SPC Myles Gaudet, left, and SPC Matthew Tempesta pull security as members of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul, 27 May 2011. (U.S. Air Force, SSgt Brian Ferguson)

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From Good to Great

Brigadier General Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army

We are in an information war. Because the people are the center of gravity in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, one of the defining characteristics of insurgencies is the constant struggle between the legitimate government and the insurgents for the trust and cooperation of the indigenous population. Influencing the citizenry’s views of the conflict and managing their expectations of the future is thus essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency campaign. The people’s perceptions and attitudes will ultimately dictate who they support—their government or the insurgent.

To that end, competently managing information that affects the population’s attitudes and beliefs is a decisive element of successful counterinsurgency. In U.S. military doctrine, we refer to this effort as information operations (IO). Information operations are activities undertaken by military and nonmilitary organizations to shape the essential narrative of a conflict or situation and thus affect the attitudes and behaviors of the targeted audience. Examples of IO activities include key leader engagements, the dissemination of products such as handbills and flyers, conversations and interviews with press organizations, television and radio advertisements, and any other activity that promotes the dissemination of information. Unlike the insurgents, we cannot lie or propagandize with falsehoods and intentional misinformation with these activities. However, as the saying goes, we can be “first with the truth.” Moreover, we can be smarter with the truth.

Fortunately, most leaders today in the U.S. military recognize that information operations are a legitimate and necessary component of successful counterinsurgency. However, it has been my observation that the approach units take in integrating IO into their daily framework operations varies greatly, and consequently so do the results.

Most successful information operations share similar characteristics, beginning with the development of a sound IO concept of operation and culminating with a detailed plan of execution. There are some very creative and intellectually sound concepts and plans developed by commanders and their
staffs at all levels from battalion through corps and army-level command. There is less understanding and appreciation, however, of how to best execute IO in practice.

The purpose of this article is to identify common shortcomings that units experience while executing IO and to offer suggestions on how to improve that execution. Three conditions must exist to achieve optimal affects with information operations.

First and foremost, commanders at all levels must understand and acknowledge that information operations are an important and potentially decisive component of their overarching COIN strategy. In other words, commanders must emphasize the importance of IO in everything they do so that subordinate leaders and units not only hear the message but also see it reinforced in the commander’s actions and priorities. If this fundamental condition is not met, and information operations are not understood as a top priority of the unit commander, then they won’t be important to subordinate commanders either. The result will be insufficient rigor in application to achieve positive effects.

The second necessary condition for success is a concept of operation that integrates information operations into every facet of a unit’s daily framework. To gain maximum effect, operations need to consistently and constantly send a message to the target audience. The key to developing that kind of repetition with information operations is to develop a concept of operation that threads IO activities through every line of operation constituting a unit’s campaign plan.

The third condition for success is execution of an IO plan such that intended messages are driven home repetitively to the target audience. Of the three conditions identified, the competent and persistent execution of IO activities is the one that most units most often fail to achieve. To that end, the remainder of this article will identify unit and organization shortcomings that dull the positive impact of IO and thus impede mission accomplishment.

Repetitive Messaging

The most common mistake committed by units when executing information operations is the failure to achieve sufficient repetitious delivery of messages to their intended audience. Repetition is a key tenet of IO execution, and the failure to constantly drive home a consistent message dilutes the impact on the target audiences. For years, commercial advertisers have based their advertisement strategies on the premise that there is a positive correlation between the number of times a consumer is exposed to product advertisements and that consumer’s inclination to sample a new product. The very same principle applies to how we influence our target audiences when we conduct COIN. In general, four main areas individually or collectively contribute to a lack of repetitive messaging:

- Too many IO themes and messages.
- Too little time dedicated to disseminating them.
- Little or no unity of effort when delivering messages.
- Lack of processes or feedback mechanisms to ensure that messages are being delivered accurately, routinely, and repetitiously.

I will address each one of these areas individually.

Too Many IO Themes and Messages

All too often, organizations develop too many themes and messages for the target audiences they are attempting to influence. Doing this inadvertently impedes their ability to repetitiously drive home the intended message to a target audience. Remembering the basic advertising tenet that a message must reach its intended target multiple times to compel a change in consumer purchasing habits, it follows that minimizing themes and repeating fewer messages more often will maximize the exposure of the target audience to those ideas over time. For example, an IO plan based on five themes with eight messages developed for each theme is much more difficult to deliver to an audience multiple times compared to a simple plan with three themes, and perhaps three or four supporting messages per
theme. In the first case, over forty messages must be repetitively delivered, while in the second case, there are only nine to twelve messages, making it significantly easier to disseminate multiple times to targeted audiences compared to forty messages.

During my last tour in Iraq from December 2009 to December 2010, the 1st Armored Division developed an IO plan around five themes and six to eight supporting messages per theme; that is, we attempted to disseminate thirty to forty supporting messages to several different audiences. We quickly learned that, based upon the finite number of dissemination options available, we could not gain sufficient repetition to achieve our desired IO effects. Realizing the nature of the problem, we did two things to reduce our messaging requirements. First, we prioritized the themes we wanted the division leadership and units to focus on—reducing that number from five to three. Then we reviewed our supporting messages for these themes and selected the best two to four messages per theme that would resonate with our target audiences. By taking this approach, we reduced our messaging requirements from forty down to twelve, thus creating a condition that allowed us to reach our target audiences multiple times with our limited dissemination assets.

Too Little Time Spreading the Word

Another common mistake organizations make that distracts them from achieving repetition in messaging is the failure to allocate sufficient time for message delivery. All too often, units change the theme and messages they deliver before they have achieved sufficient repetition of delivery to successfully gain any significant IO effect. By their very nature, information operations do not lend themselves to immediate results. When insufficient time is allotted for delivering messages, units typically fail to achieve sufficient repetition, dramatically reducing the chances that their IO efforts will have the desired effect.

In the 1st Armored Division, we found that in order to reach our target audiences multiple times with our themes and messages, we had to deliver them over a period of months—not days or weeks. We used the full complement of delivery assets—senior leader (both U.S. and Iraqi military) engagements with key Iraqi interlocutors, press engagements, billboard and handbill advertisements, radio spots on local stations, television information commercials, and other nonattributional means. No matter how detailed our dissemination plans were, we found that the number of Sheiks and tribal leaders participate in a 1st Armored Division BCT-initiated key leader engagement.
one resource permitting us to repetitively reach our target audience was time.

We also worked hard to ensure that the messages were delivered multiple times by different means of delivery so that our target audience was exposed from various directions. For example, if we were trying to enhance the image of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the eyes of their own citizens, we would ensure that our key leaders always included supporting messages of this nature in their conversations with key Iraqi interlocutors. We would also ensure that we incorporated these same types of supporting messages in handbills and billboard advertisements depicting ISF security successes, as well as radio and television advertisements that aired several times a day across multiple radio and TV stations. The goal, which we often achieved, was to saturate our target audience with consistent messages that supported one of our key three themes.

After several months of hearing about ISF successes from personal conversations, seeing examples on billboards in the city, hearing of them on the radio stations, and seeing them on TV infomercials, we had a high level of confidence that our target audiences’ belief system and attitudes were affected. Quite simply, they got the message that Iraqi Security Forces were competent and capable, and they began to act accordingly. It may sound easy, but that kind of success requires direct and persistent leader emphasis and involvement at all levels. Units also must implement systems to track the execution of their IO activities to ensure that they are delivering messages to the intended audiences accurately and frequently. I cannot overemphasize the importance of such “message saturation.” Such repetition and constancy is a critical prerequisite to influencing a targeted audience. Believe me, it does not happen by accident, and it won’t happen just because someone writes it into an order.

**Unity of Effort and Breadth of Message Delivery**

It is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the required repetitive messaging by relying on only one or two of the delivery options available to your organization. We must make a disciplined effort to ensure that we employ every messaging asset and capability at our disposal in a deliberate, calculated, and disciplined manner. This requires a centralized system where guidance is given to key leaders at every level of your organization concerning what message they are to deliver, to which target audience, by what means—and how often. In this same vein, it’s important that units develop feedback mechanisms to track the delivery of messages to their key audiences. Such a feedback loop will allow your IO team to monitor the level of saturation you are achieving with messages and ensure that your subordinate units and leaders are executing their IO activities as designed.

To ensure that all messages and actions are supportive of the IO effort, directive guidance should also be given to those individuals in your organization charged with developing print products, radio and television commercials, and other dissemination means. In the 1st Armored Division, we centralized all message coordination in what we called the communications strategy (COMSTRAT) working group. The members were from the division’s IO section, Civil-Military Operations section, Public Affairs Office, and the Military Information Support Operations section.

In an effort to emphasize the importance of this group and the priority of its duties, the division commander assigned a flag officer to chair its sessions.
The primary purpose of this weekly meeting was to synchronize IO activities across all units and leaders in the division. Key agenda items included assessments concerning the quality of the messages we were using, when to change or update messages, when to transition from one theme to another, synchronization of all IO activities and assets, and organizational compliance with message delivery. At the conclusion of this meeting each week, we were able to ensure that every IO asset we had available in the division was being employed in a coordinated and synchronized manner designed to achieve message saturation with our key audiences.

**Lack of a Feedback Loop**

We found that one of the major impediments to achieving the repetitious delivery of messages to our key audiences was the failure of many units and leaders to execute IO tasks accurately or consistently. Generally, this was not due to willful disobedience on their part, but rather to the fact that units were often assigned requirements that exceeded their capacities. Under these conditions, commanders do what good commanders do—they prioritize.

In the case of our division, initially many of our units did not give sufficient priority to IO. To address this shortcoming in our execution strategy, the division created a set of detailed feedback mechanisms designed to track the execution of IO tasks by subordinate units and divisional staff sections. Each week in the COMSRAT working group, we would review a series of IO activity performance measures that units were required to execute. Examples of these measures included requiring every brigade in the division to hold one Arab press conference a month; reviewing any...
enemy activity that resulted in harm or suffering to the Iraqi people and confirming that corresponding IO measures were taken to discredit the enemy; confirmation that handbills and billboards with specific messages were delivered to an intended audience; identification of high-visibility future venues that would allow units to message large Iraqi audiences; and confirmation that senior leaders were conducting key leader engagements with the right people and consistent with the frequency we determined was necessary to ensure influence.

This list of performance measures is illustrative and far from exhaustive. I simply want to show the level of detail we tracked at division in an effort to ensure that all of our subordinate units and leaders were prioritizing the execution of their IO activities in accordance with our division commander’s guidance. As noted, units don’t intentionally neglect the execution of their IO tasks. They just don’t generally make them a priority, and consequently those critical tasks are not executed consistently. However, consistency, accuracy, and most importantly, repetition are foundational elements of successful IO. Units thus need a feedback loop to ensure that foundation is solid.

The U.S. Army today is widely recognized as the world’s preeminent counterinsurgency force. We have achieved our current level of expertise through a combination of experience on the battlefield and the ability to learn and adapt both as leaders and as an institution. In the last nine years, one of the most important lessons we have learned is the critical importance of IO in the operational environment. Having acknowledged that reality, we must ensure we execute IO strategies and concepts with the same degree of rigor and discipline that we are renowned for in conducting military operations. To control the center of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare, we must achieve the repetitious delivery of accurate and coordinated messages to key audiences to influence their attitudes and behavior. That means doing four things better: limiting the number of IO themes and messages we disseminate; ensuring allocation of sufficient time to deliver messages, planning in terms of months, not days or weeks; achieving unity of effort with every IO delivery asset we have; and finally, creating processes or systems in our organizations to guarantee that IO messages are delivered to the right audience, accurately, consistently, and most importantly, repetitiously. MR
Fighting the Information War but Losing Credibility

What Can We Do?

Lieutenant Colonel Rumi Nielson-Green, U.S. Army

Fighting the so-called “information war” against terrorists and insurgents has cost the U.S. military nearly $1 billion in the past three years.¹ But that may not be the highest cost.

Congressional questions about the spending for communication programs and news reports about questionable use of contracted public relations firms and journalists have brought to light an undefined area of military operations with little oversight or controls. Not surprisingly, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, in March 2010, directed an internal assessment of information operations and internal investigations into specific activities.²

In a December 2009 Washington Post column, David Ignatius points out that “the military has funded a range of contractors, specialists, training programs and initiatives,” and that the “militarization of information,” particularly when hiring “covert contractors,” should sound an alarm.³

However, in times of war, when ends may justify means, why shouldn’t the military aggressively promulgate positive images of the United States and fight enemy propaganda?⁴ Why shouldn’t the military hire public relations firms to plant unattributed American-friendly articles in foreign media (as alleged in the case of the Lincoln Group in Iraq in 2004)?⁵ Why shouldn’t the military use companies that offer to “do more than just information gathering,” merging “reporting, intelligence, connection-peddling, and strategic communications” (as is alleged about International Safety Networks)?⁶

Contractors who operate journalistic, news, or public relations activities for the military blur the lines between public affairs, journalism, military information support operations (MISO, formerly PSYOP). The dangers of these types of activities seem obvious. They change what are accepted international protections for journalists as non-combatants. They hinder and endanger journalists and render military public affairs ineffective. They rile up conspiracy theorists and provide fodder for anti-American sentiment. A nation that cherishes and promotes freedom of speech and press erodes these values and its credibility when it subjects foreign people to covert media.
manipulation. In the world of instantaneous news reporting, such activities extend beyond targeted foreign populations and reach U.S. and allied populations.

Robert Hastings, a former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, sees a line that “ought not to be crossed.” He notes that “as a constitutional democracy, our government has an obligation to share robust information based on truth without attempting to influence its people,” but adds, “We have to remember that public affairs needs to be done by public affairs people. Moreover, if we hire someone to do this type of work, they need to follow the same rules and directives that military public affairs officers follow. We should not be able to hire a surrogate to do otherwise.”

Questionable public information contracts are merely a symptom of an underlying problem within the military: no doctrine exists for strategic communications. This results in ineffective implementation and insufficient training for leaders and public affairs officers. In the absence of doctrine, military organizations experimented with strategic communications during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the end, these well-intended schemes might cost the United States its credibility. Why did these ill- adviseed initiatives become so pervasive? How do we meet the need to communicate in a far-sighted way that is integrated into all operations and demonstrated in not only words but by deeds?

What the Military Needs is Some “Strat Comm”
The military is in the business of fighting and winning our Nation’s wars. Commanders saw a need to fight in the information realm and found innovative ways to do so. They must be innovative not only because of technology and an instantaneous news cycle, but also because there is no doctrine to follow. What does exist are guiding principles of strategic communication published in August 2008. These are neither prescriptive nor proscriptive and are only guidelines. Each military service has manuals for public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations, but none for strategic communication or communication strategies. Beyond internal regulations and doctrine, the military is not restricted or empowered by laws or codes addressing its roles, authorities, or responsibilities in public information.

U.S. Army LTC Richard McNorton, left, a public affairs officer, and LTC Charles Poole, the 10th Mountain Division chief of information operations, talk with an employee of the Kandahar Media Compound, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 26 January 2011.
The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, known as the Smith-Mundt Act, allows Department of State activities to “promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations.” This act “is a key statute outlining the global mission of U.S. propaganda abroad and the limitations on distribution of U.S. propaganda at home.” Many view the act as applicable to the Department of Defense (DOD), but it is not. In 2006, the Defense Policy Analysis Office concluded that it did not apply to DOD. The advent of the information age, the military’s need to operate in the information realm, and the increasing need for interagency synchronization makes the provisions of this 62-year-old act outdated.

Absent existing doctrine on how to operate in the information realm, military leaders instituted directors of strategic communication and reorganized public affairs functions in the last several years. Hastings, who served as the military’s head of public affairs in 2008 and 2009, said that during his tenure, he watched as strategic communication became the initiative du jour in every major command. He describes “Strat Comm” offices “popping up” throughout the military as major commands attempted to engage both enemy and friendly audiences in the information realm. The organizational structure and functions of these offices varied: some of these structures were effective and appropriate, while others were not.

Even as we describe it as “the orchestration and/or synchronization of actions, images, and words to achieve a desired effect,” the term “strategic communication” is a point of contention and confusion. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes, “We get too hung up on that word, strategic. . . But beyond the term itself, I believe we have walked away from the original intent. By organizing to it—creating whole structures around it—we have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking.”

The distinction between strategic communication, information operations, and public affairs is critical. Military officers and laypersons alike often use the terms interchangeably, adding to the problem.

Information operations practitioners train to coordinate and synchronize five core functions to influence the adversary: military information support operations, military deception, electronic warfare, computer network operations, and operations security.

Public affairs is a related capability but not a function of information operations. Military public affairs personnel are responsible for internal communication, media relations, and community relations and are advisors to commanders on these areas. Public affairs is not an information operations discipline or a MISO tool. It contributes to information operations by communicating truthful and factual unclassified information in a timely manner using approved DOD guidance to keep the public informed about the military’s activities. Public affairs operations also counter adversary propaganda and deter adversary actions while maintaining the trust and confidence of U.S., allied, and friendly audiences without censorship or propaganda.

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. commanders saw the enemy use the media to amplify the propaganda effects of suicide attacks and other violence. The commanders recognized the need to counter and pre-empt the enemy’s messaging. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates shared this view. In a speech at Kansas State University in 2007, he said, “It is just plain embarrassing that Al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America. Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications.” Such observations led to reorganizations within headquarters’ staffs throughout the military in an attempt to operationalize communication.

One result is the subordination of public affairs functions, along with MISO and information operations, beneath an effects director or a strategic communications director within some senior military unit headquarters. On the surface, this may seem a reasonable consolidation of functions; however, it leads to several troubling outcomes.

Public affairs is not an information operations discipline or a MISO tool.
In some operational level headquarters, public affairs functions are under the control of effects chiefs who are combat arms experts. This type of hierarchy, by default, treats public affairs operations as a means to target audiences or use press releases as virtual bullets in the information realm. This paradigm leads to the production and release of press products that push good-news stories while withholding negative information. Mullen said, “Make no mistake—there has been a certain arrogance to our ‘strat comm’ efforts. We’ve come to believe that messages are something we can launch downrange like a rocket, something we can fire for effect.”

The real effect of attempting to make public affairs a non-lethal weapon is that it renders it ineffective. Journalists will not repeat a press release full of polemics and propaganda with little or no news value; therefore, no one gets the message. The effort is futile. Worse, the long-term consequence is damage to credibility and media relations. Journalists will not trust a spokesperson pushing propaganda, and the public will lose trust in the military.

Unlike operational level units, strategic level headquarters are adopting a strategic communication director model that produces other negative outcomes. Under General Stanley McChrystal’s command, the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO military headquarters in Afghanistan, implemented such a reorganization for its communication effort. Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith, director of communication, synchronizes “public affairs, information operations, and key leader engagement.” Smith is a career communicator with skills and experiences well suited for orchestrating these functions. He understands both the art and the science of communication as well as the implications of public affairs and MISO crossover. However, he may be the only experienced, suitably ranked flag officer in the U.S. military able to head such an endeavor. Colonel Gregory Julian, public affairs chief for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, said there are no other qualified two-star generals in the U.S. pipeline. Furthermore, Julian observes there is no other nation in the alliance within NATO that has such an expert at the requisite rank.
Julian, who served as the director of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Public Affairs in 2009, is “disappointed with the multi-layer bureaucracy that has been put into place.” During the previous tenure, they operated with “flat, clear authority for rapid/accurate release of information.” They were able, in most instances, to get facts out before the enemy propaganda cycle. The additional bureaucracy has synchronized communication, but degraded speed and agility in releasing it—the very need that drove reorganization.

Layering public affairs beneath other staff structures reduces its responsiveness; it eliminates a public affairs officer’s ability to serve as a special advisor to the commander. In these modified structures, a public affairs officer must provide his advice to either an effects chief or strategic communications director whose training, public affairs knowledge, or personal assessment determines what, if any, advice goes forward. This works in the case of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) because Smith is a trained public relations expert. However, even with an expert at the head of such an organization, the very fact that public affairs and information operations activities share the same immediate supervisor is troublesome. As Ignatius puts it, “Problems arise in part because activities are lumped together.” He recounts Smith saying that he has tried to bring a more disciplined view of what information operations is, and make certain that ISAF does not have activities bleeding into one another. De-linking these functions will make such blending even less likely.

By making strategic communications an entity rather than a way of operating, organizations increase the divide between rhetoric and action. Communications umbrella organizations segregate public affairs activities from routine operations. Rather than looking to build new structures, we should be changing the processes. Strategic communication should permeate the organization. Leaders should weigh the effects of their actions against effects on the population or adversary perception and train their troops to think likewise. A model
“strat comm” savvy public affairs officer is one who thinks of achieving desired effects through prudent public affairs activities, implements and integrates communication strategies and techniques supporting all operations, and provides sound advice to the commander. How do we move toward this ideal?

**Education and Training**

New “strat comm” structures and public affairs reorganization did not happen arbitrarily. Leaders need to solve problems, public affairs officers are not always part of the solution, and neither has received adequate training to operate in today’s information environment. Without the requisite skills and knowledge, leaders experiment with communication deficiencies including contracted outsourcing for these functions. Had public affairs officers produced desired effects consistently, there would have been no reorganizations and perhaps better advice to the commander. How do we move toward this ideal?

A recent article, “In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication,” by Dennis M. Murphy, states that “doctrinal underpinnings are absent” and the institutional culture prefers conventional kinetic applications. Murphy thinks the military needs a “forcing-function” to drive information efforts. He suggests instituting a commander-articulated “information end-state” alongside the doctrinally established military end-state that drives all operational planning. This approach will shorten the timeline for bringing the military toward Mullen’s call to shift to “a way of thinking.” However, this is only a starting point.

Declaring an information end-state will not make commanders better in communication or grasping the strategic implications of their actions and rhetoric. Hastings suggests a deeper institutional change is necessary. He says we need to give commanders the breadth and depth of understanding to operate in the information realm. He observes that the “very top guys get it” but “as you move down to the colonel levels, are they going to have to learn the lessons as the others did?” Hastings thinks communication instruction for officers should be given from accession, reinforced at every level of institutional education throughout an officer’s career, and incorporated into training. He points out that all officers, regardless of specialty, learn the value and necessity of planning for enabling functions, such as logistics or signal support, without which military operations fail. Communication and public affairs are just as critical, particularly for today’s counterinsurgency operations, yet are not thoroughly taught.

The paucity in communication education, exacerbated by a lack of doctrine, is not surprising because we do not view it as an enabling function. New military officers are expected to become experts in the complex art and science of warfighting through rigorous courses and training directly associated with their specialty. These specialty courses vary in length from six months to a year and leave them little time for non-critical tasks. The public affairs officer basic qualification course for all military services is 43 days. It is the only required public affairs-specific training for the remainder of an officer’s career. Because public affairs officer selection differs among the military services, the amount of on-the-job experience attained by the time an officer reaches mid-level and senior ranks vary. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps public affairs officers typically begin
their careers shortly after entry into service as lieutenants or ensigns. Many Army public affairs officers enter the field after more than 10 years in service in other Army specialties. Both of these accession methods are beneficial. Beginning a career and remaining in that field for the duration of the service obligation produces highly experienced, specialized personnel. However, military services currently favor combat arms skills, so such singular specialization may preclude selection to senior grades. Conversely, the Army’s model provides public affairs officers operational experience in other fields, producing a better-rounded professional whom combat arms practitioners may consider more credible. None of the services has routinely promoted public affairs officers to general officer levels. Only the Navy and the Army have career public affairs flag and general officers.

Military career progression requires officers, including public affairs officers, to attend an intermediate level education course and then, if selected, one of the senior service colleges. These institutions present opportunities to incorporate increasing levels of communication education. When selected to attend these schools, public affairs officers can contribute to their colleagues’ understanding of communication integration. As an officer progresses in rank, opportunities for specialized communication, public diplomacy, and other associated fields should be required. We should provide all senior leaders with the academic foundations to apply strategic communication in an operational environment that demands interagency cooperation and synchronization in U.S. interventions or conflict. The Nation needs to produce military leaders who think beyond kinetic solutions. This should not be the exception, but the norm.

In addition to institutional opportunities afforded all officers, public affairs officers have limited opportunities to train with industry and attend graduate programs. Expansion of these programs with the addition of strategic studies and communication academic fellowships to think-tanks and graduate schools can create the needed cadre of senior-level public affairs experts. Along with well-educated, forward-thinking strategic leaders, equally qualified and capable public affairs officers are needed to advise them and prevent the blurring of lines between propaganda and appropriate public information.

Conclusion

This article is not a comprehensive exploration of the full scope of strategic communications, public affairs, and information operations challenges. Other considerations in preparing military leaders and public affairs officers to operate in the information environment include education in sociology, anthropology, and related fields. These areas would certainly provide officers with a better appreciation for the human-factor, as could expansion of foreign language proficiency and foreign military exchange programs.

This article looks narrowly at recent changes in communication approaches and public affairs issues. My recommendations include—

- Establishing, either by law or by regulation, parameters for military information operations and public information.
- Separating public affairs activities from influence operations to remove real or perceived bleed-over.
- Re-instituting strong public affairs and information operations integration across all staff planning and functions.
- Reestablishing public affairs as a special staff function where it has been abdicated.
- Changing doctrine to force deliberate planning for communication.
- Changing educational institutions to better educate officers on communication and strategic effects throughout their careers.
- Improving and expanding specialized public affairs officer training.

Existing gray areas in military communication activities leave room for the possibility of irrevocable damage to the U.S. military’s credibility and the reputation of the United States. Today’s wars are, and many future conflicts may likely be, counterinsurgencies. The lynchpin of such conflicts is the indigenous population. When they have sufficient trust and confidence in their government and international partners, they will win. If the U.S. military operates poorly and proves to be untrustworthy in word and deed, it dooms itself and the Nation’s well-meaning interventions to failure. As the war in Afghanistan continues and the U.S. military prepares for whatever may come next, we must make changes now to how the military operates and communicates to the public and the world. The Nation’s credibility is at stake.
INFORMATION WAR

4. The term “propaganda” is not defined in U.S. code, U.S. military doctrine for information, or public operations. For the purposes of this paper, it means the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purposes of persuasion to help or injure an institution or cause. As a public affairs practitioner, I interpret the intent of public affairs restrictions against propaganda as meaning the release or withholding of information in an attempt to persuade the U.S. public rather than simply to inform.
12. Hastings interview.
18. I draw these conclusions from my experiences as the Combined Joint Task Force-101 and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) public affairs officer during OEF IX, March 2008-June 2009. This division replaced a headquarters that had adopted the subordination of public affairs to the effects director. The departing unit’s public affairs officer and external observers recommended returning to the traditional public affairs organization. Under the effects cell, the outgoing unit experienced reduced timeliness in information release; over-production of soft news press releases (which, as one reporter confided, was viewed as “useless U.S. propaganda”); and an inability to provide candid public affairs advice to the commander. Based upon these recommendations, CJTF-101 reverted to public affairs as a special staff function but with command emphasis to integrate public affairs activities across all operations and for all operations to integrate with public affairs.
19. Mullen, 4.
22. Ignatius.
24. Mullen, 2.
25. Hastings interview.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. I am an Army officer with 21 years of service, 10 as a public affairs officer. The observations provided are based upon my experiences and understanding of the public affairs accession and officer career development.

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PHOTO: An Afghan child offers a flower to U.S. Army SGT John M. Davis, near Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 14 April 2011. (U.S. Army, SPC Edward A. Garibay)

New Norms for the 21st Century Soldier

Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane, U.S. Army

Because future armed conflict will remain in the realm of uncertainty, Army forces demand skills and expertise that, although present within the Army, are not specifically designed into the structure of operating forces or are not trained, tracked, or developed by the military (often these are civilian skills of reserve component personnel). The Army must develop a scheme for identifying and tracking the relevant skill sets that are resident in the Total Force so that it can apply this expertise to future demands.

The Army Capstone Concept

More than nine years of armed conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have given the Army a multitude of lessons to assess and learn from. The era of persistent conflict has brought change across all military operations and training levels. Operational realities such as no frontlines or rear areas, an enemy in and among the population, and competition for popular support have forced us to learn many hard lessons.

Chief among them is the realization that specialized skills are essential for successful operations. The specialized skills required of soldiers today and in the future are articulated in this article as New Norms. They include operational adaptability, cultural and language proficiency, negotiation, digital literacy and space knowledge, weapons technical intelligence, and site exploitation. These specialized skills must now become universal tasks as soldiers continue to face the demands of the current fight.

Leader Development Strategy

The genesis for the discussion of New Norms is the Army Leader Development Strategy, which builds on the Army’s experiences after the end of the Cold War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It assumes that the future operational environment will be even more uncertain, complex, and competitive than today’s is, as hybrid threats challenge the Army across the full spectrum of operations.
The outcome of a campaign of learning over the past ten years, the Army Leader Development Strategy responds to these challenges and demands. It seeks to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative Army leaders. Leaders at all levels must appreciate the complexity of the dynamic security environment in which they operate. They need to have or gain knowledge and understanding of geopolitics, culture, and language. They must act on opportunities within the scope of their units’ collective knowledge and capability.

The strategy also identifies and develops leaders with expertise in financial management, program management, acquisition, education, strategic planning, and force development. Implementation of the strategy recognizes the necessary balance between leadership and technical expertise within leaders, critical to how we address the responsibilities given to us under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

**Operational Adaptability**

*The Army Capstone Concept, The Army Operating Concept, and Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,* reference soldier specialized skills and the importance of culture, language, and technology for soldiers today. The central idea of *The Army Capstone Concept* is operational adaptability—being comfortable with ambiguity and decentralization and being willing to accept risk and make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation. This is essential to developing situational understanding and seizing and exploiting the initiative.

Operational adaptability requires a mastery of operational art and the ability to link the tactical employment of forces to policy goals and strategic objectives. It requires proficient forces that understand how to combine Joint, Army, interagency, and multinational capabilities to assist friends; protect and reassure indigenous populations; and identify, isolate, and defeat enemies.

Operational adaptability requires cohesive teams and resilient soldiers who are capable of overcoming the enduring psychological and moral challenges of combat. It also requires, before we enter combat, in-depth understanding of how we generate units and capabilities under the Title 10 authorities and responsibilities.
Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the Army’s transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn in Iraq have put great demands on soldier knowledge in culture and foreign languages. Arguably, Arabic and Afghan cultural awareness and basic language proficiency in Arabic, Dari, or Pashto have become skill sets required of the post-9/11 Army. There is also the potential for Farsi, Chinese, or another language to come to the forefront in future military engagements. Cultural study guides and language instructional pamphlets have joined operations, logistics, intelligence, and technical field manuals on our bookshelves. These interpersonal “soft skills” have never been as important as they are today because of the key role that human terrain plays in a counterinsurgency and other operations across the globe.

The Army designed its Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy to remove gaps in its capability to influence different cultures and operate effectively within them. Battlefield lessons learned have demonstrated that language proficiency and cultural understanding are vital enablers for full spectrum operations.

Initial Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom lessons learned indicated that soldiers and their leaders had a limited understanding of how cultural considerations influence the planning, execution, and outcomes of military operations. In addition, insufficient foreign language capability across the Army limited unit, individual leader, and soldier effectiveness. Lessons learned also revealed that the Army did not have a bench of future leaders with cultural and foreign language capabilities. This shortfall reduces the Army’s overall effectiveness in meeting the needs of the geographic combatant commanders.

To be successful in full spectrum operations, soldiers must have foreign language skills and cultural comprehension. Existing education and training programs and other initiatives are helping to meet this need, particularly for specialists, but they do not meet the Army’s broader requirements. To close the gaps in cultural understanding and foreign language skills, we must build unit capability and expand the scope of leader development. Increased scope, emphasis, and rigor are required in culture and foreign language training to support a unit’s training for its mission essential tasks during the Army Force Generation process leading to deployment for partnership building or combat missions. We must revise leader development programs to produce Army leaders who understand how cultural comprehension and foreign language capabilities affect task accomplishment. Consequently, the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy is guided by and directly supports the Army Leader Development Strategy.

The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy is a holistic strategy for cultural and foreign language education and training to close capability gaps. It links leaders’ and soldiers’ knowledge, skills, and abilities to unit capability to enable the execution of missions and tasks. The end state is an Army with the right blend of culture awareness and foreign language expertise to facilitate full spectrum operations among other cultures. (Follow-on work is necessary to account for the career development of civilians through integrating a culture and foreign language strategy within the Civilian Education System.)

Cultural Awareness

Traditionally, the study of foreign cultures has been the domain of anthropologists, foreign area officers, and Special Forces. Culture is an integrated system of socially acquired values, beliefs, and rules of conduct governing the range of accepted behaviors in any given society. Cultural differences distinguish societies from one another. Cultural awareness implies being aware of cultural norms, behaviors, and rules of conduct at the level of realization or knowledge. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, emphasize its importance.

Cultural awareness has become an especially important competency for small-unit leaders. Perceptive junior leaders learn how cultures affect military
operations. They study major world cultures and put a priority on learning the details of the new operational environment when deployed. Different solutions are required in each different cultural context. Effective small-unit leaders adapt to new situations, realizing their words and actions may be interpreted differently in different cultures. Cultural awareness requires self-awareness, self-directed learning, and adaptability.7

Knowing foreign cultures requires understanding of what people and societies value or love. All soldiers and leaders must be able to look at situations through another culture’s lenses. For example, in Muslim countries cultural awareness includes knowing not to give someone money or pass food with the left hand. Soldiers should strive to comprehend the dynamics of more complex cultural situations.

The Army may benefit a great deal by expanding assignments, training, and education of its foreign area officers. These officers can be effective in bridging the divide between cultures to meet America’s national interests or theater strategy abroad. Foreign area offices could better support the Army at war through more effective assignment of its regional specialists in theater, by more closely blending their skills and education (e.g., The Defense Strategy Course) with that of those who work as strategists (Functional Area 59), and by tying strategy to regional partner-building activities. Affording foreign area officers more career incentives and promotion pathways will help build a bench of experienced leaders to tackle the toughest challenges in the future.8

Negotiation

The empowered, enabled leader’s responsibilities increase in a decentralized environment.9 Military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have tactical importance, operational significance, and strategic implications in the daily life of soldiers as they attempt to secure neighborhoods, strengthen political institutions, acquire information and intelligence, and gain cooperation. Negotiating is a critical warfighting skill. Our negotiation skills influence the Army’s ability to meet strategic goals and accomplish missions efficiently and effectively.10

Strategic leaders often rely on negotiation to obtain cooperation and support to accomplish a
mission. Commanders who ordinarily only issue orders now negotiate plans and actions with agency partners, partner nations, and nongovernmental agencies. In the spirit of cooperation and to get things done, commanders sometimes have to interpret all requirements to the satisfaction of one or more partners.\textsuperscript{11}

Successful negotiating requires a wide range of interpersonal skills. To resolve conflicting views, strategic leaders must visualize several end states, while maintaining a clear idea of the best one. They use tact to justify standing firm on nonnegotiable points while simultaneously communicating respect for other participants.\textsuperscript{12}

A successful negotiator must exercise good judgment and be mentally agile and skilled in active listening. Negotiators must be able to diagnose unspoken agendas and detach themselves from the negotiation process. Successful negotiating also involves communicating a clear position on all issues while conveying a willingness to bargain on negotiable ones. This entails recognizing what is acceptable to all parties and working towards a common goal.\textsuperscript{13}

Digital Literacy

The New Norm of digital literacy reflects the technological advances that help soldiers access, acquire, process, and move information on the modern battlefield. Most soldiers entering the Army today acquired many of their basic digital literacy skills while growing up. Some skills, such as establishing a local area network or using digital communications devices, came with specific military occupational specialties in the past. Now, due to their common use by the public, these skills are becoming “universal tasks.”

Army Digital Literacy (D-Lit) is individual awareness of attitudes toward and abilities to appropriately use digital tools to accomplish Army missions and personal and professional development.\textsuperscript{14}

The four D-Lit competency levels are—

- Baseline.
- Functional.
- Advanced.
- Expert.

Baseline. All soldiers and DA civilians must be competent, responsible users of digital technology who can communicate, locate, transform, and share information through digital devices and services to meet their mission or job requirements. Assuring that every soldier and DA civilian has baseline digital competencies maximizes the intersection of teachable moments with point-of-need training and learning content delivered digitally anytime, anywhere.

Functional. Operators and managers must possess specific knowledge, skills, and abilities to use, manage, assess, and understand digital technologies and apply them to meet the Army mission in real-world situations. They must also sustain baseline D-Lit competencies.

Advanced. Knowledge managers, system administrators, bandwidth monitors, and technical professionals down to the help desk are responsible for implementing, developing, and maintaining digital technologies and applications to meet Army missions in real-world situations. They must achieve this competency level and sustain baseline and functional D-Lit competencies.

Expert. Highest-capability users, such as managers, developers, and technical engineers, have the training, expertise, and experience needed to...
control risks and to optimize opportunities for digital technology to meet Army missions in real world, simulated, and forecast circumstances. They must meet the requirements for expert and sustain all three lower D-Lit competencies. Establishing a baseline for digital literacy is critical to TRADOC as it implements Army Learning Concept 2015.

These capabilities will be increasingly evident in young soldiers and DA civilians new to the Army as U.S. schools emphasize digital literacy. The Army may assess these capabilities during accession, but the requirement to make soldiers and civilian employees capable and “Army ready” will continue to be an early-career training necessity. Individuals advancing through their careers will become more digitally literate at points of need, either required or voluntary.

In a basic sense, digital literacy is the ability to navigate basic online functions such as email or to simply possess a minimum level of technology knowledge. It is also the ability to use new tools such as smart phones and social media to full advantage and to understand information and communication technology so that one has the ability to find information, on demand, using any viable online means to do so, without hesitation.

The use of smart phones and iPad-like devices in the civilian sector highlights the potential of smart phone technologies and digital applications for the military. This includes administrative actions, training, and battlefield tactical functions. That’s why the Army Capabilities Integration Center and the Army’s chief information officer initiated a series of pilot programs under an umbrella term, “Connecting Soldiers to Digital Applications.”

The Army is exploring how best to exploit small, lightweight, and affordable phones in tactical operations. The Army Evaluation Task Force evaluated both military-developed and commercially developed tactical applications for position location and identification reporting, calls for fire, MEDEVAC requests, and other situational awareness and mission command task features.

Other battlefield applications under operational concept review include—

- Threat Act Program. This program enables soldiers who have left a forward operating base to continuously search and update information data repositories on enemy activity in their area of operations.
- Soldier Eyes. This program uses phone sensors for situational awareness on location. It links

Since the Army launched its MilGaming portal in February 2011, more than 12,000 people have logged some 10,000 hours downloading game software such as Virtual BattleSpace and sharing user-created scenarios and videos.
into data repositories to identify key locations and provide directions and distance to enable appropriate movement.

- **New Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Feeds.** This capability provides a day or night live video feed from a camera, mounted on a vehicle, to a unit’s headquarters, thus allowing the unit’s leaders to see what their soldiers see on the ground.

- **“Media Share.”** This application allows soldiers to submit photos or video to their higher headquarters and helps in the collection and analysis of intelligence.

- **Future Connecting Soldiers to Digital Applications Program efforts.** These may include a gateway project and base stations to integrate smart phones with tactical radio networks and mission command systems. Other devices, such as pads, tablets, and other hand-held mobile devices, may assist soldiers in field and in garrison with planning, operations, education, and training. The pace of change in mobile networking is accelerating, and the Army needs to stay connected to these opportunities.

Reliance on digital and cyber media continues to grow as modern armies move to keep up with new information technologies. The 1 October 2010 creation of Cyber Command reflects this. It is an Army organization that plans, coordinates, and integrates network operations to defend all Army networks to ensure that the Army retains freedom of action in cyberspace. The Army must leverage the capabilities of cyber travelling through the electromagnetic spectrum and control it to support freedom of maneuver and degrade our enemy. The real potential for cyber attacks at all echelons and the cyber electromagnetic operational uncertainty ahead identify “cyber skills” as a potential New Norm, requiring training and education in the future.

### Space Knowledge

The Army has evolved from a space-enabled force to a fully space-dependent Army in which effective execution of full spectrum operations depends on soldiers at all levels understanding, leveraging, and employing capabilities—space-based systems such as line-of-sight satellite communications, GPS-provided navigation, precision engagement, and timing protocols; terrestrial and atmospheric monitoring for operational environment awareness; missile warning; and multi-discipline intelligence. Space equipment and materiel have provided “normalized” capabilities to the force for decades, but many leaders and soldiers do not know how to integrate the capabilities effectively or to plan for disruptions to operations.

Space knowledge involves more than just knowing that space systems provide capabilities. It includes understanding operational parameters, risks, and constraints, such as the effect of the sun and terrestrial environment on systems, and having the ability to recognize and mitigate denial, disruption, or interference with space-enabled capabilities.

Today’s leaders cannot go to war or into an operational environment without satellite communications, GPS, space-based ISR, environmental monitoring, and missile warning. They should understand the planning, integration, and coordination necessary to fully access and integrate all available space capabilities and effects. The Army must incorporate space education and knowledge across the learning continuum, stressing the implications of degraded space capabilities and emphasizing mitigation techniques through rigorous training scenarios.

Space is no longer the exclusive domain of the U.S. military. It has now become a contested environment. Space knowledge, as a New Norm, must include the ability to harness the power of space-enabled capabilities and mitigate their denial and disruption.

### Weapons Technical Intelligence

Weapons technical intelligence, as a New Norm, stems from the technical and forensic collection and exploitation of captured materials that enable analysts to conduct trend, pattern, and link analysis. The intelligence products derived from the weapons technical intelligence process directly support force
protection, planning, targeting, material identification and sourcing, and even criminal prosecution. Acquiring evidence assists law enforcement in a sovereign country to find the responsible culprits of crimes so that they can prosecute them under the country’s laws. This helps deter future criminal actions through effective law enforcement and strengthens the host or partner nation through application of the rule of law, a key component of democratic governance. Commanders benefit from weapons technical intelligence throughout full spectrum operations in which the enemy uses asymmetric means as their principal method of invasion and attack.16

Weapons intelligence teams are small tactical teams that provide support to Army brigade combat teams and Marine Corps regimental combat teams. They provide commanders on the battlefield with a dedicated, counter-improvised explosive device-focused, tactical collection and exploitation capability in support of targeting.

Commanders may employ the teams during raids, in a cordon and search, at attack sites (post-blast IED, sniper incidents, etc.), or at locations where weapons are discovered (pre-blast IED detected and rendered safe, cache sites, bomb-making facilities, and others).

Site Exploitation

Site exploitation is another scientifically and technically oriented New Norm. It consists of search techniques and collection methods to preserve documents, material, and tactical questioning results. This enables rapid exploitation of information gained from the site to facilitate follow-on actions to attack the network. Site exploitation requires an awareness of the local culture to exploit collected information and material fully.

Information at a site may take a variety of forms. It encompasses all potential sources of information, and is defined as facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. The medium can include documents, computers, recordings, human sources, and materials such as weapons, ammunition, equipment, chemicals, and supplies. Site exploitation is an enabler to processes, such as weapons technical intelligence, that provide the Joint commander and small units the ability to exert and maintain constant pressure on the enemy network.
Summary and Conclusion

New Norms stress the value of soldier operational adaptability and knowledge of foreign cultures and language, negotiation, digital literacy and space knowledge, weapons technical intelligence, and site exploitation. These New Norms emerged from tough lessons learned in current operations, as well as from insights gained during concept and capability development.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is working to accelerate the process of institutionalizing these skills through training and by enhancing programs of instruction at Army schoolhouses. We must continue to standardize individual tasks at home station, military schools, and the combat training centers to eliminate varying competency levels from school to school.

As the Army continues to adapt, additional New Norms will surely emerge, thereby adding to the demands put on the education and training infrastructure. Arguably, under certain battlefield conditions, these New Norms are as important as conducting physical fitness and maintaining soldier marksman-ship and proficiency in warrior tasks and small unit battle drills. New Norms are yet another reflection of how the Army is working to adapt to the changing nature of conflict in the post 9/11 era and to the changing face of emerging technology. MR

NOTES

3. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept, (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 August 2010).
4. The Army Capstone Concept, 16.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 7-3.
13. Ibid., 12-25.
"And you have to forget your wealth in this war. You have to make it a war of the poor. You have to ask infinitely more of men than the materiel."

— Jean Lartéguy, The Face of War

IT WAS MY fourth day in command, and I was returning from a visit with one of my teams. We rolled up just as a dust-off lifted off next to a wadi intersecting Highway 1. On board: one dead Romanian captain and two wounded Romanian soldiers. Welcome to Zabul, 2009.

It was April, and I was the new provincial lead mentor for the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Zabul, southern Afghanistan. I arrived with a somewhat nebulous mission to “mentor” the local police forces. The mission was nebulous in that I am an infantryman, not a police officer, and the Afghan forces are not quite soldiers but not police officers, either. I had a collection of assets to help me in my mission, including Afghan police officers in pickup trucks, an ad hoc team of various National Guardsmen, and a sprinkling of active duty leaders and Navy corpsmen—not exactly the “book force” for mentoring or counterinsurgency.

I did have a wide-ranging, if self-defined, mandate. The successes and failures would be largely mine. This allowed me room to experiment and led to some tangible, positive tactical results and a template for employing indigenous and NATO forces as the American mission in Afghanistan moves forward.

My deputy chief of police rolled up with four green ANP Ford Rangers. Impeccably dressed as always, he informed me that his intelligence indicated an improvised explosive device (IED) cell had fled to the Sur Ghar Mountains via the Surkhagan Valley.

Wishing to make a good impression, I told him, “I think we would be wise to pursue and catch them.” He was testing me, and my answer proved to be the one he was looking for. He smiled and walked off to lead the way.

This would be the first of five separate fights and well over two dozen missions in three months in and around the Surkhagan Valley.
The Five Fights

The Tarnak River parallels Highway 1 in Zabul Province. During the springtime, fording sites are at a premium. Consequently, it took several minutes for us to find one. We then drove due east at a leisurely pace in deference to the terrain, the dust, and our up-armored HMMWVs’ creaking suspensions. Traveling near the back of the convoy, I saw our HMMWVs and police trucks suddenly spread out and the crews dismount while PKM, .50-caliber machine guns, and MK-19 grenade launchers opened up to engage an unseen enemy. The Taliban had gone back to their objective rally point 10 kilometers east of Highway 1 in the orchards surrounding the town of Ebrahimkhel. The Taliban were clearly surprised, yet apparently unconcerned at our arrival. Here, I was witnessing Pashtun warfare for the first time—an 800-meter live fire exercise featuring the boom of rocket-propelled grenades firing and exploding, Hungarian automatic assault rifles firing at a 30-degree elevated tilt to accommodate the long range, and a Russian machine gun fired at the hip by a slowly walking Afghan policeman who was scattering his comrades only meters in front of him with comedic results. The cacophony of sound with the occasional snap and hiss of ineffective return fire proved as exhilarating as it was worthless.

Grabbing the nearest interpreter, or “terp,” I got the deputy chief of police to remount his troops while I relayed the same order to the three U.S. HMMWVs. Unfortunately, the “action front” battle drill had left one HMMWV mired in the flooded fields. The Afghan police, in no mood to move any closer, and the U.S. soldiers, wisely unwilling to leave a truck behind, took 45 minutes to fix the problem. By that time, the Taliban had fled to the safety of the mountains 10 kilometers further east. We rolled up to the villages of Abdulqader Kalay and Surkhagan well after the Taliban’s hasty retreat and conducted a dismounted patrol in each village—to no effect.

Thus ended the first fight of the Surkhagan. Lessons learned:

- Afghans like to shoot their guns.
- However, they do not like to engage close enough to get shot.
- They will deliberately engage at nonlethal distances to ensure they get to shoot their guns without getting shot.
- The Americans followed the Afghan lead.

Following this fight, the standard order to my
teams was to pursue until you can longer do so—by vehicle if possible, by foot if necessary. Do not stop. Only days later, the revised techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) were proofed.

The second fight of the Surkhagan was similar to the first—at least at the outset. We received a call at Forward Operating Base Apache, our base in Qalat, reporting an ambush on Highway 1. We rolled in 10 minutes, linking up with the deputy chief of police en route. Speeding down Highway 1, my team quickly encountered an Afghan army company arrayed formidably along both sides of the road with a U.S. embedded transition team accompanying them. The “Zeus,” the Afghan nickname for the twin 23-mm cannons on the back of an 8-ton truck, stood prominently on a small hill. My deputy chief of police went to the Afghan army commander while I went to his American mentor. It took but a minute for both of us to get the same story: “We were ambushed, we shot back, the enemy fled east, we won, battle over.” I walked over to the deputy and said simply, “Surkhagan.” He silently smiled yet again, and we repeated the actions of our fight less than two weeks ago.

The Taliban had adjusted their TTPs as well. They had pushed their objective rally point back another six kilometers to the town of Abdulqader Kalay, where they engaged us again at the predicted 800-meter range. The Afghan police started its “action front” battle drill, but U.S. forces sped forward in the face of the Taliban’s ineffective fire. The Afghan police, shocked, quickly remounted and followed.

The standard TTP for operating in built-up areas with three HMMWVs is for two of them to maneuver cross-country on each side of the town, covering for “pissers,” or escaping Taliban. The third HMMWV would then push through the center of town with the Afghan police following. It was a decent tactic as long as the Taliban played along. We were fortunate because they did. The Taliban had not anticipated our spirited pursuit. Two died in the town, and the Taliban left their bodies behind as they fled on motorcycles to the town of Surkhagan and we continued our pursuit. As I was in the third HMMWV in the convoy as we rolled into Abdulqader Kalay, I became the lead vehicle in the main effort, driving through the center of the town.

We received ineffective fire from the hills and from within the town itself. I dismounted with one U.S. soldier, one terp, and six Afghan police and
continued the pursuit as planned, on foot. Our solitary antagonist was 200 meters away, ensconced behind a mud wall surrounding a vineyard. Using M203 grenade launchers, AK-47 and M4 rifle fire, and smoke and fragmentary grenades, we closed to within 50 meters of his position.

For those unfamiliar with southern Afghanistan’s vineyards, a lack of wood and a preponderance of dirt cause farmers to use three-foot-high mud walls as trellises. These mud walls run parallel to each other three to five meters apart. We climbed over dozens of such walls in order to close with the remaining Taliban fighter. This was a slow and exhausting task. When we finally came within close range of the fighter, a well-placed M203 round silenced him. However, his bravery as the Taliban force’s rear guard was rewarded. As we closed to his position, two Taliban PKM machine guns opened up on our force from the hills 600 meters away and 300 feet above us in altitude. The fire was effective, if nonlethal. An 18-inch-high mound of dirt to my front was adequate cover for me, and my physical exhaustion precluded a sprint to a wadi 50 meters in front of me. We exchanged indecisive fire with the Taliban for several minutes while the remainder of the U.S. forces maneuvered to put mounted and dismounted fire on the PKM machine gunners dominating my small element. The synchronized U.S. counterattack by fire finally silenced the guns, and I walked back to the center of town with my men. I had recovered physically, but the hills and heat had conquered me mentally. More so, I might add, than the Taliban’s surprisingly well-executed break-contact battle drill. In retrospect, we should have continued the pursuit.

During our mounted exfiltration, we reclaimed the bodies abandoned in Abdulqader Kalay. One was Mullah Qayum, the Taliban military commander for Qalat District.

Thus ended the second fight of the Surkhagan. Lessons learned:

- Pursuit works, provided the Taliban do not know we are going to do it.
- Motorcycle-mounted Taliban move faster than HMMWV-mounted American soldiers and truck-mounted Afghan Security Forces.
- Ten miles of running per week is not enough to keep in fighting shape.
- Exhaustion results in part from carrying too much gear.
- Afghan police like killing Taliban. When properly led, they were more aggressive than I anticipated.
- You run out of hand grenades quickly in close combat.

After-action adjustments included allowing dismounts and track commanders to remove the side inserts from our body armor, but required them to carry more water and extra fragmentary grenades. I increased my daily runs to four miles. We realized that stopping to pick up dead Taliban is a good way to collect information. Had we delayed, they would have been stripped of their weapons and cell phones.

Still, I remained without an answer to the Taliban’s superior mobility. Only helicopters could counter the Taliban’s fast, all-terrain motorcycles, but dedicated helicopter assets were not available in Zabul Province at the time. We needed help. The death of Mullah Qayum gave my forces some credibility with the greater “Team Zabul.” The team included a Special Forces advanced operational base with several A-Teams working throughout Zabul and could request dedicated helicopter assets. With a good plan, perhaps Special Operations Command (SOCOM) would provide helicopter support to alleviate my mobility disadvantage. It took two weeks to develop our plan and another two weeks for approval, allocation, and execution. Our final plan was resource-intensive and impressive. (The mandatory 45 slides were magnificent in their high-resolution imagery and detailed phases.)

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment’s long-distance, heavy-lift helicopter would transport multiple A-Teams with foreign special operations forces to a landing zone right outside Surkhagan in the early morning. To quickly gain the high ground, additional small teams would insert themselves just next to the hilltops from which the enemy shot at me. Ground forces including Special Forces, explosive ordnance disposal specialists, Romanian Army soldiers, and Afghan police would converge on the town of Surkhagan from the north and west. B-1s, AC-130s, and Reapers would blanket the sky. No Taliban could escape this unstoppable force, and indeed, no Taliban did. Their complete absence made Surkhagan a dry hole that day.
Even so, it was about a 72-hour operation from start to finish. The 160th would not fly during the day. By 1000 hours on the day of the operation, we knew it was over. The ground forces stayed with the air assault force until 2200 and nightfall. While waiting, we did some presence patrols in Abdulqader Kalay, Bazugay to the north of Surkhagan, and Bar Kharowti to the south.

While exfiltrating, insult turned to injury. An Afghan police truck hit an IED in Sin Mandeh, the wadi we used for the exfiltration. Three Afghan policemen were severely injured and flown out. We remained on-site overnight, awaiting daybreak to continue our exfiltration. A B-1 circled overhead through the night; it relayed the presence of possible Taliban, but little more information than that. However, there was nothing we could work with, despite our desire to do so.

Thus, the third fight of the Surkhagan ended as a clear victory for the Taliban. Lessons learned:

● Taliban move. Where they were yesterday is not going to be where they are today.
● Any operation based on information 24-hours old, much less three weeks old, is already a failure.
● Helicopter requests require detailed planning, but the intelligence you use to justify those requests will be too old to act upon by the time you get your helicopters. Therefore, you cannot move on the ground faster than the Taliban can, ever.

Dusting off my old U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-8, Counter Guerilla Operations, circa 1986, I ordered my teams to “go old school.” We would employ night ambushes to interdict the Taliban’s movements. A night operation is laborious, risky, and usually fruitless. Despite these limitations, action was necessary. Highway 1 was suffering two lethal IED attacks or ambushes a week in Zabul Province. Hardest hit were the Afghan police and civilians.

Night ambushes were of limited value because they were almost invariably compromised during infiltration. Fortunately, the Taliban proved largely incapable of countering them, as the ambush force was usually of platoon strength or greater. The lethal IED count did drop by half. The mere fact we were conducting night ambushes seemed to give the Taliban pause. For two weeks, my teams ran an ambush about every other night. Three teams were arrayed along Highway 1 from Tarnak Wa Jaldak District in the south (Team Viper), to Qalat District (Team Swampfox), and to the north out of Shajoy District (Team Nomad). We used rolling drop-offs and presence-patrol leave-behinds during the day, and long dismounted marches from the forward operating bases and combat outposts at night.

During the fourth fight of the Surkhagan, Team Nomad finally brought us success. I had authorized and encouraged cross-boundary operations for operational flexibility and for basic deception. Team Nomad used a long, 60-km cross-country movement to place an ambush in Qalat, Team Swampfox’s area of operations. While en route, they had a meeting engagement with a Taliban team and captured two Taliban with weapons. The Nomad commander made the decision to continue with the ambush, hoping that the Taliban would assume he would cancel it due to the earlier contact. However, the Taliban counter-ambushed him with a platoon-sized force outside the village of Duri. Team Nomad immediately responded with a decisive counterattack and aggressive pursuit of the Taliban, which resulted in three Taliban killed in action and recovered, light casualties among the Afghan police, and one U.S. soldier wounded but able to return to duty. Intelligence and enemy radio traffic indicated several more Taliban wounded, but they escaped or at least remained undiscovered in the desert night.

Team Swampfox immediately responded with reinforcements, resupplied Nomad’s depleted ammunition, gathered additional Afghan policemen, and pursued the enemy. We arrived an hour after the contact but found no additional Taliban. Afghan police from Qalat (part of Team Swampfox) searched the area and discovered one motorcycle and two bodies, while Nomad maintained the perimeter and redistributed ammunition. One of the bodies recovered was Mullah Karaman, the replacement for Mullah Qayum.

If luck is the meeting of preparation and opportunity, then we were indeed lucky. During the same
week as the killing of Mullah Karaman—during the fourth fight of the Surkhagan—the 82nd Airborne Aviation Brigade detached a task force of Blackhawks and Apaches to Zabul. While the request procedures for the Blackhawks were laborious and long, the Apaches were available for immediate close-combat attack if a friendly element found itself in a “troops in contact” situation or under “imminent threat” of attack.

Also working in our favor was the fact that we had a Taliban informant supplying us with information. The informant let the Afghan police chief know that the Taliban’s Quetta Shura was unhappy with the deaths of two senior Taliban commanders and was sending a new commander from outside the province to the area. My chief of police suspected that any such foreign commander would need to execute an ambush soon after arrival to “prove himself.” He estimated that in about four days a platoon-sized Taliban force would gather in the Surkhagan Valley for this impending attack.

I concluded that if I couldn’t move faster than the Taliban, I would have to slow them down. The ambushes were working to a degree, but were certainly not decisive. Working with other members of Task Force Zabul, we envisioned Apaches fixing the enemy while the Afghan police moved in to finish them on the ground. However, as the third fight demonstrated, if I wanted to defeat them on the ground, I had to know where to look. I needed better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

I went to the U.S. liaison for the Romanians who made up the Task Force Zabul command team and asked him if he had any Predator coverage available. He did, but it was for the wrong day. After a few hours of deft negotiation with unknown higher and lateral task force headquarters, he secured Reaper coverage for me on the day I needed. Then I went over to the aviation battalion commander. She agreed that two Apaches would be on stand-by that day. Should a unit find itself in “imminent threat,” the Apaches would provide close combat attack aviation support.

The plan still needed refinement. The Apaches, flying at 7,500 feet in 90 degree temperature, could give me only about an hour of coverage. It took ground vehicles about three hours to travel from Qalat to Surkhagan. If I could not get to Surkhagan before the Apaches ran out of fuel, the Taliban would still escape to the Sur Ghar Mountains. We had to travel two hours without tipping off the Taliban as to our intent. Knowledge of the terrain and cooperation from Taliban spies provided the solution.
The Surkhagan Valley contains only two passes through the Sur Ghar Mountains that are passable with four-wheel vehicles: Dab Pass to the south and Shajoy Pass to the north. Surkhagan was key terrain for the Taliban because it provided a pass through the mountains for motorcycles, but not for trucks. The Taliban could use it, but we could not.

The Dab Pass in particular is a notorious choke point marked by a snaking trail lined with burned-out hulks of vehicles that were the victims of IEDs and ambushes. However, the Dab Pass was only 40 minutes from the Surkhagan Pass. If I could get to Dab Pass before the Apaches lifted off from Qalat, we would be able to get in close to the Taliban as they were being held in place by the Apaches and finish them. I asked my chief of police to let it slip to suspected informants that we would be going to the Dab Pass to inspect a nearby town (Shahbazkhel). Hopefully, the jittery Taliban would not consider our movement a threat.

The fifth, and final, fight of the Surkhagan went pretty much according to plan. Reconnaissance detected 20 motorcycles in Abdulkader Kalay near the “start point” at 0500. This meant that somewhere between 20 and 40 Taliban were meeting there. My Afghan police force successfully made it to Shahbazkhel by 0800, and there still was no sign of movement from the Taliban. The Apaches were put on stand-by because of “imminent threat,” and as the Afghan police broke toward Surkhagan, the Apaches launched.

They caught the Taliban in the open desert only a few hundred meters from the Sur Ghar Mountains near an abandoned town called Surgay Tangay. The initial salvo caught the Taliban off guard, and killed many in a matter of minutes. The rest dropped their motorcycles and ran for the hills, but they soon realized that our circling gunships attacked any moving fighters they saw. As predicted, the Taliban took cover and tried to wait us out. By that time, however, the Afghan police were assaulting on line, guided by the Apache pilots.

The Taliban were on the horns of a dilemma. If they stayed still, the Afghan police would discover them and shoot them (five Taliban died this way). If they ran, the Apaches would kill them. Based
upon gun-camera footage, we believe the Apaches’ 30-mm rounds, Hellfire missiles, and folding fin aerial rocket flechettes killed 15 Taliban and possibly wounded another 10, as most Taliban chose to risk being killed by the circling Apaches rather than face the advancing Afghan police and American soldiers.

The fight ended when the Apaches ran low on fuel and left the area. Those Taliban who were far enough away from the Afghan police sweep to make a run for it sprinted to safety on foot, having abandoned their motorcycles. We recovered 10 bodies, an equal number of weapons, and 12 motorcycles.

The Taliban had initially split up into two groups. The larger group went east to the mountains, while four Taliban went west to Highway 1. The Reaper stayed with the group heading west, and we achieved target hand-off, which the returning Apaches coordinated through the joint terminal air controller at Zabul base. All four Taliban in the group heading west were killed. Afghan police linked up with Romanian Army forces and recovered two of the four bodies.

The day was not an unqualified success. The Afghan police executed one captured Taliban. In a cosmic irony of sorts, the man who was believed to have killed the prisoner died two hours later along with another policeman in an IED strike as we exfiltrated in the Duri Mandeh just a kilometer from the scene of Duri Ridge.

The new Taliban commander was killed, along with two other “mullahs.” No lethal IED attacks took place for the next five weeks along Highway 1.

However, we could not replicate the results, as the Afghan police mentor teams stood down from active operations for over 30 days to train new recruits for the upcoming elections. By the time the training was over, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage concentrated on large, deliberate fights in Helmand Province and elsewhere. Finding large groups of Taliban proved impossible without UAV coverage. The lethality of the Apaches working with Afghan police forced the Taliban to be extremely cautious about exposing themselves to attack.

Thus ended the fifth fight of the Surkhagan. Lessons learned:

- Air mobility is essential to countering the Taliban’s mobility advantage.
- The Taliban do not plan weeks in advance, and we should not either.
• Know yourself, know your enemy, and know the terrain.
• Decentralize authority for control and execution to the lowest levels possible to match the flexibility of the enemy. If you do not trust your commanders to execute missions without prior approval, fire them and replace them with people you do trust.

Follow-on Lessons
Regional Police Advisory Command-South and Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-South commanders understood the above principles. While we planned regular operations one week in advance, we delegated the authority to execute no-notice missions based on conditions on the ground.

Subordinate team commanders enjoyed the same freedom of action. Of the five fights described in this article, only two were planned, and the one with the greatest planning turned out to be the least effective.

My forces did not enjoy success because of any particular tactical insight, technology, or person (save our association with the local Afghans and their unmatched knowledge of the enemy and terrain). The one distinguishing feature separating my forces from others within Team Zabul was the freedom of action to move toward the enemy decisively based on the local commander’s initiative.

We employed tactics well-known to the graduate of any basic officer leaders course. Ambushes, patrols, and pursuit are not revolutionary examples of the maneuver arts. They have been the foundation of counterinsurgency operations since Caesar’s time.

American forces in Afghanistan have largely traded mobility for armor and firepower. In the Korangal and elsewhere, we have attempted to bring the Taliban to their demise through the “tethered goat” tactics that failed the French at Dien Bien Phu. The tethered goats—small, isolated combat outposts—while nominally justified as denying key terrain, serve mostly as enticements for the elusive Taliban to expose themselves. Yet, insurgencies are historically won by the force with the greatest mobility. The United States used air mobility and aero-scouts to great effect in Vietnam, but these efforts were resource intensive. The Rhodesian Light Infantry, restrained by their inability to field more than 5,000 soldiers and with limited airlift support at any given time due to crushing embargoes, used a similar though less resource-intensive version they called “Fire Force” based upon lessons learned in Malaysia.1 We must learn from these examples. As troop counts diminish, we must increase our mobility and decentralize our planning and execution authority if we wish to maintain our hard-earned gains.

When empowered junior officers and NCOs lead American counterinsurgency campaigns, we can be very effective, as proven in El Salvador in the 1980s. We have a young officer corps with years of counterinsurgency experience. We must trust the most outstanding of these majors and lieutenant colonels to execute combined arms and air assault operations based on available intelligence, their experience, and their proven ability to work with mentored indigenous forces.

The war of the flag officers is ending in Afghanistan. The success of that war will be measured by historians. The war of the field grade officers approaches. It is that war we must now turn our attention to. Fortunately, our mid-grade officers and NCOs are ready.

The UAV revolution must provide actionable intelligence at the lowest levels possible. Taskings for strategic UAVs must come from the majors and lieutenant colonels to whom we will entrust our future Joint task forces, and those UAVs must send back intelligence to them immediately. Fixed- and rotary-wing air support controlled by these commanders must be available with the requisite command relationship. Our legacy air doctrine designed to defeat the Soviet Union’s strategic power is incapable of doing this mission. Generals McChrystal and Petraeus’s harsh but necessary restrictions on fixed-wing air support enacted to minimize civilian and friendly casualties from errant and poorly executed air strikes prove this. Cheap, reliable, persistent air support is the key to countering the Taliban’s current
mobility advantage. Blackhawks and Chinooks must transport troops to battle. We must never again use a Chinook to fly troops or cargo from one fixed-wing-capable airstrip to another. We must reserve blade hours for moving forces to kill the enemy, not for providing tours for dignitaries. We must resurrect the light attack/armed reconnaissance and light mobility aircraft programs to support U.S. forces, not merely to train partner-nation air forces. In the words of U.S. Air Force spokesman Roger Drinnon, these programs are designed for “nations [that] need an aircraft that’s affordable, inexpensive, and easily maintained.” Unfortunately, the United States is one of those nations, and if the Air Force cannot yet see this, then the Army must stand up and demand these assets. Whether Air Force captains or Army warrant officers fly them is inconsequential in the final analysis. IEDs are claiming the butcher’s toll. We spend billions on counter-IED technology and squander the billions invested in rotary wing aircraft by misusing or restricting their use. The first priority for COIN in the Quadrennial Defense Review is to “increase the availability of rotary wing assets.” The single best way to do that is never use helicopters when airplanes are the better choice.

The Army’s generals are not irrelevant to this new fight, but the arena in which they do battle must change to the political arena. That is where they can do the most for our Army squads.

**Conclusions**

Our ability to gain the trust of the Afghans with whom we fight is the *sine qua non* of any success we enjoy. I cannot hope to lecture an Afghan general with 30 years of experience on how to fight in his home country. I can only suggest ways to perhaps do it a bit better. Effective counterinsurgency depends on Afghan National Security Forces conducting highly dangerous yet essential presence patrols and daily security operations.

The Afghan National Security Forces are trained, equipped, and manned to do this now. The time has come for them to conduct these missions with minimal American assistance, and we must attribute any success we enjoy to them. They are unquestionably militarily superior to the Taliban, their competitors for the leadership of the Afghan people.

The drawdown in Afghanistan presents an outstanding opportunity to redefine our strategic commitment. The surge in Iraq seemed to suggest to some that America is not serious unless it dedicates masses of troops. While the surge’s necessity was debatable, its success is not. However, it has left us in the unenviable position of being expected to mobilize large numbers of forces to prove we are resolute. Contrast this with the deliberately small footprint the United States maintained in El Salvador to obtain an equally successful outcome.

In counterinsurgencies, time is more valuable than mass. The days of America being able to afford both are over. Our taxpayers, our allies, and our enemies must know that we can deliver American resolve effectively at a reasonable cost for as long as we must. We have invested untold treasure and blood in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the process, we have developed a cadre of officers and NCOs capable of conducting the future fight at reasonable cost. Properly empowered and equipped, these young leaders can fight future battles in Afghanistan cheaper, better, and safer than our current doctrine and TTPs allow. The future mission in Afghanistan is at hand, and the future leaders of the Army must stand ready to perform it. *MR*

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**NOTES**


“We have to diminish the idea that technology is going to change warfare . . .
War is primarily a human endeavor.”

— General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces and NATO Supreme Allied Command

The world seemed to breathe a collective sigh of relief at the end of the long Cold War. That momentous event, however, did not mark the end of global armed conflict. While the number of armed conflicts worldwide has been declining since peaking in the early 1990s, and a conventional war between two large states seems unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, community conflicts and a “growing number of increasingly disorderly spaces” that may facilitate even more such conflicts now characterize the global security environment.

Citizens of our globalized community may no longer need to lie anxiously awake in their beds at night, wondering if the world will be there in the morning, but the current climate of disorder may cause death by a thousand small cuts. These are “small wars,” insurgencies, localized intrastate civil conflicts that emerge from disruptive political, economic, and social problems. Nearly 80 percent of the surges in armed violence over the past decade were recurring conflicts, which should remind us—if we needed further reminding—that attending to post-conflict transitions is an integral part of any intervention.

These conflicts have most often involved failed or failing states, or anocracies—a purgatory-style regime that blends elements of democracy and autocracy, without the stabilizing benefits of either. Nearly three out of every four post-Cold War international crises have involved failed or failing states, and according to the Failed States Index (sponsored jointly by Fund For Peace and Foreign Policy magazine) the number of countries on “alert” status has shown a modest but steady increase for the past four to five years. Anocratic regime states are more than twice as likely to experience instability and violent conflict.

This violence involves competing militias, warring ethnic groups, warlords, illicit transnational networks, and informal paramilitary organizations not bound by conventional “laws of war.” The illegitimate offspring of criminal combatants dominate gray zones and lawless “no-go areas,” using their ill-gotten gains to fund conflict and buy operational and logistical support. This is the reality of the nightmarish nexus of crime and terror.
These ugly struggles typically have complicated—if not chaotic—origins, and they tend to last for a long time. They are notoriously difficult to end, and it is always difficult to determine who won. Their enduring character is due, in part, to the indiscriminate nature of their violence, which seeks to break the will of the adversary by destroying homes, institutions, and infrastructure, which breeds a “never forget” mentality in their enemies.

Warring factions may have either little choice or little incentive to end the conflict. Some want it to continue because of “greed rather than grievance,” since it provides them power, status, or money they would not have in its absence. Some continue just because it is what they have always done. Child soldiers are increasingly lured into these struggles, creating a generation that knows only how to fight and has virtually no other skills, experience, or prospects. They fight because that’s all they know how to do—driving what some have called “supply-side war.”

Small wars are not a new development, and America is certainly no stranger to fighting them. However, fighting them effectively requires more than just experience. The U.S. Armed Forces have put tremendous effort into learning lessons from past conflicts to help them adapt to new contingencies, but as the transition from Iraq to Afghanistan demonstrated, the next conflict is not like the last one.

The history of insurgency and small wars—including contemporary ones—tells us that understanding the human dimension of a conflict is critically important. There is much more to the human dimension than knowing an adversary’s culture. Even a deep grasp of culture and social dynamics is not sufficient to win a war (though a deficient understanding may be enough to lose one). Strategy should place less emphasis on national-level planning and more on the local community level. The state remains relevant as a basic unit in the international system, but today’s
fragmented, complex conflicts often require us to dig deeper. Insurgencies and movements of resistance become living systems.\textsuperscript{15} They—almost literally—take on lives of their own.

Ultimately, insurgencies usually do not win, but their degree of strategic success certainly exceeds their disadvantaged size, military strength, and sophistication. They do this by leveraging their strengths in an asymmetric way. The resulting dynamics—some of which are obvious—work in their favor. Of course, insurgent movements must address the fundamental problems facing all armed groups, regardless of their history, motivations, or goals. Anthony Vinci describes these as the three basic problems of mobilization.\textsuperscript{16} The insurgent needs people who want to fight (motivation); the means of force, including weapons and survivability (logistics); and the ability to exercise direction (leadership, organization, and communications).

The basic tasks themselves are relatively straightforward, but how militants approach them determines whether they are successful in the political and psychological spheres of conflict. Those spheres serve as the insurgents’ fulcrum for exerting asymmetric power.

In the sections that follow, I outline seven significant sources of power for insurgencies and resistance movements:

- The power of rising expectations.
- The power of the people.
- The power of the underdog.
- The power of agility.
- The power of resistance.
- The power of security.
- The power of belonging.

Understanding them can help explain how and why some insurgencies succeed while others do not, and help shape strategies for countering them. This article is a heuristic, not a historiography. The nature and mechanisms of power are dynamic and often context dependent. Exceptions exist for nearly every rule. With that caveat, I offer my thoughts on the following pillars of small war power.

**Power of Rising Expectations**

“While poverty has rarely been a driving force for revolutionary movements and wars, rising expectations often have.”—Joint Operating Environment, 2008.

Insurgency offers the hope of advancement, ascension, or freedom. By definition, insurgencies are aspirational. Insurgents do not have a defensive “bunker mentality”; revolutionary calls to action advance the cause—to make life better, to gain essential freedoms. “Without rising aspirations and expectations, society would not make the effort and take the risks to acquire new forms of behavior to achieve greater results.”\textsuperscript{17} In that sense, rising expectations empower regime resistance.\textsuperscript{18}

For centuries, the impoverished and oppressed, especially in undeveloped areas of the world, suffered profoundly from “want,” but resigned themselves to their fates. Many of the “have-nots” had no notion of the lives of the “haves.” They may have wished for things to be different, but with no knowledge of anything beyond their own communities, they had no sense of what different might look like, much less that it might be attainable. Globalization and technology have changed that.

Today, the competitive aspirations of communities may become even more intense than those of nations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in
comments to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign on 15 July 2008, forecast that “Over the next 20 years and more, certain pressures—population, resources, energy, economic and environmental climates—could combine with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to produce new sources of deprivation, rage, and instability . . . [such that] the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come less from ambitious states than failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs—much less the aspirations—of their people.” The power of rising expectations in fueling conflict is likely to get worse before it gets better.

Early conflict theories advanced the idea that poverty and deprivation were “root causes” of political violence. Subsequent evidence has demonstrated quite clearly that poverty alone is neither a substantial cause nor a robust predictor. Some suggest a more nuanced idea, that perhaps the dynamic is one of relative deprivation. Research does not support the idea that discontent is sufficient to inspire collective political violence. However, discontent is one thing and injustice is quite another. Framing a problem as an injustice permits the insurgent to transform the people’s expectations into action.

Most theories of radicalization and extremist ideology have some element of grievance as a foundational element. But why do some grievances incite action while others do not? One key reason seems to be that those affected view the grievance as an injustice. The contrast between the way things are (what the people have) and the way they think things should be (what they should have) fuels these perceptions. Rising expectations heighten that gap, creating a climate that engenders grievances of inequity. This, in essence, is where relative deprivation leads to perceptions of absolute injustice.

When the aggrieved see that others do not suffer, or have overcome suffering—perhaps through revolutionary violence—what once was annoying now seems unfair. Because people do not regard injustices as random events, it is not difficult to place blame on a certain target—a policy, person, or nation. The blamed party is then vilified—often demonized—which inspires the aggrieved to take action to remedy the injustices against them.

**Power of the Underdog**

“The underdog often starts the fight, and occasionally the upper dog deserves to win.”—Edgar Watson Howe

An insurgent movement is nearly always viewed as an underdog. We generally identify and define an underdog in relation to a more favored entity—a “top dog.” We regard the underdog as being or having “less than” the top dog. People like to root for the underdog—especially when there is some glimmer of hope that the aspirations of the disadvantaged party will prevail. Although we widely recognize the underdog’s appeal, the mechanisms by which it happens are complicated.

Not surprisingly, a great deal of research shows that people do not like to identify themselves as losers. So what accounts for the urge to root for or join the underdog? It’s a question that social scientists have only recently started to untangle.

A couple of lessons are starting to emerge from research in marketing and social psychology. Bear in mind that most of the research done on the underdog phenomenon has considered fans of different sports teams or consumers of certain product brands, not insurgencies.

First, while most people try to view themselves positively and wish others to do the same, top dog supporters focus on the outcome of performance, while underdog supporters focus on the positive and attractive qualities of the “players” themselves and on the importance of the domain in their own lives. Second, sustained support does not require the underdog to put in a stellar performance, but there must at least be intermittent glimmers of hope. Stated differently, “underdogs need to come close upon occasion or at least show flashes of potential in order to merit support; otherwise they are just losers and nobody expects anything from them.” Two additional points are worth mentioning about the underdog’s appeal. One is his perceived persistence and tenacity in the face of adversity, a quality others admire and with which many wish to identify. In addition, support for the
underdog seems to be rooted in people’s perceptions of fairness and justice. Underdogs are at a disadvantage in competition with top dogs. If the disadvantaged can succeed, then success—in the grand scheme of things—seems more attainable, fairer, and more equitable.

If even some of these dynamics apply in armed civil conflicts, the power of the underdog is potentially quite important for insurgent movements. For the past 35 years, psychologists have investigated a phenomenon they call the “bask in reflected glory” effect. Basically, this occurs when a person associates himself with a group or institution that has status, a reputation of popularity, or success (even though the person has had nothing to do with that success). Consider how some sports fans (a term derived from the word “fanatic”) discuss their favorite teams using the pronoun “we,” and you get the idea. This effect is quite possibly a major factor driving the success of an insurgent or terrorist “brand” and the reason why more hangers-on seem to associate themselves with such groups than the groups themselves would recognize as associates.

Power of Agility

Rule 1: “Many and small” beats “few and large.”—John Arquilla

One of the great challenges in countering insurgent movements is that they are moving targets. Their structure, organization, and tactics are fluid. They are constantly adapting, evolving, and morphing. Although some insurgent groups historically have had a more centralized, paramilitary structure, the insurgencies of the 21st century are predominantly decentralized, dynamic, and agile.

Agility is a force’s ability to adapt, to learn, and to change (in a timely way) to meet the threats it faces. Effective insurgent movements are both structurally and culturally agile. Agile insurgent movements are not only resilient to adversity and change, but they also are responsive to it, and they adapt accordingly. Setting aside for a moment the debate about whether Al-Qaeda is a global insurgency movement, consider its agility and evolution. What began as a “services support bureau” for Afghans resisting Soviet occupation subsequently became a “base” for operations by existing terrorist groups, then the notional hub of a global network of
new “affiliate” organizations, then a kind of social movement, and ultimately, a “brand” or inspirational hub for a virulent and violent ideology. Being agile and adaptive has advantages. Agility is perhaps the single most important factor in organizational learning. The U.S. Army, of course, has invested millions of dollars in developing repositories for “lessons learned” and has assessed and identified critical changes necessary for it to adapt to the current global security environment. But these extensive efforts do not guarantee actionable adaptations. By nature, if not by design, conventional forces tend to be large, heavy, and slow. That posture works well in conventional theater operations but not so well in insurgencies or small wars. A lean, flexible, and decentralized organization can move much more quickly from idea to action. It can maintain greater compartmentalization to enhance operational security and reduce risks from extensive, prolonged communications. It can shift quickly between kinetic attacks and psychological or political activity. It can move money, mobilize personnel, and replenish losses in leadership more easily. The counterinsurgent is typically running to catch up, only to find that when he figures something out, it has changed or is no longer important. Agility is a highly effective force multiplier, especially against a large, plodding adversary.

Power of the People

The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.—Mao Tse-tung

Contemporary insurgents have a clear home-field advantage, which they often exploit to great effect. Because insurgents, particularly revolutionaries, take up the mantle of resistance, they ostensibly represent the people. The extent to which the population perceives their rhetoric as reality drives its support. Chairman Mao referred to a style of small wars as “people’s wars.”

In population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the people are the counterinsurgent’s focus of effort and the prize for success. Accordingly, many have come to regard insurgencies and attempts to counter them as essentially “battles for the hearts and minds” of the people. What may not be immediately apparent, though, is that this battle does not begin at a zero baseline for each side. At the outset, the insurgency proclaims itself as the justice-seeking voice and representative of the people. The counterinsurgent must earn, cajole, and maneuver to win the population to his side. The insurgent arguably already has them, and needs only to retain or not alienate them.

Consider in-group and out-group distinctions (“us” and “them”). Two common dynamics that tend to drive in-group-out-group (intergroup) relationships are in-group favoritism (a tendency to evaluate and behave more favorably toward in-group members) and out-group derogation (a tendency to evaluate and behave more negatively toward out-group members).

Popular support is not only the “richest source of power” but also the richest source of energy and momentum for the insurgency. Popular support is not a sufficient condition for success, but it is necessary for resistance to thrive. From a psychological perspective, both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent would like the population to identify with their group and oppose the other group.

To draw persons into the in-group, the insurgency crafts its narrative with an “insider voice,” while embedding itself physically and unobtrusively throughout the civil population. Insurgents follow Mao Tse-tung’s maxim that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” They aim to be indistinguishable from the people, becoming their voice and amplifying the threat posed by the out-group counterinsurgent with persistent propaganda and misinformation. This has the dual effect of making the in-group (that they have created) more cohesive and increasing opposition to the regime.

Gaining the support of the people is both the insurgents’ primary strategy and their primary objective. Chairman Mao said, “Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people.”
Power of Resistance

All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles more surmountable than those of human resistance.

— Sir B.H. Liddell Hart

Insurgents do not just use asymmetric tactics; they do so in the context of asymmetric strategies. The insurgent’s most fundamental objective is simply to thwart the counterinsurgent’s objectives. We may think of this as “monkey wrench power.” Throwing a monkey wrench is a form of sabotage. The purpose of sabotage is to interfere with a competitor’s goals and interests and to create disorder. Disorder is the strategic friend of the insurgent and the foe of the regime.

Insurgent movements often do not aim for decisive victory, but rather to prevent the counterinsurgent from achieving victory. They seek to be winning, not necessarily to be victorious. To be winning, the insurgent need only to disrupt, break, and resist. He does not have to build, create, or sustain. In nearly every way, the insurgent’s burden is much easier than that of the counterinsurgent. Henry Kissinger noted nearly a half century ago, “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” This asymmetry is the essence of resistance and it gives the insurgent an enormous advantage.

The asymmetries of constraint further multiply the insurgency’s power. The insurgent has much more tactical latitude to resist than the state has to quell the resistance. Insurgent tactics are constrained only by the ethos and popular support of the people. As long as the insurgent is able to take the people’s side, he can largely use any means they wish.

The insurgent’s grand strategy of “not losing” involves persistently provoking, disrupting, and exhausting counterinsurgent forces. The insurgents provoke the state, hoping counterinsurgent forces will overreact with excessive force. The resisters then flaunt and leverage that regime’s response in order to mobilize their own popular support.

They disrupt the counterinsurgent with every demonstration of active resistance (since the counterinsurgent’s goal is to stop the resistance) and by showing the populace that the state cannot ensure the security of its people. Few tactics are more effective in this regard than intermittent, indiscriminant acts of violence. Creating a climate of fear and general disorder further undermines the regime’s legitimacy.

Finally, insurgents exhaust regime forces by draining their fiscal and personnel resources, compelling them to protect “everything” and rebuild what the insurgent has destroyed, while thwarting their ability to capitalize on any success or to gain any momentum. Few forces and certainly few nations have the political will to persist against such prolonged adversity.

Power of Belonging

Comradeship makes a man feel warm and courageous when all his instincts tend to make him cold and afraid.—Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery

Insurgent movements offer a way to belong, to be part of something bigger than oneself, to experience the bonds of affiliation, and to be empowered with a role that has meaning and purpose. These are powerful—if intangible—rewards for the most vulnerable subgroup of prospective members. The promise of belonging draws them in, and if properly managed, keeps them engaged and loyal.

Loyalty is most often built on a platform of connectedness, a shared identity, and a shared sense of belonging.

Observations on recruitment within terrorist and violent extremist organizations show that many people join to gain solidarity with family, friends, or acquaintances. “For the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or to violence.” As is true for many forms of collective violence, from terrorism...
to conventional combat, individuals are more often mobilized to act because of their commitments to other people rather than commitments to causes and abstract ideals.

While some people participate in or support an insurgency because of a principled dedication to the cause, for many others being part of the insurgency is basically an end unto itself. It gives them a sense of purpose and an identity. The psychological motive is primary, while the ideological/political motive is secondary. However, even for those who are “true believers,” the feeling of belonging often has a powerful pull.

It is no coincidence that the wellspring of most resistance movements flows from a pool of alienated and angry young men. Modern small war conflicts capitalize on identity-based security threats, which are particularly incendiary issues for that demographic category. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen of the Strategic Studies Institute note, “Insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment by defiance, particularly among young males with the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and lack of purpose. Insurgency can provide a sense of adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends its political objectives.” With the global “youth bulge,” about 87 percent of world’s populations between the ages of 10 and 19 now live in developing countries, many of which are furnaces of political instability stoked by curtailed modernity and an ethos of nonstate belonging and boundaries. This suggests perhaps that the highest risk group for an uprising—demographically and psychosocially—is now densely concentrated in the world’s riskiest and most volatile spaces.

Power of Security

Most people want security in this world, not liberty.—H.L. Mencken

Budding insurgents often find within the movement an essential sense of physical, social, and emotional security. Physically, there is strength in numbers. Socially, mutual accountability and trust breeds loyalty. Emotionally, the ideology, doctrine, and rules of the group provide a reassuring sense of structure.

Virtually every briefing these days on the character of insurgency or irregular warfare includes a pyramid graphic illustrating the “hierarchy of needs.” In the first half of the 20th century, psychologist Abraham Maslow developed a theory for understanding human motivation, which he

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based on a hierarchical constellation of human needs. Most fundamental are basic physiological needs like food and water. Just above that lies the category of “safety” needs. As a practical matter, those combined categories comprise the essence of human security—freedom from want (physiological needs) and freedom from fear (safety needs).

Insurgents create fear and disorder, then use them to mobilize support. A climate of disorder undermines confidence in the regime’s ability to protect its citizens. Disorder can enhance fear even more than increases in crime or actual risk of harm. Civil conflicts, ethnic/religious tensions, and drug trafficking all contribute to a community’s sense of fearful insecurity. “This sense of insecurity has led to a growing realization that the provision of security itself as a public good—the very raison d’être of the states system—can no longer be guaranteed by that system.”

Fear often works as a tactic when the fear-inducing message includes a proposed solution or an option for security. Between the regime and the counterinsurgent, whoever appears to be in control—or appears uncontrollable by the other—will have an upper hand in managing the climate of community safety and the security of the populace. The state that does not govern, secure, or take care of its people abdicates its power to those who will.

A wrinkle in the contemporary challenge is that insurgent groups now not only seek to manipulate and dominate the threats to community security, but also increasingly seek to offer services and solutions. Hezbollah has been an exemplar of this approach, though it is certainly not the only group to use it. Hezbollah is perhaps best known in the West for its persistent and horrific acts of terrorism, including its association with the pivotal suicide bombings of U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, which arguably ushered in the modern era of suicide terrorism. Hezbollah also has a significant network of social and medical services, which it creates and sustains in areas with great need and deficient infrastructure. When illness or crisis threatens, victims often have little choice but to turn to Hezbollah and its facilities for help. Hezbollah will help with a generous spirit, without requiring allegiance or demanding reciprocity. It does not impose services on the population or tell the citizens what they need. Rather, Hezbollah identifies the needs and gaps neglected by the state, builds capacity, and attracts those in need. (The idea of using attraction rather than promotion is a subtlety often lost on counterinsurgents.) Hezbollah has learned that securing the population from want also secures their loyalty and support.

Conclusion

We should take a step back from our current obsession with “terrorism” and the next “big attack” and keep an eye on disorderly, ungoverned spaces; the evolving character of armed groups and nonstate collectives; and the erosive, insidious damage rendered to global security by the thousand small cuts of community conflict.

Wars are “primarily human endeavors.” Small wars are less amenable, however, to nation-centric analysis. Neither our adversary nor his armed forces are monolithic. We may need to modify our traditional “center of gravity” analysis to accommodate multiple centers of gravity in an asymmetric diffusion of power. Insurgencies and movements of resistance are dynamic, living systems powered by social dynamics. Successful insurgent movements leverage their available sources of power to gain the sympathy of the broader population and to mobilize a small cadre of armed forces. For the insurgent, these dynamics—the power of rising expectations, the power of the people, the power of the underdog, the power of agility, the power of resistance, the power of security, and the power of belonging—become the pillars of small war power. For the counterinsurgent, each of these pillars presents both a potential hazard and an exploitable vulnerability.

General James Mattis said of the U.S. effort in Iraq, “Sometimes wars are won by the side that makes the fewest mistakes, and the enemy made mistake after mistake after mistake. And we, on our side, when we saw we made a mistake, we corrected ourselves. And so the enemy is working amongst the population, and eventually the people identified that we were the ones doing things right and that the enemy was working against the people’s best interest. So they turned on them.”

In Iraq, U.S. forces arguably prevailed by undermining and toppling the insurgency’s pillars of power.


IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere, one key enabler for insurgent operations is the weapons cache. Finding the enemy’s weapons stores is a cause for excitement in a unit; unit S-2 shops often make “bragging” slides when such caches are found—using buzzwords such as “jackpot” or “money.” Such a find provides tangible evidence that intelligence is accurate and that the unit is operating smoothly. Normally, such discoveries are the result of intelligence collection, and in counterinsurgency, it is often human intelligence (HUMINT) that leads to big cache finds. In recent years, this has worked well in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, one must consider the maturity of these theaters; HUMINT has literally had years to develop. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors are employed with much skill based on theater-specific lessons learned. Theater-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures are so well developed that soldiers practice them at training centers such as the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center.1

However, immature theaters may be the norm in future counterinsurgency operations. Consider the fact that the United States supports a myriad of global partners who have internal threats that can snowball into insurgencies. Units may not always have the luxury of relying on mature, theater-specific sources and methods for intelligence.

In this article, we focus on the issue of locating weapons caches—arguably one of the most effective ways to reduce violence in an insurgency. We approached this problem by posting an open question on an Army-sponsored forum known as Intelst, which is frequented by many professionals with varying degrees of tactical-level experience.2 In other disciplines, this is known as “crowdsourcing.”

PHOTO: Iraqi National Police and U.S. advisors inspect a National Police Reva armored personnel vehicle after an IED attack on Route Peggy (Photo courtesy of CPT Paulo Shakarian)
The question we asked was, “Suppose you are an insurgent and you want to position a weapons cache in a district or province. What considerations would you make when placing it?” We received many good responses, and have compiled them here into an analytical framework for locating weapons caches that professionals can apply to several environments.

It turns out that some techniques we learned about were used in contingencies such as Northern Ireland and Vietnam—hence the title of this article, which introduces our analytical framework for finding caches and shows how it applies in three case studies, each in a different war.

The Framework: Thinking like an Insurgent Logistics Officer

Based on our discussions, we determined that there are three aspects of cache location that staffs should consider when producing an estimate—security, accessibility, and distribution. The idea is to mirror concerns of an insurgent. Below, we list the three areas, along with relevant questions that the insurgent may ask.

- **Security.** Is the cache site secure against an opposing force? Is it located in an area where the locals are likely to report the existence of a cache to the opposing force? Is the cache in an area normally patrolled by the opposing force? Would the cache be inside the cordon of an opposing force when an operation (i.e. IED attack) is conducted? Can nearby members of the cell protect or evacuate the site in the case of an emergency?

- **Accessibility.** Can members of the cell easily access the site to resupply stores or obtain weapons for a pending operation? What terrain features can be used as reference points to locate the cache? Does the cache support cell members staying at the site for an extended period? Can the cache be accessed by multiple lines of communication to avoid setting a pattern?

- **Distribution.** If the cache is designed to support the operations of multiple insurgent cells, is it near a road or other line of communication that would allow the munitions to be more easily distributed to those cells? If the cache is designed to support a series of pending attacks, is it near a line of communication that allows easy access to the

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**U.S. Army SGT Cullen Wurzer finds a bag of rocket-propelled grenades and a grenade launcher while searching a compound in Pacha Khak, Afghanistan, 7 April 2011.**
attack sites? When munitions are transported to or from the cache, must a cell member travel through an unfriendly neighborhood or an area where security forces are conducting frequent patrols?

There are some things to note about these three areas. First, insurgent planners encounter tension between security and accessibility (and to a lesser extent, between security and distribution). Hence, there are inherent trade-offs between making a site more accessible and making it more secure. The cellular structure of many insurgent organizations encountered leads us to assume that security would trump accessibility. In such a scenario, a small number of individuals would have access to the cache, thus difficult access instructions would not pose a problem. However, even in a cellular structure, easy accessibility may prove necessary. Consider a logistics cell that prepositions munitions at a cache site for the operators to retrieve later. So, which is more likely for an organization with a cellular structure? In such a case, one must consider the purpose of a cache. Better understanding of what the insurgents use the cache for can help focus on how the insurgent staff weights each of the three components of our framework. For example, if the site is for tactical-level use, it is likely a small site, possibly located in a wood line used for storing a limited number of weapons to support two or three nearby attacks. On the other hand, insurgents may hide operational-level caches in large caves, and those caches could contain hundreds of pounds of explosives.

Another consideration associated with accessibility is “micro-terrain.” Counter-IED experts often associate micro-terrain with small pieces of terrain (culverts, lampposts, fire hydrants, etc.) that an insurgent uses to mark an attack location—often to aid in the timing of detonation. An old Special Forces manual, ST 31-205, which describes methods to hide a weapons cache, mentions the use of micro-terrain as a means to improve accessibility to a site. The manual identifies two types of reference points—immediate, which identify a major terrain feature near the cache, and final, a piece of micro-terrain close to the site. Often, the immediate and final reference points are related—allowing the placer of the cache to specify directions to the final reference point by way of the immediate reference point.

As a theater matures and caches are found, a review of exploitation reports may reveal patterns that demonstrate how the insurgent uses such reference points and help decode “clandestine communication” of an insurgent organization (i.e., bricks or rocks stacked in a certain manner, etc.).

The areas of security and distribution may also cause the insurgent staff to consider sociocultural variables. To ensure the security of the cache, it is safer for the insurgent to place it in a friendly neighborhood. To make it easier to transport weapons, the insurgent may prefer that lines of communication to caches be in friendly, or at least neutral, territory. Security and distribution may also add tension to placing tactical caches. Ideally, a cache should be close to an attack site to minimize security risks in moving weapons to the site. However, if the cache is too close to the attack site, security forces could uncover it in a cordon or area search after an attack.

With the above framework in mind, we will look at how it applies to a few real-world situations. First, we look at a case study from Vietnam in which the framework led to discoveries of a significant amount of munitions. Then, we consider British counterinsurgent operations in Northern Ireland, where the framework provided indicators for cache sites. Finally, we provide an example from Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the framework led to counter-IED operations that involved denying the insurgents terrain to use for cache sites. The framework was applied (knowingly or unknowingly) in each of these cases, but each time it led to a different result.

**Case Study I: Hue, Vietnam, 1968**

During the Tet Offensive of 1968, North Vietnamese conventional forces (the NVAs) took the city of Hue. U.S. Marines, supported by several Army units, fought to retake the city. Based out of Da Nang, the Marine division had only one ground line of communication between Da Nang and Hue—Route 1, an 80-kilometer paved road which ran through very steep terrain for about 20 kilometers north of Da Nang over the Hai Van Pass and then ran parallel to the coastline on level ground. This route became the main supply route for the operations in Hue. The Marines attempted to start regular combat logistics patrols to support
operations in Hue. Prior to the convoy, engineer elements supported by light infantry conducted a route-clearance operation on the 20 kilometers of steep terrain over the pass. However, despite clearing this most dangerous portion of the route each morning along Highway 1, the Marine combat logistics patrols hit command-detonated land mines three days in a row just north of the city. The mines destroyed their lead vehicles and forced them to return to Da Nang.

The 2/502 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) (whose S-3 was the then-Major Otstott) was given the mission to keep Highway Route 1 “green” in that first 20 kilometers of very steep terrain. Rather than continue the unsuccessful route clearance operations, they decided to use an “attack the network” approach. The battalion would attempt to locate the weapons caches. The 2/502 staff conducted some good “common sense” intelligence preparation of the battlefield to determine the caches’ locations.

We examine them here with our framework:

- **Security**: In order to avoid detection from U.S. aerial assets, the mine emplacers would select a cache location where jungle canopy would provide better concealment against airborne reconnaissance platforms.

- **Accessibility**: The mine emplacers would have to ensure that individuals in the cell could easily access the hiding places to utilize the munitions or resupply the cache. Hence, there would be foot trails to allow access. Moreover, if the emplacers were to stay for an extended period to interdict the road, without returning home to villages in the area, they would need shelter and water. Thus, the staff concluded that the cache would be near a stream under the triple canopy vegetation.

- **Distribution**: The 2/502 PIR staff determined that the mine emplacers would need to store their weapons relatively close to the attack sites, and they had to transport heavy munitions over very steep treacherous terrain. The staff concluded that such base camps would be no more than two kilometers from the attack locations. They also believed that the cache would be positioned uphill, to make moving the munitions to the locations of attacks easier. Further, the staff concluded that, to ensure redundancy, emplacers would maintain caches on both sides of the steep ridge that the highway crossed in the Hai Van Pass.

Based on their analysis, the staff was able to draw two small objectives that were likely candidates for the cache sites. They tasked two companies to move off road through the difficult terrain, one company to take each objective, supported by a third company in reserve. They maintained command and control with a forward battalion command post.

The operations lasted about two days, and the company taking the northern objective discovered two huts and about 500 pounds of explosive material inside their designated objective area. Meanwhile, the second company found another small base camp, also inside its designated objective area. At this second site, consisting of two or three huts, the company engaged five or six enemy combatants in a brief firefight that resulted in two to three enemy casualties. They discovered 800 pounds of explosives and destroyed them on site. The operations neutralized the threat to the highway, and it remained open for the next 40 days after the operation. During this time, the battalion patrolled the area alongside the highway, set ambushes at night, and kept the enemy from emplacing any new IEDs on the main supply route.
Case Study II: Northern Ireland, Mid-1970s

During the early years of the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA’s) campaign in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, a Royal Engineer officer, Captain Winthrop, created a list of key analytical features to help find IRA weapons caches. It turned out that focusing on these features greatly increased the chances of finding caches. The list included the following:

- The IRA quartermaster (responsible for weapons supply) would build the weapons cache in a place that allowed friendly observation at all times. Early in the conflict, a quartermaster would often place the cache in line of sight of his own house.
- The cache could be evacuated out of direct line of sight of a surveillance asset.
- The location was marked by some easily recognized feature (lone tree, specified telephone pole, derelict house) and then by some small local mark on that feature (a scratch on a tree or a stone). This micro-terrain enabled outsiders to collect the weapons by following instructions.
- The cache location had several routes of access.

- The cache itself was usually a metal milk can, sometimes buried under or inside a stone wall, where signs of disturbance could be easily disguised to avoid detection.

Using our framework, the reader can see that the first, second, and fifth items fall under the area of security: the IRA wanted to ensure that the site was watched at all times, but was in a location where it could be evacuated outside of anyone’s line of sight. The third item indicates that they used the micro-terrain to advantage for accessibility. Further, they used multiple ingress and egress routes for the cache, the fourth item to affect both accessibility and distribution.

Case Study III: Balad, Iraq, 2006

In October 2006, a road known as Route Peggy, outside the city of Balad, Iraq, was the scene of seven IED attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces in a period of ten days. To address the attacks and use the opportunity to train, a team of U.S. advisors (which included Captain Shakarian) conducted a map analysis of the so-called IED “hot-spot” with their Iraqi staff officers. The imagery of the attack site was revealing. Although thick pomegranate
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and palm groves lined the sides of Route Peggy, all of the attacks took place near an open area free of trees and close to the edge of that open area. The U.S. and Iraqi staff officers then identified several patches devoid of trees in the imagery near the open area—areas that would be concealed but could still be used as staging areas or cache sites for the attacks. A patrol sent out to investigate these sites found evidence of caches—fresh garbage packed neatly in a trash bag as well as a radio. There had been no previous military or police use of this area. Armed with the knowledge of possible staging areas, a local U.S. unit worked with the Iraqis to deny the enemy these staging areas by a variety of means (increased patrols, removal of vegetation, and increased interaction with locals). Because of this operational change, the terrain was no longer useful to the enemy, and the attacks stopped.

The caches employed by the insurgents in this situation were transient and tactical in nature—the insurgents were using them to pre-position supplies for the attacks. However, our framework still applies. First, let us consider security. Clearly, the insurgents relied on the concealment of trees to avoid detection from patrols on the road. Moreover, the cache locations were outside the radius of the normal cordon established following an IED attack. This allowed the insurgents to avoid compromise of the hiding place after an operation. Regarding accessibility, the patrols on the ground also found multiple footpaths leading from the attack sites. What was noteworthy was that these paths were too small to be on any map, and vegetation hid them on the imagery. Clearly, the proximity of the caches to the attack sites also allowed for easy placement of munitions for an IED attack.

Interesting also to note is that the analysis that led to the discovery of the caches did not produce a large weapons cache, but it did provide insight into how the insurgents conducted operations. The unit used the information about these tactical-level caches to counter the threat. By denying the enemy access to these sites, the unit was also able to degrade the insurgent’s capability. Although the patrols did not recover any munitions, the analysis did lead to a successful operation against the insurgents. The IED hotspot was neutralized.
The Way Forward

We designed the common sense analytical framework introduced in this article to help staff planners better determine locations on the ground where caches can be found. In each of our vignettes, the unit leveraged this information differently. In Northern Ireland, the British used this analysis to establish a list of likely indicators for cache sites. These could be given to patrols looking for suspicious areas or used to help verify other pieces of intelligence, such as HUMINT. In Vietnam, good analysis led to a highly successful operation where munitions were recovered and additional attacks were prevented by removing the IED supplies. In Iraq, the analysis led to an operational decision to deny the enemy use of the cache locations. The way to use this analysis is certainly not limited to these techniques. Essentially, the framework of this paper can be used to aid development of named areas of interest, which can then be used in a variety of ways—from kinetic operations to cueing of intelligence assets.

We think that analytical frameworks such as the one presented here will gain more importance in Army staff planning, particularly in immature theaters. Personnel in units deploying to new environments will often have little intuition on how to best pursue mission objectives. Just as a nine-line MEDEVAC request forces a soldier in combat to take stock of the current situation, analytical frameworks such as this can be used to better help staffs initially understand unfamiliar environments.

Such analytical techniques already exist for conventional environments and weapon systems (for example, locating origins of mortar attacks). However, for nonconventional scenarios such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, or peacekeeping, units often must resort to theater-specific techniques. We note that lessons learned from places such as Iraq and Afghanistan also tend to be theater specific. As a result, units involved in future contingencies in immature theaters will most likely apply the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan in an ad hoc manner.

The development of non-theater specific analytical frameworks such as the one presented in this article can alleviate this issue—particularly in the face of nonstandard weapon systems such as IEDs. Such analytical frameworks will provide a complement to the military decision making process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and analysis of competing hypotheses.

Further, many high-technology devices in the force today aid warfighters in finding IEDs and the networks that employ them, but our common sense techniques can often be as useful as high-technology counterparts. Go after the hotspots with a healthy dose of analytical common sense, and you will see a pay off. MR

NOTES

2. We would like to thank retired LTC Holden, moderator of the INTELST Forum. For more information, send email to intelst@listserv.army.pentagon.mil.
4. These three aspects are based on four bullet points outlined by Homer McDougle, a retired special operations forces operator and current instructor at JRTC. McDougle’s four points separated accessibility and maintenance (we combine these into “accessibility”). He categorized protection from the environment under security, where we place that under accessibility. The views expressed in this note are McDougle’s personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of JRTC.
5. The idea of “thinking like an insurgent S-4” was provided by Michael Ligon, a USAIC instructor and retired military intelligence officer.
7. The idea of “thinking like an insurgent S-4” was provided by Michael Ligon, a USAIC instructor and retired military intelligence officer.
8. The authors would like to thank Michael Ligon for illustrating the idea of clandestine communication.
9. The events described in Vietnam are from the experiences of retired LTG Otstott.
10. The events described in Balad are from the experiences of retired LTG Otstott.
11. The events described in Balad are from the experiences of CPT Shakarian.
HISTORY HAS DEMONSTRATED that rurally based insurgencies are often more successful against their counterinsurgent foes than insurgencies that emphasize urban operations. During the initial stages of the French-Algerian war in the 1950s, two insurgent groups challenged the French—the urban-based Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (MTLD) and the rurally based Front of National Liberation (FLN). As the conflict wore on, pressures brought to bear by the French eventually destroyed the urban MTLD. In contrast, largely because of its deep rural connections and organization, the FLN withstood the pressures of French military operations and eventually prevailed.2

Not only have rurally based insurgencies been more likely to outlast their urban counterparts, they have also been quite successful at defeating more powerful adversaries. The Chinese Communists’ rebellion against the Kuomintang suffered innumerable hardships in the early years of the insurrection when it focused on urban areas, but it later achieved startling successes when its strategic focus became rural.

The root of the Vietcong’s success against the United States in Vietnam was rurally based action, as was the Mujahideen insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s current insurgency against the International Security Assistance Force is also of a predominantly rural form.

Contrary to the rural focus of successful insurgencies, most counterinsurgencies emphasize the control of major cities and the use of urban-oriented operations. In Colombia, for example, “state forces frequently control the centers of large towns and cities, where municipal government buildings are located,” but “the state’s authority evaporates” as one moves further into the countryside.3 Likewise, during the Vietminh resistance to the French, a government provincial chief noted, “The Vietminh had their areas, like the Plains of Reeds, which we just abandoned. Whatever the Vietminh wanted to do [in those rural areas], we did not bother them.”4 Similarly, in 2009, the Canadian military emphasized a deployment of forces in the area immediately in and around Kandahar City in Afghanistan.5

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This urban bias in counterinsurgency operations is troublesome because it favors the insurgency, and is welcomed and encouraged by guerrilla armies. Through purposeful harassment tactics by guerrilla forces, “the government is systematically eliminated from the countryside . . . The government is thus cut off from the population.” During the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks, for example, T.E. Lawrence argued that the Arab insurgents “must not take Medina [a major city in Saudi Arabia]. The Turk was harmless there. We wanted him to stay at Medina and every other distant place, in the largest numbers.” The Turkish counterinsurgent was welcome to major cities and transit lines “just so long as he gave [the insurgents] the other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the Arab world.”

Two questions emerge from this contradiction between the urban operational bias of many counterinsurgencies and the rural focus of successful insurgencies. Why is there an urban bias in counterinsurgency operations? And how does this bias influence the conduct and resolution of a counterinsurgency? Answering these questions leads us to the conclusion that the control of urban areas, while necessary, is not sufficient to bring about a successful resolution to a counterinsurgency campaign.

**Urban Bias and Cost-Efficiency**

The concentration of counterinsurgency operations in urban areas is the result of a myopic focus on issues of cost effectiveness and practicality. Such a focus leads counterinsurgencies to emphasize urban operations, often at the expense of coherent rural plans.

Control of the local population is the basic objective of both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent. As Mao said of the relationship between the population and the insurgency, “the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it.” He added, “It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish...
out of its native element, cannot live.” Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel David Galula argues that “The population, therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it [is] for his enemy.”

Clearly, control and political sympathies differ in value to a counterinsurgent. The forces of the counterinsurgency can control a population and yet the people may still hold their actions and objectives in exceedingly poor regard. However, the population is usually cooperative or, at least, quiescent within the areas of counterinsurgency control. In contrast, while their sympathies might reside with the counterinsurgency, if the counterinsurgents are unable to provide security, the majority of the people will actively or passively work for the insurgency. Control is therefore paramount; however, “in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population.” Clearly, obtaining the favor of the people is good for the long-term health of a political system.

Given the aim of controlling the population, a simple concern for cost-efficiency can lead the counterinsurgent to focus his attention on areas with the highest concentration of people, namely, on urban areas. Indeed, as the French counterinsurgency theorist Roger Trinquier has explicitly noted, “The army should make its main effort in those areas where the population is densest; that is, in the cities.” After 2009, Canada’s operational plan in Kandahar Province followed this same logic. In focusing on Kandahar City and its immediate environs, the Canadian forces bid for the control of 75 percent of the population of Kandahar Province.

Policing urban centers is also easier and more cost-efficient than controlling the vast rural countryside. Curfews, for example, can separate urban insurgents from the passive population. When urban insurgents break curfews to terrorize city dwellers, sabotage governmental projects, and target counterinsurgent forces, it is easy to identify them and restrict their freedom of assembly and movement. As Trinquier argues, “The forces of order can easily watch all the streets of a city with a minimum of troops. Anyone found away from his home at night is suspect.”

The Cuban Revolution demonstrates well the relative ease of counterinsurgent operational and administrative control within urban areas. While Fidel Castro’s fledging guerrilla organization operated in the mountains of Oriente Province, Cuba’s many urban-based revolutionaries were far better organized and had significantly more resources at their disposal. Yet, strikes, riots, and instances of terrorism in Havana and Santiago in 1958 proved to be disastrous for these groups because the Batista government was able to easily maintain control in Cuba’s main urban centers. Those who undertook acts of protest or terrorism, espionage, and sedition were readily visible to the regime’s security forces. As a result, the various urban-based insurgent organizations suffered many serious defeats and became subordinate to Castro’s rural revolutionary movement. Largely for this reason, Castro later remarked that urban areas ought to be best understood as “the grave of the guerrilla.”

Aid to the local population is also a central operational characteristic of a counterinsurgency campaign—particularly when a powerful third-party state intervenes on behalf of an indigenous government. However, such aid is often highly fungible. Food, building supplies, or other material goods can easily end up in insurgent hands. Material goods given to the local population to win their sympathy can come to rest, finally, in the hands of the insurgency. Thus, effective control of the recipient population is a clear prerequisite of effective aid. As Trinquier points out, “We must not lose sight of the fact that any material aid we give will only profit the enemy if the organization that permits his control and manipulation of the people has not first been destroyed. Aid must be prudently administered until the police operation has been completed.”
While the often intimate connection between the guerrilla fighter and the population is a recurrent theme in almost all viable insurgencies, Vietnam provides an interesting example of the effect of the transferability of material goods on an insurrection. During the Vietcong resistance to the United States, rural peasants frequently gave food supplies to guerrilla fighters because the forces of the counter-insurgency did not have sufficient levels of control over the population, particularly in rural areas. For instance, a guerrilla involved in an uprising in a village in the Mekong Delta later stated: “There was a time when I myself was living in the woods, dying of thirst, and deprived in every way. When I would come out, the people would cry. They felt sorry for us. But they would only prepare something for us and send us on our way. They gave us enough to eat, but wouldn’t let us stay in their house . . . [Regardless] this underground support enabled the revolution to organize the large uprising of 20 July 1960.” Resourced largely through the provision of fungible material goods by rural villagers, the uprising was the beginning of the protracted insurgency in My Tho, which contributed significantly to the eventual defeat of the United States.

Aid is only effective when it takes place within the boundaries of a cordoned area under robust counterinsurgency control. Many forms of aid also require direct access to recipients. The fungible quality of aid, therefore, reinforces the general urban orientation of counterinsurgency operations. As Lieutenant Colonel Simon Heatherington, commander of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, noted, “Reconstruction efforts have largely been relegated to urban areas because security conditions are so dangerous.” Similarly, one official from the Canadian International Development Agency, who worked in Kandahar Province, noted, “Our biggest challenge is security. Virtually all nongovernmental organizations have left the province because of the insurgency, except for a few pockets in urban areas such as Kandahar City.”21 Thus, given that the counterinsurgency can only provide a safe working environment to aid workers in areas they control, aid distribution tends to thrive in a theater of operations’ urban areas where the security operations of the counterinsurgent are most effective.

Humanitarian workers are not the only individuals likely to cluster into urban areas. Journalists,
academics, human rights advocates, and other public figures are also likely to congregate in cities. This tendency is a repeated occurrence during both internal wars and counterinsurgencies. During the Bosnian War, for instance, most foreign journalists lived and worked in the capital city, Sarajevo. Similarly, in 2005, only three major American news outlets—Newsweek, the Associated Press, and the Washington Post—had correspondents stationed in Afghanistan. The country bureau desk of each of these organizations, moreover, was located in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul.

Such public figures have a rather disproportionate influence on how the campaign is portrayed to the domestic public of the counterinsurgency. The presumed casualty averseness of the American public and the desire for troops to follow domestic standards of legality and humanitarian behavior are also frequent concerns. Media coverage and the dissemination of other information to the public can heavily influence the domestic perception of these issues. Properly satisfying this thirst for information is a crucial operational task for the counterinsurgency. As Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, notes, “The information environment is a critical dimension of such internal wars, and insurgents attempt to shape it to their advantage. One way they do this is by carrying out activities, such as suicide attacks, that may have little military value but create fear and uncertainty. These actions are executed to attract high-profile media coverage or local publicity and inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities.”

While controlling the information that urban-based public figures receive is essential, such actions reinforce the urban bias in counterinsurgency operations by placing a premium on the static defense of urban areas—often at the expense of coherent rural operational plans. The congregation of media and other public figures in urban areas is likely to see disturbances within cities as indications of the success or failure of the wider war. For this reason, despite the relative ease with which they can achieve control in urban areas, counterinsurgent forces often keep an overly large presence in such areas in order to limit the occurrence of urban-based security incidents. As Seth Jones notes, in 2002, “with rare exceptions, the 4,000-member International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did not venture beyond the capital. Its purpose was to protect the Afghan interim administration and help provide security to the capital.” Thus, the need to shape and control the information environment within the cities creates a centripetal force that incessantly pulls the counterinsurgent back into them.

In sum, numerous and mutually reinforcing reasons bias counterinsurgency operational plans toward urban areas. The natural congregation of the population in cities reduces the cost of security operations, while providing a clear concentration of a main objective of counterinsurgency warfare—the population. In turn, successful security operations make counterinsurgency aid more effective by reducing the transfer of material resources to insurgents. Finally, domestic politics and the contemporary era of instant global information-sharing reinforce the urban focus because insurgent attacks in urban areas are often taken as proxies for the wider state of the war. Yet, while controlling urban centers is a necessary condition for successful counterinsurgency, it does not bring success by itself. Counterinsurgents expend a great deal of effort in urban areas, but often the real heart of the war is in the countryside.

How Urban Bias Influences Campaigns

To understand how an urban bias influences the conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign, we must remember that the insurgency has the initiative in terms of strategic interactions. A counterinsurgency, by choosing to bias its operational plans toward urban environments—largely for reasons of cost-efficiency and expediency—presents several vulnerable flanks to observant, rural
based insurgents. Indeed, such vulnerabilities are usually exploited in remarkably similar ways.

Most countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are predominantly rural, although Iraq is a clear exception. An urban bias in a counterinsurgency’s operational plan thus leaves most of a country’s population under insurgent domination. This is a great martial, logistical, and political advantage for the insurgency. Only about 24 percent of the population of Afghanistan, for example, lived in urban areas as of 2008. Thus, by focusing operations in the major urban centers, some 76 percent of the people of Afghanistan were under the control of local warlords and insurgent groups. This is a recurrent phenomenon that benefits the insurrection. As Mao Tse-tung noted of the Japanese counterinsurgency in northern China during the late 1930s, “The enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of communication, and some of the plains, which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part [of the countryside] will be taken up by guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere.”

A bias toward urban areas also concedes the bulk of a country’s territory to its enemy, and its geographic features can be of tremendous benefit to an insurgency. Mountainous areas, heavily forested regions, or dense jungles conceal the location of insurgent bases and allow for the use of elusive guerrilla tactics.

The presence of a sizable territory within which the guerrilla can operate is another crucial geographic consideration. Without enough room to conduct guerrilla operations, the insurgents will eventually have to fight a decisive battle with the more powerful conventional forces of the counterinsurgency. The result will likely be a devastating military defeat for the guerrillas.

A counterinsurgency biased toward urban environments concentrates its security patrols and military efforts into a relatively small amount of territory. The predictable result is more effective insurgency guerrilla operations. When cities are emphasized in counterinsurgency operations, the guerrillas can retreat from advancing security forces, trading territory for time until the localized balance of forces favors them. In contrast, the counterinsurgent undertakes large will-o’-the-wisp operations that produce
no decisive results, while the insurgents harass his patrols and destroy his outposts and static defenses. As T.E. Lawrence tells us, given room to maneuver, an insurgency can truly become “an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas.”

By focusing operations on urban areas, the counterinsurgent also ignores an important fact: cities are not materially self-sufficient. Cities depend on material resources and lines of transportation and communication that extend throughout the countryside. Food, critical consumer goods, and even electrical power are all generated in rural areas. A counterinsurgency that disregards these realities cedes the beating heart of the country to the insurgency. During the Vietminh resistance to the French, the insurgency implemented an economic blockade of urban areas, and it later used a similar strategy against the United States. The Vietminh intended to starve the entrenched forces of the French through a scorched earth policy of “barren orchards and empty houses.” They believed, quite correctly, that they could cripple the French counterinsurgency by blockading the major towns and cities under its control.

When basic subsistence is at stake, power usually resides with the rural areas that produce a country’s staple crops and other foodstuffs. Similarly, detached from the bulk of the population, an external counterinsurgency cannot recruit sufficient indigenous forces to protect the fledgling regime. The insurgency that controls the countryside, then, has a nearly insurmountable material advantage. During the mujahideen war against the Soviets, for example, “the source of the resistance power was not the cities and towns but the rural areas.” In contrast, by relying upon urban operations to the neglect of rural operational plans, “Kabul [and the Soviet forces] found it impossible to tap the [human resources of the] rural areas outside of their control, which only left the larger cities which could provide conscripts.”

Even when it is feasible to supply the cities, vulnerable lines of transport, supply, and communication constantly threaten urban viability. Attacks on the counterinsurgent’s vulnerable lines of supply also reinforce the urban bias. As available resources decrease, the incentive to pursue more cost-efficient urban operations increases and major rural operations tend to cease. Predictably, insecurity in the

A U.S. soldier checks an area for improvised explosive devices during a route-clearance mission in the rural area near Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, 3 October 2010.
countryside frequently leads to a further retrenchment of forces in and around urban areas. During the Communist insurrection in Greece, “various and mobile police squadrons were being attacked so heavily that they were forced to withdraw to the major villages, leaving much of the countryside under rebel control.” During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, too, it was well noted by the guerrilla leadership that attacks along the cities’ vulnerable supply lines “would have the added benefit of compelling the Soviets to tie down an ever higher proportion of the men in static security duties.” Finally, the loss of electrical power, foodstuffs, and material goods creates urban squalor. Discontent soars and the counterinsurgent will tend to adopt an even greater bias towards urban operations in order to maintain his flagging control. This retrenchment of effort, in turn, increases the counterinsurgent’s vulnerability further still.

The war in Afghanistan presents an interesting longitudinal example of the vulnerability of supply lines to guerrilla attack. During the fight with the Soviet Union, insurgent leaders knew the vulnerable points of the cumbersome Soviet counterinsurgency perfectly well, targeted them to great effect, and attacked lines of supply throughout the countryside and ultimately the major cities. As Ali Jalali and Lester Grau note, “The Soviet presence depended on its ability to keep roads open. Much of the Soviet combat in Afghanistan was a fight for control of the road network. Soviet security of the Eastern LOC [line of communication] required 26 battalions manning 199 outposts.” Indeed, between 1985 and 1987, the Mujahideen launched over 10,000 ambushes against Soviet supply convoys along the vulnerable lines of communication of the urban-based regime.

As one insurgent leader noted, the vulnerability of cities was clearly understood:

I knew my enemy’s [the Soviet’s] sensitive spots—the Salang highway, aircraft on the ground, the power supply, the dams, the bridges, the pipelines and, at the center of them all, Kabul. . . . There was a concerted effort on my part to coordinate attacks aimed at cutting off Kabul from supplies or facilities coming from outside the city. This involved ambushes on convoys on roads leading to Kabul, the mining of dams that provided its water, or cutting its power lines.

These rurally based attacks on supply and transport lines compelled the counterinsurgent forces to retreat into defensible areas in and around major urban centers. As an Inter-Services Intelligence commander later noted, “These tactics had the effect of creating a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of the Soviets and Afghans. They reacted by deploying more and more troops in static guard duties [along the supply lines near to the major urban centers], thus reducing their ability to mount offensive operations.”

This pattern of vulnerable supply lines, insurgent attacks, and a retrenchment of forces is, perhaps, repeating itself in the current counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Frequent attacks on NATO and American supply columns, particularly at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, have begun to wear on the counterinsurgents’ operational effectiveness. Between the months of June and September 2009, for example, over 145 convoy drivers died in ambushes, and insurgent attacks destroyed some 123 vehicles. Since then, attacks have continued to escalate in both frequency and boldness. The growing pattern of insurgent attacks on vulnerable supply routes in Afghanistan presents a real operational challenge for the counterinsurgency.

More than 80 percent of NATO and American supplies flow across the border into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The highway from Kabul to Kandahar is also a major site of insurgent activity. In imitation of the strategy that led to seizure of Kabul in the 1990s, the Taliban is now concentrating its efforts against its enemies’ urban supply lines—and with increasing effectiveness.

In summary, it seems that expanded guerrilla areas of operation, attacks upon vulnerable supply lines, and the economic blockade of cities are, in many ways, the unintentional product of a counterinsurgency’s deliberate decision to bias its operational attention toward urban areas.

Redressing the Urban Bias

To begin to redress the urban bias in operations, the counterinsurgency must first rethink the relative value of rural and urban space. The viability of major cities differs tremendously in times of war versus times of peace.
In times of peace, political power tends to reside in a country’s major cities. Politicians make their major decisions in the cities. Taxes flow from the countryside into urban areas where governments then redistribute the funds across the country. The same is true of economic wealth, which tends to cluster in urban areas. Because of the sheer number of urban inhabitants, most nations’ economies supply the populations of cities. Profitable services, commerce, and other industries also tend to locate in cities, because city dwellers are avaricious consumers of rural products.

Yet, during an insurgency, cities actually become the most vulnerable parts of a country, and real power and political capacity reside in the countryside. In times of peace, no barriers exist to living the urban life. Food is delivered without hindrance; power is easily generated and transferred for consumption; transit to and from urban areas is peaceful and ensured.

However, as waves of revolution sweep across the countryside, they wash away the power of urban areas, and the locus of authority and dominance passes to the rural countryside.

Cumulatively, then, the evidence presented here suggests that the control of urban areas, while necessary, is not sufficient to effect a successful resolution to a counterinsurgency campaign. The primary lesson that we can draw from this is a simple one: the army that controls the countryside, controls the state.

NOTES

16. Ibid.
18. Trinquier, 42.
29. Iraq presents an obvious counterexample to this trend because a little over 60 percent of the country’s population lives in cities. Regardless, the relative ease with which the Iraq insurgency was suppressed by the influx of new troops during the so-called ‘troop surge’ demonstrates, once again, that urban insurgencies are fairly vulnerable to the actions of a counterinsurgency.
32. James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), 75-90; for a qualitative demonstration of this same point, see Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Delul: Brassey’s Inc., 1996), 54.
33. Mao Tse-tung, 98.
34. Lawrence, 198.
35. Elliot, 54.
40. Jalali and Grau, 147.
43. Ibid.
46. Hugh Graham, “City of Kandahar is Key that Unlocks Afghanistan,” Toronto Star, 10 June 2008, 1.
THE U.S. ARMY is currently wrestling with the concept of “design” as an advanced application of problem management. Design was first inserted into U.S. Army doctrine in 2006 with the incorporation of a campaign design chapter in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which was followed-up with references to design in both the U.S. Army’s capstone manual, FM 3-0, Operations and the revised manual for dealing with post-hostility operations, FM 3-07, Stability Operations. The inclusion of a chapter outlining the design process in the current version of the Army’s key doctrinal reference for planning—FM 5-0, The Operations Process—has elevated the concept of design to the level of capstone doctrine.

Despite the previous years of debate and revision of design doctrine, acceptance and inculcation of design into the problem-management processes of U.S. Army units in the field appears tentative. The probable explanation for this is that the concept of design was not thoroughly tested by the field prior to its inclusion in doctrine. This is a lesson the Army has learned before, catalogued in exacting detail in two remarkable TRADOC publications, John Romjue’s From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, published in 1984, and Major Paul Herbert’s Deciding What Has To Be Done (Leavenworth Paper #16), published in 1988.

To summarize these two works, the publication of the Active Defense doctrine in the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations, led to a period of “spirited debate” and—more significantly—serious experimentation by the field headquarters (such as V Corps) who would have to operationalize the concepts. “While generally well accepted, [the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations] raised penetrating questions, even among its admirers, and the general critique was wide ranging.” As a result, in 1979 then-TRADOC commander, General Donn Starry, instituted a new doctrinal process that emphasized “operational concepts [that] did not become doctrine until tested, approved, and accepted” by the field Army force. In other words, General Starry and his doctrine team recognized that only experimentation
with concepts would address “the misgivings that existed within the Army itself about the doctrine of the active defense—misgivings which the debate did not satisfactorily resolve.”

Until the experimentation process can catch up, another way to alleviate the hesitation of units to accept design might be the examination of practical, historical examples upon which to base understanding. Although obviously the critical concepts inherent in the current military application of the Army Design Methodology, such as systems-theory, complexity, and problem framing, would not have been familiar to military planners, the basic premise of how design “fits”—the integration of conceptual thinking and detailed planning—is not necessarily new. The purpose of this article is to provide a sort of “case-study” for the application of design.

In January of 1943, one year before General Dwight Eisenhower or Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery began to consider the problem-set of Normandy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and United Kingdom decided “the time had come to begin the detailed development of the Overlord plan.” Subsequently, the chiefs appointed British Lieutenant General F.E. Morgan as Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), and tasked him to build and lead a team to provide “the basis for the subsequent development of detailed plans.” The efforts of the COSSAC staff and their relationship to the subsequent preparations made by Eisenhower and his staff are a case study for the development of a campaign design that was operationalized through detailed planning.

**Understanding Design**

The U.S. Army views the Army Design Methodology as a broad problem-solving approach that integrates detailed planning with “critical and creative thinking” through iterative problem-framing to generate “a greater understanding, a proposed solution based on that understanding, and a means to learn and adapt.”

Design requires commanders to “lead adaptive work” and “engage in learning through action” to verify they are solving the right problem, rather than solving the problem right. As a cognitive methodology, the design approach examines a problem from three perspectives—the environment, the problem, and the operation.

Examination of the environment builds understanding about why the current situation (the “observed system”) is different from the commander’s intent (the “desired system”). Framing the problem entails visualizing the tensions between the “observed system” and the “desired system” to determine actions required to transform the system. The concept for affecting this transformation is termed the operational approach, which entails developing a “broad conceptualization of general actions” that “provides the logic” to guide the development of courses of action during (subsequent) detailed planning. In terms of campaign development, the operational approach outlines parallel and sequential actions, often manifested as lines of operation or lines of effort and described, according to FM 3-0, through the elements of operational design. As design is meant to be integrated with detailed planning, the “output” or final result of the process is a design concept that reflects “understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state.”

A historical example that is congruent with the doctrinal explanation of the Army Design Methodology may prove useful for examining how the U.S. Army applied design during war fighting.
Using this methodology, the application of Design is characterized by:

- Applying critical and creative thinking.
- Emphasizing the conceptual (versus the detailed).
- Leveraging subject matter experts.
- Emphasizing continuous learning.
- Applying a continuous, iterative, cognitive methodology through problem-framing and re-framing.

The efforts of Lieutenant General Morgan and the COSSAC staff during World War II represent a design approach to campaign development. It aligns with the U.S. Army’s current thinking about the application of Design to military problem management.

**Designing the Victory in Europe**

On the 5th and 6th of June, 1944, Allied forces under the supreme command of General Dwight Eisenhower initiated Operation Overlord. The combined air/sea assault that commenced Overlord involved more than 5,000 landing craft (protected by over 700 warships) carrying five Allied divisions and the insertion of three parachute divisions by over 1,000 transports and gliders, all supported by over 4,000 fighter and bomber aircraft. The nearly 130,000 soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines of seven nations that conducted this assault represented the vanguard of a force that would eventually number more than four million and, in less than a year, prove capable of defeating Nazi Germany. The orchestration of the tactical missions, logistical preparations, sea-borne movement, establishment of air superiority, preparatory bombardment and fire support, and indirect control of partisan forces represented an immense and complex undertaking.

The success of Operation Overlord in June 1944 began 18 months earlier with the efforts of Morgan and his COSSAC team. The stated objective of COSSAC was to begin the formal planning for three operations: deception operations in 1943.
(Cockade), a rapid return to the continent in the event that Germany surrendered (Rankin), and a “full scale assault against the continent in 1944 (Overlord).” ¹⁴ Given a general time frame (summer 1944), a generic geographical orientation (northern France), and an estimate of available forces (five assault divisions), the COSSAC team was tasked with the “development of the Overlord operation from a strategic conception into a final attack plan.” ¹⁵ Morgan quickly realized that an effort to build a campaign as wide-ranging as an assault on Germany through northwest Europe to end the war required more than just traditional military planning. To accomplish this, the COSSAC staff applied a design-centric approach that emphasized critical and creative thinking, focused on broad concepts, employed experts, and built processes for continuous learning through an iterative methodology of problem-framing.

Critical and creative thought. To focus the efforts required for dealing with a problem-set of Operation Overlord magnitude, the staff applied critical and creative thinking to “clarify objectives in the context of the operational environment and within the limits imposed by policy, strategy, orders, or directives.” ¹⁶ The controlling idea that enabled the COSSAC staff to forego the traditional techniques of military planners and adopt a more design-centric approach was a recognition that their proper role was to set conditions for future planning efforts. As Morgan himself identified early in the process, the methodologies of the COSSAC staff needed to be different from a typical planning effort.¹⁷ The application of this sort of critical and creative thinking enabled the staff to view the problem more holistically and actively seek out opportunities to learn from ongoing operations. For example, Morgan viewed the execution of the 1943 deception operations (Operation Cockade) as “a reasonably realistic rehearsal in the course of which we would be able to overhaul the procedures that we would need to use for the great campaign.” ¹⁸ The detached perspective of the staff enabled a broader approach than could have been achieved by a staff accountable to both a commander and to assigned forces.

Focus on broad concepts that enable detailed planning. Field Manual 5-0 describes our operational process as the integration “of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component [Design] and a detailed component [the Military Decision Making Process].” ¹⁹ The
COSSAC staff grasped this distinction intuitively, seeing detailed planning as the responsibility of the land, sea, and air elements executing the actual operations.20 This led them to focus their efforts on devising ways to facilitate future learning. Constantly returning to the analysis of previous efforts, the staff sought to identify things they needed to learn about, and establish a learning environment. This included sending team members “to look over the preparations for Operation Husky to learn therefrom what would be of use to us.”21 It also included making a full analysis of historical examples, including every military crossing of the English Channel from the 11th century to the 1942 raid on the port of Dieppe. These efforts reinforced the notion of learning through action by using experimental modeling to solve facets of the problem, and they spun-off numerous prototypes, including the Mulberry artificial harbors, a petroleum pipeline across the Channel, the amphibious vehicle (DUKW), and the Bailey bridge.22

One primary way in which the COSSAC staff maintained its focus on a broad (versus detailed) approach was by limiting the scope of its activities to things it could control.23 Two examples demonstrate how COSSAC applied this technique—the initially singular focus on the channel crossing and the deliberate delay in analyzing alternate invasion directives.

The original Combined Chiefs of Staff planning directive, issued in March of 1943, tasked the COSSAC staff to prepare three separate plans—Cockade (deception operations), Rankin (unforeseen German surrender), and Overlord (channel crossing). However, after preparing the first overview of the plans in May 1943, General Morgan convinced the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reduce the scope of the staff’s efforts to the advanced guard mission of crossing the channel—Operation Overlord. As Morgan noted, “This supplementary directive gave us a more tangible object,” leading to a better refined, more focused effort.24 Later (following the Quadrant conference in August 1943), the COSSAC staff was given a new, additional planning requirement: examination of an invasion of Europe through Norway (Operation Jupiter). Fortunately, the COSSAC team ignored this task, the need for which rapidly became nonexistent. Morgan, confronting the Combined Chiefs of Staff, again made this deliberate scaling of effort possible. He argued that “if justice were to be done to a plan for Operation Jupiter, less than justice would be available to Operation Overlord.”25 In both cases, the staff purposefully limited the scope of the problem to achieve a more refined effort on its most important parts.

Employment of subject-matter experts. Lieutenant General Morgan used the structure of the COSSAC staff to facilitate learning by combining officers of the British and U.S. Navies, Armies, and Air Forces in a fully integrated, joint staff.26 The new design doctrine explicitly outlines leveraging “subject matter experts while formulating their own understanding.”27 Initially structured under a British model with three directorates (intelligence, operations, and logistics), every element of the staff was fully integrated with both British and American officers from every service. The inclusion of subject matter experts to supplement the military staff was extensive. As General Morgan pointed out, “Ambassadors, microfilm operators, bankers, agriculturists, newspapermen, lawyers, foresters, and a host of others, each the master of some technique [were] needed to help get us where
we wanted to go.” In addition to subject matter expert integration, the COSSAC staff was “in daily contact with the headquarters of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army . . . specially so with its Services of Supply organization.” As the size and scope of the COSSAC staff’s efforts grew, the inclusion of experts in all of the various directorates and subordinate sections was logical and inevitable. However, the experts most critical to the success of the effort were the high-level diplomats with the broadest understanding of the overall situation who only interacted with the core members of the design effort, but “added immeasurably to the general effectiveness of the whole organization.”28 The inclusion of experts also facilitated the development of the COSSAC team as a learning organization.

Setting conditions for continuous learning. From its formation until it handed its plan over to General Eisenhower, the prime directive of COSSAC was to self-structure to maximize learning through action. As one of the “central tenets,” continuous learning is a requisite part of the Army Design Methodology.29 The COSSAC staff facilitated learning by framing and re-framing the problem set of moving over 1 million soldiers across the Atlantic and the English Channel onto the European continent. Although much of the analytic effort resulted in finite, definitive planning information, the COSSAC staff strove to build a conceptual framework that future subordinate staffs could build upon. This reflected their general understanding that the eventual goal of their effort should be a broad approach that would set the conditions for a subordinate land component commander.

Another way in which the COSSAC team approached learning through action was the use of models or prototypes, expressly created for testing and refinement. Within a military campaign, rapid prototyping can take many forms, including wargaming, narratives, system diagrams, or pilot programs. Prototyping supports learning by enabling dialogue through interaction with the physical manifestation of an idea. It relieves the tensions between the need to act and the need to think by speeding up learning. As the operations staff of the 1st United States Army observed after World War II, “However perfect and carefully devised a plan of operations may be, there are always adjustments to be made . . . it is far better to discover them and to eliminate them during a practice period than to wait and let them come to light during important action when it will be too late to make corrections.”30 The COSSAC staff sought to use initial iterations as learning events to inform future design and planning. For example, the detailed work on Operation Cockade became a prototype for future deception operations and a learning tool for the overall design effort.31 The staff also viewed the 1942 raid operation at Dieppe, France, as a prototype. As General Morgan noted, “there were . . . many invaluable by-products of this raid which stood us at COSSAC in very good stead.”32 The use of prototypes and models enhanced the COSSAC staff’s ability to continually frame, test, and re-frame their problem set.

Iterative framing. Over the course of 1943, the COSSAC staff employed a cyclic process of problem refinement. FM 5-0 emphasizes the importance of employing an iterative framing methodology “to develop understanding of the operational environment; make sense of complex, ill-structured problems; and develop approaches to solving them.”33 Engaging in no less than six distinct iterations to refine the plan for Operation Overlord, the COSSAC staff started with a thorough review of the work completed by previous planning efforts and then framed and re-framed the problem, questioning every assumption and planning limitation from the mission assigned to the minimum required forces for a successful operation.34 By so doing, the staff realized the need to expand the amphibious landing area to facilitate the capture of more than one port. Another significant refinement came during the fourth iteration, when a “supplementary directive” reduced the scope of COSSAC’s efforts to the advanced guard mission of crossing the channel. This gave the COSSAC staff “a more tangible object, namely,
to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out.”35 Also notable was the fifth iteration, an operational test of the design at the British Staff College in Largs, Scotland.16

The COSSAC staff applied the same iterative learning process to the development of Operation Rankin, the response of the Allies to an unforeseen surrender or disintegration of Germany. The detailed work done to outline the three separate operation plans served as models for initial framing of post-hostility planning as “the unconditional surrender of Germany, represented in actuality the culmination of Operation Overlord.” As Lieutenant General Morgan observed, “although Operation Rankin never took place, it provided COSSAC with a great amount of invaluable experience and information that was indispensible to other activities.”17

**Conclusion**

The purpose of the Army Design Methodology is to “organize the activities of battle command” by developing adaptive and learning organizations that are masters of integrated planning through the “operations process”—planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.38

Until the U.S. Army can refine the Army Design Methodology within the crucible of operational testing, historical case studies can provide a way to put this methodology in perspective.

The example provided by Morgan and the COSSAC staff has particular significance to today’s Joint force. Throughout its nine-month existence, the COSSAC staff focused on learning through action, employed experts, utilized iterative framing and re-framing, and integrated conceptual approaches with detailed solutions. These actions distinguish the efforts of the COSSAC team as a design approach.

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4. Ibid., 29.

5. Ibid., 30.


7. Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1950), 129.


9. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division. U.S. Army in World War II Series (The War Department) (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1951), 156-59. The planning efforts that eventually became Operation Overlord originated under U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall (and then Brigadier General Eisenhower) in the War Plans Division of the Army staff. This initial “outline of operations” advocated a three-phased plan for an amphibious assault in April of 1943 and built a series of assumptions that shaped COSSAC’s iterations of the design of Operation Overlord. These efforts were “designed to govern deployment and operations” within a strategic framework that envisioned the British Isles as a forward marshaling and training area.


11. Banach, 96, and FM 5-0, 3-5 to 3-6.

12. FM 5-0, 3-7 to 3-12.


15. Morgan, vi, and COSSAC Paper.

16. FM 5-0, 3-5.


18. Morgan, 84. See also SHEAF, 18.

19. FM 5-0, 3-1.

20. Morgan, 151. The COSSAC team recognized from the outset that their efforts were “a means to an end. . . . The assault would be the affair of the advanced-guard commander to whom in due course would pass the responsibility for detailed planning (151).”

21. SHEAF, 7, and Morgan, 68.

22. Morgan, 132. For a detailed explanation of the idea genesis and subsequent development of these inventions see Morgan, 263-74. The designation of DUKW is not an acronym—the name comes from the model naming terminology used by GMC.

23. Morgan, 131. Morgan and the COSSAC team recognized that defeat of the enemy’s reserves was the key to the overall campaign; however, getting there was the initial focus: “The climax of the campaign will be the defeat in battle of the main body of the enemy’s reserves. This will definitely not take place on or near the beaches. . . . we must never lose sight of the fact that the assault on the beaches is merely a first step to what must follow.”

24. SHEAF, 3 and 5, and Morgan, 66.


26. SHEAF, 3-4.

27. FM 5-0, 3-1.

28. Morgan, 44, 64, and 217.

29. FM 5-0, 3-1.


31. Morgan, 83. Morgan noted, “It was evident that we must make what virtue we could of necessity and that while fulfilling the terms of our directive we must be at pains to derive from our rehearsal operations such benefit as we could for our main purpose.”

32. Morgan, 84.

33. FM 5-0, 3-2.

34. Cline, Washington Command Post, 159.

35. Morgan, 66. See also pages 55 and 135.

36. Morgan, 144.

37. Morgan, 118 and 123.

38. FM 5-0, 3-1 and 1-9.
The Turkish-American Crisis
An Analysis of 1 March 2003

Karen Kaya

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS FACED a serious crisis on 1 March 2003 when the Turkish Parliament voted down the Turkish government’s motion to deploy American troops in Turkey and open a northern front into Iraq.1 What went wrong? How did this decision affect bilateral relations? How can we prevent such incidents from happening again? Given the importance of the strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States, these are important questions worth exploring.

The decision itself arose from several Turkish miscalculations. The Turkish public and parliament were mostly against war. Although the administration, army, and foreign ministry were not crazy about the idea of war, they did not wish to disrupt relations with the United States, a strong ally. On the other hand, they were reluctant to appear to be part of an effort to remove a neighboring country’s regime by force, regardless of how bad that regime was. The European Union, which Turkey was trying to join, was divided on the issue of Iraq.

Several factors came together to produce the outcome of 1 March 2003. The domestic political environment in Turkey prior to 1 March 2003 was fragmented. There was no clear single point of contact for negotiations with the United States. In addition, U.S. war plans matured around the time of Turkey’s general elections. The soon-to-be-elected party had no idea what was happening. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had only come to power in November of 2002 and was inexperienced in foreign policy, resented U.S. policies. It was difficult for a party with its Islamic beliefs to get Turkey involved with large-scale military operations against a neighboring Muslim country. Moreover, the Turkish public remembered that Turkey had to deal with a refugee crisis and a huge loss in tourism revenues after the previous Gulf War. Concerns about the creation of an autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq led to fears about a Kurdish secessionist movement. Finally, the military, the president, the parliament, the prime minister,
the foreign minister, and the National Security Council all disagreed with each other.

In this uncertain environment, the government decided to require two motions from parliament, instead of one. When the first motion passed with a comfortable margin, the United States naturally thought that the second one would pass as well. However, it did not. And the crisis ensued.²

What Were the Stakes?

Turkish-American relations expert Soli Özel remembers that to create a northern front, the United States requested the use of Turkish airbases near Istanbul and the Black Sea, permission to deploy 80,000 to 90,000 American troops on Turkish territory en route to Iraq, permission to station 250 planes at Turkish airports, and the use of 14 airports and five sea ports. In return, the United States would establish a 20-kilometer security zone in northern Iraq. Up to 50,000 Turkish troops would go into this zone, some 30,000 of whom would be under U.S. operational command. The United States also promised that it would not allow the Kurdish political parties in northern Iraq to send their forces to Kirkuk, a multicultural city with a majority of Turcoman residents, and that fighters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and their bases in northern Iraq would be eliminated. Turkey would also receive $6 billion in grants or $24 billion in long-term loans. The Turkish government had already approved U.S. technical personnel upgrading several bases and sending men, vehicles, and materiel to the port city of Iskenderun. Even though these developments indicated a willingness on the part of the Turkish government to satisfy Washington’s demands, the task itself turned out to be more complicated.³

The domestic political environment in Turkey during the period leading up to the infamous “motion” was one of uncertainty and dysfunction. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit had held talks with U.S. officials, including President George W. Bush and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. However, Ecevit’s health was deteriorating. There were calls for him to step down. Sixty deputies from his party, the Democratic Left Party, had already resigned, including the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister. There were calls for early general elections.⁴ When the Bush administration made its first official demarche with the Turkish

Former President George W. Bush and then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of the Republic of Turkey talk with reporters in the Oval Office, 16 January 2002.
government, serious splits within the Turkish political landscape were surfacing. In fact, the very day that Wolfowitz made his requests, coalition leaders agreed to hold early elections. These splits eventually dragged Turkey toward a period of political uncertainty and the denial of U.S. requests to open a northern front.

**Gap between Domestic and Foreign Policy Actors**

Wolfowitz’s visit led to an agreement between the United States and Turkey to begin preparations for war in Iraq, even though the Turkish side had not made any final decision. The idea was that both sides would not be caught off-guard when a final decision was made, and no time would be lost.

As a follow-up to Wolfowitz’s visit, several government officials—including the undersecretary of the Turkish foreign ministry, the foreign minister, and the minister of state in charge of treasury—visited Washington in the fall of 2002 to discuss war plans in further detail. Turkey conveyed its expectations regarding its economic needs in case hostilities broke out. In mid-October, Turkish military authorities officially started discussing contingency plans for Iraq with their American counterparts, and the Turkish government allowed the use of Turkish airspace for U-2 flights over Iraq. While Turkish and American military officials were busy working on plans for military operations, Turkish politicians were busy with election campaigns.

**A New Party comes to Power**

On 3 November 2002, the recently formed Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory. Founded only a little over a year before the elections, the AKP was a brand new player on the political scene. The party had strong Islamic roots, and most of its members resented U.S. policies. The AKP had no experience in national government, foreign policy, or decision making. Involving the AKP in large-scale military operations against a neighboring Muslim country like Iraq was therefore problematic. The military and secular establishments were uncomfortable with the party’s rise to power, and it was unclear whether the AKP would be able to work with the Turkish military.

**War Memories**

The public and government were also uncomfortable with the idea of involving Turkey in another war. Turkey had suffered an estimated $40 to $50 billion in economic losses during the 1991 Gulf War, some of which were due to unkept American pledges. Many thought Turkey’s president had not bargained hard enough with the Bush Administration and expected tough negotiations to protect Turkey’s interests this time.

The possibility of a military intervention in Iraq also brought up memories of PKK terrorism. Most Turks believed the power vacuum created in northern Iraq was a result of the first Gulf War—that it created a safe haven for the PKK and paved the way for terrorism and the resultant loss of 30,000 Turkish lives in 15 years. The Turks believed that one of the consequences of the Gulf War was the creation of a semi-autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The majority of Turks worried that a military campaign in Iraq might further consolidate this entity. They also feared that a U.S. operation relying on Iraqi Kurds might empower an independent Kurdish state and even ignite Kurdish secessionist movements.
movements in Turkey. The fear was that Iraq’s Kurds, with America’s tacit blessing, would exploit the turmoil that would follow an Iraqi defeat by setting up their own independent state in the chunk of northern Iraq under their control.9

As the Americans discussed following the model they used to destroy the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, they became worried about the role Kurdish groups would play in the war and in post-Saddam Iraq. The Turks believed that if Kurdish groups aided by the American troops helped topple the Saddam regime, the Kurds would be the main beneficiaries of the operation.10

The war would be the first time the Turkish Republic hosted a large number of foreign troops on its territory, and it was unclear whether the Turkish public would be comfortable with some 80,000 to 90,000 troops stationed on its soil to invade a neighboring Muslim country.11

The public also felt that Turkey would have to deal with the aftermath of the war, while the United States could leave the region whenever it decided. The public feared that the United States would withdraw prematurely and leave the region full of political demons. If the United States did not provide the necessary troops or resources to rebuild Iraq, it might fall into a prolonged ethnic conflict that could aggravate militant radical Islamic terrorist groups, who might use terror and other guerrilla tactics to weaken the U.S. position in the Middle East. The Turks felt that if Iraq fell into anarchy, it would likely spill over into the rest of the Gulf and create a catastrophe, leaving Turkey and other countries in the region to deal with it. Some Turks feared that a victory over Iraq, far from being a deathblow to terrorism, would end up producing a new generation of terrorists.

The Turks also believed that such a war would severely harm the economies in the region. Memo- ries of losses after the Gulf War exacerbated the economic concerns. Turkey claimed that it lost up to $100 billion in trade revenues because of the economic sanctions enforced on Iraq. With another invasion of Iraq, trade activities that had recovered in the past decade would halt again. More important, tourism, amounting to $10 billion annually, would be severely hurt, along with desperately needed new foreign investment. An intervention in Iraq would destabilize the region at a time when stability was the key component to success in the global fight against terrorism.

Turkey was also concerned that countries like Iran and Syria might increase their support to terrorist groups in order to marginalize American influence and that Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah might increase their activities in the region. Turkey was concerned about having to deal with an influx of refugees, as had happened in the previous Gulf War crisis, worried that weapons of mass destruction might end up in the hands of terrorists, and that Iran might conclude that the only way to defend itself from the United States was to acquire nuclear weapons of its own and to increase and accelerate its efforts in this direction.

In view of all these things, therefore, Turkey decided to maintain the status quo rather than involve itself in an operation that might open the doors to military, political, and economic uncertainty.

Too Many Communication Channels

Normally, the leader of the victorious party in Turkey becomes prime minister, but due to a court verdict, the AKP’s leader could not do so. Thus,
an interim prime minister assumed power to serve until the verdict was satisfied. After the November elections, communications between the United States and Turkey entailed negotiations between then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and the Turkish Prime Minister-elect Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aided by three of his advisers, but none of these people had any official capacity to represent the Turkish government. The details of the meetings that took place between these parties were never communicated to the Foreign Ministry or the Turkish General Staff. As a result, negotiations and promises made through back channels often went beyond the limits set in official channels. The president and the speaker of the parliament were opposed to cooperation without a UN resolution that legitimated the war against Iraq. The foreign ministry was in favor of cooperation. The military had major reservations about the war and the future of northern Iraq, but it was in favor of cooperation because it wanted to have a say in how Iraq’s future would unfold after the war. Since then, several generals have expressed that Turkey’s refusal of the motion was a mistake, lamenting a lost historical opportunity to end the PKK presence in northern Iraq.

The government was thus divided. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül was uncomfortable with the idea of a northern front launching from Turkey. The Prime Minister-elect, the leader of the governing party, was in favor of cooperation. The National Security Council makes security-related decisions in Turkey, but it was also divided. The opposition party opposed the deployment of American troops into northern Iraq but supported the unilateral deployment of Turkish troops to the same area, a move the United States would not accept.

The Turkish military had major concerns and suspicions. On 24 February 2003, the Kurdish parliament in northern Iraq declared it “would not let any foreign military in.” Turkish military leaders wondered if the United States was negotiating with Ankara on the one hand, while supporting Kurdish leaders on the other. When the United States insisted on distributing a large number of anti-aircraft missiles to Kurdish groups, Turkish military officials understandably wondered who these anti-aircraft missiles were going to be used against. The United States insisted an American commander command the Turkish troops in northern Iraq and tried to include a clause in the agreement preventing Turkish troops from opening fire on anyone, including PKK members, unless were fired upon first. (Eventually, the United States had to drop this clause due to a public uproar about it.)

The United States had requested the use of a large number of airports and ports, which would have had the effect of turning the whole country into a U.S. logistical base and creating suspicions that the United States might also invade Iran and Syria via Turkey.

Turkey believed that after a certain period, Turkish troops would be told, “We don’t need you, you can leave now.” Some worried that the United States would not allow Turkish troops more than 15 to 20 kilometers inside Iraq and hold them in a security zone.

Two Decrees

In an effort to improve Turkey’s bargaining position, the Turkish government decided to separate the issue into two different motions requiring parliamentary approval. The Turkish constitution stipulated that the arrival of American military personnel onto Turkish soil for the proposed modernization effort would require such approval, and the deployment of military units in Turkey, including the landing of U.S. combat forces en route to Iraq, would require parliamentary approval. The government could have combined both of these issues into a single comprehensive motion but did not. The foreign ministry and the military thought this was the proper way to proceed, but the
prime minister thought otherwise, so the government chose to submit a motion to the parliament authorizing only the first part of the request: the upgrading of the military infrastructure in Turkey. This was approved by a safe margin: 308 in favor, 198 against. The second part of the U.S. request remained on hold. Had the two motions been combined into one, they might have passed comfortably.\textsuperscript{15}

The “accident” of 1 March 2003. The second motion, which entailed the landing of U.S. combat forces en route to Iraq and the deployment of their support units on Turkish soil, finally came to the Parliament on 1 March 2003.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the prime minister-elect’s strong appeal, around 100 AKP parliament members defected in a closed vote and the resolution was defeated. The parliament refused the government’s request for permission to invite U.S. ground troops into Turkey and refused to allow Turkish troops to cross into northern Iraq. Public opinion was overwhelmingly against a war Turkey considered unjust.\textsuperscript{17}

Turkish-American relations. U.S. officials were shocked at the decision. Despite the great disappointment, the U.S. official position was to respect Turkey’s democratic will. However, once the war began, the United States had to rely on cooperation with the Kurdish factions and their militias in northern Iraq, as Turkey had feared. It later surfaced that Turkey allowed U.S. Special Forces passage to northern Iraq and the use of Turkish airspace, before the parliament’s decision. Turkey also allowed the transportation of wounded U.S. soldiers to the Incirlik base in Adana. In an effort to ease tensions and as a sign of Turkey’s continuing importance, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Ankara on 2 April 2003 and offered Turkey one billion dollars in grants or eight and a half billion dollars in loans. The U.S. Senate approved the loans on condition that Turkey would not unilaterally send troops to northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{18}

The major casualty of this ordeal was close relations between the Pentagon and the Turkish armed forces. In addition, both sides started redefining the 1990s strategic partnership between the two countries. From an American perspective, the Turkish military failed to be steadfast when the United States called upon it in a moment of need. However, Turkish politicians denied “turning their backs” on the United States, and pointed to domestic public opinion, national security interests, and bureaucratic and domestic complications.\textsuperscript{19}
What Did We Learn?

Pursuing a multi-track diplomacy with several actors within Turkey led to confusion and false promises. Having a clear and legitimate point of contact for negotiations is important. In addition, understanding the domestic environment within a country is critical. In this case, negotiations became void due to general elections and an administration change.

Even though relations have been on the mend since the United States pledged to support Turkey in its fight against PKK terror in November 2007, the two militaries still hold grudges against each other. Military-to-military relations need repairing. Both militaries have to develop a better understanding of each other’s concerns and learn to have a more open dialogue. In judging each other’s decisions, both sides need to take into account the domestic situation within the two countries and better understand their respective operational environments. One possible way to achieve this might be to increase opportunities for exchange programs for cadets in the service academies to promote mutual understanding. Both sides should take better advantage of international military education and training opportunities at available facilities. Opportunities for language training of cadets and officers might also prove useful in promoting mutual understanding.

As former U.S. Ambassador Mark Parris has noted, the United States considers Turkey a “European country,” and due to Cold War logic, the State Department assigns it to the European Bureau, and the Pentagon assigns it to European Command (EUCOM). However, since the end of the Cold War, the most difficult issues in U.S.-Turkish relations have arisen in the Middle East, an area that is the responsibility of Central Command (CENTCOM), which does not have the same expertise or understanding of Turkey. On the other hand, European specialists who are unfamiliar with the crises on Turkey’s borders fill key jobs relating to Turkey for which CENTCOM specialists might be better qualified. The result is often deadlock, which Turkey perceives as disregard. One possible solution is to fill key jobs in both EUCOM and CENTCOM with people who have expertise in both regions.

For its part, Turkey vastly overestimated its importance to the United States. Some claim that by refusing the motion to allow a northern front, Turkey was trying to prevent the Iraq war. Turkey did not realize how serious the United States was about invading Iraq, and did not realize that the United States would do so regardless of whether Turkey supported it or not. Such a misperception points to the urgent need for mutual understanding of contemporary operational environments and military intentions.

NOTES

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Özel, “A Year on Uncharted Waters.”
11. Ergin, 3.
17. Özel, “A Year on Uncharted Waters.”
19. Özel, “A Year on Uncharted Waters.”
22. Özel, “A Year on Uncharted Waters.”
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS are logistics centric operations. In contrast to other operations, logistics as a Joint function becomes the main effort. Joint operations typically emphasize command and control, maneuver, fires, and intelligence. In humanitarian assistance, the value of military forces is logistics command, control, and execution. When a Joint task force (JTF) arrives to respond to a disaster, it is a behemoth of capability compared to all other interagency, international, and nongovernmental agencies. The unique capability that makes a Joint task force valuable is the ability to organize and execute logistics operations in a chaotic environment.

Operation Unified Response in Haiti was no different. The essential task that defined success was the rapid distribution of sustainment to the Haitian people. The responsiveness of Joint Task Force Haiti was essential; getting there saved lives while influencing the strategic communications battle in meeting the response expectations of the international community.

Humanitarian Assistance Considerations

This article uses lessons learned from Operation Unified Response to present the following considerations for humanitarian assistance operations:

Humanitarian assistance operations are logistics centric. There is the need for a robust expeditionary logistics organization to deploy rapidly to meet expectations for humanitarian assistance operations. This organization must be able to receive and stage deploying DOD forces and facilitate or execute the reception and distribution of relief supplies and materials.

We must think differently about how Joint task forces support humanitarian operations. The JTF headquarters must be focused and resourced to command and control logistics functions. This capability must be more robust than the capability normally found in a maneuver-centric Joint task force J-4 section designed to sustain the force.

The command and control function of the Joint task force must include the ability to capture and display a common logistics operational picture. In humanitarian assistance operations, U.S. military forces will...
always assume a supporting role to other agencies, but paradoxically, they will have the most capacity. This is certainly the case in command and control. Therefore any U.S. military common operational picture must include the activities of the interagency, the international community, and nongovernmental organizations.

Command relationships for logistics units are important. This was obvious in Haiti with multiple logistics organizations deployed from multiple services. But how does the Joint construct of logistics as a service function in humanitarian assistance operations? Does a Joint functional component command for logistics subordinate to the Joint Task Force Headquarters make sense?

Background and Initial Deployments

While U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is well suited for responding to natural disasters and has frequently done so in its area of responsibility, nothing could have prepared SOUTHCOM for the magnitude of the earthquake that devastated Haiti. The epicenter of the 7.2 quake was about 10 miles southeast of Port-au-Prince, the densely populated capital of the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere. More than 220,000 people perished in the earthquake, and more than a million found themselves without shelter. The earthquake devastated the infrastructure of Port-au-Prince, including buildings that housed the Haitian government. The road network was largely impassable, and the communications infrastructure badly damaged.

The quake captured the immediate attention of our Nation’s leaders, resulting in a heightened state of urgency. The urgency led to constant demands for detailed information at the tactical level, and this contributed to friction within SOUTHCOM and JTF Haiti headquarters. The most difficult challenge in the initial days of the response was understanding what the population needed. In the absence of defined requirements, SOUTHCOM leaders had to rely on their experience, intuition, and limited communications with those in Haiti to tailor the available forces and deploy them as quickly as possible to Haiti.

The security situation in Haiti had been tenuous enough to warrant 10 years of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a standing United Nations peacekeeping force. Many Haitian government and MINUSTAH leaders died in the collapse of their headquarters. A focus on preventing an environmental tragedy from devolving into political violence and chaos accounted for early decisions to deploy the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, the Global Response Force. Because of airfield limitations, deploying a force capable of ensuring security came at the expense of deploying other capabilities, mostly logistics capabilities.

As a result, logistics capabilities and logistics command and control diminished after the initial response. While the United States Transportation Command’s Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) deployed within the first week and made an enormous positive impact, it could not coordinate the total logistics effort. The unit prevented an unmitigated disaster at the Port-au-Prince Airfield by bringing order to the chaos of arriving material and personnel, but it could not organize distribution inland from the port and airfield.

The Need for an Expeditionary Logistics Capability

The earthquake in Haiti reinforced the requirement for an expeditionary logistics capability. This type of organization does not exist as part of any global response force. The 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) deployed to Haiti to serve as the Joint Logistics Command. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) subsequently replaced it. Both units are logistics command and control elements without assigned forces and neither is postured for rapid deployment. However, when they do stand up and deploy, each unit has tremendous capability.

Working through the process to identify units to attach to 3rd ESC and subsequently working the request-for-forces process through Joint Forces Command precluded rapid deployment. What was required immediately in Haiti was an expeditionary version of a “corps level or above,” multifunctional logistics unit capable of pulling together the entire logistics effort and fully resourced with subordinate units for command and control and to execute logistics.

To mitigate the tragedy in Haiti, the immediate requirement was for planning and executing logistics operations in concert with United States Agency for International Development and the World Food Program. Relief supplies pre-staged in World Food Program warehouses or coming through Port-au-Prince had to be organized into correctly sized packages for onward movement to distribution points. There was an enormous demand for contingency contracting support, which had the dual benefit of reducing the force footprint and employing the local population. Logistics planning was also required for medical and engineering operations and reception, staging, and force sustainment considerations for deploying U.S. forces and relief supplies.

In a perfect world, a logistics unit with this capability would have been the first to deploy. As noted, security concerns and physical limitations for force reception precluded this approach in Haiti, and the force required was not available or ready for expeditionary operations. Post-deployment dwell time concerns raised availability issues, and the 377th TSC reserve unit had unique activation concerns. Soldiers motivated to deploy manned both units, but neither unit was deployable or expeditionary.

Joint Task Forces for Humanitarian Assistance

The leadership and staff from JTF-PO were immediately incorporated into the Joint headquarters. This demonstrated Joint Task Force Haiti commander Lieutenant General Ken Keen’s intuitive sense early on for the need for logistics command and control within the headquarters to meet the demands of the operation. U.S. Army South, the obvious choice to form the JTF, had been reserved by the commander of U.S. SOUTHCOM to be employed in the event of a disaster-motivated mass migration. Lieutenant General Frank Hemlick, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, recognized the need for a core to form the Joint task force and offered the Corps’ assault command post. Although not normally part of the Global Response Force,
the assault command post provided a competent and capable staff upon which to build Joint Task Force Haiti.

The focus of the 18th Airborne Corps is that of a maneuver headquarters. The logistics command and control capability is resident in the G-4 staff section and is organized, focused, and equipped to support the commander as he plans and directs the sustainment of forces assigned to the corps. The G-4 staff section became the core JTF-Haiti’s J-4. In spite of valiant efforts, the J-4 was not resourced to plan and direct the logistics associated with humanitarian assistance operations well beyond the scope of force sustainment activities.

By convention, Joint task force operational planning and execution must be a lead “J-3 operations” activity. Therefore, we must weight the operations section with logistics planners possessing the requisite skill sets for success in humanitarian operations. While this seems intuitively obvious, we often fail to recognize humanitarian relief operations as logistics-centric and fail to organize properly. The typical JTF works with a J-3 designed to support the planning, integration, and direction of maneuver, fires, and intelligence. This is not optimal for humanitarian assistance. Two options exist to correct this situation.

The first option is to develop and resource a Joint manning document with logistics planners, drawing skill sets from service components or by requesting individual augmentees. A second option is to employ an above-the-corps level U.S. Army logistics organization, such as a theater support command or an expeditionary sustainment command.

Line-by-line development of a Joint manning document in the midst of crisis is challenging. It also has the disadvantage of producing a unit that lacks cohesion because its members have never trained together or developed internal staff procedures. The individual augmentation approach might be the best solution for small-scale humanitarian assistance operations where a logistics unit with significant capability and capacity would be overkill.

The second option, building the JTF from a logistics unit core, guarantees unit cohesion, consistent training, and established staff processes. Logisticians who can plan and execute the functions of the main effort are part of the operations section. Individual augmentation to a core JTF logistics unit might be required, but these augments would be in intelligence, communications, and maneuver functions.


(USAF, TSgt Dennis J. Henry, Jr.)
Rarely do we consider forming a Joint task force around a logistics unit, but this approach is perhaps the most practical for humanitarian assistance.

**A Logistics Common Operational Picture**

The tragedy in Haiti and the response effort captured the world’s attention. The insatiable demand for information on the progress of the operation from all levels of the U.S. government reflected this interest. Much of the demand was to demonstrate the extent of the response and measure its success, or to gain situational awareness in a world of near instantaneous access to information. For logisticians the majority of requests for information focused on comparing requirements with capabilities. Logistics planning is requirements based. In the absence of requirements, how does a commander know what capabilities he needs?

Early challenges in depicting information were the result of chaos and uncertainty. General Keen indicated immediate requirements determination was impossible. At first, communications between the forming JTF and the rest of the world were limited to a Blackberry-based cell phone network. The communications situation improved over time, as did Joint Task Force Haiti’s ability to determine its requirements and daily activities. However, the default communications medium remained PowerPoint briefs, which were laborious to build and maintain on the fly.

Operation Unified Response required a “common operational picture” for logistics. Future operations will as well. This common operational picture should at a minimum capture and display requirements, daily logistics activities, logistics centers, supply routes, medical centers, and engineering projects. It should be unclassified in a humanitarian assistance environment, allowing anyone to access the information with a few mouse clicks or key strokes.

Updating the information in the logistics common operational picture should be easy. Ideally, it would automatically access information from

LTG Keen, second from the left, talks to Marine Corps BG Mike Dana, a Joint Task Force Haiti logistics officer, about the effects of the recent earthquake, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 20 January 2010.
many sources, self-populate, and update itself. For example, in addition to displaying information on the activities of Joint Task Force Haiti and its subordinate units, it would have been optimum to have had visibility on the activities of all inbound shipping and civil and military aircraft. Information on the actions of other nations and nongovernmental activities would also have been helpful.

A number of organizations are working to develop logistics common operational pictures. We cannot develop a usable and deployable version fast enough, however. Access to information in real time has become an everyday expectation. The faster and more accurately we can develop and share an information picture, the more accurate, focused, and effective our response will become. A logistics common operational picture also mitigates the need to inform higher headquarters through laborious PowerPoint briefings requiring hours of preparation and adding little value to the overall effort.

**Joint Logistics Command Relationships**

The efficacy of a Joint functional component command for logistics continues to be a question pondered in the Joint logistics community. Current doctrine provides for this option as well as the more traditional approach of logistics as a service responsibility. In Haiti, as in all humanitarian and disaster relief operations, the question has two dimensions—logistics support to the affected population, and logistics sustainment to the deployed force.

A Joint logistics component command to the Joint task force makes sense for planning and executing support to the affected population. This is particularly true if the forces the services deploy are logistics forces consolidated under a single commander as a subcomponent to a large Joint task force. In this situation, span of control would suggest battalion-sized or equivalent forces that require a level of command between them and a three-star Joint task force commander. This was the case in Haiti.

The magnitude of the effort should be the key consideration in deciding to establish a Joint logistics command. Perhaps the Joint task force itself could most effectively perform command and control for multiple service logistics forces during a small humanitarian crisis. Establishing a Joint component command for logistics would result in ineffective and inefficient layering of the Joint task force. It rarely makes sense to establish a Joint functional component commander for logistics to accomplish force sustainment. We resource, organize, and design our forces to be self-sustaining. As the theater matures, service support usually shifts to a common-user logistics relationship and is the responsibility of an Army logistics command. While perhaps inefficient, service-based logistics is certainly effective and flexible, at least in the initial stages, and aligns with Title X roles, responsibilities, and resourcing. In a humanitarian effort such as Operation Unified Response, speed to respond is a critical consideration, and effectiveness trumps efficiency.

The command relationships established during Operation Unified Response were effective. Everyone remained focused on working to assist the Haitian people, and we achieved unity of effort. However, as in all operations, getting the command and control relationship correct was difficult, and a different personal dynamic could have caused friction due to organizational chart challenges. The more we define relationships along doctrinal lines, the better they work.

Planners from the Joint Staff J-4 and SOUTHCOM designed the logistics force and defined command relationships among logistics units during the first few days of the response. This effort did not transfer effectively into execution. The 3rd ESC, designated as the Joint Logistics Command, was to serve as the Joint logistics functional component. However, there was little in this command that ended up Joint. It remained Army-centric, as 3rd ESC. This is not a criticism; it simply reflects the reality of what occurred.

Other logistic unit command relationships that required definition were the Army and Navy components of Joint Logistics Over the Shore and an ad hoc organization, self-dubbed “JTF-PO.”

> Everyone remained focused on working to assist the Haitian people, and we achieved unity of effort.
by Rear Admiral Sam Perez, previously assigned as the deputy to SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force South, the JTF-PO’s mission was to run the port at Port-au-Prince. It had an enormous positive impact on operations there, but the presence of this nondoctrinal organization added confusion to the logistics command relationships. Indeed, a post-crisis effort to capture and depict the command relationships between logistics units required 16 drafts to arrive at any level of consensus among those involved.

Obviously, we have more work to do to define the command and control structure. Unity of effort and unity of command are both important considerations. TRANSCOM’s JTF-PO is designed to achieve unity of effort, through a “coordinating” relationship with the combatant commander, but it is not set up to achieve unity of command, which requires a tactical control relationship with the JTF or functional logistics component, if established. We must consider these relationships as well as those among critical logistics organizations.

An Exception to Normal Operations

The magnitude of the disaster in Haiti and the size of the response made Operation Unified Response an exception to normal operations. The Department of Defense rarely responds to foreign disasters and when it does, the requirement is generally more manageable. Consequently, we must take care concerning the lessons we draw from this large-scale crisis.

One could argue that structuring and organizing U.S. forces for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief does not make a great deal of sense, especially in the current environment of fiscal constraint and given the continued requirement to meet our enemies abroad. We should recognize the strategic luxury we enjoy. We live in a world in which we can employ (and if we are not careful, dissipate) our military capability providing foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Our leaders need to think hard before deciding to build specific capabilities for this purpose.

The capabilities required to respond effectively to a humanitarian assistance crisis are the same capabilities required for any expeditionary operation. This is certainly true for logistics units. The term “expeditionary” defines the capability required for logistics units in support of Operation Unified Response or any other humanitarian operation. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan tend to take the edge off our expeditionary capability. Forces deploying to these operations tend to fall in on mature forward operating bases with established sustainment systems.

The time has come to develop a system to capture and display a common operational picture for logistics that incorporates information from all participants in an operation. We must be able to access strategic and tactical information and precise information on logistics requirements. Effectiveness and efficiency literally save lives.

Command relationships among logistics units are important. Humanitarian assistance operations are logistics-centric. Logisticians must consider much more than pure sustainment of the force. They should consider the practicality of a Joint functional component command for logistics. If not, the ideal “core” of a JTF humanitarian assistance mission is a logistics unit trained and predisposed to tackle challenges common to such events. **MR**
HAVING JUST RETURNED from Kabul, it is particularly pertinent to be involved in an initiative which was set up 66 years ago. Mrs. Roosevelt was writing as the Second World War drew to its climax, at a time when exploiting the relationship between the United States and Britain would have been supported by the vast majority of people in both our countries. Since then we have “won” the Cold War, experiencing a transformation into an interconnected world where borders mean little, alliances ebb and flow, the relative strength and influence of countries have changed, and there is only one world superpower.

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said in 1969 that sharing a land mass with a richer and more powerful neighbour was like sleeping with an elephant. “No matter how even-tempered and friendly the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.” Although this remark was made from an economic and social perspective, it is an entirely appropriate metaphor to describe the relationship that coalition partners have had with the United States over the past decade in security operations. How do we ensure that contemporary coalition operations are as effective as possible, particularly when one partner dominates so conspicuously in terms of mass or physical investment?

A “Special Relationship”?  
Since World War II, Anglo-American relations have often been characterised as “special.” The shared cultural and historical inheritance of the two countries is seen by some as underpinning their close diplomatic and military co-operation. The term special relationship was first used by Winston Churchill during his Iron Curtain speech of March 1946. His reason was to guarantee a firm stance against the rise of Stalin’s Soviet Union. It is not surprising that for the length of the Cold War, the common enemy; cultural and historical similarities; diplomatic consultation; and intelligence, defence, and nuclear co-operation meant that there was a particular closeness in Anglo-American relations.

Based upon General Parker’s speech at the Army War College on 25 January 2011, this article also appears in the Spring 2011 edition of British Army Review.

PHOTO: Elephant on the border of the Serengeti and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania. (nickandmel2006)
But some judge this to be a spurious mantra, to many it is irrelevant, and to some it is one-sided. The U.S. ambassador to Britain from 1991 to 1994, the anglophile Raymond Seitz, tried to remove the term from diplomatic dialogue all together. This is instructive since, at times of mutual crisis, there is a sense of common purpose, but when this is not so—in Seitz’s case after the Cold War had ended and there were differences of interpretation of the Balkans conflict—the relationship can sometimes appear anything but special. However, current polling in the United States shows 36 percent of people consider the United Kingdom to be their most valuable ally, 29 percent identify Canada, 12 percent Japan, 10 percent Israel, and 5 percent Germany. Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt was clearly expressing a widely held sentiment in 1944 which has, to a degree, retained its currency until today. This is important, not because we have some special contract between us—we do not—but because there are channels of communication, understanding, mutual analysis, and shared problem solving that will continue to benefit us both if they are exploited.

In the case of the United Kingdom and the United States, there is one obvious difference which I must highlight, and that is size, as the map shows (Figure 1). And then here are some statistics that elaborate this further (Figure 2).
U.S. officers do not bat an eyelid at shifting huge amounts of stuff in very short order. Consider the 30,000 troop uplift in Afghanistan, announced by President Obama at West Point on 1 December 2009. There were forces flowing into theatre within days, very challenging ground lines of communications were reinforced and made considerably more robust, and 31 FOBs [forward operating bases] were either built or expanded, often in remote locations. The task was completed within eight months—an extraordinary achievement that was almost taken for granted by those of us conducting operations. The United States is big, it takes scale in its stride, and its thought processes are attuned in a way that those from smaller nations are not.

So what about the United Kingdom? A smaller country should be more agile in its thought processes, it should be able to make more out of less, and it should communicate more effectively up and down its (more streamlined) structures. The level of strategic understanding in small nations is probably more extensive, they have a more outward looking culture, can exercise leverage through their tactical efforts, but have little credibility at the operational level—they have neither the size nor capacity to “go it alone” on anything other than limited operations. Of course, there is more to this than size. The United States wields considerable power and influence across the globe: my point is that we should foster a common understanding that makes coalitions resilient—all partners must feel that they have a special relationship with each other, which exploits their strengths.

The History of Coalitions

Seventy years ago, the British diplomat and politician Harold Nicolson wrote that “the basis of any Alliance, or Coalition, is an agreement between two or more sovereign states to subordinate their separate interests to a single purpose.”1 The usual reason for creation of a coalition is the recognition that the pooling of resources can bring formidable concentrations of power that would not be available to individual states, whether it be the coalition of Balkan Christian leaders that fought (and lost) the Battle of Kosovo against the invading Ottoman Turks in 1389, or the formidable coalition that was formed to oppose the expansionism of Louis
XIV’s France in the late 17th and early 18th centuries—England, the Netherlands, Prussia, Denmark, Austria, and a host of other states.

The mutual interests that bring together coalition partners do not need to be a direct threat. The single most important reason why the United States gained independence in 1783 was that France and Spain joined the rebelling colonists in an anti-British coalition, taking advantage of British pre-occupation in North America to strike at a rival at a time of weakness.

In the three great wars of the 20th century—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—coalitions won, and in all the Anglo-American relationship was pivotal. We, rightly, look back at the relationship of 1941 to 1945 as both cohesive and successful, but there were plenty of examples of the British trying to manipulate—and vice versa. Shared culture and values smoothed the path; they did not eliminate such stresses.

For the United States, coalition operations in World War II were further complicated because it was fighting a two-hemisphere war, and the U.S. Navy, especially in the formidable person of Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, was more interested in the Pacific. This led to some infighting between the U.S. services, which allowed the British, especially given the negotiating skill of the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, to win some key arguments—for instance, the decision to launch a second front in 1942 not in France, but in North Africa. Ultimately, U.S. experience in negotiations combined with a preponderance of troops, ships, and aircraft ensured that they won most of the arguments from 1943 onwards.

Just as people of a certain age remember where they were when they heard JFK had been assassinated, younger generations remember the same about 9/11. It was a turning point in more ways than one, not least because the United States activated Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; since then, the United States and the United Kingdom have been involved in coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The sense of a new threat—radical Islam—which succeeded those of the 20th century, brought our countries and others together, unified in a common purpose. There have been tensions and stresses, but the common military heritage of the two countries and our recent experience in operating together has set us up well.

But we should not assume that all will continue to be well. History points to the way that coalitions evolve. Power can shift within a coalition over time, as states wax or wane. Common interests can begin to shift at the political level. We know that war is an extension of politics by other means, and as political dynamics change, so will the objectives of the coalition. A coalition is dynamic, not static; and just like a car that does not get regular maintenance, it can become less efficient and eventually stop working altogether.

Today, both of our countries recognize that coalitions are here to stay. The recent U.K. Strategic Defence and Security review concluded that “alliances and partnerships will remain a fundamental part of our approach to defense and security.” In the United States, the policy is defined in a number of areas. I understand that a new document, “Building Partnership Capacity,” is out in draft at TRADOC, and that the president recently stated that “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.” The Army Plan stipulates that crucial to the Army’s success in the future operational environment are “balanced land forces prepared to engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies.” Our respective reasons for this imperative to work with others will be subtly different, but the result is the same—a mutual desire to cooperate. There will also be some nations that are able to bring capabilities to the fight which we are not well placed to provide on our own. This will range from regional knowl-
edge—illustrated by the Turks in ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] or the Gulf States in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait—to the force-generation capabilities that may be unique, such as the gendarmerie police capability of Italy, France, and some of the South American states. So we need to develop groupings that are as broadly based as possible and bring a tapestry of capabilities together.

A Strategic Perspective

I have not always seen enough evidence that our nations sufficiently understand that, by making coalition operations an element of national policy, we have to concede some national aspirations for wider collective objectives, and that there have to be mechanisms in place which will allow us to “operationalize” our multinational plans. History has already emphasised the need for common understanding. But there are real frictions here. Each nation that contributes to a coalition will have invested some political strategic equity in the venture no matter what the scale of their tactical investment. This means that events and politics at the national strategic level will have a disproportionate and unexpected impact on the ground and vice versa.

For example, the Spanish investment in Iraq from August 2003 amounted to around 1,300 troops. It was neither a battle-winning nor a battle-losing figure, but it was the sixth-largest troop contributor at the time and was strategically important. A reasonably close-fought election in Spain in early 2004 was immediately preceded by the March terrorist attack in Madrid, which killed 201 and injured over 1,000 citizens. This influenced the outcome: the party that came into power had placed withdrawal from Iraq as a central element of their manifesto, and their troops withdrew within two months, irrespective of the tactical impact. In this case, the fallout was manageable, if highly undesirable, but it shows how easy it can be to disturb a coalition.

There are plenty of other examples: the unexpected Dutch withdrawal from operations in Afghanistan in February 2010, the impact in Germany of the Kunduz airstrike in September 2009, and maybe—from a British perspective—the events that led to the Iraqi operations in Basra in March 2008.

Clausewitz may well have been right in the context of coalitions when he stated, “that it is to politics that we must always return.”

Although this strategic examination must consider international complexity, there is also an intra-national dynamic, the parallel requirements of a multi-agency, cross-government, “comprehensive” approach. The contemporary operating environment accomplishes decisive effect through the political, economic, social, intelligence, and security space, and is a combination of all of these. So even if we can get capitals to talk to each other, there will be inbuilt frictions between the various departments with responsibility for policy and execution. This has been recognised in the United Kingdom by creating the National Security Council, an initiative designed to provide more coherent, comprehensive direction to all the departments of state. It is still too early to assess how well this is working, but I believe that we are moving in the right direction.

In British military doctrine, Selection and Maintenance of the Aim is a “master” principle of war. In ISAF, it was assumed that the NATO strategic command mechanisms would provide the necessary military leadership. It brings the partners together in a well-tested forum (the North Atlantic Council), with supporting processes and a clearly defined chain of command. But in my time in Afghanistan it felt reactive, bureaucratic, and detached from the immediacy of the debate in capitals. In short, it felt to me as if NATO mechanisms provided window dressing while the core business was conducted informally and bilaterally between capitals.

Carl von Clausewitz.

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Once again, the flaw lies with an insufficient sense of common purpose among the partners. The North Atlantic Council worked in the Cold War because perceptions of the threat were more consistent among Allies, and because it was never tested in combat. Today the NATO process lacks the sophistication to deal with the challenge we face, and struggles to afford the appropriate priority to Afghanistan in comparison to its other interests. I have to submit that to propose that we place much greater emphasis on NATO’s ability to take charge will be naïve—certainly in an Afghan context.

So if the official mechanisms are not working, what about the various bilateral “special relationships”? I have tried to identify the U.S.-U.K. strategic coordination machinery for Afghanistan, and the arrangements that exist seem to me unduly ad hoc. There is a view that the practice of U.K.-U.S. coordination at the highest level is so embedded in the habits of both our governments that it comes naturally and easily. With each new U.S. administration, there is often a nervousness in the British camp about whether the new president and his advisers will continue to want to work so closely with us. But there is an assumption that it will not take very long before the utility of our close and trusting relationship becomes apparent to the new team. This bothers me a little. There is a whiff of complacency. The timing and format of the exchanges between our political masters and officials can be somewhat ad hoc, and I can see no evidence of a willingness to subordinate national objectives which would have been evident during World War II.

I have asked whether the grand strategic coherence that we have managed to develop in previous conflicts is achievable in the contemporary operating environment. I have advocated greater international coherence in the Afghan operation. I am aware that this could sound like an alibi for the security line of operation, but that is not my intention. In such a complex region where there are so many conflicting interests and an enemy that has time on its side, grand strategic coherence is a prerequisite for success.
What Can Be Done?

I have three comments. The first is that perceptions of the threat must be managed carefully so that there is a collective view among partner nations that it is in their self-interest to defer to the common good. This requires a change to current political attitudes, certainly in the European nations that I have observed, for this to be “battle winning.” But the narrative can be matured so that it is more convincing in the capitals of those who are dispatching their young men and women into harm’s way.

The second is probably more pragmatic, since it is to advocate lead nation status from the United States and do everything that we can to reinforce the coherence and momentum that this generates. The nation with the largest stake will have the tightest command and control mechanisms, the most effective staff engine, and the resources to exploit priorities and main effort.

The third is to invest in command and control at the theatre strategic level and, in so doing, mitigate the confusion caused by any grand strategic incoherence. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is self-evident that the United States is the dominant operational and tactical contributor. In both cases, the chain of command to Washington has in practice provided the principal strategic command link. Decisions are made between Washington and the theatre, which are subsequently settled with other allies. This works, but only up to a point. The political commitment to the campaign in Washington must be unequivocal. There has to be a consistent and agreed line between the departments of state, and there should be a sophisticated mechanism to keep partners fully engaged. This must be managed more formally and forcefully than at present if we are to provide the context for operational and tactical success.

The Theatre/Operational Perspective

In its way, Iraq was relatively uncomplicated at the theatre level with fewer stakeholders and a clear mission. There was limited NATO involvement, fewer coalition partners, a reduced European influence, and a “host nation” whose emerging sovereignty would not summarily reject coalition plans, certainly at the time I was there. There was also an existing, if battered, infrastructure and the immediate potential for considerable economic wealth.

Afghanistan takes this to Ph.D. levels of complexity. The security force has a NATO brand without the supporting marketing or sales capacity; there are a large number of international players both inside and outside the coalition, and all have different objectives, some subtle, some less so. The region is complex, with porous borders providing safe havens for insurgents on two sides, and a complex history of enduring conflict. The sovereign government led by President Karzai has called for support, and yet in economic terms its prospects will only be realised in the medium- to long-term.

The only place where all these interests are played out is in Kabul. The various authorities in political and development arenas are only loosely coordinated by the UN—an organisation that has a grand strategic stake and will ultimately play a vital role when the situation has matured to the status of a “normal” developing country. So, how do we bring order to this challenging situation?

We start by accepting that the lead nation takes charge, probably subtly, given the inevitable sensitivities. Initially this will be in the security space, partly because this is pragmatic—the military are comfortable with complexity—and partly because security provides the foundation for everything else. But we have to encourage the development of a wider plan which synchronises efforts and establishes priorities.

The four lines of activity illustrated in the Theatre Strategic Idea (Figure 3) are designed to meet a common objective. Security is the most obvious, the one which everyone marks and which tends to divert attention from other more important areas. I would suggest that security is broadly on track; it is hard, but the foundations are being maintained for other decisive activity.

The economic line at the bottom is just as important. The people of Afghanistan need to be free from want, indeed the country needs to become a “normal” developing country as soon as possible. Again, this line is going reasonably well. There is almost too
much short-term aid, and its coordination is poor, but there is plenty of activity in this area. In the longer 10-to 15-year timeframe, President Karzai’s undertaking from the United States to enter into a long-term strategic agreement during his trip to Washington last April [2010] provides the confidence that there is a prize to be gained if progress can be sustained.

It is the middle two lines that should concern us. Building Afghan capacity requires the government of Afghanistan to become a credible partner, supported by a concerted effort from the international community in Kabul. It has been very disjointed, but the upgrading of the NATO senior civilian representative and the appointment of Mark Sedwill has provided a focus which was not evident in the past. This empowerment was intended to provide a focal point for all the nonmilitary actors working with the government of Afghanistan, whose coordination was so important to progress and success. But it is the political diplomatic line that should concern us most. This links back to the comments that I made about strategic commitment and leadership. If it was effective then, it would have a more significant impact in Kabul and Islamabad than has been evident up to now.

Whatever happens, there is a need for theatre strategic leadership, and I have seen two fine U.S. four-stars take charge of the military operation. They developed and described their own clear and convincing plan, systematically brought the other stakeholders alongside, and then created structures that bring all the interested parties together to synchronise effect. In particular, General McChrystal produced a plan over the summer of 2009 which is still broadly in play today. He invigorated the hierarchy by forming the subordinate NATO Training Mission and CJATF 435 [Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435], and creating the operational level three-star ISAF Joint Command. These were critical in clarifying the mission and approach.
One other theatre perspective is about achieving common situational awareness. This is difficult. Not only is there a mass of information swirling about, but there are also sensitivities over how much some of that information can be shared between allies.

Communication is difficult. It takes time and it can be frustrating. How often are those who do not have English as a first language bypassed because they are not quick enough to grasp what is going on? We don’t let them see much of the relevant material and then speak too quickly for them to understand what we are saying. I recognise that the demands of the operation, in particular the troops putting their lives at risk, require rapid and incisive decision making, but at the theatre level there is scope to resolve this. We can ensure that national interests are properly represented. Yet, why do national contributors resist sharing their policies at the point where the theatre plans are being made and, just as importantly, where their ambassadors are based? The United Kingdom has started to come round to this, but it has been a struggle.

During my time in Kabul, I tried to get the military representatives of eight core nations to meet regularly, stimulating contact between capitals and their military representatives at NATO headquarters. But there was resistance. Nations were not prepared to empower their representatives, and I suspect that it has come to nothing.

“Followership”

What makes a good coalition junior partner? The bottom line has to be someone who, at every level, is honest about what he will do and then does it in a timely manner. This is easy to say, but if it were so, we would have far fewer challenges. So what must be done?

At the grand strategic level, I have emphasised enough the need to share our interpretation of the mission and make sure that differences are reconciled.

There needs to be a greater willingness to accept the importance of the theatre strategic level. A good follower will discipline itself not to focus on tactical outputs in national isolation, bypassing the coalition chain of command. It will allow its interests to be managed by the coalition headquarters structure through influence, persuasion, and constant engagement. A good follower must
be prepared to engage constructively in the coalition debate and empower its representatives to do the same, and this has to reflect the interests of all the national stakeholders—a comprehensive view shaped by grand strategic engagement.

The influence effort should be replicated where possible at every level of the chain of command, so that there is a parallel “hierarchy of wisdom” that reflects national interests as well as contributing to coalition staff capacity. There is a need for junior partners to develop increasingly sophisticated national influencing networks inside the coalition. I made it very clear to the British in the ISAF chain of command that they were always representing, to some degree, their national interest. This was not a threat to the coalition. It meant that national risks and opportunities would be exploited far more easily throughout the chain of command, caveats would be managed before they had a significant impact, and plans could be shaped to take account of any sensitivities in as close to real time as possible. This is conceptual interoperability.

And finally, personality. People’s personalities played some part in events; their relationships with others had an impact on the outcome, no matter what the structures, plans, or common understanding. One of the arts of followership is to mix the character cocktails so that you gain the maximum amount of influence and leverage. This does not mean that everyone has to get on—quite the reverse. On some occasions it will be necessary to confront and disagree. But there must be respect. Appointing an individual into a coalition post must not be a haphazard exercise. It must be the result of careful planning, possibly over many years. There is one supreme example of this. I often speak of Sir John Dill, and there is one particular instance where personality made a strategic difference.

Dill was Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the early years of World War II. Churchill didn’t get on with him and posted him to Washington as his personal representative, where he became Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission, and then senior British representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was an extraordinary military diplomat who became immensely important in making the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee—which included members from both countries—function. President Roosevelt described Dill as “the most important figure in the remarkable accord which has been developed in the combined operations of our two countries.” He died suddenly in Washington in November 1944. The route to the Washington National Cathedral was lined by thousands of troops, and when his body was interred in Arlington National Cemetery, a witness recorded that “I have never seen so many men so visibly shaken by sadness. Marshall’s face was truly stricken ...”4

Coalitions are rooted in the past and are here to stay. I am in no doubt that they work best when we are in bed with an elephant—but not the one that Trudeau referred too, rather one who is swift as a cheetah, cunning as a fox, with a brain enabled by Apple or Microsoft, and surrounded by a loyal and honest herd. U.S. capacity has tipped the balance in the wars of the 20th century and now, in the 21st century, it is providing the foundation to build security in an intensely complex environment. Without this capability, commitment, and leadership our endeavours would be incredible and ineffective. **MR**

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1. Kermit Roosevelt (10 October 1889-4 June 1943), son of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, explored two continents alongside his father, graduated from Harvard University, served with the U.S. and British Armies in both World Wars, and was an astute businessman.

2. This section was written with material provided by Professor Gary Sheffield, Professor of War Studies, University of Birmingham.


“The Battle of Gettysburg,” Verse V
Edgar Lee Masters (1869-1950)

The peach orchard, the oak trees,
The graves of those long dead,
The pastures where the cattle fed,
The old farm houses in the meadow,
The rocks in Culp Hill’s shadow,
The old bridges and wooded ridges,
Waited through many years for these
To come to them for this event,
Fulfilling their fated destinies
By the road of Emmitsburg,
Near Gettysburg,
Where perished Pickett’s regiment.
None passing this spot for many a year
Saw in oak trees and in peach trees
The demon of luring sorceries,
As a place where thousands in wonderment
Should suddenly see the implacable Fear
Under a summer sky,
With white clouds drifting high.

The Battle of Gettysburg, 1-3 July 1863, is often called the Civil War’s high-water mark or turning point. Between 46,000 and 51,000 soldiers from the two armies were killed, wounded, missing, or captured.

The statue on the right is the 72nd Pennsylvanian Infantry Monument, sculpted in 1888 by Stephens and dedicated on 4 July 1891. (Photo: Robert Swanson, 2005)

Contrary to myth, most U.S. military detention facilities did not resort to brutal interrogation methods during the first years of our nation’s conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the popular perception that they did is wildly inaccurate. However, some facilities tragically did resort to such methods, including the now notorious examples of Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram. In Iraq, many of the facilities employing so-called “enhanced” interrogation techniques were special operations facilities. Incredibly, even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the facility run by the elite Special Mission Unit in Iraq continued to permit more of these techniques than had been allowed even at Abu Ghraib.

It was into a detention center run by this Special Mission Unit that a U.S. Air Force major strode in early in 2006. Although interrogation techniques derived from U.S. military survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) schools were no longer officially promulgated within this unit, these harsh techniques were all that many of its interrogators understood. Consequently, within this detention center, legally acceptable doctrinal approaches were consistently applied in the harshest possible manner.

The major, a school-trained interrogator with a significant background in law enforcement, knew that the unit’s interrogators had it wrong. So, he set out to teach them the value of doctrinal, rapport-based interrogation approaches that can be truly enhanced, not by brute force, but by the cunning application of traditional law enforcement techniques.

Writing under the pseudonym of “Matthew Alexander,” this leader has penned two memoirs that are essential reading for anyone wishing to understand how real (and not pseudo) interrogators think and operate.

In his first memoir, How to Break a Terrorist, Alexander described how he used the power of personal example to teach his team that they could be far more effective if they convinced (rather than coerced) their sources to talk. Thanks to his good efforts—and to those he led—he unit quickly began to produce results. Most notably, his team coaxed intelligence from sources that led to the successful U.S. air strike against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. At the time, Zarqawi was the most wanted man of coalition forces in Iraq. Zarqawi’s death proved a terrible psychological blow to the terrorist organization he led, especially since Zarqawi had long cultivated a reputation for invincibility among his followers.

Alexander’s newly published second memoir, Kill or Capture, begins where How to Break a Terrorist left off: Zarqawi is dead, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been forced out of the Baghdad and Anbar governorates and is regrouping in northern Iraq. Alexander requested to leave the main detention facility of the Special Mission Unit and head north as part of a two-man mobile interrogation team in support of a larger raid team. His request was granted.

What followed is an exciting tale told in a clear, clipped manner that would make Papa Hemmingway proud. Combat veterans will recognize Alexander’s simple, emotive descriptions of combat operations as authentic. Many counterinsurgents will also relate to the sinking feeling Alexander describes at the start of the story when his team mistakenly releases their main Al-Qaeda quarry, the elusive “Zafar,” head of Al-Qaeda operations in northern Iraq. Yes, like a rollercoaster, the story’s ultimate destination is known. (Despite his early lucky escape, Zafar does not stand a chance.) But knowing this does not make the ride any less thrilling.

Zafar’s capture, like Zarqawi’s death, was a terrific blow to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Although not the cause of the “Sunni Awakening” (which had already begun), the forced removal of these two terrorist leaders from power emboldened more Sunnis to take arms against the much-feared terrorist organization.

However, as important as these intelligence successes were to the coalition cause in Iraq, more important to history are the lessons Alexander’s story offers to all Americans. One lesson is that harsh interrogation methods produce inferior intelligence, and those who claim that such methods work well are dangerously ignorant.

Skilled, professional interrogators understand that prisoners are not machines that we can force to tell the truth if only we can find the right, scientifically measurable lever and pull it. Instead, prisoners are human beings who, under even great physical duress, retain the power within their private mental realms to choose to tell the truth or not. To get people to tell the truth, you have to convince them that they should. Herein lies the art and skill of real interrogators.

Alexander’s memoirs argue convincingly for keeping America’s interrogators on the moral high ground. Alexander and his interrogators were not only amazingly successful; they avoided the scandals that have plagued too many U.S. units during our country’s
recent conflicts abroad. Of these scandals, most grievous has been the damage caused by allegations of torture. In particular, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo not only decreased support for America’s foreign wars at home, but these twin scandals were recruitment boons for our jihadist enemies. As Alexander writes, “I learned in Iraq that the number one reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”

But the cost of these scandals may run deeper still than the deaths of thousands in America’s current wars. Under the questionable “legal” cover provided by well-intentioned, but profoundly ignorant, policymakers and lawyers, some interrogators essentially tortured many prisoners, and by so doing, endangered our nation’s very soul. This has dealt a severe blow to our collective understanding of who we are—our core belief that America must strive to set a positive example for others to follow. As Alexander teaches us, “Murderers like Zarqawi can kill us, but they can’t force us to change who we are. We can only do that to ourselves.” Is it permanent, the grave damage that various torture scandals have dealt to the lofty ideals we Americans hold for ourselves? Sadly, we will not know the answer to this question until we witness how future U.S. service members wage war on their own battlefields.

How to Break a Terrorist is already a classic military memoir. Kill or Capture deserves to be as well. Leaders or interrogators who want to be good at what they do should (and probably will) read these two books. But Alexander’s memoirs also contain valuable lessons for all students of war, history, and the American experience. Indeed, any American could profit from reading these books, not just for the lessons they offer, but because they are a sheer pleasure to read. Although works of weighty historical importance, they read as quickly and easily as page-turning suspense novels.

In short, read Kill or Capture and its antecedent, How to Break a Terrorist. You will find both a thrilling ride, and perhaps even (as I believe I did), grow in wisdom as a result.


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David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers is a heart-rending account of an American infantry battalion at war. It is an eyewitness report of the Iraq war shorn of its glory and seen over the gun sight of an M-4 rifle, through the windshield of a Humvee, and in the eyes of the dead and wounded—the latter often sacrificing more than the American public realizes. The author brings often unbearable soldier stories into full view.

Finkel does a good job of capturing the soldiers’ sacrifices comprehensively and vividly, showing us the futility of some of their daily missions, the camaraderie generated by their experiences, and their heroism. The surviving heroes of the 2-16th Infantry Battalion suffered inordinately from their survival—bad dreams, strange tics, mental issues, and worse.

The author also explores the burden of command—its challenges, aspirations, frustrations, and successes—through the person of Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Kauzlarich, who knows that his battalion has won at the end of his tour, but also that it had seen enough.

The author, a Pulitzer Prize winner with an eye for both the pathos and courage found on the battlefield, has impeccable writing credentials, and was embedded with the 800-man unit in Rustamiyah, Iraq, for eight months. This is not a dry-eye book. Yet, it is a must read for all U.S. soldiers and policymakers. The latter should look through the appendix with its roster of soldiers, note the Purple Heart recipients, and pause over the pictures of the battalion’s 14 dead American soldiers. The 2-16th Infantry made a difference, but it paid a steep price.

**Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland**

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How Terrorism Ends lays out the intellectual framework and crucial points that lead to the demise of many terrorists organizations, focusing on how terrorist organizations end and how nations might develop strategies and goals that could help lead to that end. One of Cronin’s major points is that fewer than five percent of terrorist campaigns succeed. Killing civilians does not seem to be a promising way to achieve political aims.

Cronin addresses six ways in which terrorist organizations can end—capturing or killing the group’s leader, entering a legitimate political process, achieving the group’s aims, implosion, or loss of the group’s public support, defeat by brute force, and transition from terrorism to another form of violence.

Some of Cronin’s findings are quite interesting. For example, most terrorist organizations last less than eight years; killing a terrorist leader may not damage the group as much as arresting him, especially if he is humiliated before the public and sentenced to prison; states negotiate with terrorists because they want the conflict to end, while the terrorist organization often does not; and finally, terrorist organizations often fail because their violence against the civilian populace ends up provoking popular revulsion against them.
Cronin points out up front that Al-Qaeda will end without achieving its strategic goals. However, she also clearly points out that Al-Qaeda is different from most other terrorist organizations. She demonstrates the organization’s strengths, resilience, methods of recruitment, means of support, and communications. Cronin then demonstrates how Al-Qaeda might come to an end.

How Terrorism Ends is comprehensive, historical, and academically rigorous. Terror campaigns might seem endless, but as Cronin has so accurately depicted, terror campaigns always end and usually not in the favor of the terrorists organization. I highly recommend the book to anyone with an interest in understanding terrorist organizations and the political and military means to defeat them.

Ken Miller, Platte City, Missouri


Good Boss, Bad Boss is a necessary read for anyone who has ever suffered through a toxic workplace and wondered what he could learn from the experience. The topic of toxic leadership provides many lively discussions across the Department of Defense, and this book adds much to the discourse. Robert Sutton is no stranger to the topic of uncivilized workplaces; his 2007 book, The No Asshole Rule, effectively describes survival skills for employees with bullying bosses.

The response from readers was overwhelming and Good Boss, Bad Boss builds on his earlier work; here he focuses on how to learn from the best practices of good bosses. Sutton has crafted an engaging and useful operator’s manual on how to be a good boss, filled with practical advice pulled as much from research as from anecdotal experiences from readers and bloggers on his site Work Matters. The book is engaging and hard to put down. Subordinates and bosses alike will recognize many workplace challenges depicted within these pages.

Good Boss, Bad Boss describes the effective traits of good leaders. Sutton summarizes each of these traits into simple, easily remembered concepts such as the “Attitude of Wisdom,” which serves as the boundary between smart and wise bosses. “Smart bosses have the confidence to act on what they know but feel and express little doubt (in public or private) about what they believe or do. Wise bosses have the confidence to act on what they know and the humility to doubt their knowledge.” The key difference is that bosses can be very intelligent, but if they lack the ability to listen to a divergent view they cannot be wise enough to learn when they have missed something important. Sutton advises, “Act on your temporary conviction as if it was a real conviction; and when you realize it is wrong, correct course quickly.”

Good Boss, Bad Boss entertainingly guides the reader through the traits and best practices of good bosses and gives practical advice on how to emulate them. It would be difficult to find a better book for leader development programs at battalion and brigade levels. One might read Good Boss, Bad Boss in tandem with its predecessor, The No Asshole Rule. The book is an outstanding read that has the potential to improve military and civilian leaders and the organizations they lead.

LTC Richard A. Mc Connell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


While some war memoirs resemble classical paintings filled with scenes of heroic triumphs, Clint Van Winkle’s resembles a Dali surrealistic landscape, blending reality, illusions, and nightmares. As an amphibious assault vehicle section leader, Sergeant Van Winkle served in Iraq in 2003 in Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Although he saw action at Nasiriyah, he does not take a strictly chronological approach to recounting the events. Instead, Van Winkle gives the reader a glimpse into the mind of a veteran wrestling with the meaning and affects of post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) by blending the stories of combat with stories of return to civilian life. His memoir tells more of his experience of war than simply his experiences in war.

Making frequent use of literary flashback, Van Winkle’s story twists and turns from the present to the past and back again, reflecting his personal struggles with the recurrent memories of war. He tells how certain sights or sounds in his post-war college days would suddenly throw his mind back into the war zone. Apprehensively intrigued by the unsettled nature and pattern of the narrative, the reader is drawn deeply into the stream of consciousness, unsure of whether or not Van Winkle is at home or in Iraq—in combat or in a nightmare. Thus, his memoirs become a literary taste of PTSD, a mental world where the dead and living coexist.

Throughout, Van Winkle turns his ire on people and organizations that only superficially support veterans. He scorns citizens who are satisfied with simply displaying yellow ribbon bumper stickers or college students who protest wars they do not understand. He speaks of his frustration at the Veterans Administration whose impersonal care and “take a pill” mentality hampers his attempts to understand and recover from his wartime experience. Turning to self-medication through alcohol, Van Winkle finds solace only among fellow combat vets. Despite these mental and emotional struggles, he achieves success in college; yet he despairs of ever finding the sense of purpose and belonging found on the battlefield. Its values and actions had become the new normal for him, hindering a complete return to the “normalcy” of the civilian world.

Van Winkle ends the memoir, hopeful, but still trapped in a war
he left but cannot leave behind. His masterful powers of description and keen sense of irony fully engage the reader’s attention. The author’s stories of combat spare no details but plunge the reader into the gut-wrenching scenes of death and destruction that befell friend and foe alike. He points out the paradoxes that make up war—death and freedom, camaraderie and hatred, saving life and killing. Overall, Van Winkle’s memoir makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing struggle to understand PTSD. He humanizes the acronym, bringing the reader along on the tortuous mental journey and silencing those who provide cheap solutions and shallow answers to veterans’ issues.

**1LT Jonathan E. Newell, USAR, Amherst, New Hampshire**


An intriguing read, The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq is a fascinating collection of writings by academicians from diverse fields with a combined total of over 100 years of military experience. Hy S. Rothstein has 26 years of service as a Special Forces officer in addition to a Ph.D. in international relations. Major Christopher Ford is a member of the Judge Advocate Corps who served from 2004 to 2005 with the 1st Calvary Division in Baghdad. Almost all contributors are associated with the Naval Postgraduate School.

With a nuanced observation of overlap, transition points, and the interplay of “three circles of war”—state, interstate war, civil war, and insurgency—the contributors meticulously lead the reader through their particular area of interest. The book addresses mistakes made, lessons learned, adaptations developed, problems remaining, and solutions recommended. Collectively, the essays bring together intellect, experience, and analytical capacity.

The contributors write from within their given field of expertise on a range of topics that takes the reader from the mistake-riddled days immediately following the 2003 Iraq invasion through current attempts to formulate and execute a responsible withdrawal strategy. However, some of the book’s conclusions seem like a blinding flash of the obvious.

The book analyzes the diverse groups operating within Iraq at the start of the war, including each group’s interests and the complex causal relationships between each group’s interests and the three, at times concurrent, types of war.

“Stabilizing Iraq” covers the initial missteps in stabilizing the country’s political, economic, and security structures. Heather S. Gregg argues that a rush to implement democratic reforms (elections in particular) without first developing civic institutions to heal the ethnic divides, fueled insurgency (particularly by marginalizing Sunnis) and sowed the seed of civil war. Her extensive academic background in political science, cultural anthropology, and Islam, as well as her extensive fieldwork in both Palestine and the Balkans inform Gregg’s analysis.

“Understanding Our Adversary” examines how the initially dysfunctional U.S. intelligence apparatus failed to adequately prepare policymakers and senior military commanders for the complexity of cause and effect at all levels of the conflict. The section gives a frank assessment of how a search for justification for previously held objectives and means, by policy and military leaders, had at least as much of a detrimental effect on intelligence gathering and reporting, as did problems of integration and cooperation within the intelligence community itself. Another section focuses on the legal and ethical obligations incurred by invasion, occupying, and post-occupation forces.

“Measuring War and Victory” addresses the always-controversial topic of metrics, from combat-centric kinetic metrics to game theory, as way to understand current events and predict future “shocks.” The final section outlines trends in strategic communications (grossly deficient), the development of a coherent, comprehensive strategy (after significant missteps), and a responsible withdrawal strategy.

Overall, this intriguing, in-depth analysis of “the dynamics of conflict in Iraq,” is well worth the read, although this reader wonders how amenable measures of effectiveness are to mathematical models and formulaic forecasting, as in Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid’s system dynamics with multiple feedback loops, or Fox’s adaptation of Nash’s Game Theory.

**MAJ Thomas E. Walton, Sr., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


In Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, Dr. Paul Rexton Kan provides unique insight regarding the role of drugs and contemporary warfare on the modern battlefield as well as in nation building situations. Although Kans is not the first to present research on the correlation between drugs and war, he provides a thorough exploration of theories applicable today. He examines the violent actors involved in the drug trade, the drugs the actors produce and distribute, how drugs enter into conflicts, and solutions to inhibit the drug trade’s effect on conflict.

I enjoyed Kan’s multilayered approach, especially his ability to focus on the tie between drug trafficking and war and strategies to combat drugs as a way to reduce conflict. He not only presents basic concepts but identifies four strategies that could assist in refining social, economic, and political conditions to overcome drug trade burdens.

Kan takes a complex topic, presents modern application of the concepts, and provides possible solutions that one could attempt to indirectly reduce conflict (e.g.,
by reducing the financial support warring groups receive from the drug trade). Insightful, contemporary, and applicable at all levels, this book provides information that requires the reader to reconsider past approaches to reduce global conflict.

MAJ Misti L. Frodyma, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship is among America’s most important. The problem is how to manage it, especially in light of the ever-worsening security situation in Mexico, encapsulate the critical issues from a binational security perspective, and offer recommendations on new approaches to some old problems.

While immigration and trade remain at the forefront of the bilateral agenda, in a concise but effective monograph, several RAND analysts focus on three priority security threats—organized crime, a category that includes narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling; illegal migration and trafficking in persons; and terrorism. What is new in this mix are the unprecedented levels of violence and audacity displayed by criminal organizations, particularly the drug trafficking organizations, which the authors contend are increasingly emboldened—committing more acts in public, targeting Mexican police forces without hesitation, and even hiring ex-special forces members from the Mexican military. These developments are well known, having prompted increasing outrage and public condemnation, as well as a call to action from both heads of state.

In response to these burgeoning threats, the authors recommend three broad policy options for consideration by the Obama administration: increased engagement with Mexico, maintaining current levels of aid and support, and retrenchment from the status quo. Recent dialogue has centered on variations of the first two options, while there is little talk of pulling back. In fact, most observers say “more, faster, wider, and deeper” with regard to the amount, speed of application, and breadth and depth of U.S. aid to Mexico.

The monograph is a model of organization and simplicity. Particularly useful are scene-setting chapters dealing with the current security situation in Mexico, along with useful synopses of current levels of U.S. support and the Mexican government’s response. The policy options give decision makers clear choices. The study’s conclusions and recommendations are equally forceful.

Security in Mexico is highly recommended to those desiring a synopsis of key and current national security issues affecting the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship, along with a menu of possible policy approaches to addressing them. It should be of interest to U.S. policymakers, as well as students of U.S.-Latin American affairs.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia


Nonproliferation Norms is a theoretical and analytical study in nuclear decision making, using social psychology as a means of evaluating states’ choices in the interactive and dynamic global environment. Maria Rost Rublee, a lecturer at the University of Auckland, is a former intelligence officer in the Defense Intelligence Agency. Her analyses of the democratic societies in Japan, Sweden, and Germany are complete and informative, giving the reader a comprehensive background and understanding of the decision-making dynamics involved in these countries.

By means of comparison between three theories of international relations dynamics, the author analyzes the tangible evidence surrounding the evolutions of five states’ nuclear weapons programs. First, she explores the lens of “realism” and the implications of state independence and self-determination to create security, potentially through acquisition of nuclear weapons to offset national threats. The second theory, “neoliberal institutionalism,” considers nonproliferation as a cooperative move to achieve lower transaction costs and increase transparency, where states benefit by technology transfer and international assistance with peaceful scientific nuclear programs, which outweigh the costs of sole (rogue) development. Finally, Rublee examines each of the five states’ nuclear programs through “constructivism,” her central premise, by which she investigates internal and international social environments, with roles and norms established by the nonproliferation community, which enforces states to conform to disarmament ideals.

However, her presupposition of constructivism as an encompassing model overlooks a fundamental realism aspect: internal threats to state security, particularly in dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Specifically, Egypt and Libya, two state governments that were the progeny of military coups in 1954 and 1969, respectively, are still susceptible to violent internal conflict. Both states previously pursued nuclear armament programs, only to later abandon their efforts and investments. Rublee attributes the cause as their desire to conform to international nonproliferation norms, whereas the truth is probably closer to a theory proposed by game-theorist and Nobel Laureate economist Thomas C. Schelling, that the dictator must eventually entrust the nuclear weapons to his military.

Nuclear weapons, by strategic necessity, are located far from the capital cities so as not to invite a preemptive or second-strike attack onto the seat of government and large population centers. The keys would be in the hands of military officials,
who would have autonomous control of the weapons, permitting retaliation if the dictator dies in an attack. Thus, initial state interest while beginning a nuclear weapons program transforms into concern and suspicion as leaders approach their goal and must decide who is to be trusted with the ultimate military power in their country. Once the dictator decides to abandon nuclear arms in order to restore internal security, all threats thereafter to continue nuclear weapons development are actually deceptions calculated to gain international concessions during the transition into the nonproliferation community, and to offset the previously incurred development costs. Most importantly, this entire deductive process is implicit and restricted to the highest levels of the state, given that an articulated suspicion of a coup could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

As a theoretical investigation of decision making, Rublee’s work is worthwhile to the defense community as a review in nuclear development or restraint within democratic societies, but is less engaging as a comprehensive study. Additionally, the book is written to facilitate single chapter or subchapter use, which can be useful in area studies as each section covers all the relevant history in detail, but becomes repetitive as a beginning-to-end read. For modeling authoritarian states, the reader should include Thomas Schelling’s essays, “Who Will Have the Bomb?” and “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism” from his compilation Choice and Consequence, to facilitate a thorough consideration of the dynamics within nuclear program decision making.

MAJ Orrin Stitt, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Measuring effectiveness over time is a challenging problem, particularly when the subject is counterinsurgency, with its focus on highly subjective factors, such as the population’s support for a government. Thus, even if one has the correct objectives in mind, it may be difficult to develop objective means of measuring their achievement.

Colonel Gregory Daddis, a history professor at the U.S. Military Academy, has examined this problem at length as it applied to our involvement in Vietnam. He traces the use and misuse of a wide variety of metrics, ranging from a simple “body count” of enemy dead to the 157 questions of the 1969 “System for Evaluating Effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.”

Daddis’s conclusion is that the U.S. military drowned in overwhelming amounts of data, which it used selectively to justify policies ranging from vindicating the airborne concept to “proving” the success of Vietnamization.

The most common tendency was, of course, to use objective kinetic factors such as body count and downplay attempts to measure the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese populace. The author attributes this to American inability to understand insurgency, but is careful to explain other factors. For example, he describes the logic of General William Westmoreland, the overall U.S. commander from 1964 to 1968, who believed that he had to attrit large enemy units before addressing the needs of the population. However, Daddis also notes that figures such as body count were often the only way for officers to show progress during the brief tenure of their unit commands, whereas progress in pacification might well be measured in decades. In fact, he repeatedly suggests that military leaders believed that effort must equate to progress, without measuring the actual results.

Daddis explores the perceptions of career soldiers concerning impediments to American victory. In this regard, he contends that, during the mid-1960s, many soldiers perceived politician-imposed restrictions as the main obstacle. Later in the conflict, the author argues, soldiers did not understand the lack of public support for the war, and therefore blamed the allegedly poor quality of draftees from a “permissive society” for a lack of success.

Daddis is undoubtedly correct that the Army created inequities and discontent by sending the least-educated, lowest-scoring troops to combat units while assigning soldiers that are more educated to technical positions. However, he repeatedly insists that the lowest-scoring soldiers, “Project 100,000” troops, learned and performed as well as their peers in Vietnam. This was probably true for those who actually reached Vietnam, but it overlooks the disproportionately large number of Project 100,000 troops that had great difficulty completing military training prior to deployment.

No Sure Victory is a thought-provoking look at a problem that is both perennial and current. Not all readers will agree with the author’s conclusions, but his comments on the difficulty of measuring effectiveness in counterinsurgency make the book essential reading for anyone concerned with our current and probable future conflicts.

COL Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


15 Minutes is a remarkably readable account of the complexities that confronted General Curtis LeMay and his Strategic Air Command during the Cold War. On the one hand, it impresses upon the reader just how unwinnable a nuclear war would have been. On the other hand, it illustrates that, if we were to fight such a war, it would leave us no time for contemplation. Strategic Air Command would have had to launch over 1,500 bombers in 15 minutes. The president of the United States would have had to evacuate to a “safe” haven in 15 minutes. A
survivable airborne communications network would have had to become operational in 15 minutes. In short, we would have to take the actions required to transform the United States from sole loser of the war to merely a mutual loser within 15 minutes from the time we detected a Soviet missile launch.

Author L. Douglas Keeney guides the reader on a year-by-year odyssey from 1950 through 1968 by means of an unlikely literary device: The entire work is a series of vignettes. Some of them are accounts of official activities, others are accounts of media reports, and still other accounts are poignantly personal. Often the vignettes have no ostensible connection with each other. Indeed, early on in the book, the reader might wonder how this or that vignette is topical at all. For that matter, the significance of even the “15 minutes” motif is far from obvious at the outset. However, as one sojourns with Keeney through the Cold War, the vignettes become discernible as threads interwoven into an incredibly complex tapestry.

As a result, the picture of life during the Cold War (as viewed from the perspective of one whose life is circumscribed by LeMay’s Strategic Air Command) gradually unfolds in much the same way it likely would have for one experiencing the Cold War first hand: accumulating bits and pieces of information about the nuclear world in all of its dimensions with every passing day—from the workplace, from the news, from casual family conversations around the dining room table, every vignette inviting a new challenge to some old assumption, each passing year requiring some new countermeasure, some new policy, some new way to ensure the ultimately unensurable—that a nuclear war could be won without grave consequences for all involved.

If there is a punch line to 15 Minutes, it is the dawning realization in 1968 that the Soviets now needed only 13.8 minutes to preempt action by U.S. nuclear forces. Could the United States respond after a first strike? Probably so, but no scenario was imaginable in which ugly outcomes could be altogether avoided.

In addition to weaving a marvelous tapestry, Keeney includes an interesting photo gallery and an especially useful glossary titled “The Language of the Cold War.” The glossary alone makes 15 Minutes a valuable work for students of the Cold War.

COL John Mark Mattox, Ph.D., Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico


The story of the Bataan Death march has been told many times before, but never quite like this. In, Tears in the Darkness: The Story of the Bataan Death March and Its Aftermath, Michael and Elizabeth M. Norman combine hundreds of interviews with combatants from both sides with the personal story of Ben Steele, a Montana cowboy. Steele’s cowboy lifestyle gave him an opportunity to work outdoors learning skills that would help him survive the brutal years of forced labor during captivity.

The great outdoors inspired Ben, a self-taught artist, to portray his captors, the starvation-riddled bodies of his fellow prisoners, and to recreate pictures of his Montana home through pencil drawings. The authors brilliantly use Ben’s drawings to tie together their writing and the scenes only he could depict.

Steele enlisted in the Army in 1940 at the suggestion of his mother. “You really ought to get in before they draft you,” she said. He chose the Army and one year later, on 8 December 1941, the Japanese bombed Clark Air Base in the Philippines, destroying the American air fleet (surprisingly still on the ground and unprotected) and thrusting Steele into war. Two weeks later the Japanese invaded the Bataan Peninsula. After months of fighting, the Japanese overran the starved, outnumbered, and exhausted American forces, forcing the surrender of 76,000 American and Filipino troops.

What followed was the brutality of the 66-mile “death” march (where stopping meant certain execution), the depravity and disease of POW camps, and finally the transport ships where POWs were packed like “pickles in a barrel” on their way to labor camps on the Japanese mainland.

Intertwined among the beatings, beheadings, and inhumanity are stories of courage and compassion. There are stories of Filipinos along the death march who risked punishment to slip prisoners a bite to eat or water to drink and prisoners who gave up meals of stewed mango beans and crust of burned rice to help those lying hopelessly in a POW hospital.

The authors also tell the story of the Japanese Imperial Army, what drove it to commit atrocities, and the resulting trials. Equally telling is the Normans’ description of General MacArthur’s actions in the Philippines. The Normans pull no punches when they describe MacArthur’s lame attempt to boost morale. During one radio broadcast, MacArthur told the troops that relief troops were on the way. The authors note, “MacArthur knew it was a lie—the Philippines were cutoff. Washington knew it, and so did MacArthur.”

Ultimately, a book about the human spirit, this is a story of valor, honor, and courage, in the midst of great hardship. If you read only one book about Bataan, this should be the one.

Michael E. Weaver, Lansing, Kansas


Authority on military history and strategy Martin van Creveld’s latest book, The Age of Airpower is compelling and insightful, yet immensely readable. The volume is a tour de force and a persuasive read for military planners and politicians
grappling with the merits and future utility of airpower.

For the majority of the narrative, Van Creveld investigates where airpower has come from, how it has evolved, and what it has achieved in the many wars, large and small, in which it has participated. For completeness, the study takes a far wider perspective than many other contemporary works. Naval aviation, heliborne operations, the employment of nuclear weapons, and space operations are covered in detail, as are the organizations that designed, developed, and produced the machines. However, Van Creveld avoids simply enumerating airpower’s technological advances and evolving capabilities, and focuses on military effectiveness compared with sister services and against the enemy. He achieves this purpose with great skill.

Over 20 skillfully written chapters, subdivided into five mutually supportive sections (“Into The Blue, 1900-1939”; “The Greatest War Of All, 1939-1945”; “The War That Never Was, 1945-1991”; “Little Wars, 1945-2010”; and “War Amongst the People, 1898-2010”), Van Creveld expertly tweaks conventional wisdom and redefines the limits of what airpower could and did achieve via a number of pertinent and diverse historical case studies.

Those with a particular interest in counterinsurgency operations will enjoy his analysis of airpower’s ability against terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents. As we might expect from an author of Van Creveld’s standing, each chapter is expertly researched, citing individual bravery, collective endeavors, seminal battles, and political realities; each combines seamlessly to provide an attention-grabbing, logical, and perceptive account. His forceful, lucid, and balanced technique will not disappoint his readers.

The Age of Airpower seeks to gaze into the future as well. The final chapter, “Conclusions: Going Down, 1945-?” paints a relatively bleak—but not unsurprising—picture for airpower enthusiasts by uncovering a number of unpalatable realities. Fundamentally, and as the title of the chapter suggests, far from growing in utility, conventional airpower, according to Van Creveld, is firmly on the decline. Despite acknowledging technological innovations, the chapter notes that precision-guided munitions have not made fighter-bombers more effective and that airpower is not as effective in a counterinsurgency setting as some would have us believe. Highlighting cost, reaction time, and physical numbers, Van Creveld argues that while conventional airpower’s star is firmly on the decline, missiles, satellites, and UAVs are increasingly taking the upper hand. Here, he is wise to mention the organizational and cultural implications of such a rapid transformation; the effects have the potential to be profound.

His bottom line is that the halcyon days of airpower as a relatively dominant factor on the battlefield are fast becoming a thing of the past. Likewise, he cautions that the days of manned attack aircraft are also rapidly drawing to a close; few would disagree with his logic.

The Age of Airpower is a must read for anyone interested in airpower, but particularly military planners and politicians involved in its ongoing procurement and contemporary employment. The book has all the hallmarks of an excellent college text and has the potential to generate considerable debate among airpower enthusiasts and military professionals alike. Above all, this is a detailed, perceptive historical account that highlights the unique ability of airpower to strike distant targets at great speed without regard to geography and articulates its limitations and rapidly evolving nature.

LTC Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Weeton, Lancashire, United Kingdom

While much has been written about and by the victims of the gulags, very little has surfaced concerning the guards, administrators, and technicians who administered the vast slave labor system. This makes Gulag Boss, the reminiscences of a civilian engineer who volunteered to work on one of the notorious labor projects on the edge of the Arctic Circle, a rare window into how this system worked.

A product of the Soviet system, Fyoder Mochulsky graduated from a trade school in 1940, was a candidate member of the Communist Party, and went to the far north believing that the people serving time there not only deserved to be punished but were also being rehabilitated through their labor.

He soon found that the system was not all he thought it to be. In addition to ordinary criminals there were former repatriated POWs from the Winter War with Finland, Poles from what was now called the Western Ukraine, Basmachi rebels from Central Asia and Kulaks—peasants who were slightly better off than the standard dirt-poor peasant. He also rapidly learned that neither rehabilitation nor punishment was the purpose of the system. It was to provide the state free labor on projects and in conditions in which no one in their right mind would volunteer.

Mochulsky discovered that there was no one from the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) assigned to administer his work unit (apparently a common problem in the gulags) and by default, he became responsible for all aspects of the slave-labor operation on the stretch of track he was building his area. At a time when failure to meet “norms” of construction could lead a charge of “wrecking” and an instant change in status from warden to prisoner, he knew he had to get things done. As a young, motivated, and conscientious leader, Mochulsky was soon meeting norms. In an example of the banality of evil, the trained railroad engineer now found himself an expert in using forced labor to build railroads and roads important to the needs of the State.
Eventually Mochulsky found himself a commissioned NKVD officer, stuck in the gulag system. It seemed to me, reading of the events almost 70 years after they played out, that the engineer had discovered that his status as an NKVD lieutenant placed him only at a slightly better position than that of the prisoners he was in charge of. Mochulsky was eventually able to “escape” by means of a reposting to the foreign ministry. In time, he would become a successful diplomat.

At the end of the book Mochulsky asks himself some very telling questions about this whole episode of his life and the system for which he worked. Overall, *Gulag Boss* is a well-told and gripping story as well as a study in ethics.

**LTC James D. Crabtree, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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The title of *Immortal* refers to soldiers who were known for their military prowess and their loyalty, the famous elite corps of the ancient Persian rulers. It also alludes to the long history of Persian and Iranian culture and the central military role it has played throughout the history of the Middle East. The author, Steven Ward, is highly qualified for the task, having served as a CIA intelligence analyst on Iran and the Middle East, as deputy intelligence officer at the National Intelligence Council, and as a member of the National Security Council.

The book provides a long historical perspective of Iranian military culture beginning with the fabled Persian Empire founded by Cyrus the Great and continuing with the Achaemenids, Parthians, and Sassanians. It discusses the Arab invasion and Islamization of Persia, the Mongol conquests, and the emergence of the Shi’a Safavid dynasty as a force in the Islamic world that contested the dominance of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. The author also examines the significance of Iran’s geography to its strategic vision and self-image—“Fortress Iran.” After a discussion of the impact of Russian and British colonialism, the emergence of oil as a strategic resource, and both World Wars, the narrative continues with a detailed account of the U.S. relationship with the Pahlavi Shahs and their program of secularization and modernization.

The book’s most original and revealing aspect is its analysis and evaluation of Iran’s military since the Islamic Revolution. It treats the war with Iraq in detail and includes a thorough discussion of the main campaigns, battles, and strategic problems. Of special interest is the discussion of the relationship between the *Artesh*—Iran’s professional military—and the *Pasdaran*—the Revolutionary Guards. The role of Shi’a religious zeal and its exploitation by the regime through the formation and sacrifice of the volunteer *Basinji* battalions is also examined. Of particular interest is what the author terms the “undeclared war with the United States” triggered by American support for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and disputes over the free passage of oil tankers and air traffic in the Persian Gulf region. Also discussed is the role of war and conflict in crushing internal dissent and Iran’s support for other Shi’a revolutionary movements such as Hezbollah.

The changes wrought by the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the subsequent war against Iraq provide the immediate backdrop to a discussion of Iran’s ongoing attempt to emerge as a regional power, independent of the West and of the Arab World, and able to pursue its own policy as a regional power broker. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and refusal to bow to international demands seem the logical expression of this strategic objective.

Ward has provided a valuable addition to the literature on Iran’s military. An extensive bibliography and citation apparatus support his work. Military officers and national security professionals would do well to read this book—highly recommended.

**LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D., USAR, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
We Recommend


This is the story of George Custer’s best cavalry company at the 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn—Company M. With a tragically flawed, but extremely brave company commander and a no-nonsense first sergeant, Company M maintained a disciplined withdrawal from the skirmish line fighting, saving Major Marcus Reno’s entire detachment and possibly the rest of the regiment from annihilation.

Presented here is the most-detailed work on a single company at the Little Bighorn ever written—the product of multi-year research at archives across the country and detailed visits to the battle field by a combat veteran who understands fields of fire, weapons’ effects, training, morale, decision making, unit cohesion, and the value of outstanding noncommissioned officers.

*From the publisher.*


When war broke out in Europe in 1914, political leaders in the United States were swayed by popular opinion to remain neutral; yet less than three years later, the nation declared war on Germany. Justus D. Doenecke examines the clash of opinions over the war during this transformative period and offers a fresh perspective on America’s decision to enter World War I.

Doenecke reappraises the public and private diplomacy of President Woodrow Wilson and his closest advisors and explores in great depth the response of Congress to the war. He also investigates the debates that raged in the popular media and among citizen groups that sprung up across the country as the U.S. economy was threatened by European blockades and as Americans died on ships sunk by German U-boats.

The decision to engage in battle ultimately belonged to Wilson, but as Doenecke demonstrates, Wilson’s choice was not made in isolation. *Nothing Less Than War* provides a comprehensive examination of America’s internal political climate and its changing international role during the seminal period of 1914-1917.

*From the publisher.*


In June 1961, Nikita Khrushchev called it “the most dangerous place on earth.” He knew what he was talking about.

Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred a year later, but the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was more decisive in shaping the Cold War—and more perilous. For the first time in history, American and Soviet fighting men and tanks stood arrayed against each other, only yards apart. One mistake, one overzealous commander—and the trip wire would be sprung for a war that would go nuclear in a heartbeat. On one side was a young, untested U.S. president still reeling from the Bay of Pigs disaster. On the other, a Soviet premier hemmed in by the Chinese, the East Germans, and hard-liners in his own government. Neither really understood the other, both tried cynically to manipulate events. And so, week by week, the dangers grew.

Based on a wealth of new documents and interviews, filled with fresh—sometimes startling—insights, written with immediacy and drama, *Berlin 1961* is a masterly look at key events of the twentieth century, with powerful applications to these early years of the twenty-first.

*From the publisher.*
“The B-17”

You can talk of your planes and talk of them long,  
Discuss all their points, both the weak and the strong,  
You can argue with passion and calmly assess,  
Demerits and merits each plane may possess.  
Pile figures on fact and statistics relate,  
Or a personal preference impressively state,  
But when it’s all over it’s plain to be seen,  
There’s none that quite touches the B-17.

First of the four-motored bombers she came,  
First to the stratosphere, first to the fame,  
Of bombing by daylight the enemy skies,  
And first to invite the Luftwaffe to rise.  
She made the long hauls, whatever the cost,  
And many came back, and many were lost.  
Formations were lashed by the fighters and flak,  
And battles took place that were bloody and black.

But them she rode still triumphantly strong,  
To deliver the goods where we know they belong.  
So thanks to the escort for helping us through,  
And thanks to the ’24, gallant and true.  
A toast to them all, let every man raise.  
And this to the Fortress describing our praise:  
She’s a symbol of all freedom can mean,  
When angered to flight—the B-17.

This poem and the drawing which appears on the facing page are from the journal kept by First Lieutenant Howard Latton of the 381st Bomber Group during his internment in Luft Stalag III (the location of the “Great Escape”) during World War II. After a bombing run over Berlin, an explosion killed seven of the nine fliers aboard his plane and forced him to bail out. Then-2LT Latton evaded capture for three days before being taken prisoner and was held for ten months, until liberated by U.S. troops in April of 1945. Written and drawn by his comrades, these journal entries are just two of the many that depict life in a POW camp, the Army Air Corps’ admiration for their B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators, and the gratitude they had for the fighter escorts. The Honorable Mr. Latton, now 95 and a retired judge for Wisconsin’s 25th Judicial Circuit Court, has graciously donated his journal to the Wisconsin Veterans Museum in Madison.
the culinary art as practiced in OLD NÜRNBURG