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UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES began the second decade of the 21st century decisively engaged in operations around the world, continuing a trend of prolonged military operations other than war that began in the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and continued during the first decade of the 21st century in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army faces the challenge of long, repeated deployments against enemy formations that do not lend themselves to straightforward doctrinal definitions and constructs.

Army doctrine has evolved to meet the challenges. Doctrine writers have struggled to use clear, concise language that accurately depicts operating concepts. A significant part of this struggle arose after the confflation of doctrinal terms and operational priorities that occurred when the Army made stability operations of equal importance with offensive and defensive operations within full spectrum operations. Despite the Army’s long history of fighting small wars against irregular forces, the ascendance of stability operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s ran counter to existing Army beliefs about the appropriate roles and missions of the U.S. Army.

The central idea of Army doctrine is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of advantage in sustained land operations. A new operating concept, unified land operations, returns this central idea to its proper place, applicable to all Army operations. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain and maintain a position of advantage provides a battlefield framework and logic that nests unified land operations within the joint operational construct of unified action and provides a structure that allows commanders to effectively and accurately describe their intent in time, space, purpose, and priority. The doctrine allows leaders to integrate diverse tactical tasks, battles, and engagements, over time, to achieve strategic objectives.

This article introduces the logic behind the new operating concept by presenting a short history of the evolution of Army doctrine from the advent of AirLand Battle in 1982 to the introduction of Unified Land Operations in 2011. The central idea of unified land operations is rooted in AirLand Battle doctrine and retains many of the key full spectrum operations ideas within an overarching concept that emphasizes lethal capabilities as fundamental to successful Army operations.
AirLand Battle (1982-1993)

The Army introduced AirLand Battle as its operating concept in 1982 partly as a reaction to the inadequacies of the Army’s previous operating concept, Active Defense, which had focused on winning a defensive first battle in central Europe against numerically superior forces from the Soviet Union. More offensively oriented, AirLand Battle introduced the term operational level of war to the Army lexicon and made campaign planning—the integration of joint forces in a series of battles and engagements to achieve a strategic purpose—a fundamental requirement.

When the Army published the 1986 version of FM 100-5, it preserved and strengthened AirLand Battle’s central ideas—the importance of the operational level of warfare, its focus on the seizing and retaining the initiative, and its insistence on the requirement for multi-service cooperation. The lead paragraphs describing AirLand Battle capture these themes explicitly:

AirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels, securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to accomplish the mission. The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy—to achieve our purposes. To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery, and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander’s goals. From the enemy’s point of view, these operations must be rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting. The pace must be fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteraction.

Our operational planning must orient on decisive objectives. It must stress flexibility, the creation of opportunities to fight on favorable terms by capitalizing on enemy vulnerabilities, concentration against enemy centers of gravity, synchronized joint operations, and aggressive exploitation of tactical gains to achieve operational results.

The deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq were the Army’s proving grounds for AirLand Battle during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. As part of a joint and coalition force, Army
forces completely overwhelmed and destroyed an overmatched enemy. Operation Desert Storm provided a rare opportunity to test Army doctrine and force structure against a threat they were optimized to meet.\(^6\)

However, AirLand Battle doctrine was not a rigid, dogmatic concept suitable to only one kind of fight. Chapter 1 of FM 100-5 clearly identified challenges and threats across a wide spectrum of conflict, from conventional fights against the Warsaw Pact, to mid-intensity fights against Soviet surrogates, and even nonlinear and low-intensity fights against insurgent and terrorist groups:

The Army must be ready to fight enemies whose capabilities vary widely. In high- or mid-intensity conflict, these may be modern tank, motorize, and airborne forces like the Warsaw Pact armies or other similarly organized forces, including Soviet surrogates. Less mechanized but otherwise well-equipped regular and irregular forces and terrorist groups can be expected to operate against Army forces in most parts of the world. In low-intensity conflicts, light forces, insurgent, and terrorists may be the only military threat present.\(^7\)

In discussing how the Army operates in a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment, FM 100-5 describes a “counterinsurgency campaign made in concert with the initiatives of other government agencies involved to ensure a synchronized national effort.” This language intimates a “whole-of-government approach” familiar to contemporary readers of doctrine. Other operations referenced are “Foreign Internal Defense,” “peacetime contingency,” and “peacekeeping” operations. Two paragraphs dedicated to the discussion of terrorism warn that “terrorists pursue strategic objectives through LIC,” and that “terrorism constitutes a threat which must be dealt with within the Army’s daily operations and which will continue to be of concern in high- and mid-intensity conflicts.”\(^8\)

The language describing the threat and operating environment in the 1986 version of FM 100-5 demonstrates a nuanced appreciation of the enemy and of battlefield conditions. The Army successfully applied AirLand Battle’s emphasis on gaining the initiative, on operational art, and on operating as part of a joint environment in combat in 1991. Unfortunately, while the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 added some important ideas for future doctrine, it diluted the central aspects of AirLand Battle because a changing environment and domestic expectations increased competition for resources among the services.


The evaporation of the threat presented by the former Soviet Union and the U.S. Army’s overwhelming success in Operation Desert Storm led to the expectation of a “peace dividend” of decreased military budgets in the early 1990s.\(^9\) This, in turn, led the Army to embark on a search for new capstone doctrine to describe its role in a new strategic context—one in which that the United States had emerged as the world’s sole remaining superpower.\(^10\) The 1993 version of FM 100-5 reflects this sentiment:

The 1993 doctrine reflects Army thinking in a new, strategic era . . . It causes AirLand Battle to evolve into a variety of choices for a battlefield framework and a wider interservice arena, allows for the increasing incidence of combined operations, and recognizes that Army forces operate across the range of military operations. It is truly doctrine for the full dimensions of the battlefield in a force-projection environment . . . It reflects the lessons learned from recent experiences and the setting of today’s strategic and technological realities.\(^11\)

AirLand Battle is not referred to again anywhere within the body of the FM. More perplexing, the doctrine writers did not replace AirLand Battle with another operating concept to delineate the central idea or ideas of Army doctrine. The manual still discusses operational art, retaining much of the language from the 1986 version, but subordinates it within the section describing the operational level of war. Initiative remains a tenet of Army operations, and the manual frequently discusses its significance.
but leaves readers to infer its relative importance as opposed to explicitly stating it. Other terms and constructs, like the Army’s capacity for force projection and its capability to operate as part of a joint or combined team, appear to take on increased importance through the addition of new chapters or sections. While the 1993 version of FM 100-5 retains much of the verbiage from AirLand Battle describing these terms, it broadens the discussion to include topics such as cultural and language considerations in operations other than war. While these discussions described conditions found in the operating environment at the time, they failed to improve or focus understanding about how the Army conducts operations or to what purpose.

The 1993 FM failed to provide the Army with a new operating concept, or perhaps better said, left the operating concept ambiguous. It did, however, sow the seeds of ideas that emerged as central aspects of Army doctrine in the 21st century. These new ideas include the terms full-dimension operations, and combat functions (including battle command) intended to assist commanders in the synchronization of battlefield effects. The 1993 FM also added a section on conflict resolution and replaced the term low intensity conflict with operations other than war (OOTW).

The term full-dimension operations was the closest the 1993 version of FM 100-5 came to providing the Army with a new operating concept. However, the term appears in the body of the manual only twice: first in the section on strategic context, where it states, “The Army must be capable of full-dimension operations”; and later in the introduction to Chapter 6, “Planning.” The Glossary eventually defines full-dimension operations as “the application of all capabilities available to an Army commander to accomplish his mission decisively and at the least cost across the full range of possible operations.”

The influence of full-dimension operations on future doctrine is evident in the appearance of a similar term—full spectrum operations—as the Army’s next explicit operating concept. Full spectrum operations were defined in 2001 as “the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.” Although the definition has since changed, the operating concept was still in use as of the writing of this article and the components of full spectrum operations—offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civilian authorities—are fully retained within the emerging doctrine of unified land operations.

Just as the thinking behind the development of the term full dimension operations influenced the eventual development of the Army’s next operating concept—full spectrum operations—the introduction of combat functions resonates in the Army today. The combat functions introduced in 1993—intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command—were the operational level version of the battlefield operating systems. The 2001 and later versions of FM 100-5 combine the combat functions and battlefield operating systems, and they later evolve into the Army’s warfighting functions. The arrangement and grouping of similar battlefield activities into systems or functions to assist commanders and staffs in the “integration, coordination, preparation, and execution of successful combined-arms operations” appears self evident now, but was a significant
contribution to doctrinal thought at the time. The introduction of battle command within the combat functions was a powerful addition to the Army’s lexicon. The term would later become synonymous with a commander’s role in combat.

The Army devoted a section of FM 100-5 to conflict resolution in 1993, reflecting its struggles, including its experiences in Operation Desert Storm, to define when the fighting should end and what the subsequent peace might look like. The section emphasized the commander’s need to understand the conditions required to end a conflict and how to best combine military operations to bring about its most favorable resolution. Addressing conflict resolution in Army capstone doctrine represented a significant addition which a future version of FM 3-0 expanded on and captured within unified land operations.

Changing the term low intensity conflict to operations other than war was the final significant change in the 1993 version of FM 3-0. At first glance, this may seem like mere wordsmithing, but explicitly delineating the Army’s role in combat operations as different from its role in what the 1993 version of FM 3-0 described as “conflict” and “peacetime” proved the harbinger of future debates about Army priorities in stability operations (SO) and major combat operations (MCO). The 1993 manual failed to articulate an operating concept applicable to all Army operations, reinforcing the idea of separate and competing priorities.

Chapter 13, “Operations Other than War,” of the FM even offers separate principles and tenets that apply exclusively in an OOTW environment. The 1993 version of FM 3-0 was a step backwards with respect to providing a unifying operating concept for all Army operations, but it did articulate several new ideas that continue to resonate today, and it proved to be the longest lasting version of the manual until 2001.

Full Spectrum Operations (2001-2011)

The 2001 version of FM 3-0 defines full spectrum operations as “the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.” While not an operating concept, the term described what the Army did and entire chapters were devoted to articulating how to use full spectrum operations to accomplish Army missions. Indeed, the very purpose of the 2001 version of FM 3-0 was to establish “keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations,” making it the de facto operational concept. The 2008 version of FM 3-0 then explicitly designated full spectrum operations as the Army’s operational concept and expanded its definition to read,

Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.

This definition reflected the realities of seven years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Terms like “prudent risk,” “proportional,” and “understanding of all variables” acknowledged the complex nature of the operational environment and threat the Army was likely to face.

During the decade that full spectrum operations was the Army’s exclusive operating concept, the Army introduced, improved, or expanded several important ideas and changed or discarded others. It retained the importance of initiative in Army operations. It expanded and improved the definition of battle command, eventually discarding the term in 2011—although retaining its essential elements. The Army also discarded the terms deep, close, and rear as part of the battlefield framework, as well as the term supporting effort to delineate priorities. It elevated stability operations to an importance equal to combat operations, touching off an extended Army debate about balance and priorities. Finally, the Army expanded and changed the definition of operational art.

In 2001, FM 3-0 introduced a chapter on the foundations of full spectrum operations by describing the essence of warfighting as inherently simple, distilling it into five general rules. This same language appears in the introduction to the FM.
The doctrine states Army forces—

- Win on the offense.
- Initiate combat on their terms—not their adversaries.
- Gain and maintain the initiative.
- Build momentum quickly.
- Win decisively.19

The first four of these rules amplify the importance of initiative to successful Army operations. While long held as an important tenet, the codification of initiative within the definition of the Army’s operating concept in 2008 returned initiative to its central place of importance. That fundamental precept remains almost unchanged in Unified Land Operations.

In 2001, battle command was defined as “the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy.” The chapter dedicated to battle command relies on the terms “visualize, describe, direct, and lead” to describe battle command.20 In 2001, command and control was subordinate to battle command, but the 2008 version of FM 3-0 reversed the subordination.

Command and control ascended to preeminence with battle command becoming subordinate to it. The 2008 FM added the term understand before visualize, and introduced mission command as a term to describe the “preferred means of battle command.”21 By 2011, mission command had subsumed battle command and replaced command and control as a warfighting function. In this new role, mission command is both a warfighting function and the preferred method of command. The FM stresses using “mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent.”22 It explains this change as a philosophical shift, necessary to place emphasis on the commander instead of the systems employed.

The terms battle command, command and control, and mission command evolved during the ten years full spectrum operations were the Army’s operating concept, but those terms’ most useful elements—the essence of battle command (i.e. understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, assess) and the emphasis of the commander’s role in operations—were retained. The construct
of unified land operations reflects the evolution completely and retains mission command among its foundations.

The terms describing the battlefield framework (later the operational framework) also evolved.23 The 2001 version of the manual introduced decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations as a way to describe the “allocation of forces by purpose,” while it retained close, deep, and rear to describe operations in “spatial terms.” The FM retained the term main effort as the “activity, unit, or area that constitutes the most important task at the time,” but dropped the term supporting effort.24 By 2008, the term operational framework—which included the terms deep, close, and rear, battlespace, battlefield organization, and area of interest—was completely rescinded, leaving decisive, shaping, sustaining, and main effort as descriptors within the chapter on command and control.

The authors of Unified Land Operations considered the history and evolution of the operational framework in Army doctrine as they developed the new operating concept. As a result, Unified Land Operations reintroduces many terms rescinded in 2008 and returns the AirLand Battle term supporting effort to the lexicon.25

The intent is to provide Army leaders with the broadest menu of terms for “clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources,” while acknowledging that leaders “are not bound by any specific framework” and that leaders should use the frameworks “in combination.”26 It is important to emphasize that none of these terms or concepts are new; rather, they have each proved their utility in some cases for 30 years.

Making stability operations equal to offensive and defensive operations represents the most significant and controversial doctrinal evolution of the past 30 years. The 2008 change represented a change in culture and philosophy that portends adjustments in Army priorities across all the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). General William Wallace, the commander of Training and Doctrine Command at the time, explicitly referred to the 2008 version of FM 3-0 as a “revolutionary departure from past doctrine” that recognized the Army’s need to operate among populations and the fact that battlefield success was “no longer enough.”27 Similarly, the 2008 version of FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, invalidated the practice of assuming that success in stability operations flowed from the Army’s ability to prosecute major combat operations:

During the Cold War, Army forces prepared to fight and win against a near-peer competitor. The Army’s training focus was on offensive and defensive operations in major combat operations. As recently as 2001, the Army believed that forces trained to conduct the offense and defense in major combat operations could conduct stability and civil support operations effectively. However, the complexity of today’s operational environments and commander’s legal and moral obligations to the population of an area of operations has shown that approach to be incorrect.28

More than a reflection of Army experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, this change had been Department of Defense policy since 2005.29 By 2008, Army doctrine emphasized the “essentiality of nonlethal actions with combat actions” and promoted stability operations tasks as “a central element of operations equal in importance to the offense and defense.”30 The tasks associated with stability operations were not new to the Army, but the belief that stability operations could be “as important as—or more important than—offensive and defensive operations” was. The belief that these operations were not only the responsibility of specialized forces but also of general-purpose forces at every echelon was also new.31

At the same time, descriptors used to explain the application of full spectrum operations, such as “equal weight,” “parity,” and “balance,” subtly shifted the utility of the operating concept. For example, the section of FM 3-0 (2011) titled Combining the Elements of Full Spectrum Operations reads, “Commanders consider their missions, decide which tactics to use, and balance...
the elements of full spectrum operations while preparing their concept of operations.” The chapter also discusses how “commanders analyze the situation carefully to achieve a balance between lethal and nonlethal actions.” While the presence of the word “balance” does not discredit the usefulness of an operating concept like full spectrum operations, it is important to acknowledge that “achieving balance” or using a “balanced approach” to operations does not produce any effect on an enemy or equate to winning.

It is also important to recognize how pervasive the use of the term “balance” has become in Army and national security parlance. The 2010 National Security Strategy, for example, discusses rebalancing military capabilities “to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.”32 The U.S. Army Forces Command Campaign Plan acknowledges that the current operational tempo has left an Army out of balance to meet its full spectrum operations obligations.33 The 2009 Army Posture Statement notes, “After seven years of continuous combat, our Army remains out of balance, straining our ability to . . . maintain strategic depth.” In fact, restoring balance is referred to 16 times in the statement.34 While “balance” in this context refers to many of the DOTMLPF domains, it also clearly refers to the loss of the Army’s capability to conduct major combat operations because of its almost exclusive focus on stability operations.

The new operational concept, unified land operations, seeks to refocus leaders on arranging activities and forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy by seizing, exploiting, and retaining the initiative—a marked difference from language calling for achieving “balance” between combat and stability tasks or lethal and nonlethal tasks.

Operational art is the final significant topic of evolutionary doctrinal change that influenced the development of Unified Land Operations. AirLand Battle doctrine introduced the term in 1986, but did not associate it with any particular Army echelon or level of war. The doctrine stated, “No particular echelon of command is solely or uniquely concerned with operational art.”35 The implication was that every Army echelon had a stake in sequencing actions contributing to the accomplishment of strategic goals. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 retained this language, although it embedded operational art within the chapter on the operational level of war. By 2008, the importance of operational art as a concept gave rise to a chapter on it, but its applicability across echelons had changed. Doctrine restricted the use of operational art to the operational level of war by stating explicitly that operational art was “applied only at the operational level.”36 By 2011, this caveat had been removed, leaving it once again less restrictive: “Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.”37

The Army’s latest operating concept, unified land operations, embraces the joint definition of operational art, but decouples it from the levels of war and from echelons. It states: “Operational art is not associated with a specific echelon or formation, and . . . applies to any formation that must effectively arrange multiple tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part.”38

Many authors have examined applying operational art across echelons and levels of war, and we will not perform another such examination here. This article discusses operational art only to demonstrate its connections with earlier Army operating concepts like full spectrum operations and to highlight its importance for how the Army intends to fight in the future.

Unified Land Operations

The foundations of current Army doctrine have links to key ideas articulated in AirLand Battle in the 1993 version of FM 100-5 and in the Army’s most recent operating concept—full spectrum operations. AirLand Battle emphasized initiative, operational art, and operations as part of a joint force. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 introduced battle command and full-dimension operations, initiated a discussion of conditions for conflict resolution, and raised operations other than war to the level of combat operations. In the decade that full spectrum operations served as the Army’s operating concept, the Army expanded the meaning of battle command, incorporated it within mission command. It discarded or changed the terms operational framework and operational art. Operations other than war became stability
operations—and equal in importance to major combat operations. To a great extent, the Army carried forward the most useful aspects of each of these ideas into the new operating concept of unified land operations. The definition of unified land operations is “to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.” The definition cements the best ideas of past doctrine into one statement that reaffirms the intent of all Army operations, regardless of conditions, environment, or operational context.

In addition, Unified Land Operations stresses the importance of mission command and operational art and returns to doctrine many of the terms used in the past to describe the battlefield and operational frameworks. The title, Unified Land Operations, implies that the Army operates as part of a joint, interagency, or international coalition, and the FM explicitly states that the Army’s contribution to unified action requires the “full integration of U.S. military operations with the efforts of coalition partners and other government agencies.”

The evolution of these ideas and constructs as well as the reasons for their inclusion within Unified Land Operations have already been described.

The 2011 version of ADP 3-0 offers two additional ideas that demand introduction. One, lethality, is certainly not a new idea, but its articulation as “the most basic building block for military operations” is. The second, the introduction of combined arms maneuver and wide area security as the Army’s two core competencies, represents an important addition whose utility and meaning require further discussion.

Previous versions of FM 3-0 described lethal actions as “critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive missions,” and stated, “Offensive and defensive operations place a premium on employing the lethal effects of combat power against the enemy.” On the other hand, stability and civil support operations emphasize nonlethal actions: “Army forces employ a variety of nonlethal means in stability and civil support operations. . . Stability and civil support operations emphasize nonlethal, constructive actions by Soldiers.”

Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 departs from this philosophy, stating that “lethality is the foundation for effective offensive, defensive, and stability operations,” and that “lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence is sufficient to accomplish the mission through non-lethal engagements and activities.”

These statements reflect a sentiment that an increasing number of Army practitioners express, that the U.S. Army’s capability and capacity to apply lethal force provide it with the credibility and skills for success in all types of operations and distinguish it from other government institutions and even from other armies of the world. Recognition of lethality as the foundation of all other military capabilities is sure to be controversial, but that should not detract from the statement the doctrine makes about the underlying purpose of the U.S. Army, nor from the focus it provides to Army units and leaders for training and operations in the future.
The introduction of combined arms maneuver and wide area security as core competencies is the second significant addition ADP 3-0 offers. Combined arms maneuver is the means by which units gain and maintain the initiative within an operation, while wide area security is the means by which units deny the initiative to the enemy. These two core competencies help Army forces defeat or destroy an enemy, seize or occupy key terrain, protect or secure critical assets and populations, and prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. Army forces use them in combination and execute them though a combination of offense, defense, and stability operations. For example, in a counterinsurgency operation against a substantial internal or external threat, one set of units or Army systems may focus on exploiting the initiative through offensive operations—i.e., is enemy focused; and another, collaboratively and correspondingly, may focus on retaining the initiative through stability operations—i.e., is population focused. This does not imply that the units perform these missions exclusively; different units have different priorities that support the larger operation’s broader goals, end states, and strategies, regardless of echelon.

ADP 3-0 defines combined arms maneuver as “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces, seize, occupy, and defend land areas, to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy in order to seize and exploit the initiative.” Wide area security is “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect population, forces, infrastructure, and activities, deny the enemy positions of advantage, and consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.” Together they provide a cognitive tool for orienting combat power through offense, defense, and stability operations toward two related purposes: namely, gaining and exploiting the initiative and preventing the enemy from obtaining it.

It is important to note that wide area security and combined arms maneuver do not supplant offense, defense, and stability operations, nor are they intended for use as tactical tasks. Instead, they provide commanders a means to describe the arrangement of tactical actions and/or the application of combat power to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy. The core competencies are applicable in all Army operations, at all echelons. Used properly they provide a cognitive tool to assist commanders in describing their vision and orienting forces to purpose.

**Conclusion**

This article has explored the logic behind the adaptation and adoption of the Army’s new operating concept, unified land operations. As noted by General Martin Dempsey, select, unified land operations were a “natural intellectual outgrowth” of AirLand Battle and full spectrum operations. Unified land operations embrace past concepts that have the most utility for success today and in the future, concepts that proved their utility during 30 years of application in places like Panama, Kuwait, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The article also introduces concepts that are new or unique to unified land operations. While discussions of lethality are certainly not new, championing lethality as the “foundation for all other military capabilities” by acknowledging a lethal capability as necessary, a priori, to accomplishing all Army missions—combat and otherwise—is a sharp departure from earlier Army doctrine. This emphasis communicates that the Army’s unique, core capability—its expert application of lethal force during sustained land operations—is what sets the Army apart from every other government, military, and international institution.

The core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security are the only truly new constructs within unified land operations. They will assist commanders in describing the arrangement of tactical actions with the elements of combat power to achieve a position of advantage vis-à-vis the enemy. They do not represent radical departures from earlier doctrine, but rather new cognitive tools that bind existing Army operations—offense, defense, and stability—to the purpose of gaining or retaining the initiative. In other words, they link the emphasis on initiative found in AirLand Battle with the operating concept described by full spectrum operations.

The adoption of unified land operations continues the long tradition of meaningful
doctrinal evolution within the Army. Certainly, future additions of ADP 3-0 and related doctrinal manuals will address important elements of doctrine not fully developed within the 2011 versions, such as a definition of combat power, to include the role of the leader and leadership in successful Army operations. This enduring construct has been central to Army doctrine for years, but the current version of ADP 3-0 does not fully discuss it. Another area needing more discussion is how the practitioners of operational art are influenced by and account for tactical, operational, and strategic risks. Other themes and ideas may require more discussion as well.

Unified land operations amplify the utility of initiative, full spectrum operations, and mission command. Army doctrine recognizes lethality’s importance in all operations and introduces combined arms maneuver and wide area security as means to link offense, defense, and stability operations to the purpose of gaining and maintaining the initiative.

The Army’s contribution to unified action—unified land operations—are how the Army will succeed in sustained land operations as part of a joint or combined force. They are also the foundation for future doctrinal development to carry the Army through the many emerging challenges it will face in the coming decades. MR

NOTES

1. For consistency, this article uses the term operating concept to describe the Army’s central doctrinal themes or constructs. Operating concept is used because of existing connotations attached to the other terms as well as their association with specific time periods or previous version of FM 100-5 and FM 3-0. For example, the 1986 version of FM 100-5 refers to AirLand Battle as the Army’s warfighting doctrine. The 2008 version of FM 3-0 refers to full spectrum operations as the Army’s operational concept. Other editions of FM 3-0 are without a clearly articulated central theme altogether.


4. FM 100-5, Operations, is the predecessor to FM 3-0. Under the new initiative known as Army Doctrine 2015, the Army’s capstone manuals are now Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs). Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, is the first manual published under this construct.


8. Ibid., 5.


12. Ibid., 1-4 and Glossary-5.


14. The September 2011 publication of ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, replaces the term full spectrum operations with the term decisive action to describe the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civilian authorities. This change was made because of the tendency within the Army to equate full spectrum operations with major combat operations. None of the descriptive or qualifying language used to describe the construct was changed.

15. FM 100-5 (1993), 2-12.

16. Ibid., 6-23.

17. FM 3-0 (2001), viii.

18. FM 3-0 (2008), 3-1.

19. FM 3-0 (2001), 4-1.

20. Ibid., 5-3.

21. FM 3-0 (2008), 5-19.

22. FM 3-0 (2011), 4-5.

23. The 1986 and 1993 versions of FM 100-5 used the term battlefield framework. This was changed with the publication of the 2001 version of FM 3-0 to operational framework, which included a section titled battlefield organization. The 2008 version of FM 3-0 uses neither term.

24. FM 3-0 (2001), 4-18 to 4-25.

25. In unified land operations, deep-close-security replaces deep-close-rear. This change reflects the reality and importance of the domains of cyber/electronic warfare, space, and other threats not confined to a rear area. The term “rear area” may still have utility when describing the arrangement of friendly forces but is not included as part of the operational framework.


27. FM 3-0 (2008), Foreword.


29. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005), DODD 3000.05 states, “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” This policy was renewed in 2009.

30. FM 3-0 (2008), vi-vii.

31. FM 3-0 (2011), x.


36. FM 3-0 (2008), 6-1.


38. Draft Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, 9.

39. Draft Army Doctrine Publication 3-0. The principle of integration on page 7 of ADP 3-0 captures the necessity of operating as part of a joint, interagency, or multinational coalition.

40. FM 3-0 (2011), 3-4, 3-5.

41. Draft Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, 7.


43. Draft Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, 6.

44. Ibid., Foreword.

45. Now referred to as Decision Action with the adoption of ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE are weary after ten years of war, and the Obama administration acknowledges its exit strategy from Afghanistan will be shaped by a more lenient assessment of the government there. Changes in strategy in the past three years have introduced thousands of additional troops and billions of additional dollars into the U.S. war effort—the result has been a precipitous expansion of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. In the wake of Osama bin-Laden’s death and the Obama administration’s deadline to begin withdrawing troops, the president is considering another review of U.S. operations to assess the way forward.

The problem, as recent events in Afghanistan have demonstrated, is that the U.S. government’s budget-making process can easily undermine strategy. Strategy formulation is the result of detailed planning to achieve specified objectives. Strategies take time to mature and achieve results, but some leaders use the budget, which functions on a much shorter timeline, to manipulate, shift, or expand U.S. strategic priorities. Instead of working within an agreed-upon strategic framework and supporting it, the annual budget cycle encourages policymakers and program managers to adopt a myopic perspective that focuses on immediate needs. For example, some policymakers use the budget cycle to support programs beneficial to their constituents, and some program managers use it to push for the expansion or continuation of programs they control. Both actions threaten the effectiveness of U.S. operations because they confuse short-term needs with long-range requirements. Government agencies and members of Congress can significantly influence U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan by pursuing personal agendas without understanding the implications their actions have on the war effort.

If the budget is being used to influence strategy, have we placed the cart before the horse? This article examines the strategy-making process, how leaders prioritize efforts in a constrained budget environment, and the effects of the annual budget cycle on the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. In the end, I propose some new solutions to solve problems that cut across many agencies and aspects of our federal government.
Strategy in General

Effective strategies are long-term plans that align objectives with resources. They are generally broad in scope and mature slowly. In short, leaders typically must wait years before they see substantive results. Ideally, leaders match objectives with a variety of ways (methods) and means (resources) to accommodate political, resource, and other constraints. As war strategy analyst Harry Yarger notes, “Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests.”

When theorists write about strategy, they sometimes fail to consider the impact of fiscal constraints. However, the realization that not all priorities will be funded is critical to strategy development, especially when budgets are tight. Leaders must make compromises and trade-offs. Thus, strategic priorities focus the efforts of the U.S. defense establishment. One of the purposes of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Quadrennial Defense Review is to prioritize objectives, and in so doing, to guide the department as it subsequently works to fund them through the budget-making process. Similarly, the National Security Strategy lays out the president’s priorities, which in turn should guide the allocation of the budget. Unfortunately, the government cannot fund all activities to desired levels. Therefore, strategy, as codified in the aforementioned documents, serves to focus our nation’s efforts, both for defense and national security as a whole, and identify those areas deemed most critical for funding by our nation’s leadership.

Once the leaders set these priorities, policymakers must formulate a budget to link ends, ways, and means. They make trade-offs as they marry resources (money) to the most critical national strategic priorities. Circumstances may dictate that the government forgo funding for low priority objectives due to fiscal or manpower constraints. Policymakers must assess the risks associated with such actions. The budget process can be highly contentious, and the system works as planned so long as programs that support critical strategic objectives are funded in accordance with their priority status. However, it is rare, especially in government, for matters such as this to go as intended.

The Budget-Strategy Disconnect

There are two main reasons for the disconnect between the budget cycle and strategy:

**Time horizons.** First, the budget cycle and strategy-making process operate on different time horizons. Budgets are formulated annually and forecast one year in advance, while strategies look three, four, or five years into the future. Consequently, the budget reflects shifting priorities both domestic and international, while changes in strategy depend on a long, time-consuming strategy review process. Simply put, strategies are like aircraft carriers—they take a great deal of time to change direction, while budgets are like speed boats—highly maneuverable and able to change course swiftly.

**Number of stakeholders.** Second, the number of players who influence the budget is huge when compared to those who influence strategy. Budget formulation is a collaborative effort that applies a “whole-of-government” approach. Program managers from various executive agencies provide input and passionately fight for their programs’ survival, while legislators in Congress, along with their staffers, work to support projects they believe are beneficial (both to the war effort and their constituencies). By contrast, strategy development involves only a small group of well-placed elites. It is an isolated affair involving the leadership of the nation.

In their classic review of the implementation of federal work programs in Oakland during the 1970s, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky commented on something they called the complexity of joint

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action. Essentially, they found agreement was more difficult (and less likely) when more participants and decision points were added to a particular scenario. They found a “multiplicity of participants and perspectives combined to produce a formidable obstacle course for the program.” A large number of well-placed program managers and policymakers able to influence the budget process means more hands are in the cookie jar. Besides diluting individual responsibility, the large number of actors involved dramatically decreases the likelihood of achieving strategic objectives. The impact on strategic priorities can be drastic, especially if lawmakers make decisions along partisan lines, are unsure the direction strategy is intended to take, or fall victim to mission creep. Strong leadership is required to maintain strategic focus to the ultimate objective.

As it stands, members of Congress, their staffs, and bureaucrats have the power to dictate de facto strategy through the budget-making process. Nowhere has the problem been more acute than with the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

The Budget as Cause—Strategic Drift in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan is about to enter its 11th year, and the fight today is a far cry from the one I encountered as a young platoon leader in 2002. Back then, roughly 5,000 troops were assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. After the Bush administration’s period of strategic drift (due mostly to the tough fight U.S. forces were engaged with in Iraq), additional troops were assigned to respond to the increased aggressiveness of Al-Qaeda and the declining security situation. Today, there are over 100,000 U.S. military personnel in country. The huge troop commitment demonstrates a U.S. shift in priorities (from Iraq to Afghanistan). With the expansion of the war effort, it has become more difficult than ever to maintain strategic focus.

Program managers. Program managers are able to influence strategy through the annual budget request to Congress, and the problem this creates is rampant throughout government. The managers
fight tooth and nail to adopt new programs or defend old ones (especially those threatened with deletion); once the budget is approved, they begin the process anew for the next cycle. The managers have become so engrossed in their particular programs that they have forgotten the actual purpose for the United States being in Afghanistan—to defeat Al-Qaeda and prevent its return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In championing their causes so vociferously, program managers have lost sight of the core U.S. goal and unwittingly contributed to the expansion of U.S. strategic objectives to include nation building.

The danger occurs when program managers, though they have the best of intentions, impact strategy through passionate advocacy. Within the State Department, program officers in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs fit this model. The problem is not that they are bad Americans—far from it. They are committed patriots who wholeheartedly support the Obama administration’s objective “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The problem is they have unwittingly become victims of their own obsession. Some examples will help explain.

Corrections programs in Afghanistan started in 2005 as a small affair and have since mushroomed into a leviathan. Three years ago, the budget request for corrections programs was $19 million. Program requests have since increased sharply to $80 million for fiscal year (FY) 2011. In 2009, the United States demonstrated its commitment to corrections in Afghanistan with the unveiling of a $60 million detention facility in Parwan. Additionally, it solicited requests for proposals from between $15 to $20 million to expand the prison at Pol-e-Charki in Kabul. Specifically, the money was to address the most critical infrastructure needs related to external security, internal prison management, and minimum international standards for the health and well-being of inmates. The mere fact that the United States is engaged in such activities shows the extent of strategic drift in Afghanistan. Moreover, escalation of funding over the last several years reinforces the point. While most of the evidence is anecdotal and difficult to verify, escalation in the program is not attributable to a deteriorating security situation but to program managers seeking new ways to expand programs on the ground. They have worked hard to support the war effort. Unfortunately, they have moved beyond the scope of U.S. objectives.

The United States provided $12.1 million to improve legal services in Afghanistan in 2010. Like corrections, this program started out small in 2003 with the goal to expand and improve legal services to the poor and disempowered, while increasing public awareness of legal issues, rights, and services. The original intent was admirable, but today the program requires building numerous field offices to “expand the reach of its activities to ensure that Afghans have access to legal representation in every province of the country.” Such programs, while nice to have, are not in keeping with our core goal in Afghanistan. Circumstantial evidence indicates program managers consistently seek new ways to expand their programs beyond the scope of their original purpose. They played a vital role in the expansion of justice programs to their current levels because it was in their interest to see their programs continued or expanded. It was their job to justify the value of particular programs to agency leaders and members of Congress. However, programs like the ones just listed are beyond the scope of our mission in Afghanistan. Neither the construction of prisons nor the improvement of legal services supports our core goal—to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda.

The closest plausible link is that they support the nested objective to promote “a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.” With such an indirect relationship, it is easy to make the argument that virtually any program, especially one that entails large expenditures, enhances the capacity of the host-nation government. Admittedly, these
programs demonstrate U.S. resolve and support counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts; however, the fact that U.S. soldiers operate the prisons and U.S. contractors construct the facilities undermines any claim that the mission improves the capacity of the government of Afghanistan—especially since Afghans are ill-equipped to take responsibility for such facilities upon our departure. United States support for Afghan justice programs provides clear evidence that it is engaged in nation building.

Experience has demonstrated how influential program managers can be during the budget formulation process. Ultimately, a lack of responsible oversight by senior leaders in Washington is to blame for this, but the problem is rampant, and the Department of Defense is not exempt.

An old adage says that when everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. This is the problem DOD faces with the recent expansion of funding for COIN, counterterrorism, and stabilization operations, despite the establishment of priorities in the Quadrennial Defense Review. It seems likely that program managers played a key role in securing support for their programs in another staggeringly large DOD budget. Despite his unqualified support for multiple defense missions, even then Secretary of Defense Gates acknowledged the problem, disparaging it as “math, not strategy.” Gordon Adams adds, “This unlimited agenda of missions does not constitute a strategy. It is a grocery list that justifies ever-expanding, global U.S. military engagement, and of course, significantly more resources than the country can afford.”

Program managers have the ability to influence our strategy in Afghanistan through the budget process. Unless we provide greater oversight and nest programs inside strategic goals, the aforementioned problems will continue.

**Poor management practices.** The burden does not lie solely with program managers. We can attribute many of the poor management practices to the size of the cadre of senior managers within our government. The sheer size of the U.S. government bureaucracy creates opportunities for managers to claim plausible deniability or even ignorance about decisions made by their subordinates. Put another way, managers are not asking the tough questions to determine why certain programs are in budget requests. The nature of our bureaucracy promotes fragmented decision making which makes one wonder whether future budget requests may include funding for the construction of medical schools in Afghanistan with taxpayer dollars. Is this really something the U.S. government should be doing? The fact that bureaucrats believe we should reveals the extent to which mission creep has taken hold and perverted our strategy in Afghanistan.

**The Role of Congress**

Legislators and their staffs can affect strategy in a similar manner. Congressional representatives depend on the support of their constituents, therefore success depends on tangible benefits for voters. The result is a myopic perspective on the part of Congress, and earmarks are a natural corollary to this. (They provide immediate visible benefits.)

Put another way, Congress has adopted a short-term outlook at the expense of the long-term strategy. Programs that promote jobs locally may be good for that congressional district, but do they support the strategic objectives set forth by the president and the National Security Council? In most cases, the answer is a resounding no. Furthermore, they compromise the credibility of Congress, the Department of Defense, and the strategy itself.

Numerous instances of congressional largesse are politically troublesome. For example, in FY 2005, the Consolidated Appropriations Act included $50 million in earmarks for programs that directly addressed the needs of Afghan women and girls. Despite the obvious benefit of such programs to the people (especially women) of Afghanistan, like the justice programs, they have no direct relationship with our core goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda and prevent its return. Using a very broad definition of the objective, one could argue that such programs do support the strategy, but such oblique support is tantamount to irrelevance. In the current context, women’s programs do not help us to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda; therefore, we should not be spending taxpayer dollars in support of them. Here again, the budget process provides an opening for individuals to influence U.S. strategy indirectly.

Problems with congressional appropriations are not isolated to the State Department. In fact, Section 9012 of the 2012 Defense Appropriations Bill provides the Department of Defense $150 million to operate a Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations in Afghanistan. Specifically, Section 9012 provides funds from overseas contingency operations to the Secretary of Defense to “carry out projects in fiscal year 2012 to assist the commander of the United States Central Command in developing a link between United States military operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom and the economic elements of United States national power.” Thus, it seems the war in Afghanistan has become an economic opportunity for U.S. businesses. For one reason or another, one or several congressional representatives likely included the task force in order to benefit local businesses from their districts. Such support does not come without a cost. It takes money away from critical activities (e.g., police training) essential for success in Afghanistan. Again, we see how the budget-making process is used to expand the scope of operations to the detriment of the strategic objectives of our mission in Afghanistan.

On a different level, earmarks undermine DOD’s ability to achieve its goals—a critical problem when the United States is engaged in two wars simultaneously. Earmarks create strategic drift and compromise support for long-term strategic objectives. For example, in 2007 the DOD Inspector General identified 2,587 earmarks (each less than $15 million in cost) worth a combined total of $5.87 billion. Most of the earmarks concerned non-Afghan programs and at least five did not support core DOD goals.

This information should give us pause. It shows how funding can be dictated through mark-ups of legislation, with little-to-no concern for strategic priorities. As noted earlier, earmarks are enticing for congressional leaders because they provide jobs in local districts. However, they also produce a slippery slope that could lead to a complete loss of confidence in the Department of Defense.

Earmarks in the defense budget threaten congressional credibility as well. Earmarks are essentially legislative provisions that serve personal interests. They draw money away from real priorities—such as the war in Afghanistan—which makes them even more disturbing. Earmarks are a surreptitious way to fund projects that benefit constituents of a particular district (and its associated members of Congress). They undermine the credibility of Congress because they are a clear example of the abuse of power by congressional...
leaders. In the end, program managers, legislative staffers, and members of congress themselves are responsible for our successes and failures in Afghanistan. They must recognize the role they play as leaders, see the flaws in the arrangement, and make a deliberate choice not to exploit an imperfect system.

**Putting Things Back in Order**

Although it will not be easy and will probably require multiple iterations before we finally get it right, there are actions that we can take to effectively tie the budget to strategy and thus prevent bureaucrats from unwittingly compromising strategic objectives.

First, we can vet inputs from program managers before including them in any formal budget request. To that end, agency managers and senior leaders must provide responsible oversight for budget requests before submitting them to the Office of Management and Budget and Congress. Someone has to serve as the “honest broker,” making tough decisions to prevent the adoption of programs that do not support strategic objectives.

Second, we must hold members of Congress and their staffs more accountable by compelling them to tie earmarks in budget requests to the strategic objectives they support. For example, we could tie an earmark to fund an ammunition factory to objectives they support. For example, we could tie an earmark to fund an ammunition factory to a strategic objective in Afghanistan or some other core DOD goal.

Third, each agency could have programs that support its portion of a particular strategy listed as separate line items within its portion of the budget. Like earmarks, the justification for inclusion of programs in the budget should be that it supports some overarching strategic objective. Essentially, justification for programs should explicitly state what key goal each particular program supports, similar to the way the military links specific missions with lines of operations. The benefits would be twofold: they would enable transparency and they would serve as a check-and-balance system because justification for the line item would have to pass the common sense test. Leaders would be more accountable because, along with earmarks, individual programs in the annual budget request would relate to strategic objectives, thus making it more difficult to disguise funding from the American people.

Finally, a single department should manage long-range plans, especially war plans, with funding provided from all players to a single agency for management purposes. Obviously, investing so much authority in a single organization would require congressional support. The ideal candidate to bear the burden for overseas contingency operations is the Department of Defense, for it is already responsible for the nation’s defense. Letters of agreement between agencies should suffice (at least initially) to transfer funding, and the process will only get better over time. We will have to develop and streamline the process to gain efficiencies, but the potential benefits surely justify the effort.

**Conclusion**

In the end, we must decide if the budget supports the strategy or if the strategy is simply a raison d’être for an ever-expanding budget. At present, it appears the budget is being used to influence strategy, so it seems we have put the cart before the horse.

Strategy development and implementation is broken in the United States. Too many participants have opportunities to influence the process. Sometimes, they do so unwittingly, based on blind commitment to the cause. At other times, they willfully exploit the process to serve selfish ends. Either way, the key to solving the problem will be “honest brokers” making the tough decisions necessary to keep the country focused on its strategic goals. We can do better, and this paper aims to better integrate the strategy and budget-making processes.

**MR**

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**NOTES**

3. Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 102-10. The authors traced the path of decisions and clearance points in the EDA public works program and discovered more participants and decisions resulted in a decreased likelihood of success.
4. Ibid., 102.
Requests for corrections programs for each year are as follows: 2009: $19M; 2009 Supplemental: $46M; 2010: $65M; 2010 Supplemental: $85M; 2011: $80M. 

Further, the report notes a key objective for INL in Afghanistan is to “help rebuild a safe, secure, and humane Afghan corrections system that meets international standards,” INL Program and Budget Guide, 129. 


That unity of effort toward an adequately defined objective is a prime precondition for military success is axiomatic. In Afghanistan, however, many uncomfortable questions regarding the exact nature of the international effort remain unspoken in public, and thus undeated by Western political leaders. Even at the highest levels, military leaders have constructed the war in Afghanistan as a fight against the Taliban. This almost guarantees our national failure. Instead, we should explain to the American people that the U.S. effort is a fight for the uncommitted Pashtun population of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only in this way can we clearly define a war strategy that creates the conditions for a sustainable peace and is synchronized with our national strategy and national character. We require a sustainable engagement strategy, not merely an exit strategy. It must be one that understands that stability and governance in Kabul is a function of stability and governance in Islamabad and vice versa, and a policy that considers Pashtun combat power and stability in Pakistan. Such a policy will recognize the conditions under which Pakistan maintains its internal stability and its ability to remain a deterrent against India. Without sustained engagement, these goals will likely fail.

Led by the United States, NATO must clearly answer three uncomfortable questions:

- Is Afghanistan, as currently constituted, a viable nation-state?
- Is the Hazara-dominated, Tajik-dominated Afghan National Army (ANA) the correct mechanism for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan?
- Is the survival of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani government the primary NATO foreign policy goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Posing these questions forces us to reexamine our operational and strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, objectives that we are unlikely to achieve until we fundamentally reevaluate our assumptions about Afghanistan itself, the achievable roles and missions of the Afghan Security Forces, and the impact of those decisions on both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Our lack of understanding of the first principles of engagement in Afghanistan makes even an attempt to negotiate with elements of the Taliban a potentially self-abortive effort. In the case of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), this “unexamined life” perpetuates significant structural deficiencies imposed or suggested by the GIRoA’s Western sponsors. In the case of the United States, lack of any debate of first principles may result in a strategy implemented by various government departments working at cross purposes. Afghanistan as currently constructed will always be inherently unstable. The operational objective of a stable Afghanistan may be impossible to achieve.

The Myth of the “Graveyard of Empires”

It is common, though incorrect, to describe Afghanistan as the “Graveyard of Empires.” This trite saying has created a self-fulfilling prophecy and the easy post-war explanation that Afghan missions are doomed to failure before execution by immutable factors of terrain, population, and culture. While no one familiar with Afghanistan would describe it as less than dizzyingly complex, it is also a fact that the United States faced and defeated a much better supported and nationally popular insurgency in Vietnam and did so on terrain as daunting as that in Afghanistan.

We must have no doubt that Afghanistan is viable, but to broadly frame the concepts of “Afghanistan” and “viable,” we must understand Afghanistan’s history and political development, and that of its neighbors in the region. The borders of Afghanistan are generally understood and accepted, which is one major problem already solved. This has its negative connotations in that Afghanistan becomes the place for Shi’a who are not Iranian, Uzbek who are not Uzbeki, Tajiks who don’t have Tajik passports, and Pashtuns who don’t view themselves as Pakistani. Obviously, the construct of Afghanistan is somewhat viable, else it would have long ago joined the legion of nations that no longer exist. Even at its most isolated and damaged, Afghanistan has persisted. However, its existence was predicated on minimal interference in provincial affairs by the Kabul-based national government.

Locally recruited police have access to the population that the National Army does not.

Why Afghanistan persists is partially a function of Great Power politics, which gives the “Graveyard of Empires” concept some currency. However, it is much more instructive to view Afghanistan as a proto-nation, or a nation at an exceedingly low level of political development. Like sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan lacks any applied template of effective, let alone broadly popular, political governance. Failures, roadblocks, and challenges in establishing nontribal government in Afghanistan should come as no surprise. We are asking a generally preliterate and brutalized people to accept the lessons it took others over 2,000 years to learn. If viewed in this fashion, we should be shocked by any success, not failure.

However, success is highly important to the United States and the greater global community. Success or failure is not just about a medium-sized Central Asian nation. Failure in Afghanistan is a threat to the stability of the region as whole. Given these stakes, we must understand that the tools of government must be viable and sustainable. Our attempt to immediately foist a highly centralized, Western European-styled, social-democratic constitution on Afghanistan was neither well thought out nor well explained. Amending the current constitution, with
the goal of producing popularly elected, empowered provincial governors would be a much easier bridge to cross, while simultaneously removing one of the primary “recruiting points” of the Taliban. This decentralization of power would minimize the negative impact should the president of Afghanistan fail to have the restraint of a Cincinnatus in wielding his currently broad powers. Although Afghanistan has survived and remained within its colonial boundaries, this is not proof that it is inherently stable. Maintaining Afghanistan as defined by its existing borders requires an exceptionally deft or brutal governance. Well-meaning incompetency may prove fatal.

The ANA and the Once and Future Northern Alliance

In the wake of the creation of the GIRQoA, the Northern Alliance was a logical foundation for the Afghan National Army. However, as obvious and easy as this solution was, it appears that integrating significant Pashtun involvement in the ANA was never a priority. The downside to the lack of consideration of broad-ranging Pashtun involvement has created a dynamic that has imparted velocity to the insurgent. In political form, the complaint among Pashtuns is that the GIRQoA is not representative of their interests. Outside the boundaries of Kabul, the ANA serves as the most visible face of the Karzai-led regime. In turn, this has created an information operations nightmare in which the Taliban has their primary messages—GIRQoA disinterest and Taliban legitimacy—essentially placed in their hands by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and GIRQoA.

We have created much of the information warfare ammunition that our enemies use to generate their combat power. While it was understandable that Pashtun interests were given short-shift in considerations immediately following the fall of the Taliban, at this point counterinsurgency doctrine and common sense demands that some mechanism is created to give the Pashtun population some “buy-in” to the GIRQoA that they presently lack. Benign neglect is expected by the Pashtun and likely acceptable to them, but dominion by multi-millennial enemies via their national army is not.

The non-Pashtun populations are not going to share nor diminish their own combat or political power in order to placate Pashtun concerns, nor, considering their recent and ancient history, should we make them. We should discuss a “democratization” of armed forces in Afghanistan along with attempts to introduce some tribal equities into GIRQoA operations, especially the manning and employment of the Afghan National Police (ANP). If the GIRQoA doesn’t want external control over ANP, it will have to accept a degree of “warlordism.” This is not necessarily bad, and can be used as an effective mechanism for GIRQoA central control, as the warlords should be given significant power to police themselves. While repugnant to Western sensibilities, this is a proven and accepted modus operandi in Afghan history.

Many commanders who have served in Southern Afghanistan have noted with anger and dismay the lack of involvement from the relatively well-trained and unquestionably well-equipped ANA. The “whys” for this inefficacy have often been ignored as irrelevant by maneuver commanders. This is mostly because at the tactical level, ANA tactical failures probably are irrelevant. Strategically, they are of vital importance. The predominant theories for ANA failings fall into three main camps. One is simply the lack of ANA interest in the future of southern Afghanistan. The ANA’s Tajik-dominated leadership views the situation there as less than relevant to their concerns. A second theory is the implicit understanding that the establishment of robust ANA capability will be an excuse for ISAF forces to quickly withdraw. A third and more nuanced explanation is that the ANA understands better than anyone else that Hazarras led by Tajiks killing Pashtuns is counterproductive to the stability of southern Afghanistan. The ANA’s Tajik-dominated leadership views the situation there as less than relevant to their concerns. A second theory is the implicit understanding that the establishment of robust ANA capability will be an excuse for ISAF forces to quickly withdraw. A third and more nuanced explanation is that the ANA understands better than anyone else that Hazarras led by Tajiks killing Pashtuns is counterproductive to the stability of southern Afghanistan, that their best strategy is to stay in their bases and limit their actions to highway security and minimizing interaction with the Pashtun people. Regardless of the “why,” the ANA in its current demographic form as the primary vehicle for internally based COIN in Afghanistan
must be understood as fundamentally flawed and almost certainly doomed to failure.

The Western sensibility desires a multi-cultural Afghanistan, and, by extension, a multi-cultural ANA. This prime U.S. operational objective is not understood by the Pashtun population. The ANP, largely locally recruited, serves as a much more viable, effective, and tolerable force for COIN. Despite their many admitted shortcomings, they remain better trained, equipped, and led than the Taliban forces they face. To reverse current trends in southern Afghanistan, it is necessary to transition COIN effort away from an ANA-based force toward an ANP-based force.

The lack of unity of effort by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is magnified by the current splitting of the chains of command starting at the ministerial level. The ANA, working for Ministry of Defense, and the ANP, working for Ministry of Interior, are a disjointed and often counterproductive total Afghan National Security Force. They should both work for the same commander at the provincial level at least. This provincial ANSF commander must further have a commitment from and responsibility to the provincial governor. Discussions of talks between Karzai and the Taliban only exacerbate the situation. The (arguably) two most despised Afghan power brokers appear to be solely interested in consolidating their significant and disruptive military and political advantages rather than adjusting to the needs and desires of the Afghan People. Such negotiations must be preceded by identifying and implementing mechanisms that increase the voice of the currently ignored populations rather than entrenching both the current failing and previously failed governments.

The Afghan Border Patrol, currently one of the more neglected legs of ANSF, might have the best of both worlds. Their structure is more akin to the ANA, authorizing the military structure and heavy weapons to provide combat power overmatch against anti-GIROa forces. Border patrol recruiting and manning are much more local in nature, often employing soldiers from the same tribes who for centuries have maintained the areas surrounding the present border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. A transfer of ANA forces to the border patrol could possibly reinforce a neglected aspect of our strategy as well as alleviate many concerns among the Pashtun people.

The role of the National Directorate of Security certainly needs to be evaluated and reconsidered. The directorate is perceived to be descended from “KHAD,” the Afghan franchise of the Soviet KGB. The National Directorate of Security remains dominated by the former Parcham faction. While overt endorsement of socialism is gone, the local Pashtuns still identify it by name and associate it with educated, Dari-speaking Kabul. The directorate has significant leadership links with the GIRoA’s Pashtun leaders, but remains distrusted by the non-Dari speaking Pashtun population within the south despite its creeping Pashtunization. The integration of an organization such as this by Western forces in the overall security strategy remains neglected as the equivalent simply doesn’t exist in Western society. Yet they continue to wield real, and at times disruptive, power.

The tangled security structure leads to several different armed factions working for different leaders, with different tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. On occasion, these factions can be a vital enabler of ISAF, but lack of coordination is often self-defeating. The varying levels of training, command boundaries, and U.S. mentorship lead to significant shortcomings in the overall effort to make Afghans responsible for their own security. Counterinsurgency is a challenge in the best of situations; the present ANSF structure, as well as its integration with ISAF, unduly impedes COIN efforts at the tactical level and undermines Afghan stability.

**Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy and Minority Rule in Pakistan**

Most Americans, even those familiar with the Afghanistan situation, are not well informed on the prevailing policies that drive governance in Pakistan or the nature of that governance. A myriad of political and economic influences shape Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan and, not incidentally, Pakistani internal politics.

The first and most important of these influences is “strategic depth,” which has influenced Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan for decades. Based on Pakistani fears of Indian conventional combat power, and in recognition of the limitations of Pakistani
geography, “strategic depth” essentially states that Afghanistan represents a part of Pakistan for political, military, and economic considerations. Pakistan must insist on a pliant (if not directly controlled) Afghan state to provide it with the economic, geographic, and military depth to successively deter an Indian *coup de main*.

This policy of Pakistani interference in Afghan affairs is based upon broad consensus in Pakistani political and strategic policy circles, and, as stated earlier, is a hallmark of historic Pakistani thought. Such a policy led the Pakistan government to support the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. It is likely that Pakistan was convinced that its decades of experience with Kashmiri militants, along with its experience in managing the unruly Pashtun tribes of the then Northwest Frontier Provinces (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), would allow it to successfully create an Afghan government suitably receptive to Pakistani concerns.

The eventual dynamic of the Al-Qaeda marriage to the Taliban has overthrown this Pakistani calculus. Indeed, it is unlikely that any nation-state in modern times has been faced with such a seismic shift in its operating foreign policy principles as the Pakistanis have recently faced. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban marriage has resulted in the destruction of the heretofore effective Pakistani mechanism of control of the Pashtuns via a combination of tribal engagement, economic incentives, and social autonomy. Instead, the new generation of radicalized Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen declared war upon Pakistan, resulting in the eventual Pakistani Taliban (known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan) takeover of the Swat Valley in 2006. The Pakistani military, to its credit, has responded by resolutely taking the fight to the Pakistani Taliban, but the radicalization of the Pashtuns has been accompanied by the creeping radicalization of Punjabi poor of Pakistan. Depending on evolving
conditions within Pakistan, the elements and tactics used for decades to avoid radicalization, like political and economic patronage, might be losing their effectiveness. The success that the Pakistani Taliban has had in radicalizing the formerly docile but desperately poor Punjabi minority, along with the unpopularity of the Pakistani military’s domestic operations, have created a significant challenge to the Pakistani government. The effects of this radicalization were clearly shown with the assassination of Punjabi Governor Salman Taseer in January of last year. This loss certainly highlights the pressures on Pakistan’s stability.

Ultimately, the international community must determine whether a decentralized Afghanistan serves to deflect Pashtun frustrations away from the strategically critical government in Islamabad. In other words, would a stabilized Afghanistan lead to a more destabilized Pakistan? Can we convince Pakistan that a stable, functionally neutralist Afghanistan is of greater strategic benefit than a pliant one? The risks of Taliban rule in Kabul shrink in comparison to Islamist rule in Islamabad. Pakistan’s often bewildering actions can be understood when viewed from this perspective. ISAF may want a democratic, stable, prosperous, and Western-oriented Afghanistan, but it is naïve to think all our partners believe such an outcome is in their best interest.

The Way Ahead

American policy in Afghanistan must clearly and loudly state our support for Pakistani stability and security while continuing to demand the cessation of Pakistani policies that are manifestly counter to this end. Additionally, American policy must demand from the GIRoA an acceptance of a degree of Pashtun-dominated government-affiliated combat power, with the concurrent agreement that creating more capable Afghan Border Patrol or ANP is not the acceptance of a suicide pact. The demand for security deliverables is an absolute prerequisite for the build-up of Pashtun combat power. Starting to cut the Gordian Knot of Pakistani stability resting on Afghan weakness is the essential first step to the creation of an enduring security structure for South and Central Asia.

As uncomfortable as these questions and their inevitable discussions are, worse still is holding on to simple and myopic objectives removed from the realities of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. If we are to buck conventional wisdom and succeed in this most critical of strategic lands, we must deal with the Pashtun people. They are neither our enemies nor an obstacle. Rather, they simply are. Understanding their concerns while assuaging the legitimate concerns of their neighbors will help us develop a coherent strategy that embraces the people whose cooperation we require for lasting success.
In September of 2009, former Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) General Stanley McChrystal formally requested additional forces in Afghanistan to fight a war that had begun eight years before. He warned that without additional forces the conflict would “likely result in failure.” The situation appeared dire. In his initial assessment to the Pentagon, General McChrystal went on to say, “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term—while Afghan security capacity matures—risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” The critical component in gaining the initiative was partnering with the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) in a much more inclusive and integrated manner than in the past. In the Arghandab District of Kandahar Province in 2010, our battalion pushed the limits of partnership in a meaningful way to create irreversible momentum against the insurgency.

Challenges

General McChrystal mentioned some of the shortcomings of ISAF units when he said that coalition forces had failed to aggressively defend the Afghan population. He said ISAF was “pre-occupied with protection of our own forces; we have operated in a manner that distances us—physically and psychologically—from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.” That psychological distance was evident in our failure to comprehend the complex social, political, economic, and cultural affairs of Afghan society. McChrystal’s report also highlighted the Afghan security force’s inadequate performance and interaction with coalition units. McChrystal called for “radically more integrated and partnered” work.

That last phrase stuck in my head as I planned my operational campaign over the next few months, and it caused me to reflect on my background in counterinsurgency. I knew that we would have to fight this insurgency
in a vastly different way than we had during my previous tour in Kandahar in 2004. At that time, our battalion was at the large base on Kandahar Airfield and at one external combat outpost in a deserted area isolated from the population. Our connection with the Afghan people and security forces was evident, but it lacked a sense of depth and permanency. Our platoons conducted day and night patrols among the population but returned to base unseen by them. The Afghan security forces partnered with us during operations but then returned separately to their own camps. Our soldiers conducted temporary patrol base operations in villages, left after several days, and had no permanent presence inside the villages. We did not stop to evaluate our methods because there was relative peace in Kandahar in 2004, and the population was optimistic following the October elections.

Five years later, the approach and the security situation had changed. In September 2009 the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division, led by Colonel Arthur Kandarian, began training to fight and win in Afghanistan by the following summer. Three months later it was announced that the brigade would deploy as the lead surge brigade of 30,000 Army forces to conduct operations in Regional Command (RC) South. My battalion was one of four maneuver battalions from the brigade with the opportunity to employ counterinsurgency tactics. The Brigade Combat Team was the main effort in RC South from June to November of 2010, but our mission differed on this tour, mainly because it included protecting the Afghan people in partnership with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. Our destination was the historic Taliban stronghold in Arghandab and in the Zheri District in Kandahar province. Zheri is the spiritual homeland and birthplace of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, whose ideology still resonated with much of the population in the environs surrounding Kandahar City. The two districts were obvious places to concentrate forces against the insurgents.

The Plan to Partner

Following General McChrystal’s directives, Colonel Kandarian emphasized that the Afghan army must take ownership of the security in their country. To ensure our Afghan brothers did this, we needed to live, train, and fight side by side with them. For months before deployment, I said that we were going to partner “uncomfortably” with the Afghan army and police and that we would take extreme measures to ensure the Afghans assumed an equal risk in everything that we did. We planned to place the needs of the ANSF above our own in order to get them into the fight. We needed to anticipate that operations would be more complicated when we lived, trained, and fought side by side with the Afghan security forces.

Throughout our predeployment training, we planned for and implemented combined and integrated operations with the Afghan security forces. At Fort Campbell, we integrated Afghan role players dressed in full indigenous attire into all training scenarios. The scenarios included cultural nuances and language integration. We shared ideas with my fellow battalion commanders on techniques for integrating dismounted patrols with Afghan soldiers, and we practiced those methods. For our mission rehearsal exercise, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk provided the most realistic Afghan scenarios I had witnessed since the start of the current wars. However, even the JRTC did not fully prepare us for the types of extreme partnership we had planned. Afghan civilian role players serving as ANA leaders were reluctant to reside in our tactical operations center. They preferred to return to their own “camps,” as I had seen them do in 2004. The ANSF role players were reluctant to integrate with us during planning sessions. These examples reminded me of our previous deployments, although they provided insights about the challenges I faced later in Afghanistan.

We spent months describing and discussing how to integrate Afghan soldiers and police into
our formations, base camps, and our lives in the upcoming year. During the predeployment training, we did not know how many ANSF would be available to partner with us, so we made contingencies to follow the model of the Special Forces Afghan Local Police initiative while we were still at Fort Campbell.

We also spent many months conditioning our soldiers' minds to accept Afghan soldiers as our teammates and the Afghan people as the prize to protect. McChrystal’s guidance said that the mission was to protect the population, but in this fight, the enemy is part of the population and distinguishing enemy insurgents from non-combatants can be extremely confusing and frustrating. In leader development sessions, we discussed eliminating the cultural bias that I believe exists in everyone to a certain degree. Our soldiers had to operate with the mindset that the Afghan people were our “brothers.” It was a pre-condition for our partnership. General Petraeus, who assumed command in Afghanistan in July of 2010, continued to emphasize the importance of the indigenous people. He explicitly highlighted this in his counterinsurgency guidance: “Live among the people. We cannot commute to the fight. Position joint bases and combat outposts as close to those we are seeking to secure as feasible. Decide on locations with input from our partners and after consultation with local citizens and informed by intelligence and security assessments.”

Inspired by 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which we observed during the predeployment site survey in February 2010, we committed at the platoon level to living in small combat outposts among the people in the villages of Arghandab District. The challenge the 2-508 Infantry faced, we learned, was garnering enough ANA forces to partner with at the multiple combat outposts spread throughout the district. Many Army leaders today disagree with this decision to partner with and live with Afghans at the platoon level. They believe that this method stretches a unit to the point where force protection requirements prevent it from patrolling effectively and conducting operations with an appropriate amount of combat power. I sought to saturate the community with small combined units that would challenge the insurgents in their own sanctuaries on a 24-hour basis. I was taking a calculated risk inspired by the desire to change the status quo of operations and establish a conduit for developing relationships with the people.

An RPG gunner suppresses a Taliban fighting position during the battle at Noor Mohammed Khan Kalache, August 2010.
Meeting Our Afghan Warriors

Our battalion partnered with the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 205th Afghan National Army Corps, when we arrived in Kandahar in June 2010. This unit was the second battalion formed as part of the newly established Afghan Army following the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2003, it had operated primarily in the southern provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand Provinces, including during the Marjah Offensive in 2010. It had collaborated with U.S. conventional and Special Forces for the duration of its existence and became accustomed to staging from large bases such as Camp Hero near Kandahar Airfield. As an experienced unit, 1/1/205 did not expect our new approach to operations.

As a surge battalion, we went to Arghandab District to replace Charlie Company, 2-508 Parachute Infantry Regiment, of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, and expand security along the northwest side of the Arghandab River. Our battalion task force combined with 1/1/205 was initially approximately 1,100 soldiers strong and grew to nearly 1,600 during the deployment with the attachment of two U.S. rifle companies of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, led by Colonel Jeff Martindale, and the Afghan National Police. In other words, our battalion was tenfold that of the unit we were to replace.

In June, C/2-508, the company my battalion would relieve, had three combat outposts with Afghan soldiers collocated at only one of their camps. The Afghan soldiers partnered with Charlie Company were reluctant to live away from their company headquarters. Charlie Company had two platoons living deep in the pomegranate orchards typical of the Arghandab. They were in the midst of the population they were there to protect, but had no Afghan partners. Their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Guy Jones, advised us to coach the Afghan soldiers to partner at all the combat outposts as his forces transitioned out; our brigade commander, Colonel Kandarian, also directed this process. Our intent was to partner more effectively with the ANA so more Afghans could get into the fight—to “help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans,” as President Obama put it in his speech to cadets at West Point in December 2009. In previous tours, we typically lived on separate compounds and did not share much intelligence information with the indigenous forces, for fear of compromise. In the previous eight years of conflict, the ANA saw U.S. and Canadian forces as mentors. This time we did not come to Afghanistan to advise the Afghans. We came to fight with them, side by side, or in the Afghan Dari phrase, shonna ba shonna—shoulder to shoulder.

Implementing the plan was not simple; management, cultural, and logistical challenges surfaced immediately. At my first meeting with our partners, I described the goal of living together, sharing hardships, burdens, intelligence, and serving as equals. The Afghan commander was wary about splitting his companies and platoons from his battalion headquarters and was concerned about the living conditions for his men.

As we brought additional forces, there was very little infrastructure in Arghandab District to accommodate two battalions of soldiers, Afghan and American. We would build combat outposts from the ground up. Our objective was to live among the populace rather than build a large-scale forward operating base to house more than 1,000 soldiers separated from the population. As we fought and cleared Taliban sanctuaries in the villages, we remained there and built combat outposts to help hold the terrain. We started with three such outposts, and the number grew to 17 over the course of the deployment.

Sharing Hardship

As we worked to establish the outposts, tensions ran high between the Afghan and American soldiers. The Afghans were concerned that the Americans wanted to live in austere conditions but saw that the Americans had better resources to accommodate themselves. To assuage their concerns, we shared provisions with the Afghans. To demonstrate that we would strive to be equals in our relationship, we shared each other’s food and water and lived side by side in tents or in the same mud structures to facilitate combined planning and intelligence sharing that was critical for mission success. The ANA began to understand that we were resolute in our cause, and relationships began to develop. The ANA command sergeant major said it was better to have separate showers, latrines, and kitchens since
his soldiers had different hygiene customs. The ANA opinion on how we would collaborate allowed the relationship to mature in a way that was natural for both sides. Our command sergeants major agreed that soldiers should jointly maintain the combat outposts to include guard detail, police calls, and base defense maintenance, but this was not a smooth process. Sharp cultural differences divided Americans and Afghans. Pressing soldiers of both nations into close, austere confines under the stress of mortal combat created a volatile environment, but through shared hardship, the soldiers cultivated bonds of friendship. To this day, I maintain contact with several Afghan officers through email and social media, as do other soldiers.

**Cultural Acumen**

Comprehending the Afghan culture is obviously essential to success in counterinsurgency. The Kandak commander requested assistance to build a makeshift mosque for his soldiers on the camp shared by our battalion headquarters elements. We provided it. He needed a speaker system for the Kandak mullah to announce the call to prayer five times a day. The local population and many farmers in the area could hear the mosque speaker for several hundred meters outside the camp. Because of the large presence of Afghan soldiers, the mosque, and the Afghan national flags billowing in the wind, the people in the community began to view our camp as an Afghan institution.

Our combined presence brought us closer to the local community in other ways as well. All 17 combat outposts were combined with Afghan soldiers or police at the platoon level. It was common for a local leader or resident to approach the camp and ask the Afghan gate guard to speak with the ANA commander to resolve local area security or economic development issues. U.S. soldiers could also communicate effectively with the local populace. Learning some of the local language and using it while in the environment is essential to effective partnership. Our brigade brought Dari and Pashto language instructors to Fort Campbell before we deployed. Most soldiers participated in a five-week class to learn basic words and phrases, and a select few attended a five-month intensive program.

My counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Mangal, spoke Pashto, and I committed to learn it so I could communicate with the local population we were there to protect. While deployed, I had sessions with my interpreter to learn the local dialect and to learn how to speak essential phrases. Although my skills were clearly not those of a trained linguist, the effort I made greatly aided the development of my relationship with Mangal, local leaders, and the people of our area. I met with Mangal without an interpreter many times, engaged in essential communication, and departed understanding the subject discussed.

In my commander’s intent statement, I gave the battalion a key task—to develop genuine relationships with Afghans at the squad level. I believed that an essential component of our partnership was with the people of the local area and our language skills were a critical component of that. Many Afghan elders noticed our soldiers speaking Pashto to the people; this helped our NCOs and junior officers get to know the villagers and farmers of Arghandab as well as the fields the farmers owned, the houses where they lived, how many children they had, and other facts about their lives. They did not solicit this knowledge to collect intelligence or determine a need, but simply to develop relationships and demonstrate unity with the population. In time, the relationships gave birth to intelligence, development projects, and information we used to eliminate or deter insurgents from putting down roots in the area.

Living among the people in our area and building relationships with them were instrumental to developing the Afghan Local Police. The local police augmented the national police by helping provide security in the more remote areas where the national police did not have a large presence.

In a previous *Military Review* article, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit discusses conventional forces mentoring and training the Afghan Local Police.
In concert with special operations teams led by Lieutenant Colonel Chris Riga, our conventional soldiers assumed a lead role in training, mentoring, and patrolling with local police organizations throughout the district. In the interim, the police forces we helped develop provided local defense to the villages where they lived. Captain David Ahern, commander of A/1-66 AR, pioneered the concept of conventional forces leading Afghan Local Police training. His men established a close partnership with Afghans in the village of Tabin to accomplish the task. ISAF and Department of Defense leaders subsequently recognized them for their initiative. Developing genuine relationships and living among the people made the program effective.

Our efforts were unique in that we rapidly expanded the program with our conventional force augmentation, so the Afghan Local Police came under some scrutiny. In October 2011, Foreign Policy online criticized the program and cited concerns that if the Afghan Local Police force was left unchecked it could lead to abuse of power and create the kind of unwanted militias that have been a common cause of instability in the past.12 However, the local police force effort in the Arghandab was not a militia but a vetted contributor to security. The key to success was the fact that our forces monitored the program in the villages and closely coordinated it with the district government and national police. We determined that the local police were effectively supporting our security efforts. In Arghandab District, the Taliban feared the Afghan Local Police. The insurgency was very much a local issue in Arghandab, and the local police force was essential to identify and prevent insurgents from establishing sanctuaries there. Our partnership with the national police in the district revealed this during routine collaborative intelligence-sharing sessions.

**Integrated Command and Control**

Inside the base camps, combining command and control proved to be as significant a challenge
as sharing living areas. The Kandak staff, sorely undermanned, had officers to hold the S2, S3, S4, S6, and executive officer positions, but there were very few enlisted soldiers in the headquarters.

Our initial attempt to integrate Afghan soldiers into the battalion tactical operations center met with resistance. The Kandak commander insisted on a separate section of the headquarters building for parallel command and control. He was concerned that his soldiers would be too loud in our command center and that we might soon see things missing from the desks. The Afghan soldiers were typically uneducated and from varied backgrounds. Many were Tajik but their numbers also included Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Most spoke Dari, but a good percentage spoke Pashto, the local language, including the Kandak commander and most of the 3rd Company whose soldiers were from Jalalabad. Their lack of education inhibited efforts to establish a combined operations center, but the fact that many of the soldiers spoke Pashto endeared them to the local population. In spite of such complications, the ANA was actually the most respected government institution in the district.

The battalion operated with parallel command posts located in the same facility (but not in the same room) for the first six months. There was simply not enough space to accommodate both staffs due to the lack of infrastructure, but we were adamant that the tactical operations center be integrated in the same room. This dynamic also manifested itself at the company level, although each company had a slightly different method of integrating command and control. Individual leader personalities influenced all aspects of partnering.

Housing our operations centers in separate rooms had kept us apart and prevented true collaboration, but we were able to update our command center to further improve our partnership. In December 2010, a Navy Seabees construction battalion built a wooden structure on our base camp to serve as our tactical operations center. The blueprint provided equal office space for the entire Afghan staff and a command center large enough to accommodate Afghan command personnel, radiotelephone operators, planners, and analysts. After relenting for six months on the parallel command structure, I finally insisted with my partner that we integrate in the new facility. The Kandak did not get any additional personnel for their staff but they moved Afghan troopers into our command center, and this helped us to share a common operating picture of the battlefield.

Our sharing of operational and intelligence information became transparent. We conducted command updates, intelligence briefings, and operational planning in a combined environment. Such sharing of intelligence and operations planning did not occur in any of my previous combat deployments. It was critical to building trust in our relationship and effectiveness in our operations.

Highly educated and experienced in his trade, the Kandak intelligence officer had the ability to develop sources that far exceeded our own and the daily collaboration with him was immensely beneficial. When we first met, Mangal was reluctant to agree to conduct any tactical operations without explicit approval from his brigade commander. I initially believed this to be a result of Soviet influence on his training and development. (Mangal had fought with the Russians during the Jihad of the 1980s and had attended formal Soviet military training.) I later learned that his reluctance was based on his initial level of trust of our unit. When we demonstrated that he and his staff were to be part of the planning process, he became more comfortable. Instead of asking for his brigade commander’s approval to conduct operations, he briefed the commander about battalion operations.

Although it took nearly six months to achieve the optimally integrated command and control at the battalion level, this was far more than I had experienced in two previous combat tours alongside indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those operations, the indigenous force headquarters was on a different installation.
marginalizing real-time information sharing, combined planning, and intelligence development.

Together we overcame many obstacles in integrating joint American-Afghan intelligence and operational planning. I could see pride growing in the ANA as they shared combat experiences fighting the Taliban alongside our soldiers as well. Standard planning processes and troop leading procedures preceded all operations in which the Kandak participated. Terrain model rehearsals included Afghan leaders who could brief their part of the operation. We could not afford to plan in a vacuum and bring partners in at the last minute.

Fighting Side by Side

Afghan soldiers, fully integrated with our soldiers day and night, patrolled the battlefield on foot in combined formations. A squad of Afghans typically led the patrol followed by a squad of Americans or vice versa. Colonel Kandarian mandated that we combine all patrols and operations. Any exceptions to the mandate had to be briefed to him for approval.

We had to make concessions to overcome obstacles in our partnership. For example, the ANA is significantly under-resourced in night vision devices, and this caused them problems during night patrols and base defense after dark. Our solution was to loan night-vision devices to Afghan soldiers. This made many of our noncommissioned officers uncomfortable due to accountability concerns for sensitive items once we handed them to Afghans, but it was a risk I was willing to accept to keep our partnership moving forward and keep the Afghans in the fight.

I looked at it this way: transferring items to the Afghans provided an opportunity to teach accountability to our brothers. This exemplifies a principle I discovered: serving alongside Afghans as equals often provides a better teaching method than serving as an advisor or trainer. We transferred accountability to the Afghans with control systems implemented by American leaders living in the same confines.

Both American and Afghan units sustained casualties during many operations, and the medical evacuation was combined. American soldiers never left a fallen Afghan behind, and many risked their lives for their partners under fire. Corporal David Bixler earned the Silver Star for saving an Afghan
Learning from Our Past

The positive experiences of 2010-2011 would not have been possible without our past deployment experience and the renewed emphasis on the population promulgated by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus. Including the ANSF in the planning and execution of all operations created a challenge that required all our mental agility, adaptability, and flexibility. We found that our cultural training, including a language commitment, served as the cornerstone to success. The Kandak operations officer told our incoming American relief unit that our efforts to understand Afghans were appreciated: the key, he said, had been to “respect the people, their culture, and their religion.” Soldiers cannot do this unless they take the time to immerse themselves in that culture and live among the people.

Our success in counterinsurgency depends on our ability to leverage indigenous forces and provide security for a nation struggling for survival. Our methods were well received by most of the local population, the government, and ANSF. The results were soon evident on the battlefield and in the bonds we built in the local communities that were essential to pacifying the Arghandab. We could not maximize our effectiveness by unilateral occupation of outposts isolated from local forces and the people.

Convincing American soldiers to live side by side with an indigenous force imposes difficulties. It takes commitment, persistence, and cultural tolerance. We must be willing to accept risk to achieve victory in the long haul. The people are truly the prize. Connecting with them in a meaningful way is essential. **MR**

### NOTES

3. Ibid., 1-2.
4. Ibid., 2-15.
5. In December 2009, President Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. The “surge” began with the addition of U.S. marines to conduct offensive operations in Marjah District of Helmand Province in February 2010. The remainder of the surge forces deployed to Afghanistan spread over a period of 8 months culminating in August. Second Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division comprised much of the second wave of forces and initiated combat operations in Kandahar Province in July 2010.
6. GEN Petraeus, 2010 COIN Guidance, issued to all commands operating in Afghanistan in August 2010.
7. The concept consisted of collocating a U.S. platoon of 18 to 20 soldiers together with a platoon of Afghan soldiers numbering approximately 30. The typical combat outpost was a mud brick home that the villagers agreed to lease to us. We expanded out of the mud brick structures and built HESCO walls large enough to accommodate a parking area for vehicles, living space, and kitchen and field shower facilities. In many cases, the outposts were nestled inside the village with the local residents literally as our next-door neighbors. We assumed risk in order to become a genuine part of the community.
9. CSM Barrios was instrumental in establishing rapport with the Afghans. He had previous experience from earlier deployments and submitted a tactical lessons learned document that received praise from the COMISAF CSM at the time, CSM Hall.
10. My Battalion Commander’s Intent statement.
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**PHOTO:** General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, and General Omar N. Bradley, Commander, 12th Army Group, examine a suitcase of silverware, part of German loot stored in a salt mine at Merkers, 12 April 1945. (National Archives, RG 111-SC-204515)

The Monuments Officers of World War II have captured the imagination of the popular press, and many professionals in the fields of archaeology, architecture, and art history revere them as legends. However, the challenges these military officers faced and their accomplishments in the face of overwhelming odds offer critical lessons to today’s full-spectrum and stability operations warfighters. It is easy to forget that in situations of conflict and natural disaster the preservation of cultural property, sacred places, and objects of value rank behind only protecting human life and safety as the top priorities. Recognition of, respect for, and preservation of items and places of cultural importance in a community are extremely valuable to stabilizing and reconstructing the social fabric.1

Few contest the long-term value of cultural property protection during full-spectrum operations. However, one might reasonably question its immediate benefits to Western military personnel facing hostile engagements in today’s complex conflict situations. One immediate response refers to the media battle that is an inevitable part of all modern conflict. Just as the Italians and Germans used propaganda effectively to advance their causes during the African and Italian campaigns, the terrorists and insurgents of today are often on the scene with video cameras. The British monuments program in 1943 began in part as a response to an Italian propaganda effort centering on the ancient Roman city of Cyrenica in Libya. After the ancient site changed hands from the Italians to the British and back to the Italians, the Italian government put together a propaganda campaign with the message that the British had shown no respect for the glory of ancient Rome. The Italians faked damage to the museum, photographed statues under reconstruction and added captions accusing the British of deliberately breaking them, and offered examples of graffiti written in English.2 The power of these materials was manifest. They helped convince the Italian people that the British had no respect for any element of Italian or Roman history and culture.
Similarly, during the German retreat in Italy, the Germans accused the Allies of stealing paintings and Italian artwork and sought to enrage Italian radio listeners by telling them that the Allies were offering the pick of Italian artwork to their generals for their personal collections. In this type of operational environment, it is critical that friendly forces follow strict behavioral guidelines so that the local population does not believe that military personnel are engaging in theft, damage, or disrespectful acts.

In the spirit of the axiom, “Those who fail to study the past are doomed to repeat it,” I offer some lessons from the World War II cultural property protection efforts in North Africa and Italy.

Cultural Property Protection Requires Support and Direction from the Highest Levels

During World War II, in response to concern expressed by highly placed academics and professionals, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed the Commission for the Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas, now commonly known as the Roberts Commission, in honor of its chairman, Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. The British had a similar commission in the War Office in London. The two commissions recommended that military officer subject matter experts become cultural property advisors to combat commanders in the field. These officers became members of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) Section. Political leaders and military strategists understood the public relations value of engaging and succeeding in these efforts and the propaganda value to the enemy if they did not. General Dwight D. Eisenhower personally set the tone, issuing the following order on 26 May 1944:

Shortly we will be fighting our way across the continent of Europe in battles designed to preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve. It is the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible.³

Even though the United States is a signatory to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, current cultural property protection initiatives within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) have been relegated to voluntary “additional duty” status for a group of dedicated DOD cultural resource managers, lawyers, and other professionals. Fortunately, these individuals have a viable partnership with dedicated subject matter experts, like members of the Archaeological Institute of America, who have volunteered to provide cultural training for military personnel and information for critical planning documents such as the Defense Intelligence Agency “no strike” lists.⁴ Nevertheless, DOD still needs an institutionalized program and process to engage the cultural property protection issue in a responsive, predictable, and dependable way that gets appropriate information to the right people at the right time. This initiative should come from the secretariat level.
You Have to Begin with a List

The *Lists of Protected Monuments* produced by the MFAA illustrate the effective potential of military-academic partnerships. During World War II, officers began with lists developed by the Roberts Commission, and the Harvard American Defense Group supplemented this information in the field using Baedeker travel guides and the 24-volume *Guida d’Italia* published by the Touring Club Italiano. Each list covered two or three regions and included military orders to protect cultural property. These lists enabled officers in the field to quickly find, identify, and document monuments, works of art, and collections of cultural property as they moved into contested areas. This efficiency accelerated the process of finding and partnering with host nation heritage professionals.

Today, under the 1954 Hague Convention and Section 402 of the *National Historic Preservation Act*, DOD planners and deployed personnel must consider cultural properties that appear on the UNESCO *World Heritage List* in addition to properties that appear on any host nation equivalent of the *National Register of Historic Places*. Section 402 has been upheld in the Ninth District Court of California (see also Dugong vs. Gates). The lists are important and can be offered to military professionals in the form of detailed geographic information systems maps with specific coordinates, geo-rectified features, and supporting databases with attribute information. However, the combat commander at the local level must remember that individual communities also have cultural property, cultural landscape, and sacred places that are not on anyone’s list. Failure to identify and respect these features could very well be interpreted as an act of hostility and provoke violent retribution.

**Rules and Processes are Essential**

During operations, military personnel require clear guidelines and expectations. In the case of the MFAA, a civil affairs pamphlet offered the required guidance. GTA 41-01-002, *Civil Affairs Arts, Monuments, and Archives Guide* is the current version of this document.

In addition, Central Command has developed environmental regulations for contingency operations with a robust chapter clarifying “historical/cultural” requirements. The chapter includes a checklist in flow-chart form for ground-disturbing projects in archaeologically sensitive areas. At Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, just east of Baghdad, Iraq, an observant young soldier noticed that contractors were excavating archaeological material to fill HESCO containers. He brought the new Central Command regulation to the attention of the commander. Excavation stopped, saving an ancient Mesopotamian site. Furthermore, the FOB commander became interested in local preservation issues, as did local government officials he worked with.

**Build Partnerships with Host Nation Personnel**

To build cultural property protection partnerships with host nation personnel, the commander must understand what types of domestic cultural property protection systems are already in place. In Italy, experienced monuments officers prepared a summary of the Italian Ministry of Culture structure so they could identify and locate the individuals in positions of responsibility they needed to work with. The MFAA developed a special civil affairs handbook of Italian cultural institutions that explained the ministries and superintendents that were responsible for all forms of cultural property in Italy, whether archives, libraries, monuments, antiquities, works of art, or buildings.

Americans are often amazed to learn that citizens of Afghanistan risked their lives to protect the treasures of their National Museum or that Iraq has a robust Antiquities Authority with inspectors assigned to every province. In areas where it was safe to work with Americans, these inspectors were responsive and helpful for projects that had the potential to impact archaeological sites.
During the expansion of a patrol base near Tell Arba’ah Kabiir, a U.S. State Department heritage liaison, Diane Siebrandt, arranged for an inspector to examine the proposed expansion footprint. The inspector proposed a less sensitive direction for patrol base construction and pointed out signs of recent interments of human remains. Disturbance of these remains could have stopped or delayed the project and infuriated community members living nearby.

It is critical to form trusting, amicable relationships with local partners and to avoid developing false expectations. A productive partnership of this nature includes sharing of accurate and detailed information. Lieutenant Fredrick Hartt’s efforts to save cultural property post-liberation Central Italy is illustrative. In his initial meeting with Professor Filippo Rossi, director of the Galleries of Florence, he—
- Outlined the administrative structure of the MFAA.
- Introduced the officers.
- Outlined the ways that the MFAA could help the superintendents.
- Explained the limitations of how they could help.

In response to his cordial but candid approach, the Italians provided Hartt critical information concerning collections and deposits still in German hands.

**Immediate Documentation is Essential**

When violations of international law take the form of deliberate damage to cultural property, it is critical to collect information and document it immediately and, if possible, use standards of forensic investigations that produce evidence admissible in court. In the case of the destruction of the bridges and the Arno waterfront in Florence by the Germans in 1944, Lieutenant Hartt requested that Professor Rossi put his first-hand account in writing. In genocidal and ethnic conflicts, aggression against cultural property is often used to demoralize and destroy communities. Evidence of these actions becomes critical when international courts bring the aggressors to justice. The importance of collecting such information was evident in the successful prosecution of General Pavle Strugar in the International Court of Justice at The Hague for deliberately damaging the world heritage site of Dubrovnic, Croatia.

**In Emergencies, Established Rules and Processes are Insufficient**

During times of war, damage to cultural property can range from simple theft to causing the collapse of an ancient church filled with artwork. Quite often, an immediate response can make a difference in saving property of inestimable value. Constructing an emergency roof covering, for example, could prevent further damage to frescoed walls in an exposed structure. As monuments officers responded to these kinds of critical situations all across Italy during World War II, they rarely had sufficient time to put contracts in place or to follow formal bureaucratic processes. Lieutenant Hartt found it necessary to authorize and initiate work for laborers and conservators without the proper paperwork. In some cases, the individuals and contractors did not receive their pay promptly, but

![GEN Eisenhower's directive concerning protection of cultural property, 29 December 1943.](file)
they did eventually. Most important, critical cultural properties were saved that would have been lost if procedures had been followed “by the book.”

**Collections Also Matter**

Cultural property protection also applies to museums and collections. In addition to mapping the cultural landscape, the military operation planning process must take account of institutions and collections of cultural property. In situations where buildings are damaged or collapsed, it is critical for recovery teams to know the original locations of collections to determine whether and where cultural property may be located in rubble. It is also critical that the process be set up so that engineer units with heavy equipment are responsive to cultural property officers and professionals.

According to Lieutenant Hartt, the overzealous response of British engineers who were attempting to clear debris threatened collections hidden in the rubble of the Colombaria Society in Florence. The engineers were planning to use bulldozers to push the rubble into the Arno. Intervention by the MFAA resulted in the recovery of—

- More than 1,000 books.
- More than 4,000 pamphlets.
- Forty-two of 82 historical and scientific manuscripts.
- Thirty of 38 codices (hand-written books dating from late antiquity through the middle ages).
- Thirty-four of 36 incunabulae (books, single-sheet documents, or images printed, not hand written, in Europe prior to 1501).

The recovered objects were deposited in the National Library in Florence and are still available to scholars today.

**Standing Historic Structures are Good Anchor Points for Reconstruction**

If there is hope of rebuilding a historic structure or neighborhood, it is critical to shore up standing ruins to use as anchors and landmarks for rebuilding. It sometimes takes less engineering effort to shore
up a structure than to clean up the wreckage after demolishing the standing section or allowing it to fall. Consequently, it is critical to structure the response chain-of-command so that overly enthusiastic engineers have to heed civil authorities who wish to incorporate standing structures into reconstruction efforts. At the Via Guicciardini, military engineers actually found it difficult to bring down a standing tower that the Florentines wanted to save.16 In fact, when they did bring it down, it destroyed a neighboring structurally sound façade that they could have used as an additional anchor point for reconstruction. The needless destruction resulting from the engineers’ well-meaning efforts created massive amounts of additional rubble that required removal. Had they simply left the structure standing and reinforced it, clean up and reconstruction would have been far more efficient. More important, the gesture of respect would have improved relations with the host nation community.

Cultural Property is Not Just Bricks and Mortar

Deployed personnel in unfamiliar environments must realize that members of local communities are the ones who should assign value to cultural properties in their landscape. After the Germans destroyed bridges crossing the Po River during their retreat, the British required wood for bridge reconstruction in time for the 1944 spring offensive. Claiming military necessity, the British 2nd Forestry Group began to cut down the dense virgin forest of Camaldoli.17 Protection for this forest dated back to at least the 11th century, the time of Saint Romauld, who established an order where monks could live as hermits in solitary huts in the forest.18 In 1944, after protests from members of the local community brought the issue to the attention of monuments officers, a critical portion of the woods near the Sacred Hermitage was saved by the successful request of the MFAA for the demining of roads leading to alternative forest resources at La Lima and Campigna. In this case, it is also critical to remember that cultural property like a virgin forest takes decades, if not centuries, to recover.

During full spectrum operations, especially in semiarid environments, Western forces should apply this lesson learned to agricultural assets like date palm plantations, olive groves, vineyards, and orchards. These entities are often critical food resources and may reflect the political and social organization at the local level. In addition, these resources are the legacy that families leave for future generations.

There are potentially similar lessons to learn from Iraq and Afghanistan where destroying vineyards, palms, or orchards can be extremely tempting when hostile personnel take cover there, but the destruction of agricultural properties can infuriate entire extended families and their communities. It is also important to note that the Koran and Islamic codes of the laws of war forbid destruction of agricultural assets during the course of battle.

Appreciate Mission Requirements and Find Common Ground

Villa Reale Poggio a Caiano was five kilometers northwest of Signa, Tuscany, where Renaissance artwork had been stored for protection. The villa itself was also historic and the Allies placed it off limits. The Germans stole 58 cases of artwork from the villa as they retreated, but many valuable works remained in storage there. However, there was no other building in the vicinity large enough to handle immediate battlefield casualties, so the 54th South African Field Dressing Station requisitioned the villa. Fortunately, the commanding officer understood his responsibility in terms of the value of the villa and its contents. One hundred ninety-nine severely wounded casualties were treated there, with no losses of or damage to cultural artifacts.

It is useful to remember that there are methods for protecting architectural and artistic elements of historic structures when they must be requisitioned as field hospitals, headquarters, or billets. First, and most critical, the occupying personnel must recognize that structures in occupied countries do not belong to the occupying personnel, no matter what their history. International law and
military regulation require DOD representatives to document the condition of historic properties when U.S. forces take responsibility for them. Without documentation, angry host nation personnel will accuse U.S. personnel of causing damage to a structure or an archaeological site, even if the damage dates back over decades or centuries. The Department of Defense has developed readily available guidelines for environmental baseline statements and condition reports to help in the documentation process when time is of the essence. In addition to documentation, all freestanding or hanging artwork in a structure should be removed and stored in a locked place to prevent looting. Frescoed or painted walls, decorative windows, and finished floors should be protected if possible. Architectural elements should be left in place.

Currently, a military museum in the U.S. has a decorative architectural feature removed from one of Saddam’s palaces on display. The international laws of war forbid the removal of such an architectural element, and its current display as a war trophy illustrates the need for improved education on this issue. In addition, we do not know how the Iraqi people perceive U.S. treatment of Saddam’s palaces. They may have witnessed disrespectful behaviors, though these palaces were built using resources essentially stolen from them.

Conclusion

“E tutto quello che ci rimane.” (It is all we have left.)

Preservation of cultural property can be critical for social restoration in a devastated community. During World War II, the Germans systematically blew up every single structure in the small town of Pieve Santo Stefano, Italy. Incredibly, they failed to destroy the Andrea della Robbia altarpiece relief, Assumption of the Virgin, in the local church. The MFAA wanted to remove the piece for its own protection, but the prospect of its relocation was unthinkable to the citizens of the community. Instead, the MFAA worked with them to save the altarpiece as part of the town’s restoration. Cultural property that survives war, sometimes miraculously, offers hope when all else seems lost.

Another example includes the recovery of stones and sculptures from the Arno River to rebuild the Ponte Santa Trinita, one of the bridges destroyed by the Germans in 1944. After the accidental bombing of the Campo Santo in Pisa, red earth drawings by Benozzo Gozzoli were found perfectly preserved underneath the lost frescoes. Not only did the drawings enable reconstruction of the art, they gave “a new insight into the process of Renaissance composition.” U.S. monuments officer Captain Deane Keller played such a critical role in the recovery of the Campo Santo that upon his death he was buried there, honored by the United States, Italy, and the Vatican.

Even the destruction of the Bamyan Buddhas in Afghanistan offers a glimmer of hope. Within the empty niches formerly occupied by the giant statues, ancient oil paintings were discovered that the sculptures had hidden. No one suspected the existence of these extraordinary works of art, especially the Taliban.

As we consider the present and look to the future, we can begin to assemble contemporary lessons learned concerning cultural property protection.

One of Saddam Hussein’s palaces serves as the Anbar Operations Center for Iraqi politicians inside Camp Blue Diamond, Iraq, 16 January 2009. Camp Blue Diamond is now protected by the Iraqi Army.
Some members of the current generation of U.S. military personnel, operating without a formal program comparable to the MFAA, have intuitively responded to cultural property challenges and discovered the force-multiplication effects of doing so. Examples include Major Cori Wegener, the only serving U.S. cultural property officer since World War II. Inspired by the MFAA, she joined U.S. Army Civil Affairs as a reservist with the hope of using her expertise as an art historian and curator. She was assigned to assist the staff at the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad with recovery efforts after rampant looting. She is now the founding president of the U.S. Committee for the Blue Shield, an organization committed to supporting proper U.S. implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention. Lieutenant Benjamin Roberts encouraged the use of Commander Emergency Response Funds to rebuild tourist amenities at Agar Quf, Iraq. And of course there is Sergeant James Carlson, the soldier at FOB Hammer who saved some of Iraq’s archaeological heritage from filling HESCO containers. In all three cases, these efforts resulted not only in preservation but also in improved relations with host nation personnel and progress toward improved stability. There is no question that DOD is capable of institutionalizing efforts of this nature and reaping the benefits of cultural property protection as a force multiplier. The key is recognizing the challenge and obtaining corresponding support from the secretariat level. And so, we are back at lesson one. 

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NOTES

10. Laurie Rush, personal communication with members of the FOB Hammer command group.
15. Ibid., 52-53.
16. Ibid., 54.
17. Ibid., 93-94.
18. It is interesting to note, however, that there is documentation that sacred forests in Italy date back to at least the third century BC. The Lex Spoletina, a Roman inscription on a stone marker, clearly indicates that the Monteluco Forest, south of Camadoli, is protected, and that any individual harvesting wood from within this sacred forest was required to sacrifice an ox to Jupiter.
20. Hartt, 92.
22. Ibid, 85.
Journalist Sebastian Junger’s 2010 book, War, chronicles the time he spent in 2007 and 2008 with a company in the 173rd Airborne Brigade in eastern Afghanistan in a self-described effort to “convey what soldiers experience” in combat. Even with such a seemingly straightforward objective in mind, Junger inadvertently set off a debate about the Army’s concept of professionalism. Both officers and enlisted personnel found something to argue about in Junger’s work: either the soldiers Junger depicted were not professional at all, they said, or they were professional only where and when it mattered. The book either demonstrates that Army professionalism is an obsolete art, or it shows the consequences of the Army allowing it to atrophy. (The film Restrepo is a two-hour documentary covering the same subject material and roughly the same themes as the book.)

The vocabulary used and the arguments made in the debate are often ill-conceived and confused. Professionalism usually seems to mean little more than well-kept haircuts, shaved faces, bloused boots, and saying “sir” at the end of every sentence addressed to an officer or “sergeant” at the end of every sentence addressed to an NCO. The word “professionalism” is generally synonymous with “irrelevant.” That, at any rate, is the dialectic in Junger’s book, in which “soldiers make a distinction between the petty tyrannies of garrison life and the very real ordeals of combat. . . poor garrison soldiers like to think it’s impossible to be good at both.” Scant consideration is given in War or Restrepo to the profession of arms being anything other than ground combat, and the dichotomy between the garrison soldiers and soldiers in the field says something about how the Army has come to view its own professionalism. Junger’s book has brought a murky problem into very sharp focus. The Army has poorly managed the message of what it means to be a member of the profession of arms, and its clientele, American society, subsequently misinterpreted the message; consequently, the identity of the institution as a profession has been degraded.

Soldiers versus Warriors

Being in the profession of arms entails more than simply conducting the business of ground combat. This being the case, a working definition of the word profession is required, and we need to apply it to the Army as an institution to understand how the Army fits into the cognitive framework of a profession.
The theory of the U.S. Army professional originated in Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*. Huntington provided an early, prolific definition of the term profession, defining it as “a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.” Professions are distinct from other vocations by virtue of their intrinsic characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Notably, Huntington highlights that education is essential in fostering expertise: “professional knowledge has a history, and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional competence.” The fact that society is the primary client and responsibility of every profession implies that obligation and duty reign supreme over monetary reward in a professional’s motivations. It also implies the importance of “a sense of organic unity and consciousness [among members of a profession] as a group apart from laymen.”

Three of Huntington’s observations on the Army as a profession are relevant here:

- First, the military meets the professional requirement of expertise by having skill in the “management of violence.” Huntington emphasizes that the management of violence is “neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent),” but rather “an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training.” Furthermore, the military professional’s skill revolves around “the management of violence not the act of violence itself.” True military professionals are something more than warriors. They are distinguished not so much for their skill in wielding swords as for their skill in equipping, training, and leading sword-wielding warriors in combat.

- Second, the professional’s motivation consists of “a technical love for [his] craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society.” The military professional “is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steady and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence.” Military service matters more to the professional for its nonmaterial benefits than for its limited paychecks.

- Third, the professional military is an exclusive and relatively tightly policed corporate body, entrance into which is permitted only after acquiring “the requisite education and training and is usually permitted only at the lowest level of professional competence.” Military professionals are “permitted to perform certain types of duties and functions by virtue of . . . rank; [they do] not receive rank because [they have] been assigned to an office.” Essentially, professionals earn their status within the military, and maintain and increase it only through continued professional experience and demonstrated competence.

Huntington viewed only officers as true military professionals. As far as he was concerned, enlisted personnel were distinct from officers because they only received technical training, not intellectual training, and only had to obey their superiors in the service while the officers had a professional responsibility to society. While that was probably true in the pre-Vietnam Army of which Huntington wrote and with which he was familiar, such distinctions are no longer accurate in an Army that invests tremendous time and resources in developing “strategic” noncommissioned officers. Throughout this article, the term *professional* refers to a service member possessing Huntington’s requisite expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, as either an officer or an NCO.

A second crucial work for understanding the nature of the profession of arms is Andrew Abbot’s *The System of Professions*, which examines how various professions relate to and compete with each other. Abbot says the “link between a profession and its work” is its jurisdiction. Because all professions essentially serve the same client—society—their
jurisdictions overlap and create friction points. While professions try to establish jurisdictional supremacy for a “heartland of work over which [they have] complete, legally established control,” in practice this is impossible. As a result, power-sharing and responsibility-sharing arrangements come into being through bargaining at the highest echelons of the competing professions. Because civilians ultimately determine the jurisdictional boundaries for the Army as a profession, it is vital that Army leaders capably and honestly represent the service at negotiations that determine those boundaries.

In such negotiations, the Army significantly contributes to the process that decides whether Stryker vehicle maintenance will be the primary responsibility of the Army or contracted out to foreign civilians, whether the training of future officers will be handled exclusively by active-duty members of the officer corps or shared with contracted former service members, or whether the Army will take primary responsibility for training Afghan National Security Forces or relinquish this task to civilian agencies.

The above examples are all questions of professional jurisdiction, and the short-term settlements that strategic leaders reach in answering them affect the Army’s long-term professional identity by sending cues to service members as to their proper roles and to American society as to how the Army views itself and its relationship to society. The bargaining process thus becomes a vehicle for communicating the Army’s view on its reason for existing. That raison d’etre in the last decade has been widely described as emphasizing ground combat, the warrior role—at the expense of the service’s professional identity. While retaining autonomy in ground combat in its jurisdictional negotiations with other professions, the Army has allowed its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness to atrophy. As an institution, the Army has essentially relayed the message that it prizes warriors over soldiers, and that if it could rid itself of the burdens associated with professional soldiering to better pursue the samurai ideal, it would do so, thereby abandoning professionally critical jurisdictional ground.
The Flagging Expertise of the Experts

The Army is signaling that it does not consider the generation and application of abstract knowledge to be its responsibility. While the service has generally prevailed in maintaining a jurisdictional monopoly on ground combat, this in and of itself does not constitute professional expertise so much as represent technical competence. As Lloyd J. Matthews points out, most of the prominent defense experts within American society are not actually uniformed military but a menagerie of retirees, journalists, think tankers, and contractors affiliated with the larger defense community.¹⁶ The range of responsibilities and activities that these groups now cover in territory that could justifiably be called the Army’s intellectual jurisdiction spans an impressive gamut that runs from the mundane, such as preparing and conducting surveys and analyses, to the downright alarming, such as writing doctrine and designing war games.¹⁷ Civilian academics are increasingly receiving accreditation in studies related to national defense, and because they tend to be “better writers than military officers, more motivated to write, better educated, closer to research facilities, and blessed with more time to devote to intellectual inquiry,” they are dominating both the direction and scope of national debates on defense policy—despite their general acute lack of military service.¹⁸

These manifestations of abstract knowledge in actual practice are the intellectual activities that ought to be primarily, if not exclusively, the realm of the Army, and through these activities the Army exercises adaptability, regenerates itself, and retains institutional memory. Some indicators show the Army is aware of and concerned with these challenges, particularly the substantial improvements in opportunities and incentives for NCOs to pursue further education and the option for officers to attend graduate school in exchange for additional years of service. In addition, advanced degrees and demonstrated proficiency in a foreign language are now de facto requirements to attain the higher ranks.

Yet, when contrasted against the predictable timetable for promotion among senior officers and NCOs, the net result of all of these opportunities and incentives has not been to foster the “capacity to perform serious study in the degree field,” or a continuous tendency to adapt and apply specific disciplines to the profession of arms, but to instead foster degree-collecting and a mentality that sees “the degree field [as] irrelevant—just get the sheepskin.”¹⁹ The master’s degree, whether in international relations, physiology, civil engineering, or Arabic, has become analogous to the Ranger Tab for the Infantry officer—something expected and necessary for career progression—and not evidence of a proclivity for serious thought about the military profession.

Part of the reason for this check-the-block approach to higher education may be because the Army has deliberately separated men of action and men of thought, with clear objective and subjective preference going to the former over the latter.²⁰ While that may partially be true, this assumption is also somewhat undermined by the celebrity of such individuals as General David H. Petraeus and Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, which is in large part due to their intellects.

Rather than attributing the profession’s failure to maintain primacy in its jurisdiction to a biased promotion system that inherently discriminates against intellectualism—a battle cry trumpeted more by professional intellectuals than by intelligent professionals—a more plausible explanation is the fact that the Army has been fighting a two-front war for a decade with an increasingly younger force. Those with the requisite intellectual credentials to serve as stewards of our abstract knowledge base have retired, and those who have risen to take their place have not had the same opportunities for intellectual development while deploying multiple times, taking care of their families, and meeting all of the requirements for career progression.

Thus, if the current message the Army is sending is something along the lines of “We don’t value professional knowledge, nor do we have an exclusive claim to it,” it is doing so not so much because the Army dislikes intellectuals, but because in the current operational environment, expertise in ground combat—experience—is more valuable in the near-term than abstract knowledge. That rationale might be reasonable given the task set before the Army, but such myopic thinking has degraded the long-term professional identity of the service and clouded our civilian counterparts’
understanding of that professional identity. Once significant combat actions have ceased the Army must begin to regenerate masters of the profession’s abstract knowledge base to reclaim its lost intellectual jurisdiction.

**We Fight for Pay: The Rise of the Mercenaries**

At the same time that an increasingly civilian thinking apparatus is taking over the Army’s jurisdiction in the realm of intellectual expertise, the Army’s claim to professional responsibility and its obligation to American society are losing significance for the members of the profession. Service in the newly minted all-volunteer Army was once about personally contributing to national security and the preeminence of the American way of life. The Army enforced that perception through the slogan “Be All You Can Be” and the Soldier’s Creed, which emphasizes subordination of the self to the nation, the Army mission, and Army comrades. To be sure, soldiers fought less for the professional identity of the Army or its ideals of service and more for the buddy to the right and left or simply to get home, but even so, they took great pride in their professional status as members of an exclusive body with a crucial responsibility to the Nation. This is the Huntingtonian professional ideal of responsibility to the client: service for service’s sake, rather than for financial remuneration.

The Global War on Terrorism injected an entirely different generation of American youth into the armed services, altering that basic professional identity. In an essay examining the effect of increased privatization and outsourcing of defense on the Army, Deborah Avant notes, “Military service has come to be seen by many of those serving as just a job or a means to achieve side benefits.” A primary culprit is the proliferation of defense contractors in the past decade and the corresponding message the Army is sending to its own personnel by leaning so heavily on privatized services.

Contractors’ responsibilities cover a wide swath of functions that in earlier times were exclusively in the purview of active-duty personnel. This alone erodes the Army jurisdictional claim to expertise. However, such erosion does not occur in isolation, but in full view of the active-duty members of the profession, who observe contractors doing jobs similar to their own while receiving visibly better benefits, greater freedoms, and higher compensation. Soldiers “take pride in conducting missions that only soldiers can do,” but that distinction increasingly applies to a limited range of operations compared to the potential span of Army responsibilities. As a result, soldiers make statements to the effect that they eagerly await serving out their contract so they can get a contracting job where the pay is substantially higher, the lifestyle more agreeable, and the work almost as rewarding. This is the antithesis of Huntingtonian professional responsibility to the client: it is the textbook definition of an individual “who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded,” rather than an individual who exhibits a “steadying and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence.”

As was the case with erosion of the Army’s claim to expertise in its knowledge base, ten years of ongoing combat could partially explain this trend—but not entirely. Outsourcing Army tasks is a conscious decision that leaders make during jurisdictional negotiations in Washington, and the clear result of that process has been a willingness by the Army’s leadership to divest itself of many functions not directly related to ground combat.
When Army personnel strains are no longer as pressing, the profession must consider what sort of message it is sending to its junior officers and NCOs by having “for-profit companies staff [key training] programs with retired officers” and contractors. In a profession that alleges to live by the mantra of Duty, Honor, Country, how far is that professional ethos compromised by introducing junior members of the profession to the competing benefits of private life at such an early stage in their development? As the Army increasingly employs marketplace incentives to attract and retain officer [and NCO] talent,” how much further will it continue to erode the professional ethic of selfless service to the nation?

Would You Like to Fast Track That? The McDonaldization of the Junior Officer and NCO Corps

George Ritzer’s “McDonaldization” thesis gave a name to a long-noticed phenomenon in post-industrial societies around the globe. McDonaldization is “the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world” by causing bureaucratic institutions to elevate as cardinal virtues the principles of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control to the exclusion of less rational, yet arguably more critical, professional values. In their essay examining the effect of McDonaldization on the Army, Remi Hajjar and Morten G. Ender note that “McDonaldization dilutes a profession’s essence and core (i.e., expert knowledge practiced in relatively autonomous and discretionary settings by human experts) by creating rigidly over-controlling, bureaucratic management systems and procedures.”

The McDonaldization tendency and its detrimental effects are apparent in the professional development of Army leaders. The need to efficiently distribute talent within the junior officer and NCO personnel pool causes these leaders to shuffle from short-duration leadership positions to obligatory staff jobs at the expense of personal development, leading to feeling “slighted... by the limited number and...
short duration of developmental assignments” and the fear that “they are less capable leaders.” Similarly, the constant movement of senior officers and NCOs into predictable duty assignments along a rigidly controlled career path, a consequence of the Army’s relentless pursuit of efficient personnel management, tends to foster a “lack of experiential diversity [which] impairs the professional performance of . . . many strategic Army leaders.”

The same tendency to relocate talent throughout the institution that impairs the personal development of junior leaders also handicaps senior Army leaders by making it virtually impossible for them to gain any unique perspectives or capabilities about the profession and simultaneously survive into its senior ranks. As Matthews puts it, the fact that most senior officers and NCOs “have not negotiated every wicket in a general officer qualification course that could only have been designed by Genghis Khan’s G3 [operations officer]” makes it extremely difficult for leaders with the requisite skills for success at the strategic level to make it to the jurisdictional negotiating table. The acquisition of such skills requires sufficient time for military intellectuals to experience, reflect upon, and write about their own profession. Regrettably, such time is simply lacking because of the strain caused by the War on Terror and the highly bureaucratic Army personnel management system.

My personal experience and that of my fellow infantry lieutenants shows McDonaldization has penetrated the Army personnel system down to the lowest levels. Almost across the board, infantry lieutenants know that, after graduation from the Infantry Basic Officer Leader’s Course, they will go to Ranger School, and if they want a decent shot at leading a platoon, they had better get their tab. They then know, regardless of the unit they’ll be posting to, they will go to Airborne School. Once a lieutenant gets his platoon, he understands that, in addition to actually doing his job of leading 32 to 43 soldiers, if he wants to experience positive career progression, he must make a good enough impression on his superiors to merit being selected above his peers to serve in either the scout recon or mortar speciality platoon or as a company executive officer or battalion assistant S-3.

Where they fall in that ranking system of jobs gives infantry lieutenants a pretty good idea of how the Army rates their competence, because Officer Evaluation Report rater comments that determine future job assignments are extremely predictable; as Hajjar and Ender point out, “the websites of the Army personnel commands abound with verbatim comments that raters must use if they wish to get subordinate officers promoted.” That system also will determine who will be in the first-round draft for selection to attend the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course or a similar qualification course to enable newly minted captains to command companies. Alternatively, for those officers more interested in the nonconventional face of the Army, many lieutenants start building their packets for Special Forces or Ranger battalion assignments before they even arrive at their first unit—not because they don’t care about being platoon leaders, but because the timeline is that oblivious to variances in experience and uncompromising in scope.

The Army should see the McDonaldization dilemma as relevant when certain types of personalities start to predominate over others because of the personnel system. The McDonaldized Army timeline brings four general types of leaders into sharp relief: careerists, who focus primarily on making their timeline hacks and checking the boxes on the way to general of officer; the disgruntled, who are typically either very smart, very competent, or both; the stalwarts, who dedicate themselves heart and soul to mastering their segment of ground warfare; and
the ambivalent, who do the job the Army tells them to do, but not as well as the other three. Through a combination of vitriolic politicking, the occasional case of incompetence, and a wounded ego that seeks immediate acclaim and glory for even the most mediocre accomplishments, the careerists tend to fall on their swords and get out at an early stage.

The disgruntled occasionally share the same wounded ego complex with their careerist peers, but more often than not are under the opinion that the Army “hates smart people” and does not reward them nearly as well as the civilian world does for what they see as their innovative, common-sense thinking. Consequently, they leave shortly after their term of service expires.

This leaves the stalwart and the ambivalent as the predominant surviving population in the Army. In spite of their best efforts, the stalwart rarely have ample time to master the complexities of combined arms, joint firepower, and full-spectrum operations and still develop into truly strategic thinkers capable of interfacing with their civilian colleagues at the highest echelons of the national security community.

By comparison, the ambivalent typically lack the motivation to acquire the experiential diversity essential to the Army for defending its intellectual jurisdictions and preserving its professional ethos.

McDonaldization thus departs from the Huntingtonian ideal of corporateness, in which professional status within the military is earned through professional experience and demonstrated competence. A system that can accurately predict professional status five years out inevitably starts to become less professional and more bureaucratic, and its members view themselves less as stewards of a body of abstract knowledge and more as experts for hire to the best-rewarding master. If the Army wants to maintain a core of highly qualified, expert personnel, it needs to figure out a way to retain talent while also allowing its leaders to realize their professional ambitions without risking their careers.

Where Are the Washingtons?

When considering the nature of the profession of arms and what it means to be a member of that profession, the Army would do well to revisit its memories of the American Revolution, a time when Congress delayed paying its soldiers, a time of costly and prolonged war when strains in the personnel and supply systems of the Army caused innumerable tensions among the officers immediately around General George Washington, forcing him to convene them to discuss the issue of pay. Pulling out from his pocket a document from Congress addressing the subject, Washington reached for his spectacles, and then apologized: “Forgive me, gentlemen, for my eyes have grown dim in the service of my country.”

This is a relevant frame of reference for discussing professionalism in the American Army. Our leaders need to put their eyeglasses on. In their strategic negotiations with other jurisdictional actors, they have demonstrated a clear preference for being seen as ground warfare experts, a title that implies more vocational occupation than professional domain. They have willingly yielded significant jurisdictional territory. As a result, the media and our political leaders seem at a loss in comprehending the service as a profession. If the Army, through its actions, is not communicating its devotion to its expertise, dedication to service, and promotion through merit, it will appear to be nothing more than a trade in which minutia such as haircuts and shaves represent professionalism.

The Army has lost its professional identity, and it is of vital interest both to national security and the institution’s historic character that it figure out how to recapture that lost spirit. Anything less risks consigning the Army to a position of secondary importance. An institution in such a position ceases to attract the best available talent and becomes only a place of employment of the last resort. The American people may continue to support and respect their armed services—but in the years after major combat operations end, the Army must translate that support into motivated, dedicated, professional service to the Nation.

NOTES

2. Ibid., 14.
4. Ibid., 8.
5. Ibid., 10.
6. Ibid., 11.
7. Ibid., 13.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 15.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 16.
12. Ibid., 17.
17. Ibid., 69.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 71.
20. Ibid., 61.
23. Ibid., 285.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 284.
27. Avant, 276.
31. Hajjar and Ender, 519.
32. Ibid., 523.
33. Ibid.
34. Matthews, 82.
35. Hajjar and Ender, 525.
SINCE THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY, when chaplains began accompanying U.S. service members overseas, American military chaplains have served as primary points of contact between the military and foreign civilians. Chaplains’ work with local civilian clergy, religious communities, and relief organizations was the primary foundation of these relationships. From the Spanish-American War to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, chaplains and commanders alike have determined that chaplains, by virtue of their religious authority and cultural knowledge, may be uniquely positioned to bridge cultural divides and form critical links in networks connecting foreign populations to the American military.¹ Chaplains’ interactions with foreign nationals have revealed not only perceptions about the chaplain’s role within the military, but also the military’s vision of its own mission.

For most of the 20th century, chaplains interacted with civilian laity and clergy who were of the same religious group, but since the end of the Cold War, chaplains have been increasingly called upon to work with foreign nationals of diverse faith groups. The amplification of chaplains’ official roles and their interactions with diverse faith communities emphasize the chaplain’s potential significance in information operations and in tactical and operational decision making.² At the same time, the increasingly evangelical composition of the American chaplain corps since the end of the Vietnam War has introduced new tensions to a pluralistic operational environment, as some evangelical chaplains have asserted a fundamental right, constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, to evangelize or proselytize both in the military and among foreign populations.³ Perhaps most important, chaplains themselves have often been driving these changes. Consistently targets of scrutiny by critics, activists, and commanders, chaplains have frequently searched for a mission that made them indispensable and culturally relevant to the military.
With American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, where commanders, politicians, and pundits have deemed positive intercultural interactions critical to the American military mission, thinking about chaplains as intermediaries or “religious liaisons” in a counterinsurgency environment has become commonplace. Recent studies from institutions outside the military and first-hand reports from some within have suggested that chaplains may be uniquely situated to mediate cultural and religious conflicts and are therefore critical to military operational effectiveness and perhaps even strategic success. The nature of chaplains’ historical relationships with foreign nationals is important because chaplains and analysts point to them as precedent, arguing that current trends toward operationalizing chaplains are simply formalizing roles and processes that have been occurring informally for over a century. However, the differences are critically important, and the process of formalizing these roles may actually undermine the chaplain’s efficacy in these tasks, due at least in part to the informal, ambiguous, and voluntary nature of the relationship. While many have lauded this shift as natural and positive, it has relied on generally unproven and problematic assumptions about the nature of interreligious dialogue and the mission and basic competencies of the corps of chaplains. If left unexamined, the formal operationalizing of military chaplains could have serious negative consequences.

Ultimately, the trend threatens chaplains’ traditional and historical roles as pastoral leaders for American military service personnel and informal cultural mediators with foreign nationals. Almost certainly, prioritizing a religious liaison role for the chaplain would significantly reduce the chaplain’s available time for pastoral care and counseling for American service members. Furthermore, and probably more significantly, in some situations, operationalizing a chaplain as a formal religious liaison could threaten his or her noncombatant status and blur the line between church and state (or religious and military) responsibilities. Thus, by explicitly and purposefully involving chaplains more directly in the official tactical, operational, and strategic military mission, the organization undermines the chaplain’s somewhat ambiguous status, which has afforded him a wide and flexible range of roles and functions in peacetime and in war.

Father Bill Devine, the 7th Marine Regimental chaplain, speaks to U.S. marines assigned to the 5th Marine Regiment during Catholic mass at one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces, 19 April 2003, Tikrit, Iraq.
20th-Century Chaplains

Chaplains first accompanied American troops overseas in the Spanish-American War, which led to a significant influx of chaplain volunteers into the military. The United States signed the First Geneva Convention in 1882, so this was the first war in which chaplains would be treated as noncombatants. In the original convention, in Articles I and II, chaplains were acknowledged as neutral parties to be “protected and respected by belligerents” only when they were attached to ambulances and hospitals. At other times, their status was unspecified. Chaplain Leslie R. Groves, Sr., remarked that “noncombatants had best be out of the way when the guns are working.”

Groves deployed with Henry Ware Lawton’s 2nd Division, V Corps, to Daiquiri, Cuba, in June 1898, where Lawton’s troops would later fight in the battle of El Caney. During most of the campaign, Groves was stationed at a hospital to work with the victims of a yellow fever outbreak. However, accompanying troops abroad did pave the way for a wider sphere of influence for chaplains.

Throughout the Spanish-American War, chaplains in the field discovered that they were not always accorded respect when they were not with medical service personnel. Consequently, few chaplains worked near the front, but those who did set a pattern for ministering to soldiers—especially the wounded—on the battlefield itself. After the Spanish-American War, many chaplains concluded that their rightful place was in combat, instead of in the rear at headquarters or in a hospital. And in the 20th century, chaplains, for the most part, held this role sacrosanct. Even in the midst of intense and rancorous political discussions about American involvement in wars, chaplains have maintained that their primary duty was to minister to soldiers at the front. They were to embody their God’s presence in the field.

A second aspect of the chaplain’s ministry abroad emerged as chaplains sought to demonstrate their utility to armed forces in combat. Chaplains became prime candidates for taking on occupation armies’ other-than-war duties. Chaplain William D. McKinnon, serving with U.S. Army forces in Manila, attempted to negotiate a peace settlement to the conflict with the Catholic archbishop of Manila. With the consent of Brigadier General Thomas Anderson, McKinnon walked across the battlefield and, with a Spanish escort, met the archbishop. The meeting was ultimately unsuccessful, but it established that chaplains—especially in concert with a willing commander—could communicate even official messages with civilian leaders. Later, as part of the American post-war occupation of the Philippines, McKinnon was appointed the superintendent of Manila schools and the acting assistant quartermaster in charge of cemeteries, again blurring the line between official religious and military duties.

As the Chaplain Corps professionalized along with the rest of the Army in the early 20th century, chaplains’ potential as intermediaries became more apparent. In the wake of the early 20th-century Root Reforms, the chaplain corps continued on a path to professionalization and respectability within the Army. Chaplains won the right to wear military rank, and the process for screening and accepting potential chaplains was standardized.

During World War I, chaplains who served with American forces in Europe concentrated on their responsibilities as ministers to soldiers, however, when encountering civilians or coreligionists, they did so without an evangelical mindset. In one letter, Chaplain Arthur Hicks, a Church of Christ minister, wrote that occasionally the chaplains would work with the Saint Mihiel School, which taught more than 18 subjects to local students.

By World War II, few questioned that the chaplains’ proper place was on the battlefield. The Army published Training Manual 16-205, *The Chaplain*, which stated, “When the ground forces go into action, their chaplain should be with them.” In practice, then, one might expect chaplains to “move from one platoon to another” or to “minister to the wounded in exposed positions.” The manual was careful to articulate that the chaplain would not “place himself in unnecessary danger. He must be careful that his movements do not disclose hidden positions to the enemy or draw his fire.” Still, it suggested that if there were heavy casualties, the chaplain would be best utilized at a forward aid station, where he could assist in collecting the wounded or in bandaging and performing other simple medical tasks. The chaplain, who had shared the “peril of battle” with soldiers, would thereby “gain a place in their confidence” that would
“reinforce powerfully all his efforts to give moral and religious instruction and inspiration.”

As chaplains gained access to the front lines, they also gained access to foreign nationals—as civilians, soldiers, refugees, and prisoners of war. In World War II, American military chaplains frequently worked with refugee populations throughout Europe, most of them Jewish. In this regard, the few Jewish chaplains in the U.S. Army served double duty, ministering not only to Jewish soldiers, but also to Jewish communities in refugee camps and small towns. Chaplain David Max Eichhorn recalled doing extensive work in this area, including locating “22 old Jewish women . . . whose husbands and children [had] been deported,” and whom the Germans left in the town to burden the community. He performed a funeral for a 97-year-old woman and took care of others “with the aid of money raised by Jewish soldiers and supplies furnished by the American Army and the French.” He reflected, “There is no other Army like it in the whole world. I had to plead with these men not to give me as much as they wanted to give. Many of them wanted to empty their pockets and give me all they had.” However, throughout the war, such efforts remained unofficial and were viewed as supplemental to the chaplain’s primary mission.

In the postwar world, chaplains assumed a more formal function in their interactions with foreign nationals, even though the interactions were primarily pastoral and did not serve an operational or strategic end. Two examples illustrate this. At the Nuremberg Trials, the Army assigned a Lutheran chaplain, Henry Gerecke, and a Roman Catholic chaplain, Sixtus O’Connor, to minister to Nazi war criminals, mirroring the age-old split in Germany between Protestants and Catholics. The chaplains, along with the Army psychologist there, were the only prison officials who spoke German. Those chaplains’ cultural sensitivities, linguistic knowledge, and credibility as religious figures enabled them to interact with prisoners on a personal and pastoral level rather than simply as military personnel. Similarly, Jewish chaplains were the primary people who worked with Holocaust survivors in the aftermath of concentration camp liberation. One survivor wrote that Rabbi Abraham Klausner was a “rabbi, friend, [and] brother” and
that Klausner had “become one of us.” Klausner worked closely with Jewish-American civilian organizations and with the military to provide ministerial care to Holocaust survivors.14

Chaplains stationed in occupied Japan reported they were interested in learning the Japanese language and working with local Japanese people to forge international ties.15 Jewish chaplain Milton Rosen gave lectures to Japanese civilians and officials and at the same time ministered to Jewish civilians who had escaped from Nazi Germany—all while continuing in his official capacity as minister to American service members. Many of Rosen’s encounters with civilians—in Japan and later in Korea—were informal and involved mutual education and respect on the part of chaplains and local civilians. According to Rosen, such interactions were most successful when they involved learning about the other group’s culture and when official functions did not impede the development of personal relationships.16

Emil Kapaun, a Catholic chaplain, learned Japanese to facilitate his local work in Japan, though, unlike Rosen, Kapaun clearly understood that his role would provide significant opportunities to evangelize. He wrote in his journal, “I never dreamed of being a Missionary, yet here I am in a Mission land, a Pagan land . . . and the way it looks, many of the Japanese are going to receive the true faith.” Kapaun’s statement points to a potentially significant conflict for chaplains. Those who represented faiths and denominations for which proselytization and evangelism was a key tenet might face challenges working in a pluralistic setting. Within the military, the chaplains asserted that, while they would not proselytize others of different faiths or religious preferences, they were permitted to evangelize service members who did not affiliate themselves with a particular religious group.17 However, these limits did not necessarily apply to interactions with foreign civilians.

Even after the Korean War, when several chaplains reported significant interactions and relationships with Korean congregations and refugees, official chaplain documents did not reflect this activity as an official function. In the 1959 Navy chaplains manual, little mention was made of chaplains’ interactions with foreign civilians. Surplus chapel funds (voluntary offerings made at religious services) were, with the assent of the worshippers and the chaplain, sometimes donated to civilian organizations, but the Army field manual was silent on the issue of such interactions.18

In many ways, the American war in Vietnam signaled a subtle move toward more official activity in service of a military objective as chaplains’ official and nonreligious duties overlapped with unofficial and religious ones in civic action programs (CAPs). According to the chaplains’ Vietnam orientation guide, CAP activities were “to use military resources for the benefit of civilian communities, such as assisting in health, welfare, and public works projects, improving living conditions, alleviating suffering, and improving the economic base of the country.” The programs sought “to gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for the Armed Forces and to emphasize the concept of freedom and worth of the individual.”19

Within each division area of operations, commanders were to initiate and complete projects designed to win the hearts and minds of local Vietnamese civilians. In specific terms, CAP initiatives included both “short-range, high
impact” projects, such as distributing relief supplies or digging wells to gain rapid acceptance in an area, and long-range projects, such as building schools or hospitals, undertaken by units permanently stationed in an area.20

Chaplains contributed to civic action programs by collecting and apportioning donations collected at services and other venues.21 Chaplains across the world raised money for various causes in Vietnam. One successful campaign, for the Go Vap Orphanage, resulted in total offerings of more than $32,000.22 However, the Army chief of chaplains was quick to point out that civic action programs were not within the realm of chaplains’ official duties and suggested that chaplains should not become too entangled in them. In response to a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) chaplain who wished to begin a program of sponsorship of Army of the Republic of Vietnam units in order to meet the “urgent demands of dependents of Vietnamese servicemen for clothing, shoes...[and] personal hygiene items,” the chief replied such assistance was merited, but that the chaplain should work with the U.S. Army, Vietnam, and MACV staff chaplains to arrange for it through recognized channels.23

Even with institutional hurdles in place, chaplains themselves frequently reported that their interactions with local Vietnamese civilians were among the most significant of their tours. These efforts also increased goodwill among religious congregations and organizations in the United States. In 1971, for example, a United Methodist chaplain newsletter ran a picture of Ralph VanLandingham, installation chaplain at Bien Hoa Air Base, giving an offering to the sisters of Ke Sat Orphanage in Ho Nai. The picture was titled “So Children Could Have Eggs for Breakfast,” and the caption told readers that the $239 gift, used to purchase chickens, had been given by the Protestant congregation at Bien Hoa.24 Chaplains also accompanied doctors, nurses, and medics on medical civil action program missions, where they distributed treats to children and established contacts with local leaders.25

Donald Rich, assigned to a military assistance group team, reported that he had considerable and sustained contacts with American missionaries and
Vietnamese churches. Because he was a Protestant chaplain assigned to a remote area, he often relied on Vietnamese Catholic priests, many of whom spoke English, to provide coverage for his Catholic unit members.26 As in World War II and Korea, chaplains generally assisted foreign people and organizations whose faith preferences closely mirrored their own. The substantial Catholic minority in Vietnam allowed for many cross-cultural but intra-religious exchanges.

However, in Vietnam, many chaplains and military units also came into frequent contact with Vietnamese Buddhists and animists. As a part of the quest to win “hearts and minds,” many commanders recognized the significance of intercultural and interreligious understanding. In 1965, the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force, Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, and his staff chaplain, Allen Craven, worked with Chaplain Robert Mole to develop the “Southeast Asia Religious Research Project.”27 Mole developed his work into an orientation program for troops in all commands of the III Marine Amphibious Force.28 Later, Mole revised the program into the Unit Leader’s Personal Response Handbook, which served as a primer on Vietnamese and Southeast Asian cultural and religious traditions, but more importantly emphasized the importance of military officers changing their own attitudes and responses to indigenous people. Chaplains intervened as moral advisors to commanders when they recognized problems that hindered the effectiveness of American pacification programs.29 Still, these programs were usually ad hoc and directed by a specific commander and a volunteer chaplain. Chaplains were not expected to be experts on world religions or local culture—though, when available, commanders did exploit these capabilities.

After the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the chaplain community struggled against serious opposition and challenge from the civilian religious community and worked to reestablish its mission and prove its utility within the military. On the pastoral side, chaplains decided to focus on family ministry and securing the rights of military personnel, but on the institutional side, chaplains worked to emphasize the potential strategic importance and significance of their interreligious and humanitarian work. In a 1985 professional bulletin article, Navy chaplains stationed in Korea wrote that chaplains there frequently helped visiting ships complete “community relations projects” with “local orphanages, hospitals, or senior citizen homes” because the chaplain was expected to be the source for relevant “information, recommendations, and arrangements.”30

The post-Cold War period encouraged these sorts of developments. Chaplains deployed with American troops in Haiti and Bosnia. However, most of these interactions were informal and unofficial, supporting the humanitarian nature of the conflict and focusing on the reconciliation of religious differences among local populations.31 Though commanders sometimes tasked chaplains with a religious liaison role, it was rarely couched in terms of directly supporting a strategic mission. Chaplains’ work may have added value, but it did not replace their primary task of supporting soldiers, nor was it generally deemed mission-critical.

21st-Century Chaplains

In the 21st century, in the context of a post-9/11 world and in the midst of two large-scale U.S. military interventions overseas, chaplains have again appeared as critical cross-cultural intermediaries within the military. By the early 2000s, Navy, Army, and joint command publications highlighted the importance of religion and culture in contemporary conflicts and the chaplain’s potential role as cultural intermediary. For example, Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, articulates that the joint force chaplain, with the commander’s approval, “may serve as a point of contact to [host nation] civilian and military religious leaders, institutions, and organizations, including established and emerging military chaplaincies.”32 Army and Navy manuals relate similar instructions to their chaplains, and the Navy also maintains that a chaplain may act as a “spokesperson to foster awareness about indigenous concerns, issues, or attitudes.”33 These statements marked a significant change from the unofficial and quasi-official pronouncements of the Cold War era, which emphasized the chaplain’s pastoral role and his role as an advisor to the commander regarding religious support issues. Such policies and directives moved away from the humanitarian character of previous chaplain-civilian interactions and moved instead into the realm of nationbuilding and population security.
In previous American military interventions, chaplains most frequently liaised with civilians of similar faiths, but military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have required more interfaith cooperation. While the military does contain Muslim chaplains, most chaplains in the military today identify themselves as evangelical, Protestant Christians, and many of them assert conversion of non-Christians as a primary tenet of their religious practice. Even so, many chaplains have displayed the desire to cooperate with local Muslim religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan and significant skills to do so.

On the ground, several chaplains and commanders have reported working with local religious leaders successfully. Serving with the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, in Afghanistan in 2004, Chaplain Eric Eliason met several Afghan soldiers who wished to have their own chaplain, and then trained a local mullah to act as a military chaplain using his own experiences and training materials from the Chaplain’s Officer Basic Course. Chaplain John Stutz, serving with the 101st Airborne’s Civil-Military Operations Center in Iraq, acted as a liaison between imams and a unit in Mosul when the local religious leaders felt they were treated disrespectfully by American soldiers who stopped and searched them. This same chaplain also arranged for local imams to visit detainees held by the 101st Division.

Several authors have suggested such cooperation is possible because chaplains and local religious leaders share certain worldviews and assumptions about religion, including a belief in God; the assumption of equality of humankind; the accountability of humans to God; the significance of morality; and the requirement of justice for peace.

Yet such assumptions neglect significant historical and cultural trends that suggest a more complicated relationship, particularly between evangelical Christian chaplains and Muslim religious and tribal leaders. Chaplains, after all, wear the uniform of the U.S. military along with religious insignia—namely the Christian cross—that carry heavy symbolic weight in the Muslim world. As positive an image as interfaith dialogue may have in the West, in areas under the control of those who follow an extremist Islamist ideology, that same dialogue may actually be deadly.
Furthermore, it is ludicrous to expect all military chaplains to have sufficient levels of cultural and religious training outside of their own faith tradition, the desire to liaise with foreign nationals, or the generally ecumenical religious worldview most likely to result in positive relationships. Simply put, it is difficult to imagine chaplains who have encouraged evangelism in Muslim populations serving as very successful liaisons with local religious leaders. These concerns have been brought up by advocates for including chaplains in religious liaison missions, but they are generally mentioned only in passing, as potential words of caution, and have yet to be addressed in pragmatic or doctrinal terms. Issues of gender and theology, on the other hand, go largely unmentioned, as if fundamental differences in belief and praxis are unimportant to either American military chaplains or their counterparts abroad.

Even if the dubious assumptions about chaplains’ potential as formal religious liaisons were true, there are still very real dangers, both philosophical and practical, to this sort of operationalizing of chaplains to suit the military’s strategic mission. Such close ties to a formal American military mission could seriously jeopardize chaplains’ status as noncombatants, undermine a chaplain’s personal security, and compromise his credibility as a member of the clergy rather than as an agent of human intelligence collection. Although JP 1-05 mandates that chaplains should take no actions that might jeopardize their special status, there is almost no specific guidance as to what this might mean in practice, in effect, leaving such decisions up to individual chaplains and commanders.

These official policies and on-the-ground experiences reflect the emerging consensus that religion will continue to play a vital role in future nation building and peace-keeping operations. Certainly, though, not all chaplains will feel comfortable acting as religious liaisons, or are particularly well-suited to working in a pluralistic faith environment, or have sufficient education and experience to undertake such endeavors. While chaplains have frequently interacted with foreign nationals, the chaplain community and individual chaplains have consistently emphasized that their primary role is to provide spiritual support and care to American service members, a job which, given the operational tempo of current military missions, could most certainly occupy most, if not all, of their time. Numbers alone suggest that chaplains are stretched thin—particularly for religious minorities who are, obviously, not segregated in specific units. Even with a growing number of service members expressing “no religious preference,” atheism, or agnosticism, chaplains remain critical resources for personal and family counseling, suicide prevention, and mental health. Even when chaplains are willing and capable to perform a religious liaison function, commanders must jealously guard the chaplain’s time and resources to ensure adequate religious and spiritual support for the service members under their command. The chaplain as a staff officer operates under the commander’s program, intent, and guidance. In fact, in discussions about the chaplain’s role down range, battalion and brigade commanders have often been the most hesitant to encourage a widely expanded formal role for the chaplain.

As the military continues to recognize and act on the significance of religion and culture to nationbuilding and peacekeeping operations,
chaplains are likely to remain critical connectors in networks of military and civilian leaders. The chaplaincy must remain vigilant about defining and protecting chaplains’ noncombatant status and chaplains’ primary duties to American service members. Commanders, too, must take an active role to limit formally operationalizing military chaplains within the American military, particularly in nation-building and counterinsurgency missions.

At the same time, understanding the chaplains’ historical involvement in humanitarian efforts and in forming intense personal connections with foreign civilians should validate the more informal venue for this sort of work and may provide guidelines for appropriate limitations, training, and personnel requirements for increasing chaplains’ participation in negotiations, assistance, and intercultural relationships.

NOTES

1. The literature on chaplains’ ambiguous position within the military and religious communities is extensive. Specifically, chaplains are seen as occupying an ambiguous space between military and religious institutions and cultures, between military and civilian worlds, and between enlisted personnel and officers. They are, at once, full members of these institutions, but operate outside of some of the traditional boundaries. As such, they may have greater flexibility in moving between the two and have traits of each group that give them credibility; however, they are also outsiders in a sense, which presents other challenges for integration within the group and identity formation. For more extensive discussion of these ideas, see Sharon R. Eisenack Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jacqueline E. Whitlatch, “Conflict and Compromise: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006.

2. See, for example, Norman Emery, “Intelligence Support to Information Operations: Staff Chaplains,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (July-September 2003); Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Training Techniques (TOQ-2003); David E. Smith, “The Implications of Chaplaincy Involvement within Information Operations,” IOSphere (Fall 2008): 43-50. This shift is also evidenced in FM 1-05, Religious Support (April 2003), and The Army Chaplaincy, which in 2009 dedicated an entire issue to the subject of world religions and the effect of religion on military operations.


4. On the role of religion in counterinsurgency, see David Morris, “The Big Suck: Notes from the Jarhead Underground,” Virginia Quarterly Review (Winter 2007), <http://www.vqronline.org> (15 July 2011); Frank Hoffman, Luttucks Lamenters, Small Wars Journal, 22 April 2007, <http://smallwarsjournal.com> (15 July 2011); David Kilcullen, Religion and Insurgency, Small Wars Journal (12 May 2007), <http://smallwarsjournal.com> (15 July 2011). These analysts disagree about the religious nature of foreign fighting ideologies in Iraq and Afghanistan, with some arguing that they are driven by fundamentalist Islamist ideologies and are therefore “uniquely violent and fanatical” (see Hoffman and Edward Luttwak), while others argue that religion is not actually at the root of these insurgenacies, but is rather a tool for ideological recruitment and a cover for more practical ends (see Kilcullen). The debate matters a great deal because counterinsurgents responses are tied to understanding the motivations and culture of both the insurgents and the population with which the insurgency operates.

5. See, for example, George Adams, “Chaplains as Liasions with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan,” Peaceworks no. 56, United States Institute of Peace (March 2006); Scottie Lloyd, “Chaplain Contact with Local Religious Leaders: A Strategic Support,” United States Army War College Paper, 2005; a report by 2LT Brandon Ellason, written for the University of Military Intelligence, goes so far as to suggest that chaplains are not only qualified, but perhaps the most qualified and available, to perform a religious liaison function for so-called Sunni “Awakening Councils” formed to respond to the growing threat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ellason, “Awakening Councils in Iraq,” University of Military Intelligence, 2008.


8. C.H. Martin to Adjutant General, Headquarters Provost-Marshall-General, Department of Cemeteries, Manila, 29 July 1899; George P. Anderson to Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Provost-Marshall-General, Department of Public Instruction, Manila, 25 July 1899. Annual Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army 1899, Part II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), 271. Certainly, chaplains were not the only military personnel who took on such civilian administrative duties, but this involvement marked a significant move toward making chaplains fully involved in the military mission of their units.


11. Department of the Army, The Chaplain, TM 16-205 (1944), 64.


17. The distinction between the two is a fine one. Thus, “to evangelize,” in this context, most closely means preaching or telling in informal conversation and is focused on those who claim no religious faith, while “proselytize” has a meaning closer to active conversion and may target those with an expressed religious faith. Originally, the National Conference on Ministry made the distinction to the Armed Forces (NCFMAP), but it has become an important line, especially for evangelical military chaplains. In 2005, however, the Air Force took the step to stop circulating the document, lest it be mistaken as policy. See Alan Cooperman, “Air Force Withdraws Paper for Chaplains,” Washington Post (11 October 2005). The distinction between the two has also come under scrutiny because of the ban on “proselytizing” (but not “evangelizing”) in U.S. Central Command’s General Order Number One. This distinction is unsatisfactory to critics of the chaplaincy who claim “evangelizing” those with no religious preference is just as problematic (and potentially coercive) as active “proselytizing.” See Goodstein, Evangelicals Are a Growing Force.


20. Ibid.

21. Chaplains used nonappropriated funds for nonofficial purposes and to purchase denominationally specific religious accessories, such as candlesticks or procession crosses. Frequently, however, chaplains misused appropriated funds for the second purpose.


24. United Methodist Chaplain Newsletter, Commission on Chaplains and Related Ministries, United Methodist Church, December 1971, 1, USACHCS, Vietnam Files, Box 7.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.


30. Li, J.E. Tranah, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations COMPLEXACT China, Korea, Navy Chaplains Bulletin 1 (Summer 1985), 27.


34. In 2009, the Defense Manpower Data Center reported there were 11 Muslim chaplains for just over 5,000 service members who identified as Muslims. In terms of chaplain support for religious minorities, both Jews and Muslims are actually overrepresented by chaplain coverage. Counts of “evangelistic” chaplains vary depending on how certain denominations are coded. For one set of data on the number of religious adherents within the American military and the ecclesiastical distribution of chaplains from 2009, see Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers, “Demographics.” http://www.militaryatheists.org/demographics.html (accessed 14 July 2011).


36. Ibid., 27.


No nation can safely trust its martial honor to leaders who do not maintain the universal code which distinguishes between those things that are right and those things that are wrong.

— General Douglas MacArthur

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N A RECENT letter to the editor of Stars and Stripes, an Army Lieutenant General called on service members, veterans, and civilians who disagree with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to write their chain of command and elected leaders to make their views known.1 When later asked about the lieutenant general’s letter, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff condemned it, saying: “In the end, if there is policy direction that someone in uniform disagrees with...the answer is not advocacy; it is in fact to vote with your feet.”2

The debate over the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” brought to the fore a debate central to leadership: what is the appropriate way for military leaders to deal with policy disagreements? Whether the disagreement is over war strategy in Afghanistan or homosexuals in the military, do leaders have the luxury of simply leaving the service in response to a disagreement? Or, do they have a greater responsibility to the soldiers they serve? Must they remain in uniform and work to change the policy from inside the establishment? What responsibility do military leaders have to make their disagreements known while still maintaining healthy civil-military relations?

This article will explore the appropriateness of military leaders leaving the service in response to policy disagreements.3 First, the article will survey the responsibilities military leaders have to the branch they serve through the lens of the Army, Navy, and Air Force core values. Next, the article will consider the concomitant responsibility military leaders have to act as loyal subordinates to civilian authority. Finally, the article will determine whether resigning or retiring because of a policy disagreement is in keeping with military values.
A Leader’s Responsibilities to Soldiers

The Army’s Leadership Requirements Model defines an Army leader as one who demonstrates three attributes: character, presence, and intellectual capacity. In embodying character, leaders in every branch of military service must align their personal values with those of the military, demonstrating through word and deed adherence to these solemn principles. By espousing core values, the military does not expect leaders to abandon their personal values. Rather, we expect them to use their personal values and experiences in conjunction with institutional values to provide principled leadership to their subordinates.

The Army expresses these values as “loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage,” and directs leaders to use them as guides in every decision they make. Similarly, the Air Force’s three core values of “integrity, service before self, and excellence in all we do” visit many of the same themes. Finally, the Navy and Marine Corps reinforce these same concepts in their core values of “honor, courage, and commitment.”

In analyzing the core values of the various branches, the common theme among all branches of service is that all service members, and particularly military leaders, must possess three central attributes: honor, courage, and selfless service. Consequently, any military leader considering leaving the service because of a policy disagreement would rely on these values to make his decision.

The concept of honor is possibly the most important of the core values. The Army defines it as an enduring understanding of and commitment to what is right. Similarly, the Navy refers to honor as the responsibility to “abide by an uncompromising code of integrity,” as well as the fulfillment of one’s “legal and ethical responsibilities.” Finally, the Air Force views honor as inextricably linked to integrity, and these concepts serve as the underpinning of a service member’s character. Beyond just doing “what is right even when no one is looking,” military members with honor and integrity encourage the free exchange of information between superiors and subordinates. Specifically, “they value candor in their dealing with superiors as a mark of loyalty, even when offering dissenting
The common interpretation among all of the services is that honor is an indispensable trait of strong character and transcends everything leaders do in representing the military and the service members under their charge.

The second attribute essential to successful military leadership is courage. Both the Navy and the Army specifically articulate courage as an independent core value, while the Air Force views it as a subset of integrity. The Army considers personal courage, particularly moral courage, as the ability to stand firm for what is right and communicate openly and honestly. The Navy’s definition is a bit broader, encompassing courage to face the requirements of one’s mission and acting in the best interest of the service. Finally, the Air Force defines a service member with integrity as one who “possesses moral courage and does what is right even if the personal cost is high.” Common to all interpretations is an emphasis on moral courage as the co-equal, and in some instances the superior, of physical courage.

Finally, all branches of the military view selfless service as the final integral core value. The Air Force links it to duty, defining selfless service as “an abiding dedication to the age-old military virtue of selfless dedication to duty at all times and in all circumstances—including putting one’s life at risk if called to do so.” The Army considers selfless service to include “doing what is right for the Nation, the Army, the organization, and subordinates.” Finally, the Navy core values refer to selfless service as “commitment,” imploring every member of the Department of the Navy to “join together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people, and ourselves.” Common to all of these definitions is a reference to the duty that service members, and specifically leaders, owe to their fellow service members. Specifically, leaders must earn the loyalty of their soldiers by protecting them from unwise decisions that may misuse them. However, leaders also have a duty to their superiors, requiring them to obey the orders of those appointed over them. In addition, leaders have a duty to fulfill their obligations. When a leader takes responsibility for soldiers, he must demonstrate conscientiousness, or “a high sense of responsibility for personal contributions to the Army, demonstrated through dedicated effort, organization, thoroughness, reliability, and practicality.” Combined, the core values of honor, courage, and selfless service embody the responsibilities all service members have in serving their country. Upholding these values is the primary duty of any military leader.

A Leader’s Responsibilities to the State

In addition to responsibilities to their fellow service members, leaders have equally important responsibilities to the country they serve. In the United States, military service is a sacred trust in which the military is subordinate to civilian authority. At its foundation, healthy civil-military relations involve the challenge of reconciling “a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.” When military members attempt to influence civilian policy decisions, whether through statements or actions, society views this as an inappropriate intermingling of military and political power.

Although civil-military relations enjoyed an intellectual resurgence recently, the two principle theories in this field date back to the 1950s. In his seminal work, The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington argued a theory of “objective civilian control,” in which the civilian authorities dictate military policy, then leave military leaders to decide the operations necessary to achieve that policy. Central to Huntington’s theory is an understanding of liberal theory, in which the primary concern of the state is to protect the individual rights of the citizen. As a result, the military must be strong enough to defeat external threats, while remaining subservient to civilian authority. Huntington believed that the only way to achieve this balance was to grant military leaders the latitude to conduct military operations without unnecessary interference from civilian authorities. Huntington
believed the only way for objective civilian control to operate effectively in a liberal society like the United States is for the military to be composed of professional officers who will obey civilian control.23

In responding to Huntington’s theory, Morris Janowitz has advanced the “civic republican theory” as a response to Huntington’s theory. Janowitz argues that instead of individual rights, the primary focus of a democratic state should be “engaging citizens in the activity of public life.”24 Involving the citizenry in the operation of the state expands the interest of the citizen from his individual welfare to the common welfare.25 As a result, Janowitz’s civil republican theory focuses on keeping citizens involved in public service and fostering a greater understanding among military members of civilian political issues.

The importance of civilian control of the military is central to both Huntington’s and Janowitz’s theories and is reflected in law. The United States Code, Title 10, Section 3583, enjoins commanders and all others in authority in the military “to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; . . . [and] to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them.” As the statute makes clear, the definition of a good military leader is one who is, among other attributes, subordinate to civilian authority and the rule of law.26

In addition, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) contains a punitive article related to the preservation of civilian control. Article 88 of the UCMJ, “Contempt toward officials,” provides:

Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or legislature of any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 27

Article 88 of the UCMJ has two significant aspects. First, it prohibits commissioned officers from demonstrating contempt toward officials. This is likely a reflection of the authority granted to commissioned officers as leaders of the military. Secondly, the article is rooted in deep tradition. Restraint in speaking out against civilian authorities has been the standard since the Revolutionary War. 28 As Chief Justice Earl Warren stated when discussing civil-military relations, “A tradition has been bred into us that the perpetuation of free government depends upon the continued supremacy of the civilian representatives of the people.” 29 Laws and punitive articles prohibiting military involvement in political matters preserve the deep civil-military tradition in the United States.

Leaving the Service as an Act of Dissent

Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogleman retired in 1997 after wrestling with many of the issues discussed in this article. In the months leading up to his surprise retirement, General Fogleman had strong disagreements with then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen. 30 In addition to the perceived bungling of First Lieutenant Kelly Flinn’s adultery case, Fogleman was particularly upset over the punishment of the officer in charge of the Khobar Towers complex at the time it was attacked by terrorists. 31 Fogleman felt that the officer did everything he could to prevent the bombing and that further punishment would only have a chilling effect across the force. 32 As a result of these and other disagreements, Fogleman felt that he could no longer be an effective leader and retired after completing three years of a four-year tour.

Impact on Fellow Service Members

When considering retirement or resignation over policy disagreements, a military leader must consider the impact on his fellow service members. This analysis can be difficult depending on the nature of the policy issue. For instance, when a military leader disagrees with war policy, the policy’s tangible effect on the welfare of service members may be relatively clear. The wrong strategic policy decisions in Afghanistan could predictably lead to unnecessary deaths and decreased morale among service members. Military leaders can rely on several past precedents in which bad policy led to unnecessary deaths to guide them in their decision. However, if the policy concerns the internal administrative policies of the services, the effects on service members can be less clear. For instance, the decision to allow homosexual service members to serve openly is much more nuanced, and we cannot predict the consequences of such a policy decision with certainty. In the example cited above, General Fogleman’s decision to retire was rooted not in a particular policy, but rather an intangible perception that institutional values had changed. In such cases, military leaders must rely on both their personal and institutional core values to guide their decision.

When deciding to leave the service, military leaders must first consider whether such drastic action is necessary to preserve honor. As outlined above, honor is the central concept that undergirds the military’s core values. This concept requires military leaders to “abide by an uncompromising code of integrity,” while at the same time fulfilling all “legal and ethical responsibilities.” 33 If the military leader believes that accepting a policy decision and continuing to serve would compromise the leader’s honor, then the leader is no longer in a position to provide effective leadership. As General Fogleman stated on his decision to retire, “you really do have to get up and look at yourself in the mirror every day and ask, ‘Do I feel honorable and clean?’” 34 Certainly, if the answer is “no,” then the military leader must leave the service. However, one must determine whether the policy decision is a reflection of enduring service values or merely an isolated bad decision that strong leadership can...
mitigate. The leader must determine whether the honorable action would be to stay in the service and work to change the policy from inside the organization or leave the service and relinquish his influence in the matter.

The military leader must next consider the core value of courage. Military leaders must demonstrate moral courage and do “what is right, even if the personal cost is high.” If a leader believes that a certain policy decision will have a widespread negative effect on service members, then he must demonstrate the courage of his convictions and leave the service.

General Fogleman believed that the punishment of the commander in charge of Khobar Towers was based on politics rather than on the facts of the case. He felt that unjustifiably “punishing him would have a chilling effect on commanders around the world who might then infer that protecting their forces outweighed accomplishing their missions.”

Faced with such predictable negative consequences to the service members he led, Fogleman had little choice but to leave the Air Force. Like Fogleman, any leader who believes that a policy decision will significantly harm service members should not sit by, shake his head, and watch it happen. He should decide not be a part of it, regardless of the personal cost. That is the true essence of moral courage.

When considering whether to leave military service, a leader must consider the core value of selfless service. Leaders at all levels have a duty to fulfill their obligations to their subordinates, peers, and superiors. Each officer takes an oath to “well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office” he enters. In leaving the service, the officer elects to prematurely end this duty, a prospect that some leaders find an unacceptable shirking of one’s duties. However, as General Fogleman pointed out, if a military leader is no longer effective because his personal views are in conflict with institutional core values, then selfless service would suggest departure as the best course of action. In Fogleman’s view, leaders serve on two levels: as a member of the greater profession of arms and on a personal level. From the perspective of a member of the profession, a leader must continue to serve in furtherance of the profession, regardless of policy disagreements. However, on a personal level, if the leader can no longer effectively lead because of the disagreement, he must do what is best for those he serves and leave the service. When continued service becomes counterproductive, “then the institution becomes more important than the individual, and, looking at the core value of service before self, the choice becomes staying another year and going through the motions or stepping down.”

When considering leaving the military, leaders must assess the impact their departure will have on their fellow service members, and determine whether honor, courage, and selfless service necessitate their departure.

**Form of Dissent from Policy Decisions**

In addition to the impact on one’s fellow service members, leaders must determine what negative impact their departures may have on the military institution and civilian authority. To act honorably, leaders must act with candor and make their disagreements known. Leaders must view candor as an integral part of loyalty, “even when offering dissenting opinions.” However, military leaders must not let others view their departure as a political act calculated to influence civilian policy decisions. Fogleman submitted a carefully worded request for early retirement several days before the Secretary made his final announcement regarding the Khobar Towers officer. By submitting a retirement request, rather than resigning, prior to the formal decision, Fogleman preempted any inference that he was resigning in protest. As Fogleman stated, “the reason it was a request for retirement versus a resignation is that it was consistent with everything that I had said up to that date—which was, this is a tour and not a sentence.”

As Fogleman recognized, honorable leaders must preserve loyalty to civilian authority even when they elect to end their service over policy disagreements.

Leaders must also determine whether, from an institutional perspective, they are truly demonstrating moral courage and selfless service by departing the military. Leaders must consider whether they are facing the requirements of their mission and acting in the best interest of the service by leaving. From one perspective, the top priority should be to retain strong, value-based leaders in the organization and prevent a perception of tension between military and civilian leaders. This reasoning would argue in favor of subordinating personal views to those
of the institution. In such cases, Fogleman said, “You ignore it. You keep soldiering on, you just keep slugging away.”44 However, some would argue in favor of departure if the military leader can no longer serve as an effective advocate for the military because of policy differences. If he stays, the leader risks being a divisive element. As a result, the military leader must weigh personal versus institutional interests when making the decision to leave the military in protest.

Another consideration for leaders should be what impact their departure will have on the policy decision and the military. Some say the leader runs the risk of being “political roadkill,” and his departure will soon be forgotten. In such cases, the leader’s resignation will have been in vain. However, this argument presumes that the leader’s departure intended to influence the decisions of civilian authorities. As outlined by Huntington and Janowitz, such interference violates longstanding civil-military traditions and should not be the motivation for leaving. Instead, leaders should leave the military when they believe that they can no longer honorably serve and retain their character. When leaders are unable to reconcile their personal values with the service’s established values, then they have little choice but to leave the military. However, before determining the service’s values to be incompatible with his own, the leader must be confident that he has done everything legally possible to influence those values from within.

A leader’s decision to leave the military because of a policy disagreement is a complex one. Although “voting with your feet” sounds simple, the actual decision involves assessing the impact the decision will have on fellow service members and civil-military relations. The decision is highly personal, requiring the leader to assess his personal values as well as the values of the civilian and military institutions he serves. Whether the disagreement involves administrative policies like “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” or war policies such as troop levels in Afghanistan, the leader must determine if the policy reflects a fundamental change in institutional values, or merely a decision requiring the leader to adapt. In either case, military leaders must rely on the core values of honor, courage, and selfless service to guide them in their decision. MR

NOTES

1. LTG Benjamin Mixon, Letter to the Editor, “Let Your Views Be Known,” Stars and Stripes, 8 March 2010. The letter by LTG Mixon, commander of U.S. Army Pacific Command, stated: “The recent commentaries on the adverse effects of repeal of the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy were insightful. It is often stated that most service members are in favor of repealing the policy. I do not believe that is accurate. I suspect many service members, their families, veterans, and citizens are wondering what to do to stop this ill-advised repeal of a policy that has achieved a balance between a citizen’s desire to serve and acceptable conduct. Now is the time to write your elected officials and chain of command and express your views. If those of us who are in favor of retaining the current policy do not speak up, there is no chance to retain the current policy.”


3. Although the article will rely on a general officer retirement as a case study, the analysis applies to military leaders at all levels.


5. Ibid., 4-2.

6. Ibid.


9. FM 6-22, 4-6.

10. USN Instruction 5350.15C.


12. Ibid.

13. FM 6-22, 4-6.


15. The debate over which virtue—moral courage or physical courage—is rarer has continued for hundreds of years. As orator Wendell Phillips noted in the early 1800s, “Physical bravery is an animal instinct; moral bravery is a much higher and truer courage.” Maj William T. Coffey, Patriot Hearts (Colorado Springs: Purple Mountain Publishing, 2000), 117.

16. USAF Doctrine Document 1-1, 4-6.

17. FM 6-22, 4-6.

18. USN Instruction 5350.15C.

19. FM 6-22, 4-6.


22. Huntington, 149. As Huntington explains, the traditional functions of a liberal state are “the political function of adjusting and synthesizing the interests within society; the legal function of guaranteeing the rights of the individual; and the economic and social function of broadening the opportunities for individual self-development.”

23. Burk, 10.


25. Ibid.

26. Don M. Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006).


29. Ibid.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. USN Instruction 5350.15C.

34. Kohn.

35. USAF Doctrine Document 1-1, 5.


37. 5 U.S.C. 3331 (2010). Even if the military leader has made the decision to resign, the final decision is up to the civilian authorities with whom he disagrees. Once commissioned, an officer continues to serve at the pleasure of the president, meaning that a competent authority could deny any request for resignation. In such cases, the officer would be morally required to continue his duty. Richard Swain, “Reflection on an Ethic of Officership,” Parameters (Spring 2007), 4.


39. Ibid.

40. USAF Doctrine Document 1-1, 5.

41. Ibid., 11.

42. Ibid.

43. USN Instruction 5350.15C.

44. Kohn, 13.
IN THE CURRENT operating environment, mission success relies on the ability to improve relationships with foreign individuals, organizations, or militaries. Service personnel tend to deploy to a variety of areas in the world throughout their careers and are only assigned to certain jobs and locations for relatively short periods. They need efficient, effective ways to acquire a culture and language capability. The notion of cross-cultural competence (3C) has been developed to reflect this requirement.1 One definition of it is “the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively engage individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds to achieve the desired effect, despite not having an in-depth knowledge of the other culture.”2

In the last few years, we have undertaken a number of research projects aimed at understanding 3C in the military. We have had the privilege of interviewing many warfighters from the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, warrior-diplomats who spent years interacting and building relationships with their foreign counterparts in different parts of the world as a part of their assignments. (Henceforth, we refer to them as “cross-cultural experts.”) Reflecting on our research, we noticed that cross-cultural experts develop certain mental strategies or habits that help them learn about new cultures quickly. Such mental habits can be adopted and practiced by anyone, at any level of military command. In the spirit of Stephen R. Covey’s The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, the primary intent of this article is to provide practical descriptions of these mental strategies, illustrated by operational examples and supported by the research literature.3

The seven mental habits organize around three metacognitive strategies—i.e., strategies for thinking about and reflecting on one’s own thinking: adopting a cross-culturalist stance, seeking and extending cultural understanding, and applying cultural understanding to guide action. In the following, we will
discuss each of the seven habits (see Figure 1) and how they relate to metacognitive awareness.

**Adopting a Cross-Culturalist Stance**

1. **Know yourself and how you are different.** Cross-cultural experts are aware that they see the world in a particular way because of their background, personal history, and culture. They anticipate that, in an interaction with someone who has a different background, the perspectives each person brings to the situation will likely not match. General Zinni, an exceptional warrior-diplomat and cross-cultural expert, noted in an interview:

   "The natural instinct for us is to see a fact and interpret it in our context, and not to say, my understanding of this—my context might not be the right one to interpret this fact. And that may be the most significant thing—that fact, that act, that decision, or that response—how do you do the interpretation? That's the real cultural question. Do I do it through my prism, or do I try to understand another prism which will give me more clarity and [bring me] closer to truth?"

Recognizing this mismatch leads cross-cultural experts to explore commonalities and differences between themselves and the people within their area of operations. Experience living in multiple locations often leads them to develop theories about how Americans differ from other people in the world.

Cultural researchers seek to frame such differences objectively. Cross-cultural experts instead learn to frame these differences in terms of how they themselves are different. For example, they note that most of the world does not operate on the same timelines as Americans do. A Marine Corps colonel told us—

"When I would ask about the Taliban to try to find out when was the last time they had been intimidated by them, received a night letter or whatever, they would say, “Well, it was a while ago.” And getting the clear sense for how long ago that was, in relation to time, was difficult; they still remembered it like it was yesterday and they don’t have calendars; you can’t go in there and ask what day of the month it was. But, I knew they were very agricultural so I used crop-cycles

**Figure 1**

The seven habits of highly effective warrior-diplomats.
as a reference. You walk through the villages and they’re all out there planting or growing stuff so I figured that would be the one way to communicate. Based on that, I estimated it to be about two years before.

Cross-cultural experts understand that their personal and cultural background influences their view of the world. A Marine Corps lieutenant colonel described how this supports an innate motivation for learning:

I temper myself with a dose of humility by reminding myself that, “Hey, you don’t always see things right or know things.” If I do that, I may put myself on a false precipice, or pedestal, from which I could fall. So, what I say with that is, even though I’ve been to Japan a few times, I say . . . “What more can I learn?”

Some researchers believe that certain kinds of cultural knowledge are more important than others in promoting further learning. The cross-cultural experts we have studied use their own personal interests as the starting point for learning about new cultures. Their self-defined learning objectives can come from long-term interests or from the need to improve or adapt action. Some of the experts we interviewed had a lifelong curiosity about human social, cultural, and psychological dynamics. However, this was not always the case. Many had deep, intrinsic interests in history; some were interested in religion, others in sports, and still others in weapons. All used these areas of interest as a basis for formulating questions about a new region or culture. They sought answers through research before deploying, or through conversation with locals once on the ground. For example, one expert we interviewed was particularly interested in knives, and would take every opportunity to discuss knife-making practices with local Afghans. In this way, he used his intrinsic interest to establish a personal connection to the culture.

2. Know the value of a little cultural understanding. Experts operating in different cultural environments understand why meeting mission objectives requires learning about the local culture. All the cross-cultural experts we
interviewed had independently developed clear rationales for the value of cultural understanding. These rationales motivated learning each time they entered a new culture. One Marine Corps colonel noted that learning some things about a culture “peels away the unknown.” It reduces the uncertainty inherent in interacting with people who are very different and thereby increases confidence.

It may not be that you need to read 15 books to know certain facts; it’s just that the act of reading builds your confidence. I mean if you practice for a sport . . . if you go, if I put you right now in front of a stadium of 10,000 people and say do this sport, are you going to be nervous? Or, if I give you a chance to practice for a year to where you get really good at it, and then put you there, are you going to be more comfortable? That’s what your training is doing.

Almost without exception, every expert we interviewed told us he used cultural knowledge as a foundation for building relationships with natives by demonstrating interest.

As one Army captain put it, “when you show that you know something about their culture…to them it’s kind of like a check, it’s like, oh okay, you know a little bit, hey? And it’s like, I’m not very good with languages so it does help break the barrier in a way I can’t do through language.”

Some experts go as far as noting that full language proficiency is not a requirement for successful interaction. It can be sufficient to learn a few key words and phrases to help facilitate social interactions.

So I supplemented the pointy-talkie-cards with about a sheet of paper or two…with a bunch of Iraqi phrases that were more like social lubrication than anything else. Like sayings like, “see you again tomorrow,” or there was one which, essentially translated to, “this is frustrating and useless,” which turned out to be “yapsi tibin,” it’s “rice over beans,” or “beans over rice,” just let it get done.

In this way, the experts in our sample themselves identified the words and phrases they wanted to learn in order to achieve specific goals which were important to them.

Most frequently, their goal was to build relationships. However, their primary motivations for building relationships were to stay safe and to accomplish the mission. Some experts provided specific examples of ways in which cultural knowledge can be employed to assess risk.

When you’re first meeting your interpreters, you have to figure out where they’re coming from, what they believe. My feeling is I don’t want to get blown up… so what is it going to take and can I trust him? Is he a suicide bomber? I have to figure these things out. And, you can’t just ask that question, “are you Taliban?” You have to weasel your way into it somehow, and maybe throw some hints out there… I know some nuggets of information that I think would kind of call your bluff-type of information. Like “what do you think of Massoud?” I’ll just throw it out there and see what happens. Then I look for indicators, looking for any reason to doubt, and I guess that is the bottom line…So the more I know, the more I can roll in certain situations and test the water.

General Zinni noted, “The amount of risk isn’t as great as it might appear when you have an understanding of who you’re with and what you’re doing.” Once the risk is lower, it is easier to create learning and relationship-building opportunities, such as hanging out with interpreters during down time and talking to them about their language and culture.

3. Frame intercultural interactions as opportunities to learn. Cross-cultural experts expect to continue to learn new things about a culture the whole time they are in it. As one Marine Corps colonel told us, they tend to regard the knowledge and skills they acquired in training as a springboard for continuing learning.

I think that all that operational culture that you’re given and all those briefs and stuff, it’s good just to kind of put you on your guard that when you go downrange it’s going to be different. Don’t think of it as an absolute and this is the way it’s going to be. But these are some of the typical things that we’ve experienced. When you get there be open to the fact that there
are going to be differences and to try to educate yourself as quickly as you can when you’re in that environment to those differences. A famous research study reviewed the way experts learn from experience in a wide variety of domains and concluded that in order to effectively use experiences as opportunities for practice, one must explicitly frame the experience as an opportunity to learn. The cross-cultural experts we interviewed indeed sought out experiences and relationships that they could learn from.

Numerous warfighters described to us how they deliberately establish relationships with “cultural insiders” to support learning. Cultural insiders are members of the culture and can provide a wealth of information. Most used their interpreters as cultural mentors in order to vet and improve their knowledge of a region’s history, culture, and language. At times, they even sought feedback from interpreters on how they performed in specific interactions, after the fact. However, many were also creative in taking advantage of ad hoc mentoring relationships. An Army captain said:

To speak to a 70-year old Afghan is incredible. You do not get to be 70 years old in Afghanistan by being dumb. There was this guy who we kept running into and he sounded really intriguing. He didn’t want to talk to us. But I guess I finally sort of wore him down out of curiosity on both parts. We just sort of ended up sitting on the side of the street, propped up against the building, having some tea, and talking to each other. I pointed to his beard and I asked him, “You’re a very wise man, how did you get to be so old and wise?” and he sort of looked at me like, “Wow, you’re asking me that question?” I could just see this whole, sort of cog screeching, “Wow! No one has ever asked me that question.” So, that’s when we sat down. He says, “Well, let’s sit down, and let’s talk about that.”

Just as demonstrating basic knowledge about a culture can serve to build bridges—the very act of showing interest in learning about it can too. Several
experts cite both wanting to learn more and wanting to strengthen local relationships as a dual motivation for identifying and interacting with cultural mentors. A month into my tour I had my [Afghan National Army] soldiers teach me the letters of the alphabet. In five minutes there was a crowd of 12 people around us. I could tell that it did something to them that someone cared enough to learn their language. It was important to them that I respected their culture and language. After that I was really able to start a dialogue with a lot of the soldiers. With a few in particular, our relationship changed from that point on.

Ample research demonstrates that seeking this type of feedback is essential for developing expertise. However, mentors at times provide biased perspectives. Several of the experts we have interviewed talked about how they often checked up on the information provided to them by native mentors by seeking a second opinion:

There could be a slant there or a hidden agenda there that I don’t know of. So take it with a grain of salt. He says something, then I go back and get online and say, “All right, let’s see what this is,” and verify and check.

Seeking a second opinion on specific issues, either from another informant or online, also helps assess the overall credibility of the first informant.

Seeking and Extending Cultural Understanding

4. Pay attention to surprises. Cross-cultural experts are alert to discrepancies and puzzling behavior and inquire into their causes. The surprise caused by encountering unexpected situations motivates them to make sense of the situation, sometimes by trying to consider the world from the point of view of people raised in the other culture. An Army major described being in charge of a U.S.-Afghan team conducting a poppy clearing operation. His team had started building a road so the local farmers could get their goods to market more easily and were working with a local mullah who helped them connect with the locals. He added:

At the end of the operation, we were packing everything up... It was me and four or five trucks with the Afghans. My interpreter came up and said, “Hey sir, there’s a lot of [humanitarian assistance] stuff left over.” I said, “Really? They said they distributed it all.” And he said, “They kept some; they’re hiding it in that truck.” The Afghan leader there at that time was the mullah. I went to him and said, “I understand we have lots of supplies left over.” He said, “No, we don’t have any more supplies—they’re all distributed.” I knew he was lying. If this had happened in the U.S., if he had been a member of my unit, I’d have pulled a weapon on him, said you’re guilty, read him his rights and put him into custody.

The Army major was surprised to find out that the mullah, whom he had found to be helpful and agreeable, would not only take things that didn’t belong to him, but also lie about it. However, he forced himself to assess the situation from the mullah’s point of view:

He wasn’t a U.S. officer, he was an Afghan. From our perspective, he was stealing supplies. But in his book, he was supporting his troops. He was taking what was deserved for doing his work. You can’t take a black and white perspective that it’s right or wrong. My way of handling it was not to be accusatory. I wanted to point it out and let him know that we knew, but I wasn’t going to stick my finger in his face.

In the States, it’d be a different matter. If I created a situation here where I was the bad guy, embarrassed the mullah, it would’ve been bad. Instead, I recognized that he was trying to do the right thing by his troops.

We found that cross-cultural experts consistently adopt the perspective of culturally different “others” as a strategy for developing a deeper understanding within situations they initially experience as surprising or confusing. Research suggests that “perspective-taking” is indeed an effective strategy within social and intercultural situations and that individuals who frequently tend to take others’ viewpoints are able to describe their own positions in a manner more easily understood by others. Perspective-taking also increases the ability to discover hidden agreements and reach desired outcomes in negotiations.
5. **Test your knowledge.** Cross-cultural experts do not have a firm expectation that everything they know (and everything they have been told) is true. They continually question their understanding and have well-developed strategies for finding out when and how they are wrong.

Adopting a scientific mindset, including formulating and testing hypotheses, is associated with cross-cultural competence. For example, one study found that the types of questions cross-cultural experts ask in order to make sense of cultural surprises are similar to the kinds of questions scientists ask in order to test their hypotheses.10

Trying out different strategies and directly seeking feedback are two ways of testing cultural hypotheses. A Marine Corps lieutenant colonel provided us with a good example of how he used both strategies in Iraq to test a hypothesis about a cultural rule he learned in training:

I remember going through training; they’d tell us, “If they see the bottom of your feet, that’s automatically an offense.” I thought, “Well okay, that’s pretty extreme.” So, I asked my interpreter, “I always was told if you show the bottom of your feet it’s an egregious sin.” He goes, “It depends, if your legs are tight and all that. They know that you don’t mean to be disrespectful, but just don’t automatically show the bottom of your feet, if you’re sitting down cross-legged.” So, I would make an effort out of it when I sat cross-legged, I would apologize, and the people would say, “No, we know, you Americans . . . we don’t take this as an offense.” So, I inquired and I tested it out and sure enough, no big problem.”

A second Marine Corps lieutenant colonel’s experience in Somalia provides a great example of using cultural mentors to test a hypothesis. In this case, the lieutenant colonel was surprised to see men with red hair and beards in local crowds, in a country where the population generally has black or brown hair. He developed a hypothesis and vetted it with his interpreter:

In Somalia, if you see a man in the crowd with a red beard, and it is usually just a small little goatee-type of beard, or his hair dyed red as well, then that tells you he is the leader or the tribal elder. I actually learned it when I got into country. And the way I learned about it is there would be a crowd, and people would be talking to me, but instead of answering me, they would look towards the man with the red beard. So I just kind of put two-and-two together to figure out, “This is the guy in charge because everybody keeps looking to him for answers.” I confirmed it with my interpreter. I said, “Why is his beard red? I mean obviously there are no redheads over here. Is this man a leader?”

6. **Reflect on your experiences.** Cross-cultural experts continue to learn from experiences after they happen. During an intercultural interaction, there is little time to reflect on what one is seeing, hearing, and thinking, but afterwards, one can think back over the experience and perhaps uncover signals not noticed at the time or assessments and assumptions made that turned out to be incorrect. It is even possible to identify missed opportunities.

The power of reflection as a learning strategy is evident in the following account of the first meeting between a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and an Afghan battalion commander in charge of mentoring. Present for the meeting were all the Afghan commander’s officers, about a dozen or so. The Marine colonel went around the room introducing himself. Suddenly, one of the Afghans stood up, pointed at the colonel, and said (in front of all the other Afghan officers), “This man is a jerk.”

The Marine remembered—

Now, I’m leaving a family behind. I’m deployed, and part of me is thinking, “I don’t need to take this crap.” I wanted to say, “Hey buckaroo, I’m here to help you guys, you’re not doing anything for me...the types of questions cross-cultural experts ask in order to make sense of cultural surprises are similar to the kinds of questions scientists ask in order to test their hypotheses.
here.” But I bit my tongue and swallowed it. *I didn’t know where he was going at the time* . . . But, I understood that to be effective I could never show that I had lost my temper. So I said, “Clearly, you are a wise man, for my wife, too, thinks I’m a jerk.” And a cacophony of laughter broke out . . .

The Afghan officer became my biggest advocate through the whole deployment. *Later on, I was able to deduce* that he was trying to demonstrate in front of his peers that he was a man of importance and was using me as a way to demonstrate that by calling me a jerk.

In a later interaction with the Afghan officer, the lieutenant colonel aired his hypothesis about the officer’s intent, demonstrating to the Afghan officer that he had thought about the exchange and allowing the Marine to set the stage for the development of a deeper relationship.

The strategy of reflecting on experience as a way to develop expertise is well documented. Chess masters, for example, do not spend all their time playing against each other. In fact, they spend most of their time studying past positions and games.11 Reflection can either occur internally or as part of a dialogue with a colleague or, even better, with a mentor. Reflection in the form of dialogue is an especially effective learning strategy because the process of formulating thoughts in order to express them to others is in and of itself a very useful learning activity that leads to meta-cognitive development.12

### Applying Cultural Understanding to Guide Action

7. *Adapt what you express and how you express it.* Cross-cultural experts use their cultural knowledge and understanding to determine what they want to achieve and how to express themselves to accomplish it. Cross-cultural experts set communication objectives by visualizing how they want the other person to see them. Then they engage in disciplined self-presentation to meet those ends. For example, the Marine lieutenant colonel who the Afghan called a jerk thought carefully about how he wanted his response to be perceived:

I understood that for me to be effective I could never show that I had lost my temper. I had to consistently remain calm, cool, and collected under any circumstance. If the Afghans saw me come unglued, they
would probably say, “He can’t control his emotions.” And I had learned in training that a Pashtun man always keeps his emotions under check. So if I could not control my emotions there, how could they trust me in a firefight? So I tried to demonstrate that not only could I remain cool, but I could turn this around and show that I can influence others and be in control. What I wanted to do was be humorous without being crazy-looking.

Considering the context means considering all the messages communicated: through words, body language, posture, dress, social context, and actions (e.g., showing up early or late, showing up alone or with a security detail). It also involves anticipating that one might not achieve all one’s objectives in a single conversation. As General Zinni observed in the quotation at the beginning of this paper, “Cultural understanding helps you discover what your objectives should be.” In our interview, he went further to describe the key to developing such understanding:

We [Americans] come intent to convey a message. It’s in our nature, and it’s our cultural thing that we don’t listen. We come with the message precooked. You know, it’s the way we do business. And so, they shut down. I mean that can be disrespectful. You know, I really shouldn’t form a message until I listen.

The notion that one should “seek first to understand, then to be understood” (formulated by Covey in his original 7 Habits) is a valuable recommendation for human interaction in any cultural context. Covey himself described the universal usefulness of the strategy: “Unless people trust you and believe that you understand them, they will be too angry, defensive, guilty, or afraid to be influenced.”

**How Can Military Leaders Foster Cross-Cultural Expertise?**

The above are seven mental strategies that highly experienced warrior-diplomats use to develop and practice cross-cultural expertise. Our research suggests that these mental strategies have implications for effective mission performance and mission readiness: preparing for deployments overseas, gaining traction within a new culture or environment, and learning from experiences (Figure 3).

![Figure 3](image-url)

Cross-cultural expertise has implications for mission-related performance, mission readiness, and ongoing learning.
Mental strategies for 3C are often discussed as the results of a great deal of experience, and clearly experience helps. However, it is possible to foster effective mental habits early in one’s career path, setting the stage for ongoing cultural learning beginning with the first overseas assignment.

Many leaders likely already engage in some of the practices described in this article. We hope that presenting an inclusive set of strategies will help leaders advance their own cross-cultural competence and perhaps enhance ongoing training and development of junior staff. One way for leaders to enhance cultural skills and knowledge is to deliberately foster dialogue with and between subordinates around cultural issues. Many of the experts we interviewed participate in ongoing discussions about culture and intercultural experiences online in the military blogosphere or on Facebook.

To open discussion, leaders can share this article with subordinates. Further, to begin fostering development of the seven habits, one might organize a discussion of cultural issues or experiences around the following activities:

- Get members of the group to report on cultural surprises.
- Discuss them as a group.
- Try to take the native’s perspective.
- Formulate some hypotheses.
- Locate cultural mentors and ask them questions.
- Compare their answers.

Such discussions can help seasoned practitioners set or define a positive vision. By describing and providing examples of possible outcomes produced by handling intercultural interactions wisely, leaders encourage acquiring important cultural knowledge and skills before, during, and after deployment. MR

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NOTES

The past 10-plus years of war have provided numerous opportunities for the Army to capture lessons learned for the future of leader development—for both officers and NCOs. How many and which of these lessons the Army will translate into actual content, curriculum, and pedagogy in Army schools or leader development programs is unknown. This article examines the Army as a learning organization and recommends the Army include studies on the human dimension in leader development schools and programs.

How We Learn

Because the Army is a learning organization, it is imperative that it learn from its history—both the good and bad. Such common reflective practices as after action reviews, leader feedback, coaching, and performance counseling all speak to a learning organization. Additionally, the Army currently has numerous knowledge networks under the AKO umbrella for military functions such as intelligence, fires, medical, maneuver, signal, and religion, as well as the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Battle Command Knowledge System. These venues are top-down and bottom-up forums that disseminate and share information from the Army to the Army. On the Internet, companycommand.com and platoonleader.com are forums that share lessons learned and best practices at the grass roots and junior officer levels. All of these forums empower users to share insights and lessons learned, but that information may or may not become institutionalized in formal instructional, educational, or training material.

In his seminal work on the subject, *The Fifth Discipline*, Peter Senge, one of the leading teachers and proponents of learning organizations, defines a learning organization as one “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people...
are continually learning how to learn together.”

He adds that learning organizations are possible because—

Not only is it our nature to learn but we love to learn. . . . Most of us at one time or another have been part of a great team, a group of people who functioned together in an extraordinary way—who trusted one another, who complemented one another’s strengths and compensated for one another’s limitations, who had common goals that were larger than individual goals, and who produced extraordinary results. . . . The team that became great didn’t start off great—it learned how to produce extraordinary results.¹

Senge proposes that learning organizations be grounded in “developing three core learning capabilities: fostering aspiration, developing reflective conversation, and understanding complexity.”²

Nothing in Senge’s thoughts or words is contradictory to what the Army wants to achieve today or be like in 2025. In fact, Senge’s ideas may help the Army learn more effectively and get where it wants to be in 2025 and beyond in terms of real, intentional, and systematic leader development.

What Senge discusses supports our Army’s leader development doctrine, and the doctrine supports what he writes. The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) for a 21st Century Army (25 November 2009) calls for a “balanced commitment to the three pillars of leader development: training, education, and experience . . . our leader development strategy is part of a campaign of learning. It seeks to be as adaptive and innovative as the leaders it must develop.” The campaign needs careful, thoughtful analysis of what constitutes learning and how to achieve it. Three critical aspects of a learning environment are content or curriculum, pedagogy (the art and science of teaching), and the student’s willingness to learn.

David Kolb’s learning-styles model describes different ways that individuals learn. All of them focus on some type of reflective thinking about what individuals experienced, read, or heard.³ Kolb’s model is a good starting point to help us understand that every activity a soldier undertakes has an experiential element that the soldier becomes aware of as he reflects and thinks about it. In other words, the soldier “thinks back and acts forward.”

Completing the mission is only one part of a soldier’s requirements in the operational environment. Thinking back about what happened and using that information and knowledge to influence subsequent actions for the better is another important requirement, and this equates to learning for performance. The very simple habit-forming attitude—thinking back and acting forward—fosters aspiration, develops reflective conversations, and helps us understand complexity. Army stories and vignettes often capitalize on this powerful learning technique. If we make an effort to deliberately and habitually reflect as we act, real learning will occur.

Donald Schon’s work on reflective practices further supports the notion of thinking back and acting forward. It discusses organizations that focus on reflecting (and journaling) about experiences to improve performance.⁴ The common denominator is “systemic reflection” at the individual and team level—a habitual team or individual after action review in which soldiers and leaders make a conscientious effort to learn so that they will not repeat mistakes of the past.

New formal instructional material and improved pedagogy for Army schools and leader development programs will arise from systemic reflection and shared lessons learned. Consider the potential benefits to the Army if all soldiers involved in the more serious historical incidents in our Nation’s history had systemically reflected on what they saw, thought, and did, and the Army had captured and catalogued the information they provided to use in its leader development programs.

Lessons Learned for Commanders and Leaders

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have provided countless stories from which to learn. Staff Sergeants Salvatore Giunta and Robert Miller and Private First Class Ross McGinnis displayed selfless service, loyalty, and personal courage, as have countless other soldiers and leaders, named and unnamed, who have set the example, taken the initiative, performed courageously, and chosen the harder right rather than the easier wrong.
However, as is often the case in human nature, much learning and development comes because of failures or negative psychological and emotional events. Without question, the vast majority of soldiers in combat have done, and are doing, the right thing under difficult circumstances—but we also know that bad things are going to happen—they always do. And our adversaries will use the media, the Internet, and social networking to cleverly exploit the slightest misstep by U.S. forces for their own strategic and tactical purposes.

Analysis of the unfortunate and tragic U.S. incidents that have occurred in OIF and OEF provides common themes, insights, and lessons learned (tangible “take-aways”) that leaders should be aware of and look for, both in themselves and in their soldiers.

The purpose here is not to—

● Dwell on or highlight the bad stuff.
● Second-guess decisions.
● Criticize with the benefit of hindsight.
● Discuss the personalities involved in the events.
● Rehash or re-tell the stories.

Our purpose is to help Army leaders learn—really learn. We want to capture and articulate what can, and arguably should, be put in leaders’ kit bags (in this case their hearts and brains) in terms of the human dimension of war to better equip them to look out for and not make the same mistakes made in the past. We also want to raise awareness of common themes that have occurred in combat over the years—and will continue for years to come.

What follows are brief summaries of some high-profile cases from OEF and OIF:

The “kill team.” A small group of soldiers in the 2nd Infantry Division allegedly formed a “kill team” in late 2009 or early 2010. Some of the team members allegedly killed two or three unarmed and nonthreatening Afghans, then staged the scenes to make it look as if the deaths were combat related. They also allegedly committed other violations of regulations and law, such as collecting war trophies and photographing team members with dead bodies.

The Haditha killings. In November 2005 in Haditha, Iraq, 24 Iraqis were allegedly killed by U.S. Marines as part of a retribution attack after a convoy from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, was hit by an improvised explosive device that killed Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas and severely wounded another marine. At least three officers were officially reprimanded for failing to properly report and investigate the killings. All criminal charges against six marines were dropped and one marine was prosecuted and found not guilty. The squad leader was recently given a plea deal and found guilty of negligent dereliction of duty.

The canal killings. Three noncommissioned officers from the 172nd Brigade Combat Team were found guilty of executing four Iraqi detainees on or around April 2007. These “canal killings” (as they were called on a CNN documentary about them) were allegedly a response to detainees being released—after having been detained only a few days—and immediately returning to the fight.

Samarra murders. Four soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were found guilty of killing three detainees in May 2006 during Operation Iron Triangle near Samarra, Iraq. Allegedly, the
soldiers released the detainees and then shot them to make it look like an escape attempt.

**Tigris River bridge incident.** In January 2004, soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division allegedly forced two Iraqis off a bridge over the Tigris River. One of the Iraqis died. An officer and an NCO were found guilty of crimes related to this incident (assault and obstruction of justice). During the investigation it was alleged that the battalion commander wanted to cover up the bridge incident.

**Mahmudiya murders and rape.** In March 2006, near Mahmudiya, Iraq, four soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) killed four Iraqi noncombatants and raped one of them before killing her. All four soldiers were found guilty of rape and murder.

**Abu Ghraib.** Eleven soldiers were found guilty of detainee abuse and other crimes in connection with this well-publicized case in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq.

**Bagram detainee abuse.** In the spring and summer of 2002, at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, soldiers were allegedly involved in detainee abuse cases, which were featured on a CNN documentary, “Taxi to the Dark Side.” At least 15 personnel were charged with crimes and five were convicted.

The eight incidents briefly described above, along with others from all conflicts (most notably the My Lai incident in Vietnam in 1968) highlight what can happen in war. Clearly, the incidents are not a reflection of our Army, our professional ethic, or the seven Army Values. In addition, they may not be examples of leadership failures.

They do indicate a need for increased leader education about indicators of ethics abdication. Additionally, we must face the reality that the military is a reflection of society, and one of the incidences—the rape and murder at Mahmudiya, Iraq—was likely in part a result of a criminal element within the ranks.

Most important from a learning perspective is the fact that the incidents were a result of some, if not all, of nine psychological and emotional constructs that can be a consequence of a stressful, complex, uncertain, and highly volatile combat environment. The nine constructs are:

**Authorization.** Authorization is the perception that the chain of command sanctions, approves, or directs a particular behavior, i.e., “I was just following orders,” or “This is what my leaders want/expect me to do.”

**Transfer of responsibility.** Transfer of responsibility is the perception that some other person bears the responsibility for an unethical act, i.e., “Someone else is responsible.”

**Routinization.** Routinization occurs when soldiers gradually acculturate to unethical actions or abuses. Unethical behavior simply becomes routine, i.e., “It’s just what we do.” An athlete who has taken performance enhancing drugs for years or teenagers paying for one movie and watching two or three in a cineplex are civilian examples. The routine and daily execution of the “final solution” by Nazi Germany during World War II is history’s most horrendous example of routinization.

**Dehumanization/disqualification.** These occur when soldiers lose respect for others or think that others are “below them.” Soldiers may feel like they are being forced to protect or help people who are not like them and who they do not like. During the Vietnam War, use of the derogatory terms “gooks” or “slopes” indicated that some soldiers had dehumanized the local people.

**Moral disengagement.** Moral disengagement occurs when soldiers are so physically, mentally, psychologically, and emotionally stressed and exhausted that they cognitively disengage from moral and ethical reasoning or simply do not think about it. This usually takes the form of some kind of self-deception (lying to themselves), rationalization (the ends justifies the means), or even “mindlessness” or “mind-numbing.” It often results in routinization of unethical behaviors. In some cases, a soldier may simply not think in terms of right and wrong or may not be thinking at all—just acting without thinking.

**Bracketed morality.** Bracketed morality refers to a soldier assigning a different set of values or beliefs in one context (for example, while deployed) as opposed to another (while back “in the world”). Or, put another way, “What happens in theater stays in theater.”

**Misplaced loyalty.** This refers to a soldier placing his loyalty to other soldiers (battle buddies) or the small unit higher than the organization’s values—the Seven Army Values. A soldier committing an unethical act to take care of or cover for a squad mate is an example.
Peer pressure. Peer pressure is the influences of the group or unit that can override a soldier’s ability to act or think individually (a lack of moral courage).

Groupthink. Groupthink is similar to peer pressure when the weight of the group’s ideas overrides the soldier’s ability to think and act alone (a lack of moral courage).

Some of the constructs above can act alone on a soldier’s thinking and emotional well-being, although they normally work in combination. When several of these constructs in combination influence a soldier, bad things may happen. Arguably, all nine of them influenced soldier and leader actions at My Lai and at Abu Ghraib. Some or all played a significant role in the other incidents. Although there are volumes of academic research on these constructs, they really are not complicated for Army leaders to understand or identify.6 Army commanders and leaders, both officers and NCOs, are intelligent, educated, and well-meaning professionals. Their awareness of “what can happen” may be all it takes to help mitigate these threats. More important from the leader development perspective is that these psychological and emotional threats should be known and understood by commanders and leaders. They should discuss them at command and staff meetings and during after action reviews and integrate them into predeployment training. Even more dogmatically, they could be checklist items for leaders to carry with them.

The nine constructs are human issues. The Army is in the business of leading human beings—individual, emotive, thoughtful, distinct people. No two are the same. You cannot produce the exact same model of them on an assembly line year after year. No rigid “scientific method” will influence people to accomplish the mission. Training soldiers—and developing them into leaders—is the work of thoughtful craftsmen, not the processing of thousands of parts that come together to complete the organization. Because individual free will exists, friction, uncertainty, psychological interaction, and chance will also exist. Combat leaders must understand the complex nature of human beings.

The statements below, taken from investigations and discussions of the incidents above and others, are examples of what leaders should listen for as signs that a soldier may be suffering from some of these threats:

“He displayed pure hatred for the enemy and often referred to them as savages.”

“Are we going to protect the population or kill insurgents?”

“When the world you thought was made of concrete turns out to be smoke and mirrors, the results can be devastating.”

“I don’t care if I die.”

“We are undermanned and no one gives a damn.”

“Certain people are not to come back alive.”

“The Army has great leaders and morally bankrupt leaders.”

“I challenge you to imagine the frustration felt after being engaged in firefights for several hours with the enemy and then capturing them, only to have them released two days later because you’re told the holding area needs more information on them.”

“Don’t tell them about _____.”

“The climate in the unit was toxic.”

“We repeatedly found ourselves fighting the same enemy again and again.”

“Kill all military-aged males on the objective.”

“We need more kills.”

Of course, these quotes must be taken in context. As stand-alone quotes, they may have a negative or threatening meaning, while in context, they may not mean a problem exists at all. Context matters. But if a leader hears remarks like the ones just above, his radar screen should blip with a cautionary note and he should start asking probing questions. In addition, leaders should look out for soldiers who behave erratically or anti-socially. For example, a soldier torturing or killing dogs and cats would be an obvious warning sign.

Interestingly (and coincidentally) after the My Lai incident, Lieutenant General William Peers’
investigation found nine factors that influenced that tragic event:

● Lack of proper training.
● Attitude toward the local people (lack of cultural sensitivity).
● Permissive attitude.
● Psychological factors.
● Organizational factors.
● Nature of the enemy.
● Plans, orders, and commander’s intent.
● Attitude of the government officials.
● Leadership. 7

The same psychological constructs that were the proximate cause of My Lai are still a threat to our soldiers and leaders and will always be. From a learning perspective, the nine constructs previously discussed are a subset of the nine factors found at My Lai—the attitude toward the locals, psychological factors, the nature of the enemy, plans and orders, and leadership. This dates back to 1968 and highlights the need to learn, really learn, from the past. Of course, atrocities by U.S. soldiers have occurred throughout U.S. wars to include during World War II with the killing of German prisoners at Dachau, Germany. 8 They also include the killing of German and Italian prisoners at Biscari, Italy. 9 These historical examples are powerful reminders of how the dark side of warfare can influence soldiers’ and leaders’ thoughts, emotions, and behaviors.

Other Recommendations

Other curriculum additions we propose involve contextual and environmental challenges (as opposed to psychological constructs) that soldiers and leaders might experience while deployed. Teaching and discussing these and others challenges will better prepare future combat leaders for some of the challenges they could face. This list of challenges is certainly not complete:

● Winning tactically but losing operationally or strategically.
● Reporting of events—truthful or otherwise.
● Corruption and bribes.
● Contractors in the battlespace.
● Lack of resources.
● Unrealistic expectations in an area of operations.
● Commanders out of touch with reality at lower levels.
● Soldiers stretched too thin.

Some challenges on this list are clearly outside the average private to staff sergeant’s thought process and influence. In fact, squad leaders and even platoon sergeants and platoon leaders may have very little influence over most of these things—but leaders at all levels should be aware of them. Other challenges leaders will have to be cognizant of and likely address include—

● Decisions regarding escalation of force.
● Dropping or planting weapons.
● War trophies.
● Revenge motives.
● The need to control their own and their soldiers’ emotions.
● The attitude of “If no one talks, no one will find out.”

These are the kinds of things that a squad leader, platoon sergeant, or platoon leader can directly control. They are individual leader challenges—but also commander issues—and influenced by command climate. The leader has to recognize when soldiers feel threatened and determine when he needs to resort to an escalation of force. The leader chooses (or allows subordinates to choose) to carry a spare weapon on patrol to drop next to a shooting victim to make it appear the patrol was fired upon. Leaders create a reality that justifies their actions when deployed. Leaders allow soldiers to give in to lesser instincts and succumb to blood lust. Leaders allow killing for revenge. Clearly, the Army does not condone these things, nor does it equivocate that they might be permitted in some circumstances. These are first and foremost individual choices and must be seen that way. But strong, educated, and knowledgeable leaders and leadership can influence individual choices.

Leaders must be able to—

● Recognize a noncombatant.
● Understand the risks to and treatment of noncombatants.
● Recognize and know the risks to legally protected sites.
● Provide a clear commander’s intent.
● Identify a questionable command climate.
● Know when to intervene to stop wrongdoing of others.

All of these things should be addressed by the institution and the command—these are leader issues. Contextually they all begin with command
climate and are all about leaders being able to control their own and their soldiers’ emotions. First, the leader must master self-awareness and self-management, and then look at things in a political and emotional context. Only when he has mastered that can he set the tone that will address the other items (noncombatants, risk, historically protected sites, and other responsibilities).

From a pedagogical perspective in a school environment or officer and noncommissioned officer professional development program, leaders could analyze and discuss real vignettes while integrating the nine constructs recommended within a case study methodology. This technique would require researching the facts of each case, then discussing the human dimension aspects in context. The challenge with this case study technique would be ensuring that the real personalities involved in the stories are removed from the learning environment unless the actual knowledge of the personalities involved enhances the learning experience. The goal of the sessions should be real learning—not “protection of reputations.” Students could reflect on and discuss insights and lessons learned from their knowledge, experiences, and understanding of the cases. Of course, integrating similar vignettes into pre-deployment scenarios and training would also be an effective technique of learning from the past and enhancing leader development for the future.

**Real Learning via Self-Awareness and Self-Management**

Learning, growing, and developing are life-long choices that individuals and organizations make—they don’t just happen. Being a life-long learner is a conscious choice that requires a high level of self-awareness and self-management. Leaders need to be self-aware enough to know both what they do know and what they do not know, and when, where, and what they need to learn. For example, life-long learners must be self-aware enough to know that they lack knowledge in some areas, and then take the steps to learn or improve in those areas—self-management. The leaders who think they know it all or have nothing else to learn are setting up themselves, their units, and their missions for failure—or worse. We have introduced some specific topics we feel leaders need to know in a combat environment.

For professionally grounded leaders to understand, learn, and adapt, they must also intentionally and habitually practice self-management, which should
flow directly from being self-aware (of note, one can be self-aware without self-managing). The leaders, being consciously aware of what and how they are thinking (meta-cognition) and feeling, must then regulate those thoughts and feelings to best fit the context they are experiencing. Self-managing leaders must effectively focus and control their thinking and emotions to better control themselves and lead their soldiers. Being more knowledgeable and aware of the human dimension and the concepts and constructs we have introduced can only make for better leaders.

Army leaders primarily lead people, not organizations, and the development and understanding of people (the human dimension) should be a fundamental purpose of all leader development programs—as is being tactically and technically proficient. Equally important, leaders should be in programs to study themselves (to develop and practice self-awareness)—who they are, what formed them, how they think, why they think that way, and the potential consequences of decisions based on their thought processes and mental models.11

We recommend making self-awareness a focus of leader development. Our contention is that by concentrating a large part of our efforts inward, we will develop leaders of known moral character, with the ability to critically view their environment (including their soldiers), look out for common threats in the human dimension, and make decisions consistent with the values of the nation and the Army and that advance the commander’s intent and mission. Real leader development begins with one’s self.12

The more knowledge of human behavior and the human dimension leaders have, the more they will understand and potentially influence it. Firm knowledge of the psychological and emotional constructs and recurring themes we have recommended can be a start point. For example, leaders’ thoughts and emotions may drive them to seek some kind of irrational revenge after the tragic loss of some of their soldiers to an immoral adversary. How (and if) leaders regulate this revenge motive (both cognitively and emotionally) will affect their decision cycle, their ethical reasoning, and ultimately their behavior.

Notably, the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness project with the University of Pennsylvania to enhance resilience in soldiers and their families is a wonderful and effective means to teach self-awareness and self-management.13 A significant portion of the project stems from the university’s psychology department and attempts to teach emotion regulation, impulse control, and causal analysis. These three skills are classic examples of self-awareness and self-regulation. For example, the “ABC” (activation event, belief, consequences), “avoid thinking traps” (errors in thinking), and “detect icebergs” (deep-seated mental models) skills teach the student how to practice self-awareness and self-regulation.14 Leaders who are knowledgeable of the threats and constructs we have discussed and can habitually practice the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness skills will more effectively understand themselves, control their thoughts and behaviors, lead their soldiers, mitigate threats, ensure ethical behaviors, and accomplish the mission.

Summary

In combat, leaders must be aware of the many negative psychological and emotional effects that the stresses and violence of combat may have on their soldiers: the nine constructs we have discussed. Sound pedagogy and planned training throughout our Army can educate, train, and develop our leaders to—

- Recognize threatening signs in their soldiers.
- Recognize threatening signs in themselves.
- Ethically reason.
- Recognize an ethical situation that may not be self-evident.

The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic is addressing these last two areas. Self-aware leaders should habitually ask themselves and their trusted subordinates if there are any unhealthy signs or indicators in their units. Self-aware commanders should also habitually ask their subordinates what ethical challenges their units are facing or may face in the future.

If this ability or knowledge requires a checklist, so be it. The material for the checklist and the curriculum is based on years of lessons learned from our Army—a learning organization. Given the strategic environment in terms of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the time seems right to focus on and improve our leader-development schools and programs. We have proposed some specific content to assist in that effort. MR
U.S. soldiers with the 4th Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group secure their jump gear and prepare to board a U.S. Air Force KC-130 Hercules aircraft at the John C. Stennis Space Center in Mississippi, 8 March 2011, during Emerald Warrior 2011.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
10. We define self-awareness as habitually and intentionally monitoring one’s thoughts (meta-cognition or thinking about how one is thinking), feelings, emotions, and behaviors. We define self-management as habitually and intentionally controlling one’s thoughts, feelings, emotions, and behaviors.
11. Senge.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan includes three lines of effort—security, governance, and development. Securing the population and quelling the insurgency in rural Afghanistan remain two of the biggest challenges facing coalition forces, along with assisting the nongovernmental organizations in providing sustainable jobs and agricultural opportunities to Afghans. These economic opportunities provide income and lessen the attraction of joining the insurgency. Coalition forces are finding that one of the best ways to achieve strategic goals is to use female marines and soldiers to influence the family unit. Over the past decade, coalition forces have formed informal female engagement teams (FETs), mainly from tactical and provincial reconstruction teams, civil affairs forces, and agribusiness development teams. However, U.S. Army efforts remain ad hoc and disorganized, and training and employment are not standardized. The Army needs to better staff, employ, and train female engagement teams to ensure we are meeting strategic goals and objectives and institutionalizing these practices for future contingencies.

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, recognizes that groups like families and tribes play critical roles in influencing the outcome of a counterinsurgency effort, but it erroneously claims these groups are beyond the control of military forces or civilian governing institutions. They are not. Female soldiers can and are building relationships with Afghan women and men, empowering them through economic development programs, education, and training, but they are doing so at several separate levels, to include battalions and brigades, provincial reconstruction teams, agribusiness development teams, and special operations cultural support teams. These teams are operating in a semi-coordinated battle space. Their efforts can be redundant and repetitive when not properly coordinated across the battle space and when coupled with the current nonstandardized training. The resulting effort is not nearly as effective as it could be in reaching Afghan women.
Beginnings

Female engagement teams were formed because cultural restrictions on females, especially those in the rural, mostly Pashtun villages, prohibited their contact with men outside of their families. These teams not only provide a variety of services to the women and children of the villages, but also build personal relationships with these people. According to author Cherry Lindholm, mothers and grandmothers in the compounds, which house extended families, influence the fighting-age male, because the “adult sons not only bring home wives as subservient helpers for their mothers, but also tend to ally themselves with their mothers in their competitive struggles with their fathers.” Sons stay with the family while daughters leave to join their husband’s family. Therefore, having female soldiers establish positive relationships within Afghan families can ultimately network to several families as the children marry and pass on their positive experiences to new families and a new generation.

Westerners often think that Afghan women are powerless, not only because of cultural constraints but also because Afghan men do not support rights or opportunities for women. This generally isn’t the case. In fact, women’s rights activist Sima Wali states, “the stereotype of Afghan men as women haters and oppressors is incorrect. Most Afghan men are committed to the cause of better conditions and freedom for Afghan women.” The coalition force use of females to break through cultural and religious barriers and misperceptions to reach Afghan women exhibits a show of trust and respect to Afghan traditions and Islamic values. Understanding and respect can breed cooperation, and when this cooperation spreads across families, a powerful tool emerges for fighting the insurgency.

Coalition force females have the advantage of engaging both Afghan women and men. According to Deborah Rodriguez, author of Kabul Beauty School, “foreign women are not held to the same rigorous standards as Afghan women. [They] are like another gender entirely, able to wander back and forth between the two otherwise separate worlds of men and women.” While this is difficult to explain, according to an article in Small Wars Journal, empirical evidence shows that “many Pashtun men, far from shunning American women, show a preference for interacting with them over U.S. men.” This may be because, in some cases, the coalition force male soldiers are clearly there as such—soldiers—and perceived as destructive and dangerous. Although the Afghan men recognize the coalition force women as soldiers, they are also distinctly female.

Female engagement teams are not a new concept. They first came on the scene in 2004 as U.S. Army and Marine Corps “cordon and search teams” in Iraq, but have now evolved into a more sophisticated tool. U.S. Army Special Forces have female soldiers on their cultural support teams to interact with Afghan females. The Marine Corps continues to train and deploy FETs in their areas of operations. The provincial reconstruction teams, although not sourced to provide dedicated female engagement teams, do use females to perform similar duties when they are available and their normal duties permit. Agribusiness development teams have women’s initiative training teams to teach small-business opportunities to Afghan women such as food drying, beekeeping, and poultry production. The U.S. Army is finally catching up, and recent Forces Command guidance directs that all units that deploy after 31 August 2011 must have trained FETs exclusively dedicated to engaging the female population of Afghanistan.

Training Programs

Both the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) cultural support teams have in-resident training programs for their FETs. The Army does not. Instead, units are left to select and train their soldiers as the commander sees fit. A 22 April 2011 decision briefing to the vice chief of staff of the Army, which provided recommendations on predeployment training and institutionalization of FETs in the general purpose force, explored four courses of action for training FETs: train the trainer, mobile training teams, training at a central site, and training at a central training site with a mobile training team capability. The recommendation and ultimate decision from this briefing was to put together a handbook for commanders and a training support package that deploying units could use to train their own team. The decision brief also required FET employment training at the COIN Academy. The guide is available to anyone with a common access card.
at the Army Lessons Learned Information System and is also on the Army Training Network. The Center for Army Lessons Learned published the third version of the handbook in September 2011.

In addition, the training support package, which consists of slides and notes to support FET training, is available on the Army Training Network. The “Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement Teams” gives a fairly comprehensive history of the teams and admits that “the Army as a whole has been slow and late in accepting the FET concept.” The commander’s guide and the subsequent training support package pull from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command cultural support team program of instruction and the Marine Corps FET program of instruction, and also include a great deal of information that comes from an informal “FET Academy” in Regional Command-East. LisaRe Brooks, a Ph.D. human terrain social scientist; Lieutenant Colonel Teresa Wolfgang, commander of the 404th Civil Affairs Battalion; and Shakila Reshtoon, the CJ-9 women’s affairs advisor, developed and implemented a 40-hour, five-day training program in 2010 that focused on the engagement of Afghan females in a culturally sensitive and respectful manner through FETs. This program was the precursor to the current FET training support package.

The Regional Command-East team used female soldiers from Task Force Wolverine, a brigade command team from the New Hampshire National Guard under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division, as their pilot program. Task Force Wolverine females had recently formed an organic FET in response to the growing need to engage the female population. The initial volunteers came from within the task force staff sections. The first 30 hours of training included instruction on culture, daily language practice, information collection, a simulated shura, engagement techniques, interpreter management, religion awareness, Commander’s Emergency Relief Program, administration, and participation in actual female engagements at the nearby Egyptian
Hospital. The task force trained team members on tactical movement, patrolling, and basic defensive skills with organic resources. The trainers revamped course content based on feedback from the first class, adding storyboards, working with the media, Afghan traditional medicine, and some required reading. There were more than ten instructors and two to three translators, as well as assistance from Afghan business women and government officials.

Because it was the only formalized FET training in the Army, the course rapidly became so popular that Dr. Brooks and Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang found themselves training soldiers from Regional Command-North and South, as well as Department of State officials and airmen and sailors from the provincial reconstruction teams. Eventually, a great deal of this training found its way into the Army’s training support package. The most important part of this early training is that the trainers were subject matter experts in their fields of human-terrain analysis and civil affairs, which is not the case with the current “train the trainer” version of the Army training support package.

While certainly well-intentioned, the training support package has an obvious flaw. It includes long lectures on Afghan history and culture but does not provide subject matter experts to teach the classes. It includes references to Defense Language Institute Dari and Pashto language training but provides no native or trained speaker to assist. The deploying brigades and battalions are expected to resource the instructors organically, and it is doubtful many of these units have anyone assigned who is an expert in Afghan culture or language. Because of this, most units are choosing to use the Army training support package as a resource and putting together their own training packages. The 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, when preparing for its Afghanistan deployment, chose to do this, and the commander appointed a female captain as the FET lead to develop a brigade training package. The unit set up its own training, to include bringing in Afghan-American language trainers and asking them to teach cultural aspects as well. The New York National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 108th Infantry, FET leader was completely unaware of the Army’s training support package and chose to put together her own training based on a syllabus developed by the 10th Mountain Division. The 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the Ohio National Guard also put together their own training package. Thus, it would seem that the Army’s efforts to standardize training for the general purpose force still have a long way to go to achieve equality with either USMC training or that of SOCOM cultural support teams. In his article, “Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan,” Joseph A. L’Etoile writes, “A robust training regimen must be created if the FETs are to realize their full potential. Courses in tactical questioning, human terrain analysis, cultural understanding, and advanced situational awareness are essential.” Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the FET initiatives because they can’t necessarily be numerically qualified.

Anecdotal evidence, storyboards, and after action reports indicate the teams are making a difference with business projects, but empirical evidence and personal interviews show that when the relief in place/transfer of authority occurs, the successful projects are sometimes lost in transition and may take several months to start again. There needs to be a clear delineation between what the engagement teams do at the tactical level, such as searching and tactical questioning—which can mean very physically demanding missions—and what the FETs do at the operational level, such as the fairly new concept of using U.S. female military police to assist female Afghan Uniform Police with recruiting more female police officers. Other FET initiatives include conducting hygiene and midwife classes in Dand and Eastern Panjwai to overcome years of forced home isolation, and even more sophisticated efforts such as the small business ventures mentioned earlier. Shakila Reshtoon, the women’s affairs advisor for Combined Joint Task Force 101 in 2010, found that as both women and men saw other women be successful with these
small businesses, they became more accepting of seeing women in commerce and began to want to take part in the programs themselves.²⁶

**A Way Forward**

For the FET program to succeed and move into the future, the Army must institutionalize the role of the FET at battalion and brigade level and build mobile training teams of subject matter experts that deploy to training centers to standardize the training for all deploying units. While adding “FET lanes” at the training centers is a step in the right direction, the Army needs to standardize these lanes and the training conducted to ensure each unit receives quality instruction. The Army could go even further and establish female engagement training teams at Fort Dix, Camp Shelby, and all three combat maneuver training centers.²⁷ The FETs at the tactical level need training in tactical questioning, pulling security, and additional weapons training.²⁸ Moreover, the Army must delineate between these teams and those at the operational level in the provincial reconstruction team, agribusiness development teams, civil affairs units, and military support information operations, which all require additional training to assist nongovernmental organizations with economic development opportunities and to interface at the strategic level with International Security Forces Afghanistan, Department of State, and the government of Afghanistan. The current process of ad hoc training and organization is unacceptable, and not only unfair to those individuals involved, but also a grave disservice to the mission.²⁹ The Army should institutionalize this training for future contingency missions where female soldiers may again be needed to engage with the female portion of the population. **MR**

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**NOTES**

8. LTC Jeffrey S. Walton, TRADOC G-3, email message to author, 13 September 2011.
13. LTC Teresa Wolfgang, email message to author, 28 October 2011.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. CPT Heather DiSilvio, email message to author, 29 September 2011 and 9 January 2012.
19. LTC Kristen Rouse, email message to author, 7 August 2011.
20. Dr. LisaRe Brooks, email message to author, 6 October 2011.
23. LTC Teresa Wolfgang, interview by author, Fort Dix, NJ, 9 September 2011.
24. CPT Iajaira Perez, Provost Marshal, 116th IBCT, Virginia National Guard, email message to author 18 August 2011.
25. 2LT Catherine Gibbs, HHC 1-5 INF, 1/25, email message to author, 18 August 2011.
27. LTC Teresa Wolfgang, email message to author, 28 October 2011.
WESTERN MEDIA HAVE noted that Iraqi politicians failed to agree on thanking the American military in appreciation of its efforts to liberate Iraq from tyranny and for establishing democratic principles to replace the dictatorship and slavery that the Iraqi people had suffered for more than four decades. Those sources added that Iraqis, thus, are “ungrateful.”

No, for God’s sake, we are not ungrateful. We’re not opportunists fishing in dark waters. Although some of us rang the war bells, advocating division in an attempt to gain power, we’re peaceful people. We’ve endured oppression and deprivation for a long time, so all we want is to move on in building our country. Since you came, American Soldier, we started to see the light of hope after almost losing it forever.

You came uninvited, no question, but you don’t have to leave unthanked. Though your leadership sent you over, putting its mistakes on you, we know that you did your best to avoid making more mistakes and to correct the first strategic fault: coming here without a solid plan, or international cover from the UN Security Council.

But do we have to recall why you came, and what resulted from that? Maybe. Let’s go back in time. Let’s go back to the day the tyrant decided to invade Kuwait. Before that he carried out eight years of devastating war against Iran. Yes, we were invaders once. The Security Council responded by commissioning the Allies to remove the tyrant’s forces “by all means.” He refused to yield to that resolution, leading the country into a losing battle, even from the day it started. Consequently, the Iraqi people felt humiliated enough to overcome their fear of the dictator’s punishment. A broad revolution spread all over the country. There was a declaration of rejection that the regime never experienced before. On the contrary, the regime had been accustomed to listening to long poems of praise in luxurious palaces.

The oppressor spared no effort to extinguish this uprising. Have you heard of the mass graves? Yes, the ground is still weeping over hundreds of them, praying to Allah for mercy on those who were buried alive; their only fault
was refusing to obey the tyrant. The dictator was not reluctant to use his whole arsenal, including chemical weapons, to put down the uprising. Do you know about Halabja? Alas for the children, the men, women, and old people burned by a blaze of fire from the sky with no refuge to be found. Those who were supposed to protect them sent those flames.

Yet all these tragedies didn’t satisfy the dictator. Hoping to extend his reign, he went on confronting the international community, forcing them to extend sanctions. As a result, the country’s infrastructure was destroyed and reached the brink of collapse. The people were exhausted trying to provide for their basic needs of bread and medicine. Due to the regime’s policies, Iraqis became the poorest people in world despite their rich natural and human resources.

The day when aching mothers saw the rope around Saddam’s neck, after you captured him and brought him to justice, they prayed to Allah to protect you, American Soldier, and to light the road before you. Your road was gloomy from the time you came to our country until your efforts were assisted by the determination of the Iraqi security forces and finally overcame the forces of darkness. The road was dark because the enemy of freedom smashed its lights. Each sacrifice you made was a candle piercing that darkness. You walked and we followed your lead. There were times we ran past you, then slowed down to wait for you. You were confused but patient. Thank you for your patience and for your kind sacrifices.

Thank you for putting your soul into fighting the insurgency, which had made the Iraqi people and government its enemy before making an enemy of you. Thank you for training the Iraqi security forces, making them strong enough to defend the country. Thank you for spending vast amounts of money to reconstruct the collapsed infrastructure in my country. Thank you for leading the Iraqi people to freedom. Thank you for exposing corruption in your ranks. You were not shy about announcing it and apologizing publicly. You even insisted on prosecuting and putting behind bars those who had been jailors themselves.

Thank you, Sergeant Christina, for standing guard late at night to protect a police station that took fire from unknown gunmen. Thank you, Lieutenant Mark, for leading your platoon to arrest dangerous wanted groups. Thank you, Major Greg, for helping Iraqi judges in prosecuting criminals. Thank you, General Adams, for commanding your division to patrol the towns and villages in your area day and night. Thank you, diplomat Chuck, for faithfully and seriously communicating with both the local and the national government, proving them with the guidance and advice they needed most. Thank you, men and women who left mothers, spouses, and children behind. Your families barely slept, fearing the worst for you. Thank you for refusing to give up and for walking the road all the way to the end. You eventually handed Iraq back to its people as proud as it was and will be forever.

Pardon us. The Iraqi people are not ungrateful, just afraid. We still fear that the magic will turn back on us, returning us to the darkness that you, with the help of almighty Allah, saved us from. We have learned to overcome our fears, however. We promise we will not make you regret what you gave us. We will keep building our country, protect it, and safeguard our freedom so you’ll be proud of us.

Thank you, American Soldier, as you go back home, and God bless you. **MR**

In late 2006, I found myself at Military Review working on an article by an Army captain named Travis Patriquin, a brigade staff officer stationed outside Ramadi, the capital-elect of al-Qaeda’s would-be caliphate and formerly the deadliest city in Iraq. Over the course of six weeks we did the usual back-and-forth with Patriquin, until we had the article (“Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots,” Military Review, January-February 2007) ready to go. All we needed was our author’s final approval. It never came. In one of war’s perpetual ironies, this officer, who had done so much to spur the Sunni Awakening and pacify Ramadi, had been killed by an IED.

In A Soldier’s Dream, William Doyle brings Travis Patriquin back to life. The resulting portrait is an inspiring one. Doyle’s Patriquin is a burly officer who couldn’t pass Ranger School (twice) or max a PT test. He’s a chain smoker. He has a mustache, and hair you can actually see, and he reads history and poetry, studies other cultures, and loves to talk to people. He’s worked with special operators and he’s been a paratrooper, but in the end, he’s a schmoozer, the type of soldier often dismissed by high-and-tight warriors. That, as Doyle portrays it, was a damn good thing for the people of Ramadi.

Doyle makes a convincing case that without Patriquin’s cultivation of Sattar abu Risha, the sheik who allied with the coalition and rallied his peers against Al-Qaeda, there might not have been an Awakening. Patriquin’s main weapons were enthusiastic Arabic, personal charisma, and perseverance. Thus we see him chatting for hours on end with Sattar, cultivating the trust necessary to win the sheik over. He argues loudly with senior officers wary of the Sunni, uses the web to get the word out, and, one can imagine, generally makes a pain in the ass of himself to those who move too slowly. Today, Patriquin’s private brand of soft power might seem like common sense, but in 2006 he was in the COIN vanguard. Doyle’s thesis—that one eminently human being can make a big difference—might sound trite, but it’s worth repeating in an age of drone warfare.

While A Soldier’s Dream is mainly valedictory, Doyle takes pains to note the contributions other soldiers and marines (Deane, Lechner, McClung, MacFarland, McLaughlin et al.) made to the Awakening. The book also offers a good brigade-level picture of the Awakening as it unfolded, and it describes in detail the little-known battle of Sufiyah—although it raises, and not consciously, several questions about the U.S. response.

A Soldier’s Dream is not a perfect book. The praise verges on effusive, the prose is sometimes redundant, and the author makes some obvious mistakes about Army doings. However, these are mere quibbles. In the end, William Doyle deserves our thanks for commemorating a remarkable officer and illuminating his exploits in helping to bring about one of the Iraq War’s real success stories.

LTC Art Bilodeau, USA, Retired, Louisville, Kentucky


If you harbor any doubts about man’s capacity for inhumanity to his fellow man, you will lose them when reading this disturbing, important book.

In Less Than Human, David Livingstone Smith unblinkingly describes the darker side of mankind’s history. He focuses on horrors perpetrated upon “Jews, sub-Saharan Africans, and Native Americans” due to their “immense historical significance” and because they are “richly documented.” But the awful tales he relates come from across the world and some date back to prehistory. There are stories of mass murder, rape, slavery, and torture. But most poignant are the stories of individual victims. There is, for example, the heart-rending tale of Ota Benga, a Batwa (“pygmy”) tribesman whose family was killed in the Congo Free State by the mercenary forces of King Leopold II of Belgium, who was sold into slavery and purchased by an American entrepreneur, who was put on display in 1904 in the Bronx Zoo (where he shared a cage with an orangutan), and who, freed but longing to return home, killed himself with a bullet to his own heart.

What makes it possible for us homo sapiens to treat other members of our species so horrifically, Smith argues, is our unique mental ability to “essentialize” the world around us. We divide living things into species, and species into kinds. We then rank species and kinds from highest to lowest. There are very good evolutionary reasons we are built to view living beings
this way. Considering animals and insects as inferior things enabled our ancestors to thoroughly exploit these creatures, while seeing other groups of homo sapiens as either human or inhuman gave our forebears a potent psychological prop for choosing either trade or war as a means to acquire resources.

Smith convincingly argues that, since all homo sapiens have the capacity to dehumanize other homo sapiens, each of us also possesses the potential to commit atrocities—and even to take pleasure from such acts. We should not think of, say, German troops and New World settlers as “monsters” for what they did to Jews, Native Americans, or African slaves. Instead, what we should find troubling is just how ordinary many of them were.

As distressing as this idea may be for some, for U.S. service members, the most disturbing facet of this book will be reading the words of fellow service members and realizing just how neatly these words fit into humanity’s dark tradition of dehumanization.

There is the Gulf War pilot who, in language reminiscent of that used by the Hutus during the Rwandan genocide, said, “It’s almost like you flipped on the light in the kitchen at night and the cockroaches start scurrying, and we’re killing them.” There is the 82nd Airborne soldier in Iraq who said, “A lot of guys really supported the whole concept that if they don’t speak English and they have darker skin, they’re not as human as us, so we can do what we want.” There is the soldier at Abu Ghraib who, while forcing one detainee to masturbate above the face of another detainee, remarked, “Look at what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.” And then there is the senior U.S. general who compared Fallujah to “a huge rat’s nest” that was “festeriing” and needed to be dealt with—an image uncomfortably close to the depiction of Jews as a scurrying horde of rats in the infamous Nazi propaganda film, *The Eternal Jew*.

Readers may protest that such statements by U.S. service members are colorful metaphors rather than genuine instances of dehumanization. However, if one has served for very long in our military, it is probably not hard to recollect other examples of dehumanizing comments that reinforce Smith’s point—such as, perhaps, jokes heard about dirty “hajis” or “ragheads” when one served in the Middle East.

The lesson that military leaders should draw from Smith’s exhaustive research is clear. You can dehumanize the enemy and, at least at first, make the task of killing fellow human beings easier for your soldiers. But you do so today at great peril, for wherever dehumanization goes, mission-, life-, and soul-destroying atrocity almost certainly follows.

As good as this book is, it ends on a disappointing note. After masterfully employing the fields of history, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy to illuminate an evolution-wrought flaw of the human condition, Smith’s final, somewhat feeble recommendation is that “the study of dehumanization . . . be made a priority” so that we understand “exactly how dehumanization works and what can be done to prevent it.”

Left unanswered is what such prevention might even look like. This gap is glaring when one considers that those who most exhibit the impulse to dehumanize others are precisely those who are least receptive to a cure for their condition. Did senior members of Hitler’s regime wish to be cured of their anti-Semitism? Of course not. Also problematic is the idea of any government deciding to cure its members of their worst impulses toward others (as vividly depicted in Stanley Kubrick’s masterpiece, *A Clockwork Orange*).

Still, Smith’s accomplishment is stunning. He has written a book that is strikingly original, clearly and eloquently written, and—for anyone who believes that truth is preferable to untruth, no matter how ugly this truth—an absolutely “essential” read.

**LTC Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army, Fort Huachuca, Arizona**


“The Internet today is in its Wild West stage. You link to it at your own risk.”—Mark Bowden

The Wild West is an apt metaphor for author Mark Bowden’s journey into the depths of cyberspace, where “white hats” and “black hats” are locked in an incessant and pitched battle for control over the Internet. Within the digital domain there are daily gunfights, little formal authority, and an ever-present sense of danger.

In the pages of *Worm*, author Mark Bowden weaves the story of the Conficker worm, a powerful and enigmatic piece of malware that infects the Internet and countless systems with ease. Is Conficker the leading wave of a digital assault force or simply a computer prank run amok. *Worm* details a digital-age battle between good and evil, white hats and black hats, to protect the Internet from falling victim to a botnet of massive proportions. The battle lines are drawn across the electromagnetic spectrum, and the fight is as real and as unforgiving as any in the physical world.

Bowden is a bestselling author, contributing editor for *Vanity Fair*, and an *Atlantic Monthly* national correspondent. His book *Black Hawk Down* spent more than a year on the *New York Times* bestseller list, was a finalist for the National Book Award, and was adapted into a major motion picture. Bowden is also the author of the international bestseller *Killing Pablo* and *Guests of the Ayatollah*. Bowden is a columnist at *The Philadelphia Inquirer* and has written for *The New Yorker, The New York Times, Sports Illustrated*, and *Rolling Stone*.

*Worm* is more than a tale of the Wild West. It is a harbinger of the future, where threats to the cyber domain are as real and as potentially cataclysmic as a weapon of mass destruction. For Bowden, *Worm* is a warning, a foreboding tome to the common masses, those unwitting souls who see the freedom of the Internet but not the inherent danger.
It is only fitting that Bowden brings *Worm* to a close without ever really ending the story: Conficker seemingly contained, but not eradicated. Lurking. Waiting. But for what? *Worm* is a “must read” for current and future military leaders. Bowden crafts a truly compelling story, but also one that describes what future warfare may very well become.

For that reason alone, *Worm* is an exceptional start point for any serious reading on cyber warfare or the future of digital age combat.

**LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Beatrice Heuser, chair of International History at the University of Reading, United Kingdom, is one of the most thoughtful and lucid writers on strategic thought in the world. She continues her impressive contributions to the field of strategic studies in her latest book, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. To be clear, this book is not simply a history of strategy throughout the ages. Rather, at its heart lies a stimulating discussion of the relationship between politics and the use of force.

Heuser explores the frustratingly elusive quest to better understand which military strategies more efficiently achieve greater political ends than others. However, unlike many other works on this subject, Heuser examines how social institutions, norms, and culture contribute to this exploration. Importantly, by investigating the political, ideological, and cultural environment of strategic thought throughout the ages, Heuser is able to demonstrate why and how ideas such as strategic bombing and total warfare developed and why these concepts were popular in certain times but not in others. In doing this, Heuser is able to convincingly establish that the relationship between strategy and war is even more complex than originally thought. This approach also allows for sustained examinations into how varying cultural and societal experiences influenced some of history’s most significant strategic thinkers (i.e., Clausewitz, Napoleon, Corbett, etc.). As a result, Heuser’s methodology allows us to both explore the evolution of strategic thinking in a more nuanced manner and help contribute to a deeper understanding of society’s role in influencing the conduct of war.

The breadth and depth of Heuser’s analysis is intimidating to say the least. Coming in at 578 pages, the book literally covers the evolution of strategic thought from antiquity to the present. Despite this, there are areas that are not adequately covered. To begin, the book should be more accurately titled, *The Evolution of “Western” Strategy*, as there is hardly a word on Eastern military or political strategy. This might not seem like a major omission—many works have focused on one over the other. However, given that one of the key questions Heuser seeks to answer is whether or not there is a Western way of thinking about war, then some type of comparative case study of the competing Eastern school is necessary. This is not to say we cannot trace the development of strategic ideas *within* the Western world, but, to fully appreciate the cultural and social context under which strategic thought is developed, some type of contrast with other non-Western perspectives would have been helpful.

Also, given the interest in counterinsurgency, one chapter of only 17 pages is disappointing, especially considering that counterinsurgent strategies tend to vary along the very variables that Heuser seeks to study. For example, why did British and French responses to post-World War II insurrections differ so radically? How can culture and institutions better inform this understanding? Finally, an examination into whether certain factors are more influential than others would have been useful as well. For example, do democratic values and ideals have a more determining influence over policy than traditional realpolitik variables? If so, why?

These minor points shouldn’t be seen as critiques as much as missed opportunities. Heuser’s methodological approach and her analytical style are well-reasoned, clear, readable, and thought provoking. Any interested student of the relationship between force and politics will find *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* invaluable.

**J. Thomas Moriarty, Charlottesville, Virginia**

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Retired general Hugh Shelton joined the Army and rose to become the 14th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had an illustrious career that included two combat tours in Vietnam, serving as the assistant division command of the 101st Airborne Division during the invasion of Iraq during the first Persian Gulf War; command of the 20,000-person joint task force charged with restoring power Haiti’s deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide; and upon promotion to four stars, serving as the commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Shelton served under presidents Clinton and Bush, overseeing the Kosovo intervention and helping devise the initial military response to 9/11. In *Without Hesitation*, Shelton recounts his earliest days as a boy growing up in North Carolina through his service as the ranking officer in America’s armed forces. He also tells of how he came back from a devastating fall from a ladder after his retirement from the Army, ultimately overcoming total paralysis from the neck down and learning how to walk again.

Following Shelton through his 38 years of service, the reader gets a feel for the Army that fought in Vietnam and then had to repair itself after ten-plus years of sustained combat. The book’s interest quotient...
Murphy weaves a complex tapis-try of the origins of piracy, which is by no means a new phenomenon in Somalia. During the 1950s, yachts were seized and held for ransom, and through the years, disputes over fishing rights have resulted in the seizure of foreign fishing boats for ransom. So what has created this sudden spike in piracy? Murphy suggests the increase started after the fall of Mohamed Said Barre, who was deposed in 1991. Barre’s dictatorial regime was the last semi-stable Somali government, and with Barre’s fall Somalia fell back into the form of government it has embraced for thousands of years—the tribal system.

Murphy argues that the current piracy spike was made possible because Somalia was a failed state unable to control its coastal waters, which allowed lawlessness to prevail and criminal elements to establish themselves. When fishing boats were seized for ransom, the acquisitions gained the attention of criminal warlords who took the opportunity to start a viable business venture—and business has been good.

_Somalia_ is illuminating reading for those who are curious about the complexities that contributed to the Somali piracy issue. However, Murphy could have made some improvements. First, his discussion of the complex tribal system needs a linked diagram to illustrate complex interpersonal relationships. Second, there is only one map in the book. Additional maps would help clarify an already multifaceted discussion. Finally, Murphy’s conclusions of what should be done to solve these issues are incomplete.

_Somalia: The New Barbary?_ adds to the piracy discussion, but readers could get lost in the details. The book could be helpful to staff officers and analysts who are seeking to broaden their knowledge of the Somali piracy problem, but they should seek further study to assist in developing solutions.

**LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Robert E. Hunter of the National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, writes an account of not only why a security and stability strategy is needed for the post-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf region, but also what the strategy should look like. Utilizing the skilled experts of RAND and his own travels to speak with experts and government officials throughout the region, the United States, and Europe, Hunter first puts into historical context the current regional situation and the stability challenges posed by individual states. Within a framework of eight components, he analyzes the future of Iraq; Iran; asymmetric threats; regional assurance; the Arab-Israeli conflict; regional tensions, crises and conflicts; the roles of other external actors; and arms control and confidence-building measures. Each component is individually and qualitatively assessed, then interwoven and probed, before recommendations are made for a regional “way ahead” that would best secure and stabilize the region going forward.

Hunter’s many findings discuss the inability of the United States to effectively act unilaterally within the region; the necessity for a U.S.-led, but not dominated, multilateral approach to secure regional peace; the importance of Europe’s, China’s, India’s, and Russia’s involvement in this multilateral effort; the criticality of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Gaza issue; the importance of collectively unifying nations within the region against terrorism; and limiting weapons purchases and sales among regional states in an effort to promote their own peaceful coexistence, including Iran. However, the author presents why it might not be in Iran’s best interest to promote a collective peace if it means giving up its freedom of action or its nuclear pursuits, which may prove problematic to the region as a whole.


Piracy, rarely mentioned in the media until the last few years, has seen ever-increasing headlines heralding ever-larger ships being seized with correspondingly ever-increasing ransoms. How did this start, and what can be done about it? Martin Murphy’s _Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa_ details the problem of piracy, its origins, and what factors contributed to its growth.

**LTC James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
Although appearing somewhat idealistic at times, Hunter makes numerous interrelated recommendations that he believes will ensure an enduring peace throughout the region. Beyond those alluded to above, he recommends the establishment of a universal political and military structure of regional states, the presence of forces from states outside the region to demonstrate international resolve, the establishment of an organization similar to the Conference of Security Cooperation in Europe to resolve security issues before they become significant problems, a Partnership for Peace-like regional security model for employment of collective forces, and economic cooperation/integration among regional states.

The book is comprehensive, yet not thorough. It reads as though the author underestimates the complexities of the regional environment, which is surely not the case. The book’s brevity, coupled with the expansiveness of the subject matter, leaves something to be desired. Nonetheless, it is soundly researched, superbly articulated, and a very informative “think piece” suitable for diverse readership.

It is best read by military and interagency professionals; international relations, political science and foreign affairs students/academics specializing in the Persian Gulf region; and others interested in gaining a general understanding of the challenges of establishing peace in an inherently conflict-ridden region of the world.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D., LtCol, USMC, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Transforming Command is a worthy addition to the military professional’s library, especially with mission command being the subject of much attention in the Army. Chief of Staff of the Army General Martin Dempsey lists it among his nine areas of focus. TRADOC has founded a “Center of Excellence” to make “mission command institutional across the Army.”

Author Eitan Shamir teaches at Tel Aviv University and is a research fellow for the Israeli Defense Forces. He presents a well-sourced and thorough understanding of mission command and its varied history. He gives a broad overview of its beginnings and attempts to implement mission command in three very different militaries: British, Israeli, and American. While these Armies’ experiences with mission command form the core of the book, Shamir also explains how mission command originated in the early 19th century in reforms undertaken by the Prussian Army. The book concludes with an assessment of the success of the reform attempts and asks the question: Is it even possible to implement a concept from the early 19th century into a modern army?

By providing an understanding of the Prussian origins of mission command and the challenges other nations faced when attempting to implement their interpretation of mission command, Transforming Command helps 21st-century American military professionals understand it. Mission command came about because of specific cultural and societal norms of early 19th-century Prussia coupled with that nation’s security environment and the technology available in that era. Reading Transforming Command will add to the understanding of this salient point; mission command is a product of a unique time and place and cannot simply be lifted from one nation/army and placed unchanged into another. Shamir is positive about the possibility of adopting mission command, but his reviews of American, British, and Israeli attempts to adopt it and consistently use it over the years are mixed.

Transforming Command is a valuable contribution to the study of mission command. In the complex environment that U.S. soldiers face today and in the future, a more decentralized organization with empowered leadership at all levels will be necessary. Reading Transforming Command is a good place to begin making this a reality.

MAJ Dan Leaf, USA, Special Operations Command


Contrary to its strategic insignificance to the United States in the post-immediate Cold War era, Africa in post-9/11 has gained primacy in U.S. foreign policymakers’ quest for energy sources and the war against terrorism.

Author Donovan C. Chau examines Kenya’s strategic partnership with the United States by analyzing the two nation’s common security threats in Greater East Africa, since 9/11. Threats shared by both countries include the Iraqi and Afghan wars, insurgencies in Somalia and Yemen, the potential of renewed conflicts in Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the threat of terrorism from the Horn of Africa.

Chau discusses the significance of Kenya’s geography, politics, and armed forces to the strategic partnership. Kenya felt “surrounded by hostile countries—socialist Tanzania and aggressively militant Uganda.” Socialist Tanzania had patchy, strained relationships with Western capitalist-oriented Kenya because of its close relations with United States. Democratic Tanzania’s and 1998 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania waned the strained relationship. The attacks strengthened U.S. relations with Kenya and also increased its presence in Greater East Africa.

Militarist and belligerent Idi Amin’s Uganda’s alliance with the Soviet Union and Muslim states “altered the strategic balance in the region” and strained relationships with Kenya, Tanzania, and Kenya’s Western allies including Israel. Uganda’s support for Palestinian terrorists, who hijacked an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Entebbe and negotiated demands
from there, heightened its threat and strengthened the strategic partnership to confront the challenges posed. Collapsed Somalia, harboring terrorist groups with Al-Qaeda links, poses the most security challenge to Kenya and Western interests, as is evident in terrorist attacks on Western interests in the region.

The United States has accordingly formed strategic partnerships with Kenya and Ethiopia and undertaken joint counterterrorism operations to confront their common threats in the region, especially from Somalia.

Chau’s book gives a compelling analysis of contemporary threat of terrorism and related crimes, such as piracy from Greater East Africa, and attempts by the United States and its strategic partners to combat them. In an age of terrorism festering in weak and collapsed states in Africa, especially in Greater East Africa, the book contributes to the literature on international security and is relevant to the defense community.

The sources are credible and articulate threats from East Africa. The extensive discussions on Kenya’s geography, politics, and armed forces fail to articulate in detail their connection with Kenya’s relevance in the region. The book reveals U.S. strategic selective engagement in Africa, but it fails to discuss this important U.S. foreign policy. The book could have done better with a detailed discussion of U.S. patchy and selective engagement with Africa, fuelled by neorealist considerations and consequential security backlash adversely affecting the attainment of its strategic interest in Africa.

Kofi Nsia-Pepra,
Military Observer UNAMIR Peacekeeping Force in Rwanda


Robert Schaefer’s *The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad* is creating a stir and pulling in great reviews from *The Economist, Kirkus Reviews, The National Interest,* and other reputable publications. Lieutenant Colonel Schaefer, a Russia foreign area officer (FAO) now serving in the U.S. Embassy in Estonia, used his language skills, Special Forces background, and critical analysis to produce a first-rate study that is part history, part counterinsurgency theory, and part predictive analysis. The fighting in Chechnya has been ongoing since 1994. The Russian Federation declared that its counterinsurgency campaign came to an end in 2009, yet its casualties continue, outstripping coalition losses in Afghanistan. Schaefer argues that because the Chechen insurgents are unable to cooperate or govern during peace time and lack a realizable endgame, they will ultimately fail. Conversely, he argues that the Russian reliance on firepower instead of political solutions has protracted the conflict and led to a widening of the conflict from Chechnya to the North Caucasus region. Russia has not yet built a common house on its southern borders where distinct peoples can coexist.

Reports on the fighting in Chechnya disappeared from the front pages of Western newspapers long ago. Russia has taken credit for doing its part in the global war on terror in its southern border regions. The 2004 insurgent hostage-taking of over 1,300 schoolchildren and teachers in neighboring Beslan cost the insurgents any hope of Western support. The aftermath of 186 dead children led potential sympathizers to dismiss the insurgents as brutal terrorists. It is hard for a foreigner to understand the complexities and nuances of the North Caucasus. Schaeffer has tried to overcome much of this through his thorough research and his efforts to present both sides fairly. His history of the region and the post-Soviet phase is especially well done.

This is definitely a good book and well worth studying, although its impact of internationalist Islamic fundamentalism might be a bit oversold. The author often contrasts Russian counterinsurgency with U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This may be a problem, since Russia is fighting what it views as an internal war. Counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States was developed for fighting external insurgencies far from U.S. borders. In many particulars, external and internal counterinsurgency campaigns may overlap, but in terms of relations with the local populace, goals and the information campaign need to be different. Further, in an internal war, the counterinsurgent cannot merely go home, since he is, theoretically at least, already there. But, these are nit-picky points.

I strongly recommend this book to students of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the contemporary application of force. These days, that includes a lot of professional military people and politicians.

*Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*


Since 1994, Russian military officers have published their accounts of the fighting in Chechnya and journalists have offered insights from Russian and Chechen points of view. *The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won And Lost* by Ilyas Akhmadov (a Chechen who fought against the Russians and later served as Chechnya’s Foreign Minister) and Miriam Lansky (an expert in Russian affairs) provides an entirely different viewpoint of the conflict. Akhmadov was a Chechen combatant who also worked with Chechnya’s top leaders. Because Chechnya’s entire early rebel leadership has been eliminated, Akhmadov is the sole contributor to provide insight into the planning and intrigues of the Chechens.

*The Chechen Struggle* is structured around four issues: the fighting that occurred during the first and second wars between Russia and...
Chechnya; the internal squabbles among the Chechen groups that prevented them from arriving at a consolidated position; the efforts of some Chechens, Russians, and the international community to end the fighting; and first-hand portraits of Chechnya’s leaders (in particular, former presidents Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov and the renowned fighter Shamil Basayev).

Akhmadov discovered that war has its own rules and algorithms—its own cause and effect. That war is a “thing in itself” might be its most frightening characteristic. It is a process where each fact brings to life a new one. Further, war can change one’s code of conduct in unexpected ways, often leading to horrific results.

Internal squabbles among groups occupy much of the text. Maskhadov’s quandary, Akhmadov writes, was trying to do something constructive within the government while simultaneously trying to appease armed units, several of whom would eventually unite against him. Another primary element of the book was Akhmadov’s time as foreign minister and the efforts he, some Russians, and members of the international community took to try to end the conflict peacefully.

Akhmadov composed something known as the “Akhmadov Plan,” of which the fundamental aspect was that Chechnya could become a UN protectorate. Unfortunately, the lack of success in these areas, combined with the aftereffects of 9/11 and the growing aggression on the part of Basayev and other armed unit commanders, pushed Maskhadov into a union with the radicals. He had no other choice. There were no jobs, everything was in ruins, religious disputes kept arising among the armed units, and there was no international response.

Finally, Akhmadov offers three very different images of the most important figures in Chechnya during these conflicts—Dudayev, Maskhadov, and Basayev. Dudayev is characterized as charismatic and forceful, someone who would not have permitted the opposition that developed under Maskhadov. To Akhmadov, Maskhadov was a model of personal honor and ethical conduct. Basayev initially is treated friendly by Akhmadov, but Akhmadov’s sentiment gradually changes as he realizes Basayev is an irreconcilable revolutionary. He and Lansky end the book stating that Chechnya’s dream of independence has merely been deferred.

The book does have a few inconsistencies in dates and a few grammatical problems. However, overall, the book offers an interesting and unique counterpoint to the many Russian versions of events. It is not important if you agree with Akhmadov’s viewpoint. What is important is that it is another side of the story.

Timothy L. Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Proxy Warriors, Ariel I. Ahram explains why some states have used devolution of violence through militias and other organizations to form the basis of the state’s coercive power, and why some states have been more successful with this practice than other states have. Ahram’s thesis is based around two factors: the method by which states were transformed from colonies to sovereign states, and the overall regional security threat in the area. The implications are that states that overthrow colonial rulers by revolutionary means and are situated in areas of minimal outside threat continue to devolve violence to outside actors along the “revolutionary model.” Conversely, states that must deal with colonial powers through revolution, but inhabit a region of high outside threat, will begin with devolved mechanisms of coercion, and then begin to consolidate the mechanisms of coercion among state actors as a necessary component of state survival. On the opposite end of the spectrum, states that achieve sovereignty through the negotiated and orderly withdrawal of colonial powers, especially in regions where the threat from neighbors is high, tend to consolidate the mechanisms of coercion among state organized and controlled institutions.

To illustrate each of these three theories, Ahram uses case studies of the devolution to violence in Indonesia (revolutionary and low threat), Iraq (negotiated and high threat), and Iran (revolutionary and high threat). Each of these case studies is thorough and does an excellent job of illustrating the ways the states used militias as security forces in line with the ways their states were created.

One disappointment, however, is that despite referencing Sudan’s Darfur region and the use of “Janjaweed” militia men, this particular example of the devolution of violence was not used as a case study. In fact, no examples from Africa were used in the case studies, despite numerous available examples of devolution of violence to militias and regional histories of colonial presence that could have supported the author’s thesis.

The book would be a useful read for anyone preparing to deploy to a combat theater. It provides a basis of understanding why states turn to nonstate actors for security, as exemplified in the book by the Iraqi “awakening movement” and as seen in Afghanistan with the increasing development of the “local security forces.”

CPT Leonard M. Joyner, II, USA, Baumholder, Germany


Few American Army generals have been held in such awe and reverence as Major General Fox Connor. Connor mentored Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and Patton, and he served as General Pershing’s G3 in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) during World War I. Connor is seen as the Army’s acknowledged...
doctrinal artillery expert and a strategic genius. Author Edward Cox, in a short work that includes 24 pages of pictures, attempts to solve the enigma of “The General.”

Conner was an enigma because he never wrote a book and inexplicably destroyed all his papers that covered his 44 years of military service. Eisenhower, who had served as Conner’s brigade executive officer in Panama, described him as “the ablest man I ever knew.” What then were the sources of Conner’s genius and his extremely effective mentoring methods? The value of this book lies in the author’s attempt to answer these questions.

To the first question, Conner’s thrice-wounded Civil War veteran father sparked his son’s interest in the military. When he was 8, Conner decided he would attend West Point— he graduated 17 out of 59 in the class of 1898. His interest in reading and intellectual pursuits came from his schoolteacher parents. One result was that he ultimately taught himself French and German to keep up with the best military writings of the period. He, too, had several influential role models for whom he worked, e.g., his first commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Haskins, a voracious reader and Civil War veteran, and Medal of Honor recipients Brigadier J. Franklin Bell, who later became the Army’s chief of staff, and Colonel Andre W. Brewster, a China Punitive Expedition veteran and the Army’s inspector general.

To the second question, Conners was a personal example to those he mentored. He taught the importance of professional competence. He also demonstrated the value of lifelong learning. He would personally read and study “into the night.” In Panama, he would give Eisenhower military books and then question him on the books’ major themes and ask why the generals being discussed made the decisions they did. He motivated Ike to prepare for a second war with Germany; a war he prophetically believed would involve a great allied coalition. Additionally, he recognized the value of “spending time” with talented officers. He would spend hours riding and camping with Ike. As the AEF G3, he would schedule one day a week with Colonel Marshall, the 1st Infantry Division G3 and later his assistant at AEF G3.

Cox points out the high lights of Conner’s career, but at times, he seems to lose objectivity and gets caught up in Connor hero worship. He does not address Russ Stayanoff’s article that alleges Conner was extremely authoritarian, demeaning to others, and court martial happy while he was in Panama. Also not adequately covered were Conner’s behavioral extremes, e.g., routinely working to the point of exhaustion, obsessing with details, or chain smoking to the point that it destroyed his health and kept him from being recalled to active duty during World War II. Regardless, this is an interesting, valuable, and historically informative read. Many questions about Conner remain unanswered, which is probably the way “the General” would have wanted it.

Gene Klann, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


James Nelson’s The Remains of Company D is a micro-history that explores the experiences of the men of D Company, 28th Infantry, 1st Division, in World War I. The work follows the doughboys from their training at various stateside camps, through the battlefields of France, and to their reintegration back into American society at the end of the Great War. Much like Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers, Nelson follows the individual stories of the officers and men who served in the company to provide an intimate exploration of how a small unit, and each of its soldiers, experienced the war. Because the 28th Infantry was one of the first American units to serve in France, participating in most of the American Expeditionary Forces’ major battles and campaigns, the book also provides a larger portrait of how the army fought and endured the Great War.

Nelson was inspired to write the book by the service of his grandfather, John Nelson, a Company D, World War I veteran, whose life nearly ended during his unit’s assault on Berzy during the Aisne-Marne Campaign of July 1918. To better understand the key role the Great War played in his grandfather’s life, the author has pieced together the events that made up the elder Nelson’s Company D microcosm. By drawing upon archival sources, published histories, letters, diaries, and the memories of the relatives of the soldiers in the company, he offers his readers a glimpse not only of his grandfather’s experiences of the war, but also those of the “average” American soldier.

Although Nelson tells a good story, he does tend to overuse certain phrases in the book for dramatic effect. Despite this minor flaw, Nelson knows how to tell a good story without sacrificing historical accuracy or the larger context of events.

Richard Faulkner, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Union War is an engaging historical analysis that examines the motivational factors of northern loyalists during the Civil War. Author Gary W. Gallagher firmly declares that preservation of the Union was the central factor responsible for the initial enlistment of soldiers. Faith in the idea of Union was the driving mechanism behind their perseverance during the most unfavorable moments of the war. Gallagher argues that in opposition to popular belief, ending slavery was not a significant goal of the Union at the beginning of the war. The debate of ending slavery became substantial only when northerners realized it could be used as a crippling tool against Confederate forces.
The author identifies key issues concerning Union soldiers and political figures through diaries, newspaper accounts, letters, and other concurrent evidence. Through these dialogues, Gallagher captures the profound meaning of the Union among the Civil War generation. The Union represented the legacy of the founding fathers. The model democratic republic they had created was like no other in the world. It was built upon a constitution that ensured political liberty as well as the opportunity for economic improvement. Its preservation was essential. The collapse of the republic would not only shame the founding fathers but also future generations of Americans who would utilize its political and economic benefits.

Particularly well done is Gallagher’s interpretation of emancipation. He devotes an entire chapter to deciphering why emancipation became part of the war for the Union. During his thorough assessment of the subject, the author challenges the traditional beliefs of many respected Civil War historians. He ultimately concludes that military contingency was responsible for shaping the future of emancipation. He pinpoints the battle of Seven Pines as the decisive factor of emancipation and the eventual use of African-American soldiers. The outcome of the battle laid the foundation for a Confederate victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run that greatly boosted Confederate morale when it was at an all-time low.

The book is an enjoyable read that offers new insight into why the Civil War was fought. Members of the defense community and history buffs at all levels will find themselves questioning previously established theories. Gallagher convinces the reader that an accurate understanding of why the Union fought is essential to appreciate the progression of the Civil War’s events and its eventual outcome. The Union War is a refreshing addition to Civil War literature and is sure to spark controversy among Civil War historians.

Siobhan E. Ausberry, Bristow, Virginia


As the title infers, Your Brother in Arms: A Union Soldier’s Odyssey, conveys the experiences of an enthusiastic 19-year-old volunteer. George P. McClelland joined the army with a group of his friends, nicknamed the “Luny Crowd,” in August 1862. (McClelland rose to the rank of brevet major in 1865.). Author Richard C. Plumb has assembled a rich history from letters McClelland wrote (primarily to his two sisters) that shares his insights as a common soldier during his two-and-a-half years with the 155th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment. McClelland’s letters provide a glimpse into the horrors of battle, the daily monotony of camp life, and the enduring campaign marches. Conversely, the letters reveal the comfort, support, and strength he received from his sisters’ continuous correspondence.

I found the book to be enjoyable and rich in context with an easy flow. Plumb’s chronological approach to the story adds new light to the sacrifices shared by soldiers. Each chapter is well researched and summarizes the activities of the Army of the Potomac, the 155th Pennsylvania. The book closes with the author’s notes about the letters.

McClelland’s gift as a writer helps to promote him into the rank of officer. He is candidly open about his view of the president and about various Army of the Potomac commanders he served under during his enlistment. He admired General Joseph Hooker when he commanded the Army of the Potomac, commenting, “[Hooker] could have subdued the Army of Northern Virginia had he not been restrained by ‘the powers in Washington.’” Similar to the conflicts of today and throughout our history, the uncertainty of living in an area with constant threat of partisan attacks can create a high level of stress for the soldier. The 155th Pennsylvania was no exception; Sergeant McClelland brought home the monotonous duty of guarding railroads and supply lines against attacks by the partisan forces operating in northern Virginia. He wrote, “It is really dangerous as we are liable to be picked off by murderous assassins at any time.”

Maps inserted in the applicable chapters could have helped the reader visualize the various campaigns and the battles McClelland lived through. Moreover, a photograph of a soldier in the distinctive Zouave uniform would have given the reader an image of how McClelland would have appeared between 1863 and 1865. These minor points do not overshadow McClelland’s rich experiences transforming from a green recruit to a mature veteran who fought in major battles from Fredericksburg to Five Forks. Your Brother in Arms is well worth your time to read.

R. Scott Martin, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Over the last decade, two historians, American Roger Chickering and German Stig Förster, have collaborated on a project exploring the nature and evolution of that ill-defined phenomenon, “total war.” In association with the German Historical Institute, the two men have worked with a host of other scholars to compile five anthologies of scholarly essays examining the conceptual framework of total war and the way that idea has been realized on battlefields from the American Civil War to the Second World War. The result of their efforts is a body of scholarship that enhances our understanding of one of the most significant and terrible aspects of modern military history.

Their current work, a collection entitled War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815, is offered as a sort of “prequel” to their previous volumes. In putting it together, Förster and Chickering attempt to link the “master narrative” of early
modern military history—“military revolution”—with the dominant narrative of modern warfare, the evolution of total war. At first glance, these two themes seem to intersect at the end of the 18th century when the American and French Revolutions led to an unprecedented mobilization and militarization of societies as well as the dramatic expansion of the geographic scope of organized violence. The question then becomes, did the expansion of state power and the growth of armies seen during the end of the ancien régime serve as clear markers on the road to versions of total war seen between 1914 and 1945? Or was it the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars that marked the beginning of a terrible evolution that climaxed at Hiroshima?

These questions are examined in each of the book’s three sections. The first, “Perspectives on a Military History of the Revolutionary Era,” focuses on the historiographic problems associated with searching for the origins of total war in this period. The second, “The Growing Dimensions of Battle,” considers the various new ways that violence was expressed in this period, from the massive naval effort of the British Empire to the locally focused resistance of the Spanish guerrillas in Navarre and Galicia. Finally, the third section, “Civil Institutions and the Growing Scope of War,” considers complementary topics like the role of slavery in the American Revolution and the way revolutionary ideology collided with the diverse religious practice of Alsace.

As with the other books in the series, readers are likely to find the most interesting chapters near the front of the book, though all the essays can be read for some level of profit. Nevertheless, be warned. This is not a book aimed at the casual student of military history. Both the topics covered and price demanded together indicate this is a collection aimed primarily at scholars and university libraries.

LTC Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Barbarians and Brothers investigates violence and restraint in war during the early modern period. As Wayne E. Lee shows, conflict either intensified or diminished depending on dynamic and unique intersections of four determinant factors: capacity, control, calculation, and culture. These categories modulated organized violence between the 16th and 18th centuries and informed combatants’ perception of enemies as either brothers, who shared similarities, or as incompatible barbarians. Convincingly supported by meticulous research, this “us or them” mentality created a visceral valve mechanism that regulated violence accordingly.

Lee, a professor at the University of North Carolina and former U.S. Army officer, demonstrates through pertinent and comparative case studies how the aforementioned factors connect to the barbarian/brother model. These dynamic interrelationships are nuanced and explain why some conflicts of the era were so brutal while others of the same period remained mild in contrast. The differences are varied and supported through primary sources from the Anglo-Irish Wars of the 16th century, the English Civil War, the Anglo-Indian conflicts of the early 17th century, and the Revolutionary War.

In the examined conflicts, restraint was achieved (but not guaranteed) when opponents shared similar capacity, control, calculation, and culture. However, according to the historical record, when these factors were not shared between combatants and societies, levels of qualitative and quantitative violence increased to brutal levels with greater frequency, intensity, and scope. This is demonstrated in a case study on the ferocity of the Iroquois’ and Continental Army’s conflict during Sullivan’s Campaign in 1777. In form, this particular case study acts to differentiate the relative tractability of combat between the British and Continental Army during the Revolutionary War in a companion study found in the same part of the book, of which there are four total.

Within each part of Lee’s work, cogent analysis and interesting segues are provided, which add depth to the historical work conducted in the chapters. For example, developments in logistics in the 18th century are examined that reinforce the concept of restraint as a defining feature of war. These points are highlighted in chapter seven along with a particularly interesting discussion of Grotius, Vattel, and others on the codification of martial “rules” that eventually led to Lieber’s Code in 1863. Another poignant development was the bureaucratic capacity, or failure, to pay soldiers—a timeless problem for armies from the Carthaginians through the Continental Army. For example, when armies in the past failed to receive their due, plunder and looting often concomitantly unleashed greater violence.

The final case study investigates how the factors of capacity, control, calculation, and culture intersected during the American Civil War and why it remains such a confounding conflict. Lee’s conclusion also demonstrates the applicability of his analysis to other historical contexts as well as to contemporary conflicts. For example, the “Barbarian/Brother” model is potentially and particularly relevant to cases where ethnic conflict underlies other issues. In addition to a very readable historical work on the complex historical period of the 16 to the 18th centuries, Barbarians and Brothers, altogether, significantly contributes to the historiography and understanding.

CPT Nathaniel L. Moir, USAR, Fergus Falls, Minnesota
We Recommend


On 26 March 1970, deep in the jungles of Vietnam, Alpha Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, the famed Blackhorse Regiment, began hearing radio calls from an infantry unit four kilometers away that had stumbled into a hidden North Vietnamese Army stronghold. Outnumbered at least six to one, the 90-man American company was fighting for its existence.

Captain John Poindexter, Alpha Troop's 25-year-old commander, realized that his outfit was the only hope for the trapped company. Thirty years later Poindexter was made aware that his award recommendations for his men and even the records of the battle had somehow gone missing. Thus began the “battle” to ensure that his brave men’s accomplishments would never be forgotten again.

On 20 October 2009, President Obama awarded the Alpha Troop with the Presidential Unit Citation: the highest combat award that can be given to a military unit.

**Freedom Flyers:** The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, J. Todd Moye, Oxford University Press, New York, 256 pages, $17.95.

Denied the right to fully participate in the U.S. war effort alongside whites at the beginning of World War II, African Americans—spurred on by black newspapers and civil rights organizations such as the NAACP—compelled the prestigious Army Air Corps to open its training programs to black pilots, despite the objections of its top generals. Thousands of young men came from every part of the country to Tuskegee, Alabama, in the heart of the segregated South, to enter the program, which expanded in 1943 to train multi-engine bomber pilots in addition to fighter pilots. By the end of the war, Tuskegee Airfield had become a small city populated by black mechanics, parachute packers, doctors, and nurses. Together, they helped prove that racial segregation of the fighting forces was so inefficient as to be counterproductive to the nation’s defense.

**An American Adventure:** From Early Aviation through Three Wars to the White House, William Lloyd Stearman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 304 pages, $37.95.

A memoir of extraordinary scope, William Lloyd Stearman’s reminiscences will attract those interested in early aviation, World War II in the Pacific, life as a diplomat behind the Iron Curtain, the Vietnam War, and the ins and outs of national security decision making in the White House. Stearman begins with a description of his childhood as the son of aviation pioneer Lloyd Stearman. He then covers his naval combat experiences in the Pacific War and later struggles as one of the Navy’s youngest ship captains. Following graduate school, he moved to the front lines of the Cold War and writes about his life as a diplomat who negotiated with the Soviets, spent nine years in Berlin and Vienna, and was director of psychological operations against North Vietnam. His reflections on seventeen years with the National Security Council at the White House are of special interest.

*From the publisher.*
**Why the Infantry Squad of Tomorrow Should Resemble the Squad of Today**

**First Lieutenant George W. Runkle, IV, AR, G Co, 3/2 CR**—In Major General Robert B. Brown’s article, “The Infantry Squad: Decisive Force Now and in the Future” (Military Review, November-December 2011), he presents a passionate argument for equipping the infantry squad with an all-encompassing suite of technology. His argument is that while technological advances have made our sister services totally dominant in their respective domains, these same advances have not yet been applied to the infantry squad. As a result, we risk losing the ability to dominate the ground fight the way we (theoretically) dominate air and naval warfare. However, the methods do not meet the intent—squads cannot have “overmatch” through the methods he recommends.

General Brown is correct when he says that today’s soldiers would not face information overload by carrying a computer network on patrol. The majority of today’s NCOs and company-grade officers come from Generation Y, known as the Millennial Generation; their children (tomorrow’s soldiers), along with today’s newest soldiers, are a part of the so-called Generation Z, or Internet Generation. It is undeniable that these soldiers grew up with technology in their lives and are more at ease with technology than without it. Unfortunately, the total access to information and technology that these generations have enjoyed has caused them to prefer horizontal leadership, rather than the Army’s traditional vertical leadership. While this is a great thing in the S-3 shop, the last thing an infantry squad leader needs in a battle is a private having total access to all of the same information that the squad leader does and deciding that the squad should do something else. All of the networks and devices in the world can’t replace experience and good judgment. If they could, then the “textbook approach” would have won every battle in the history of mankind and the war in Vietnam would have ended in 1964.

General Brown’s article pays lip service to the one of the most obvious issues with his vision—weight. He openly admits that the networked soldier is going to have to carry a lot of batteries, and that battery weight and size are obstacles. However, he does not adequately address this issue—“we should use a holistic approach to solve these power and energy challenges.” “We should” is not the right answer—the Army specifically demands a single common battery used for all devices and a low weight that is specified in the number of grams, not kilograms.

Despite eight pages of talking about how soldiers should abandon their maps and carry smart phones with full network access, he devotes only three paragraphs to the soldier’s load... primarily buzzwords (i.e. “innovative power generation”) mixed in with more ideas for expensive equipment. The article totally neglects the issue of a soldier’s mobility once the equipment breaks. If we have soldiers whose weapons don’t function because they aren’t properly maintained, how can we expect our soldiers to properly maintain their exoskeletons and robotic mules? Since my squad leaders will be totally networked in, will I have the authority to allow them to abandon a broken robot while on patrol? Or, will that be my brigade commander’s call, because he will be linked in with every soldier on the patrol? Robotic mules can’t be cheap, after all. This leads me to the other issue that Major General Brown has overlooked in his article—loss of command and initiative at all levels below brigade.

Presently, the important multipliers that General Brown wants to see pushed down to the infantry squad—rotary wing assets, unmanned aerial systems, EOD teams, etc.—are usually brigade-level assets. General Brown himself states that the infantry squad should have network linkages to BCT-level assets and repeatedly asks why squads are still equipped with line-of-sight radios. Why should a squad have a method of communication that surpasses the ability to talk to its parent battalion? The only answer I can come up with is that in the brigade of tomorrow, the brigade TOC will have an individual television screen dedicated to every individual squad on patrol. The brigade battle captain would then be expected to communicate directly to squad leaders and monitor all of the squad’s actions. If that happens, how can we expect our junior NCOs and officers to develop enough to become senior leaders?

General Brown writes that in 1959, explosive “fox-hole diggers” were projected to replace the entrenching tool. In 2000, when I was a private, I read with amazement about the exoskeleton that would let me road march 20 miles an hour with tremendous loads. Neither of these predictions, nor a million others like them, ever came to fruition. Yet General Brown overlooked a number of improvements that we have made—the Camelbak, better MREs, and cold weather gear all come to mind. Maybe we haven’t been failing our squads after all—improvements are always needed, but that doesn’t mean they have to be expensive or heavy.
ANNOUNCING the 2012 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen dramatic developments in how we fight our wars. Perhaps most dramatic have been the ever-increasing contributions and sacrifices of women in what have previously been considered male-only areas of operation. Current and future innovations can use automation, robotics, and other technologies to lighten the soldier’s load and negate the necessity of physical strength in many battlefield tasks. The blurring of the line between front-line and support units in counterinsurgency conflicts, the success of programs such as Cultural Support Teams, and other 21st century evolutions in the conduct of combat all contribute to a need to rethink our nation’s current combat exclusion rules. These considerations are far from comprehensive, but serve as an introduction to the 2012 DePuy writing contest topic:

What is the role of women in the United States Army for the next 20 years?

★ Contest closes 29 June 2012 ★

1st Place  $1,000 and publication in Military Review
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3rd Place  $500 and consideration for publication in Military Review

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