City Gods and Village Deities
The Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations

Eric Jardine

“The enemies are the city gods, but we are the village deities.”

- Peng Xuefeng, a Chinese Communist strategist

HISTORY HAS DEMONSTRATED that rurally based insurgencies are often more successful against their counterinsurgent foes than insurgencies that emphasize urban operations. During the initial stages of the French-Algerian war in the 1950s, two insurgent groups challenged the French—the urban-based Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (MTLD) and the rurally based Front of National Liberation (FLN). As the conflict wore on, pressures brought to bear by the French eventually destroyed the urban MTLD. In contrast, largely because of its deep rural connections and organization, the FLN withstood the pressures of French military operations and eventually prevailed.

Not only have rurally based insurgencies been more likely to outlast their urban counterparts, they have also been quite successful at defeating more powerful adversaries. The Chinese Communists’ rebellion against the Kuomintang suffered innumerable hardships in the early years of the insurrection when it focused on urban areas, but it later achieved startling successes when its strategic focus became rural.

The root of the Vietcong’s success against the United States in Vietnam was rurally based action, as was the Mujahideen insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s current insurgency against the International Security Assistance Force is also of a predominantly rural form.

Contrary to the rural focus of successful insurgencies, most counterinsurgencies emphasize the control of major cities and the use of urban-oriented operations. In Colombia, for example, “state forces frequently control the centers of large towns and cities, where municipal government buildings are located,” but “the state’s authority evaporates” as one moves further into the countryside. Likewise, during the Vietminh resistance to the French, a government provincial chief noted, “The Vietminh had their areas, like the Plains of Reeds, which we just abandoned. Whatever the Vietminh wanted to do [in those rural areas], we did not bother them.” Similarly, in 2009, the Canadian military emphasized a deployment of forces in the area immediately in and around Kandahar City in Afghanistan.

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PHOTO: Merchants and shoppers crowd the market area next to the Kabul River, Kabul, Afghanistan, 28 July 2009. (U.S. Army photo, SGT Teddy Wade)
This urban bias in counterinsurgency operations is troublesome because it favors the insurgency, and is welcomed and encouraged by guerrilla armies. Through purposeful harassment tactics by guerrilla forces, “the government is systematically eliminated from the countryside . . . The government is thus cut off from the population.” During the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks, for example, T.E. Lawrence argued that the Arab insurgents “must not take Medina [a major city in Saudi Arabia]. The Turk was harmless there. We wanted him to stay at Medina and every other distant place, in the largest numbers.” The Turkish counterinsurgent was welcome to major cities and transit lines “just so long as he gave [the insurgents] the other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the Arab world.”

Two questions emerge from this contradiction between the urban operational bias of many counterinsurgencies and the rural focus of successful insurgencies. Why is there an urban bias in counterinsurgency operations? And how does this bias influence the conduct and resolution of a counterinsurgency? Answering these questions leads us to the conclusion that the control of urban areas, while necessary, is not sufficient to bring about a successful resolution to a counterinsurgency campaign.

**Urban Bias and Cost-Efficiency**

The concentration of counterinsurgency operations in urban areas is the result of a myopic focus on issues of cost effectiveness and practicality. Such a focus leads counterinsurgencies to emphasize urban operations, often at the expense of coherent rural plans.

Control of the local population is the basic objective of both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent. As Mao said of the relationship between the population and the insurgency, “the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it.” He added, “It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish...
out of its native element, cannot live.” Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel David Galula argues that “The population, therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it [is] for his enemy.”

Clearly, control and political sympathies differ in value to a counterinsurgent. The forces of the counterinsurgency can control a population and yet the people may still hold their actions and objectives in exceedingly poor regard. However, the population is usually cooperative or, at least, quiescent within the areas of counterinsurgency control. In contrast, while their sympathies might reside with the counterinsurgency, if the counterinsurgents are unable to provide security, the majority of the people will actively or passively work for the insurgency. Control is therefore paramount; however, “in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population.” Clearly, obtaining the favor of the people is good for the long-term health of a political system.

Given the aim of controlling the population, a simple concern for cost-efficiency can lead the counterinsurgent to focus his attention on areas with the highest concentration of people, namely, on urban areas. Indeed, as the French counterinsurgency theorist Roger Trinquier has explicitly noted, “The army should make its main effort in those areas where the population is densest; that is, in the cities.” After 2009, Canada’s operational plan in Kandahar Province followed this same logic. In focusing on Kandahar City and its immediate environs, the Canadian forces bid for the control of 75 percent of the population of Kandahar Province.

Policing urban centers is also easier and more cost-efficient than controlling the vast rural countryside. Curfews, for example, can separate urban insurgents from the passive population. When urban insurgents break curfews to terrorize city dwellers, sabotage governmental projects, and target counterinsurgent forces, it is easy to identify them and restrict their freedom of assembly and movement. As Trinquier argues, “The forces of order can easily watch all the streets of a city with a minimum of troops. Anyone found away from his home at night is suspect.”

The Cuban Revolution demonstrates well the relative ease of counterinsurgent operational and administrative control within urban areas. While Fidel Castro’s fledging guerrilla organization operated in the mountains of Oriente Province, Cuba’s many urban-based revolutionaries were far better organized and had significantly more resources at their disposal. Yet, strikes, riots, and instances of terrorism in Havana and Santiago in 1958 proved to be disastrous for these groups because the Batista government was able to easily maintain control in Cuba’s main urban centers. Those who undertook acts of protest or terrorism, espionage, and sedition were readily visible to the regime’s security forces. As a result, the various urban-based insurgent organizations suffered many serious defeats and became subordinate to Castro’s rural revolutionary movement. Largely for this reason, Castro later remarked that urban areas ought to be best understood as “the grave of the guerrilla.”

Aid to the local population is also a central operational characteristic of a counterinsurgency campaign—particularly when a powerful third-party state intervenes on behalf of an indigenous government. However, such aid is often highly fungible. Food, building supplies, or other material goods can easily end up in insurgent hands. Material goods given to the local population to win their sympathy can come to rest, finally, in the hands of the insurgency. Thus, effective control of the recipient population is a clear prerequisite of effective aid. As Trinquier points out, “We must not lose sight of the fact that any material aid we give will only profit the enemy if the organization that permits his control and manipulation of the people has not first been destroyed. Aid must be prudently administered until the police operation has been completed.”
While the often intimate connection between the guerrilla fighter and the population is a recurrent theme in almost all viable insurgencies, Vietnam provides an interesting example of the effect of the transferability of material goods on an insurrection. During the Vietcong resistance to the United States, rural peasants frequently gave food supplies to guerrilla fighters because the forces of the counterinsurgency did not have sufficient levels of control over the population, particularly in rural areas. For instance, a guerrilla involved in an uprising in a village in the Mekong Delta later stated: “There was a time when I myself was living in the woods, dying of thirst, and deprived in every way. When I would come out, the people would cry. They felt sorry for us. But they would only prepare something for us and send us on our way. They gave us enough to eat, but wouldn’t let us stay in their house . . . [Regardless] this underground support enabled the revolution to organize the large uprising of 20 July 1960.” Resourced largely through the provision of fungible material goods by rural villagers, the uprising was the beginning of the protracted insurgency in My Tho, which contributed significantly to the eventual defeat of the United States.

Aid is only effective when it takes place within the boundaries of a cordoned area under robust counterinsurgency control. Many forms of aid also require direct access to recipients. The fungible quality of aid, therefore, reinforces the general urban orientation of counterinsurgency operations. As Lieutenant Colonel Simon Heatherington, commander of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, noted, “Reconstruction efforts have largely been relegated to urban areas because security conditions are so dangerous.” Similarly, one official from the Canadian International Development Agency, who worked in Kandahar Province, noted, “Our biggest challenge is security. Virtually all nongovernmental organizations have left the province because of the insurgency, except for a few pockets in urban areas such as Kandahar City.”

Thus, given that the counterinsurgency can only provide a safe working environment to aid workers in areas they control, aid distribution tends to thrive in a theater of operations’ urban areas where the security operations of the counterinsurgent are most effective.

Humanitarian workers are not the only individuals likely to cluster into urban areas. Journalists,
academics, human rights advocates, and other public figures are also likely to congregate in cities. This tendency is a repeated occurrence during both internal wars and counterinsurgencies. During the Bosnian War, for instance, most foreign journalists lived and worked in the capital city, Sarajevo. Similarly, in 2005, only three major American news outlets—Newsweek, the Associated Press, and the Washington Post—had correspondents stationed in Afghanistan. The country bureau desk of each of these organizations, moreover, was located in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul.

Such public figures have a rather disproportionate influence on how the campaign is portrayed to the domestic public of the counterinsurgency. The presumed casualty averseness of the American public and the desire for troops to follow domestic standards of legality and humanitarian behavior are also frequent concerns. Media coverage and the dissemination of other information to the public can heavily influence the domestic perception of these issues. Properly satisfying this thirst for information is a crucial operational task for the counterinsurgency. As Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, notes, “The information environment is a critical dimension of such internal wars, and insurgents attempt to shape it to their advantage. One way they do this is by carrying out activities, such as suicide attacks, that may have little military value but create fear and uncertainty. . . . These actions are executed to attract high-profile media coverage or local publicity and inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities.”

While controlling the information that urban-based public figures receive is essential, such actions reinforce the urban bias in counterinsurgency operations by placing a premium on the static defense of urban areas—often at the expense of coherent rural operational plans. The congregation of media and other public figures in urban areas is likely to see disturbances within cities as indications of the success or failure of the wider war. For this reason, despite the relative ease with which they can achieve control in urban areas, counterinsurgent forces often keep an overly large presence in such areas in order to limit the occurrence of urban-based security incidents. As Seth Jones notes, in 2002, “with rare exceptions, the 4,000-member International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did not venture beyond the capital. Its purpose was to protect the Afghan interim administration and help provide security to the capital.” Thus, the need to shape and control the information environment within the cities creates a centripetal force that incessantly pulls the counterinsurgent back into them.

In sum, numerous and mutually reinforcing reasons bias counterinsurgency operational plans toward urban areas. The natural congregation of the population in cities reduces the cost of security operations, while providing a clear concentration of a main objective of counterinsurgency warfare—the population. In turn, successful security operations make counterinsurgency aid more effective by reducing the transfer of material resources to insurgents. Finally, domestic politics and the contemporary era of instant global information-sharing reinforce the urban focus because insurgent attacks in urban areas are often taken as proxies for the wider state of the war. Yet, while controlling urban centers is a necessary condition for successful counterinsurgency, it does not bring success by itself. Counterinsurgents expend a great deal of effort in urban areas, but often the real heart of the war is in the countryside.

**How Urban Bias Influences Campaigns**

To understand how an urban bias influences the conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign, we must remember that the insurgency has the initiative in terms of strategic interactions. A counterinsurgency, by choosing to bias its operational plans toward urban environments—largely for reasons of cost-efficiency and expediency—presents several vulnerable flanks to observant, rural...
based insurgents. Indeed, such vulnerabilities are usually exploited in remarkably similar ways.

Most countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are predominantly rural, although Iraq is a clear exception. An urban bias in a counterinsurgency’s operational plan thus leaves most of a country’s population under insurgent domination. This is a great martial, logistical, and political advantage for the insurgency. Only about 24 percent of the population of Afghanistan, for example, lived in urban areas as of 2008. Thus, by focusing operations in the major urban centers, some 76 percent of the people of Afghanistan were under the control of local warlords and insurgent groups. This is a recurrent phenomenon that benefits the insurrection. As Mao Tse-tung noted of the Japanese counterinsurgency in northern China during the late 1930s, “The enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of communication, and some of the plains, which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part [of the countryside] will be taken up by guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere.”

A bias toward urban areas also concedes the bulk of a country’s territory to its enemy, and its geographic features can be of tremendous benefit to an insurgency. Mountainous areas, heavily forested regions, or dense jungles conceal the location of insurgent bases and allow for the use of elusive guerrilla tactics.

The presence of a sizable territory within which the guerrilla can operate is another crucial geographic consideration. Without enough room to conduct guerrilla operations, the insurgents will eventually have to fight a decisive battle with the more powerful conventional forces of the counterinsurgency. The result will likely be a devastating military defeat for the guerrillas.

A counterinsurgency biased toward urban environments concentrates its security patrols and military efforts into a relatively small amount of territory. The predictable result is more effective insurgency guerrilla operations. When cities are emphasized in counterinsurgency operations, the guerrillas can retreat from advancing security forces, trading territory for time until the localized balance of forces favors them. In contrast, the counterinsurgent undertakes large will-o’-the-wisp operations that produce
no decisive results, while the insurgents harass his patrols and destroy his outposts and static defenses. As T.E. Lawrence tells us, given room to maneuver, an insurgency can truly become “an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas.”

By focusing operations on urban areas, the counterinsurgent also ignores an important fact: cities are not materially self-sufficient. Cities depend on material resources and lines of transportation and communication that extend throughout the countryside. Food, critical consumer goods, and even electrical power are all generated in rural areas. A counterinsurgency that disregards these realities cedes the beating heart of the country to the insurgency. During the Vietminh resistance to the French, the insurgency implemented an economic blockade of urban areas, and it later used a similar strategy against the United States. The Vietminh intended to starve the entrenched forces of the French through a scorched earth policy of “barren orchards and empty houses.” They believed, quite correctly, that they could cripple the French counterinsurgency by blockading the major towns and cities under its control.

When basic subsistence is at stake, power usually resides with the rural areas that produce a country’s staple crops and other foodstuffs. Similarly, detached from the bulk of the population, an external counterinsurgency cannot recruit sufficient indigenous forces to protect the fledgling regime. The insurgency that controls the countryside, then, has a nearly insurmountable material advantage. During the mujahideen war against the Soviets, for example, “the source of the resistance power was not the cities and towns but the rural areas.” In contrast, by relying upon urban operations to the neglect of rural operational plans, “Kabul [and the Soviet forces] found it impossible to tap the [human resources of the] rural areas outside of their control, which only left the larger cities which could provide conscripts.”

Even when it is feasible to supply the cities, vulnerable lines of transport, supply, and communication constantly threaten urban viability. Attacks on the counterinsurgent’s vulnerable lines of supply also reinforce the urban bias. As available resources decrease, the incentive to pursue more cost-efficient urban operations increases and major rural operations tend to cease. Predictably, insecurity in the

A U.S. soldier checks an area for improvised explosive devices during a route-clearance mission in the rural area near Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, 3 October 2010.
countryside frequently leads to a further retrenchment of forces in and around urban areas. During the Communist insurrection in Greece, “various and mobile police squadrons were being attacked so heavily that they were forced to withdraw to the major villages, leaving much of the countryside under rebel control.” During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, too, it was well noted by the guerrilla leadership that attacks along the cities’ vulnerable supply lines “would have the added benefit of compelling the Soviets to tie down an ever higher proportion of the men in static security duties.” Finally, the loss of electrical power, foodstuffs, and material goods creates urban squalor. Discontent soars and the counterinsurgent will tend to adopt an even greater bias towards urban operations in order to maintain his flagging control. This retrenchment of effort, in turn, increases the counterinsurgent’s vulnerability further still.

The war in Afghanistan presents an interesting longitudinal example of the vulnerability of supply lines to guerrilla attack. During the fight with the Soviet Union, insurgent leaders knew the vulnerable points of the cumbersome Soviet counterinsurgency perfectly well, targeted them to great effect, and attacked lines of supply throughout the countryside and ultimately the major cities. As Ali Jalali and Lester Grau note, “The Soviet presence depended on its ability to keep roads open. Much of the Soviet combat in Afghanistan was a fight for control of the road network. Soviet security of the Eastern LOC [line of communication] required 26 battalions manning 199 outposts.” Indeed, between 1985 and 1987, the Mujahideen launched over 10,000 ambushes against Soviet supply convoys along the vulnerable lines of communication of the urban-based regime.

As one insurgent leader noted, the vulnerability of cities was clearly understood:

I knew my enemy’s [the Soviet’s] sensitive spots—the Salang highway, aircraft on the ground, the power supply, the dams, the bridges, the pipelines and, at the center of them all, Kabul. . . . There was a concerted effort on my part to coordinate attacks aimed at cutting off Kabul from supplies or facilities coming from outside the city. This involved ambushes on convoys on roads leading to Kabul, the mining of dams that provided its water, or cutting its power lines.

These rurally based attacks on supply and transport lines compelled the counterinsurgent forces to retreat into defensible areas in and around major urban centers. As an Inter-Services Intelligence commander later noted, “These tactics had the effect of creating a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of the Soviets and Afghans. They reacted by deploying more and more troops in static guard duties [along the supply lines near to the major urban centers], thus reducing their ability to mount offensive operations.”

This pattern of vulnerable supply lines, insurgent attacks, and a retrenchment of forces is, perhaps, repeating itself in the current counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Frequent attacks on NATO and American supply columns, particularly at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, have begun to wear on the counterinsurgents’ operational effectiveness. Between the months of June and September 2009, for example, over 145 convoy drivers died in ambushes, and insurgent attacks destroyed some 123 vehicles. Since then, attacks have continued to escalate in both frequency and boldness. The growing pattern of insurgent attacks on vulnerable supply routes in Afghanistan presents a real operational challenge for the counterinsurgency.

More than 80 percent of NATO and American supplies flow across the border into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The highway from Kabul to Kandahar is also a major site of insurgent activity. In imitation of the strategy that led to seizure of Kabul in the 1990s, the Taliban is now concentrating its efforts against its enemies’ urban supply lines—and with increasing effectiveness.

In summary, it seems that expanded guerrilla areas of operation, attacks upon vulnerable supply lines, and the economic blockade of cities are, in many ways, the unintentional product of a counterinsurgency’s deliberate decision to bias its operational attention toward urban areas.

**Redressing the Urban Bias**

To begin to redress the urban bias in operations, the counterinsurgency must first rethink the relative value of rural and urban space. The viability of major cities differs tremendously in times of war versus times of peace.
In times of peace, political power tends to reside in a country’s major cities. Politicians make their major decisions in the cities. Taxes flow from the countryside into urban areas where governments then redistribute the funds across the country. The same is true of economic wealth, which tends to cluster in urban areas. Because of the sheer number of urban inhabitants, most nations’ economies supply the populations of cities. Profitable services, commerce, and other industries also tend to locate in cities, because city dwellers are avaricious consumers of rural products.

Yet, during an insurgency, cities actually become the most vulnerable parts of a country, and real power and political capacity reside in the countryside. In times of peace, no barriers exist to living the urban life. Food is delivered without hindrance; power is easily generated and transferred for consumption; transit to and from urban areas is peaceful and ensured.

However, as waves of revolution sweep across the countryside, they wash away the power of urban areas, and the locus of authority and dominance passes to the rural countryside.

Cumulatively, then, the evidence presented here suggests that the control of urban areas, while necessary, is not sufficient to effect a successful resolution to a counterinsurgency campaign. The primary lesson that we can draw from this is a simple one: the army that controls the countryside, controls the state.

NOTES

13. This percentage figure is from the Operation Kantolo factsheet available at CEFCOM’s website, <http://www.comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/kantolo-eng.asp>.
16. Ibid.
18. Trinquier, 42.
29. Iraq presents an obvious counterexample to this trend because a little over 60 percent of the country’s population lives in cities. Regardless, the relative ease with which the Iraq insurgency was suppressed by the influx of new troops during the so-called “troop surge” demonstrates, once again, that urban insurgencies are fairly vulnerable to the actions of a counterinsurgency.
32. James D. Fearon and David Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), 75-90; for a qualitative demonstration of this same point, see Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles: Brassey’s Inc., 1996), 54.
33. Mao Tse-tung, 98.
34. Lawrence, 198.
35. Eliot, 54.
39. Yousaf and Adkin, 45.
40. Jalali and Grau, 147.
43. Ibid.