IN SPEECHES IN September and October 2007, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey coined the phrase “era of persistent conflict,” by which he meant “a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstates, and individual actors, who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.” Among the instigators of persistent conflict are believers in extremist ideologies that contradict our core values and our concept of civilization and 1,100 terrorist organizations seeking to take advantage of failed and failing states.

Although General Casey coined his phrase four years ago, the concerns he raised still resonate. They have spawned a cottage industry whose business it is to debate the future role and structure of the U.S. military, to include the circumstances under which the United States should employ its military and civilian instruments of power in an era of persistent conflict and the capacity of U.S. government agencies to be relevant in war zones.

During the Cold War, threats themselves drove U.S. military plans and structure. However, these days, as U.S. strategists survey the changed landscape since the fall of the Soviet Union, the events following 9/11, and the developing situation across the Atlantic, an admonition from Peter Drucker seems most apropos: “The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence; it is to act with yesterday’s logic.” Although Drucker was not referring to insurgency in Afghanistan, irregular threats off the coast of Africa, or hybrid threats in the jungles of South America, he aptly described a limiting factor on the U.S. ability to operate effectively in these environments, namely, the limitations imposed by intellectual constraints. There is little debate that we live in turbulent times, but we wonder if the old rules still apply or if the emergence of a new paradigm has changed the rules for dealing with turbulence in political, economic, and military affairs, and counterinsurgency.

This article looks at the trajectory of counterinsurgency thinking in the first decade of the new millennium, questions whether we are applying yesterday’s logic or developing a new paradigm, and offers a few thoughts about the future. We base our observations on our service at the Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell and the Counterinsurgency Center, where we engaged with theorists, educators, and military, civilian, and nongovernmental practitioners from many countries, departments, agencies, and organizations.

One blogger has proposed replacing General Casey’s phrase “era of persistent conflict” with the phrase “era of persistent engagement” (first used by General James Mattis in a 2009 speech). The blogger wonders if the word “conflict” is “too kinetic” and asks if “engagement” better reflects advise and assist missions, which he believes are more consistent with the “complex mix of military/counterinsurgency/humanitarian/capacity building operations,” which the United States will likely perform in the future.4

This “complex mix” is the subject of increasing debate within the military (and elsewhere). The debate has crystallized around two themes. One is whether, as Colonel Gian Gentile has proposed, “the American Army . . . [is] so consumed with counterinsurgency tactics that COIN tactics and operations have now eclipsed strategy.”5 (Strategy means “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives,” or as Gentile defines it, a “choice, options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve policy objectives.”)6 Gentile argues that the U.S. Army’s population-centric tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq became a strategy that precluded “America’s Army from thinking in other more limited ways for dealing with instability and insurgencies.”7

The question is whether anyone in the military or government is thinking about a better way. To paraphrase one speaker at a recent irregular warfare symposium, it is false to assume that tactics solve the problem of strategy.8 Is the United States truly willing to “pay any price, bear any burden”?9 Or will policy always constrain strategy? For example, the military once believed that a strategy that required stabilizing Iraq would require “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.”10 However, U.S. government policy demanded far fewer soldiers. Whether U.S. policy to redeploy 33,000 from Afghanistan by summer of 2012 comports with conditions on the ground or the advice of military commanders was a topic of great discussion when announced.11

A component of that “tactics versus strategy” theme, one that retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor also propounded, is that COIN and nation building should not be core missions of the military. To Macgregor, the military has strayed far afield from its purpose of protecting the nation and countering conventional threats. Macgregor openly questions whether the Army could “perform if we suddenly had to fight against someone with real capability. I don’t think we would fare very well.”12

Mattis has also expressed concern about the future focus of the military. In the 2008 Joint Operating Environment, he writes, “Competition and conflict among conventional powers will continue to be the primary strategic and operational concern over the next 25 years.” Although Mattis acknowledges that there will be “an undeniable diffusion of power to unconventional, non-state, or trans-state actors,” he focuses on these actors as terrorist organizations rather than insurgent movements.13

On the other side are Peter Mansoor and John Nagl. The former worries that “our senior leaders [will] allow our newly developed counterinsurgency capabilities to lapse.”14 The latter contends that the Army must “get better at building societies” and develop “the intellectual tools necessary to foster host nation political and economic development,” rather than further a warrior mentality.15

Inherent in that swirling debate is a question: on which foreseeable threats should we base our national military strategy? What does future conflict or engagement look like? The August 2010 Army Operating Concept states unequivocally that “violent extremism remains the most likely threat to U.S. interests,” yet acknowledges that the most dangerous threat is from “a nation state possessing conventional and WMD [weapons of mass destruc-
tion] capabilities with intent to use them against U.S. interests. . . .” Enemies that the United States might face include “terrorist groups [and] insurgents . . . that will likely focus on irregular warfare operations [and] terrorism.” The question underlying the positions of Mansoor and Nagl, as well as the Army Operating Concept, is whether the U.S. military should be in the nation-building business.

As an answer, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) proclaims that the military must “succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations,” and “maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict.” Nevertheless, the Department of Defense “will continue to place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner capacity skill sets.”

Current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey weighed in on the discussion during a speech on 24 February 2011. Before the Association of the United States Army, Dempsey framed the debate with a question: “Are you going to be capable of counterinsurgency or major combat? You know, this isn’t ‘Jeopardy’ where you get to pick one from column A and one from column B.” The military will have no choice—a condition clearly stated in the 2010 National Security Strategy: “We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.”

Writing in Joint Force Quarterly, former Secretary of Defense Gates minimized the risk entailed by attempting to tackle all of the tasks specified in the National Security Strategy: “It is true that the United States would be hard pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but where on earth would we do that?”

These statements mean that the U.S. military must maintain the ability to defeat insurgencies, restore or create stable governments, kill terrorists, and build armies, all the while also remaining capable of destroying conventional military forces. Moreover, the reality is that we must build, rebuild, or maintain
these capabilities in the face of troop reductions and certain budget cuts. If the military is to succeed at the task of defeating an insurgency while also training for all of the other tasks, the U.S. government as a whole must get beyond a focus on COIN tactics. The focus must shift to the strategic aspects of COIN.

The requirement for the military is to fight, counter, or build wherever the politicians tell us to fight, counter, or build. However, the military will have to do that within the policy constraints imposed by those same political leaders. Policy will guide military strategy and constrain the means available to achieve the policy ends.

**Strategic Thinking and COIN**

The 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations clearly outlined expectations for the use of the military as an instrument of national policy: “The preeminent requirement of all joint operations . . . is that they help to create or maintain the conditions sought by [national] policy. Joint forces must provide political leaders a much wider range of competencies than just dominance in combat.” To achieve the policy goals, the military must be prepared, the concept adds, to conduct relief and reconstruction operations as well as the tasks defined in the QDR.21

Does the military today focus on nation building rather than fighting (as Gentile claims)? Or should the Army “devalue irregular warfare adaptations needed on the battlefield today in favor of other capabilities that might be useful in a hypothetical conflict later”?22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen settles those questions by writing that the military must maintain a “capacity for irregular warfare without compromising our conventional and nuclear superiority.” This leads us to ask how commanders are to prepare for every eventuality without an apparent priority.23

The Army Operating Concept dismisses questions of priority by blithely stating “to succeed in the future operational environment, Army forces must be able to conduct full-spectrum operations. . . .” Such operations include the recent concepts of combined arms maneuver and wide area security. To perform the latter, the Army must “protect forces, populations, infrastructures, and activities, predominantly in protracted counterinsurgency, relief, and reconstruction efforts, and sustained engagement focused on the development of partner capabilities.” Within that framework, a key mission will be to “succeed in counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism operations.”24 In other words, the Army must be able to fight on a conventional battlefield while also countering insurgents and simultaneously reconstructing the host nation and training its military and police.

If the U.S. government did not understand this before 9/11, surely it understands now that counterinsurgency is complex, and requires a comprehensive approach to defeat an insurgency. This approach includes a military that can defeat insurgents and establish security, but in an era of persistent conflict, civilian agencies must play the greater role. These agencies must shoulder the burden of combating corruption, establishing government legitimacy, strengthening the economy, creating a police and judiciary that are responsive to the people and to the law, identifying and addressing grievances, and establishing an education system to provide the people the tools they need to better their lives.

The strategic considerations embodied in the Army Operating Concept are clear: “The establishment of political order and economic stability are not only part of war, but are the logical outcomes as conflict often results in a change of government for the defeated. While other government agencies contribute in a variety of ways to national security, the Army is frequently the only agency capable of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst and aftermath of combat. To this end, the Army identifies soldiers and leaders within the active Army and the the Army’s reserve components who possess unique skills, training, and experiences that could assist commanders until conditions permit other agencies to contribute.” 25

The Quadrennial Defense Review also addresses how to establish order and stability. Although the
QDR declares that the “U.S. military can and should have the expertise and capacity to conduct [development and governance],” National Security Presidential Directive 44 charged the Department of State with the responsibility to lead efforts in those areas. State’s lack of capacity to handle those responsibilities forced the military into a role that it was not trained, equipped, or organized to handle. The QDR adamantly states, “The U.S. military is not the most appropriate institution to lead capacity-building efforts to enhance civilian institutions overseas.” On the other hand, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 in 2009 directed the department to establish a “core” capability not only to “restore or provide essential services,” and “to repair critical infrastructure,” but also to “strengthen governance and the rule of law,” and to “[foster] economic stability and development.”

So, if the military is not the appropriate institution, and the Department of State cannot (or will not) lead the effort, what agency will? At the strategic level, who is in charge? Apparently, by default, the U.S. military is.

The implications of the above are breathtaking. As Steven Metz pointed out in Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, “to optimize its capability for counterinsurgency,” the United States would need organizations that are intelligence-centric; fully interagency; capable of seamless integration with partners; culturally and psychologically adept; and capable of sustained, high-level involvement in a protracted operation. Those organizations will be responsible for removing “causes of instability and aggression,” “removing regimes,” and “stabilizing and transforming nations.”

How should the military train its leaders to be able to perform such functions? To deal with such turbulence (to use Drucker’s term), the military cannot apply “yesterday’s logic” of deterring wars when possible and winning them when required. It must also be fully prepared to build or rebuild nations using experts who may appear from the Reserve Component as though by magic. (We do not address how the Reserve Component will acquire those experts or how long we require such “high demand, low density” individuals for a specific conflict.)

**Implications**

The U.S. Army inserted its first ground troops into Afghanistan on 19 October 2001. The original mission was “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime, [and to conduct] sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.” Note there is nothing about establishing or reestablishing a government or building a nation. “Yesterday’s logic” demanded the Army destroy the Taliban. Today’s logic demands that it stabilize the country and transform the government as well.

What appeared as a simply worded mission has become a bizarre panoply of ill-defined and undefined missions with no easy distinction between them: stability operations, phase IV operations, overseas contingency operations, complex operations, full spectrum operations, fourth-generation warfare, asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, civil war, operations other than war, terrorism, and perhaps the strangest of all—*man-caused disasters*.

Mark Twain once wrote, “A powerful agent is the right word.” On 9 March 2011, a reporter asked a State Department representative whether the fighting in Libya was a civil war. The response was: “I would just say that what we have is a leader who used not just arms but heavy weaponry against his people and is now in a situation where he’s lost all legitimacy.”

It seems we have created a lexicon that has added only confusion to what it is the Army is supposed to do. If we are having this much difficulty defining the problem, think how much more difficult it would be to eliminate the problem. Commenting on the U.S. propensity to create sometimes unfathomable meanings, a NATO general officer recently pleaded, “Please stop!”

Within a few years in Afghanistan and Iraq, the missions to disrupt, attack, and drive out had morphed into counterinsurgency, or even nation building. Given the directives and the tactical, operational, and strategic missions espoused in the latest joint and Army publications, how should the Army address the multiple-set counterinsurgency mission with which it has been saddled?
Perhaps Yogi Berra’s observation that “90 percent of this game is about one-half mental” is the answer. The Army has devoted a great deal of brainpower to the “one-half mental” part of the problem, pumping out service doctrine; participating in the development of joint doctrine; reconfiguring conventional combat organizations for “advise, assist, and mentor” missions; developing training standards for counterinsurgency operations; and, inventing a whole slew of new words to try to determine exactly what it is trying to do.

We have written thousands of articles, published hundreds of books, attended innumerable briefings and seminars, created countless working groups, contracted with think tanks, and formed lessons learned organizations at all levels, but have we achieved the “one-half mental” level that will allow us to solve the COIN tactical versus strategic dilemma? Do we even accept that there is a dilemma? How does the military develop a strategy if there is no agreed-upon threat, conventional, or otherwise? Professor Martin van Creveld believes that all our articles, books, and other publications should have been loaded on board the Titanic for all the good they did.\(^{35}\)

There are several approaches to finding the answers to the last few questions above. One is the unconstrained resource approach that says the Army can do everything we task it to do if it only has \(x\) number of more soldiers. The reality, however, is that there will be fewer soldiers.

Another approach is to argue with Congress and the National Command Authority that any operations that go beyond establishing and maintaining security amount to the dreaded “Victorian nation building” referenced by Secretary Gates is his 25 February 2011 speech at West Point.\(^{36}\)

A third approach is to examine the long-term implications of a counterinsurgency campaign. Soldiers and politicians must understand that, as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states, “Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.”\(^ {37}\) Strategy may require decisiveness, but policy will demand restraints. Restraints in COIN result in many turns of calendar pages. Historians who study insurgencies understand this concept. I hope the events of the past ten years have caused current military and civilian leaders to grasp this fact, which history teaches to those who choose to read it.

Approaches two and three above involve accepting risk. They also involve building U.S. government civilian capacity—an expensive, difficult, and probably unrealistic requirement, but one essential in an era of persistent conflict or engagement. Although the Department of State has created the Civilian Response Corps, we have not yet seen whether that action translates into a commitment to governance rather than diplomacy. State has created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to bring together military and civilian efforts during the stabilization phase of a conflict, but we have not yet seen whether it will get the funds required to accomplish that mission.

The Department of Defense has codified its views on the military’s future role: “IW (irregular warfare) is as strategically important as traditional warfare,” and the military must be able to do everything.\(^ {38}\) Easy to say, but is it strategically and intellectually possible?

The authors of *Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps* conclude that the military education system inadequately addresses strategy and “how to ensure the
achievement of national objectives.” To achieve that level of understanding, “officers must also develop a broader knowledge of politics, economics, and the use of information in modern warfare to cope with a more complicated and rapidly evolving international environment.”39 If that requirement applied to irregular warfare or counterinsurgency, military officers would have to be proficient in service and joint operations as well as the economic, social, and political components of national military strategy, and know how to rebuild governments, train armies, and develop police and judicial systems.

In the past era of conventional warfare, military strategy—“employing the instruments of [military] power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives”—focused on actors such as the Soviet Union. We knew who the actors were and how they fought, and we knew their strategic objectives. If we defeated the actors, we won the war.

In unconventional warfare, we cannot focus on the actors. We have to understand the entire operational environment. That includes trying to determine the problem. Is it terrorism or crime? Is it an attempt to overthrow a repressive government; an attempt to overthrow a government populated by officials of a different tribe or religion, dissatisfaction with social conditions; or simply a power grab? Is it a combination of all the above? A critical component of countering an insurgency is to understand its root causes. Root causes of an insurgency have everything to do with the national strategy to defeat the insurgents.

The environments into which we call the military to fight, police, support, train, and build are a complex, interactive, and dynamic system of systems, constantly moving and shifting, often because of our very presence. Outside actors, sanctuaries, centuries-old rivalries, and allies whose national self-interests can drive military commanders to distraction populate this environment.

Our challenge is not just to defeat an enemy bent on killing us, but also to integrate our political, social, infrastructural, informational, and economic efforts to try to mitigate the root causes of the problem. Moreover, we have to do that by, with, and through the host nation government—assuming there is one. That is very different from the World War II Pacific theater debate over whether the main offensive should be through the Central or the Southwest Pacific.

As Joint Publication 5-0 explains, security cooperation plans should “enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and military objectives.” Of six phases in planning for a joint campaign, “phase 0” is intended to deter potential adversaries and “solidify relationships with friends and allies” by shaping perceptions and influencing behaviors.40 Ideally, military forces should act in consonance with a security cooperation plan to help host nation security forces increase their capacity to provide security for the population and legitimate authorities.

As a by-product, those forces could also help the country team identify root causes and other indicators of potential unrest. If an insurgency reaches a level beyond the host nation’s ability to contain it, U.S. military forces can play a security force assistance role, along with joint and combined forces and civilian agencies, to help host nation forces defeat internal or external threats.41 To truly understand the “different pieces” that help achieve national objectives in an era of persistent conflict,
the military also must appreciate the capabilities, limitations, roles, and missions of civilian agencies now collectively known as “the interagency”—a grouping that an author of a recent Small Wars Journal article labeled as a “dysfunctional system.”42

How is the Army to prepare for a strategic environment characterized by persistent conflict or engagement in which no task is too bold to assign to a brigade combat team? Commanders are good at training their units to close with and destroy the enemy, but how do they train tactical units to accomplish nation building? If other agencies are not contributing to the strategy, how does the Army acquire enough reservists or active duty personnel with the requisite skills?

A RAND study titled “How Insurgencies End” examined 89 insurgencies and concluded, “the median length of an insurgency is ten years, typically tailing out gradually to end state at 16 years.”43 A strategic decision to engage in a counterinsurgency, therefore, has tremendous long-term implications. Can the military sustain a force engaged for that length of time while also preparing for all other contingencies possible in full spectrum operations? What is the impact on maintaining equipment, caring for families, providing professional military and civilian education to the force, and retaining soldiers? How much will that engagement cost?

Based on the U.S. military experience in Iraq, “yesterday’s logic” often seems more realistic than today’s field manuals. Neither FM 3-07, Stability Operations, nor DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” assign a government mission to the U.S. military. However, FM 3-07 does require the military to establish a Transitional Military Authority in certain circumstances under international law. The military is directed to support other U.S. government departments or agencies and to draw expertise from them.44 That is quite unlike the 1947 FM 27-5, Civil Affairs Military Government, which prescribed that military forces “institute control of civilian affairs by military government or otherwise in the occupied or liberated areas.”45 Unlike what we ask military units to do today, in World War II and Korea, “combat units [were] tasked to defeat enemy combatants, not provide governance to the occupied populations.”46

“Yesterday’s logic” said that killing the enemy in a conventional war would lead to destruction of the enemy’s will, which would result in surrender. Today’s logic is that insurgents may be more concerned with destroying the will of the counterinsurgent than they are with maintaining the will of the insurgent fighters. To quote Steven Metz: “Protracted conflicts with long intervals of little progress, even significant setbacks, are antithetical to American impatience and do not set well with military and political leaders.”47 However, today’s logic dictates that persistent conflict may be the norm.

The 2010 National Security Strategy emphasizes diplomacy, partnerships, shaping the international order, and working with like-minded nations. In other words, using the soft power of the State Department trumps the hard power of the Defense Department. While a “whole-of-government” approach may seem quite reasonable in a 52-page White House strategic document, such an approach is not achievable unless supported by specific policies undergirded by Congressional appropriations. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review recommends that a core State Department mission be the application of soft power to promote governance in failing states and across the spectrum of conflict. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that the report might become just another that lies “dormant on the bookshelves of offices across Washington” unless civilian policy makers, with enthusiastic Defense support, embrace its recommendations.48
The new paradigm is that developmental aid is as important as bullets and artillery shells. As observed during a 2010 conference on that subject at Wilton Park in the United Kingdom, development aid is central to current COIN doctrine and strategy; however, its effectiveness is questionable. Aid can be effective only if linked to a long-term persistent engagement. Military doctrine states that success requires an approach that “integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government.” Unfortunately, “neither USAID nor the U.S. State Department shares the military’s attentiveness to formal doctrine,” or its emphasis on “mid-career training and education.”

These conclusions demonstrate the “disjuncture between COIN doctrine and political reality.” Political reality resides both within the United States and within the host nation and directly affects the ability of the U.S. military to perform its mission. Politically, The Army Capstone Concept directs that the new paradigm of stability operations “be a critical component to the future force’s operational adaptability” during an era of persistent conflict. However, the doctrinal, educational, and training reality is that there is a significant gap in the military’s ability to execute that mission. The military faces the conundrum of having to prepare for traditional offensive and defensive missions—which it is well prepared to execute—and having a new paradigm imposed on it simply because no other government agency can do its job.

We began by noting the comments of a blogger who proposed modifying General Casey’s view of the future from conflict to engagement. The blogger observed that the term is more consistent with the “complex mix of military/counterinsurgency/humanitarian/capacity building operations.” Based on all recent pronouncements, the future is now. It took the military years to acquire the skills necessary to counter insurgencies. How long will it take the military to acquire the skills necessary to stabilize nations?

In his initial letter to the Army, Chief of Staff Dempsey expressed his uncertainty about the future and challenged the Army to “provide the Nation with the greatest number of options” to meet that uncertain future. Later, he acknowledged that the Army has competing narratives—those articulated by Gentile, Macgregor, Mansoor, and Nagl. Counterinsurgency is the future; major combat operations are the future; full spectrum operations are the future.

In 31 August 2011 training guidance, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff makes clear that the military must “institutionalize” counterinsurgency and stability operations “as core competencies.”

Having observed the Army’s internal struggle as it moved from the “left hook” in the 1991 Gulf War to key leader engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, we cannot allow ourselves to ignore the lessons we have learned the hard way. Creating a vision, cultivating that vision, and institutionalizing the necessary competencies must begin now.

NOTES

12. Teague, “Is This Any Way to Fight a War?” COL (Retired) Macgregor fought in Operation Desert Storm, holds a Ph.D., and is president of a consulting firm.
18. Transcript, General Martin Dempsey, remarks at the Association of the United States Army Winter Symposium, Fort Lauderdale, FL, 24 February 2011.
25. Army Operating Concept, 26-27.
29. Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), vi-vii, 16
30. Army Operating Concept, 27.
32. Director of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano used the last term in her testimony before Congress, 15 January 2009.
33. “State Department Declines to Call Libyan Conflict ‘Civil War,’” foxnews.com, 9 March 2011.
34. Non-attribution policy.
40. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: 26 December 2006), IV-35.
43. Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), xii.
47. Metz, Learning from Iraq, 98.
51. GEN Martin E. Dempsey, “Thoughts on Crossing the Line of Departure,” Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, undated; Department of the Army briefing, Army Transition Team “What we heard . . . ,” 12 April 2011.