Division, did not have a political advisor for at least the last three to four months of its rotation. Such an advisor is a likely windfall of information and an efficiency multiplier for the command. Based solely on our experiences in MND-N, however, one might conclude that a political advisor was not necessary to assist in understanding and reporting economic effects in a counterinsurgency fight.

The political advisor is in the unique position to coordinate directly with the Department of State, but has no written policy regarding channels of coordination related to economic development. Neither does the military have any doctrine regarding the utilization of a political advisor other than the broad statement in Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency: “The political advisor’s job is to help shape the environment.” Our political advisor did an admirable job. The problem is that no formal mechanism for collaboration exists between DOD and the Department of State at the division level. There is no Department of State equivalent to the division commander. (Also, the Department of State provided no economic advisor—only a political advisor.) Our division commander did a fantastic job of collaborating, but he made it happen through his own energy and not through any official expectation of synchronized effort. Through his guidance, we collaborated with outside sources that generously provided economic development data (in addition to invaluable input from our own brigades). We collaborated directly with the U.S. Embassy economics section, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and various other U.S. government sources through our internal efforts—not doctrine, not policy, and not execution orders through higher military channels.

**Analytical Considerations and Efforts**

Aside from our reporting channels and collaboration initiatives, what other factors should we have considered in our analysis? We did not consider access to health care and how that may have affected the economic well-being of our operating environment. We marginally considered environmental factors and spent much energy trying to discover information about recycling. We found that recycling had been studied, which resulted in a funded project (and even an article in a military-related publication). However, when we followed up on the project to evaluate its impact on the community, we found that it had been abandoned.

Unfortunately, this experience proved typical. Both military and civilian organizations would diligently launch well-intentioned projects that were not monitored or followed up. Moreover, “lessons learned,” an ingrained concept in the military to capture and disseminate valuable lessons, did not readily offer economic development success stories at the strategic or operational level. We practiced a new “rapid adaptation initiative” across our operating area to swiftly share best practices, but we did not have the historic perspective to inform and shape our approach and subsequently measure economic development. We conducted biweekly meetings with the provincial reconstruction teams (five in MND-N) and subordinate brigades to share economic and governance-related activities and effects, but we had no liaison with larger strategic efforts from other agencies that might be affecting economic development in our area. We had no information from higher to give us a clear common operating picture of accomplishments by the World Bank, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, or even DOD-sponsored third parties. This lack of information left a gap of knowledge for analyzing economic development in northern Iraq.

Our brigades disbursed Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) monies as directed by law for such things as short-term employment programs that contributed to the environmental health of the community (e.g., trash pick-up, and more elaborate trash collection systems involving much effort and engineering between Iraqi and U.S. personnel). This effort took monumental amounts of time, money, and man-hours and had a significant effect in several provinces. While expensive, it was one of the tangible good news stories from a whole-of-government collaboration. For example, such an effort occurred in Mosul through the collaborative efforts of U.S.
military forces, Iraqi forces, and community leaders working tirelessly under dangerous conditions to make Mosul a cleaner and safer place. Since healthy communities are more likely to work, consume, and produce, it made sense to collect data and assess whether or not our collaborative efforts were having a positive effect on the economy. Unfortunately, we did not have enough granularity in our collection methodology to analyze the deep effects of these projects. We looked at short-term employment and decreased violence. One might wonder, in light of the stovepipes mentioned previously, how many effects were double-counted or not considered at all.

In addition, we did not look in depth at youth initiatives—sports, arts, and life-skills programs—and how those affected the local economy. Our brigades and USAID were involved in youth initiatives in direct and positive ways, yet we did not have anything other than anecdotal evidence on how such actions affected the local economy. We had data on employment numbers (short-term jobs) and the number of participants. Perhaps getting a young adult (13 to 15 years old) involved in sports or the arts could change the focus of that person and those he influenced from participating in the insurgency to participating in the local economy, but we did not gather any data to find out the attitudes of young adults involved in sports or the arts. We collected data from our brigades on increasing or decreasing violence in their respective areas of responsibility. However, we had no data to indicate that the money spent on sports and arts decreased violence, increased retail market activity, or influenced any other economic indicator. We believed that the two were tied together (based on assessments from operators on the ground), but we had no empirical data to turn this assumption into a fact. This presents a Catch-22 dilemma—on one hand, the counterinsurgency manual cautions against relying too heavily on numbers; yet on the other hand, we (the military institution, writ large) must present data to the appropriators and government accounting officials in D.C. to ensure value comes from dollars spent.

Because dollars for national defense increasingly reflect a whole-of-government approach, it is vital for analysts at divisions and corps to account for the activities of all actors in a given area of operations. As we stated above, youth initiatives aim to influence the recruiting base for insurgents—the host nation’s youth. In many instances, several actors were simultaneously focusing on programs for this young adult repository of enemy recruiting. Again, good programs began because of assessments shared through stovepiped chains, making it difficult for us to gauge the impact we were having and difficult for decision makers in Washington to fully appreciate the whole-of-government effect on the Iraqi economy.

Since many young adults (among other groups of the population) were out of work, we conducted a weighted analysis on unemployment numbers and underemployment estimates. Yet we had vastly different statistics from different sources (e.g., United Nations, The World Bank, USAID, corps studies, etc.). In fact, the data was so wildly varied (18 to 65 percent unemployment) it was difficult to come to any meaningful conclusions. We surmised that one of the reasons for the large variation included differing definitions of “unemployed” among Western, Iraqi, World Bank, and United Nations analysts. The definition of “underemployed” proved tricky, as well. (Does “underemployed” mean a credentialed physician employed as a dishwasher? Or does “underemployed” mean a capable employee working 20 hours per week instead of 40 hours per week?) Additionally, we had to juxtapose our conclusions against the common Iraqi perception that working on a public works project was still
“unemployed” or “underemployed” because the employer was not the Iraqi government. Obviously, employment and unemployment statistics were precarious bits of data on which to base conclusions.

From the polling results, we also analyzed perceptions of salary, security, and government assistance for job creation. We routinely cross-referenced these results with subjective assessments from the provincial reconstruction teams. One of the problems we saw with this methodology was that the teams reported only anecdotal evidence they gathered in areas to which they had full access (at least for 11 of the 12 months of our rotation). The reports did not include data from provincial areas to which they had no access—presumably areas to which the Gallup pollsters might freely travel. Thus, our analysis was not a true composite representation because it lacked comparable access to all areas.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Nevertheless, we used the available data gathered by resources on hand to come up with conclusions and recommendations for our command. We shared the data with our brigades and provincial reconstruction team partners. Clearly, had we been able to access more raw data from other governmental and nongovernmental agencies, we could have refined our conclusions. We believe such access will enable future staff officers to make better recommendations for command decisions.

In retrospect, even without that access, we could improve our methodology. How do we better deal with constraints hampering meaningful assessments? We could use different metrics. We could measure the percentage of progress on all projects in our operational area, whether funded by the U.S. military (using CERP dollars) or by other agencies. We could rely solely on provincial reconstruction team and subordinate brigade reports. We could rely solely on the polling data. We recommend, however, a hybrid of all of these sources, and integrated statistics from other U.S. agencies and international agencies.

Before we departed Iraq, the corps commander and the ambassador directed us to work with all the provincial reconstruction teams in MND-N to
develop a unified common plan. Collaborating on the unified common plan proved to be an excellent beginning to facilitate sharing information in the future. However, because it does not apply to USAID, USDA, other agencies, and DOD organizations at higher levels, it will not create a culture change for the efficient sharing of information. We recommend that all agencies involved in funding economic development in stability operations develop a unified common plan endorsed at the departmental level.

We acknowledge that we can never expect to collect perfect data. In a COIN environment, friction will always play a factor. Not only is it difficult to collect information in a hostile operating environment, but also to collaborate with U.S. government agencies who are not accustomed or required to share information with the military. To compensate for this tendency, we recommend continuing the conversation at Joint and agency levels to share data related to funding economic development projects.

We also recommend some entity (we called it “joint interagency economic development” in our conversations) be commissioned as a data collector, data repository, and central think tank to guide the planning, execution, and assessment of economic development in the COIN environments of the future. MR

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3. “COIN forces succeed by eliminating turbulence and helping the host nation meet the populace’s basic needs. . . . Success requires military forces engaged in COIN operations to . . . conduct or participate in political, social, informational, and economic programs.” U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), para. 2-6, 2-2.

4. The SIGIR (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction) reports provided much information and were a potential data source, but they were hampered by the same statistical obstacles we highlight in this paper.


6. This is an example where a project might be counted as 100 percent expended and complete for the SIGIR report—and it would be accurate—but the result is that the expenditure ultimately did not have the intended positive effect.

7. Normal rotations, insurgent activity, and new directions from new provincial reconstruction team leaders or military commanders accounted for some of this lack of monitoring and follow up.
Controlling the Human High Ground
Identifying Cultural Opportunities for Insurgency

Major Mark J. Broekhuizen, U.S. Marine Corps

RECENTLY, GENERAL DAVID Petraeus said, “The core of any counterinsurgency strategy must focus on the fact that the decisive terrain is the human terrain, not the high ground or river crossing.” While this statement is clearly true, we must deepen our understanding to identify the high ground of that human terrain. Only after identifying and establishing control of this key human terrain will we be able to achieve the population influence required for successful counterinsurgency.

The occurrence of insurgencies has been described as a function of “motive and opportunity.” Specifically, cultural motives can contribute to the causes of an insurgency. Eliminating these cultural motives for insurgency is the oft-espoused objective of the military’s cultural training and analysis. But this training and analysis must also account for the opportunities required for an insurgency to occur. Just as a physical terrain analysis is used to identify key terrain on the battlefield, an analysis of cultural opportunities for insurgency can be used to identify the key human terrain. An understanding of operational culture can support identification and control of this human high ground.

References to the role of culture in counterinsurgency are often used in the context of how populations are impacted by the counterinsurgent’s operations. The common logic of this approach is that a counterinsurgent who fails to understand the local culture may conduct his mission in a manner that violates a local custom or taboo. The result of this violation may be that the counterinsurgent’s efforts are viewed as illegitimate and result in rebellion against him. The counterinsurgent has inadvertently sparked new motives for insurgency. In response to this dynamic, cultural analysis and training can limit these violations and reduce local resistance.

While this removal of motive has obvious merit, identifying and eliminating a motive for behavior may be more difficult than simply eliminating the opportunity for that behavior. For example, the looting after the fall of Baghdad was not necessarily the result of a new motive, but...
a new opportunity allowed by the decrease in law and order. In general, we must distinguish between criminal or insurgent activity that is in response to a new motive and that which is merely the response to a new opportunity.

Since opportunities are more readily reduced than motives, understanding cultural opportunities for insurgency should take precedence over cultural motives during our cultural training and analysis. Since insurgents are often locally or regionally based, their initial levels of cultural understanding undoubtedly add to their overall “information advantage.” As limited resources constrain both the counterinsurgent and insurgent’s use of force to establish population control, they must each identify the most culturally effective strategies. By identifying cultural opportunities for insurgency, the counterinsurgent can reduce the insurgent’s information advantage and prioritize his own efforts.

In its simplest form, an insurgency is a battle between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent (also referred to here as the “state”) for control of the population. Control of the population allows the state to overcome its information disadvantage while the same control allows the insurgents to overcome their force disadvantage.

Even absent an insurgency, states are not always capable of penetrating and controlling all of their populations. States can have difficulty maintaining a monopoly on violence, and may not be able to displace local strongmen operating on different rules. The weakness of the state provides the opportunity for resistance or insurgency. Logically, we can then assume that any element of the population not under the state’s control represents a cultural opportunity for the insurgent. The counterinsurgent must understand how an insurgent can exploit this available cultural space and deny him the chance.

To survive and win, insurgencies need inputs—recruits, materiel, food, etc. The manner they seek these inputs can be numerous and culturally specific. Insurgent inputs are a result of opportunities allowed by the counterinsurgent or the structural environment and can be obtained from within the conflict area or outside it. In some cases, the environment may simply not allow the counterinsurgent to limit all insurgent inputs. An example of this is the availability of insurgent safe havens beyond national borders. However, if the counterinsurgent understands and controls the cultural opportunities within the country, the insurgent seeking safety in a cross-border haven may find he is becoming irrelevant.

Outputs are as important to the growth of an insurgency as inputs. Outputs may be activities aimed at acquiring new inputs (recruits, tax revenues, etc.) or at attacking the state’s ability to maintain its control of the population, thereby creating new opportunities to grow. Like inputs, outputs take culturally specific forms. An example is the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq, by Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This output decreased the state’s monopoly of force by increasing sectarian fighting. The insurgents did not target a physical or symbolic element of the state, but indirectly targeted the state’s (and coalition forces’) ability to maintain control of the population through a culturally specific opportunity. The resulting decrease in the state’s control of the population allowed Al-Qaeda greater opportunity to recruit and grow.

A Map for the Human Terrain

Any discussion of a topic as opaque as culture must include definitions of key terms. While such definitions can be the topic of much debate, the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning provides the definitions necessary for this article. The center defines “culture” as “[t]he shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influence a person’s and a group’s actions and choices.” Of more concern to the counterinsurgent is “operational culture,” which the center defines as “[t]hose aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military actions that influence the culture of an area of operations.” The center refines it by identifying five key dimensions of operational culture—“physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure and belief systems.” These five dimensions provide an effective model for identifying cultural opportunities for insurgent inputs and outputs.

Physical Environment

All insurgencies need a supportive physical environment to grow and survive. The physical environment consists of such elements as food, shelter, water, land, climate, fuel, and power.
Neither the state nor the insurgent can control all these elements. Therefore, the state must attempt to control those environmental inputs without which the insurgent cannot survive. For example, during the Malayan Emergency, the Malayan Communist Party relied on inputs of rice from Chinese “squatters” to sustain them in the jungle. In response, the British enforced strict rice controls and achieved the effect of “starving the guerrillas out.”

Land itself may be the most difficult element of the physical environment to control, as insurgents can often retreat to mountainous, desert, or jungle terrain that is difficult to reach. However, it might also be the most insignificant, for insurgents need access to the population. As the British in Malaya demonstrated, targeting and controlling access to the people is more important than controlling the land.

**Economy**

The state often lacks the ability or the will to control all elements of its economy, resulting in an “informal economy” that involves illegal and unregulated goods and services. The state by definition lacks control of the informal economy, which presents a cultural opportunity for the insurgents. First, he obtains needed money. Second, insurgent control of the informal economic sector can deteriorate the formal sector, an output that further undermines this element of state control. Insurgents can exploit such culturally specific opportunities within the informal economy like hawala networks to transfer funds and receive funds from external sources. Because the insurgents in Iraq controlled much of the fuel distribution routes, they were able to profit substantially from the sale of black market fuel.

Identifying insurgent economic opportunities can be challenging. In some cultures, corruption and bribery are an “accepted way of doing business.” While these illegal transactions can provide a source for insurgent revenue, they are also often confused with culturally accepted patronage. In many cases, the counterinsurgent mistakes such legitimate patronage for criminal or insurgent behavior and

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**Image Description:**

A U.S. Army first lieutenant and his translator speak with an Afghan during a patrol through Kandigal Village, Afghanistan, 15 December 2009.
misidentifies a patron as an insurgent. As patrons can be holders of social or political power, such mistakes can create new cultural opportunities for the insurgents to exploit.

Insurgents also pursue outputs aimed at exploiting economic opportunities such as kidnapping affluent citizens. These actions simultaneously demonstrate the state’s inability to protect them and allow the insurgent to gain inputs from ransoms. If they conduct the same operations against members of the state’s control infrastructure (i.e. police), they can create even more space to grow. Insurgents can also collect rents for “protection.” The insurgents gain income from these rents and the “protection” they provide is an output that effectively replaces the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. It serves as one more step by which the insurgents supersede the state. By understanding economic opportunities, the counterinsurgent can focus efforts on controlling them to force the insurgent to use harsher methods to extract economic inputs from the population. This undermines the insurgency’s popular support and can serve as a new motive to support the state.

**Social Structures**

Social structures also provide cultural opportunities for the state and the insurgent. Social structures are a “set of organized relationships or ties among people.” These relationships could be organized around characteristics of age, gender, tribe, class, ethnicity, and religious lines. In Malaya, the British understood the insurgency was concentrated within a sub-ethnic group of Chinese and was able to target that group. In the 1990s, Saddam Hussein recognized the limited authority of tribal sheiks and exploited tribal affiliation to strengthen his social control. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, gender played a significant role in targeting social structures for control. Specifically, coalition forces heavily targeted young men while cultural constraints prevented significant contact or searching of Iraqi females by males. Unsearched females were a significant opportunity for insurgents until culturally acceptable measures were put in place to remove it.

The counterinsurgent must recognize the opportunities certain groups present to the insurgent and prioritize its efforts to help these groups resist insurgent control. Given the counterinsurgent’s information disadvantage, this type of cultural knowledge is critical. As with criminal profiling, understanding social structures allows the counterinsurgent to more effectively target specific elements of the population. The importance of age and gender are obvious when considering that the young adult male population is so often the target of insurgent recruiting efforts. Religious groups can also be the target of insurgent recruiting. For example, although the majority of Salafi Muslims are not extremists, many Islamic extremists are Salafi, an association that gives them another cultural opportunity to exploit.

A recent example of a social structure opportunity for the counterinsurgent is the partnered efforts with Sunni tribes to combat Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The success of this alliance demonstrates effective targeting of a social group to support the counterinsurgency. In this manner, social structures can present cultural opportunities for the state or the insurgent to increase control over the population.

**Political Structures**

Political structures also provide cultural opportunities. Political structures are “[t]he way that power and leadership is apportioned to people, and exercised, according to the social structure of the society.” States are often incapable of consolidating political power in the society, leaving a void that an insurgent group can fill. This was apparent in Iraq. After the removal of the Ba’ath Party, as many new holders of political power...
emerged, some supported the state but many did not. These holders of political power may be tribal leaders, business owners, labor unions, or religious leaders. Identifying the holders of nonstate political power and coopting them is a proven counterinsurgency approach. For example, as American leaders struggled to gain control of the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, they executed a policy of “benevolent assimilation” by providing “greatly expanded opportunities for political power to elites.” However, the counterinsurgent must use caution if the support of nonstate holders of power involves supporting local strongmen or warlords. The warlords could actually end up contesting the state or other groups for power.

Belief Systems

A culture’s belief systems include history, imagined memory, folklore, icons, symbols and communication, rituals, norms, mores and taboos, and religious beliefs. Belief systems matter, and the counterinsurgent must understand their influence. For example, Hindu “untouchables” had dramatic motives for rebellion at the bottom of the Indian caste system, but often did not because their values and their environments were synchronized. If the counterinsurgent’s policy is not in accordance with the population’s belief systems, the disequilibrium provides a cultural opportunity for the insurgent even if that policy is part of his own agenda. He translates the disequilibrium into the motive he also requires to recruit.

Belief system opportunities can also be converted into inputs and outputs for the insurgency. For example, insurgents may attempt to use memory and folklore. Consider the Sunni-insurgent group that adopted the name “1920 Revolutionary Brigade” in an attempt to gain legitimacy by capitalizing on the popularity of the 1920 revolt against the British. But with cultural understanding, the counterinsurgent can establish control of belief system opportunities before the insurgent can exploit them. By promising independence in Malaya, the British denied the communists the opportunity to exploit anti-colonialist beliefs. Al-Qaeda in Iraq attempted to exploit belief system opportunities by claiming that it was the duty of Muslims to fight coalition forces, while the counterinsurgents did the same by claiming it
was a tribal duty to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Some circumstances simply prevent counterinsurgent efforts from being completely compatible with existing belief systems. This may be the case with the presence of a foreign occupation force that cannot overcome the perception that it is present merely for the intrusive influence of a third country. A successful insurgency will take advantage of this and exploit a belief system opportunity that neither the state nor the foreign counterinsurgency force can counter without risking its own power.  

Making Motives Irrelevant

Insurgents take advantage of countless individual motives to pursue greater control of their environments, to pursue economic gain, to obtain social or political power, or act in accordance with their beliefs. But while these motives for insurgency are necessary, they alone are not sufficient. Any effective counterinsurgency strategy will aim to reduce these motives for insurgency, but attempting to address motives without control of the population will simply result in more opportunities for the insurgent to exploit.

The fact that an insurgency exists at all indicates state weakness and open political space for the insurgent to exploit. The counterinsurgent’s primary objective must be to identify this available space and establish control of it without inciting popular resistance. By denying or limiting the opportunities for insurgents, these motives can be made irrelevant in the short term. Understanding cultural opportunities for insurgency should therefore be the primary focus of cultural training and a key requirement for planning counterinsurgency operations. MR

NOTES

1. GEN David H. Petraeus, “Afghanistan is Hard All the Time, But It’s Doable,” The Times, 18 September 2009.
6. Ibid., 45.
8. Ibid., 322.
11. Ibid., 40.
12. Leites and Wolf, 32.
13. Ibid., 32.
14. Ibid., 53.
15. Salomini and Holmes-Eber, 36.
16. Ibid., 15.
17. Ibid., 51-52.
20. Ibid., 51.
21. Salomini and Holmes-Eber, 76.
23. Ibid., 5.
24. Ibid., 3.
25. Salomini and Holmes-Eber, 78.
27. Salomini and Holmes-Eber, 81.
28. Ibid., 105.
29. Ibid., 111.
32. Salomini and Holmes-Eber, 147.
35. Salomini and Holmes-Eber, 167-199.
37. Komer, 64.
Dealing with Absolutes

Religion, the Operational Environment, and the Art of Design

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Joshua conquered the whole land. He defeated the kings of the hill country, the eastern slopes, and the western foothills, as well as those of the dry country to the south. He spared no one; everyone was put to death. This was what the Lord God had commanded.¹

— Joshua 10:40

When the sacred months are over, slay the idolaters wherever you find them. Arrest them, besiege them, and lie in ambush everywhere for them. If they repent and take to prayer and render the alms levy, allow them to go their way. God is forgiving and merciful.²

— Koran, Sura 9:5

M Y DISCUSSION HERE examines the effects of religion on the operational environment and how planners and commanders may use the concept of Design to gain a deeper situational understanding of the role religion plays in motivating and justifying actions in this environment.

Design and Ideological Mobilizations

Recently, the U.S. Army has recognized the need for a broader understanding of the complex environments in which it operates. Consequently, the Army is institutionalizing a more holistic approach that seeks to understand situations in greater breadth and depth with an aim to find deeper and more durable solutions to complex problems. This process, known as Design, seeks to understand by “framing” a given situation within a context. When the situation changes, planners will “reframe” a perspective against a more relevant context. Practitioners of Design include not only traditional military, political, and environmental factors in their analysis and synthesis, but also broader areas of human endeavor such as history, culture, society, and religion.³

The method of Design is useful to strategic planners only if it facilitates a more accurate understanding of reality and therefore fosters helpful modifications to operational plans. Fully understanding the role of religion
in a given situation or event goes beyond simple rational understanding. It includes accepting and apprehending other modes of human perception, exchange, and discourse. These modes include emotional empathy and consideration of other opinions—even those opinions that lie outside the parameters of traditional Western logic, judgments, perceptions, and intuitions.

Planners tend to approach their work in a rigorously logical, methodical, process-oriented manner best exemplified by formalized military staff processes such as the Joint Operations Planning Process and the U.S. Army’s Military Decision Making Process. A process approach can be very good for straightforward (linear) actions such as force-on-force operations. However, such process approaches are ill-suited to community-centered action in which force has second-and third-order (or greater) effects which often undermine the desired outcomes. If planners seek to understand a human system in which religion plays a significant part, they must remember the inherent complexity of the individual religious experience and its many social dimensions. Specifically, planners and thinkers involved in the Design process should bear in mind the following guidelines when assessing the potential impact of religion on the strategic or operational environment.

Religion as a Presence in the Operational Environment

Although many religions have been used to further political, social, or spiritual aims, I focus on the three monotheistic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These religions tend to be dogmatically exclusivist. They classify people into believers and non-believers. This bifurcated worldview tends to create an “us versus them” mentality, which can foster conditions to justify the use of force against those who have not accepted “the truth.”

Judaism originated as the religion of an ethnic group—the Twelve Tribes of Israel. Throughout its history, Judaism has retained its exclusivist character. It has not been especially keen to convert others. Rather, it has concentrated on preserving the purity of its beliefs and the integrity of its traditions against an often hostile environment. In contrast, Christianity has been a missionary religion from the beginning. An outgrowth of Judaism, it developed by converting others to its views. First, it drew converts from the Jewish community, but soon it welcomed outsiders. Similarly, Islam has been a missionary religion from its beginning. It grew by converting pagans and Christians to its views. The missionary aspect of Christianity and Islam is important because it demonstrates a desire to convert the unenlightened “other” to the “one true faith.” The believer does not come to accept “the other” as he is but seeks to change him for his own good. If “the other” cannot be converted, followers of missionary religions have historically demonstrated a tendency to dismiss, reject, or even attempt to destroy this “other.”

Tenacity of Religion

The tenets of religion are not amenable to rational proof. Significantly, they are also not amenable to rational disproof. Believers hold religious axioms as “true” through the process of “belief”—that is, the psychological act of accepting that certain assumed “facts” correspond to truth based on a “leap of faith.” This process is neither rational nor irrational. It may be described as supra-rational because its object-knowledge of the absolute—and its means-perception through faith—lie beyond the scope of reason. Reason, however, has a role in religion. Once “truths” are accepted, believers use inductive and deductive logic to speculate, expand, clarify, comment, question, and affirm these beliefs. Unfortunately, reason may also serve to justify violence and war in the name of religious faith.

Some anthropologists propose a religious component to human nature. They suggest that an internal mechanism inherent in human nature may compel us to seek explanations for paradoxes and human limitations to cope with despair about mortality. This mechanism propels us to seek answers to ultimate questions. A purely supernatural explanation of these transcendental desires creates values and a worldview that are
consistent with specific religious beliefs. Such an idea was expressed famously by Augustine of Hippo: “You have made us for yourself; and our heart is restless until it rests in you.” Religion is a nearly universal phenomenon. This means that it will likely be a factor, sometimes a very significant one, in situations involving national security.

In contemporary American society, religious faith is mostly a personal matter. Americans find it difficult to conceive of religion as a motivating factor in warfare. However, when considered in the long historical perspective, the social impact of religious belief has been enormous. If we examine the patterns of world history, clearly human societies have been deeply shaped by religious belief. The present state of affairs that has existed in “the West” since the 19th century, where secularism and an attitude of indifference or hostility to religious belief prevail, is atypical of human history as a whole.

Even Marxism with its assessment of traditional religion as “the opium of the masses” failed to extinguish the human need for belief. Instead, it inaugurated a period where millions practiced a kind of materialistic and godless ideology, a “religion” characterized by its own dogmas, orthodoxies, heresies, and saints. Capitalism, with its emphasis on material consumption and lack of any ideal other than the pursuit of profit and wealth, offers even less religious satisfaction than socialism. Although some Western intellectuals have famously declared that “God is dead” and resolved to live with the resulting angst, this has not been a generally accepted reaction to the ubiquitous religious impulse.10

**Significance of Religion**

Religion is primarily significant because it offers answers to the primordial questions of human existence. However, beyond this eschatological and metaphysical aim, religion provides moral and ethical norms for both individual and collective life. In addition, many religions incorporate social norms into their practices which are invested with considerable moral authority. This aspect of religion is significant from the collective perspective. Many would argue that the position of women in Islam, and to a lesser degree in Judaism and Christianity, stems from cultural norms that have gained quasi-religious force. However, also important is that others consider these norms as integral parts of their system of belief.

In addition to theological tenets, most religions, and certainly the three great monotheistic religions, have either developed or adopted a particular worldview. This worldview entails a cosmology, an anthropology, and one or more models for social life. These form the context within which new ideas are accepted, rejected, or modified by the religious tradition. Discoveries in the physical and biological sciences in particular have proved to be a challenge to religion because they have provided rational explanations for natural and human phenomena that do not depend on a religious worldview. The conflict between religiously based worldviews and science is greatest when the religious view involves a fundamentalist interpretation of scripture. An example is the continuing controversy between the scientific theory of evolution and some Christian groups’ theories of intelligent design.11

**Religion and War**

Religion is generally regarded as a force for peace today. However, throughout history, it has served to justify war or even served as a weapon of war. How
is it, then, “mobilized” for war? Certain conditions must exist if religion is to be used as an effective weapon.

First, there must be a community of believers who are willing to take collective action based on their common belief. For example, during the Middle Ages, people identified themselves not by ethnicity but primarily by their religious affiliation—as Christians, Muslims, or Jews. A similar situation exists today in the Balkans where peoples of the same ethnicity, who speak the same language and share essentially one culture, sharply distinguish themselves solely on the basis of religion. The same is true in other areas of the world such as Indonesia and parts of Africa. Although one of the commonly recognized virtues of Islam is that it does not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity, the orthodox Islamic worldview is based on religious discrimination between believer, non-believer, and “People of the Book.”

Another necessary condition is that the group in question must perceive itself as oppressed and that religion offers an option for liberation. For example, a common theme expressed by the militant Muslim Brotherhood is that Muslims were colonized and oppressed by the West because they had not been faithful to Islamic practices. Thus, the solution to their plight is to return to the strict practices of Islam. God himself will then redress any perceived injustices.

Although the conditions discussed are necessary for the use of religion as a weapon, their existence is not sufficient; they do not guarantee that this will occur. They merely create the possibility. The actual use of religion as a weapon occurs as the result of a human decision or series of decisions, judgments that conditions or beliefs do not pre-determine. Religion becomes a weapon of war when it is used as justification for armed violence. This use may be either explicitly intended by religious leaders or may be the interpretation given to certain phrases of scripture or the sayings of religious leaders by others. In any case, religion becomes a weapon because it serves as a powerful motivation to violent action.

The two main tendencies that facilitate the use of religion as a weapon are fundamentalism and proselytism. Fundamentalism promotes a rigid frame of reference that accentuates the differences between believers and “the other.” It also promotes a literalist and inflexible mentality that genuinely believes that “truth” may be grasped and understood as an objective fact. Proselytism actively seeks to change “the other” through conversion. In some cases, the zeal for converting the other may result in offering the vanquished alternatives of either conversion or death. These two forces have been at work for centuries in the complex relationships between the Islamic and Christian worlds.

After the “Age of Enlightenment” in the West, the concept of “secular democracy” largely replaced that of “Christendom.” Thus, today the conflict between religions has been transformed into one of democracy versus Islamic theocracy. In the West, aggressive proselytism of secular democracy is not only part of national agendas, but also that of many nongovernmental organizations promoting “human rights.” Rather than being viewed as a religiously neutral stance, the active promotion of democracy and abstract “human rights”—a secular mentality separate from religiously based ethics—is something many Muslim societies view as alien ideology that competes directly with Islamic moral and religious values. Democracy and the promotion of secular human rights have become for many Muslims an anti-religious “other.”

Religions that maintain certain writings as uniquely inspired by God are preoccupied with interpreting these texts. By definition, their scriptures have eternal validity and authority. Interpretation is amenable to reason, and throughout history scholars of the three great monotheistic faiths have made their names based on specific religious leaders by others.
interpretations of their religious traditions. Closely tied to scriptural interpretation are cultural developments and the history of ideas. One school of interpretation posits that scripture is inspired by God. In extreme cases the sacred text is considered as the very utterance of God.\textsuperscript{15} The other main school of interpretation believes that, although scripture may be divinely inspired, it is neither final nor infallible but subject to interpretation, development, and contextualization.\textsuperscript{16}

Both of these positions are hermeneutical or interpretational frameworks. They both have internal logic, so that their acceptance is a matter of belief. As such, they are not subject to rational confirmation or denial. However, once either position is accepted as a mental framework, reason and logic may be applied to its interpretation and commentary. The extreme school of thought is capable of making religious interpretation susceptible to “weaponization.”

**Fundamentalism and War**

The first of these positions, that scripture is immutable, is commonly known as a fundamentalist position because it bases its views on what it regards as the fundamental, unvarnished version of the sacred texts. Fundamentalist interpretations exist in all three monotheistic religions. The texts of the Jewish scripture, particularly the Torah and the Psalms, as well as Islam’s Koran contain many passages where God prescribes violence against the unfaithful. Many of the Psalms explicitly invoke God’s wrath upon enemies.\textsuperscript{17} Others use bellicose imagery.\textsuperscript{18} Advocates of a fundamentalist interpretation of scripture accept these texts at face value and also place themselves at odds against all other competing positions, both within their own faith and with outsiders.

Advocates of fundamentalism deny the possibility of salvation to those who do not accept their interpretation of their faith; at worst they may advocate violence against “the other.” Fundamentalism has provided an intellectual justification for unjust wars based on religion. For example, the Salafist and Wahhabi schools of Koranic interpretation have been identified as ideological sources of the modern call for “external” jihad and the restoration of an Islamic theocracy. Fundamentalist Judaism calls for the restoration of the Temple of Jerusalem and of the territory of “Greater Israel” in the manner of a theocracy. These two positions are logically irreconcilable, and if unchecked, would make any compromise needed for peacemaking in Palestine impossible. Unfortunately, advocates of these two positions are currently active and influential in the Middle East.

Christianity also has fundamentalist strains, though the Christian texts themselves—the Gospels and the books of the New Testament—are remarkably free from worldly violent pronouncements. Indeed, Jesus himself advocated an extreme form of pacifism and insisted that “my Kingdom is not of this world.”\textsuperscript{19} However, most Christians accept the Jewish scriptures, which they call the “Old Testament,” as a valid—although incomplete—revelation from God. Christians have also used these texts to justify violence in the name of religion.\textsuperscript{20} Despite this tendency, Christianity was in its origin and, for nearly four hundred years, a pacifist religion that abhorred all violence as sinful. Its followers evinced a preference for martyrdom over the most basic right of individual or collective self-defense.

Only with the advent of official status as the religion of the Roman Empire were Christians forced to wrestle with the concept that collective violence in the form of war, may, in some instances, be morally justified. The classic proponent of the idea of the “just war” was Augustine of Hippo.\textsuperscript{21} Thomas Aquinas later developed this idea and, to this day, his work represents the leading Christian justification for war.\textsuperscript{22} His idea of the just war also serves as the basis for the modern Western humanitarian theory of war. Despite very sharp theoretical limitations on both the justification for war and on moral behavior in war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), Christian practice did not follow theory. Christians waged vicious and genocidal wars against enemies of a different religion, unorthodox Christians, and even between Christians of the same persuasion. Militant Christianity bloodied the course of human history in the West.

**Religious Intolerance**

Historically, religious intolerance has been much more prevalent than religious tolerance. However, the majority religion has not always
persecuted or killed the minority. Minority individuals and groups have been left more or less on their own so long as they have remained small and inconspicuous in number. In some cases, members of these groups with rare and useful skills have been accepted and even promoted within the society of the majority so long as they provided necessary services and conformed to the prevailing social mores—including the dominant religious-social complexes. Although most Western democracies take the concept of religious tolerance as an article of faith, that posture is a relative newcomer on the world scene (when observed against the canvas of human history). Most societies have insisted on the practice of their majority religion, the toleration of other religions being limited to isolated cases and a few outsiders.

In Hellenistic times, including—perhaps surprisingly—during the Roman Empire, many religions were tolerated, though the civil authorities normally imposed the official cult of the emperor or the king on all citizens with very few exceptions granted. Indeed, refusal to worship the sovereign became a major cause for martyrdom among Hellenistic Jews and Christians.

The modern Western concept of freedom of conscience is a product of the Enlightenment and flourished only after the Peace of Westphalia put an end to the terrible wars of religion in Europe. Freedom of conscience is closely associated with the gradual secularization and democratization of western Europe and America. Its history reveals the rarity and youth of the concepts involved, and it explains why it is not as generally accepted outside the West as Westerners imagine or wish.

Despite its newness, freedom of conscience and religious toleration have been embraced by much of the international community under the leadership of the West and the world media. These ideals are certainly contrary to ideas of religious absolutism. We have to recognize this fact and understand that theocracy is a perfectly valid and rational alternative to those who accept a worldview that places enormous importance on a particular religious system. A society ordered around absolutist religious values and cultural norms is not amenable to rapid advances in

The author greets Muslim villagers in Afghanistan.
freedom of thought and speech. However, this cultural intractability to Western values does not justify the use of religion as a weapon of war.

As may be seen from our survey of some of the religious attitudes that exist within the monotheistic traditions, a broad cultural understanding of religion and its various social contexts may provide a lens through which the presence of religion and its effects on a given operational environment may be assessed. To accomplish this I offer the following recommendations:

Accept the reality of religion. Religion is neither rational nor irrational; it is supra-rational—beyond the reach of strict reason. However, once the basic tenets of a given religion are accepted, it is usually amenable to rational understanding, and its precepts may be discussed rationally.

Religion will continue to have a profound influence on individual and collective actions. Thus, religion must be recognized as significant even though it is not reducible to rational explanation alone. As Rudolf Otto expressed it, “the object of religious awe or reverence—the tremendum and augustum, cannot be fully determined conceptually: it is non-rational, as is the beauty of a musical composition, which no less eludes complete conceptual analysis.” The acceptance that religion has its own specific category separate from logical reason is very important to the understanding of any situation in which religion plays a part. Such acceptance may be difficult for those accustomed to deal in tangible political realities, especially those guided by modern notions of realpolitik. However, the reality and importance of the religious factor in politics was acknowledged by no less a political analyst than Machiavelli.

All religions must be granted validity, if not from the planner’s philosophical point of view, at least from an empirical perspective. For religious persons, granting validity to another religion—the religion of “the other”—may be a difficult emotional and intellectual task. For nonbelievers, or those for whom religion is not a significant part of their psychic or emotional makeup, recognizing the reality and significance of religious belief may be even more challenging. A useful reminder for planners is this: Even if you do not accept the tenets of a particular religion, they are real to believers. This means that a specific religion is a reality, even if not one’s own.

Recognize that religion deals with absolutes. This is its most intractable quality. The fact that many religions affirm knowledge of absolute truth makes them much more intractable to interactions that require moderation and compromise outside their belief systems. Diplomacy requires that those who hold conflicting positions meet somewhere in a middle ground. This requires flexibility and willingness to compromise. However, many religious figures are revered precisely because of their zealotry and their uncompromising belief. Indeed, many who are regarded as saints by their followers are viewed as fanatics by their opponents. We have to recognize to what extent participants in a given interaction may be willing to compromise. Otherwise, much time and effort may be wasted in a fruitless pursuit of a goal not shared by the parties involved.

Understand that religion has both personal and social aspects. Religion is a complex concept. It has both personal and social aspects. The personal aspects may be significant when they mold the thoughts and actions of key players in political or cultural spheres. These individuals may exercise great influence over their followers. The social aspects are even more significant because they may be influential in motivating collective actions. In many places and situations, religious identity is often the most significant source of collective identity.

Understand that religion consists of theological beliefs and cultural norms. The word religion encompasses a wide range of meanings and refers to more than theological concepts. It also provides norms for personal and collective conduct, a system of ostensibly “moral” values. Many religions include ancillary norms that dictate behavior, dress, diet, and the like. Such aesthetic norms can carry the force of moral law in a fundamentalist, theocratic society. Some religious interpretations apply the same rigor of enforcement
to these norms as they do to deeper theological tenets. Other interpretations within the same religious body may recognize these aesthetic aspects as traditional cultural accretions that do not have the same force as theological beliefs.

Since most people are not overly reflective in their day-to-day interactions and use of language, the complex admixture of cultural-religious traditions are not always adequately distinguished, and the richness and ambiguities inherent in language only add to the problem. When religiously inspired norms combine with cultural attitudes or mores, the result may be described as a religious-cultural complex.

One can see an example of the impact of cultural customs in the various practices on the veiling of women. The Koran mandates that Muslim women must observe modesty in dress. This mandate has been interpreted variously in the Islamic world to mean the covering of the entire body, as in the Pashtun burqa, or in the simple head scarf, as worn by many Indonesian women.

Realize that religion exists in context with other ideologies. There was a time in the West when politics and religion were one. In much of today’s world, this identification remains important. Even in the West, religion does not normally exist in isolation from other modes of thought, political or religious. A religion normally exists in a context that often shapes and influences what that religious tradition emphasizes. When a religion, or a sect within the religion, is in the minority, it may take a defensive and sometimes militant attitude toward the majority faith. Conversely, members of a majority religion may decide to tyrannize all opposition and persecute other minority faiths. This tyranny of the majority also occurs in confrontations between Western modes of thought, such as those stemming from religious traditions, Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, democratic idealism, secular humanism, and forms of political totalitarianism (such as Marxism).

Use religion as a tool. As is true of all cultural constructs, religion may serve purposes other than its avowed spiritual function. Thus, it may take on political, cultural, social, and other roles. Leaders of all types recognize the power of religion and leverage it to their own purposes.

Ethical dimension. The use of religion as a weapon, and the defense against the use of religion as a weapon, both present challenging ethical implications. Just as the use of medical or psychological knowledge to leverage personal or group advantage is fraught with ethical perils, so does the use of religion. As an example, can a commander use his chaplain to try to influence local religious leaders based on the chaplain’s religious status? Another example might be to consider what may be some of the advantages as well as potential pitfalls of using religious precepts as the basis for civic or military action? These and other questions have no clear-cut answer. They are subject to moral and ethical interpretation. In a larger context, these questions relate to the age-old ethical dilemma of whether or not the end justifies the means and, if so, under what circumstances?

Collective Human Interaction

In summary, religion has been and continues to be a significant factor in individual and collective human interaction. Despite Western attempts to “separate God from Caesar,” religion refuses to be relegated to a backwater in world affairs. Failing to deal with its presence, influence, and effects is tantamount to denying reality. Ironically, religious beliefs—the most abstruse and transcendental constructions of the human mind—have practical and at times deadly consequences for individuals and communities. For the policymaker, the military officer, and the practitioner of Design, ignoring religion and all its complex effects is simply not an option. MR

NOTES

3. “Design enables commanders to conceptualize the operational environment. They can visualize the environment in terms of not only enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the spectrum of conflict, but also in the context of the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time (PMESII-PT, FM 3-0).” Jack Kem, Design: Tools of the Trade (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 12.
4. “In exile, the Jews felt the harshness of the surrounding world; this sense of presence helped them to feel enveloped by a benevolent God.” Karen Armstrong, A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (New York: Ballantine, 1993), 76.
5. “I have been given all authority in heaven and on earth. Go, then, to all peoples everywhere and make them my disciples; baptize them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and teach them to obey everything I have commanded you. And I will be with you always, to the end of the age.” Matt. 28:19-20.
6. “Therefore call men to the true Faith, and follow the straight path as you are commanded.” The Koran, 340.
7. Rudolf Otto has identified the human capability to apprehend supra-rational objects as the feeling for the “numinous,” and the object of this apprehension the mysterium tremendum—the awesome mystery, which leads to the idea of God as the “wholly other.” Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923), 25-30.
8. “Indeed, there is a case for arguing that Homo sapiens is also Homo religious. Men and women started to worship gods as soon as they became recognizably human; they created religions at the same time as they created works of art.” Armstrong, 9.


10. The French revolutionary government inaugurated the reign of “Reason” and the end of official Christianity in the new Republic. Later Nietzsche declared the death of God and the dawning of the era of the Superman. Marx called religion the “opium of the masses.” In the 20th century, scientific positivism and communism were opposed to religion; capitalism ignored or bypassed religious concerns. Philosophers such as Sartre have attempted to construct a morality that does not depend on God. Despite all these trends, religion has survived and promises to be a powerful force into the 21st century. For a concise treatment of the confrontation of religion and modernity, see Armstrong, op. cit., 365-371.

11. “Darwin’s name has become a byword for atheism in fundamentalist circles, yet the Origin was not intended as an attack upon religion, but was a sober, careful exposition of a scientific theory.” Armstrong, 94.

12. “Before calling themselves Leonese, Castillian, or Aragonese, those who fought against the Moors and who lived intermixed with the Jews called themselves Christians.” Américo Castro, La realidad histórica de España (Mexico City, Mexico: Editorial Pemca, 1985), 25.

13. “He [God] has revealed to you the Book with the Truth, confirming the scriptures which preceded it; for He has already revealed the Torah and the Gospel for the guidance of mankind, and the distinction of right from wrong.” The Koran, 42-43. “The only true faith in God is Islam.” The Koran, 44. “Had the People of the Book accepted the Faith, it would surely have been better for them. Some are true believers, but most of them are evil-doers. . . . Yet they are not all alike. There are among the People of the Book some upright men who all night long recite the revelations of God and worship Him; who believe in God and the Last Day; who enjoin justice and forbid evil and vie with each other in good works. These are righteous men: whatever good they do, its reward shall not be denied them. God well knows the righteous.”

14. “Jewish and Muslim fundamentalists had turned their mythoi into pragmatic logos designed to achieve a practical result. Protestant fundamentalists had perverted myth in a different way. They had turned the Christian myths into scientific facts, and had created a hybrid that was neither good science nor good religion. This had run counter to the whole tradition of spirituality and had involved great strain, since religious truth is not rational in nature and cannot be proved scientifically.” Armstrong, 355.

15. In the Koran, God speaks thus: “We have revealed the Koran in the Arabic tongue that you may understand its meaning. It is a transcript of the eternal book in Our keeping, sublime, and full of wisdom.” The Koran, 343. “Those that suppress any part of the Scriptures which God has revealed in order to gain some paltry end and shall swallow nothing but fire into their bellies.” The Koran, 27.

16. “Since the late eighteenth century, German scholars had applied the new techniques of literary analysis, archaeology, and comparative linguistics to the Bible, subjecting it to a scientifically empirical methodology.” Armstrong, 91.

17. “What my enemies say can never be trusted: they only want to destroy. Their words are flattering and smooth, but filled with deadly deceit. Condemn and punish them, O God; may their own plots cause their ruin. Drive them out of your presence because of their many sins and their rebellion against you.” Ps. 5:9-10.

18. “Then the Lord thundered from the sky: and the voice of the Most High was heard. He shot his arrows and scattered his enemies; with flashes of lightning he sent them running.” Ps. 18:13-14.

19. “You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your friends, hate your enemies. But now I tell you: love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may become the children of your Father in heaven.” Matt. 5:43-45.

20. This is true to this day, as shown by Preston Jones and Cody Beckham in God’s Hiddenness in Combat: Toward Christian Reflection on Battle (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2009).

21. Even when acknowledging the social necessity of the “just war,” Augustine laments its violence. “For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrongdoing, even though it gave rise to no war, would still be matter of grief to man because it is man’s wrongdoing. Let everyone, then, who thinks with pain on these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery.” Augustine of Hippo, The City of God against the Pagans, 617-18.

22. “Christians can use violence when they have a duty to do so; in other words, when they are soldiers (or policemen). Such Christians respond to violence from enemies that threaten peace and order—not passively, but with force. . . . Christians fight in the army and pray for victory because they are formed by the perfect virtue of charity. Charity is the ruling virtue in the moral life.” Alexander F.C. Webster and Darrell Cole, The Virtue of War: Reclaiming the Classic Christian Traditions East and West (Salisbury, MS: Regina Orthodox Press, 2004), 150.

23. Here I have adapted the concepts of a “complex” and the constellation of such complexes used in Jungian psychology and applied them to a larger social context. “Some collective complexes, circling around issues of sex, religion, money, or power affect almost everyone to some degree and can lead to fierce discharges of energy, even to war, if provoked severely enough.” Murray Stein, Jung’s Map of the Soul: An Introduction (Chicago: Open Court, 1998), 76.

24. “. . . up until the 1880s, much of Europe, while religiously diverse, nonetheless had no real freedom of religion in the sense that we understand it today. Being the wrong kind of Christian could still lead to one’s death, and sometimes a horribly violent one—countless thousands were burned alive at stakes, and Anabaptists, because they believed in baptism by immersion, were often killed by drowning, in a macabre and deliberately ironic method of execution.” Christopher Catherwood, Making War in the Name of God (New York: Citadel Press, 2007), 119.


26. “. . . expositions of religious truth in language inevitably tend to stress the ‘rational’ attributes of God. But though the above mistake is thus a natural one enough, it is none the less seriously misleading. For so far are these ‘rational’ attributes from exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational or supra-rational Subject of which they are predicates.” Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 2.

27. “In his celebrated treatise on political leadership, The Prince, Machiavelli acknowledges the influence of religiously derived ethical ideas, even as he challenges their usefulness in politics. He also devotes an entire section to what he terms ‘ecclesiastical principalities.’” See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, (London: Penguin, 1981), 73-78.

28. “Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their chastity; not to display their adornments (except such as are normally revealed); to draw their veils over their bosoms and not to display their finery except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their step-sons, their brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their women-servants, and their slave-girls; male attendants lacking in natural vigour, and children who have no carnal knowledge of women. And let them not stamp their feet when walking so as to reveal their hidden trinkets.” The Koran, 248.
During the period from 2004 to 2008, the eastern Afghanistan province of Nangarhar showed considerable progress in both counterinsurgency (COIN) and counternarcotics. These successes were the result of several factors, only some of which were the considerable efforts and resources of the U.S. military, other U.S. agencies, and coalition partners. Although, what worked there is not necessarily replicable in other provinces, given Afghanistan’s considerable diversity, some of the strategies seem relevant beyond Nangarhar, particularly efforts at interagency coordination.

The security situation was tenuous in 2004, but by 2008 had improved dramatically to the point where Afghan security forces had the lead. Local governance, particularly at the provincial level, had begun to form and implement some policies. The economy expanded, especially through agriculture, small businesses, trade, and, in some years, illicit production of opium.

During two growing seasons the poppy crop was considerably reduced, and in 2007 and 2008, it was almost eliminated. Again, this was a result of various factors coming together. The growth of the licit economy gave alternatives to growing poppy or trafficking opium. In both periods, the government, the mullahs, and to some extent the tribes encouraged farmers not to grow poppy. The increased security by 2007 allowed the police, army, and eradication units to reliably operate through much of the province. The appointment of a strong governor who implemented an aggressive counternarcotics strategy also helped.

Another significant factor in Nangarhar’s progress was improved coordination among U.S. government agencies and the U.S. military. This cooperation yielded by mid-2008 “Nangarhar Inc.,” an attempt to integrate COIN, counternarcotics, and development strategies into one long-term plan. At the same time, U.S. agencies completed a “synchronization matrix” for counternarcotics. Both of these efforts benefited from the planning capability of the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team’s plans section.

While Nangarhar made significant progress during this period, considerable problems remain, and the advances are fragile and reversible. There needs to be a long-term commitment across all three pillars of the COIN strategy: security, economic development, and governance.

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PHOTO: U.S. Soldiers patrol the area in support of Afghan elections, 18 September 2010, in Nangarhar Province. (U.S. Army photo by SPC David A. Jackson)
Background

Nangarhar Province is located east of Kabul, along the border with Pakistan, and at the western end of the Khyber Pass. The province has two major rivers, the Kabul and the Konar, which flow year-round and support local agriculture, the province’s economic bedrock. Most of the population, including those who live in the capital city of Jalalabad, reside in the irrigated plains along these rivers. To the south is the Spin Ghar Mountain Range reaching more than 14,000 feet, making infiltration from Pakistan difficult, especially in the winter. The road linking Kabul to Peshawar, a major paved highway and a historical trade route, crosses the province from east to west. There is one paved airstrip in Jalalabad, although it is primarily for military use.

The population is almost entirely Pashtun, divided into several main tribes, with the only other major ethnic group, the Peshaei, present in the northwest of the province. The population has been increasing because of natural growth and the return of refugees, mostly from Pakistan. Nangarhar is in a strategic location due to the regional trade route and because it borders three sections of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), an area of Pakistan that has a related, mostly Pashtun-based insurgency. It is also the political and economic hub for the surrounding provinces due to existing trade routes, its relatively large population, geography, and Afghan history. The former king’s winter palace is located in Nangarhar, and to this day Kabul pays attention to the province’s circumstances.

Because the province’s central valley along the Kabul River is at a relatively low altitude, the climate is hot in the summer and mild during the winter. This climate and an extensive irrigation system, largely installed by the Soviets, allow farmers to grow up to three crops a year, mostly wheat, rice, sugar cane, fruits, vegetables, and poppy in some years.

COIN Strategy

From 2004 until 2008, the COIN strategy for Nangarhar had three main “pillars”: security, economic development, and governance. Complementary efforts included public relations and information operations, counternarcotics,
rule of law (which could be included under the governance pillar), and counterterrorism (which could be included under security).

Security. From 2004 to 2008, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and coalition forces increased their presence in Nangarhar, and the Afghan National Police and the Afghan Border Police showed progress. Insurgent groups had only a limited capacity to carry out operations and held very little territory in the province. Although coalition forces remained mostly within the NATO command structure, Nangarhar was almost exclusively a U.S. effort.

Importantly, the population supported the ANA and was generally in favor of the coalition presence. Locals supported the provincial government despite many complaints, and some backed President Karzai’s national administration. The Taliban did not appear to have much popular support, although this could be hard to judge because locals probably told coalition officers what they wanted to hear. An attempt by the Taliban to establish a consolidated front (the so-called “Tora Bora Front”) in southern Nangarhar in late 2007 was soundly defeated. Because of this inability to confront Afghan and coalition forces, the Taliban resorted to asymmetric tactics, such as improvised explosive devices and car bombs, in Jalalabad and district centers.

Significantly, the Nangarhar tribes could muster their own forces, and in some cases prevented the Taliban from crossing their territory. Some tribes, such as the Mohmand and the Afridi, had populations on both sides of the border with Pakistan and influenced how much control the Afghan state had over the border. During 2004 and 2005, local militias, particularly that of Peshai leader Hazrat Ali, had significant influence.

Civilian casualties were a source of considerable tension between coalition forces and the local population. The so-called “Marsof” incident of 2007, during which more than two dozen civilians died, was a considerable setback for relations with the local community. Bombings that caused unintended casualties, such as the erroneous attack on a wedding in 2008, also increased tensions. Besides basic moral concerns, civilian casualties must be avoided due to the elevated place of revenge in Pashtun culture (deaths of family members can set off decades-long feuds) and how hard it was to rebuild positive relations with the community.

Internal Afghan tensions also presented security challenges. The riots in Jalalabad during the spring of 2005 are one example. Instigators hijacked an isolated protest by university students and turned it into several days of rioting that included attacks against the UN office and the Pakistani consulate.

Coalition presence began with Special Forces and a provincial reconstruction team in 2003. The Marines began a battalion-level presence in the winter of 2004-2005, followed by a brigade headquarters at Jalalabad Airfield covering Nangarhar and the nearby provinces of Konar, Laghman, and Nuristan (previously Nangarhar had been supervised by the brigade headquarters in Khost). In 2007 and 2008, a special troops battalion provided excellent security and coordination with the provincial reconstruction team and Afghan forces. Afghan National Army presence also increased with a brigade headquarters under the Kabul-based corps command. The 101st Airborne Division provided a battalion air wing in the spring of 2008, increasing firepower and troop mobility.

As U.S. and Afghan military gained strength, small firebases and patrol bases were established. Probably the most important of these was at Torkham Gate, which eventually expanded to include a border coordination center that housed Afghan, Pakistani, and U.S. officers. These small bases increased the security of the rural population, supported the local security forces, and put U.S. forces in contact with more of the population. While these small bases proved vulnerable to attack in nearby provinces, particularly Nuristan, in Nangarhar they were fairly secure.

U.S. military units worked to develop Afghan Army and police units, conducting combined patrols, providing equipment, and mentoring at various levels up to brigade staff. Coalition officers also worked to improve coordination between different Afghan security forces, which

An attempt by the Taliban to establish a consolidated front...in late 2007 was soundly defeated.
often lacked compatible communications or had considerable animosity toward each other. The establishment of a control center in Jalalabad brought together U.S. and Afghan security forces to coordinate responses to security incidents.

The Afghan National Police were a weak link in the security forces in Nangarhar. While the Afghan Army enjoyed popular support and was a source of national pride, the population saw the police as providing limited security at best, and corrupt and predatory practices at worst. A major U.S. effort to bolster the police began in 2005 with a training center near Jalalabad. Nangarhar also benefited from a relatively competent provincial police chief appointed in January 2007. The nascent Afghan Border Police was being developed during this period, and was not yet fully staffed, funded, or equipped.

**Economic development.** Nangarhar’s economy strengthened over this four-year period (although statistics are far from complete). This was in part a result of the improved security that allowed markets to be established. International assistance from the U.S. military’s Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Asian Development Bank, and the European Union helped get the economy back on its feet. The growing military presence also injected funds into the local economy and provided jobs.

The increased trade to and from Pakistan (including considerable NATO logistical movements) through Torkham Gate provided various types of employment, and tariffs at the border apparently helped support the provincial government. Although difficult to quantify, poppy proceeds clearly boosted the local economy, as did a brisk trade of smuggled consumer goods into Pakistan (due to trade agreements that allowed goods to enter Afghanistan with reduced tariffs). There was also a strong entrepreneurial bent among the population. However, many challenges remained for moving the economy forward. The lack of electricity was a major hurdle, with the coalition generators at Jalalabad Airfield producing more electricity than what was available in the rest of the province. Only the ingenuity of Afghan technicians held together the antiquated Soviet-era generators at the Darunta Dam just west of Jalalabad. Equally daunting was the weak rule of law that governed the business world, and a system of property records that often had overlapping deeds from different periods of Afghan history. The irrigation system suffered from lack of maintenance, although by the spring of 2008 CERP funds were improving it.

**Politics.** Multiple poles of power, both within the Afghan state and through informal actors such as tribal leaders, families, and business leaders, made Nangarhar politics very complex. Combined with
this was the disruption caused by decades of war, the influence of the Karzai administration on local politics, the influence and political relations of the coalition, drug money, and possibly the influence of foreign players. The province’s turbulent history affected local politics as well, through long-standing tribal disputes coupled with persistent memories of who sided with which faction during Afghanistan’s wars that began with the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Two governors played major roles during this time. Hajji Din Mohammed was influential as a member of a prominent old family of Nangarhar and an ally of Karzai’s. Later the governor of Kabul Province, he was affable, shrewd, and charming, but had only limited popular support. Some Afghans felt he was unduly influenced by Pakistan. The second governor was Gul Agha Sherzai, formerly the governor of Kandahar Province, where he had considerable sway. He is a forceful man known as the “Bulldozer,” and developed a reputation for getting things done, despite the lack of a local power base upon his arrival.

Two elections took place during this period—the presidential election of 2004 and the parliamentary elections of 2005. These elections went off relatively smoothly in Nangarhar, and the results were largely seen as credible by the local population.

Overall, provincial government expanded during this period, and the Jalalabad municipal government gained a reputation for being able to provide some services. By 2008, government was present in each of the province’s 22 districts, but was uneven in quality and capacity. The 2005 elections not only designated members of the national parliament, but also elected a provincial council. Unfortunately, this council had almost no funding, and its powers and authorities were not well defined. During 2007-2008, it attempted to be a counterbalance to Governor Sherzai and his policies, with mixed results.

Most Afghan political parties had been largely discredited among the population, who saw the parties as having a role in the power struggles that contributed to Afghanistan’s wars. Only two parties were influential in Nangarhar during this time, either overtly or covertly: the Hezb-e Islami Khalis, created by now deceased former mujahideen leader Yunus Khalis; and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin of opposition leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

**Counternarcotics.** Nangarhar has historically been a major poppy-growing area of Afghanistan. The poppy is planted in the late fall, then harvested in April or May, depending on the altitude. The 2008 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report for Afghanistan said the following: “Nangarhar was traditionally a large poppy growing area and in 2007 was estimated to have 18,739 hectares of opium cultivation. In 2008, Nangarhar became poppy-free for the first time since the UN began opium cultivation monitoring in Afghanistan. In 2004, opium cultivation in Nangarhar was 28,213 hectares; in 2005, it fell to 1,093 hectares. In 2006, cultivation increased to 4,872 hectares but could only be found in very remote parts of the province.”

The reduction in the 2004-2005 growing season was due to a convergence of several factors. First, farmers believed a large-scale eradication plan was imminent, and were reluctant to plant as a result. Second, there was an informal understanding that large-scale development projects were planned that would provide alternative livelihoods. Third, the Afghan government at the local and national level campaigned against poppy cultivation. Fourth, local mullahs preached that drug production was against Islam.

As noted, however, poppy cultivation increased over the next two growing seasons. In response, Governor Sherzai led an aggressive counternarcotics campaign beginning in the fall of 2007, with support from U.S. agencies. His government had the police put growers in jail and worked with district governors and tribal leaders to reduce the poppy crop, while at the same time the mullahs again spoke out against drug production. Helicopter overflights of Nangarhar in the spring of 2008 showed almost no poppy, an astonishing outcome (at the same time, poppy production in neighboring Konar, Laghman, and Nuristan provinces was less than 1,000 hectares each).

While the Afghan government can rightly take most of the credit for this success, U.S. efforts also contributed. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency...
and the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau were both active in counternarcotics, and the U.S. military supported security to the point where the Afghan police were able to operate in most districts (in contrast to provinces such as Helmand). The establishment of small bases, in particular, helped extend security to the districts, and the Taliban was unable to take and hold areas that could have benefited the narcotraffickers.

The construction of farm-to-market roads to bring licit crops to markets was important, as were efforts by U.S. Department of Agriculture officers to form agricultural cooperatives in 2005. A particularly daunting problem was microcredit, since many poor farmers were growing poppy in order to pay off loans from drug-connected intermediaries.

The plans section of the 173d ABCT hosted a series of interagency meetings on counternarcotics beginning in the fall of 2007. These meetings produced a synchronization matrix of U.S. counternarcotics efforts for the province, determining which agency was doing what, where, and for what end, while also providing a forum for discussions. This effort identified overlaps and gaps, and informed the planning for Nangarhar Inc. as well.

Conditions specific to Nangarhar Province contributed to counternarcotics “wins” in both the 2004-2005 and 2007-2008 growing seasons. Chief among these were alternatives to poppy production that created jobs in agriculture (the climate allows several crops a year), small businesses (especially in Jalalabad), and trade along the route with Pakistan through the Khyber Pass. Large infrastructure projects such as road-building and irrigation systems supported counternarcotics efforts, both by contributing to the job alternatives and by providing construction jobs for unskilled or semi-skilled laborers. Improved security reached the rural areas, the police were able to move more freely, and assistance projects were implemented. Small firebases contributed to this improvement. In turn, advances in economic development and governance almost certainly supported the security “pillar.”

While difficult to quantify, counternarcotics successes supported COIN efforts. The reduced poppy crop meant less money to fund the insurgency, and almost certainly reduced the level of corruption in the government. In a more general sense, the public saw that laws were being enforced and the government was engaged and having an impact. Interagency cooperation, not only at the strategic level but also at the operational level, was vital. The efforts of Governor Sherzai were also critical for the counternarcotics effort of 2007-2008. In most provinces, the governor is the most important local official; having a governor committed to the counternarcotics effort, and influential enough to carry out a program, was indispensable. However, there were no convictions of major Nangarhar-based drug producers/traffickers during this period. The judiciary, and the apparent lack of will by the Afghan national government to go after traffickers, was a weak link in counternarcotics efforts.

The reduction or elimination of poppy meant a very significant loss of income for what, in most cases, were poor communities. Particularly in 2004-2005, communities reduced their crop with the understanding that there would be a payoff in terms of jobs or projects. It is important that the coalition follow through on any such compact. Farmers may be adopting a strategy of not growing poppy during years when they perceive the risk of eradication is high. Because opium gum can be stored for several years, this may give them an economic “cushion” to make it through these years. A long-term, integrated strategy that forecasts for several years (and makes multi-year commitments) is necessary. Nangarhar Inc. was such a framework.

**Nangarhar Inc.**

“Nangarhar Inc.” was the name given to an integrated, long-term development and commercial plan for Nangarhar that would support counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts at the same time. This plan was informally initiated in late 2007 by the commander of the 173d in Jalalabad; the State Department political advisor to the brigade, based both in Jalalabad and Kabul; and the director of the Afghan Reconstruction Group at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Nangarhar Inc. looked at the province’s advantages—an improving security situation, increasing political stability, good agricultural potential, and location along a major trade route—and then worked to form an interagency strategy around them.

The plan was to bring together the major U.S. development donors—USAID, CERP, and the
Afghan and international development efforts.

The COIN aspects of Nangarhar Inc. centered on the expansion of the economy and the creation of jobs. The availability of jobs was particularly important. Jobs give alternatives to young men who might otherwise join insurgent groups for employment (rather than ideological reasons). It was also key to offer jobs and livelihoods to replace the considerable economic loss some districts suffered by reducing the poppy crop. Economic development, particularly visible signs of progress such as roads, demonstrated that the Afghan government was able to provide a better life to its people. Economic progress also served to justify the presence of coalition forces in an area traditionally wary of foreigners. It delivered an asymmetric advantage over insurgent groups having no capacity to bring economic development (and whom the people saw as hindering progress).

As a starting point for Nangarhar Inc., the plans section of the 173d Airborne developed a synchronization matrix of current and proposed projects by various agencies. Despite a presence in Nangarhar since 2001, the U.S. had never produced such a matrix. It helped clarify who was doing what, where, when, and why. Given the complexity of these endeavors, the initial synchronization matrix looked primarily at U.S. projects, but later incorporated Afghan and international development efforts.

The State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement specialists (who brought 10 million dollars of “good performance” funds to the province)—and identify “enablers” for the economy that the Afghans could not provide themselves, such as electricity. Working groups also studied “cold chains” (a network of refrigerated storage facilities) to bring agricultural produce to market and farm-to-market roads linking the outlying districts with Jalalabad and the major paved highway. They also looked at how to build a commercial airport in Nangarhar, both to ease business travel and to increase exports.

A paratrooper of the 173d Airborne Brigade scans the low ground while providing security for a convoy passing through the mountains of Paktika Province, Afghanistan, 10 November 2007.
capital to the province. This was not impossible—the private telecommunications industry in Afghanistan had been a huge success—but the weak legal framework for business and problems over land titles made most investors reluctant.

The 173d plans section eventually brought its synchronization matrix and future plans to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for a 10-day review and polish, then presented it to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and the leaders of the 101st Airborne Division. It was later shared with the provincial leaders and the wider international community.

Nangarhar Inc. was a decent first attempt at a difficult task: interagency coordination aimed at multiple goals, including counternarcotics, counterinsurgency, economic development, and the establishment of local governance. Interagency coordination was easy since Jalalabad is only 30 to 40 minutes by plane from Kabul. Helicopters and fixed-wing planes shuttled Embassy officers to Jalalabad Airfield and brought Army officers to the Embassy for meetings. High-level support from the U.S. ambassador, the deputy chief of mission, and the leadership of the 101st Airborne Division gave the project a needed push and encouraged civilian agencies to participate.

Several positive factors made Nangarhar Inc. a viable possibility: improved security, the availability of development funds, emerging local governance, an economic base of agriculture and trade, and the involvement of several U.S. agencies. Clearly, this project could not be repeated in every province of Afghanistan. However, Herat and Balkh provinces, also located on trade routes, might present similar opportunities. Kandahar and Khost provinces have similar economic opportunities in terms of trade and agriculture, but still present considerable security challenges.

Nangarhar Inc. was an asymmetric counterinsurgency tool. The Taliban and other insurgent groups cannot provide basic infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems, electrical generation and distribution grids, and civilian airports.

The attempts by the Afghan Reconstruction Group to attract private investment were important. Given that the reconstruction of Afghanistan will be a long-term effort, complementing international donors with domestic private capital will be necessary.

During a temporary assignment to Afghanistan in early 2010, I asked civilian and military U.S. officials about the status of Nangarhar Inc. While parts of the plan had been adopted, particularly short-term projects, the overall strategy and long-term planning appeared to have been superseded by new initiatives.

Conclusions

- A confluence of several mutually reinforcing factors contributed to the counterinsurgency progress in Nangarhar. These factors were an improving government, popular support for the government and security forces, a strengthened economic situation, and a stabilizing security situation.
- Interagency cooperation saw considerable improvement, but also required considerable effort. Coordination took place at the Embassy in Kabul and at the task force headquarters in Bagram. The proximity of Jalalabad to both Kabul and Bagram facilitated coordination.
- Nangarhar is the political and economic “center of gravity” for this part of Afghanistan, so COIN progress may spread to the neighboring provinces of Konar, Laghman, and Nuristan.
- The presence of the brigade headquarters at Jalalabad Airfield provided a visible sign of coalition commitment that seemed to increase the confidence of local leaders, while keeping
the “fence-sitters” aligned with the government and giving the population the confidence to reject the Taliban.

- Providing electricity to the province is critical. It will fundamentally change the province both economically and socially. This is something the Taliban cannot provide, and it is an “asymmetric” advantage. However, completing the large-scale infrastructure needed will require big donors such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, or a major U.S. commitment.

- The general support from the population for the coalition and the Afghan government, especially the Afghan National Army, is critical. Many people, especially the younger generation, seem to want to move forward and reject the Taliban’s very conservative social policies. Counterinsurgency efforts had increased likelihood of success because the population was almost entirely Pashtun, and there were minimal ethnic clashes.

- The relative quiet during the early years of the period under review in adjacent agencies of Pakistan’s FATA contributed to the successes in Nangarhar. Khurram’s large Shi’ite population made it harder for the (Sunni) Taliban to work its way across the border into Afghanistan. In addition, positive results in Nangarhar may positively influence the adjacent Khurram, Bajaur, and Khyber sections of the FATA.

- While programs to build up Afghan security forces received considerable resources, the civil service side did not benefit from an equivalent effort. At the end of the period under review, there was still a pressing need to strengthen local government at all levels (particularly the civil service cadre), and a need to improve formal justice systems. Improvement of the education system, including teacher training, is also crucial to the sustainment of democracy.

- Coalition forces need to balance the increased security measures put in place, particularly moving in heavily armored vehicles, with the necessity to maintain contact with the local population. Force protection measures are often an unintended barrier that diminishes coalition understanding of local circumstances. While risky, the establishment of firebases throughout the province increased the contact of U.S. forces with the population. It is also best to have the same military units (and civilian officers) rotate repeatedly through the province.

- Given the very low baseline of development, the complexity of the insurgency, and the tendency for poppy cultivation to return, the international community should consider making a long-term commitment to the province of perhaps 10 or 20 years. To ease the burden on U.S. taxpayers and to make this effort sustainable, private investors need to be involved. Of course, this requires secure property rights and the legal structure for businesses to operate.

- COIN successes in Nangarhar may have relevance for other provinces with similar challenges, particularly Khost, Kandahar, and Helmand. However, a “cookie cutter” approach will not work. 

**NOTE**

**Identifying the Center of Gravity of Afghan Mentoring**

Major David H. Park, U.S. Army

WE FREQUENTLY HEAR American mentors speak of the “Afghan right.” Many of these mentors would quote: “*Better the Afghans do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.*”\(^1\) creatively quoting the famous axiom of Lawrence of Arabia. The problem is that these American mentors are using the famous quotation out of context. Some mentors use this phrase to state their chauvinistic belief that the Afghans will never achieve our standards, while others lean on this concept to cover up their inability or lack of desire to teach and mentor their Afghan counterparts.\(^2\)

As explained by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bateman in the December 2008 issue of *Armed Forces Journal*, T.E. Lawrence was advising a band of guerrilla insurgents, not a regular army practicing counterinsurgency.\(^3\) Furthermore, the quotation, which was number 19 in a list of 27 pieces of advice published in a local British army journal in Egypt called *The Arab Bulletin*, starts with a disclaimer by Lawrence of Arabia himself:

> The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu [Bedouin, the tribal nomads of the deserts]; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are, of course, not suitable to any other person’s need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules.[*Emphasis LTC Bateman’s.*]\(^4\)

Aside from the obvious fact that Pashtuns and Tajiks are in no way related to Hejaz Arabs, except in sharing a common religion, we must also remember that Lawrence of Arabia was training a group of insurgent rebels, fighting against a counterinsurgent regular army of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, nearly a century ago. Transplanted to Afghanistan of 2009, he would...
be a Chechen mujahedeen advisor to the Taliban, rather than a coalition force mentor, building a regular army. Many coalition force mentors use the Lawrence quote without adequately understanding its context, thus allowing an “Afghan wrong” to continue, believing that they are perpetuating an “Afghan right.”

Like it or not, the Afghan National Army (ANA) doctrine is a carbon copy of U.S. doctrine. We came in and set up its current army. U.S. military officers and contractors created the ANA’s doctrine and table of organization and equipment. If we are to make it work, the mentors must fully embrace teaching American operational doctrine to the Afghans. Afghans can fight. They need our assistance in building self-sustaining systems to establish a regular Army with full spectrum tactical and operational proficiency. We are not building a mujahedeen force to harass a Cold War foe anymore.

Most ANA units are highly centralized, top-down organizations, whose centers of gravity are their command and control systems, specifically corps and brigade S3 systems. The decisive point of mentoring is the transference of our command and control systems to these centers of gravity. If we teach command and control systems properly to the ANA, they will produce better operations orders and be more proficient. The result of this upward spiral in tactical and operational proficiency will be the successful completion of the coalition mentoring mission, allowing us to leave Afghanistan with success and honor.

**Afghan Culture and Planning: “Afghan Right” or “Afghan Wrong?”**

As a validator in the validation transition team within Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, I had the honor and the privilege of observing and assessing daily operations of 30 ANA units, including two brigade headquarters and 27 battalions belonging to all five ANA Corps, from late 2008 through late 2009. While these 30 units do not represent all of the ANA, their performances provide a valuable insight into the state of ANA readiness, as observed by one American officer, using a uniform standard on all 30 units. The following describes a typical Afghan planning process.

**Question and answer planning process (Q&A PP).** A typical ANA planning process begins when the brigade commander receives his mission from the corps commander on his cell phone. In my experience, upon telephonic receipt of the mission, instead of analyzing the mission in a systematic way, culminating in course of action development, the brigade commanders develop courses of action first. The entire staff and all of the battalion commanders would be called in for the mission brief and planning process. The brigade commanders regurgitate the higher echelon’s directive to their battalion commanders. Then they would add further detail to the order, without any staff analysis and input. Following this propagation of the hasty course of action, the battalion commanders in attendance and the primary staff would try to flesh out the mission by asking the brigade commander both pertinent and impertinent questions. (In all observed cases, battalion commanders were present in the initial and subsequent brigade planning sessions.)
The brigade commanders would respond to these questions, essentially fleshing out tasks to subordinate units and staff on the spot. This question and answer session would last anywhere from two to five hours at a time. Sometimes the commanders or their mentors would call for another session for the following day, with similar results. I have named this process the “question and answer planning process” (Q&A PP). The Q&A PPs develop as a result of lack of planning. Subordinate commanders and staff members have to “pull” guidance and taskers out of the brigade commander, without using any systemic method whatsoever. Following one or more sessions of the Q&A PP, the S3 would retire to his office, where he would single-handedly produce an order, with or without his clerk’s help, within about one hour, using only his memory, because no one takes notes during a typical question and answer planning process. He would then publish the order the next day.

The following day, the subordinate commanders would return with questions about the mission. This would result in further Q&A PP, which may or may not result in a written fragmentary order, but would continue until all participants were either satisfied or exhausted. There would be no time for rehearsals at the end of this planning process. They sometimes would conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections haphazardly at the end of the day. Then, the operation would begin with no battle tracking at any echelon.

Commanders would be notified of significant activities via cell phone, and their tactical operations center would not keep a running log of activities. Some radio traffic would take place between forward units and the headquarters, but the tactical operations center generally would not track any of it, and no icons would denote maneuver unit dispositions on a map. Mentors were happy that the ANA was practicing its “Afghan right.” In fact, in all observed cases, following a typical Q&A PP, mentors encouraged holding another session the next day to answer further questions, sometimes leaving the Afghans alone to allow them to “plan better on their own.” If we continue to unintentionally promote these sessions by not intervening, we are directly abetting their adoption as the de facto planning process in large areas of Afghanistan.

If the Q&A PP results in a feasible, acceptable, suitable, and complete course of action, we should praise it as the “Afghan right.” However, in all of the cases I assessed, the Q&A PP simply wasted available planning time rather than contributing to the formation of a suitable course of action. In all observed cases, the ground commander scrapped the plans upon deployment, and formulated a new plan from scratch. Even though many coalition plans suffer the same fate upon contact, the complete decoupling of intelligence preparation of the battle field and other mission analysis products from course of action development prevents most ANA operations orders from even being a foundation for fragmentary orders. Officers simply do not base their courses of action on well-prepared intelligence and mission analysis. Therefore, it’s clear that the Q&A PP is an “Afghan wrong,” which simply burns up available planning time and causes undue fatigue among staff participants.

Nature of Afghan organizational culture.
The decentralized “mission command” that U.S. and coalition forces practice is a fairly new phenomenon, enabled by a well-trained, highly educated officer and NCO corps of mostly Western armies. First practiced and perfected by German armies who called it “Auftragstaktik” in the last two centuries, the U.S. Army adopted it because we can make it work. However, most other armies in the world, including the ANA, do not have the independent-minded leaders that mission command needs to function properly. The Afghan organizational culture is not optimally aligned with mission command. Afghanistan is one of the most traditional societies in the world. Its people value the opinions of their elders and superiors more than individual common sense dictates. As most U.S. Soldiers learn, the Afghans value their tribal identities more than their national identity. Tribal elders make all decisions for the tribe in outlying areas, as countless U.S. mentors can attest after having attended numerous Tajik and Hazara shuras or Pashtun Jirgas. The military is a reflection of the society from which it springs, and it operates in the same way as the society it protects. The Afghan commander and his highest-ranking staff officers run ANA units in a strictly top-down, centralized manner, similar to how the local elders and imams run most villages in Afghanistan. This is why the
cell phone tasking by the commander, described previously, is the principal means of mission tasking in the ANA.

Another characteristic of Afghan tribal governance is its emphasis on consensus building. Although elders do hold a great deal of power in Afghanistan’s traditional culture, they adhere to building a group consensus through a long process of discussion during which people drink chai tea and voice their opinions and grievances. The Australian counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen notes, “It is important to remember . . . that population groups in a traditional society exercise choices collectively, not individually . . . choices tend to reflect group consensus . . . [and] this tendency is even more pronounced in tribal societies under the stress of insurgency.”

The tradition of chai drinking and consensus building is another cultural origin of the Q&A PP. These two seemingly contradictory characteristics, that of heavy-handed autocracy, and that of consensus building, form the foundation of Q&A PP.

We confirmed this theory of centralized, top-down leadership focused on consensus building during our observations of Afghan units. The staff acted strictly in accordance with the commander’s guidance, but engaged in long discussions rather than relying on quick, decisive action based on logical analysis. Company commanders were not empowered to make any real decisions without consulting their superiors. The only leaders able to make quick decisions were commanders several echelons above the actual leader on the ground. Many coalition mentors observed corps and brigade commanders calling company commanders directly on their cell phones, skipping the chain of command, to give detailed directives during actual operations.

Second- and third-order effects of Q&A PP. By conducting a question and answer planning process that takes days to complete, without producing sound plans, the units we observed would regularly and grossly violate the 1/3-2/3 rule (in which time for preparation is allocated downward), giving the lower echelons no time to parallel plan at their level. At corps and brigade level, this deficiency prevented battalions from even having a chance to conduct...
proper mission planning. Knowing this, subordinate battalion commanders made the effort to personally attend the brigade Q&A PP to remain in the loop about any planning and coordination that took place.

The second-order effect was that battalion mentors had no time to train and coach their counterparts in the MDMP, troop leading procedures, or pre-combat inspections before or during actual operations. As of 2009, battalion level mentors were the mainstay of our mentoring effort. They had the time and resources to influence the ANA planning cycle. Brigade mentors were generally dual tasked as actual coalition operations officers or XOs, so they were not fully engaged in mentoring. But due to Q&A PP consuming all available planning time at the brigade level, where little to no mentoring took place, the battalion mentors were left with literally no time to mentor their battalion commanders and staff, perpetuating this downward spiral of combat ineffective planning cycles.

The third-order effect was that junior officers never learned troop leading procedures or what “right” looks like, perpetuating the cycle of the “Afghan wrong” for the next generation of ANA officers. Believing they had their coalition mentors’ tacit support, the ANA units continued to practice Q&A PP. This is now the de facto planning process practiced at every level in some regions of Afghanistan.

Do we want this to continue? The result of this planning process is really a lack of planning, and zero production of quality operations orders. To increase the combat effectiveness of the ANA, mentors must take charge and continuously reinforce establishing the command and control warfighting function at corps and brigade level, to allow it to filter down the echelons.

**Aligning Mentoring Methodology with Host Culture**

The ANA is a highly centralized, top-down, leader-centric, consensus-seeking organization, mirroring the culture from which it originates. With that in mind, there are things we need to understand and actions we need to take to improve their effectiveness.

**ANA center of gravity for mentoring.** Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, defines centers of gravity as those characteristics, capabilities, or localities

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**Case in Point, May 2009**

In the largest operation that I observed, a major offensive in Badghis Province in May 2009 (alternatively called “Operation Iron Fist,” “Operation Ghormach,” or “Operation Khora II” by ANA, U.S., and Italian officers at multiple echelons), 1/207 Brigade headquarters used six days to plan and write an operations order (without producing a mission statement). This excessively long planning session by the brigade gave the battalions and companies only one day to prepare prior to deploying to Badghis Province, which had not been cleared of Taliban presence since 2001.

Despite the ANA battalion commanders’ best efforts, 3-1/207 Battalion lost an entire platoon to the insurgents during the push into the insurgent stronghold of Bala Mugharb. Platoon members not killed outright were tortured and beheaded by the local insurgents, while the coalition mentors watched helplessly across the valley. The loss was due to a lack of planning time allotted to the battalions and to the brigade S3’s insistence to personally control individual companies from various battalions in the main area of operation. The Italian battle group, in direct support, was barred by its own national caveat from providing more than one platoon at a time per operation, and, thus unable to assist the beleaguered ANA platoon.

A week after the massacre, the ANA 3-1/207 battalion commander was relieved of command, despite the fact that the brigade commander ordered the attack and prescribed the method of attack down to the smallest detail. The lieutenant commander in charge of the U.S. embedded transition team that had been training 3-1/207 Battalion was replaced by a captain with no battalion level planning and operations experience from a different team as the battalion moved into Badghis Province after the brigade-level planning in Herat. The mission dragged on for another month until the Italian and Spanish operational mentors and liason teams rotated out, and U.S. embedded transition teams were dismantled and the 4/82d Advise and Assist Brigade moved in. With the entire Italian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, Spanish OMLT, and U.S. mentors rotating out of the theater simultaneously, the collective memory of this event is now lost, destined for continual annual repetition, as it has for several summers now. Here was an “Afghan wrong” allowed to continue to its inevitable conclusion.
from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It adds:

The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of campaigns and major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the commander’s intent and operational design. Senior commanders describe the center of gravity in military terms, such as objectives and missions. 16

Although we use the term “center of gravity” for tactical courses of action, we can use the same concept to identify the center of gravity of the ANA for mentoring purposes.

The ANA, being a highly centralized, top-down, consensus-seeking organization, derives its freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight from its commanders. The same can be said of coalition units, but given the cultural context, it is significantly more so for an ANA unit. Its corps lack a division echelon, so corps HQs command brigades. Therefore, the corps- and brigade-level command and control system is the decisive terrain for mentoring. The ANA corps and brigade affect the success or failure of their subordinates far more than in a Western army. Within this decisive terrain, as proper planning drives command and control, the commander and the G/S3 planning staff at corps and brigade level are the centers of gravity for mentoring. Therefore, the commander’s intent and operational design of coalition mentoring must focus on this center of gravity.

Decisive point of mentoring. If security transition is our prime mission in Afghanistan, then deliberate and planned mentoring is the right methodology. 17 If the ANA is a top-down, leader-centric, consensus-seeking organization, and corps- and brigade-level commanders and G/S3 staff the centers of gravity, what is our decisive point for mentoring? Where do we mass our Soldiers and resources to accomplish our end state?

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, defines a decisive point as:

A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. . . . Decisive points shape operational design and allow commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable . . . . Events, such as commitment of the enemy operational reserve, may also be decisive points. Once identified and selected for action, decisive points become objectives. 18

For mentoring, if corps- and brigade-level commanders and planning S3 staff are the centers of gravity, then the successful teaching of the MDMP is our decisive point for a mentoring victory. Once corps and brigade produce the right plan for battalions to execute, it will be a matter of time until battalions are able to do the same. Eventually, with planning and operations systems maturing, U.S. and coalition mentors will be able to truly stand off and provide combat enablers only.

Product-focused MDMP. The Afghan army does not purposefully avoid using the MDMP. Contracted U.S. instructors currently teach it to them during two-week courses in regional training centers. The problem is that the ANA will rotate students through a given course, consisting of 177 PowerPoint slides, to keep their day-to-day operations going. 19 If mentors are not deeply involved, up to 14 different people over two weeks could be attending its course in one officer’s slot. Following the schooling, ANA still finds the MDMP process foreign to their organizational culture. This is where the mentors must step in. 20

Mentors have to demonstrate all the different tools available within the MDMP. Good mentors can teach one technique per mission, or one a week, until the Afghan staff is ready to put it all together. 21 This is a time and energy consuming process, but it should be the heart and soul of mentoring at the brigade and corps level. By focusing on MDMP products, and not the process, we can make the system more palatable to our Afghan allies. Instead of focusing on the ANA doing every sub-step of MDMP, we
need to focus them on appreciating the usefulness of individual MDMP products, because they help the ANA plan better, resulting in more successful combat operations.

Some MDMP products whose benefits must be emphasized are:

- Commander’s planning timeline.
- Proper commander’s guidance.
- Modified combined obstacles overlay.
- Doctrinal template.
- Situational template.
- Enemy course of action statements and sketches.
- Restated mission based on analysis of specified, implied, essential tasks.
- Friendly course of action statements and sketches.
- Synchronization matrix.
- Warning orders contributing to parallel planning at lower echelons.
- Operations and fragmentary orders.

We must remember that MDMP is a means to an end, only a process, a methodology. Proper planning and execution through a well-thought-out order is its end state. The MDMP is not something we can contract out for a two-week course. This is something that must be learned hands-on, through dedicated mentoring.

Mentoring is more than advising. It is a full-time process through the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment cycle. We cannot expect our ANA counterparts to be proficient in it after attending a single contracted course. In fact, most of the staff primaries had already attended the coalition course in MDMP when we observed them. They had not retained much from the courses. Daily, continuous mentoring at every echelon must reinforce the MDMP. We need mentors who understand the MDMP, know how to teach it, and have the patience to train their counterparts daily.

Afghan culture as an enabler. The Afghan cultural affinity for autocracy and consensus-building by elders does not have to be an impediment to the growth of the ANA. We can use it to leverage the teaching of MDMP and the development of proper staff systems. When staff sections are properly educated in what their final products should look like, and when battalion- and brigade-level executive officers and deputy commanders learn how the MDMP is supposed to flow, their cultural affinity for discussion and group consensus will help them develop doctrinally sound courses of action. The unit commander and the XO, once they know what “right” looks like, can shape the discussion, and prevent Q&A PP from occurring, thereby creating effective planning sessions.

The decisive point for mentors. In each region, the ANA’s corps and brigade command and control elements (commander plus the G/S3 shop) are the centers of gravity where all important decisions are made, affecting every echelon beneath them. The decisive point for mentors is teaching the MDMP to the command and control element, allowing for proper planning and operations systems development and setting the conditions for tactical proficiency.

The teaching of MDMP has not been the top priority for most mentors. Coalition mentors generally act as liaison officers and instructors for low-level tactics, techniques, and procedures. They are excellent at teaching small arms marksmanship and buddy rush lanes. Successive teams of mentors have taught ANA units mostly individual- and squad-level skills for years, while neglecting battalion- and brigade-level planning process. This is the case because our mentors are not selected based on a specific end state.

If we accept that the ANA can fight well, but needs help building unit-level systems, we must select mentors based on the end state desired. Brigade and corps command and control systems are the centers of gravity in our mentoring effort. We must place our best mentors in those billets and leverage the Afghan cultural affinity for seeking consensus to build their staff systems. The following are recommendations for improving the mentoring effort:

- Assign maneuver, fires, and effects majors or lieutenant colonels with actual S3 experience in active duty Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) units as full-time additional corps- and brigade-level planning advisors. Placing an officer who has never performed these crucial jobs in a full-time environment in a TO&E unit into an S3 mentor position tells our Afghan counterparts that we do not consider the S3 function important. (Currently, some of the brigade- and corps-level mentors are dual-tasked as coalition brigade combat team staff members, limiting their effectiveness)
● Assign three additional mentors at the corps G3 shop. In addition to the G3 OIC, assign personnel for G3 chief of operations, chief of training, and G3 chief of planning. Many ANA corps-level G3 planning chiefs do not have mentors assigned to them. These three areas—operations, training, and planning—are crucial and resource intensive enough that they warrant separate field grade mentors. Currently, one officer mentors all of them, with a corresponding level of result. In 2009, the 209th Corps had one Italian major and one U.S. National Guard lieutenant colonel, augmented by contractors, to assist the corps G3 shop. But as they were dual tasked as S3s in their respective brigades, their effectiveness was severely limited.

● Assign two additional mentors at the brigade S3. In addition to the S3 OIC, assign an S3 training and S3 plans. These mentors must be majors who have performed at that level in the U.S. Army.

● Adopt a larger mentor-team structure, mirroring the NATO operational mentor and liaison team structure. Currently, such NATO teams are deploying an actual battalion commander and his staff, with a dedicated security force, allowing the the teams to mentor far more effectively, at least from a systemic point of view. Numerous U.S. mentoring units are severely undermanned and undertrained in systems development.

● We should develop a mentor-taught program of instruction for ANA staff at respective echelons as well as an assessment recordkeeping system to enable follow-on teams to pick up where the last team left off. Right now, many teams reinvent the wheel each year due to a lack of a uniform program of instruction, regularly assessed in accordance with a uniform standard. Most mentors do not know what to teach, nor how to teach, and revert to their comfort zone, teaching basic rifle marksmanship and buddy rushes over and over.

We are not developing a band of insurgents as Lawrence of Arabia did. We are developing a regular national army. Thus, we must embrace teaching MDMP at all levels. Remember, Afghans can fight. They need our help in building systems to become a self-sustaining army that can operate without mentors. Only then can we go home with success and honor.27

NOTES

1. LTC Robert L. Bateman addresses this often-misquoted adage in his article found at <www.afjournal.com/2008/12/j3801570>. However, his main idea and aim is different. Permission obtained from LTC Bateman to quote him and mention his article, 17 February 2010 via AKO email.


4. Ibid.

5. I credit LTC Tony Leal, NMNG, RCAC-West, and LTC Haydon, Deputy RCAC-West, 2006-2009, for personally teaching and showing me what empirical “Afghan wrong” is and should look like.

6. COL Baer, the Validation Transition Team Chief, Task Force Phoenix first used this phrase in 2006, in his final “VTT Brief” to all incoming U.S. mentors in late 2008.

7. Leal and Haydon.


10. A similar concept of “mission command” is found at 26 April to 8 May 2009, and on my interview of CPT Thomas Beyerl, Team Chief, 3/11207 Embedded Transition Team, conducted 16 October 2009 at Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan, as well as another interview of CPT Ray Gabriel, executive officer of the Badghis Provincial Police Mentor Team, and SFC David Easley, the PMT NCOIC, conducted 8 October 2009, also at Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan. 15. U.S. active duty units serve 12 months in Afghanistan; national guard units, 9 months; Italians 6 months, and Spaniards, 4 months. RC-West in August of 2009 saw all four elements of the coalition rotated out simultaneously within a five-week period in a rare convergence of timing.


17. COL (Ret.) Dave Prugh, who served 75 total months in Afghanistan as an officer then as a contractor, recently as the civilian SME for J3 Validation, CSTC-A, makes a good case arguing that the Army has imprudently placed National Guard units in charge of mentoring, and active duty units in charge of security, when it should have been the other way around. Available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/143-prugh.pdf>, 15-16.


19. When I attended numerous ANA battalion and company commanders and their primary staff why they rotated different students through the course instead of sending the same ones daily so they could learn, the stated consensus among the leaders was that commanders and staff primaries were needed at their desks to operate the unit. The reality was that they sent their assistants and replacements to the class because they could, and no one stopped them.


21. Much progress in this area occurred when Combined Training Advisor Group-Afghanistan under BG Neil Baverstock (UK) created Counterinsurgency Handbooks/Workbooks at the brigade, battalion, and company levels in the summer of 2009. These handbooks contained easily actionable “cheat cards” that ANA officers could use to quickly apply doctrinal methodology during the planning and execution phases of combat operations. 22. Most ANA intel officers know how to make these, but due to commander’s failure to conduct proper MDMP, these products are almost never incorporated into planning.

23. In my experience, this is the most difficult single item to teach, but with the highest potential payoff for unit operation.


26. Ibid.

27. “Success and Honor” is the motto of U.S. Forces-Iraq during Operation New Dawn, the final redeployment from Iraq, 2010-2011.
The Criticality of Captains’ Education

Now and in the Future

Colonel William M. Raymond, Jr., Ph.D., U.S. Army  
Lieutenant Colonel Keith R. Beurskens, U.S. Army, Retired  
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Education is not a tax—it is an investment in the future leaders of our Army.

— Major General Edward Cardon

TODAY’S OFFICERS ATTENDING the Captains Career Course (CCC) have a wealth of experience and training obtained while serving in an Army at war. However, each captain’s learning has been both unique and limited to the jobs he held, specific deployment training, and operational experiences. In contrast, education provides breadth to his learning. Education is the linchpin that allows him to make sense of his experiences and training. It also conditions his mind to learning and should inspire him to become a lifelong learner who has the self-awareness, agility, and adaptability to lead our Army. In today’s complex operational environment, an individual’s ability to understand, learn, and adapt is the key to being successful.

The Army owes its captains who have made the decision to stay past their Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) an education that provides them with the knowledge and skills necessary to serve as company commanders and staff officers, leading troops in complex circumstances. To address this significant educational requirement, the Army has 15 different Captains Career Courses across the country.1 They all have varying standards and conditions designed to address the unique requirements associated with each branch. This diversity presents challenges for ensuring the Army meets the education needs to develop its future leaders.

A recent study of the Army’s CCCs, directed by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Combined Arms Center (CAC) commanders, discovered that, in a time of turmoil characterized by a high operational tempo and limited resources, only about a third of these courses are achieving academic excellence.2 While the study noted several systemic problems, it also emphasized that there are many unsung heroes across TRADOC doing a tremendous job with the resources available. The study’s overarching conclusion was that in order to optimize a captain’s learning experience, the

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Army must provide at least two critical things: high-quality small group leaders (SGLs) and a rigorous, relevant curriculum. This conclusion resulted from a review of the role of the Army captain; an examination of the history of the Officer Education System, particularly with respect to captains; an analysis of the current state of the 15 CCCs; and the future of officer education as articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, “The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015.”

Role of the Army Captain

Time spent as a captain represents a period of tremendous and increasingly broad professional growth. While the CCC is not a transition between tactical, operational, and strategic art, it is still a critical period for a company grade officer. At this point in their service, most captains face a key career decision to stay beyond their initial ADSO. Deciding to attend the CCC signals a renewed commitment to the profession of arms. Captains will have their first opportunity to command and to shoulder the responsibility of administering the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Officers will spend the most time at the captain rank, currently an average of 6.3 years. During this period, captains will also serve on staffs ranging from battalion to combatant command.

Past Officer Education Studies

Historically, the Army has been concerned with officer education in general, and in particular captains’ education. This emphasis began with the founding of the first U.S. Army school in 1776 under the Corps of Engineers. Just after World War II, the Army established officer advanced courses specifically to train and educate captains for what would become the Cold War. In studying the problem of captains’ education, the Army has consistently found that captains need more education than training.

Prior to the most recent 2010 CCC Study, there were 11 major studies of officer education, spanning the last 64 years. All of the studies had remarkably similar conclusions. The previous studies generally found there was too much...
emphasis on training at the expense of education. They indicated that captains would grow the most through reflection on their experiences in an academic setting involving intellectual challenges and discussions with their peers. Moreover, these challenges needed to come from academic rigor and direct peer contact. This combination would, they generally found, achieve a balance in education and training.

General Martin Dempsey, the TRADOC commander, emphasizes this same need for balance. He has stated in the past that “the Army Leader Development Strategy requires a balanced commitment among the three pillars of leader development—training, education, and experience—and [the strategy] considers the development of leaders to be a career-long process.” Most U.S. Army attempts to alleviate this imbalance have suffered from a lack of priority and resources. The optimal balance between education, training, and experience has been elusive, especially with regard to the time required for education. The one major exception to these findings, at least for captains’ education, was the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), which was considered an outstanding and valuable course. It was eliminated due to resource constraints with the assurance that its curriculum, which focused on staff skills and problem solving, would be integrated into the existing CCCs.

Now that combat-experienced captains are the norm, the time devoted to their education is even more important to help them make better sense of their operational experiences and training. Retired General Anthony Zinni, former Central Command commander, recently emphasized this point while speaking to students and faculty at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He argued that “Education is very important. You cannot skip it. You can make up training but you cannot make up education. The echelonment of education is important and irreplaceable. Without education, experience is meaningless—they cannot be decoupled.” For too long, the Army has not placed enough emphasis on captains’ education.

2010 CCC Study

In February 2010, the CAC commander created a study team from the faculty and students of the Command and General Staff College to examine the current CCCs. Over three months, the team assessed all 15 CCCs based on interviews with key leaders. Then there were focus groups and surveys with students and faculty, a review of key documents, and a formal report. The team’s mission focused on whether or not the CCCs are developing officers consistent with the requirements of Army Regulation 350-1, which states that the CCC “provides captains with the tactical, technical and leader knowledge and skills needed to lead company sized units and serve on battalion and brigade staffs.” The team assessed five interrelated focus areas for each CCC: the curriculum, facilities, governance, staff and faculty, and students. Finally, the timing of the study provided an opportunity to examine the recently implemented 2009 “common core” redesign.

The 2010 CCC study provided a comprehensive snapshot of the current state of the Army’s CCCs, resulting in 47 findings and 71 recommendations. Five key findings are the most important:

- There is no substitute for a high-quality small group leader. Not only must branches select their best and brightest to serve in these positions, but they also must have a certification and development process that transforms these officers into educators.
- The curriculum must be current, relevant, and rigorous. Presently, its development and execution face numerous challenges.
- There should be increased oversight and rigor in CCC governance, especially a formal process to reconcile common core and branch-specific curriculum requirements.

...the Army Leader Development Strategy requires a balanced commitment among the three pillars of leader development—training, education, and experience—and [the strategy] considers the development of leaders to be a career-long process.
Most CCC classrooms need to be updated with educational technology and configured to support small group instruction.

Students overwhelmingly emphasized the importance of the environment provided by a resident course (instead of distance learning): learning from peers and instructors with diverse backgrounds (Army, other services, and international officers); personal and professional development and networking opportunities; and a time for balance between personal and professional commitments and interests.

The first two findings are so essential to ensuring an optimal learning experience that they warrant further discussion. With respect to the CCC, there is no substitute for a high-quality SGL. Those selected do not have to hold a Ph.D. or master’s degree. However, they must receive the proper certification and development (both initial preparation and continuing through their duration as SGLs). Where the study team identified academic excellence at a CCC, all the SGLs were majors, except one school which had a mix of majors and promotable captains. All SGLs had commanded in combat or had similar experience from key and developmental positions. These schools also had rigorous certification and development programs to ensure that their SGLs were best prepared to serve as educators.

Curriculum is the other critical factor for an optimal educational experience. Both the common core and branch-specific portions must be current, relevant, and rigorous. The curriculum should be grounded on current doctrine and incorporate the latest lessons learned from the operational environment. School leadership and faculty must conduct a thorough review of the program of instruction and assessment of the learner to ensure that the learning outcomes are achieved. Clearly, the optimal educational experience and best learning environment would be one with a dedicated and certified SGL, who is teaching the most current and relevant curriculum, supported by an experienced instructional design and developmental staff.

One of the most significant issues identified by the study team was that most CCCs do not sufficiently emphasize the communicative arts, specifically written communication skills. This issue was created in part by the loss of CAS3 and its associated learning outcomes. As evidenced by the number of majors enrolling in a writing improvement program while attending intermediate level education, the Army must address this deficiency earlier in an officer’s career. The CCC curriculum must include more written assignments. TRADOC should also resource each school with communicative arts personnel who are focused on supporting students attending the CCC and conducting faculty development for the SGLs.

The study team found that most of the concerns identified with the 2009 common core redesign were a result of its hasty implementation. The deficiencies will improve over time with subsequent iterations. The common core is based on the principle that all officers should share a common base of fundamental skills. This principle is sound, but application and understanding of these fundamental skills is relative to each officer’s branch of assignment. For example, Infantry and Armor branch officers require a deeper understanding of the tactics associated with offensive operations than other officers. Other branches need to understand the fundamentals of offense, but more importantly, they need to know how to best support maneuver from their branches’ perspectives. Therefore, aside from the method of delivery, learning objectives, and student assessments, each school must tailor common core lessons to its branch’s specific focus.

The study team also conducted a survey and collected demographic data on the FY10 CCC student population. Significantly, the team found that 70 percent of CCC students favored the current 20- to 21-week resident model over current distance learning and temporary duty course hybrids. This finding nearly matched the 72 percent of like-minded bloggers on the CAC commander’s blog about the CCC. At every CCC, students and faculty emphasized the educational value of the resident course. The study also revealed that 73 percent of married students attend CCC in an accompanied status. And while some captains commanded prior to attending the CCC, 81 percent of students had not received command credit prior to their attendance.

Why Change?

The CCC 2010 study was a focused look at existing captains’ education, which has been the result of evolutionary change of the Cold War and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
War, Industrial Age model for professional military education. Concurrent with the CCC study, TRADOC initiated the development of a new learning concept that proposes a significant paradigm shift in how the Army learns. There are four primary drivers of this new learning concept: Army Force Generation; the need to restore balance between the education, experience, and training pillars of leader development; rapid and continuing technological change; and generational differences across the Army that affect how students learn.

The Army Learning Concept for 2015

“The United States Army Learning Concept [ALC] for 2015 describes “an Army learning model that meets the all-volunteer Army’s need to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders capable of meeting the challenges of operational adaptability in an era of persistent conflict.”7 The objective of the ALC 2015 is the creation of a learning continuum that blurs the lines between the operating and generating forces by more closely integrating self-development, institutional instruction, and operational experience. The learning continuum begins when one joins the Army and does not end until one leaves. It is learner-centric, not instructor-centric.18 ALC 2015 applies to both the Active and Reserve components.

Included in the ALC 2015 is the proposal to change how and where the Army conducts the CCC. The ALC 2015 describes a new learning environment within the Information Age, stating that “by 2015, CCC is envisioned to be a more tailored, modular learning approach completed over time, with a mix of resident and nonresident gated learning events that include both standardized and tailored learning modules.” It further states, “Common core leader development modules are envisioned to be conducted in a cross-branch, face-to-face setting at the regional learning center by on-site faculty, mobile training teams, networked links to schoolhouse, or a combination of methods depending on location throughput.” With respect to captain’s education, it concludes, “At this point in the officer’s career, broadening opportunities are available for advanced civil schooling, partnerships with industry, and developmental assignments with other government agencies… Before the transition to field grade, CPTs should have achieved at least half of the credits necessary to earn a Master’s Degree.”19

CCC 2015

Combined Arms Center Leader Development and Education, CGSC, has recently created the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT), which is responsible for captains’ education. The school is developing an initial concept for transitioning the 2010 CCC to a 2015 CCC. Upon promotion to first lieutenant, all officers would take an Army Learning Assessment (ALA), establishing a baseline for each officer’s learning requirements. Any significant gaps identified in an officer’s foundational proficiency would be addressed by completion of a preparation course prior to attendance at any resident phases of instruction.

A common core resident phase (similar to CAS3’s learning environment and educational outcomes) would be completed in a peer-to-peer, facilitated, small group seminar at an on-post regional learning center (RLC).20 An officer can attend the common core phase at an RLC before or after his reassignment, thus allowing greater flexibility to best suit each officer’s circumstances and better support Army Force Generation goals.

The branch-specific phase at branch schools would also be conducted in small groups of peers with educational tracks determined by branch commandants, based on each officer’s prior training, experience, and education. For instance, a branch-detailed Military Intelligence officer may attend a longer branch track while a degreed Engineer officer may attend a shorter branch track. The branch phase
may add as much as three months of temporary duty separation from family compared to the current CCC model. Finally, each officer would establish a continuing education program. This program would consist of distance learning electives and other resident functional courses, determined by the officer, his branch, and his operational commander to be completed prior to the officer’s promotion to major and attendance at Intermediate Level Education.

A cross-walk of the key recommendations from the 2010 CCC study and the ALC 2015 indicates that the intent of the recommendations can be achieved within this new educational construct. SALT has completed some initial work on a timeline and process to ensure the ALC 2015 concepts are developed to both achieve the intended educational experience and synchronize implementation with anticipated resources. The proposed CCC 2015 model is more learner-centric, will better support Army Force Generation, and should make better use of Army resources when compared to the current model.

When CCC 2015 is implemented, three critical questions will need to be answered affirmatively for it to be successful. First, will captains and their families support the increased personal operational tempo resulting from the distance learning requirements and temporary duty? Second, will the operating force and commanders be willing to provide the time necessary for their officers to complete educational requirements? And finally, will this new educational construct be viewed as an improvement over the existing CCC model and still provide captains that are competent, capable, and willing to lead America’s sons and daughters?

Conclusions

The CCC is essential to developing critical and creative thinkers, agile and adaptive enough to address complex problems. Developing these skills takes time, a rigorous curriculum that addresses all three requirements of AR 350-1, and most important, a quality SGL who can draw out experiences from the students based on adult learning principles. Even in this era of persistent conflict, the Army must continue to invest in officer education.

The CCC is both developmental and progressive. It is developmental because it teaches the skills...
necessary to lead company-sized units and be competent battalion and brigade staff officers. The CCC is also progressive in that it builds on the technical skills initially taught in each branch’s basic course. It is the last branch-technical training for many officers.

The CCC is also an essential component in developing each officer’s understanding of and commitment to the profession of arms. As its name implies, by deciding to attend the Captains “Career” Course, the officer is acknowledging his willingness to commit to the Army beyond the initial ADSO. General Creighton Abrams, former chief of staff of the Army, once emphasized, “This is the point that officers make the decision to pass up other things in life and sign on in the officer corps to make the Army their career. It is because they desire to belong to something that has these ideals and strives to get them.”21 The Army should reinforce the captains’ decisions with an education that helps them serve well. Education is arguably the most important pillar of the Army Leader Development Strategy, since education allows one to gain better understanding of experiences and training. By committing the necessary resources to ensure a quality education for captains, the Army can demonstrate its commitment to the development of our future leaders. MR

NOTES

1. The fifteen Captains Career Courses (CCCs) are: Air Defense Artillery; Adjutant General; Army Medical Department (which includes six branches—Nurse Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps, Medical Specialist Corps, and Veterinary Corps); Aviation; Chaplain; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear; Engineers; Field Artillery; Finance; Judge Advocate General; Logistics (which includes Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation); Maneuver (which includes Armor and Infantry); Military Intelligence; Military Police; and Signal.


5. Email correspondence with LTC Teresa Wardell, Chief of Officer Personnel Management System Task Force.


8. CGSC Lecture at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 April 2009.


10. Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Washington, DC: GPO, 18 December 2009), para. 3-32, 70.

11. Common Core curriculum is 7.5 weeks of keystone and capstone doctrinal foundations (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0, 7-0, and 6-22) that every U.S Army captain receives.

12. Based on the team’s student survey results for the question, “Given the following options for CCC attendance, please select the option you would prefer.” 69.53% of the students chose “Current (approximately 20-21 week) resident attendance at CCC.” There were four other possible responses, which included options of a blended learning concept with a reduced temporary duty resident course (with varying lengths) and distance learning (of varying lengths) (2010 CCC Study).


14. Based on faculty and student focus groups’ feedback and student demographic data collected from CCs during each site visit. This data includes the entire student population for the current year (2010 CCC Study).

15. Ibid.

16. Based on the team’s student surveys, 27 percent of the respondents commanded prior to attending CCC, however, only 19 percent received key and developmental command credit due to serving as a commander for more than 12 months (2010 CCC Study).

17. ALC 2015, 1.

18. Instructor-centric learning is characterized by the instructor as the expert and the institution determining what and how learning occurs. Learner-centric learning is characterized by the instructor as facilitator guiding the learning process with the learner determining what and how to learn.

19. ALC 2015, 44.

20. Regional Learning Centers will be established at stateside and overseas installations to enhance and extend the learning environment to meet learner needs across their career spans. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, 14.

A group of military officers and noncommissioned officers if they have considered leaving the profession of arms because of the way a supervisor treated them, and, depending on their time in service, anywhere from a third to all of them will raise their hands to say yes. However, what we should recognize about such an informal polling process is that we are only addressing the survivors. We have no idea how many actually left, and whether those who chose to leave were talented contributors chased out by bad leadership or low performers not suited for a military career. Spend some additional time with those who raised their hands and, if you give them a chance to tell you, you will hear some tales of abuse that are inconsistent with a world-class organization. A professional and recruited force requires leadership that inspires, not dissuades, continuing service.

A Look Back

The essay “Toxic Leadership,” published by Military Review in 2004, suggested that those in leadership positions who manifest destructive leadership styles represent a problem for the military. It concluded that the interpersonal style of the leader is an important factor in determining organizational climate and effectiveness. The basis for the assertions in “Toxic Leadership” derived from a series of focus group interviews conducted at the U.S. Army War College in 2003. The article defined toxic leadership as an apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates, a personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate, and a conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest. It concluded with suggestions for future research, including a call for quantitative studies to determine the scope and nature of the problem. The purpose of this article is to provide a brief update on some key research in the area of toxic leadership, report the results of a recent study that focused on mid-grade officers at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and address some issues that have arisen during discussions on this topic.
“Toxic Leadership” resulted in a deluge of emails to the author wherein readers reported their painful experiences with bullying bosses. The horrific stories of abuse and humiliation were compelling, but they were also anecdotal. Reactions to the article were enthusiastic among mid-grade and junior officers, but there was considerably less interest in the subject among senior officers who actually had the power and authority to drive policy change. Senior officers tended to believe that the problem of destructive leadership used to be much worse than it is today. Most of those surveyed at the Army War College (54.6 percent) felt that there is less destructive leadership today than five years ago. They could easily relate stories of abuse at the hands of superiors, but tended to relate to them as a rite of passage with little connection to contemporary reality. The view from the top of the organizational hierarchy is apparently rosier than at the bottom.

We sought to further test this assertion, and to answer some basic questions about the relationship between experiences with bad leaders and various measures of satisfaction and inclination among mid-grade officers to remain in service. Before reporting the results of some survey research conducted at CGSC in 2008, we will briefly review some of the recent literature on toxic leadership.

Bad Leadership in Perspective

Most of the books and articles written about leadership tend to focus on the traits, skills, and behaviors exhibited by good leaders. This positive view of leadership is appropriate since good leadership provides value to organizations. Bad leaders are fortunately the exception rather than the rule. However, as Harvard professor Barbara Kellerman asserted in her 2004 book, Bad Leadership, “Anyone not dwelling in a cave is regularly exposed, if only through the media, to people who exercise power in ways that are not good.” She provided a helpful typology of bad leadership that included headings such as: incompetent, rigid, intemperate, callous, corrupt, insular, and evil. Clearly, there are many ways to be a bad leader. While she recognized that the cost of bad leadership is difficult to determine, she advocated against ignoring or accepting it and for learning more about it, so we can “attack it as we would any disease that damages, debilitates, and sometimes even kills.”

In 2005, Jean Lipman-Blumen published what we consider the definitive work on the topic. In The Allure of Toxic Leaders, she suggested a disturbing reason why there seem to be so many bad leaders in our midst. She asserted that followers actually enable toxic leaders and that organizations often not only tolerate them, but also produce and sustain them. She defined toxic leaders expansively, as “having the effect of poison” and focused on their negative impact. For Lipman-Blumen, it is the significant and enduring harm that follows toxic leaders that defines them.

Kissing up and Kicking Down

Stanford Professor Robert Sutton explores the phenomenon in his 2007 book, The No Asshole Rule. He postulates two criteria for determining whether one is dealing with a bad leader whom he colorfully refers to as “an asshole”:

- After talking to the alleged asshole, does the “target” feel oppressed, humiliated, de-energized, or belittled by the person? In particular, does the target feel worse about him or herself?
- Does the alleged asshole aim his or her venom at people who are less powerful rather than at those who are more powerful?

Sutton notes that toxic leaders tend to “kiss up” even as they “kick down,” which partially explains why the negative impact of their leadership style is not consistently recognized by their superiors. We know that the superiors often have an inflated view of their skills and ignore negative aspects of their leadership style. Sometimes leaders overestimate their own ability to identify the impact of their subordinates’ actions and fail to step in when subordinates exhibit toxic tendencies. The superior might see some behaviors as merely “a bit rough” and fail to see the full measure of the suffering experienced in the ranks.

We are not advocating “warm and fuzzy” leadership where we never raise our voices. There is a place for a rough style of leadership under certain conditions. Even Robert Sutton indicates that there are times when every leader needs to play the asshole. There is nothing quite so effective as a well-timed and well-acted fit by the boss, so long as he does not overuse such
techniques or apply them in such a way as to harm unit effectiveness. The art of leadership involves applying the right interpersonal technique as the situation and needs of the followers demand. When the enemy is in the wire and you are down to the last rounds of ammunition, it is not the time to call for a focus group. It is rarely appropriate, however, to use humiliating, demeaning, and belittling behavior.

Mitchell Kusy and Elizabeth Holloway made a bold and disconcerting statement after they conducted a national research study using both interviews and surveys: “Toxic people thrive only in a toxic system.” Their exploration of toxicity in organizations highlights the role of system dynamics and organizational culture in promoting toxic behavior. They suggest that despite the fact that organizational leaders may not intend to create an environment conducive to toxic personalities, their lack of attention and ignorance of the problem enables toxic behavior. Toxic personalities exist in organizations because people tolerate them, change to accommodate them, or protect them.

A recent study by Richard Bullis and George Reed surveyed the U.S. Army War College class of 2008 and found that senior military officers at the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel frequently reported experiences with destructive leadership. Colonels reported experiencing less toxic leadership than lieutenant colonels, and GS 15s experienced it less than GS 14s. The study suggested that branches of the service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) experience toxic leadership at comparable rates, and the experiences did not vary significantly by race or gender. Civilian employees and U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard officers reported that they experienced more toxic leadership than did their active-duty military counterparts. Of particular interest in this study was the finding that while all measures of satisfaction declined when respondents experienced toxic leadership, such bad experiences did not necessarily translate to an inclination to leave military service. In other words, senior military officers reported that they suffered under toxic leaders, but they did not necessarily choose to leave because of those experiences. We might hypothesize that they so identified with their roles and found their positions so gratifying that bad leadership from their bosses was not enough to move them into another line of work. It is also possible that they had many years of good leadership experience to offset the negative experiences.

We replicated the survey approach taken by Bullis and Reed at the U.S. Army War College and submitted a questionnaire to the Command and General Staff College class of 2009. The survey asked them to identify leadership behaviors that they experienced in the 12 months preceding the course. The survey was administered electronically over January and February 2009 and garnered 167 usable responses. Unlike the War College class, which included civilian employees and all branches of the armed forces, the CGSC study included only active-duty Army majors. Of the 167 respondents, 156 were male and 11 were female. Respondents included 12 African-Americans, 3 Native Americans, 11 Asians/Pacific Islanders, and 5 who identified themselves as “Other.”
When asked the question, “Have you ever seriously considered leaving your service or agency because of the way you were treated by a supervisor?” more than half (102 or 61 percent) responded positively. Deciding whether to stay in a profession is a complicated matter, so we also asked respondents to imagine that they were under no service obligation and then indicate how likely it was that they would choose to remain in the Army. Most respondents indicated that they were inclined to remain in service as follows: very likely = 35.9 percent; likely = 40.1 percent; neutral = 10.8 percent; unlikely = 6.6 percent; and very unlikely = 6 percent. We find it encouraging that 76 percent of the class indicated that they were likely to remain in service, but we are concerned that 24 percent of the class was either undecided or negatively disposed to remain in service. We conducted a regression analysis to determine if there was a relationship between experiences with toxic leadership and an inclination to remain in service. We found that, unlike the U.S. Army War College class, these mid-grade officers were significantly less inclined to remain in service when they experienced toxic leadership. Mid-grade officers in this population who experienced toxic leadership tended to look for an exit.

We modified an existing survey instrument to measure the specific negative leadership behaviors experienced by the class of 2009. Blake Ashforth’s “Petty Tyranny in Organizations” scale was useful because it provided a list of 43 behaviors with headings such as “playing favorites” and “belittling or embarrassing subordinates.” We asked members of the class to indicate how often they experienced these behaviors in the 12-month period preceding their arrival at the course. Response options included “very seldom,” “seldom,” “sometimes,” “often,” and “very often.”

The top 15 most-experienced negative leadership behaviors on the Army War College list showed remarkable consistency with the experiences of mid-grade officers. Yelling at subordinates was a nearby number 16 on the War College list. In all cases, the Army War College mean scores and standard deviations were lower, providing additional support to the notion that experience with toxicity decreases as rank increases, and that senior officers experience less variation in leadership style from their superiors.

**Case Studies and Surveys as Indicators**

Two recent cases drawn from media reports serve to demonstrate the problem of toxic leadership in stark detail. The *Army Times* reported a case of misuse of authority by four noncommissioned officers in Iraq that resulted in at least two court martial convictions for cruelty and maltreatment. In this case, a group of sergeants allegedly engaged in a campaign of “verbal abuse, physical punishment, and ridicule of other Soldiers.” The investigation was initiated because of the death of a private who was in the unit only 10 days before he committed suicide. In another case, a Navy captain was relieved of duty for cruelty and maltreatment of her crew. According to a report by *Time*, “her removal has generated cheers from those who had served with her since she graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1985.” This latter case is useful for pointing out the degree to which members hold the organization accountable for toxic leaders. While an investigation by the Navy’s Inspector General documented many instances of humiliation, “even greater anger seems directed at the Navy brass for promoting such an officer to positions of ever-increasing responsibility.” Both of these cases were extreme examples where the chain of command eventually acted. In the former case, however, it was not the unit climate but the death of a Soldier that prompted the inquiry. In the latter case, a pattern of perceived abuse resulted in a series of anonymous complaints from the crew that prompted the command to investigate. In light of the findings of the Army War College and CGSC studies, we suggest that much toxic behavior in military units goes undetected or without organizational response.

When members of the CGSC class of 2009 were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement “My service’s evaluation and selection system is effective in promoting its best members,” 6.6 percent strongly disagreed; 24.6 percent disagreed; another 24.6 percent neither agreed or disagreed; 39.5 percent agreed; and 4.2 percent strongly agreed. Those who experienced toxic leadership reported that they were significantly less satisfied with pay and benefits; relationships with coworkers, supervisors and subordinates; the kind of work...
they did; and their jobs. While we would expect to see dissatisfaction with supervisors under toxic leadership, it is interesting to note that those who experienced toxic leadership reported lower satisfaction on every measure included in the survey. Toxic leaders apparently cast a wide and destructive wake of dissatisfaction.

We asked members of the class to recall the situation that caused them to seriously consider leaving the profession and then provide information about the supervisor in question. From these responses, we were able to identify a “hit parade” of behaviors these mid-grade officers viewed as particularly problematic. When asked how long ago the incident took place, the most common answer was one to three years ago (24.6 percent). Most of the time the toxic leader was their immediate supervisor, a male of the same specialty and race, and a captain or major. The behaviors most often checked as problematic included: having an arrogant or superior attitude (49.7 percent); unreasonably holding subordinates accountable for matters beyond their control (48.5 percent); wanting things done his or her own way or no way (44.9 percent); valuing his or her career over the good of the organization (40.1 percent); losing his or her temper (35.9 percent); and ignoring required counseling activities (31.1 percent).

Because 360-degree feedback and climate surveys have been touted as a tool to combat toxic leadership, we asked members of the class to indicate their experiences with assessments that considered responses from supervisors, peers, and subordinates. More than half (61.7 percent) indicated that they had the opportunity to participate in a unit climate survey in the unit to which they were assigned before reporting to the course. Opinions varied as to whether the survey was effective. Thirty respondents reported that it was effective (very effective and effective combined) and 54 indicated that it was ineffective (very ineffective and ineffective combined).

This response could indicate dissatisfaction with surveys that are administered to no positive effect. Pro forma use of such tools can falsely raise expectations that are dashed when the results fail to prompt change. When asked about 360-degree feedback instruments, a smaller number reported having experience with them (25.1 percent). Of these, 24 indicated that they were effective, and 11 indicated that they were ineffective. We might conclude that both climate surveys and 360-degree feedback instruments are under-used in this population, and that these findings indicate that there is room for improvement on how the chain of command uses the data.

To determine a sense of the kind of leadership that these mid-grade officers were receiving from their superiors, we asked them to think about lieutenant colonels and colonels that they had personal experience with and then place them by percentage into four descriptive categories. In other words, we asked them to indicate the percentage of lieutenant colonels and colonels that fit four distinct descriptions. We provided narrative descriptions that ranged from very favorable to toxic. The good news is that the mean for the most favorable description was 48.68 percent. The bad news is that the mean for leaders described as toxic was 17.87 percent. At this point, we should note that there is insufficient cross-sector study of toxic leadership to establish what a good or a bad level of toxic leadership is. We simply have to ask whether it is satisfactory that almost 18 percent of the supervisors of mid-grade officers are considered by their subordinates to be a detriment to mission accomplishment with a leadership style so problematic that these subordinates would seriously consider exiting military service if they were asked to serve under them again.

Analysis and Evaluation

As with any research study, our approach had some methodological weaknesses. Because the response rate was low and the sample was relatively small, we advise caution when generalizing findings to the Army at large. We can only indicate that the data we have is suggestive and representative of a small but important group of mid-grade officers. We would be pleased if other researchers continue quantitative analyses...
TOXIC LEADERSHIP

with larger populations. We have established that there is sufficient evidence to assert that experience with toxic leadership diminishes as one moves up the organizational hierarchy. We recommend additional studies at all levels to determine exactly the kind of leadership that Soldiers are experiencing and then to use that information to help improve leader development programs. Army leadership doctrine is generally sound, and the world would undoubtedly be a better place if all leaders practiced what Field Manual 6-22, Leadership, preaches. This study concludes that not all do, which presents an organizational problem worthy of a systemic response.

We draw no conclusions about the causes of toxic behavior at the individual level. That is rightly the domain of the fields of psychiatry and psychology, two of many fields in which we claim no expertise. We are more concerned with the actions an organization should take to monitor the kind of leadership that is actually being exercised on its behalf and how it should intercede when those in positions of authority fail to act in accordance with the organization’s core values. We should recognize that we will probably never eliminate the problem of toxic leadership, but perhaps we can manage the problem in a better way.

Our first suggestion is more vigorous intervention to identify and deal with destructive leaders. The use of climate assessments and 360-degree feedback for development are good tools if used properly, yet our research indicates that there is room for improvement in the extent and method of their use. The corporate sector has made good use of executive coaching to modify executive behavior, but this approach has received little attention within the military. Military organizations tend to rely on the chain of command for coaching and evaluation, but this approach warrants additional scrutiny in the modular force where organizational charts are fluid and span of control (especially by senior raters) can be expansive. Supervisors do have an important role and should be alert for toxic tendencies in their subordinates. They should extend their gaze beyond short-term mission accomplishment to include the long-term health and welfare of the organization. It has never been sufficient to “get the job done” without casting an eye to “how it gets done.”

**Practical Conclusions**

If you are still reading this article, you are probably thinking about the relationships that you have had with your supervisors and perhaps about how you have been mistreated. Our advice is to break out of that mode of thought. There is very little you can do about how you were (or are being) treated by your superiors. Toxic leaders are notoriously unconcerned with how their actions impact direct reports. Let it
leaders do their fellow Soldiers a great service. Watchdog agencies and inspector generals’ offices should be prepared not only to receive and respond to issues of command climate, but also to protect the whistleblowers.

We also recommend that the system of professional military education examine and use negative examples of leadership in addition to the stories of exemplary leadership that abound in our doctrinal publications. We can learn much from negative case studies, and stories of failure can be powerful influencers of organizational culture. Technical competence is no substitute for skill in the interpersonal domain where leadership takes place. Our professional schools, courses, and human resource systems will do well to place as much emphasis on building and maintaining effective teams as on honing combat skills.

Our Nation entrusts its military leaders with the most precious resource it has to offer—its sons and daughters who selflessly volunteer to serve, often at great personal hazard. Such patriotism deserves the very best leadership that we can muster. MR

The authors would like to express their appreciation to Ms. Maria Clark of the Command and General Staff College Quality Assurance Office for her invaluable assistance in administering the questionnaire used in this study.

NOTES

2. Craig Bullis and George Reed, “Assessing Leaders to Establish and Maintain Positive Command Climate,” A Report to the Secretary of the Army (February 2003), 1.
4. Ibid., 243.
7. Marshall Goldsmith, one of the world’s most preeminent executive coaches, asserts that leaders often delude themselves about their achievements, status, and contributions. See What Got You Here Won’t Get You There (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 16-17.
8. Sutton.
9. This is the foundational concept of contingency theories of leadership such as Situational Leadership II, a well-known theory purveyed by the Center for Leadership Studies in Escondido, CA. For more information, see Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard, and Dewey E. Johnson, Management of Organizational Behavior, 9th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2008).
12. Only 51 percent of the War College population indicated that they seriously considered leaving due to treatment by a superior; another indication that longevity might be associated with leadership style.
13. B=.015, S.E. = .005, Wald 10.275, Sig. = .001, Exp (B) = .985.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
Numerous conversations, papers, books, and presentations stress the need for the Army to compete more effectively against a multitude of state and nonstate actors in the information environment. However, the Army often forgets that this competition does not take place between large, faceless organizations. It is a struggle of a group of professionals—information warriors—who must match wits with agile, thinking foes who do not always observe the same rules of engagement or moral strictures as U.S. forces. Talk about influencing the information environment is cheap, but is the Army ready to invest in a nontraditional educational regimen and a professionally rewarding career path for Information Operations (IO) officers?

The key to developing a strong information warrior cadre and culture is to create a broader Army organizational culture that values IO’s contribution. The first step in this effort is to develop a group of information warriors of such capability and quality that they can demonstrate a mastery of their trade and explain what they can do for the commander, what assets they need, and then deliver. However, the IO field is not the easiest specialty in the Army, nor is its core capabilities easy to master. Information warrior education should include numerous training sabbaticals, in both hard and soft science fields, and opportunities for cultural and language immersion. In the field or in the corridors of the Pentagon, successful IO requires officers who can get IO recognized as a value-added tool worthy of the same recognition as artillery and close air support. This is a bureaucratic skill that we must identify and cultivate. It is often critical in making IO work, and it cannot be taught.

The Challenge

The information that people receive drives their cognition, and hence their action or inaction. If we can properly manipulate the information that a target population receives, then we can steer that population’s actions in directions advantageous to national and operational objectives. A target population can be of any size; it can be a single individual, such as a...
American commander, or a brigade staff, or the residents of a town, or an entire nation.

More often than not, the goal of the commander is to target the decision making of an opposing commander and the morale of his soldiers. This is the purpose of maneuver, surprise, flanking, or even wearing the outlandish costumes of the barbarians who took on the armies of the Roman Republic. The movement of kinetic assets in relation to those of an opposing force, or their movement to a sensitive site (such as a nation’s capital), can generate fear, alter the cost-benefit calculation, and lead to limited skirmishes. Altering the cost-benefit calculation forecloses an opponent’s courses of action and can push him to take actions advantageous to friendly forces. “Shock and awe” is a more contemporary example of the use of military force to influence specific populations. Often, the point of maneuver warfare is not to attrit forces, but to exploit the opposition’s psychology by presenting information in the form of force disposition.

Joint Publication 3-13 defines information operations:

The integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.¹

There are kinetic operations, and there is IO—all those other warfighting capabilities that can alter the decision making of an adversary but do not employ kinetic means. That is how we treat IO today—as the “other” operation. It is the drop-bucket for all the capabilities we have that do not involve the “real” work of the Army, putting firepower on a target. While many might object, it is impossible to dispute the fact that top Army officers earned their stars by starting their careers in, and staying connected to, the kinetic side of the house. The Army’s information

U.S. Air Force 1LT Georganne Hassell, information operations officer with Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul, helps Afghan students decorate scarves at the Zarghona Girls School in Qalat City, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 8 July 2010.
warriors face a corporate culture challenge not unlike what the special operations forces community had to endure until Desert One in 1980 demonstrated the price of neglect.

**Training: Achieving Acceptance through Relevance**

The growing centrality of IO in Army doctrine owes its rise to the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Remote-controlled improvised explosive device attacks, hostile local civilians, Internet rumors, and other intangible scourges have frustrated the plans of too many commanders for too long. The real question is whether IO will survive our inevitable withdrawal from those two theaters.

After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude, it seems unlikely that the Army will discard IO as completely as it did PSYOP units in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam. It did so then in an effort to cleanse the stigma of that conflict, but today globalization has so tightly intertwined the movement of people, materiel, and information that the information environment is now the primary battlefield. This interconnectedness brings conflict. Those who feel they have suffered from globalization can now easily reach out and attack those who have benefited from it. Thus, information warriors will have to remain on call to defend our globally dispersed interests when the next conflict comes around, as it surely will.

To be of the greatest use to today’s commanders and to avoid the same fate of the PSYOP units in the Army’s post-Vietnam retooling, information warriors must prove their relevance to officers who will be tomorrow’s generals.

I recommend a three-pronged approach to build the intellectual rigor and operational relevance of the information warrior: know your audience, know your tools, and know the machine.

- **Know your audience.** Articles in numerous journals have already gone into detail about the importance of language skills and cultural awareness to a contemporary ground force—and rightfully so, given the impact that deficiencies in these skills have had in ongoing operations. To their credit, the Marine Corps and Army have finally realized the value of providing cultural awareness and key-terms education for reducing the friction between patrols and local populations.

However, at the end of the day, the Army is not training the type of information warrior who can produce the strong cognitive impact that Hamas, Hezbollah, or Al-Qaeda propaganda teams do. The goal of any IO campaign is to influence a population—to alter the decisions they make—by shaping the information they absorb. Such a task is impossible if one does not understand the perceptual filters that affect that information absorption: language, individual bias, group dynamics, social pressures, and cultural norms. An information warrior should know the religious impact of every turn of phrase in the target audience’s language, as well as the slang used and how to shape that language for age bracket, television, print media, or Internet outlets. Outsourcing message production to Madison Avenue types and the message management companies springing up all over the DC Beltway has yet to help a staff sergeant patrolling in Ar Ramadi or Lashkar Gah.

Nothing can replace the value of an information warrior with long-term language exposure gained through in-country cultural immersion. Ashley Jackson’s recent article in *RUSI* journal points to numerous successes of British special forces during World Wars I and II in enemy rear areas. These forces were commanded by officers and business-men who had spent long portions of their lives in those theaters, the most successful and contemporarily relevant being the famous Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia). And that is what the Army faces today—opposition forces who know what the local people need to hear and the threats, promises, or religious and tribal appeals that will get them to behave in particular ways.

Until information warriors are allowed to get inside a culture through long-term posting, something not currently compatible with the career track of a regular officer, this problem will persist. While the Defense Language Institute can give Soldiers understanding of a language, valuable on...
standard patrols and interrogation, it is not enough to make them message masters. What they need is cultural immersion through cohabitation with a population. (Being a psychological operations team member on a forward operating base does not count.) The current operational environment does afford information warriors a chance to gain face-to-face exposure through provincial reconstruction teams and postings as an embedded advisor or instructor. These tours should be mandatory for any information warrior.

- **Know your tools.** The orchestration of an array of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities in a dynamic human environment presents an information warrior with a complex set of operational choices. He must be a master of critical thinking and technical insight. The core skills of IO cover hard and soft (or social) sciences, with electronic warfare and computer network operations at one end of the spectrum and psychology operations, military deception, and operational security at the other. Both sides tend to attract a different personality type, and it is rare to find an individual who is a natural, ideal mixture of technician and philosopher. The purpose of melding electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security was to create synergies of effect by their proper combination in the mission space as a kind of cognitive combined arms team. However, becoming proficient in one of these disciplines, let alone the various subdisciplines, requires years of training and field experience. (The electronic warfare community has been the most vocal about the hazards of the IO conglomeration. A frequent claim is that an information warrior is like a pool of water eight feet wide and one foot deep, while a good electronic warfare officer is one foot wide and eight feet deep.)

It may be impossible for an information warrior to be all things to all people, but it is possible to create one who is comfortable enough in each of the core capabilities to know when and how to use them to achieve mission objectives or recognize when he cannot. Comfort with all IO core capabilities is essential because it is a common human trait to follow the most comfortable course of action in moments of crisis and stress, rather than doing what is best. This is similar to the idea that “If all you have is a hammer, every problem is a nail.” While training can allow an individual

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**Image Description:**

COL James W. Adams, deputy commander of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA., listens to a sheik’s concerns during a meeting at Forward Operating Base Kalsu, while SSG Shawn Wenninger, in charge of information operations, takes notes, 4 January 2010.
to achieve a high level of skill in performing a function under stress, the performance of the function can often lead to a loss of focus on why the function is necessary. A firm grounding in the fundamental knowledge of each core capability unified by an understanding of strategic theory and national strategy helps maintain a sense of focus when carrying out an IO campaign.

Comfort with each of the core capabilities will require frequent sabbaticals to universities or long-term specialty schools to learn and stay current on the various IO skill sets. Such sabbaticals can tie in with language and cultural immersion by studying or teaching at foreign universities or military technical schools. This has the natural result that an information warrior will be out of rotation longer than his peers are. Even so, at the end of the day, what is important is exposure to an interdisciplinary education so that he begins to think in increasingly creative ways to connect capabilities with mission objectives.

However, the information warrior cannot do it alone. He will have to rely on a cadre of technically trained warrant officers and noncommissioned officers to carry out the highly specialized tasks that make up the core capabilities. For example, it takes seven years to train a truly competent technical electronic intelligence specialist. This is not a progression conducive to an officer career, or one that lends itself to pursuing other training.

- Know the machine. An information warrior can instantly be of use to task forces, Joint force commanders, headquarters elements, and the like, if he has training in both the hard and soft sciences. However, unless he can get others in his command, especially the operations staff (S3, G3, J3), to understand how IO core capabilities fulfill mission objectives and to incorporate them into courses of action, then he might as well not have been trained at all.

Information operations are nonkinetic activities in the land of the kinetic. Units are full of officers who joined the Army to put firepower on a target, and received promotions based on their ability to do so. Information warriors are the odd ducks, like intelligence officers, who promise to add value to military activities, but the methods of their operation and their results seem almost imperceptible. (They lack the visual, psychological, and measurable impact of something blowing up.) The Army does not want units conducting IO just because it is required by DA to complete a certain number of IO activities quarterly. It wants its units to actually recognize the value of coordinating the “open hand” of IO with the “clenched fist” of kinetic operations. U.S. Strategic Command is still years away from developing munitions effectiveness for all of the IO capabilities, but even when they are incorporated into planning, without a strong information warrior, or previous IO training, these staffs will consistently default to what they know and are comfortable with. Humans will often go to the 70 percent solution they know rather than the 90 percent solution they do not.

This is the type of environment that every information warrior should be prepared to walk into. Many commanders who have repeatedly dealt with riotous populations (needing good psychological operations) or remote-controlled explosives (requiring electronic warfare) recognize the limits of the clenched fist. Even so, information warriors will still be pushing the new and the different—in essence, the disruptive.

An information warrior needs to be empathetic to the lifestyle and concerns of the Soldiers he works with. He needs to be able to talk shop with them and make them realize he knows what their world is like. Frequent cross-postings to other job billets, where IO is not the primary concern, has two advantages: it exposes the information warrior to how Soldiers work and choose courses of action, and it brings a person who knows how to leverage IO into a unit that might not realize what IO can do. Platoon leaders in Afghanistan did not realize how indispensible National Geospatial Intelligence Agency imagery intelligence products were until the U.S. Air Force officer attached to their task force showed them their patrol route...the information environment is now the primary battlefield.
before they moved out. That Air Force officer then became the most protected person in the unit. That is the type of impact an information warrior needs to aim for.

Moving Forward

An information warrior should be an interdisciplinary expert in the use of a variety of hard and soft science skills and know-how those skills will impact the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural elements of a mission. He must understand the desired end state of his area of responsibility, the information environment and human terrain in that area, and how he can use IO to connect the two. The information warrior is the pivot upon which the force’s nonkinetic capabilities spin to complement the greater military strategy in the information environment.

Do not think that the Army can simply establish the IO career field, train a few officers, and consider itself ready to compete. The career field is only the first step in building a competitive advantage, the first, and long overdue step of an evolutionary shift in how the Army will deal with its missions in a globalized world. Just creating more information warriors and posting them in more places is not enough. We must develop a logical, rigorous, and comprehensive training strategy to make them relevant in their operational environment. **MR**

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### NOTES

2. Ashley Jackson, “The Imperial Antecedents to British Special Forces,” *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 3.
ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) units are increasingly recognized as important tools that America has available in its fight against terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other states. However, Civil Affairs as a proponent has not received funding, support, or recognition commensurate with its mission. Perhaps the most significant challenge the branch faces is overcoming a command structure that separates Active and Reserve components, reducing CA units’ capabilities and hobbling their relationship with maneuver units.

The current CA structure does not properly align with the rapidly expanding and maturing needs of the CA total force. While it is tempting to continue to examine the problem of a CA proponency from the Reserve component versus Active component perspective, the continuing demands placed on the CA branch compel us to embrace a new support paradigm.

Gun-toting Diplomats
Described by the Army as “gun-toting diplomats,” CA units in both the Active and Reserve components conduct counterterrorism holistically by helping partner nations address the underlying grievances that lead people to violence and extremism. Operating in four-man teams either to support conventional forces or as part of a special operations task force, CA units garner local support for U.S. and host nation policies, develop capability and institutions, and help deter terrorist recruitment. CA soldiers are commanders’ cultural advisors, regional experts, and the Army’s experts in negotiation, reconstruction, and civil reconnaissance. Testifying before Congress in 2007, then-Army Special Operations Command commander, Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, described CA units as “experts in both advancing U.S. interests and objectives and developing the capabilities of partner nations through regional engagements.” As described in RAND Corporations’ War by Other Means, CA operations are most effective when they go beyond merely “winning hearts and minds” and become a key part of a transformational counterinsurgency operation that aims to “change the underlying structure of society and governance . . . to make insurgency an irrelevant mode of pursuing a grievance.”
Currently, about 80 percent of the Army’s CA Soldiers are in the Army Reserve, assigned—along with reserve psychological operations forces—to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), which is subordinate to the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). The majority of CA units have traditionally been in the Army Reserve to facilitate access to the rare skills of functional specialists—such as veterinarians, agricultural experts, and economists—that are better developed in the civilian sector.

The remaining 20 percent of CA strength is in the active component, assigned primarily to the Army’s lone active duty CA unit, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne). The brigade reports directly to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) along with other special operations units such as the Special Forces groups and the 75th Ranger Regiment. Outside of USASOC, Active component CA Soldiers also serve as brigade combat team S-9s, division and corps G-9s at theater special operation commands, and in other assignments.

USACAPOC civil affairs units support general-purpose forces, while CA Soldiers assigned to USASOC support missions within Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Current Army rules of allocation for deployed units generally result in a CA company attached to each brigade combat team and a CA battalion attached to each division. Civil affairs functional specialists also provide support to provincial reconstruction teams and other civil-support elements. The Reserve component CA commands support higher echelons.

The Problem

Until November 2006, the entire CA force, both Active and Reserve, was assigned to USACAPOC. In 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) under then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned why CA, with its focus on the indirect approach to war, belonged in the same command as special direct action units like the Ranger Regiment. According to a report on CA from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, DOD took the position that reassigning CA out of USASOC would allow better integration between CA and general-purpose forces. The report also stated that the Army resisted moving CA, arguing that doing so would hinder CA capabilities in the short term and not improve their integration with conventional forces in the end. Despite the Army’s resistance, DOD reassigned all Reserve component CA units from USASOC to USARC. Active component CA remains under the purview of USASOC. Members of the CA community call this reassignment “the divorce”—with all the negative connotations that word conjures.

The current arrangement, Active component CA as part of USASOC and the Reserve component as part of USARC, has hindered the development of a total force CA capability without noticeably improving the relationship between CA and conventional forces. While the move breached the operational wall between general purpose and special operations forces, placing USACAPOC under USARC built a brand new wall in its place. In addition, the divorce has exacerbated existing Active and Reserve component tensions and strengthened the view that Reserve CA forces are not as capable as their active duty counterparts. These tensions hurt the development of CA as a proponent and diminish the perceived importance of reserve units.

The divorce has also hindered the evolution of CA doctrine and training. Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is the proponent for both Reserve and Active component CA even as it writes doctrine and develops education for special operations forces. Active component CA officers at the center and school are writing doctrine meant for both Reserve and Active component CA units, despite the fact that the majority of their operational assignments are in Active component special operations units. As a result, USACAPOC is not the proponent for the 80 percent of CA Soldiers it administers.

While the move breached the operational wall between general purpose and special operations forces, placing USACAPOC under USARC built a brand new wall in its place.
effect, neither the two-star reserve commander of USACAPOC nor the four-star commander of Joint Forces Command supervises or directs the development of doctrine and schooling for CA. These factors are significant because of the current extremely rapid pace of development of CA doctrine and the large-scale expansion of the CA force.

USACAPOC’s assignment to USARC means that reserve CA units are no longer able to obtain Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11) funds earmarked for special operations forces. Civil Affairs struggled to meet its budgetary needs while under USASOC, but now USACAPOC must compete against every other reserve unit in the Army for funding. Under USARC, reserve CA units have had more success obtaining some kinds of equipment, but the inability to access Major Force Program 11 funds makes it difficult for reserve units to obtain the specialized equipment and training they need.

Academic and military observers have suggested a number of solutions to correct the fallout of the “divorce.” Most notable is a Secretary of Defense-commissioned report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that calls for USACAPOC to return to USASOC and administer all CA units under a single, robust, active-duty, general-officer command. The principal advantages of this plan are that it would help address funding issues by giving Reserve Component CA units access to MFP 11 funds and alleviate Active/Reserve component tensions by making all components equal under a single command. It would also clarify the issue of command and control by returning to a simple organizational structure that, while far from perfect, is certainly preferable to the existing one.

A New Paradigm

A return to the old system as advocated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies report certainly has merit. USACAPOC would again be part of USASOC and Active and Reserve component civil affairs units both would be designated as special operations forces. However, the center’s recommendation examines the issue of total force Civil Affairs through an outdated lens. Solving the problem of how to organize CA requires a new perspective because of the rapid increase in the size of the CA force and its mission requirements since 9/11. The major organizational challenge is no longer managing Active and Reserve components, but appropriately supporting conventional and special operations forces. While in general active-duty CA units support SOF and Reserve CA units support conventional forces, exceptions are becoming increasingly common. During the surge in Iraq, CA units supported general-purpose forces in Iraq and elsewhere, while Reserve component CA units conducted special operations-like missions. More important, the planned 2013 addition of the 85th CA Brigade (an Active CA brigade supporting conventional forces) and the need for active-duty CA staff officers at the brigade combat team level and higher will make the old Active/Reserve component frame of reference increasingly obsolete.

Looking at the CA mission from this new perspective gives us three critical insights for developing a new proponentcy. An Army proponent is the agency that develops doctrine, organization, training, and education for a specific area of responsibility. Because of the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the primary requirement of CA has become supporting conventional forces, while supporting SOF has become a secondary concern in terms of manpower, deployments, and funding.

The increased demand for CA generalists rather than functional specialists in Iraq and Afghanistan has exacerbated this trend. To be most effective, CA doctrine and military education should focus on how CA can best support general-purpose forces; support to SOF should be a specialty.

Active CA support of general-purpose forces will grow in the next few years until it meets or exceeds Active component requirements to support SOF. The creation of the 85th CA Brigade (dedicated to supporting conventional forces) and the addition of Active component CA staff positions within brigade combat teams, division and corps staffs, and higher echelons will eventually require a larger Active component contribution than that required for SOF. As a result, CA support to general-purpose forces will no longer be a primarily Reserve component mission.
The Army should recognize and embrace the significant differences between the missions and capabilities of CA units that support SOF and those supporting conventional forces. Testifying before Congress in 2007, then-SOCOM commander, General Bryan D. Brown, specifically mentioned USASOC Civil Affairs units as special operations forces “trained, organized, and equipped to perform functions that conventional forces are not.” CA support to SOF requires CA Soldiers to live and work directly with SOF teams in isolated, austere, and remote environments, and be familiar with special operations command and control procedures. On the other hand, CA support to conventional forces requires understanding the military decision making process at the tactical and operational level and knowing how to integrate CA organizations within the operations of large conventional units.

Civil Affairs units supporting special operations forces need training in more specialized skills such as languages, advanced negotiation, and operating non-tactical vehicles, while CA units supporting general-purpose forces focus on conventional operations. Unique doctrine, schooling, and education are required for each kind of CA support. Instead of ignoring these distinctions in the interest of lessening Active/Reserve component tensions—the Army should recognize and embrace them as a way to maximize support to both SOF and general-purpose forces. (See table.)

### The Aviation Branch as a Model for Proponency

Because the current CA organizational structure is insufficient and returning to the old system is not acceptable, the Army should examine other branches for potential model solutions. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has already examined Special Forces, Infantry, and the Chaplain Corps as potential models. However, it is better to look at a model from a branch containing both conventional and special operations units. The Aviation Branch is probably the best example; it supervises a large conventional force as well as USASOC’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, which supports the Ranger Regiment, Special Forces, and special mission units. Viewed broadly, the 160th essentially has the same mission as a conventional Aviation unit—to transport personnel in and around the battlefield and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Affairs Support to Special Operations Forces</th>
<th>Civil Affairs Support to General Purpose Forces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Size</strong></td>
<td>Attached to small special operations task forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Operation</strong></td>
<td>Contribute directly to Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command and Control</strong></td>
<td>Controlled by Theater Special Operations Command or Ambassador/Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Base</strong></td>
<td>Must be able to operate in isolated, austere environments independently or with other special operation forces</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Examples of Rare Skills Required</strong></td>
<td>Navigation of nontactical vehicles and advanced language skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patrol and Combat Operations</strong></td>
<td>Small unit patrolling and integration with other special operations forces</td>
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provide attack aviation fire support—but its highly specialized equipment and techniques, rigorous selection process, and the often classified nature of its operations distinguish it. The Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker is the Aviation Branch proponent and writes doctrine and field manuals for the entire aviation force, while Fort Bragg’s Special Warfare Center and School (in coordination with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and USASOC’s Directorate of Special Operations Aviation) is the proponent for special operations aviation. While special operations aviation has its own field manuals and doctrine, the manuals refer to Fort Rucker regulations, and like all special operations field manuals, “complement and [are] consistent with Joint and Army doctrine.”

Pilots and aviation support personnel frequently serve in both the aviation regiment and conventional units throughout their careers.

Civil Affairs could follow a similar model. The 95th CA Brigade should continue to report directly to USASOC as a special operations unit within the larger CA force, just as 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment is a special operations unit within the aviation force. All CA units that support conventional forces, regardless of component, should be under USACAPOC. For the next few years, this will be mostly Reserve component units, but as the CA branch grows, an increasing number of Active component CA units such as the 85th CA Brigade could migrate to USACAPOC. In accordance with AR 5-22, USACAPOC cannot be the proponent for CA, so it would have to work closely with another organization, most likely Training and Doctrine Command, to provide doctrine, guidance, and schooling for the CA branch and community. This is similar to the role Fort Rucker plays for the aviation force. Similarly, just as the Special Warfare Center and School prepares doctrine for other special operations units, under this model it would only write doctrine for USASOC-assigned CA units and provide education and training for CA Soldiers supporting special operations.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Aviation Branch Model

This model has five key advantages over returning all CA units to USASOC. It recognizes
and embraces the differences in capabilities and training required to provide proper support to both special operations and general-purpose forces. Rather than writing catch-all doctrine and providing non-specific training for both kinds of CA units, the school and center could focus on what it does best: training, educating, and writing doctrine for special operations forces. Just as important, USACAPOC would be able to drive the development of general CA doctrine.

This model also allows better integration of CA and general-purpose forces. One of the original rationales for moving USACAPOC out of USASOC was to remove a bureaucratic barrier between SOF and general-purpose forces. Unfortunately, the move simply put a new barrier in its place. Having USACAPOC as an Active component command outside of USASOC would remove both bureaucratic barriers.

This new model will also help alleviate existing Active component/Reserve component tensions within the CA community. Under the Aviation branch model, CA support to general-purpose forces will be a total-force mission rather than simply a Reserve component one. As a result, the perception of Reserve component CA units and their contributions will improve, as will the overall image of the CA community.

Another significant benefit: Active component CA Soldiers and officers will be able to serve in assignments in special operations and in the conventional forces just as their aviation and infantry counterparts do. This ability will allow the cross-pollination of ideas and tactics, techniques, and procedures that will improve the quality of CA support and strengthen the entire CA community. We should also institute a program allowing mobilized Reserve component CA Soldiers to serve in special operations assignments to strengthen this cross-pollination of concepts and experiences in the CA total force as well.

The elevation of USACAPOC to an Active component command outside of USASOC will help make CA equal to older branches such as Infantry, Armor, or Signal. Such a move, along with the creation of additional Active component CA general officer positions at the Pentagon and within USACAPOC and USASOC, will help reverse the perception among many Army officers that joining CA is a “career ender” and help attract the ambitious and talented officers that the branch requires.

Even so, the Aviation Branch model does pose a number of disadvantages. For example, increasing the number of Active component positions outside of SOF will make the assignment and assessment of active-duty CA Soldiers more challenging. Currently, all active-duty Soldiers selected for CA training report to the 95th CA Brigade upon successful completion of the CA Qualification Course. However, if many positions for Active component CA Soldiers reside outside of USASOC, other assignments may be necessary. Assignment to the 95th CA Brigade might eventually require a selection process similar in purpose to Special Forces assessment and selection, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment’s Green Platoon Course and Selection, or the Ranger Regiment’s Ranger Indoctrination Program. This will be a bureaucratic hurdle and will extend the already lengthy training pipeline, but instituting such a program is a manageable challenge. In addition, a CA selection course will enhance the reputation of selected CA personnel within the special operations community by giving them additional bona fides.

One of the major advantages of subordinating USACAPOC to USARC was that USARC understood the reserve mobilization process better than any other command in the Army. While more CA Soldiers will be Active component in the near future, even by 2013 over 70 percent will still be Reserve component. Managing this large number of Reserve component Soldiers would be somewhat easier if USACAPOC were still directly underneath USARC, but the benefit is not significant enough to prevent moving USACAPOC to another command. Appointing a Reserve component officer as the USACAPOC deputy will also help USACAPOC manage the mobilization process.
The greatest disadvantage of this move—compared with simply returning USACAPOC to USASOC—is that the command will remain unable to access MFP 11 funds earmarked for special operations forces. While USACAPOC’s funding would likely be better in USASOC, placing the command in Forces Command rather than USARC is still a potentially significant improvement. To overcome any remaining funding gap, the Army should recognize that CA units supporting general-purpose forces still require a significant amount of specialized training and equipment. While the training and equipment requirements of general-purpose force CA units are not the same as SOF CA units, they differ enough from most conventional units to require supplemental funding. The Army will need to push for increased funding for CA elements supporting general-purpose forces to ensure that they have everything they need to accomplish their pivotal missions.

**Joint Proponency**

The CA Army proponency question also raises the issue of Joint proponency. Currently, SOCOM is the Joint proponent for all CA units, including U.S. Marine Corps CA Groups and the U.S. Navy Maritime CA Group. The Air Force does not have a formal civil affairs organization but does provide important augmentation to civil affairs-related functions such as provincial reconstruction teams.

Special Operations Command is not the ideal place for a CA Joint proponency because no other CA unit within the Department of Defense is considered a special operations unit besides the Army’s 95th CA Brigade. Neither Navy nor Marine Corps CA units are considered special operations forces. Title X legislation specifies CA as one of the core special operations tasks, and SOCOM certainly should have a role in civil affairs proponency, but the need for a better Joint proponent becomes apparent when one accepts the new paradigm of managing CA support for both general-purpose and special operations units.

Joint Forces Command (or the office that inherits its Joint proponency function if the command is closed) is probably the best place for Joint proponency as it will align Joint proponency for CA with Army proponency. This arrangement will continue to raise the profile of CA within the conventional military and help establish the branch as a crucial battlefield system rather than a specialized afterthought.

**Conclusion**

Making USACAPOC an active command outside of USASOC will put it in the best position to take a major part not only in the development of overall CA doctrine and education, but also in preparing the majority of CA units to support general-purpose forces. Similarly, leaving the 95th CA Brigade as the only CA unit within USASOC will enable the Special Warfare Center and School to concentrate exclusively on CA support to special operations. This system will be a dramatic change of proponency from both the current system and the one prior to “the divorce” and will have to overcome significant bureaucratic hurdles. However, such a change is necessary to develop a mature civil affairs total force capable of meeting the new demands placed on it by modern threats. **MR**

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**NOTES**


2. Civil Affairs Operations are defined formally as “those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.” See Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil Military Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 8 July 2008), GL-6.


5. This article only deals directly with the issue of civil affairs proponency; however, one cannot address this issue without also examining psychological operations proponency. For an excellent discussion of the issue of the psychological operations proponency, see Timothy D. Huening, “Advancing the Art and Science of Psychological Operations Requires a Serious Investment,” 21 April 2009, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/advancing-the-art-and-science/>.


7. Ibid., 7.


11. Hicks, 36-37; and Special Forces officer, interview by author, June 2009.
12. Hicks, 38.
15. “USACAPOC (A) Command Overview Slideshow.”
17. Ibid. For an examination of the unique military, psychological and physical demands placed on units undertaking special operations civil affairs missions, see Don W. Bryant II, “Into Africa: CA Teams Expand Operation Enduring Freedom into Africa,” Special Warfare, September-October 2008, 18-25.
20. See Huening, 10, for a similar discussion of the possibility of cross-pollination between RC/AC psychological operations personnel if all PSYOP units are under a single command.
21. Hicks, 30.
22. The former SWCS commandant, MG Thomas R. Csrnko, has recently stated that he is already looking into the possibility of assessment and selection for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers and noncommissioned officers. See Thomas R. Csrnko, “From the Commandant,” May-June 2009, Special Warfare, 4.
23. Report to Congress on Civil Affairs, 7-8.
24. Hicks and Monvorn first recognized the need for continued high-level reserve officer representation at the command, if USACAPOC became an Active component command. See Hicks, 38.
25. In this context, Joint proponent is defined as a “Service, combatant command, or Joint Staff directorate assigned coordinating authority to lead the collaborative development and integration of a Joint capability with specific responsibilities designated by the Secretary of Defense.” See Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Designation of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as Joint Proponent for Civil Affairs (CA),” 27 April 2009.
26. Hicks, 32-5.
27. Holshek also recommends that JFCOM should be the Joint proponent for CA, but under a system where there is no longer a distinction between special operations and general-purpose civil affairs support. See Holshek, 132.

RED TEAMING

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UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY AND CULTURAL STUDIES
AS THE U.S. military looks ahead to the first half of the 21st century, several global trends—globalization, technology availability, population growth, urbanization, increased resource demands, climate change, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—are shaping the international security environment. They place increasing stresses on governments to satisfy their citizens’ legitimate expectations, including meeting their basic needs, receiving fair and impartial justice, and attaining increased prosperity and opportunities for themselves and their progeny. Governments unable to satisfy these aspirations risk losing their ability to govern. This loss creates opportunities for extremist groups to export terror and violence on behalf of radical ideologies. Ultimately, it becomes a setting for persistent conflict.

Persistent Conflict

Protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors increasing will to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends remains the likely strategic environment through the first half of the 21st century and possibly beyond. Anticipated strategies for an era of this persistent conflict suggest that U.S. forces will have four major tasks:

- **Prevail** in the current conflict.
- **Deter**, and if necessary, **defeat** enemies in future conflicts, including defense of the homeland.
- **Support** civil authorities at home and abroad.
- **Engage** with partner nations to build the capacity of their security forces; in concert with other elements of national power, build the capacity of their governments and gain their cooperation in operations across the spectrum of conflict.

While partner engagement has long been a part of national strategies, the United States has only episodically relied on its military forces to play significant roles in this fourth task. Because of the conventional military threats, the level of international stability ensured by competing superpowers, and a low extremist group threat, the U.S. military did not put much effort into persuading partner nations to build their security forces’ capacities. However, with the heightened threat extremist groups pose to regional and global stability, the U.S. military must accept this role. Because the threat is persistent, the response must be persistent.

**The U.S. Army Approach to Security Force Assistance**

Brigadier General Edward P. Donnelly, U.S. Army; Colonel Mike Redmond, British Army; and Major Bill Torrey, U.S. Army

Brigadier General Edward P. Donnelly recently completed two years as the Army’s deputy director for strategy with responsibility for the International Affairs and Security Cooperation portfolios. He has served seven operational and combat tours. He holds several advanced and professional degrees including a J.D. from Suffolk University.

Colonel Mike Redmond, British Army, was the chief, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Stability Operations Division. He holds an M.S. from the National War College, Washington DC.

Major Bill Torrey is an Army strategist with Stability Operations Division. He is also currently pursuing a masters degree with Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

PHOTO: NATO and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan visit Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Balkh, Faryab, and Wardak. Through PRTs, ISAF supports reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. Currently, there are 26 PRTs operating through Afghanistan. (Photo by U.S. Navy CPO Joshua Treadwell)
Persistent engagement is a protracted effort, in concert with other elements of government, to build the capacity of partner nations to secure their territory and govern their population, and to gain their cooperation in operations across the spectrum of conflict. Accomplished largely through security cooperation efforts to build partner capacity and relationships, persistent engagement is crucial to success in persistent conflict. The military is the primary instrument to build the capability of other nations’ military forces and institutions by providing security force assistance (SFA). The military has supplementary roles assisting other agencies’ efforts to build partner nations’ governance capacity. It also helps those agencies develop their own capacity to assist other nations. Security cooperation, including SFA, increases the cooperation of partner nations in operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Security Force Assistance

Security force assistance is the combination of activities to build the capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. SFA is a task military forces conduct in coordination with, supported by, or in support of other agencies, as part of stability operations across the spectrum of conflict. Security force assistance also frequently contributes to building relationships, which, among other things, provides political support for military operations and government or security force capacity-building efforts.

The Army approach to SFA has five components:

- Demand.
- Supply.
- Preparation.
- Execution (including assessment).
- Sustainment.

Demand. Geographic combatant commands establish and articulate demand. They set it forth in their theater strategies to achieve end states of security and stability within their areas of responsibility, in accordance with guidance from the secretary of defense in his guidance for employment of forces. Department of Defense processes validate, prioritize, and direct geographic combatant commands’ demands.

Army service component commands develop theater campaign plans to execute geographic combatant commands’ assigned responsibilities and achieve operational effects. Army service component commands, security cooperation organizations, Joint Force commanders, theater special operations commands, and Department of State country teams coordinate plans within the area of responsibility. They may also develop operational or institutional demands to include in the Army service component commands’ plans. The country team, for example, is a likely source of demand for military assistance to other agencies’ governance or economic capacity building plans.

The Army service component commands’ plans set forth requests for assistance articulated in the form of capabilities required to achieve effects. The Department of Defense validates and prioritizes the requests and directs the military services to provide individuals, units, equipment, capabilities, and programs to the Army service component commands to meet the requests. Upon direction to provide assistance, the Army determines how to supply the requirement. The two sources from which the Army can draw are the operating force and the generating force.

Supply. When using operating forces to fill a demand, Army special purpose forces will frequently be the first and best choice. Organized, trained, and equipped to conduct small-unit operations, possessing regionally focused language and cultural skills and foreign internal defense training, Army special purpose forces are ideally suited for employment in the most common SFA tasks involving small, adaptive, and short-duration packages required for capacity building at the individual and small organization levels. When unique or niche capabilities are also required, general
purpose forces or small tailored organizations can be attached to the special purpose forces unit for the duration of the mission. Army special purpose forces can operate with a less visible footprint, making them ideally suited for many SFA missions, because the nations most likely to need SFA assistance often do not want their populations to know they asked for it.

When the demand for operating forces exceeds the supply of special purpose forces or when special purpose forces are not best suited for the mission, the Army will most likely task a general purpose forces brigade to provide the assistance. The Army has 302 modular general purpose forces brigades, including 73 maneuver brigade combat teams (BCTs) and 98 multifunctional support brigades. The Army used maneuver BCTs in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (and now Operation New Dawn) to build Iraqi and Afghan security force capacity. Lessons from these deployments so far indicate that the brigade is a viable basis for large-scale SFA to build capacity at the individual and unit levels. The planning, command and control, and sustainment capabilities inherent in a general purpose forces brigade headquarters enable the brigade to plan, execute, and sustain larger, more complex, more varied, and longer-duration SFA missions.

The brigade’s modular design enables the Army to organize it for the SFA mission with individuals, organizations, and capabilities from special purpose forces, other general purpose forces, and even generating force organizations. The more the stated demand articulates the desired effects of the SFA mission and the earlier it is received, the more likely it is that the general purpose forces task organization will contain the best blend of capabilities for the mission. The brigade can organize elements of the required size and skill sets for each mission, and it can provide sustained assistance across multiple locations using its internal staff capabilities. Host nation facilities or specific logistic capabilities from across the parent formation can support the deployed teams logistically, depending on the environment. Specialized units can augment the formation, while organic units can adapt to meet unique mission requirements. The brigade contains a broad range of experience. An average brigade combat team,
for example, has over 250 commissioned officers and over 1,000 NCOs of sergeant rank and above, providing a large base of trainers and advisors.

When generating forces fill a demand, the Army will normally task an Army command to develop an appropriately sized capability package to deliver the desired effect, or organize the package around Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) or direct reporting unit staff elements. Other generating force elements can contribute individuals, organizations, or capabilities. If threat conditions require protected transportation and security, or the task requires a significant support structure, operating forces may contribute to the package, as well. If it is necessary to equip foreign security forces, the Army’s Materiel Enterprise should determine the best way to supply the assistance. Options include the Foreign Military Sales program, authorized high priority direct sales, declaration of excess defense articles, and temporary loans. When a specific program best meets the demand—International Military Training and Education, for example—the generating force will supply the required assistance.

**Preparation.** Once a source of supply has been identified for a demand, the individuals, organizations, capabilities, equipment, or programs prepare for execution.

- When the source is special purpose forces, Special Operations Command will task an appropriate element and request augmentation, if required, from the general purpose forces or the generating force. HQDA will task accordingly.
- When the source is general purpose forces, Forces Command will task the appropriate organization in line with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and request appropriate special purpose forces or generating force augmentation for HQDA tasking.

The ARFORGEN process enables progressive preparation for any assigned mission by allocating resources to organizations, which build readiness through three sequential phases—Reset, Train-Ready, and Available. Regardless of the organization sourcing the requirement, the matching of supply to demand should occur as early as possible in the ARFORGEN process—ideally before the end of a unit’s Reset phase. During the Train-Ready phase, units receive individuals, organizations, capabilities, training, and any special equipment required for the SFA mission. The 162d Training Brigade, collocated with the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, is the primary instrument to assist in these integration activities. The brigade provides mobile training teams and on-site instruction to develop individual and collective skills and facilitate the scheduling of relevant language, regional and cultural awareness education. The integration of SFA training within JRTC and other combat training centers (CTCs) using special role players and mission-specific scenarios provides additional opportunities for collective unit preparation. During this Train-Ready phase, units coordinate with Army service component commands, country teams, offices of defense cooperation or coordination, and regionally focused special purpose forces to enhance mission preparation and regional orientation.

Region-specific teams, including regionally focused foreign area officers, will work with the 162d Brigade to help the deploying unit translate theory into specific situational practices. The teams may deploy with SFA units to improve language proficiency, cultural awareness, and long-term continuity. They also provide lessons from deployments to update and refine SFA training syllabi and help develop scenarios and assessments for specific geographic areas. Although the generating forces tasked with SFA do not operate on an ARFORGEN cycle, they are able to take advantage of the 162d Brigade’s “clearinghouse” and tailorable training support capabilities.

**Execution.** Properly prepared individuals, organizations, capabilities, equipment, and programs are available to execute SFA during the ARFORGEN Available phase. Army service component commands assess the effects of SFA during and after its delivery and adjust plans and future requirements accordingly.

Special purpose forces-sourced SFA, coordinated with the country team, takes place under the operational control of the theater special operations command and, if appropriate, the special operations command-forward in the country.

Generating force-sourced SFA is under the operational control of the Army service component commands and coordinated with the country team.
and, if appropriate, the local security cooperation organizations. The Army service component commands may choose to delegate control of smaller or less complex SFA missions to the security cooperation organizations or even to the Defense or Army attaché.

Generating force-sourced SFA delivered to foreign nonmilitary security forces and institutions (e.g., national police, intelligence services, local police) is under the operational control of the Army service component commands in direct support of another federal agency. The Army service component commands would either be assisting with military-unique capabilities or augmenting them with military capabilities adapted to a civil purpose for limited periods, usually when surge conditions exceed the capabilities of the federal agencies.

Equipment and associated training provided to foreign security forces is under the operational control of the Army service component commands, although the commands normally delegate it to the security cooperation organizations.

Recently added to each Army service component commands staff is a 20- to 23-person security cooperation division, the focal point for all SFA-related planning, execution, and assessment. The security cooperation division is the primary coordination point between the Army service component commands and country teams, security cooperation organizations, geographic combatant commands staffs, region-specific Special Operations Command elements, and HQDA. In addition to being the Army service component commands’ major developer of SFA demand requirements, the security cooperation division assists units assigned SFA missions and assesses their effectiveness in SFA activities.

**Sustainment.** The anticipated strategic environment of the 21st century requires SFA missions of significantly greater frequency, duration, and scope than those in the latter half of the 20th century. The Army must adapt its force management institutions to sustain SFA efforts and make them as much a part of its core competencies as the ability to conduct major combat operations. The Army’s enterprise approach will help it achieve balance between sustaining existing capabilities to prevail over conventional military adversaries and institutionalizing the changes necessary to enable sustained SFA efforts. Enterprise approach leaders are empowered to take a holistic view of Army objectives and resources and act cohesively to provide trained and ready forces and capabilities effectively and efficiently. The two core enterprises most important for sustaining the Army’s ability to conduct SFA are the Human Capital and the Materiel Enterprises.

The Army’s Human Capital Enterprise trains, educates, and develops soldiers and leaders who understand the importance of SFA in the context of the national strategy. It makes Soldier participation in SFA-related activities part of the Soldiers’ permanent record. Continuous review of skill requirements enables the Army to adjust and maintain adequate inventories of appropriately skilled individuals in both the active and reserve components. One example is the plan to field an additional 100 foreign area officers (10 percent increase overall and 25 percent in the critically affected specialties) by converting an equivalent number of generalist billets by FY 2012.

Army doctrine is another part of the Human Capital Enterprise. After the publication of FM 3-0, *Operations*, both FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, were refined for building partner capacity. Future revisions will reflect continued evolution of thinking as lessons are learned and concepts honed.

Army training systems have also kept pace with the increased need for SFA. The TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is one
example of adapting to the need for greater cultural awareness to support SFA. The establishment of a force modernization proponent for SFA at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is further evidence of the Army’s move to institutionalize its ability to deliver SFA.

In addition to supporting the soldiers who undertake SFA, the Human Capital Enterprise builds partner capacity. When an SFA effort focuses on a foreign security force’s institutions, the Human Capital Enterprise’s force management element meets the requirement. It also provides the International Military Education and Training program through which partner nation service members attend U.S. Army schools.

The Army’s Materiel Enterprise is the primary generating force element maintaining and sustaining the equipment and materiel of a foreign security force. The Foreign Military Sales program provides equipment to foreign security forces. Loans, donations of excess defense articles, and encouragement of fledgling foreign nation production capabilities are also important means to build capacity, as are sales or donations by partner nations conducting complementary SFA activities. The Materiel Enterprise ensures equipment is available for foreign security forces and that supporting institutions are able to maintain it.

**Conclusion**

The Army’s approach to providing SFA nests within the security cooperation concept of persistent engagement to minimize enemy opportunities within an era of persistent conflict. The Department of Defense validates, prioritizes, and directs combatant commander requirements to ensure the Army makes the best use of its operating and generating forces for SFA. Both special and general purpose forces prepare and employ individuals, organizations, equipment, and programs to build the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and institutions. Organized with tailored assistance from operating and generating forces, prepared, trained, and regionally-aligned through the ARFORGEN cycle, and under the operational control of Army service component commands, brigades are the key component of this concept and the primary instruments for delivering SFA. The second key component is building foreign security force capacity at the institutional level through the employment of individuals, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and programs from the generating force.

This SFA concept is sufficiently versatile and agile to meet fluctuations in demand. It also allows the Army to maintain a balanced force capable of full spectrum operations to execute the balanced strategy our Nation requires. *MR*

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**NOTES**

1. This definition of security force assistance is adapted from Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68 on SFA. It differs slightly from definitions in Army Field Manuals (FMs) 3-07 and 3-07.1 and from definitions in Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, previous draft DODI, and papers on SFA fundamentals. These differences are not stark and represent the continuing evolution of thinking regarding SFA and its objects. “Capacity” as used in this article is shorthand for “capability (the qualitative ability to do something) and capacity (the quantitative amount of that capability the force can do).”


3. A Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) is responsible for planning and in-country management of U.S. security cooperation programs, including security assistance. These offices have a number of names, including Offices of Defense Cooperation, Security Cooperation Offices, Offices of Defense Coordination, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Military Group, Military Training Mission, etc. Combined Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is a Security Cooperation Organization, as was Multinational Security Training Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which is now United States Forces-Iraq, Advising and Training (USF-I (A&T)).
THE DEVASTATION IN Haiti caused by the 7.0 magnitude earthquake on 12 January 2010 prompted the longest and largest U.S. military effort in a foreign disaster relief operation. The earthquake destroyed vast areas of Port-au-Prince, the nation’s capital, as well as a number of communities to the west of the capital, killing an estimated 230,000 persons and leaving thousands trapped in the wreckage and over two million without shelter. At the peak of Operation Unified Response, 1 February 2010, Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) consisted of over 22,000 service members, 58 aircraft, and 23 ships. With the stand-down of JTF-H on 1 June, Operation Unified Response lasted nearly five months.

This article contains our initial observations and recommendations to after action reviews and lessons that our military and interagency community should learn from as we prepare for the next foreign disaster.

The Response

Within hours of the earthquake, President René Preval sent several of his ministers on motorcycles to the home of U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Ken Merten, to request immediate assistance from the United States. The first request was to take control and open the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, whose terminal had been significantly damaged and tower disabled. Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen was with Ambassador Merten at the time, had already been in contact with Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and was able to assure the ministers our military would respond. Runway conditions allowing, we were confident we had the capability to open the airfield.

On 13 January, General Keen was able to make contact with Haitian government officials at the airport and inspect the runway with UN officials. Under the direction of SOUTHCOM, elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) began to arrive on that day to assist the government of Haiti and the U.S. Embassy. The 1st Special Operations Wing reopened the international
airport, while the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Higgins and military aircraft began delivering relief supplies and evacuating American citizens. Department of Defense immediately ordered the USS Carl Vinson, USS Bataan, USS Nassau, and USS Carter Hall to Haiti along with additional forces from the 82d Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps assigned to the Global Response Force. Recognizing the need to establish a command and control element for the rapidly growing force, SOUTHCOM established Headquarters, JTF-H on 14 January to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Joint Task Force-Haiti assumed responsibility for all U.S. forces and began directing activities to assist in providing timely relief. Immediately, the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, arrived along with 58 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft with elements of the amphibious ready groups. These elements, together with members of SOUTHCOM, Joint Force Special Operations Component, and the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command formed JTF-H, which led efforts through the emergency phase and into the relief phase of the operation. Additionally, Joint Forces Command, Northern Command, European Command, Transportation Command, and other selected units mobilized personnel to augment JTF-H with required specialties.

On 20 January, the hospital ship USNS Comfort, equipped with surgical operating teams and orthopedic surgeons, arrived in the operations area. 82d Airborne’s 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) supported multiple interagency humanitarian aid distribution missions in the heaviest impacted areas of Port-au-Prince. By the end of January, JTF-H controlled over 22,200 troops both on the ground and offshore. Sixteen distribution sites were established to provide food, water, and medical care.

Joint Task Force-Haiti planners and leaders worked alongside their counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), USAID, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop plans for moving internally displaced persons at risk due
to the impending hurricane season. Joint Task Force-Haiti conducted assessments and executed engineering projects with the UN and NGOs to mitigate the risk and reduce the number of people requiring relocation.

The Joint Force Maritime Component Command, composed of the 22d and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, conducted missions outside Port-au-Prince to the west and north. Using the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces, Sailors and Marines brought relief to thousands of Haitians in the outlying regions.

On 15 March, United States Army South (ARSouth) deployed to augment JTF-H’s staff, and on 18 March ARSouth conducted a relief in place and transfer of authority with the XVIII Airborne Corps. When the 2d BCT redeployed at the beginning of April, JTF-H retained 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment as its primary Army force. The JTF continued to provide relief support in the form of shelter and engineering projects, while international partners took responsibility for food and water distribution. As the rainy season approached, it became clear that JTF-H would continue operations through the end of May, when SOUTHCOM New Horizons exercises would provide the transition to continuing theater security cooperation activities.

From mid-March through mid-May, the JTF mission focused on mitigating the dangers of pending heavy rains, floods, and mudslides at nine designated internally displaced persons camps in Port-au-Prince, to include supporting Haitian government, UN, USAID, and NGO partners in relocating displaced persons to transitional resettlement sites. Through these efforts, JTF-H postured for a seamless transition to the newly created SOUTHCOM Coordination Cell and Theater Security Cooperation activities represented by the New Horizons exercise.

Although Operation Unified Response was the longest and largest U.S. military foreign disaster relief endeavor, U.S. military support was only a part of the response. The support from the international community was phenomenal and together saved countless lives that could have been lost to this disaster.

The tremendous response from the international community was a blessing but also presented some unique challenges. The following are observations from the JTF-H perspective.

**Respond Quickly and Effectively**

Fundamental to saving lives in the onset of any disaster is responding quickly and effectively. In Haiti, this became even more pressing due to the devastation of the earthquake and a lack of Haitian government capacity to respond.

The rapid deployment of U.S. military forces and U.S. resources was quick and effective, but not always efficient. The initial surge of forces and relief efforts was ad hoc because no single agency or organization exists with the capacity to adequately respond to such an emergency. This effort was outside the formal U.S. military planning, sourcing, and tracking procedures, resulting in shortfalls in some areas. Because of the flexibility of our military forces and rapid deployment of the DOD Global Response Force, JTF-H helped avert a food and water crisis. Although more than 230,000 people died from the earthquake, the abundant and superior medical assistance provided by the U.S. military and the international community saved thousands of lives. The most significant challenge facing the U.S. military and the international community in the initial emergency phase was logistics.

Overall, the U.S. military’s logistics response was proactive and robust. Three areas presented challenges:

1. Incomplete situational awareness in the early hours after the quake made it difficult to determine requirements and priorities.
2. Absence early on of a unified and integrated logistics command and control structure to integrate

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**The most significant challenge facing the U.S. military and the international community in the initial emergency phase was logistics.**
the overall logistics effort led to gaps in reception, staging, and movement of forces, equipment, and supplies into Haiti.

(3) Initial reliance on the only airport into Haiti, Toussaint Louverture International Airport, for the throughput of personnel and relief supplies forced the U.S. military to develop a system for validating and prioritizing global international flights to ensure critical equipment, supplies, and personnel were available.

Joint Task Force-Haiti worked through these challenges and issues, but our logistical system is designed and focused primarily on internal support to our own forces, rather than external support in a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation. A more thorough look into capabilities required for this type of operation is necessary.

There are two primary ways to deliver aid directly to Haiti. The first is by air through the international airport in Port-au-Prince. This airport has only one runway and one small taxiway. Further, the earthquake rendered the control tower and the terminal unusable. Establishing an aerial port of debarkation within the first few days of the earthquake was critical. Within 28 hours of the earthquake, Airmen from the 21st, 23d, and 123d Special Tactics Squadrons had supervisory control of the airport. They oversaw airport and runway operations around the clock until it transferred to the Haitian Airport Authority in March. The throughput the Airmen managed increased from 13 flights per day (prequake) to a peak of 150 flights per day to enable the needed flow of personnel, equipment, and relief supplies. However, even this increase in capacity could not meet the demand, so SOUTHCOM’s 12th Air Force, in coordination with the United Nations, developed a system of prioritization by creating slot times and priorities driven by the Haitian government.

The other primary means of delivery is by sea through the Port-au-Prince seaport. The earthquake rendered both northern and southern piers unusable. Joint Task Force-Haiti, with assets from U.S. Transportation Command supported by the Army and Navy, initially established a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability to bring supplies in from the sea. This more than doubled the number of shipping containers received compared to prequake numbers. SOUTHCOM also established the JTF port opening element to repair the damaged southern pier and establish a temporary port capability using two contracted Crowley barges. This enhanced the flow of relief supplies and reduced some of the pressure on the international airport.

Less than 48 hours after the earthquake, the lead elements of 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, landed at the airport and moved to the heavily damaged area of Port-au-Prince. Along with USS Carl Vinson and its fleet of helicopters, the force provided vital relief supplies in a sustained manner. Almost as important at the time was a visible sign for the Haitian people that support was arriving. It provided hope for many Haitians.

Maritime forces were logistically self-sufficient and did not need to use either the aerial port or seaport. Aircraft carrier and amphibious ship operations provided lift assets to move supplies in support of the JTF. The Navy and Marine Corps pushed forces ashore to execute critical humanitarian assistance operations, which were instrumental in the overall success of the mission. Placing a Navy flag officer from the Joint Force Maritime Component Command in the JTF headquarters and officers in the Joint operations center ensured operations were fully synchronized and provided a common operating picture.

All these efforts were instrumental in saving lives in the initial weeks of the response. As we prepare for the next foreign disaster in support of the

A Haitian boy watches as U.S. Sailors in rigid-hull inflatable boats from the amphibious dock landing ships USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) and USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) arrive at the New Hope Mission in Bonel, Haiti, 19 January 2010.
lead federal agency and partner nation, we should do the following:

● Develop a robust and capable team to deploy trained and equipped personnel in an early-entry package to conduct assessments and develop requirements, as well as render immediate life-saving assistance.

● Examine the requirements for an enduring Joint logistics organization, with the appropriate command and control, as part of the Global Response Force.

● Continue Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore and Joint task force port-opening deployments and exercises, and increase education on these capabilities across all services.

● Maintain the Global Response Force with a responsive Joint capability that can operate in both a permissive and nonpermissive environment with forced entry capability.

Protect the People

When the lead elements of 82d Airborne Division’s 2d BCT arrived in Haiti, we talked with the troop commander about the existing permissive but uncertain environment in Port-au-Prince. We discussed the requirement to focus on the needs of the Haitian people, the rules of engagement, and the nature of our humanitarian assistance mission. While we would be security conscious, we were not there to deliver aid through the barrel of a gun, but by reaching out with a hand of friendship. To that end, our leaders and troops showed tremendous flexibility and agility. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states that the “focus of counterinsurgency is the people: provide for the people, protect the people, and convince the people of their government’s legitimacy.”

Haiti certainly illustrated that the focus of a humanitarian assistance mission must be the people. The fundamentals of counterinsurgency doctrine are very applicable in a foreign disaster relief mission.

From the beginning, the focus was to save lives and mitigate suffering. Every member of the task force understood this focus and the three initial priorities—provide critical medical aid, distribute water and food, and support the search and rescue efforts. Throughout the operation, JTF-H’s close relationship with the Haitian people ensured mission success.

The people of Haiti affected by the earthquake were our operational center of gravity and the centerpiece of all our efforts. Leaders and troops were in constant contact with Haitians in their assigned area of operations. They worked to understand the culture. “Creole” speakers at the platoon level ensured units could communicate effectively in the predominant language of the people on the street. Troops reached out with a hand of friendship and provided hope where none existed.

Gang violence was a concern since over 4,000 prisoners, including many prominent gang leaders, escaped from a major prison immediately following the earthquake. It was uncertain how this would affect humanitarian efforts. Fortunately, a lack of security was never an impediment to executing humanitarian assistance operations. The Haitian people viewed U.S. troops as helping them to recover from the earthquake and protecting them from those that would do them harm. Our close working relationship with MINUSTAH forces and their efforts in security operations enabled the Joint task force to focus on humanitarian assistance operations and specific security tasks in support of that effort.

To conduct humanitarian assistance, security must be established to protect the people from looting and acts of violence. In Haiti, the presence of UN forces on the streets following the earthquake and the integration of the arriving U.S. forces deterred the possibility of a deteriorating security situation.

Protecting the people, understanding their culture, speaking their language, living among the populace, and developing a relationship with the community leaders are key in accomplishing this mission. We offer this as a model for our next foreign disaster response.

Build Partnerships

Success in a foreign disaster relief operation hinges on partnerships. Operation Unified Response could not have succeeded without the strong partnerships shared and developed with the government of Haiti, UN, USAID, and NGO counterparts. General Keen’s relationship with Major General Floriano Peixoto, MINUSTAH force commander from Brazil, dates back to 1984.
when both were captains. This friendship helped the staffs to work closely together and share a common operating picture in Haiti.

In the first few days following the earthquake, the two generals discussed how it was necessary for JTF-H to operate within the envelope of a safe and secure environment provided by MINUSTAH forces. Major General Floriano Peixoto’s force of roughly 4,000 troops in Port-au-Prince would provide the necessary security so JTF forces could support the humanitarian assistance mission. Bringing both staffs together early in the operation ensured the two commanders aligned priorities. It also enabled the task force to support the delivery of food, water, and emergency medical care. This would not have been possible without a shared sense of trust and partnership. Developing relationships and partnerships early is essential. Leaders at every level must devote time and energy to make it happen. Regular meetings with all parties ensured understanding, aligned priorities, improved communication, and contributed to unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

One notable example of this was the development of the first major food distribution plan. The World Food Program, JTF-H, MINUSTAH, and various UN agencies and NGOs spearheaded the initial delivery of food throughout the city of Port-au-Prince and surrounding communities at 16 food distribution points. The result was that more than two million Haitians received much-needed food and water. This initial food distribution plan was flawlessly executed because of the Joint and combined planning and partnerships that were cultivated. There are two tasks we should take on to build partnerships:

- Leaders at every level should seek out the key partners to build a relationship that will ensure unity of effort.
- We need to conduct exercises with partner nations, UN, and other U.S. agencies to develop relationships and refine processes/systems.

**Coordinate and Collaborate to Achieve Unity of Effort**

The JTF operated in a complex, dynamic, permissive environment, yet an uncertain one. It

From right, U.S. Army LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen, the commanding general of Joint Task Force-Haiti, Brazilian army MG Floriano Peixoto, the commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, and U.S. Army COL Timothy McAteer, the commanding officer of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, share a moment at McAteer’s command post in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 11 March 2010.
included the government of Haiti, United Nations, USAID as the U.S. lead federal agency operating with the U.S. Embassy and host of interagency partners, and hundreds of NGOs. One key to JTF success was the ability to coordinate and collaborate with all the organizations. Establishing JTF-H’s humanitarian assistance coordination cell at the operational level facilitated this coordination and collaboration. The cell served as the conduit for bringing different organizations and functions together under one “coordination and collaboration roof.” It pulled together the efforts of JTF-H, MINUSTAH military forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and the NGOs to build a common understanding of the requirement. Led by a JTF-H general officer, the coordinating cell was comprised of more than 30 U.S. military members. It interfaced with every Joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organization to ensure synchronization of effort.

To coordinate and collaborate with nonmilitary partners, it was necessary to share information. Early on, we decided to be open and transparent. To do this, JTF-H operated on unclassified systems and used commercially available programs such as Google Earth to build a humanitarian assistance common operating picture at the tactical level.

Coordination and collaboration was critical at the operational and tactical levels. For instance, JTF-H did not have command and control of the area of operations, and MINUSTAH and the JTF both occupied the same tactical terrain. Camp managers representing NGOs primarily oversaw the thousands of spontaneous internally displaced persons camps. The JTF simply overlapped forces in the area and familiarized ourselves with the camps to provide capabilities where needed and enable those we worked with to accomplish their mission.

The daily collaboration of unit leaders from the platoon to the brigade level with community leaders, MINUSTAH military forces, and NGOs was key to developing an understanding of the environment, determining requirements, maintaining situational awareness, and supporting the Haitian people.

To achieve unity of effort we need to use nontraditional methods:

- Develop an unclassified humanitarian assistance common operational picture with the available tools to share information with nonmilitary partners (interagency, NGOs, UN, etc).
- Codify the use of coordination centers like the JTF Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, UN Coordination Support Committee (consisting of the leadership of the Haitian Government, the UN, humanitarian assistance agencies, and JTF and Joint Operations Tasking Center when conducting foreign disaster relief.

**Communicate, Communicate, Communicate**

On 14 January, about 36 hours after the earthquake, the ramp of the Toussaint Louverture International Airport was occupied by hundreds of journalists and camera crews from all over the world. The tragic circumstances surrounding the earthquake had focused the eyes of the world on Haiti. We recognized that the JTF must be transparent, approachable, and responsive to the public—Haitian and U.S. as well as international audiences. The permissive environment allowed the JTF to reach out through both traditional and social media forums. The news media was embedded at every level and was proactive in telling the story of what the “whole of government” was doing with UN and NGO partners in support of the government of Haiti.

Facebook (with over 5,000 followers) and Twitter (with over 270 followers) were used to counter possible misinformation. On the first day of the movement of displaced persons from one of the spontaneous camps to a new settlement site, JTF public affairs personnel used cameras on their cell phones to “Twitpic” Haiti’s president visiting the new resettlement location. The photos were posted on Twitter and on JTF’s Facebook within seconds. This was one of many examples of leveraging social media to communicate to the world.

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**JTF-H...used commercially available programs such as Google Earth to build a humanitarian assistance common operating picture...**
Another organization that furthered the JTF’s communication efforts was the Joint Information and Interagency Center. The center served as the hub for coordinating and synchronizing communication efforts from the strategic to the tactical levels. The goal was to ensure that all U.S. government personnel providing humanitarian relief in Haiti spoke with one voice and provided timely and accurate information. One of the products that grew from the Joint Information and Interagency Center was daily talking points that provided the overall communication goal, core themes, target audiences, and top-line messages. This product evolved into the “JTF Two Pager” that included Operation Unified Response themes, priorities, talking points, facts, and figures. It was distributed throughout the JTF, SOUTHCOM, and the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

To further communication with all agencies, we recommend the following:
- Codify the use of a joint information and interagency center when employing a JTF.
- Add a social media expert on the joint manning document for the JTF public affairs office.
- Examine and revise policies and procedures where possible to allow the maximum use of unclassified means and mediums for information sharing to include social media, blogs, and websites.

Support the Lead Federal Agency

Being in Haiti at the time of the earthquake enabled us to personally see the magnitude of destruction and get a sense of its impact on the Haitian people. The evening of 12 January and the following morning, we knew the United States and the world would have to immediately respond with a massive effort. President Obama declared that providing relief to Haiti was a priority, and his administration issued guidance that it would be a unified whole-of-government effort with USAID as the lead federal agency. This early national commitment provided strategic intent and DOD resources for a rapid response, but policy, preparation, organizational issues, and civilian capacity challenged longer-term implementation.
USAID stood up the Office for Response Coordination in Haiti, led by Ambassador Lew Lucke. From the start, the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of the lead federal agency were not clearly defined. While the designation as lead federal agent gave broad authority to coordinate efforts, there was no specification of subordinate support relationships or division of labor. USAID had few personnel on the ground to form and lead the robust planning required early in the crisis, so the JTF provided planners to USAID and worked to ensure the JTF was enabling and supporting USAID in all efforts.

When a whole-of-government approach is needed and directed, we should ensure all government agencies understand their role and responsibilities. The lead federal agency should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities and appropriate resources and authorities. Department of Defense, Department of State, and the lead federal agency should work together to determine the conditions that must be met to redeploy military forces at the end of the emergency and relief response phases.

For future foreign disaster relief operations, we need to:

● Examine how to mobilize civilian capacity to support the lead federal agency and explore with the UN the idea of forming an international civilian and military capability to respond to disasters.
● Examine how to improve the integration and capacity of our military and civilian disaster assessment teams, and consider the development of small, medium, and large teams that can respond within 12 hours of a disaster.
● Examine policies and procedures that will allow DOD greater flexibility to leverage the support of the public/private sector.

Pull From All Available Resources to Form the Joint Task Force

The capabilities and the command and control necessary to build a Joint task force for a contingency of this nature were not included in the Global Response Force, and due to other possible contingencies, SOUTHCOM’s Army component was not available. Consequently, JTF-H was formed ad hoc. Fortunately, the XVIII Airborne Corps had a trained and ready force that could deploy immediately as the core for the JTF. This was key to success. However, the Corps lacked key enablers, so other organizations had to provide depth.

Southern Command, Joint Forces Command, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, Joint Communications Support Element, Joint Public Affairs Support Element, Northern Command, European Command, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy elements, as well as numerous liaison officers, responded and filled the gaps. Initially, the JTF depended on the embassy to provide workspace and communications equipment to operate. The close proximity of the JTF to the U.S. Embassy facilitated the initial whole-of-government response and the development of relationships among the various staffs. The JTF later established its headquarters next to the embassy and close to the MINUSTAH headquarters, which facilitated continued coordination, collaboration, and communication. Unless we posture the proper capabilities in the Global Response Force or in the combatant commands, we will have to continue to build future JTFs during a crisis response in a similar ad hoc fashion. To use all available resources for foreign disaster response operations, we should:

● Review U.S. combatant command components and Joint Force Command headquarters’ capacity and role in forming a JTF.
● Review the capability and deployability of the Global Response Force in support of forming a JTF headquarters.
● Locate the JTF headquarters where it can best coordinate and communicate with the embassy, partner nations, and other key organizations.

Include the Host Nation Government

Our response to a foreign disaster relief mission is at the request of the host nation. We should ensure

When a whole-of-government approach is needed and directed, we should ensure all government agencies understand their role and responsibilities.
the host nation provides the necessary leadership to coordinate its efforts. In order for the host nation government to have legitimacy with its citizens, it must provide early and consistent leadership of all aspects of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.

The earthquake significantly impaired the government of Haiti, which was a weak institution even before the earthquake. Fourteen of sixteen ministry buildings were destroyed and hundreds of government workers perished in the earthquake. Many who survived were understandably traumatized by the catastrophe. It was important to reassure the people that their government was in charge and working to address their needs. This proved to be a challenge as the people complained of the lack of visible national leadership.

During disasters, government leaders need to get out among the people and communicate with citizens. They should also be involved in the humanitarian response and reconstruction planning early to provide guidance and ensure the efforts of the international community support their nation’s long-term plan. It was critical that the government of Haiti be included in all aspects of planning and decision making.

Work Closely with the UN Humanitarian Community

In Haiti, one cannot effectively conduct humanitarian assistance or foreign disaster relief without working closely with the UN and the vast number of NGOs that have been there for years. These agencies are crucial when it comes to humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief support, but they add complexity when it comes to governance and building host nation capacity. There are reportedly over 1,000 NGOs working with the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Haiti. As the scouts and soldiers of the humanitarian effort, NGOs manage displaced persons camps, conduct food and shelter distributions, establish medical facilities, and deliver all types of relief. While critical, their work should ultimately help build the capability of the government of Haiti to govern.

Initially, the JTF commanders and staff did not fully appreciate the number of humanitarian
organizations that were in Haiti before the earthquake. It became apparent the JTF would have to reach out and integrate them into their systems and processes to be successful, so the JTF worked with the UN to develop UN-approved coordination processes to include government of Haiti-led “coordinating support committees” and a UN-led “joint operations tasking center” where requirements were validated and tasked to the appropriate organizations. When working with the UN, the JTF also had to understand and coordinate within the UN “cluster system” to achieve unity of effort.

Much like working within a “whole of U.S. government” effort, we must work within a “whole of international community” effort at the macro level. This can only be accomplished by good coordination and collaboration after clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of all the players.

**Anticipate Challenges with Internally Displaced Persons**

Natural disasters are historically followed by the displacement of people. The number of displaced persons depends on the magnitude of the disaster and the country’s ability to respond to it. This earthquake created a challenge that will be with Haiti for decades. As the emergency response phase began to pass, it became apparent that the major challenge facing the government of Haiti and the international community was the estimated one-to-two million internally displaced persons who had established approximately 1,300 spontaneous settlements in Port-au-Prince. The magnitude of the destruction forced many to live under sheets, tarps, tents, or nothing at all. Some camps emerged in areas prone to flooding and mud slides. With the rainy season approaching, this challenge became the number one priority of the government of Haiti and the international community.

The JTF’s mission of saving lives and mitigating suffering then focused on the top nine internally displaced persons camps most likely to flood or have mud slides. These nine camps were home to over 100,000 people. Even after engineering projects lessened the effects of the rain in each of these camps, approximately 6,000 people needed to move to safer ground. To assist in the effort led by the UN, the JTF provided engineer support, transportation assets, and civil affairs teams at each priority camp. The JTF also supported camp managers and NGOs as they performed critical tasks. At the strategic level, the JTF and USAID worked closely with the UN and the government of Haiti to develop an internally displaced persons strategy. While none of these requirements were anticipated in the initial days of the disaster, we knew that issues regarding displaced persons had to be addressed following most natural disasters. To plan and execute an acceptable solution requires host nation leadership as well as cooperation and coordination among the international partners.

**Conclusion**

In Haiti, the U.S. military was a supporting element of a larger humanitarian assistance disaster relief network. Militarily, this can be frustrating at times. Chain of command is inherent to the military. Once an order is given, it is executed. Because of the enormity of the situation and the myriad organizations with disparate goals supporting the Haitian earthquake disaster response, there was no collective command and control structure. Rather, it was about all organizations coordinating, collaborating, and communicating toward a common purpose—to save lives and mitigate suffering.

The JTF-H chain of command directed a great deal of effort toward working with the different leaders at each level of support. From the strategic to the tactical level, it was imperative that JTF-H spoke with one voice and acted as a catalyst to achieve unity of effort. Our ability to assist in maintaining focus enabled overall mission success.

Haiti has many challenges ahead. It will take not only an enduring U.S. commitment, but also an international community commitment for Haiti to “build back better” and give its people an opportunity to recover, reconstruct, and prosper in the decades to come while being prepared for the next natural disaster.

On the next page are some recommendations as we look for lessons that the U.S. military, interagency, UN, and international community can apply in preparing for the next disaster response. **MR**
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE

1. Develop a more robust and capable disaster response assessment and initial life-saving response team.

2. Have combatant commands maintain a JTF capable force trained and ready to deploy in support of a foreign disaster relief operation with requirements from the Global Response Force.

3. Develop an international disaster response framework for nations to deploy civilian and military capability to respond to disasters.

4. Conduct exercises to develop relationships and refine processes and systems.

5. Codify the use of coordination centers like the U.S. JTF-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, UN coordinating support committees, and Joint operations tasking centers; make them adaptable to any existing partner-nation center.

6. Develop and codify unclassified information sharing tools like All Partners Access Network and JTF-Haiti’s humanitarian assistance common operating picture; make them adaptable to any partner-nation’s existing system.

7. Examine how best to integrate and support the NGOs and public/private sector in support of humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief.

8. Tackle the internally displaced persons challenge immediately.

NOTES


Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Time to End the Conflict

Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Johnson, U.S. Army

There has been much discussion as of late about reintegration and reconciliation in Afghanistan and the impact it will have on ending the current conflict.

Reintegration is defined as the operational and tactical level efforts to assimilate insurgents and low- to mid-level commanders peacefully into Afghan society. More specifically, reintegration occurs when individuals or groups of commanders and fighters lay down their arms and inform the Afghan government or the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF) of their desire to return to their communities.

Reconciliation, on the other hand, involves higher-level political dialogue with senior commanders of major insurgent groups (e.g., the Taliban). The goal of these efforts is to persuade insurgent leaders and groups to terminate their armed resistance and assume a legitimate role in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

Reintegration and reconciliation are a part of the natural cycle of armed conflict. Eventually, insurgents grow weary of fighting, and only the most extreme elements see no end to war. As happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodia, Somalia, and the Philippines, Afghanistan now faces the challenge of how to reintegrate and reconcile with the enemies it has been fighting over the last nine years.

Peace and National Reconciliation

In his inaugural address on 19 November 2009, President Hamid Karzai declared peace and national reconciliation one of Afghanistan’s top priorities. He said not all insurgents are ideologically motivated, and many are driven by personal and tribal grievances, lack of employment opportunities, and an inability to provide for and protect their families. What he did not mention is that many of the insurgents (and noninsurgents) are also disillusioned with his government’s ability to provide basic needs such as long-term employment, schools, hospitals, and a justice system. Many view the GIRoA as ineffective and corrupt, and, in many cases, see a viable alternative in the Taliban. The
Afghan people are tired of conflict and do not really care who provides them opportunity, security, and justice, as long as they can live and raise their children in peace, without fear of being maimed by an insurgent-emplaced roadside bomb or killed in an “escalation of force” incident because they were driving too close to a coalition convoy.

**Reconciliation.** Both President Karzai and the Afghan people understand all too well that the time has come to put an end to armed conflict and reconcile and reintegrate with their “sad and upset brothers.” Combined military counterinsurgency operations can assist in setting the conditions for sustainable security, the installation of good government leaders, and the implementation of long-term development programs, but they will not end the conflict. The war in Afghanistan will come to a successful conclusion only when senior level Taliban commanders are reconciled and their fighters return home to their communities.

For the best chance of success, the program needs to build on a community-based approach that reintegrates insurgents at the lowest level, utilizing Afghanistan’s tradition of conflict resolution by local shuras (groups of village elders) including tribal and religious leaders. At the village and community level the elders have to decide whether to accept an insurgent back into the community. If a community’s elders refuse to take the insurgent back, the Ministry of Interior will need to assume responsibility for the insurgent and move him to a central reintegration facility where he can receive religious and de-radicalization training until another community can be found.

**Steps for reintegration.** When a community accepts an insurgent back, various steps occur. First, the community elders, the Ministry of Interior, the National Directorate of Security, the Ministry of Defense and, when requested, the ISAF will have to screen, interview, and collect biometric data. Once processed, the insurgent will be issued an identification card, connected with his family, and provided safe housing and a way to feed himself and his family. Initially, the Ministry of Interior will likely collect the insurgent’s weapons and then determine at a later date whether the insurgent will be allowed to continue to possess a personal weapon according to Afghan gun laws. If he is on a coalition targeting list, it will also be important that coalition forces are notified so that the insurgent’s name can be temporarily moved to a restricted targeting list while he is in the process of reintegration. If successfully reintegrated and determined to no longer pose a threat to coalition forces, the insurgent could eventually be removed from all coalition targeting lists.

**Avoiding resentment.** In order not to create a “prodigal son” situation, in which resentment grows among community residents who chose to stay and not fight against the government while the insurgent is welcomed back with open arms and no repercussions, the focus of support should be on the community, not the insurgent. The community receives the immediate cash-for-work programs and long-term development projects not only on behalf of the reintegrating fighter, but also on behalf of the community as a whole. In short, the community rather than the insurgent is rewarded for accepting the insurgent back.

Under the auspices of a local defense initiative, many of these fighters might even be eligible to serve in a community defense force supervised and trained by the Ministry of Interior. This force would not supplant but augment the local police force, especially in areas where no large Afghan National Police or Army presence exists. Most of these fighters do not reintegrate because they have an epiphany and decide that the Afghan government is not so bad after all. In reality, most return because they feel they have a better chance of protecting

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**Combined military counterinsurgency operations can assist in setting the conditions for sustainable security, the installation of good government leaders, and the implementation of long-term development programs, but they will not end the conflict.**
their personal interests, villages, and families by working with the Afghan government than fighting against it. With this type of motivation, there is no better candidate to form a local defense force as long as he can be trusted, trained, and closely supervised. In the end, the insurgents get one chance at reintegration or reconciliation. If they return to raise arms against the government that accepted them back, then they will be eliminated.

**Responsibility of community elders.** Much responsibility falls on the community elders, the foundation of Afghan society; however, much responsibility also rests with the Afghan district, provincial, and national leaders and the international community. The insurgents provide security, employment opportunities, and fair, timely justice to their supporters; the Afghan government still struggles with these. To counter “shadow governments,” reintegration must be closely linked to long-term economic development and social programs focused on communities that accept fighters wishing to reintegrate. These programs should take the form of vocational training in such fields as reforestation, agriculture, and public works. Insurgent skills and community needs will determine programs that contribute to building a sustainable local economy.

**Challenges**

Several challenges have to be confronted to succeed with reconciliation and reintegration.

**Top-down structure.** Although the GIRoA’s National Peace and Reintegration draft program includes many facets of a community-based approach, to expedite the program the central government will use existing structures. This use is of some concern because the current structures do not allow for key ministerial representation below the provincial level. Without key ministerial representation at the district level, village elders and community leaders will struggle to obtain the required resources from the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security for background checks, biometric data collection, weapons collection, and interviewing. A centrally run, top-down national reintegration program will falter.

The strength of Afghanistan is its population and local leaders. Reintegration must be a bottom-up process where the local leaders and the lowest level of government (districts) have the resources in personnel and funds to make decisions on the ground and reintegrate. As there are over 300 districts in Afghanistan, it is not possible to resource all districts with the required resources. However, key districts where reintegration is either occurring or expected to occur should receive resources first. Just to say there are too many districts is not the answer. For reintegration to work, the proper community-based structure must be in place along with authorities who speak on behalf of the Afghan government.

On the other hand, due to the high level and type of discussions with senior commanders seeking political roles or positions in the government, reconciliation belongs at the provincial, regional, and national level where these negotiations and decisions are best made.

**Funding.** Although many countries (e.g., United States, Japan, and United Kingdom) have promised millions of dollars, there is still a lack of funding for reintegration and reconciliation. The UN Development Program that played a major role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of illegally armed groups does not have the funds to support reintegration and reconciliation. Commander Emergency Relief Program (CERP)
monies can assist communities reintegrating former fighters with cash-for-work programs, but cannot support long-term development projects that keep former enemies in the community and off the battlefield.

In the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Provisions for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Pakistan (section 1222), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and in coordination with the GIRoA, has the authority to apply CERP funds to support reintegration. However, little initial guidance was provided in the NDAA concerning how to manage these funds and use them in the field. Some of these issues have been resolved, and CERP funding is now having a greater impact, which, along with other national direct funding, will continue to be the primary source of funding for reintegration until the promised monies from donor countries are committed.

**Foreign interests.** The future of Afghanistan has regional and political implications for Tehran, Moscow, London, Washington, Islamabad, and New Delhi. Some countries fear that if reintegration and, especially, reconciliation occur too quickly and with the wrong leaders, much of what we have gained over the last nine years will be lost. Most acknowledge that reintegration and reconciliation are inevitable, but the program must be carefully crafted and not extended to all. Afghanistan has made far too many strides in women’s rights, for example, to see this progress truncated by the reintroduction of the Taliban into local communities and government positions.

**Local militias.** With the reintegration and reconciliation of commanders and fighters, another real concern is that many of them will simply walk away from the insurgency under the guise of reintegration and form local militias to protect their families and villages or to exact revenge on their rivals. Just because an insurgent chooses to stop fighting against the GIRoA and reintegrate or reconcile does not mean that he trusts and believes in the government any more than he did when he fought against it. In fact, in many parts of the country, deep mistrust of the government and especially of the Afghan National Police and local police force still exists. If the GIRoA cannot provide honest, trustworthy leaders at the local government level and the necessary security to improve the daily lives of the Afghan people, then local militias will fill the void.

**Opportunism.** As with any program that involves large sums of money, the risk exists that communities will collude with insurgents to take advantage of the Afghan government. There is little to stop a community from welcoming back insurgents only for the purpose of receiving additional assistance from the GIRoA and the international community. In fact, a real danger is that the program could even inadvertently create more insurgents in the short-term by encouraging communities to send residents to engage coalition forces for a limited period of time and then return for the benefit of the community. International community oversight of the funding and the communities accepting reintegrees will be imperative.

**Insurgents get a vote.** Many Afghans are still not convinced reintegration and reconciliation will bring an end to fighting and do not believe the program will have an impact at all. Even among the insurgent groups, there is no consensus or great desire to reintegrate and reconcile. Al-Qaeda and Haqqani are likely to oppose and undermine any attempt at reintegration and reconciliation. Al-Qaeda senior leaders know they will never be offered reconciliation, and they have no interest in joining a government supported by the West. Haqqani likewise will not support reintegration.

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and reconciliation because it wants to replace the current government, not be a part of it. Perhaps if promised key positions in the government they could be enticed. The Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—especially the low- to mid-level commanders and fighters—will likely be more flexible and negotiate their return to their communities. If truly seen as an Afghan-led program without over-involvement from coalition forces or the international community, the majority of the insurgents who have families, business interests, and ties to their tribes and communities are likely to return. Conditions must allow for an honorable return with some prospects of a better life.

Conclusion
The international community and the Afghan government understand the importance of a successful reintegration and reconciliation program. That is why so much time and effort have been spent over the last year in developing a sustainable program that does not over-promise, but offers enough in the way of security, governance, and development to convince insurgent commanders and fighters tired of fighting to return home.

Despite the challenges that the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program faces, there is great hope, if structured and funded properly, that the program will assist in ending the conflict. Ultimately, with or without a coherent program, reintegration and even reconciliation will continue to occur at the district and community levels. Even today, fighters are coming home from the battlefield to spend time with their families and take a break. Unfortunately, many, finding nothing more at home than before they left, return to the fight.

The goal of the National Peace and Reintegration Program is to give these insurgents a way to be formally accepted back into the community and the Afghan government. The GIRoA has a lot of work to do to convince them to trust it. A well formulated, well communicated National Peace and Reintegration Program that provides tangible results will provide the framework on which to build this trust and end the conflict. MR
THE ORIGINS OF the surrealist movement in the early 20th century were influenced by an aesthetic of contradictory convergence in which opposite elements intermingle to create energetic clashes of energy and movement. This ironic merging of contradictions can also manifest itself within combat zones and is on full display in Sebastian Junger’s recent book, War, which juxtaposes the seeming simplicity of military tactics with the cacophony and friction of combat, the boredom of waiting for the next operation with the adrenaline-pumping rush of a firefight, the brotherly bonds of war with the lonely isolation of dealing with one’s fear. Broken into three parts that in many ways embody the visceral nature of combat—fear, killing, and love—War delves into the world of a combat infantry unit and provides an unvarnished picture of our modern-day Soldiers.

Between the spring of 2007 and 2008, Junger made five trips to the Korengal Valley and was embedded with the Soldiers of the 2d Platoon, Battle Company, 173d Airborne Brigade. A Vanity Fair correspondent, Junger is no stranger to placing himself in highly dangerous environments. Before writing War, he was embedded with a unit in Afghanistan’s Zabul Province, and he also spent time in the Niger Delta profiling Nigerian militants attacking U.S. oil and gas infrastructure. However, he admits that he was unprepared for the level of violence in the Korengal Valley.

Situated in northeastern Afghanistan, the Korengal Valley is a mere six miles wide and six miles long, and is in many ways “the Afghanistan of Afghanistan: too remote to conquer, too poor to intimidate, too autonomous to buy off.” Battle Company’s objective is to block mobility corridors of insurgents, who are traipsing back and forth along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and bringing men and supplies with them. A large part of this mission involves the Sisyphean task of hauling heavy loads up steep hills to secure the higher ground: “Wars are fought with very heavy machinery that works best on top of the biggest hill in the area and used against men who are lower...
down. That, in a nutshell, is military tactics, and it means that an enormous amount of war-fighting simply consists of carrying heavy loads uphill.”

One of Battle Company’s key tasks is to build an outpost—named Restrepo after a fallen comrade—on a hilltop overlooking the valley. Other construction projects focus on development efforts such as paving roads and transportation routes in an effort to gain the support of the local civilians. Development projects, however, seem to lag behind schedule. The primary focus appears to be gaining territorial dominance. In the documentary, Restrepo, created by Junger and British cameraman Tim Hetherington, the company commander believes the Restrepo Outpost is a “middle finger” to the insurgents because it means that U.S. troops have the territorial advantage. It represents one of the unit’s most successful achievements.

During this period, Battle Company is also the “tip of the spear” in Afghanistan. Nearly 70 percent of the bombs dropped in Afghanistan were in and around the Korengal Valley, and these 150 Soldiers encountered nearly one-fifth of all combat operations in Afghanistan. At times there was a routinized battle structure that developed in which U.S. troops conducted daily patrols until they confronted the enemy and a firefight ensued. Once troops were in contact, they called in their massive firepower and the insurgents knew that they had about 30 minutes until the Apaches and the A-10s arrived. Even with the airpower advantage, each Soldier in the platoon carries anywhere between 80 and 120 pounds of guns and ammunition—an oxymoronic light infantry.

Moreover, the men of Battle Company face a grueling and austere environment of “axle-breaking, helicopter crashing, spirit-killing, mind-bending terrain that few military plans survive intact even for an hour.” Often they only eat one hot meal a day, tarantulas frequently invade their living space, they can go for days or weeks without showering, and they are cut off entirely from their friends, family . . . and women.

What kind of young men are drawn to this environment, and in many cases, volunteer to be sent to the front lines?

Ironically, many of the men within this unit are accidental Soldiers. What draws many of these 20-somethings to the war front is rarely the political disagreements between the U.S. government and the Taliban insurgents. For a few, military service represents a family tradition. For some, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 motivated their decision to join the military. However, for a majority of the men, boredom, staying out of jail, or simply getting their lives straightened out are common reasons for joining the military. Reading the conversations of the Soldiers feels, in many ways, like eavesdropping on a group of fraternity boys: touting their hunting adventures at home; practicing pick-up lines on each other; and even speculating about the possibility of masturbating during a firefight. For most, the war does not represent an extension of politics; rather, fighting in Afghanistan offers them an unforeseen opportunity to feel utilized and to remake themselves among the shale and holly trees in the Korengal Valley.

For many of these men, combat is a game they fall in love with. For starters, combat can be exciting. Enveloped in a cacophony of activities—from the spitfire of artillery, to covering fellow Soldiers, to dodging bullets that travel faster than the speed of sound—combat can pump so much adrenaline that fear dissipates into the background. The relatively calm and composed nature of the Soldiers under such unimaginable conditions—at least for most civilians—is a testament to their steely professionalism. In fact, it seems that the Soldiers are more apprehensive when they are not fighting because during these times they have less control over events.

More than excitement, combat can attract young men because everything takes on a significant importance. Even mundane activities such as drinking water and staying hydrated become important. If a Soldier is dehydrated, he could endanger the whole group by falling behind on a patrol or tipping off the enemy because his urine gives off a concentrated stench. Soldiers cannot only think of themselves but must elevate the group’s needs above their own. The protection and

For many of these men, combat is a game they fall in love with.
The defense of the tribe is an insanely compelling idea, and once you’ve been exposed to it, there’s almost nothing else that you’d rather do... collective defense can be so compelling—so addictive—that eventually it becomes the rationale for why the group exists in the first place.”

This pledge to each other provides the men with a clear and certain purpose—something that many do not have outside the combat zone. It also creates unbreakable ties among men that provide them unwavering reassurance, protection, and moral support.

Simultaneously, there is deep isolation that accompanies combat, and many of the Soldiers tend to compartmentalize and suppress discussion regarding disturbing, personal emotions. Fear is obviously an emotion that each one experiences; however, there seems to be an unspoken rule not to discuss it. The official military support system also appears to be in line with this approach. When one of the men goes to the counselor to unload, he is advised to start smoking cigarettes to help relieve his stress:

Anderson sat on an ammo crate and gave me one of those awkward grins that sometimes precede a confession. “I’ve only been here four months and I can’t believe how messed up I already am,” he said, “I went to the counselor and he asked if I smoked cigarettes and I told him no and he said, ‘Well, you may want to think about starting.’” He lit a cigarette and inhaled. “I hate these fuckin’ things, he said.

The constant suppression of haunting memories takes its toll. Some men become numb, some are unable to reintegrate into a non-combat environment, and many take a host of psychiatric meds. The sweeping of combat’s psychological impacts under the proverbial rug provides a disturbing realization how, as a society, we are short changing our Soldier’s long-term mental well-being for their short-term “warrior ethos.”

Overall, War provides an unadulterated and revealing glimpse of the rhythms of day-to-day combat at the tactical level. An award-winning author who wrote The Perfect Storm, Junger has a flair for vivid literary illustrations. His raw descriptions of combat can make you feel as if you are reading the script for the next Hollywood blockbuster, but in these scenes, the blood and iron are not stage props.

However, upon finishing the book, I felt distressed. Although the intent of the book is not to discuss the overarching Afghanistan strategy, it nonetheless provides keen insights into the larger conflict. In April 2010, the U.S. military left the Korengal Valley not because we had declared “victory” but because we realized that the area was not a terrorist hotbed. Rather, the secondary and tertiary effects of our presence sparked much of the fighting. The area surrounding many U.S. outposts had traditionally been a main conduit for the lumber industry. By some accounts, when American Soldiers first came into the Valley in 2002, they aligned themselves with a northern Safi tribe, which ignited armed resistance from local lumber cutters who believed that the northern Safis were looking to take over their traditional operational area. Reflecting on these larger dynamics and sub-dynamics, I wonder if often we are sending our accidental Soldiers to fight accidental terrorists. MR

“Would the Marines who fought at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, you know, be proud of us?” Lance Corporal Joe Mahardy asked his platoon leader, Lieutenant Donovan Campbell, 36 hours after the words “JIHAD, JIHAD, JIHAD” came from every minaret in the city of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province. Overcome by emotion, Campbell fought back tears and composed himself before assuring his fellow Marine that “the Corps is proud of us.”

Donovan Campbell, an Ivy Leaguer, is not the typical Marine. In his senior year at Princeton, he realized that the chance to assume responsibility and serve others meant more to him than opportunities with Fortune 500 companies. He wanted to excel in an environment where personal performance meant more than family connections; he wanted a test, and the Marine Corps accommodated that wish. Though he had no desire to “drag up painful memories,” Campbell wrote Joker One because he thought it was his duty; he believed that someone was obligated to tell the platoon’s story and, as the unit leader, the responsibility fell to him.

Campbell describes his 2003 Iraq deployment at a division command post as uneventful, and he lobbied hard to return as a platoon leader, which he did in 2004 as a member of Golf Company, 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment. His fascinating narrative addresses forming the company, preparing for deployment, fighting in Ramadi, and returning home.

Reporting to Golf Company, Campbell joined a unit that was manned at less than 50 percent of authorized strength. Once deployment orders came down, new arrivals poured in, but they reported so close to deployment that training opportunities were minimal. The first wave of new Marines had two months to prepare for deployment and the second a mere four weeks, much less than the expected six months. Such a short period of preparation proved a challenge, but the dogged professionalism of the company’s NCOs was apparent throughout. Campbell’s gratitude and respect for his NCOs were clear, save for his indifference toward his marginal and mercifully unnamed platoon sergeant, whose excessive time in marksmanship units rather than the infantry left him unprepared to lead.

Campbell describes a platoon leader’s isolation clearly and disturbingly. He claims that the leader cannot spend time or energy thinking of home, missing a spouse, or worrying about personal safety. Campbell suggests that a leader’s most effective defense mechanism is to consider himself already dead, which allows him sole focus on completing the mission and taking care of subordinates. Such an approach is not unprecedented; think of the 506th PIR’s Lieutenant Ronald Speirs who, in Band of Brothers, observed that “the only hope you have is to accept the fact that you’re already dead.” That two warriors, separated by six decades, come to the same conclusion suggests the timelessness of a combat leader’s challenges.

The unit took over a city previously occupied by the Army, whose Soldiers described the area as stable (no fatalities in six months). The Marines arrived believing that the Army had been too hard on the locals. Golf’s original intent was to “extend . . . the velvet glove” because “the people are the prize.” How the residents of Ramadi viewed the soft war approach is enlightening; their nickname for the Marines was awat, a soft cake that easily crumbles. In short, the locals interpreted kindness as weakness. When fighting intensified, the Marines continued to take every precaution to minimize harm to noncombatants while killing hundreds of combatants. Even when it was clear that the locals resented the Marines, the Americans remained committed to protecting them. To do otherwise, in Campbell’s words, would mean he and the platoon would “not deserve the title of United States Marines.”

A cynic might see this line, reminiscent of the “Marine’s Hymn,” as quaint, if not naive. Others might see it as commitment to a cause more important than the individual.

Campbell ruthlessly critiques his performance throughout the book. His platoon’s first loss was one of the unit’s most popular Marines. The attack that led to this fatality came when Campbell decided to keep his unit in place while medical treatment was arranged for over a dozen children injured by an insurgent-fired rocket propelled grenade. He considered leaving because a unit that remained stationary for too long was certain to be attacked again, but in the end he concluded that Marines are dedicated to protecting the innocent, not themselves.

Joker One is a study of leadership that both inspires and provokes thought. Campbell observes that in combat there are only “bad and worse” options; the leader makes his choice, “then lives with the results and shuts up about the whole thing.” Campbell provides enormous insight into the burden of leading both during and after the fight.

LTC James Varner, USA, Retired, Platte City, Missouri
WASHINGTON RULES: America’s Path to Permanent War, Andrew J. Bacevich compares the claim that President John Kennedy would have pulled U.S. forces out of Vietnam if only Kennedy had not been assassinated to the pleasing illusion voiced by a heroine of Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises. This heroine states that she and Jake, the book’s protagonist, would have lived happily ever after if only World War I had not occurred. “Yes,” Jake wistfully replies, “Isn’t it pretty to think so?”

Far from pulling U.S. forces out of Vietnam, Bacevich argues, Kennedy only managed to mire the U.S. more deeply in that conflict, despite the lessons about intervention he should have learned from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The reason for these failures of Kennedy was that, like every other U.S. president since World War II, Kennedy was wedded to certain unwritten rules of U.S. foreign policy—rules which foisted the Vietnam War upon countries who did not need this war and rules which subsequently led Americans to blithely accept their country’s descent into a state of permanent war.

Forming the foundation of these rules, Bacevich says, is a credo that “summons the United States—and the United States alone—to lead, save, liberate, and ultimately transform the world.” A sacred trinity of principles rests upon this credo, specifically, “an abiding conviction that the minimum essentials of international peace and order require the United States to maintain a global military presence, to configure its forces for global power projection, and to counter existing or anticipated threats by relying on a policy of global interventionism.”

According to Bacevich, both Republicans and Democrats worship at the altar of these rules. Indeed, to oppose these rules is to subject oneself to public ridicule. Thus it is that selfishness, moral cowardice, and a crusading idealism have brought about the dreadful future of which President Dwight Eisenhower warned in his famous farewell address—a future in which national interests, democratic processes, and individual liberties are shanghaied by a massive, war-mongering military-industrial complex.

This event, Bacevich argues, has been disastrous for our country. We Americans not only waste blood and treasure in extravagant amounts, but our sacrifices usually do more harm than good. The Vietnam War is only one such example. To cite another, after almost eight years of war, tens of thousands of lives lost, and billions of dollars spent, Iraq’s deep-rooted political issues remain unresolved, leaving that country’s fate uncertain. Meanwhile, Afghanistan is caught in a tragic downward spiral.

America must fundamentally reorient itself to the world, Bacevich says. We must realize that, as well-meaning as we may be, the use of force (or threat of force) cannot bring the profound behavioral changes to foreign societies that we expect it to bring. Counterinsurgency doctrine will not solve this problem since it makes American military leaders responsible for types of operations (such as the restoration of essential services) for which our professional background and training are rarely sufficient. Besides, our country simply cannot afford the political, civic, and economic costs of nation-building and long wars.

Bacevich proposes that we return to the outlook of our Founding Fathers, for most of whom a large standing military was anathema and who thought that it was through the power of America’s unique example that we could best influence the world. To this end, Bacevich suggests a new trinity of foreign policy principles: “First, the purpose of the U.S. military is not to combat evil or remake the world, but to defend the United States and its most vital interests . . . Second, the primary duty station of the American soldier is in America . . . Third, consistent with the Just War Tradition, the United States should employ force only as a last resort and only in self-defense.”

Once read, it becomes clear why Washington Rules has created such a stir within U.S. foreign policy circles. Bacevich possesses a rare gift for rhetoric, and because he is a retired Army colonel with a Ph.D. from Princeton, it should surprise no one that the book is well-informed by history, academic theory, and military experience. The book is so powerfully rendered and its arguments so counter to established thinking that it would be difficult for any open-minded American to find it, if not convincing, at the very least distressing. The net effect is to make the book the most damning indictment of American leadership since Tom Ricks’ Fiasco. Any American who cares about the state of the Nation should read it, and Bacevich’s ideas, which are largely not his but belong to our Founding Fathers, need to be once again part of mainstream American political discourse.

In the final analysis, however, Washington Rules represents the same type of wistful idealism Bacevich so frequently and successfully derides within its pages. Considering the lengthy educational process, which Bacevich says brought him to the harsh “truth” (unvarnished by illusion) about U.S. foreign policy, is it possible that he will not continue to philosophically evolve until he arrives at a new unvarnished “truth” someday? Is it also possible that the world has changed so little that we Americans can remain secure from technologically-enabled transnational terrorist groups, protected only by a strong border guard and the threat of massive, conventional military retaliation? Is it really true that, in good conscience, we can keep our military at home, undisturbed by lurid media reports of genocide and mad tyrants abroad?

No, but it is pretty to think so. Major Douglas A. Pryer, USA, Haverfordwest, UK

Robert Jervis's book is interesting because he offers some counterintuitive insights concerning intelligence. In his conclusion, he states “Because intelligence is unpopular and better intelligence may be more unpopular, political leaders are likely to be content with decriying intelligence's performance.” Earlier in the book, he comments, “Indeed, despite the fact decision makers always say they want better intelligence, for good political and psychological reasons they often do not, which is part of the explanation for why intelligence reforms are rarely fully implemented.” He cites Richard Nixon as one of the most vocal intelligence critics when presented with disturbing, but accurate, news. Decision makers are comforted that intelligence can be wrong and they can shift the blame or rationalize rejecting an assessment because it clashed with their desired policies.

The centerpiece of Jervis's book is the intelligence failures surrounding the Shah of Iran's fall from power in 1978. With the Cold War paramount, few resources were devoted to Iran. There was also little communication between analysts examining politics and economics. Peer coordination was not stressed and reports flowed up a hierarchical system. Jervis argues intelligence should be messy, a “systematic exposure of the evidence for and against a particular belief,” instead of neatly formulated packages of event reporting. (There was a similar tendency during the rush toward involvement in Kosovo when analysts competed with CNN for the latest news scoop.)

Jervis’s case study concerning Iraqi WMD might still be too fresh to draw all lessons because so much is still classified and careers are still being made by professionals who are hesitant to talk openly. Much of his criticism is directed toward George Tenet, who did not know there was a dispute about issues like the purpose of the Iraqi aluminum tubes until the National Intelligence Estimate was written. Jervis sympathizes with the U.S. intelligence community in that other national intelligence services also believed Iraq had active WMD programs. He highlights the analytical problem of ignoring non-events, like Hussein Kemal’s information that Iraq’s WMD programs were moribund. Too often, alternative explanations are equated with naivety in an intellectual environment that rewards confidence and shuns complexity.

Jervis has dedicated considerable effort to documenting intelligence errors while offering realistic remedies. He identifies America’s lack of self-awareness and unexamined predispositions as fundamental challenges. We still do not have a strong desire to experience other cultures. Less than 14 million U.S. passports were issued in fiscal year 2009 among over 300 million citizens. Some biases must be acknowledged even if they cannot be solved. Why Intelligence Fails deserves to be studied along with the writings of Sherman Kent, Richard Betts, and other keen observers of the intelligence field.

James Cricks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


That the world is well along its journey into the “information age” is apparent to even the most pedestrian observer of human activity. Preschoolers can now communicate across the world and access data of myriad kinds in ways their grandparents could never have imagined. However, as Daniel Gerstein points out, advances in information technology are not the only things happening at warp speed today. No less significant are the advances in biotechnology. Indeed, future generations may characterize the present day not as the “information age” but rather as the “age of biotechnology.”

The potential presented by biotechnological advances for the eradication of disease and the extension of human life is so vast as to render the present-day technology a watershed in human history. However, the increased potential for positive outcomes is matched and, unless we are vigilant, could be surpassed by the potential for negative outcomes from the misuse of new-found knowledge. Gerstein characterizes the present day as the confluence of globalization, terrorism, and biotechnology. He describes in detail the fine line between legitimate and illegitimate use of the capacity to affect living organisms. In particular, he focuses on the possible misuse of biotechnology by terrorists, both their likelihood of acquiring the technical wherewithal and their likely motivations for doing so.

Gerstein does not paint a hopeless, doomsday picture. Rather, he urges active engagement and constant vigilance to anticipate and counter the bioterrorist threat. He argues that the reader can expect such an approach to yield a reasonable degree of success, though not eliminating the chance of a biological attack or a manmade epidemic of sizable proportion. He does not view bioterrorism as posing an existential threat to the United States in the way that some have viewed nuclear weapons.

Bioterror in the 21st Century begins with a discussion of globalization, places the two-sided coin of biotechnology and biowarfare within that globalized setting, and discusses homeland defense in light of these circumstances. He then considers the possible motivations for terrorist use of biotechnology through various game-theory constructs. Gerstein makes a particularly thought-provoking observation: “Since it is manifestly impossible to guard against every biological threat, some of our most aggressive protective efforts should be directed toward...
Christopher Preble, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, wages a contentious argument that for the United States to become more secure, it should dramatically reduce the size and inherent capabilities of its military. He asserts that U.S. military power is exceedingly expensive, misused, and counterproductive, undermining U.S. interests. He notes that the U.S. spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined and that its military budget is growing at twice the rate of the rest of the world, despite having no hostile neighbors. He objects to expensive programs such as the Air Force’s F-35 and F-22, the Marine Corps’ V-22, the Navy’s Virginia-class submarine, and the Army’s Future Combat Systems, calling them overkill systems and nothing more than congressional special interest projects designed to preserve district jobs.
In light of competing domestic needs, Preble highlights the cost of financing the active force and post-service benefits, calling them excessively burdensome to U.S. taxpayers and the domestic economy. He espouses the notion that too much of the U.S. defense budget goes toward protecting “free-riding” allies: “So long as the world looks upon the U.S. as always capable of intervening, there will always be demands that it do so ...” Protecting allies overtaxes the U.S. military with a spectrum of operations ranging from combat to protecting trade routes.
Preble maintains the United States exacerbates matters by incorrectly thinking that its security directly depends on global stability that only it can assure. As the self-appointed global governance police, the United States has a tendency to act unilaterally in deploying its military, even in the absence of a UN mandate. He believes that deploying our military to prevent the destabilizing effect of war violates constitutional executive powers afforded the president and rarely passes a cost-benefit analysis test, never mind the damages it causes to U.S. international relations. Furthermore, mission successes may disguise underlying realities that surface years from now. He contends that our military presence in the Middle East is destabilizing and has become the principle recruiting device for Osama bin-Laden.
Along with the aforementioned reduction of expensive service programs, Preble advocates dramatically reducing the size of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, while encouraging our allies to increase the size of their militaries in the spirit of equitable burden-sharing, a position he states is supported by the American public. He concludes by proposing four admittedly not so novel, but refocused, decision criteria for determining the future use of a significantly reduced U.S. military. There must be a “compelling U.S. national security interest,” there must be a “clear national consensus,” there must be “clear and obtainable military objectives,” and it must be used as a “last resort.”
Preble’s argument is well-articulated, compelling, and thought-provoking. He persuasively draws upon constitutional law and crafts his argument with relevant government data, public opinion, and scholarly research. Regrettably, he only superficially covers opposing views, leaving the reader with some skepticism about his proposed “way ahead.” The author’s view of the United States as acting too irrationally in employing military power comes across as more naïve than idealistic. That said, the book is an interesting read for a broad range of academics, government officials, and military professionals interested in alternative approaches to national security and economic prosperity.

AMERICA’S COLD WAR: The Politics of Insecurity
For most veterans of the Cold War, the era was a sustained and often stressful effort to prevent the spread of communism and especially prevent the influence of the Soviet Union, China, and their allies.
Professors Campbell Craig and Frederik Logevall remind us in America’s Cold War that much of America’s motivation for this struggle was due to less idealistic domestic considerations, such as the economics of the military-industrial complex and the need for politicians to achieve partisan goals by appearing tough on communism. Given conservative suspicions, this last need was particularly important for Democrats, who bore a “special burden ... to demonstrate at all times the proper anti-communist bona fides.” By contrast, conservative Republicans such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan could and did take a more
Craig and Logevall argue that the United States had already “contained” Soviet expansionism in 1950, but that these domestic considerations led to a globalized, militarized approach to foreign policy, a hard-line approach that was visible even in the George W. Bush administration’s response to 9/11. For these reasons, the authors contend, the United States incurred enormous costs, not only in terms of foreign and American casualties, but also in the areas of partisan and interest-group politics, a growing U.S. tolerance for standing armed forces, and huge defense expenditures that might otherwise have been invested in more productive ways.

This argument has considerable merit and bears some attention. However, in their determination to ascribe events to such domestic, partisan concerns, the authors frequently overlook other factors. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, a simple statement of political alliance, is immediately equated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an elaborate defense structure that only began to develop several years later, after the Korean conflict gave a new sense of urgency to western European defense.

Similarly, the authors suggest that the death of Stalin in 1953 offered an opportunity for reduced confrontation. Yet, this interpretation overlooks the fact that Dwight Eisenhower had come to the presidency directly from service as the first NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, a position in which he had become acutely aware that NATO could not function without the resources and strategic depth provided by West Germany. To suggest that Moscow and Washington might have reached some agreement on a neutralized Germany was to overlook Eisenhower’s lifetime of military experience, not to mention the intense diplomatic maneuvering going on in 1953 to create a West German military force.

The authors are correct in noting that Washington (and for that matter, Moscow) overlooked the local, nationalistic concerns of third-world insurgents. Yet, the Vietnamese conflict appears almost in isolation, without consideration of similar local but communist-backed insurgencies in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Mozambique, and numerous other places; in context, these insurgencies made Vietnam seem both more significant and more winnable than the authors concede.

Finally, the authors assert that during the 1980s, American hardliners did not believe the Cold War could be ended peacefully, or that the USSR could actually fail because of internal weaknesses. However, at the time, many of those hardliners argued that the Carter-Reagan increases in defense spending would force the Soviets to match that spending, adding to the economic problems that led Mikhail Gorbachev to rethink the entire system.

America’s Cold War is a useful summary of the domestic considerations of that conflict; as the authors suggest, examining such aspects of one nation’s history provides a valuable corrective to the trend to think of nation-states as monolithic players. Yet, this account of Cold War national security policy is, in its own way, as incomplete as the international, comparative accounts the authors seek to correct.

Jonathan M. House,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE HUMAN FACE OF WAR,

Jim Storr has written an important, thought-provoking book that should be read by anyone who is interested in military thought and its implications for doctrine, organization, training, and leader development. The book’s focus is on the tactical level of war and classic combat operations. Storr, a former officer in the British Army, is a serious student of the military profession. More important, he is a keen synthesizer of various research. In writing this book, he meticulously used studies in the disciplines of history, psychology, systems theory, complexity theory, philosophy, and the history of science.

The book’s title might cause some to think The Human Face of War is akin to Richard Holmes’ Acts of War or John Keegan’s The Face of Battle—it is not. The book is not about how humans act in combat, but rather how human behavior should affect our theories of combat. The book addresses many recent theories, to include the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop, effects based operations, attrition, and the use of postmodern language in military theory.

For many readers, the most engaging portions of the book will follow the discussions of theories, where Storr applies them to the conduct of operations: “So what is needed is a body of theory as to how to fight; but also how to organize armies in peacetime to fight and win when needed. Organization, doctrine, training policy, and issues which affect social cohesion and career progression are all relevant factors.”

Storr focuses on the simple premise that we must use empirical studies of what works and then shows how this calls into question some of our current beliefs about building and training an army. For example, research by the British Defence Operational Analysis Centre indicates that four factors tend to dominate the outcomes of battles, regardless of force ratios: surprise, air superiority, aggressive ground reconnaissance, and shock. He closes the discussion looking at the much-denigrated and misunderstood idea of “attrition.” His defense of attrition is counter to much current thought, but put in context, is convincing.

The remainder of the book applies the precepts developed in the first three chapters about how to design organizations to attack an opponent’s will and generate shock and surprise.
Many of Storr’s recommendations are counter to current practice, but are, nevertheless, soundly reasoned. He takes on the infatuation with more and better information and looks at officer development and the qualities that make a good commander.

The densely packed book often challenges conventional wisdom. Whether you agree or not, his ideas are documented and well-reasoned. To ignore them puts one at the peril of overlooking insights gleaned from good research and analysis. While there are some who feel the days of major combat operations are over, there is evidence that small unit combined arms operations skills are needed for any kind of combat. The Human Face of War helps envision a better way to build a force that can be formidable in the conduct of combined arms combat.

Clinton J. Ancker, III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The U.S. intelligence community received considerable scrutiny in the aftermath of 9/11 for a lack of intra-governmental intelligence sharing. In response to this deficit, the Bush administration launched a sweeping information-sharing initiative to remedy perceived federal intelligence stovepiping. However, as former president Bush made clear in his National Strategy for Information Sharing, a strong intelligence community relies on more than just U.S. intelligence. Federal, state, and local authorities must partner with private sector and foreign governments to obtain a complete intelligence picture. The focus of James Walsh’s new book is this last element, the foreign partners. Walsh presents a well-reasoned and detailed account of how nations trade intelligence for money, training, and protection. Through several case studies, the author advances his theory on how countries can obtain more reliable information from their foreign partners through hierarchical relationships.

Walsh points at distrust as the main barrier to forming effective international intelligence relationships. The distrust is often felt by both parties. For example, a developing country may exaggerate its intelligence to garner favor and financial support from the United States. After a relationship is established, the country may fear the United States will abandon it unless it produces more intelligence, while the United States will remain skeptical of the origins and reliability of the intelligence. The only way to mitigate this distrust is to ensure that the benefits of adhering to the intelligence-sharing agreement far outweigh the costs associated with maintaining the agreement.

The main question Walsh seeks to answer is: How can governments overcome policy divides, intelligence manipulation, and deep-seated distrust to arrive at a mutually beneficial intelligence-sharing agreement? The author seeks answers in historical case studies, including the diverse relationships America has formed with foreign partners in the post-9/11 fight against international terrorism. America’s robust intelligence-sharing agreement with European countries is built on a mutual trust that stems from common interests, similar government policies, and a history of cooperation. Simultaneously, countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt have a less intuitive, yet still crucial, relationship with America. Although these countries have extremely valuable intelligence, their differing policies and interests create a mutual distrust between the governments. Through a hierarchical agreement, in which the United States provides substantial financing, oversight, and training, these unlikely allies have provided invaluable intelligence. Finally, juxtaposed against the successful relationships is America’s non-relationship with Iran and Syria. As Walsh makes clear, when the policy differences and feelings of distrust are too significant, even a hierarchical agreement will not remedy the divide.

The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing offers a fascinating glimpse into the world of international intelligence, but it is by no means a stand-alone primer. Walsh makes a valiant effort to explain one aspect of an extraordinarily complex issue. That said, readers hoping to learn about the entire U.S. information sharing environment will be disappointed. In addition, the author admits his inability to review the large body of classified information significantly limited his research, leaving Walsh’s conclusions more questionable. Despite these limitations, Walsh’s work is a solid contribution to the growing body of scholarship on intelligence sharing.

MAJ Daniel Sennott, USA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina


Readers who are hoping that Kenneth Pollack’s A Path Out of the Desert offers a plan for a quick exit from the Middle East will be disappointed. Pollack’s sobering expectation is that our path out of the desert will be measured in decades, not years.

Still, the book deserves to be read, not only because of Pollack’s track record for clear insights into Middle East policy, but also on the book’s individual merits. A Path Out of the Desert is a cogent analysis of the challenges the United States faces in the Middle East. Pollack argues that political Islam, internal strife, and terrorism constitute threats to U.S. interests in the region—oil, Israel, and America’s Arab allies—and will keep the United States involved there for decades. The only way to extricate forces from the region is to stay involved there until the region’s states have overcome the chronic internal instability.

Pollack’s solution for this chronic instability is a patient,
well-resourced U.S. campaign to encourage regimes to democratize. Only genuine democratic reform can resolve the anger and discontent that give rise to security threats. Furthermore, a hasty reform can result in the same unrest the United States is trying to overcome.

If there is a weakness in Pollack’s book, it is that it does not consider U.S. interests in the Middle East in the context of U.S. global interests. As a result, the reader does not know what America would have to give up globally to follow Pollack’s grand strategy for the Middle East, nor is it clear how U.S. involvement in a major militarized conflict outside the region—not implausible in the next half-century—would impact U.S. efforts at Middle Eastern societal reform. In addition, Pollack largely excludes Afghanistan from his analysis, perhaps disappointing those looking for a primer on that conflict.

There is much about the book to commend to military and security professionals of all stripes. It contains a comprehensive yet concise treatment of the socioeconomic problems that confront the Middle East, as well as a balanced discussion of America’s interests in oil and Israel. It provides context for potential future military operations in the region, from advisory missions to major combat operations. The consistency of Pollack’s logic is a welcome contribution to the policy debate. While U.S. involvement in the Middle East may go on longer than many Americans would like, Pollack reminds us that it is better to depart after 50 years than to have to stay there for 100.

Nathan Toronto, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr’s The Guns of August 2008 is a good history of the recent war between Russia and Georgia, but Ronald Asmus’s A Little War that Shook the World does Cornell and Starr’s book one better. Asmus, through his diplomatic connections and years spent in the region, accesses high-level, first-person U.S. and Georgian accounts of the conflict. His interviews include personalities such as Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili and former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice. Behind-the-scene recollections, along with other interviews, offer readers keen insights regarding how different personalities and perceptions interacted to produce decisions.

Rarely is such a story told so soon after a historical event. Asmus’s only shortcoming was his inability to acquire the same access to Russian sources. In fact, Russia’s aversion to similar questioning (by Russian or other interviewers) has hurt Russia’s overall effort to cast the conflict in a favorable light. Asmus’s story is thus how the conflict unfolded from a Georgian and U.S. perspective, with a few Russian journalist accounts added to the mix.

Asmus’s chronology of events describes both the diplomatic and military fog of war that descended on Georgia. President Saakashvili faced increasing pressure from the United States not to act or provoke Russian actions in the region. In hindsight, Russia’s actions appear more preplanned than U.S. decision makers wanted to believe. The U.S. pressure was countered by Saakashvili’s conviction to act on behalf of Georgians and not let Georgia’s grip on its territorial integrity slip away, an act that no Georgian would let him forget.

The intense stress of trying to make two fiery competitors calm down is obvious in Asmus’s descriptions of Georgian and Russian countermoves inside South Ossetia; discussions among French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin; and discussions between Sarkozy and Saakashvili in Georgia. These geopolitical dynamics influenced the advice and behavior of the United States and NATO.

A LITTLE WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD clarifies the rationale behind Russian and Georgian actions. If this war interests you, then you should enjoy the book.

Tim Thomas,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


This well-organized and clearly written account covers the short tenure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004. James Dobbins served as an envoy to Afghanistan in the Bush administration. The other authors are RAND analysts focused on nation building. The authors organize the book into seven sections—organizing and running the CPA itself, forming the Iraqi Governing Council, establishing security, governing the country, promoting democracy, growing the economy, and disarming militias.

Similar to other analyses of the CPA, the authors cite the disbanding of the Saddam-era Iraqi army and the draconian de-Ba’athification policy as the two biggest decisions (and mistakes) made by Ambassador Paul Bremer. The book makes extensive use of emails and memos written by CPA officials and others involved in rebuilding Iraq. It also incorporates memoirs of senior American officials; especially valuable and enlightening are references from a book written by Bremer, as well as those of retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and Douglas Feith.

Occupying Iraq offers the greatest detail on security-related subjects, such as the rebuilding of the army and police and the attempts to control militias. The book also describes the attempts to rebuild the economy, almost to the point of losing the reader in minutiae. The authors strongly criticize CPA decisions which they believe directly led to the insurgency and
civil war, but they acknowledge the CPA’s achievements under difficult conditions. According to this analysis, the CPA restored electricity to above prewar levels, promoted economic growth, and reformed the judicial system. The authors emphasize, though, that the CPA and coalition forces achieved this progress with little guidance and even less support from Washington. The problem with Occupying Iraq is that it suffers from the same deficiency that the provisional authority did. The book is a narrative of Americans talking to other Americans. Just as the CPA had staffers with precious little understanding of Iraq outside the Green Zone, this book provides few details about how the CPA interacted with Iraqis other than the returning exiles such as Mowwafaq al-Rubaie or Ahmad Chalabi. The book’s only attempt to give voice to ordinary Iraqis is through the use of polling data. The footnotes almost exclusively cite memos and emails sent by one American official to another, or to a few high-level Iraqis. The most revealing quotation comes from Bremer’s aide Robert Blackwill when describing the CPA’s seven-step plan for democratizing Iraq: “[It was] a schoolbook solution, but a solution without . . . Iraqis.” 

COL Robert E. Friedenberg, U.S. Embassy, Damascus, Syria


Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch, and Patrick Fitzgerald effectively demonstrate how intelligence agencies in both the United States and Europe may have violated and circumvented national and international law in the name of the War on Terrorism. These accusations against the Western powers may not come as a great revelation to many readers, as bookstore shelves are filled with recent publications detailing governmental activities involving rendition, wire tapping, intimidation, and torture. However, this book is better annotated and organized than most, and the authors go to great lengths to show a consistent thread of intentional manipulation of the intelligence system to support a narrow neoconservative agenda.

The authors assert the manipulation became malignant in the Bush administration under the pressure and control of Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz. The Bush administration created its own intelligence apparatus to circumvent the existing systems within the intelligence community. Such creative analytical groups as the Office of Strategic Influence, Office of Special Plans, and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group were used to pass raw information directly to the office of the president and advertise the existence of supposed relationships between terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the government of Iraq. According to this account, the lack of reliable information on these terrorist associations initially kept the CIA and other intelligence agencies skeptical of the linkages being proposed by Douglas Feith and Adam Shulsky.

The political intrigues described in this book will hold the reader’s full attention. The authors show the actions of key players preceding the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its “Coalition of the Willing.” According to the authors, the greatest threat posed by Islamism and Islamic terrorism is not another attack on a Western nation, but their legitimizing effect on government abuses within liberal democracies. U.S. and European governments have used the threat of terrorism to violate their own laws, erode the rights of citizens, and to justify spending enormous sums of money on a threat they themselves have overinflated and continue to perpetuate. Skeptics and supporters alike of the Iraq War and the War on Terrorism should read this book. It will challenge many assertions made regarding the wars, their justifications, ramifications, and future impact on Western societies.

LTC Randy G. Masten, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


John Kampfner presents a timely and provoking thesis in today’s globalized, interconnected world: “Why have [democratic] freedoms been so easily traded in return for security or prosperity?” He takes the reader on a journey through eight different nation-state case studies (Singapore, China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, India, Italy, Britain, and the United States) that inform his thesis. Methods of governing within these nations range from traditional authoritarian tactics to hybrid models that include overt bribery, skillful manipulation, and subliminal fear-mongering of the state’s citizens. Successes and failures of free markets and opportunism combined with new-era threats to the Western way of life have led to a global shifting of opinion about democratic ideals, classic liberties, and individual self-determination. Freedom for Sale provides a lens with which to examine this shift.

Kampfner establishes a metric to evaluate each of the different societies in the case study nations. He describes a pact in which a group of people “are keen to defend a system that requires an almost complete abrogation of freedom of expression in return for a very good normal life.” The reader is offered differing motives of societies to embrace (or at least accept) this pact. These range from the traditional threat (or use) of violent suppression of the society; the second-order effect of globalization, which creates broad opportunism and pursuit of self-satisfaction even in the middle and lower classes within societies; and the willing acceptance of sacrificed liberties in democracies.
such as Britain and the United States resulting from the new-era terror campaign against their way of life. Kampfner’s analysis is most provoking through his use of citizens’ perspectives, creating the dramatic effect of seeing democracy through the eyes of the people. The perspectives challenge one’s thinking about democratic freedoms and their associated costs.

Freedom for Sale is well suited for anyone with an interest in the idea of democracy and its role in the future geopolitical landscape. Kampfner highlights the frictions between Western democratic models that facilitate governance of a society while simultaneously creating, managing, and exploiting the opportunities presented by globalization and the expansion of free markets. This blunt representation of what people are willing to sacrifice for their own benefit leads one to thoughtfully reevaluate his definition of democratic freedoms and reflect on the author’s core question, “what costs are security and prosperity worth?”

LTC Andrew B. Nocks, Retired, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**AMERICA’S CAPTIVES: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror**. Paul J. Springer, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2010, 278 pages, $34.95.

Paul Springer’s America’s Captives arrives at a time when public discourse of POW treatment is primed for some true historical analysis of the subject rather than mere opinion. Springer provides a measure of sorely needed historical context for the current debate on the U.S. handling of prisoners during the past nine years.

Unfortunately, the substance of America’s Captives is far too lean. The book is, in essence, a collection of nine short essays on American treatment of POWs in its wars, none of which has sufficient depth. For example, Springer devotes a total of 12 pages to the Mexican War and attempts to fully address the weighty issue of POW treatment in the Korean War in a mere 15. Even the book’s most substantial chapter on the American Civil War provides minimal detail on issues such as the prisoner exchange cartel and the contents of the Lieber Code, and offers almost no explanation as to why most military prisons in the North and the South became overwhelmed, why some did not, and what could have been done differently given the strategic and operational situation by 1864. The biggest problem with this broad-yet-shallow brush approach is that the voices of those charged with organizing and overseeing POW systems and facilities are virtually nonexistent. In order to prove, as Springer claims, that the United States has a habit of delinquency when it comes to dealing with enemy POWs, those voices need to be heard.

Another issue with America’s Captives is that it does not illustrate the negative impact, if any, that the improvisational approach toward POWs had on the outcome of America’s wars. Springer concludes the U.S. needs to break the habit of unpreparedness in handling POWs, but he does not provide a compelling lesson from history as reason to do so (the recent embarrassment of Abu Ghraib is not enough). Springer himself admits that it is “unrealistic” to expect U.S. military planners to make POW operations a priority in planning for future wars. If so, the reader may well agree that the U.S. military has always tended to improvise when dealing with prisoners, yet still be inclined to ask, “So what?”

None of these shortcomings negate the fact that America’s Captives is an important study for military officials and historians alike. Springer’s argument about the American propensity to ignore the POW problem is most likely correct, but is not as compelling as it could be.

MAJ Clay Mountcastle, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


For many who have engaged insurgents over the last few years, a fundamental question may have emerged. Why did the U.S. initially seem so unprepared for this enemy? Insurgency is nothing new for us; what understanding can we apply to our current situation from past experiences? John Mackinlay sets out to answer those questions with a unique perspective: he served in the British Army with the Gurkhas in the 1960s, then as a United Nations researcher. Mackinlay’s background enabled him to observe the steady evolution of insurgency over the years from the Maoist model he first encountered as a young British officer to the post-Maoist model we face today. Thus, this history blends the academic discussion of insurgency with a practical flavor—especially when Mackinlay discusses how to proceed against the future challenges of global insurgency.

In The Insurgent Archipelago, Mackinlay chronicles the evolution of Maoist insurgency through the 20th century into the 21st. In the Maoist model, insurgency targeted the disaffected population through the use of a “carefully organized clandestine, fragile and linear structure . . . [that was] vulnerable and could be interdicted.” The post-Maoist model is almost the opposite of the Maoist one, “more informal, almost chaotic.” The differences between these two types of insurgency are so significant it is difficult to see how one evolved from the other, but Mackinlay expertly pilots the reader through the intricacies of their similarities and differences.

An archipelago is a chain of islands connected tectonically; similarly, various insurgencies are connected in ways not always apparent at first glance. As so many other human endeavors have benefited from improved global communications, so has insurgency, changing its nature in the process. Mackinlay describes
masses of disaffected populations connected by the internet and globalized media and inflamed by propaganda. These populations are unified by a common interest that is more ideological and less tied to territory and therefore harder to interdict. The chapters discussing expeditionary versus domestic approaches to insurgency are especially enlightening, comparing the U.S. approach with those of our partners in Britain and Europe.

The Insurgent Archipelago should be read by Department of Defense personnel and anyone interested in domestic strategies that deal with insurgency within our borders. For Soldier and civilian alike, Mackinlay skilfully describes the complexities and challenges of global insurgency, presenting examples of what has worked and what has not. This book is especially pertinent since it discusses the emerging trend of global insurgents employing the internet. The Insurgent Archipelago is an excellent addition to any military or civilian library.

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In 1995 former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara published his controversial memoir, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, a publication that stoked passions of the Vietnam War that many thought Operation Desert Storm had put to rest. The memoir also stoked the passion of McNamara’s counterpart, McGeorge Bundy, who determined that he finally needed to consider his own influential role in the conflict.

Bundy hired Gordon Goldstein, a scholar in international affairs and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, to help him write a memoir of his experiences as national security advisor. He sought to answer two questions in his book: “How did the ‘tragedy’ of the Vietnam War come to pass?” and “What guidance can it provide for the future?” Just a year later, Bundy passed away before he could finish a manuscript; however, the death did not deter Goldstein. Instead, he crafted a purpose distinct from Bundy’s, though just as important—to discern the “pivotal lessons of Bundy’s performance as national security advisor.” The result, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam, is a crucial addition to the scholarship of civil-military relations during the Vietnam War.

Lessons in Disaster provides readers with a concise, yet deeply informative, analysis of the major deliberations regarding Vietnam within both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Given his relationship to Bundy, Goldstein offers a strikingly impartial and critical examination of Bundy’s role in those deliberations. He centers the text around six lessons in national leadership and policy-making that he derives from his extensive research and interviews with Bundy. Goldstein particularly focuses his analysis on 1964 and 1965; he delineates how during this period the Johnson administration failed to conduct a deliberate evaluation of strategy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, failed to craft a coherent strategy with specific objectives, and failed to communicate truthfully and openly with the American people. He ultimately places much of the failure on Bundy, by detailing his indecisiveness and his failure to coordinate the national security apparatus effectively.

The primary criticism with Lessons in Disaster rests in its final chapter, in which Goldstein focuses on a counterfactual argument—the question of “how [Kennedy] would have confronted the crisis of Vietnam in a second term.” Some readers may dismiss this analysis as hypothetical or revisionist history; others certainly will grapple with the approach. Nevertheless, Goldstein’s approach is academically sound, and the analysis provides an insightful perspective into Kennedy’s views on Southeast Asia, as well as the historical lessons readers may discern by comparing Kennedy’s approach to his successor’s.

In The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam describes McGeorge Bundy as “the brightest light in that glaring constellation around the President.” Bundy epitomized JFK’s “wise men”—a graduate of Groton and Yale, a member of Skull and Bones, the youngest Dean of Faculty in Harvard’s history. Yet, as Gordon Goldstein’s text reveals, this pedigree and intelligence did not transfer into sound leadership and decision making. Given the recent deliberations over national strategy in Afghanistan—particularly the emphasis the president reportedly placed on Lessons in Disaster—Goldstein’s critical analysis of McGeorge Bundy’s actions as national security advisor and the dysfunctional civil-military relationship he oversaw offers today’s readers yet another poignant, prescient caution against both arrogant leadership and strategy with “indeterminate ends.”

MAJ Jeff Gibbons, USA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina


Anatoly Adamishin and Richard Schifter argue that the Cold War ended on 17 January 1989 in Vienna. This is when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced its first concluding document, as part of the implementation of the Helsinki accords, and showed a new spirit of friendship between the USSR and the USA. The authors have a considerable degree of personal experience to support this claim. Adamishin and Schifter were heavily involved in the discussion of human rights between the Soviet and American governments. Adamishin served in a variety of positions in the Soviet diplomatic
services, including deputy foreign minister under Eduard Shevardnadze. Schiffer served as assistant secretary of state for human rights from 1985 to 1989 under George Schultz. The two men developed a personal friendship as they worked to improve the state of human rights in the USSR. They argue that small agreements on human rights issues allowed the defusing of Cold War tensions, leading to disarmament, encouraging perestroika, and helping Gorbachev’s reform program.

The book is organized by chronological subject, with the authors contributing essays for each chapter. This leads to an excellent contrast between points of view. While broader issues are certainly discussed, Adamishin and Schiffer focus on their personal experiences, recounting their lives and diplomatic careers. Interestingly, Schiffer was inclined toward socialism and actively took part in collegiate disputes between brands of communism, but still managed to gain a position in the Reagan administration. Schiffer’s personal expertise with communism allowed him to detect the slight changes made toward the end of Brezhnev’s reign and appreciate the significant improvements that Gorbachev could bring.

The book is an interesting, well-written look at the mechanics of diplomacy. The authors repeatedly affirm that “the devil is in the details” in diplomatic agreements, and it is the working out of solutions within the confines set by political leadership that enables progress. They also look at some of the failings made by Russia and the United States in the immediate post-Soviet era. Adamishin mourns the fall of Gorbachev and feels that Russia would have fared better if Yeltsin had not risen to power. Schiffer wishes that the first Bush administration had been more supportive of perestroika and Russian economic recovery.

The real value of this book is in its discussion of human rights and the ability of external prodding to assist internal reform. Many of the requests made by President Reagan, Secretary Schultz, Schiffer, and others were advocated by reformers within the Soviet Union. External prodding allowed interested Soviet officials to reform psychiatric confinement, internal exile, and Jewish emigration. While these human rights issues were not as significant as the economic and political failures of the Soviet Union, they allowed some change within the system, giving Gorbachev more room to maneuver and unintentionally destroy the Soviet Union.

John E. Fahey, Fairfax, Virginia


In this biography of Fleet Admiral “Bull” Halsey, John Wukovits has produced a fast-paced historical opus that reads like an adventure novel. Access to the Halsey family and previously unpublished reflections from the admiral’s personal memoirs and letters ensure an authoritative and credible read.

Halsey, who held senior level naval commands in the Pacific from Pearl Harbor to the Japanese surrender, is described as the consummate combat commander, the beau ideal of the warrior ethos. He was an offensive-minded, aggressive warfighter, who boldly sought to engage the enemy. The admiral’s mantra was, “Kill Japs, kill Japs, and kill more Japs,” and “Hit hard, hit fast, and hit often.” His combative spirit and inspiring quotes made him the darling of the press. The Associated Press reported that Europe had Patton; the Pacific had William “the Bull” Halsey. His positive relations with the media and his successful offensive actions in early 1942 made him an iconic, real-time hero back home in America.

The author provides a balanced assessment of the admiral. Halsey smoked, cussed, appreciated Scotch, and in the tradition of naval aviators, enjoyed a good time. He made some significant errors in judgment that the book objectively examines. The blunder which most seriously damaged Halsey’s reputation occurred in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In pursuit of Admiral Ozawa’s carriers, Halsey left the San Bernadino Straits unprotected. This jeopardized the invasion beaches and resulted in significant battle damage to Admiral Kincaid’s 7th Fleet. Twice during the war, Admiral Halsey’s decisions resulted in his fleet being in the path of killer typhoons. The outcome was several sunk and damaged ships as well the loss of over 800 men and 200 aircraft. The courts of inquiry for each event faulted Halsey’s judgment.

In addition to its historical significance, the book’s value lies in its lessons for organizational leaders. Its level of detail makes it a potential leadership textbook. As noted, Halsey had faults, but also possessed considerable leadership strengths. He was decisive and action-oriented, readily accepting responsibility. He deeply cared for those who served in his command and treated them fairly. This inspired deep loyalty and respect. He endorsed aggressive training and recognition programs. Significantly, he was very successful in developing harmonious relations with the media, the Army and Marines, and the theater’s Allies. He was also an example of how a strength can become a liability. At Leyte, his aggressive nature motivated him to go after the Japanese carriers. In so doing, he completely ignored his secondary mission of providing security for the invasion fleet.

The book should be read not only by those interested in military history but also practicing leaders who want to capture what is called the “Spirit of the Bull.”

Gene Klann, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In his preface, H. Paul Jeffers speculates that “most Americans, if asked if they have ever heard of General Joe Collins, are likely to
reply with a puzzled look, ‘General Joe who?’” Jeffers seeks to answer that question with the publication of Taking Command. Dubbing his work the “first biography” of Collins, Jeffers draws on “official military histories and records, field orders, situation reports, letters, memoranda, Collins’ autobiography, memoirs of other World War II generals, press accounts of the war, and official histories of the conflict” to describe Collins’s contributions that spanned four decades of public service.

As the full title of his biography would indicate, Jeffers focuses much of his presentation on Collins’ World War II record. After summarizing the general’s early life from birth through late 1941, Jeffers devotes over two-thirds of the biography to Collins’ rise from colonel to lieutenant general and commander of VII Corps through 1945. Serving first in the Pacific as commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division, “Lightning Joe” led the unit’s effort to dispatch organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal. Reassigned to the European Theater of Operations by early 1944, Collins took command of VII Corps in February. Jeffers recounts many of the major operations that Allied forces, including VII Corps, executed to end the war by May 1945. In describing these operations, Jeffers occasionally pursues the details of these actions and departs from his biographical subject.

Jeffers devotes the last quarter of the biography to the general’s service in senior positions during the post-war period, the Korean War, and the early stages of American involvement in Vietnam. One learns of the challenges Collins faced as the Army’s chief of public information, vice chief of staff, chief of staff, member of NATO’s Standing Group, and special representative of the United States in Vietnam. Jeffers reveals the influence that Eisenhower had on Collins’ advancement.

Although clearly not the focus of Jeffers’ biography, the post-war contributions of General Collins warrant more scrutiny and detail. While the author discovered little contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts of Collins during World War II, “there was an explosion of coverage of him as the army chief of staff during the Korean War and as Eisenhower’s envoy to Saigon in 1954.” The book’s bibliography suggests that many of those resources remain untapped. Additionally, the biography’s lack of documentation—no footnotes or endnotes—does little to encourage more research in the references cited by the author.

To those who would raise the question “General Joe who?” Taking Command may serve as a start point. A reader would then be advised to pick up General Collins’ Lightning Joe: An Autobiography, a reference Jeffers draws upon extensively.

*Stephen D. Coats, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*


John Mosier’s Deathride dispels two of the most enduring myths of the war on the Eastern Front during World War II. The first myth is that Hitler underestimated the Russians’ ability to absorb the blitzkrieg by his mechanized forces. The second myth is that the Russians could take massive casualties and still be able to function. Both are proven to be propaganda that Stalin created and continued to repeat throughout the war.

Mosier dispels the first myth by showing that Hitler constantly pushed deep into Russia to capture the main Russian force before it could retreat into the interior of the vast Russian steppes. Mosier argues that Hitler saw the key to defeating the Eastern front was to smash the whole of the Russian Army and seize the resource rich areas of the Ukraine (the bread basket of Russia), the Caucasus (oil), and the fertile land of the Don and Volga rivers. Hitler believed that if he could prevent the natural resources from reaching Russian industry, the Russian military effort would collapse. The German general staff, however, did not agree with Hitler’s logic and felt the capture of Moscow and Leningrad would defeat the Russians.

Mosier dispels the second myth by discussing Russia’s reputed 20 million Red Army casualties. Research supports the actual figure is closer to 33 million. It is unfathomable that the Russians could train and equip an army absorbing these kinds of casualties. Figures indicate that with so many new recruits, the only form of maneuver available was a frontal attack, which was easy to control but costly in casualties.

**Deathride’s** research and documentation sets it apart from other books on the subject. Its only drawback is that sometimes the numbers still do not add up. For instance, if the Russians lost 4.3 million in 1941 and had almost 3 million captured, and the rule of thumb is three wounded in action for every KIA, how did the Russians have anyone left in uniform with over 15 million casualties? As Mosier points out, no matter what the real numbers are, the Russians were at the bottom of the manpower barrel during the last months of the war.

Mosier argues that Hitler could have set the conditions to cut off the Russian war machine from natural resources, and this—coupled with enormous casualties—shows how close Hitler came to defeating the Russian Army. Deathride is the first of many books based on former Soviet Union archives. The book is a great start to a more academically rigorous study of the Eastern front during World War II.

**LTC Richard S. Vick, Jr., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Although there is no official study of American participation in World War I, the bookshelves are full of works on the causes and consequences of the war, individual battles, the home front, prisoners of war, and more. *Bodies of War* is the first work to address U.S. memorials, cemeteries, and other means of remembering those who died in the war.

Nothing was inevitable about the way Americans chose to remember. Many actions were ad hoc or based on inappropriate precedent. Some nations leave the dead where they die, others bring them home. Based on the Civil War practice, the United States gave the next of kin the choice. Half chose to bring bodies home, half left them in Europe. In the war theater, the U.S. was slow to decide whether to leave decayed bodies and makeshift memorials at the battle sites or to build elaborate tourist-attracting cemeteries and monuments. The result was a divided focus for remembrance and mourning.

Among topics treated in *Bodies of War* are graves registration, the monument commission and the debate over monuments and cemeteries, the trips to the cemeteries and memorials by Gold Star Mothers, and the neglect of black Soldiers and their next of kin. American decisions are shown arising from previous postwar practices. The American approach is contrasted with those of European nations with many more casualties.

Budreau, a historian at the Army Surgeon General’s office, addresses serious questions about the ways in which we deal with our war dead, the ways we choose to remember them, and the ways we select those we memorialize and those we ignore. Money and politics and absentmindedness have all played a role in establishing a policy for burial and memorial. Some decisions are the product of haste, others of prejudice. All determine how we remember.

The United States decided between 1917 and 1929 to sanitize the process, to honor a sacrificed hero rather than transport and grieve over a body. There were no memorials to the sons and husbands who came back invalids. Nor were there remembrances of military women and minorities.

None of these choices was inevitable, and none is a mandatory precedent for subsequent wars. In wars to come, remembrance will again be negotiated ground, influenced by choices made before.

War kills, and the living have to deal with their dead. *Bodies of War* reminds us of that. The book deserves a wide audience, particularly among those destined to fight tomorrow’s wars.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas

What was the biggest lie you ever told? Did it put you on a forefront of one of the most significant revolutions in the past century? Homer Lea’s did. The five-foot-three-inch hunchback who weighed only 100 pounds and dropped out of Stanford College managed to convince high-ranking Chinese officials that he was not only a military expert but also the relative of the famous Confederate General Robert E. Lee. With this proclamation, he found himself poised on the brink of immense change in the Chinese government, a position that would eventually lead to his tenure as the principal foreign advisor during the 1911 Chinese Republican revolution.

From the Publisher.


In recent years, scholars in international relations and other fields have begun to conceive of security more broadly, moving away from a state-centered concept of national security toward the idea of human security, which emphasizes the individual and human well-being. Viewing global environmental change through the lens of human security connects such problems as melting ice caps and carbon emissions to poverty, vulnerability, equity, and conflict. This book examines the complex social, health, and economic consequences of environmental change across the globe.

From the Publisher.


The Vietnam War: A Chronology of War is a richly detailed, day-by-day history of the significant Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force events from the Vietnam War, from the pre-war role of military advisors to the 1975 fall of Saigon. Each entry is full of historical information and identifies the date, location, and military units involved, while introductory essays place these events within the context of the overall conflict. This encyclopedic account of the history of the Vietnam War comes to life with original photos and colorful art from the collections of all four services and military artists. With a foreword by U.S. Senator Jim Webb, a distinguished Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, this volume includes one of the most powerful voices from this often-unsung generation of servicemen and women.

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Vietnam
“Veterans of the Wars”
Edgar Lee Masters (1869-1950)

Edwin, your father has never ceased to be
My admiration, and I can close my eyes
And see his soldier shape arise
In vivid memory.

And I recall him as he used to stride
So straight, and how he never stayed or shirked
Through the long years, and how he worked
For wages to provide

For you and for his brood; and by great care
Saved from small earnings enough to buy a house,
A garden and some apple boughs
For his Sunday and evening chair,

When with his duties ended he would read
Of Antietam, Shiloh, the Wilderness,
Of battles he had fought, of stress,
Of victory and stampede.

And when old age and agonized disease
Racked him he bore them with heroic will,
As one who knew the battle’s drill,
And prized the good of peace.

What training like the soldier’s life commands
For all men’s days such strength and discipline,
For all the labors, trials wherein
The soul deserts or stands?

Were soldiers not of money plots the pawn;
Or did not after the wars vote as they fought,
Who would not have the youthful wrought
Into such will and brawn?

Were there some way to keep the usurers chained
Against the use of souls by Mars refined
Above the mass of humankind,
Who would not have them trained?

For those who were in mind your father’s peers,
But dodged the battle, were about our town
The drunkards, failures, drooped and down,
Who crawled the idiot years.


Staff Sergeant Miller was shot in his upper torso. Ignoring the wound, he continued to push the fight, moving to draw fire from over one hundred enemy fighters upon himself. He then again charged forward through an open area in order to allow his teammates to safely reach cover. After killing at least 10 insurgents, wounding dozens more, and repeatedly exposing himself to withering enemy fire while moving from position to position, Staff Sergeant Miller was mortally wounded by enemy fire. His extraordinary valor ultimately saved the lives of seven members of his own team and 15 Afghanistan National Army soldiers. Staff Sergeant Miller’s heroism and selflessness above and beyond the call of duty, and at the cost of his own life, are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Army.