



Dangerous Liaisons

The Context and Consequences of Operationalizing Military Chaplains

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SINCE THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY, when chaplains began accompanying U.S. service members overseas, American military chaplains have served as primary points of contact between the military and foreign civilians. Chaplains' work with local civilian clergy, religious communities, and relief organizations was the primary foundation of these relationships. From the Spanish-American War to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, chaplains and commanders alike have determined that chaplains, by virtue of their religious authority and cultural knowledge, may be uniquely positioned to bridge cultural divides and form critical links in networks connecting foreign populations to the American military.¹ Chaplains' interactions with foreign nationals have revealed not only perceptions about the chaplain's role within the military, but also the military's vision of its own mission.

For most of the 20th century, chaplains interacted with civilian laity and clergy who were of the same religious group, but since the end of the Cold War, chaplains have been increasingly called upon to work with foreign nationals of diverse faith groups. The amplification of chaplains' official roles and their interactions with diverse faith communities emphasize the chaplain's potential significance in information operations and in tactical and operational decision making.² At the same time, the increasingly evangelical composition of the American chaplain corps since the end of the Vietnam War has introduced new tensions to a pluralistic operational environment, as some evangelical chaplains have asserted a fundamental right, constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, to evangelize or proselytize both in the military and among foreign populations.³ Perhaps most important, chaplains themselves have often been driving these changes. Consistently targets of scrutiny by critics, activists, and commanders, chaplains have frequently searched for a mission that made them indispensable and culturally relevant to the military.

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PHOTO: U.S. Air Force CPT Paul Amaliri, a chaplain with the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, offers a prayer for airmen with the 532nd Expeditionary Security Forces at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, 18 September 2009. (U.S. Air Force, SrA Christopher Hubenthal)

With American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, where commanders, politicians, and pundits have deemed positive intercultural interactions critical to the American military mission, thinking about chaplains as intermediaries or “religious liaisons” in a counterinsurgency environment has become commonplace.⁴ Recent studies from institutions outside the military and first-hand reports from some within have suggested that chaplains may be uniquely situated to mediate cultural and religious conflicts and are therefore critical to military operational effectiveness and perhaps even strategic success.⁵ The nature of chaplains’ historical relationships with foreign nationals is important because chaplains and analysts point to them as precedent, arguing that current trends toward operationalizing chaplains are simply formalizing roles and processes that have been occurring informally for over a century. However, the differences are critically important, and the process of formalizing these roles may actually undermine the chaplain’s efficacy in these tasks, due at least in part to the informal, ambiguous, and voluntary nature of the relationship. While many have lauded this shift as natural and positive, it has relied on generally

unproven and problematic assumptions about the nature of interreligious dialogue and the mission and basic competencies of the corps of chaplains. If left unexamined, the formal operationalizing of military chaplains could have serious negative consequences.

Ultimately, the trend threatens chaplains’ traditional and historical roles as pastoral leaders for American military service personnel and informal cultural mediators with foreign nationals. Almost certainly, prioritizing a religious liaison role for the chaplain would significantly reduce the chaplain’s available time for pastoral care and counseling for American service members. Furthermore, and probably more significantly, in some situations, operationalizing a chaplain as a formal religious liaison could threaten his or her noncombatant status and blur the line between church and state (or religious and military) responsibilities. Thus, by explicitly and purposefully involving chaplains more directly in the *official* tactical, operational, and strategic military mission, the organization undermines the chaplain’s somewhat ambiguous status, which has afforded him a wide and flexible range of roles and functions in peacetime and in war.



(U.S. Navy)

Father Bill Devine, the 7th Marine Regimental chaplain, speaks to U.S. marines assigned to the 5th Marine Regiment during Catholic mass at one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces, 19 April 2003, Tikrit, Iraq.

20th-Century Chaplains

Chaplains first accompanied American troops overseas in the Spanish-American War, which led to a significant influx of chaplain volunteers into the military. The United States signed the First Geneva Convention in 1882, so this was the first war in which chaplains would be treated as noncombatants. In the original convention, in Articles I and II, chaplains were acknowledged as neutral parties to be “protected and respected by belligerents” only when they were attached to ambulances and hospitals. At other times, their status was unspecified. Chaplain Leslie R. Groves, Sr., remarked that “noncombatants had best be out of the way when the guns are working.”⁶ Groves deployed with Henry Ware Lawton’s 2nd Division, V Corps, to Daiquiri, Cuba, in June 1898, where Lawton’s troops would later fight in the battle of El Caney. During most of the campaign, Groves was stationed at a hospital to work with the victims of a yellow fever outbreak. However, accompanying troops abroad did pave the way for a wider sphere of influence for chaplains.

Throughout the Spanish-American War, chaplains in the field discovered that they were not always accorded respect when they were not with medical service personnel.⁷ Consequently, few chaplains worked near the front, but those who did set a pattern for ministering to soldiers—especially the wounded—on the battlefield itself. After the Spanish-American War, many chaplains concluded that their rightful place was in combat, instead of in the rear at headquarters or in a hospital. And in the 20th century, chaplains, for the most part, held this role sacrosanct. Even in the midst of intense and rancorous political discussions about American involvement in wars, chaplains have maintained that their primary duty was to minister to soldiers at the front. They were to embody their God’s presence in the field.

A second aspect of the chaplain’s ministry abroad emerged as chaplains sought to demonstrate their utility to armed forces in combat. Chaplains became prime candidates for taking on occupation armies’ other-than-war duties. Chaplain William D. McKinnon, serving with U.S. Army forces in Manila, attempted to negotiate a peace settlement to the conflict with the Catholic archbishop of Manila. With the consent of Brigadier General Thomas

Anderson, McKinnon walked across the battlefield and, with a Spanish escort, met the archbishop. The meeting was ultimately unsuccessful, but it established that chaplains—especially in concert with a willing commander—could communicate even official messages with civilian leaders. Later, as part of the American post-war occupation of the Philippines, McKinnon was appointed the superintendent of Manila schools and the acting assistant quartermaster in charge of cemeteries, again blurring the line between official religious and military duties.⁸

As the Chaplain Corps professionalized along with the rest of the Army in the early 20th century, chaplains’ potential as intermediaries became more apparent. In the wake of the early 20th-century Root Reforms, the chaplain corps continued on a path to professionalization and respectability within the Army. Chaplains won the right to wear military rank, and the process for screening and accepting potential chaplains was standardized.⁹

During World War I, chaplains who served with American forces in Europe concentrated on their responsibilities as ministers to soldiers, however, when encountering civilians or coreligionists, they did so without an evangelical mindset. In one letter, Chaplain Arthur Hicks, a Church of Christ minister, wrote that occasionally the chaplains would work with the Saint Mihiel School, which taught more than 18 subjects to local students.¹⁰

By World War II, few questioned that the chaplains’ proper place was on the battlefield. The Army published Training Manual 16-205, *The Chaplain*, which stated, “When the ground forces go into action, their chaplain should be with them.” In practice, then, one might expect chaplains to “move from one platoon to another” or to “minister to the wounded in exposed positions.” The manual was careful to articulate that the chaplain would not “place himself in unnecessary danger. He must be careful that his movements do not disclose hidden positions to the enemy or draw his fire.” Still, it suggested that if there were heavy casualties, the chaplain would be best utilized at a forward aid station, where he could assist in collecting the wounded or in bandaging and performing other simple medical tasks. The chaplain, who had shared the “peril of battle” with soldiers, would thereby “gain a place in their confidence” that would



U.S. Army

A Roman Catholic chaplain ministers to Union soldiers during the American Civil War.

“reinforce powerfully all his efforts to give moral and religious instruction and inspiration.”¹¹

As chaplains gained access to the front lines, they also gained access to foreign nationals—as civilians, soldiers, refugees, and prisoners of war. In World War II, American military chaplains frequently worked with refugee populations throughout Europe, most of them Jewish. In this regard, the few Jewish chaplains in the U.S. Army served double duty, ministering not only to Jewish soldiers, but also to Jewish communities in refugee camps and small towns. Chaplain David Max Eichhorn recalled doing extensive work in this area, including locating “22 old Jewish women . . . whose husbands and children [had] been deported,” and whom the Germans left in the town to burden the community. He performed a funeral for a 97-year-old woman and took care of others “with the aid of money raised by Jewish soldiers and supplies furnished by the American Army and the French.” He reflected, “There is no other Army like it in the whole world. I had to plead with these men not to give me as much as they wanted to give. Many of them wanted to empty their pockets and give me

all they had.”¹² However, throughout the war, such efforts remained unofficial and were viewed as supplemental to the chaplain’s primary mission.

In the postwar world, chaplains assumed a more formal function in their interactions with foreign nationals, even though the interactions were primarily pastoral and did not serve an operational or strategic end. Two examples illustrate this. At the Nuremberg Trials, the Army assigned a Lutheran chaplain, Henry Gerecke, and a Roman Catholic chaplain, Sixtus O’Connor, to minister to Nazi war criminals, mirroring the age-old split in Germany between Protestants and Catholics. The chaplains, along with the Army psychologist there, were the only prison officials who spoke German. Those chaplains’ cultural sensitivities, linguistic knowledge, and credibility as religious figures enabled them to interact with prisoners on a personal and pastoral level rather than simply as military personnel.¹³ Similarly, Jewish chaplains were the primary people who worked with Holocaust survivors in the aftermath of concentration camp liberation. One survivor wrote that Rabbi Abraham Klausner was a “rabbi, friend, [and] brother” and

that Klausner had “become one of us.” Klausner worked closely with Jewish-American civilian organizations and with the military to provide ministerial care to Holocaust survivors.¹⁴

Chaplains stationed in occupied Japan reported they were interested in learning the Japanese language and working with local Japanese people to forge international ties.¹⁵ Jewish chaplain Milton Rosen gave lectures to Japanese civilians and officials and at the same time ministered to Jewish civilians who had escaped from Nazi Germany—all while continuing in his official capacity as minister to American service members. Many of Rosen’s encounters with civilians—in Japan and later in Korea—were informal and involved mutual education and respect on the part of chaplains and local civilians. According to Rosen, such interactions were most successful when they involved learning about the other group’s culture and when official functions did not impede the development of personal relationships.¹⁶

Emil Kapaun, a Catholic chaplain, learned Japanese to facilitate his local work in Japan, though, unlike Rosen, Kapaun clearly understood that his role would provide significant opportunities to evangelize. He wrote in his journal, “I never dreamed of being a Missionary, yet here I am in a Mission land, a Pagan land . . . and the way it looks, many of the Japanese are going to receive the true faith.” Kapaun’s statement points to a potentially significant conflict for chaplains. Those who represented faiths and denominations for which proselytization and evangelism was a key tenet might face challenges working in a pluralistic setting. Within the military, the chaplains asserted that, while they would not proselytize others of different faiths or religious preferences, they were permitted to evangelize service members who did not affiliate themselves with a particular religious group.¹⁷ However, these limits did not necessarily apply to interactions with foreign civilians.

Even after the Korean War, when several chaplains reported significant interactions and relationships with Korean congregations and refugees, official chaplain documents did not reflect this activity as an official function. In the 1959 Navy chaplains manual, little mention was made of chaplains’ interactions with foreign civilians. Surplus chapel funds (voluntary offerings made

at religious services) were, with the assent of the worshippers and the chaplain, sometimes donated to civilian organizations, but the Army field manual was silent on the issue of such interactions.¹⁸

In many ways, the American war in Vietnam signaled a subtle move toward more official activity in service of a military objective as chaplains’ official and nonreligious duties overlapped with unofficial and religious ones in civic action programs (CAPs). According to the chaplains’ Vietnam orientation guide, CAP activities were “to use military resources for the benefit of civilian communities, such as assisting in health, welfare, and public works projects, improving living conditions, alleviating suffering, and improving the economic base of the country.” The programs sought “to gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for the Armed Forces and to emphasize the concept of freedom and worth of the individual.”¹⁹

Within each division area of operations, commanders were to initiate and complete projects designed to win the hearts and minds of local Vietnamese civilians. In specific terms, CAP initiatives included both “short-range, high



Chaplain (CPT) Andrew Cohen leads the Sabbath evening worship during the sixth day of Hanukkah at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. (U.S. Air Force, A1C Jason Epley)



U.S. Air Force chaplain LTC Michael Weber (center) directs volunteers from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan during the sorting of donations at Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan, 23 July 2007.

impact” projects, such as distributing relief supplies or digging wells to gain rapid acceptance in an area, and long-range projects, such as building schools or hospitals, undertaken by units permanently stationed in an area.²⁰

Chaplains contributed to civic action programs by collecting and apportioning donations collected at services and other venues.²¹ Chaplains across the world raised money for various causes in Vietnam. One successful campaign, for the Go Vap Orphanage, resulted in total offerings of more than \$32,000.²² However, the Army chief of chaplains was quick to point out that civic action programs were not within the realm of chaplains’ official duties and suggested that chaplains should not become too entangled in them. In response to a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) chaplain who wished to begin a program of sponsorship of Army of the Republic of Vietnam units in order to meet the “urgent demands of dependents of Vietnamese servicemen for clothing, shoes. . . [and] personal hygiene items,” the chief replied such assistance was merited, but that the chaplain should work with the U.S. Army,

Vietnam, and MACV staff chaplains to arrange for it through recognized channels.²³

Even with institutional hurdles in place, chaplains themselves frequently reported that their interactions with local Vietnamese civilians were among the most significant of their tours. These efforts also increased goodwill among religious congregations and organizations in the United States. In 1971, for example, a United Methodist chaplain newsletter ran a picture of Ralph VanLandingham, installation chaplain at Bien Hoa Air Base, giving an offering to the sisters of Ke Sat Orphanage in Ho Nai. The picture was titled “So Children Could Have Eggs for Breakfast,” and the caption told readers that the \$239 gift, used to purchase chickens, had been given by the Protestant congregation at Bien Hoa.²⁴ Chaplains also accompanied doctors, nurses, and medics on medical civil action program missions, where they distributed treats to children and established contacts with local leaders.²⁵

Donald Rich, assigned to a military assistance group team, reported that he had considerable and sustained contacts with American missionaries and

Vietnamese churches. Because he was a Protestant chaplain assigned to a remote area, he often relied on Vietnamese Catholic priests, many of whom spoke English, to provide coverage for his Catholic unit members.²⁶ As in World War II and Korea, chaplains generally assisted foreign people and organizations whose faith preferences closely mirrored their own. The substantial Catholic minority in Vietnam allowed for many cross-cultural but intra-religious exchanges.

However, in Vietnam, many chaplains and military units also came into frequent contact with Vietnamese Buddhists and animists. As a part of the quest to win “hearts and minds,” many commanders recognized the significance of intercultural and interreligious understanding. In 1965, the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force, Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, and his staff chaplain, Allen Craven, worked with Chaplain Robert Mole to develop the “Southeast Asia Religious Research Project.”²⁷ Mole developed his work into an orientation program for troops in all commands of the III Marine Amphibious Force.²⁸ Later, Mole revised the program into the *Unit Leader’s Personal Response Handbook*, which served as a primer on Vietnamese and Southeast Asian cultural and religious traditions, but more importantly emphasized the importance of military officers changing their own attitudes and responses to indigenous people. Chaplains intervened as moral advisors to commanders when they recognized problems that hindered the effectiveness of American pacification programs.²⁹ Still, these programs were usually ad hoc and directed by a specific commander and a volunteer chaplain. Chaplains were not expected to be experts on world religions or local culture—though, when available, commanders did exploit these capabilities.

After the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the chaplain community struggled against serious opposition and challenge from the civilian religious community and worked to reestablish its mission and prove its utility within the military. On the pastoral side, chaplains decided to focus on family ministry and securing the rights of military personnel, but on the institutional side, chaplains worked to emphasize the potential strategic importance and significance of their interreligious and humanitarian work. In a 1985 professional bulletin article, Navy chaplains stationed in Korea wrote that chaplains there frequently helped visiting ships complete

“community relations projects” with “local orphanages, hospitals, or senior citizen homes” because the chaplain was expected to be the source for relevant “information, recommendations, and arrangements.”³⁰

The post-Cold War period encouraged these sorts of developments. Chaplains deployed with American troops in Haiti and Bosnia. However, most of these interactions were informal and unofficial, supporting the humanitarian nature of the conflict and focusing on the reconciliation of religious differences among local populations.³¹ Though commanders sometimes tasked chaplains with a religious liaison role, it was rarely couched in terms of directly supporting a strategic mission. Chaplains’ work may have added value, but it did not replace their primary task of supporting soldiers, nor was it generally deemed mission-critical.

21st-Century Chaplains

In the 21st century, in the context of a post-9/11 world and in the midst of two large-scale U.S. military interventions overseas, chaplains have again appeared as critical cross-cultural intermediaries within the military. By the early 2000s, Navy, Army, and joint command publications highlighted the importance of religion and culture in contemporary conflicts and the chaplain’s potential role as cultural intermediary. For example, Joint Publication 1-05, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, articulates that the joint force chaplain, with the commander’s approval, “may serve as a point of contact to [host nation] civilian and military religious leaders, institutions, and organizations, including established and emerging military chaplaincies.”³² Army and Navy manuals relate similar instructions to their chaplains, and the Navy also maintains that a chaplain may act as a “spokesperson to foster awareness about indigenous concerns, issues, or attitudes.”³³ These statements marked a significant change from the unofficial and quasi-official pronouncements of the Cold War era, which emphasized the chaplain’s pastoral role and his role as an advisor to the commander regarding religious support issues. Such policies and directives moved away from the humanitarian character of previous chaplain-civilian interactions and moved instead into the realm of nationbuilding and population security.

In previous American military interventions, chaplains most frequently liaised with civilians of similar faiths, but military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have required more interfaith cooperation. While the military does contain Muslim chaplains, most chaplains in the military today identify themselves as evangelical, Protestant Christians, and many of them assert conversion of non-Christians as a primary tenet of their religious practice.³⁴ Even so, many chaplains have displayed the desire to cooperate with local Muslim religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan and significant skills to do so.

On the ground, several chaplains and commanders have reported working with local religious leaders successfully. Serving with the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, in Afghanistan in 2004, Chaplain Eric Eliason met several Afghan soldiers who wished to have their own chaplain, and then trained a local mullah to act as a military chaplain using his own experiences and training materials from the Chaplain's Officer Basic Course.³⁵ Chaplain John Stutz, serving with the 101st Airborne's Civil-Military Operations Center in Iraq, acted as a liaison

between imams and a unit in Mosul when the local religious leaders felt they were treated disrespectfully by American soldiers who stopped and searched them. This same chaplain also arranged for local imams to visit detainees held by the 101st Division.³⁶

Several authors have suggested such cooperation is possible because chaplains and local religious leaders share certain worldviews and assumptions about religion, including a belief in God; the assumption of equality of humankind; the accountability of humans to God; the significance of morality; and the requirement of justice for peace.³⁷

Yet such assumptions neglect significant historical and cultural trends that suggest a more complicated relationship, particularly between evangelical Christian chaplains and Muslim religious and tribal leaders. Chaplains, after all, wear the uniform of the U.S. military along with religious insignia—namely the Christian cross—that carry heavy symbolic weight in the Muslim world.³⁸ As positive an image as interfaith dialogue may have in the West, in areas under the control of those who follow an extremist Islamist ideology, that same dialogue may actually be deadly.



(U.S. Air Force, Ann Samuel W. Goodman)

Soldiers enrolled in the Chaplain Basic Officer Leadership Course at Fort Jackson, SC, practice ramp ceremonies during training at Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, 23 February 2010.

Furthermore, it is ludicrous to expect all military chaplains to have sufficient levels of cultural and religious training outside of their own faith tradition, the desire to liaise with foreign nationals, or the generally ecumenical religious worldview most likely to result in positive relationships. Simply put, it is difficult to imagine chaplains who have encouraged evangelism in Muslim populations serving as very successful liaisons with local religious leaders.³⁹ These concerns have been brought up by advocates for including chaplains in religious liaison missions, but they are generally mentioned only in passing, as potential words of caution, and have yet to be addressed in pragmatic or doctrinal terms.⁴⁰ Issues of gender and theology, on the other hand, go largely unmentioned, as if fundamental differences in belief and praxis are unimportant to either American military chaplains or their counterparts abroad.

Even if the dubious assumptions about chaplains' potential as formal religious liaisons were true, there are still very real dangers, both philosophical and practical, to this sort of operationalizing of chaplains to suit the military's strategic mission. Such close ties to a formal American military mission could seriously jeopardize chaplains' status as noncombatants, undermine a chaplain's personal security, and compromise his credibility as a member of the clergy rather than as an agent of human intelligence collection. Although JP 1-05 mandates that chaplains should take no actions that might jeopardize their special status, there is almost no specific guidance as to what this might mean in practice, in effect, leaving such decisions up to individual chaplains and commanders.

These official policies and on-the-ground experiences reflect the emerging consensus that religion will continue to play a vital role in future nation building and peace-keeping operations.⁴¹ Certainly, though, not all chaplains will feel comfortable acting as religious liaisons, or are particularly well-suited to working in a pluralistic faith environment, or have sufficient education and experience to undertake such endeavors. While chaplains have frequently interacted with foreign nationals, the chaplain community and individual chaplains have consistently emphasized that their primary role is to provide spiritual support and



U.S. Army chief of chaplains MG Douglas Carver, meets with chaplains and chaplains' assistants during a visit to Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 28 March 2011. (U.S. Navy, ENS Haraz Ghanbari)

care to American service members, a job which, given the operational tempo of current military missions, could most certainly occupy most, if not all, of their time. Numbers alone suggest that chaplains are stretched thin—particularly for religious minorities who are, obviously, not segregated in specific units. Even with a growing number of service members expressing “no religious preference,” atheism, or agnosticism, chaplains remain critical resources for personal and family counseling, suicide prevention, and mental health.⁴² Even when chaplains are willing and capable to perform a religious liaison function, commanders must jealously guard the chaplain's time and resources to ensure adequate religious and spiritual support for the service members under their command. The chaplain as a staff officer operates under the commander's program, intent, and guidance. In fact, in discussions about the chaplain's role down range, battalion and brigade commanders have often been the most hesitant to encourage a widely expanded formal role for the chaplain.⁴³

As the military continues to recognize and act on the significance of religion and culture to nationbuilding and peacekeeping operations,

chaplains are likely to remain critical connectors in networks of military and civilian leaders. The chaplaincy must remain vigilant about defining and protecting chaplains' noncombatant status and chaplains' primary duties to American service members. Commanders, too, must take an active role to limit formally operationalizing military chaplains within the American military, particularly in nationbuilding and counterinsurgency missions.

At the same time, understanding the chaplains' historical involvement in humanitarian efforts and in forming intense personal connections with foreign civilians should validate the more informal venue for this sort of work and may provide guidelines for appropriate limitations, training, and personnel requirements for increasing chaplains' participation in negotiations, assistance, and intercultural relationships. **MR**

NOTES

1. The literature on chaplains' ambiguous position within the military and religious communities is extensive. Specifically, chaplains are seen as occupying an ambiguous space between military and religious institutions and cultures, between military and civilian worlds, and between enlisted personnel and officers. They are, at once, full members of these institutions, but operate outside of some of the traditional boundaries. As such, they may have greater flexibility in moving between the two and have traits of each group that give them credibility; however, they are also outsiders in a sense, which presents other challenges for integration within the group and identity formation. For a more extensive discussion of these ideas, see Sharon Erikson Nepstad, *Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jacqueline E. Whitt, "Conflict and Compromise: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.

2. See, for example, Norman Emery, "Intelligence Support to Information Operations: Staff Chaplains," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (July-September 2003); Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Training Techniques (TQ2-2003); David E. Smith, "The Implications of Chaplaincy Involvement within Information Operations," *IOSphere* (Fall 2006): 43-50. This shift is also evidenced in FM 1-05, *Religious Support* (April 2003), and *The Army Chaplaincy*, which in 2009 dedicated an entire issue to the subject of world religions and the effect of religion on military operations.

3. On the composition of the chaplain corps, see Laurie Goodstein, "Evangelicals Are a Growing Force in the Military Chaplain Corps," *New York Times*, 12 July 2005; Tim Townsend, "Evangelical Christianity Disproportionately Represented by Military Chaplains," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 January 2011.

4. On the role of religion in counterinsurgency, see David Morris, "The Big Suck: Notes from the Jarhead Underground," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Winter 2007), <<http://www.vqronline.org>> (15 July 2011); Frank Hoffman, "Luttwak's Lament," *Small Wars Journal* (22 April 2007), <<http://smallwarsjournal.com>> (15 July 2011); David Kilcullen, "Religion and Insurgency," *Small Wars Journal* (12 May 2007), <<http://smallwarsjournal.com>> (15 July 2011). These analysts disagree about the religious nature of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, some arguing that they are driven by fundamentalist Islamist ideologies and are therefore "uniquely violent and fanatical," (see Hoffman and Edward Luttwak), while others argue that religion is not actually at the root of these insurgencies, but is rather rhetorical cover and a tool for manipulation (see Kilcullen). The debate matters a great deal because counterinsurgent responses are tied to understanding the motivations and culture of both the insurgents and the population in which the insurgency operates.

5. See, for example, George Adams, "Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," *Peaceworks* no. 56, United States Institute of Peace (March 2006); Scottie Lloyd, "Chaplain Contact with Local Religious Leaders: A Strategic Support," United States Army War College Paper, 2005; a report by 2LT Brandon Eliason, written for the University of Military Intelligence, goes so far as to suggest that chaplains are not only qualified, but perhaps the most qualified and available, to perform a religious liaison function for so-called Sunni "Awakening Councils" formed to respond to the growing threat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Eliason, "Awakening Councils in Iraq," University of Military Intelligence, 2008.

6. Leslie R. Groves, Sr., "Campaigning a la Hobo," Archives, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Fort Jackson, SC, 9.

7. William J. Hourihan, "Before the Chaplain Assistant," *The Army Chaplaincy* (Spring 1999).

8. C.H. Martin to Adjutant General, Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General, Department of Cemeteries, Manila, 29 July 1899; George P. Anderson to Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General, Department of Public Instruction, Manila, 25 July 1899, Annual Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army 1899, Part II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), 271. Certainly, chaplains were not the only military personnel who took on such civilian administrative duties, but this involvement marked a significant move toward making chaplains fully involved in the military mission of their units.

9. Richard Budd, *Serving Two Masters: The Development of the American Military Chaplaincy, 1860-1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

10. Arthur Hicks, letters to wife, December 1918-March 1919, "Chaplain (CPT) Arthur Hicks—With Army in Europe (WWI)—#6618," United States Institute for Military History, Carlisle, PA.

11. Department of the Army, *The Chaplain*, TM 16-205 (1944), 64.

12. David Max Eichhorn, *The GI's Rabbi: World War II Letters of David Max Eichhorn*, ed. Greg Palmer and Mark S. Zaid (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 231.

13. David Max Eichhorn, *The GI's Rabbi: World War II Letters of David Max Eichhorn*, ed. Greg Palmer and Mark S. Zaid (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 231.

14. William J. Hourihan, "U.S. Army Chaplain Ministry to German War Criminals at Nuremberg, 1945-1946," *The Army Chaplaincy* (Winter-Spring 2000): 15; Albert Isaac Slomovitz, *The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish Military Chaplains and American History* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 108.

15. Milton J. Rosen, *An American Rabbi in Korea: A Chaplain's Journey in the Forgotten War* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 11.

16. Rosen, 28, 32, 4-48.

17. The distinction between the two is a fine one. Thus, "to evangelize," in this context, most closely means preaching or telling in informal conversation and is focused on those who claim no religious faith, while "proselytize" has a meaning closer to active conversion and may target those with an expressed religious faith. Originally, the National Conference on Ministry made the distinction to the Armed Forces (NCMAF), but it has become an important line, especially for evangelical military chaplains. In 2005, however, the Air Force took the step to stop circulating the document, lest it be mistaken as policy. See Alan Cooperman, "Air Force Withdraws Paper for Chaplains," *Washington Post* (11 October 2005). The distinction between the two has also come under scrutiny because of the ban on "proselytizing" (but not "evangelizing") in U.S. Central Command's General Order Number One. This distinction is unsatisfactory to critics of the chaplaincy who claim "evangelizing" those with no religious preference is just as problematic (and potentially coercive) as active "proselytizing." See Goodstein, "Evangelicals Are a Growing Force."

18. Department of the Navy, *Chaplains' Manual*, NAVPERS 15664-B (Washington DC: Department of Naval Personnel, 1959), 8, 20, 23.

19. "Chaplain Orientation—RVN," U.S. Army Chaplain School, Fort Hamilton, NY, December 1968, 1-5, USACHCS Vietnam Files, Box 5. The Civic Action Programs here should not be confused with a Marine Corps program, Combined Action Platoons, with the same acronym.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Chaplains used nonappropriated funds for nonofficial purposes and to purchase denominationally specific religious accessories, such as candlesticks or processional crosses. Frequently, however, chaplains misused appropriated funds for the second purpose.

22. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Historical Review, 1965-1966.

23. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Historical Review, 1967-1968, 46.

24. United Methodist Chaplain Newsletter, Commission on Chaplains and Related Ministries, United Methodist Church, December 1971, 1, USACHCS, Vietnam Files, Box 7.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. Robert L. Mole, "Unit Leader's Personal Response Handbook" (Washington DC: GPO, 1968).

28. Anne C. Loveland, "Prophetic Ministry and the Military Chaplaincy during the Vietnam Era," in *Moral Problems in American Life: New Perspectives on Cultural History*, ed. Karen Halttunen and Lewis Perry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 251.

29. Department of the Navy, Office of the Navy Chief of Chaplains, Warren Newman, "Personal Response Project: A Shaft of Sunlight," *Navy Chaplains Bulletin* 3, no. 3 (1982), 32-33.

30. Lt. J.E. Trahan, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations "COMFLEACT China, Korea," *Navy Chaplains Bulletin* 1 (Summer 1985), 27.

31. See Kenneth E. Lawson, *Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in the Balkans, 1995-2005*.

32. Joint Publication 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations* (Washington DC: JCS, 2004), chapter 2, paragraph 3.

33. United States Army, Field Manual 1-05, *Religious Support* (Washington DC: GPO, 2003); United States Navy, Navy Warfare Publication, 1-05 (Newport, RI: Department of the Navy, 2003), paragraph 5.8.4.

34. In 2009, the Defense Manpower Data Center reported there were 11 Muslim chaplains for just over 5,000 service members who identified as Muslims. In terms of chaplain support for religious minorities, both Jews and Muslims are actually overrepresented by chaplain coverage. Counts of "evangelistic" chaplains vary depending on how certain denominations are coded. For one set of data on the number of religious adherents within the American military and the ecclesiastical distribution of chaplains from 2009, see Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers, "Demographics," <http://www.militaryatheists.org/demographics.html> (accessed 14 July 2011).

35. George Adams, "Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," *Peaceworks* no. 56, United States Institute of Peace (March 2006), 31.

36. *Ibid.*, 27.

37. See, for example, Joseph R. Didziulis, "Winning the Battle for Hearts and Minds: Operationalizing Cultural Awareness during Stability Operation," Air Command and Staff College Paper, April 2008, 25; LaMar Griffin, "Strategic Religious Dialogue: A Chaplain's Perspective on Religious Leader Liaison," *Review of Faith and International Affairs* 7, no. 4 (2009); S.K. Moore, *The Ministry and Theology of Reconciliation in Operations* (n.p., n.d.), 29, quoted in Scottie Lloyd, "Chaplain Contact with Local Religious Leaders: A Strategic Support," United States Army War College Paper, 4; and Sulayman S. Nyang, "Challenges Facing Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the United States," in *Christian-Muslim Encounter*, eds. Yvonne Y. Haddad and Wadi Z. Haddad (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), 336.

38. On the potential symbolism of military chaplains, especially Christians in predominately Muslim areas, see Stacey Gutkowski and George Wilkes, "Changing Chaplaincy: A Contribution to Debate over the Roles of U.S. and British Military Chaplains in Afghanistan," *Religion, State, and Society* 39, no. 1 (11 March 2011): 111-24.

39. On chaplains and other officers using religion in less-acceptable ways, see Kathryn Joyce, "Christian Soldiers," *Newsweek*, 19 June 2009; "GIs Told to Bring Afghans to Jesus," *Knight Ridder/Tribune*, 4 May 2009; and Jeff Sharlett, "Jesus Killed Mohammed: The Crusade for a Christian Military" *Harper's Magazine*, May 2009, 31-43.

40. See, for example, John W. Brinsfield and Eric Wester, "Ethical Challenges for Commanders and Their Chaplains," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (2009): 20-21; Steven L. Smith and Eric Wester, "Letters," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (2010): 5-6; Chris Seiple "Ready . . . Or Not: Equipping the U.S. Military Chaplain for Inter-Religious Liaison," *Review of Faith and International Affairs* 7, no. 4 (2009); and Douglas Johnston, "U.S. Military Chaplains: Redirecting a Critical Asset," *Review of Faith and International Affairs* 7, no. 4 (2009).

41. See, for example, Chadwick F. Alger, "Religion as a Peace Tool," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1 (June 2002): 94-109; Scott R. Appleby, "Religion as an Agent of Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 821-41; Marc Gopin, "Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution," *Peace and Change* 22 (January 1997): 1-31; Douglas M. Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Emma Kay and David Last, "The Spiritual Dimension of Peacekeeping: A Dual Role for the Chaplaincy?" *Peace Research* 31 (February 1999); Luc Reyschler, "Religion and Conflict," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 2 (January 1997): 19-38; and Robert Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover, eds., *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

42. The Army Chaplain Corps has set out its strategic priorities for 2009-2014, and it includes a focus on all of these areas. The roles discussed here—namely acting as religious liaisons and advising commanders on local and world religions—form only two of twenty-six "major objectives" for the period in question. "The Army Chaplaincy Strategic Plan, 2009-2014," <<http://www.chapnet.army.mil/Documents/StratPlan.pdf>>, (14 July 2011). See also Vicki Brown, "Chaplains on the Front Lines of Suicide Prevention," (30 July 2009), United Methodist Church, <<http://www.umc.org/site/apps/lnet/content.aspx?c=1wL4Kn1LH&b=4776577&ct=7264511>> (14 July 2011).

43. For specifics, see the extended discussion in a *Small Wars Journal* forum on the issue. "Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan," (3 April 2006), <<http://council.smallwarsjournal.com>> (15 July 2011).

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