
All In is not the typical biography or “tell-all” about public figures. The book does not span retired General David Petraeus’s entire life and career, but it does relate some aspects of the CIA director’s early life and helps explain how he became who he is. There are new revelations about Petraeus that unless you were part of his inner circle you would not know, but at times, his thoughts surprised even some of those who knew him well. What this biography covers well and clearly is the issue of strategic thinking and leadership.

Paula Broadwell achieves what no other reporter or author has been able to do since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. In fact, Broadwell’s access to Petraeus is the first of this kind since Rick Atkinson was embedded for two months with the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq and wrote In the Company of Soldiers. Broadwell provides insights that few others have. Some have questioned her objectivity, but having been part of the personal staff myself and seeing the inner workings of Petraeus and his staff, I affirm that Broadwell presents both a skeptic’s and a proponent’s view about Petraeus and the Iraq War. While she is loyal to him as a mentor, she paints an objective picture of the hardship of leadership at his level. Vernon Loeb of the Washington Post helped ensure the narrative remained objective; Loeb had an important role in structuring and editing the book.

Several books have attempted to cover the inner workings of Petraeus—how he thinks and how he makes decisions. Who is this man entrusted to command at all levels including the Central Intelligence Agency? Tom Rick’s The Gamble and Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How This Ends do a respectable job with the access they had at that time. However, All In provides new insights into Petraeus, even for those in his most inner circle, including some new and insightful anecdotes from his youth regarding his intellectual development (how his father’s “gruff love” shaped his drive), exposure to low-intensity conflict (especially in Latin America), and the heavy burden of command and how it affects even the strongest people.

Because Petraeus is so well known, the author did not have to explain his leadership traits and actions. Publicly criticized about his relationship with the media, Petraeus insisted that to effectively perform his duties, he was obliged to report to the American public what its military was doing. He felt it was incumbent on its military leaders to engage with the media. One of Petraeus’s key driving factors is that one must be “first with the truth.” That is non-negotiable.

Petraeus used decentralized command and control effectively to gather information, talk to troops at all levels, and “see” the issues while attempting to get a “feel” for what was happening in the area of operations (not unlike what he did in Iraq). In military terms, he was gaining situational awareness and understanding in order to better provide leadership, direction, and guidance at the operational and strategic level.

Petraeus’s career has spanned two presidential administrations. He has dealt with Congress as a commanding general with the 101st Airborne Division, the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and U.S. Central Command. His final tour was as commander with the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. Students of civil-military relations will learn about senior leaders at all levels and about civil control over the military and the authority the president and Congress have over the military.

For professional military leaders, from the new recruit up to the senior general, the book is full of case studies on leadership, critical thinking, leadership challenges, how to get the best out of subordinates while facing the innumerable challenges of counterinsurgency, and leading the “next greatest generation” of soldiers.

Broadwell offers a cautionary note about her conversations with Petraeus: he never said counterinsurgency was the only way to fight, but that it was the best way to pursue the fights America was involved in. We must be careful not to take the wrong lessons from these two wars. Petraeus was also a huge advocate of the use of “full spectrum” operations, which encompasses all elements required to prosecute our nation’s wars.

All In is a fast read that draws you into the inner workings and decisions of one of the most well known military leaders of our time and, in former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ words, one of America’s “great battle captains.”

COL Steve Boylan, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In late July 2011, U.S. military authorities announced that it had an AWOL soldier, Private First Class Naser Abdo, in custody for planning an attack on the Fort Hood Army Base, the same installation where
Major Nidal Hasan struck nearly two years earlier. Abdo’s case illustrates the “homegrown” terrorism trend in America and Western Europe, small-scale, leaderless attacks carried out by jihadists operating on their own initiative. In Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam, investigative journalist J.M. Berger explores the travails of numerous Americans who have committed themselves to a personal jihad.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 galvanized the jihadist movement, which extended its reach to America. Giving top priority to countering Soviet communism, the Reagan administration turned a blind eye to the radical Islamic clerics and Afghan fighters who toured America seeking support from Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Although they engaged in numerous attacks that targeted American interests overseas, Islamic extremists did not conduct any major attacks inside the United States until the early 1990s. On 26 February 1993, a small circle of Islamic extremists (under the direction of Pakistani Ramzi Yousef) attempted to topple the World Trade Center towers. It later transpired that Yousef was a member of Al-Qaeda, which had attracted several American recruits over the years.

Since 9/11, Americans have become visible representatives of Al-Qaeda in the media. Adam Gadahn (a.k.a. “Azzam the American”) has emerged as a leading Al-Qaeda spokesperson on the Internet. Another important figure is Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric who grew up in New Mexico and played an important operational role for Al-Qaeda. Fluent in both Arabic and English, he had an encyclopedic knowledge of Islam and was a gifted speaker capable of moving men to action. Once characterized as the “bin Laden of the internet,” Al-Awlaki’s pronouncements were broadcast on jihadist websites and YouTube. (He was killed September 2011.)

According to Bergen, several traits exist among the American jihadists. Many act out of a sense of altruism in that they believe their fellow Muslims are under attack. Nevertheless, they often exhibit an obsession with violence and feel a strong sense of alienation. Identity politics is also important. The allure of joining an empowered social network should not be underestimated. Here, the Internet is important insofar as it allows dissident groups to disseminate their message and provide a mechanism of social reinforcement.

The popularity of online forums has caused a shift in the patterns of radicalization. The Internet enables individuals to connect with the global jihad and immerse themselves in a dizzying array of radical Islamic literature. Previously, Al-Qaeda and related groups tightly controlled indoctrination, but since 9/11, the model has changed. First, the invasion of Afghanistan destroyed the network of Al-Qaeda terrorist-training camps. Second, the atmosphere in America became less congenial for jihadist recruiters. Today, mosques are less hospitable to extremists and monitoring is pervasive.

The declining quality of terrorist training and increased surveillance has combined to work against terrorist plotters. Arguably, the quality of their recruiters has declined because many of them are young men with “little practical experience in Islam, fighting, or life.” Many are “jihobbyists,” a term coined by the terrorism analyst Jarret Brachman. The jihobbyists run into trouble when they attempt to move from talk to action, and those who are most likely to act are also those who are most likely to have attracted law enforcement scrutiny. In the short term at least, this makes performing major terrorist acts extremely difficult but not impossible.

Not long after Osama bin-Laden’s death, U.S. officials warned that Bin-Laden’s demise could speed up the jihadist lone-wolf trend over the next few years and that Al-Qaeda could become a more decentralized, and therefore more difficult, entity to stop. Berger’s study will be useful to those who wish to gain a better understanding of this trend.

George Michael, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


The Operators is a cautionary tale of media-military relations. On one hand, it is a subtle reminder that “intelligence preparation of the battlefield” is a term that applies to every military operation, even something as seemingly innocuous as an engagement with a journalist. On the other hand, it is a stark reminder of how events can spin horribly out of control when a writer’s agenda trumps the privilege of access. Ultimately, The Operators is a mix of yellow journalism and rabid antiwar sentiment, a dubiously sourced manuscript published under the guise of an expose on the Afghan war.

The first image to greet readers of this book is what many in the media refer to as “the drunken general.” The front cover graphic bears an uncanny resemblance to now-retired General David Petraeus in his official Central Command photo. With tie askew, whiskey on the rocks in hand, and a 9-mm Beretta at the ready, it proves difficult to miss the simple fact that every detail of the uniform matches that of the retired and highly respected Army general. The back cover is no better, depicting a McChrystal-like figure with beer in hand and armed with a combat knife. In more genteel times, this would be considered character assassination.

Little of The Operators subject matter is new. It draws heavily from the author’s previous Rolling Stone articles, “The Runaway General,” “King David’s War,” and “Another Runaway General.”
Michael Hastings promises to reveal much more detail, to “name names,” but, as readers soon find, when editorial license cannot place McChrystal in close proximity to an especially acerbic quote, Hastings attributes comments to an unsuspecting trip planner or a distant member of the staff. However, The Operators confirms that, in the hands of an unscrupulous journalist, loose facts, innuendo, and hyperbole can bring a career to its knees.

Hastings, a former reporter for Newsweek and now a freelance journalist, stands by his earlier claims that none of what he writes intends harm. But even the least discerning of readers may well question his sincerity, if not his facts. The outcome of “The Runaway General” leaves him with little credibility in this regard, and The Operators does nothing to improve this perception. His hatred of the war has been revealed, his dislike of military leaders exposed, and his personal agenda laid bare before his audience.

There is nothing within the pages of The Operators that will appeal to military leaders and little of value for readers in general. Those who purchase the book will be disappointed; those who read it will likely regret the decision to do so.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ALLAH’S ANGELS: Chechen Women in War, Paul J. Murphy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2010, 294 pages, $34.95.

Allah’s Angels: Chechen Women in War illustrates how changes and evolutions in the political and social environment, shifts in regional power, latent grievances and hatred, and behaviors of state and nonstate actors link and interact to cause war. Poignant and at times disturbing, this book took me back to my own experiences in the post-war environment of the Balkans in 1996 and 1997. Paul Murphy uses the brutal, bloody environment in Chechnya and the North Caucasus from 1994 to 1999 as the backdrop to examine the impact of war on Chechen women, who were its principal victims and (in some cases) its perpetrators.

Murphy is a U.S. counterterrorism official, a college professor, author, and currently the director of the Russia-Eurasia Terror Watch, uses reports from human rights organizations, police, military, news sources, and personal interviews to argue that Chechen women are the principal victims of the wars with Russia and the current conflict with Islamic jihadists. Although a Westerner, Murphy’s experience in Russia, especially his counterterrorism projects with the Russian parliament, give him unique insight into the historical, cultural, religious, political, and regional factors that continue to leave an indelible mark on Russian and Chechen society.

Well-organized, Allah’s Angels provides insight into the traditional identity and cultural norms for women in a historically patriarchal society based on Islam. These norms include adherence to strict social, ethical, and moral codes; a hierarchy of values (honor, loyalty to ethnic group); and a strong family-clan orientation (men as heads of households and breadwinners, and women as wives, mothers, caregivers, and peacemakers).

After this cultural perspective, the author provides a comprehensive portrait of all categories of Chechen women including innocents. In this portrait are those wounded or killed by indiscriminate bombing and shelling, kidnapped for ransom, robbed, raped, burned out of their homes, and targeted for honor killings; accomplices (posobniki) tortured or killed as suspected terrorists or collaborators; suicide bombers (“black widows,” shakhidas); snipers (“white stockings”); and “organizers” (those individuals attempting to focus attention on human rights abuses).

Although Murphy acknowledges there is no single profile for how or why women join the Islamic resistance movement, his analysis shows how over time, the cumulative effects of violence, the everchanging political and military aspects of the war, and necessity forced Chechen women to venture from their traditional gender roles and responsibilities to survive.

The last two chapters, perhaps the most intriguing, examine how Chechen women coped with the psychological scars of war, maintained their will to survive, returned to their traditional role in society, or to a more overt role as educators, businesswomen, public figures, or human rights activists.

Murphy highlights that although rebuilding efforts continue in Chechnya, new battle lines have been drawn within Chechen society focusing on the role of men and women. Abdul Sultygov, a Chechen sociologist describes this issue. “It’s kind of a revolution, the start of a matriarchy, which is threatening to destroy the nucleus of Chechen society—the family—and could ultimately be even more destructive than Stalin’s deportations. The long-term implications for Chechen women is unknown but the current movement championing traditional Islam, led by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, is taking away the rights of women and waging war through government programs and laws.

Allah’s Angels is a well-written and documented book that explains how conflict environments and actors evolve over time and how regional conflicts have transnational and cultural implications. Its extensive notes, useful index, and numerous photos of the wartime environment and various Chechen women (angels) provide great insight into the culture. Whether you agree with Murphy’s views or not, the book is of enduring value.

LTC Edward D. Jennings, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


Peter Lorge’s The Asian Military Revolution is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about
military revolution and is a pithy primer on Asian military history. Admirably concise, the book’s brevity is its strength but also a weakness. The short length will be attractive to students who frequently feel overwhelmed with reading, although truncating so much history into so little space sometimes leaves out explanatory context, and will likely cause confusion to some readers not as familiar as the author with the events and people he describes.

As Lorge reminds us, the military revolution, which many Western academics have placed at the center of or as the prime mover of the West’s rise to world dominance, first occurred in China in the 12th and 13th centuries 400 years before Europe underwent a similar revolution after the introduction of gunpowder and guns from China. The author points out that political and social structures such as a centralized state and efficient taxation were necessary to facilitate the Chinese military revolution. He maintains the same is true for all the countries that took advantage of the military revolution—including those in Europe.

Thus, he reverses the argument of scholars who have claimed the development of gunpowder weapons in Europe required the political and social changes that produced strong, centralized states. Lorge goes on to give a brief overview of how gunpowder and gunpowder weapons influenced warfare in China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. He reiterates the consensus of area specialists: that the impact was less dramatic than many Western historians proclaim and was mediated by local culture such that there was “no inherent single response to encountering either European culture or technology.”

Those who are interested in the development of “the bomb” in the title will be disappointed. Lorge limits his discussion of this development to the opening paragraph of his concluding chapter. His focus is overwhelmingly on the introduction of gunpowder and gunpowder weapons and how this did or did not produce changes in a particular polity or region. While perhaps attractive to busy readers, the book’s brevity results in some compression that will be off-putting. Readers not familiar with the history of Myanmar or Burma, for instance, may find the brief overview of Burmese military history hard to follow, and when Lorge discusses “the First Toungoo dynasty,” or the “Zunghars,” without even a brief explanation, sometimes for several pages, he will lose some readers. Still, for the interested reader, Lorge offers good suggestions for further reading after each of his chapters.

A much-needed look at a much-neglected topic, and particularly important now to U.S. military readers given the new emphasis DOD is placing on Asia, The Asian Military Revolution would be an excellent college introductory text on Asian warfare. National security professionals and anyone interested in an introduction to this critical part of the world should read it.

COL David Hunter-Chester, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

UNTIL THEY ARE HOME: Bringing Back the MIAs from Vietnam, A Personal Memoir, Thomas T. Smith, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2011, 136 pages, $29.95

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas T. Smith (Retired) commanded Detachment 2, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting/Joint POW-MIA Accounting Command in Hanoi between 2003 and 2004. His book is an informative and interesting review of that demanding and rewarding year of analysis, research, planning, and operations to recover the remains of American MIA in all areas of Vietnam.

Rich in descriptions of the demanding, even dangerous, work involved in field operations to recover remains in jungle, mountains, and swamps, Until They Are Home gives unstinting praise to the men and women, military and civilian, who have given many years to this noble effort. It provides an insider’s view of the planning and research involved in each recovery operation. Perhaps most important, Until They Are Home details the extensive political tasks involved in coordinating the Vietnamese and American partners in this undertaking. It is fascinating to learn of the intricate maneuvering required to bring both sides to political agreement on each aspect of the recovery mission. The author’s description of duty in Vietnam, “a place of shadows within shadows, secrets within secrets” is a picture of how two former enemies cooperated to achieve common goals—each side with different reasons to cooperate and different political bosses to satisfy. Some solutions were reached only after protracted official negotiations, while other important decisions were reached through discrete behind-the-scenes common agreement.

Smith’s depiction of the routine “life” of Detachment 2 personnel will strike a sympathetic chord with those whose duties involved the personalities, politics, and logistics of field operations. During his year of command in Hanoi, joint U.S.-Vietnam operations recovered 14 sets of American remains. The author’s description of the extensive preparation, expenditure of man-hours, and risk to the lives of the operational personnel shows the dedicated efforts the United States exerts to assure the best possible accounting for, and repatriation of, every lost service member.

Until They Are Home is an absorbing, easy read that is helped greatly by the many photographs—most taken by the author and other Detachment 2 personnel—that illustrate every aspect of the MIA recovery process, from files research to moving repatriation ceremonies. Highly recommended for all service members and their families.

COL John B. Haseman, USA, Retired, Grand Junction, Colorado

Lewis Sorley’s The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnamese Generals is a work of great heft, both intellectual and physical. Totaling 919 pages, the work contains South Vietnamese officers’ detailed examinations of their country’s role in the Vietnam War. From 1976 to 1978, the U.S. Army Center of Military History transcribed oral histories of South Vietnam’s officers in a collection later referred to as the “Indochina Monographs”; the edited reminiscences make up the bulk of this work. Sorley’s work explores the vastness of the Vietnam War’s complexities, including the Republic of Vietnam Armed Force’s performance on the battlefield, its strategy and tactics, leadership, intelligence, logistics, and partnership with U.S. forces. Also covered are events specific to the war itself, including the General Offensives of 1968-1969, the Cambodian Incursion, the Easter Offensive, and the Final Collapse. As with all good history, this work answers a great many questions yet encourages the reader to pose many more.

In the years immediately following the Vietnam War, American scholars chronicled the war under the narrow presumption that the effort was a U.S.-owned endeavor gone wrong. To that end, scholars went to great length to discover the precise reasons for U.S. failure, and initial debates hinged upon where the U.S. military, and in particular the U.S. Army, had failed. Among the early works, most notable were Harry Summers’ On Strategy and Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam. They examined the war strictly through the participation of U.S. military forces, largely ignoring the South Vietnamese role in a war fought on South Vietnamese soil for the defense of South Vietnam. While it is true the United States failed to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, so, too, had its South Vietnamese ally failed.

Placing South Vietnam’s efforts firmly within the Vietnam War must be the aim of any modern scholar examining this multifaceted and complex history. Sorley’s edited collection presents a rich and valuable source of information, especially for scholars still framing their study in the beginning stages of research. The Indochina Monographs are a vast and dense collection, and scholars should be aware that they could not be represented in total. In order to examine the Indochina Monographs in their full entirety, scholars should go to the original source.

Michael Dodge, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


If you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover, you shouldn’t judge this one by its title. The title’s reference to “Hiroshima” could suggest the book traverses well-trodden ground recounting the aftermath of the world’s first nuclear detonation in anger, and its reference to “race” is likely to elicit the kind of negative reaction that sometimes attends appeals to racial injustice in an effort to steer arguments over divisive social issues.

However, this is not the case. On the contrary, After Hiroshima presents a remarkably compelling argument that, beginning with the bombing of Hiroshima and continuing throughout the era of nuclear testing in the Pacific and well into the Vietnam experience, Asian governments and publics deeply and widely held the view that U.S. nuclear weapons were essentially anti-Asian weapons that the United States would never consider using against a “white” enemy. Indeed, the sentiment in Asia was that the United States had not used the bomb against Nazi Germany precisely for that reason. When it is pointed out that the United States had not developed the bomb prior to the fall of Nazi Germany, the response seems to have been something along the lines of “Yes, but even if it had, the United States would not have used it in Europe.”

After Hiroshima makes a very strong case that the United States conducted its foreign policy from 1945 to 1965—in Asia and elsewhere, with allies and with adversaries—on the basis of this perception. Indeed, even if the U.S. had protested that the race-based perception was not correct, the protest would have fallen on deaf ears internationally, as the United States struggled mightily with its own racial issues at home—a fact, which After Hiroshima points out, was not lost on the Communist propaganda machine of that era, both in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

The book’s thorough research and documentation make it an excellent tool for the student of history and equally valuable for the student of national security seeking to make sense of the fiscal perplexities of the current decade. The parallels are striking: declining defense budgets, war fatigue after the conclusion of two long and costly wars, increasing public antipathy against nuclear weapon use, and debate over the role nuclear weapons should play in a security environment quite unlike the one for which they were designed.

The realities that faced the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations face us now. They suggest questions like, “What role, if any, should nuclear weapons play in the world?” “What are the moral ramifications of their use?” and “How will the rest of the world perceive our national choices vis-à-vis nuclear weapons?” The last question is particularly important given the U.S. proclivity to view the world through a particular lens and then assume that everyone else views it in the same way—and that if they do not, they are simply “out of step.”

After Hiroshima reminds us that there is more than one way to view the world and that Americans ignore alternative world views at
their peril. In the world of nuclear weapons, failing to appreciate the ramifications of other perspectives has consequences of unthinkable gravity.

John Mark Mattox, Ph.D., Alexandria, Virginia


Although dissimilar in format and time frame, this book contains haunting echoes of “Berlin Diary,” William L. Shirer’s journal that warned of an epoch-making tragedy in the works. Edward Girardet recounts three decades of “I-was-there” Afghan history that extends from the Soviet invasion to the now-expected U.S. and NATO pullout.

Unless you consider his visits with tribal leaders and fighters at mountain teahouses, the author eschewed the official semblance of embedding with any faction. It is a shame that America’s politicians, envoys, and generals could not have straddled the same mules or walked the same paths that took Girardet early on into the dangerous valleys and along the mountain trails that give realism and insight to this book.

“Experience has convinced me,” writes Girardet, “that whether out of political expediency, arrogance, or plain ignorance, too many Western policymakers continually fail to examine the history of this defiant country. Satellite links, remote-controlled drones or heavily armed sorties provide little insight into the soul of this hard and insolent land.”

Much of Girardet’s reporting appeared in the Christian Science Monitor. This once-powerful news voice has suffered from the decline of print journalism, but at its height was well regarded for using independent journalists like Girardet and not pool reporters on a quick, well-protected, in-and-out search for a dateline. The author’s other credits are many, and include the MacNeil Lehrer NewsHour, The International Herald Tribune, Financial Times, and U.S. News and World Report.

One historical figure that crossed Girardet’s path was “a strikingly tall man with a thin black beard” who confronted a party of reporters while Soviet mortar shells fell nearby. It was in the twilight of Moscow’s influence, and this was Osama bin-Laden, flush with the victory that launched his career.

The young terrorism mastermind warned the Western reporters in perfect English: “If I see you again, I’ll kill you. Don’t ever come back.” A week later, they would meet again and another tense confrontation ensued, but this time Girardet was backed by a strong force of friendly mujahedeen who resented the “Arabs” interlopers and forced the Al-Qaeda element to back off.

The author soon learned that, even under the heel of Moscow, Afghanistan comprised myriad tribal or ethnic groups and that no single valley, province, or region was representative of the country as a whole. “I was at a loss,” he recalls, “as to which mujahedeen group would give me the best chance at writing an accurate story (during the Soviet occupation).”

Even when he was among Afghan fighters who radiated historical confidence in their religion and heritage, Girardet wondered how an army equipped largely with museum-piece long-bore rifles could be effective against Soviet helicopters and armor.

Considering the period this book covers, it nevertheless maintains a fast-paced narrative—sometimes travelogue, sometimes a who’s who of major and minor players in the Afghan saga. I also welcomed the final 28 pages devoted to a timeline of crucial events; mini-biographies of difficult, often obscure personages; a list and explanation of acronyms; and a comprehensive index.

George Ridge, J.D., Tucson, Arizona


Military forces have many non-combat casualties. In past wars, forces in camps faced illness and death from exposure, poor food, and improper sanitation. Soldiers can also get sick from the normal health problems that strike civilians. Accidental deaths can happen at any time. Some soldiers, overcome with the cumulative stresses of combat, military life, or personal problems, can turn to suicide. Fratricide, both intentional and unintentional, is a recurring problem.

Recent news articles have discussed the current suicide rates of soldiers and fratricide among U.S. forces and their Afghan allies. Fragging discusses the problem of intentional fratricide during the Vietnam War. “What is the truth about fragging in Vietnam? How often did it really happen? What were the causes?” While there can be attacks on superiors during any war, Vietnam seems to be the war where fratricide became much more frequent and associated with the general history of the war. Fragging reports estimates that there were between 600 to 850 fragging attacks in the Army and between 100 to 150 in the Marine Corps.

George Lepre examines military records with a specific focus on fatal fragging incidents. His chapters look at the military culture of the time, the fragging phenomenon, the attackers’ motives, the military response, a comparison with Australian forces in Vietnam, and the legacy of fragging.

Why were there so many attacks? Each particular attacker may have his own reason. But, why were there so many attacks in one conflict? Any military force has some members who get into disciplinary problems, but the Vietnam War came with its own unique dynamics. It may be impossible to answer why there were so many incidents, but Lepre points to the morale and discipline of the military, the rage against superiors, racial tension, and drug use.

Lepre also looks at many reports of fragging in popular media that were just simply false. Fragging was probably worse in Vietnam than in any other conflict, but the size of the problem has also been exaggerated in popular culture.
Lepre’s book is not entertaining reading because it focuses on such a serious problem, but it may be valuable to those who want to learn more about the problem. At the same time, we have to remember that every war is different. Lessons learned from the Vietnam War may have limited application in Afghanistan.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF, Retired, Athens, New York


Since Thucydides recorded his account of the Peloponnesian Wars more than 2,400 years ago, combat memoirs have occupied a place of honor on the military professional’s bookshelf. The best of these works interpret the excitement, fear, boredom, doubt, folly, panic, courage, and horror of armed conflict in a voice whose initial innocence magnifies the shock of the subsequent baptism by fire. War, it seems, is a tragedy we cannot bear to ignore.

In Valleys of Death: A Memoir of the Korean War, retired Colonel William Richardson and coauthor Kevin Maurer have produced an unforgettable account of Richardson’s combat experience in Korea. As a young soldier, Richardson barely managed to reenlist in an Army that was busily downsizing after World War II. Assigned to an infantry battalion at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, Richardson and his poorly equipped unit shipped out to Korea in July 1950 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Harold K. Johnson, later the Army’s Chief of Staff. Landing at Pusan in mid-August, the battalion joined the 8th Cavalry Regiment and quickly began a movement toward the “Bowling Alley,” northeast of Taegu.

Richardson’s memoir conveys these preliminary events in an engaging if economical fashion, but the narrative really finds its stride once the shooting starts. Richardson recounts the experience of ground combat with admirable understatement, limiting his description to his own actions and events in his immediate vicinity. Consider, for example, his description of his unit’s first moments under enemy fire: “Suddenly artillery shells and mortar rounds crashed down around us. We dove into ditches that lined the road and waited for the barrage to end. . . . A smoky haze with the pungent smell of gunpowder hung over us, as we started moving forward. I could feel my heart beating and my breaths came quickly, almost as if I was running. But it wasn’t nerves. It was adrenaline.”

Following the X Corps landings at Inchon, Richardson and the 8th Cavalry Regiment participated in the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, racing north in pursuit of the disintegrating North Korean forces. By late October, United Nations forces had crossed the 38th Parallel and captured the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. The war seemed over.

However, at Unsan, the fortunes of war turned dramatically worse. On the night of 1 November 1950, several regiments of Chinese “volunteers” launched a well-planned counterattack that forced the Americans into a hasty retreat, with Richardson’s 3rd Battalion, now under the command of Major Robert Ormond, providing a rear guard. Enemy forces overran the battalion perimeter in several places, and the rear guard action degenerated into a deadly melee in and around the battalion command post. After two days of fighting, the Chinese captured most of the survivors, including Richardson.

Richardson’s subsequent detention in squalid communist POW camps followed a familiar tragic pattern. American prisoners received little food or medical attention while marching north toward hastily arranged camps near the Yalu River. Guards executed those too wounded or exhausted to keep pace, and the prisoners faced the additional hazard of UN airstrikes. The camps themselves offered little salvation. Richardson and his fellow prisoners huddled together in unheated huts, and dozens of them died each day because of malnutrition, dysentery, exposure, and untreated wounds. In one of the memoir’s most remarkable and disturbing episodes, Richardson himself narrowly escapes drowning in a pool of human waste.

When cease-fire talks began in July 1951, living conditions improved dramatically, but prisoners still had to endure concerted Chinese efforts to reeducate them. These efforts persuaded some prisoners to cooperate in the effort in exchange for better food and more privileges (thus contributing to later collaboration charges and rumors of widespread “brainwashing”). Richardson and others resisted the manipulation, suffered various punishments as a result, and mounted several escape attempts, none of them successful. Richardson finally regained his freedom as part of the “Big Switch” prisoner exchange in August 1953.

Although few scholars have examined the plight of American POWs in Korea, the Pentagon conducted several studies (now declassified), and many survivors have authored superb accounts of their captivity. Richardson’s memoir is among the best of these works. His account of Unsan may prove even more significant, as this action has received relatively little attention from scholars, tacticians, or the participants themselves. Valleys of Death elegantly sheds light on a dark chapter in American military history.

LTC Bill Latham, USA, Retired, Overland Park, Kansas


This enlightening book reads like a close-up study of world leaders at the end of 1941: Roosevelt, Churchill, MacArthur, Hitler, and Stalin. Beginning on 21 December 1941, we are absorbed into the events of each day leading up to the new year, and the book juxtaposes the strategies and expectations of the nations at war. While Churchill
and his staff contemplated the handling of a trip to pro-Vichy French-Canada, Hitler reluctantly begged the German people for donations of warm clothes for his soldiers. Hitler was not willing to show his warriors as weak, but Churchill asked Roosevelt for American soldiers to relieve British troops in Iceland and guaranteed the Empire’s hold on Singapore. The book details parts of Churchill’s private life, including early indications of his angina, his enjoyment of church services, and his manic habits of working at night.

While the U.S. East Coast was worried about Germany’s role in its future (with fake antiaircraft guns poised on buildings as much to reassure Americans as to fool the enemy), citizens on the opposite coast were manning observation posts in search of a second Japanese attack. Even so, this was to be a “normal” Christmas, with Roosevelt insisting the National Christmas Tree be lit on the White House lawn. What was not widely known was that in a cloakroom behind the display a Hollywood-based Navy reservist and movie star, Lieutenant Robert Montgomery, was hanging war maps and creating special pushpins.

Cultural contrasts are evident among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. While Americans celebrated the season much as they did before the war, the British were accustomed to blackout conditions and rationing. Our new ally, the Soviet Union, put out carefully worded press statements that omitted phrases like “freedom of religion.”

Readers are inside MacArthur’s Corregidor Christmas as well, following the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and the author does not hesitate to give examples of MacArthur’s boastfulness even as the Japanese make steady progress against his forces.

As we sojourn into New Year’s Eve, with familiar throngs in Times Square, author Weintraub allows the reader to feel the winter’s winds of change. This would be the last Christmas “as usual” for quite some time.

**Heidi M. Crabtree, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


**Madhusree Mukerjee’s Churchill’s Secret War** is a compelling, in-depth account of a needless and little-known famine that caused the death of about three million Indians in Bengal in 1943. The book does much more than simply recount starvation and death set against the complex and dynamic backdrop of World War II (although the author does so in a most persuasive manner, with discerning accounts of those badly affected by the famine). Instead, Churchill’s Secret War highlights external factors, internal divisions, and India’s long fight for independence, all of which played important roles in the decision-making progress surrounding the food crisis. Winston Churchill’s abject failure to support those most in need is central to the narrative.

Controversially, while many view Churchill as an inspirational war leader and loyal partner, Mukerjee paints a compelling picture of a man afflicted by racial prejudice and complicit in the unnecessary death of so many ordinary Indians. The book also sheds light on a leader who was often misleading and deeply guarded the truth, especially with his closest ally.

Churchill’s Secret War is well researched, challenging, and informative. Mukerjee’s style is free flowing and engaging, drawing sensibly on persuasive quotations and historical facts. The result is an easy, if disturbing, read that is hard to put down. Of necessity, Mukerjee cleverly explains why so many historical accounts have overlooked or downplayed the famine. She also makes clear that available foodstuffs were withheld from India in the summer and autumn of 1943 largely due to Churchill’s dislike of austerity at home, his commitment to stockpiling food for the Balkans, and the long-term requirement to feed postwar Britain. However, Mukerjee never lets the reader forget that the starvation and death were ultimately avoidable. By doing so, she implies strongly that Churchill was almost akin to a war criminal.

Churchill’s Secret War is a significant contribution to Indian history and a must read for students of colonial history and the region. It will also be of particular interest (and no doubt generate significant heated debate) for World War II enthusiasts and those with an interest in Churchill’s leadership. For the lay reader, this is a troubling account of indifference, deception, and imperial brutality, which ultimately contributed to rebellion, independence from British rule, and postwar partition.

**LTC Andrew M. Roe, Ph.D., British Army, Episkopi Cantonment, Cyprus**


The 92nd Division was the only fully organized and manned African American division of the American Army in World War I. As with other divisions raised during the war, the 92nd suffered from poor training and the other systemic challenges of mass mobilization. Unlike other American units, however, the division suffered the additional burden of having to prove the capabilities of its officers and soldiers to an army and society that doubted their intelligence and courage.

In Unjustly Dishonored, Robert Ferrell seeks to set the record straight on the 92nd Division’s war record. He notes that at the end of the war, the American Expeditionary Force’s senior officers maintained that the 92nd had panicked under fire during the Meuse Argonne Campaign and had to be pulled from the line. These senior white officers generally claimed that the division...
represented a failed experiment and laid the blame for the unit’s lackluster combat performance on the black officers who commanded its companies and platoons.

Drawing upon previously unpublished archival records, Ferrell shows that the division’s poor reputation rested largely on the performance of one of the unit’s four infantry regiments, and that the division’s other infantry, engineer, and artillery regiments built sterling combat records. He lays much of the blame for the 92nd’s alleged shortcomings at the feet of the division’s white field grade and general officers. These officers, Ferrell notes, were ill-prepared to face the challenge of modern warfare and often undercut the morale and combat effectiveness of their units by allowing racist assumptions to color their actions.

Although Ferrell adds to our knowledge of the 92nd Division, his book is rather terse (145 pages) for such an important subject. Ferrell spends much time discussing what the unit’s white officers thought of their commissioned African American subordinates, but little time actually analyzing how well the black officers actually performed. *Unjustly Dishonored* is a good primer, but the 92nd Division deserves a more comprehensive examination.

Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

NOTHING LESS THAN WAR:

Many past histories of the United States entry into the World War I have focused on Imperial Germany’s implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare, and President Woodrow Wilson’s subsequent, if hesitant, declaration of war to reclaim freedom of the seas and the American right to neutrality. While *Nothing Less Than War* prominently features this topic, its author, Justus D. Doenecke, also skillfully traces the intricate policy decisions and machinations of Wilson and his inner cadre that managed to keep the United States neutral until the spring of 1917.

Arranged as a classical political and diplomatic history, the book argues that while Wilson often formulated his statecraft without consulting his cabinet or the national media, he did not make policy decisions in a vacuum. In order to explore this notion, the author carefully examines not only how Wilson reacted to major crises throughout his administration, such as the sinking of the *Lusitania*, but also how key members of his government viewed and interpreted them. This well-executed approach provides a fascinating look into the strange dichotomy of Wilsonian statecraft in which occasional complete deference to aides on key policy issues alternates with autocratic presidential decision making. Interestingly, Doenecke suggests that such contrasts were not necessarily caused by outright international ignorance or political ineptitude, but rather by the impossible situation that Wilson faced: the public demanded neutrality as well as a firm stance against belligerents violating American international rights.

Doenecke’s analysis is strongest in the extremely thorough examination of period newspapers and magazines featured in *Nothing Less Than War*. By following the reactions of a wide range of interventionist, neutral, pro-entente, and pro-German periodicals to Wilson’s various policies and peace-brokering attempts, Doenecke illustrates the difficulty the American public had in reaching a consensus on the war and neutrality in general. These sources and Doenecke’s survey of the historian interpretations of Wilsonian policies demonstrate that unanimous interventionist sentiment did not fuel U.S. entry into the Great War and it was not even thought imminent when the United States eventually broke diplomatic relations with Germany.

Doenecke’s analysis, however, is not without flaws. By covering the entire period of U.S. neutrality from 1914 to 1917, Doenecke must at times address certain topics in cursory fashion. He only sporadically examines the debates over military preparedness, the role of the United States in the Entente once war was declared, and the German espionage scandals. These topics deserve more attention.

Although the scope of *Nothing Less Than War* might be slightly too broad, Doenecke’s excellent use of source materials and his thorough research far outweigh its shortcomings. I recommend the book to defense professionals curious about the roles of military power and domestic politics in the application of U.S. foreign policy.

Joseph Barron,
Alexandria, Virginia


Those familiar with the history of the U.S. Army in World War I might recognize the name of Clarence Ransom Edwards as the commanding general of the 26th (Yankee) Division, who was among many generals relieved by General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces. One of Michael E. Shay’s purposes in writing this book was to illuminate the deeper causes of that relief, while giving full tribute to the life of Clarence Edwards. The author succeeds on both counts.

Major General Clarence Edwards’ relief became a topic of postwar American politics, as he was commanding a National Guard division drawn from greater New England. Over the course of their training, deployment, and combat experience, the soldiers of the 26th Division came to revere Edwards and referred to him as “daddy.” Shay explains how the tensions between Pershing and Edwards predated the war itself and Edwards’ tendency to carp when confronted with issues within his command exacerbated this.
He rarely took responsibility and habitually blamed the shortcomings of his own command on other parties. When Pershing ordered Edwards’ long-considered relief on 20 October 1918, Edwards had just received word of the death of his only child. He came home to a hero’s reception. The perceived injustice of his relief, while operations were underway in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, became the substance of regional and national politics. Edwards encouraged this tumult out of his own concern for his reputation, his regional political connections, and his sense of maltreatment at the hands of Pershing.

_Revered Commander, Malign General_ may be most valuable for the contemporary reader not for its explanation of the deeper causes of relief, but for what it reveals about the evolution of the military profession. Edwards was a political class of officer, who depended as much on connections with senators, the secretary of war, and the president of the United States for advancement, as he did on his own level of personal achievement. Shay reveals the personal connection between President William Howard Taft and Edwards, including pictures of Edwards and Taft in a golf foursome and riding horses together. The book reveals the depth of Army general officer in-house politicking that predated World War I, long before the reforms that led to today’s now-familiar centralized promotion boards. The book provides insight into a politically connected general officer corps badly in need of reform.

For those in search of Army counterinsurgency history, _Revered Commander, Malign General_ also reveals in detail the impact the Philippine-American war had on Clarence Ransom Edwards’ development as an officer. Edwards’ service in the Philippines marked him to a far greater extent than his service in The Great War. The Philippines was where Edwards learned to lead. The story and the pictures of this biography reveal an era of Army development that stands in stark contrast to the professionalism of the U.S. Army today.

**COL Dean A. Nowowiejski, Ph.D., USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


The treatment of POWs is one of the neglected aspects of World War I. There have been studies of humanitarian agencies in the camps and of home front involvement, but because prisoners of war are a sidebar to the military, diplomatic, or social histories of the battlefields and the home front, much of the coverage has examined the interwar years, a period when prison camps and the war itself were downplayed as Europe sought harmony and forgetfulness. This is the first major study of the three major belligerents’ handling of POWs, particularly in the combat zone.

_Violence Against Prisoners of War in the First World War_ is the first to explore the extent of violence in the British, French, and German prisons. Jones has delved deeply into the pertinent archives and documents in three languages. She finds, not surprisingly, that the treatment of POWs differed among the three nations and that over time, with deterioration as the war progressed, propaganda took hold, and conditions became more desperate, particularly for the Germans.

Going into the war, custom dictated the removal of prisoners not only from the field of combat but also from any action that promoted the enemy cause. POWs were treated with decency and respect, but the modern way of war created both massive numbers of POWs and massive animosities. As casualty rates rose, POWs came to represent the cause of those losses. As the battlefield required large numbers of laborers, POW labor camps came into use by all three nations, and some were illegally close to the front lines. Conditions varied not only by country and by time but also by the nature of the camp, and whether it was in a civilian area or in the combat zone. This use of prisoners changed the definition of POW, and it was a violation of international law.

Jones also notes a class distinction in the treatment of POWs due to differing military and civilian traditions and differing degrees of civilian control. The author does not attempt to use World War I as an explanation for the brutality of World War II, although she does note that there were two types of camps in World War I, the home front camp that England later chose as its model in World War II and the battlefield labor camp that became the German model. The past may not dictate the present, but it clearly presents options.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, Texas**


In _The Campaigns for Vicksburg, 1862-1863: Leadership Lessons_, historian Kevin J. Dougherty places Vicksburg in the spotlight as the “decisive battle of the Civil War,” arguing that superior leadership resulted in the Union Army’s 1863 victory. He further claims the disparity in generalship between U.S. Major General Ulysses S. Grant and Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton decided Vicksburg’s fate. Attempting to prove that leadership—more than any other factor—contributed to the campaign’s success, Dougherty offers a thorough campaign history, a basic background to Civil War era military structure, and 30 instructional “leadership vignettes.” This not only familiarizes readers with the “brilliant campaign of maneuver,” but also highlights the campaign’s many leadership lessons.
To prove his argument, Dougherty includes analyses of officers and individual soldiers’ experiences. Attention to both groups illustrates that good leadership qualities such as bravery, persistence, self-confidence, and preparation resulted in Union victory. To demonstrate this, each of Dougherty’s vignettes explores a significant moment in the campaign with a detailed summary and concludes with bulleted “takeaways.” Dougherty designed the short chapters—approximately two to five pages each—to compel the reader to internalize each lesson and contemplate its effect on the campaign. This organization makes the book an easy and stimulating read.

Dougherty’s “takeaways” make this book a convenient teaching instrument. Besides assessing leadership qualities, he also considers planning and networking skills. While these lessons apply to any career field, they are especially pertinent to military instructors who will find this book especially helpful when introducing their cadets to basic military structure, operational planning, and core leadership skills. By presenting the Vicksburg Campaign in concise accounts and incorporating useful takeaways, Dougherty’s work offers a clear decision-making guide and campaign history.

The most significant shortcoming of the book is Dougherty’s scapegoating of Pemberton. Dougherty allocates three chapters to Pemberton and his poor leadership skills, yet only one chapter for the shortcomings of Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General Joseph E. Johnston. Dougherty criticizes Pemberton excessively; his critical focus is disproportionate. Johnston and Davis, as Dougherty briefly comments, also made mistakes that resulted in Vicksburg’s surrender. Dougherty’s tone for U.S. Major Generals Grant and Sherman approaches the laudatory. Greater recognition of Grant’s earlier failures would have helped the book by exposing that even great leaders have faults. Despite these weaknesses, Dougherty effectively underlines the value of good leadership in the Vicksburg Campaign and provides a valuable teaching tool for military professionals.

Angela M. Riotto,
Hattiesburg, Mississippi

THE MORMON REBELLION:
America’s First Civil War 1857-1858,

In 1857, President James Buchanan ordered 2,500 soldiers to escort Brigham Young’s replacement as territorial governor to Utah, and restore order and federal control in the mountain west. Brigham Young and his followers saw this as a violation of their constitutional liberties and their right to self-government, and they resisted.

The Mormon Rebellion, David Bigler and Will Bagley’s study of the resultant Utah War begins unambiguously. The Mormons “meant to supersede Buchanan and the government he stood for.” Worse, the Mormons could not “tolerate peaceful coexistence with any beliefs but their own.” Bigler and Bagley score points for clarity, not objectivity. They argue that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS), as led by Brigham Young, was a militant anti-republican millenarian movement, making conflict between the Mormons and the United States inevitable.

Bigler and Bagley trace the LDS Church’s history back to its founder Joseph Smith, accusing him and his followers of picking fights with their neighbors, counterfeiting, committing random acts of violence, and punishing dissenters even before Smith was murdered and Brigham Young led the Mormons westward. Much of the book focuses on Brigham Young’s policy toward Native Americans. Bigler and Bagley accuse Young and his followers of killing uncooperative Native Americans “often execution style” or with poison, and yet somehow allying with them against the U.S. government. (Complaints from Indian agents helped to spur Buchanan to dispatch troops.)

Bigler and Bagley use a wide variety of sources for their work. They have searched Young’s correspondence, diaries, reports from soldiers in Johnston’s Army and contemporaneous Mormon accounts, demonstrating their long experience with the era and the subject. Unfortunately, they show a marked preference for embittered apostate or excommunicated members of the LDS church.

I should note here that I am a Mormon, who has read a good deal of historical work and primary documents about this period of Utah history. Bigler and Bagley’s reliance on primary sources that are obviously ghostwritten, heavily edited by others, or written angrily while in exile greatly hurts The Mormon Rebellion’s scholarly value.

However, this preference is not a problem when Bigler and Bagley focus on the U.S. Army’s journey to Fort Bridger, its long winter there, and the eventual march into Salt Lake City. The chapters on the actual campaign and the army are quite good. Colonel, later Brigadier General, Albert Johnston was an effective leader, who managed to keep the largest single formation of the U.S. Army fed, housed, and motivated despite wintering in a burned-out fort hundreds of miles from any kind of supply base. Many of Johnston’s junior officers show excellent leadership and fieldcraft.

Bigler and Bagley succeed in one of their objectives—to show the U.S. Army’s excellent leadership and men during the Utah campaign. If Bigler and Bagley had focused on the actual campaign rather than interpretations of Mormon doctrine and attacks on Brigham Young and his followers, this would have been a much more valuable book.

1LT John E. Fahey,
Lafayette, Indiana

David Alvarez provides a fascinating and well-researched history of the Vatican’s military forces in the post-medieval period. Going beyond the traditional Swiss Guard story, the author delves into campaigns conducted by the Pontifical Army between 1796 and 1870 as part of the Great Power struggle over Italy and illustrates how the Army haphazardly confronted the forces of Italian unification. He elaborates on the Papacy’s World War II mobilization and its precarious position vis-a-vis both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and then brings the story into the modern era with an overview to the Papal disarmament of 1970 and the security challenges of the present day.

The book goes beyond previous volumes like Popes, Cardinals and War; The Pope’s Legions; and The Pope’s Army given its depth of research. A professor of politics, the author gained access to a number of hitherto unexplored archives and provides the reader with an extensive, multilingual bibliography.

Several factors make this book an intriguing read. First, the author demonstrates the natural tensions of a secular and spiritual papacy, which was concurrently the headquarters of a world church and an Italian sovereign state. Second, the book shows how the papal forces have been overlooked in the nationalistic history of Italian unification, especially, the Pontifical Army’s victory over Giuseppe Garibaldi’s Red Shirts at Mentana. (Official Italian history credits the supporting French with this triumph.)

The author’s history of the Pope’s military endeavors introduces the reader to a wide array of unique characters—rogues, heroes, incompetents, and villains. General Hermann Kanzler, the last commander-in-chief of the Pontifical Army, who created a truly professional force just before the demise of the Papal States, is one character deserving of his own English-language biography. I highly recommend this book to any scholar or officer interested in military, Italian, or Roman Catholic history.

MAJ Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., USAR, Zurich, Switzerland

Writing and Thinking

Master Sergeant Raymond V. Morgan, USAF, Retired, Leawood, Kansas—I recently picked up the current copy of Military Review while at the exchange today. It’s an outstanding publication as always. The article by Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt, “Dangerous Liaisons: The Context and Consequences of Operationalizing Military Chaplains” is probably the best I’ve ever read about the military chaplaincy, and I’ve read almost all of them. After a full career in Air Force Chapel Management, I keep in touch with both chaplains and managers through a retirees web site in the Chapel Family Program, and I plan to share this article with others. I would like to see a future article about what chaplains endured in the Bataan experience during World War II. Their ability to adapt and overcome tremendous adversity is an inspiration for all. Another interesting role model would be Chaplain (MG) Charles I. Carpenter, who served as the first Chief of Air Force Chaplains. I served during his tenure and have an admiration for him and his work. I would also like to mention that recently the Air Force Chaplain School at Maxwell AFB was closed and both Army and Air Force chaplains now train together at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Your sections of book reviews and recommendations for reading are excellent. Might I also suggest “Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II’s Most Dramatic Mission” by Hampton Sides. It is a well-written chronology of the Bataan Death March, the horrible conditions our captured servicemen endured in Japanese POW camps in the Philippines, and the heroic rescue mission to liberate them.