



DEVELOPING NCO LEADERS for the 21st Century

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Soldiers actually tend to be pretty skilled at this kind of work. A huge fraction of military officers were captains of their soccer teams, scout leaders, student government officers, whatever. They understand leadership. Even at the enlisted level, the basic essence of being a good sergeant is to be a quick study of character, a master of motivation, and a strong communicator, someone who really understands human nature. A lot of basic military work is inherently 'sociological,' and this has helped us in our crash effort to building up a working society here.¹

—Captain Ken Burgess, 2d Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Baghdad, Iraq, 2004

The key to the Army's success is our flexibility and willingness to change, to meet the world as it is—without altering the core competencies that make the Army the best fighting force in the world.²

—Field Manual (FM) 22-7.7

AT THE CENTER of Army transformation efforts stands the noncommissioned officer. He leads our Soldiers into 21st-century battle.³ He cares for, trains, and directs our Soldiers in peace and in war. He is the primary implementer of our new doctrine and concepts. He commands the small units maneuvering our new platforms and engaging the enemy with our new weapons systems. He is the face of the American people as he interacts with indigenous people on counterinsurgency battlefields. An effective leadership development model for the U.S. Army noncommissioned officer waging 21st-century warfare must define the threat correctly, develop leaders of character, and implement knowledge management strategies for disseminating current and emerging doctrine.

In today's security environment, change is the norm. The 360-degree fight among indigenous populations is probably here to stay.⁴ Our capstone doctrine in FM 3-0, *Operations* explains that—

Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st-century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace.

Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other until combat erupts. Killing

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PHOTO: SGT Andrew Wolfgang provides security during a cordon and knock in Taji, Iraq, 9 August 2009. (U.S. Army, PFC Ali Hargis)

or capturing the enemy in proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.⁵

The greater part of the panorama of change affecting contemporary operations is the dramatically increased involvement of the American Soldier with indigenous peoples. While changes in weaponry, equipment, force design, communications, technology, information exchange, and an exhaustive menu of threats deluge our Army at war, the human dimension profoundly begs the attention of transformation efforts.⁶ Our NCO leader stands at the heart of this transformation as its primary agent of delivery.

Irregular Warfare

The Army will conduct full spectrum operations among the people. Whole-of-government approaches will include soft power, non-lethal engagements, and effective messaging in information operations. At the blink of an eye, however, situations can and do turn explosively lethal and require disciplined application of combined arms maneuver. In this environment, the shaping of attitudes and values is as important as fire control, economy of force, and rules of engagement. Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms.⁷ Platforms, technology, weaponry, and information superiority are all mission-essential components of successful land combat operations in 21st-century warfare. However, without a thorough understanding of the human dimension, a wily and cunning enemy adept at cultural exploitation may actually leverage military superiority against the Army's campaign objectives. When examining leader development models for the Army NCO corps for the 21st century, it is imperative that we define the threat environment correctly and apply paradigms that address the requirements of an increasingly human-centric battlefield.

We need NCO leaders who are educated, trained, and inspired to pursue a balanced, human-centric approach to irregular warfare in the 21st century. These NCO leaders must be self-aware and always conscious of the strategic context of their actions and the unit's actions.

This is not to say that leader development for major combat operations is no longer required or that conventional warfare training is obsolete. We should not sacrifice systematic training in large-scale combined arms maneuver for increased effectiveness in irregular warfare environments. The question of either/or is based on a false premise and disregards the doctrinal azimuth provided in FM 3-0.

Leader development for NCOs must and will include development of leadership capabilities normally honed in more conventional training venues. NCOs will still provide leadership at qualification tables and gunneries; combined live-fire exercises; joint rapid-deployment exercises; force-on-force conventional maneuver in our "dirt" combat training centers; and advanced training in battle command processes and applications. Leadership in major combat operations or in irregular warfare is still leadership. The contexts and threats may vary, but the relationship between the leader and the led still requires education in military art and science and indoctrination in a culture of values and tradition.

Our allies hail from diverse ethnic, national, and cultural origins. Operating in large-scale combined arms maneuver with multinational partners may require cross-cultural association skills for the NCO small-unit leader or the battle staff NCO coordinating actions between commands. Human-centric leadership capabilities honed in our own units require external applications when dealing outside our own cultural comfort zones. Modern warfare has produced the phenomenon of the "global rifle platoon."

Our military transition teams immerse themselves in the culture of indigenous forces. In counter-insurgency operations, indigenous forces must gradually assume the lead in order for our forces to retrograde. The military transition team must overcome the barriers of language, culture, race,

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religion, and experience if it is to succeed in developing the capabilities of indigenous forces. The U.S. Army NCO frequently assumes responsibility for providing leadership for these missions. His education and training may contribute to the success of counterinsurgency operations or fail him at the point of attack. Military transition team members that become a source of irritation of indigenous forces may impede the progress of the campaign plan. NCO leadership for these contexts must be developed intentionally and deliberately.

In the spring of 2008, an American NCO defaced a copy of the Koran by scrawling foul language on its pages and then posted it on a silhouette for target practice on a small arms range shared with Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi security forces found the holy book with 14 holes in it the next day. Their indignant reaction was so severe that several general officers immediately convened councils with Iraqi leaders to issue official apologies. Even the President of the United States publicly asked for forgiveness from the Iraqi Prime Minister.⁸

While this situation is not the norm, neither is it an anomaly. Irregular warfare requires weaponizing cultural knowledge, not merely routine “check-the-block” cultural awareness classes. Human-centric warfare requires area-specific cultural knowledge as well as tactical adaptability.

The adaptive, multi-skilled leader described in FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, is a paradigm for 21st-century NCO leader development. His adaptability is a key trait:

Adaptable leaders scan the environment, derive the key characteristics of the situation, and are aware of what it will take to perform in the changed environment. Leaders must be particularly observant for evidence that the environment has changed in unexpected ways. They recognize that they face highly adaptive adversaries, and operate within dynamic, ever-changing environments. Sometimes what happens in the same environment changes suddenly and unexpectedly from a calm, relatively safe operation to a direct fire situation. Other times environments differ (from a combat deployment to a humanitarian one) and adaptation is required for mind-sets and instincts to change.⁹

Today’s Soldier knows almost nothing but change and must adapt constantly to a volatile and unpredictable environment. Since 2004, our Army has introduced an entirely new force design (modularity), dozens of new equipment and uniform suites, digital communication command posts, and modifications to training programs of instruction and methods of delivery. Moreover, we soldier within the vortex of an unprecedented doctrinal revolution as the Army has rewritten nearly all its field manuals during this period. This places increasing demands upon squad leaders, platoon and section sergeants, first sergeants, and sergeants major to adapt standards, requirements, and safety considerations to the avalanche of change facing today’s Soldier.

Counterinsurgency operations may provide the best problem set in arriving at the optimal solution for developing adaptive NCO leaders. If an NCO leader can learn to thrive in a counterinsurgency operation, everything else is easier in comparison. General David H. Petraeus has referred to counterinsurgency as “graduate-level warfare.”¹⁰ An NCO corps at home in the dangerous, complex, ambiguous environs of counterinsurgency warfare should find conventional warfare less difficult and easier to adapt to.¹¹

The optimal leadership development model for the 21st century recognizes the NCO as the principal agent of change in a transforming force and emphasizes human-centric factors in full spectrum operations. Correctly diagnosing the threat environment of irregular warfare must inform our models for leader development. Adaptive and creative thinking will remain a staple in addressing both the threat and the operational environment.

Traditions, Heritage, and Values

Noncommissioned officers are the stewards of Army traditions, emblems, regalia, and heraldry. From the days when the standard-bearer literally bore the unit’s flag or standards into battle at the

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U.S. Army, SGT Teddy Wade

U.S. Army soldiers from 3rd Infantry Regiment, Old Guard, march during the NCO Parade at Fort Myer, VA, 19 May 2009.

head of the formation to the present, where the command sergeant major safeguards the unit's colors, NCOs promote reverence for and pride in the Army service. The Army's customs, courtesies, and rituals pass from generation to generation through the diligent observance of noncommissioned officers who preserve the heritage of the past and project the tradition of *esprit de corps* into the present.

Ceremonies and rituals are a vehicle for displaying the Army's values. Far from being empty exercises in pomp and parade, they communicate transcendent values such as love of country, liberty, and honor. Whether observing a major ceremony such as a memorial for fallen comrades or a minor ceremony such as Retreat and To the Colors, the NCO stands at the center of the traditions and rituals. The NCO prepares the parade field, the banquet hall, and the chapel. The NCO supervises the firing teams, the pallbearers, and the Color Guard. NCOs stand between commanders exchanging the regimental colors at a change of command ceremony.

These ceremonies and rituals highlight the Army's values and traditions. They symbolize the honor, discipline, and sacrifices our Soldiers have made throughout our long and storied history. These values must never change; we must conscientiously adhere to them in order to pass them along with fidelity and respect to emerging generations of Soldiers. In an era where change is fast and furi-

ous and leaders learn to "adapt or die," our professional NCO corps must remain firmly grounded in our prestigious heritage of victory with honor. The Army is a values-based organization and requires NCO leaders that faithfully transmit our values at home and abroad, whether during peace keeping or combat.

Army leadership doctrine explains what leaders must *be*, *know*, and *do*. This model translates into the spiritual, mental, and physical characteristics of leadership and provides a metric for self-development that addresses the whole person.

We must begin with character. What a leader must be is a model of Army Values—loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor,

integrity, and personal courage. Don Snider, a professor of political science at the U.S. Military Academy, breaks down character development into three strands: the spiritual (what is true); the ethical (what is right); and the social (actions).¹² Snider teaches that a leader of character "seeks to discover the truth, decide what is right, and demonstrate the courage to act accordingly. . . always."¹³ Current NCO development models do not address this highly personal and spiritual quest for truth firmly enough. Should we teach cadets at West Point to employ their personal faith as a leadership tool in this way, but not our NCO corps? While respecting each NCO's personal choices and beliefs, it is nonetheless material to this discussion to note that morals do not emerge from a vacuum. In his farewell address, George Washington stated:

Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid

us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.¹⁴

NCO leader development models should require character development to more closely mirror the educational paradigms employed at West Point. Many NCO leaders inculcate this spiritual dimension into their personal self-development, but the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System is silent on the matter. It is critical for our own NCO leaders to seek truth as our Soldiers face complex ethical dangers conducting full spectrum operations in religiously saturated environments. In an interview with the Combat Studies Institute, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Iacobucci explains the importance of morals and values in conflict. Reflecting on the lessons he learned from this experience [Operation Iraqi Freedom], Iacobucci stresses the importance of “having a good command climate and establishing sound morals and values.” As he explains, “If you’re going to go into this business of exchanging blows with people and taking their lives, it can very quickly erode into something very messy. It’s only values and morals that keep everything together.”¹⁵

The Army Leadership Requirements Model detailed in FM 6-22 identifies three attributes of what a leader must be: a leader of character, a leader with presence, and a leader with intellectual capacity. The Noncommissioned Officer Educational System plays a central role in NCO leader development and programs of instruction should emphasize these requirements. Success in 21st-century warfare begins with educational experiences that deepen the professional NCO’s commitment to leading with character.

Knowledge must inform character, and knowledge must be translated into action. The *be, know, and do* model remains relevant for our professional development efforts in the NCO corps. Knowledge and action not informed by strong moral character may prove ineffective during combat in current and future threat environments.

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The demands of 21st-century warfare will continue to pose complex sets of problems for our leaders to navigate and may include religious, tribal, ethnic, social, and political variables. The actions of the “strategic corporal” on COIN battlefields frequently blast throughout the world in real time on digital mass media. Establishing educational and training values that emphasize character development, self-awareness, and personal growth will help our NCO leaders stay true to unchanging principles. Fidelity to these principles will contribute to mission success in constantly changing environments with complex sets of human-centric problems.

Noncommissioned officers are the conduit of leadership that connects commanders and Soldiers. As stewards of our traditions, heritage, ceremonies, and heraldry, NCOs bear our standards in the midst of the daunting challenges posed by 21st-century warfare. Now more than ever before, leadership development for NCOs must be grounded in unchanging principles and values.

The NCO Leader and Doctrine

The capstone of Army doctrine, FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, initiated a doctrinal revolution within the Army that is still generating change.¹⁶ Many of today’s senior NCOs learned doctrine from painstaking study of dog-eared paper manuals by highlighting key passages and making notes in the margins. The shelf life of these doctrinal publications ordinarily lasted five years. While always dynamic in nature, doctrine seemed relatively stable from the early 1990s until the outset of the War on Terrorism. Most NCOs owned their own copies of the field manuals on leadership, physical training, leadership counseling, battle drills, and battle focused training, and their proponent FM or unique-unit FM. In the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System, noncommissioned officers learned how to navigate doctrine by searching for answers to problems using glossaries or other reference aids.

Today, two unique challenges have emerged to complicate the dissemination of Army doctrine: the advent of paperless references and the fluid nature of current doctrine itself. Together, these two factors affect the transmittal of doctrinal knowledge and require a fresh look at how NCOs obtain and retain doctrinal knowledge.



U.S. Army PFC Richard W. Jones Jr.

SSG William Fullerton, assigned to 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, Special Troops Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, briefs his soldiers prior to going on patrol from Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, 4 July 2009.

Digitization of operational products, regulations, field manuals, pamphlets, and other distributed information has changed the culture of information exchange. No longer bound by the constraints of researching paper references and painstakingly typing out quoted portions, today's operator can copy and paste with lightning speed (and perhaps not as much attention to detail). Without paper products, however, NCOs may lose some of the traditional absorption and retention of doctrinal knowledge. This situation results in a professional NCO corps frequently overwhelmed by information and constrained to reading from a desktop computer screen instead of a paper FM that could fit into a Tuff Box, rucksack, or cargo pocket.

Even if today's NCO leader had recourse to the old paper versions of his doctrine, the doctrine itself presents two additional difficulties: it is fluid in nature (as the recent generation of interim field manuals suggests); and doctrine often yields to battlefield lessons learned. Placing greater emphasis on knowledge management strategies for NCO leader development may mitigate both difficulties.

NCOs in the 21st century should appropriate knowledge management concepts as the principal delivery system for the Army-wide transmittal of current and emerging doctrinal knowledge. Knowledge management is simply the practice of captur-

ing, storing, and sharing explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is delivered in publications, slide shows, spreadsheets, reports, etc. Tacit knowledge such as insights, experiences, advice, analysis, and opinion is experiential. It is delivered in online forums, instant messaging, and other means of social sharing. While both types of knowledge are necessary, it is tacit knowledge that fosters social learning for a community of practice.¹⁷

Professional online forums such as the Battle Command Knowledge System's NCO Net hold enormous potential for enabling knowledge management for our NCO leadership.¹⁸ NCO Net provides a secure, professionally moderated discussion and exchange forum for NCOs

working out the problems facing our Army at war today. NCOs share questions and problems as well as solutions, experiences, and advice for fellow NCOs. NCO Net has helped thousands of noncommissioned officers in fielding assistance with current issues in near real time. These forums provide a way of discussing doctrine in theory as well as applied and expanded doctrine as members share their own tactics, techniques, and procedures. Current membership in NCO Net tops 37,000 voluntary participants from active duty, U.S. Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserves.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned also offers enormous potential for enhancing the Army's NCO leadership. We have barely tapped resources like the Battle Command Knowledge System and the Center for Army Lessons Learned as social learning platforms that support transformation. Formal inclusion of these and other knowledge management platforms in all enlisted training programs

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with emphasis on the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System will rapidly multiply organizational knowledge. Unit commanders at every echelon should support participation in knowledge management forums at the organizational and Army levels.

We are a doctrine-based Army, and FM 3-0 sets the direction for the present and the future. It is imperative that our NCO leaders absorb and communicate the doctrinal parameters provided in FM 3-0 and incorporate relevant observations, insights, and lessons into their training efforts. We can optimize this fluid, dynamic learning environment by implementing aggressive, intentional knowledge-management strategies for today's NCO leaders. Through platforms such as the noncommissioned officer network, our enlisted leaders can share the doctrinal knowledge explained in our publications as well as lessons learned from current operations. Pulling together the doctrinal concepts as well as the battlefield observations, insights, and lessons will also accelerate efforts to develop relevant "dirt" training in the combat training centers. Building synergy between field operators, Training and Doctrine Command developers, and Combat Training Center observer/controllers is a stated goal of the Training and Doctrine Command.¹⁹

The paperless publication system promotes online presence. NCO leaders that stay current on emerging issues and topics may find a wealth of support on a variety of Battle Command Knowledge System online forums. Communities of practice exist for niche communities (such as executive or training officer network) or macro communities (logisticians network). An active community of practice applies the collective knowledge of its membership to problem-solving. This fosters collaboration and social learning as it facilitates the development of relevant solution sets. A single forum topic posted on the Battle Command Knowledge System Counterinsurgency Forum in 2007, "Suicide Bomber Defeat," garnered 187 replies from sources as divergent as the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Multinational Force-I Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.²⁰ This type of collaboration exponentially multiplies the doctrinal acumen and operational savvy of all participants and their organizations.

It is probably not realistic to assume our corps of noncommissioned officers will master the fluid nature of current doctrinal concepts utilizing pre-digital educational methods alone. Noncommissioned Officer Educational System classrooms practice the small-group method of instruction in order to optimize the experiences, knowledge, and cognitive abilities of the students in a professionally facilitated forum. Virtual knowledge management forums do the same but on an Army-wide scale that maximizes reach and depth. The doctrinal revolution set in motion by FM 3-0 is still reverberating throughout the force; observations, insights, and lessons are still pouring in from combat operations in theater. NCOs are deluged with new information. We can find a more realistic paradigm for the transmission of current and emerging doctrine for our corps of noncommissioned officers by utilizing knowledge management platforms.

Changing Conditions, Unchanging Values

Warfare in the 21st century will demand increasingly complex skill sets from NCO leaders and require a human-centric focus for problem solving. The operational environment will almost certainly involve unconventional, asymmetrical threats and intensive human interaction with indigenous populations, indigenous forces, and multinational partners. The volatile, unpredictable nature of irregular warfare will require an NCO corps firmly rooted in heritage, tradition, and a culture of conscientiously observed Army values. The leader with character who seeks truth and acts ethically will be able to model that which must never change in situations that are constantly changing all around him.

Developing this leader will require knowledge management strategies that leverage the collective expertise of the NCO corps for the benefit of all its members. A doctrine-based Army must disseminate doctrine in ways that are practical, deliverable, and relevant to this generation of NCO leaders. To achieve this, we must adapt available learning methods to the intended target audience. Online communities of practice provide social exchanges of experiential knowledge and rapid transfer of emerging best practices in near real time. This process aids the education and training of combat-ready warriors well prepared for a

variety of operational scenarios. Optimization of the experiences of other Soldiers has long been an Army precept and an educational linchpin of our institutional and operational training domains.

The Army NCO is the primary transmitter of transformation. He is also the steward of our heritage, traditions, and values. Deploying the NCO leader to volatile 21st-century battlefields to conduct

full spectrum operations will require leadership that can adapt tactics without compromising ethics. Technologies rise and fall, and weapons systems evolve; but human beings will always remain at the center of warfare. The Army NCO leaders of tomorrow will rise to meet every challenge with courage, competence, and confidence—as long as we never forget who we are and how we got here. **MR**

NOTES

1. Karl Zinsmeister, *Dawn Over Baghdad: How the U.S. Military is Using Bullets and Ballots to Remake Iraq*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2005)

2. FM 22-7.7, *The Army NCO Guide* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2002).

3. In this article, the pronouns “he” and “him” are generic and represent both male and female NCO leaders.

4. Trend analysis is the most fragile element of forecasting. The world’s future over the coming quarter of a century will be subject to enormous disruptions and surprises, natural as well as man-made. These disruptions, and many other contiguous forces, can easily change the trajectory of any single trend. The *Joint Operating Environment* (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, November 2008) recognizes that many, if not all, trends and trajectories of the future will be non-linear.

5. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: GPO, February 2008).

6. Ibid. “This conflict will be waged in an environment that is complex, multidimensional, and rooted in the human dimension. Military forces alone cannot win this conflict; winning requires the close cooperation and coordination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts. Due to the human nature of the conflict, however, land power will remain important to the military effort and essential to victory.”

7. *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* (Washington DC: GPO, September 2007). “Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms. *Irregular warfare* depends not just on our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. *People, not platforms and advanced technology will be the key to irregular warfare success*. The joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to executing *irregular warfare*.”

8. Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Bush Apologizes for Quran Shooting,” Associated Press, 2008-05-20.

9. FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington DC: GPO), para. 10-49.

10. Jamie Gumbrecht, “Troop Numbers to Thin In 2008,” McClatchy Newspapers, 30 December 2007.

11. BG Edward L. Cardon, “Recognizing the Army’s Cultural Changes,” *Army*, September 2007. “We do not fully understand how the culture of our junior leaders and soldiers has changed. For example, we know a number of our armor captains have not completed tank gunnery because of an extended deployment. To some, this is a harbinger to a downfall of Army readiness. But to our junior leaders, the reaction is quite different. *They are very confident they can rapidly master the required skills*. Why do they think like this? New equipment, new tactics, different training—our sol-

diers know they have to adapt both to win and to stay alive. They are not afraid of the unknown; they use their skills to adapt to the unknown. This is not to suggest or say that we should never conduct tank gunnery. We should, and there is no sound reason why our armor crewmen should not be experts on their tanks as a matter of training, but our junior leaders see a lack of a particular skill as a challenge to overcome, as they have already demonstrated in every combat deployment.”

12. Don Snider, “The Human Spirit, Ethics, and Character: An Integrated Approach to Warrior Development,” presentation to the Chief of Chaplains’ Senior Leadership Conference, April 2007.

13. Ibid.

14. George Washington, *Farewell Address*, Preparatory to His Declination, Baltimore, MD., George and Henry Keating (1896).

15. Combat Studies Institute, *Operational Leadership Experiences*, interview with LTC Michael Iocabucci, 1 June 2006.

16. GEN William S. Wallace, “FM 3-0 Setting the Capstone of Army Doctrine,” *Army*, March 2008.

17. FM 6-01.1, *Knowledge Management*, (Washington DC: GPO, 2008), para. 1-17. “*Connection* provides people with a structure and networks—both technical and social—that facilitate communication. Since knowledge is social and used for the benefit of people, most people seek it from those they know and trust before querying others or accessing databases. Seeking knowledge from other people leads to collaboration.”

18. The Lessons Learned Course, conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, is being designed to train officers, warrant officers, and NCOs assigned responsibility for establishing and managing a lessons learned program in their organization and their subordinate units.

19. Ibid., GEN William S. Wallace, “TRADOC is committed to providing our soldiers with the best, most relevant and innovative training opportunities while transforming a campaign-quality Army with Joint and expeditionary capabilities. We continue to push lessons learned in theater directly to soldiers on the ground and to units across the Army. Our lessons learned are simultaneously providing the foundation and underpinnings for development of Army doctrine that is reinforced and practiced at operational units and our training centers.”

20. Battle Command Knowledge System, professional forums, 30 July 2009, <<https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=384421&lang=en-U.S.>> (AKO password required). Alternate site, <<https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?>> (30 July 2009).