
In late 2006, I found myself at *Military Review* working on an article by an Army captain named Travis Patriquin, a brigade staff officer stationed outside Ramadi, the capital-elect of al-Qaeda’s would-be caliphate and formerly the deadliest city in Iraq. Over the course of six weeks we did the usual back-and-forth with Patriquin, until we had the article (“Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots,” *Military Review*, January-February 2007) ready to go. All we needed was our author’s final approval. It never came.

In one of war’s perpetual ironies, this officer, who had done so much to spur the Sunni Awakening and pacify Ramadi, had been killed by an IED.

In *A Soldier’s Dream*, William Doyle brings Travis Patriquin back to life. The resulting portrait is an inspiring one. Doyle’s Patriquin is a burly officer who couldn’t pass Ranger School (twice) or max a PT test. He’s a chain smoker. He has a mustache, and hair you can actually see, and he reads history and poetry, studies other cultures, and loves to talk to people. He’s worked with special operators and he’s been a paratrooper, but in the end, he’s a schmoozer, the type of soldier often dismissed by high-and-tight warriors. That, as Doyle portrays it, was a damn good thing for the people of Ramadi.

Doyle makes a convincing case that without Patriquin’s cultivation of Sattar abu Risha, the sheik who allied with the coalition and rallied his peers against Al-Qaeda, there might not have been an Awakening. Patriquin’s main weapons were enthusiastic Arabic, personal charisma, and perseverance. Thus we see him chatting for hours on end with Sattar, cultivating the trust necessary to win the sheik over. He argues loudly with senior officers wary of the Sunni, uses the web to get the word out, and, one can imagine, generally makes a pain in the ass of himself to those who move too slowly. Today, Patriquin’s private brand of soft power might seem like common sense, but in 2006 he was in the COIN vanguard.

Doyle’s thesis—that one eminently human being can make a big difference—might sound trite, but it’s worth repeating in an age of drone warfare.

While *A Soldier’s Dream* is mainly valedictory, Doyle takes pains to note the contributions other soldiers and marines (Deane, Lechner, McClung, MacFarland, McLaughlin et al.) made to the Awakening. The book also offers a good brigade-level picture of the Awakening as it unfolded, and it describes in detail the little-known battle of Sufiyah—although it raises, and not consciously, several questions about the U.S. response.

*A Soldier’s Dream* is not a perfect book. The praise verges on effusive, the prose is sometimes redundant, and the author makes some obvious mistakes about Army doings. However, these are mere quibbles. In the end, William Doyle deserves our thanks for commemorating a remarkable officer and illuminating his exploits in helping to bring about one of the Iraq War’s real success stories.

**LTC Art Bilodeau, USA, Retired, Louisville, Kentucky**


If you harbor any doubts about man’s capacity for inhumanity to his fellow man, you will lose them when reading this disturbing, important book.

In *Less Than Human*, David Livingstone Smith unblinkingly describes the darker side of mankind’s history. He focuses on horrors perpetrated upon “Jews, sub-Saharan Africans, and Native Americans” due to their “immense historical significance” and because they are “richly documented.” But the awful tales he relates come from across the world and some date back to prehistory. There are stories of mass murder, rape, slavery, and torture. But most poignant are the stories of individual victims. There is, for example, the heart-rending tale of Ota Benga, a Batwa (“pygmy”) tribesman whose family was killed in the Congo Free State by the mercenary forces of King Leopold II of Belgium, who was sold into slavery and purchased by an American entrepreneur, who was put on display in 1904 in the Bronx Zoo (where he shared a cage with an orangutan), and who, freed but longing to return home, killed himself with a bullet to his own heart.

What makes it possible for us homo sapiens to treat other members of our species so horrifically, Smith argues, is our unique mental ability to “essentialize” the world around us. We divide living things into species, and species into kinds. We then rank species and kinds from highest to lowest. There are very good evolutionary reasons we are built to view living beings...
Readers may protest that such statements by U.S. service members are colorful metaphors rather than genuine instances of dehumanization. However, if one has served for very long in our military, it is probably not hard to recollect other examples of dehumanizing comments that reinforce Smith’s point—such as, perhaps, jokes heard about dirty “hajis” or “ragheads” when one served in the Middle East.

The lesson that military leaders should draw from Smith’s exhaustive research is clear. You can dehumanize the enemy and, at least at first, make the task of killing fellow human beings easier for your soldiers. But you do so today at great peril, for wherever dehumanization goes, mission-, life-, and soul-destroying atrocity almost certainly follows.

As good as this book is, it ends on a disappointing note. After masterfully employing the fields of history, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy to illuminate an evolution-wrought flaw of the human condition, Smith’s final, somewhat feeble recommendation is that “the study of dehumanization . . . be made a priority” so that we understand “exactly how dehumanization works and what can be done to prevent it.”

Left unanswered is what such prevention might even look like. This gap is glaring when one considers that those who most exhibit the impulse to dehumanize others are precisely those who are least receptive to a cure for their condition. Did senior members of Hitler’s regime wish to be cured of their anti-Semitism? Of course not. Also problematic is the idea of any government deciding to cure its members of their worst impulses toward others (as vividly depicted in Stanley Kubrick’s masterpiece, A Clockwork Orange).

Still, Smith’s accomplishment is stunning. He has written a book that is strikingly original, clearly and eloquently written, and—for anyone who believes that truth is preferable to untruth, no matter how ugly this truth—an absolutely “essential” read.

Mark Bowden

Worm: The First Digital World War

The Wild West is an apt metaphor for author Mark Bowden’s journey into the depths of cyberspace, where “white hats” and “black hats” are locked in an incessant and pitched battle for control over the Internet. Within the digital domain there are daily gunfights, little formal authority, and an ever-present sense of danger.

In the pages of Worm, author Mark Bowden weaves the story of the Conficker worm, a powerful and enigmatic piece of malware that infects the Internet and countless systems with ease. Is Conficker the leading wave of a digital assault force or simply a computer prank run amok? Worm details a digital-age battle between good and evil, white hats and black hats, to protect the Internet from falling victim to a botnet of massive proportions. The battle lines are drawn across the electromagnetic spectrum, and the fight is as real and as unforgiving as any in the physical world.

Bowden is a bestselling author, contributing editor for Vanity Fair, and an Atlantic Monthly national correspondent. His book Black Hawk Down spent more than a year on the New York Times bestseller list, was a finalist for the National Book Award, and was adapted into a major motion picture. Bowden is also the author of the international bestsellers Killing Pablo and Guests of the Ayatollah. Bowden is a columnist at The Philadelphia Inquirer and has written for The New Yorker, The New York Times, Sports Illustrated, and Rolling Stone.

Worm is more than a tale of the Wild West. It is a harbinger of the future, where threats to the cyber domain are as real and as potentially cataclysmic as a weapon of mass destruction. For Bowden, Worm is a warning, a foreboding tome to the common masses, those unwitting souls who see the freedom of the Internet but not the inherent danger.
It is only fitting that Bowden brings *Worm* to a close without ever really ending the story: Conficker seemingly contained, but not eradicated. Lurking. Waiting. But for what?

*Worm* is a “must read” for current and future military leaders. Bowden crafts a truly compelling story, but also one that describes what future warfare may very well become. For that reason alone, *Worm* is an exceptional start point for any serious reading on cyber warfare or the future of digital age combat.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Beatrice Heuser, chair of International History at the University of Reading, United Kingdom, is one of the most thoughtful and lucid writers on strategic thought in the world. She continues her impressive contributions to the field of strategic studies in her latest book, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. To be clear, this book is not simply a history of strategy throughout the ages. Rather, at its heart lies a stimulating discussion of the relationship between politics and the use of force.

Heuser explores the frustratingly elusive quest to better understand which military strategies more efficiently achieve greater political ends than others. However, unlike many other works on this subject, Heuser examines how social institutions, norms, and culture contribute to this exploration. Importantly, by investigating the political, ideological, and cultural environment of strategic thought throughout the ages, Heuser is able to demonstrate why and how ideas such as strategic bombing and total warfare developed and why these concepts were popular in certain times but not in others.

In doing this, Heuser is able to convincingly establish that the relationship between strategy and war is even more complex than originally thought. This approach also allows for sustained examinations into how varying cultural and societal experiences influenced some of history’s most significant strategic thinkers (i.e., Clausewitz, Napoleon, Corbett, etc.). As a result, Heuser’s methodology allows us to both explore the evolution of strategic thinking in a more nuanced manner and help contribute to a deeper understanding of society’s role in influencing the conduct of war.

The breadth and depth of Heuser’s analysis is intimidating to say the least. Coming in at 578 pages, the book literally covers the evolution of strategic thought from antiquity to the present. Despite this, there are areas that are not adequately covered.

To begin, the book should be more accurately titled, *The Evolution of “Western” Strategy*, as there is hardly a word on Eastern military or political strategy. This might not seem like a major omission—many works have focused on one over the other. However, given that one of the key questions Heuser seeks to answer is whether or not there is a Western way of thinking about war, then some type of comparative case study of the competing Eastern school is necessary. This is not to say we cannot trace the development of strategic ideas within the Western world, but, to fully appreciate the cultural and social context under which strategic thought is developed, some type of contrast with other non-Western perspectives would have been helpful.

Also, given the interest in counterinsurgency, one chapter of only 17 pages is disappointing, especially considering that counterinsurgent strategies tend to vary along the very variables that Heuser seeks to study. For example, why did British and French responses to post-World War II insurgencies differ so radically? How can culture and institutions better inform this understanding? Finally, an examination into whether certain factors are more influential than others would have been useful as well. For example, do democratic values and ideas have a more determining influence over policy than traditional realpolitik variables? If so, why?

These minor points shouldn’t be seen as critiques as much as missed opportunities. Heuser’s methodological approach and her analytical style are well-reasoned, clear, readable, and thought provoking. Any interested student of the relationship between force and politics will find *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* invaluable.

J. Thomas Moriarty, Charlottesville, Virginia

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Retired general Hugh Shelton joined the Army and rose to become the 14th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had an illustrious career that included two combat tours in Vietnam, serving as the assistant division command of the 101st Airborne Division during the invasion of Iraq during the first Persian Gulf War; command of the 20,000-person joint task force charged with restoring to power Haiti’s deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide; and upon promotion to four stars, serving as the commander in chief, U.S. Special Operations Command. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Shelton served under presidents Clinton and Bush, overseeing the Kosovo intervention and helping devise the initial military response to 9/11. In *Without Hesitation*, Shelton recounts his earliest days as a boy growing up in North Carolina through his service as the ranking officer in America’s armed forces. He also tells of how he came back from a devastating fall from a ladder after his retirement from the Army, ultimately overcoming total paralysis from the neck down and learning how to walk again.

Following Shelton through his 38 years of service, the reader gets a feel for the Army that fought in Vietnam and then had to repair itself after ten-plus years of sustained combat. The book’s interest quotient...
takes a quantum leap when Shelton writes about his tenure as chairman. *Without Hesitation* is aptly named, because, without equivocation, Shelton provides an unvarnished account of the events and personalities involved in formulating defense policy during his time at the Pentagon. He pulls no punches, describing former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as having a style “based on deception, deceit, working political agendas, and trying to get the Joint Chiefs to support an action that might not be the right thing for the country . . .” Shelton also unloads on Senator John McCain, saying that he was convinced the senator “had a screw loose” after McCain had grilled him several times in Congressional hearings. Shelton does not spare his fellow generals and is very critical of Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander of NATO during the Kosovo campaign, and Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

*Without Hesitation* provides a very readable account of the life and times of a dedicated soldier, while at the same time providing a unique behind-the-scenes insight into national security decision making at the highest levels. For these reasons, I strongly recommend the book.

LTC James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Piracy, rarely mentioned in the media until the last few years, has seen ever-increasing headlines heralding ever-larger ships being seized with correspondingly ever-increasing ransoms. How did this start, and what can be done about it? Martin Murphy’s *SOMALIA: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa* details the problem of piracy, its origins, and what factors contributed to its growth.

Murphy weaves a complex tapestry of the origins of piracy, which is by no means a new phenomenon in Somalia. During the 1950s, yachts were seized and held for ransom, and through the years, disputes over fishing rights have resulted in the seizure of foreign fishing boats for ransom. So what has created this sudden spike in piracy? Murphy suggests the increase started after the fall of Mohamed Said Barre, who was deposed in 1991. Barre’s dictatorial regime was the last semi-stable Somali government, and with Barre’s fall Somalia fell back into the form of government it has embraced for thousands of years—the tribal system.

Murphy argues that the current piracy spike was made possible because Somalia was a failed state unable to control its coastal waters, which allowed lawlessness to prevail and criminal elements to establish themselves. When fishing boats were seized for ransom, the acquisitions gained the attention of criminal warlords who took the opportunity to start a viable business venture—and business has been good.

*Somalia* is illuminating reading for those who are curious about the complexities that contributed to the Somali piracy issue. However, Murphy could have made some improvements. First, his discussion of the complex tribal system needs a linked diagram to illustrate complex interpersonal relationships. Second, there is only one map in the book. Additional maps would help clarify an already multifaceted discussion. Finally, Murphy’s conclusions of what should be done to solve these issues are incomplete.

*Somalia: The New Barbary?* adds to the piracy discussion, but readers could get lost in the details. The book could be helpful to staff officers and analysts who are seeking to broaden their knowledge of the Somali piracy problem, but they should seek further study to assist in developing solutions.

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Robert E. Hunter of the National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, writes an account of not only why a security and stability strategy is needed for the post-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf region, but also what the strategy should look like. Utilizing the skilled experts of RAND and his own travels to speak with experts and government officials throughout the region, the United States, and Europe, Hunter first puts into historical context the current regional situation and the stability challenges posed by individual states. Within a framework of eight components, he analyzes the future of Iraq; Iran; asymmetric threats; regional assurance; the Arab-Israeli conflict; regional tensions, crises and conflicts; the roles of other external actors; and arms control and confidence-building measures. Each component is individually and qualitatively assessed, then interwoven and probed, before recommendations are made for a regional “way ahead” that would best secure and stabilize the region going forward.

Hunter’s many findings discuss the inability of the United States to effectively act unilaterally within the region; the necessity for a U.S.-led, but not dominated, multilateral approach to secure regional peace; the importance of Europe’s, China’s, India’s, and Russia’s involvement in this multilateral effort; the criticality of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Gaza issue; the importance of collectively unifying nations within the region against terrorism; and limiting weapons purchases and sales among regional states in an effort to promote their own peaceful coexistence, including Iran. However, the author presents why it might not be in Iran’s best interest to promote a collective peace if it means giving up its freedom of action or its nuclear pursuits, which may prove problematic to the region as a whole.
Although appearing somewhat idealistic at times, Hunter makes numerous interrelated recommendations that he believes will ensure an enduring peace throughout the region. Beyond those alluded to above, he recommends the establishment of a universal political and military structure of regional states, the presence of forces from states outside the region to demonstrate international resolve, the establishment of an organization similar to the Conference of Security Cooperation in Europe to resolve security issues before they become significant problems, a Partnership for Peace-like regional security model for employment of collective forces, and economic cooperation/integration among regional states.

The book is comprehensive, yet not thorough. It reads as though the author underestimates the complexities of the regional environment, which is surely not the case. The book's brevity, coupled with the expansiveness of the subject matter, leaves something to be desired. Nonetheless, it is soundly researched, superbly articulated, and a very informative "think piece" suitable for diverse readership. It is best read by military and interagency professionals; international relations, political science and foreign affairs students/academics specializing in the Persian Gulf region; and others interested in gaining a general understanding of the challenges of establishing peace in an inherently conflict-ridden region of the world.

David A. Anderson, Ph.D.,
LtCol, USMC, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Transforming Command is a worthy addition to the military professional's library, especially with mission command being the subject of much attention in the Army. Chief of Staff of the Army General Martin Dempsey lists it among his nine areas of focus. TRADOC has founded a "Center of Excellence" to make "mission command institutional across the Army."

Author Eitan Shamir teaches at Tel Aviv University and is a research fellow for the Israeli Defense Forces. He presents a well-sourced and thorough understanding of mission command and its varied history. He gives a broad overview of its beginnings and attempts to implement mission command in three very different militaries: British, Israeli, and American. While these Armies' experiences with mission command form the core of the book, Shamir also explains how mission command originated in the early 19th century in reforms undertaken by the Prussian Army. The book concludes with an assessment of the success of the reform attempts and asks the question: Is it even possible to implement a concept from the early 19th century into a modern army?

By providing an understanding of the Prussian origins of mission command and the challenges other nations faced when attempting to implement their interpretation of mission command, Transforming Command helps 21st-century American military professionals understand it. Mission command came about because of specific cultural and societal norms of early 19th-century Prussia coupled with that nation's security environment and the technology available in that era. Reading Transforming Command will add to the understanding of this salient point; mission command is a product of a unique time and place and cannot simply be lifted from one nation/army and placed unchanged into another. Shamir is positive about the possibility of adopting mission command, but his reviews of American, British, and Israeli attempts to adopt it and consistently use it over the years are mixed.

Transforming Command is a valuable contribution to the study of mission command. In the complex environment that U.S. soldiers face today and in the future, a more decentralized organization with empowered leadership at all levels will be necessary. Reading Transforming Command is a good place to begin making this a reality.

MAJ Dan Leaf, USA,
Special Operations Command


Contrary to its strategic insignificance to the United States in the post-immediate Cold War era, Africa in post-9/11 has gained primacy in U.S. foreign policymakers’ quest for energy sources and the war against terrorism.

Author Donovan C. Chau examines Kenya’s strategic partnership with the United States by analyzing the two nation’s common security threats in Greater East Africa, since 9/11. Threats shared by both countries include the Iraqi and Afghan wars, insurgencies in Somalia and Yemen, the potential of renewed conflicts in Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the threat of terrorism from the Horn of Africa.

Chau discusses the significance of Kenya’s geography, politics, and armed forces to the strategic partnership. Kenya felt “surrounded by hostile countries—socialist Tanzania and aggressively militant Uganda.” Socialist Tanzania had patchy, strained relationships with Western capitalist-oriented Kenya because of its close relations with United States. Democratic Tanzania’s and 1998 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania waned the strained relationship. The attacks strengthened U.S. relations with Kenya and also increased its presence in Greater East Africa.

Militarist and belligerent Idi Amin’s Uganda’s alliance with the Soviet Union and Muslim states “altered the strategic balance in the region” and strained relationships with Kenya, Tanzania, and Kenya’s Western allies including Israel. Uganda’s support for Palestinian terrorists, who hijacked an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Entebbe and negotiated demands
from there, heightened its threat and strengthened the strategic partnership to confront the challenges posed. Collapsed Somalia, harboring terrorist groups with Al-Qaeda links, poses the most security challenge to Kenya and Western interests, as is evident in terrorist attacks on Western interests in the region.

The United States has accordingly formed strategic partnerships with Kenya and Ethiopia and undertaken joint counterterrorism operations to confront their common threats in the region, especially from Somalia.

Chau’s book gives a compelling analysis of contemporary threat of terrorism and related crimes, such as piracy from Greater East Africa, and attempts by the United States and its strategic partners to combat them. In an age of terrorism festering in weak and collapsed states in Africa, especially in Greater East Africa, the book contributes to the literature on international security and is relevant to the defense community.

The sources are credible and articulate threats from East Africa. The extensive discussions on Kenya’s geography, politics, and armed forces fail to articulate in detail their connection with Kenya’s relevance in the region. The book reveals U.S. strategic selective engagement in Africa, but it fails to discuss this important U.S. foreign policy. The book could have done better with a detailed discussion of U.S. patchy and selective engagement with Africa, fuelled by neorealist considerations and consequential security backlash adversely affecting the attainment of its strategic interest in Africa.

Kofi Nsia-Pepra,
Military Observer UNAMIR Peacekeeping Force in Rwanda


Robert Schaefer’s The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad is creating a stir and pulling in great reviews from The Economist, Kirkus Reviews, The National Interest, and other reputable publications. Lieutenant Colonel Schaefer, a Russia foreign area officer (FAO) now serving in the U.S. Embassy in Estonia, used his language skills, Special Forces background, and critical analysis to produce a first-rate study that is part history, part counterinsurgency theory, and part predictive analysis. The fighting in Chechnya has been ongoing since 1994. The Russian Federation declared that its counterinsurgency campaign came to an end in 2009, yet its casualties continue, outstripping coalition losses in Afghanistan. Schaefer argues that because the Chechen insurgents are unable to cooperate or govern during peace time and lack a realizable endgame, they will ultimately fail. Conversely, he argues that the Russian reliance on firepower instead of political solutions has protracted the conflict and led to a widening of the conflict from Chechnya to the North Caucasus region. Russia has not yet built a common house on its southern borders where distinct peoples can coexist.

Reports on the fighting in Chechnya disappeared from the front pages of Western newspapers long ago. Russia has taken credit for doing its part in the global war on terror in its southern border regions. The 2004 insurgent hostage-taking of over 1,300 schoolchildren and teachers in neighboring Beslan cost the insurgents any hope of Western support. The aftermath of 186 dead children led potential sympathizers to dismiss the insurgents as brutal terrorists. It is hard for a foreigner to understand the complexities and nuances of the North Caucasus. Schaefer has tried to overcome much of this through his thorough research and his efforts to present both sides fairly. His history of the region and the post-Soviet phase is especially well done.

This is definitely a good book and well worth studying, although its impact of internationalist Islamic fundamentalism might be a bit oversold. The author often contrasts Russian counterinsurgency with U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This may be a problem, since Russia is fighting what it views as an internal war. Counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States was developed for fighting external insurgencies far from U.S. borders. In many particulars, external and internal counterinsurgency campaigns may overlap, but in terms of relations with the local populace, goals and the information campaign need to be different. Further, in an internal war, the counterinsurgent cannot merely go home, since he is, theoretically at least, already there. But, these are nit-picky points.

I strongly recommend this book to students of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the contemporary application of force. These days, that includes a lot of professional military people and politicians.

Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., LTC, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Since 1994, Russian military officers have published their accounts of the fighting in Chechnya and journalists have offered insights from Russian and Chechen points of view. The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won And Lost by Ilyas Akhmadov (a Chechen who fought against the Russians and later served as Chechnya’s Foreign Minister) and Miriam Lansky (an expert in Russian affairs) provides an entirely different viewpoint of the conflict. Akhmadov was a Chechen combatant who also worked with Chechnya’s top leaders. Because Chechnya’s entire early rebel leadership has been eliminated, Akhmadov is the sole contributor to provide insight into the planning and intrigues of the Chechens.

The Chechen Struggle is structured around four issues: the fighting that occurred during the first and second wars between Russia and
Chechnya; the internal squabbles among the Chechen groups that prevented them from arriving at a consolidated position; the efforts of some Chechens, Russians, and the international community to end the fighting; and first-hand portraits of Chechnya’s leaders (in particular, former presidents Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov and the renowned fighter Shamil Basayev).

Akhmadov discovered that war has its own rules and algorithms—its own cause and effect. That war is a “thing in itself” might be its most frightening characteristic. It is a process where each fact brings to life a new one. Further, war can change one’s code of conduct in unexpected ways, often leading to horrific results.

Internal squabbles among groups occupy much of the text. Maskhadov’s quandary, Akhmadov writes, was trying to do something constructive within the government while simultaneously trying to appease armed units, several of whom would eventually unite against him. Another primary element of the book was Akhmadov’s time as foreign minister and the efforts he, some Russians, and members of the international community took to try to end the conflict peacefully. Akhmadov composed something known as the “Akhmadov Plan,” of which the fundamental aspect was that Chechnya could become a UN protectorate. Unfortunately, the lack of success in these areas, combined with the aftereffects of 9/11 and the growing aggression on the part of Basayev and other armed unit commanders, pushed Maskhadov into a union with the radicals. He had no other choice. There were no jobs, everything was in ruins, religious disputes kept arising among the armed units, and there was no international response.

Finally, Akhmadov offers three very different images of the most important figures in Chechnya during these conflicts—Dudayev, Maskhadov, and Basayev. Dudayev is characterized as charismatic and forceful, someone who would not have permitted the opposition that developed under Maskhadov. To Akhmadov, Maskhadov was a model of personal honor and ethical conduct. Basayev initially is treated friendly by Akhmadov, but Akmadov’s sentiment gradually changes as he realizes Basayev is an irreconcilable revolutionary. He and Lansky end the book stating that Chechnya’s dream of independence has merely been deferred.

The book does have a few inconsistencies in dates and a few grammatical problems. However, overall, the book offers an interesting and unique counterpoint to the many Russian versions of events. It is not important if you agree with Akhmadov’s viewpoint. What is important is that it is another side of the story.

Timothy L. Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Proxy Warriors, Ariel I. Ahram explains why some states have used devolution of violence through militias and other organizations to form the basis of the state’s coercive power, and why some states have been more successful with this practice than other states have. Ahram’s thesis is based around two factors: the method by which states were transformed from colonies to sovereign states, and the overall regional security threat in the area. The implications are that states that overthrow colonial rulers by revolutionary means and are situated in areas of minimal outside threat continue to devolve violence to outside actors along the “revolutionary model.” Conversely, states that oust colonial powers through revolution, but inhabit a region of high outside threat, will begin with devolved mechanisms of coercion, and then begin to consolidate the mechanisms of coercion among state actors as a necessary component of state survival. On the opposite end of the spectrum, states that achieve sovereignty through the negotiated and orderly withdrawal of colonial powers, especially in regions where the threat from neighbors is high, tend to consolidate the mechanisms of coercion among state organized and controlled institutions.

To illustrate each of these three theories, Ahram uses case studies of the devolution to violence in Indonesia (revolutionary and low threat), Iraq (negotiated and high threat), and Iran (revolutionary and high threat). Each of these case studies is thorough and does an excellent job of illustrating the ways the states used militias as security forces in line with the ways their states were created.

One disappointment, however, is that despite referencing Sudan’s Darfur region and the use of “Janjaweed” militia men, this particular example of the devolution of violence was not used as a case study. In fact, no examples from Africa were used in the case studies, despite numerous available examples of devolution of violence to militias and regional histories of colonial presence that could have supported the author’s thesis.

The book would be a useful read for anyone preparing to deploy to a combat theater. It provides a basis of understanding why states turn to nonstate actors for security, as exemplified in the book by the Iraqi “awakening movement” and as seen in Afghanistan with the increasing development of the “local security forces.”

CPT Leonard M. Joyner, II, USA, Baumholder, Germany


Few American Army generals have been held in such awe and reverence as Major General Fox Connor. Connor mentored Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and Patton, and he served as General Pershing’s G3 in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) during World War I. Connor is seen as the Army’s acknowledged
doctrinal artillery expert and a strategic genius. Author Edward Cox, in a short work that includes 24 pages of pictures, attempts to solve the enigma of “The General.”

Conner was an enigma because he never wrote a book and inexplicably destroyed all his papers that covered his 44 years of military service. Eisenhower, who had served as Conner’s brigade executive officer in Panama, described him as “the ablest man I ever knew.” What then were the sources of Conner’s genius and his extremely effective mentoring methods? The value of this book lies in the author’s attempt to answer these questions.

To the first question, Conner’s thrice-wounded Civil War veteran father sparked his son’s interest in the military. When he was 8, Conner decided he would attend West Point—he graduated 17 out of 59 in the class of 1898. His interest in reading and intellectual pursuits came from his schoolteacher parents. One result was that he ultimately taught himself French and German to keep up with the best military writings of the period. He, too, had several influential role models for whom he worked, e.g., his first commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Haskins, a voracious reader and Civil War veteran, and Medal of Honor recipients Brigadier J. Franklin Bell, who later became the Army’s chief of staff, and Colonel Andre W. Brewster, a China Punitive Expedition veteran and the Army’s inspector general.

To the second question, Conner was a personal example to those he mentored. He taught the importance of professional competence. He also demonstrated the value of lifelong learning. He would personally read and study “into the night.” In Panama, he would give Eisenhower military books and then question him on the books’ major themes and ask why the generals being discussed made the decisions they did. He motivated Ike to prepare for a second war with Germany; a war he prophetically believed would involve a great allied coalition. Additionally, he recognized the value of “spending time” with talented officers. He would spend hours riding and camping with Ike. As the AEF G3, he would schedule one day a week with Colonel Marshall, the 1st Infantry Division G3 and later his assistant at AEF G3.

Cox points out the high lights of Conner’s career, but at times, he seems to lose objectivity and gets caught up in Conner hero worship. He does not address Russ Stayanoff’s article that alleges Conner was extremely authoritarian, demeaning to others, and court martial happy while he was in Panama. Also not adequately covered were Conner’s behavioral extremes, e.g., routinely working to the point of exhaustion, obsessing with details, or chain smoking to the point that it destroyed his health and kept him from being recalled to active duty during World War II. Regardless, this is an interesting, valuable, and historically informative read. Many questions about Conner remain unanswered, which is probably the way “the General” would have wanted it.

Gene Klann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


James Nelson’s The Remains of Company D is a micro-history that explores the experiences of members of the 1st Division, 28th Infantry during the Great War. Nelson follows the doughboys from their training at various stateside camps, through the battlefields of France, and to their reintroduction into American society at the end of the Great War. Much like Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers, Nelson follows the individual stories of officers and men who served in the company to provide an intimate exploration of how a small unit, and each of its soldiers, experienced the war. Because the 28th Infantry was one of the first American units to serve in France, participating in most of the American Expeditionary Forces’ major battles and campaigns, the book also provides a larger portrait of how the army fought and endured the Great War.

Nelson was inspired to write the book by the service of his grandfather, John Nelson, a Company D, World War I veteran, whose life nearly ended during his unit’s assault on Berzy during the Aisne-Marne Campaign of July 1918. To better understand the key role the Great War played in his grandfather’s life, the author has pieced together the events that made up the elder Nelson’s Company D micro-cosmos. By drawing upon archival sources, published histories, letters, diaries, and the memories of the relatives of the soldiers in the company, he offers his readers a glimpse not only of his grandfather’s experiences of the war, but also those of the “average” American soldier.

Although Nelson tells a good story, he does tend to overuse certain phrases in the book for dramatic effect. Despite this minor flaw, Nelson knows how to tell a good story without sacrificing historical accuracy or the larger context of events.

Richard Faulkner, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The Union War is an engaging historical analysis that examines the motivational factors of northern loyalists during the Civil War. Author Gary W. Gallagher firmly declares that preservation of the Union was the central factor responsible for the initial enlistment of soldiers. Faith in the idea of Union was the driving mechanism behind their perseverance during the most unfavorable moments of the war. Gallagher argues that in opposition to popular belief, ending slavery was not a significant goal of the Union at the beginning of the war. The debate of ending slavery became substantial only when northerners realized it could be used as a crippling tool against Confederate forces.
The author identifies key issues concerning Union soldiers and political figures through diaries, newspaper accounts, letters, and other concurrent evidence. Through these dialogues, Gallagher captures the profound meaning of the Union among the Civil War generation. The Union represented the legacy of the founding fathers. The model democratic republic they had created was like no other in the world. It was built upon a constitution that ensured political liberty as well as the opportunity for economic improvement. Its preservation was essential. The collapse of the republic would not only shame the founding fathers but also future generations of Americans who would utilize its political and economic benefits.

Particularly well done is Gallagher’s interpretation of emancipation. He devotes an entire chapter to deciphering why emancipation became part of the war for the Union. During his thorough assessment of the subject, the author challenges the traditional beliefs of many respected Civil War historians. He ultimately concludes that military contingency was responsible for shaping the future of emancipation. He pinpoints the battle of Seven Pines as the decisive factor of emancipation and the eventual use of African-American soldiers. The outcome of the battle laid the foundation for a Confederate victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run that greatly boosted Confederate morale when it was at an all time low.

The book is an enjoyable read that offers new insight into why the Civil War was fought. Members of the defense community and history buffs at all levels will find themselves questioning previously established theories. Gallagher convinces the reader that an accurate understanding of why the Union fought is essential to appreciate the progression of the Civil War’s events and its eventual outcome. The Union War is a refreshing addition to Civil War literature and is sure to spark controversy among Civil War historians.

Siobhan E. Ausberry,
Bristow, Virginia


As the title infers, Your Brother in Arms: A Union Soldier’s Odyssey, conveys the experiences of an enthusiastic 19-year-old volunteer. George P. McClelland joined the army with a group of his friends, nicknamed the “Luny Crowd,” in August 1862. (McClelland rose to the rank of brevet major in 1865.). Author Richard C. Plumb has assembled a rich history from letters McClelland wrote (primarily to his two sisters) that shares his insights as a common soldier during his two-and-a-half years with the 155th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment. McClelland’s letters provide a glimpse into the horrors of battle, the daily monotony of camp life, and the enduring campaign marches. Conversely, the letters reveal the comfort, support, and strength he received from his sisters’ continuous correspondence.

I found the book to be enjoyable and rich in context with an easy flow. Plumb’s chronological approach to the story adds new light to the sacrifices shared by soldiers. Each chapter is well researched and summarizes the activities of the Army of the Potomac, the 155th Pennsylvania. The book closes with the author’s notes about the letters.

McClelland’s gift as a writer helps to promote him into the rank of officer. He is candidly open about his view of the president and about various Army of the Potomac commanders he served under during his enlistment. He admired General Joseph Hooker when he commanded the Army of the Potomac, commenting, “[Hooker] could have subdued the Army of Northern Virginia had he not been restrained by ‘the powers in Washington.’” Similar to the conflicts of today and throughout our history, the uncertainty of living in an area with constant threat of partisan attacks can create a high level of stress for the soldier. The 155th Pennsylvania was no exception; Sergeant McClelland brought home the monotonous duty of guarding railroads and supply lines against attacks by the partisan forces operating in northern Virginia. He wrote, “It is really dangerous as we are liable to be picked off by murderous assassins at any time.”

Maps inserted in the applicable chapters could have helped the reader visualize the various campaigns and the battles McClelland lived through. Moreover, a photograph of a soldier in the distinctive Zouave uniform would have given the reader an image of how McClelland would have appeared between 1863 and 1865. These minor points do not overshadow McClelland’s rich experiences transforming from a green recruit to a mature veteran who fought in major battles from Fredericksburg to Five Forks. Your Brother in Arms is well worth your time to read.

R. Scott Martin,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Over the last decade, two historians, American Roger Chickering and German Stig Förster, have collaborated on a project exploring the nature and evolution of that ill-defined phenomenon, “total war.” In association with the German Historical Institute, the two men have worked with a host of other scholars to compile five anthologies of scholarly essays examining the conceptual framework of total war and the way that idea has been realized on battlefields from the American Civil War to the Second World War. The result of their efforts is a body of scholarship that enhances our understanding of one of the most significant and terrible aspects of modern military history.

Their current work, a collection entitled War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815, is offered as a sort of “prequel” to their previous volumes. In putting it together, Förster and Chickering attempt to link the “master narrative” of early
modern military history—“military revolution”—with the dominant narrative of modern warfare, the evolution of total war. At first glance, these two themes seem to intersect at the end of the 18th century when the American and French Revolutions led to an unprecedented mobilization and militarization of societies as well as the dramatic expansion of the geographic scope of organized violence. The question then becomes, did the expansion of state power and the growth of armies seen during the end of the ancien régime serve as clear markers on the road to versions of total war seen between 1914 and 1945? Or was it the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars that marked the beginning of a terrible evolution that climaxed at Hiroshima?

These questions are examined in each of the book’s three sections. The first, “Perspectives on a Military History of the Revolutionary Era,” focuses on the historiographic problems associated with searching for the origins of total war in this period. The second, “The Growing Dimensions of Battle,” considers the various new ways that violence was expressed in this period, from the massive naval effort of the British Empire to the locally focused resistance of the Spanish guerrillas in Navarre and Galicia. Finally, the third section, “Civil Institutions and the Growing Scope of War,” considers complementary topics like the role of slavery in the American Revolution and the way revolutionary ideology collided with the diverse religious practice of Alsace.

As with the other books in the series, readers are likely to find the meatiest chapters near the front of the book, though all the essays can be read for some level of profit. Nevertheless, be warned. This is not a book aimed at the casual student of military history. Both the topics covered and price demanded together indicate this is a collection aimed primarily at scholars and university libraries.

LTC Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Barbarians and Brothers investigates violence and restraint in war during the early modern period. As Wayne E. Lee shows, conflict either intensified or diminished depending on dynamic and unique intersections of four determinant factors: capacity, control, calculation, and culture. These categories modulated organized violence between the 16th and 18th centuries and informed combatants’ perception of enemies as either brothers, who shared similarities, or as incompatible barbarians. Convincingly supported by meticulous research, this “us or them” mentality created a visceral valve mechanism that regulated violence accordingly.

Lee, a professor at the University of North Carolina and former U.S. Army officer, demonstrates through pertinent and comparative case studies how the aforementioned factors connect to the barbarian/brother model. These dynamic interrelationships are nuanced and explain why some conflicts of the era were so brutal while others of the same period remained mild in contrast. The differences are varied and supported through primary sources from the Anglo-Irish Wars of the 16th century, the English Civil War, the Anglo-Indian conflicts of the early 17th century, and the Revolutionary War.

In the examined conflicts, restraint was achieved (but not guaranteed) when opponents shared similar capacity, control, calculation, and culture. However, according to the historical record, when these factors were not shared between combatants and societies, levels of qualitative and quantitative violence increased to brutal levels with greater frequency, intensity, and scope. This is demonstrated in a case study on the ferocity of the Iroquois’ and Continental Army during the Revolutionary War in a companion study found in the same part of the book, of which there are four total.

Within each part of Lee’s work, cogent analysis and interesting segues are provided, which add depth to the historical work conducted in the chapters. For example, developments in logistics in the 18th century are examined that reinforce the concept of restraint as a defining feature of war. These points are highlighted in chapter seven along with a particularly interesting discussion of Grotius, Vattel, and others on the codification of martial “rules” that eventually led to Lieber’s Code in 1863. Another poignant development was the bureaucratic capacity, or failure, to pay soldiers—a timeless problem for armies from the Carthaginians through the Continental Army. For example, when armies in the past failed to receive their due, plunder and looting often concomitantly unleashed greater violence.

The final case study investigates how the factors of capacity, control, calculation, and culture intersected during the American Civil War and why it remains such a confounding conflict. Lee’s conclusion also demonstrates the applicability of his analysis to other historical contexts as well as to contemporary conflicts. For example, the “Barbarian/Brother” model is potentially and particularly relevant to cases where ethnic conflict underlies other issues. In addition to a very readable historical work on the complex historical period of the 16 to the 18th centuries, Barbarians and Brothers, altogether, significantly contributes to the historiography and understanding.

CPT Nathaniel L. Moir, USAR, Fergus Falls, Minnesota
We Recommend

**AN AMERICAN ADVENTURE:** From Early Aviation through Three Wars to the White House, William Lloyd Stearman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 304 pages, $37.95.

A memoir of extraordinary scope, William Lloyd Stearman’s reminiscences will attract those interested in early aviation, World War II in the Pacific, life as a diplomat behind the Iron Curtain, the Vietnam War, and the ins and outs of national security decision making in the White House. Stearman begins with a description of his childhood as the son of aviation pioneer Lloyd Stearman. He then covers his naval combat experiences in the Pacific War and later struggles as one of the Navy’s youngest ship captains. Following graduate school, he moved to the front lines of the Cold War and writes about his life as a diplomat who negotiated with the Soviets, spent nine years in Berlin and Vienna, and was director of psychological operations against North Vietnam. His reflections on seventeen years with the National Security Council at the White House are of special interest.

*From the publisher.*

**FREEDOM FLYERS:** The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, J. Todd Moye, Oxford University Press, New York, 256 pages, $17.95.

Denied the right to fully participate in the U.S. war effort alongside whites at the beginning of World War II, African Americans—spurred on by black newspapers and civil rights organizations such as the NAACP—compelled the prestigious Army Air Corps to open its training programs to black pilots, despite the objections of its top generals. Thousands of young men came from every part of the country to Tuskegee, Alabama, in the heart of the segregated South, to enter the program, which expanded in 1943 to train multi-engine bomber pilots in addition to fighter pilots. By the end of the war, Tuskegee Airfield had become a small city populated by black mechanics, parachute packers, doctors, and nurses. Together, they helped prove that racial segregation of the fighting forces was so inefficient as to be counterproductive to the nation’s defense.

*From the publisher.*


On 26 March 1970, deep in the jungles of Vietnam, Alpha Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, the famed Blackhorse Regiment, began hearing radio calls from an infantry unit four kilometers away that had stumbled into a hidden North Vietnamese Army stronghold. Outnumbered at least six to one, the 90-man American company was fighting for its existence.

Captain John Poindexter, Alpha Troop’s 25-year-old commander, realized that his outfit was the only hope for the trapped company. Thirty years later Poindexter was made aware that his award recommendations for his men and even the records of the battle had somehow gone missing. Thus began the “battle” to ensure that his brave men’s accomplishments would never be forgotten again.

On 20 October 2009, President Obama awarded the Alpha Troop with the Presidential Unit Citation: the highest combat award that can be given to a military unit.

*From the publisher.*
Why the Infantry Squad of Tomorrow Should Resemble the Squad of Today

First Lieutenant George W. Runkle, IV, AR, G Co, 3/2 CR—In Major General Robert B. Brown’s article, “The Infantry Squad: Decisive Force Now and in the Future” (Military Review, November-December 2011), he presents a passionate argument for equipping the infantry squad with an all-encompassing suite of technology. His argument is that while technological advances have made our sister services totally dominant in their respective domains, these same advances have not been applied to the infantry squad. As a result, we risk losing the ability to dominate the ground fight the way we (theoretically) dominate air and naval warfare. However, the methods do not meet the intent—squads cannot have “overmatch” through the methods he recommends.

General Brown is correct when he says that today’s soldiers would not face information overload by carrying a computer network on patrol. The majority of today’s NCOs and company-grade officers come from Generation Y, known as the Millennial Generation; their children (tomorrow’s soldiers), along with today’s newest soldiers, are part of the so-called Generation Z, or Internet Generation. It is undeniable that these soldiers grew up with technology in their lives and are more at ease with technology than without it. Unfortunately, the total access to information and technology that these generations have enjoyed has caused them to prefer horizontal leadership, rather than the Army’s traditional vertical leadership. While this is a great thing in the S-3 shop, the last thing an infantry squad leader needs in a battle is a private having total access to all of the same information that the squad leader does and deciding that the squad should do something else. All of the networks and devices in the world can’t replace experience and good judgment. If they could, then “the textbook approach” would have won every battle in the history of mankind and the war in Vietnam would have ended in 1964.

General Brown’s article pays lip service to the one of the most obvious issues with his vision—weight. He openly admits that the networked soldier is going to have to carry a lot of batteries, and that battery weight and size are obstacles. However, he does not adequately address this issue—“we should use a holistic approach to solve these power and energy challenges.” “We should” is not the right answer—the Army specifically demands a single common battery used for all devices and a low weight that is specified in the number of grams, not kilograms.

Despite eight pages of talking about how soldiers should abandon their maps and carry smart phones with full network access, he devotes only three paragraphs to the soldier’s load...primarily buzzwords (i.e. “innovative power generation”) mixed in with more ideas for expensive equipment. The article totally neglects the issue of a soldier’s mobility once the equipment breaks. If we have soldiers whose weapons don’t function because they aren’t properly maintained, how can we expect our soldiers to properly maintain their exoskeletons and robotic mules? Since my squad leaders will be totally networked in, will I have the authority to allow them to abandon a broken robot while on patrol? Or, will that be my brigade commander’s call, because he will be linked in with every soldier on the patrol? Robotic mules can’t be cheap, after all. This leads me to the other issue that Major General Brown has overlooked in his article—loss of command and initiative at all levels below brigade.

Presently, the important multipliers that General Brown wants to see pushed down to the infantry squad—rotary wing assets, unmanned aerial systems, EOD teams, etc.—are usually brigade-level assets. General Brown himself states that the infantry squad should have network linkages to BCT-level assets and repeatedly asks why squads are still equipped with line-of-sight radios. Why should a squad have a method of communication that surpasses the ability to talk to its parent battalion? The only answer I can come up with is that in the brigade of tomorrow, the brigade TOC will have an individual television screen dedicated to every individual squad on patrol. The brigade battle captain would then be expected to communicate directly to squad leaders and monitor all of the squad’s actions. If that happens, how can we expect our junior NCOs and officers to develop enough to become senior leaders?

General Brown writes that in 1959, explosive “fox-hole diggers” were projected to replace the entrenching tool. In 2000, when I was a private, I read with amazement about the exoskeleton that would let me road march 20 miles an hour with tremendous loads. Neither of these predictions, nor a million others like them, ever came to fruition. Yet General Brown overlooked a number of improvements that we have made—the Camelbak, better MREs, and cold weather gear all come to mind. Maybe we haven’t been failing our squads after all—improvements are always needed, but that doesn’t mean they have to be expensive or heavy.