
“Would the Marines who fought at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, you know, be proud of us?” Lance Corporal Joe Mahardy asked his platoon leader, Lieutenant Donovan Campbell, 36 hours after the words “JIHAD, JIHAD, JIHAD” came from every minaret in the city of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province. Overcome by emotion, Campbell fought back tears and composed himself before assuring his fellow Marine that “the Corps is proud of us.”

Donovan Campbell, an Ivy Leaguer, is not the typical Marine. In his senior year at Princeton, he realized that the chance to assume responsibility and serve others meant more to him than opportunities with Fortune 500 companies. He wanted to excel in an environment where personal performance meant more than family connections; he wanted a test, and the Marine Corps accommodated that wish. Though he had no desire to “drag up painful memories,” Campbell wrote Joker One because he thought it was his duty; he believed that someone was obligated to tell the platoon’s story and, as the unit leader, the responsibility fell to him.

Campbell describes his 2003 Iraq deployment at a division command post as uneventful, and he lobbied hard to return as a platoon leader, which he did in 2004 as a member of Golf Company, 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment. His fascinating narrative addresses forming the company, preparing for deployment, fighting in Ramadi, and returning home.

Reporting to Golf Company, Campbell joined a unit that was manned at less than 50 percent of authorized strength. Once deployment orders came down, new arrivals poured in, but they reported so close to deployment that training opportunities were minimal. The first wave of new Marines had two months to prepare for deployment and the second a mere four weeks, much less than the expected six months. Such a short period of preparation proved a challenge, but the dogged professionalism of the company’s NCOs was apparent throughout. Campbell’s gratitude and respect for his NCOs were clear, save for his indifference toward his marginal and mercifully unnamed platoon sergeant, whose excessive time in marksmanship units rather than the infantry left him unprepared to lead.

Campbell describes a platoon leader’s isolation clearly and disturbingly. He claims that the leader cannot spend time or energy thinking of home, missing a spouse, or worrying about personal safety. Campbell suggests that a leader’s most effective defense mechanism is to consider himself already dead, which allows him sole focus on completing the mission and taking care of subordinates. Such an approach is not unprecedented; think of the 506th PIR’s Lieutenant Ronald Speirs who, in Band of Brothers, observed that “the only hope you have is to accept the fact that you’re already dead.” That two warriors, separated by six decades, come to the same conclusion suggests the timelessness of a combat leader’s challenges.

The unit took over a city previously occupied by the Army, whose Soldiers described the area as stable (no fatalities in six months). The Marines arrived believing that the Army had been too hard on the locals. Golf’s original intent was to “extend . . . the velvet glove” because “the people are the prize.” How the residents of Ramadi viewed the soft war approach is enlightening; their nickname for the Marines was awat, a soft cake that easily crumbles. In short, the locals interpreted kindness as weakness. When fighting intensified, the Marines continued to take every precaution to minimize harm to noncombatants while killing hundreds of combatants. Even when it was clear that the locals resented the Marines, the Americans remained committed to protecting them. To do otherwise, in Campbell’s words, would mean he and the platoon would “not deserve the title of United States Marines.”

A cynic might see this line, reminiscent of the “Marine’s Hymn,” as quaint, if not naive. Others might see it as commitment to a cause more important than the individual.

Campbell ruthlessly critiques his performance throughout the book. His platoon’s first loss was one of the unit’s most popular Marines. The attack that led to this fatality came when Campbell decided to keep his unit in place while medical treatment was arranged for over a dozen children injured by an insurgent-fired rocket propelled grenade. He considered leaving because a unit that remained stationary for too long was certain to be attacked again, but in the end he concluded that Marines are dedicated to protecting the innocent, not themselves.

Joker One is a study of leadership that both inspires and provokes thought. Campbell observes that in combat there are only “bad and worse” options; the leader makes his choice, “then lives with the results and shuts up about the whole thing.” Campbell provides enormous insight into the burden of leading both during and after the fight.

LTC James Varner, USA, Retired, Platte City, Missouri
WASHINGTON RULES: America’s Path to Permanent War, Andrew J. Bacevich compares the claim that President John Kennedy would have pulled U.S. forces out of Vietnam if only Kennedy had not been assassinated to the pleasing illusion voiced by a heroine of Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises. This heroine states that she and Jake, the book’s protagonist, would have lived happily ever after if only World War I had not occurred. “Yes,” Jake wistfully replies, “Isn’t it pretty to think so?”

Far from pulling U.S. forces out of Vietnam, Bacevich argues, Kennedy only managed to mire the U.S. more deeply in that conflict, despite the lessons about intervention he should have learned from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The reason for these failures of Kennedy was that, like every other U.S. president since World War II, Kennedy was wedded to certain unwritten rules of U.S. foreign policy—rules which foisted the Vietnam War upon countries who did not need this war and rules which subsequently led Americans to blithely accept their country’s descent into a state of permanent war.

Forming the foundation of these rules, Bacevich says, is a credo that “summons the United States—and the United States alone—to lead, save, liberate, and ultimately transform the world.” A sacred trinity of principles rests upon this credo, specifically, “an abiding conviction that the minimum essentials of international peace and order require the United States to maintain a global military presence, to configure its forces for global power projection, and to counter existing or anticipated threats by relying on a policy of global interventionism.”

According to Bacevich, both Republicans and Democrats worship at the altar of these rules. Indeed, to oppose these rules is to subject oneself to public ridicule. Thus it is that selfishness, moral cowardice, and a crusading idealism have brought about the dreadful future of which President Dwight Eisenhower warned in his famous farewell address—a future in which national interests, democratic processes, and individual liberties are shanghaied by a massive, warmongering military-industrial complex.

This event, Bacevich argues, has been disastrous for our country. We Americans not only waste blood and treasure in extravagant amounts, but our sacrifices usually do more harm than good. The Vietnam War is only one such example. To cite another, after almost eight years of war, tens of thousands of lives lost, and billions of dollars spent, Iraq’s deep-rooted political issues remain unresolved, leaving that country’s fate uncertain. Meanwhile, Afghanistan is caught in a tragic downward spiral.

America must fundamentally reorient itself to the world, Bacevich says. We must realize that, as well-meaning as we may be, the use of force (or threat of force) cannot bring the profound behavioral changes to foreign societies that we expect it to bring. Counterinsurgency doctrine will not solve this problem since it makes American military leaders responsible for types of operations (such as the restoration of essential services) for which our professional background and training are rarely sufficient. Besides, our country simply cannot afford the political, civic, and economic costs of nation-building and long wars.

Bacevich proposes that we return to the outlook of our Founding Fathers, for most of whom a large standing military was anathema and who thought that it was through the power of America’s unique example that we could best influence the world. To this end, Bacevich suggests a new trinity of foreign policy principles: “First, the purpose of the U.S. military is not to combat evil or remake the world, but to defend the United States and its most vital interests . . . Second, the primary duty station of the American soldier is in America . . . Third, consistent with the Just War Tradition, the United States should employ force only as a last resort and only in self-defense.”

Once read, it becomes clear why Washington Rules has created such a stir within U.S. foreign policy circles. Bacevich possesses a rare gift for rhetoric, and because he is a retired Army colonel with a Ph.D. from Princeton, it should surprise no one that the book is well-informed by history, academic theory, and military experience. The book is so powerfully rendered and its arguments so counter to established thinking that it would be difficult for any open-minded American to find it, if not convincing, at the very least distressing. The net effect is to make the book the most damning indictment of American leadership since Tom Ricks’ Fiasco. Any American who cares about the state of the Nation should read it, and Bacevich’s ideas, which are largely not his but belong to our Founding Fathers, need to be once again part of mainstream American political discourse.

In the final analysis, however, Washington Rules represents the same type of wistful idealism Bacevich so frequently and successfully derides within its pages. Considering the lengthy educational process, which Bacevich says brought him to the harsh “truth” (unvarnished by illusion) about U.S. foreign policy, is it possible that he will not continue to philosophically evolve until he arrives at a new unvarnished “truth” someday? Is it also possible that the world has changed so little that we Americans can remain secure from technologically-enabled transnational terrorist groups, protected only by a strong border guard and the threat of massive, conventional military retaliation? Is it really true that, in good conscience, we can keep our military at home, undisturbed by lurid media reports of genocide and mad tyrants abroad?

No, but it is pretty to think so.

Major Douglas A. Pryer, USA, Haverfordwest, UK

Robert Jervis’s book is interesting because he offers some counterintuitive insights concerning intelligence. In his conclusion, he states “Because intelligence is unpopular and better intelligence may be more unpopular, political leaders are likely to be content with decrying intelligence’s performance.” Earlier in the book, he comments, “Indeed, despite the fact decision makers always say they want better intelligence, for good political and psychological reasons they often do not, which is part of the explanation for why intelligence reforms are rarely fully implemented.” He cites Richard Nixon as one of the most vocal intelligence critics when presented with disturbing, but accurate, news. Decision makers are comforted that intelligence can be wrong and they can shift the blame or rationalize rejecting an assessment because it clashed with their desired policies.

The centerpiece of Jervis’s book is the intelligence failures surrounding the Shah of Iran’s fall from power in 1978. With the Cold War paramount, few resources were devoted to Iran. There was also little communication between analysts examining politics and economics. Peer coordination was not stressed and reports flowed up a hierarchical system. Jervis argues intelligence should be messy, a “systematic exposure of the evidence for and against a particular belief,” instead of neatly formulated packages of event reporting. (There was a similar tendency during the rush toward involvement in Kosovo when analysts competed with CNN for the latest news scoop.)

Jervis’s case study concerning Iraqi WMD might still be too fresh to draw all lessons because so much is still classified and careers are still being made by professionals who are hesitant to talk openly. Much of his criticism is directed toward George Tenet, who did not know there was a dispute about issues like the purpose of the Iraqi aluminum tubes until the National Intelligence Estimate was written. Jervis sympathizes with the U.S. intelligence community in that other national intelligence services also believed Iraq had active WMD programs. He highlights the analytical problem of ignoring non-events, like Hussein Kemal’s information that Iraq’s WMD programs were moribund. Too often, alternative explanations are equated with naivety in an intellectual environment that rewards confidence and shuns complexity.

Jervis has dedicated considerable effort to documenting intelligence errors while offering realistic remedies. He identifies America’s lack of self-awareness and unexamined predispositions as fundamental challenges. We still do not have a strong desire to experience other cultures. Less than 14 million U.S. passports were issued in fiscal year 2009 among over 300 million citizens. Some biases must be acknowledged even if they cannot be solved. Why Intelligence Fails deserves to be studied along with the writings of Sherman Kent, Richard Betts, and other keen observers of the intelligence field.

James Cricks,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


That the world is well along its journey into the “information age” is apparent to even the most pedestrian observer of human activity. Preschoolers can now communicate across the world and access data of myriad kinds in ways their grandparents could never have imagined. However, as Daniel Gerstein points out, advances in information technology are not the only things happening at warp speed today. No less significant are the advances in biotechnology. Indeed, future generations may characterize the present day not as the “information age” but rather as the “age of biotechnology.”

The potential presented by biotechnological advances for the eradication of disease and the extension of human life is so vast as to render the present-day technology a watershed in human history. However, the increased potential for positive outcomes is matched and, unless we are vigilant, could be surpassed by the potential for negative outcomes from the misuse of new-found knowledge. Gerstein characterizes the present day as the confluence of globalization, terrorism, and biotechnology. He describes in detail the fine line between legitimate and illegitimate use of the capacity to affect living organisms. In particular, he focuses on the possible misuse of biotechnology by terrorists, both their likelihood of acquiring the technical wherewithal and their likely motivations for doing so.

Gerstein does not paint a hopeless, doomsday picture. Rather, he urges active engagement and constant vigilance to anticipate and counter the bioterrorist threat. He argues that the reader can expect such an approach to yield a reasonable degree of success, though not eliminating the chance of a biological attack or a manmade epidemic of sizable proportion. He does not view bioterrorism as posing an existential threat to the United States in the way that some have viewed nuclear weapons.

Bioterror in the 21st Century begins with a discussion of globalism, places the two-sided coin of biotechnology and biowarfare within that globalized setting, and discusses homeland defense in light of these circumstances. He then considers the possible motivations for terrorist use of biotechnology through various game-theory constructs. Gerstein makes a particularly thought-provoking observation: “Since it is manifestly impossible to guard against every biological threat, some of our most aggressive protective efforts should be directed toward
understanding terrorist motivations vis-à-vis biological warfare.”

Perhaps Gerstein’s greatest service is to assemble a compendium of useful charts, tables, and diagrams from government and academic sources. His bibliography identifies key contemporary documents and studies in the rapidly emerging public policy field. Although the book suffers from occasional redundancies and data presentations without an immediately obvious point, Gerstein’s conclusions largely tie together these loose ends. Bioterror in the 21st Century raises a topic that the nation and the world ignores at its peril. Those of us still languishing in the information age would do well to inform ourselves.

COL John Mark Mattox, Ph.D., Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico


Christopher Preble, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, wagers a contentious argument that for the United States to become more secure, it should dramatically reduce the size and inherent capabilities of its military. He asserts that U.S. military power is exceedingly expensive, misused, and counterproductive, undermining U.S. interests. He notes that the U.S. spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined and that its military budget is growing at twice the rate of the rest of the world, despite having no hostile neighbors. He objects to expensive programs such as the Air Force’s F-35 and F-22, the Marine Corps’ V-22, the Navy’s Virginia-class submarine, and the Army’s Future Combat Systems, calling them overkill systems and nothing more than congressional special interest projects designed to preserve district jobs.

In light of competing domestic needs, Preble highlights the cost of financing the active force and post-service benefits, calling them excessively burdensome to U.S. taxpayers and the domestic economy. He espouses the notion that too much of the U.S. defense budget goes toward protecting “free-riding” allies: “So long as the world looks upon the U.S. as always capable of intervening, there will always be demands that it do so . . .” Protecting allies overtaxes the U.S. military with a spectrum of operations ranging from combat to protecting trade routes.

Preble maintains the United States exacerbates matters by incorrectly thinking that its security directly depends on global stability that only it can assure. As the self-appointed global governance police, the United States has a tendency to act unilaterally in deploying its military, even in the absence of a UN mandate. He believes that deploying our military to prevent the destabilizing effect of war violates constitutional executive powers afforded the president and rarely passes a cost-benefit analysis test, never mind the damages it causes to U.S. international relations. Furthermore, mission successes may disguise underlying realities that surface years from now. He contends that our military presence in the Middle East is destabilizing and has become the principle recruiting device for Osama bin-Laden.

Along with the aforementioned reduction of expensive service programs, Preble advocates dramatically reducing the size of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, while encouraging our allies to increase the size of their militaries in the spirit of equitable burden-sharing, a position he states is supported by the American public. He concludes by proposing four admittedly not novel, but refocused, decision criteria for determining the future use of a significantly reduced U.S. military. There must be a “compelling U.S. national security interest,” there must be a “clear national consensus,” there must be “clear and obtainable military objectives,” and it must be used as a “last resort.”

Preble’s argument is well-articulated, compelling, and thought-provoking. He persuasively draws upon constitutional law and crafts his argument with relevant government data, public opinion, and scholarly research. Regrettably, he only superficially covers opposing views, leaving the reader with some skepticism about his proposed “way ahead.” The author’s view of the United States as acting too irrationally in employing military power comes across as more naive than idealistic. That said, the book is an interesting read for a broad range of academics, government officials, and military professionals interested in alternative approaches to national security and economic prosperity.

LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D., USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


For most veterans of the Cold War, the era was a sustained and often stressful effort to prevent the spread of communism and especially prevent the influence of the Soviet Union, China, and their allies.

Professors Campbell Craig and Frederik Logevall remind us in America’s Cold War that much of America’s motivation for this struggle was due to less idealistic domestic considerations, such as the economics of the military-industrial complex and the need for politicians to achieve partisan goals by appearing tough on communism. Given conservative suspicions, this last need was particularly important for Democrats, who bore a “special burden . . . to demonstrate at all times the proper anti-communist bona fides.” By contrast, conservative Republicans such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan could and did take a more
pragmatic approach when dealing with Moscow and Beijing.

Craig and Logevall argue that the United States had already “contained” Soviet expansionism in 1950, but that these domestic considerations led to a globalized, militarized approach to foreign policy, a hard-line approach that was visible even in the George W. Bush administration’s response to 9/11. For these reasons, the authors contend, the United States incurred enormous costs, not only in terms of foreign and American casualties, but also in the areas of partisan and interest-group politics, a growing U.S. tolerance for standing armed forces, and huge defense expenditures that might otherwise have been invested in more productive ways.

This argument has considerable merit and bears some attention. However, in their determination to ascribe events to such domestic, partisan concerns, the authors frequently overlook other factors. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, a simple statement of political alliance, is immediately equated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an elaborate defense structure that only began to develop several years later, after the Korean conflict gave a new sense of urgency to western European defense.

Similarly, the authors suggest that the death of Stalin in 1953 offered an opportunity for reduced confrontation. Yet, this interpretation overlooks the fact that Dwight Eisenhower had come to the presidency directly from service as the first NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, a position in which he had become acutely aware that NATO could not function without the resources and strategic depth provided by West Germany. To suggest that Moscow and Washington might have reached some agreement on a neutralized Germany was to overlook Eisenhower’s lifetime of military experience, not to mention the intense diplomatic maneuvering going on in 1953 to create a West German military force.

The authors are correct in noting that Washington (and for that matter, Moscow) overlooked the local, nationalistic concerns of third-world insurgents. Yet, the Vietnamese conflict appears almost in isolation, without consideration of similar local but communist-backed insurgencies in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Mozambique, and numerous other places; in context, these insurgencies made Vietnam seem both more significant and more winnable than the authors concede.

Finally, the authors assert that during the 1980s, American hardliners did not believe the Cold War could be ended peacefully, or that the USSR could actually fail because of internal weaknesses. However, at the time, many of those hardliners argued that the Carter-Reagan increases in defense spending would force the Soviets to match that spending, adding to the economic problems that led Mikhail Gorbachev to rethink the entire system.

America’s Cold War is a useful summary of the domestic considerations of that conflict; as the authors suggest, examining such aspects of one nation’s history provides a valuable corrective to the trend to think of nation-states as monolithic players. Yet, this account of Cold War national security policy is, in its own way, as incomplete as the international, comparative accounts the authors seek to correct.

Jonathan M. House, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Jim Storr has written an important, thought-provoking book that should be read by anyone who is interested in military thought and its implications for doctrine, organization, training, and leader development. The book’s focus is on the tactical level of war and classic combat operations. Storr, a former officer in the British Army, is a serious student of the military profession. More important, he is a keen synthesizer of various research. In writing this book, he meticulously used studies in the disciplines of history, psychology, systems theory, complexity theory, philosophy, and the history of science.

The book’s title might cause some to think The Human Face of War is akin to Richard Holmes’ Acts of War or John Keegan’s The Face of Battle—it is not. The book is not about how humans act in combat, but rather how human behavior should affect our theories of combat. The book addresses many recent theories, to include the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop, effects based operations, attrition, and the use of postmodern language in military theory.

For many readers, the most engaging portions of the book will follow the discussions of theories, where Storr applies them to the conduct of operations: “So what is needed is a body of theory as to how to fight; but also how to organize armies in peacetime to fight and win when needed. Organization, doctrine, training policy, and issues which affect social cohesion and career progression are all relevant factors.”

Storr focuses on the simple premise that we must use empirical studies of what works and then shows how this calls into question some of our current beliefs about building and training an army. For example, research by the British Defence Operational Analysis Centre indicates that four factors tend to dominate the outcomes of battles, regardless of force ratios: surprise, air superiority, aggressive ground reconnaissance, and shock. He closes the discussion looking at the much-denigrated and misunderstood idea of “attrition.” His defense of attrition is counter to much current thought, but put in context, is convincing.

The remainder of the book applies the precepts developed in the first three chapters about how to design organizations to attack an opponent’s will and generate shock and surprise.
Many of Storr’s recommendations are counter to current practice, but are, nevertheless, soundly reasoned. He takes on the infatuation with more and better information and looks at officer development and the qualities that make a good commander.

The densely packed book often challenges conventional wisdom. Whether you agree or not, his ideas are documented and well-reasoned. To ignore them puts one at the peril of overlooking insights gleaned from good research and analysis. While there are some who feel the days of major combat operations are over, there is evidence that small unit combined arms operations skills are needed for any kind of combat. The Human Face of War helps envision a better way to build a force that can be formidable in the conduct of combined arms combat.

Clinton J. Ancker, III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The U.S. intelligence community received considerable scrutiny in the aftermath of 9/11 for a lack of intra-governmental intelligence sharing. In response to this deficit, the Bush administration launched a sweeping information-sharing initiative to remedy perceived federal intelligence stovepiping. However, as former president Bush made clear in his National Strategy for Information Sharing, a strong intelligence community relies on more than just U.S. intelligence. Federal, state, and local authorities must partner with private sector and foreign governments to obtain a complete intelligence picture. The focus of James Walsh’s new book is this last element, the foreign partners. Walsh presents a well-reasoned and detailed account of how countries can obtain more reliable information from their foreign partners through hierarchical relationships.

Walsh points at distrust as the main barrier to forming effective international intelligence relationships. The distrust is often felt by both parties. For example, a developing country may exaggerate its intelligence to garner favor and financial support from the United States. After a relationship is established, the country may fear the United States will abandon it unless it produces more intelligence, while the United States will remain skeptical of the origins and reliability of the intelligence. The only way to mitigate this distrust is to ensure that the benefits of adhering to the intelligence-sharing agreement far outweigh the costs associated with maintaining the agreement.

The main question Walsh seeks to answer is: How can governments overcome policy divides, intelligence manipulation, and deep-seated distrust to arrive at a mutually beneficial intelligence-sharing agreement? The author seeks answers in historical case studies, including the diverse relationships America has formed with foreign partners in the post-9/11 fight against international terrorism. America’s robust intelligence-sharing agreement with European countries is built on a mutual trust that stems from common interests, similar government policies, and a history of cooperation. Simultaneously, countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt have a less intuitive, yet still crucial, relationship with America. Although these countries have extremely valuable intelligence, their differing policies and interests create a mutual distrust between the governments. Through a hierarchical agreement, in which the United States provides substantial financing, oversight, and training, these unlikely allies have provided invaluable intelligence. Finally, juxtaposed against the successful relationships is America’s non-relationship with Iran and Syria. As Walsh makes clear, when the policy differences and feelings of distrust are too significant, even a hierarchical agreement will not remedy the divide.

The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing offers a fascinating glimpse into the world of international intelligence, but it is by no means a stand-alone primer. Walsh makes a valiant effort to explain one aspect of an extraordinarily complex issue. That said, readers hoping to learn about the entire U.S. information sharing environment will be disappointed. In addition, the author admits his inability to review the large body of classified information significantly limited his research, leaving Walsh’s conclusions more questionable. Despite these limitations, Walsh’s work is a solid contribution to the growing body of scholarship on intelligence sharing.

MAJ Daniel Sennott, USA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina


Readers who are hoping that Kenneth Pollack’s A Path Out of the Desert offers a plan for a quick exit from the Middle East will be disappointed. Pollack’s sobering expectation is that our path out of the desert will be measured in decades, not years.

Still, the book deserves to be read, not only because of Pollack’s track record for clear insights into Middle East policy, but also on the book’s individual merits. A Path Out of the Desert is a cogent analysis of the challenges the United States faces in the Middle East. Pollack argues that political Islam, internal strife, and terrorism constitute threats to U.S. interests in the region—oil, Israel, and America’s Arab allies—and will keep the United States involved there for decades. The only way to extricate forces from the region is to stay involved there until the region’s states have overcome the chronic internal instability.

Pollack’s solution for this chronic instability is a patient,
well-resourced U.S. campaign to encourage regimes to democratize. Only genuine democratic reform can resolve the anger and discontent that give rise to security threats. Furthermore, a hasty reform can result in the same unrest the United States is trying to overcome.

If there is a weakness in Pollack’s book, it is that it does not consider U.S. interests in the Middle East in the context of U.S. global interests. As a result, the reader does not know what America would have to give up globally to follow Pollack’s grand strategy for the Middle East, nor is it clear how U.S. involvement in a major militarized conflict outside the region—not implausible in the next half-century—would impact U.S. region—not implausible in the next half-century.


Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr’s The Guns of August 2008 is a good history of the recent war between Russia and Georgia, but Ronald Asmus’s A Little War that Shook the World does Cornell and Starr’s book one better. Asmus, through his diplomatic connections and years spent in the region, accesses high-level, first-person U.S. and Georgian accounts of the conflict. His interviews include personalities such as Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili and former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice. Behind-the-scenes recollections, along with other interviews, offer readers keen insights regarding how different personalities and perceptions interacted to produce decisions.

Rarely is such a story told so soon after a historical event. Asmus’s only shortcoming was his inability to acquire the same access to Russian sources. In fact, Russia’s aversion to similar questioning (by Russian or other interviewers) has hurt Russia’s overall effort to cast the conflict in a favorable light. Asmus’s story is thus how the conflict unfolded from a Georgian and U.S. perspective, with a few Russian journalist accounts added to the mix.

Asmus’s chronology of events describes both the diplomatic and military fog of war that descended on Georgia. President Saakashvili faced increasing pressure from the United States not to act or provoke Russian actions in the region. In hindsight, Russia’s actions appear more preplanned than U.S. decision makers wanted to believe. The U.S. pressure was countered by Saakashvili’s conviction to act on behalf of Georgians and not let Georgia’s grip on its territorial integrity slip away, an act that no Georgian would let him forget.

The intense stress of trying to make two fiery competitors calm down is obvious in Asmus’s descriptions of Georgian and Russian countermoves inside South Ossetia; discussions among French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin; and discussions between Sarkozy and Saakashvili in Georgia. These geopolitical dynamics influenced the advice and behavior of the United States and NATO.

A Little War that Shook the World clarifies the rationale behind Russian and Georgian actions. If this war interests you, then you should enjoy the book.

Tim Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


This well-organized and clearly written account covers the short tenure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004. James Dobbins served as an envoy to Afghanistan in the Bush administration. The other authors are RAND analysts focused on nation building. The authors organize the book into seven sections—organizing and running the CPA itself, forming the Iraqi Governing Council, establishing security, governing the country, promoting democracy, growing the economy, and disarming militias.

Similar to other analyses of the CPA, the authors cite the disbanding of the Saddam-era Iraqi army and the draconian de-Ba’athification policy as the two biggest decisions (and mistakes) made by Ambassador Paul Bremer. The book makes extensive use of emails and memos written by CPA officials and others involved in rebuilding Iraq. It also incorporates memoirs of senior American officials; especially valuable and enlightening are references from a book written by Bremer, as well as those of retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and Douglas Feith.

Occupying Iraq offers the greatest detail on security-related subjects, such as the rebuilding of the army and police and the attempts to control militias. The book also describes the attempts to rebuild the economy, almost to the point of losing the reader in minutiae. The authors strongly criticize CPA decisions which they believe directly led to the insurgency and
civil war, but they acknowledge the CPA’s achievements under difficult conditions. According to this analysis, the CPA restored electricity to above prewar levels, promoted economic growth, and reformed the judicial system. The authors emphasize, though, that the CPA and coalition forces achieved this progress with little guidance and even less support from Washington.

The problem with Occupying Iraq is that it suffers from the same deficiency that the provisional authority did. The book is a narrative of Americans talking to other Americans. Just as the CPA had staffers with precious little understanding of Iraq outside the Green Zone, this book provides few details about how the CPA interacted with Iraqis other than the returning exiles such as Mowwafaq al-Rubaie or Ahmad Chalabi. The book’s only attempt to give voice to ordinary Iraqis is through the use of polling data. The footnotes almost exclusively cite memos and emails sent by one American official to another, or to a few high-level Iraqis. The most revealing quotation comes from Bremer’s aide Robert Blackwill when describing the CPA’s seven-step plan for democratizing Iraq: “[It was] a schoolbook solution, but it’s our only solution.”

COL Robert E. Friedenberg, U.S. Embassy, Damascus, Syria


Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch, and Patrick Fitzgerald effectively demonstrate how intelligence agencies in both the United States and Europe may have violated and circumvented national and international law in the name of the War on Terrorism. These accusations against the Western powers may not come as a great revelation to many readers, as bookstore shelves are filled with recent publications detailing governmental activities involving rendition, wire tapping, intimidation, and torture. However, this book is better annotated and organized than most, and the authors go to great lengths to show a consistent thread of intentional manipulation of the intelligence system to support a narrow neoconservative agenda.

The authors assert the manipulation became malignant in the Bush administration under the pressure and control of Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz. The Bush administration created its own intelligence apparatus to circumvent the existing systems within the intelligence community. Such creative analytical groups as the Office of Strategic Influence, Office of Special Plans, and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group were used to pass raw information directly to the office of the president and advertise the existence of supposed relationships between terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the government of Iraq. According to this account, the lack of reliable information on these terrorist associations initially kept the CIA and other intelligence agencies skeptical of the linkages being proposed by Douglas Feith and Adam Shulsky.

The political intrigues described in this book will hold the reader’s full attention. The authors show the actions of key players preceding the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its “Coalition of the Willing.” According to the authors, the greatest threat posed by Islamism and Islamic terrorism is not another attack on a Western nation, but their legitimizing effect on government abuses within liberal democracies. U.S. and European governments have used the threat of terrorism to violate their own laws, erode the rights of citizens, and to justify spending enormous sums of money on a threat they themselves have overinflated and continue to perpetuate.

Skeptics and supporters alike of the Iraq War and the War on Terrorism should read this book. It will challenge many assertions made regarding the wars, their justifications, ramifications, and future impact on Western societies. LTC Randy G. Masten, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


John Kampfner presents a timely and provoking thesis in today’s globalized, interconnected world: “Why have [democratic] freedoms been so easily traded in return for security or prosperity?” He takes the reader on a journey through eight different nation-state case studies (Singapore, China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, India, Italy, Britain, and the United States) that inform his thesis. Methods of governing within these nations range from traditional authoritarian tactics to hybrid models that include overt bribery, skilful manipulation, and subliminal fear-mongering of the state’s citizens. Successes and failures of free markets and opportunism combined with new-era threats to the Western way of life have led to a global shifting of opinion about democratic ideals, classic liberties, and individual self-determination. Freedom for Sale provides a lens with which to examine this shift.

Kampfner establishes a metric to evaluate each of the different societies in the case study nations. He describes a pact in which a group of people “are keen to defend a system that requires an almost complete abrogation of freedom of expression in return for a very good normal life.” The reader is offered differing motives of societies to embrace (or at least accept) this pact. These range from the traditional threat (or use) of violent suppression of the society; the second-order effect of globalization, which creates broad opportunism and pursuit of self-satisfaction even in the middle and lower classes within societies; and the willing acceptance of sacrificed liberties in democracies.
such as Britain and the United States resulting from the new-era terror campaign against their way of life. Kampfner’s analysis is most provocative through his use of citizens’ perspectives, creating the dramatic effect of seeing democracy through the eyes of the people. The perspectives challenge one’s thinking about democratic freedoms and their associated costs.

Freedom for Sale is well suited for anyone with an interest in the idea of democracy and its role in the future geopolitical landscape. Kampfner highlights the frictions between Western democratic models that facilitate governance of a society while simultaneously creating, managing, and exploiting the opportunities presented by globalization and the expansion of free markets. This blunt representation of what people are willing to sacrifice for their own benefit leads one to thoughtfully reevaluate his definition of democratic freedoms and reflect on the author’s core question, “what costs are security and prosperity worth?”

LTC Andrew B. Nocks, Retired, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**AMERICA’S CAPTIVES:**
Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror, Paul J. Springer, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2010, 278 pages, $34.95.

Paul Springer’s America’s Captives arrives at a time when public discourse of POW treatment is primed for some true historical analysis of the subject rather than mere opinion. Springer provides a measure of sorely needed historical context for the current debate on the U.S. handling of prisoners during the past nine years.

Unfortunately, the substance of America’s Captives is far too lean. The book is, in essence, a collection of nine short essays on American treatment of POWs in its wars, none of which has sufficient depth. For example, Springer devotes a total of 12 pages to the Mexican War and attempts to fully address the weighty issue of POW treatment in the Korean War in a mere 15. Even the book’s most substantial chapter on the American Civil War provides minimal detail on issues such as the prisoner exchange cartel and the contents of the Lieber Code, and offers almost no explanation as to why most military prisons in the North and the South became overwhelmed, why some did not, and what could have been done differently given the strategic and operational situation by 1864. The biggest problem with this broad-yet-shallow brush approach is that the voices of those charged with organizing and overseeing POW systems and facilities are virtually nonexistent. In order to prove, as Springer claims, that the United States has a habit of delinquency when it comes to dealing with enemy POWs, those voices need to be heard.

Another issue with America’s Captives is that it does not illustrate the negative impact, if any, that the improvisational approach toward POWs had on the outcome of America’s wars. Springer concludes the U.S. needs to break the habit of unpreparedness in handling POWs, but he does not provide a compelling lesson from history as reason to do so (the recent embarrassment of Abu Ghraib is not enough). Springer himself admits that it is “unrealistic” to expect U.S. military planners to make POW operations a priority in planning for future wars. If so, the reader may well agree that the U.S. military has always tended to improvise when dealing with prisoners, yet still be inclined to ask, “So what?”

None of these shortcomings negate the fact that America’s Captives is an important study for military officials and historians alike. Springer’s argument about the American propensity to ignore the POW problem is most likely correct, but is not as compelling as it could be.

MAJ Clay Mountcastle, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**THE INSURGENT ARCHIPELAGO:**

For many who have engaged insurgents over the last few years, a fundamental question may have emerged. Why did the U.S. initially seem so unprepared for this enemy? Insurgency is nothing new for us; what understanding can we apply to our current situation from past experiences? John Mackinlay sets out to answer those questions with a unique perspective: he served in the British Army with the Gurkhas in the 1960s, then as a United Nations researcher. Mackinlay’s background enabled him to observe the steady evolution of insurgency over the years from the Maoist model he first encountered as a young British officer to the post-Maoist model we face today. Thus, this history blends the academic discussion of insurgency with a practical flavor—especially when Mackinlay discusses how to proceed against the future challenges of global insurgency.

In The Insurgent Archipelago, Mackinlay chronicles the evolution of Maoist insurgency through the 20th century into the 21st. In the Maoist model, insurgency targeted the disaffected population through the use of a “carefully organized clandestine, fragile and linear structure . . . [that was] vulnerable and could be interdicted.” The post-Maoist model is almost the opposite of the Maoist one, “more informal, almost chaotic.” The differences between these two types of insurgency are so significant it is difficult to see how one evolved from the other, but Mackinlay expertly pilots the reader through the intricacies of their similarities and differences.

An archipelago is a chain of islands connected tectonically; similarly, various insurgencies are connected in ways not always apparent at first glance. As so many other human endeavors have benefited from improved global communications, so has insurgency, changing its nature in the process. Mackinlay describes
masses of disaffected populations connected by the internet and globalized media and inflamed by propaganda. These populations are unified by a common interest that is more ideological and less tied to territory and therefore harder to interdict. The chapters discussing expeditionary versus domestic approaches to insurgency are especially enlightening, comparing the U.S. approach with those of our partners in Britain and Europe.

The Insurgent Archipelago should be read by Department of Defense personnel and anyone interested in domestic strategies that deal with insurgency within our borders. For Soldier and civilian alike, Mackinlay skillfully describes the complexities and challenges of global insurgency, presenting examples of what has worked and what has not. This book is especially pertinent since it discusses the emerging trend of global insurgents employing the internet. The Insurgent Archipelago is an excellent addition to any military or civilian library.

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In 1995 former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara published his controversial memoir, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, a publication that stoked passions of the Vietnam War that many thought Operation Desert Storm had put to rest. The memoir also stoked the passion of McNamara’s counterpart, McGeorge Bundy, who determined that he finally needed to consider his own influential role in the conflict.

Bundy hired Gordon Goldstein, a scholar in international affairs and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, to help him write a memoir of his experiences as national security advisor. He sought to answer two questions in his book: “How did the ‘tragedy’ of the Vietnam War come to pass?” and “What guidance can it provide for the future?” Just a year later, Bundy passed away before he could finish a manuscript; however, the death did not deter Goldstein. Instead, he crafted a purpose distinct from Bundy’s, though just as important—to discern the “pivotal lessons of Bundy’s performance as national security advisor.” The result, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam, is a crucial addition to the scholarship of civil-military relations during the Vietnam War.

Lessons in Disaster provides readers with a concise, yet deeply informative, analysis of the major deliberations regarding Vietnam within both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Given his relationship to Bundy, Goldstein offers a strikingly impartial and critical examination of Bundy’s role in those deliberations. He centers the text around six lessons in national leadership and policy-making that he derives from his extensive research and interviews with Bundy. Goldstein particularly focuses his analysis on 1964 and 1965; he delineates how during this period the Johnson administration failed to conduct a deliberate evaluation of strategy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, failed to craft a coherent strategy with specific objectives, and failed to communicate truthfully and openly with the American people. He ultimately places much of the failure on Bundy, by detailing his indecisiveness and his failure to coordinate the national security apparatus effectively.

The primary criticism with Lessons in Disaster rests in its final chapter, in which Goldstein focuses on a counterfactual argument—the question of “how [Kennedy] would have confronted the crisis of Vietnam in a second term.” Some readers may dismiss this analysis as hypothetical or revisionist history; others certainly will grapple with the approach. Nevertheless, Goldstein’s approach is academically sound, and the analysis provides an insightful perspective into Kennedy’s views on Southeast Asia, as well as the historical lessons readers may discern by comparing Kennedy’s approach to his successor’s.

In The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam describes McGeorge Bundy as “the brightest light in that glittering constellation around the President.” Bundy epitomized JFK’s “wise men”—a graduate of Groton and Yale, a member of Skull and Bones, the youngest Dean of Faculty in Harvard’s history. Yet, as Gordon Goldstein’s text reveals, this pedigree and intelligence did not transfer into sound leadership and decision making. Given the recent deliberations over national strategy in Afghanistan—particularly the emphasis the president reportedly placed on Lessons in Disaster—Goldstein’s critical analysis of McGeorge Bundy’s actions as national security advisor and the dysfunctional civil-military relationship he oversaw offers today’s readers yet another poignant, prescient caution against both arrogant leadership and strategy with “indeterminate ends.”

MAJ Jeff Gibbons, USA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina


Anatoly Adamishin and Richard Schifter argue that the Cold War ended on 17 January 1989 in Vienna. This is when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced its first concluding document, as part of the implementation of the Helsinki accords, and showed a new spirit of friendship between the USSR and the USA. The authors have a considerable degree of personal experience to support this claim. Adamishin and Schifter were heavily involved in the discussion of human rights between the Soviet and American governments. Adamishin served in a variety of positions in the Soviet diplomatic
services, including deputy foreign minister under Eduard Shevardnadze. Schifter served as assistant secretary of state for human rights from 1985 to 1989 under George Schultz. The two men developed a personal friendship as they worked to improve the state of human rights in the USSR. They argue that small agreements on human rights issues allowed the defusing of Cold War tensions, leading to disarmament, encouraging perestroika, and helping Gorbachev’s reform program.

The book is organized by chronological subject, with the authors contributing essays for each chapter. This leads to an excellent contrast between points of view. While broader issues are certainly discussed, Adamishin and Schifter focus on their personal experiences, recounting their lives and diplomatic careers. Interestingly, Schifter was inclined toward socialism and actively took part in collegiate disputes between brands of communism, but still managed to gain a position in the Reagan administration. Schifter’s personal expertise with communism allowed him to detect the slight changes made toward the end of Brezhnev’s reign and appreciate the significant improvements that Gorbachev could bring.

The book is an interesting, well-written look at the mechanics of the “working level” of diplomacy. The authors repeatedly affirm that “the devil is in the details” in diplomatic agreements, and it is the working out of solutions within the confines set by political leadership that enables progress. They also look at some of the failings made by Russia and the United States in the immediate post-Soviet era. Adamishin mourns the fall of Gorbachev and feels that Russia would have fared better if Yeltsin had not risen to power. Schifter wishes that the first Bush administration had been more supportive of perestroika and Russian economic recovery.

The real value of this book is in its discussion of human rights and the ability of external prodding to assist internal reform. Many of the requests made by President Reagan, Secretary Schultz, Schifter, and others were advocated by reformers within the Soviet Union. External prodding allowed interested Soviet officials to reform psychiatric confinement, internal exile, and Jewish emigration. While these human rights issues were not as significant as the economic and political failures of the Soviet Union, they allowed some change within the system, giving Gorbachev more room to maneuver and unintentionally destroy the Soviet Union.

John E. Fahey, Fairfax, Virginia


In this biography of Fleet Admiral “Bull” Halsey, John Wukovits has produced a fast-paced historical opus that reads like an adventure novel. Access to the Halsey family and previously unpublished reflections from the admiral’s personal memoirs and letters ensure an authoritative and credible read.

Halsey, who held senior level naval commands in the Pacific from Pearl Harbor to the Japanese surrender, is described as the consummate combat commander, the beau ideal of the warrior ethos. He was an offensive-minded, aggressive warfighter, who boldly sought to engage the enemy. The admiral’s mantra was, “Kill Japs, kill Japs, and kill more Japs,” and “Hit hard, hit fast, and hit often.” His combative spirit and inspiring quotes made him the darling of the press. The Associated Press reported that Europe had Patton; the Pacific had William “the Bull” Halsey. His positive relations with the media and his successful offensive actions in early 1942 made him an iconic, real-time hero back home in America.

The author provides a balanced assessment of the admiral. Halsey smoked, cussed, appreciated Scotch, and in the tradition of naval aviators, enjoyed a good time. He made some significant errors in judgment that the book objectively examines. The blunder which most seriously damaged Halsey’s reputation occurred in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In pursuit of Admiral Ozawa’s carriers, Halsey left the San Bernadino Straits unprotected. This jeopardized the invasion beaches and resulted in significant battle damage to Admiral Kincaid’s 7th Fleet. Twice during the war, Admiral Halsey’s decisions resulted in his fleet being in the path of killer typhoons. The outcome was several sunk and damaged ships as well as the loss of over 800 men and 200 aircraft. The courts of inquiry for each event faulted Halsey’s judgment.

In addition to its historical significance, the book’s value lies in its lessons for organizational leaders. Its level of detail makes it a potential leadership textbook. As noted, Halsey had faults, but also possessed considerable leadership strengths. He was decisive and action-oriented, readily accepting responsibility. He deeply cared for those who served in his command and treated them fairly. This inspired deep loyalty and respect. He endorsed aggressive training and recognition programs. Significantly, he was very successful in developing harmonious relations with the media, the Army and Marines, and the theater’s Allies. He was also an example of how a strength can become a liability. At Leyte, his aggressive nature motivated him to go after the Japanese carriers. In so doing, he completely ignored his secondary mission of providing security for the invasion fleet.

The book should be read not only by those interested in military history but also practicing leaders who want to capture what is called the “Spirit of the Bull.”

Gene Klann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In his preface, H. Paul Jeffers speculates that “most Americans, if asked if they have ever heard of General Joe Collins, are likely to
reply with a puzzled look, ‘General Joe who?’” Jeffers seeks to answer that question with the publication of Taking Command. Dubbing his work the “first biography” of Collins, Jeffers draws on “official military histories and records, field orders, situation reports, letters, memoranda, Collins’ autobiography, memoirs of other World War II generals, press accounts of the war, and official histories of the conflict” to describe Collins’ contributions that spanned four decades of public service.

As the full title of his biography would indicate, Jeffers focuses much of his presentation on Collins’ World War II record. After summarizing the general’s early life from birth through late 1941, Jeffers devotes over two-thirds of the biography to Collins’ rise from colonel to lieutenant general and commander of VII Corps through 1945. Serving first in the Pacific as commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division, “Lightning Joe” led the unit’s effort to dispatch organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal. Reassigned to the European Theater of Operations by early 1944, Collins took command of VII Corps in February. Jeffers recounts many of the major operations that Allied forces, including VII Corps, executed to end the war by May 1945. In describing these operations, Jeffers occasionally pursues the details of these actions and departs from his biographical subject.

Jeffers devotes the last quarter of the biography to the general’s service in senior positions during the post-war period, the Korean War, and the early stages of American involvement in Vietnam. One learns of the challenges Collins faced as the Army’s chief of public information, vice chief of staff, chief of staff, member of NATO’s Standing Group, and special representative of the United States in Vietnam. Jeffers reveals the influence that Eisenhower had on Collins’ advancement.

Although clearly not the focus of Jeffers’ biography, the post-war contributions of General Collins warrant more scrutiny and detail. While the author discovered little contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts of Collins during World War II, “there was an explosion of coverage of him as the army chief of staff during the Korean War and as Eisenhower’s envoy to Saigon in 1954.” The book’s bibliography suggests that many of those resources remain untapped. Additionally, the biography’s lack of documentation—no footnotes or endnotes—does little to encourage more research in the references cited by the author.

To those who would raise the question “General Joe who?” Taking Command may serve as a start point. A reader would then be advised to pick up General Collins’ Lightning Joe: An Autobiography, a reference Jeffers draws upon extensively.

Stephen D. Coats, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


John Mosier’s Deathride dispels two of the most enduring myths of the war on the Eastern Front during World War II. The first myth is that Hitler underestimated the Russians’ ability to absorb the blitzkrieg by his mechanized forces. The second myth is that the Russians could take massive casualties and still be able to function. Both are proven to be propaganda that Stalin created and continued to repeat throughout the war.

Mosier dispels the first myth by showing that Hitler constantly pushed deep into Russia to capture the main Russian force before it could retreat into the interior of the vast Russian steppes. Mosier argues that Hitler saw the key to defeating the Eastern front was to smash the whole of the Russian Army and seize the resource rich areas of the Ukraine (the bread basket of Russia), the Caucasus (oil), and the fertile land of the Don and Volga rivers. Hitler believed that if he could prevent the natural resources from reaching Russian industry, the Russian military effort would collapse. The German general staff, however, did not agree with Hitler’s logic and felt the capture of Moscow and Leningrad would defeat the Russians.

Mosier dispels the second myth by discussing Russia’s reputed 20 million Red Army casualties. Research supports the actual figure is closer to 33 million. It is unfathomable that the Russians could train and equip an army absorbing these kinds of casualties. Figures indicate that with so many new recruits, the only form of maneuver available was a frontal attack, which was easy to control but costly in casualties.

Deathride’s research and documentation sets it apart from other books on the subject. Its only drawback is that sometimes the numbers still do not add up. For instance, if the Russians lost 4.3 million in 1941 and had almost 3 million captured, and the rule of thumb is three wounded in action for every KIA, how did the Russians have anyone left in uniform with over 15 million casualties? As Mosier points out, no matter what the real numbers are, the Russians were at the bottom of the manpower barrel during the last months of the war.

Mosier argues that Hitler could have set the conditions to cut off the Russian war machine from natural resources, and this—coupled with enormous casualties—shows how close Hitler came to defeating the Russian Army. Deathride is the first of many books based on former Soviet Union archives. The book is a great start to a more academically rigorous study of the Eastern front during World War II.

LTC Richard S. Vick, Jr.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Although there is no official study of American participation in World War I, the bookshelves are full of works on the causes and consequences of the war, individual battles, the home front, prisoners of war, and more. Bodies of War is the first work to address U.S. memorials, cemeteries, and other means of remembering those who died in the war.

Nothing was inevitable about the way Americans chose to remember. Many actions were ad hoc or based on inappropriate precedent. Some nations leave the dead where they die, others bring them home. Based on the Civil War practice, the United States gave the next of kin the choice. Half chose to bring bodies home, half left them in Europe. In the war theater, the U.S. was slow to decide whether to leave decayed bodies and makeshift memorials at the battle sites or to build elaborate tourist-attracting cemeteries and monuments. The result was a divided focus for remembrance and mourning.

Among topics treated in Bodies of War are graves registration, the monument commission and the debate over monuments and cemeteries, the trips to the cemeteries and memorials by Gold Star Mothers, and the neglect of black Soldiers and their next of kin. American decisions are shown arising from previous postwar practices. The American approach is contrasted with those of European nations with many more casualties.

Budreau, a historian at the Army Surgeon General’s office, addresses serious questions about the ways in which we deal with our war dead, the ways we choose to remember them, and the ways we select those we memorialize and those we ignore. Money and politics and absentmindedness have all played a role in establishing a policy for burial and memorial. Some decisions are the product of haste, others of prejudice. All determine how we remember.

The United States decided between 1917 and 1929 to sanitize the process, to honor a sacrificed hero rather than transport and grieve over a body. There were no memorials to the sons and husbands who came back invalids. Nor were there remembrances of military women and minorities.

None of these choices was inevitable, and none is a mandatory precedent for subsequent wars. In wars to come, remembrance will again be negotiated ground, influenced by choices made before.

War kills, and the living have to deal with their dead. Bodies of War reminds us of that. The book deserves a wide audience, particularly among those destined to fight tomorrow’s wars.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas

What was the biggest lie you ever told? Did it put you on a forefront of one of the most significant revolutions in the past century? Homer Lea’s did. The five-foot-three-inch hunchback who weighed only 100 pounds and dropped out of Stanford College managed to convince high-ranking Chinese officials that he was not only a military expert but also the relative of the famous Confederate General Robert E. Lee. With this proclamation, he found himself poised on the brink of immense change in the Chinese government, a position that would eventually lead to his tenure as the principal foreign advisor during the 1911 Chinese Republican revolution.

From the Publisher.


In recent years, scholars in international relations and other fields have begun to conceive of security more broadly, moving away from a state-centered concept of national security toward the idea of human security, which emphasizes the individual and human well-being. Viewing global environmental change through the lens of human security connects such problems as melting ice caps and carbon emissions to poverty, vulnerability, equity, and conflict. This book examines the complex social, health, and economic consequences of environmental change across the globe.

From the Publisher.


The Vietnam War: A Chronology of War is a richly detailed, day-by-day history of the significant Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force events from the Vietnam War, from the pre-war role of military advisors to the 1975 fall of Saigon. Each entry is full of historical information and identifies the date, location, and military units involved, while introductory essays place these events within the context of the overall conflict. This encyclopedic account of the history of the Vietnam War comes to life with original photos and colorful art from the collections of all four services and military artists. With a foreword by U.S. Senator Jim Webb, a distinguished Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, this volume includes one of the most powerful voices from this often-unsung generation of servicemen and women.

From the Publisher.