



KABOOM: Embracing the Suck in a Savage Little War, Matt Gallagher, Da Capo Press, 2010, 294 pages, \$24.95.

As its title implies, *Kaboom* is about as subtle as a road-side bomb. Matt Gallagher writes on everything from the potentially deadly routine

of patrolling the streets of an Iraqi town to the sudden thrill of a high-speed pursuit of a known insurgent. His account of life as a company grade officer during the surge in Iraq is insightful, colorful, and at times irreverent. It is an excellent snapshot of a junior officer embroiled in a counterinsurgency fight.

For many who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan, Gallagher's memoir will strike a chord. The author shares his thoughts about how the military is pursuing counterinsurgency operations from the ground level. Gallagher's style varies from prose to dialogue to even rap-style poetry. He covers everything from the extreme poverty of people to a soldier dealing with the loneliness of being reassigned mid-way through tour. Much of what is presented is common to many soldiers serving in a combat zone, but Gallagher's kaleidoscopic lens presents a collage of the complexities leaders face fighting a "savage little war."

Gallagher deployed to Iraq in late 2007 and remained there until February 2009. *Kaboom* started out as an online blog, a tool for staying in touch with friends and family, but it gained a larger following. In the summer of 2008, Gallagher's chain of command ordered him to shut down his blog due to some controversial posts. It might be tempting to choose sides in this blog situation; however, viewing the book solely through the blog incident deprives the reader of

what Gallagher learned through that experience as well as a whole host of others. There are fundamental lessons depicted in these pages common to those engaged in combat and worthy of study and discussion. Clearly the experience was life-changing for the author. He says, "What we didn't know, even though the old soldier stories say it clear as day, is that we would always be there, even long after we left."

Kaboom is an excellent choice for a leader development program at battalion and brigade level. I also recommend the book to senior leaders seeking a viewpoint of subordinates they may lead into combat. For military and civilian alike, *Kaboom*, leads the reader through the maze of complexities we have asked the next generation of combat leaders to face. *Kaboom* is an exceptionally engaging read.

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FIGHTING CHANCE: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment, edited by Neyla Arnas, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University Press, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2009, 330 pages, \$35.00.

Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment is a compilation of essays by distinguished scholars meant to "stimulate a productive debate" and help establish an enduring whole-of-government approach to unforeseen crises and preserve U.S. national security interests. Each work corresponds to one of six trend categories established by the Department of Defense: conflict; demographics; economy; environment; culture, identity, and governance; and science and technology. Regional

experts reflect on these trend categories within Africa, China, Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, Eurasia, South Asia, and Latin America. The book assesses how probable trends, possible natural disasters, and unexpected events created by irrational actors could shape the U.S. national security environment in the future.

While sorting through the static surrounding these trends, the authors "go beyond the obvious dangers." They clearly articulate how the trends intersect and interact with each other to create possible strategic shocks and, therefore, national security concerns. Particularly interesting are the discussions regarding population, age, and ethnic demographic shifts that continue between the developed and developing world. The possible crisis dynamics include a Christian-dominated, developed world that is in need of workers, yet nurtures nationalism and tighter immigration laws—in contrast to the growing, youthful, unemployed, non-Christian populations of the developing world.

The discussion of the future role of the Department of Defense in influencing trends and mitigating shocks is especially useful. The authors believe in a highly adaptive and functional military able to effectively work with allies, interagency organizations, and international institutions across all instruments of national power—specifically in conducting stability and reconstruction operations. They caution against an excessive role of the military and misallocation of federal funds.

This thought-provoking, insightful work leaves the reader pondering the vast complexities, dynamics, interconnectedness, volatility, and fragility of a globalizing world. The reader feels small, yet empowered with an informed appreciation of

how difficult it is for nations to posture themselves in ways that preserve their survival, relevance, and prosperity. The book will be of interest to many, particularly academics and graduate students within the social sciences and career interagency and military professionals.

**LTC David A. Anderson, Ph.D.,
USMC, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth Kansas**

CONTEMPORARY STATES OF EMERGENCY: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, Zone Books, 2010, New York, 406 pages, \$36.95.

No relationship is more complex or internationally significant than the one between military forces and humanitarians. Seventeen top academic essayists explore this linkage and provide insights the military rarely hears. For example, a former vice president of Medecins San Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) describes the many divisions within the humanitarian world as these organizations struggle over direction and limited funding. Interestingly, the Greek Section of MSF was expelled during the Kosovo War after they sent a team to bring aid to hospitals in Pristina and Belgrade. In a nod to Clausewitz, an editor even asserts humanitarianism is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means.

The “Right to Intervene” has become an important tool of the United Nations’ Security Council, used increasingly in mandates worldwide. The 1999 Kosovo experience was often discussed as a watershed event when MSF, the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian organizations openly sided with NATO and abandoned their normal neutrality. This collaboration has continued, although the International Committee of the Red Cross has discreetly warned that military intervention has actually increased the risk to aid workers.

Several of the more powerful essays concerned civilian deaths during military humanitarian operations, such as Kosovo or Somalia. International courts have been hesitant to consider trying Western military leaders despite “incidental” casualties and “iatrogenic violence” unleashed as a byproduct of war. The hiding of Picasso’s *Guernica* war painting during U.S. Secretary of State Powell’s 2003 UN speech was cited as an instance when UN officials avoided difficult questions that may be raised about the consequences of Security Council military actions in the name of humanity. Despite wariness from both civilian and military sides, Craig Calhoun contends it is increasingly hard to keep emergency response distinct from military operations.

Laurence Falls presented a unique perspective of humanitarian organizations as benevolent dictators, occupying positions of dominance. They practice “therapeutic governance” when a state is unable to protect its citizens. The migratory corps of humanitarian experts is a new feature of international intervention, serving like high-profile emergency room doctors.

The most significant shortcoming of the book is the lack of military contributors. The editors chose to rely on attendees at an international social science conference in Canada and a seminar in Paris. The inclusion of thoughts from experts like retired general Anthony Zinni or General Douglas Fraser would have made the book more comprehensive. Despite this flaw, there is no doubt that before military officers participate in another intervention, they should consider this book’s insights.

**James R. Cricks,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

REBELS WITHOUT BORDERS: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics, Idean Salehyan, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2009, 216 pages, \$39.95.

Idean Salehyan has produced an interesting, persuasive study that pushes future research on civil war

and insurgencies outside the box. The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* defines civil war as “a war between opposing groups of citizens of the same country.” Salehyan’s work expands the definition beyond this narrow scope. According to him, civil war, rebellion, and insurgency should not be studied as if they solely occur within the clearly delineated borders of a country. These events are not isolated from the regional or international context in which they occur. Salehyan provides strong evidence in the form of quantitative cross-national datasets and qualitative case narratives to demonstrate how interstate and intrastate conflicts are driven by transnational relationships, connections, and actors that readily bridge the traditional boundaries of the modern nation-state.

The study considers recent conflicts and provides in-depth case studies on the Nicaraguan Civil War (1978 to 1989) and the Rwandan Civil War (1990 to 1996). Salehyan clearly illustrates how insurgents use borders to their benefit before and during a conflict. Internationally recognized borders define geographical jurisdiction, where the authority of one state ends and another begins.

However, as Salehyan’s work clearly demonstrates, it is in this border region where the opportunity may exist for a nascent insurgent organization to improve its logistical base, increase its force strength, refine the organization structure, and influence the target population with propaganda. Salehyan shows how the relative strength of the states involved, their relationship with one another, and the presence of a third party can affect the intensity, duration, and resolution of a conflict. While each civil war or insurgency is different, they react to the variables in a similar, predictable manner.

Salehyan’s work is scholarly in nature, providing a detailed review of his research methodologies, an extensive bibliography, and a detailed index. The book is recommended for anyone interested in conflict and conflict resolution, and especially

for those researching civil war, insurgency, and counterinsurgency.
LTC Randy G. Masten, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

QUICKSAND: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East, Geoffrey Wawro, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010, 720 pages, \$37.95.

Geoffrey Wawro's *Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East* attempts to be a single history of America's involvement in the Middle East, beginning in the late 19th century. It is an excellent first attempt to synthesize this entire era. Previous literature has examined specific time periods, specific geographical areas, or specific topics. This is not to say that *Quicksand* is comprehensive; this is no social or cultural history but rather one limited to politics and foreign affairs, and its arrangement is chronological, not topical. Further, the perspective is American more than, say, Egyptian or Iraqi or Israeli.

The book provides a clear exposition of the various threads of U.S. involvement, working through material from early Zionism and Wilsonian idealism to the adventures of Dick Cheney and George Bush in pursuit of moral diplomacy, regime change, and oil. Along the way, presidents and statesmen do stupid things for reasons that may or may not stand careful scrutiny, and occasionally there is a hero or a heroic moment. Mostly, those who were once heroes are shown to be far from their mythological stature. As histories should, *Quicksand* provides a nuanced corrective to contemporary media coverage.

The book is frequently provocative. A major weakness is that the quality of the evidence declines sharply after 1980. Before that, the documentation is excellent, relying heavily on primary sources but not forgetting the pertinent secondary sources. The last 30 years, when history is still current and subject to debate in public rather than academic circles, is based on secondary sources with axes to grind. Even oral history, the salvation of other

authors who write of recent history, is absent from the footnotes of the controversial chapters. And there is a slight tilt to the left.

Exceeding 600 pages of text, *Quicksand* is not a one-night read. Given the wealth of material, particularly for the years before the Reagan presidency and the new conservative ascendancy, hasty reading is not advised. The complexity of the U.S. involvement is also something that takes time to absorb. The individual seeking to understand how we got to where we are today will be well served to begin with Wawro's *Quicksand*.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas

A HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, Edward M. Spiers, Reaktion Books, Inc., London, 2010, 223 pages, \$35.00.

Edward M. Spiers, professor of strategic studies and the pro-dean of research in the faculty of arts at Leeds University, is a long-time contributor to the scholarly world of literature on chemical and biological weapons. His latest work is a succinct and readily accessible account of the history and key issues associated with chemical and biological weapons from World War I to the present. It successfully avoids the tedious rendition of technical details and acronyms that often plague works of this kind and would make an excellent graduate or undergraduate text to introduce the development and use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the pertinent chemical and biological treaty regimens.

The book's discussion of chemical and biological weapon-related concerns in the post-9/11 and post-anthrax letter era is especially valuable in that it enables the reader to view the present dialogue in historical context and not merely as an aberration stemming from post-9/11 concerns over public safety. Of particular note is its even-handed discussion of the complexities associated with

acquiring "actionable" intelligence about clandestine chemical and biological research programs and, when intelligence can be obtained, distinguishing between malevolent and legitimate chemical and biological research. The book's summary of the intelligence situation surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq is particularly informative.

Perhaps the book's most valuable contribution results from the care the author takes to distinguish media hype from responsible scientific analysis. Spiers illuminates what aspects of the problem ought to be taken in stride and what aspects ought to cause concern to both private citizens and public policymakers.

While not a criticism of this excellent history, its nature and composition invites interesting philosophical reflections which, at some point and in some future work, deserve an answer: "Why discuss chemical and biological weapons in tandem?" Phenomenologically, chemical and biological weapons are very different things. Legally, they are governed by two distinct international treaties. In terms of their likely efficacy or military utility, the differences are likewise significant.

Quoting CIA Director William Webster, the author notes that "biological warfare agents, including toxins, are more potent than the most deadly chemical warfare agents and provide the broadest area coverage per pound of payload of any weapons system." Given that advances in the life sciences may be to the 21st century what advances in physics were to the 20th, one might be tempted to venture less timidly and suggest that biological weapons are potentially *far* more potent—orders of magnitude more potent—than chemical weapons. Of course, there are similarities: both are weapons, both are eschewed (at least publicly) by all respectable nations, both are subjects of international law. But what is it about chemical and biological weapons that makes it appropriate to discuss them in the

same breath? One could make the case that both elephants and whales are big, that they are gray, that they are mammals, and that they both can be trained to perform for audiences at zoos. However, that does not necessarily mean that elephants and whales belong in the same discussion. Of course, it is a long-standing practice to discuss chemical and biological weapons together, as well as in the company of nuclear weapons, but the practice is a curious one which probably deserves scholarly justification.

In sum, *A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons* is an excellent overview of an often underappreciated segment of 20th- and 21st-century security studies. It deserves the thoughtful attention of both students and professionals occupied with the enormously difficult problems associated with chemical and biological weapons.
COL John Mark Mattox, Ph.D., USA, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

CONFRONTING THE CHAOS: A Rogue Military Historian Returns to Afghanistan, Sean M. Maloney, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2009, 275 pages, \$34.95.

Dr. Sean Maloney is Canada's designated military historian for his country's efforts in Afghanistan. He is a former Canadian Army combat arms officer who teaches at the Canadian Royal Military College War Studies Programme and is the strategic studies advisor to the Canadian Defence Academy. He has the frequent flyer miles to Afghanistan, the worn-out boots, and shredded rucksack to complete his credentials. His first book, *Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan*, covers the 2002 to 2003 period of Canada's efforts in that war-torn land. Maloney's new book continues the coverage to 2005. Both are must-read books. Maloney provides the military historian's perspective to this crucial period with a reasoned, rational view that avoids the deadline distortion

of news reporting. This is not to say it is a slow or academic read. Maloney is irreverent, acidic, and clearly not politically correct. The man is a biker who is often out-of-favor with higher-ups in what he terms the "Canadian nanny state."

While the U.S. Army was focusing on Iraq in 2004 and 2005, Afghanistan was fighting for its life. There were three on-going wars: one against the post 9/11 Taliban and forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, another with the remnants of Al Qaeda, and another with the narcolords. The coalition focused on the first war in the eastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Nangrahar, and Kunar. In the meantime, the neo-Taliban were "raising the south" in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces among the Baluchis and Kakar Pashtun. The drug lords joined the cause. Still, the period had its successes, such as the Heavy Weapons Cantonment Program, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, and the successful conduct of three national elections.

What U.S. soldiers know about Afghanistan is normally from the American experience, yet the coalition effort is much wider. Maloney provides a look at the other parts of the coalition with humor, proportionality, and personal observations. Since the Canadians were concentrated in the south, Maloney focuses on that area.

There is one drawback to this first-rate book. There are no maps. Ground war is intimately concerned with geography, so grab a good map before you start reading.

Maloney provides a good look at the coalition mission through 2005 and the changing U.S. mission in the East. Understanding NATO and coalition goals and operations is a byzantine labyrinth. Maloney provides that understanding without losing his tactical focus. I strongly recommend his book to historians and military professionals alike.

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE CULTURE OF MILITARY INNOVATION: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel, Dima Adamsky, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2010, 231 pages, \$25.95.

This carefully researched work presents a detailed case study in comparative strategic culture and the revolution in military affairs. First, it discusses the different traditions in which military innovation has developed in diverse nation-states. Second, it addresses how a "new theory of victory" originates in various cultural settings. It assesses the national cultures of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel and how they have approached and interpreted the changing nature of warfare.

The author contends that the most recent revolution in military affairs can be traced to the 1970s when standoff precision-guided munitions were introduced. The Soviets were first to recognize that the munitions would fundamentally change warfare and represented a critical discontinuity referred to as the military-technical revolution. The revolution in military affairs and the military-technical revolution are terms describing "radical military innovation that render existing doctrine and forms of combat obsolete."

Adamsky makes a convincing argument that the American way of war elevates material superiority, advanced technologies, and the attrition of the enemy by massive firepower over a fighting style focused on innovative doctrine, strategic imagination, or creative maneuvering. American romanticism with technology and confidence in homegrown ingenuity explains a strategic culture that is described by Adamsky as anti-intellectual, antihistorical, and uninspired. It is a culture that is uncomfortable with counterinsurgency and stability operations in which technology and firepower have less application. This way of war has developed from an American cognitive style that is

logical-analytical and focuses on the object independent from the context in which it is embedded. It is further characterized by applied research, empiricism, and induction.

The Israeli way of war was founded on the quest for absolute security, a cult of the tactical offensive, the ability to improvise, preemptive strikes, and a national siege mentality. They view leadership, courage, and combat experience as the essentials of military art rather than formal education or theoretical knowledge. They value doers who are flexible and adaptable rather than theorists or philosophers, resulting in a weak commitment to military theory and doctrine. Also, their military thought did not keep up with the sophistication of their weapons. They developed and procured weapons systems but treated them as force multipliers for their current operational concept rather than as an inducement to change their existing military architecture. Israeli cognitive style is pragmatic and focuses on doing above understanding. It takes a problem-solving perspective that emphasizes analysis and procedural knowledge over descriptive knowledge or strategic vision. It is thus less receptive to acknowledging paradigmatic changes in the nature of warfare.

This volume has a highly academic and uneven literary style and an irritating repetition of key ideas. However, its freshness, use of primary sources (approximately 80 pages of detailed notes), and basic premise that understanding national culture helps predict a nation's military innovation make it an ideal reference for strategists, scholars, armchair generals, and those interested in applying cultural models to organizational behavior.

**Gene Klann, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**GANGS, PSEUDO-MILITARIES,
AND OTHER MODERN
MERCENARIES**, Max G. Manwaring, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2010, 238 pages, \$36.00.

Gangs is from the pen of a venerable author and educator within the American military establishment. Dr. Max Manwaring gives us an additional element about wars that do not involve the maneuver of formal military units—the concept of legitimacy. Manwaring provides a straightforward list of key points and lessons, leading off with “develop a coherent legitimacy theory of engagement.” His list of what one must do to prevail against gangs is pretty long and daunting, but Manwaring must be credited with addressing the challenge and providing such a list. The gangs about which he writes are more than just street gangs and drug cartels; he also includes paramilitaries, vigilantes, popular militias, and youth leagues. Manwaring considers state use of gang-like organizations as a way to manage violence against militarily superior foes.

Manwaring helpfully divides his discussion according to who might be fighting whom: state versus parts of its own society, non-state actors versus other non-state actors, a nation-state versus other states through proxies, etc. The book focuses on the purposeful use of gangs as an element in unrestricted forms of warfare. Thus, Manwaring begins by citing Lenin's perspective on the use of agitation violence and then updates that part of Leninism through today's leftist asymmetric and unrestricted warfare. It is refreshing to read a point finessed through his examples rather than stated: legitimacy does not necessarily reside with the government against a gang. The gang might be an illegitimate tool of a government. Manwaring does not directly broach the possibility that the concern for legitimacy might require opposition to government, but we can infer from his elevation of the question of legitimacy (and the examples he uses) that it will not necessarily reside with the counterinsurgent.

It is also encouraging to see a book on general security theory using a majority of examples from the Western Hemisphere, given

that the greatest and most pressing challenges to U.S. security will likely come from that half of the globe. Of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, for example, Manwaring writes: “Chavez's concept of regional superinsurgency, conducted primarily by popular militias, appears to be in accord with Lenin's approach to the conduct of irregular asymmetrical political war.”

Manwaring acknowledges a formidable group of collaborators that has been thoughtfully attending to these questions for some time, though it is perhaps overly homogenous (almost all retired U.S. Army officers). The footnotes, bibliography, and index will be particularly useful to many readers.

**Geoffrey B. Demarest,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE WAR IN KOREA, 1950-1951: They Came from the North, Allan R. Millett, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2010, 644 pages, \$45.00.

This is the second volume of a projected trilogy on the history of the Korean War meant to synthesize, as much as possible, various national viewpoints. One of Allan R. Millett's goals is to put the Koreans back at the center of their own history. He portrays the political and military struggle in Korea in local terms as a struggle between two competing revolutionary movements, and in international terms as part of the Cold War. His first volume provides a succinct summary of Korean political history, 1945-1950.

After summarizing the events in the first volume, Millett narrates the war's first year when the communists, and then the UN, tried to unite Korea by force. He ends the volume with both sides determining how they will achieve a political solution after their military strategies have failed. Drawing on primary material from Russian, American, South Korean, and Chinese archives, he shows how the tensions between Stalin, Mao, and Kim were resolved and led to an invasion of southern Korea, and then repeats the process

for U.S. relations with South Korea and the UN. Millett punctures myths and opens the way for a more dispassionate examination of the war and its implications, giving the reader detailed accounts of the decisions being made in Moscow, Beijing, New York, and Washington.

Millett easily shifts between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare and does not eschew high politics and diplomacy. He tells the course of battles and their effect on the participants and then explains problems faced at higher levels. His narrative integrates topics other have neglected: atrocities, the effects of disease, and “battle fatigue” on UN troops; the logistical problems faced by all the combatants; problems in managing multinational troop contingents; and UN and South Korean integration plans for North Korea. He shows how events in Korea looked to decision makers in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, pointing out that neither Kim Il Sung nor Syngman Rhee were invited to join in these high-level strategic discussions. His analysis of the campaigns of the war’s first year is refreshingly free of institutional triumphalism and he presents a succinct summary of the rewards and difficulties on both sides.

Millett superbly integrates national points of view into his narrative, not concentrating on the action of a single country at the expense of the others. As befits a careful scholar, his notes offer insights about the sources as he explains a subject’s historiography and how he differentiates between views. In addition, Millett includes a lengthy bibliographic essay in which he discusses his research and how it fits into Korean War historiography. His judgments are as judicious as his style is felicitous.

This volume, along with its companion, will repay the time it takes to read. When completed, the trilogy will be this generation’s standard work on the war.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,
Seoul, Korea**

**“EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN”:
The U.S. Decision to Conduct
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare,**
Joel Ira Holwitt, Texas A&M
University Press, College Station,
2009, 245 pages, \$37.50.

U.S. Navy submarine officer Joel Ira Holwitt has performed an impressive feat with this book. Of the questions bothering historians and others about the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, surely the decision to engage the Japanese in unrestricted bombing and submarine warfare has puzzled most. Up until the Japanese attack, freedom of navigation of the seas and stalwart opposition to unrestricted warfare—a “shoot first ask questions later” approach to war perfected by the Germans in World War I—were pillars of American foreign policy.

For the American government to have overturned 160 years of naval and diplomatic precedent was astonishing since the decision makers all had clear memories of German provocation in 1917. Most historians have tended to simply consign the decision to anger and revenge over the dastardly attack at Pearl Harbor. Yet the abruptness of the decision still boggles the mind—at one stroke pretense and precedence were swept aside. Holwitt’s book examines this question closely and reveals a much more nuanced and complex process that led to this stunning turnaround in foreign policy. Combining expert use of primary archival sources and the records of wargaming and policy papers at the Naval War College, he has found that the U.S. Navy had been thinking about the issue of submarine war zones for some time and had institutionally decided that unrestricted submarine warfare would be instituted as a matter of course (along with strategic bombing). This is the major finding of the book. By the late 1930s, it was an open secret among the Navy’s top strategic leaders on the General Board, at the Naval War College, and in the planning division of the Chief of Naval Operations, that the Orange War Plan against Japan must include this rejection of traditional restraint.

In addition to this major discovery in the archival evidence, Holwitt’s study reinforces the conclusions of others that this course of action did not translate into submarine design or changes in tactics, which is one reason U.S. submarines initially performed so poorly (faulty torpedoes being the other). However, he does make a case that the Orange War Plan resulted in an “accidentally” fortuitous design for fleet submarines that were ideal for unrestricted commerce warfare. The only weakness in his argument here, and it is minor, is that he fails to link this design to the constraints of the Washington Naval Treaty (1922) on overseas basing that mandated long range, habitable submarines.

Holwitt is to be commended for not shying away from moral judgments—noting that the biggest losers were civilians both at sea and ashore (who starved). He also finds it “troubling” that the decision was made almost completely divorced from civilian control. This is a superb book that fully explains how the United States came to adopt a strategy regarded by many as illegal and tantamount to “terror.”

**CDR John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.,
USN, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**PATTON, TENACITY IN
ACTION,** Agostino Von Hassell,
Thomas Nelson, Nashville, TN,
2010, 192 pages, \$19.99.

Patton, Tenacity in Action is an in-depth, personal look at General George S. Patton, Jr. The book refutes many of the exaggerated personality traits seen in the 1970 movie about Patton starring George C. Scott.

Von Hassell focuses on the complex nature of Patton the man. Patton had many fears, hopes, joys, and triumphs and as many failures and successes. Patton was far from perfect, but he was not a cold-hearted task master. He was constantly afraid of his own cowardice and took unusual risk to prove otherwise, he was driven to succeed but was sensitive and ever-caring about the soldiers he led.

The book covers Patton's early childhood including the learning difficulties he overcame to earn a West Point appointment. Von Hassell explains the history of Patton's family and what they expected of young George. Details of Patton's discipline, appetite for reading and learning, and his unwavering determination help in understanding Patton in his later years as master tactician and strategist.

The majority of the book relates Patton's military career, including his crowning jewel—the liberation of Bastogne. Von Hassell tells how Patton's personality influenced his vision and decision-making processes as an officer and a general. Most interesting is Patton's decision to relieve the embattled garrison at Bastogne and how the media portrayed Patton in the movie of the same name.

I recommend the book to anyone interested in successful military leaders, and to anyone determined to get past the myths about Patton.

**Kenneth J. Miller,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE GRAND DESIGN: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War, Donald Stoker, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, 512 pages, \$27.95.

Donald Stoker insists that too many studies of how the Civil War was won and lost focus on battlefield campaigns and tactics. Stoker argues the North won because it destroyed the Confederates' ability to maintain effective resistance, and the South lost because it failed to keep its armies intact long enough to gain independence. While battles are important, strategy ultimately determines the outcome.

In *The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War*, Stoker defines strategy as different from policy, operations, and tactics. Strategy, he explains, is the overall plan of action for defeating the opposing belligerent. Policy is the political outcome desired by the war, and tactics and operations are the battle and campaign level of warfare.

Both the North and South

attempted to develop a winning strategy early in the war, but neither succeeded. Northern generals confused themselves by trying to accomplish too much at once. Their objective was to capture the Confederate capital in Richmond. General McClellan tried to end the war in one campaign. The Confederates, on the other hand, struggled to defend their territory with an inadequate amount of men. They defended cities and tactical objectives, but their armies sustained irreplaceable casualties. They stretched their resources beyond their capacity and failed to sustain a strategy that would have allowed them to win.

If the North had earlier adopted the strategy they chose late in the war, the rebellion might have ended rather quickly. Ulysses S. Grant's aggressive battle-seeking campaigns forced the South to fight, and casualties whittled away at Confederate numbers as well as their morale. Southern forces had been able to counter Union pushes into their territory, which were aimed at fixed locations, by harassing Northern supply routes. Campaigns like Sherman's March through Georgia took the advantage away from the South because it allowed the North freedom of movement and made use of its superior manpower.

Stoker argues his point effectively; he avoids bogging the reader down with details of campaigns and battles. Rather, he discusses the in-depth planning that went into campaigns and describes them with an eye to their strategic importance. Stoker extensively explains the problems encountered by Northern and Southern generals in relation to strategic planning. He shows that both sides failed to keep a clear focus on how they could win the war and allowed other factors to complicate their objectives. It was the North's eventual adoption of an effective strategy, and the South's failure to do so, that determined the final result. *The Grand Design* is an excellent look at Civil War strategy with lessons that can be applied today.

**Ryland Breeding,
Richmond, Virginia**

CAVALRY OF THE HEARTLAND: The Mounted Forces of the Army of Tennessee, Edward G. Longacre, Westhome Publishing, Yardley, PA, 2009, 429 pages, \$35.00.

Building on some of his earlier works, *Lee's Cavalrymen* and *Lincoln's Cavalrymen*, Edward Longacre's *Cavalry of the Heartland: The Mounted Forces of the Army of Tennessee* is a rich, comprehensive history of the Confederacy's Western Army cavalry operations, which arguably had some of the most colorful mounted officers of the American Civil War. Longacre takes the reader from the Western Army's creation in Tennessee and Kentucky through its final battles in North Carolina. He chronicles mounted operations across the theater through the experiences of key officers, particularly generals Nathan Bedford Forrest, John Hunt Morgan, and Joseph Wheeler. In doing so, Longacre provides an even narrative, balancing the more renowned raids with the mundane duties of the Southern mounted arm in support of its army in the field.

The book's title is misleading. Rather than confining the book to merely the Army of Tennessee's operations, Longacre tells a far more comprehensive story of mounted operations across the expanse of the entire western theater. Realizing the interrelated nature of operations between the scattered western departments, he skillfully includes examples from all three. For instance, he recounts Joseph Johnston's decision in early 1863 to gather cavalry forces in west Tennessee and northern Mississippi into a single, powerful corps under Earl Van Dorn—a decision that proved disastrous to the Confederate war effort. Pemberton's Army of Mississippi, bereft of cavalry, was unable either to determine Grant's intentions toward Vicksburg or contain Union cavalry thrusts such as Grierson's celebrated raid. Putting these and other cavalry operations into their proper context against the backdrop of the larger field operations in the west is this study's true virtue.

As with earlier works, Longacre's *Cavalry of the Heartland* is based on meticulous research using both primary and secondary sources. While the depth of the author's research is evident, his narrative does not get bogged down despite some minute and important detail. Longacre includes useful maps, short biographies, and orders of battle which—combined with the rich analytic text—provide a captivating story of the western Confederacy's knights errant and a compelling history of the western theater of war. As such, *Cavalry of the Heartland* should be regarded as an important resource on the Civil War's western theater and should be included with the likes of Stanley Horn's classic *The Army of Tennessee* and Steven Woodworth's more recent *Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865*.

**Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

EUROPEAN WARFARE 1350-1750, edited by Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, 394 pages, \$34.99.

European Warfare 1350-1750 is an anthology of perspectives and interpretations by leading military historians on warfare over a span

of time that has traditionally been treated by at least two different groups of specialists: historians of the Middle Ages and those of the Early Modern Period. The book addresses the perceived need by both groups of scholars to cross the artificial divide between their chosen periods. Its publication follows a decision made at a conference at the University of Reading, England, entitled "Crossing the Divide: Continuity and Change in Late-Medieval and Early-Modern Warfare." This new perspective has resulted in reframing the timeline of history so that the years between 1350 and 1750 are seen as a continuous and coherent whole.

The volume's 14 essays are wide-ranging and tend to take a long view of a specific complex subject—the *longue durée*—while keeping an eye for the relevant detail. They cover such diverse topics as "Warfare and the International State System"; "Aspects of Operational Art: Communications, Cannon, and Small War"; "Legality and Legitimacy in War and its Conduct 1350-1650"; "Conflict, Religion, and Ideology"; and "Warfare, Entrepreneurship, and the Fiscal-Military State." Most students of the period will find at least a few pieces that speak to their interests.


The essays are preceded by an insightful introductory piece

by the volume's editors, which summarizes the state of knowledge and conceptualizations about the period and suggests areas for further exploration. While emphasizing the themes of societal and technological change and the symbiosis between the military and the emergence of the modern nation-state system, the editors have avoided the controversies associated with the concept of a "military revolution" or a "revolution in military affairs," which have colored so much of the debate about the period. The emphasis is on continuity and development in the context of significant technological and societal change.

Most of the essays assume a basic understanding of military and cultural history and are not suited for the casual reader. Scholars and students of the periods involved will find invigorating perspectives and stimulating ideas for their own research. The anthology is supplemented by biographical sketches of the contributors, maps, and an extensive bibliography that includes both primary and secondary sources (although I noticed the absence of important sources on the Early Italian Wars)—highly recommended.

**LTC Prisco R. Hernández,
Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas**

MR We Recommend



THE TWILIGHT WARRIORS, Broadway Books, New York, 2010, 400 pages, \$24.99.

The Twilight Warriors by military historian and former navy pilot Robert Gandt is the engrossing, page-turning story of this tightly knit crew of young naval aviators who find themselves thrust into the epic Battle of Okinawa, the last great campaign of the Pacific theater and the largest land-air-sea engagement in history. From the cockpit of a Corsair fighter, we gaze down at the Japanese task force racing to destroy the American amphibious force. Through the eyes of the men on the destroyers assigned to picket ship duty, we experience the terror as wave after wave of kamikazes crash into their ships. Standing on the deck of the legendary battleship Yamato, we watch Japan's last hope for victory die in a tableau of gunfire and explosions.

Derived from hours of interviews with the surviving Tail End Charlies as well as memoirs, journals, and correspondence of Okinawa veterans from both the American and Japanese sides, *The Twilight Warriors* is, at its core, the story of a band of steadfast young Americans in the thick of a massive, all-important military campaign and their enigmatic, fanatically courageous enemy.


From the Publisher.



ANCIENT CHINESE WARFARE, Ralph D. Sawyer, Basic Books, New York, 2011, 576 pages, \$39.99.

The history of China is a history of warfare. Rarely in its 3,000-year existence has the country not been beset by war, rebellion, or raids. Warfare was a primary source of innovation, social evolution, and material progress in the Legendary Era, Hsia dynasty, and Shang dynasty—indeed, war was the force that formed the first cohesive Chinese empire, setting China on a trajectory of state building and aggressive activity that continues to this day. In *Ancient Chinese Warfare*, a preeminent expert on Chinese military history uses recently recovered documents and archaeological findings to construct a comprehensive guide to the developing technologies, strategies, and logistics of ancient Chinese militarism. The result is a definitive look at the tools and methods that won wars and shaped culture in ancient China.

From the Publisher.



OPERATION HOMECOMING: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Home Front, in the Words of U.S. Troops and Their Families, Andrew Carroll, ed., University of Chicago Press, IL, 2008, 432 pages, \$16.95.

Operation Homecoming is the result of a major initiative launched by the National Endowment for the Arts to bring distinguished writers to military bases to inspire U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and their families to record their wartime experiences. Encouraged by such authors as Tom Clancy, Mark Bowden, Bobbie Ann Mason, Tobias Wolff, Jeff Shaara, and Marilyn Nelson, American military personnel and their loved ones wrote candidly about what they saw, heard, and felt while in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as on the home front. Taken together, these eyewitness accounts, private journals, short stories, letters, and other personal writings become a dramatic narrative that shows the human side of warfare.

From the Publisher.