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The publication you hold in your hand (or are perhaps reading on a computer, tablet, or smart phone) has been in print in various formats, under various titles, and with various printing cycles for ninety years. The first edition, January 1922 (actually printed on 10 February 1922), was entitled *Instructors’ Summary of Military Articles* and published at Fort Leavenworth by the General Service Schools (previously the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, created by General William T. Sherman in 1881). Its primary purpose was to provide instructors a collection of the previous month’s best articles on military matters (usually coming from foreign magazines and journals), international developments, recommended books, and other information thought to be of value to those educating the Army’s mid-career officers.

*Military Review* now prides itself as holding right of first publication for nearly 100% of its articles, but for the first 12 years of its existence, this publication was simply a compendium of reprinted information. In December of 1933, the first original article appeared: "Conduct of a Holding Attack," written by MAJ J. Lawton Collins, who would later serve as VII Corps commander during the Normandy invasion (gaining the moniker "Lightning Joe") and Chief of Staff of the Army during the Korean War. With this piece, the journal began its current function of providing a forum for the open exchange of original thought and debate. Interestingly, many thought that Collins had overstepped his boundaries and violated operational security in his article. Many copies of that issue were recalled and destroyed, and pages 67-70 with his article were sliced out of library copies.

To prevent such scandals in the future, as early as December of 1935 the masthead bore the disclaimer "The opinions expressed by authors are not necessarily official," a practice that continues to this day with slight wording changes. This seemingly minor editorial and legal point is actually one of the most significant milestones in *Military Review* history, as it indicates that we have been providing a venue for reasoned, respectful, researched critique of Army policy and doctrine for over three-quarters of a century.
Throughout its 90 years of publication, the journal has undergone much evolution, with some of its many titles including: Command and General Staff School Quarterly Review of Military Literature, Command and General Staff School Quarterly, and Command and General Staff School Military Review. Finally, in 1942, it adopted the title by which we know it today: Military Review. Along the way it has gone back and forth several times from being printed monthly, quarterly, and now bimonthly. The January 1965 issue was the first to bear the slogan “The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army.”

Even while World War II still raged, Military Review received the mission to translate its articles into Spanish and Portuguese for distribution to our allies in Central and South America, with the first such issues printed in April of 1945. Perhaps one of the first Cold War programs intended to guard against encroaching Soviet communism, our Latin American editions continue the valuable tradition of sharing information and opinions on matters of mutual defense with our partners in the Western Hemisphere.

Translations expanded in September of 2005 with the creation of an Arabic edition to support our coalition partners in Southwest Asia, and French prototypes (for distribution among Francophone nations in NATO and Africa) have been published twice, once in 1998 and again in 2010. In October of 2006, we began publishing annual Special Readers, focused on important topics such as counterinsurgency warfare, interagency operations, military ethics, and the Profession of Arms.

From its original production run of 600 copies to our present circulation of over 140,000 individual copies printed per year including the Special Readers and the foreign language editions, Military Review has adapted to the needs of the Army, responded to international political and economic climates, and continued to be a place where Army leaders, noted academics, and all concerned can both contribute and read the latest developments, ideas, and even controversy concerning land warfare’s role in national and international security. Though electronic media may displace some of our printed circulation, in whatever format it is read, we anticipate Military Review will continue to be the “The Professional Journal of the United States Army” for another 90 years.
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After ten years of war, there are a number of truisms that have been developed from hard-fought battlefield experience. One that has gained prominence is the concept of intelligence and information integration. Integrating intelligence and information means different things to different people, but one thing is certain: without integration, the entire decision-making process is compromised, rife with gaps that can lead to miscalculations. The following is a compilation of thoughts and ideas we call “Ten Points for the Commander.” There are no magic bullets or new ideas. However, unless we capture these lessons and begin to incorporate them into our training and education programs, we are likely to miss a critical opportunity and have to reinvent them during the next conflict.

1. Learn about and build fusion cells. Organizations called fusion cells built in Iraq and later in Afghanistan should be a focal point for integrating intelligence and information in the future. The birth of the modular army stripped the division and corps headquarters of their organic “fusion-like” capability found in the all-source control elements in their intelligence battalions. This created an environment where the volume and velocity of information from so many different sources forced organizations such as the brigade combat teams and below to collect and analyze data. This makes the development of these fusion cells a critical requirement.

Fusion is about focusing our intelligence and information collections systems, and about the speed of responding to the task, precision in addressing the problem with the best available capability, and understanding what the expected outcomes should be. Fusion is a leadership function. It must be top-down driven, and we must provide top cover so that the fusion element can have complete freedom of action. This element must be able to communicate rapidly up, down, and laterally across organizations without restrictions (flattening networks). The level of maturity in the team will grow over time as experience grows. It will grow much quicker if the right leaders are chosen and everyone on the team (service, interagency, or coalition) understands the commander’s intent.
As fusion cells became effective, more players wanted to be involved (joint, interagency, coalition, and indigenous forces) and these organizations became the “go-to” formations for integrating intelligence and fusing it with operations. We have yet to capture all of the lessons learned and pull together best practices. We must ensure we capture the “how to” based on a decade of intelligence and warfighting fusion experience.

2. **Over-classification hinders.** The over-classification of information by ill-informed headquarters and individuals continues to challenge our ability to be transparent across our forces, the services, the joint and interagency communities, and our international partners. The classification habit, as well as the inability to merge our servers and data, cripples us when we try to integrate intelligence. It inhibits building trust and confidence among the various military and civilian players that collaborate, share, and build relationships to make informed decisions. Complementary unclassified and open source intelligence can often be better than what we have in the classified domain. The fusion and analysis of open source information with other forms of classified materials is essential to understanding the operational environment. The emergence of open source information as an intelligence discipline is powerful, and one cannot overstate its importance. In the past, most intelligence came from the normal “INTs”: signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT). In today’s information age, the old closed-loop system of intelligence, especially that which is over-classified, is rapidly becoming irrelevant.

3. **Understand and learn to integrate ISR capabilities.** As many are well aware, the integration of surveillance and reconnaissance assets is a maneuver commander’s responsibility, yet often this is left to S2s, G2s, and J2s to synchronize. Why? Either the commander doesn’t make the time to do the work, or he doesn’t understand the capabilities he has to employ. Senior and operational leaders do not know or understand intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools well. As we have matured with material solutions over these past ten years of war, our leader development, training, and education on these various systems has not. Often the only time we use and integrate these “tools of collection” is when we are in combat. Using and synchronizing these assets and understanding their capabilities should begin much earlier so that commanders are not wasting deployed units’ valuable time figuring out how to synchronize and integrate these assets and their collection plans; we must begin this training and education immediately.

4. **Everyone must do intelligence and information integration.** Integration has a different meaning for the intelligence community than it has for the operational community. The intelligence community sees integration with two components (collection and analysis), while the operational community seeks an outcome, an action, a result from the enormous amount of collection and analysis it performs.

The intelligence community must align its thinking with those who have to decide or execute the findings from collection and analysis. Think of it as a three-legged stool. The intelligence community has responsibility for two of these legs, when in fact, the third is the most important and least understood inside the broader intelligence community. The intelligence community needs to see itself as the critical enabling capability of decision making, whether tactical or strategic. The challenge in today’s complex world is knowing the difference between the two.
5. **Leadership is critical.** Rank doesn’t matter in intelligence. A junior analyst inside an organization may have the most knowledge on a critical subject debated at the senior staff level. However, many times he is not involved in the discussion. In other cases, a young captain or major may have the best set of skills to run a fusion cell and direct operational elements on the battlefield, but some senior commander is uncomfortable responding to junior officers.

We have to understand that brilliance comes in all sizes, shapes, colors of uniforms, and ranks. We have an incredibly talented and young workforce that has gained enormous experience over the past decade of war. How will we nurture them in the years ahead? They represent the best of our organizations and our future and see the world differently. They must be allowed to continue to thrive in this highly uncertain and complex world we live in. Our future training programs need to be developed in a way that allows for this type of environment and talent to flourish. Given diminishing budgets, we remain very concerned that first on the chopping block will be training, when in fact, it is training that made us as good as we are today, and now is the time when training becomes paramount.

While we still need to prosecute the war, we will need to start looking very hard at adjusting our future priorities. Many of these are directed, some from Washington, D.C., all the way down to the company command level, but do they use the right priorities? The closer one gets to any problem, the more one understands it and can focus on solving it. That said, the leadership can and must focus, aligning our intelligence system to address priorities and solve problems we are likely to face in the future. This will require strong leaders at every level to believe their voice matters (the intelligence collection system is not a fair-share system—it goes to the highest priorities). If they see intelligence collection does not align with their desired outcomes, they need to speak up.

6. **Everyone wants to “see” a map.** Mapping cultures is probably the most difficult geospatial task, and we are going to have to do a better job at it. We’re exceptional at mapping defense-related activities, facilities, homes, bridges, and the like, but how do you map a tribe, a culture, or an entire...
society? This will take vastly more integration between the all-source community and the geospatial community. This also requires geospatial specialists to get out into the field. Just because you can see imagery from miles above the earth doesn’t mean you understand the problem. We need to get our best and brightest into areas where we are operating or likely to operate. We need to build teams of area experts and geospatial analysts who can construct templates of societies. The burgeoning populations in the places most likely to experience conflict are those we understand least. We can do better in defining regions and areas of the world. We can determine gaps in our knowledge base, and then decide how to better focus limited collection resources.

7. **Combine the different “INTs.”** Intelligence integration combines different intelligence capabilities (often from different organizations and agencies) into a product that is better informed and more accurate. We often derived our assessments of things from a Central Intelligence Agency (HUMINT) or National Security Agency (SIGINT) perspective, and each organization’s view was strongly biased by overweighting the intelligence it specialized in, leaving the all-source analyst to be the integrator. That works in effective fusion cells, but it’s difficult elsewhere. It is human nature to want to get the golden nugget of intelligence that drives success, but one rarely does. We have to figure out how to better integrate all-source intelligence and to do it geospatially (and that information has to be sharable across an entire coalition).

8. **Mission command will affect the decision maker as the ultimate consumer of intelligence.** The decision maker is the ultimate consumer of intelligence. That person or group of people must be intimately involved in the intelligence collection, integration, and analysis process—it’s too difficult and dynamic to understand otherwise. This is an all-consuming endeavor and nearly an impossibly tall order, but strategic decisions still require senior leaders to take that approach. It’s their responsibility and duty, especially when lives are at stake. Since we demand this type of “mission command” on the battlefield, we should also expect it all the way up the chain. Training in this discipline must begin at the earliest stages. Commanders at every level must mentor and coach subordinate commanders on this integration work. A deeper understanding of both the tools of collection and the operational understanding that the senior commander is trying to achieve is a good start point. These lessons carry over as the younger generation of leaders move up the ranks. Knowing the fundamentals of this work early in a career helps to create integrators at senior levels.

9. **Create context and shared understanding.** Context is king. Achieving an understanding of what is happening—or will happen—comes from a truly integrated picture of an area, the situation, and the various personalities in it. It demands a layered approach over time that builds depth of understanding. We achieve greater levels of understanding and context by transparency; we may need to develop a process that requires us to involve outside experts to comment on different reads from the area under review. If we do this effectively, we could increase our understanding ten-fold. It may be much like posing a specific thesis to people to see if it passes their common-sense test. For many years, we were prisoners of the reports we got, and had precious little depth or nuanced analysis by natives of the region or people closer to the problems. Good intelligence does not always come from the intelligence personnel on a staff or from within a headquarters. Outside expertise or local expertise is of value to an organization and can help build expertise within the wider command over time. We did this poorly in the early years of the war and only really expanded into this type of expertise in recent years. It is still rare to find a subject matter expert at the company, battalion, or even BCT level. Most of these experts are typically at much higher echelons. While they are helpful and of value at those levels, we need them most down where the proverbial rubber meets the road.

10. **Synchronization of intelligence over time is critical.** The final task is to pull it all together in
order to execute the assigned mission effectively. This is not an easy task. In fact, it is a tall order for even the most experienced commander and staff. As we develop our plans, we need to consider how to integrate intelligence capabilities and the associated intelligence assessment throughout each component of the plan, synchronizing it in time and space to meet the commander’s intent. Whether it is for a small unit patrol or a theater campaign plan, we must integrate intelligence into each aspect (i.e., pre-, during-, and post-operation). Did we answer the “commander critical information requirements,” “priority intelligence requirements,” and other information collection related tasks? How reliable are the answers? How credible are the sources? Not working through the why, how, when, and where of each allocated or assigned asset a command receives places the mission at greater risk. Synchronization has been part of our thinking for many years now, but it usually falls short within our higher headquarters, especially once we make contact with the enemy. If we do more synchronized planning with greater rigor right from the start, using our operations planning process, we can provide our subordinate units greater flexibility and less uncertainty. At the end of the day, we achieve success in combat when subordinate units collectively understand the mission and higher commands have properly resourced them for success. Then and only then can they accomplish a well-synchronized campaign plan.

Conclusion

Intelligence and information integration is a critical warfighting skill in today’s complex and rapidly changing operational environment. As an Army, we have made huge strides, but we still have work to do in the joint, interagency, and multinational areas. With the speed of technological changes, speed of war, and the scale of modular Army Force adaptations, it would be irresponsible not to capitalize on all of the extraordinary gains we have achieved throughout this decade of war. We still have enormous strides to make, and we hope these “Ten Points” provide an azimuth to assist commanders and leaders at every echelon. They are the ultimate integrators of intelligence, those who build teams, build trust, and build relationships. Our strongest desire is that these “Ten Points” can help to start and accelerate that building throughout our Army. MR
IN THE YEARS since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became symbols of asymmetric warfare and modern military conflict, very little has changed in the realm of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) strategy. The military is always searching for better vehicles and equipment to defeat what is, at its core, a homemade device made for a fraction of the cost of our technological countermeasures. As a result, C-IED strategy has primarily focused on developing new ways to mitigate the effects of an IED blast rather than trying to prevent it from occurring. Billions of dollars have been spent in the name of saving lives, yet the true cause of the problem and its origins remain largely ignored, leaving out the crucial role played by population-centric counterinsurgency operations.

The Nature of the Problem

When elements of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment arrived in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, in July 2010, they faced an area of operations that had seen constantly increasing IED activity for several years in the same spots along Highway 1, an important maneuver corridor running from Kandahar City to Kabul. Casualties quickly mounted as IEDs with large net explosive weights detonated on convoys and route clearance vehicles, destroying even the largest of their kind. The insurgents had the propaganda victory they sought by obliterating American “tanks,” and security forces were scrambling to stop the bleeding and maintain freedom of movement.

Initial counter-IED plans sought to facilitate the relief in place between two Romanian battalions conducting operations along the highway. Conceived as a means to deter enemy IED emplacement, the plan was simple—flood the engagement areas with security forces, occupy established checkpoints, and maintain near constant surveillance to interdict any attempted insurgent activity on the most dangerous sections of the road. A combined arms approach integrated route clearance platoons with organic maneuver units to patrol the highway. Improvised explosive device activity decreased rapidly despite insurgent attempts to exploit the seams of units’ battle spaces and emplace IEDs in the least-patrolled and least-overwatched areas.
The mission was considered a success. The Romanian battalions were able to conduct their transfer of authority, and overall insurgent IED activity on the previously lethal sections of the road remained mostly low or ineffective, even during the usual summer fighting surge in southern Afghanistan. The presence of security forces along the highway decreased in favor of operations in other areas, and the IED threat was believed to be mostly pacified.

Yet, the IEDs never really went away. A few months later, in the period leading up to the provincial elections in September, new engagement areas were steadily appearing just outside the previously established boundaries of the first operation. By November, the same sections of the road had re-emerged as the most dangerous routes in the area of operations as over 1,500 pounds of homemade explosives detonated in the course of only a few days. With the arrival of spring in 2011, IED activity resumed in the same areas it had taken place during the previous three years. Initial suppression operations had succeeded in temporarily relieving the pressure, but failed to address the true source of the IED problem—the pervading influence and support of a homegrown local insurgency.

Security and Influence

The first step for any counterinsurgent is to secure the population against the intimidation and influence of the insurgency. Doctrine (and conventional wisdom) argue that the surest way to accomplish this is by establishing a persistent partnership with local security forces and living among the population. Merely conducting weekly visits and key leader engagements with local elders and officials may provide insights into governance and development issues, but they achieve few lasting effects unless the people feel safe.

Because both sides of a modern asymmetric conflict must continuously vie for the support of the local population, the counterinsurgent can develop a baseline security assessment of an area by tracking reports of insurgent activity against civilians. In this case, distinguishing between active anti-civilian and passive anti-civilian activity is critical. Active anti-civilian activity can include intimidation, forced taxation, and isolation through the emplacement of mine or IED obstacle belts that limit the population’s freedom of movement. Clearly, counterinsurgents cannot engage in such activity because it would lead to a complete loss of popular support and bring a swift end to their efforts. Insurgents, on the other hand, may use these tactics to increase their control and influence in a given area. Popular support need not be given happily, but it must be at a level to ensure that the influence of government security forces and the people’s desire for economic and essential services aid never outweigh their fear of insurgent retribution or punishment. As an example, there have been cases in which the Taliban senior leadership replaced insurgent commanders because they were thought to have been too harsh on local civilians and therefore a threat to the insurgency’s popular support.1 The most successful insurgent commanders know to use intimidation only when necessary to maintain their control of the people.

Consequently, areas experiencing limited insurgent intimidation are more likely to be insurgent-dominated support zones than areas with higher numbers of reports, especially in places with a significant International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence.

In this regard, the term “freedom of influence” is introduced in order to more precisely define the variable that the insurgents use to control the population. Whereas freedom of movement describes the ability of a maneuver element to project combat power at a chosen time, space, and purpose, freedom of influence reflects the capability of the insurgent or counterinsurgent to engage with and directly affect the local population’s attitudes, opinions, and perceptions.

In the situation described earlier, although ISAF and ANSF security forces were able to maintain their freedom of movement by conducting disruption and interdiction operations along Highway 1, the insurgents held their freedom of influence on the population in the surrounding villages. This...
led to a continuously accessible support zone just outside the operational boundaries and focus of friendly security patrols. The early positive effects they achieved did not translate into lasting security gains, leaving the next rotation of units open to the same dangers as before.

**Measuring Success**

In a field replete with numbers, statistics, metrics, and assessments, defining a true measure of success for C-IED operations and strategy is difficult. The standard model tends to weigh heavily the number of IEDs found and cleared by security forces against the number that detonate. The underlying assumption is that an increased percentage of IEDs found and cleared means that insurgent forces are less effective with their IED emplacements, and that friendly forces have adapted to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Further analysis looks at the rate at which the percentage of cleared IEDs increases or decreases, which measures how quickly friendly forces are adapting to changes in insurgent tactics (or, conversely, how slowly the insurgents are changing their tactics to match the counterinsurgents’ countermeasures). Another way of looking at the problem is to assess the effectiveness of IED detonations by determining how many IED strikes damage vehicles or cause casualties. However, most of these methods are better for identifying contested areas rather than assessing a district’s overall security because IED activity will typically mirror any increased presence of security forces.

Additional methodologies of quantitative and qualitative data analysis attempt to track overall security trends at both a provincial and district level. Unfortunately, most of these are defined in terms of counterinsurgent activity rather than that of the civilian population. For example, a “route status matrix” provides commanders with a graphical depiction of freedom of movement on primary and secondary roads based on recent IED activity (normally an aggregate set against ISAF and ANSF patrols) as well as deliberate clearance operations conducted by engineers and route clearance platoons. However, this matrix does not consider freedom of movement of local traffic, which could present a vastly different picture if an insurgent has decided not to limit the security forces’ freedom of movement but rather to maintain his own freedom of influence by placing obstacle belts between the population and the roads.

U.S. Army soldiers train for IED detection in Baghdad, Iraq, 4 October 2009.
The metric perhaps least reminiscent of classic and modern counterinsurgency doctrine is tracking the number of high-valued individuals (HVIs) killed or captured in raids or direct attacks. Those classified as HVIs are normally senior insurgent military commanders or shadow government leaders with influence within the Taliban. They are rarely, if ever, low-level insurgents actually conducting the attacks. Such individuals are considered expendable and easily replaceable.

Yet throughout the last several years, insurgent networks have grown increasingly larger and more interconnected. Finding an irreplaceable leader or personality has proven nearly impossible. Little quantitative data exists to support the hypothesis that HVI targeting operations have any measurable long-term effect on levels of insurgent activity; their operations may slow down or even cease after they lose a key leader or explosives expert, but it is only a matter of time before the void is filled and operations resume. Treating the symptoms does not cure the disease.

However, one metric may effectively measure security gains in the Afghan counterinsurgency conflict and modern asymmetric conflict in general, particularly at the local or district level—IEDs turned in or reported by civilians. In these instances, a local national provides unsolicited information to ISAF or ANSF forces that leads to the discovery of an IED or its components. Care must be taken to distinguish an unsolicited tip from that of a paid informant or source. While an informant may provide potentially reliable information, there have been cases of sources intentionally emplacing weapons or explosive materials themselves and then leading security forces to the cache site simply to collect a monetary reward.

The importance of an IED turned in by a civilian comes from the direct interaction between that person and representatives of the government, particularly if the device is turned in to the Afghan National Army, police, or local governance centers. A local population willing to point out the locations of explosive materials could indicate security gains in that area, especially if the area already has a high level of insurgent IED activity. The more the people feel that the government can protect them and provide better stability than the insurgents, the greater the stake they have in their own security against insurgent intimidation. Similar developments led to the beginning of the highly successful Sunni Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program in late 2006, as well as the onset of the Afghan Local Police program in 2010.

The most successful C-IED operations nest within counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. They do not focus on the devices themselves, but on the population. A company-sized element that moves into villages adjacent to a primary IED engagement area and remains there for an extended period, habitually interacting with the villagers and conducting key leader engagements, should begin to see security gains in the form of local national tips and turn-ins. In some cases, a lack of available maneuver units can limit combat power for such operations, forcing commanders to attempt to cover large areas and reducing the number of possible engagements with the people. However, in the end, a continuous presence somewhere is better than a fleeting presence everywhere. As the people begin to believe that the security will be lasting and not just temporary, they are more likely to provide intelligence and turn against the insurgency.

An area with a large ISAF presence, and consequently an increased amount of violent activity, but with no increase in IEDs turned in is cause for concern. Villages with a higher number of turn-ins likely feel more connected to their government and security forces and are more willing to take a direct stand against the insurgency. Conversely, low turn-in areas may fear intimidation and retaliation for assisting security forces and would rather hold their tongue and remain isolated than fight back. In that case, the insurgent influence in the area is probably strong enough that the people fear the repercussions of cooperating with the government more than...
they seek its protection. Special attention should be paid to IED events within a short distance of a village, since the people in the village likely knew something about the device and its emplacement, but were too afraid to say anything. These events are far too common and must be countered by comprehensive counterinsurgency operations.

Each explosive detonation against ISAF or ANSF is a psychological victory for the insurgency, demonstrating the weakness of the government and its inability to provide security and stability for its people. The government must convince the people, especially their influential community and religious leaders, that the insurgency poses the greater threat to their villages and people. All too often, the sporadic presence of security forces in an area leads to a rapid spike of activity in response, conditioning the people to associate the government with increased violence.

To actively engage the population and garner support against the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must overcome this mindset.

Separating the people from the influence of their government is one of the primary objectives for an insurgency in order to maintain its influence over the population free from outside intervention. Afghanistan expert Seth Jones notes that “by threatening the population, the insurgents give individuals a strong rationale to refuse or refrain from cooperating with the indigenous government and external actors.” Successful counterinsurgency operations must aim to defeat this insurgent influence.

The first step in that process is security; a population can never have faith in its government if it is not trusted to provide even basic protection. A periodic presence will not suffice, since the insurgents can (and usually do) wait until a patrol has left the area to aggressively counter any positive relations and reclaim their control of the people. Only persistent security during the initial stages of operations can set the conditions to tip the balance of support in favor of the government and away from the insurgents.

Separating the Insurgent, Attacking the Network

Successfully securing the population will lead to the separation of the insurgent, as the insurgency requires the support of the people to survive. One of the key advances in modern counterinsurgency has been the application of biometric and forensic intelligence to catch an elusive enemy capable of blending in with the population. Biometric enrollments have become part of campaign plans, and the addition of law enforcement personnel and trained explosive ordnance disposal technicians has provided units with increasingly more information about the construction and origins of IEDs through their detailed post-blast analysis. Separately, biometrics and post-blast analysis each provide invaluable intelligence unavailable to previous generations of counterinsurgents, but their benefits become even more evident when combined.

Conducting independent biometric enrollments is an excellent way to build a database of citizens but by itself does not separate the insurgent from
the population except in certain rare cases. Similarly, comprehensive post-blast analysis provides a wealth of information about IED construction and composition, often including fingerprints and other biometric data found at the scene of an event, but ends short of positive identification. Although latent fingerprints can be matched to others found in different events, they provide little information about the actual person emplacing or constructing the devices.

When biometrics and post-blast analysis merge, they have the capability to truly separate the insurgent. Fingerprints recovered from IED materials in one area can be linked to a specific person enrolled somewhere else, painting a more detailed picture of the device’s origin and defining the insurgent network more clearly. Such success depends on training units to treat each IED event not as an impediment to maneuver that they need to breach or clear, but as a legitimate crime scene with valuable forensic evidence available to catch the perpetrator and identify his supplier.

Education for indigenous and coalition security forces as well as the local population is paramount to understanding how both biometrics and post-blast analysis can be used to isolate the insurgents from innocents, identifying those who act against the interests of the people and the government. A robust biometrics and forensics program should be at the forefront of any “attack the network” strategy because it can link explosive events to their locations on the battlefield and potentially provide the identity of those responsible. Developing a picture of these low-level insurgent networks is the key to understanding the origins of the explosive devices and identifying the supply chains that support them.

Ultimately, the true goal of biometrics and forensics is to develop the rule of law through the host nation government and judicial system. Evidence collected from explosive materials or post-blast analysis can help convict criminals in local courts. Warrants and arrests are the direct result of a concerted effort by ground units in partnership with indigenous security forces to conduct a thorough investigation of an event rather than clearing the scene and moving on to the next objective. The gratification may not be as instant as catching an insurgent in the act, but the long-term effects are considerably more beneficial.

Despite the potential advantages of quickly enrolling an entire population into a biometrics database, care must be taken to ensure that indigenous security forces take the lead in all biometrics operations to avoid the perception of continuous foreign intervention and the systematic cataloguing of local citizens. More direct action on the part of ISAF forces runs the risk of aggravating the very population they mean to protect, while host nation forces can build relationships with the local civilians while conducting a legitimate census. This has the added benefit of engaging many communities that traditionally do not see a regular ANSF presence. Although biometrics collection is an important element of C-IED strategy, it should not come at the expense of alienating the people.

Attacking the network through a concerted evidence and biometrics collection effort is an integral aspect of C-IED strategy, yet it must complement rather than substitute for counterinsurgency operations. Understanding the difference between actively targeting insurgent nodes and indirectly eroding their support and influence through the population is important. While analyzing insurgent TTP and attack methods will certainly provide valuable information to ground units conducting operations, it does not eliminate the source of the threat. A constantly evolving game of spy-versus-spy only circumvents the issue, showing no signs of ending as both insurgent and counterinsurgent vie for the tactical upper hand.

Final Thoughts

Military strategy in Afghanistan has scarcely changed since the early days of hunting the Taliban in 2001. Even today, we place more emphasis and attention on targeting operations designed to crumble insurgent networks than on population-centric counterinsurgency. Improvised explosive devices are considered a lamentable byproduct of the insurgent’s general unwillingness to engage in direct action. Technological advances continue to flow into theater to guard against increasingly sophisticated and dangerous threats that, in spite of the new technology, continue to injure and kill soldiers and civilians.

Both of these methods—targeting and technology—are essentially defensive and reactive in nature. Even operations against Taliban leaders and facilita-
tors seek to reduce insurgent capability to conduct attacks, their success measured in complicated slides, graphs, and charts arranged in whatever way best represents progress. IEDs are simply the weapon of choice to support the insurgents’ political cause, facilitating consolidation of power and influence from within the population.

Although counter-IED strategy is a microcosm of counterinsurgency, our intelligence and operations groups sometimes treat it as a separate function, preferring to develop new methods to defeat the device (or its intended effects) rather than understand it. The tools needed to effectively neutralize IEDs as a battlefield threat will not be found in technological systems or equipment, nor in killing insurgent leaders, but rather in building relationships with the people who have become the battleground for all modern military conflicts. Their silence speaks as loudly as the next explosion. MR

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2. See for example the Canadian’s experience in Kandahar in 2009; Carl Forsberg, “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” The Institute for the Study of War, December 2009, 52.
William Shakespeare wrote in Coriolanus, “What is a city but the people?” In the same vein, what is an army but the soldiers? The most important activity our institutional Army conducts is human capital management—the assessment, development, and employment of soldiers. However, as analyses by the Secretary of the Army’s Generating Force Reform Task Force and numerous others have suggested, many of these systems are antiquated and flawed. A 2011 survey found that 65 percent of Active Duty general officers rated personnel management as one of the worst performing functions in the Army. As one general noted, “Human capital [management] is the most important, yet the least agile system.” In other words, we are an Army of people, but what we do worst is manage those people. These complex systems are now faltering under the strain of persistent conflict and changing demographics. Significant adjustments are necessary to best meet the needs of the Army in the future.

The Army’s people and organizations are not meeting their potential because of inflexible legacy institutions and systems, based on antiquated, industrial-age management theory. Secretary Robert Gates recently asked, “How can the Army break up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion processes, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its best, brightest, and most battle-tested young officers to lead the service in the future?”

The chief of staff of the Army’s transition team also found personnel management an area of significant concern. An Army Times article succinctly summed up the team’s findings:

“Personnel management is a source of frustration, the report said. Manning remains the biggest frustration. In the words of one leader, the order to ‘man, train and equip’ has become ‘train, equip and man.’ ‘Need a personnel system that restores human interface,’ one respondent said. ‘Need a major course correction in our personnel management. We need to put the person back in personnel management.’ Officers also said they want to have more input in their career paths.”

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The Problem

The Army’s human capital management enterprise is a complex system within a larger complex environment. There are numerous competing interests, demand nodes, organizations, laws, and regulations pulling and pushing people in opposing directions. Figure 1 illustrates some of the complexity present in the Army’s personnel management system. In this complex system, the requirements set forth by Congress and the Department of Defense drive the Army to develop policy and processes that dramatically affect the life cycle needs of operational force units and individual professionals. Understanding interactions within this complex system illuminates some of the root problems with the Army’s current human capital management enterprise.

The management system has four primary shortcomings:

- It struggles to adapt and respond quickly to changing Army requirements.
- It lacks clarity in its personnel inventory and capabilities.
- The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) constrains the efforts to match talent with requirements, resulting in short and rigid career timelines.
- It has lost the trust of many due to the friction and imbalance between unit manning and individual development.

The Army must resolve these issues to have a flexible, competitive human capital management system and the talent it requires to win on future battlefields.

Failure to adapt and respond quickly. The Army has undergone enormous change during the past decade. Unfortunately, significantly less of that change occurred in the institutional Army’s human capital management system and the talent it requires to win on future battlefields.
capital management arena. Emerging requirements such as military transition teams in Iraq and the establishment of the Army’s Cyber Command were significant shocks to the institution, which failed to adapt and respond quickly. When the Multi-National Force-Iraq commander provided a detailed proposal for the fielding of military transition teams in Iraq, he included broad definitions for the personnel requirements. For instance, the rank of the logistics advisor could range from sergeant first class through captain, but the individual had to be someone who understood and could train the Iraqis on battalion sustainment. That allowed the Army to fill the slot with a supply sergeant, a transporter, an infantryman who had been an S4, or support platoon leader. The Army (G1, G8, and G3) immediately rejected the flexibility, insisting they could not manage like that. The requisition did not match the requirements system.5

The Army’s resourcing of Cyber Command was another example of failure to adapt and respond quickly. The Army is still struggling to assess, develop, and employ the cyber talent it needs more than two years since it established Cyber Command. While force developers designate positions in accordance with a simplified coding methodology, the Army’s personnel database cannot identify the required skills and experience within its 1.1 million-person organization.

The mismatch between requirements and available inventory is also worth mentioning. As new organizations emerge and drive requirements for knowledgeable, skillful, and experienced personnel, the Army’s current limited lateral entry and continuum of service policies prohibit hiring. To succeed in an uncertain future, the Army must learn how to meet emerging requirements rapidly. Doing so requires flexibility.

Lack of clarity on personnel inventory and capabilities. The Army cannot account for its personnel in numbers, costs, and abilities. The fragmented method in which the Army manages its people across components limits flexibility and responsiveness to the detriment of the organization and employees. The legacy systems, policies, and tools used by our human resource organizations compound this problem. The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) is an example of an antiquated tool. Using a non-searchable form with a culturally skewed and inflated narrative that overly focuses on
command, this document provides little real utility to
determine an individual’s potential and actual skills
or his intellectual character.

Instead, the OER measures short-term performance
and accomplishments from the eyes of two or three
superiors and is generally inaccurate and unscientific.
The 2009 Army Research Institute survey found that
88 percent of officers self-evaluated themselves to be
in the top 25 percent of their peer group—an indica-
tor of the Army’s inability to use a developmental
tool like the OER to review and develop its leaders.6

This poor mechanism for evaluating future leaders
has many consequences. Chiefly, it robs the Army of
the ability to clearly see what skills, behaviors, and
experiences its people possess. A 2010 report by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies recom-
mended an overhaul of the current Department of
Defense practices for tracking officer competencies,
skills, and abilities to inform a future, more flexible
personnel management system.7

There is also a principal-agent disconnect.
According to a report by the Army’s Strategic Studies
Institute, it arises when—

two parties do not share the same infor-
mation and have differing interests. For
example, commanders (the principals), are
charged with leading their organizations
to successful outcomes. They desire “ace”
job candidates—[professionals] who can
dramatically exceed minimal performance
requirements because there is a high correla-
tion between their talents and work require-
ments. However, when making assignments,
Human Resource Command (HRC) branch
managers (the agents) have no real mecha-
nism for determining which specific talents
commanders are seeking, or how large the
supply of them is.8

For example, a security force assistance brigade
may have a pending mission in central Africa. If it
requires a planner with regional expertise, under the
current system, HRC cannot identify an officer who
recently graduated from Georgetown University with
a Masters in Public Policy, wrote his thesis on central
African government and politics, and has a grasp of
basic French. Although this officer is the ideal
candidate, the brigade may not receive the talent it
requires, and the officer will miss an opportunity to
employ his acquired knowledge.

The ongoing conversion of
the “the Army Profession” has
identified the Army’s manning
and requirement determination
systems as “antiquated.”

A recent survey of West Point graduates found that
just 16 percent believe the current personnel system
does a good job matching talents with jobs.9 The
ongoing conversion of the “the Army Profession”
has identified the Army’s manning and requirement
determination systems as “antiquated.”10 The current
system diminishes the Army’s return on its human
capital investment at the cost of both the organization
and the individual.

DOPMA constraints. The current DOPMA
limits the Army’s ability to flexibly manage its of-
icers, resulting in short and rigid career timelines. As
originally crafted, DOPMA was designed to reward
good performance while encouraging nonperformers
to leave, provide predictable career progression, and
maintain young and healthy corps of officers.11

The primary result of this law is cohort manage-
ment. Cohort management forces the Army to push
leaders though a system based on a clearly defined
timeline for promotion. Department of the Army
Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3 describes this roadmap
in great detail and lays out the standardized career
for all officers within a 20-year lifecycle.12 The Army
committed to a system that efficiently met the needs of
a previous generation but is inflexible to the require-
ments of today’s force.

Recently the Defense Science Board offered this
analysis of career management:

Careers of the Department’s military person-
nel, active and reserve, are currently managed
within a restrictive set of laws, regulations,
and policies, all reinforced by culture and
tradition. Many of these laws and regulations
have been in force fifty years or more. They
all may have been sensible fifty years ago,
but the Defense Science Board believes they
certainly have the effect today of inhibiting
the Department’s flexibility and adaptability,
lessening its ability to use and deploy people efficiently, and ultimately wasting human capital.\textsuperscript{13}

Because of these restrictions, the Army cannot adapt to meet the demands of changing force generation models and cycles or provide additional broadening opportunities to develop tomorrow’s leaders, and may lose a generation of leaders—military and civilian—with the experience and knowledge to succeed in other organizations.

Due to the strict adherence to cohort management, officers move from position to position regardless of force generation cycles. Broadening opportunities have two inherently detrimental elements. First, it forces officers to move at a predetermined rate, with little regard to acquired skills, knowledge, and experience. This hurts the officers and the organization. The operational force commander and the individual should have a voice on the timing of leader moves. The second negative effect is the cultural stigma associated with broadening assignments. If the Army’s ultimate test is promotion and selection board results; then those with the most operational time most often win. Those that can beat the system and remain in tactical assignments have a higher selection rate for command.\textsuperscript{14}

**Loss of institutional trust.** There is loss of institutional trust due to the friction and imbalance between unit manning and individual development. Unit manning of the Army’s modular force structure operating under a rotational readiness cycle is lagging months behind requirements. Leaders in the operational force lack stability, ultimately resulting in personnel turbulence that can lead to decreased unit cohesion. Unit cohesion is a primary predictor of combat effectiveness and adaptability.\textsuperscript{15} The reality of our current manning system is that units equip, train, and then man their formations en route to combat in a “just-in-time” manner. The chief of staff of the Army’s manning guidance solidifies this policy.\textsuperscript{16} For example, in my most recent operational force assignment, the brigade deployed with eight of its 12 battalion executive and operations officers not completing any training with their staff or unit. It also experienced a 46 percent turnover in the course of 14 months. Less than three months before deploying, 155 crewmembers were still conducting individual readiness level progression in their assigned aircraft. In other words, a large portion of the brigade’s primary fighting force was still not proficient on individual tasks when the brigade was loading out for Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{17}

Institutional trust is lost because operational force commanders do not believe the institution will behave in a way that is good for their units. Specifically, HRC will require a brigade combat team (BCT) commander to rotate several field grade officers and company commanders out of Afghanistan to the institutional Army when the brigade is just three months into its deployment and at the height of the fighting season. This turnover decreases cohesion, continuity, and combat effectiveness. From an HRC perspective, the officers must move because their time is up, and the guidance in DA PAM 600-3 indicates the officer’s next requirement is a broadening assignment. It argues that we must continue to push officers through the defined gates to ensure we have the necessary leaders for the future. While the BCT commander and the institution both have valid arguments, the institution should have the flexibility to support the warfighting commanders and still meet individual development needs. Unfortunately, the current system rarely allows this to happen.

**Outcomes for the Army Human Capital Management System**

The Army has not adapted its human capital management systems beyond their rigid industrial-age foundations.\textsuperscript{18} To transform the Army’s human capital management system from an antiquated and inflexible structure, the Army must clearly identify the desired strategic human capital management outcomes that will drive the development of truly modern systems.\textsuperscript{19} These systems must empower individual flexibility while maximizing organizational performance and agility. We must exploit available knowledge and innovative technologies to build a human capital system worthy of all our professionals.

**Outcome 1. Rapid response to requirements.** The Army’s human resource management systems must be able to keep pace with the rapid change cycle of today’s environment. To do so, the Army should adopt a talent management framework that supports overall objectives while mitigating risk. The short-term risk is the cost of a mismatch in people and requirements combined with the cost of losing talented people to the civilian labor market.\textsuperscript{20} The long-term risk is a decline in the performance of the
Army as a profession and as a warfighting arm of the nation’s security strategy.

A successful talent management strategy has two key ingredients. The first is organizational transparency of opportunities, requirements, and eligible personnel in near real-time and in all dimensions of individual talent. Currently, the Army’s human resource system does not provide a clear understanding of skills, knowledge, and behaviors residing within the organization. Using existing information technology and data-mining systems, the Army can build decision-support tools to help human resource managers and organizational leaders identify available talent and future potential through an integrated database of knowledge instead of antiquated management techniques that rely upon non-searchable assessments, centralization, and limited information.21 (See Figure 2 for an example, the pilot program, Green Pages, developed by the Office of Economic Manpower Analysis).22 The second element should address the friction between unit manning and individual development models. A new human capital management system should enable unit manning that increases unit cohesion at the brigade level and below while remaining adaptive to meet changing force generation requirements.

**Outcome 2. Leaders identified, developed, and retained.** Human capital management strategy cannot be developed in isolation. It must incorporate relevant development and retention plans across the total Army. We must integrate institutional, individual, and self-development systems to meet goals established in the Army learning concept and management systems that empower individual direction. These same systems must have the built-in flexibility to ensure the development and retention of a diverse array of talents to meet the Army’s ever-evolving talent and skill requirements.

Options the Army should consider to identify, develop, and retain our best leaders include—
- Improving retention beyond 20 years.
- Adjusting allowable trainees, transients, holdees, and students.
- Revising evaluation systems to ensure that they adequately assess the attributes we seek in our future leaders.

**Figure 2: Army Green Pages.**
Increasing nonoperational developmental opportunities with flexible promotion, retention, and retirement policies.

Revising DOPMA to support these proposals while allowing for improved unit readiness.23

Outcome 3. An integrated human capital management system. The Army will continue to struggle to be “One Army” until the various human resource management systems (active, guard, reserve, and civilian) are merged. The Army must field a new service delivery model with the necessary authorities and tools to perform all human resources work requirements and deliver human resource services with the most effective administration feasible with the available level of technology. This integrated system for management of all human capital must meet the needs of the Army and the individual soldier and civilian while also supporting Army objectives. Essential to this outcome is the integrated management of all components and cohorts throughout the Army.

Outcome 4. Army ethics and values. The Army must continue to maintain its distinctive place as an institution of exceptional respect because of our culture of professionalism. The adoption of mission command is key to the evolving Army culture in our operational force and in our institutional Army as well. As the Army considers options to reform its human capital management system, it should reinforce the conceptual foundations of mission command by decentralizing, thus reinforcing the independence of leaders and the desire to accept and take responsibility. Finally, mission command calls into question the size of our headquarters organizations and their bloated personnel accounts. To faithfully implement mission command, the Army needs to consider options for reducing staff size and headquarters from the brigade to the Department of the Army.24

Implementation

Implementing these changes will not be easy. The Army will have to overcome cultural barriers, break up the institutional concrete and its bureaucratic rigidity, and rewrite existing law and regulations. It will require support and direct involvement from senior leaders. Although the challenges may be great, the rewards for the Army will be enormous.

First, organizational and individual performance will increase because of the reformed and enhanced human capital resource system.25 As the abilities of people are properly aligned with requirements, individuals will thrive and so will organizations. Additionally, by flexibly managing leaders, operational units will have increased cohesion. Warfighting units that are manned fully and early and remain intact will be more effective and more adaptable on the battlefield.

Second, the personnel system, and the Army as a whole, will be more responsive and adaptable once they adopt a truly modern system that maximizes talent. Talent management will integrate organizational goals with a comprehensive human resource strategy to attract, identify, develop, retain, and employ individuals.26 This new system will allow the Army to better know its people and more quickly assess where to best employ them to help the Army succeed.

Finally, and significantly, the Army will increase retention because its changed system engages individuals and aligns individual desires and abilities with requirements.27 Increased retention will allow the Army to decide who should remain in the Army and who should move on, instead of creating conditions where the soldier is frustrated, underdeveloped, and underappreciated.

To avoid further declines in combat readiness, loss of exceptional professionals, and damage to Army professionalism, we need to reshape our institutions from rigid manufacturing machines to adaptable and innovative networks that provide the very best support to our soldiers and civilians and their families.

NOTES

5. COL Casey Haskins, personal email correspondence, 2 February 2011, Director of Military Instruction at the United States Military Academy, NY.
6. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Army
17. Author’s personal observations (2009-2010).
23. General Martin Dempsey, 37th CSA’s Thoughts on the Future (Department of the Army, 13 June 2011).
24. Ibid.
27. Kock and Burke, Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso.

WHAT IS AN ARMY?

ADP 3-0
Unified Land Operations

For additional information on ADP 3-0 and Doctrine 2015 visit:
The proponent for ADP 3-0 and Doctrine 2015 is the Combined Arms Center:

Call the US Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD):
(913) 684-5354 / DSN 552-5354

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, is the Army’s first doctrine publication under Doctrine 2015. ADP 3-0 provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army forces to operate across the range of military operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as part of a larger effort.

ADP 3-0 introduces Unified Land Operations as the Army’s contribution to Unified Action. The Army demonstrates its core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security through Decisive Action: simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities. ADP 3-0 also introduces the six tenets of Unified Land Operations, as well as an updated operational framework for organizing operations.

Refer to the proponent’s web site for a more in-depth overview of the latest edition of US Army Operational Doctrine.
Suppose I just told you that half of my platoon had been destroyed but didn’t tell you the remaining half is so goddamned mad we’re going to fight twice as hard. What meaning will be conveyed by statistics like “50 percent destroyed”? The only meaningful statistic in warfare is when the other side quits.¹

— Karl Marlantes, What It Is Like to Go to War

To my knowledge, in the nine-plus months I’ve been here, [in] not a single case where we have engaged in an escalation of force incident and hurt someone has it turned out that the vehicle had a suicide bomb or weapons in it and, in many cases, [it] had families in it.²

— General Stanley McChrystal, March 2010

ON 17 DECEMBER 2010, 26-year-old street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi stood in front of a government building in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, doused himself with paint thinner and set himself alight. According to his family, Bouazizi’s desperate, defiant act was due to indignities he had long suffered at the hands of corrupt local officials. When he died in a hospital less than three weeks later, he died without knowing what the world was just finding out: he had done far more than set himself a fire. He had sparked a blaze that would soon rage across much of the Arab world.

Within hours of Bouazizi’s self-immolation, a small anti-government protest took place in Sidi Bouzid that was captured in a cell phone video and posted to the Internet. Within days, Tunisians from all economic classes were demonstrating against President Ben Ali in Tunis and other cities. Within weeks, the dictator had fled the country.

Eighteen days later, inspired by what had transpired in Tunisia, Egyptian demonstrators forced their autocratic ruler of 29 years, Hosni Mubarak, to step down. Protests soon engulfed Libya, too, but Libya’s dictator, Muammar

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ART: Washington Crossing the Delaware,1851, Oil on canvas, Metropolitan Museum of Art. Although tactically proficient, General George Washington’s real brilliance was as a moral strategist. For example, his insistence that the Continental Army adhere more closely than the British Army to the laws of war strengthened American determination at the expense of British resolve.

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Gaddafi, proved much tougher to dislodge, and the country quickly slid into civil war. Now he too is gone. In four other countries, protestors forced the resignation of government ministers. Many other Arab governments have struggled to appease their own mobs of angry demonstrators.

The Databyte is Mightier than the Tank

When they analyze the “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening,” future historians will probably stress the crucial role information technology played in fanning its flames. Thanks to news outlets like Al Jazeera and social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and SMS networks, the gap between the dictatorships’ propaganda and reality has been relentlessly exposed. Although they tried, Arab autocrats have been unable to plausibly deny the scale of the demonstrations against them. Even more damaging to their regimes, they have been unable to suppress videos of the passionate protests. And when they ordered brutal security crackdowns, they have been unable to hide the graphic images and sounds of oppression, the crack of gunfire, the visible fear of civilians, the cries of the wounded, and the disturbing sight of bloody corpses.

It may be counterintuitive, but more often than not, the databyte is proving mightier than the tank. How can this be? The answer is simple: armed conflict is more a matter of mind (perceptions and judgment) than weapons.

Pit protestors armed with placards against a tank, and if the tank’s crew chooses to fire upon the demonstrators, it is “game over.” Tank wins. However, consider the information-based decisions that must take place for a tank crew to kill protestors. The crew must first believe that they should do so, either because they sincerely think it is right and necessary or because their superiors will punish them for not following orders. Furthermore, for such an atrocity to continue, every leader in this crew’s chain-of-command must believe that it should continue. A single break in this chain and the tank becomes about as dangerous to demonstrators as a broken blender. Then, if the tank crew actually joins the protestors, it is an almost certain sign that the regime’s end is near.

On 6 February 2011, a peaceful revolutionary stands on an Egyptian tank. Five days later, Egypt’s president of 30 years, Hosni Mubarak, stepped down.
In the information age, dictators are finding it increasingly difficult to keep their opposition’s message from being heard—most critically, by members of their own security forces. Although it is too early to announce the death of the Stalinesque dictatorships and propaganda machines that rose to such prominence in the 20th century, their end is certainly nigh.

Another sign of the times has been the rise of Wikileaks, a website that publishes leaked information. The sheer number of classified U.S. documents the website has published is both unprecedented and mind-boggling. In 2010, the site released hundreds of thousands of classified reports covering six years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, and then followed this by publishing the first of 251,287 classified diplomatic cables spanning 45 years from 274 U.S. embassies. Demonstrating how connected the world has become, some of these cables played a crucial role in inspiring the “Arab Awakening.”

The information age has also meant more deployments for U.S. forces. In the 1990s, disturbing media images provoked U.S. humanitarian interventions in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The power of the media (actually, the power of truth) is such today that it not only sends U.S. troops into combat zones, but it also brings them home. Our humanitarian intervention in Somalia came to an end when American television viewers watched Somali mobs dragging the bodies of American soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu. Similarly, graphic stories of atrocities at such places as Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Haditha increased the call to bring American troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan—and served as recruitment boons for our terrorist enemies as well.

Such information-related trend lines—now accelerating—reflect the truly seismic political and social changes that have been afoot since at least the 1960s. During the Vietnam War, correspondents reported ugly truths on the ground that often luridly contradicted the glowing reports of U.S. leaders, creating a “credibility gap.” Particularly damaging to American morale was the report of atrocities at My Lai, a horrific war crime that—like Abu Ghraib decades later—deepened American confusion about the war and heightened questions about its moral legitimacy. The release of the “Pentagon Papers” in 1971 prefigured the rise of Wikileaks, and today’s “Arab Awakening” has much in common with glasnost and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

The U.S. military should be extracting powerful lessons from these seismic changes: morally unaware communication is ineffective communication. “Culture training” is a type of moral awareness training and is thus very important. Military actions and intentions must be transparent. Information engagement trumps weapons engagement. Actions speak louder than words. The ethical conduct of U.S. troops matters deeply.

But sadly, although the Obama administration has demonstrated a fuller understanding of these lessons than its predecessor did, real change eludes our military.

**Missing the Moral Forest for the Kinetic Trees**

The opening overview to the May 2010 U.S. National Security Directive, signed by President Barack Obama, states that the United States will “continue to underwrite global security.” This bold statement is quickly qualified by the caveat that “no one nation . . . can meet global challenges alone.”

Even thus qualified, the goal of “underwriting global security” is a lofty one, probably more ambitious in scale than any objective publicly pronounced by this or any other democracy in recent history. Such a goal must be supported by a huge budget, and certainly U.S. military “hard power” is well-resourced. Although Russia and China are sometimes referred to as “near peer” competitors, even combined, the military budgets of the two countries do not equal that of the United States. In fact, the United States spends almost as much each year on its military as the rest of the world does put together.

Our nation’s spending on “soft power” is far less robust, as is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Department of State’s and USAID’s 2010 budgets combined were less than 10 percent of the DOD’s budget. Within the military, little money is spent on non-kinetic methods of applying power. Most military discretionary spending—a third of the total 2011 budget—goes toward procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation. In turn, nearly all this enormous budget slice goes toward big-dollar kinetic weapons programs, the three most expensive
currently being the Ballistic Missile Defense system, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the Virginia Class submarine program.\(^\text{17}\)

Two of the Army’s most expensive programs are related to information technology, which on the surface sounds like a good thing.\(^\text{18}\) The Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program develops and fields robots, remote sensors, and advanced individual communications equipment previously associated with the Future Combat Systems program, while the Warfighter Information Network Program delivers robust communication architecture to support super-connected brigades. However, how any of this will actually enhance our Army’s ability to communicate with the world is unclear. Consider, for example, the sci-fi, cyborg-like appearance the American GI is steadily assuming. By making soldiers appear less human, our military is morally insulating itself from foreign populations rather than integrating with them. One might as well expect a Star Wars village of Ewoks to embrace Imperial Storm Troopers as expect the village elders of third-world countries to accept heavily helmeted and encumbered American soldiers surrounded by small land robots and flying R2D2s. We need more than just a robust, kinetic-focused intranet. We need enhanced, morally aware communication with the world around us.

The current U.S. Army and Marine counterinsurgency manual states, “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.”\(^\text{19}\) It adds, “Lose moral legitimacy, lose the war.”\(^\text{20}\) Such adages reflect a long-overdue recognition of war’s moral dimension—a recognition that led to improved tactics and, in Iraq if not yet in Afghanistan, greater success.

But our military has yet to truly capitalize on these moral insights, which many wrongly see as belonging to only one type of warfare—counterinsurgency. Many still do not realize that, when Dresden’s citizens have video cell phones and
are plugged into the Internet, the military that firebombs them probably does not get to continue its strategic bombing campaign.

Military procurement processes are proving especially resistant to moral ideas. With the exception of money spent making our weapons systems more accurate and our sensors more discriminating, total spending to ensure morally aware operations cannot be more than a tiny fraction of the cost of our most expensive weapons programs.21

This is not to say that the U.S. military is ignoring its need to communicate in a morally aware fashion. In February 2010, for example, the Department of Defense (DOD) gave service members permission to use social media, blogs, and other Internet capabilities for their own personal needs.22 Allowing soldiers to share their stories with the world should go a long way toward convincing skeptics that U.S. troops conduct themselves in a morally legitimate fashion in combat zones—provided they are thus conducting themselves and have a good connection to the internet. Other promising developments include increased attention to Law of Armed Conflict instruction at commissioning sources and during the initial training of enlisted service members,23 establishing of a center in 2008 “to reinforce the Army profession and its Ethic,”24 and giving greater emphasis on “culture training” in both the Army and Marines.25

Nonetheless, unsupported by any substantial shift in resources or training, such steps are proving inadequate. Most troublingly, the moral “hits” our military receives due to misconduct or poor judgment in combat zones just keep on coming. Perhaps most shamefully, in early 2010, 12 U.S. soldiers were charged with complicity in the murder of three Afghans for what was apparently the sheer “fun” of killing them. Also in 2010, coalition forces in Afghanistan issued a number of apologies for the accidental killings of groups of civilians—killings that less discerning media sources labeled as “atrocities.”26

Clearly, we must do better.

What We Say about Ourselves to Each Other

To ensure our actions send the right message, we must first ensure that the words that guide us are the right words. That is, we must pay close attention to words since, as a noble in Shakespeare’s Othello put it, “Opinion, the sovereign mistress of effects” determines our actions.27

So, what words govern the U.S. profession of arms? Our laws, regulations, and doctrine do not speak with one clear voice on the subject.

Moral guidance for U.S. troops begins with national law, which includes the requirement to obey the Law of Armed Conflict (as accepted and understood in U.S. government treaties) and the Torture Convention of 1984. Federal statutes also require service members to swear an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States,” a text containing powerful moral judgments concerning the basic rights of all Americans. But revealingly, although enlisted troops must swear to obey the lawful orders of their chain of command, service members are not required by oath to obey only moral orders. For new troops, this failure is the first sign that the institution that they have joined relies on an overly legalistic system of conduct.28

Presidential executive orders provide additional guidance. Executive Order 12674 outlines financial prohibitions, and Executive Order 10631 defines the U.S. military’s “code of conduct.”29 This code is not comprehensive, but rather it addresses how U.S. service members should act when they “evade capture, resist while a prisoner, or escape from the enemy.”30

The DOD provides further guidance. DOD Regulation 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics, mostly consists of financial prohibitions. Chapter 2 of the regulation

One might as well expect a Star Wars village of Ewoks to embrace Imperial Storm Troopers as expect the village elders of third-world countries to accept heavily helmeted and encumbered American soldiers surrounded by small land robots and flying R2D2s.
contains a “code of ethics.”

However, this chapter’s list of financial prohibitions is as narrow in scope as the military’s “code of conduct.”

Little known to most service members, this regulation also defines 10 “primary ethical values” that govern our profession. Additionally, it provides a similarly obscure 10-step ethical decision-making tool.

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, defines five “values of joint service” that are “common to all the services.” Only one, “integrity,” is a DOD primary ethical value, and it is unclear from the manual’s wording whether the other four values are supposed to augment or replace the DOD values. “Integrity” is rated the highest joint warfare value, with no precedence assigned to the remaining four.

This joint publication also states, “Military power must be wielded in an unimpeachable moral fashion, with respect for human rights and adherence to the Geneva Conventions.” This is followed by a refutation of legalism: “Morality should not be a matter of legality, but of conscience.” Unfortunately, these two bold statements of principle are practically hidden in the small print of this 106-page manual.

More robust guidance about what it means to be a U.S. military professional begins at the service level. The Army’s “capstone doctrine” for its professional ethic is Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army. Along with a narrative of how our profession historically evolved, this manual proposes three paradigms as the Army’s “most important guiding values and standards.” They are “Army Values,” the “Soldier’s Creed,” and “The Warrior Ethos.”

The Army Values are Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage, thus contrived and arranged to spell LDRSHP (leadership). Once again, it is unclear whether these values are meant to supplement or replace the values listed at higher command levels. The Army Values are also unranked, generating such questions as: What does a soldier do when his sense of loyalty to his fellow soldiers and unit is at odds with his sense of duty to his country? Does a soldier lie, if by doing so he thinks he will help his country? The paradigm’s answers to these and probably all difficult ethical questions are muddy.

Additionally, while the manual defines “integrity” in order to encourage soldiers to do what is “morally right,” it does not provide any tools to help soldiers determine what the morally right (or best) course of action is for an ethical dilemma. Yes, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and scores of regulations provide thousands of pages of prohibitions, but just because an action is legal does not mean it is the right thing to do. If we expect soldiers to use the DOD’s 10-step ethical decision-making model, they need to know that the model exists and we must train them on how to use it.

It gets worse. While the Army Values paradigm is unhelpful in promoting ethical decision-making, the Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos are downright counterproductive. They promote such immoral principles as blind obedience to authority, devotion to technical competence and kinetic military power, and winning at any cost. They teach soldiers to put mission accomplishment first (rather than, say, their sense of honor). They offer only a dash of moral concern, stating that soldiers “live the Army Values” (a paradigm that, as we have just seen, provides very little in the way of ethical advice). They also exhort soldiers to be disciplined and mentally tough. (Tough, one wonders, to the point of lacking compassion for locals and armed enemies?) Additionally, they offer no “soft power” alternatives to defeating the enemy: soldiers must “stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.” In short, that these creeds could contribute to immoral actions is not hard to see. They clearly belong to the ill-prepared Cold War-shaped army that first embarked on the “War on Terrorism,” and not to the more experienced, wiser Army that we should be today.

This discussion thus far is only a brief summary of the inadequacies and inconsistencies of our military’s published professional ethic. Considering such shortcomings, the frequency with which some U.S. troops display moral confusion on today’s battlefields is not surprising. The surprise is that the vast majority of American service members manage to operate with moral legitimacy—or at least with consistently greater legitimacy than their armed enemies. It would seem that, even when amoral legalism reigns supreme and behavior is often fuelled more by a desire to avoid punishment...
than by a desire to do what is right, one institutional triumph (that of routinely justifiable battlefield conduct) remains possible. But inevitably, legalism’s tragic flaw becomes obvious when a service member believes that, in the remote corner of the world in which he finds himself, he can commit awful deeds and go unpunished.

What our military needs is better, not more, doctrine about our professional ethic. This new doctrine must be clearer, less morally schizophrenic, rationally sound, easily understood, and effectively communicated throughout all services. It should balance negative legal prohibitions with positive ethical principles and include a simple, well-understood ethical decision-making tool to help service members determine the best course of action for a given situation.

Such a written professional ethic would promote positive moral conduct at every level of command. Ultimately, the guiding principles of this ethic would become the “talking points” with which we engage the media and enhance our moral standing with foreign populations, the international community, our civilian leaders, and all other Americans—not so much because we say these talking points, but because we exhibit them, through our actions.

**Putting Our Dollars, Strategy, and Training Where Our Counterinsurgency Doctrine Is**

Getting the words right is a critical first step, but it takes more than words to get actions right. It takes dollars, training, and morally designed military strategies.

In my essay, “Controlling the Beast Within: the Key to Success on 21st-Century Battlefields,” I presented several ideas for improving the Army’s ethics program. These ideas included the following:

- Ethics training is command business.
- Moral restraint “needs to be incorporated in all battle drills, such as tank tables, urban close-quarters combat lanes, and practice interrogations.”
- Operations officers rather than lawyers and chaplains need to be the staff proponents for ethics.
- Installations should provide a multi-week ethics course for unit “ethics master gunners.”
- Service schools should focus more on helping leaders to understand war’s moral dimension.\(^46\)

To these points, I add the following considerations.

**Staff planning.** The U.S. Marines, Navy, and Air Force would benefit just as much from robust ethics programs. Across services, we should update staff planning models to reflect the importance of maintaining the moral advantage over the enemy. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, has a useful discussion on the importance of moral concerns to determining a side’s “center of gravity,” but such considerations are otherwise largely unaddressed in doctrine.\(^47\) Furthermore, when staffs assess courses of action, evaluation criteria should address questions like the following: Which course of action (COA) best promotes the legitimacy of the host nation government? Which COA will result in fewer U.S.-inflicted civilian deaths and suffering? In some cases, commanders and staffs should treat “moral legitimacy” as a distinct line of operation within a campaign plan or course of action. Since we “train as we fight,” during staff exercises at home station and senior military colleges, questions related to moral legitimacy should be trainer-led foci.

**Measures of effectiveness.** The “measures of effectiveness” for a strategy, campaign, or mission order should emphasize moral questions. They should also be linked to the moral questions that staffs ask when assessing potential courses of action. For example, is the host nation government showing signs of increased political stability? Are non-combatant deaths and injuries resulting from the actions of coalition and host nation forces decreasing? Other measures could include the following: Is the host nation government growing less corrupt? Are its judiciary and criminal justice systems gaining public trust? Are coalition and host nation forces reducing collateral damage? Are enemy strength and morale decreasing? Are we actively investigating and punishing war crimes committed by host nation security forces? Is the desertion rate of host nation
security forces decreasing? Are allied governments providing more substantial materiel support?

**Information management.** We are by far the most classified military in U.S. history. Our default setting for keeping documents classified is decades rather than months or years. The earliest that classified documents are automatically declassified is 10 years after their classification, and if these documents fall into certain categories (which most do), the rule is 25 years. Documents associated with Special Access Programs are automatically protected for even longer (40 years). Making matters exponentially worse, nearly all of the computers and networks supporting combat operations are classified systems, and almost everyone using these systems routinely classifies the traffic they generate—even when there is no reason for secrecy.

Maintaining operational security is important, but we must also recognize that the value that such information holds for our enemies is usually highly perishable. If we are to build bridges and communicate better, we must get this fixed. One option is to have all reports in a classified archive drop into a declassified archive after only one year of classification—unless, that is, the creator of the report has coded his report with a special exception to this rule. Such transparency would highlight the good conduct of our troops and make our military appear more honest. It would also make sites like Wikileaks largely irrelevant.

**Designing moral strategies.** Moral considerations should trump short-term operational and force protection concerns when we design strategy. Consider, for example, our current practice of using drones to target militants in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). U.S. drone attacks have killed over 2,000 people in Pakistan. Although estimates vary wildly, the number of non-militants killed in these attacks is probably about one-fifth of the total number of deaths. Unsurprisingly, the deaths of such “innocents” are extremely unpopular in Pakistan. One Gallup poll showed only nine percent of Pakistanis supported these drone attacks. Meanwhile, it is not at all clear that the drone attacks in Pakistan have reduced insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. Since these attacks began, coalition deaths in Afghanistan have sky-rocketed from 60 in 2004 to 711 in 2010. Deaths from IEDs (which often involve supplies and training from the FATA) grew from four deaths in 2004 to 368 deaths in 2010. Simply put, by most moral measures of effectiveness, this battlefield tactic is failing. Drone attacks are driving recruits to join our jihadist enemies, increasing instability in nuclear Pakistan, and decreasing America’s moral authority. The moral cost of this quixotic quest to deny insurgents a safe haven in Pakistan is too steep a price to pay, especially when one notes that it is probably impossible to deny sanctuary to an armed enemy through airpower alone.

So, what will be the outcome of our moral myopia in Afghanistan? Our counterinsurgency manual does offer one general prediction: Lose moral legitimacy, lose the war.

**Turning America’s Warship**

It has never been more important for the U.S. military to embrace war’s moral qualities. However, this will take a seismic shift in our thinking every bit as profound as the changes currently sweeping the Arab world.

We can already feel the tremors of such a shift taking place. Well grounded in moral ideas, the 2006 counterinsurgency manual helped engineer a much more successful U.S. approach in Iraq. The Law of Armed Conflict instruction that service members receive upon entering the U.S. military has improved. DOD policy now makes it possible for service members to use the Internet to tell their personal stories. Also, the U.S. Army and Marines have improved “culture training.”

But these steps are not nearly enough. We must commit far more resources to ensure we maintain not just a physical advantage over our enemies, but a moral advantage as well. We need to get our military profession’s guiding principles—our written ethic—right. We need to extract ourselves from the largely unnecessary cloud of classified information that obscures our battlefield conduct (which is much better than most people guess it is). We must also ensure that our strategies, campaign plans, and mission orders display moral awareness.

With regard to resources, there is a reason for the U.S. military’s ponderous rate of change. Sitting atop this change are immensely heavy forces of inertia, to include industrial profiteering, the electoral interests of congressional leaders, and decades-entrenched military service cultures.
There is hope, though, that real change will arrive more rapidly than our current moral trajectory suggests. For one, the field grade officers who began fighting our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are now either general officers or senior field grade officers. (Mid-level Army and Marine management was the driving force behind the development of the counterinsurgency manual.) For another, senior Generals Martin Dempsey and Raymond Odierno have already demonstrated their enthusiasm for counterinsurgency doctrine, information engagement, and the professionalization of our military. Their current roles see them well placed to make a difference in ensuring military resources, training, and strategy are what and where they need to be.

In 1988, General Dempsey, then a major at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, argued in his master’s thesis “for a reconsideration of both the ethics curriculum in the Army schoolhouse and the Army Ethic . . . to better account for the importance of Duty in the profession of arms.” He concluded:

Someone once compared the effort of directing the Army to steering an aircraft carrier. As the analogy goes, if the Captain turns the rudder too fast in either direction, the aircraft on deck will slide into the sea. If he turns the rudder back and forth, the ship will move from side to side, but the direction of travel will remain unchanged. If, however, the Captain moves the rudder just a little bit and holds it in that position for a long time, the ship will eventually begin to turn as he wants it to. To do that, of course, the Captain must have a vision of where he wants the ship to go, long before it gets there. The Army, too, needs a vision. In large measure, that vision is the Army Ethic.

Not just our Army but also our entire military needs a change of direction. Napoleon once said that, in war, “morale is to the physical as three is to one.” However, in the modern age, information technology generates far greater coherency of moral opinion than was possible during Napoleon’s time. The empowerment of collective moral judgment by modern technology is a matter of the greatest import for the fighting spirit of nations, communities, organizations, and warriors. To say that, in war today, moral considerations are to the physical as ten is to one is no understatement—and this relative importance of moral concerns to physical ones promises to only grow. Thus it is that the two great ethical questions of warfare (should we go to war, and, are we waging a war properly?) matter now more than ever.

Many still do not understand that the most profound impact of information technology on warfare can be seen in the rising importance of war’s moral dimension. So, while there is hope that America’s warship is starting to turn, the question remains: What will the final cost be in terms of casualties, mission failure, and the erosion of our nation’s moral authority if our warship should stay on its current course?

After a decade of warfare and all the painful, sometimes shameful tribulations that these years have contained, it is troubling to think that these costs could be much higher still.
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NOTES


4. For example, one cable from an American ambassador described Ben Ali as “agitating, out of touch, and surrounded by corruption. The fact that the U.S. government apparently thought as little of Ben Ali as Tunisians themselves did was a revelation— and a source of shame—to many Tunisians.

5. It is the case that dictator’s are never mistaken—quite the opposite. Every news report, even if it consists entirely of observable facts, has at least a subjective context. Metaphorically, I take a capitalististic view of “truth”: just as Adam Smith argued that, in a free market, an “invisible hand” regulates the economy, so that the nation and the citizen tend to receive greater wealth than they would in a closed market, in a society with a free press, an invisible hand regulates truth so that generational with the nation and its citizens receive a fuller version of it. If information technology improves, so does “truth,” or, to continue the metaphor, so does the strength of truth’s hand.

6. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a 2009 interview, said, “The incidents there [at Abu Ghraib] likely inspired many young men and women to fight against us, and they still do, as a matter of fact.” “Matthew Alexander,” the pseudonym of the author of two books (including one describing how he led the interrogation team that successfully hunted down Mustafa al-Zarqawi), said, “I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo.”


8. I refer to both political and moral legitimacy in this essay. As I use the term, “political legitimacy” is the judgment of a nation or community as to whether its government is exercising its right to govern it. “Moral legitimacy,” on the other hand, is the judgment that a nation or community as to whether a government’s actions are right and proper. It is thus possible for a nation to see its government as politically legitimate and yet judge that this same government lacks moral legitimacy (such as when a nation accepts that a “bad” king has the divine right to rule or that a “bad” president can finish his term because he was constitutionally elected). Establishing or reinforcing a host nation government’s political legitimacy is usually the first order of business for a counterinsurgent. However, in order to sustain the conflict, the counterinsurgents of mature democracies must work hard to maintain moral legitimacy.

9. It is a common observation that soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan must receive short culture and language orientation courses. In addition, a five-man “human terrain team” consisting of anthropologists and social scientists now supports the commander of each deployed combat brigade. Unfortunately, the members of this team are often the only members of a deploying brigade with a deep understanding of a particular culture—and this team’s members are not decision-makers. Also disappoitingly, the professional education of military intelligence service members typically focuses on the technical skills associated with their trades, not cultural (or rather, moral) understanding.

10. The most famous example of this media tendency involved a gunshy video of U.S. attack helicopters targeting a mixed group of insurgents and civilians in Iraq. The pilots certainly made ethically inexcusable (and some would say illegal) judgment calls. However, there is little doubt but that the pilots thought that the entire group that they fired upon consisted of insurgents. Nonetheless, Wikileaks labeled the video “Collateral Murder” and a host of other websites have identified the incident as a “war crime” or “atrocity.”

11. This essay’s emphasis on war’s moral dimension represents nothing new in political theory. By the late 19th century, Karl von Clausewitz argued that a purely “legalistic” system is one in which moral choices derive solely from the consideration of negative prohibitions. For any given situation, such a system can produce multiple courses of action of equal moral value so long as none of these options are specifically prohibited. On the other hand, a purely ethical system is one in which action is guided by positive principles. Thus, for any situation, such a system offers multiple courses of action rated from best to worst. I propose here that the U.S. military needs a better balance of the legal and the ethical.
33. Ibid., 155-7. These ten values are “Honesty,” “Integrity,” “Loyalty,” “Accountability,” “Fairness,” “Caring,” “Respect,” “Promise Keeping,” “Responsible Citizenship,” and the “Pursuit of Excellence.”

34. Ibid., 157-8.


36. Ibid., 1-3.

37. Ibid., 1-4.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid., 1-16.

41. The U.S. Army’s leadership manual does provide some guidance with regard to the precedence of these values, stating that an “officer’s responsibility as a public servant is first to the Nation, then to the Army, and then to his unit and his Soldiers” (Field Manual 6-22, Leadership, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 2006, 3-2). However, this maxim pertains only to commissioned officers. Furthermore, the manual does not emphasize it and it is probably unknown to most soldiers.

42. Field Manual 1, The Army, 4-10. The first line of the Warrior Ethos states, “I will always place the mission first.”

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.


50. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone,” New America Foundation Website, January 10, 2011, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (accessed June 26, 2011). This site is as transparent in its calculations on this subject as any. Every drone attack in Pakistan since 2004 is plotted on a map; each plotting includes links to the news articles “from reliable media organizations with deep reporting capabilities in Pakistan” that form the basis of the article’s calculations. One of the article’s key summaries is as follows: “Our study shows that the 253 reported drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, including 42 in 2011, from 2004 to the present have killed approximately between 1,557 and 2,464 individuals, of whom around 1,264 to 1,993 were described as militants in reliable press accounts. Thus, the true non-militant fatality rate since 2004 according to our analysis is approximately 20 percent. In 2010, it was more like five percent.” So, there is one positive moral note with regard to these attacks: target discrimination appears to be improving.

51. Ibid.


54. Ibid.


58. Ibid., 99.
Command Responsibility and Accountability

Lieutenant Colonel Joe Doty, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired, and Captain Chuck Doty, U.S. Navy, Retired

The privilege of command is a fleeting sensation. Those who are commanded are the beneficiaries of the system, as their lives—their very existences—are placed uniquely in the care of the commanding officer. They have a right to expect that their leader will be held to exacting standards of professionalism and personal accountability. Their parents, husbands, wives, children, and friends should also expect this to be so, as the commander is entrusted with the treasured life of their loved-ones.”

— Bryan McGrath, Information Dissemination, 18 September 2010

Two maxims are inculcated into naval culture. The first is that if a ship runs aground, it is the captain’s responsibility. The second is that the captain is always responsible, even if he or she isn’t. These are not just words by the U.S. Navy—the Navy backs them up. Many skippers have been relieved of command for collisions or groundings. For example, according to the 17 September 2010 edition of Navy Times, two commanding officers, both holding the rank of commander (O-5), were relieved in 2010 for collisions. Being relieved under these circumstances is the norm in the Navy, part of their professional ethic. Navy ship and submarine commanders have an expectation that they should and will be relieved of their duties when incidents of this nature occur on their watch. This expectation is different than a performance or behavior standard. According to the same issue of Navy Times, 12 other commanders and captains (O-6s) were relieved for inappropriate conduct, temperament and demeanor, or loss of confidence in the ability to command.

Everything the Unit Does or Fails to Do

In the Army, there is an old saying that the commander is responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do. But are they accountable? Historically, the Army does not relieve commanders at the O-5/O-6 level at the same rate as the Navy, and maybe it shouldn’t. Maybe the Navy is too quick to relieve ship commanders. However, for our Army to maintain a healthy
professional ethic, commanders need to embrace the spirit of this saying as their command responsibility, and Army leadership should consider how they hold commanders accountable for what their units and soldiers do and fail to do.

A few common themes permeate the two adages mentioned above:

- A commander can delegate authority but not responsibility. Authority refers to who is in charge, while responsibility refers to who is accountable.
- A commander is responsible but very often not in control.
- Commanders have a responsibility to ensure their subordinates are trained and can operate independently based on the commander’s intent.
- Commanders have a responsibility to set a command climate wherein subordinates will act ethically in the absence of leaders.

Former Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom brigade commanders commented on two of these themes: the commander is responsible for everything the unit does and fails to do, and a commander is responsible but not in control:

- “I agree with first one, we can’t step back from this, but expect senior echelons to exercise judgment in when/how to hold them accountable for a unit’s actions. I disagree with the second, decentralization doesn’t mean ‘not in control.’ We can train and educate for mission command and decentralized operations, I did this with my brigade combat team and it worked.”
- “I think this idea of accountability is essential to success. This puts energy on the commander to develop subordinates, stay involved and take responsibility for operations, and manage risk. It is imperative in higher commanders to balance this. For example, in a detainee abuse case, we investigated and found it was not a systemic problem in command. We held those responsible accountable. As a result I changed the way I checked leaders and organizations. Since the Army is human, bad things will happen. It is not always what happens but how we react to it . . . after all, commanders bring order to chaos. We should not expect that chaos will not happen.”
- “Organizationaly, yes, though I do not agree that a commander should be responsible for criminal activity by subordinates unless he was aware and ignored or clearly set the conditions to enable it. I agree pretty much with the second one. Organizations are
like aircraft carriers, they don’t turn on a dime and one man can’t do it all, so leaders must describe where they want the ship to go, the values they will rely on to get them there and then describe and execute the preparation (training, etc.) necessary to get there. They then constantly assess against [the] changing environment and adapt as necessary.”

● “Responsibility for successes should always be attributed to the folks who actually did the hard work to make it happen, and that is not the commander. Take public responsibility for all failures, aggressively investigate what happened, correct it and put systems in place to ensure it does not reoccur. Set an appropriate command climate to ensure the unit does the harder right rather than the easier wrong. Bad stuff will happen, no matter what you do. The larger the organization, the more bad stuff and the more it will stink. In a proper command, as described above, those things that go wrong will be understood to be exceptions and out of the immediate span of control of the commander. Furthermore, how the commander responds to the event is more important than the event itself. In the end, there will be times when circumstances or political equities demand that someone take a fall, and that may be the commander. But it is not always necessary that someone take a fall, aside from the individual(s) whose direct actions caused the failure or event.”

This topic is relevant today for three key reasons:

● Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are decentralized at a level that is new to our Army’s culture, and it appears this operating environment will not change in the near future.

● Soldiers across the Army are committing suicide or injuring themselves due to high-risk behaviors at unacceptable levels.

● The Army, at the earlier direction of General George Casey, is taking the time to look at, define, and perhaps codify, its professional ethic.

**Responsible but not in Control?**

Without question, in an operational environment, the fixed command space of a naval vessel is quite different than an Army commander’s battle space. In terms of control, a ship commander has much more direct control of his or her sailors than an Army commander. Within the Army, this issue is exponentially exacerbated by the decentralized nature of our current operations. Clearly a battalion or brigade commander cannot be everywhere their platoon leaders or company commanders are. With that reality, what are the implications for the Army commander?

The key learning point behind the statement that the commander is responsible for everything the unit does and fails to do is really philosophical because in reality commanders cannot lead, supervise, or micromanage their subordinates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, nor should they. Commanders and leaders cannot prevent every possible bad thing from happening in a unit, but commanders who understand, internalize, and command their unit by being responsible but not in control will be thinking, planning, and acting in a way that sets up the unit and its soldiers for success.

In practical terms, accountability means consequences, both positive (awards, promotions, superb ratings, etc.) and negative (letters of reprimand, Article 15s, relief for cause, poor ratings, etc.). For example, the Army’s officer evaluation reporting system is an easy way to hold commanders accountable for what happens in their units, but how effective are senior raters using it? The current system was intended to have as the “standard” 33 percent receive above center of mass ratings. The reality is that senior raters shoot for 49.99 percent above center of mass ratings. Is this the best way to hold commanders really accountable?

How responsible and accountable should commanders be for a high suicide rate, incidents of sexual harassment, war crimes, or a high number of drug-and-alcohol-related incidents within their units? Discussions of accountability should revolve around whether the commander knew or should have known the unit’s level of readiness and training, and command climate. For example, in 2008, a Houston-based recruiting command that experienced four suicides was found to have a command climate.
climate that was a contributing factor in the deaths. The battalion commander was reprimanded, but not relieved.

Commanders set their units up for success primarily through the command climates they establish. At its most basic level, a command climate sets the conditions for how the unit and its soldiers should act when the commander is not around.

Without question, a commander who sets or allows an unethical command climate is setting up his unit and subordinates for failure. Historically, there are many examples of this. The My Lai massacre in 1968 is one of the most well known and studied examples. Another example occurred in Kosovo in September 2000, in Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division was found, according to the investigation, to have a command climate that contributed to torture and a tragic case of rape and murder. The battalion commander was reprimanded but not relieved of command. More recently, there are a few examples from Afghanistan and Iraq where questionable command climates contributed to misconduct or crimes.

Commanders should intentionally and thoughtfully establish and maintain a positive and ethical climate in their units. This effort should not be an afterthought or of secondary priority. It must be considered, along with mission accomplishment, as the top priority. An ethical command climate must be maintained through constant reinforcement of positive actions.

There is no such thing as a neutral or non-command climate. Something is going to happen based on the words and actions of the commander. And importantly, there is an enormous difference between promoting unethical conduct, looking the other way, and a “wink and a nod” to certain behaviors. None of these are good and some are worse than others. Every commander in the Army should be acutely aware that everything they say (or don’t say) and do (or don’t do) is being seen and internalized by their subordinates. Commanders must lead by example. The climate the commander establishes will greatly influence how soldiers think and act in the absence of their leaders, good or bad.

Clearly, commanders know they have the responsibility of ensuring their units are trained to a high level of competence. They must also understand and internalize that they have a responsibility for the character of their units.

Many may read this and conclude we are recommending that commanders micromanage subordinate commanders, have overly intrusive and pedantic POV inspections, weekend safety briefs, and other techniques that are obtuse and sophomoric. That is not the case. Others may read this and think we are advocating “witch hunts” or more opportunities to play “gotcha” with commanders. Again, that is not the case.

We are recommending that commanders rethink and critically reassess who they are as commanders (become more self-aware), what their responsibilities entail, and whether they are ready for the awesome privilege and responsibility of commanding America’s soldiers. Discussions of a commander’s responsibility and accountability are difficult, sensitive, and often political, especially when discussing serving commanders, but as the Army discusses and reaffirms its professional ethic, it is a discussion that needs to happen. MR

NOTE

THE CENTER FOR Army Leadership (CAL) Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) assesses and tracks trends in Army leader attitudes, leader development, quality of leadership, and the contribution of leadership to mission accomplishment. Over 100 questions cover topics on the quality of leadership and leader development. The results of the 2010 CASAL are summarized here in three main sections: leader development, effects of character and climate on leadership, and professional military education (PME) in leader development.

The CASAL provides research guidance for policy decisions and program development. It is an authoritative source that uses a large, random representative sample and a rigorous scientific approach for survey development, data collection, and data analysis, and it calibrates its findings with other Army research. Data was collected online from a representative sample of over 22,000 Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officers (second lieutenant to colonel), warrant officers (chief warrant officer five), and noncommissioned officers (sergeant to command sergeant major).

Approximately 22,500 Army leaders participated, with a response rate of 16.1 percent. The large, random representative sample, combined with comparisons with other Army research, allows for high confidence in the accuracy of these findings. Responses are both quantitative and qualitative.

Leader Development
Trend data indicates that Army leaders are lacking in developing their subordinates for future leadership roles. Data collected from 2006 to 2010 consistently show that Develops Others is the lowest rated Army Leader Core Competency. A two-thirds favorability rating has been established in research as a threshold for acceptability. Since 2006, no more than 61 percent of active duty Army leaders have rated Develops Others favorably. While this competency has improved in the last several years, it is still well below the acceptability threshold and rated much lower than all other core competencies.
This area is important because it affects both current and future generations of leaders. Those leaders who are currently not being properly developed by their superiors will not know how to properly develop others in the future.

The lack of leader development is not limited to just superiors’ demonstration of the competency. In fact, the CASAL examined leader development from several angles, including leader development within units as well as development through professional military education courses. When asked what level of priority their unit placed on leader development within the unit, only 46 percent of Active Component (AC) leaders indicated it was a high or very high priority while 24 percent indicated that it was low or very low. This is the lowest level of perceived priority reported on the CASAL.

When asked how effective their direct superior was at calling attention to leader development opportunities, only 59 percent of those surveyed responded that their superior was effective or very effective. In fact, just 49 percent indicated that their superior would support their attendance at institutional training if it required that they miss a key unit event, and 33 percent were convinced that their superior would not support their attendance. This indicates a breakdown beyond firsthand leader development and shows that, to a large degree, leaders are also not helping their subordinates to develop through other sources. Perceptions of poor leader development affect beliefs in commitment to the Army and trust in the Army as an institution. Of those who indicated that they did not believe that the Army was headed in the right direction to face the challenges of the next 10 years, 26 percent indicated that this was because of the poor quality of current Army unit leader development.

Changing the culture of the Army with regard to leader development may be difficult given the currently high OPTEMPO. The strains of fighting two wars for a decade have taken their toll on leader development. According to the Profession of Arms

Effects of Character and Command Climate on Leadership

Another issue identified by CASAL data is toxic leadership. Toxic leaders are those self-absorbed and self-promoting leaders who work to meet their own personal goals and the goals of the organization at the expense of their subordinates. While there are many definitions of toxic leadership, there are consistencies. Common behaviors among toxic leaders include avoiding subordinates, denigrating subordinates, hoarding information and job tasks, micromanaging, and acting aggressively toward or intimidating others. We estimate that, based on several CASAL data points, one leader in five is viewed negatively for—

- Not putting unit needs ahead of his own (22%).
- Being “a real jerk” (25%).
- Doing things and behaving in a way that is positive for the organization and himself, but negative for subordinates (18%).
- Doing things and behaving in a way that is
negative for the organization, himself, and subordinates (5%).

- Holding honest mistakes against the unit (2%).

When asked to estimate how big of a problem toxic leadership is in the military on a scale of one to seven, 39 percent of leaders responded six or seven, indicating a serious problem, while only 13 percent responded with one or two, indicating it was not a problem. Furthermore, 83 percent of leaders indicate that they have observed one or more leaders exhibiting negative behaviors in the last year, and 17 percent indicated seeing five or more. Unfortunately, there is no indication that this issue with toxic leadership will correct itself. Promotion of toxic leaders along with lack of negative feedback from subordinates, as well as their willingness to emulate toxic leaders, creates a cycle of toxicity that is not easily broken.

The cycle is due to several factors. The first is the paradox of tyrannical leadership, which states that subordinates who work for a toxic leader tend to be more productive due to fear of reprisals. This increase in productivity then reflects well upon the leaders, bringing accolades and even promotion. In this instance, such individual and organizational responses reinforce the negative behaviors. Consequently, the leaders continue to engage in them and the cycle continues. Another reason that toxic leadership continues without intervention is that in the current Army culture most subordinates are unwilling to speak out against leaders that behave in such a manner. Furthermore, the success of superiors who are toxic reinforces the message to their subordinates that this is what the path to success looks like. Unfortunately, 50 percent of those subordinates who indicated they worked for a toxic leader expected him to receive further promotion, and 18 percent indicated that they would still emulate him.

Toxic leadership negatively affects command climate. Toxic leaders often promote zero-defect mentalities and hold honest mistakes of subordinates against them. As stated earlier, 24 percent of leaders believe that honest mistakes are held against them. This leads to a zero-defect mentality, which causes many to believe that they should not be creative or attempt to discover novel solutions because they will be punished if the chance they take does not work.
Thirty percent of respondents indicated that they believe their unit has a zero-defect mentality. An additional side effect of the zero-defect mentality is it may deter leaders from seeking help because they feel this may get them into trouble. Only 55 percent of leaders indicated that seeking help within their unit was acceptable.

There are several things the Army can do to help to alleviate issues with toxic leadership. First, cultivating a climate in which we allow subordinates to evaluate their superiors honestly without fear of reprisal is essential. This will require a break from the tradition of superiors reviewing leaders in a top-down fashion. Open criticism of superiors by subordinates is not a realistic solution. Instead, programs such as the Army’s multisource assessment and feedback (MSAF), which allow leaders to receive 360 degree (i.e., self, superior, subordinate, and peer) feedback, will help leaders to see how they are viewed by those they work with rather than just by those they work for. The MSAF process also allows leaders to openly and honestly evaluate themselves and reflect on the evaluations of others. Further, it provides individualized coaching on how to improve as a leader, based on superior, subordinate, and peer feedback. This process may not work for all leaders who are perceived as toxic, because some will know that they are toxic and will not care to change, but it should work to change the behaviors of those leaders who were unaware that they were perceived as toxic to begin with and do desire to be positive leaders.

Another potential solution to the toxic leadership problem is to implement a systemic change in identification and selection of leaders. To do this, the Army must first examine its screening and promotion processes, effectively preventing them from gaining leadership positions.

Professional Military Education in Leader Development

A third key concern suggested by CASAL data is the state of professional military education. According to the Army Leader Development Model, leader development should happen across three overlapping domains: operational experience, self-development, and institutional training. Operational experience and self-development have consistently been rated high in their ability to prepare leaders for future leadership roles. Even though self-development is seen as important, 65 percent of leaders indicate that their unit expects them to engage in self-development, but only 40 percent of leaders agree that their unit allows them time to do so. Thus, there is a clear gap between value and unit support. A larger gap exists between operational experience and self- versus military-directed education. Military education is based on an organized, time-tested, professionally accepted and shared knowledge base intended to apply to many situations. Capitalizing on operational experience requires feedback and careful planning, in order to ensure practice makes perfect, instead of practice reinforcing negatives or aligning with arbitrary goals and idiosyncratic leader desires. If the Army is to improve leader development by offering purposeful and doctrinally aligned guidance then it is critical that the military education domain improve. Unfortunately, only 49 percent responded that their most recent professional military education course actually improved their ability to develop subordinates.

Institutional education has a 58 percent favorability rating, a 9 percent increase from 2009, and is perceived as having the following strengths:

- Proper career timing, with the exception of junior NCOs.
- Quality of instructors (80% favorability rating, 5% increase from 2009).
- Seventy-one percent AC and 79 percent RC consider attendance at Army institutional courses as beneficial beyond meeting education requirements.
- Effective application of lessons. The majority of leaders (67%) think that they are effective at applying what they learned.

Unfortunately, institutional education has many perceived weaknesses as well, and they offset the aforementioned strengths:
LEADERSHIP SURVEY

- Too few (about 50%) company grade officers and junior NCOs believe that they had sufficient opportunities to attend courses or schools.
- Many junior NCOs (40%) said they attended their most recent course too late in their career.
- Two-thirds of graduates think that they are effective at applying what they learned, while less than one-half (48%) believe that their organization is effective at utilizing or supporting their leadership skills.
- Nineteen percent of all AC recent graduates think that current Army education/schools are so ineffective that the Army will not be prepared to meet future challenges.
- Only a slim majority of graduates (51%) thought that the course actually improved their leadership capabilities.

Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and chief warrant fives were also surveyed about what skills were lacking for recent graduates. The most common response was “appropriate critical thinking and problem solving skills.” When asked about potential improvements, students who found their course ineffective said the course should make leadership a focus and cover specific leadership issues. About a third of the sample suggested improving course content by having focused instruction specific to leadership, including basic leadership skills and specific leadership issues such as developing others and mentoring. Comments also suggested that courses should provide more hands-on experiences where leaders could lead others in the course and course content should be updated to be relevant and match current operational settings.

The curricula of for professional military education courses should be reevaluated to ensure it is relevant to the demands leaders face in day-to-day activities. Although a large portion of leaders (32 to 43 percent depending on deployment status and history) do not believe course content is relevant or up-to-date, an examination of the program of instruction by recent course graduates would ensure that the content targets leaders’ knowledge and skills. If the curriculum is on track, the process in which we deliver the content to leaders would then become the most likely reason that leaders are not learning the skills they need to be effective.

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, addresses field-grade officers’ current issues in hopes of enhancing the professional military education at Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, 16 July 2010.
Conclusion

The main issues identified in this paper relate to the lack of leader development of subordinates. We could overcome lack of leader development of subordinates if professional military education properly taught this topic, but the CASAL respondents do not believe it does. Disappointingly, only half of the respondents felt that they were better able to influence others, or were better prepared to develop others, or that the course actually improved their leadership abilities.

Furthermore, we might overcome lack of leader development if subordinates had strong positive leaders to emulate, but data on toxic leadership indicate that this is not always the case. With 1 in 5 leaders viewed negatively, and 83 percent of respondents indicating that they have directly observed a toxic leader in the last year, it would seem that a large percentage of soldiers should not emulate the leaders around them.

So what can we do to correct this problem? As stated earlier, changing the culture within the Army to make leader development a priority is an important first step. Some sort of incentive for engaging in leader development might make it likely for this to happen. Nearly all of the hundreds of leader priorities have some sort of consequence for not completing them. If leader development is to become a priority, there must be consequences for those leaders who do not develop their subordinates. Furthermore, we need an organizational vision that makes leader development a priority in the unit. This will require a top-down promotion of leader development in units, with commanders integrating leader development into their vision for the organization and making it part of their measure of success. As this occurs, leaders must go beyond developing their subordinates. They should exemplify an attitude which exalts subordinate development and use self-promotion (demonstrating competence and sharing accomplishments) to communicate the different developmental opportunities provided in briefings, trainings, and during counseling. These two strategies can resolve perceptual deficiencies (i.e., a subordinate does not always realize when he is being developed) and benefit learning by reminding the subordinate that development is occurring and that he should be taking something away from the experience. In short, leaders need to make it clear when their actions are meant to develop the subordinate.

In the meantime, we must improve leader development in professional military education. Leaders currently do not believe that the professional military education system is effectively preparing them to influence others or develop others as leaders, and that’s a problem because that is the heart of what Army leadership is. Furthermore, efforts should be made to identify and remove negative leaders in the Army. These leaders not only bring down morale and increase turnover, but also provide bad examples for subordinates to emulate. Programs that incorporate 360-degree feedback will allow leaders to see how all those around them view them and adjust their behaviors to improve their leadership abilities.

NOTES

1. Note that what follows are subjective perceptions and not test results of knowledge and skills. That being said, the data are important because perceptions affect behavior, and ultimately, mission accomplishment. Percentages denote favorability unless otherwise stated.
2. All data unless otherwise indicated come from CASAL surveys, 2006-2010.
WHAT A DIFFERENCE six months make. Early in 2011, an overwhelming majority of American policymakers, opinion makers, and the public were strongly opposed to more military entanglements overseas, particularly a third war in a Muslim country. And there was a strong sense that given our overstretched position due to the war in Afghanistan, continued exposure in Iraq, and—above all—severe economic challenges at home, the time had come to reduce U.S. commitments overseas. In June 2011, when announcing the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, President Obama put it as follows: “America, it is time to focus on nationbuilding here at home.” Regarding involvement in Libya, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in March 2011: “My view would be, if there is going to be that kind of assistance [providing arms] to the opposition, there are plenty of sources for it other than the United States.” Admiral Mike Mullen raised questions about a Libyan involvement, stating in a March 2011 Senate hearing that a no-fly zone would be “an extraordinarily complex operation to set up.”

Six months later, in September 2011, as the military campaign in Libya was winding down, it was widely hailed as a great success. As Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers wrote in The New York Times, while “it would be premature to call the war in Libya a complete success for United States interests . . . the arrival of victorious rebels on the shores of Tripoli last week gave President Obama’s senior advisers a chance to claim a key victory.” NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in early September, “We can already draw the first lessons from the operation, and most of them are positive.” In a meeting on 20 September with Libya’s new interim leader, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, President Obama said, “Today, the Libyan people are writing a new chapter in the life of their nation. After four decades of darkness, they can walk the streets, free from a tyrant.”

Moreover, Libya was held up as a model for more such interventions. Cooper and Myers wrote, “The conflict may, in some important ways, become a model for how the United States wields force in other countries where its
interests are threatened.” Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, opined that the Libyan operation was “in many ways a model on how the United States can lead the way that allows allies to support.” Leon Panetta, current Secretary of Defense, said that the campaign was “a good indication of the kind of partnership and alliances that we need to have for the future if we are going to deal with the threats that we confront in today’s world.”

As international attention turned to the massacres in Syria, world leaders and observers discussed applying the “Libyan model.” French President Nicolas Sarkozy pointedly said on his visit to post-Gaddafi Libya, “I hope that one day young Syrians can be given the opportunity that young Libyans are now being given.” Syrian activists called for the creation of a no-fly zone over Syria, similar to that imposed over Libya.¹ An August New York Times article noted, “The very fact that the administration has joined with the same allies that it banded with on Libya to call for Mr. Assad to go and to impose penalties on his regime could take the United States one step closer to applying the Libya model toward Syria.”

No doubt, as time passes, the assessment of the Libya campaign will be recast—and more than once. Nevertheless, one can already draw several rather important lessons from the campaign.

Lesson 1. Boots off the Ground

The Libya campaign showed that a strategy previously advocated for other countries, particularly Afghanistan, could work effectively. The strategy, advocated by Vice President Joe Biden and John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, entails using airpower, drones, Special Forces, the CIA, and, crucially, working with native forces rather than committing American and allied conventional ground forces.² It is sometimes referred to as “offshoring,” although calling it “boots off the ground” may better capture its essence.

Boots off the ground was the way in which the campaign was carried out in Kosovo, which NATO won with no allied combat fatalities and
at low costs. It was also the way the Taliban were overthrown in Afghanistan in 2001, in a campaign that relied largely on the forces of local tribes, such as the Northern Alliance of Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, among others—although some conventional backup was committed. The United States “[took] full advantage of their air superiority and the [Taliban’s] lack of sophisticated air defenses . . . using a wide and deadly repertoire: B-52’s, B-1’s, Navy jets, Predator drones, and AC-130 Special Operations gunships.” And “boots off the ground” worked in Libya, with minimal casualties for NATO, at relatively low costs, and with the fighting mainly carried out by Libyans seeking a new life for themselves.

Aside from the important but obvious advantages of low casualties and low costs, “boots off the ground” has one major merit that is not so readily apparent. It is much less alienating to the population and makes disengagement—the exit strategy—much easier to achieve.

People of most nations (and certainly many in the Middle East) resent the presence of foreign troops within their borders. Thus, even many Iraqis and Afghans who view the American military presence as beneficial to their security (or pocketbooks) often seem troubled both by U.S. combat methods (which they see as yielding too many civilian casualties) and by what they deem freewheeling personal conduct (including the presence of female soldiers). Above all, they consider foreign troops a violation of their sovereignty and a sign of their underlying weakness. They cannot wait for the day when these troops go home.

The Libyan rebels made it clear from the beginning that although they sought NATO support, they did not want foreign boots on the ground. Avoiding such presence largely mitigated the perceived threat to sovereignty.

Similarly avoided were the political traps that await an administration seeking to disengage from a military campaign but afraid that the opposition will criticize it for being weak on defense if it leaves prematurely, as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. This whole issue is avoided in Libya; as the military campaign ends, disengagement is not much of a problem.

Can “boots off the ground” be applied elsewhere? Is it the new model for armed interventions overseas? One should be wary of generalizations. Obviously, what can be made to work in Libya cannot be employed against North Korea. Arguably, it is already being employed in Yemen, but it might well not work against the well-entrenched Hezbollah.

Also, some question whether we can make “boots off the ground” work in land-locked nations like Afghanistan. Carrier-based close air support aircraft may have to travel much greater distances, potentially decreasing responsiveness and hindering the “boots off the ground” effort. In addition, when one has no local bases, it becomes more difficult to collect human intelligence. Given the high number of casualties and costs of a long war involving conventional forces, whether these disadvantages are sufficient to negate the merits of the “boots off the ground” strategy is a question on which reasonable people can differ. One lesson, though, stands out: when “boots off the ground” can be employed, it seems to compare rather favorably to conventional “boots on the ground” invasions and occupations.

**Lesson 2. Avoid Mission Creep**

Assessments of military campaigns depend on what their goals were. Thus, if one looks at Operation Desert Storm that pushed Saddam out of Kuwait in 1991, one will rank it as very successful if one assumes its goal was to reaffirm the long-established Westphalian norm that lies at the very foundation of the prevailing world order—that no nation may use its armed forces to invade another nation, and nations that do so will be pushed back and “punished.” However, one would rank Desert Storm less well if one assumed its goal was to force a regime change in Iraq, to topple Saddam, and to protect the Shi’a who were rising up against him.

The American tendency to allow campaigns with originally limited goals to morph into campaigns that have more expansive goals can turn successful drives into questionable and contested
operations. The failures or defects are thus as much a consequence of mission creep as of inherent difficulties.

A key example is the war in Afghanistan. In March 2009, President Obama narrowly defined the goals of the war there as to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda.” Later, in October 2009, the Obama administration reiterated that the plan was a limited plan to “destroy [Al-Qaeda’s] leadership, its infrastructure, and its capability.” This definition reflected a scaling back of a much more ambitious goal set by President Bush, who sought “to build a flourishing democracy as an alternative to a hateful ideology.” However, over time, a variety of forces led the Obama administration to expand again the goals of the war to include defeating the Taliban (even after very few Al-Qaeda were left in Afghanistan, and much larger numbers were threatening U.S. interests in other places) and to help establish a stable Afghan government.

Obama outlined the added goals in May 2010 by stating his intent to “strengthen Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for [its] own security” and “a civilian effort to promote good governance and development and regional cooperation.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered a still more expansive view, saying: “I would imagine, if things go well [under President Karzai], that we would be helping with the education and health systems and agriculture productivity long after the military presence had either diminished or disappeared.”

The forces that pushed for this mission creep deserve a brief review, because we shall see them in play in Libya and elsewhere. In part, they are idealistic and normative. Americans hold that all people if free to choose, would “naturally” prefer the democratic form of government and a free society respecting human rights and based on the rule of law. Indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. neo-conservatives argued that the whole world was marching toward “the end of history,” a state of affairs in which all governments would be democratic. They held—and President Bush reportedly agreed with them—that in the few situations in which nations were lagging, the United States had a duty to help them “catch up with history.” Or, in plain English, to force regime change. This is one of the reasons given for U.S. armed intervention in Iraq in 2003. At the same time, liberals held that the United States should use its power to protect people from humanitarian abuse and thus support more armed interventions on this ground. For instance, Special Assistant to the President Samantha Power, who played a key role in convincing President Obama to engage in Libya, is the author of an influential book, *A Problem from Hell*, in which she chastises the West for not using force to stop genocide in places such as Cambodia, the Congo, and Rwanda.

In addition, a military doctrine was developed that held that one could not achieve narrow security goals (i.e., defeating Al-Qaeda) without also engaging in nationbuilding. It suggested that one cannot win wars against insurgencies merely by using military force, but must also win the hearts and minds of the population by doing good deeds for them (e.g., building roads, clinics, schools, etc.). Also, by shoring up our local partners, we show that to support, say, the Karzai administration, would lead to a stable, democratic government with at least a reasonable level of integrity. This doctrine (referred to as counterinsurgency or COIN in contrast to counterterrorism or CT)
entailed a very considerable mission expansion, and its results are subject to considerable differences of opinion. However, there is no denying that while the military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan came swiftly and at low human and economic costs, the main casualties and difficulties arose in the nation-building phase, where the outcomes are far from clear.

All these considerations have played, and continue to play, a role in Libya. Initially, the goal of the operation was a strictly humanitarian one: to prevent Gaddafi from carrying out his threat, issued in February 2011, to “attack [the rebels] in their lairs” and “cleanse Libya house by house.” He repeated his intent by saying, “The moment of truth has come. There will be no mercy. Our troops will be coming to Benghazi tonight.” In March, President Obama stated, “We are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya.” True, even at that point, he mentioned the need to also achieve a regime change, but explicitly ruled it out as a goal of the military operation. The regime was going to change by other means; as Obama put it, “In the coming weeks, we will continue to help the Libyan people with humanitarian and economic assistance so that they can fulfill their aspirations peacefully.”

Very quickly, the goal of the Libyan mission expanded. In April 2011, Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron published a joint pledge asserting that regime change must take place in order to achieve the humanitarian goal. They stated, “Gaddafi must go, and go for good,” so that “a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders.” Moreover, they added that NATO would use its force to promote these goals: “So long as Gaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds.”

The issue came to a head when, in May, Gaddafi offered a ceasefire with the rebels that would have ended the humanitarian crisis and would have led to negotiations between the rebels and Gaddafi—but entailed no regime change. (The ceasefire could have been enforced either by threatening to resume NATO bombing if it was not honored or by putting UN peacekeeping forces between the parties.) NATO, however, rejected the offer out of hand; Gaddafi—and his regime—had to go. Next, NATO proceeded to bomb not only military targets but also Gaddafi’s residential compound in Tripoli, reportedly killing his son and three grandchildren.

As of September 2011, the goals of both averting a humanitarian crisis and toppling the Gaddafi regime had been achieved, and hence one might conclude that mission creep had no deleterious effects, at least in this case. Actually, two goals were attained for the price of one.

It is here that the question of what follows becomes crucial for a fuller assessment of the Libya campaign. There are strong sociological reasons to expect that it is unlikely that a stable democratic government will emerge in Libya. These include the absence of most institutions of a civil society after decades of tyranny, the thin middle class, and the lack of democratic tradition. (For more indicators, see a discussion of a Marshall Plan below.) Clearly, we may evaluate the mission expansion rather differently if we witness the rise of a new military authoritarian government in Libya—whether or not it has a democratic façade—than if a stable democratic regime arises.

The same holds for the level of civil strife and the number of casualties that may follow. Libya, like many other societies, is a tribal amalgam. If these tribes hold together to support a new government and solve their differences through negotiations, the 2011 NATO regime-change add-on mission will be deemed a great success. If we witness the kind of massive civilian casualties we have seen in Iraq, where more than 100,000 civilians are estimated to have died between 2004 and 2009 and inter-group violence continues, the assessments will be less rosy. Indeed, despite assurances that the new leadership
in Libya is “building a democratic and modern civil state with rules, governed with justice and equality,” there is room for concern. An Amnesty International report released in September found that the Libyan rebels have committed war crimes ranging from torture to revenge killings of Gaddafi loyalists.

As early as July, Human Rights Watch reported that rebel forces had “burned some homes, looted from hospitals, homes and shops, and beaten some individuals alleged to have supported government forces.” The report finds that, since February, “hundreds of people have been taken from their homes, at work, at checkpoints, or simply from the streets.” The rebels beat the detainees, tortured them with electric shocks, and sometimes shot or lynched them immediately. Furthermore, the rebels have stirred up racism against many sub-Saharan Africans, who have been attacked, jailed, and abused under the new government. Rebel forces have emptied entire villages of black Libyans.

Black African women were raped by rebel forces in the refugee camps outside of Tripoli.

Reports of internal conflicts and lawlessness are also cause for concern. In July, allied militia sent to arrest military chief Abdel Fattah Younes for possible contact with Gaddafi assassinated him instead. These militias also looted ammunition warehouses abandoned by Gaddafi’s forces and sent weapons to Al-Qaeda factions in North Africa and other terrorist groups outside the Libyan borders.

In short, whether the mission creep has ended up this time with a resounding success or a debacle remains to be seen. However, the sociology of Libya suggests that, at least in the near future, no stable democratic government is in the offing, and hence that the mission creep was an overreach.

Lesson 3. Nationbuilding, a Bridge Too Far

The ink had hardly dried on September’s rosy assessments of the Libyan NATO operation, when
we heard a chorus of voices declaring that “we” (the West, the United States, or the UN) should help the Libyan people build the right kind of government, economy, and society. Moreover, the nation-builders seem to want to repeat the mistakes the United States made in Iraq in trying to recast most everything, which resulted in scores of unfinished and failed projects. Thus, in a “Friends of Libya” session at the UN, more than 60 government representatives “offered assistance in areas including the judiciary, education, and constitutional law.” President Obama promised to build new partnerships with Libya to encourage the country’s “extraordinary potential” for democratic reform, claiming that “we all know what’s needed. . . . New laws and a constitution that upholds the rule of law. . . . And, for the first time in Libyan history, free and fair elections.”

Others seek to include all the Arab Spring nations, or better yet—the entire Middle East. Former Foreign Office Minister and Member of Parliament David Davis calls for a British Marshall Plan in the Middle East, arguing that such a plan is “one of the best ways to consolidate and support the Arab Spring as it stands, [and] could spark reform in other Arab and Gulf countries, too.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton believes that “as the Arab Spring unfolds across the Middle East and North Africa, some principles of the [Marshall] plan apply again, especially in Egypt and Tunisia.” Senator John Kerry argues, “We are again in desperate need of a Marshall Plan for the Middle East.” Senator John McCain also favors such a plan.

Although the Marshall Plan did not cover Japan, the great success of the United States and its allies in introducing democracy and a free economy to Japan and Germany are usually cited as proof of what can be done. However, this is not the case. What was possible in Japan and Germany at the end of World War II is not possible now in the Middle East, and particularly not in Libya. There are important differences between then and now.

The most important difference concerns security. Germany and Japan had surrendered after defeat in a war. Political and economic developments took place only after hostilities ceased. There were no terrorists, no insurgencies, no car bombs—which Western forces are sure to encounter if they seek to play a similar role in Libya, Sudan, Somalia, or Yemen.

Moreover, after the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, few would even advocate that the West should occupy more land in the Middle East and manage its transformation. Thus, while the German and Japanese reconstructions were very much hands-on projects, those now under consideration amount to long-distance social engineering, with the West providing funds and advice while leaving the execution of plans to the locals. Such long-distance endeavors have a particularly bad record.

Germany and Japan were strong nation-states before World War II. Citizens strongly identified with the nation and were willing to make major sacrifices for the “fatherland.” In contrast, Middle Eastern nations are tribal societies cobbled together by Western countries, and the first loyalty of many of their citizens is to their individual ethnic or confessional group. They tend to look at the nation as a source of spoils for their tribe and fight for their share, rather than make sacrifices for the national whole. Deep hostilities, such as those between the Shi’a and the Sunnis, among the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Kochi, and among various tribes in other nations, either gridlock the national polities (in Iraq and Afghanistan), lead to large-scale violence (in Yemen and Sudan), result in massive oppression and armed conflicts (in Libya and Syria), or otherwise hinder political and economic development.

One must also take into account that Germany and Japan were developed nations before World War II, with strong industrial bases, strong infrastructures, educated populations, and strong support for science and technology, corporations, business, and commerce. Hence, they had mainly to be reconstructed. In contrast, many Middle Eastern states lack many of these assets, institutions, and traditions, and therefore cannot be reconstructed but must be constructed in the first place—a much taller order. This is most obvious in Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. Other nations, such as Tunisia, Pakistan, Morocco, Syria, and Egypt have better prepared populations and resources, but still score poorly compared to Germany and Japan.

Finally, the advocates of a Marshall Plan for the Middle East disregard the small matter of costs. During the Marshall Plan’s first year, it demanded
13 percent of the U.S. budget. Today foreign aid commands less than one percent and, given the currently grave budgetary concerns, America and its NATO allies are much more inclined to cut such overseas expenditure than to increase them.

Both the West and the Middle East—in particular, countries that have the sociological makeup of Libya—will be better off if we make it clear that the nations of the region will have to rely primarily on themselves (and maybe on their oil-rich brethren) to modernize their economies and build their polities. Arguing otherwise will merely lead to disappointment and disillusion—on both sides of the ocean.

Lesson 4. Leading from Behind—But Who is on First?

The campaign in Libya was structured differently from most, if not all, of its predecessors in which NATO (or NATO members) were involved. The United States deliberately did not play the main role. French President Sarkozy was the first head of state to demand armed intervention in Libya, initially in the form of imposing a no-fly zone. He was soon joined by British Prime Minister David Cameron, and only then did the United States add its support. Although the United States did launch 97 percent of the Tomahawk cruise missiles against Gaddafi’s air forces at the beginning of the mission, NATO forces took over relatively quickly. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen pointed out that “European powers carried out the vast majority of the air strikes and only one of the 18 ships enforcing the arms embargo was American.” France was the largest contributor, with French planes flying about a third of all sorties.

This approach reflected President Obama’s longstanding position that the United States should consult and cooperate with allies, share the burden of such operations, and not act unilaterally or even as the leader of the pack (in contrast to President Bush’s approach). As David Rothkopf, a former national security official under Clinton, put it, “We need to give the Obama administration credit for finding a way, taking the long view, resisting the pressure to do too much too soon, resisting the old approaches which would have had the U.S. far more involved than it could have or should have.”

Critics of this approach considered it a reflection of weakness. “Leading from behind” became a much-mocked phrase. In March 2011, Mitt Romney stated, “In the past, America has been
feared sometimes, has been respected, but today, that America is seen as being weak.” He offered as evidence the fact that “we’re following France into Libya.” Even in the more recent wake of praise for the operation, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham expressed “regret that this success was so long in coming due to the failure of the United States to employ the full weight of our air power.”

There is room for legitimate disagreement about the best ways to organize such campaigns and what the U.S. role in them should be. However, both those who favor leading from behind and those who oppose it should realize that the Libya campaign does not favor either of these positions. The main reason: it let the whole world see that NATO—the grand military machine initially designed to thwart the attacks of another superpower, the U.S.S.R.—turned out to be a very weak body.

NATO has always had some difficulty in acting in unison, as there are often considerable differences among the members about who to fight, how to fight, and what to fight for. Thus, in the past many nations introduced caveats restricting how and where NATO could deploy its troops, essentially allowing nations to opt out of NATO operations. This is the case in Afghanistan, where German, French and Italian troops have been restricted to noncombat areas. Caveats also hindered the Kosovo Force response in Kosovo in 2004, when German troops refused orders to join other elements in controlling riots. The Economist sees in Libya a “worrying trend of member countries taking an increasingly a la carte approach to their alliance responsibilities.” It elaborates: The initial ambivalence of Muslim Turkey was to a degree understandable. But Germany marked a new low when it followed its refusal to back Resolution 1973 with a withdrawal of all practical support for NATO’s mission, even jeopardizing the early stages of the campaign by pulling its crews out of the alliance’s airborne warning and control aircraft . . . Poland also declined to join the mission, adding insult to injury by describing NATO’s intervention as motivated by oil.

Out of 28 NATO members, 14 committed military assets, but just eight were prepared to fly ground-attack sorties. They were France, Britain, America (albeit on a very limited scale after the opening onslaught on the regime’s air defenses), Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Italy and Canada. Only France and Britain deployed attack helicopters.

Moreover, “NATO’s European members were highly dependent on American military help to keep going. The U.S. provided about three-quarters of the aerial tankers without which the strike fighters, mostly flying from bases in Italy, could not have reached their targets. America also provided most of the cruise missiles that degraded Colonel Gaddafi’s air defenses sufficiently for the no-fly zone to be established. When stocks of precision-guided weapons held by European forces ran low after only a couple of months, the U.S. had to provide fresh supplies. And, few attack missions were flown without American electronic warfare aircraft operating above as ‘guardian angels.’”

Rasmussen admitted, “The operation has made visible that the Europeans lack a number of essential military capabilities.” In June, Former Defense Secretary Gates criticized the lack of investment by European members in “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets” which he believes hindered the Libya campaign. He warned, “The most advanced fighter aircraft are little use if allies do not have the means to identify, process, and strike targets as part of an integrated campaign.” In short, he concluded that NATO European allies are so weak they face “collective military irrelevance.” In the foreseeable future, it seems, the United States will have to lead, and commit most of the resources, especially if the other side poses more of a challenge than Libya did.

In Conclusion

The military success of the 2011 NATO-led campaign in Libya indicates that, even in the current context of economic challenges, calls for reentrenchment, and concerns that U.S. forces are overstretched overseas, humanitarian missions can be effectively carried out.

The strategy of “boots off the ground” has many advantages—when it can be employed. It results in comparatively low casualty rates and low costs, and it is also less alienating to the local population and makes disengagement much easier.
While the United States succeeded in letting the European members of NATO carry a good part of the burden in Libya, the European nations’ low level of resources and disagreements with one another makes one wonder if such “leading from behind” could work in dealing with more demanding challenges, say, in Iran.

One must guard against the strong tendency of humanitarian missions (which set out to protect civilians) to turn into missions that seek forced regime change, lead to much higher levels of casualties, and tend to fail.

Moreover, wrecking a tyranny does not automatically make for a democratic government; it is far from clear what will be the nature of the new regime in Libya, for which NATO has opened the door by destroying the old leadership structure.

Above all, those who seek to engage in nation-building should carefully examine the conditions under which it succeeds, and avoid nation-building or minimize their involvement in it when the conditions are as unfavorable as they are in Libya and in several other parts of the Middle East.

NOTES

11. Ibid.
The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, or WHINSEC, commemorated its 10th anniversary on 13 January 2011, with a special celebration attended by the deputy commanding general of the Combined Arms Center, local dignitaries, a former commandant, and Maneuver Center of Excellence leadership. The celebration featured pre-recorded congratulatory video messages from the Department of Defense, combatant commands, and partner-nation military/law enforcement leadership. The event served as a platform for organizational reflection to move WHINSEC into its second decade of providing quality training and education to the security force personnel of the Western Hemisphere. The distinguished guest speaker was U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Thomas A. Shannon, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. He spoke about the evolution of regional relationships and WHINSEC’s enduring support to sustain the U.S. as a preferred partner for the 21st century and beyond. WHINSEC is a reflection and a clear demonstration of the U.S. commitment to security, stability, and prosperity in the Americas.

Despite its small size and tiny budget, WHINSEC plays a significant role in our nation’s military education system. Congressmen support this organization because, while it operates on tactical and operational levels, it has a strategic impact on U.S. foreign policy, and not only in the Western Hemisphere. Simply put, this is an “economy of force” organization, one that costs very little but yields big strategic dividends.

Appreciation for WHINSEC’s accomplishments comes from its “customers,” particularly the commanders of the U.S. military’s Northern Command and Southern Command. Both leaders and their predecessors have commended the institute during congressional testimony. As an Army Training and Doctrine Command organization, WHINSEC implements the most current Army training model. Its curricula consistently remain pedagogically sound as well as U.S.-doctrinally approved. This ensures the highest quality level of training and education for all students.

The contributions this organization makes to the nation reach far beyond the Department of Defense, and are the beginning of the relationships between nations that serve to make our hemisphere, and our world, a safer and more peaceful place.
Geopolitical Conditions

In the past, conflicts were primarily between nation states, but we now live in a world of new geopolitical dynamics. Threats have become transnational and endanger us all. In addition, we all share challenges in nature and in our daily commerce. No single nation, however strong, can face these challenges by itself; any success in combating these transnational threats and challenges will depend on international cooperation. This requires the building of partnerships and relationships.

International partnerships, like personal friendships, are not developed overnight. They are cultivated through a process involving effective communication among all parties involved, reciprocated support, and identification of common goals, leading to mutual understanding, trust, and the unwavering willingness to make shared sacrifices.

How WHINSEC Fits In

With fewer than 250 military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel from several nations, and operating with an annual budget smaller than 1/50,000th of the defense budget, WHINSEC serves as both a powerful strategic partnership promoter and an effective capability builder. The organization brings military, civilians, and police together (almost 14,000 from 34 nations over the past eleven years) and teaches in languages common to all (Spanish and English) the courses that enhance the professional capabilities of our own and partner-nation security forces. It constitutes a unique hemispheric forum in which U.S. and international students and instructors learn with and about each other, forging personal relationships that lead to international cooperation.

WHINSEC has played a key role in preparing our friends and allies in the Western Hemisphere to conduct peacekeeping operations as part of United Nation missions, including those in Haiti and Angola. Its Peace Operations Course includes U.N. distance learning components, so that those leaders who complete it are well prepared to participate in the multinational teams that perform those missions. The relationships fostered at WHINSEC also enhanced five partner nations’ security contributions on the world stage (as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan).

While WHINSEC has strategic impact, its courses have great value in the tactical and operational arenas as well...
U.S. Cadet Language/Culture Immersion Program

In an initiative that predates the U.S. Army Cadet Command’s Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency Program, WHINSEC brings ROTC and West Point cadets into the Cadet Leadership Development Course alongside partner-nation cadets for a unique and cost-effective language and cultural immersion experience. The course serves as a learning laboratory to immerse U.S. cadets in the Spanish language, while they live and work with cadets from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, or any of the other nations that send cadets to WHINSEC. Instructors from various hemispheric countries teach and share their extensive experience with them, speaking only Spanish. According to survey results, the cadets would like to expand this program. One of them, who had studied Spanish for years and had the chance to live abroad, stated that the immersion experience at WHINSEC enabled him to learn more Spanish than all the classes he had taken in his “high school and university combined.”

The Roy Benavidez NCO Academy offers courses to improve the leadership skills of non-commissioned officers. Given existing threats and conditions, most military and police operations are asymmetric in nature, requiring decentralized execution. Such small-unit operations require professional, trustworthy, and well-trained sergeants to take charge whenever necessary to get the job done to standard.

The NCO academy conducts one course focused on junior leaders, the Small Unit Leaders Course, and an NCO Professional Development Course that helps sergeants take charge and lead squads, platoons, and companies. The NCO Professional Development course is offered three times a year in Spanish, and once in English for the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean basin. Coming soon is a course based on the Army’s Sergeants Major Academy curriculum, tailored to meet the needs of our partner nations.

All of the courses at WHINSEC, not just the NCO courses, have a core emphasis on leadership, are doctrinally sound, and are relevant to the requirements of hemispheric friends and allies. The WHINSEC learning model supports U.S. interests and foreign policy objectives in the Western Hemisphere to ensure that students understand the necessity of doing the right thing, morally and ethically, as a member of a professional military or law enforcement organization while accomplishing the mission.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Ethics

The law that created WHINSEC mandated that it teach five specific democracy and human rights topics to every student in every course. These are human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a democratic society. WHINSEC has expanded this to devote at least 10 percent of each course to these themes by not only giving the classes, but also incorporating the principles into WHINSEC training—democratic, human rights, and ethical values are not only taught, but lived. They are part of the command climate and work environment.

Reaching Out

In addition to the resident and mobile training team courses, WHINSEC participates in many other major events in the U.S. and abroad, such as seminars, symposiums, and subject matter expert exchanges. In almost every case, these are joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational activities with opportunities to build relationships.

WHINSEC operates with the oversight of a Board of Visitors made up of Secretary of Defense-appointed members from academia and human rights organizations; elected political leaders representing the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; the commanders of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command; and a representative from the U.S. Department of State. Scrutiny by a group of such eminence gives great credibility to WHINSEC.

Unlike other organizations that bring international students to the United States, WHINSEC plays an integral role in its students’ careers. Many international students attend WHINSEC at cadet, junior, and field grade levels.

It is no exaggeration to say that the institute is unique in many aspects. Its courses—open to military, civilians, and police/public safety civilians—emphasize profession of arms tenets. WHINSEC trains international partners at all levels of leadership from military noncommissioned and senior field grade officers (including cadets) to mid- and senior-level law enforcement officials and government civilians. WHINSEC engages these leaders early in their careers, when they are most open to internalizing the merits and principles of respect for democracy and human rights. Many of these leaders are selected for subsequent assignment at the highest levels of their national defense institutions and/or civilian governmental offices. Staff and faculty at WHINSEC are linguistically and culturally attuned to the hemisphere and can engage with students on all levels, fostering partnerships and building lasting relationships.

WHINSEC has earned the Army Superior Unit Award, which was established by the Secretary of the Army to recognize the outstanding performance of a unit during “a difficult and challenging mission under extraordinary circumstances.”

WHINSEC’s staff and faculty are proud of their physical location. It places the institute in the finest environment to educate and build future leaders and strategic problem solvers. The Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning is the U.S. Army’s premier training center, and has reached out to WHINSEC to join forces in building capacity, forging lasting and meaningful relationships, and strengthening democracy among friends and allies.

WHINSEC’s 10th Anniversary celebration marked the beginning of a second decade helping others to mitigate their own regional security challenges, supporting security cooperation goals, and forging international relations. The institute will continue to do so. It is an investment today to save lives and to mitigate transnational threats tomorrow. During the last ten years, it has played a vital role in enabling our friends and allies to conduct peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counter-illicit trafficking operations—to mention just a few such operations. The professionals who attend its courses actually “live” the goodness of democracy and the U.S. way of life and values, and become informal goodwill ambassadors throughout the region.

As an integral component of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, WHINSEC enjoys a reputation for excellence at home and abroad. The institute is envisioning a new dawn making efforts to offer some of the WHINSEC course menu globally. With continued Department of Defense leadership, WHINSEC will continue performing its resilient, strategic outreach, supporting our efforts to prepare friends and allies to face hemispheric threats together. MR
HIS DISCUSSION BETWEEN a village elder, Afghan district chief, and a U.S. Army captain was similar to others that members of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul would have throughout our time in Zabul Province in southern Afghanistan in 2010. Village elders had convinced themselves, despite facts to the contrary, that the insurgents possessed almost superhuman capabilities. While the elders’ words and actions signified broad, passive support for the insurgents, the shame and humiliation they felt at the hands of insurgent treatment was also evident. We were not seeing the fiercely independent and aggressive Afghan. Could this really be the “Graveyard of Empires”? We were not seeing great men of honor. Could this really be the land of Pashtunwali—the unwritten code of conduct that places such an emphasis on honor?

Clearly, significant gaps existed between Afghan behaviors described in books and in our training and how Afghans actually behaved. Furthermore, the books presented cultural and historical perspectives, but they did not provide useful psychological insights or ways of interpreting behavior. As a result, they ignored the effects that decades of conflict and rampant poverty had on the people.

In a counterinsurgency environment, both sides fight for the allegiance of the local population. Without it, success is unlikely. In Afghanistan, the
government, supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is on one side of the conflict; the Taliban and other insurgent groups are on the other. How can ISAF and the Afghan government help break the insurgent-population connection and improve the relationship between the people and government? How do we answer the many if/then questions? (If the Afghan government or ISAF does this, then the population will behave as follows. . . ) The counterinsurgent must understand how the population makes decisions, such as why it decides to passively support the insurgents. The interpretive lenses that U.S. military personnel use influence their understanding of Afghanistan and Afghans and, more important, shape their future decisions on tactics, strategy, and policies for the war in Afghanistan.

Current literature and various training curricula for deploying organizations offer ways to interpret and understand Afghanistan. However, they neither satisfactorily explain how Afghans make decisions nor offer much help in predicting how they will behave in the future. Cultural lenses currently in vogue focus on the roles of the Pashtunwali code and Islam, as well as family

and sub-tribal relationships (as opposed to broader national commonalities). Historical lenses focus on the British, Soviet, and other military failures inside Afghanistan. Applying these lenses, and with some generalization, we would expect to see Afghans rebelling against centralized government or foreign influence, unwilling to be marshaled, and quickly engaging in violent exchanges when conflict arises. The current training and literature would have you see the population’s decision to passively support the insurgents as a function of familial connections, a cultural aversion to being controlled, and wariness toward outsiders, especially non-Muslims.

This does not sufficiently explain why the population behaves the way it does. It does not explain the obvious anger felt by the population, especially the elders, toward the insurgents. It does not explain the inaction of the population or the sense of hopelessness that is so prevalent.

**Battered-Spouse Syndrome and Southern Afghanistan**

Battered-spouse syndrome refers to the medical and psychological conditions that can affect a spouse who has been repeatedly abused, physically

A support team leader and a district chief discuss an upcoming shura. The district support team’s 24/7 presence alongside the district chief enabled him to increase his time with village elders more than 1,000 percent.
Three components of battered-spouse syndrome provide insights into the behaviors of Afghans abused by insurgents:

- The cycle of abuse has created an environment of persistent fear for the victim.
- Over time, the victim gives the abuser more power by perceiving him as omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient.
- As the abuse continues, the victim’s behavior increasingly becomes one of “learned helplessness.”

**Persistent Fear**

“Three years ago you came here and brought us a well. The day after you left, the Taliban came in and destroyed it. Two years ago, you came here and fixed our irrigation system. The next day after you left, the Taliban came in and destroyed it. Last year you honored our request and did not come here. We pooled our money and bought a small tractor. The Taliban thought you bought the tractor for us, so they destroyed it. Please do not come here anymore. It makes it harder for us.” — Village elder from the Shah Joy District, Zabul Province, talking to the provincial deputy governor.

Fear can become the dominant factor that drives the behavior of a battered spouse, and the climate of fear can have such a distortive effect on judgment that the battered spouse’s behaviors become shortsighted and seemingly contradictory. Take, for example, a battered spouse who calls 911. The pain is so intense and the fear of further harm so great that the battered spouse calls for help. It is a decision with an immediate time horizon—stop the pain right now. Once the police arrive and the abuse has stopped, the battered spouse’s decision making remains the same—to minimize the pain inflicted by the abuser—but the victim’s behavior does an about-face. As a result, a particularly dangerous time for the police is when they arrest the abuser. At that moment, the battered spouse may actually attack the police, the very people she called to help protect her. Although her behavior has changed dramatically, the decision making remains the same—fear drives behavior designed to minimize pain. In this case, she hopes her attack on the police communicates her support and commitment to her abuser so that he will return home less angry.

Persistent fear similar to that of a battered spouse was evident throughout Zabul Province among the village elders. They often made shortsighted decisions and then engaged in contradictory behaviors that made making a connection between the leaders and their government more difficult. Additionally, the elders’ behaviors were often contrary to the villagers’ best interests, insurgent retribution notwithstanding. For example, slightly more than half the villages refused any governmental assistance, including basic humanitarian aid. Had they been pro-insurgent, one would expect them to take as much from their government and ISAF as possible in an attempt to cause economic injury, an explicit goal of Al-Qaeda.

A climate of persistent fear was also evident at the approximately 75 shuras we attended. Elder turnout was often low. In one instance, only six elders showed up for the shura. One explained to the deputy governor that the Afghan security forces had not told them about the shura, so most of the elders were out working the fields several kilometers away. Deftly engaging the elder during a 20-minute dialogue, the deputy governor gently prodded, pushed, and cajoled him into calling the larger group of elders out from an adjacent compound where they had been hiding. At another shura, seeing low turnout, one enterprising district chief then drove through the bazaar, with a police escort, and ordered stores closed and shopkeepers to report to the nearby school for the shura. Soon the attendees’ numbers swelled to over 400.

In the majority of shuras, the initial remarks made by elders were critical of the government, ISAF, or both. Their comments often focused on civilian casualties, continued neglect, corruption, inability to stop the insurgents, or some other negative angle towards their government or ISAF. These political announcements were designed to ward off insurgent retribution. This behavior was critical for the insurgents, because keeping the population disconnected from the Afghan government increased the insurgency’s chances for success. Some elders even
refused government gifts (typically turbans or prayer rugs) because they were afraid of what might happen if they returned to their villages bearing gifts and the insurgents found out.

The elders’ fears also had the effect of denying basic services to the population through closing medical clinics and schools or refusing aid. The nongovernmental organization Ibn Sina operated a number of the medical clinics in Zabul. Ibn Sina was considered capable and credible by the population and maintained a good connection with the government’s public health director. Despite a demonstrated track record of courage, when insurgent intimidation became too strong, Ibn Sina would relent and close the clinic, with the option of either keeping it closed, reopening in a nearby area more firmly controlled by the insurgents, or relocating to another district. A schoolteacher in one district had his ear cut off as a warning for him to close the school where he worked. In another district, village elders opted to run unregistered home schools to avoid insurgent retribution rather than registering the schools with the government and receiving government assistance.

The elders’ fears also caused high levels of mistrust. Conversations involved only what would supposedly produce the least pain in terms of insurgent intimidation and retribution. Body language shifted abruptly and conversations stopped when young men approached them. One village elder developed an elaborate authentication procedure for use by the government and ISAF when they called him on his cell phone.

One of the insurgency’s central messages was straightforward and brutish: “We have the power. You do not. The corrupt government does not. The inept foreigners do not. We come and go as we please. They do not. Because we have the power, you will listen to us.”

At shuras in four different districts, elders asked, “How can you expect us to stand up and fight the Taliban, when you have 46 countries here fighting them and you can’t win?” (Because the number “46” was mentioned in each of the four districts, we concluded it came from an insurgent talking point that had resonated with the elders.) The insurgents also restricted villager mobility, often by emplacing IEDs to prevent villagers from leaving via local roads. This parallels the predicament of battered spouses when abusers restrict their mobility by denying them access to a car, seizing their credit cards, and so on.

This had the effect of—

- Emasculating the elders.
- Limiting information and social connections available to the villagers.
- Reducing economic activity—absent insurgent permission and assistance.

Other uses of violence—beatings, kidnapping, and murder—typically had two purposes—to punish the offender and to sustain the climate of fear to promote compliance with insurgent decrees. An instance of this occurred when insurgents kidnapped an off-duty police officer along with several family members. The insurgents killed him, and told his father, also a government employee, that they would kill his remaining family members if he did not immediately quit his government job and leave the province. The next day, the government employee had resigned his position and left the area. The insurgents released the remaining family members they had held captive.
The All-Knowing, All-Powerful Insurgent

“If you need to call my mobile, we need to have a code to make sure it is me you are talking to. If you call, you will ask for me by name. If it is me, I will say ‘which Haji Sahib are you calling for.’ If it is me, I will say, ‘the one with the ID.’ If it is me, I will reply, ‘This is he.’ so you will know it is me, and we can talk frankly with each other.”—An elder, worried that an insurgent informant would answer his cell phone and know he was working with his government.

Trapped in a cycle of abuse, her judgment impaired, a battered spouse can ascribe attributes to her abuser that almost elevate him to superhuman or god-like status. This significantly increases the power imbalance between the abuser and victim and reduces the victim’s ability to make sound decisions.

Elders and mullahs asked to attend shuras often displayed a similar fear of “all-knowing” insurgents. They expressed interest in attending shuras with their government, but simultaneously exhibited extreme fear. They were worried that someone would report their attendance to the insurgents.

The elders and mullahs frequently proposed one of two alternative strategies. Those close enough to the provincial capital often requested shuras be held at the governor’s compound or at a director’s office near the bazaar, since a visit to the bazaar was a legitimate behavior. If that failed, they would say the governor had ordered them to his compound. This was a legitimate excuse to attend because they had no choice in the matter. (It was also an ironic acknowledgment of government legitimacy.) The elders and mullahs also frequently asked the government to send security forces into the villages a day or two ahead of the scheduled shura and have the security force leaders “order” them to attend the meeting. The insurgents typically did not seek reprisals against attendees in these cases.

The insurgents used informants to keep tabs on the population. The tactic caused people to fear that the insurgents would soon know about any public act and even some private ones, and large segments of the population became hostage to their inflated perceptions of what the insurgents knew.

For the insurgents, this had two primary benefits. First, it increased the return on their investment, because every report from an informant and every act of violence filled the people’s minds with the possibility of many more. Anyone could be an informant, and an attack could occur at anytime. This destroyed a classic Afghan trait, pragmatism. Second, it eroded the population’s psychological strength. Hope evaporated. The implications were profound and corroborated General Petraeus’ observation that human terrain is the decisive terrain in counterinsurgency. As the importance of the human terrain increases, so does the importance of human psychological factors such as confidence and hope. We understand the importance of morale during high-intensity conflict. Why do we ignore the importance of the population’s morale in an insurgency?

Learned Helplessness

Learned helplessness is the most disturbing component of battered-spouse syndrome and likely the most important one for commanders, trainers, and COIN operators to understand. It occurs as the victim increasingly believes he is unable to control the outcome of his situation. Over time, the victim will become passive and accept painful stimuli, even though escape is possible and apparent. Low self-esteem, depression, and hopelessness often result. As an Italian proverb darkly observes, “Hope is the last thing ever lost.” By the time victims lose hope, they feel all else is lost to them as well. It is not surprising, then, that battered-spouse syndrome is often considered a form of post-traumatic stress disorder.

In this current fight, one of the key goals is for the population to choose the government while rejecting the insurgents. Choosing and rejecting both require the population to act. Future stability and any degree of progress in Afghanistan require an enfranchised and participative population. This can only be accomplished by a population confident that its government will both represent it and exist in the long-term.

In Zabul, learned helplessness was expressed in many ways: the elder who was convinced 250 armed villagers would be overrun by 20 insurgents, the men in the bazaar who found fault with everything despite concrete evidence of improvements, and the consistent refrain of “no, that’s impossible” from government officials and elders alike whenever ISAF encouraged them to solve their
own problems. Learned helplessness is beneficial for the insurgents: sustaining it does not cost very much, while restoring a sense of hope, confidence, and action requires a substantial, consistent investment from the government and ISAF.

Implications for Commanders, Trainers, and Operators

Five implications follow, listed in order of potential impact. Some of these implications reinforce previous findings regarding the fight in Afghanistan.

Nothing builds hope, and breeds success, like success. In Zabul, Americans needed to create and lead projects and programs in the initial stages, then transfer control to the Afghans, with the United States moving into a mentoring role. While a majority of Zabuli government officials and elders were initially skeptical of success, they soon found that Afghan ownership and leadership were both possible and necessary for long-term growth.

For example, when we arrived in early 2010, the norm for both government officials and elders was to come directly to the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) with project requests. The only Afghan involvement in the process was to make the request, then sit back and wait for the Americans to get it done. An enterprising young captain succeeded in reinvigorating a project coordination process. He sold the governor’s office on the concept and then led the first meeting. Two people did most of the speaking at the first meeting. The young captain said everything constructive, and the other primary speaker, a senior Afghan leader, spent all of his time berating the other government officials present. The process was similar throughout the first month of meetings, but eventually, the Afghan dialogue became more constructive: the participants discussed prioritizing limited resources, identifying focus areas for the province, and identifying the key districts for development. A month and a half into the initiative, one of the governor’s advisors took over leadership of the process and the captain became his deputy. Five months into it, both the lead and deputy were Afghan government officials. The captain now quietly advised from the third position. Afghan participation in project design and quality assurance for reconstruction and development projects had increased from five percent of the total to 28 percent, and no medium- or large-sized project began in the province unless it had first gone through the Afghan project coordination process, maximizing the government’s role while minimizing ISAF’s.
We need to know the human terrain better. As General Petraeus noted, human terrain is the decisive terrain. The population is the prize for which both sides are fighting. The population will decide the winner. Therefore, the population’s decision making is of paramount importance. Just as the American military has done an admirable job training and educating the force on the culture and customs of the nations where it fights, it must train and educate the force on the psychological aspects of populations. There is no curriculum to apply across every nation, but the populations of weak and failed states share a number of psychological attributes brought on by persistent instability and insecurity. More specific theories (such as battered-spouse syndrome) may also be appropriate to teach our war fighters to help them better understand how Afghans interpret data and make decisions. In addition, the military should request academia and think tanks to pursue research in this area.

We should not give the insurgents free advertising. The typical approach to information operations when insurgents commit atrocities is to inform the population as quickly as possible and address as broad an audience as possible. This approach certainly makes sense from a Western perspective because it evokes outrage over the killing of innocents. However, it incorrectly presumes that the Afghan population was not already outraged by insurgent atrocities. More important, this focus on broadcasting insurgent atrocities unwittingly gives the insurgents free advertising. They are intimidating the population, and our broadcasting information about their atrocities ensures news of each event reaches an even larger segment of the Zabul population, exacerbating the population’s persistent fear and belief in the insurgents’ superhuman capabilities. The population is like a battered spouse enjoying a breath of fresh air at work among friendly co-workers, only to receive periodic email reminders that when she gets home her husband will be drunk and violent.

Disseminating the news aids the abuser and further weakens the battered spouse.

Eternal optimism and a “can-do” attitude are transferrable. The American belief that no problem is too big and every problem has a solution gets Americans into trouble periodically, but that optimism and “can-do” attitude have also served us well and have a magnetic appeal for others. They reinforce the COIN best practice of American and host nation citizens working side-by-side in the belief that the more integration, the better the outcome will be. For example, a government district chief represented 10,000 to 30,000 constituents. Typically, PRTs, with ISAF’s government expertise, are centrally located in the provincial capital. As a result, PRTs visit chiefs of outlying districts only one to three hours every week or two. To augment this, our PRT sent four small teams to live in the districts fulltime and partner with district chiefs. The results were significant: mentoring time with district chiefs rose 677 percent, which in turn drove an increase of 1,150 percent in the time district chiefs spent with the population. Initially, none of the district chiefs were rated as effective with advisors. After several months of the full-time PRT presence, four were assessed as effective with advisors. As their effectiveness and time spent with the population increased, so too did the number of services and job opportunities delivered to the people. Our experiences suggested that an American presence was necessary to create forward momentum, but that after this initial success, Afghan leaders could sustain and improve the process.

We should encourage roles for the youth. Mostly, the Afghan teens and young adults seemed less like battered spouses than their middle-aged and elderly counterparts did. They appeared to have higher self-esteem and greater confidence in their ability to control events than the older population. Two programs in Zabul capitalized on this point. The first was the United Nations Development Program, which funded advisors for the provincial government. These young college graduates brought significant energy and capability to the governor’s office, took the lead and deputy positions for the project coordination process discussed earlier, played a role in the increased shura schedule for the government with village elders, and developed the vetting process and training program for the provincial intern program.

failed states share a number of psychological attributes brought on by persistent instability and insecurity.
The second was an intern program envisioned by an Air Force technical sergeant, who developed the concept and presented it to the governor for approval. Once approved, the governor’s advisors quickly assumed responsibility for administering the program. The advisors developed an interview process and written test for high school students and recent graduates, as well as a one-week training curriculum. In round one, 57 young men competed for 25 slots across the governor’s office and 10 governmental agencies. In round two, four young women interned with the education department. As we redeployed, more than 200 young men were competing for an additional 50 government intern slots in round three of the program.

The intern program connected the participants’ families to their government. Interns were paid a stipend, which drew a positive financial linkage between their families and the government, and the interns’ physical presence in the respective government offices communicated a symbolic linkage to the undecided population and insurgents alike. In addition, the interns provided capable manpower to the government. Zabul had an abysmally low-literacy rate of only one to ten percent, which was countered, in part, by the literate interns.

Conclusion

To succeed in counterinsurgency, the military must become masters of the decisive terrain—the human terrain. To this end, the military has focused on providing training on host nations’ cultures and customs. The training provides a number of lenses through which to interpret the behaviors of a host nation population and better understand its decision making calculus in order to predict future behavioral choices. In Afghanistan, the current lenses do not sufficiently explain behaviors. More research and a stronger focus on teaching the psychological factors associated with living in weak and failed states would help significantly. In the case of Afghanistan, understanding the battered-spouse syndrome would aid in understanding Afghan behaviors and help predict the population’s responses to future actions and policies, reduce ISAF frustration, and facilitate the transition of power and authority to the fledgling Afghan government. MR

1. For further discussion on battered-spouse (woman) syndrome see the works of Lenore Walker such as The Battered Woman (1979), The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984), and Battered Woman Syndrome: Empirical Findings in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2006).
2. For further discussion on learned helplessness see the works of Martin Seligman such as “Learned Helplessness: Theory and Evidence,” “Learned Helplessness,” and “Depression and Learned Helplessness in Man”; as well as Neta Bargai, et al., “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression in Battered Women: The Mediating Role of Learned Helplessness,” at <http://www.springerlink.com/content/c701v11523313865/>
3. Comments from Osama bin Laden, such as “We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy,” from a 2004 videotape, accessed 1 Jul 11, accessed at <http://articles.cnn.com/2004-11-01/world/binladen.tape_1_al-jazeera-qaedabin?_s=PM:WORLD> (1 Jul 11).
Achilles, On Modern Warfare

I met my enemies on the battlefield face to face and won renown with my strong spear.

I was brought down by an arrow I couldn’t evade.

There is no honor fighting a foe who kills you from far away, so you never look into his eyes.

Gary Beck
The Remission of Order
2011
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PHOTO: U.S. marines and sailors with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines load an Afghan boy onto a CH-47 Chinook medical helicopter after he received emergency medical treatment at the battalion’s aid station in Sangin, Afghanistan, 25 April 2011. (DOD photo by CPL Logan W. Pierce, U.S. Marine Corps)

THE ARMY IS exploring ways to make doctrine more timely and relevant through its Doctrine 2015 Project. Army doctrine authorities are seeking to develop as many dual-service Army and Marine Corps doctrine publications as possible. Both services project military force on land and approach doctrine within the same general framework. Transferring as many Army and Marine Corps publications as possible into dual-service publications will help save resources, expedite the doctrine production process, and establish a body of doctrinal literature that both services can use to share the best tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Doctrine Development

Approximately 400 Army field manuals (FMs) and Army TTP manuals were on the Army’s official doctrine website in November 2010.¹ The Marine Corps had over 270 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs), Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs), Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs), and Marine Corps Interim Publications (MCIPs).²

Many of these books are hundreds of pages long. It commonly takes from 12 to 18 months, and in many cases much longer, to develop an Army manual under the current process. Often, by the time the Army or Marine Corps publishes a manual, it is already time to revise it.

Both services have undertaken efforts to remedy this problem. As of September 2011, the Marine Corps had 304 service publications, 148 of which were multi-service manuals, and 93 were dual-designated with the Army.³ Currently, the Marine Corps shares approximately 30 percent of its doctrine with the Army.

In 2009, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) ordered Army doctrine authorities to explore ways to make Army doctrine more timely and relevant to the force. In response to this order, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) devised a new framework for Army doctrine that—

- Reduces the number of manuals to provide clarity to the force.
- Reduces the number of pages in each new manual to no more than 200, with a few unavoidable exceptions.
- Develops Army TTP (ATTP) manuals to expedite and enhance doctrine.
The Army is exploring new doctrine classification options as well. The old system designated all doctrinal manuals as field manuals, which detracted from the true meaning of what a field manual was supposed to be. The Army decided to implement a classification system similar to that of the Marine Corps. It adopted a two-level system made of up FMs and ATTP manuals. These contain doctrinal principles, along with common tactics, techniques, procedures, terms, and symbols that describe how Army organizations conduct operations and train for those operations. This two-tiered system was a step in the right direction, but Army leaders felt more needed to be done.

The Future

The Army will soon field two new levels of doctrine to better explain fundamental and enduring principles and provide detailed information on these principles. Army doctrine publications (ADPs) explain why the Army conducts operations, intelligence, sustainment, leadership, and training, just to name a few. Each of these manuals will only be 10 pages in length. Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP)s provide further details. Field manuals pertain to the operating force and those parts of the generating force that deploy with, or directly support, the operating force in the conduct of operations. By 31 December 2013, there will be only 50 field manuals, a reduction of approximately 88 percent from 2010. Field manuals contain tactics, procedures, and other important information as determined by the proponent. The FMs’ appendices contain procedures, that is, prescriptive ways of doing things that must be standardized across the Army. There is one FM for each major category of information down to branch and several functional areas, along with several types of operations.\(^4\)

An ATTP manual is a doctrinal manual that applies primarily to a single branch, functional area, or company/troop/battery and staff sections.

The above definitions of Army publications fall within the same logical framework as the Marine Corps MCDP, MCWP, MCRP, and MCIPs:

**MCDP.** The Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication—This is the philosophy of the Marine Corps on the subject of warfighting. It is the underlying thought that guides the actions of marines. Every marine is expected to read and understand this doctrine. The MCDP principles are applied in the rest of Marine Corps doctrine. They are signed by the commandant of the Marine Corps and are assessed every eight years.

**MCWP.** The Marine Corps Warfighting Publication is operational tactics, techniques, and procedures. This level of doctrine is designed to be assessed every four years but can be assessed earlier if decided.

**MCRP.** The Marine Corps Reference Publications are more detailed TTPs that usually apply to Marine Corps small units and small unit leaders. They are to be assessed every four years but can be assessed earlier if decided.

**MCIP.** The Marine Corps Interim Publication is how the Marine Corps introduces new and/or emerging doctrine. As a rule, about 70 percent of the information in MCIPs is vetted and agreed-to TTPs. The remaining 30 percent of the information may need further assessment or refinement. The Marine Corps sees this as a way to get new doctrine out to the Marine Corps faster. This level of doctrine is assessed after two years from signature. The Marine Corps can decide at the two-year mark to make it a formal doctrine publication, roll all or part of that information into another doctrine publication, cancel the entire MCIP, or agree to extend the publication as an MCIP for a certain period of time.\(^5\)

The two services have a shared repository of knowledge in tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines tactics, techniques, and procedures as follows:
• **Tactics.** The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.

• **Techniques.** Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks.

• **Procedures.** Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.

While still currently part of the Army’s doctrine hierarchy, ATTP manuals will soon disappear. Army Technique Publications (ATPs) will replace them.6

Field manuals will cover tactics and procedures. ATPs will cover techniques. Since techniques are always changing, ATPs will be rapidly updated by their doctrinal proponents. For example, ATPs dealing exclusively with infantry or armor areas of concern will be handled by the commanding general, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Soldiers will be able to make contributions through the web which will greatly enhance the proponents’ ability to update these publications in a timely manner.

The Army’s web-based system can expand to accommodate marines as well as soldiers who have a common access card. Marine Corps officers assigned to TRADOC centers of excellence can work with the Marine Corps proponents to help facilitate the rapid development of new doctrinal manuals or the modification of existing manuals.

Having FMs, ATTP manuals (soon to be ATPs), MCWPs, and MCRPs in common will help provide a common language for both services, simplify the lexicon of the ground forces, and facilitate dual service operations.

Many soldiers and marines are familiar with terms such as operations other than war, military operations other than war, stability and support operations, and stability operations, the most recent term found in the 2011 version of ADP 3-0. These terms generally mean the same thing, leaving the user of Army and Marine Corps manuals to wonder why they change so frequently.

If a soldier or marine compares FM 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, with FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, which replaced FM 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A in September of 2004, he would notice an increase of 304 terms. This represents an average increase of approximately 50 terms per year. By 2009, the terms increased from 1,765 to 2,069 from...
their 2004 totals. To reduce this amount, the Army and Marine Corps doctrinal authorities have agreed to reduce the number of service-specific terms. To achieve this goal, the services agreed to only create a new term if a common English language dictionary does not provide an acceptable definition for it.7

Resourcing Infrastructure
Reducing the number of manuals will also help relieve the stress on the Army and Marine Corps doctrinal infrastructure. Both Army and Marine Corps doctrine production have suffered from a lack of personnel. This shortage has been primarily due to the concentration of manpower in the operational force since the advent of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Army suffers from the reduced number of uniformed doctrine authors, the problem became so severe in the Marine Corps that it divested itself completely of fulltime doctrine authors. (The Marine Corps now treats doctrine writing as an additional or collateral duty.)

Both the Army and Marine Corps attempted to fill this shortage with contract personnel, but this option is no longer viable. As contract funds become increasingly difficult to obtain with shrinking budgets, it has become untenable. The forecasted lack of personnel can be solved by “re-greening” doctrine-producing institutions. As the operational tempo slows down, officers will be able to return to jobs within TRADOC as doctrine authors.

When officers are able to return to jobs within TRADOC they will bring valuable experiences from the field. To add even more experience, TRADOC envisions creating pools of highly qualified soldiers from different units across the operational force to help write doctrinal products over a brief but intense writing period. This program could include marines nominated from their major operational units.

While figures vary, the typical cost of developing a doctrinal manual from the time of inception until a general officer authenticates the publication is around $150 thousand to $200 thousand.8 More manuals integrated means fewer separate manuals for the two services, and the fewer such manuals, the more the savings. If the two services integrate only 10 manuals, the Army and Marine Corps could theoretically save $1.5 million, which they could reinvest into the doctrine development process to make it even more efficient. They might well hire more editors to review and format manuals. Editing is often the bottleneck in the doctrinal process.

Interfacing during the development of the doctrinal program directive is important for success in doctrine development. The program directive establishes the official need for a doctrine publication as well as its outline, initial timeline, purpose, scope, target audience, major issues, distribution, and stakeholders.9 If a solid plan is not put in place on the front end of the process, both services will end up implementing a series of stop-gap measures that will slow the development of the doctrinal manuals and could even lead to the project being canceled.

There have been discussions between the Army and Marine Corps to synchronize doctrine production by adhering to the doctrine publication processes, timelines, and format of the service that does most of the work on a given project. While this approach is feasible, I believe it is not the optimal solution. The most ideal proposal is to revise TRADOC Regulation 25-36, The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program, and dual-designate it with the Marine Corps. This would lead to one doctrine development process for the land component forces instead of the two-service processes currently in place.

While the goal is to integrate as many manuals as possible, the new process must be flexible enough to allow some service-specific publications. Each service must retain an infrastructure that allows it to produce its own manuals. For example, the Army has no desire or interest in developing doctrinal manuals for amphibious operations when this is the purview of the Navy and Marine Corps.

The two services must also determine how many manuals will become dual-service. Many Army and Marine Corps manuals are already
dual-service or joint and many more should be. A
commision made up of each service’s senior lead-
ers should determine which manuals will become
dual service and when.

Dual service doctrine development will build on
the existing Army doctrinal infrastructure, which
is more robust than that of the Marine Corps. The
work to produce most of the doctrine for the land
component forces will take place in the centers of
excellence and the Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.

Each center of excellence has Marine Corps
officers attending captains career courses. Upon
graduation, one or two of these officers could
transfer to doctrine development centers and serve
18 months developing doctrine. For example, the
Maneuver Support Center in Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri, produces doctrine for the Engineers,
Military Police, and the Chemical Corps. A Marine
Corps doctrine writer could interface with Army
document authors there to help develop manuals.

The benefit of this plan will manifest itself in
four ways:
  • Doctrine-producing institutions across the
Army and Marine Corps will develop a dual service
capability and memory.
  • Captains with recent deployment experience
will provide valuable insights for doctrine.
  • The officer corps will develop links across
both services as career course (or intermediate-
level education) graduates leverage contacts made
while in school.
  • Officers will provide meaningful change
while achieving stabilization for their families.

Two Marine Corps majors who are graduates of
the Army’s intermediate level education program
should be stationed at CADD, home of the Army
Proponency Division, a control center for the Army
doctrinal infrastructure that tracks the development
of manuals and interfaces with other services.

Many institutions already have Marine Corps
personnel assigned as trainers. Eighteen Marine
Corps officers can fully staff the centers, or work
at key institutions around the Army where they can
be of most value. The branch institutions where
the two services have the most in common are the
U.S. Army—
  • Intelligence Center of Excellence.
  • Fires Center of Excellence.
  • Maneuver Center of Excellence.
  • Maneuver Support Center of Excellence.
  • Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate.
One officer could work at each center of excellence with two officers stationed at CADD. This would only require four captains, two majors, and a liaison officer (from either service) to inform senior leaders of ongoing doctrinal projects. CADD envisions assigning a doctrinal liaison officer to do this and forwarding his or her work on to the committee responsible for selecting dual-service manuals.

Since the Marine Corps has no full-time doctrinal authors, and CADD is currently staffed at approximately 50 percent of authorized military manning, doctrine authorities across the military must look for new opportunities to maximize limited resources. One way to close this gap is to redistribute some military or civilian billets that came with the closing of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). This institution had 1,491 military personnel and 1,533 civilian positions when it closed. Reallocating approximately 50 Marine Corps and Army slots to doctrine-producing agencies would double the two services’ abilities to produce doctrine. Over the last few years, both the Army and Marine Corps have made significant strides in making doctrine more timely and relevant. The hope is that suggestions enumerated here will aid in this effort. 

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3. Comments from Dave Vickers, service and multi-service doctrine coordinator, USMC Doctrine Control Branch, received 29 September 2011.
6. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 August 2011).
7. Comments provided by Army terminologist in July 2010 and October 2011.
8. Information obtained by interviewing various doctrinal authorities within CADD.
Doctrine 2015 is a strategy for producing a body of operational knowledge that is relevant, timely, and accessible. Doctrine 2015 leverages technology to incorporate Soldier and leader input rapidly, reduce doctrine development time, and exploit digital publishing capabilities. Doctrine 2015 will reduce the number and length of doctrinal publications. Revisions and changes will take less time, but no enduring doctrinal principles will be lost. Doctrine 2015 will integrate operational knowledge rapidly into the professional military education system.

Doctrine 2015 will organize operational knowledge into four new categories: Army doctrine publications (ADPs), Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP$s), field manuals (FMs), and Army techniques publications (ATPs).

How the Army obtains and delivers information will change. Collaborative technology will enhance doctrine development. In addition, doctrinal digital applications will enable Soldiers to access doctrinal information in a repository through a portable digital device such as a smartphone or tablet computer.

Doctrine 2015 is a significant departure from the way doctrine has been developed in the past. Changing times, technical advances, demands from the field, and changing operational environments prompted these significant and necessary improvements. The Army’s need to teach enduring lessons and adopt new concepts remains constant.

For additional information on Doctrine 2015 visit:

Address all comments and questions to:
usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil

The proponent for Doctrine 2015 is the Combined Arms Center:
A Leader’s Grief
T.E. Lawrence, Leadership, and PTSD
James J. Schneider, Ph.D.

I had believed these misfortunes of the Revolt to be due mainly to faulty leadership, Arab and English. So I went down to Arabia to see and consider its great men.

— T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom

Leadership is perhaps the most human imperative. Without leaders—without purpose, direction, and motivation—society as we know it would not exist. Leadership is a fundamental birthright that at one time or another we are all called upon to exercise as leaders and followers. Both roles demand personal character and professional competence.

Leadership at its core is a harmonious blend of character and competence, with character expressed as a person’s virtue, personality, and especially identity, and competence manifested as the ability to decide and act when confronted with problems. Although men long understood that character was a key component of leadership, they later realized that there was another equally necessary component, competence, the ability to make informed rational judgments about choices. Throughout much of history, competence was conflated and folded into the rubric of genius. However, as warfare became increasingly more complex, because of the Industrial Revolution, training and education had to greatly supplement a leader’s “genius.”

By the end of the 19th century, awareness of the psychological dimension of leadership grew, especially as it related to character. Out of this milieu emerged a leader who served two combat “tours” of duty in the Middle East and struggled with many of the same issues our leaders—military and civilian—struggle with today: Thomas Edward (T.E.) Lawrence, known to history as Lawrence of Arabia. An accomplished diplomat, strategist, literateur, and peacemaker, he fought in the Arabian Desert for Arab freedom during World War I. Four times wounded, he struggled with the horrors of psychological shock, the uncertainty of operating within an alien culture, and the usual burdens of protracted conflict. Throughout the long war, he strove to maintain his effectiveness as a compassionate and charismatic leader, but at a high personal cost.
Thus, the story offered here is about a leader’s grief: about how Lawrence eloquently expressed that grief and how he managed to deal with it. Lawrence’s experience provides a unique historical perspective into the least known or discussed social and psychological dynamics of wartime leadership. Although there are many books written about him, few address the leadership of T.E. Lawrence in any detail. (However, see the author’s Guerilla Leader: T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, Bantam/Random House, November 2011). Largely expressed through his own words, immortalized in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, his sensitive personal reflections portray the heavy emotional burden and internal turmoil borne of leadership. Lawrence experienced symptoms we now recognize as associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These symptoms directly challenged the integrity of Lawrence’s character and identity and threatened to subvert his ability to lead.

**Modern War and Heroic Virtue**

Remarkably, most studies on PTSD rarely deal with the condition among officers, largely because of a professional paradox and an institutional bias that do not admit its existence. Today, to a large extent, military leaders—and leaders in general—still operate under the Achilles or Hector paradigm of heroic leadership, not that of Odysseus or Lawrence. In reality, the dawn of modern industrialized warfare has since rendered heroic leadership inadequate to meet the challenges of protracted war and persistent conflict. The heroic leader and his troops no longer struggle on the fields of Waterloo maintaining unflinching courage and bravery for a morning or afternoon. Instead, today’s modern, prolonged fights erode all the heroic virtues. The modern carnage of war devours the old warrior ethos and eats away at the warrior’s very soul and sanity.

The psychological aspect of war, the emotional devastation it leaves among returning troops—the “grief of soldiers,” a phrase coined by Chaim F. Shatan in 1973—has been slowly recognized and formalized as PTSD. However, there is little mention of its qualitatively different manifestation, among leaders as a grief of leaders because of the cult of the heroic leader who as the consummate tactician never flinches in battle and who never shows weakness. The leader who shows weakness of any sort is deemed unworthy and unfit to lead. Thus, the leader remains silent.

Lawrence was perhaps the first leader to break that silence when he spoke so articulately of the corrosive effects of protracted war on the mind and the leader’s ability to lead. His book is a challenge to all institutions, including the military, to reconsider their leadership ethos. Today’s leaders can no longer stand silent and alone, for long.

The military leader stands between the men he leads and the character of his own integral identity and self-worth. As such, the leader is a mediator between the interior, personal realm and the exterior, social world in which he leads. Lawrence operated in both domains. World War I’s protracted flux put Lawrence under enough stress to threaten the collapse of his leadership ability. Lawrence operated in a vortex of fatigue, fear, anxiety, horror, and loss while among the Arabs, a stranger leading strangers in a strange land. Yet, through all the challenges to his direction and guidance, Lawrence for the most part maintained a rock-like stability within himself and among those he led. Only with the insight of modern psychology and sociology can we begin to appreciate the full measure of his accomplishments

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence.
as a leader and recognize the emotional price of his success; that price I have called the leader’s grief. T.E. Lawrence grew out of a unique cultural milieu, which shaped his character, ultimately making him the leader he became. Hundreds of years of English culture had placed great emphasis on the idea of the heroic leader as the natural exemplar of military leadership. We study the Great Men of history intensely for insights into leadership and into those qualities of character that made average leaders special. Men like Achilles, Xenophon, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Caesar, and a host of others brought the English to rely heavily on the humanities as a great font of historical revelation. Along the way, they developed a rudimentary psychology of human behavior based largely on the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and mythic power of Homer. A powerful leavening of Christian orthodoxy also contributed to these ideas.

At the same time, it was understood, though perhaps vaguely, that a person’s character was also the irreducible expression of his personal identity and self-worth: all those characteristics that marked the person as a unique individual, distinct and distinguishable from another. Over time, the West recognized a certain set of qualities as especially desirable for a leader to possess. These noble qualities or virtues made a person particularly worthy; those who lacked these singular traits were deemed base and unworthy. According to this view, most men were born naturally into the realm of high character through noble birth and the grace of God. There was no reason for the lowborn and base to develop qualities through personal growth and improvement because Providence had foreordained their diminished lot in life.

The coming of the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries fundamentally challenged this view. Enlightenment scholars argued that man had the opportunity and even the obligation to create his own identity through personal growth and intervention in the world. No longer preordained to a particular fate, he could develop himself through education and self-improvement. The world suddenly opened up to the belief in a meritocracy that went well beyond the notions of birthright and nobility—now any man might be king.

Questions remained, however, as to the particular virtues toward which one ought to aspire. For most, the answer was simple—only the virtues of the heroic leader were worthy of emulation: courage, self-sacrifice, honesty, fortitude, bravery, duty, charity, compassion, and the like. Education and strong doses of religion would guide the lay acolyte to the Elysian Fields of noble character and offer him the mantle of leadership.

The Industrial Revolution

Then, suddenly, the material influence of the Industrial Revolution overturned 4,000 years of warfare in a very brief time. Just as dramatic, but in a more subtle and elusive fashion, it also transformed the psycho-dynamics of warfare forever. Even as early as the American Civil War, glimpses of the future were already evident in the protracted nature of the emerging conflict. Soldiers now engaged in battles and engagements of interminable duration. Previously, most battles ended quickly in a morning or afternoon of fighting, but toward the end of the Civil War troops engaged for weeks and months in the trenches. By the end of the first year of World War I, the endless battle was commonplace.

The psychological effects on the soldier were profound. Civil War observers began to speak of “soldiers’ melancholia,” an early reference to what would become known as post-traumatic stress disorder. Before the Industrial Revolution took hold in the 19th century, martial virtue demanded that soldiers be brave, courageous, bold, and all the rest for a few short hours. Now, under modern conditions, the soldier had to maintain his martial character for weeks, months, and even years—if he was lucky enough to survive. During Lawrence’s war, military doctors began to observe more cases of what they referred to as “shell shock,” believing its cause the result of weak character. It would take over 60 years before military medicine would truly understand the psycho-dynamics of shell shock, and the profession was none too pleased when confronted with its reality, for the results challenged the viability of its age-old warrior ethos.
Pioneering work by researchers like Chaim F. Shatan, Jonathan Shay, and others helped to transform the central features of the post-Vietnam syndrome into the more rigorous formalization of post-traumatic stress disorder. Its main symptoms include—

- Loss of control and authority over common mental functions, especially the reliability of memory and perception.
- Self-punishment and feelings of guilt.
- Rage and other violent impulses against indiscriminate targets.
- Combat brutalization and its attendant, “psychic numbing.”
- Alienation from one’s own feelings and from other people.
- Substance abuse.
- Anxiety and apprehension about the continued ability to love and trust others.
- Persistent expectations of betrayal and exploitation leading to the destruction of the capacity for social trust.
- Suicidality and feelings of despair, isolation, and meaninglessness.

Throughout most of his later life, T.E. Lawrence manifested many, if not most, of these symptoms. Though most biographers attribute much of Lawrence’s quirkiness to his “genius,” in fact as a combat veteran of a long war, he was struggling against the ravages of PTSD, and his struggle began in the Arabian Desert. Lawrence’s grief is a particular type of psychological anguish and suffering shared by all modern combat leaders who undergo protracted, catastrophic, and traumatic war experiences.

Every individual is a social and moral construction who builds his identity upon what is right and what is wrong. Culture, society, and family decide what is right and what is wrong and create the individual in their own moral image. As the person grows older, morality, identity, and self-worth become an irreducible whole that constitutes the integrity of the individual and the foundation of his personal character. Thus, challenges to our ideas of “what’s right” become threats to our personal identity and sense of worth and value. In Lawrence’s case, the Sykes-Picot Treaty—a diplomatic agreement between France and Great Britain over the final disposition of Arab territories after the war which Lawrence viewed as a sell-out of the Revolt—becomes a betrayal of “what’s right” and an event that threatened his identity and character as a leader. Throughout his book, we see him struggle to maintain his moral and psychological integrity during the long desert war. Finally, on the road to Damascus, a momentary collapse occurs. Berserker rage overwhelms his moral integrity, and the massacre at Tafas ensues—dramatically recreated in the 1962 film, Lawrence of Arabia. Essentially, Lawrence loses his ability to lead.

**Lawrence the Survivor**

The final years of Lawrence’s life were very much like those of many a modern veteran who returns from a long and brutal war: he seeks reintegration of his moral self into society and he seeks redemption for his guilt. Perhaps it is no accident that Lawrence would spend nearly three years translating The Odyssey, a story of another veteran seeking a way home through moral redemption. Psychiatrists have also pointed out that writing about one’s wartime experiences creates a “healing narrative” and helps the veteran reconstruct...
his shattered identity into some semblance of its former whole. The idea reminds us as well that to heal is to make whole again. Thus, Lawrence’s writing *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* must have been a very therapeutic process for him.

All veterans like Lawrence are survivors of their experiences. Many of these episodes have been dramatically captured by researchers. However, there is relatively little consideration given to the effects of PTSD or its manifestation among combat leaders. Indeed, there lies a fundamental and complex paradox: first, the leader—even today still under the ethos of the leader as heroic warrior—would seldom admit to any psychological devastation of his own, for to do so would be an acknowledgment of weakness and to be weak is to be unworthy to lead. The second part of the paradox has to do with the psycho-dynamics of modern, persistent conflict: the longer the leader leads, the more his personal identity and his moral character are likely to erode. At present, there are no known remedies that address this riddle. Leaders lead until the enemy kills them or they burn themselves out. This is the ethos of heroic leadership that worked well when battles were of short duration and decided in an afternoon. Under modern, protracted conditions of warfare, the idea of withdrawing leaders from combat for long periods of rehabilitation will be resisted, ironically, by all good leaders, not to mention the military institutions that perpetuate, and are gatekeepers of, the heroic warrior ethos.

Although Lawrence resolutely met the challenge of battle straight on, he also contended with another demand that caused perhaps as much psychological and emotional stress as deadly combat itself—leading a national revolt among a primitive nation whose moral construction was alien to almost everything he knew. (Our leaders today also struggle with this complexity.)

Culture would determine “what’s right” and create essential differences between the character of Lawrence and his Arab followers. Lawrence had to transcend two distinct cultural challenges: Arab social culture and conventional military culture. Ultimately, he struggled trying to solve this “problem of problems,” how to make a long journey across two cultural “voids.”

Lawrence worked on a broad canvas in the Middle East during the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918. Here his media of expression were the space, time, and mass of the military artist: the desert vault, battle time, and the armed Bedouin. Perhaps Lawrence’s greatest military achievement was the bending of these disparate media to his will. His greatest challenge was in shaping the living medium of the Bedouin. In doing so, Lawrence shaped and transformed his own identity and character.

“I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger,” he writes, “unable to think their thoughts or subscribe to their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England. If I could not assume their character, I could at least conceal my own, and pass among them without evident friction, neither a discord nor a critic but an unnoticed influence.”

Working a crimson canvas, he noted, “Blood was always on our hands: we were licensed to it. Wounding and killing seemed ephemeral pains, so very brief and sore was life with us. . . . We lived for the day and died for it. When there was reason and desire to punish, we wrote our lesson with gun or whip immediately in the sullen flesh of the sufferer, and the case was beyond repeal.”

The price? “Bedouin ways were hard even for those brought up to them, for strangers terrible: a death in life. When the march or labor ended I had no energy to record sensation, nor while it lasted any leisure to see the spiritual loveliness which sometimes came upon us by the way. In my notes, the cruel rather than the beautiful found place.”

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*Here his media of expression were the space, time, and mass of the military artist: the desert vault, battle time, and the armed Bedouin.*
Lawrence wrote that he led a “Yahoo life,” having bartered his soul to “a brute-master.” Lawrence’s expression of grief here is very much reminiscent of veterans returning home from Vietnam. We see, for instance, a similar story played in the case of John Paul Vann during Vietnam.

To lead the Arab against the Arab’s will, Lawrence became more like an Arab: “In my case, the effort for these years to live in the dress of Arabs, and to imitate their mental foundation, quit me of my English self, and let me look at the West and its conventions with new eyes: they destroyed it all for me. At the same time I could not sincerely take on the Arab skin: it was an affectation only.”

Lawrence persisted in a kind of dual state of cultural existence: “Sometimes these selves would converse in the void; and then madness was very near, as I believe it would be near the man who could see things through the veils at once of two customs, two educations, two environments.”

The “problem of problems,” how Lawrence was able to make the long journey across two cultural “voids,” is a large question his book sought to explore. Paradoxically, the cross-cultural role Lawrence played among the Arabs also began to subvert his own character and ability to lead as it eroded his own personal identity.

In the 19th century, Lawrence’s noted fellow soldier and fellow citizen, Sir William Francis Butler, wrote, “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.” Butler’s statement reminds us of the importance of the intimate and dynamic connection between learning and leading. Knowledge serves as an antidote to the consequences of interminable war. We have learned the hard lesson from Vietnam that education is an important inoculation against PTSD. Hard learning strengthens the mind to resist the shock and trauma of combat. Combat experience is the other antidote to the trauma of battle shock. Institutionally, we have made major strides with our soldiers, but the leader needs our help at this crucial stage of our Army’s history. MR.

Lawrence on a Brough Superior SS100. In May of 1935, while riding his motorcycle in Dorset, Lawrence swerved to avoid two boys on bicycles. His death due to this accident prompted calls for motorcyclists to wear helmets.
Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths,
Our bruised arms hung up for monuments,
Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings,
Our dreadful marches to delightful measures.
Grim-visage war hath smoothed his wrinkled front,
And now—instead of mounting barbèd steeds
To fright the souls of fearful adversaries—
He capers nimbly in a lady’s chamber
To the lascivious pleasing of a lute.

William Shakespeare
Richard III, Act I, Scene I.

Victor D. Comras, a leading expert on international sanctions and the global effort to combat terrorism and money laundering, writes a fascinating book about the history of the United Nations’ (UN) involvement in combating terrorism to the present day. Epitomized by a legacy of agonizing bureaucratic inertia, the UN lacks a coherent policy, capacity, and general will to effectively address global terrorism, which is undermining international peace and security. In support of his thesis, Comras details the UN’s experience in addressing terrorism—everything from the lack of a generally accepted definition of what actually constitutes terrorism and its consequences on policy development, to poorly crafted and unexecutable UN resolutions. Comras notes that no UN secretary general has willingly made countering terrorism his top priority. Secretary Kurt Waldheim had the issue thrust upon him by the Munich Olympics attack in 1972, as did Secretary Kofi Annan as a result of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Combating terrorism is also a distracter to eliminating global poverty and improving the general health and quality of life of the world’s disadvantaged.

One of numerous striking bits of research in Comras’s book is that regardless of UN objectives in combating terrorism, state objectives and competing interests (e.g., political and economic) always rule the day (i.e., one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter). Thus, it becomes next to impossible to gain consensus—particularly among security council members—that leads to enough fruitful traction to make a meaningful difference in countering terrorism. Comras details numerous cases to support this assertion, from Libya and Afghanistan to Sudan and Lebanon. The cases alone make the book valuable for the right audience.

Flawed Diplomacy is an informative, well-articulated, and thoroughly researched summary of the major events and lost opportunities that led to the current quagmire the UN faces in dealing with terrorism. It thoroughly drives home the UN’s ineptness in this endeavor. Although Comras makes substantive recommendations on how the UN can “right the ship” (e.g., through building capacity, providing clarity of effort, promoting cooperation and information sharing, and independently monitoring UN resolutions), he leaves little hope for the organization’s success going forward.

The book is not for general readership. It is best read by military and interagency professionals, international relations and political science students/academics, and others interested in a detailed understanding of the challenges facing the international community in collectively countering terrorism.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


This important, thought-provoking book examines how modern warfare, especially asymmetric conflict, continues to challenge the way we practice and think about war. Michael L. Gross goes well beyond what the book’s subtitle suggests by addressing several different types of asymmetric conflict with an emphasis on legal and ethical issues and the slow evolution of “support” for previously banned practices in warfare.

Gross is an accomplished author who specializes in military ethics and military medical ethics. He combines his skills as a historian and political scientist to communicate the relevance of this subject for today’s political and military leaders as they balance military necessity against standards of humanity during armed conflict.

Gross reviews and defines the established standards, norms, and prohibitions of warfare outlined in numerous legal documents, international treaties, and conventions. With this historical context, he transitions from the strategic level to the tactical level without losing clarity when he compares aspects of conventional and asymmetric warfare and how the role and status of both combatants and noncombatants has changed over time. Gross discusses moral dilemmas and paradoxes that asymmetric conflict presents to leaders, but particularly relevant are his discussions of targeting, the combatant/noncombatant blur, and torture. International law prohibits and condemns assassination, so why is targeted killing an acceptable practice in asymmetric conflict? The humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians is a core tenet of international law, so why are interrogation torture and the deliberate targeting of civilians condoned in asymmetric warfare? Gross answers these questions and reveals how asymmetric conflict impugns the acceptable norms and conventions of international humanitarian law and the Laws of Armed Conflict. In the last third of the book, perhaps the most valuable, Gross provides a model for leaders to evaluate proposed tactics,
BOOK REVIEWS


Few Americans can imagine a world not dominated by American power and influence. For the past six-and-a-half decades, America’s leadership—economic, military, cultural—has been so comprehensive that American exceptionalism is now the operating assumption of almost all living Americans.

In his latest book, Michael Mandelbaum lays out the reasons for America’s future decline: chronic deficit spending, the expense of aging baby boomers, our extravagant import-driven consumerism, our addiction to foreign oil, and, alas, the rise of China. But having made the case, Mandelbaum then disappoints the reader by failing to vividly describe the world—domestically or internationally—that will be created by America’s imminent decline. Will the world become leaderless and anarchic, as happened when Rome fell? Or will a new hegemon, namely China, fill the vacuum left by American implosion and reorder the world to suit its purposes? How does America craft policies with declining foreign policy and military resources to avoid these nightmarish alternative futures?

Unfortunately, Mandelbaum offers very little in the way of prognosis or prescription.

Mandelbaum also irritates by becoming preoccupied with the Middle East. His main policy recommendation is that the United States weaken Israel’s enemies—Iran and the Gulf Arab states—by reducing our domestic demand for petroleum, thereby lowering global oil prices and harming the petro-dictators’ energy export-dependant economies. In his key point, Mandelbaum reveals how much he lives in the


“War alters the shape of our families, communities and nation . . . It matters, and soldiers’ stories tell us why and how. Then and now, we have to listen.”

Welcome to the Suck is a must read for the American public and anyone interested in the emerging war narrative of our country’s experience in Iraq. For most members of the military, the “suck” of Iraq is obvious, but not so for the American public. Welcome to the Suck provides a great window through which to view the Iraq experience from the most important perspective—through the eyes of those who served there. The pictures these soldiers’ stories paint “matter” and are finding their way into our culture’s literary consciousness. The varied sources Peebles surveys appeal to all interests, spanning from novels to poetry to films and video interviews with veterans. The book does more than merely list various authors and summarize their writing; it compares and contrasts the works with writings and films from other conflicts. By doing this, Peebles aids the reader in understanding how the Iraq experience has shaped these writers and potentially our nation’s view of the conflict. Welcome to the Suck shows veterans and citizens alike where the Iraq conflict is establishing itself in our literary history.

Peebles discusses the foundation of these war stories from Iraq, arguing that many of the authors obtained their view of war from stories that emerged from previous conflicts. She says the most powerful influences were from Desert Storm and Vietnam narratives. However, the tales from Iraq have taken on a unique flavor that is a departure from the style of previous narratives.

One of the most interesting departures Peebles discusses is from a literary trope used in numerous Vietnam stories where a key character either asks to be killed or someone asks to be killed by them. This trope is interpreted as a device used by those authors to address the “moral ambiguities of that conflict.” The Iraq version also deals with moral ambiguity, but this device usually surrounds the death of a child often as part of a spurt of the moment interpretation of the rules of engagement. Peebles discusses this moral ambiguity in numerous sources, one such being Nathaniel Fick’s One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer. Fick observes, “I was learning that choices in war are rarely between good and bad, but rather between bad and worse.” For many who have grappled with the myriad wicked problems in Iraq, this observation will especially resonate.

Welcome to the Suck is for anyone interested in gaining an understanding of the emerging literary narrative of the Iraq conflict. For military and civilian alike, the book guides the reader through the unique perspectives of the stories’ authors. These American military storytellers have an important story to tell and, as Peebles quotes Linda Loman in Death of a Salesman, “attention must be paid.”

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
past, when growing American oil imports drove global energy prices. Today, China, India, and the other “developing” economies are the growth markets for Middle Eastern energy, largely insulating Gulf producers from American domestic energy policy.

We have coasted on our World War II victory as long as we can. There was a time in the late 1940s when American power was unlimited. With the only economy and global governance system that really worked, America could extend security guarantees to Europe, North Asia, the Middle East, and other places as well. Now, declining American prosperity and power will invite our international rivals to rollback our post-World War II expansion. Mandelbaum quite rightly notes the Russian threat to Europe and the Chinese designs in Asia. But he never considers that Americans might find themselves unable to continue to finance their costly and contradictory policies in the Middle East. As we move from a grand strategy of strategic offense to strategic defense, inevitably we will have to write off some of our former core interests as no longer affordable.

Global power requires money—lots of it—and China’s pockets are now far deeper than ours. Serving out our latest humiliation, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao flew to Pakistan in December 2010 and handed out a whopping $30 billion in aid and investment deals, dwarfing America’s far smaller attempts to encourage Pakistani friendship. As our global rival buys the favor of Pakistan, what becomes the future of our costly investment in Afghanistan? Perhaps America can maintain superpower status on a limited budget. Certain wastefulness could be eliminated, common sense could be restored to our fiscal and foreign policies, and unwise promises could be broken or renegotiated. But that would mean making hard foreign policy choices, something Americans haven’t done in decades.

Mandelbaum’s book can only be considered a rudimentary introduction to the severe problems undermining America’s global position. For many prospective readers, even recognizing America’s deteriorating status may be a step toward reality. But serious readers will want to move much further and explore a more cogent strategy to ensure continued American prosperity and global influence. These readers will likely find Mandelbaum’s work incomplete.

LTC Stephen L. Melton, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**DEFIANT FAILED STATE:**

In *Defiant Failed State*, Bruce Bechtol argues that North Korea, despite its current economic problems, international isolation, and image as a failed state, still poses a serious threat to America’s national security interests, not only on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia but also internationally, and the threat is more than just nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Bechtol addresses four areas where North Korea threatens America’s national interests: North Korea’s conventional military, the proliferation of weapons and weapons technology, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and issues regarding the succession plan for North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il. Analysts and specialists who deal in North Korea, regional affairs, and national security are the book’s primary audience.

North Korea’s conventional military, although overshadowed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, is still a major threat, and it has been able to maintain that threat in spite of its economic problems. North Korea threatens America’s interests in key areas of the world, such as the Middle East, by its proliferation of weapons and weapons technology. Iran and groups such as Hezbollah have benefited from their association with North Korea. Bechtol focuses his discussion of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program on the U.S. attempt through six-party talks to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon program. The book takes a critical view of the Bush administration’s conduct during these talks and blames it as much as the North Koreans for the talks’ failure. The last area Bechtol discusses is Kim Jong-il’s succession plan and why, due to Kim Jong-il being the center of all power, it is key to maintaining stability in North Korea and preventing the possible collapse of the country.

Bechtol’s conclusion on how to best deal with the North Korean threat is that “the ROK-U.S. alliance will be the key in defending the South Korean landmass” and in “protecting Seoul’s and Washington’s interests in the region.” The book concludes using instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) to analyze how North Korea uses its own instruments of national power to be a threat to the United States.

*Defiant Failed State* presents many good points. The discussion on the ROK-U.S. alliance brings up many issues that need to be discussed regarding the path forward, especially the need for South Korea to upgrade its own military forces. One question that arises from the book, though the author never asks it, is what does the United States gain from North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program if North Korea stays involved in nuclear weapons programs with nations such as Iran?

One shortcoming is the book’s poor-quality graphics. However, the biggest is that *Defiant Failed State* appears to be an update of Bechtol’s 2007 book, *Red Rouge*.

Overall, *Defiant Failed State* is worth reading by those interested in North Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance, Northeast Asia, or national security issues, and those who have not read *Red Rouge*.

MAJ Brent A. Stedry, USA, Pyeongtaek, Korea
BOOK REVIEWS


Lieutenant Colonel Erik A. Claessen’s Stalemate: An Anatomy of Conflicts Between Democracies, Islamists, and Muslim Autocrats is an outstanding treatise on the workings of modern Muslim societies from socio-political and military standpoints. He delineates the relationships of Muslim countries’ (primarily Middle Eastern) governments to the West and each other. He describes why they act the way they do: seemingly irrational to Westerners yet logical within the parameters of their beliefs. Claessen uses current and historical examples to illustrate his case.

Stalemate is a good text for use in captains career courses and higher and should be a definite read for all Army staff college students as part of their initial introduction to the operating environment. Claessen describes what he calls the “three systems”—Muslim autocrats, Islamists, and democracies. He summarizes the main points in each chapter to avoid doubt as to his explanations. One suggestion might be for readers to start at the glossary, where he defines the key terms.

Claessen begins his book by defining the operational environment and the historical relationships between the three systems. Recurring themes in the book are that Islamists cannot prevail over Muslim autocrats; Muslim autocrats lose against Western democracies; Islamists grow and thrive under Western rule; in conflicts between them, democracies, Muslim autocrats, and Islamists can win against one of the two, but not against both; and each party can attain limited objectives, only to find that ideal objectives are unobtainable. Claessen’s supports these theses through analyses and examples from the last 40 years, with particular attention to the last 10.

Claessen ends his book with a chapter for which the book is named. Its theme is directed at breaking the “stalemate” that comes from the West’s inability to grasp the realities of Muslim perceptions and behaviors based on their socio-religious worldviews. The last chapter might be best summarized: “Democracies need to realize that in stability operations involving Islamists and Muslim autocrats all activities are antagonistic, even collaboration and humanitarian assistance.” He provides recommendations that complement our stability and counterinsurgency doctrine; to wit: not all solutions are military and war exists on many different levels such as in the economic realm. Using a non-Muslim example, he shows how counterinsurgency in El Salvador parallels the Muslim countries that the United States is involved with. He gives advice that is painfully applicable to our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Stalemate provides a baseline understanding of Muslim politics and societies in an operational environment that many Westerners still do not understand. Claessen does this in a concise and logical manner. His descriptions of the historical and contextual backgrounds of Muslims through his personal experiences and studies makes the book a valuable resource for all military officers.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


Conflicts of the world cannot usually be solved with large-scale military intervention. The use of military force must be precise and calculated, including the elimination of threats with limits on collateral damage. During the U.S. military’s quest for usable weapons, “we must strive to make the best possible weapon tailored for the fight on today’s battlefields.” Both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have stressed the need to keep civilian casualties to a minimum, while still accomplishing the mission.

David A. Koplow’s Death by Moderation underlines the importance of paying attention to how the United States modernizes its weapon systems. Koplow’s topics include antipersonnel land mines, nuclear weapons, and emerging technologies labeled as nonlethal weapons. He also discusses law of armed conflict and military affairs, outlining how the United States fights today’s wars and how operations will be conducted and new weapons will be used by future forces. The author’s coverage of these topics is indicative of his substantial knowledge of these problems. The topics are relevant to the defense community.

Koplow believes in the more precise use of force and reduced collateral damage caused by the weapons of our future. However, the deterrence associated with large explosive-power weapons is lost when weapons are made for use against pinpoint targets. The use of such weapons by countries around the world may replace the need for more powerful weapons, thereby decreasing the self-deterrence or reluctance to use weapons in retaliation. The frequency of wars around the world may increase and the military advantage held by some countries may be lost. A balanced approach in developing new technologies and maintaining certain traditional military advantages should always be practiced.

CPT Steven C. Loos, USA, RC-North, Afghanistan


Shawn Engbrecht’s America’s Covert Warriors is a comprehensive look at private military contracting with first-person narratives from various contributors, with statistical data and personal opinions that make for an interesting read. As a
former U.S. Army soldier, experienced private contractor, and the founder of the Center for Advanced Security Studies, Engbrecht uses his experiences to reinforce many crucial arguments. The author discusses the successful employment of private military contracting firms in such roles or activities as conducting personal security detachments, exchanging fire with a fledgling insurgency in Iraq, training law enforcement and military units in Afghanistan, or fighting back rebel forces in Africa. Unfortunately, as in most cases dealing with combat, successes are counterbalanced with failures that have impacted negatively on the contemporary operating environment. Such was the case with the 2007 Blackwater team’s shooting of civilians in Baghdad. Groups meant to fill gaps in military capabilities (whether providing logistical support to units in the field, training a host nation force, or providing security for reconstruction projects) have grown in number and expanded their roles, taking in billions of taxpayer dollars.

Engbrecht incorporates anecdotal narratives with logical opinions to form arguments for private military contractor reform. Engbrecht takes readers through the creation, utilization, and ultimate expansion of the private military contractor industry over the last three decades. He divides the industry into three categories: logistical, advisory, and operational, all of which need more stringent oversight and regulation. The question becomes: How do you regulate an industry that has seen record growth, record profit, and bases everything on the bottom dollar?

The author presents two options for creating reform and bringing the private military contractors under control. Both options would revolutionize the industry of private contracting. The first proposal is for the industry to self-regulate, which would prevent external interference. It would include standardizing hiring requirements, training, equipment, legal restrictions, and company policies, the use of foreign persons, and interaction with the military, and would provide a strict framework from which private military contractors would have to operate. A second and more invasive technique, but less popular with contractors and stockholders, would be to create a “contractor army” within the Department of Defense. Each contractor would operate similar to a guardsman, that is, operating when called up. Engbrecht estimates that possibly 90 percent of the industry problems would vanish and the total cost of operations could be reduced by nearly 50 percent. Regardless of the reform method, the author argues that private contractors need a complete shake-up in order to bring integrity, professionalism, and respectability back to the industry. This informative book paints a thorough picture of “big business” in combat. What’s evident is that the Department of Defense has positioned itself to always need contracted support and that that support needs oversight. Without reform, contractors will continue to care more about making profit and less about accountability and professionalism.

CPT Scott Bailey, USA, Afghanistan


The Twilight of the Bombs is historian Richard Rhode’s conclusion to his tetralogy that began with the Pulitzer Prize-winning The Making of the Atomic Bomb. Twilight has the usual strong attributes that characterize Rhodes’s scholarship—solid research, intriguing detail, and an engagingly well-written story. Twilight’s emphasis is on the collapse of the Soviet Union and the removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, the ongoing nuclear crisis with North Korea, and the search for weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Rhodes argues that the possibility of rogue organizations obtaining some form of nuclear explosive device has greatly increased. No one is better than Rhodes at making understandable the complex technical aspects of nuclear weapons production.

Rhodes disregards the argument that the bomb has acted as a deterrent because of the possibility of accidental or inadvertent use, but recognizes that nuclear weapons dictated policies of caution. These horrific weapons were factors in bringing about limited war in Korea and Vietnam. Rhodes also does not adequately weigh the risks of maintaining a nuclear arsenal against the possibility that a nuclear-free world would increase the possibility of horrendous conventional warfare, wars like the long brutal Iran-Iraq war. The bomb may have deterred great power war, but it has shifted killing to the developing world—mass murder by machete.

Are nukes trump? Iran and Syria likely pursue an atomic bomb for a number of reasons including prestige and regional dominance, but more importantly, they want the bomb because without it they feel vulnerable to the overwhelming superiority of U.S. conventional forces. The take down of Iraq in a matter of days was not lost on those who would challenge the United States. But, the question of how and if “the bomb” has worked as a deterrent has always been a difficult and highly controversial case to make. Simply dismissing opposing arguments as “nuclearist sophistry” won’t do.

For all the book’s apparent strengths, the underlying plot is a tale of pulp fiction, a series of missed opportunities to achieve nuclear disarmament. The spoilers are H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, and the two evil-policy twins Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who over their long careers repeatedly derailed chances to move toward even greater reductions of nuclear weapons. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Rhodes argues, was a missed window of genuine opportunity. H.W. Bush did well.
with the ex-Soviet republics, but then floundered. Further, Rhodes maintains that the Bushes oversold weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, using the same techniques Truman used to sell the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill and the Marshall Plan.

The war scare of 1983 provoked by the military exercise Abel Archer and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis could have brought Armageddon. However, it is important to stress that while it could have happened, it did not. Sixty-five years of nuclear weapon nonuse is not insignificant, although there is no guarantee that in the future they will not be used. Nuclear armament is a big story, an important story, but only a portion of the even bigger story of the last century. The number of Japanese victims of the bomb pale in comparison to victims of conventional warfare. The tragedy of the 20th century is not just nuclear weapons. It’s the 100-million plus deaths over ideology fought with conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, a long war fought over the way humanity would be politically organized.

Rhodes passionately weighs in on the future of nuclear weapons. From his point of view these weapons will be done away with and humans will look back on the “insanity” of those dark years when mankind lived under the threat of annihilation. He believes nuclear weapons will come to be considered a crime against humanity.

Maybe, but presently that wish appears quite doubtful. 

_Hal Elliott Wert_,
_Kansas City, Missouri_


Given the current international security environment—especially with the recent political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa—few have taken the time to reflect on the meaning or events of the Cold War. When they do, it is often with feelings of nostalgia for the “good old days” of the dangerous, yet supposedly simpler and more predictable decades spanning 1945 to 1991.

James E. Wise, Jr., and Scott Baron’s _Dangerous Games: Faces, Incidents, and Casualties of the Cold War_ is not a mere nostalgia trip but a series of vignettes that put a human face on key (and not so key) events of the Cold War. It provides the antithesis for the “good old days” retrospective and reminds us of the constant tensions that existed in the global environment. Given the six-decade span of the Cold War, it is remarkable that the superpowers could exercise such restraint.

The tale of Yuri Gagarin, Russian cosmonaut and first man in space, is particularly intriguing, as the authors do well to remove the veneer of “hero of the Soviet Union” and show that Gagarin was indeed mortal, with human weaknesses, and served at the utter whim of the political leadership at the time. Other events are seen through the lens of victims or participants. Examples given are Commander Lloyd Bucher and the USS _Pueblo_ incident, and the Cuban Missile crisis, which focuses on the story of U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot Major Rudolf Anderson, shot down over Cuba while taking high-altitude intelligence imagery of Cuban long-range missile emplacements. The stories are told with sensitivity and compassion and not as a mere recap of facts.

Equally compelling is the story of North Korean defector No Kum-sok (now known as “Kenneth Rowe”), who received $100,000 for perilously delivering a Soviet MiG-15 fighter into U.S. hands in South Korea in 1955. Events like these demonstrate the depth and breadth of the Cold War.

_Dangerous Games_ is not without its flaws. The first name of U-2 pilot Rudolf Anderson is curiously misspelled “Rudolph.” Several vignettes contain overly long quotations, and the book could benefit from an overarching conclusion, which would tie the vignettes together or explain why they were included.

Still, _Dangerous Games_ provides nuance and human context to a period that is seen as stable, predictable, and monolithic. The book is a reminder that the Cold War was fraught with tension and peril and remains worthy of continued study and reflection. It is a quick read and highly recommended as a companion piece to the standard literature for students of the Cold War.

Mark Montesclaros, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


_Marshall: Lessons in Leadership_ is the last book by historian H. Paul Jeffers (who died in December 2009), and is part of a Palgrave series on great generals.

_Marshall_ joins numerous other biographies of General George C. Marshall, who is universally recognized as one of the greatest generals the United States ever produced. For example, Amazon.com lists over 300 books with George Marshall in their titles.

So, what does Jeffers’ book have to say that has not been said in other books on Marshall, including the four-volume biography by the official U.S. Army World War II historian, Forrest Pogue?

_Probably little new historical information about Marshall’s life has been unearthed in this new biography. Nevertheless, it is an engaging, colorful, and eminently readable story about Marshall’s life, his military career, and his triumphs. Organized chronologically, beginning with his 1880 birth in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, the book provides enough information about his childhood and youth to give a sense of him prior to his military career, but not so much as to detract from the part of the story the reader wants to get to—his Army career. Jeffers gets there quickly, recounting Marshall’s early experience as_
a junior officer in “an army that had no enemy.”

Like most military officers prior to the outbreak of World War I, Marshall progressed slowly, but made the most of his early assignments. One of his toughest assignments, according to Marshall, was an order to assist in mapping 2,000 square miles in southwest Texas, near Fort Clark in 1905. In this assignment, he met Malin Craig, who “thirty-four years later would recommend him to be his successor as army chief of staff.”

Marshall’s story reaches its climax as Marshall serves as Army Chief of Staff during World War II. Jeffers puts the reader in the room with Marshall and other colorful characters from the war—men such as President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generals Eisenhower and Patton.

Throughout the book, the author concentrates on Marshall’s temperament—always controlled, never egotistical, mission focused—and his leadership style—quickly identifying officers with talent and high potential and getting them into assignments where they could develop and demonstrate that potential. It is perhaps this “character study” aspect of the book that is the author’s greatest contribution to the understanding of George C. Marshall as a man, a military officer, and a leader. Recommended for all readers.

Clark Capshaw, Ph.D.,
Alexandria, Virginia,


David Sears’ Pacific Air is a work with flaws that undermine the inherent interest and excitement that a book about aerial combat in World War II’s Pacific Theater should generate. The book intertwines the development of the Grumman fighter and attack aircraft beginning in the early 1930s with the experiences of the prewar pilots who tested the planes and the wartime naval aviators who flew them into combat. Pacific Air is light on new knowledge about the Pacific campaign, but it offers a compelling, readable account of aerial combat based largely on memoirs and oral histories. Of interest is the development of tactical training among naval aviators, which allowed them to match and eventually surpass their Japanese foes.

Unfortunately, the book’s strengths cannot fully offset its structure and content problems. Throughout, Sears over-relies on the gimmicky usage of in medias res to drum up excitement among readers. Instead of restricting the use of this device to the beginning of his chapters, he incorporates chronological jumps at multiple points within the same chapter. This constant shifting distracts from Sears’ exciting narrative.

The bigger issue with Pacific Air is Sears’ uneven coverage of the Pacific campaign. For example, he weaves famed Japanese ace Saburo Sakai’s experiences into the narrative even though the bulk of Sakai’s service came against land-based planes and pilots and not against American naval aviators. These passages only briefly describe a Japanese pilot training system that was capable of turning out a small cadre of elite pilots but incapable of matching the growing numbers of well-trained American aviators, such as Alex Vraciu, who were streaming out of state-side aviation schools.

Sears suggests the appearance of the advanced Grumman aircraft and new waves of American pilots turned the tide in the Pacific, but he ignores numerous other game-changers, including vastly improved anti-aircraft gunnery, better radars, and more experienced flight directors. Curiously, Sears ends the narrative with the Battle of the Philippine Sea, even though more than a year of combat and the vexing problem of kamikaze raids against American carriers remained. His 2008 At War With the Wind covers this later period, but not solely from the perspective of American pilots.

Those looking for a concise, readable account of organizational learning and adaptation could do worse than Pacific Air. Those desiring a new perspective on carrier battles of the Pacific theater should look elsewhere.

Ryan Wadle, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Thank heaven for author and benefactor Edward S. Miller and the Naval Institute Press. Here they have underwritten an extremely worthwhile effort by independent scholar Glen M. Williford who has written in the past about harbor and coastal defenses of the United States in the Pacific. Williford’s book grew out of his studies on the extremely contentious issue of the USS Pensacola convoy. The transit of this convoy on 7 December 1941, “Just as the bombs and torpedoes were launched by Japanese warplanes at Pearl Harbor,” is one of the little known stories of World War II in the Pacific. The convoy was completely missed by the Japanese since it had left port several days prior to the attack, but it represented an ongoing full-court press by the Roosevelt administration to beef up our defenses in the Far East, especially in the Philippines. Later, the convoy, which included over 4,500 troops and tons of equipment, became a source of friction between the beleaguered General Douglas MacArthur and the War Department when it was rerouted to Australia to avoid the dangers posed by Japan’s unexpected and rapid successes in the Philippines and elsewhere. The Pensacola convoy served as the occasion for Williford to examine the broader question of U.S. efforts to improve its readiness in the increasingly dark days of late 1941 and early 1942. The book successfully argues that reinforcements like those with the Pensacola served as
the “nucleus of the first successful offensives against Japan.” In other words, at dawn we were not sleeping, rather, we were desperately trying to prepare for a war that could occur at any moment.

This is a complicated story. In making the primary argument above, Williford conclusively demolishes the idea that the Pensacola reinforcements could have prevented the fall of the Philippines and that the rerouting of the convoy by decision makers in Washington and Hawaii was ultimately the wrong decision. However, the book is so much more than just this one story. It is a logistical history of how the equipment, prior to and for a year after the war, was pushed through dangerous waters and skies to everywhere from China, to the Philippines, to Australia, and a host of islands whose names even the serious naval historian may not recall (e.g. Johnston, Palmyra, and Christmas). It also includes some wonderful little stories that are rarely read, such as the heroic performance of U.S. airmen and artillerymen in the hopeless defense of the Dutch East Indies.

Despite these rare treats, it is not a book for general audiences. For researchers this book is a gold mine of tables for equipment, shipping schedules, and aircraft ferry routes so that one can understand the enormity of the challenge faced by the United States in 1940 when it realized how unprepared it was for war in the Far East. This book really gives the reader the story of how and why these often dry and “uninteresting” operations were absolutely critical to the later success of the United States and its Allies in the Pacific. It gives the complete history of the establishment of the logistical basis for a war with only the South Pacific Islands and Australia as forward bases from which to project naval, air, and ground power.

There are some problems with the book. The prose is sometimes extremely dry, and the unending cataloging of the ships’ departures, arrivals, equipment, and routes can be exhausting to a reader looking for a gripping narrative. In other words, one of the book’s main strengths is also one of its weaknesses. This problem is exacerbated by the abrupt ending of the book. It closes with a valuable, detailed, discussion of the early 1942 shipping movements and includes a discussion of the critical Combined Chiefs of Staff ARCADIA conference in Washington from December 1941 to January 1942. However, as it finishes detailing all the various shipping movements, it simply ends. There is no summation of the book's major themes. This is unfortunate, since the central thesis and various subthenses (such as the Pensacola rerouting decision) deserve restatement and emphasis. It seems the publisher perhaps ran out of space or that the author ran out of steam. This criticism aside, the book is a valuable resource that fills an existing gap in the literature on the outbreak of war in the Pacific and is highly recommended for all historians of World War II.

**John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


In a popular and academic world where books on, about, and concerning Hitler have become a cottage industry, it would be logical to conclude that—absent a cache of hidden, genuine documents—everything that could be written about Hitler has already been written. Treatments on him range from the purely factual to the purely hypothetical, and in quality from superb to poor. It is the “stab in the back” myth from after World War I. In his mind, the “simple soldier” viewpoint always trumped that of the over-educated drawing board officers of the general staff.

In his chronological examination of the RIR 16, Weber has exhaustively mined the sources in every available language, and weighed them accordingly. His picture is more narrowly focused than that in either Richard Evans’ or Ian Kershaw’s treatment and is in some ways more vivid. In perhaps the
most chilling part of the book, the author examines the “what happened after” to the Jewish officers and men of Hitler’s regiment. Though most were more directly exposed to enemy fire than Hitler himself (another crucial piece of Hitler’s wartime legend), their fraternal solidarity ties with the Führer did not save them; in almost every case they were exterminated along with millions of others.

It is telling that in an army noted for encouraging and promoting initiative, Hitler never advanced beyond the rank of private despite four years of service and winning the Iron Cross First Class (due as much to his proximity to headquarters as to any other factor). His superiors saw or sensed something in him that prevented it. Their instincts were right. Weber’s treatment of these issues in *Hitler’s First War* is the definitive account of those years that perhaps mattered most.

Mark Hull,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Within a few months of the Battle of Fort Sumter, George B. McClellan’s small army had driven Confederate forces out of western Virginia in the first campaign of the Civil War. After the Northern collapse at First Manassas (Bull Run), Abraham Lincoln needed a successful general to take command of the routed Federal forces, and the Union victories in the mountains of Virginia were enough to put McClellan in command.

McClellan was able to build the Army of the Potomac into an effective fighting force, but Lincoln’s faith in McClellan was at this point the highest it would ever be. McClellan showed himself inept at commanding a large field army and the two men quickly proved that they had little in common besides their loyalty to the Union. John C. Waugh’s *Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General* traces the relationship between the two men back to its roots and explores the problems that plagued the Union high command.

Waugh points out that McClellan’s elite upbringing gave him a superiority complex. There was rarely a time when McClellan did not believe his opinion was the right one. He thought highly of people who agreed with him but considered those who differed with him as inferior, including Lincoln. McClellan had held this opinion since their encounters involving the Illinois Central Railroad before the war.

Lincoln was constantly frustrated with McClellan’s overcautious tendencies. McClellan was constantly overestimating Confederate troop numbers and persistently wiring Lincoln and the War Department for reinforcements. He believed Lincoln was withholding troops. Whenever Lincoln pressed McClellan to move or criticized his strategy, McClellan believed it was an attempt to ruin him and the war effort in order to bring about the abolition of slavery. As a result, he retained a hostile relationship with the president and refused to cooperate.

Lincoln realized that McClellan could keep the army in shape and that the troops held a deep affection for their general. Lincoln was reluctant to remove him after the Battle of Antietam. However, the president was unable to convince the West Pointer to target the Army of Northern Virginia instead of Richmond, and he could not allow McClellan to continually squander opportunities. The two men faced off again in the election of 1864, but it was largely an absentee affair for both. However, it magnified the political differences that Waugh explains divided them since meeting in 1857. McClellan’s refusal to accept abolition and his association with antiwar Democrats condemned him within army ranks.

*Lincoln and McClellan* is an excellent addition to Civil War scholarship. It is clear, concise, and easy to read. Waugh extensively uses letters and correspondence to put the thoughts and feelings of the two men in perspective. He achieves his goal with this book. Students of the Civil War will thoroughly understand why McClellan was incompatible with Lincoln and unfit for high command. The unique nature of the Civil War makes this book an interesting and useful study of how politics, personalities, and military affairs can interact.

**Ryland Breeding,**
Richmond, Virginia


On 25 June 1876, the fate of the 220 troopers of the 7th Cavalry was sealed as General George Armstrong Custer took his command down into the area surrounding Little Bighorn Creek. At the time of the battle, he was regarded as one of the most successful post-Civil War generals of the age.

Although many readers only associate Custer with the massacre at Little Bighorn, his military record up to that point was one of the most popular in our nation’s history. His superiors at the time were also convinced that Custer had the luck, aggressiveness, and supreme self-confidence that could sway any contest. However, on the evening prior to this last battle, his troopers began to share another opinion.

Although successful in many aspects, Custer’s judgement was clouded in this instance by his search for glory and fame. He did not adapt his tactics to those of his enemy. His men realized this just prior to this operation during his absence for a court martial. Although Custer seemed to recognize the danger of his decision when he desperately requested immediate support, his fate was already sealed. This biography encourages us to analyze the leadership elements that led to this massacre in search for lessons learned for future generations.

Charismatic and boyishly charming, Custer was one of the most
controversial and audacious military commanders of the 19th century. No matter what side the reader may take, what cannot be ignored is the effect he has on the tenets of what is truly effective generality. The Civil War was the proving ground of leaders like Custer, and if the analysis stopped there, he would be considered one of the most successful generals of our time. His bravery and dash not only polarized the enemy, but provided evidence that Union commanders could conform to conditions on the battlefield on par with their Confederate counterparts.

During the campaigns against the Indians, however, his reckless disregard for the lives of his men began to detract from his successes. Although he continued to have the support of his superiors, his popularity began to wane. He began to exhibit a general disregard for orders and regulations and a focus on self-promotion and personal interests. Part of the rationale could rest in this new style of warfare. The ferocity of fighting and atrocities committed were of a nature far removed from any of our experience up to that time. Custer, a leader who participated in two separate and distinct conflicts, is trapped in the reputation of his own performance as well as the intricacies of this new style of warfare. Regardless, whether the reader of this biography is a fan of Custer or a critic, the greater lessons he provides are the distinguishing elements of leadership required when faced with changing battlefield conditions and the nature of our own hubris as a result of past success.

LTC Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., USA, Fort Sam Houston, Texas


Reading a history of Alexander the Great might not seem to offer appropriate lessons for modern battlefield leaders. What could someone who dominated his age more than 2,300 years ago teach us? In this modern age of warfare, characterized by technology, raw-base leadership might seem archaic. Bill Yenne’s concise study of Alexander the Great provides today’s leaders with examples of leadership that transcend the centuries. The book should be read by every young officer and studied by all those whose interest in military history stems from their desire to improve their leadership skills.

General Wesley K. Clark’s preface compares Alexander to a quarterback. I would go even farther and call Alexander the Brett Favre of his age. In battles when the initial plan seemed to unravel, Alexander was at his best: improvising, scrambling, and delivering victories based on his instinct and experience. His “on the field” presence inspired all who served with him, and he was always at the critical point of the battlefield. Willing to share the hardships of his men, he drove himself as hard as he drove his soldiers.

A master of maneuver, Alexander not only won the “tactical” battle, but he knew how to relentlessly pursue a defeated enemy until he achieved final victory. Alexander was equally adept at organization, communications, and logistics. Unlike Napoleon in Russia, he reorganized and refitted his army as necessary to ensure his army was adequately equipped and fed. Throughout more than a decade of conflict, he succeeded on the battlefield and as a governor and diplomat.

Alexander was without equal on the battlefield. He dressed conspicuously in his regal armor and hundreds of enemy soldiers would attempt to claim him as their victim. He lost many horses killed beneath him, his breastplate was pierced by a lance, and he shattered numerous spears himself. Alexander’s helmet was once pierced, and he survived only because one of his most trusted lieutenants, Cleitus, saved him, running a spear through the enemy who was attempting to finish off Alexander. Yenne brings the extraordinary clash, the smell, and the sweat of the battlefield to the reader, making this account of ancient combat extremely readable to modern day warriors.

Bill Yenne does another thing not entirely shared by other accounts of Alexander the Great. He offers fair and objective criticisms of Alexander. Most noteworthy is his account of the killing of his trusted lieutenant, Cleitus—some might say his best friend—in a drunken rage. Likewise, Alexander seemed impervious to the fact that many of his original Macedonians had been campaigning for more than 10 years, suffering hardships and battle injuries. They naturally wanted to know when they would return home to their friends and families in Macedonia. Alexander reluctantly went to his tent for hours (other accounts say it was for days) and pouted, finally relenting.

Although Alexander dies at the young age of 32, his legacy as the first of the world’s greatest commanders lives on today. His exploits remain an example for all leaders where tactical and strategic knowledge, physical prowess, and leadership are practiced. He performed these feats in the same crucible as today’s warriors in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bill Yenne’s book on Alexander the Great is worthy of modern leaders study.

Thomas E. Christianson, Moffett Field, California


Does the world really need another Battle of Britain book? After reading James Holland’s The Battle of Britain, I can affirm that the world is indeed richer for its publication. The Battle of Britain is a well-written book about combat. Its David-and-Goliath appeal continues to have a mesmerizing resonance. Holland’s book is noteworthy because he understands that the weapons with which wars are fought typically result from decisions made earlier. In our own time, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, “As you know, you go to
war with the Army you have.” In that sense, Holland ably lays out the groundwork to understand the Battle of Britain in a greater strategic overview, tracing how the disaster that befell the Allies in May 1940 in France affected just how much of the Royal Air Force was going to be employed in this cauldron. It is a shocking revelation that even before the Battle of Britain, the British had already lost over 1,000 planes, and more importantly, over 300 pilots. Holland implicitly and subtly argues that the Battle of Britain begins with the air coverage for the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk.

Holland’s analysis of the primary weapon systems—the Me-109, Me-110, Spitfire, and Hurricane—is eye-opening. He demonstrates that the Me-109 was easily the superior plane as a weapon platform in terms of firepower and ammo carrying capability. Its 20-mm cannons were much more lethal than the British plane’s .30 caliber machine guns. Holland also seems to be less than enamored with the Hurricane, which in terms of numbers largely fought the battle.

Holland makes the book more indispensable by tying the Battle of Britain into its larger context. Holland lays out other critical areas such as the U-boat war, America and its strange ambassador Joseph Kennedy, as well as Ireland’s neutrality. Most readers are familiar with the story of RADAR’s development, but I was surprised at the indirect impact Bomber Command had on the battle. Bomber Command expended considerable effort on attacks on the invasion fleet with little success. However, its attacks on Berlin had a political payoff in that they so angered Hitler that he switched the focus of the bombing campaign to attacking London, giving the British Fighter Command a critical breather in terms of their airfield infrastructure in southeastern England.

Surprising for me were new photographs and a profusion of excellent and readable maps and figures. My one complaint is the omission of Derek Robinson’s Invasion, 1940, whose thesis is that the German invasion, Operation Sea Lion, was destined to be a failure.

The bottom line is this—if you don’t own a single work on the Battle of Britain, rush out and buy this one. If you have others, the scope of this book makes it easy to find a place for it on your shelves.

LTC Robert G. Smith, USA, Tampa, Florida


Alexander V. Campbell has taken his Ph.D. dissertation on the British 60th, or Royal American, Regiment of Foot, and converted it into a readable and intriguing account of this polyglot unit, which contributed in a number of ways to the French and Indian War and the development of a true Atlantic community in the pre-American Revolution period.

Unlike the classical regimental history, which recounts only campaigns and battles, The Royal American Regiment: An Atlantic Microcosm, 1755-1772, demonstrates how the Royal American Regiment, its officers and men, impacted the wider economic, social, and political fabric of the British North American Empire from 1755 to 1772. Campbell researched private papers and family archives of many of the Regiment’s officers and interweaves these sources into a stylistically readable tale.

Although not explicitly noted in the book, the actions and activities of the Royal American Regiment show the remarkable influence of Swiss foreign officers employed by the British Crown on the development of North American history. While James Prevost, Frederick Haldimand, and Henry Bouquet are the most known, a host of Swiss subalterns also rises out of the pages. These examples, and others, put human faces on late 18th century colonial warfare. The only constructive comment to offer is that Campbell could have given some context to the other British military units that were present in the North American operational area at this time. This void leaves the impression that the Royal Americans were the main thrust for all British efforts in this theater. A wider explanation would have allowed him to compare and contrast the Royal Americans with others and further highlight the Regiment’s unique elements.

The book has relevance for historians, military officers, and scholars interested in colonial and 18th century warfare. There are also lessons to consider in thinking about modern campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan—the use of foreign troops to supplement manpower, the influence of American units on Middle Eastern societies, and the importance of good leadership in difficult terrain. I would highly recommend this book for any personal library.

Major Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., USAR, Zurich, Switzerland

When states are threatened by war and terrorism, can we really expect them to abide by human rights and humanitarian law? David Forsythe’s bold analysis of U.S. policies towards terror suspects after 9/11 addresses this issue directly. Covering moral, political, and legal aspects, he examines the abuse of enemy detainees at the hands of the U.S. At the center of the debate is the Bush Administration, which Forsythe argues displayed disdain for international law, in contrast to the general public’s support for humanitarian affairs. He explores the similarities and differences between Presidents Obama and Bush on the question of prisoner treatment in an age of terrorism and asks how the administration should proceed. The book traces the Pentagon’s and CIA’s records in mistreating prisoners, providing an account which will be of interest to all those who value humanitarian law.  

From the publisher.


Among submariners in World War II, Dudley “Mush” Morton stood out as a warrior without peer. At the helm of the USS Wahoo he completely changed the way the sea war was fought in the Pacific. He would relentlessly attack the Japanese at every opportunity, going through his supply of torpedoes in record time on every patrol. In only nine months, he racked up an astounding list of achievements, including being the first American skipper to wipe out an entire enemy convoy single-handedly.

Here, for the first time, is the life and legend of a heroic, dynamic, and ultimately divisive submarine commander who fought the war on his own terms, and refused to do so any other way.  

From the publisher.


During World War II, the Third Reich’s fighter pilots destroyed some 70,000 enemy aircraft during the war, with approximately 45,000 destroyed on the Eastern Front. Of all of the Luftwaffe’s fighter aces, the stories of Walter Krupinski, Adolf Galland, Eduard Neumann, and Wolfgang Falck shine particularly bright.

From the publisher.
Writing and Thinking

MAJ David H. Park, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas—I would like to reply to a single point in Major Trent Lythgoe’s article, “Flight Simulation for the Brain: Why Army Officers Must Write” (Military Review, November-December 2011). The article stated an important and pertinent opinion concerning the status of our profession today. We must all write better as experts in our domain. The quantity and quality of our dissertation must improve continuously for the sake of our profession. There is only one point I disagree with in MAJ Lythgoe’s argument.

Some in the Army have expressed disagreement with our briefing culture involving PowerPoint slides. But I must state that the assault on PowerPoint generally centers around the culture of “cutting, pasting, and rearranging bullet statements,” as discussed by MAJ Lythgoe, rather than the briefing format itself. It is possible to use the same procedure of cutting, pasting, and rearranging ideas through Microsoft Office Word, Publisher, or even Excel. Therefore, criticizing PowerPoint as a way of criticizing uninformed and unoriginal thought is a red herring. We should encourage original, critical, and creative thinking required for professional and high-quality writing. But criticizing a briefing format such as PowerPoint does our profession much injustice, and may in fact reduce our staff efficiency.

I have had friends at several echelons who criticize PowerPoint, using a similar argument. My reply is that if they had a better means to articulate their points in a briefing, using narratives, pictures, graphs, and figures, all in one format, to please show us all. I have yet to see a better briefing format that incorporates the written narrative with visual depiction and video feeds than the Microsoft Office PowerPoint. This includes the much-vaunted Command Post of the Future that several years ago was pitched as a possible replacement for PowerPoint.

It is possible to produce a well thought-out, well-informed presentation in a PowerPoint format. To criticize PowerPoint for lack of proper analysis in staff products is akin to blaming Microsoft Office Word for one’s poor grasp of spelling and grammar. As of 2011, Microsoft Office’s PowerPoint remains the uncontested venue for the most complete way of briefing in today’s Army, incorporating the written narrative, graphic aids, and figure displays.
The Colonel Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation is sponsoring a nation-wide Interagency Writing Competition, which is open to the public. We see this as an excellent opportunity for many to share their experiences, insights, and thinking about interagency cooperation, coordination, and collaboration at the tactical and operational level of effort.

TOPICS
Participants are encouraged to submit papers focused on one of two special topics:

- The interagency role in preventing conflict when dealing with failing or failed states; or
- The validity of the “whole-of-government” approach in dealing with the full range of homeland and national security threats.

First place winners will receive a certificate, engraved plaque, and a $2,000 cash award, along with publication in one of the Simons Center's publications. Second and third place winners will receive $1,000 and $500 cash awards respectively.

SUBMISSIONS
Manuscripts can be submitted through the Simons Center website at www.TheSimonsCenter.org/competition or emailed to editor@TheSimonsCenter.org with the subject line “Interagency Writing Competition.” Deadline for submitting papers is Friday, 16 March 2012.
U.S. Army War College
STRATEGIC LANDPOWER
Essay Contest 2012

The United States Army War College and the United States Army War College Foundation are pleased to announce the annual STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest.

The topic of the essay must relate to the strategic use of landpower. Specific topics of interest, for this year’s contest are:

The Future of Landpower
Strategic Role of Landpower
The Army’s Role in National Security

Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of $4000 to the author of the best essay and a prize of $1000 to the second place winner.

For more information contact:
Dr. Michael R. Matheny
U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations
(717) 245-3459, DSN 242-3459, michael.matheny@us.army.mil

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest Rules:

1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 5000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.

2. All entries should be directed to: Dr. Michael R. Matheny, USAWC Strategic Landpower Essay Contest, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242.

3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 17 February 2012.

4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author will assign a codename in addition to a title to the essay. This codename shall appear: (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title in lieu of the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank/title, branch of service (if applicable), biographical sketch, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the codename. This envelope will not be opened until after the final selections are made and the identity of the essayist will not be known by the selection committee.

5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8½”x11”. Submit two complete copies.

6. The award winners will be notified in early Spring 2012. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by 1 April 2012.

7. The author of the best essay will receive $4000 from the U.S. Army War College Foundation. A separate prize of $1000 will be awarded to the author of the second best essay.
ANNOUNCING the 2012 General William E. DePuy
Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen dramatic developments in how we fight our wars. Perhaps most dramatic have been the ever-increasing contributions and sacrifices of women in what have previously been considered male-only areas of operation. Current and future innovations can use automation, robotics, and other technologies to lighten the soldier’s load and negate the necessity of physical strength in many battlefield tasks. The blurring of the line between front-line and support units in counterinsurgency conflicts, the success of programs such as Cultural Support Teams, and other 21st century evolutions in the conduct of combat all contribute to a need to rethink our nation’s current combat exclusion rules. These considerations are far from comprehensive, but serve as an introduction to the 2012 DePuy writing contest topic:

What is the role of women in the United States Army for the next 20 years?

★ Contest closes 29 June 2012 ★

1st Place  $1,000 and publication in Military Review
2nd Place  $750 and consideration for publication in Military Review
3rd Place  $500 and consideration for publication in Military Review

For information on how to submit an entry, go to http://militaryreview.army.mil