The Way the Army Fights Today

We know how to fight today, and we are living the principles of mission command in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, these principles are not yet institutionalized in our doctrine and in our training. They do not “pervade the force.” Until they do, until they drive our leader development, our organizational design, and our materiel acquisitions we cannot consider ourselves ready, and we should not consider ourselves sufficiently adaptable.


The 2008 version of Field Manual (FM) 3-0 initiated a comprehensive change in Army doctrine by capturing the Army’s experience of over seven years of combat and using it to change the way the Army conceptualized operations. It established full spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations—as the central concept of Army capabilities. Over the next two years the Army’s full spectrum operations approach was validated in the crucible of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Change 1 to FM 3-0 builds on the tenets of this approach to increase the Army’s operational adaptability by having the concept of mission command (MC) replace “battle command” as an activity and replace “command and control” as a warfighting function. During nearly a decade of war, both the operational environment and how the Army operates in it have changed. This article highlights MC and other major changes in Change 1 to FM 3-0 to account for the changes in the operational environment and how we operate in it. This is the critical first step in institutionalizing these changes so they can pervade the force.

Operational Environment and Hybrid Threats

Combat experience and intelligence assessments often focus on hybrid threats that combine in a decentralized manner the characteristics of conventional and unconventional forces, terrorists, and criminals. Although the 2008 version of FM 3-0 did not discuss hybrid threats by that name, it included their characteristics, and these characteristics have now become the norm.
To combat this threat, the Army is decentralizing its capabilities and conducting operations in a more distributed fashion. The operations take place in a complex and fluid environment and require leaders who not only accept but also seek adaptability and embrace it as an imperative. To enable leaders at all levels to succeed in this environment, the Army has determined that the term “mission command” is a better description of how we must approach the art of command and the science of control on the 21st century battlefield.

**Mission Command**

Mission command emphasizes the importance of context and using disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to manage transitions among offensive, defensive, and stability operations and between centralized and decentralized operations. Mission command emphasizes that the leader must understand, visualize, decide, direct, lead, and assess.

In previous versions of FM 3-0, the term “battle command” recognized the need to apply leadership to “translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions.” However, the terms “battle command” and “command and control” do not adequately address the increasing need for the commander to frequently frame and reframe an environment of ill-structured problems. The terms “battle command” and “command and control” also do not adequately address the commander’s role in team building with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. However, mission command suggests the critical role leaders at every echelon play in contributing to a shared understanding of the operational context.

By emphasizing mission command as an activity, Change 1 to FM 3-0 reinforces the central role of commanders, at all levels. Whereas the 2008 edition of FM 3-0 referred to mission command as the “preferred method for executing command and control,” mission command is now seen as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission.
control,” Change 1 defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations. Commander led, and blending the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission, mission command focuses on the human dimension of operations instead of processes and technological solutions.

Figure 1 shows commander’s tasks that must be accomplished while executing the art of command to develop an adaptable force. Commanders must understand their higher commander’s intent, the authority to act, and the technical systems needed to support their actions. Commanders must also be able to form high-performing teams with a broad range of Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.

Figure 1 also highlights staff tasks that integrate previously stove-piped capabilities. Change 1 of FM 3-0 increases the use of knowledge management and information management. It introduces the evolved concepts of “inform and influence activities” and “cyber/electromagnetic activities.

Operational Art and Design
Leaders and forces base their adaptability on critical thinking, their comfort with ambiguity, their willingness to accept prudent risk, and their ability to adjust rapidly to a continuously evolving environment. The 2010 edition of FM 5-0 introduced “Design” into Army doctrine. Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and foster innovative approaches. Design underpins the commander’s role in leading innovative, adaptive efforts throughout the operations process. Understanding the operational environment enables commanders to anticipate and manage transitions and accept risks to create opportunities. Change 1 to FM 3-0 incorporates design as a critical part of mission command.

Inform and Influence and Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities
Change 1 to FM 3-0 replaces the five Army information tasks with inform and influence activities (IIA) and cyber/electromagnetic (C/EM) activities. This represents an evolutionary change in how the Army views information with roots in Joint and Army doctrine. The Joint construct of information operations focuses on adversaries and is organized around capabilities. Earlier versions of FM 3-0 and FM 3-13, Information Operations, used this Joint construct. The 2008 FM 3-0 revised how the Army viewed information operations by describing five information tasks—information engagement, command and control warfare, information protection, operations security, and military deception. Change 1 to FM 3-0 has adopted the IIA and C/EM activities frameworks because Army forces today operate in and among the population, and such operations are significantly different from land operations and those in other domains.

The Army IIA construct emphasizes the commander’s personal involvement in developing themes and messages as an essential part of the operations process. Commanders directly involve themselves in developing themes and messages that inform and influence actors and audiences in a dynamic environment. Inform and influence activities employ cooperative, persuasive, and coercive means to assist and support Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to protect and reassure populations and isolate and defeat enemies. Cyber/Electromagnetics activities exert technical influence to protect friendly information and communications while disrupting the enemy’s ability to manipulate and move information.

Mission command uses IIA and C/EM to shape the operational environment.

Mission Command as a Warfighting Function
As aforementioned, Change 1 to FM 3-0 supplants “command and control” with mission command as a warfighting function (Figure 2). Over time,
command and control became nearly synonymous with the technical aspects of the network, often at the expense of the human dimension. In addition, the term “command and control” is inadequate to describe the role of the commander and staff in today’s fight. Mission command, as both the activity and the warfighting function, more accurately captures the commander’s role in warfighting.

**Other Changes**

Two other revisions of note in Change 1 to FM 3-0 include new characterizations of the spectrum of conflict and security force assistance. These are described below.

**Spectrum of conflict.** While it retains the spectrum of conflict with levels of violence ranging from “stable peace” to “general war,” Change 1 to FM 3-0 drops the intermediate points on the spectrum “unstable peace” and “insurgency”; however, it retains the five operational themes and includes Joint “types of operations and related activities” within the discussion of operational themes. Change 1 further develops the discussion of major combat operations.

**Security force assistance.** Change 1 to FM 3-0 emphasizes the increasing importance of security force assistance (SFA) missions. Both the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) and the *Army Capstone Concept* identify security force assistance as a critical requirement for the foreseeable future. The *Quadrennial Defense Review* states, “Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be SFA missions: ‘hands on’ efforts conducted primarily in host countries to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces . . . .”

The *Army Capstone Concept* states, “Security force assistance is essential to stability operations, countering irregular threats, preventing conflicts, and facilitating security transitions.” Recent experience reinforces the findings in the QDR. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts require a substantial commitment of conventional forces for SFA, and it is forecast that Army forces will remain heavily committed to SFA missions in the emerging security environment.
Implications for the Force

Change 1 to FM 3-0 requires educating both the generating and operating force on how mission command affects the execution of full spectrum operations. The biggest impact may be on how commanders and staffs interact daily. Mission command requires collaboration and dialog within an environment of mutual trust in which subordinates at all levels are empowered to make decisions. Establishing such an environment is challenging owing to the realities of force packaging and the ARFORGEN cycle, as well as the operational tempo of today’s units.

Nonetheless, we must focus on training the force to operate in a mission environment rather than a detailed command environment, and we must encourage disciplined initiative and a willingness to accept risk among both commanders and their staffs. Although some units have already moved toward mission command, a future force culturally adapted to the concept and its tasks may best realize its benefits.

Summary

As demands on leaders have expanded dramatically so has the need to empower them with skills, knowledge, resources, and freedom of action. Change 1 to FM 3-0 provides an opportunity to advance the concept of mission command beyond mere philosophy and let it serve as a catalyst for change in the Army. Change 1 to FM 3-0 is a critical step to drive changes in leader development, organizational design, training, and materiel acquisition to develop operational adaptability across the force.

The publication and dissemination of Change 1 to FM 3-0 enables mission command to pervade the force and have an immediate impact across the Army through leader development venues such as the Command and General Staff College and training venues such as Battle Command Training Program seminars.

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