



# Local Governance and COIN in Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008

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*The views represented in this paper are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. State Department or the U.S. Government.*

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PHOTO: Members of Task Force Spartan, 10th Mountain Division, and the local provincial government are escorted to their awaiting vehicles by members of Second Platoon, Delta Company, 102nd Infantry Division and soldiers from the Afghanistan National Army after a meeting in the Kunar Province, Afghanistan, 30 August 2006. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Joey L. Suggs)

**T**HIS ARTICLE EXAMINES local governance at the provincial, district, and municipal levels in the area of Afghanistan covered by Regional Command-East from 2004 to 2008. It reviews how local governance related to counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and operations; how governance evolved at the national level, particularly with the establishment of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance in 2007; and how changes in the national laws may have an impact on counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency strategy in the U.S.-led Regional Command-East had three main components, or “pillars”—security, development assistance, and local governance. Of these, security, mostly building up the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and taking active measures against various insurgent groups, received by far the greatest effort and resources.

Development assistance, such as building new or improving existing roads, schools, health clinics, irrigation systems, and the institutions to support them, also received considerable resources, primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development and Commander's Emergency Response Program projects.

The third pillar, local governance, made progress during this period, but did not receive as many resources as the other two pillars. In part, this was the result of an imbalance between civilian and military capacity in Regional Command-East, with the military vastly overshadowing the civilian presence, both U.S. and international, including the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. The situation also reflected a limited Afghan ability to absorb assistance, as many of the local government institutions had atrophied over the years of war. It was also the result of the priorities in the fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups, with establishment of adequate security necessary before civil institutions could take root. Building local governance was inherently a slow process. Decades of war had reduced the pool of civil servants, many of whom had migrated to Pakistan or other countries.

A decimated education system made it difficult to produce trained local leaders. Added to this was the lack of infrastructure; in 2004, most governors occupied physical compounds, but they lacked basic equipment and staff. At the district level, conditions were worse.

## Overview

Regional Command-East is the American-led military area along the border with Pakistan, from Pakitka Province in the west to Nuristan Province in the east, then north to the Hindu Kush Mountain Range. In 2004, only one brigade, supported by a logistical aviation hub at Bagram Air Base, covered the 13 provinces of Regional Command-East. By 2008, there were three brigades assigned to the area, and provincial reconstruction teams were present in all provinces (although one team covered both Kapisa and Parwan provinces).

The general structure of local governance was established over years, particularly prior to the Soviet invasion, and was defined through law; in practice, however, it was often ad hoc and varied considerably between and within provinces. The relationship between the central government in Kabul and the provinces was not always clear and often depended on personal relationships.

At the top of the local political hierarchy were the provincial governments, headed by governors, whom Kabul appointed directly for open-ended terms. Parallel to the provincial governments were the ministries, whose representatives reported to Kabul.

The district governors (also referred to by U.S. forces as sub-governors), the only officials the majority of Afghans ever met, were on the bottom rung of governance. Municipal government was ill defined in many ways, covering both urban and rural areas of varying sizes.

Elections in the fall of 2005 chose members of the provincial councils, as well as members of the *wolesi jirga* (the lower house); members of the *meshrano jirga* (upper house) were indirectly elected.

## Critical Role of Governors

While local Afghan politics is complex, with many formal and informal players, the governor was in most cases the most important political actor in a province. President Hamid Karzai directly appointed governors, and to some extent, the governor was Karzai's "envoy" in the province. However, the governor's power varied, depending on his access to funding, his influence with tribes



President Hamid Karzai of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan walks towards the governor's compound with village elders and local government officials from Kunar Province, 18 May 2006.

U.S. Army photo by SPC Michael Zuk

and business groups, his lineage (family history often carried weight), his role in the fight against the Soviets, his ties with the Kabul government, and his speaking and leadership abilities.

Governors were the chief political contacts for coalition military and political officers from 2004 to 2008. They played a key role in the success (or failure) of counterinsurgency efforts at the provincial level. Conversely, support from coalition officials was often critical to the success (and to some extent, the survival) of governors. In Regional Command-East, coalition officers met almost daily with provincial governors to discuss events, coordinate development projects, review security efforts, plan for upcoming VIP visits, review policy guidance from Kabul, or examine potential points of friction in local society.

Several governors in Regional Command-East were successful, notably Mangal (as governor of both Paktika and Laghman), Jamal in Khost, Wahidi in Konar, and Taniwal in Pakita (until his assassination by the Taliban). These governors established reputations for honesty, strong leadership, the ability to work well with the local tribes, physical courage, and ties to Karzai. Through their popular support, they opened opportunities for provincial reconstruction teams and maneuver units to engage more with the people, move additional development funding into communities, and push back against insurgents (particularly those from outside of the provinces.) These governors depended heavily on the United States to provide security and development assistance, while U.S. forces depended on the governors to manage the complex politics of their provinces.

Given the internal divisions in many Afghan provinces, governors played an important role in resolving or reducing tribal or ethnic disputes. For example, Ghazni Province includes Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, and during warmer months, nomadic Kuchis. Their ethnic differences have historically led to considerable friction, which a skilled governor can help minimize. Tribal and sub-tribal disputes

over land or historic grievances are also potential flashpoints, and the Taliban uses these disputes to their tactical advantage, as they did in the 1990s when they took over much of the country.

Some governors were important in solving problems that occurred when foreigners interacted with Afghan society. These problems ranged from the benign, such as cultural misunderstandings, to the important, such as crops and property damage during raids, to the critical, when air strikes mistakenly killed civilians. The governors had to walk a fine line between getting the truth out (the Taliban had become expert at distorting the truth regarding coalition attacks) and not appearing biased in favor of outsiders.

In a larger sense, the governors played a critical role in strategic communications, given the cultural complexities, the difficulty of learning Afghan languages, the deep-seated suspicions towards outsiders, and Taliban disinformation campaigns. Low literacy rates and the isolation of many rural communities made this task even harder. However, many of the governors were impressive public speakers and capably presented the provincial and national government's views and supported coalition efforts. Radio networks helped the government connect with the population, and large *shuras* assemblies presented similar opportunities. For example, in 2007 hundreds of tribal elders attended a shura in Paktika Province, giving Governor Khpalwak a chance to reach much of the province, directly or indirectly.

Governors also played an important role in communicating with decision makers and populations in International Security Assistance Force home countries. For example, the U.S. Embassy sponsored several successful trips by delegations of governors to the United States and Europe, where they presented the "ground truth" of their provinces and described the repressive and violent nature of the Taliban insurgency. This was especially important in Europe, where public support for International Security Assistance Force efforts in

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Afghanistan was often shaky. Some governors were also effective in briefing visiting officials, including U.S. congressional delegations.

Several governors played an important part in the 2005 parliament and provincial council elections. They helped organize the elections and explained to a population largely unfamiliar with elections and democracy what the elections were about, why they needed to participate, and what to expect from their representatives after the elections. As Afghanistan looks to future rounds of elections, the governors could play this role again.

## Coalition Support to Governors

Brigades, provincial reconstruction teams, and battalions helped the governors overcome various obstacles. For example, brigades hosted regional governors' conferences that brought together governors, their staffs, Kabul-based officials, and provincial security officials to discuss security and development issues. These conferences were useful in comparing notes, increasing communication

between governors, and developing regional policies and projects. They also presented opportunities for press briefings. Some provincial reconstruction teams took the lead in arranging for governors to travel to Kabul to meet with embassy and government officials and donor agencies such as the World Bank. The meetings helped the governors better understand the often-complex world of international assistance, while giving donors insights from the field.

Coalition efforts helped governors succeed in other ways. Governors often took credit for coalition-funded development projects, which increased their standing among the people. In more dangerous provinces, military assets—including convoys and helicopters—provided mobility for government officials, and the provincial reconstructions teams helped fund some governors' staffs and train them in basic administrative tasks. The provincial coordination centers, established with coalition support as "911" centers of a sort, gave citizens points of contact for Afghan security forces. Provincial reconstruction team officers, in particular, acted as neutral advisors—giving governors advice that they might not get from locals with personal agendas—while also giving some governors warnings when corruption, favoritism, or bad policy decisions threatened to undermine their credibility with the local population.

## Governors as a COIN Liability

Being an Afghan governor during this period was a daunting task, as many provinces had fractured societies, dire poverty, no infrastructure, and active insurgencies. Some governors were not up to the task. The governor of Ghazni, newly appointed in the spring of 2008, had difficulties running his large, ethnically divided and often-violent province and was soon replaced. Counterinsurgency efforts in Ghazni suffered due to the weak administration under this governor and the lack of continuity as governors changed. The long-term absence of many governors from their provinces was a recurring problem, as they spent weeks or months in Kabul or overseas. (One governor in Regional Command-East was relieved for this reason in early 2008.) This was particularly troublesome when their reluctance to delegate authority to deputies caused provincial administration to grind to a halt. Other governors suffered from lack of legitimacy because they



U.S. Air Force, SSgt Joshua T. Jasper

An Afghan engineer talks with U.S. Air Force CPT Paul Frantz of the Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team, 6 November 2007.

had played a particularly bloody role in previous fighting in Afghanistan, or they favored one tribal or ethnic group over another. Some had no resources to provide basic services or got little or no support from Kabul.

Corrupt governors were one of the biggest obstacles to long-term coalition success in Regional Command-East, undercutting counterinsurgency efforts, in some cases severely. For example, between 2004 and 2005, the local population in Konar believed that the governor and some provincial security chiefs misappropriated government funds and engaged in smuggling of timber and gemstones. During the same period, the locals saw the governor of Khost Province enriching himself through the sale of publicly owned land. These governors decreased the legitimacy of the Afghan government, provided openings for the Taliban to increase its influence, and almost certainly reduced the credibility of the coalition forces who worked with them.

Corruption of Afghan officials was a central, recurring theme in conversations with locals during this period. Afghans expected coalition forces to end corruption among provincial officials and were not at all understanding when this did not happen. They assumed that the coalition lacked the will to counter corrupt officials, or worse, that the coalition accepted the corruption. In fact, both Department of Defense and State officers confronted provincial officials with charges of corruption when they had compelling evidence of its practice, and this may have modified behavior in some cases. At the same time, mullahs, business groups, and later provincial councils continued to publicly and privately accuse provincial officials of corruption. Not all of the corruption at the provincial level was destined for the officials' own pockets: some governors used illegal tolls on highways and border crossings to fund projects and the day-to-day running of their governments.

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## **Lack of Human Resources**

Afghanistan lacks the human capital to fill all governor slots adequately, and Kabul had to scramble to find good candidates willing to work in difficult and dangerous provinces. In some cases, governors had to stay on longer than they wished or to the point of exhaustion. Several governors told me they wanted to leave their posts, but President Karzai had asked them not to. Weak or absent staff support and the lack of facilities or security for the governors' families made the situation worse. In addition, many governors had conflicts or rivalries with other officials in their province, some of whom reported directly to superiors in Kabul, not to the governors.

## **District Governance**

Subordinate to the provincial level of governance are the districts, headed by district governors (also called sub-governors). By law, Kabul appoints district governors, but in practice the provincial governors appointed many of them during the period from 2004 to 2008. In Regional Command-East, district governance varied from being effective to almost nonexistent, and in most cases the district governors struggled with inadequate funding and staffing. The district governor was important because he was the only official presence many Afghans came in contact with, and he and his staff determined how a rural country perceived the government. In most cases, the district centers also had a district police chief. Ministries and judicial authorities were also present in some districts.

The district governors often seemed to merely react to what was happening in their districts, rather than work to accomplish a list of tasks. According to governance advisors Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon, the district governor's responsibilities often included "dispute resolution and other problem-solving activities depending on relations with the provincial authorities and local, customary, and informal power-holders."<sup>1</sup>

## **Security and District Governance**

From 2004 to 2008, the availability of resources, the level of security, and the insurgent threat determined district government effectiveness. Security also affected the coalition's ability to support district governance; within Regional Command-East,

the ability of insurgents to hinder district governance ranged from negligible in Bamian Province to very significant in Nuristan, Konar, Khost, and Paktika Provinces.

The coalition reacted to security conditions at the district level with a variety of responses. In 2004 in Paktika Province, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Walter Piatt, deployed groups of soldiers, usually led by captains, to district centers for weeks at a time. This provided enough security for the nascent district governments to begin to take root, gave the officers an opportunity to mentor and work with Afghan officials, and provided U.S. forces a good picture of what was happening on the ground. This program worked in part because the insurgent groups were only just organizing in Paktika. (In contrast, when British forces in Helmand Province first deployed to district centers, Taliban forces quickly pinned them down, and they faced considerable logistical challenges.) The Bermel district of Paktika, across from Pakistan's South Waziristan Agency, suffered from constant attacks; insurgents had twice overrun the district government. To counter this, in 2005 the U.S. 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, based in Paktika Province, established a firebase that also served as the district center.<sup>2</sup>

The security situation in Khost Province gradually worsened from 2004 to 2008, as insurgent groups, particularly the Haqqani Network, increased their capabilities. Initially, civil affairs team members from the provincial reconstruction team and company commanders from the maneuver battalion based in Khost supported district officials by visiting their compounds during daylong patrols. By 2007, the security situation dictated that most of the district centers be fortified and guarded by soldiers and police. In parts of Konar and Nuristan provinces, particularly the Pesh, Korangal, and Waygal valleys, localized insurgencies were strong, hindering the growth of local governance and even threatening firebases. An insurgent attack on Wanat in July of 2008 left nine U.S. soldiers dead.

On the other hand, security in Nangarhar Province improved so much that by 2008 Afghan security forces took over much of the responsibility for the province. District-level governance expanded due to the efforts of the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team and a special troops battalion, which ran

forward operating bases and patrol bases in several of the districts.

## Shortcomings and Suggestions

While State Department political officers posted to the provincial reconstruction teams and the brigades visited the district centers, their limited numbers meant that most support went to provincial governments. More civilian focus at the district level later bore fruit. (In 2009, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul posted officers at the district level.)

Elections of district governors have been under consideration several times but have not yet occurred. During the 2005 provincial elections, the international community judged that holding simultaneous district level elections made the mechanics of the elections too complicated. District governor appointments were sometimes handed out as favors, and some appointees reportedly enriched themselves in districts with smuggling routes.

Putting mechanisms in place to adequately fund and resource district governance would help COIN efforts, as would training civil servants to administer this layer of government. The Indian government's initiative in 2008 to train 500 Afghan civil servants was a good beginning.

## Additional Institutions

Provincial councils and the municipalities are two other layers of local governance, although coalition forces often worked with them less frequently than with the governors and district governors. Elections in September 2005 chose members of parliament and provincial councils. The councils' first task was to pick one of their members for the *meshrano jirga*. Beyond this task, their job was less defined; involvement in developmental planning, environmental protection, and evaluating provincial government seemed to be common themes.<sup>3</sup> Limited funding also hindered their effectiveness.

## Independent Directorate for Local Governance

The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) was established in August 2007 by Afghan presidential decree, with the mandate to "consolidate and stabilize, achieve development and equitable economic growth, and to achieve improvements in service delivery through just, democratic processes

and institutions of governance at the sub-national level, thus improving the quality of life of Afghan citizens.”<sup>24</sup> The Ministry of Interior had previously been responsible for sub-national governance, but it had acquired a reputation for corruption and inefficiency. Nationwide, the IDLG inherited more than 10,000 employees of varying quality and abilities; however, its core staff—those formulating and implementing national policy—appeared to number less than 100 in the spring of 2008.

The IDLG represented a fundamental shift in how Kabul administered local governance, and it had immediate implications for COIN strategy in Regional Command-East. The directorate took a much more vigorous approach to managing local governance than the Ministry of Interior had. At the same time, IDLG officers began to assert themselves as the supervisors of local officials. They demanded a say in how provincial reconstruction teams, battalions, and brigade staffs related to local governments, and asked that Kabul be informed of coalition interactions with provincial officials.

With considerable support from President Karzai and the international community, the IDLG began an ambitious program to overhaul governance at

the provincial, district, and municipal levels. It also began increasing its influence in Kabul and improving coordination with other ministries, some of which had considerable stakes in local governance. An important step forward was the development of the “Five Year Strategic Work Plan” in April of 2008. The plan outlined general goals, including policy development, institution building, and broader governance, nested within the overarching Afghan National Development Strategy. A coherent and realistic document conceived with support from international advisors, the plan laid out a blueprint for local governance and described areas where donors could provide financial and technical assistance.

## Challenges Facing the Independent Directorate

As with all previous Afghan governments, the IDLG faced the difficult task of extending its writ to the provinces. This was a daunting task, given the size of Afghanistan and its rugged terrain, harsh winters, and the lack of transportation infrastructure. Additional challenges included limited resources, several governors who acted quite independently, the need to balance complex



U.S. Army. SSGT Isaac A. Graham

Village elders from Paktika and Khowst Provinces of Afghanistan during a meeting on local government, Firebase Wilderness, Paktika Province, 10 September 2007.



political situations at both the national and local levels, and the need for President Karzai to become involved in decision making at the local-governance level. Added to this were very real security considerations for those traveling in parts of the country.

A major hurdle for the IDLG was the lack of trained civil servants, a result of decades of war, of the migration of a significant percentage of the population to other countries, and of an education system that, by 2001, was almost nonexistent. Some of the best governors were those who had returned from overseas, but significant security risks, hardship, and low pay kept others away, a situation even more evident at the district and municipal levels.

In the IDLG's favor was the remarkably rapid expansion of cell phone coverage to many parts of the country and the availability of Internet service in cities, which allowed the directorate to be in almost constant communication with many governors. At the same time, commercial air travel was gradually becoming available for cities such as Herat, and the Afghan military's air wing began flying to more places, allowing IDLG officers to visit the provinces more easily.

Beginning in late 2007, the directorate began a review of provincial governors, removing some of the more corrupt and inefficient ones. Criteria for new governors included loyalty to President Karzai, the ability to work with the local population, administrative and governance capabilities, and the ability to work with the coalition. Some of the newly appointed governors were marked improvements, particularly Wahidi in Konar Province and Amin in Farah Province. One of Afghanistan's best governors, Mangal, was moved to the strategically important province of Helmand. In the spring of 2008, the directorate began reviews of its Kabul staff, as well as mayors and district governors.

## Transfer of Authorities to the Provincial Level

The Independent Directorate for Local Governance, as part of an effort by several ministries, began to redraft local governance laws and policies. This included examining how to devolve power from Kabul to the provinces to give local officials greater budgetary and policy authority. From a COIN

perspective, this had the advantage of making local government more responsive to its constituents, but in Kabul, there was some resistance to giving more budgetary authority to governors, because it could decrease the influence of ministries that channeled funding directly to their offices in the provinces.

This transfer of power to the local level could give more Afghans input into government programs and policies, move decision making to a level where it can adapt to local conditions (an important consideration in a country as diverse as Afghanistan), and persuade people that a government is in place and functioning. It may also be effective in countering Taliban shadow governments in some provinces.

However, compelling historical and practical reasons argue against devolution of power to the provinces. In the past, some governors have become powers unto themselves, with little accountability to Kabul. Others have come under the influence of neighboring countries, or become local warlords or the proxies of local warlords. As noted, governors in some ways act as the Afghan president's envoy to a province, so Kabul has an interest in maintaining control over them, particularly during the run up to elections. History has also shown that Afghanistan has the potential to fracture along ethnic or regional lines, which is an argument for maintaining power in Kabul.

The current constitution leaves open the option of some devolution of power. Article 137 says,

The government, while preserving the principle of centralism, shall delegate certain authorities to local administration units, for the purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social and cultural affairs, and increasing the participation of people in the development of the nation.<sup>5</sup>

An important factor in the long run will be the development of a civil service cadre with enough officers available to run government effectively at the local level. At the same time, a strong center will also

***...compelling historical and practical reasons argue against devolution of power to the provinces.***



need to remain in place to hold Afghanistan together. As World Peace Foundation president Robert Rotburg notes, “Regardless of ethnicity, many Afghan politicians and policymakers from across the country favor a strong central state in order to curb powerful regional figures who often receive support from outside the country, as well as to reduce the danger of criminal influence over local government.”<sup>6</sup>

## Funding Provincial Government

A fundamental problem for Afghan governors was the lack of funding for the day-to-day operation of provincial government and discretionary projects or emergency responses (an important consideration in Afghanistan, with its droughts, floods, and earthquakes). The IDLG approached the international community in early 2008 to help establish a “governor’s fund” to provide money directly to governors with a reputation for honesty and efficiency.

The U.S. military and the provincial reconstruction team office (with access to helicopters and aircraft) helped the IDLG arrange transportation to the provinces (including more remote provinces such as Badghis and Zabul), where provincial officials, who rarely received visitors from the central government, treated the visits as major events. The governors often assembled dozens of provincial leaders, including district governors, provincial council members, security chiefs, and tribal leaders, for roundtable discussions and held smaller meetings focused on governance, security, and development. These trips yielded positive results not only as consultations, but also as demonstrations that the central government was extending its reach to the provinces. Still, a considerable disconnect remained between the center and the provinces, and much work remains to be done in this area.

## Conclusions

As the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual *Counterinsurgency* notes, “Success in counterinsurgency operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support.”<sup>7</sup> By late summer 2008, the overall trend in Regional Command-East was positive. A system of local governance was under construction. However, the government had

not yet achieved legitimacy in many places and was only beginning to develop the ability to address the conditions that allowed the insurgency to gain limited support. Local factors, such as tribal structures and the considerable capabilities of coalition forces, helped prevent insurgent forces from gaining a critical mass of support.

Experience in eastern Afghanistan highlights the following:

- In Regional Command-East, security efforts were foremost and received most of the resources. Whether security, governance, or development should have the lead role was a subject of debate, but governance received the least emphasis of these three COIN pillars during this period.

- The coalition civilian component during this period was numerically inadequate. While many of our political officers were dedicated, competent, and effective, there were not enough of them, and as a result, the governance pillar did not move forward as much as it could have.

- The growth of government in some areas required that the coalition adjust its practices over time. In 2004, the provincial reconstruction teams and battalions had to fill vacuums of governance in some areas, but by 2008, Afghan officials were very much in the lead in some places, and the coalition was playing a reduced role.

- While difficult to document, corruption and the appearance of corruption were endemic in Regional Command-East. This was corrosive to COIN efforts and difficult to counter, given how culturally ingrained it was. The judicial system was struggling, and there appeared to be a lack of will at high levels of the government to confront corruption. On the positive side, Regional Command-East had only limited narcotics trafficking (with the exception of Nangarhar in some years), which reduced the levels of corruption in comparison with Regional Command-South, where the drug trade flourished.

- The security situation in Regional Command-East became markedly worse in the spring of 2005 as insurgent groups became more effective, preventing nongovernmental organizations from having a large presence in border provinces. This not only restricted flows of funds, but also limited access for experts in governance. Coalition officers had to fill this gap.

- A lack of trained civil servants is one of the greatest challenges to achieving adequate local

governance. There is no quick fix to this, but establishing regional civil service academies and providing adequate pay would be a positive step.

- Given the multiple, fundamental challenges to achieving adequate government in Afghanistan, the international community must be prepared for a protracted engagement and design long-term programs.

- Provincial government is also important as a testing ground for the next generation of Afghan national leadership, where leaders can gain experience and develop their political platforms.

- Improved local government will counter Taliban shadow governments. While the presence of a Taliban shadow government in Regional Command-East seemed minimal compared to some provinces in Regional Command-South, gaps in coverage invite an insurgent presence.

- U.S. programs supporting local governments were not always coordinated with programs of the

international community, and vice-versa. This was in part due to the limited presence of international donors in many of the border provinces.

- While the formal structures of local government are established and strengthened, there will still be a need for tribal governance to fill voids in rural areas until the government of Afghanistan expands.

- The government of Afghanistan needs to increase tax revenues to support government bureaucracies and fund services at the local level. At the same time, it should implement mechanisms to punish the misuse of public funds.

- As Afghan security forces strengthen, they will need strong local governments to collaborate with, not only for the immediate needs of counterinsurgency, but also for the long-term stability of their country. Otherwise, a developed Afghan military may be tempted to become involved in the political affairs of the country. **MR**

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#### NOTES

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