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A U.S. Army soldier assigned to Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, walks through a valley during a patrol through Malajat, Afghanistan, 4 June 2011. (U.S. Army, SGT Ken Seue, 7th MPAD)

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Physics Demands
A New Basic
Combat Weapon

Joseph P. Avery, Ph.D.

A MERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY strategy demands that our combat forces defeat enemy combatants across the full spectrum of battlefield environments, not just leafy jungles or the plains of Europe. Despite an increasing portfolio of enemies that are flexible, well armed, and robust, our Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces have been stuck for decades hauling assault rifles firing NATO 5.56x45 millimeter (mm) (.223 caliber) varmint rounds over a half-century old. A decade into a new century, we need to adopt a more robust projectile and basic combat weapon (BCW) to meet current and emerging performance requirements. Despite incremental improvements, the M16 rifle and its 5.56 mm NATO round are unable to compete effectively in current and anticipated combat environments because of the physics of ballistic performance, combat terrain, and the nature and fighting characteristics of the enemy.

When the first official assault rifle appeared on the battlefield, the German MP-44, named the “Sturmgewehr” or assault rifle, its purpose was to provide German infantry with greater firepower by replacing the five-round, 8 mm, bolt-action K98 Mauser with the 30-round, 7.92 mm, fully automatic assault rifle. This development was a significant leap in firepower for the individual combat soldier in World War II. It is no accident that the highly rated and prolific Russian AK-47 looks very similar to the MP-44 that was introduced five years earlier. Hugo Schmeisser, the captured German designer of the MP-44, was working in the same Russian factory where Mikhail Kalashnikov was designing the AK-47, and Schmeisser obviously provided great influence in the design.

Considering the evolution in small arms technology and combat requirements, the United States had to upgrade its BCW firepower leading to a replacement for the powerful but heavy World War II-era, .30 caliber, M-1 Garand and Browning Automatic Rifles. Follow-on BCW development was influenced through an Army study by S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, and

This article expresses the views of the author, not those of the U.S. Department of Defense or military services.

subsequent Marshall articles indicating that only 15 to 25 percent of our soldiers actually fired at the enemy during World War II (50 percent in Korea). Marshall claimed this to be a “universal problem.” Although Marshall’s research came under broad criticism as significantly flawed, American weapons development continued to assume that we needed weapons that could discharge a large volume of “shoot and spray” fire—not well aimed and placed shots.

In the World War II Pacific Theater, shooting at the enemy was a major problem because camouflaged Japanese forces hid in jungle growth or in caves and fortifications and were difficult to target. Except for Japanese suicide attacks and occasional close encounters, soldiers fired in the general direction of the enemy. They had no other choice. The same issue arose in the jungles of Vietnam, where the enemy was frequently unseen. Today, the combat environment is very different, and the enemy is frequently quite visible at all ranges from close quarters to over 1,000 yards.

In 1957, the Army selected and issued the 20-round, automatic, 150 grain (gr.), 7.62x51 mm M14 rifle as the new American BCW. It was not enthusiastically embraced because it was too long, too heavy (11.5 lbs loaded), and had a powerful recoil (17.25 lbs). Despite these drawbacks, the M14’s maximum effective range was a respectable 460 meters with the sniper version having a range of 690 to 800 meters. Limited enthusiasm about the heavy M14 led to an immediate search for its replacement.

Eugene Stoner’s space-age design was the result. Stoner’s “plastic” 5.56x45 mm (.223 cal.) M16, with the M193 55 gr. projectile and a 30-round magazine was a light 8.79 pounds loaded. Unfortunately, it has a propensity to jam and fail due to its direct impingement method of operation that vents gas and residue directly into the internal action of the weapon. In both caliber and design, the M16 was a dramatic departure from any BCW previously adopted by the United States. The Army later adopted the improved 62 gr., M855, 5.56 mm cartridge that was less effective than the M193 against personnel under 200 yards, and more recently the 5.56 mm M855A1 “Enhanced Performance Round,” which is not yet fully assessed.

The advertised maximum effective range of both the M14 with a 150 gr., 7.62 mm NATO cartridge and the M16’s 62 gr., 5.56 mm M855 NATO cartridge was 460 meters. This equal classification is odd considering the dramatic difference in cartridges.

“Effective” is the key word. In this instance, it denotes the maximum range a projectile is expected to inflict casualties or damage. Both projectiles fired at a paper mache mannequin at 460 meters may sail the distance, but one will probably bounce off. As previous studies concluded, a truly lethal maximum effective range for an M885, 5.56 mm NATO projectile is about 200 to 250 meters (218-273 yards). Therefore, because half of our firefights occur well beyond 300 meters, our weapons are marginally effective.

An excellent 2009 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College study, Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan, brilliantly summarized the problem, and it is not limited to Afghanistan. The study concluded that American military weapons, cartridge lethality, combat optics, doctrine, and marksmanship training are vastly inadequate, costing American soldiers their lives. After a mountain of operational evidence concluding that the American military’s BCW was vastly inadequate to address a broad array of battlefield dynamics,
the Army finally started to take steps to improve the M16’s maximum effective range and lethality.

The M16’s weight, range, and caliber proved good for leaf-penetrating jungle warfare, but less so when fighting in deserts, mountains, valleys, and close quarters combat. The Army itself demonstrated proof of the M16’s obsolescence when the 101st Airborne and other units started using significantly enhanced 7.62 mm M14s in Afghanistan in mountain battles where the M16A4 and M249 proved basically useless. In the interim, the soldiers themselves used captured AK-47s to better compete in the mountainous terrain. As the title of this article emphasizes, we are clearly outgunned, and that situation will continue as we fight a geo-diverse global war on terrorism and face advanced new weapons, such as the AK-12, the 5th-generation Russian AK.

A New BCW

The basic combat weapon requires a focused transfer of energy downrange sufficient to incapacitate the enemy across a broad spectrum of combat environments. Both a new cartridge and more reliable platform are long overdue to meet these requirements. The new cartridge and firing platform must not only prove effective at close quarters, but must also have the ballistic horsepower to effectively negotiate steep mountains, cross far ridges at mid-to-long range, and engage long-range targets across desert terrain. The new cartridge and firing platform must have the capability to penetrate through vehicles at a distance, excel at rooftop-to-rooftop fighting, double as a long-range sniper rifle if needed, and be highly reliable. If well designed, the cartridge could also replace the 5.56 mm squad automatic weapon (SAW) and possibly the 7.62 mm machineguns, providing a significant cost savings. Affordability requires that we attempt to reduce the current and stove-piped weapon systems for each type of fire, including direct assault, close quarters, suppression, sniper, and vehicle incapacitation.

In another attempt to address the significant shortfalls of our current BCW, the Army recently developed the lead-free, M855A1, 5.56 mm, 62 gr. Enhanced Performance Round, tipped with a steel arrow penetrator and more powerful propellant. According to an Army report, the “super round” has better armor-penetrating performance at 350 meters than both the 5.56 mm M855 and 7.62 mm M80, as well as better hard-target performance than the 7.62 mm, and is highly accurate up to 600 meters. It also has better vehicle, glass, and structural penetration abilities, and snipers have reportedly killed enemy combatants up to 700 meters away using the new round. However, it is too early to assess the long-term performance of this new round in a broad range of combat scenarios and environments, including what adverse impact it may have on the M16, M4, or M249 platforms. The community of firearms and ballistic experts has not had an opportunity to independently test the ballistic and terminal performance of this new round. Although the Army increased the muzzle velocity to 3,150 fps. and added a steel penetrator, it is still only a 62 gr. projectile.

The M16 has had two problems in the past: a cartridge with a projectile that is far too small (62 gr.) and underpowered, and a weapon platform that is unreliable and prone to jamming because of basic design flaws. It appears the military will go to any length to continue to nibble around the edges to keep this half-century old, 5.56 mm Cold War-relic cartridge operational. If the Army wanted to enhance a cartridge, it should have enhanced a cartridge of greater substance and redesigned a reliable platform around it.

In terms of short-range and close quarters combat requirements, our forces are facing enemy characteristics similar to those of the Moro guerrillas during the Philippine-American War and Japanese during World War II. The Philippine-American War combat environment led to development of
the Model 1911 230 gr., 45-caliber pistol. Similar to today’s Al-Qaeda Muslim extremists, Moros had high battlefield morale and often used drugs to heighten courage and inhibit the sensation of pain. Ammunition with significant stopping power was required to repulse their fanatical attacks. During World War II, the .45 caliber, automatic Colt pistol (ACP) 230 gr., full metal jacket round at 850 ft/s also passed the test against the fanatical Japanese forces and frequent suicide attacks.

By contrast, there have been many instances, especially in close quarters, house-to-house combat in Iraq, when the small 5.56 mm projectile, with a high velocity of 3,000 ft/s, would zip through an enemy combatant center mass without causing effective incapacitation, allowing further attacks on our forces. The projectile’s entrance and exit occurred so quickly (the ice pick effect) that the enemy combatant did not realize he had been shot until later when either additional rounds or internal blood loss finally downed him.

Soldiers have been clamoring for a new caliber (and more reliable) weapon to ensure single-shot knockdowns at close range and to effectively address the diverse, longer-range shooting environments current and future combat forces experience as they face significantly heavier caliber weapons of significant range and energy.

Meeting the Challenge

The enemy is well aware of the M16’s weaknesses. New calibers and platforms have been developed in the United States and tested by firearms experts in an attempt to meet the aforementioned challenges.

Two examples are the Barrett 6.8 SPC (Special Purpose Cartridge) Remington and the Alexander Arms 6.5 mm Grendel. Both were extensively tested and appear to well outperform the M885 5.56 mm NATO round. In Afghanistan, a Jane’s Defense Weekly posting in the Pakistan Defence Forum claims that more than half of Taliban small-arms attacks on British patrols took place between 300 and 900 meters, well outside the 5.56 mm NATO round’s effective range. The enemy is well aware of this and positions his forces accordingly. It is not certain what additional range the 5.56 mm Enhanced Performance Round will realize in a mountainous environment, nor what its terminal effectiveness is at any range.

Ballistic Performance

The physics of external ballistics and current and future combat environments appear to demand a new caliber of weapons—whether or not based on the M16 chassis. Many firearm experts, combat users, and studies have recommended the heavier and modernized 123 gr., 6.5x39 mm Grendel Lapua Scenar cartridge as a replacement for the current 5.56 mm NATO and possibly the 7.62 mm NATO as well. With double the mass of the 5.56 mm NATO, the ballistics of a 6.5 mm 123 gr. Lapua Scenar projectile far outperforms the M16’s 5.56 mm, the AK-47’s 7.62x39 mm, the Barrett 6.8 mm SPC (110-115 gr.), and it flies faster, farther, and with significantly less recoil (9.23 lbs vs. 17.24 lbs) than the 7.62 mm NATO round. The superior ballistic performance (Ballistic Coefficient [BC] = .547), low recoil, higher accuracy,
longer range, and superior reliability of a 6.5 mm basic combat weapon against the 5.56 mm M16 and AK-47’s 7.62x39 mm should at least raise the possibility of replacing the 5.56 mm family of weapons with a new platform and cartridge. The ballistic coefficient measures the ability of the projectile to retain velocity and resist wind to target, and the higher the ballistic coefficient, the more efficient the round. A 5.56 mm M885 NATO has a ballistic coefficient of approximately .250 versus .547 for the 6.5 mm. It also appears that the Grendel 6.5 mm or similar cartridge with its higher sectional density, heavier and flatter shooting projectiles (90 gr. to 144 gr.), and effective long-range killing power proven on animals up to 500 pounds in mountain environments, offers a solution that deserves consideration.

Although additional testing of both external and terminal ballistics of various projectile configurations is necessary to attain an optimal effectiveness over a broad spectrum of combat environments, one can deduce that a more robust and heavier alternative to the 5.56 mm NATO is needed. That alternative would be compatible with the U.S. military’s historical desire and battlefield experience to keep BCW ballistic performance around a .30 caliber package (M1903 Springfield 30-06 cal., M1 Garand 30-06 cal., and M14 7.72x51 mm NATO—a shorter 30-06 cartridge), and with its history of using a 6 mm cartridge (112 gr.-135 gr.) in combat.

The American 6 mm Cartridge Proven in Combat

In 1895, prior to introduction of the 1903 30-06 Springfield, the Navy and Marine Corps adopted the Lee Navy Rifle Model 1895 as their basic combat weapon, using the Lee rifle 6 mm cartridge, the first cartridge designed for use in both rifles and machineguns (Colt-Browning Model 1895 machinegun). The 6 mm cartridge was lighter, more accurate, and demonstrated better penetrating power than the military’s previous .30-40 Krag cartridge, and had been used successfully in many battles. Although

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(At 600 yards)</th>
<th>NATO 5.56 OTM</th>
<th>NATO 7.62 OTM</th>
<th>Grendel 6.5 OTM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Velocity (fps.)</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>1,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy (Ft/lbs.)</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop (inches)</td>
<td>-91.08</td>
<td>-96.95</td>
<td>-81.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Yds. Supersonic</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoil (lbs.)</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>17.24</td>
<td>9.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OTM = Open Tip Match Projectile
the current 6.5 mm is a more powerful and modern cartridge, the 6 mm Lee Model 1895 with a 135 gr. projectile at 2,469 fps is the closest technical cousin that the American military has fielded effectively in harsh combat conditions. It was first used during the Spanish American War of 1898.

The 6 mm Lee Rifle was carried by the First Marine Battalion (Reinforced) in various battles to capture Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1898. According to a 15 June 1898 report by Captain George Elliott, commander of the expedition of 225 marines to capture Cuzco Wells from an enemy force of approximately 500 Spanish, the marine battalion used the new 6 mm Lee effectively at ranges of 800 yards. In addition, Private Frank Keeler reported that his Company D set their sights at 1,200 yards and effectively fired well-aimed shots at the enemy. Most fire during the mountainous campaign ranged from 600 to 1,200 yards.

According to reports, the marines used deliberate, well-aimed volley fire in an environment of high mountains, ridges, valleys and dense chaparral. A 29 June 1898 New York Sun article written from the war zone on the rifle’s performance reported that despite periodic issues with the extracting mechanism and the bolt stop, the weapon performed well, as did the 6 mm cartridge. According to the field report, the enemy suffered severe wounds “due to the enormous velocity of the projectile, which caused an explosive effect.” The decimated enemy thought they were under machinegun fire due to the weapon’s range and rapid fire.

Marine sharpshooters also effectively used the flat shooting and accurate cartridge of the 6 mm Lee Rifle during the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to knockout artillery battery crews at long range. Although the Lee Model 1895 rifle was not the ideal BCW and was soon replaced by the superior 1903 Springfield 30-06 cal., the 6 mm cartridge performed well under diverse and harsh combat conditions at both short and long range. One benefit was that the 6 mm was a lighter cartridge to carry than .30 cal ammunition, and that was important in the mountainous and jungle terrain.

Using an M16A4/M4 equivalent chassis to save cost, the powerful, highly accurate, and flat-shooting 6.5 mm round is capable of incapacitating the enemy at five as well as 1,000 yards with far greater penetration against vehicles and other hard targets than the standard 5.56 mm NATO. You can fire inside buildings single-shot or full automatic with a sound suppressor. Place effective optics on the weapon, and it will knock the enemy off mountain and building tops at over 1,000 yards (1,300 fps @ 462 ft/lbs.) without calling in a special sniper team. A five-shot grouping will easily fall within a 4.5-inch square at 600 meters. A belt-fed 6.5 mm SAW variant could potentially replace current light and medium machine guns, and give excellent performance across-the-board. Additional lab, field, and operational testing would have to be performed to optimize cartridge configuration and weapon design. Snipers or belt-fed machinegunners may desire a heavier load than the 123 gr. and may opt for a 130 gr. or 140 gr. 6.5 mm projectile. There is also a possibility that a 6.5 mm cartridge, which fits into the 5.56 mm magazine, could also be “enhanced” with a steel penetrator and more powerful propellant. That would provide the 123 gr. package with theoretically double the devastation and longer range than the M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round, giving our forces the edge in any combat environment and at any range. However, a big question and possible drawback with the “enhanced” version of any caliber cartridge is its terminal effects at very close range with a possibility of severe “ice picking,” a problem with the current M855 5.56 mm.

A Versatile and Reliable BCW

United States combat forces require a versatile and reliable BCW with the ability to incapacitate the enemy at close quarters with sufficient ballistic energy to smack-down enemy forces with authoritative force at long distance. We can either analyze the newly developed and currently existing 6.5 mm cartridges, or attempt an expensive development of a new family of ammunition. Assessing the recently developed 123 gr. Lapua Scenar 6.5 mm, with its high velocity, flat trajectories, and greater knockdown power than the 5.56 mm well beyond 600 meters, may be a place to start. The new family of 6.5 mm projectiles has over twice the lethality of the 5.56 mm, M855 NATO round, and regardless of the configuration, with a 123 gr. projectile that does not go subsonic until 1,275 yards, if you can see a target, you can theoretically hit it.
Using a standard M16A4 rifle, the 5.56 mm (M855) performance with a 62 gr. bullet at 500 yards (457 meters) attains 1,739 to 1,884 fps velocity with 489 to 517 ft/lbs of knockdown energy. In contrast, a standard 6.5 mm 123 gr. Lapua Scenar bullet using a 24-inch barrel performs at 1,875 fps with 961 ft/lbs of energy. For a more eye-opening comparison, a large 230 gr., .45 cal. automatic Colt pistol full metal jacket Model 1911 automatic, fired at point-blank range, has a muzzle velocity of 835 ft/sec with 414 ft/lbs of knockdown energy. As described in the previous chart, the 6.5 mm 123 gr. Lapua far exceeds this kill capability at over 600 yards. This performance helps keep friendly forces outside the enemy’s effective kill radius by outranging enemy forces with a greater reach and knockdown capability.

**Current 6.5 mm BCW Contenders**

Tactical Rifles, Inc. developed an M40 6.5x47 mm sniper rifle that produced shot groups between .025” to .05” at 100 yards, and 1.5” at 350 yards with an effective range of over 1,000 meters (1,093 yards). This means that every unit can have light weight organic sniper support without waiting for limited and highly specialized sniper teams. These are significant improvements in firepower capability that we have today, not 10 years from now. A 6.5 mm magazine with the same dimensions as a 30-round, 5.56 mm magazine will hold 26 rounds. Although each magazine will hold four rounds less, each round is far more powerful and flexible. The key is to match the 6.5 mm cartridge with an improved weapon platform.

The Alexander Arms 6.5 mm ultra-light Grendel is another well designed 6.5 mm assault rifle that outperforms the current M16A4 in power and reliability. The Grendel uses a more reliable piston gas system that is difficult to jam, even after firing hundreds of rounds and being exposed to water, mud, and sand.

Although not a 6.5 mm, another competitor that outperforms the M16 is the Barrett 6.8 SPC REC7. Unlike the Lee Navy Rifle example of an entirely new weapon, both the Alexander Arms 6.5 mm Grendel and the Barrett 6.8 mm REC7 are compatible with the current M16A4 and M4 configurations, reducing training and orientation requirements, yet the Grendel has superior performance improvements over the M16A4 and M4, such as a gas-piston operated design for high reliability in combat, the ability to resist jams, and a more powerful cartridge. The important difference between the two is the weapon caliber, 6.5 mm versus 6.8 mm. The 6.5 mm gives better performance over longer ranges and fits in the 5.56 mm magazine.

Additional testing is required, and there is always the option of designing an entirely new platform around the current or an enhanced 6.5 mm cartridge. It may be prudent to release a group of 6.5 mm, M16-chassis weapons for operational field testing in Afghanistan by deployed forces to test against the 5.56 mm M885, M885A1 Enhanced Performance Round, and AK47. Research should look into possible enhancement of an even more powerful 6.5 mm Enhanced Performance Round, but the enhanced round may not be ideal under all combat conditions.

Training would be modified to teach personnel to take advantage of such a powerful weapon through use of more controlled aim-and-fire operations versus point and spray. The ammunition carry weight is slightly increased, but the gain in soldier confidence and combat power, range, reliability, and accuracy may be worth the tradeoff. A basic load of 210 rounds of 6.5 mm, 123 gr. Lapua Scenar ammunition will weigh about 2.4 pounds over the current 5.56 mm combat load. Each round weighs more, but each contains far more kill capability at all ranges.

Does another half-century have to pass before American forces shoulder a basic combat weapon that is reliable and can match the full-spectrum combat environments faced by current and future American combat forces? Do we really need another major study to bury this issue when good replacement systems already exist?

The time has arrived for our military forces to have a basic weapon that can effectively compete against the capabilities of our adversaries. **MR**
Cultural Training for Military Personnel
Revisiting the Vietnam Era

Allison Abbe, Ph.D., and Melissa Gouge

IN THE YEARS since the 9/11 attacks and in the subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense has initiated many programs and policies to prepare military personnel to operate in foreign cultures. Although these programs are new, the problem of preparing military personnel for operations abroad is not. In this article, we review Vietnam-era and more recent cultural training methods in the context of their underlying instructional principles. There is much to learn from the Vietnam-era programs in terms of successful instructional methods and ensuring the transfer of cultural learning.

Relations between U.S. military personnel and members of the communities in which they operate abroad are an ongoing consideration for defense leaders. These relations have sometimes turned hostile, such as when naval ships were barred from harbors in Spain in the 1960s due to a liberty incident at a bullfight in which U.S. sailors were cheering for the bull.1 Another example occurred when violent crimes allegedly committed by U.S. service members soured relations with German host nationals after World War II.2 In addition to relations with host communities, intercultural interactions have been an integral component of operations, such as in training and advising indigenous forces. The United States has engaged in military advising around the world, from Southeast Asia to Central America. Thus, it was somewhat surprising that the U.S. military did not have existing programs on which to build when the need arose after 9/11 to prepare ground troops for the realities of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the years since 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense has initiated many changes in policy and organizational structure, such as the addition of cultural issues to Army doctrine.3 Moreover, it has established culture centers to develop and deliver training.4 Although these programs are new, the need to prepare military personnel for operations abroad is not. For example, Special
Forces personnel have always had a cultural and regional element to their roles and training. The years of both Vietnam and post-9/11 were rapid growth periods for research on and implementation of cultural training programs for general purpose forces. This paper will review some of the methods developed in those two eras to highlight notable methods that can be incorporated into current and future training and education programs.

In subsequent sections, we review the Vietnam era and more recent cultural training programs in the context of their underlying instructional principles.

**Applying Merrill’s Principles of Instruction**

In synthesizing instructional design theories, professor of instructional technology M. David Merrill identified five core principles of instruction. These principles provide a prescriptive framework for designing instruction in a way that best facilitates learning. Applying these principles to cultural training can help identify valuable lessons from past programs and guide the design of current and future programs.

**Learning is promoted when learners are engaged in solving real-world problems.**

Training for intercultural effectiveness should focus on the interaction between members of cultures rather than on the cultures themselves.

Effective instruction tends to provide a real-world context or frame concrete problems for the learner. Case studies, critical incidents, and narratives provide context. They also frame cultural learning in terms of problems or situations that military personnel are likely to encounter. Early cultural training methods often advocated this approach.

A product of U.S. defense research efforts, the critical incident technique was developed by John Flanagan while devising methods for aviation personnel selection. Other researchers subsequently used this method to identify intercultural situations and published a set of critical incidents for use in cultural training. Critical incidents were to “bridge the gap” between the concrete and abstract to help stimulate the interest of those going abroad. Because those least effective in intercultural encounters are often the ones most confident in their abilities, concrete situations can

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*Air Force Capt Tanya Manning, shown at the head of the “table,” eats her meal in the customary way of the Middle Eastern culture. Women take their meals in a separate room from men during this traditional Afghan luncheon coordinated by the 189th Infantry Brigade as part of cultural awareness training at Camp Atterbury, Joint Maneuver Training Center, 14 November 2009.*

(U.S. Army photo by T.D. Jackson)
be helpful in pointing out the need for cultural learning. Such situations form the foundation of the culture assimilator method discussed in a subsequent section.12

More recently, the Air Force Cultural Studies Project gathered first-person narratives from airmen about their intercultural experiences on deployment. Dramatizations of such experiences are often cultural training tools, such as in the Army 360 training13 or the Army Excellence in Leadership tool.14 This approach contrasts with the area studies approach, which seeks to convey factual and conceptual information about a specific group, country, or region.15 Area studies include multimedia, films, novels, and reading materials reviewed and approved by experts.16 In Vietnam, a “package concept” included multimedia materials that did not require an instructor.17 Potential problems included oversimplifications or intentionally projecting a particular image of a culture.18

The military services’ culture centers used the area studies approach in their initial efforts in 2005 and 2006.19 Subject matter experts designed courses and materials on specific countries and topics, and also provided supplementary material in the form of guide books or “smart cards” as references on deployment.20 Marine and soldier reactions to these materials were mixed and often unfavorable.21 The culture centers’ offerings have since expanded to include more operationally and functionally oriented instruction.

Learning is promoted when relevant previous experience is activated.22

An increased awareness of and insight into American values and assumptions results in greater alertness and ability to diagnose failures in intercultural communication, and more flexibility in modifying one’s own behavior.23

Because everyone is socialized into at least one culture, a service member’s experiences of his culture can teach knowledge and skills for engaging with other cultures. Although the impact of one’s own culture is often unrecognized and automatic, instruction can make cultural self-awareness explicit and use it to structure new learning. Activating or forming a mental structure for existing knowledge can help in acquiring new knowledge.

Various training methods can be used to build cultural self-awareness. For example, A.J. Kraemer developed a cultural self-awareness workshop.24 Its goal is to enable participants to recognize cultural influences on their thinking to decrease their “culturally conditioned assumptions.”25 The workshop includes lectures, role play, and debriefing exercises in small groups.

Another method that develops cultural self-awareness is the contrast-American exercise.26 Although originally developed for military personnel, it has also been used by World Bank staff, State Department staff, and business executives, and the International Management Institute of American University uses it now.27 This face-to-face training tool was initially developed from research into American cultural patterns, mirror images of those patterns, and advisory overseas scenarios.28 Trainees participated in exercises with live actors playing the role of someone from another culture. Additional training focused on intercultural communication.

Learning is promoted when the instruction demonstrates what is to be learned rather than merely telling information about what is to be learned.29

Comparing an optimal or criterion performance with an ineffective performance can give the trainee a basis for evaluating his own behavior in similar circumstances.30

Merrill argued that presenting examples is more effective than presenting information. Thus, the critical incident approach, depicting real-world situations involving conflicting cultural norms, can address this principle. Common assumptions people make in intercultural encounters involve projected cognitive similarity (assuming another person’s cognition is similar to their own in similar situations).31 Critical incidents can demonstrate concrete examples of this phenomenon.

Training can also depict cultural norms or practices that military personnel are likely to encounter. “Overseamanship” was an entertaining program intended to develop culture specific awareness and positive relationships with local populations for naval personnel on liberty in ports around the world.32 Developed by David Rosenberg, a culture expert and folk entertainer, in cooperation with the Navy People-to-People department, the program featured instruction by Rosenberg himself, who demonstrated cultural awareness through singing, dancing, and audience involvement.33
In another approach, group- or team-based training with multi-cultural members provided intercultural conflicts via direct experience. Having trainees interact and perform tasks with foreign nationals in the training environment provides opportunities to experience the kinds of interpersonal conflicts that will likely occur on deployment, but in a structured environment. Such opportunities are readily available in military educational institutions, as these schools typically have foreign military students in attendance along with U.S. personnel.

Other proposed forms of demonstration include Air Force research examining the potential for modeling and imitation to help develop intercultural skills. Prominent researcher in intercultural communication Richard Brislin also recommended using modeling and social support training. This argument has recent echoes. Although the training has a strong theoretical basis, it is unclear whether any subsequent design of cultural training explicitly included the modeling of exemplary intercultural behavior.

Learning is promoted when learners are required to use their new knowledge or skill to solve problems. Each individual needs to experiment with various ways in which new patterns of thought and new ways of observation and behavior can become a part of himself. Several methods give trainees the opportunity to apply their new cultural knowledge or skills by presenting situations in which the trainees can make errors or experience uncertainty that increase the likelihood of behavior change.

The culture assimilator tool was originally developed for military application and later refined for other intercultural situations. Early culture assimilators were culture or country specific (e.g., Greece, Thailand, and Korea). Culture assimilators were also developed to improve race relations in the Army, linking internal diversity challenges with external, intercultural training, as has been suggested more recently. Later, culture-general assimilators were developed for situations involving multiple foreign
cultures abroad or multiple cultures within one’s home country.\textsuperscript{43}

Culture assimilators consist of critical incidents and different responses to or interpretations of those incidents. Trainees choose a response, and subsequent discussions address the appropriateness of each option for the target culture. Evaluations using different methods have shown that culture assimilators are effective, resulting in positive changes in both attitude and behavior.\textsuperscript{44}

In another method, the self-confrontation technique sought to increase the degree of rapport and efficiency of communications with host nationals.\textsuperscript{45} Participants received a detailed description of interaction expectations, followed by a videotaped role-play exercise. Afterward, participants were given feedback of their performance while viewing the tape and then participated in another role-play exercise, again receiving feedback with video. Evaluation of this method showed that behavioral skills for interacting in Middle Eastern and North African countries improved in ROTC students and officers, and the skills were retained over time.\textsuperscript{46}

Simulations and tactical games have been widely used in military training for some time. The Navy supported research to develop cross-cultural simulations.\textsuperscript{47} In fact, Navy funding was used to develop Bafa Bafa, a widely known cultural simulations game in current use. Fictitious cultures were constructed because military personnel were likely to work in several different countries, so needed to learn not just specific cultural norms and facts, but also principles underlying intercultural dynamics.\textsuperscript{48}

Once informed of the rules in Bafa Bafa, the groups must work together to achieve a common task while not revealing the norms of their particular culture to outsiders. As the groups interact, they get an idea of how ambiguous rules impede task completion. Business executives, students, Peace Corps workers, and other professionals who work across cultures have used this simulation. Ironically, it is less commonly used in the military, despite its origins with the Navy.

More recent simulations for cultural training include Enhanced Learning Environments with Creative Technologies for Bi-lateral Negotiations (ELECT-BiLAT).\textsuperscript{49} After completing a negotiation exercise set in Iraq, trainees in ELECT-BiLAT can view selected moments from their simulated meeting and receive feedback. This kind of training is a cost-effective means of providing simulations for large numbers of personnel preparing for deployment.\textsuperscript{50}

Learning is promoted when learners are encouraged to integrate (transfer) the new knowledge or skill into their everyday life.\textsuperscript{51}

Techniques must be devised to transfer the favorable behaviors learned during training to the real world.\textsuperscript{52}

Integration, Merrill’s fifth principle, suggests that learners benefit from reflecting on, discussing, or defending their new skill set. Teaching one’s new knowledge or skill to others also accomplishes integration and transfer, as does demonstrating use of the knowledge or skill on the job.\textsuperscript{53} In this way, the learner individualizes the new knowledge for his or her purposes. Providing training after personnel had been in country for some time was one recommendation to ensure cultural training transfer.\textsuperscript{54} In addition, training programs in the 1960s and 1970s provided plenty of opportunities for integration and transfer by providing cultural instruction at the unit level.

More recently, integration and transfer have become central concerns for cultural training and education. Methods for integration that include a social component—teaching, discussion, and application on the job—not only increase transfer for the learner, but also can facilitate learning in others. Formally establishing communities of learning and practice help to achieve this goal, as the Army has done in recent years with its Battle Command Knowledge System, which provides opportunities for peer-to-peer exchanges and dissemination of knowledge.\textsuperscript{55}

Predecessor Cultural Training Programs

The methods described above were largely developed in defense research and partly implemented into training programs. Some training combined multiple methods and provided instruction at the unit level, such as the Personal Response Program and the Troop-Community Relations Program. Developed for and funded by the Army and the Navy, the Personal Response Program was
implemented for personnel deploying to Vietnam, specifically in the combined-action platoons of the Marine Corps. The Troop Community Relations Program was designed for troops stationed in Korea.

Cultural understanding and sensitivity were a tactical necessity for marines conducting counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. Surveys of marines’ attitudes toward and experiences with the host nation population in both Vietnam and Japan helped identify important cultural information. The critical incidents developed for the Personal Response Program were among the most effective aspects of the program. In the Marine Corps, unit leaders led critical incident briefings to change attitudes and build concern and respect for the Vietnamese. The program eventually employed lectures, discussions, illustrated message posters, human-interest news releases, and role playing in simulated village settings at the NCO Leadership School in Okinawa and in the Orientation School for combined action units and supporting units. The program included cultural analysis, active problem solving, attitude modification, and learning reinforcement (e.g., feedback to the trainee). Combined-action platoon instruction, personal response, and other socio-cultural material totaled about 26.5 hours of training, or 38 percent of the combined-action platoon’s predeployment training time.

The Personal Response Program was successful and well-received. Indeed, feedback from those who received the training indicated that the personal-response component should have been lengthened. Leaders reported the benefits of the program for learning about their troops’ attitudes. Overall, both the Combined Action Platoon Program and the Personal Response Program were viewed as quite successful. Unfortunately the ground forces did not widely adopt them.

The Troop Community Relations program in Korea had similar goals: positive regard for host nationals, social objectivity, the ability to deal with culture shock, and the maintenance of effective relationships. The program included culture-specific lectures on Korean customs, family patterns, and religion, followed by a series of discussion sessions. An action program was implemented including soldiers teaching English, social gatherings, and small-scale, cooperative community development projects between Americans and Koreans. The small-scale pilot program subsequently went Army-Korea wide between 1965 and 1967. An evaluation showed that attitudes toward Korean soldiers improved as a result of the training. Even when poorly implemented, the program produced more positive views.

Conclusions
Many of the themes of and methods for cultural training in the 1960s and 1970s have parallels today. First, the goal has not changed. Brislin noted, “Cross cultural training has as its purpose the development of attitudes and behaviors of U.S. military personnel such as to enable them to function most effectively in a foreign environment.” This goal has been echoed more recently by discussions of cross-cultural competence as enabling “external adaptability” and mission success. The Marine Corps uses the concept of “operational culture.” The consensus is that cultural understanding and related skills are a necessity for most military personnel, for at least some types of operations.

Second, both eras shared the common challenge of providing effective training to large numbers of personnel within a short period of time. Similar debates emerged about how to approach cultural training and education. In earlier times, some authors distinguished between area studies approaches and human relations training. This distinction included not only the content of what was taught (specific norms and beliefs), but also the method, with human relations training being more experiential and case-based.
A similar distinction has emerged recently in the form of culture- or region-specific vs. culture-general approaches. The military services have partly resolved the debate over the merits of each by adopting both. Predeployment cultural training tends to be highly tailored to the country and cultures that personnel will encounter on their upcoming deployment, whereas professional military education employs regional or culture-specific elements in addition to more general principles and skills. The Introduction to Culture course offered by the Community College of the Air Force is an example of the culture-general approach in military education. It emphasizes developing cultural relativism.

Third, the use of similar instructional methods across eras is evident. Critical incidents and case-based instruction have been used both in earlier conflicts in Southeast Asia as well as for Afghanistan and Iraq more recently. Providing relevant, problem-oriented instruction and opportunities to apply cultural knowledge and skills are common events, although the media tend to differ. In the Vietnam era, application often occurred in live role play or in classroom discussion. More recently, although live role play is still used at training centers, use of computer-based simulations is increasing. New trainee intercultural skills emerge in interactions with instructional technologies, and then presumably transfer to human-to-human interactions.

The absence of earlier cultural training programs from recent discussions suggests that there is still much to learn from examining research and training from the 1960s and 1970s. For example, culture-assimilator and contrast-American methods do not appear in current approaches to military cultural training, although their impact on learning has been demonstrated in the literature. These methods could be of use in a variety of training and education settings and media today.

Instructional technologies present another issue for further examination. Clark has argued that different instructional media do not influence learning because they are merely delivery mechanisms, not the instructional method. Thus, to the extent that instructional technologies use the same methods as in earlier cultural training, we would not expect any differences in learning. However, different delivery media may not be instructionally equivalent. There
implications for the future

Vietnam-era cultural training for military personnel all but faded from consciousness during the 1980s. However, due to increasing demand, research on cultural training continued for corporate managers working abroad, providing advances in our understanding and assessment of intercultural knowledge, skills, and characteristics of benefit to military personnel.86 Findings from this research have been helpful in the development of programs and policies for the current operating environment.

The policies adopted in recent years to institutionalize cultural training and education represent one important advance over the previous era. By incorporating culture into doctrine and into strategic guidance, the Department of Defense has greatly improved the odds that the cultural training programs implemented in recent years will survive beyond the conflicts that prompted them. The military services have each implemented a strategy for cultural and foreign language training, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to highlight the importance of culture in workforce development.87 Time will tell whether these efforts are sufficient to ensure that culture does not recede, once again, into specialist communities and out of the awareness of general purpose forces. MR

Notes


6. Ibid., 45.


8. Merrill.


17. Gloria L. Grace and N. A. Holland, Multi-Media Training for Cross-Cultural Interaction (Santa Monica, CA: System Development Corporation (AD 651574) [1967]).


22. Merrill, 46.

23. Foster, 19.


25. Ibid.


28. Stewart, Danielian, and Foster.

29. Merrill.


33. CPT Walter Edward Clarke, “Carrier Captain’s report: Overseamanship spells afte the Vietnam War” (Naval Aviation News (April 1963): 12-13; CDR J.P. Dickson, Oversea-


38. Merrill.


49. John R. Raser, “Media will never in-
Welton Chang is a Defense Department analyst. He was a senior civilian advisor to Iraq’s National Intelligence Cell in 2011. He served as an Active Component Army intelligence officer from 2005 to 2009. He holds a B.A. from Dartmouth College and is an M.A. candidate in security studies at Georgetown University. He is also an associate fellow at the Truman National Security Project.

HOW WE PERFORM will determine whether we win against the terrorists. We’re fighting an intelligence war,” said Major General Hasan Daim Rasan al-Burhami, director of Iraq’s National Intelligence Cell, to a conference room full of Iraqi intelligence officers representing several agencies.

As U.S. forces in Iraq shifted focus to advise-and-assist efforts, success in Operation New Dawn now equated to the success of Iraqi Security Forces in securing the population and defeating the insurgency.

While valuable for guidance during deployment and developed for primarily tactical-level use, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, fell short in providing insight for the optimal conduct of strategic intelligence advising.

We learned many good strategies through trial and error and from other advisors who worked with us in Iraq. The observations offered here come from the experiences of numerous military and civilian advisors to Iraqi intelligence agencies from late 2010 through 2011 during Operation New Dawn.

Predeployment Preparation

Understanding the host nation’s society, culture, and language is important. A one-hour cultural awareness class will not prepare an intelligence advisor for deployment. Spend the time to understand the history, traditions, and contemporary issues facing the host nation; they provide the context for why things are the way they are. How your host nation partners phrase their responses to you and the nuances in their statements convey meanings that you will miss if you do not understand their cultural context. For example, an Iraqi may not actually agree with you, but will frequently do so out of politeness. When he does agree with you, he may say he really agrees. The nuance almost certainly will be lost if you do not understand Iraqi conversational subtleties.
Advisors should have language training prior to deployment, not only to read documents but also to be able to build rapport by using key phrases in appropriate situations. This kind of language training is difficult and resource-intensive, but critical to the success of the mission. Advisors encounter hundreds of pages of written material produced by their partners every day. Not being able to comprehend the gist of a page impedes an advisor’s effectiveness. It is inefficient to rely on an interpreter for basic language needs.

If you must rely on interpreters, be sure the interpreters understand the language, local dialect, and culture and know how to use an interpreter effectively. We learned the importance of dialectical differences when we once issued invitations for a senior leader conference that instructed invitees to wear their casual underwear (not casual military attire) to the event. Our counterparts preferred to deal with interpreters who spoke the Iraqi dialect, not the Levantine dialect our interpreters used.

On the other hand, your interpreters may be able to build a special type of rapport with host nation counterparts that you will be unable to do. Many interpreters stay in theater for years through several advisory team rotations and become the organization’s institutional memory. Some interpreters have the authority to relay information to counterparts and “massage” language used by the advisory team. However, it is essential to guard against overreach by striking a balance between giving an interpreter leeway to use his professional judgment and restricting him to specific “lanes in the road.” Used properly, interpreters and cultural advisors will greatly amplify advisors’ capabilities.

Before they arrive in country, leaders should know a great deal about the intelligence agency they are going to support (its mission, purpose, echelon, interagency responsibilities, mandates, key leaders, and so forth). At a minimum, the advisor team should have an understanding of who the agency’s customers are and how the agency has been accomplishing its mission. Advisors should
also determine what projects previous advisors succeeded or failed at, if there were previous advisors. An advisor must learn the truth on the ground, modify his understanding as required, and continually reevaluate it throughout the mission.

**Train as a team before deploying and stay together through the deployment.** Combat zones and other nonpermissive or semipermissive environments are not ideal locations for advisory teams to complete their “forming, storming, norming, and performing” phases of team development. If possible, teams should train together before they deploy so they can develop team chemistry before putting boots on ground. Teams also should be tactically proficient in shooting, driving, convoy operations, and combat casualty care; know what to do in a kidnapping scenario; and be able to defend themselves in a hostile area.

We were not able to train as a team before we began our mission, so we had to learn each other’s personalities, strengths, weaknesses, and areas of expertise after we arrived in Baghdad. Our team consisted of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Forces personnel, and State Department and Defense Department civilians and contractors. Team members had differing predeployment training pipelines (although at a minimum we all met general Central Command requirements). Only a few of us had received training in Arabic or had experience in foreign security force assistance and working with interpreters. Each team member had a different level of experience in intelligence; a few possessed an analytic background, and some had worked with Iraqis before, but only a few of us had previous knowledge of the Iraqi intelligence system. We spent valuable time assessing team members’ core competencies and integrating them into the team effort. We could have better capitalized on our time if we had conducted predeployment training together, using a tailored curriculum.

U.S. advisory team leaders should remain in command throughout the deployment. Due to circumstances beyond our control, our team leadership rotated out every three months or so in 2011 after a period of relative stability on the team. This caused numerous problems. The Iraqi director became frustrated at repeating himself and seeing advisors not living up to the promises (sometimes reasonable, sometimes not) made by previous advisory team leaders.

**Developing a Plan of Action**

Find the balance between rapport building and mission execution. The effectiveness of advisory efforts depends on the strength of the relationship the advisory team has with its partner agency. Developing rapport is especially important at the beginning of the advisory relationship. Friendships help facilitate projects. The advisory team should collocate with its host nation counterparts as much as force protection considerations allow. The team should share the same hardships and challenges as the partner force. In addition, when time-sensitive or ad hoc requirements arise, the advisory team will be nearby to assist. This is not possible if the team resides on a U.S.-only compound far away. Simply dropping in on an organization two or three times a week to socialize is not enough; the partner agency should come to see the U.S. advisory team as another “department” within its organization, fully integrated into areas where it can make a difference.

Respect your counterparts’ time, and establish a clear purpose for engagement before execution. Your counterparts are professional intelligence officers who need to satisfy both their policymakers and their customers. Your advisory efforts should not interfere with their ability to complete essential tasks. Ensuring your advice adds value will make any time with counterparts time well spent. Building rapport is essential, but once you have done so, you must strike a balance between personal and work-related conversations. It is easy to cross the line from value-added to time-wasted, although the moment that the line is crossed is sometimes not readily apparent. In many non-American cultures, it is extremely rude to tell a guest that you are busy or that other tasks take precedence over talking to him. In addition, it is easy for us Americans to misinterpret Iraqi cultural obligations as an innate enthusiasm for long discussions. Providing meals and gifts to guests is often obligatory in Arab culture, and an advisor who receives them should not regard them as proof that his advisory efforts are succeeding.

During our time in country, we learned of several incidents where advisors crossed the line from being personable to being distracting. For example, Iraqi intelligence officers at one agency told us that they were considering barring another group of U.S. advisors from the agency compound because they never did anything but make small talk for hours on
end. The Iraqis were planning to tell the guards at the front gate not to let this group of U.S. advisors onto their compound. Despite this situation, this group of advisors continued to brief their leaders daily about their accomplishments and the good rapport they had with their Iraqi counterparts.

There were also success stories. Some Iraqi officers who were initially apprehensive about forming relationships with U.S. personnel became like family to our team. Change was not initially welcome, but after we demonstrated the value of our advice, the Iraqi analysts became more open to it.

When asked for help, help. You, your advisory team, or higher echelons may envision how the host nation intelligence service should conduct business and what it can become. You should develop that vision together with your partners. Too often, we allow such visions to override the more legitimate concerns of our counterparts, many of whom are at risk because they interact with us. If your counterpart comes to you with a legitimate concern, do not dismiss it simply because it does not fit within your “agenda.” Helping your counterparts with the things they value can help encourage their support for your plan.

Sometimes the guidance from our leaders was not in our counterparts’ best interests. For example, our leaders wanted information about upcoming demonstrations while our counterparts were interested in discussing the recent spate of assassinations of Iraqi government and security officials in Baghdad. We recognized that we needed to be responsive to our chain of command but we found discussions and engagements were most fruitful when we talked about our counterparts’ priorities.

Prioritize objectives and initiatives; do not try to solve everyone’s problems all the time. Measure results, not actions. Advisory efforts must have focus to be successful. Overall strategy should arise from careful analysis of the challenges facing the host nation intelligence service. You can focus scarce resources by prioritizing and carefully choosing which objectives to reach for. Initiatives take a long time to accomplish because you have to work through foreign security force issues and your own issues, while trying to solve the problem at hand. Advisory teams often assume that constant activity is a sure path to success, but in fact, results define success. Do not become a victim of the “good idea fairy.” Hold advisory teams accountable for sustainable results to prevent overreaching.

Know where you want to go, know how you want to get there, and prepare for setbacks. Even a well thought-out plan may not get you to your desired end state. You and your partner agency may encounter obstacles. Working in a combat zone makes everything more difficult, and collaborative projects take at least three times as long to complete as projects handled unilaterally. For example, a lack of Iraqi funding once delayed acquisition of a data system. Then, U.S. advisors did not know which system would be best for the Iraqis. Finally, when our Iraqi counterparts came up with the funds for 90 percent of the costs, the vendor was unwilling to change the terms of the contract and insisted that they pay the full costs from the original contract.

Intel Lessons Learned

Use examples to show why new methods will solve problems. New solutions should be replicable and not create more problems than they solve. Inefficiencies exist in every organization, and can cause major problems. Existing processes are sometimes the result of tradition, culture, or bureaucratic overgrowth. Changing them requires host nation buy-in. Achieving buy-in requires building strong personal relationships and demonstrating that change adds value. Examples help to illustrate how changing an existing process will eliminate a problem. When advising partners on the use of structured analytic
techniques, practical exercises are important. Analysts readily accepted techniques such as Team A and Team B, Red Teaming, and Alternate Futures Analysis when advisors applied them to a high priority topic such as insurgent assassinations or threats against critical infrastructure. Even though the analysts had been taught these techniques before, they never used them until the advisory team demonstrated their value. Synchronize training engagements with the overall capacity-building strategy. The overarching strategy should establish clear guidance on what to accomplish.

You are more likely to achieve buy-in from your counterparts by showing tangible gains from changing the process. In the best of cases, you may only have to point out that the problem exists, and the partner organization will decide to try to solve it. Advisors should not create a relationship that makes the host nation depend on advisor team solutions. An internally resourced solution reduces dependence on U.S. efforts and can be an enduring one.

Instead of providing maps and imagery to our counterparts, we encouraged them to fulfill their needs by collaborating with another Iraqi agency’s imagery and mapping directorate. We could have simply handed over the imagery ourselves; however, we knew the easiest route was not always the best route. Advisors should remember that externally resourced solutions sometimes have unintended consequences. While a workaround or stopgap measure may suffice while the advisory team is in place, the goal should be to achieve enduring solutions.

Avoid jargon when you are writing training materials or correspondence. Intelligence doctrine and training materials are full of U.S. military jargon and technical terms such as “fusion” or “Ground Moving Target Indicator” or “time-dominant.” Choose your words carefully when writing and speaking for translation to your host nation counterparts. An interpreter can mistranslate jargon with grave or comic consequences. We were once embarrassed to discover that our interpreters mistranslated “predictive analysis” as “fortune telling”! After we drafted a document on trends analysis, one of our translators asked us why we were writing about clothing styles. He had mistranslated “trends” as “fashion.” We also encountered several instances where surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) was mistranslated as small arms fire (SAF)!

Even spending more time with linguists to teach them the right terminology to use may not produce the results you are looking for because interpreters and translators are not intelligence experts; in our experience, it was always best to avoid jargon and stick with basic terms.

Don’t feel compelled to force impossible standards on your counterparts. One of our Iraqi advisees once informed us that he was writing an intelligence product to depict a neighboring country in a negative light. It should come as no surprise that partner intelligence organizations do not always perform analysis that conforms to Intelligence Community Directive 203 standards. If such analysis provides policymakers with insight and information of a sufficient quality to make a good decision, then the analysis is good enough. While an advisor should try to improve a partner’s tradecraft, argumentation skills, report structure, and writing abilities, he should not expect overnight change or the sudden achievement of the analytic gold standard.

Changing the way people think about and approach problems is most effective when efforts are incremental and slow. For example, in 2009, the Iraqi prime minister established the National Intelligence Cell (NIC) in response to a series of high-profile, vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device attacks in Baghdad. The ensuing investigation found that all Iraqi intelligence agencies had
pieces of information regarding the attacks but none had shared the information. Although it took more than a year to become accepted within the community, the resulting intelligence community message dissemination capability that the NIC provided changed the way Iraqi agencies functioned. While not yet performing daily collaboration, each agency now has at least a basic common intelligence picture.

Lessons Learned and Tips for Advisors

The advisor’s mind-set and knowledge base is critical to mission success. While no one mind-set is ideal, certain traits do make some advisors more successful than others. Not all competent leaders are cut out to be advisors. Some extremely talented persons make poor advisors because they are impatient and unable to communicate their expertise in a way that their foreign counterparts can understand. Being flexible, culturally aware, conversationally adept, and patient are traits that help make advisors successful.

This is not to say that introverts are never successful or that extroverts always are. Our advisor team had a mix of personalities. We quickly learned to put team members in the positions for which they were best suited. Our introverted members gradually built up their comfort level in advising and presented detailed, well thought-out plans to their counterparts. Our extroverted members helped guide them by sharing their established relationships with counterparts as well as learning more patient advising methods.

At the end of the day, our counterparts respected us most for our subject-matter expertise. Because of the ad hoc nature of some organizations, personnel assigned to advisory teams were not always experts in intelligence disciplines relevant to the host nation. While these advisors provided value-added input to the team, their lack of expertise forced them to rely on others to train, mentor, and advise their counterparts. Nonexperts must develop a network of persons they can rely on to channel intelligence expertise to their clients. If nonexperts act as though they were experts, they may ultimately do more harm than good.
When I first began advising, one of the senior Iraqi analysts I worked with asked me where I had obtained my college degree, had I previously served in Iraq, and how many years of analytic experience I had. He said previous advisors had wasted his time by teaching him the same basic analysis courses that he had participated in for years. Unspoken between us was his hope, as well as a subtle challenge, that I would not do the same. As I counseled him on approaches to structuring analytic papers, constructing arguments, properly selecting and weighing evidence, and writing predictive analysis, he came to rely on me for advice on special reports the director had requested. At the end of my tour of duty when I told him that I was leaving, he put his hands on his hips, visibly upset, and told me this was “unacceptable” because I still had much knowledge and analytic tradecraft to impart. I also felt a certain pride that a man initially hostile to any advisory presence was fighting to keep me around. By demonstrating my value, I convinced an obstinate analyst to actively learn and adopt advanced analytic methods that he otherwise would not have considered or been able to access.

**Do not promise what you are not sure you can deliver.** Be sure your actions match your words and vice versa. Do not make promises you may not be able to keep. The host nation may make requests outside the original scope of the advise-and-assist mission. Advisors should be especially careful about how they phrase their responses to such requests. Use qualified language such as “I will try” or “Let me look into that.” This is particularly important when it comes to acquiring resources, as advisory missions are not always the best equipped and resourced. Similarly, if your partner agency makes a promise to you, hold the agency to it, but do not be surprised when they break a promise to you. Still, know that allowing this to become a common occurrence will damage advisory efforts. Everyone in the advisor-advisee relationship must understand that accountability is critical to mission success.

Advisors should also clearly state when they cannot support a request. Be knowledgeable about a request before replying to a client and buy time by performing the groundwork to address the topic later. For example, to avoid losing rapport with a client when faced with a difficult or impossible task, tell your client, “I’ll research it, but this is difficult. I will look into it and speak with you more about it next week.”

**Advice to Leaders**

*Be engaged and allow subordinates the freedom to maneuver.* Headquarters should be engaged and give their subordinate elements space to operate without unnecessary interference. Headquarters must strike a balance between simply maintaining situational awareness and micromanaging the mission. If your leaders are not working as advisors themselves, they should make every attempt to understand the cultural and institutional challenges faced by their subordinates and strive to resource and equip their subordinates to the best of their ability.

Our headquarters element gave our team numerous reporting requirements, including participating in two daily meetings and writing daily and weekly reports, and two sets of biweekly and monthly reports, all in different formats. An engaged, sympathetic headquarters element can diminish the need for such requirements. “Progress” in advisory missions is rarely measurable on a daily basis. Headquarters asked us to provide weekly “wins,” but advisors never “win”; they help their partner agency succeed.

**Coordination and collaboration with other advisory teams can prevent miscommunication, misunderstandings, and duplication of effort.** Advisors do not work in a vacuum. Other advisors, possibly from other services and agencies, often work in close proximity on related projects. Advisors must interact with other advisory teams. Sometimes, host nation security and intelligence organizations have uncooperative attitudes because of competing interests. Advisors should avoid reflecting these quarrels, synchronize their efforts with other teams,
and ensure their efforts complement existing efforts. Cooperation among teams helps complete broad, government-wide initiatives such as developing an Iraqi intelligence collection management system. Interagency infighting could also cause Iraqis to play one set of advisors off against another. Ideally, all advisors should fall within the same chain of command to achieve unity of effort.

During my tour, another advisory team began a concerted effort to procure copies of Jane’s Defense Weekly for their Iraqi counterparts. The Iraqi officers were interested in the weaponry in neighboring countries’ inventory. For several weeks, the U.S. team worked to transfer manuals from various places in the United States to Iraq. Then, another U.S. team told them that the same Iraqis had asked them for Jane’s as well, and they had already purchased new copies of the manuals for the Iraqis. If the teams had communicated more frequently, they might have avoided this duplication of effort.

Advising at the strategic level sometimes means you are at the mercy of the vagaries of national politics. Advising a national-level agency means navigating around, between, and through political obstacles ranging from budget battles to party affiliations. Unfortunately, our leaders could not mitigate the influence of host nation politics on our advisory efforts. For instance, talks about merging two governmental organizations stalled when the discussion turned to who would lead the new organization. Everyone on the committee agreed that the merged element would tremendously benefit Iraq by providing centralized information and command and control during crises. However, the newly merged organization would only need one leader. The more capable administrator of the two organizations was a politically neutral military officer. The less capable administrator was a politically connected and influential civilian. A deadlock ensued and in the end, the merger was called off.

Helping U.S. Partners

Intelligence advising in security force assistance is a critical capability the United States needs to retain for the near future. With increasing DOD financial restrictions, we must be more efficient to get the most value out of our expenditures. In his Foreign Affairs article “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “In coming years, the greatest threats to the United States are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. The U.S. government must improve its ability to help its partners defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. troops.”

The author would like to thank the NIC advisory team members for their invaluable contributions to this article and their hard work during the Operation New Dawn deployment.
Turkey and the Arab Spring

Karen Kaya

The Arab Spring is a complex, rapidly unfolding phenomenon of uprisings, revolutions, mass demonstrations, and civil war, a diverse set of movements with diverse instigators and aspirations, including freedom, economic opportunity, regime change, and ending corruption. It started in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to the rest of the Middle East throughout 2011. Although it is the most significant event to happen in the Middle East in recent history, we do not yet understand its trajectory and cannot predict its outcome. Despite the fact that the process is apparently advancing the values of freedom, justice, and democracy, it can still produce less desirable outcomes, requiring alternate approaches to standard diplomatic and economic approaches with a long-term view.

Does the Arab Spring have a Turkish model? Countries in the Middle East are looking to Turkey whose conservative social and cultural outlook, but liberal political and economic program, stand out as a model of Islamic liberalism. For the U.S. Army, this presents a long-term opportunity. Turkish security forces, trained by the U.S. Army, have begun to train other armies (such as Syria and Jordan in the Middle East and many in Central Asia and Eastern Europe). Thus U.S. lessons on civil-military relations or the laws of war will, in turn, be taught to the these countries. Given its current popularity, America could use Turkish help as it maps out the future of the Arab Spring.

All this might mean a change in the nature of the U.S. Army’s engagement with Turkey. The U.S. Army’s former engagement with Turkey mostly entailed military relations through NATO, but did not address the profound transformation of Turkish society, Turkey’s new foreign policy, and the end of the Cold War. In addition, Turkey’s democratization process has led to civilian control of the military and reduced the military’s previously unique authoritative role. Thus, if we assess them accurately, the changing dynamics in the region may present a long-term opportunity for the U.S. Army. This requires a comprehensive analysis of the so-called Turkish model. What aspects of it can Arab Spring countries aspire to, and what features of it are not applicable?
The Destination

Turkey’s current state of affairs is the result of an evolutionary process, not rapid development, but it has the ability, through its example today, to serve as a model for what some of the Arab spring countries might want to emulate. Turkey as a destination point features a democratically elected, moderate Islamic party in charge of an economic boom. Turkey can make a real and visible, if not decisive, difference in the Arab Spring’s changing societies. The Turkish experience shows that Middle Easterners do not have to choose between authoritarian government and an Islamist regime. Turkey shows that there is a third option: Islamic liberalism. With its conservative social and cultural outlook, but liberal political and economic program, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) is a model of this. It seems to demonstrate that Islamic identity does not contradict democracy, and that there is no inevitable clash between the two.

Some also argue that under JDP leadership, Turkey, in developing political, economic and cultural relations with all the countries in its region, has played a role in the emergence of the Arab Spring. By lifting visa restrictions, developing trade and cultural relations, and exporting its television programs, Turkey exposed Arabs to new ways of thinking about Islam, modernism, and elections.

However, this narrative does not tell the whole story. The Turkish military certainly had a role to play in the country’s modernization, but many claim it actually inhibited the democratic process. Some experts even claim that democratic change occurred in Turkey not because of the military, but despite it. Therefore, to say that Turkey is a model of modernization because of its military overlooks the fact that the military intervened in politics five times by staging three military coups, one “post-modern coup” that forced the government to resign, and one “e-coup” that issued an online statement threatening action. The military was not a force for democracy or progressive political change.

In addition, Kemalism, the principle the military authoritatively enforced, that Turkey should be secular and Western, cannot be a model for the region because it was authoritarianism and lack of democracy that triggered the Middle East’s uprisings in the first place. The Arab people no longer want authoritarianism.

Islamic power model. The second version of the Turkish model is that Turkey represents the consolidation of Islamic power in a formerly secular system. This model demonstrates the possibility of a party with an Islamic pedigree coming to power through democratic means, via free and fair elections. Furthermore, this model shows that such a country can be a powerful actor in the Middle East while defying, or at least openly criticizing Israel’s policies. This is the Turkey of 2002 to the present, an independent country with ties to Western institutions, yet determined to stand up to Israel and pursue its own national interests.

This narrative is also incomplete. Turkey’s democratic transition began in 2002, and the EU was the main catalyst for Turkish democracy, forcing it to improve its human rights record and establish civilian control of the military. The Customs Union agreement with Europe helped its economic development. Since none of the Arab Spring countries have any prospects of EU membership, this narrative does not apply. Turkey’s proximity to Europe and its membership in NATO created dynamics that do not exist in the Arab world. Furthermore, Turkish democracy still has a ways to go. Turkey’s infamous Kurdish question remains unresolved, and Turkey ranks poorly in freedom of the press, with a high number of journalists in prison.

Not the Journey

Turkey’s non-Arab identity and the process it followed to get to its current end state are features that do not quite apply to the Arab Spring countries. The Turkish military’s historically unique role, its membership in NATO and relations with the European Union (EU), its capitalist economy, and its evolutionary process are impossible to duplicate exactly. There are various versions of the Turkish model.

Military control model. The first is the pre-2002 Turkey in which the military controlled the secular state, and the country modernized under military control before democratically bringing Islamic actors into politics. This Turkish model’s military-controlled transition period instilled secular and Western values in Turkish society before Islamist politics arrived. The military firmly defended a secular constitution to deter any imposition of Islamic rule.
The youth model. The third version of the Turkish model is the one adopted by the people and youth who are protesting in the streets of the Middle East. They look at Turkey’s open society, strong economy, rule of law, and liberal and tolerant interpretation of Islam. This group is attracted to Turkey because of the liberal life its citizens can lead and is too young to consider Turkey’s long history under military rule.7

This narrative, which sees Turkey as a free, open, capitalist society, is also hard to replicate for the Arab Spring countries. Contrary to many Arab countries, Turkey does not have any oil, so it needs genuine economic growth. As such, it is the most capitalist country in the Islamic world. The EU market and Turkey’s Customs Union agreement with the EU allow Turkish capitalism to thrive, and necessitate an open society. These circumstances are not present in the Arab Spring countries.8

Turkey’s economic and democratic reforms took place over a period of 80 years, with many setbacks along the way. Some problematic aspects still remain. Turkey is unique in that it has a long history of secularism. In addition, it was never colonized, so it lacks the post-colonial syndrome that the Arab Spring countries have. Turkey has come to its current state after a long evolutionary process, whereas the Arab Spring countries are experiencing rapid change. Plus, for many Muslims in the Middle East, including the youth who look at the Turkey of today and want democracy, Turkey's unique past "militant secularism," such as the headscarf ban, would be unacceptable.

What the Arab Spring lacks is an Arab model of liberalization, democracy, and economic development. Egypt, not Turkey, may play this role in the long-term. Egypt is an Arab country that has long been the center of Arab entertainment and culture. Its language is the commonly understood dialect throughout the region, more so than modern standard Arabic. Therefore, Egypt may be a more relevant model for the rest of the Arab world. Currently Turkey offers hope as a co-religionist with a functioning economy. However, in the long-term, its regional location and its religious status may not be enough to bridge the gap. It is possible that Turkey and Egypt (and possibly Iran) will eventually emerge as leaders in the region, with Egypt taking the lead due to its Arab culture and language. A case in point is that, despite Turkey’s efforts to mediate Middle Eastern issues, it was Egyptian mediation that brought Hamas and Fatah together in April 2011, which, at the time, was a historic achievement for the Palestinians.9

The Diversity of the Arab Spring Countries

The Arab Spring is not a homogeneous social movement or set of national events. The people in each country are calling for something different. Some want to overthrow their government, while others are simply calling for an end to corruption or for increased economic opportunities. The countries involved are witnessing different outcomes. The internal dynamics between each country’s military and political leadership, as well as between the military and society in general, may explain the diverse outcomes.

For example, in Tunisia, people demanded political change after a single event (Muhammad Bouazizi, a young vendor, set himself on fire outside his local municipal office when the police arbitrarily confiscated his cart). In Egypt, people demanded the fall of the regime, starting out with a peaceful demonstration that turned into unrest. In Yemen, mass peaceful protests demanding an overthrow of the regime turned into demonstrations, unrest, and violence. In Bahrain, the protests centered on the lack of economic opportunity and political freedom, and eventually became a sectarian dispute between a Shi’ite majority and a Sunni minority. In Syria, people called for political change after a history of repression, with events leading to a brutal crackdown on disaffected citizens. Libya experienced civil war.
Other countries did not experience such dramatic events. Kuwait experienced political turmoil not necessarily related to the Arab Spring. Oman faced demonstrations as part of the Arab Spring, but they have not threatened the regime. Demonstrators confronted the government, but did not call for the resignation of Sultan Qaboos. Instead, they demanded a strong legislature to serve as a counterweight to monarchical power. Their main demands and frustrations had to do with a lack of economic opportunity.

It would be too hard for countries with such diverse histories, cultures, motivations, and trajectories to adapt the Turkish model exactly. Different groups would embrace different versions of it, rejecting the other aspects, creating disagreement. As such, the best model will be different for each country and each country’s political development will happen according to its own political history, sociology, and motivations.

Ironically, some in the “Arab street” see Turkey as a model because of its Muslim identity, its democratic government, its successful economy, and its relations with the West, while others say that it cannot be a model because it is not Muslim enough, not democratic enough, and not distant enough from Israel and the West. This is illustrated clearly in research done by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation. The research obtained data from 2,267 respondents from Egypt, Iran, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq. The study found that 66 percent saw Turkey as a model. The most cited reasons were its Muslim identity (15 percent), its economy (12 percent), its democracy (11 percent), and its advocacy of the rights of Palestinians and Muslims (10 percent).

However, a paradox emerged when it came to the cited reasons to reject Turkey as a role model. This time Turkey’s secular political structure was seen as a negative aspect (12 percent). The view that Turkey is not Muslim enough came second (11 percent). A perception of Turkey’s Muslim identity having been “watered down” because of its democratic process and its abolition of the Caliphate in the early 20th century probably help to fuel these perceptions. The third factor weighing against Turkey was its relations with the West and Israel (10 percent), and the fourth, the assumption that a model was not needed for the region at all (8 percent).

The Arab Spring’s Effects on Turkey

The Arab Spring revealed a lot about Turkey. Until then, many in the Arab world admired Turkey’s ability to stand up to the West by establishing good relations with countries such as Syria, Iran, and Libya while criticizing Israel. Before the Arab Spring erupted, the JDP, which came to power in 2002, had been following a new foreign policy called the “zero problems with neighbors” policy, in which Turkey pursued “proactive peace diplomacy” in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Gulf.

This new policy claimed that Turkey needed to be at peace with its diverse Muslim, Ottoman, European, and Central Asian background and take advantage of its multifaceted identity. The idea was that Turkey could talk to Damascus and Jerusalem, Tehran and Washington, and be an effective arbiter and peacemaker. In fact, when Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan made his victory speech after winning the elections for the third time in a row, he said, “Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as well as Ankara; Ramallah, Neblus, Jenin, the West Bank; Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakır.”

The policy also called for improving trade relations between Turkey and its neighbors, thereby creating more economic interdependence to promote peace. Turkey improved relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, along with all its other neighbors, causing some concern in the West that Turkey was “turning east.” In fact, this was more a case of Turkey diversifying its foreign policy based on calculations of hard national interests, just like any major power. Turkey claimed this multifaceted identity made it the best candidate for regional leader in the Middle East and among Arab nations, due to its common history, religion, and familiarity with them. Turkey also claimed this unique position enabled it to be a mediator between East and West. For example, it offered to mediate between the United States and Iran, and tried to bring Syria and Israel together to hold direct talks in 2008. Turkey also ventured into Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian negotiations and tried to mediate the Georgian-Russian conflict. The JDP’s aim in all this was to increase its stature and visibility in the world.
All this changed with the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring caught Turkey off-guard, just as it did other countries. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, where the protestors were calling for an end to authoritarian secularist policies, the JDP was able to stand with the pro-democracy movements protesting conditions similar to those the JDP had fought.

This was not the case for Libya and Syria, where events tested Turkey’s “zero problems” policy. It was harder for the JDP to criticize Muammar Gaddafi because Libya was one of Turkey’s major trading partners, with billions of dollars invested and 25,000 citizens living there when the crisis began. Thus, Turkey initially hesitated joining the NATO operation against Gaddafi, but eventually carried out its obligations as a NATO member, called on Gaddafi to step down, and supported the Libyan opposition.

When events in Syria erupted, after failed diplomatic attempts calling on the regime to implement reforms, the Turkish prime minister harshly criticized the Syrian president, supported the opposition, and demonstrated that he stood by the Syrian people (and the West), as opposed to pursuing normal relations with the Syrian government for its own interests.

Turkey’s criticism of Syria also soured relations with Iran, bringing the whole “zero-problems” policy into question. Iran warned that if Turkish officials insisted on their “contradictory behavior” and continued on their present path, Iran would choose Syria over Turkey. In short, the Arab Spring exposed the contradiction between pursuing good relations with all neighbors, including such undemocratic rogue states as Syria and Iran, while advocating democracy and values that the people demanded. When faced with this dilemma, Turkey realized that its values were incompatible with a policy of befriending Syria and Iran. The two countries were in opposing camps. Syria was close to Iran, while Turkey has historically been in the Western camp as a member of NATO.

**U.S. Military Considerations**

What made Turkey a hero in the Arab street was its harsh rhetoric against Israel, its increased self-confidence and independence from the West, its open society, successful economy, and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s success in reining in the military. When Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Libya in July 2011, crowds in Tahrir Square chanted, “Thank you, Turkey,” and “Erdoğan, Turkey, Muslim!” When Prime Minister Erdoğan took his Arab Spring tour, which included visits to Egypt and Tunisia, thousands of adoring supporters at Cairo’s airport received him like a rock star.

Turkey’s military approach in the region reflects its popularity and self-confidence. It has sent officers abroad to Arab military schools and hosted exchange students at home. Turkish military expertise (gained from the United States and NATO) has also been sought in other states, as demonstrated by joint exercises and programs with Pakistan. Turkish security forces are training other armies in the region as well. Lessons they have learned and will learn through U.S. training programs will, in turn, be taught to these countries through their own exchanges.

In fact, Turkey has taken the lead in training the security forces of many countries. It has been a key contributor in training local police and military forces in Afghanistan, having recently taken the lead within the NATO training mission to train 15,000 Afghan police officers over the
next decade. Turkey has also trained the forces of Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Jordan, and Syria under its “Guest Military Personnel Program.” Turkey leverages its close relationships and cultural and religious ties to advance military-to-military relations with those countries.

Despite all the talk about Turkey “turning east,” the fact remains that the Turkish military has had decades of U.S. assistance and training, and is full of Westernized officers. Thus, Turkey’s current position provides an opportunity. The U.S. Army can leverage its decades-old relations with its NATO ally to influence the Middle East through increased military training programs. Increased U.S. Army training of Turkish forces via exchange programs, coupled with Turkey’s initiative to take the lead in training the security forces of other Muslim countries, could enable the United States to guide the military training and education of security forces in those countries.

This is important because Arab countries in the Middle East also look at Iran. Iran represents the Muslim world’s defiance of the West, but more precisely, the ability to develop without Western assistance and in spite of Western resistance. Turkey represents a model of Muslim democracy, a legitimate political system, and a popular actor in the Middle East. Turkey is leading Iran by a wide margin, but it must be ensured that it remains the more attractive end state.

The desire to assume a leadership role has created competition between Iran and Turkey for influence in the region. Egypt is also a rival, due to its Arab culture and language. There are also the Saudis, who have tried to contain Iran while viewing Turkey’s ambitions with suspicion. Saudi Arabia is a huge power in the Gulf, with the largest population (27 million), the greatest wealth, and a wide influence.

The Middle East may be heading toward a future in which countries will adopt variations or syntheses of a Turkish model (secular democracy), an Iranian...
one (Islamic dictatorship), an Egyptian one yet to be determined, or a Saudi Arabian one. The long-term future of the Middle East may therefore depend on what happens in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and the relationship among these countries and their policies toward the rest of the region.20

The U.S. Army’s support to Turkey in its efforts to further its democratization process and become the influential Middle Eastern player that it wants to be should ensure Turkey becomes a more attractive model than the alternatives. As the effort to train and equip the Turkish Armed Forces matures, the U.S. Army might consider bolstering its support to the Turkish forces to counter Turkey’s long-time terror problem with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a problem that undermines Turkey’s attractiveness to the Arab Spring countries. However, these efforts could remain in the background and be jointly coordinated such that they do not to play into narratives that see U.S. involvement as a negative factor or the United States as controlling Turkey. A Turkey that benefits from U.S. Army engagement resources would be even more attractive in terms of local and grassroots acceptance in the Middle East. A shift from strictly military relations within NATO to a relationship that entails increased training and exchanges may be more beneficial than weapons programs for the United States, Turkey, and the Middle East.MR

NOTES

5. Kemalism is the ideology promoted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Its basic tenets are the rule of law, a representative democracy, staunch secularism and the abolishment of the Caliphate, a nation state of "Turkish people" where every Turkish citizen is considered a Turk, regardless of ethnicity, belief, or gender.
8. Ibid.
9. The two sides have since failed to agree on a government that would preside over a transition period towards elections that could lead to a reunification of the West Bank and Gaza.
13. Ibid.
17. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinde Eğitim Görmüş ve Halen Eğitim ve Öğretimleri Devam Eden Mısafir Askeri Personel Bilgileri (Information Regarding the Guest Military Personnel who has been or is being trained by the Turkish Armed Forces). Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, <http://www.tsk.tr/d_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_7_TSK_Askeri_Egitim_ve_Istibliti_Faaliyetleri/konular/Misafir_Askeri_Personel_Bilgileri.htm> (3 October 2011).
Inevitable Sword of Heat

Colonel John R. Culclasure, U.S. Air Force, Retired

History has shown that strategy, tactics, concepts, and even politics, as well as world-power positions, all eventually adjust to technology.¹

— Benjamin Delahauf Foulois

I HAD FOUND THE death ray. In 1966 I was just 12 years old, wandering among displays at an engineering exhibition in the field house of the University of South Carolina. Having just read H.G. Wells’ “War of the Worlds,” I was much attuned to heat rays, at least from a fantastical point of view. Wells’ “ghost of a beam of light” that wreaked havoc on the poor earthlings of Woking, England, prompted many young readers to ask could such a weapon be built. Was Wells’ “sword of heat” really possible? The answer was yes. Death rays were fact, and in 1966, I could almost reach out and touch one, or at least its humble ancestor. In the University of South Carolina field house, I was watching as the laser project’s author/builder, much older than I was, stood there in a white shirt and a narrow black tie, bantering as he prepared the laser device to fire. To fire! That sounded so cool . . . and ominous. Firing would take a while, he explained, because of some cosmic combination of a power source and something-or-another about a “capacitor” (whatever that was). A faint humming emanated from a black transformer and the rather small laser assembly (containing a ruby rod and flash tube) housed in an aluminum sheet metal box mounted on a plain piece of plywood.

As the firing sequence progressed and the banter continued, I found the courage to ask the man how he came to possess a ruby rod. I was supremely proud to know about this fundamental bit of laser technology by virtue of a U.S. Air Force recruiting commercial that ran early on Saturday mornings. It was my first real scientific exchange on the topic. He looked down at me and spoke gravely. It was “on loan from General Electric,” he said. I thought, “Gosh! General Electric has ruby rods to loan out! What if the Russians got one?”

The humming continued. I leaned closer. A nearby adult put a hand on my chest and in a gentle, avuncular way, pushed me back slightly. However, I was not going to miss this. I waited to see a dazzling stream of photons.
in “lock-step” coherence rip into its target.\(^2\) On this day in 1966, the target was a balloon across the room.

Suddenly, there was a “zap” or actually, a sound more like the “snap” of a cap pistol being fired, followed immediately by the unmistakable pop of the balloon. Success. Target destroyed! However, there was no blinding flash of light. No wave of heat.

Looking at the remnants of the balloon, I wondered what the future held for the device. This had been a rather meager display. A new crowd edged in, pushing me away. Then, someone joked to the laser man, “Hey fella . . . Have you ever tried lighting a match with this thing?”

That encounter was just over 50 years ago, but as I write this, the future that H.G. Wells contemplated in the 19th century is here. In the 21st century, aerospace forces stand on the cusp of immense changes due to rapidly advancing laser technology. An airman’s ability to survive and operate, including a combatant commander’s options, may now be in doubt in an environment made much more lethal because of lasers. Yes, after somewhat of a hiatus, death rays are back, and they are very potent.

Now powered up and packing a photon punch, lasers are no longer just range finders and guidance systems components. They can affect matter over great ranges, and the United States and other nations are pursuing laser weapons with future battlefields in mind. Certainly, as with most technological advances, old comfortable paradigms need scrutiny and reevaluation. We may have to cast them aside completely. Moreover, the very nature of the laser—light challenges an aircrew as never before. To prepare for future engagements and to survive them, a robust dialogue within the aerospace community is essential.

### The March of Laser Technology

The year 2010 in particular was a great year for laser weapons. Just how great? The open-source world brims with myriad “firsts” and breakthroughs heralding great change. Here are some of the more recent, perhaps ominous ones:

- Breaking the 100 kW threshold with a solid state laser.\(^3\)
- The Army testing green lasers for defense.\(^4\)
- The U.S. Navy shooting down unmanned aerial vehicles.\(^5\)
- The Army planning to test lasers in shooting down incoming rockets and mortars.\(^6\)

Intriguing terms jump out: “missiles,” “mortars,” and “unmanned aerial vehicles.” These objects loom large as targets in most of the events. Even more disquieting to the aviator is the fact that for the most part, they all entail shooting things down . . . out of the air. The implications for airpower employment are self-evident. The air warfare environment that aircrews find somewhat comfortable today is going to get much more lethal tomorrow. (The reader will note the list above is limited to U.S. efforts. However, the United States is not alone in these pursuits.)
Who Is Doing What?

Hearing ominous things about lasers, most readers will first think about the Chinese. And why not? Search around the open sources and there is plenty to read. Indeed, China maintains interest in a “larger class of weapons” or what it calls xin gainian wuqi (“new concept weapons”). Within that category are “high power lasers, high power microwaves, rail guns, coil guns, [and] particle beam weapons,” according to a 1999 report. The 2005 Annual Report to Congress on China’s military prowess asserted that China researched “ground-based laser ASAT [anti-satellite] weapons” and recorded that the Defense Intelligence Agency believed “Beijing eventually could develop a laser weapon capable of damaging or destroying satellites.” In 2006, a hullabaloo arose over the supposed blinding of a U.S. space satellite by a Chinese laser. The event was later “clarified” when the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office confirmed that a Chinese laser “illuminated” a U.S. satellite that year. In 2007, reports suggested China “continues a trend of annual [military] budget increases that significantly exceed growth of the overall economy.” This last development, more than anything, evinces China’s laser ambitions. It is reasonable to think of China as sedulous in its pursuit of laser weaponry.

Given the American military’s great reliance on space systems, it is safe to assume Russia is looking for ways to offset U.S. dominance in some fashion or another. Always wary of America and its allies’ theater missile defense efforts, it is only natural for Russia to seek parity, somewhere. Actually, the United States and Canada have already engaged Russia in a type of laser warfare. Aircrews of both nations suffered eye damage in a rather infamous sea surveillance incident off the coast of Alaska in 1996.

Paradigm Busters?

The auguries seem grim. Lasers are moving toward lethality. Other nations are striving to imbue their laser systems with high wattage and mobility. Is the aviation community taking all of this into consideration? Is it looking far enough ahead to see the ramifications and implications of these developments? Are our scenarios for laser weapons realistic enough?
There is precedent for anxiety; history is replete with examples of ignored or little-understood novel technologies destroying old ways of doing business. Nineteen years before the first laser shot, as World War II ramped up in the Pacific, on 10 December 1941, two British capital ships steamed toward Singapore to engage a Japanese flotilla threatening British interests there. One of the ships, the HMS Prince of Wales, was a relatively new battleship; the other ship, the HMS Repulse, was a still-formidable, World War I-era battle cruiser. Aware of the convoy and its mission, Japan elected to attack it with air-power, launching 84 torpedo planes to strike the convoy. The outcome of the attack was lopsided. The Prince of Wales and the Repulse sank in just under three hours within a few minutes of each other and in sight of each other.15 His Majesty’s Navy should have seen the disaster coming. In 1941, the world was aware of new aviation technologies and abilities and that aircraft could sink a ship. Pearl Harbor had just been attacked 72 hours earlier. Nevertheless, a British Navy commander clung to a certain mental model, elected not to change his fleet defense all that much, and the United Kingdom lost two warships and close to 1,000 lives.16

This was the first sinking of heavy vessels on the high seas by aircraft.17 The Japanese lost only three aircraft. Upon hearing the news, Winston Churchill later recalled, “In all the war, I never received a more direct shock.”18 The 1941 attack compels us to ask, “Is the past prologue?” The answer: The airpower community’s new science of laser capabilities could lead to an aerial version of the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales. This naval episode illustrates the penalty of failing to grasp the import of a new technology. Aircraft capabilities have long been the “edge” of “cutting edge” technologies, delivering many surprises to ground and ocean-going forces. However, now, airpower is in danger of being on the receiving end of the cut, so to speak. Moreover, our air brethren (who regard themselves as innovative thinkers and doers) do not always see far enough ahead to prefigure the full ramifications of new technologies.

As to that last point, a few timeline examples follow:

- **Beyond visual range.** Many believed air-to-air missile technologies would obviate the close-in air combat of World War II. So pervasive was this idea that internal guns were disregarded in new jet aircraft; the Vietnam experience showed the applicability of the old-fashioned dogfight and eventually the F-4E, unlike its F-4 predecessors, were equipped with a Gatling gun.19

- **Missile defense.** The belief that the Soviets could not build a high-altitude surface-to-air-missile led to the false assumption that flying at super high altitudes provided safety. In 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down while flying over the Soviet Union at an altitude of 70,000 feet by—you guessed it—a high altitude surface-to-air-missile.20

- **Jet engines.** Aircraft speed and performance dramatically increased, yet pilots operated World War II-style. Fighters attacked low and fast and flew through intense concentrations of antiaircraft fire.21 Bombers still flew in long predictable “trail” formations reminiscent of the Schweinfurt raids. Vietnam then demonstrated the need to reevaluate tactics and procedures.22

The preceding examples are by no means all-inclusive. Nor do I mean them to be a stinging indictment of any one particular aviation community. However, the examples do illustrate that the aviation community thinks it gets it right, but, sometimes it doesn’t, or at least not completely right. Studying the past and looking to the future might keep catastrophic laser encounters off the we-should-have-seen-that-coming list.
Perhaps lasers will be to airpower, as airplanes were to naval power. For decades, air defenses and associated technologies dictated where aircrews operated. Aircraft operated in a more or less “saw tooth” manner; during World War II, flying high, and then low during the Cold War (to penetrate Soviet defense); then high again (e.g., Operation Linebacker); and high yet again, using stealth technology and precision weapons. Since Operation Desert Storm, air operations have pretty much stayed in the higher altitudes. It is a nice place to be: out of the range of low altitude threats, while negating detection and SAM threats vis-à-vis exotic, stealthy materials. Not bad. Until now.

**You Cannot Outrun the Photon**

The very nature of the laser weapon is what makes operating against it so challenging. Stealth helps a pilot evade detection, but if perchance, he is visually acquired, stealth cannot help his aircraft outrun a beam of light. Furthermore, the laser is a line-of-sight weapon. Once the target is in the weapon’s sight, to fire the weapon is to kill the target (assuming of course the weapon is perfectly bore sighted). A chilling reality it is: no leading the target (good old fashioned “Kentucky windage”) is necessary, and lock-on might be a thing of the past. The mental image of F-22s flying in formation and disintegrating in rapid succession as an invisible infrared laser flicks from one Raptor to another, a la an H.G. Wells scenario, is an uncomfortable image, but definitely not an impossible or improbable one. Indeed, the laser takes us into terra incognita.

While all the aforementioned are true, it is important to note that the laser is not the “sword of heat” described by H.G. Wells. Sorry, Mr. Wells; you had a great imagination, but on this point, you were wrong. The laser creates heat, but for the laser to do damage, it must remain on the target for a certain length of time. Most readers understand this concept by virtue of various texts and arguments surrounding the airborne laser (ABL). For this weapon to work, it must acquire its target (an enemy rocket, for example), range it, adjust for the atmosphere, fire the high-level laser system, and maintain its beam on the target’s skin, or, “dwell” on the target. The dwell must be long enough for something to melt, burn, or explode. Laser engagements against aircraft follow the same process.

Knowing the above, aircrews must consider how to—

- Survive the engagement.
- Evade the engagement.
- Continue the engagement.

**Surviving the engagement.** To survive at altitude, first think “protection,” and protection might mean ablative material. For ablative material, think “heat shield.” The function of ablative material is simple. As the surface heats up, the material burns off, taking energy with it, and thus keeping the protected mass cool. It works. Anyone looking at the reentry end of the Apollo space capsule in the foyer of the National Air and Space Museum can see how the heat shield slaked off in bits and pieces as it plummeted through the atmosphere.

Ablative material, however, is likely to be heavy and perhaps not stealthy. Moreover, anyone familiar with lift equations knows that as weight is added to an aircraft, lift must increase, and this entails more energy, which means more fuel. Soon, we find ourselves in the realm of rather large, unwieldy airplanes encased in ceramics. This is a possible solution, but not a likely one, without some breakthrough in exotic materials.

**Evading the engagement.** What about evasive action and maneuvering (jink)? Is this an answer? Remember that “threshold” breakthrough that occurred just shy of the laser’s 50th birthday, the breaking of the 100kW mark? It should have made the aviation community take note. Within the laser development community (notably Northrop Grumman), crossing the 100 kW threshold meant weapons-grade high-energy lasers were in the offing. Simply put, a laser is energy, and the more energy that goes into making the beam, the more energy in the beam itself. However, even lesser power ranges—in the range of 25 kW or 50 kW—combined with good beam quality yield “many militarily useful effects.” And if the laser beam is pulsed (causing several mini-hits on the target in a short timeframe) the dwell time problem is reduced. To the aviator, the fastest jink may just not be fast enough.

Perhaps, with luck, one can attack on the proverbial dark and stormy night. I am not being flippant. Such an attack would be a realistic approach to solving the problem based on simple physics. Water vapor and other particulate matter seem to confound...
the laser weapon’s lethality. Indeed, the U.S. Navy is contemplating this problem now as it is “learning to cope with the extra difficulties of running a finely tuned electro-optical device in the harsh maritime conditions near the sea surface, where water vapor in the air tends to scatter and attenuate directed-energy beams.”25 This being the case, the U.S. Air Force’s various claims that it is an all-weather force become relevant to fighting against laser weapons.26 The confounding effect of foul weather is not a bad defense, if the weather cooperates. However, we cannot count on bad weather. We cannot control the weather. However, we can control altitude.

As noted earlier, over the decades, airpower used different altitudes (high, low, or a combination thereof). Are aviators heading back down into the weeds again? Maybe so. If so, we must remember that low-level flights, while exciting, have drawbacks: a pilot can only fly so low before the risks outweighs the advantages of doing so, and the lethality of some intense systems—the ZSU 23, for example—weigh heavily (lots and lots of projectiles fill the airspace). Low altitude is tough on airframes, too. Even so, nothing works so well as the tried and true method of putting terrain features between the pilot and the threat looking for him. Perhaps it is time to dive back into the low altitude environment again. And in doing so, in the words of T.S. Eliot,

_We shall not cease from exploration. And the end of all of our exploring Will be to arrive back where we started._27

Of course, difficult issues arise. Is it wise to put a multimillion-dollar aircraft in a low-level environment? Is this the way to counter susceptibility to laser weapons? Moreover, if the aircraft is too vulnerable, the dreaded acquisition issues surface again.

These issues are not new; all neophyte systems teeter on the edge of an abyss when we weigh their effectiveness against the entities that negate them. President Eisenhower wrestled with this conundrum as he considered the planned supersonic bomber, the B-70 _Valkyrie_, although “convinced that the age of aircraft for actual use over enemy territory is fast coming to a close.”28 In his constant weighing of defense needs against budgets, he reflected on weapon systems made passé by technological advances and concluded, “We were talking about bows and arrows at the time of gunpowder when we spoke of bombers in the missile age.”29

This argument will likely surface again, if it has not already. Replace the word “missile” with “laser” in President Eisenhower’s quote above, and the implications are clear.

**Continuing the engagement.** Despite the potential awesomeness of the laser weapon, and our visions of hapless F-22 formations, not all the news is bad. It is not going to be all _that_ easy for the bad guys equipped with antiaircraft lasers (AALs), either. To successfully engage the target, they must first acquire it. To do that, they must overcome the target’s stealth properties with some type of acquisition capability, and the AAL must have ranging equipment. As is the case with the USAF’s airborne laser, the Boeing YAL-1, a laser separate from the high-energy killing beam does the ranging.30

Thus, the enemy uses a laser to find and range a target, and the enemy AAL battery gives its own position away. (Lasers, like tracers, work both ways.) For friendly forces, it is back to the old way of doing business. We fix the AAL battery’s position through its emissions and release guided ordnance to destroy it.

Moreover, despite strides in solid-state laser

![President Dwight D. Eisenhower questioned aircraft acquisition programs given the advent of new Soviet capabilities and defenses during his tenure. (U.S. Federal Government)](image)
Laser weaponry is still pretty bulky stuff, so the AAL is not yet all that mobile. True enough, some strides have been made in this area, at least in the United States. But their lack of mobility notwithstanding, whether solid state or chemical, when lasers fire, they create quite a signature. Both the Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technology Intelligence communities now become important partners in detecting and countering an adversary’s capabilities.

**Joining the “Urgent Crowd”**

The ponderings in this article come from one ex-aviator; with luck, others from all services will weigh in with opinions, ideas, and counter positions. This is appropriate. Not long ago in *Air and Space Power Journal* an article stated it hoped to impart readers “with a sense of urgency” regarding directed energy weapons. That has happened. While not a physicist, this ex-aviator tosses his hat in with that “urgent crowd.” Yes, technology fascinates aviators. Now comes the concomitant brainstorming about how to deal with the awesome laser technology by creating realistic scenarios. We must keep the dialogue and thinking in motion. With luck, others will start thinking through these issues.

Last year Joseph Cirincione, president of the
Ploughshares Fund, was pleased that ABL funding was cancelled, going so far as to deride it as a “Flying White Elephant” that would never work. This derision is unwarranted. His and similar statements bring to mind what John Haldane, British Secretary of State for War, said in 1910: “We do not consider that aeroplanes will be of any possible use for war purposes.”

Of course, 30 years later, almost a whole fleet was decimated at anchor in Pearl Harbor, and Haldane’s nation, Great Britain, lost the HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales three days after that.

Conclusion

Laser weapon systems are extraordinarily lethal because they can operate at the speed of light; a laser is light itself. Laser weapons therefore present huge challenges. Perhaps air fleets facing laser weapons can survive, but it will take forethought and candid analysis, and one hopes not a catastrophic incident, to figure out how.

History shows that the aviation community can be slow to grasp the import of such technological challenges and adapt to them. Dealing with the new lethal laser environment—where the hit is instantaneous with the trigger pull—will require bold acceptance of ramifications affecting old paradigms and new acquisitions. These weapons will be fielded, too. Note that H.G. Wells certainly did get one thing right with his concept of the “inevitable sword of heat” … Note the word inevitable.

NOTES

1. Benjamin Delahau Foulois and Carroll V. Glines, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts (Flight, Its First Seventy-Five Years) (North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 1979), 286.
2. Many sources on physics will describe “coherence” in many different ways, but in regard to laser light and envisioned by Townes means photons are in a lock-step marching sequence as opposed to random and varied wavelengths found in, for example, an incandescent light bulb.
19. “Air War Vietnam” by Arno Press Staff, Inc. Drew Middleton (intro.) (New York: Arno Press, 1978), Excellent analysis in Part II, by COL John A. Dogline, COL Donald T. Hogg, et al., that explains how in the same year of 1665 most fighter aircraft were brought down by antiaircraft fire as opposed to MIGs, 224.
24. Note: “all weather” is not a USAF doctrinal reference, but instead shows up in various aircraft fact sheets and capability statements.
27. Ibid., 8.
29. “Air War Vietnam” by Arno Press Staff, Inc. Drew Middleton (intro.) (New York: Arno Press, 1978), Excellent analysis in Part II, by COL John A. Dogline, COL Donald T. Hogg, et al., that explains how in the same year of 1665 most fighter aircraft were brought down by antiaircraft fire as opposed to MIGs, 224.
34. “Memorandum of conference with the President, 18 November 1959”—20 January 1960, Augusta (declassified 1/18/81), courtesy Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, 7.
35. Ibid., 8.
36. The Boeing YAL-1 Airborne Laser (ABL) weapons system has three laser systems: a Track Illuminator Laser for illuminating the target and adjusting the parameters of the laser weapon’s optical system; a Beacon Illuminator Laser for reducing atmospheric aberration; and the six-module High-Energy Laser weapon system.
GROWING UP, if I wasn’t playing sports I was doing one of two things: building model airplanes or gardening with my father. Both were captivating mental exercises, but for different reasons. Building models was an exacting practice, a drill in precision and attention to detail. Gardening was a labor of love, a complex experiment in give and take. Both developed important skills, but as a leader I return most frequently to the lessons of my father’s garden. Leaders who think like gardeners are better equipped to adapt, reason creatively, and approach challenges with humility than those who think like model airplane builders. Unfortunately, many leaders in the military prefer fabricating P-51 Mustangs to nursing tomatoes.

My year-group was among the last to commission into an Army still preparing for a Cold War-style fight. As a young aviation platoon leader, I trained in Battlefield Calculus, a planning process that distills problem solving into a mathematical equation. It begins with an assessment of how many enemy articles may be in an engagement area and how many need destroying. From there, planning is not much more complex than A+B=C; matching resources to intended outcome.

I do not suggest the Army abandon the rigorous methodology represented by Battlefield Calculus. Rather, I am suggesting that Army culture is permeated with an A+B=C mentality; one that affects how we train people, which programs we develop, and how we design force structure.

In many ways, this A+B=C mentality replicates my childhood hobby of model airplane building. With the right tools assembled and directions carefully studied, work began. From the moment I picked up the first piece to apply paint or glue, nothing was beyond my control. This was my only measure of success: does the model mirror the standard?

As late as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, many in the Army were still applying model airplane reasoning to the “next” fight: assemble the right tools, apply the correct equation, execute with rigor, and the outcome will mirror the standard.
Four months before going to war in Iraq, I led my platoon in a capstone desert training event at the National Training Center (NTC). Here, we demonstrated mastery of the standard, applying the mathematics of Battlefield Calculus while fighting in support of armored forces in tank-on-tank battles. Upon completion, our unit was absolutely lethal in combined arms maneuver against an armored force on the move. Clearly, this training helped enable success in the invasion of Iraq and remains critical to what the Army does well. However, where this demanding training fell short was in what we failed to do.

During preparation for the NTC, my company commander developed a training plan for rear area security. Loosely, it was a mission that required Apache helicopters to launch on short notice to defend a division’s rear area (we still thought linearly back then) against small, irregular attacks. It incorporated quick reaction force tactics with maneuver techniques for engagements in urban terrain, something which attack aviation doctrine had largely ignored for two decades.

When he presented this training plan to the battalion commander for approval, my company commander requested two things: support in developing quick reaction force tactics, techniques, and procedures, and access to urban training sites. Both were roundly rejected.

Our unit was a prisoner of its own success, built on an ability to replicate doctrine with exactitude. The Army’s personnel system had populated the unit with leaders who demonstrated an ability to execute the prescribed methodology, and our handicap was that as an organization we could not think beyond the “directions” given in doctrine.

The result was telling. On 23 March 2003, we flew into a complex, aerial ambush near Ah Hillah expecting to execute a deep attack as prescribed in doctrine. However, nonuniformed combatants, dispersed in urban terrain, combined small arms fire with antiaircraft artillery to repel our attack. The mission was disastrous: the vast majority of our 18 aircraft were so severely damaged they would not fly again for days. Two pilots were shot down and taken prisoners of war.

We had been brilliant model airplane builders, but our gardening skills were nonexistent. In his garden, my father taught me that gardeners appreciate the unseen and anticipate the undeveloped. Throughout the spring he prepared the soil, watering, training, and fertilizing until plants were strong and ready to bear fruit. I vividly remember his consternation as he surveyed a particular plant that was pest-ridden, sickly, or dying. Accepting the unknown, he adjusted his plan. Watching my dad apply a method, wait for the effect, and adjust the next application, I learned a foundational attribute of leadership: adaptability.

Gardeners do not possess complete control. Their craft is an interchange where action and counteraction are affected by a host of things beyond their control. Gardeners anticipate, wait, and watch for change. They separate the addition of pesticide from rain and see if it holds. They add fertilizer, but not too much. The gardener is always the student, never the master.

This is the type of leader the Army should cultivate. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, asserts that leaders must “rapidly adapt cognitively and emotionally to the perplexing challenges . . . and master new competencies as well as new contexts.”

Like the gardener, counterinsurgency leaders understand that progress is affected by a host of things beyond their control: historic feuds, dysfunctional institutions, and even past mistakes by U.S. forces. Host a shura, extend trust, watch for change. Build a road, secure the population, and see if trust holds. Attack with overwhelming force, but do it carefully. A counterinsurgency leader is always the student, never the master.

However, adaptive leadership is not limited to the counterinsurgency fight. It remains a timeless military model. In recognition of this, the Army is evolving the concepts of operational adaptability and mission command, both designed to institutionalize creative, integrated, and flexible problem solving. These are a good start.
LEADERSHIP

Next Steps

To support the development of “gardener-leaders,” the Army should do three things: develop a profession that values thinking, writing, and education; adapt its personnel system to support diverse experience; and renew mentorship as a foundation to its profession.

Valuing education, thinking, and writing.

Over the last decade, the most important thing in an officer’s development was operational duty in Iraq or Afghanistan. This experience is critical, but to prepare leaders for an increasingly complex operating environment, the Army needs to enhance the value of education, thinking, and writing in its leaders.² We need to dramatically increase access to civilian education for both officers and NCOs. According to a recent Harvard study, only 31 percent of junior military officers believe that the military promotes innovation.³ Education is a key to changing this perception and the reality it represents. Education develops a leader’s identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, and interpersonal maturity.⁴ This is why universities are often compared to gardens, where minds are cultivated and ideas are the harvest.

Increase the importance of nondivisional assignments in an officer’s professional development by making them mandatory for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Assignments to the Army Staff, the Combined Arms Center, and branch schoolhouses are not “take a knee” assignments; they are investments in the institutions that support our profession and broaden a leader’s vision.⁵

Encourage officers and NCOs to write and publish. In a necessarily hierarchical organization like the Army, officers and NCOs enhance their profession through thoughtful publication while providing senior leaders access to unique and relevant ideas outside normal channels. Admiral James Stavridis recently challenged young officers to publish, taking the same kind of personal risk in shaping their profession as they do on the battlefield.⁶ In his article, Admiral Stavridis offers some “common sense guidelines” to consider when writing. Army leaders, following these guidelines, should be pushing folks to write and share. There is a wealth of untapped wisdom that will add richness to the Army’s intellectual debates.
Adapt the personnel system to support diverse experience. To promote a gardening mentality, the Army should change its personnel system from an industrial-age model that views leaders as interchangeable parts to one that manages talent on an individual basis. Model airplane builders are most comfortable with conformity and rigid process. Gardeners understand that diverse experience is required to master their craft. In the absence of a complete personnel system overhaul, the Army should allow officers who self-select for civilian education, teaching, or internships to “slip back” a year group or two in order to avoid missing key developmental jobs in their operational specialty.

Today’s prescribed timeline for officers leaves little space for variation in a career. When an officer is selected early for promotion, this timeline compresses even more. As a result, the Army is forcing its best officers to make a binary choice too early in their career: stay in operational assignments and remain competitive for command, or pursue broadening experiences at their professional peril.

By adapting its personnel system to allow officers to pursue opportunities that develop “gardener-leader” skills without hampering competitiveness for command, the Army encourages its best officers to broaden their experience. When officers who pursue opportunities outside traditional career paths command more frequently, the Army demonstrates a new set of values to junior officers.

Renew Mentorship as a Foundation to the Profession of Arms. In a culture that values “gardener-leaders,” mentorship is critical. Model airplane building provides step-by-step instructions for the novice to follow. Gardening is something that can only be learned through experience and tutelage.

Army mentorship is difficult to measure. In business, employee engagement (mentorship) is tied directly to financial performance. Companies with low employee engagement tend to lose money while those with high employee engagement tend to make money. There is no such measure of effectiveness in the Army. Yet, lack of mentorship appears near the top of many surveys to explain the decision of junior officers to leave.

To reverse this trend, the Army should include mentorship in its holistic review of the Profession of Arms. The pamphlet, Army: Profession of Arms, defines the Army’s ethic, and its values and ideals, but the word “mentor” is not mentioned. Yet what better way is there to build adaptive, creative, and humble leaders who reflect Army values than by active and genuine mentorship?

This is not a “hand-wave” suggestion. The implications of three generations serving concurrently make mentorship complicated. Millennials (born after 1978) are deeply committed to community and teamwork, easily adaptable, and comfortable with ambiguity. In short, they are more naturally inclined to “garden” than the two generations that preceded them. However, studies suggest that millennials are not as well prepared to operate in military command and control structures, resolve conflict, or safeguard classified information.

True mentorship cannot be an exercise in mirroring. Instead, it leverages the inherent strengths of this new generation while imparting timeless values and skills required of our profession.

Mentorship’s importance grows as the Army reintroduces the rigors of garrison and reduces promotion rates to align force structure with decreased end-strength. In a protracted garrison environment, experienced young officers will bristle at the loss of freedom they experienced in combat. Still, there is value in some of the “lost arts” of garrison. Mentorship during this transition supports two-way communication as the Army determines which aspects of the “old garrison” to keep and which to let go. In addition, as promotion rates decrease, mentorship is crucial to keep the best officers encouraged and provide safeguards against a return to a “zero-defect” culture.
The Test

Transitioning the Army from producing “model airplane builders” to “gardener leaders” requires culture change. However, simply talking about cultural change does not change it. Nor will the suggestions of this article alone change the culture.

Ultimately, the Army must change “the test” it uses to recruit, retain, and promote its leaders. By first identifying the “gardener” as the type of leader it wants to cultivate, the Army can adapt its processes and incentives to increase the number of adaptive, creative, and humble leaders within its ranks.

Increasing access to civilian education and encouraging leaders to take intellectual risks equips them to think in new ways. Providing space to pursue broadening experiences demonstrates that the Army values both operational and intellectual experience. Mentorship provides fertile soil for growth. Young leaders explore new ideas, take risk, and learn through the best method available: trial and error.

These steps cultivate a culture where leaders are not wedded to “the way we do things,” but are encouraged to adapt, think creatively, and approach challenges with humility. These are “must haves” if the Army expects to apply the right lessons from the last decade and build a force ready for tomorrow’s challenges.

NOTES

5. Barno.
11. Ibid.
The Missed Opportunity

A Critique of ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*

Major J.P. Clark, U.S. Army

IN OCTOBER 2011, the Army unveiled Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, the replacement for FM 3-0, *Operations*. Under the Doctrine 2015 initiative, the new ADPs replace the traditional FMs with concise discussions of general principles of only 10 to 12 pages. The reasoning behind the change is that doctrine should be useful and widely read, rather than gathering dust on the shelf. This makes ADP 1, *The Army*, and ADP 3-0, the two capstone manuals, particularly important; anyone seeking to understand the essence of the Army, how it is organized and how it operates, should be able to find the answer in a mere two dozen pages. That makes these ADPs the most important two dozen pages in the Army’s doctrine. They are not just manuals, but opportunities for communicating a vision that should not be wasted.

This need is particularly pressing now, when the Army has to sort through a confusing mix of institutional crosscurrents. First, after 10 years of continuous operations, we need to take stock of our hard-won experience and identify the enduring lessons we need to codify in doctrine. Second, nobody expects the next decade to be much like the last, so we should not rely solely upon the accumulation of wartime experience. Soldiers everywhere recognize this fact, and they look to the institution for some indication of how to prepare for new challenges. Third, the adoption of modularity is the greatest organizational shift within the U.S. Army since the early 1960s. That it was accomplished in-stride while fighting two wars is an incredible feat, but doing so left us no time for contemplation. Now there is an opportunity to think about modularity’s implications across the full spectrum of conflict and explain those implications to the force. Fourth, in a time of diminishing resources, it is important for doctrine to explain how the lessons of the past, the challenges of future, and the new force structure come together. There is no margin for wasted or misdirected effort.

Major J.P. Clark is an Army strategist currently working in Headquarters, Department of the Army. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Duke University. He has served in overseas tours in Iraq and Korea.

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Image: ADP-3-0 *Unified Land Operations*, front cover
The Role of the Army

Currently, the role of the Army is to prevent, shape, and win. The construct is sound, but, as always, the devil is in the details. Prevent, shape, and win would have been just as reasonable a response to the strategic environment of 2002 or even of 1992 as it is to the current environment. Yet, there are vast differences in the global posture, structure, and capabilities between the armies of 10 and 20 years ago and that of today. Doctrine should state how we can best employ the Army in its current configuration against present adversaries and challenges. As will be seen, the first pages of ADP 3-0 acknowledge that doctrine must address the contemporary context, not just timeless principles. However, the subsequent pages of Unified Land Operations fail to address key characteristics of today’s operational environment—a complex battlefield rife with uncertainty, adaptive enemies using an array of hybrid capabilities, and a thinly stretched, but highly capable modular U.S. Army.

This is unfortunate. It has been at least half a century since there has been so much uncertainty about how to best use ground forces.² Soldiers intuitively understand the value of boots on the ground, but many now have a hard time envisioning how the Army will contribute to the joint fight over the next several years. At the beginning of his brief tenure as chief of staff of the Army, General Martin E. Dempsey remarked that his transition team found a growing concern throughout the Army that we have lost our way.³ The current chief of staff, General Raymond T. Odierno, acknowledged similar concerns in the December 2011 blog in which he introduced the prevent, shape, win construct.⁴ Naturally, these doubts are only magnified outside the Army. While no one seriously argues that armies are obsolete, there are many who doubt whether a dollar spent on ground forces will yield the same benefit as a dollar spent on air or naval forces. An influential study, appropriately titled Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity, makes this clear when it argues for overwhelmingly disproportionate cuts to ground forces to preserve naval and air forces that “will grow increasingly important in the future strategic environment.”⁵

These concerns are part of a larger tide of opinion that views the future as part of a new strategic era in which the Army’s contributions to the joint effort will not be as self-evident as when it fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Articulating the way forward will require more than “bumper sticker” generalities. It will require a vision for the use of land power. ADP 3-0 is the most logical place to look for such a vision.
Naming of the Parts

Unfortunately, Unified Land Operations does not provide the necessary details. In content, it defaults to reasonable but timid generalities of little use to commanders and staff officers.\textsuperscript{6} In organization, ADP 3-0 avoids nuanced discussion in favor of a numbing series of definitions, a taxonomy of operational functions and methods. This “naming of the parts” approach describes the components of unified land operations without ever conveying their essence. This fault is particularly inexcusable as the Doctrine 2015 format pairs each ADP with an accompanying Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) meant to capture important details that would otherwise detract from the discussion of fundamental principles in the ADP. Unified Land Operations is consumed by definitions that ought to be relegated to ADRP 3-0. The art and challenge of operations are not in identifying constituent elements but in orchestrating them in concert with each other. The current organization atomizes these parts and treats them in isolation, which is the worst possible method of conveying the complexity of land operations.

Conceptually, Unified Land Operations builds upon the last several decades of capstone doctrine. Its lineage traces back to AirLand Battle of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{7} The most significant addition to this legacy is the acknowledgement that ground operations should take place in the larger joint and interagency context; this captures our experiences with the whole-of-government efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The most important new terminology is the introduction of two core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Like integration, these terms reflect recent experiences; they also offer the possibility of a “grand unified theory” of operations that might connect two schools of thought, one urging a high-intensity, conventional warfare focus, the other urging a counterinsurgency focus. Unfortunately, because ADP 3-0 is organized into lists of definitions, it isolates concepts rather than explores how they interact; this only reinforces the divide between those who see operations as an either-or dichotomy between high-intensity and counterinsurgency warfare. The final noteworthy change is the substitution of \textit{decisive action} for \textit{full spectrum operations} as an all-encompassing descriptor of offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support to civil authorities.

The problems of Unified Land Operations are most evident when it discusses integrating ground operations into the whole-of-government effort. The concept is uncontroversial; we have a wealth of recent experience to draw upon, and the purpose of this particular manual is to describe how the Army contributes to the larger effort of unified action. With all of these factors favoring a substantive discussion, the actual passage describing integration is a great disappointment. I quote that paragraph here in full:

\textit{Army forces do not operate independently, but as a part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. Army leaders are responsible for integrating Army operations within this larger effort. Integration involves efforts to exercise, inform, and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept. Army leaders seek to use Army capabilities to complement those of their joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These leaders depend on those partners to provide capabilities that supplement or are not organic to Army forces. Effective integration requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force.}\textsuperscript{8}

While it is difficult to find fault with any of these statements, the content is so feeble that one could replace each instance of \textit{Army} with some other service and the passage would be equally valid. Such timidity wastes the opportunity of a capstone manual to bridge joint and Army doctrine and to explain the Army’s capabilities, how it can best bring them to bear, and identify challenges in doing so. If capstone doctrine cannot provide such simple answers, it is little wonder that many feel that the institution of the Army is adrift.
Conceptual Emptiness

The problem, however, is more than just a matter of style. The conceptual emptiness of Unified Land Operations suggests that the Army still lacks a compelling vision of how to operate in the next several years. One problem is the replacement of the term full spectrum operations with decisive action, even though the two are clearly not parallel in meaning. Full spectrum operations had many detractors, but at least the term communicated the intended concept. Without a doctrinal glossary, the casual reader would never guess that decisive action encompassed offensive, defensive, stability operations, and defense support to civil authorities. The Army is America’s decisive force, but that does not mean that everything we do is decisive. Indeed, the term is so awkward that it is only rarely used within ADP 3-0, and it is completely absent from the section on operational art.9

Most readers will likely dismiss decisive action as nothing more than a buzzword meant to evoke a commendable aggressiveness and competence. This is a mistake. The term is an intellectual roadblock to determining what truly is decisive about land operations. The answer is certainly not everything. The concept is logically untenable, conflicts with joint and interagency practice, and does not accord with our recent experience of war.

One lesson of the last decade is that the nature of a conflict can make decisive action an impossible goal. If we truly believe that we cannot kill our way out of an insurgency, then we must logically accept that security operations are not decisive, and stability operations to increase governmental capacity are only a supporting effort.

The true decisive action in counterrinsurgency is the reconciliation the host government brings about. To illustrate this point, imagine a perfect counterrinsurgency campaign that neutralizes enemy combatants, increases the capability of host nation security forces, and improves the government and the economy. Yet rather than reconcile, the central government—dominated by a particular tribe, sect, or ethnic group—is so emboldened by its vastly improved security forces and temporarily prostrate enemy that it pursues a heavy-handed consolidation of power rather than the painful political concessions necessary for an enduring peace. These actions, in turn, perpetuate the political, economic, and social inequities that caused the insurgency in the first place and, in the end, lengthen the conflict. In this hypothetical case, successful tactics and operations are actually counterproductive because they never had the capacity to be decisive in the first place. This conclusion is borne out by the alternative ending, in which wiser political leaders achieve a stable peace. Host nation political elites are the decisive actors, not the American forces.

In fact, decisive action sits uneasily with most of the ADP 3-0’s stated roles for the Army, to shape, influence, engage, deter, and prevail.10 Security force assistance is at the heart of shape, influence, and engage, and while important, it will only rarely be decisive in itself. Similarly, the relatively straightforward task of deterrence through forward-positioned troops is also not decisive, as demonstrated by nearly six decades of post-war presence in Korea. The Army excels in these missions, but they are not decisive. Indeed, we should take pride that the Army holds the line better than any other service, if for no other reason that in a time of austerity, holding the line will be an increasingly important strategic function.

U.S. Army LTC John E. Rhodes, right, commander of the United Nations Command Security Battalion-Joint Security Area, and his deputy, LTC Jung Hae-In, from the Republic of Korea Army, inspect operations during a joint evacuation exercise, Camp Bonifas, Republic of South Korea, 23 February 2009. (SSG Christophe Paul)
However, we should emphasize the decisive nature of *prevail* in the context of a high-intensity conflict. In that role the Army alone provides the potential for achieving a decision against an enemy powerful or determined enough to endure strikes by the world’s most powerful air and naval forces. By diminishing the term *decisive*, ADP 3-0 avoids exploring the complex issue of how land operations contribute to the joint, interagency, and multinational effort. The passages cited above cheapen the Army’s unique role as the indispensable service in winning wars.

Why ADP 3-0 does not address these issues is not clear. In its first pages, the manual declares that one of the functions of doctrine is to provide “a statement of how the Army intends to fight.” This would necessarily require some specific statement about how the Army of today can achieve our present strategic goals. But *Unified Land Operations* instead describes operations in vague ways that could apply to any expeditionary force at any time: “[Ground forces] seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution executed through decisive action by means of Army core competencies guided by mission command.”

This is rephrased slightly differently elsewhere in the manual, but with much the same effect: “The foundation of unified land operations is built on initiative, decisive action, and mission command—linked and nested through purposeful and simultaneous execution of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security—to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state.” Both of these statements are so finely crafted as to have become completely untethered from context and, therefore, from substance. They say everything, yet they say nothing.

**Troubling Similarities**

In the 1950s, the Army faced a similar situation when it had to drastically reduce defense budgets after a frustrating conflict (Korea) and the threat from a peer competitor (the Soviet Union) caused an identity crisis. Trying to stay relevant, the Army introduced the Pentomic organization, an ill-conceived, unworkable reaction to tactical nuclear weapons. Although there is nothing in *Unified Land Operations* so flawed as the Pentomic Era organization, there are several troubling similarities.

In the pages of this journal in 1960, Lieutenant Colonels Linwood A. Carleton and Frank A. Farnsworth warned that by seeking refuge in “generic terms” the Army was creating a false understanding of war. “Such generalities appeal to the imagination, but are of only limited practical value.” This criticism could apply to the passages cited in the previous paragraph.

By imagining that initiative, decisive action, and mission command have substance independent of a specific context, the Army risks developing doctrine that describes an imaginary world we desire rather than the one we have. This was, in fact, one of the implicit critiques of past doctrine raised in the 2009 Capstone Concept. It is a criticism we have chosen to ignore.

A 1955 article by Colonel George A. Kelly contained another criticism that would be just as relevant today. Kelly found fault with the Army’s tendency to provide only “a verbal solution” to real problems by taking refuge in “virtuous” and “magic” words such as “dispersion, flexibility, and mobility” without providing the necessary detail about how to achieve these traits. This comes uncomfortably close to describing the operational tenets of ADP 3-0: flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. Few would find fault with the concepts, but *Unified Land Operations* provides little useful guidance on how to achieve such obviously desirable traits. In addition, because ADP 3-0 presents a series of stove-piped definitions treating each subject in isolation, there is no potentially illuminating discussion of the tensions among the tenets. For instance, does the centralizing aspect of synchronization ever impair adaptability?

This article has harped on the lack of specificity throughout *Unified Land Operations*. Whether or not the case has been persuasive, the effort throughout has been to measure ADP 3-0 against its own standards, not some arbitrary personal notion of what doctrine should be. ADP 3-0’s place within the hierarchy of Doctrine 2015 warrants high expectations. This critique weighs the discussion of integration against the manual’s claim that it was the most significant addition to capstone doctrine. We must evaluate the term decisive action in terms of...
its suitability as a descriptor for all land operations. This article weighs the claim that doctrine describes how the Army fights against the vague definitions of unified land operations and the operational tenets. But there are two final yardsticks specified within Unified Land Operations against which we should judge it.

The first is that doctrine should provide the “means of conceptualizing campaigns and operations, as well as a detailed understanding of conditions, frictions, and uncertainties that make achieving the ideal difficult.” ADP 3-0 comes closest to this ideal in its brief three-paragraph discussion of the operational art, but this segment is too short to build much momentum. Unified Land Operations then reverts to type and provides us with four pages of lists under the heading of “the operations structure.” These topics are not fundamental principles, but descriptive tools: the operations process, the operational framework, and the warfighting functions. They provide the means for conceptualizing campaigns in the most basic sense, but they do not illuminate the conditions, frictions, and uncertainties inherent in war. Indeed, uncertainty was the central theme of the 2009 Capstone Concept, so its absence from ADP 3-0 is thus even more disappointing. How can we discuss operations without discussing the fog and friction of war?

Yet even more glaring is the absence of the enemy. Although the opening review of the strategic context briefly identifies the nation’s two most challenging enemies as a nonstate entity able to attack our public will and a nuclear-armed state partnering with nonstate actors, after that passage there is no further mention of these—or any other—enemies. A description of operations without either uncertainty or an adversary is a sterile vision of warfare. Unified Land Operations confuses conceptual tools used to describe operations with the operations themselves.

Knowing Ourselves

Just as ADP 3-0 does not place operations in relation to the enemy, it also fails to place them in the context of the Army of 2012. This failure to speak to the present is particularly troublesome, as the Army is still working through the upheavals of modularity. While many of the new organizations have been tested in combat, those experiences represent only a limited portion of the spectrum of conflict and one that we do not anticipate revisiting in the near future. Thus, the best manner for using modular units might not be clear to joint task forces and land component commands. Some discussion of how modularity intersects with the new competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security, would be valuable. Sun Tzu said that the general who knows both himself and his enemy will “not be endangered in a hundred engagements,” yet our capstone doctrine has done nothing to foster collective professional knowledge of ourselves and our adversaries.

According to ADP 3-0, “capstone doctrine [emphasis added] also serves as the basis for decisions about organization, training, leader development, Soldiers, and facilities.” In an ideal world of linear processes, capstone doctrine would be the basis for other doctrine, as well as policies for equipping, manning, and training. In truth, not many engineers and force managers are waiting for the release of ADP 3-0 before they begin work. They often must make decisions long before the relevant doctrine appears. However, that does not mean that doctrine has no integrating function. Capstone doctrine is supposed to sort out and make sense of all the other disparate threads of organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities that shape the Army. It might be after the fact in terms of weapons procurement or force structure, but nonetheless, doctrine ought to suggest to commanders and staffs how to best use the capabilities of our forces. It also translates policy and strategic guidance into general guidelines for the employment of ground forces. ADP 3-0 is a great disappointment in this respect. It simply never engages with any of these issues.

The Army is understandably and commendably reluctant to tie the hands of commanders with overly prescriptive doctrine, but it is disingenuous to use this as an excuse for making doctrine nothing but definitions and generalities. In the process of allocating resources the Army has necessarily already made
difficult trade-offs that constrain commanders in such critical areas as which capabilities to place within brigade combat teams, the availability of enablers, the design characteristics to emphasize in vehicles and weapons, and where to allocate human capital. All of these trade-offs have operational implications. There is no better forum than ADP 3-0 for suggesting the most effective ways for commanders to take advantage of the resulting strengths and to mitigate resulting weaknesses. Rather than taking on this admittedly difficult task, Unified Land Operations confines itself to theoretical generalities that are so vague that they could just as well apply to the army of some other country or some other time in history. For instance, at what point have we not sought to achieve some other country or some other time in history. For whatever its eventual form, the U.S. Army should have capstone doctrine that meets the standards that ADP 3-0 recognizes yet fails to meet. Capstone doctrine should describe how the Army intends to fight in clear, compelling terms. It should help field grade and senior officers envision campaigns in all of their complexities and within the prevailing strategic context. Finally, it should help provide coherence to the efforts of the institutional Army by explaining the ramifications of resourcing decisions already made while clarifying likely future uses of land power (to better inform coming decisions). All this is desirable at any time, but ensuring that it takes place now is particularly important. This is a time for strategic vision, bold statements, and clear guidance. The Army looks to its capstone doctrine to provide such direction.

A Suggestion

What then should ADP 3-0 be? The following is a starting point for debate. Rather than a list of attributes and definitions, the new manual should begin with a brief discussion of how our current Army, with its associated strengths and weaknesses, can best apply the operational art. That general discussion would then be illuminated by two case studies, each describing a successful campaign against a hypothetical enemy—a nonstate actor and a regional power, both using an array of hybrid methods. Ideally, a single paragraph would cover each phase of the campaign, providing the reader with an understanding of how ground forces contribute to unified action, the interplay of combined arms maneuver and wide area security, the types of units best suited to those roles, and mission command during the frictions and uncertainties of war.

If retained, the tenets of operations should be illustrated in more tangible ways than at present. For instance, what role does lethality play in post-conflict stability operations? Case studies would provide a clear vision of how the Army fights without an unrealistic set of fixed rules that limit commanders’ freedom. This alternate ADP 3-0 would conclude with a discussion of the Army’s contribution to multinational, interagency, and joint operations. This hypothetical manual would provide both an inward-looking description of operations balanced by an outward-looking description of the link between land operations and national policy.

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Reductions of the end strength of the Army’s active component may or may not be advisable. In the wake of the latest strategic guidance from the Defense Department, *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (January 2012), the looming reductions of American ground forces have been much discussed. Whatever the merits of a smaller ground force from a defense or budgetary perspective, a smaller ground force is clearly inevitable, and the priority of the defense community is to develop plans to execute America’s military strategy in light of this new reality.

An agile expeditionary capability and the ability to increase the size of American ground forces in the event of a sustained commitment are the keys to success with a smaller standing Army and Marine Corps. With the Marine Corps and elements of the Army focused on the first point, it is this second point—ensuring the upward scalability of American ground forces—that requires further thought.

To begin, we must recognize the inevitability of a future conflict requiring a large ground force. Given the division of roles and responsibilities between the services, this observation primarily applies to the Army. The future need for a large land army is a question of “when,” not a question of “if.” We can decide as a matter of policy that we do not wish to engage in soldier-intensive counterinsurgency warfare, but this does not mean that we will always have the luxury of choosing when to participate in a future war. We may be drawn into a conflict, and successfully resolving that conflict may well require significant ground forces. Despite the best efforts of the State Department, all agree that future conflict is inevitable, and it will likely not come about at a time of our choosing. In the Army we like to speak of our nonnegotiable contract with America to fight and win our nation’s wars. We also like to say “the enemy has a vote,” and this applies to both where and when these wars take place. We can expect the enemy to attack us not in areas where we already exercise dominance, but where we are least prepared or willing to wage sustained war: on land.
As retired Major General Robert Scales wrote in the 5 January 2012 edition of the Washington Post, Here’s what the lessons of the past 70 years really teach us: We cannot pick our enemies; our enemies will pick us. They will, as they always have in the past, cede to us dominance in the air, on sea, and in space because they do not have the ability to fight us there. Our enemies have observed us closely in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they have learned the lessons taught by Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Saddam Hussein: America’s greatest vulnerability is dead Americans. So our future enemy will seek to fight us on the ground, where we have traditionally been poorly prepared. His objective will be to win by not losing, to kill as an end rather than as a means to an end.¹

None of this is to call into question the decision of the National Command Authority to reduce active component force structure at this time. Maintaining a large standing army in times of peace may be undesirable for many reasons, notably cost, but the need to economize today must not prevent us from beginning to lay a cost-effective foundation for success in a future war.

A key to success lies in the realization that a reduction in Army active component end-strength translates to an inevitable increase in the size of the Army’s Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). As a general matter, active component reductions lead to a cascade of talent into the Ready Reserve. While the size of the Ready Reserve should balloon in the short term to reflect the coming drawdown of the active component, its size will eventually stabilize as a proportion of the total size of the active component and Selected Reserve (SELRES). While the Ready Reserve does not completely mitigate the risks of a smaller active force, if properly managed it can be a crucial force multiplier, giving the National Command Authority increased flexibility in responding to an uncertain world.

Those soldiers cut from the active component who do not wish to participate in the Selected Ready Reserve...
Reserve (drilling Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve units), will end up assigned to the IRR for the duration of their statutory military service obligation (currently eight years from the day personnel are inducted into the service). If managed properly, these precious human resources (experienced soldiers, many with multiple deployments) can be effectively husbanded for two principal types of future use.

If, in a future conflict, the military surges back to force levels seen in Iraq and Afghanistan at the heights of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, individuals in the IRR can plug holes in deploying existing formations (which, for a variety of reasons, always have a certain degree of built-in “unreadiness” in their ranks and are routinely plussed-up in preparation for deployment). Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 10 years demonstrate that individual reservists are primarily used to fill holes in reserve component formations, with deploying Army National Guard units being the biggest consumers of Army IRR personnel. If, on the other hand, a future conflict requires full mobilization (to a million-man army and beyond), experienced soldiers such as those in the IRR can be used to form the core cadre of a greatly expanded conscript Army, taking on increased responsibility and rank to use their much greater relative experience to lead brand-new formations. We have the capacity to train new soldiers in a relatively short period of time; what we cannot build overnight is the experience needed to lead these formations. Individual Ready Reserve soldiers have the added benefit of being able to take leadership roles in new formations without directly decrementing the readiness of existing units.

Unfortunately, the Army’s Individual Ready Reserve currently suffers from significant problems, likely linked to a shortage of resources and institutional focus. The requirement, in paragraph 4.e.(2) of Department of Defense Instruction 1235.12, is that “the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) will be screened, maintained, and individually prepared for activation as a pretrained manpower pool to ensure the total force is completely resourced in the event of a contingency operation, national emergency, or war.” The reality is that, when Army IRR reservists were being involuntarily mobilized to active duty for Iraq and Afghanistan, more than half of them failed to respond to their notification letters. We do not know if this was because the contact information maintained by the Army was out of date or if these soldiers simply chose not to respond. Our current national policy does not support using law enforcement assets to compel compliance with mobilization orders.

Individual Ready Reserve readiness also suffers from the reservists’ misunderstanding of their obligations and an attenuated connection between the reservist and the Army. This latter problem has been much discussed under the continuum of service initiative advanced during Secretary Gates’ tenure; when soldiers leave active duty, they are “discharged” from the service and turn in their primary military identification (Common Access Card or CAC) instead of simply being transferred to the Ready Reserve to serve out the rest of the term as an individual reservist.

Fortunately, improving the management of the individuals in the Ready Reserve need not be expensive or complicated. It simply requires a willingness to identify existing shortcomings, an understanding of the Ready Reserve’s potential future importance, and the organizational will to commit a modest amount of time and energy to solving the problem.

Finding sufficient organizational resolve—the will to confront the problem—is the Army’s first big challenge. In an atmosphere of dwindling resources, the organization’s tendency is to cut all programs across the board. Politically speaking, the IRR doesn’t have a constituency within the Army that is willing to fight for a share of a shrinking resource
pool. In a way, this reflects the fact that the IRR isn’t important to today’s Army: the commanders and staffs of Army organizations, divisions, brigades, and battalions. The IRR’s importance is contingent on a future, as yet unidentified contingency (albeit one that we can be confident will come about sooner or later). The IRR is a partial solution to tomorrow’s force generation challenges; as such, its importance is to tomorrow’s Army.

Technology provides a ready fix to the problem of tracking individual reservists to ensure that they are available for future mobilization. Ensuring connectivity between an organization and a mobile, geographically diverse population is a problem that today’s banks, retailers, and other service organizations have largely solved by a creative use of the Internet. As long as some individual incentives exist (muster pay, PX/commissary access, etc.), getting individual reservists to log on, update their information, and perhaps show their face at a local Department of Defense (DOD) installation once a year (such as a National Guard armory, especially in areas remote from active component bases or U.S. Army Reserve centers) can be easily achieved with a robust, usable, web-enabled data network. A continued connection between the service member and the Defense Finance and Accounting Services—the ability to continue to receive direct pay—would provide another incentive to keep the reservists’ information up to date and facilitate tracking individual reservists. Social media provide additional opportunities to keep the reservist connected to the Army and develop or maintain any desire to serve in the event of future conflict.

Technology could also greatly facilitate completion of the ready reservist’s annual muster requirement, which is now mostly ignored unless the reservist happens to live near one of the large-scale events periodically organized by Army Human Resources Command. A user-friendly and accessible data network would facilitate on-line completion of many, if not all, of the crucial muster activities (updating information and answering questions relating to readiness status), making an in-person appearance for height and weight validation, and other matters at a local DOD facility a relatively painless activity requiring minimal advance preparation.

MAJ Hollis Cantrell, HRC career manager, verifies an Individual Ready Reserve soldier’s retirement points during an IRR Readiness Muster at the Army Reserve Center, Newtown Square, PA.
Picture this: at some time each year an individual reservist attends a muster at a nearby National Guard armory. The full-time staff checks the IRR database and confirms that he or she has already completed the on-line portion of the annual muster requirement. They validate the reservist’s height, weight, and in-person attendance, triggering automatic payment of the annual muster pay through DFAS.

A user-friendly, accessible database, combined with a clearer understanding of the ready reserve obligation and the organizational resolve to maintain a more useful IRR, would arguably result in measurably improved IRR readiness and participation rates. An improved understanding by soldiers of their ready reserve obligation would involve better communication, both with new recruits when they enter the service and with those soldiers transitioning from the active component/Selected Reserve to IRR status. This would include a briefing on the opportunities for variable participation that exist for IRR soldiers (additional duty assignments, drilling for retirement points, and opportunities to take additional military training). The active component/Selected Reserve to IRR transition will have to be better managed, consistent with the reality that these soldiers are not “getting out,” but simply transitioning to a different readiness category. Reservists will have to maintain a “real” military CAC ID and, with it, the ability to access military data networks and certain privileges hitherto reserved to active component and selected reserve soldiers. Social media will reinforce the ongoing tie between the Army and the reservist and keep the reservist apprised of the events, opportunities, and benefits of IRR service.

The current IRR affiliation program tries to affiliate individual reservists with drilling selected reserve units close to where they live to provide soldier and family support. This concept, championed and implemented by the U.S. Army Reserve and Army Human Resources Command in partnership with the Army National Guard, is a step in the direction of using local DOD resources to support geographically dispersed individual reservists. Unfortunately, this program simply provides an additional avenue of support for IRR soldiers and their families. It does nothing to directly support the IRR’s viability as a trained manpower provider.

Additional attention (and a very modest reallocation of existing resources) could upgrade the management and infrastructure of the IRR to allow it to mitigate some risks of a smaller active component. Effective management of personnel cut from the active duty end strength will provide a strategic “cushion” of reserve personnel to enable any necessary medium-term surge in the size of Army ground forces. Similarly, if prudently managed, ready reservists can provide a core cadre for new force structure in circumstances of total mobilization without critically decrementing the readiness of existing active component and Selected Reserve formations. The Army faces an important strategic choice in the current constrained budgetary environment. The Army should use its currently available resources and authorities to set the conditions for a successful future surge capacity. MR

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2. The topic of individual reservists maintaining the common access card (CAC) was much discussed at recent Individual Ready Reserve commanders’ conferences. At my last involvement, the Army systems community was very much opposed, but with the movement toward CAC-only access to many Army resources (such as a soldier’s on-line personnel file) and the symbolic importance of possession of a CAC as evidencing “real” military service, it appears that the benefits of providing a CAC to ready reservists outweigh the costs. To a soldier, it appears inconceivable that the Army could, on the one hand, attempt to keep individual reservists connected to the Army and “on the hook” for future deployments without, on the other, allowing them to maintain their CAC.
There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.

—John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1962

Corporal Scott R. Mitchell recently completed his second deployment to Afghanistan as the nonlethal targeting subject matter expert while working with an intelligence support team. He received extensive predeployment instruction including counterinsurgency theory, socio-political information collection, and evaluation training.

PHOTO: U.S. Army CPL Shane Rager, Khost Provincial Reconstruction Team, provides security during a quality assurance check of the new road that extends from the Tani district center to the village of Narizah, 5 April 2010. (U.S. Air Force, SrA Julianne M. Showalter)

TODAY’S OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (OE) calls for intelligence to be both gathered and disseminated at the lowest level. Platoons on the ground are making key decisions, and it is the “strategic corporals” who are the difference-makers in this age of irregular warfare. No longer are junior enlisted service members tasked only to perform battle drills and provide security in a line platoon. Everyone in the platoon is an intelligence collector and can bring something to the counterinsurgency table.

In today’s warfare, the military intelligence community needs to take a step backward to move forward. We now face a new enemy, one that functioned in ancient times and that has rendered our sophisticated high-tech tools useless. Today’s enemy is not the progressive and powerful Soviet Union, but the unsophisticated, ununiformed insurgent. To paraphrase David Ignatius, our enemies who live like it’s the past and behave like it’s the past have realized that they are fighting guys from the future, and guys from the future find it very hard to see you if you throw away your cell phone, shut down your email, and pass all your instructions face-to-face, hand-to-hand. If your adversary turns his back on technology and just disappears into the crowd with no flags and no uniforms, and your friends dress just like your enemies and your enemies dress like your friends, then the boots on the ground have a very hard time finding an opponent to fight.1

The Intelligible Human Dynamic

In this day and age, all the sophisticated technology in the world will not defeat our new enemy by itself. During standard Cold War operations, intelligence capabilities were quite effective in determining the enemy’s intentions, situation, and likely courses of action. The rigid nature of those operations allowed intelligence personnel to apply templates to probable
actions and maximize the collection capabilities of technological systems. However, in today’s operational environment, such technical superiority is marginalized. We must become more aware of the enemy’s intangible human dynamic. To do so requires a heavier focus on human intelligence, cultural preparation, and counterinsurgency techniques. As Montgomery McFate expressed it, “Traditional methods of warfighting have proven inadequate in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. technology, training, and doctrine designed to counter the Soviet threat are not designed for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain.”

One of many difficulties we have today is convincing a chain of command that adheres to a tradition of fighting and winning wars using conventional methods that they must abandon the old ways and implement new innovative ways for a nonfighting war. In today’s counterinsurgency operational environment, the main effort is the population, not the enemy. Unconventional warfare offers a solution to insurgent-fed war that kinetic or conventional warfare does not. Kinetic or conventional warfare uses conventional military intelligence, weapons, and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation. The adversaries are well defined and fight using weapons that primarily target the opposing army. However, conventional warfare simply does not work when fighting an insurgency.

In a counterinsurgency war environment, a higher number of hard-to-predict events occur, as they do on a daily basis in Afghanistan. Assassinations, improvised explosive devices, and ambushes are less likely to be picked up through imagery intelligence and signals intelligence. We need to look to other sources of intelligence for a better operational picture of the battle space. Human intelligence is one of those sources that we should be relying on, and it should come from a wide array of collectors, not just those with 35-series MOSs. Soldiers who patrol the battle space, private through captain, can and should bring data to the analyst. While fighting in a counterinsurgency the “strategic corporal” plays a particularly important role. Because our main effort is the population, understanding the population’s needs, wants, motives, and grievances will help separate it from the insurgence. Who better to gather that data than the boots on the ground?

**Fine Points**

During my time in Afghanistan, I identified five things the Army needs to do to perform well in a counterinsurgency:

- Educate the operators on counterinsurgency tactics and why the use of courageous restraint is necessary and will lead to victory.
- Have a good understanding of the values, norms, and beliefs of those who reside in our operational environment and a systematic way of collecting and disseminating data about them.
- Manage information and expectations.
- Empower the fighting force at the lowest levels.
- Support host nation elements attached to our units.

As I noted above, we must convince the chain of command to implement new, innovative ways of “nonfighting” the war. When I attempted to do this, I discovered that many of the soldiers in southern Afghanistan had not read FM 3-24, or knew Fall, Galula, or Kilcullen’s works. The basic principles of counterinsurgency were foreign to them. This left them ill-equipped and uninformed about the fundamental concepts of counterinsurgency. They found the use of measured force a very hard pill to swallow. However, in today’s operational environment, our main effort is to protect the people. Because collateral damage hurts that cause, in some cases, seeking cover is better than shooting. We need soldiers to change their mind-set—and stop reacting to contact and start responding to the many different

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**The basic principles of counterinsurgency were foreign to them.**
situations unconventional warfare presents. According to pundit Robert Steele, “In this environment, as in the law enforcement environment, shooting is the last thing you want a soldier to do, and thinking is the only thing you will want every soldier to be doing 24/7.” Although killing will be necessary, it must be ruthlessly accurate and measured against the reaction it is likely to produce. What are its second- and third-order effects? For example, if killing five insurgents creates ten more, is killing the five prudent? Counterinsurgency is a political process; it is a battle to win the favor of the people, not a race to kill the enemy. Mao Tse-tung notably said, “Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed.”

Yet, I found that the boots on the ground regarded courageous restraint as cowardice and persistent presence patrols and defensive operations as more of a hindrance than a “real mission.” As soldiers who adhered to the tradition of fighting and winning wars using conventional methods, they were more interested in killing the enemy than in key leader engagements. I found this mind-set from commander to private. It must change in order for us to be successful. In a counterinsurgency, killing is not our main effort. In the words of Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, “Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operations and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population.” Educating our platoon leaders on counterinsurgency should be standard procedure, as should be issuing and assigning FM 3-24 reading before deployment to Afghanistan.

We need a better understanding of the values, norms, and beliefs of those who reside within our area of operations. We should never assume what is happening there; we must always find out what is occurring. The “green layer” of the battle space is the most important layer in a counterinsurgency. According to a Center for Lessons Learned handbook, “The population in the area of conflict as a distinct and critical aspect of the situation. In both operational
theaters today (Iraq and Afghanistan) it is important to understand local knowledge and to understand the population, referred to as the green layer. We must answer the questions of who, what, when, where, and how as they pertain to culture, social behavior, norms and sanctions, conflict resolution, legitimacy of authority figures, the political and economic systems (both formal and informal), demographics, cultural geography, essential services, religious factors, popular attitudes, and external factors.

Culture is an essential aspect of the green layer. What may look abnormal in America may be perfectly acceptable in the area of operation. Myths and storytelling are a big aspect of tribal society. Understanding indigenous historical narratives improves our situational awareness. Understanding how the people resolve conflicts is a big part of understanding the environment, especially in places like Afghanistan, where the insurgents have set up shadow court systems to administer justice. Knowing who the legitimate authority figures are helps us identify what is right and wrong. The people we may think are in charge, such as village elders, maliks, or mullahs, are often puppets, with insurgents pulling their strings. Look for and find the true leaders. One of the ways to do this is by looking to see who the people are drawn to. Ask questions that bring the identities of the true power brokers to light. Who do the people go to for help? Whom do they seek approval from?

Understanding the economic system is also vital. How one makes his living often determines what side of the insurgency he will side with. Do not overlook institutions, essential services, and demographics. Knowing area literacy and employment rates, religious sect membership, and the population’s education, race, age, gender, and socio-economic status will also help in understanding the OE.

However, we must understand not only the condition but also the capabilities in the area. Schools and infrastructure are the building blocks of stability. But if there are no teachers to fill the schools, building them is fruitless. External factors affecting the environment are particularly significant. How do neighboring countries and foreign partners influence the environment? How does the local population interact with the foreign authority, and what is their reaction to the presence of foreign authority?

Knowing the socio-cultural information of the area of operation will aid us in the military decision making process and enable us to answer the important question of “why” things are happening. Looking past our own experience and studying a new world is foreign to Americans. Most Americans are ethnocentric in that we generally rebuff, rebuke, and berate that which is unknown. We need to understand and accept people’s differences for what they are and move forward. As Sir John Bagot Glubb wrote in *War in the Desert*, “The greater part of mankind is so narrowly and so complacently satisfied with their own standpoint that it never occurs to them to imagine themselves in other men’s positions, or to endeavor to analyze their motives. What a different world it would be if you all did so!”

Completing a census operation is important. This is something that the troop I was assigned to did well in Afghanistan. We conducted a village census and with the help of a human terrain team, we were able to collect comprehensive demographic data on the population. We obtained villagers’ perspectives on security, village needs, local leaders, and sources of prosperity. After finishing our fieldwork, we collected, organized, and uploaded the census data into a database in an effort to distribute the data to a global military audience. Being able...
to access census information was very useful to our unit. I found that throughout our theater of operations we do an excellent job capturing and distributing data pertaining to lethal targets, but little nonlethal census information is available.

To better prepare the unit to conduct a systematic census, I broke the village down into zones A through I and then assigned a gridded reference graphic number to each house in the zones. This gave the unit a starting point from which to obtain a standard grid reference. During the census fieldwork, we asked basic household questions, took photos of military-aged males as well, then transferred the data to a baseball-card format and uploaded it by gridded reference graphic into the database.

This allowed access to the information from any military computer, and was useful during routine patrols for real-time information about subjects during tactical questioning and street-level engagements. Much like a police officer in the United States, I could run a name or address and quickly relay information back to the unit on the ground, reporting how many people lived in a given house, describing them, and providing identifying questions such as “What is your father’s name”?

We have to manage information and expectations. Every action has a reaction in the realm of information. Word spreads very quickly in the new operational environment and insurgents use this to their advantage. Those we are protecting see and hear everything we do and say. Our actions always produce a positive or negative information reaction. We must constantly be aware of what we say and do and understand that our behaviors affect our environment in a positive or negative way; it all depends on us.

Even so, there are fundamental differences in the way we and the insurgent use information operations. The insurgent tends to formulate an information operations message and then plan an operation to support it. According to a report from the Army War College, “Insurgents use kinetic actions to achieve informational and political effects within the population”10 We formulate a mission and then create an information operations message that supports that mission.11

This fundamental difference is one of the reasons the insurgents are superior at accomplishing their political objective. The current state of our information operations is, as Steele wrote, “a mutant mix of public relations and psychological operations on steroids, with zero intelligence.”12 To counter the insurgent information operations message we must recognize this and move progressively and decisively, remembering that our combat actions generally have a negative impact on our political objective, and insurgent actions are a means to an end.

In places such as Afghanistan, it can be very frustrating for the populace to recognize that the United States cannot help them with all their problems. They regard the U.S. soldier as if he were from outer space. For example, the equipment that allows us to survive explosions and see in the dark is completely alien to a people living as though it were the year 3 A.D. Such persons wonder why we cannot provide them with electrical power
with the snap of our fingers. We must use effective information operations campaigns to ensure that the population is aware of what we can—and cannot—do for them. Furthermore, we should allow the population to take ownership of any improvements to the environment, so they will protect and maintain the gains we fought so hard to get. It is better for them to purchase a generator than it is for us to give them one; by purchasing it they will take ownership of it. There was evidence of this in Nuristan in 2006 with the development of a USAID micro hydro-electricity project, where the village purchased micro hydro-electric generators, took ownership of them, and defended them against theft or destruction by insurgents.13

Fourth, empower the fighting force at the lowest levels. Counterinsurgency is a decentralized war and as such, we have to empower the troops on the ground to make decisions that suit their needs. As stated above, “strategic corporals” are the difference-makers. In addition, we should have a good, well-equipped company intelligence support team presence on the ground working with the fighting force gathering data and quickly converting that data into actionable intelligence and putting it into ground commanders’ hands. Many soldiers are unaware of the role of these teams, and in many instances, the teams are left in the dark on upcoming missions and uninformed on results from those missions. In various battalion- and company-sized units, tasks such as tactical site exploitation are incomplete, and debriefs are given by platoon leaders or senior enlisted only. We need better understanding of how the company intelligence support team can help commanders and platoon leaders in mission planning and intelligence preparation.

Last, there must be support for the host nation. The war has to be won by those we are trying to help. The fundamental advantage the insurgent has is time; he will remain in the environment when we leave. We need to convince the population that their government will protect them when we leave. One of the best ways to do this is through joint operations, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our host-nation partner. Training, mission planning, and maneuvers should all be joint operations with the ultimate goal of having the host nation take the lead.

**Conclusion**

As counterinsurgency advisor Kilcullen has stated, in today’s operational environment, the enemy is fluid but the population is fixed.

When you fight a conventional enemy, you attack something that the enemy must defend, and then you use that ground as a pivot point in which to maneuver. In counterinsurgency, the enemy has nothing to defend. When you start making ground and pushing back, the enemy in an insurgency can just walk away or hide amongst the population.14

Ground troops—not just specialized human collection and terrain teams—must collect HUMINT throughout the region. The main focus must be on the population, not the enemy; the enemy can run away, the population cannot. As Kilcullen wrote, “Fighting an insurgency using conventional warfare is like looking for a needle in a haystack, but you’re actually destroying the haystack to find the needle.”15

Conventional warfare damages the population, which alienates them, and creates a recruitment base for the insurgents, which creates a cycle of destruction. In a counterinsurgency, you need to convince the “haystack” to give you the “needle.”

An insurgency requires the enemy to rouse the population. It also must act in a way that leads to support and sympathy. In a counterinsurgency, the troops need to interrupt this cycle; by being in the village patrolling, much like a neighborhood police officer, they can take the reaction of the population away from the insurgency. If they succeed, it will be difficult for the insurgent to achieve anything: “The role of the international force in counterinsurgency is to hold the ring and create space that allows the political process to take place.”16

We need to create enough calmness and enough population security to allow political leadership
to go forward. If we do not fight in today’s current theaters of operation using nonconventional means, we will lose. The thought process of reacting to contact must change. Before we react, we must understand our environment and respond. It will take an enormous amount of courageous restraint and understanding to win, for every shot fired, every bomb dropped is a step back in the war to win the favor of the population, and the population is the key to success. The most effective weapon in today’s operational environment is the shot not fired. According to McFate, “Often, the application of overwhelming force has the negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruitment, and demonstrating the ‘brutality’ of state forces.”

The military community has to start looking at doing things that are not traditional. “Counterinsurgency strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically.” If you can win the support of the people then they will permit an environment that allows for a stable government structure, and that stable government structure will have the ability to maintain the rule of law. **MR**

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**NOTES**

8. Ibid.
12. Steele, 18-45.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. McFate.
General Richard Cavazos and the Korean War, 1953

A Study in Combat Leadership

Colonel Thomas C. Graves, U.S. Army

By 1952, the war in Korea had settled into something that more closely resembled World War I than the fluid movement of World War II. The front lines of the opponents, the Republic of Korea and United States in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and China in the north, had more or less stabilized along a front that wound from the East Sea to the West Sea at around the 38th parallel. This line ebbed and flowed both north and south as peace talks continued at Panmunjom—with both sides using offensive or defensive actions to strengthen their position in the negotiations. Into this stalemated war, the Army sent a young lieutenant and placed him in a unit recovering from a tragic episode. The lieutenant, Richard Cavazos, would command a company with distinction and demonstrate the combat leadership that eventually earned him four stars as the first Hispanic promoted to full general in the United States Army.1

The 65th Infantry Regiment

The Borinqueneers of the 65th Infantry Regiment, Puerto Rican National Guard, arrived in Korea early in the war. Sent straight from Puerto Rico, the regiment quickly pushed into the Naktong Bulge where it was attached to the 2nd Infantry Division. Arriving almost simultaneously with the Inchon landing and the breakout from the Naktong Bulge, the regiment gained valuable combat experience as it accompanied the 2nd Division (and for a short time the 25th Infantry Division) north of the 38th parallel. Eventually earning accolades for its actions at the Hamhung Peninsula, the regiment was critical in supporting the seaborne evacuation of the U.S. X Corps in December 1950 after the Chinese intervened and forced the corps to redeploy to the south.2

Colonel Thomas C. Graves is the director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previous assignments include command of the 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Hovey, Korea, and two combat tours in Iraq.

PHOTO: Soldiers from the only all-Hispanic unit in U.S. Army history, the Borinqueneers of the 65th Infantry Regiment, north of the Han River, Korea, June 1951. (U.S. Army)
The regiment continued to fight for the remainder of the war primarily assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division as the “division’s fourth regiment” and gradually gaining experience among its noncommissioned officer corps and soldiers. The unit struggled at times with discrimination that was typical of the Army of the 1940s and 1950s. This was compounded by the fact that many of the soldiers could not speak English, which required orders to be translated to Spanish into make them clear—a process often not accomplished in time to execute the operation. Despite these difficulties, the unit performed well up until October 1952 when it came under tremendous scrutiny during the Outpost (OP) Jackson fight along the stabilized front.

Throughout 1952, the bulk of the regiment’s NCO corps rotated back to Puerto Rico after completion of normal tour of duty requirements, and the new leaders in the regiment were not prepared to lead soldiers in battle. Many of them did not speak Spanish and had tremendous difficulty communicating with their subordinates—much less inspiring them under the violent conditions that existed along the front lines. The combination of new leadership, new soldiers, and poor communications led to wholesale panic on the night of 26 October 1952 during the battle of OP Jackson. Many of the unit’s soldiers simply fled the battlefield. The aftermath of this episode resulted in the court martial of over 90 soldiers assigned to the regiment. In his subsequent inquiry, Major John S.D. Eisenhower, the son of the soon-to-be president and an operations officer in the 15th Regiment, detailed to conduct the investigation, recommended that the unit be either returned immediately to Puerto Rico or be disbanded and reconstituted with “continents” (a euphemism for officers and noncommissioned officers from the continental United States, which translated to mean caucasian officers in the still
white-centric U.S. Army of the late 1940s and early 1950s) in key leadership positions. The division commander concurred with the report and requested reconstitution from the Eighth Army commanding general, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet. The unit was officially reconstituted in March 1953. In the interim, the Army sent the regiment south to begin a period of retraining while the decision on reconstitution made its way through the Army bureaucracy to Washington. The 65th began its retraining in November, and a number of new officers and NCOs arrived to fill out the leadership ranks. Among these leaders was a young lieutenant recently arrived to the 3rd Division, Richard Cavazos.

The Early Years
Cavazos’ father, Lauro Cavazos, arrived at the King Ranch in Texas in 1912 as a cowhand on what was then the largest working cattle ranch in the world. His natural abilities and leadership were noticed by the King family and eventually resulted in him becoming the cattle foreman of the ranch. In between, he demonstrated his bravery and leadership as an artillery battery first sergeant during World War I. In 1923, Lauro married Thomasa Quintanilla and raised five children, four boys and a girl.

The Cavazos children amassed an amazing record that would make any American family proud. All five children attended college—a feat unheard of for a Mexican family working on a Texas cattle ranch in the 1940s. One son, Bobby, became the leading rusher in Division 1 NCAA football in 1953 at Texas Technical College (later Texas Technical University). His accomplishments on the football field earned him second team all-American honors and helped lead his team to a win against Auburn University at the Gator Bowl in Florida. His life would be full of accomplishments as a soldier, politician, author, and musician. Another son, Lauro, Jr., earned a Ph.D. in physiology, was appointed as the president of Texas Tech, and subsequently served as the Secretary of Education for presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush before finishing his career as a professor at Tufts University in Boston.

Richard Cavazos, the second son of Lauro senior, entered North Texas Agricultural College (NTAC) in Denton, Texas, in 1947 on a football scholarship.
Caroline Greek, from Gainesville, Texas, and, wryly, she would say, “He spent our honeymoon in Korea.” Newspaper clippings of their wedding show a petite, attractive Caroline posed with her proud husband surrounded by other infantry lieutenants. Their union would last through over 30 years of Army service, multiple assignments throughout the world, and still continues to this day.

An imposing figure of medium height with a gruff, low voice and a slight Texas accent, Cavazos was muscular from his time playing football at Texas Tech and had a commanding presence. One newspaper account described him as “husky.” He was a natural leader, as drawn to soldiers as they were to him. His natural love for soldiering and soldiers manifested itself in often emotional ways.

Korea

Arriving in Korea in the fall of 1952 and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division, which was then holding a line that encompassed the Chorwon Valley and nearby heights, Cavazos was offered staff assignments as a lieutenant, but his heart was set on command and he made his desires known as clearly as possible: “I just wanted to command and they were going to make me a liaison officer to some command or another.” Fortunately, for Cavazos and the Army, the decision to reorganize the 65th Infantry Regiment coincided with his arrival in the division, and he quickly volunteered for assignment to the star-crossed regiment.

It would prove to be a perfect fit. Cavazos had spent his childhood in south Texas as a kineno—the word literally translates to “The King’s Men” used to describe the vaqueros who were hired by the King Ranch and whose children were born on the property. Lauro Cavazos only spoke English to his children, reinforcing his desire that they learn the primary language of his adopted homeland.

Richard enjoyed reading and memorizing the poems of Rudyard Kipling. (Much later, one of his aides de camp recalled how then Lieutenant General Cavazos could still recite all of Kipling’s poems by memory.) However, Cavazos’ mother spoke only Spanish in the house, so while Richard gained a great command of the English language, he was also bilingual—a skill that came in handy throughout his career. He put it to its greatest use in his assignment in the 65th Infantry, where he issued orders to his soldiers in Spanish during battles. Spanish was so prevalent in the 65th that even the famed KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) soldiers assigned to the regiment learned Spanish, but did not learn English. As Cavazos put it, “The man who could speak Spanish was king.”

Cavazos’ initial assignment was as a platoon leader in E Company, 2nd Battalion, 65th Infantry Regiment. After going through some retraining, the regiment moved back to the front lines with the 3rd Infantry Division when it relieved the 25th Infantry Division near the Iron Triangle. Because the front line of troops was long, the regiment kept all three battalions on line with each battalion placing three companies on line. With the stabilization of the front, the standard practice for front-line infantry units was for each battalion to send out one to three patrols every night to prevent surprises by opposing Chinese forces. These patrols focused on the valleys that separated the two forces along the hill tops. Frequently, the patrols never encountered any enemy and returned without incident. However, if they made enemy contact and suffered any casualties it became a matter of honor to not leave a wounded soldier for the enemy to retrieve. This was doubly true for the soldiers in the 65th Regiment, after their performance at Jackson Heights. As Cavazos related, some of the biggest fights occurred because of the need to evacuate wounded. Once a unit made contact, if the number of casualties outstripped the ability of the patrol to evacuate them, a reserve force would be launched, and the resulting fight could last for hours.

As dishonorable as it was to leave a wounded comrade on the field of battle, the opposite was also true—it was the height of honor to capture an enemy soldier in a fight. As the regiment continued to defend along the Iron Triangle line,
they continued to encounter enemy patrols and attacks. During the night of 25 February 1953, a large Chinese force attacked Cavazos’ platoon. The attack was eventually defeated and, as the enemy withdrew at dawn, Cavazos noticed a wounded Chinese soldier in front of his position. He requested permission to recover the soldier and then led a small force forward. As expected, the enemy blanketed the area with mortar, artillery, and small-arms fire to cover their withdrawal. Undaunted, Cavazos left his small force to cover him and moved forward alone to recover the enemy soldier. For this action, he earned his first Silver Star. It would later be matched by a second Silver Star he received as a battalion commander in Vietnam.25

When the official Army decision came down to reconstitute the regiment and completely integrate it with over half of the soldiers coming from the Continental United States, the regiment was withdrawn from the line and moved back to reorganize and refit. Spanish-speaking, Puerto Rican soldiers were reassigned to other regiments while the regiment received soldiers from other units and underwent another period of intensive training before it reassumed a position along the line.26 E Company received new platoon leaders, including Second Lieutenant Patsy J. Scarpato, who would later earn a Purple Heart and Silver Star leading his platoon in combat actions.

By the time the regiment returned to the line, Cavazos had assumed command of Company E. The regiment moved up and reinforced a line along the Chorwon Valley where it was in constant contact with Chinese and North Korean forces. As part of 2nd Battalion, E Company moved back along the Chorwon-Kumwah line on 15 May 1953. Linked in with 3rd Battalion on their east and 1st Battalion in the rear as a reserve, the regiment continued to encounter enemy contact, including a major attack on 16 May on OP Harry, a critical position manned by elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by 3rd Battalion, 65th Regiment. This attack was a precursor to a larger effort the enemy attempted against the outpost in June as the prospect for a ceasefire grew closer.27

Cavazos again distinguished himself as a leader along the line during the enemy attack on OP Harry. Despite the fact that a unit outside his company and battalion manned the outpost, Cavazos recognized that enemy artillery fire had severed the vital communications link between the regiment and the outpost. Giving no thought to the danger, he moved forward and repaired the wire under heavy artillery and mortar fire. His efforts were effective, and the Army awarded him a Bronze Star for Valor for his courage under fire—his second award for valor in less than four months.28

For the remainder of the month, the regiment encountered sporadic enemy contact while continuing to aggressively patrol to protect their positions until relieved by the 15th Infantry Regiment. The 65th shifted west a mile and reassumed a portion of the line with 1st Battalion and 3rd Battalion along the front and 2nd Battalion in reserve. This shift caused the enemy to probe the regiment on the night of 10 June. The resulting fight expanded to a full enemy assault on the 15th Infantry Regiment’s position at OP Harry over the next five days.29 The OP Harry fight was part of a coordinated Chinese Communist assault across the front lines. It was believed that during this fight the enemy poured an estimated 67,000 artillery rounds into United Nations Forces, and UN artillery responded with over 117,000 rounds.30
To relieve the beleaguered 15th, 2nd Battalion launched a series of company-sized raids against Chinese forces to their front. On 14 June, Cavazos led E Company on one of these raids. Hill 412 was important for the overall defense of OP Harry. Located near the small Korean town of Sagimak, it covered the crucial western flank of the outpost. Due to its positioning, E Company was ordered to retake the hill from the Chinese and hold it to prevent the enemy from successfully taking OP Harry.31

14 June 1953

This action would start no differently than any E Company action under Cavazos’ leadership. Cavazos made it a point to train and rehearse all missions on similar terrain behind friendly lines. E Company spent the afternoon of 14 June walking through the actions required to assault Hill 412. In June, the weather in Korea is almost perfect for campaigning. The traditional monsoon season has not quite approached, the days are long, and the temperatures are warm in the day and comfortable at night. On 14 June 1953, the night was overcast and very dark with a new moon and no moonlight.32

As dusk approached, the company crossed the line of departure for their assault of the Chinese position and almost immediately came under intense artillery fire. Disregarding the fire, Cavazos urged his soldiers to push the attack. On the left flank, a Chinese machine gunner opened up on the advancing soldiers, causing many casualties and forcing E company to go to ground.33 Sergeant Joseph Lefort and Private First Class Rawleigh Garman, Jr., in the lead squad would work together to destroy this enemy position so that the company could resume its advance.34 The company violently completed its assault on the Chinese position and held it against numerous counterattacks. The enemy continued to pour heavy artillery fire into the position throughout the next three hours. With almost one-third of the company’s soldiers casualties, the position on the hill became tenuous. Just after midnight, the company received the order to return to friendly lines, having protected OP Harry against a Chinese assault.

Arguably, a withdrawal maneuver is the most dangerous action for a unit in combat with a determined enemy. Executing a withdrawal at night under cover of darkness, with one third of the unit wounded or killed, under heavy artillery and mortar fire, is almost impossible. History is replete with examples of units that started orderly withdrawals that would later turn into routs when leaders lost control of the situation. Once in a rout, it is not uncommon for soldiers to abandon equipment and wounded soldiers, drop their weapons, and flee in a panic to safety. U.S. forces in Korea encountered this phenomenon repeatedly in the first two years of the war. One key to a successful withdrawal is aggressive small-unit leadership that can maintain a warrior spirit among soldiers while executing the movement. Cavazos and his lieutenants would provide that leadership.

Having successfully penetrated the enemy’s entrenchments, causing numerous enemy casualties and destroying equipment, E Company began to withdraw shortly after midnight. By now, the company had been in the fight for over three hours and fatigue was beginning to take its toll. As he ordered the withdrawal, Cavazos set an example of calm leadership by remaining in position to search for wounded soldiers and refusing to leave a fallen comrade. He located five such soldiers and evacuated them one by one to a position of cover within the company’s hasty perimeter on the reverse slope of the enemy position. Satisfied that the five soldiers were safe with the company, he then moved forward again to search for more wounded and help gather his company together under heavy fire. Sometime during this action, he was wounded by artillery fire, but he never noticed. He was focused on his mission and the adrenalin was pumping. Despite his wounds, he continued the search until he was satisfied that all soldiers were accounted for and then led the company back to friendly lines.35 The entire company leadership ensured that the movement back into friendly lines was as organized as possible. There was no rout, no panic, no discipline, and no dishonor in the action. It is a testament to Cavazos that he was able to make this possible given the circumstances.

Cavazos made it a point to train and rehearse all missions on similar terrain behind friendly lines.
For this action, Cavazos earned the nation’s second highest award for valor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Army recognized the entire company for its bravery with at least 10 soldiers receiving the Silver Star for various actions throughout the night.36

Coming back through friendly lines, a soldier noted that Cavazos’ back was bleeding. Cavazos reported to the battalion surgeon who extracted shrapnel and small pieces of rock embedded in Cavazos’ skin from artillery fire and debris kicked up by the incoming shells. Without his knowledge, the battalion surgeon submitted his name through medical channels for the award of the Purple Heart.37

Many of the soldiers from the company would go to the battalion medical aid station throughout the night and the next day for care of their wounds. In some cases, soldiers did not even recognize that they were wounded until daylight came and others could see the blood.38

The fighting continued throughout June and into July as each nation jockeyed for its final position. The company defended against a concerted enemy effort to break through the area toward the end of the war.39 Finally, on 27 July, the armistice was signed and went into effect at 2200 hours that night. In the final hours of the conflict, each side unleashed an incredibly artillery barrage, then silence overcame the front at the appointed time. Cavazos remembered each side spending the next couple of weeks policing its concertina wire, equipment, and other items to prevent its opponents from taking them with them as they withdrew. The regiment was determined that no Chinese or North Korean forces gained from captured U.S. equipment. Despite the patrols and equipment gathering, there was no contact between the opposing sides and the ceasefire held along the line.40

Lessons Learned

Cavazos spent the next month in Korea with the regiment until it was his turn to rotate back to the United States in September 1953. Reassigned to Fort Hood, Texas, he resumed his life with his new bride at the post. He returned to the United States for his battlefield heroism and assumed command of an infantry company at Hood. His career included another successful combat tour as a battalion commander in Vietnam, where he earned another Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star—establishing him as one of the most decorated soldiers in the U.S. Army. He eventually retired as a four-star general.

Cavazos’ performance as a combat leader reinforces the notion that soldiers thrive on good leadership and will perform at their best as long as their officers demonstrate that they care about their well-being. Although the regiment had undergone a difficult period immediately prior to Cavazos’ arrival, he (and the other officers assigned to the regiment) turned the regiment around and created a dedicated, capable, combat force that served with distinction for the remainder of the war. In his words, “I never saw a unit break or run while I was there,” a fact that brings Cavazos tremendous pride to this day.41

A closer examination of his actions that led to the award of the Distinguished Service Cross on 14 June 1953 highlights what the Army expects of a combat leader. What one finds in this story is a leader who refused to let the enemy gain the upper hand, and rallied his soldiers to press the attack to meet the mission—even as soldiers were very aware that armistice talks were underway and expected the war to end soon. Soldiers understood the importance of Hill 412 to the UN position and never questioned the need for the attack.42

Cavazos understood the value of training, even during a period of extended combat. The company would never accept that a mission was “standard operating procedure.” Leaders and soldiers rehearsed and practiced all missions prior to executing them, and this led to successful company actions. Throughout these rehearsals, Cavazos’ soldiers understood that he would never ask them to do something that he was personally unwilling to do himself—a basic premise behind small-unit leadership.43

Cavazos adamantly refused to leave a soldier behind on the battlefield. Despite great personal danger, he continued to search for his soldiers, making sure that he had total accountability before he finally ordered the company to withdraw. This is the ultimate act of a leader who loves his soldiers, and this practice set Cavazos apart as a leader throughout his career.

Finally, Cavazos enforced the discipline required of soldiers in combat. This was evident in the valor and bravery displayed by the soldiers during the withdrawal from Hill 412. It was also evident in smaller ways. Soldiers were required to wear flak
vests, despite their size and weight and how uncomfortable they could be in combat. Scarpato credited the flak vest for keeping him alive. Without its protection, shrapnel would have killed him. This emphasis on discipline was critical to keeping soldiers alive on the battlefield.

Cavazos’ actions throughout his service in the Korean War are an example of dedication and bravery. He was disciplined and organized and truly cared for his soldiers, and they responded to this care. His personal example on the battlefield made the difference between success and failure for his company. His actions in Korea (and subsequently throughout his career) continued to reinforce the importance of small-unit leadership in combat—a fact that remains critical for soldiers throughout our Army in today’s combat environment.

NOTES

1. Candace LaBelle, “Contemporary Hispanic Biography: Richard Cavazos,” 2004, available from <http://encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3434000021.htm> (14 November 2011). Cavazo’s role as the first Hispanic four-star general can be confirmed from a variety of other sources as well as the one listed above.

2. Gilberto Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity, The 65th Infantry in Korea 1950-1953 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2008), 73-75. The regiment was originally tasked to support the evacuation of the Chosin Peninsula and then moved back and formed part of the defensive perimeter protecting the evacuation. The X Corps commanding general was discriminatory towards non-whites and indicated so in a conversation with the regimental commander. Later, he lauded the regiment for its performance protecting the corps during the evacuation of Hamhung.


8. Cavazos, first interview.


10. Ibid., 4.


13. Fort Hood Sentinel, 24 January 1954. This newspaper clipping was provided by Mrs. Cavazos during the author’s interview with GEN Cavazos. No further information (volume, page, etc.) was provided.


16. Gainesville, TX, newspaper circa June 1952. This was another newspaper clipping that was provided by Mrs. Cavazos from her private collection with no further information available (newspaper title, volume, page number).

17. Bruce Roche, “Colorful Texas Hero Comes Back Home,” Fort Hood Sentinel, 28 January 1954. This newspaper article was backed up by another similar article published in the Killean Daily Herald on 23 January 1954 under the title “First Lt. Richard B. Cavazos Assigned to Unit at Fort Hood.” Mrs. Caroline Cavazos provided both articles from her private collection.

18. Cavazos, first interview.

19. Cavazos, second interview.

20. Retired LTG Randolph W. House, interview with author, College Station, TX, 20 December 2011. House served as the aide de camp for LTG Cavazos at Fort Hood and remains close to him and his family to this day.

21. Cavazos, first interview. Later on, Cavazos was appointed as the Defense Attaché to Mexico as a senior colonel in the 1970s. The appointment was largely based on his combat qualifications but also on his language ability.

22. Cavazos, first interview.

23. Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity, the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea 1950-1953, 279.

24. Cavazos, first interview. GEN Cavazos has repeatedly stressed this point and indicated that many of the regiment’s firefights during this period occurred because of patrols making contact, suffering casualties, and then requiring assistance. Frequently, a patrol returned from one of these incidents, and in the after action review, the patrol leader would simply say, “It was a well-conducted fire fight,” which, according to Cavazos, was a euphemism for a very confused and difficult fight that ended up well for the unit in contact.


26. Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity, the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea 1950-1953, 281.

27. Ibid., 286.


29. Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity, the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea 1950-1953, 288.


31. Mr. Patsy J. Scarpato, telephonic interview with author, interview notes, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 2011. Scarpato was the platoon leader for 1st platoon, E Company, 65th Infantry Regiment on 14 June 1953 and was integral to the company attack. He would suffer from wounds to his head, arms, and legs and earn a silver star during the company raid. After the war, he returned to civilian life in his home town of Staten Island, NY, and became an executive with Marine Midland Bank.

32. Ibid. Scarpato provided the information on weather. The information on moon phases available from <http://www.timeanddate.com/calendar/?year=1953&country=70> (17 January 2012).

33. Ibid.

34. President of the United States, General Order #404, 15 September 1953, “Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Richard Cavazos,” available from <http://www.valerosos.com> (19 January 2012). Both of these soldiers would eventually suffer from shrapnel wounds and have to be evacuated off the battlefield.


37. Cavazos, second interview.

38. Scarpato, interview.

39. Ibid.

40. Cavazos, first interview.

41. Ibid.

42. Scarpato, interview.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.
The Joy of Officership

“Since you get more joy out of giving joy to others, you should put a good deal of thought into the happiness that you are able to give.”

— Eleanor Roosevelt

Captain Mark Adamshick, Ph.D., U.S. Navy, Retired

Recently, several articles about “toxic leadership” within the officer corps appeared in Military Review, Army, and the Military Times. Toxic leadership is certainly real. I am not dismissing it as an important issue, but we need some additional dialogue to balance the previous rhetoric about the topic. The subtle, yet significant dimension of military officership is as important today as it has ever been in our nation’s history and desperately needs some highlighting.

Being an Officer

Being an officer can be fun, and I strongly argue that it should be. Not fun in the way golfing or swimming are, but fun in the more profound sense of accomplishing something wholesome and good. Being in a joyous profession is important for several reasons. First, people do not like jobs that make them unhappy. Second, job performance correlates positively with job satisfaction. Happy workers are effective, productive workers. Third, jobs viewed as fun and rewarding entice the best and brightest to the profession. There should be no doubt that our nation’s military officer corps has always tried to recruit America’s finest young men and women to join it, and highlighting the joy of officership is essential to keeping this trend alive.

As a recent military officer retiree, I have come to believe that my profession does not do a good enough job of promoting the joy of officership to those whom we serve and those willing to serve. I want everyone to know I loved being an armed forces officer. Yes, there was separation; yes, there was hardship; and yes, there were disappointments. However, each morning when I woke up and put on the uniform, I was proud to be an officer. The profession I proudly served brought me years and years of pure joy!
Distinguished Army combat commander and Desert Storm hero General Fredrick Franks shared the joy he experienced being an officer in the following words:

I make no apologies about my pride in our nation, our Army, and our Soldiers. From that day in July 1955, when I proudly put on the fatigue shirt with “U.S. Army” over the pocket and took my place in the line with my West Point classmates, I was excited every day to be an American Soldier. I loved the Army. I loved soldiering. I loved the cause we served.¹

Being an officer should be joyous. Officers should celebrate having the daily privilege to serve the people, the platoon, the ship, the wing, the regiment, and the nation they love. This should not be negotiable. To be an exceptional officer, one must not only be competent, brave, loyal, and trustworthy, but also the exemplar of spirit and optimism. In a recent teleconference with the Class of 2012 at West Point, 1st Cavalry Division’s commander, Major General Daniel B. Allyn, emphasized the importance of an officer’s responsibility to motivate and inspire his soldiers. Speaking from Afghanistan, General Allyn said, “You must be the one to lift them up when they are down.” He suggested the cadets he was speaking to must embody the spirit of hope and optimism and bluntly stated, “Everyday for the past 30 years I have loved being an Army officer.”¹

The very next day, General Raymond T. Odierno, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, told over 1,000 seniors that he thought he would be a “five and dive” guy, but he loved being an officer and that was an important reason why he stayed.

Joy in the Profession

So where does the joy of officership come from? The story of officer happiness starts with the oath. Officers in the profession of arms swear allegiance to serve the noblest of causes. Both ethical and legal codes require them to be exceptional moral agents in the conduct of their duty. The United States Constitution sets forth the enduring values that frame the professional military ethic, and Title 10 of the United States Code (Army, section 3583) requires “all commanding officers and others in authority in the Army to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; and to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them.”¹

These demanding obligations of officership do not require us to be happy. Nor does being an effective officer require one to be happy. I have served with and for many officers who were rarely if ever joyful (as best I could tell) and yet got the job done. What I will argue is that, because of this moral mandate, armed forces officers have unlimited opportunities to experience overwhelming joy and satisfaction. For every officer to experience the same joy that Generals Franks and Odierno and Major General Allyn described is possible!

What is the relationship between reward and being a member of a profession with such an extremely rigorous moral mandate? George Washington, arguably this nation’s most important
and respected military officers, tells us the answer: “Happiness and moral duty are inseparably connected.”

We train, fight, and die for a purpose so decent and good that it is essential officers lead with a full and unambiguous eye on “happiness.” In addition to one’s personal happiness, officers have the additional responsibility of mining the challenges of their often onerous and dangerous daily routines for some seemingly inconceivable ardor and then leading in a way that allows their charges to do the same. I readily acknowledge that this is easier said than done, but even so, it seems worthwhile to explore the fundamental tenets of officerhood in order to promote joy.

Being a Warrior

Army officerhood is the professional practice of being an Army leader. Understanding what it means to be an officer, that is, having an explicit self-concept of one’s identity, is critical. To be an Army officer is to be a warrior, a servant of our nation, a member of a profession, and a leader of character. These interrelated identities shape officer behavior and form the bedrock of all Army officer development, training, and education. Once commissioned, officers are obligated to always act in a manner consistent with these identities. As was the case with the officer’s moral mandate, little in an officer’s professional identity requires him to be happy in order to fulfill his professional obligations. Perhaps one might argue that happiness is not a method or quality of officerhood, but rather the entire activity of being an officer. In the 4th century BCE, the Greek philosopher Aristotle claimed that happiness was something complete and self-sufficient, the end of things pursued in action. If you accept this notion, then officerhood becomes one method or means for a person to become satisfied in the military profession. Many great officers validate this. Matthew F. Holland suggests in his book *Eisenhower Between the Wars: The Making of a General and Statesman*, that Eisenhower subscribed to such a philosophy:

> While some of these attributes could be granted by what Aristotle called fortune or luck, in the end, one’s happiness was a virtuous activity of the soul. Dwight D. Eisenhower was not only a lucky man, but also one who took such a charge as the guide to his life.

It is naive to suggest that the entire military officer corps should be happy all the time. Our profession is a demanding one and often fraught with great disappointment and loss. What I offer here is a more philosophical view regarding the profession of arms, a view that we rarely discuss because the tactical challenges of our daily tasks often overwhelm us and we forget or neglect to see officerhood this way. Reminding ourselves often how special and joyous it is being an armed forces officer is important.

With regard to the first component of an officer’s identity, I ask, “To what happy end could being a professional warrior bring us?” To be a warrior is to follow a code. Prospective officers learn this code from the very beginning of their formation. This code allows them to stand apart morally from others who kill such as murderers, terrorists, sociopaths, and tyrants. In her essay “The Warriors Code,” Shannon French explains the justification for such a code—

> By setting high standards for themselves, warriors can create a lifeline that will allow them to pull themselves out of the hell of war and reintegrate themselves into their society. A warrior’s code may cover everything from the treatment of prisoners of war to oath keeping to table etiquette, but its primary purpose is to grant nobility to the warriors’ profession. This allows warriors to retain both their self-respect and the respect of those they guard.

In practicing their profession, warriors use judgment, compassion, discrimination, and proportionality. To do anything else would be to disgrace the code. To fight as a warrior is to do so honorably, and being honorable is joyous. All one has to do is observe a deployed unit’s return from war to see the joy experienced by the service members and their loved ones. These events are a celebration for many reasons, but one is the happiness that comes with honorable service and sacrifice. Returning warriors feel joy, joy because they are home safely, joy to be reunited with those they love, joy to see friends and family, and joy to have fought with honor. Fighting as a moral warrior can have a joyous end.
Throughout my career, I have seen such happy endings during promotion, award, and retirement ceremonies, and even military funerals. Our nation, our comrades, and our families celebrate our warriors. Those who are a part of the celebrations bask in the glory of having fought with honor. Serving your country with honor is personally and professionally satisfying.

**Servants of the Nation**

Armed forces officers are servants of the nation. Like many other men and women in dangerous professions, they often risk their lives for the safety and freedom of others. War is ugly, and to fight is often costly and unforgiving. Today’s battle space is not only unforgiving but unpredictable as well.

So where is the joy in war? Thucydides wrote, “To be happy means to be free and to be free means to be brave.”6 These simple words remind us of one of the core principles upon which our nation stands. To pursue happiness we must be free, and the preservation of this freedom rests squarely on the shoulders of the brave men and women who have answered our nation’s call to serve. As officers, we must constantly make this core principle of service come alive for those we lead. Service can be difficult, service can be lonely, service is sometimes brutal and gruesome, and the memories of war can haunt all of us long after we have fought a battle, but purposeful leaders find ways to tether sacrifice to the core principle of service in ways that are meaningful and relevant to the soldiers they lead. Resiliency requires spirit and optimism even under harsh conditions. Officers must lead their troops in a way that shows they care more about them than they do about themselves.

To serve your nation, know your troops, for as General Omar Bradley said, “The greatest leader in the world could never win a campaign unless he understood the men he had to lead.”

Standing in front of the famous Arc de Triomphe in Paris, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, left, Supreme Allied Expeditionary Force commander, addresses cheering Frenchmen. To his left are GEN Joseph Koenig, military commander of Paris, and LTG Omar N. Bradley, command of the 12th Army Group, 27 August 1944.
Officers must know their troops like they know their own children. Colin Powell remarked, "The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership."

To serve your nation, to preserve her freedom, to selflessly sacrifice for those you lead should be unmistakably joyful. Lead with this affirmative attitude, and it will rub off on your troops. They will work harder and be more resilient. As you see your men and women rise to the challenge you can be satisfied knowing you fulfilled your role as a servant to the nation. If they sense your joy in officership, they will unconditionally follow you, fight for you, and be willing to die for you and our nation.

When you become an officer, you join a profession steeped in history and tradition and whose illustrious members included the likes of Washington, Grant, Bradley, Marshall, King, Nimitz, Arnold, Hoar, Krulak, and others. Should you feel joy wearing the same uniform as did many of these great American heroes? Absolutely!

However, this is not always the case. Retired Colonel Don Snider suggests that being a member of the Army profession requires a shared self-concept. This shared identity has been criticized for being misaligned with the true meaning of officership:

Army officers are shorting themselves of an immense potential of inspiration and satisfaction because of their poorly conceived self-concept, which contributes directly to the dissatisfaction of junior officers and to the shortage of captains and misutilization of lieutenants.

Having a common self-concept implies members of the profession share the same values, beliefs, and norms and act in ways consistent with them. But this is, in fact, the professional military ethic, and it is essential for officers to embrace it in order to lead, fight, and win successfully. Equally important, as Snider suggests, the professional military ethic presents unlimited potential to improve officer inspiration and satisfaction (joy). Benjamin Franklin believed in such an ethic:

Be studious in your profession, and you will be learned. Be industrious and frugal, and you will be rich. Be sober and temperate, and you will be healthy. Be in general virtuous, and you will be happy. At least you will, by such conduct, stand the best chance for such consequences.

Franklin’s words are consistent with today’s professional military ethic, which aligns spirit with behavior, intent with action, learning with doing, and uncompromising consistency between thought and deed. Remember the commissioning oath. You swore allegiance to support and defend the enduring principles of freedom, liberty, respect, and honor in the Constitution. Through this honorable service as a member of the profession of arms, you can and will find incredible joy and happiness.

The final component of an officer’s identity is being a leader of character. In my view, character is the fuel that drives the engine of belief; belief in oneself, belief in the mission, and belief in those we lead. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will not die for their country unless they believe in their cause. You must represent this cause in all your thoughts, words, and deeds. The great American statesman Henry Clay said, “Of all the properties which belong to honorable men, not one is so highly prized as that of character.”

Leaders of Character

Character in an officer is admired and contagious. Character must be genuine and one must develop it constantly throughout the course of one’s lifetime. While it remains a lofty and ill-defined term that has different meanings for different people, character is simply the sum total of one’s virtues—honesty, compassion, prudence, and courage. The key to developing character is identifying those virtues we need to work on and then practice bringing them into balance. One can be overly or excessively prudent and lack courage or have a deficiency of it, which means those virtues have become vices. To develop character, an officer must be constantly mindful of his vices and work diligently to correct them.

Officers are also responsible for the character development of their troops. Virtuous personal habits and a steadfast focus on character development enable officer’s joy to emerge. Character is the wellspring of achievement, the result of believing in yourself and believing in your people. Little is
more joyous to an officer than seeing one of his soldiers demonstrate bravery in battle, compassion in loss, honesty when confronted, morality in killing, humility when recognized, or perseverance when weary. Character enables an officer to enjoy seeing his troops thrive in peace, win in war, and flourish in life without ever needing a thank you.

Who serves, how we serve, and who we fight change, yet many aspects of officerhood are timeless. The profession of arms is a proud and honorable one that requires dedication, selflessness, and sacrifice by its members and their families. For a moment, just a moment, reflect on and then share how much joy you have experienced being an officer. Doing so will be healthy for you, inspirational for others, and good for the profession.

I recently began teaching at West Point and ran across a former student of mine. A Naval Academy exchange midshipman who was spending the fall semester at the U.S. Military Academy, she seemed excited when I saw her and after a brief hello, told me she finally understood what I had meant when I mentioned in class two years before that the reason I stayed in the Navy for 30 years was because being an officer brought me so much happiness and it never stopped being fun. I had taught the plebes (freshman) that the true joy of officerhood was seeing the transformation of those you lead. I mentioned that officers feel true satisfaction when they see their subordinates grow as people, fight as a team, complete the mission, and thrive in their lives.

My former student had just completed her summer as a member of a team training new plebes at the Naval Academy. Her smile beamed as she described the joy she experienced watching these patriotic young men and women grow before her eyes as she helped them take their first bold steps on their long march to commissioning. I told her her career as an officer would continue to bring her great reward and happiness. As she started to walk away, she stopped, turned around, and said, “Thank you, sir!” Nothing could have made me happier.

NOTES


How Japan’s defense policies have developed and where those policies are headed has been a frequent topic of discussion among Japan specialists for decades, with realists claiming it was only a matter of time before Japan converted a portion of its vast wealth into military power. Japan became the third wealthiest country in the world in 1968, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union, and it is third again this year. (China’s GDP has edged past Japan’s.)

As the decades rolled on and Japan did not emerge as a military superpower, other observers aside from the realists made their voices heard, saying that Japan had developed anti-militarist norms and was therefore unlikely to march to the sound of guns anytime soon.

Even so, Japan does have impressive military capabilities in its Self-Defense Forces. The most convincing and recent constructivist take on this seeming dilemma is from Andrew Oros, who discusses Japan’s security identity, which he describes as “domestic antimalitarism,” in his book, Normalizing Japan. While Oros’ thesis is convincing as a description of the attitudes of Japanese society as a whole, other authors, like Mike Green and Richard Samuels, have convincingly traced the realist policies of many important Japanese policymakers.

So Japan’s defense policy, like perhaps most such policies, is a mixture of realistic pragmatism within norms-based constraints. Authors Saadia Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu have added nuance to this picture in their excellent case study on Japan’s space policy. The authors are especially effective in demonstrating the impact corporate interests have in shaping Japan’s defense policy. They trace what they describe as Japan’s “market to the military” trend in space policy.

While I think the authors skillfully trace many of the formal and informal limiting factors on Japan’s defense policy, I disagree with their characterization of Charles Kades as “principally” responsible for the drafting of Article 9, the Renunciation of War article in Japan’s postwar constitution. When directing his staff to draft a constitution, he saw that a note MacArthur gave to them as guidance specified that Japan should renounce war and armed forces, “even for its own self-defense.” What Kades did was to remove the phrase “even for its own self-defense” but add the phrase “other war potential” in after “armed forces.” The modifications to MacArthur’s original note have been the source of much of the debate on Japan’s defense policy limits. The book could also use a bibliography. Finally, I was surprised the authors did not cite Michael Chinworth’s Inside Japan’s Defense which covered some of the same material.

Japan is a space power, and its recent announcement that it will form a Space Strategy Office is further evidence of its intention to consolidate its position as such. This book is a readable, cogent examination of the interaction of corporate interests with national security interests, and adds needed nuance to the emerging understanding of Japan as an important player in the field of international security.


An insider’s tour of the many aspects of the U.S. government’s response to terrorist activities over the past ten years, Counterstrike: The Untold Story Of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda describes the evolution of the U.S. approach to confront an adaptive enemy and the complexity of the struggle.

Authors Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker interviewed numerous insiders worldwide. The interviews underscore the variety of missions the U.S. military and government have undertaken, initially in the absence of a clear understanding of how to proceed and then in the presence of more mature and incisive information.

Under the watch of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the way to victory was to eliminate the terrorist's leadership, but terrorists were continually replacing slain leaders. It soon became clear this was not the way to end the conflict. The authors argue that one roadblock to forming a new deterrence strategy was the staff’s reluctance to confront the secretary because of Rumsfeld’s focus on eliminating terrorist leaders.

However, a new strategy came from an unlikely source—a summer intern at the Pentagon. The intern made a two-pronged recommendation: to capitalize on the terrorist’s search for glory in order to catch or kill him and to discourage ideological fence sitters and young men from becoming terrorists by intervening with imams and others. The strategy was later expanded to include warning anyone against supporting terrorists in their efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
underscored this in 2008, saying that “any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor or individual” would be held fully accountable for such support.

The authors of *Counterstrike* describe several uses of the deterrence strategy and key incidents that provided the momentum to keep it on track. One method was to impose the strategy through the use of cyber activities such as “overloading,” “mimicking watermarks,” and “web-spoofing” and through operations that included the National Security Agency to create doubts in terrorists through the use of cell phone hacking and the planting of false information. Some may think the authors reveal too many techniques here, making this one of the most interesting, yet controversial, aspects of the book.

*Counterstrike* emphasizes how timely intelligence sustained the momentum of the strategy. The authors offer three troves of information: the U.S. capture of a terrorist courier, a special operations strike on a terrorist compound in Sinjar, and material discovered in Osama bin Laden’s hideaway. These operations uncovered suicide bomber identities and operations, improvised explosive devices manufacturing ingredients, and other such activities. Some of the credit for these successes goes to the sharing of information by different intelligence agencies. The work of the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. military (to include the Defense Intelligence Agency) receive special attention. Another “momentum sustainer” was the effort to win over the trust and confidence of people in the region instead of their “hearts and minds.”

The authors believe the opposition is not something the United States can defeat but “something that is going to have to implode on itself.” Americans will need to develop a culture of reliance to fight through times of intimidation and return to normal if foreign or homegrown terrorists attack us on our soil.

The book also emphasizes the efforts of service members who perform their duties while waiting for Washington to catch up.

*Counterstrike* reminds policymakers of the complexity of dealing with a nonstate enemy who picks battles on his terms.

**Tim Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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*Father of Money: Buying Peace in Baghdad* is a junior officer’s view of how reconstruction money used wisely can lead to reduced violence between factions, protection for U.S. soldiers, and an overall environment acceptable for the beginning of governance at the lower levels. The narrative tells how Jason Whiteley, then a U.S. Army captain in a tank battalion, served as the governance officer in the mixed Sunni-Shi’a southern Baghdad district of Dora in 2004.

Whiteley provides a riveting account of what it was like to serve at that time, approximately a year after the ground war when the Iraqis—and Americans—realized this would be a lengthy, complicated reconstruction effort. Whitely was on the scene when the military first realized how important money was to stimulate local employment and improve infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Crossing into a realm that many military leaders might not consider permissible and with little guidance, training, or previous experience, Whiteley, who was called Abu Floos (father of money) by the local Iraqi leaders, found a way to create a fragile system in southern Baghdad that empowered traditional tribal and U.S.-established local government leaders.

Greed, jealousy, and the arrival of Al-Qaeda made Whiteley’s plan unsustainable. Having served with Whiteley in Dora for the first four months of his tour, I can tell you this book contains lessons learned that are relevant for today’s officers, some of whom could find themselves facing problems similar to the ones Whiteley faced.

I highly recommend *Father of Money* to Defense and State Department officers and civilians who could be working abroad in fragile countries. Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans will be enraptured by the book and likely finish reading it the same day they buy it.

**LTC David T. Seigel, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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The Politics of Security in Modern Russia brings together quality academic research and sound assessments on security and security services in Russian policy development. Editor Mark Gaelotti argues that security is interwoven throughout Russia’s history and remains a key part of how Russian governments see themselves.

Even though the relationship between the United States and Russia has been “reset,” many aspects of the new rapport are still security-related. Since January 2009, there have been significant agreements and treaties between the two countries, including the ratification of START II by both the United States and Russia, expansion of the Northern Distribution Network, and talk of renewing the Conventional Forces Europe treaty. Terrorist attacks in Russia have underscored the need for greater cooperation on security between the West and Moscow.

Galleotti’s compendium addresses the role of security and security services in the development of Russian policy. In regard to the security services, the authors provide clearly articulated, well-researched positions on their current status and potential paths that they may follow in light of uncertain political futures, unclear defense budget priorities, and the pending decline of Russian population and economic capacity.

Three articles will appeal to the Military Review audience, Bettina Renz’s “Civil-Military Relations and the Security Apparatus,”

Renz and Baev’s articles complement each other with Renz laying out the friction points of Russian security reform by demonstrating its inability to delineate the responsibilities and authorities of the minister of defense, the chief of the general staff, and the heads of various security state organs. Renz concludes that Russia’s security apparatus is a byzantine collection of fiefdoms with conflicting agendas, generating a corrosive atmosphere and impeding change.

Baev’s piece on the military’s failure to reform argues that the lack of strategic foresight to enact true reform and maintain vintage Soviet military doctrine and equipment are factors in the failure. Baev points out three critical areas that continue to impede modernization: failing demographics, obsolete equipment, and inability to grasp the impact of technology as a revolution in military affairs.

Blandy uses Chechnya’s conflict to explain the role security plays in developing and executing Russian policy. He concludes that although Russia has been conducting counterterror operations in the Caucasus off and on since 1991, it never developed a policy of regional security that extends beyond the use of violence and military action.

The Politics of Security in Modern Russia has great value for readers looking to gain a better understanding of Russia’s security policies and how they are developed.

MAJ Marco Ciliberti, Baumholder, Germany

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN, Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2010, 206 pages, $23.00.

Counterinsurgency in Pakistan is an ideal country study for units deploying to the region and classic literature for those interested in national policy. Focusing on counterinsurgency capability and current progress in Pakistan, this book addresses current challenges in Operation Enduring Freedom and highlights relevant topics to consider for policy application at operational levels.

Authors G. Jones and C. Christine Fair tell us that Pakistan is a mysterious place with a value system tied to past myths and symbols that have created its present approach to terrorism. Pakistan is the key to success in combating terrorism in the region, and therefore, the world. Pakistan has a long history of recruiting and training insurgent forces, specifically anti-Shi’a groups. During the 1980s, Pakistan provided covert aid to Afghan Islamist groups and Pashtun Sunni factions. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate shifted the focus of the mujahedeen to the Kashmir Front and located training camps within Pakistan and Afghanistan. The long-standing Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan regularly resulted in India’s conventional military victories, prompting Pakistan to sponsor these insurgent groups in asymmetric combat against Indian forces. This began to shift Pakistan support to the Taliban (mostly madrassa students) in southern Afghanistan.

After 9/11, this mindset changed. Pakistan supported the overthrow of the Taliban. But by 2006, Pakistan had become increasingly concerned about India’s presence in Afghanistan and resumed supporting the Taliban, at least at the tribal levels. Retired Lieutenant General David Barno felt then that Pakistan took this new position based on U.S. plans to downsize its forces in Afghanistan—a topic of current relevance.

American and Pakistan government authorities continue to be at odds over the conflict. Should the reader review these elements with the intent to apply some of the lessons to current policy, he will increase his overall effectiveness in this theater of operations.

LTC(P) Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., Vilseck, Germany


Marketing director of the USS Midway Museum and a former journalist and author of Midway Magic and Midway Memories, Scott McGaugh brings 24 years of experience in marketing communications into a historical overview of military medicine from the U.S. Revolutionary War to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Although focusing on military medicine as experienced in U.S. forces, McGaugh provides insights and perspectives from other times and cultures.

McGaugh’s book is well researched from transcribed oral histories, first-hand accounts of events, official reports, and news items, and his research comes together in a lively blend of personal stories, facts, historical accounts, and overviews of medicine. His engaging narratives sometimes read like historical fiction, which might be distracting or confusing for some people. While much of the information used in the narratives can be checked through a selective bibliography, some facts presented are difficult to verify.

Battlefield Angels emphasizes the experiences of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps corpsmen and medics from the U.S. Army—part soldiers and part healers—on the frontline of the medical process in war. The book also provides graphic accounts of the horrors of war and provides critical insight into the problems and stresses of providing medical care to injured soldiers. As McGaugh tells us, “The real story of military medicine begins with those who breathe life into others alongside a road, deep within a jungle, or at the bottom of a foxhole.” This is where readers will find the most important insights of Battlefield Angels, the revelations of character defined by courage, duty, optimism, focus, and ingenuity.

McGaugh identifies three themes in military medicine. First, medical
problems can be far more devastating to a military force than combat. For example, McGaugh estimates that in the Revolutionary War 8,000 soldiers were killed in combat, but 17,000 died of disease. Second, advances in warfare technology, particularly technology related to killing and destruction, usually outpace peace-time advances of medicine. Thus, when war breaks out, militaries are usually behind in their capabilities to treat the wounded. Finally, although killing’s intensity and effectiveness increases from one war to the next, even delayed advances in military medicine significantly improve the chances of soldiers surviving in war. Less emphasized is the controversial subject of whether survivability is always desirable, especially with the increased physical and mental wounds carried by soldiers and civilians.

Many accounts of military medicine focus on the failure to adequately care for soldiers both on and off the battlefield as well as questionable practices such as medical experimentation. McGaugh takes readers into the trenches with on-the-ground corpsmen and medics throughout U.S. military history, to show us the good of military medicine and the heroic actions of medical personnel.

Kevin M. Bond, Ph.D.,
Los Angeles, California


The name Patton will always be connected to World War II. General George S. Patton’s wartime exploits continue to fascinate authors and historians. Three new books bring a fresh perspective to the history of famous general and his progeny.

John Nelson Rickard’s Advance and Destroy examines Patton’s leadership in the Battle of the Bulge. The book follows Patton’s preparations for the German offensive, his relief of the besieged town of Bastogne, and the closure of the Bulge. However, Patton, at times, almost disappears from the book as Rickard describes battalion-sized battles, as well as the German point of view of the campaign.

While Patton’s main mission focused on Bastogne, he also wanted to close the Bulge, but his ideas met resistance from Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, Patton’s superior. Bradley wanted Patton to take the most direct route north to link up with Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, who was pushing south. Patton wanted to cut the Bulge at its base, farther east of Bastogne, but Bradley’s orders hemmed Patton in and reduced his options, making for a slower offensive than Patton wanted. Rickard does an excellent job explaining Patton’s plans and Bradley’s decisions.

Rickard’s great contribution to history is his chapter on the Verdin meeting of Eisenhower and his generals on 19 December 1944 in which Patton famously said he could relieve Bastogne in a matter of days; Rickard pieces together the whole meeting, providing a coherent story. Rickard’s book, much like his earlier Patton at Bay, is a detailed operational history better suited to the professional soldier than the casual reader.

While Rickard focuses on Patton in the Bulge, in Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies, Harry Yeide examines Patton’s battlefield adversories from the Mexican Punitive Expedition through World Wars I and II. Yeide reveals that Patton’s enemies were not in awe of him, particularly in World War II.

Patton’s early engagements, which he fought as a lieutenant in Mexico and as a colonel in France, may have impressed his opponents, but they had no idea who they were facing. The same could be said for his opponents in North Africa and Sicily and in France’s Normandy campaign. It was not until the Lorraine campaign that the Germans took notice of their adversary. While Patton’s relief of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge is considered his seminal moment, the German high command was more focused on their own attacks west. The Germans were able to capture one of Patton’s memorandums on his battle philosophy, but as Yeide relates, “practically everyone who mattered on the Western front probably already knew it.”

Patton’s Enemies quotes from the German records and discovers that Patton is hardly mentioned in dispatches, and when he is, he is judged as a competent, not superior, general. The book’s structure, however, is a bit confusing. Instead of just focusing on Patton and his enemies on the battlefield, the author devotes entire chapters to the Germans between wars, the invasions of the West and Russia and the battle of Kursk, making it hard to remember individual Germans before they actually duel with Patton.

While Yeide clearly points out that German World War II unit reports, officer accounts, and telephone transcripts all but ignored Patton, he may have missed one source: German radio propaganda. Joseph Goebbels, the Third Reich’s propaganda minister, referred to Patton in war broadcasts in 1945. German generals might have left Patton’s name out of their reports, but German soldiers and civilians certainly knew that Patton was on the battlefield.

This is a good book for anyone who wants a deeper understanding of Patton’s battles. Yeide has grounded many of the lofty myths surrounding Patton, particularly in World War II, where his impact may not have been as effective as previous historians and biographers believed.

Ben Patton’s Growing Up Patton brings the Patton family up to the present by reflecting on the men
and women who contributed to the family’s legacy. After a brief family history focusing on the relationship between Patton, Jr., and his son, George S. Patton, IV, the book delves into their correspondence during World War II, revealing the father and son’s interest in history and their experiences at the U.S. Military Academy. Patton, Jr., was actually Patton, II, but changed it to junior after the death of his father, making his son Patton, IV. Portraits of people who touched the Patton family follow, particularly Vera Duss (Mother Benedict), who survived World War II to open an abbey in the United States that Margaret Patton (Patton, IV’s, daughter) joined in 1982. Other chapters are dedicated to soldiers who served with Patton, IV, explaining their wartime exploits and leadership.

While George Patton, IV, may never completely escape the shadow of his famous father, the book brings him into his own, relating stories of his courage, leadership, and fighting spirit on the battlefield. As the commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam, he constantly flew over the battlefield, drawing enemy fire, and once even led a platoon-sized attack after his helicopter crashed. One of the book’s funniest scenes is of Patton, IV, grabbing a “gaga-eyed” Willie Nelson out of his tour van to perform for his division, telling the singer, “You get your goddamn ass out there right now!”

Kevin M. Hymel,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Few authors capture the essence of the human dimension of war as well as John C. McManus. Combining an engaging, highly descriptive writing style with exhaustive research, McManus provides readers with a true “foxhole” perspective. It is a perspective that has enabled previous efforts such as *The Deadly Brotherhood and The Americans at D-Day* to garner praise from critics and readers alike and a perspective clearly present throughout the pages of his latest volume, *Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience World War II through Iraq*.

As the title aptly suggests, *Grunts* pays tribute to the American infantryman (Army and Marine Corps) fighting in 10 superbly chronicled battles and operations conducted since World War II. They range from the marines on the island of Peleliu to the air cavalry soldier in the jungles of Vietnam to the mechanized infantryman in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait to the grunt in the streets of Fallujah.

Using the same formula that has made him so successful, vivid writing and meticulous research, McManus honors the accomplishments of the American infantryman, emphasizes his indispensability on the battlefield, and dismisses the notion that technology will make the infantryman obsolete.

McManus’s writing style conveys the emotions, sights, and smells of battle well. He places his reader in the middle of the infantryman’s environment and into the thoughts and feelings of the soldier on the ground during combat, enabling readers to grasp the human dimension of war.

Often underplayed in any discussion of books of this genre is the criticality of research. Readers will find McManus has interwoven quality research throughout his volume. This research comes principally from newly discovered official documents, after-action reviews, letters, diaries, journals received by the author, and personal interviews. McManus’s years of research contributed significantly in crafting an engaging volume.

Those expecting a vanilla book, devoid of controversial opinion, will be surprised. McManus opines on a variety of topics related to the infantry. The author is especially critical of military and civilian leaders who he believes negatively affect the ability of the infantry to fight on the ground. He particularly focuses on decisions made in the areas of rules of engagement, troop strength, logistical support, political strategy, and operational and tactical decision making. This discussion adds significantly to the book’s readability and provides ample ground for reflection.

In his introduction, McManus says, “The most powerful, effective weapon in modern war is a well-trained, well-armed, and well-led infantry soldier.” McManus supports this premise throughout the remainder of *Grunts*. He provides outstanding examples from the past and the present on the essential role of the infantryman and a persuasive argument that technological advances will not diminish his importance on future battlefields.

Rick Bailergeron,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Eisenhower thought General Walter “Beetle” Smith indispensable to the Allied victory in Europe, yet Smith remains a little known figure. In this definitive biography, Crosswell shows Smith as Eisenhower’s necessary junior partner and offers a view of World War II in the Mediterranean and Western Europe from the highest operational level. Crosswell addresses controversial topics in coalition warfare, discusses wartime staff organization and manpower problems, and connects command decisions to the limitations imposed on them by logistics.

Crosswell’s account of Smith’s postwar career as Truman’s ambassador to the Soviet Union and CIA director and Eisenhower’s undersecretary of state leads one to understand why neither Marshall nor Eisenhower considered Smith a viable candidate for independent command; he was an operator and fixer, but not a strategic thinker. The book also highlights the Army’s
emphasis on institutionalized education, its shortcomings, its role in Smith’s career, and his relationship with George Marshall.

As one of Marshall’s inner staff, Smith was an efficient administrator, shielding his boss from unnecessary interruption and mundane affairs; he proved indispensable, emerging as Marshall’s principal apprentice and troubleshooter. Eisenhower recognized Smith’s ability after he joined the General Staff in December 1941 and requested Smith’s services when he became commander of the European Theater in June 1942.

In Crosswell’s view, Smith “was much more than advertised,” as Eisenhower’s chief of staff. Crosswell concludes that Eisenhower was “considerably less,” an indecisive leader who “proved decisive only when the decision was not to do something” and who “failed to confront the perpetual problems historically faced by the U.S. Army in war: manpower, supply of forces in the field, and civil affairs.” These judgments appear too harsh in demonstrating Crosswell’s admiration for Smith over Eisenhower. The responsibility for civil affairs lay with Marshall himself.

The Eisenhower-Smith team’s first test was Operation Torch. The invasion succeeded, but problems rapidly increased. The most serious was supplying the invaders, which Smith tried to reorganize. Eisenhower let Smith handle the press, political, and diplomatic relations. Smith’s job as SHAEF chief of staff put him at the center of a political-military maelstrom of warring egos. While Eisenhower emerged as the Western Allied coalition’s astute manager, Smith worked behind the scenes to set up the successes. He worked well with the British and produced teamwork among the various staff elements better than anyone else, something Eisenhower recognized.

Crosswell’s account of Smith’s life and of supreme command in Europe is detailed and well written, with about one third devoted to logistical and personnel problems, which have never received the attention they deserve. The book gives us greater knowledge of and insight into the politics and problems of coalition warfare.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea


At a recent scholarly conference, a number of prominent military historians confessed to being “recovering Wehrmacht-oholics.” That is, they were working to get over an unhealthy fascination with the armed forces of the Third Reich. In his new book Command Culture, Jörg Muth argues that, starting in the 19th century, the U.S. Army has been obsessed with the German military. However, while recognizing that professional military education was a key element of German battlefield performance, the U.S. Army could never replicate the best German practices in its own institutions. This, Muth believes, was especially true in the years prior to World War II. The dysfunction began at West Point, with its backward curriculum and sadistic plebe system yielding rigid conformists unable to think creatively on the battlefield. Worse, the interwar Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth possessed a mediocre faculty that stressed the “school solution” over independent and creative thought.

The only exception to this dismal picture was George C. Marshall’s Infantry School (where the curriculum was shaped by a German liaison officer). In Muth’s view, the result of the U.S. Army’s dreadful education system was a timid and lackluster performance by U.S. Army commanders in World War II.

Muth makes important points, but his argument has the effect of a sawed-off shotgun fired at close range: it achieves considerable target effect but it also inflicts significant collateral damage. His presentation is marred by intemperate language (he calls von Schlieffen “the moronic count”), syntax errors (a more attentive editor was needed), and hasty conclusions drawn from anecdotal evidence. (A handful of memoir entries leads Muth to conclude that, in contrast to German officers, American officers are routinely late to meetings). The author makes pronouncements that beg for a rejoinder (e.g., “There is no place in war for doctrine because it harnesses the mind of an officer”). He also never satisfactorily explains how the German officer education system (which purportedly stressed independence, character, and personal responsibility) could produce senior leaders so willing to serve as accomplices to the monstrous designs of Adolf Hitler.

Nevertheless, this book deserves a wide readership among military historians and active officers. Muth raises issues that must be addressed in preparing the U.S. military for the challenges of the 21st century. Thus, not only should the book be read, but it should be widely debated as well. Those who think that CGSC today fosters a “culture of mediocrity” will find that Muth offers a historical basis for their views. Those who believe our professional military education is on the right track are likely to be outraged. Let the controversy begin.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


William G. Thomas’s The Iron Way is a conceptually ambitious and methodologically innovative book about the role of the railroad before and after the Civil War. Drawing on a wealth of sources at the University of Nebraska’s Digital History Project (http://railroads.unl.edu), Thomas casts the railroad as the antebellum era’s “most visible indicator of modernity.” Its emergence as a symbol of modernity, for southern slaveholders and
northern abolitionists alike, rivaled its significance in revolutionizing industry, geography, and economic relationships.

The railroad’s swift expansion between the 1840s and the 1850s deepened the sectional schism over slavery. Thomas’s impressive statistical compilation shows that southern railroad construction and investment skyrocketed in the 1850s. The railroad’s expansion, made possible by slave labor, perpetuated the plantation system by increasing the price of slaves, opening up interior lands for cultivation, and expanding cotton markets. All of these forces—economic growth, increased mobility, the synchronization of slave trading, and the linking of commercial hubs—convinced southerners that their region, despite its anachronistic economic system, merited recognition as a “modern” nation.

Northerners thought of the railroad on different terms. Decrying the incompatibility of modernity and slavery, they equated technological advancement with moral progress and slavery’s inevitable obsolescence. Thomas shows that Midwestern railroad construction produced a class of laborers sympathetic to the new Republican Party. Workers flooded onto western prairies to build railroads such as the Illinois Central, onto western prairies to build railroads such as the Illinois Central, sparking an agricultural revolution. Thomas argues that the prairies and sparked an agricultural revolution. Thomas shows that Midwestern railroad construction produced a class of laborers sympathetic to the new Republican Party. Workers flooded onto western prairies to build railroads such as the Illinois Central, sparking an agricultural revolution.

After the war, railroads became a “nexus” for political battles over the meaning of black labor, citizenship, and portability. Thomas follows several legal cases, including the 1868 contest between Virginia’s Catherine Brown, a black woman, against the Alexandria and Washington Railroad for expelling her from a car reserved for white women. Once hailed as the slaves’ gateway to freedom, railroads ironically became the battleground in defining emancipation’s extent and purpose.

Lavishly illustrated, brilliantly argued, and impeccably researched, The Iron Way deserves serious attention by military and nonmilitary historians alike.

Anthony E. Carlson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Kemal Atatürk’s place in history is little known in the West, and few military professionals study his campaigns. This volume does what it can to address this deficiency.

Born Mustafa within the borders of an Ottoman Empire that was already shrinking, he later named himself Mustafa Kemal, or “Mustafa the Perfect” when he began his studies. It would not be the last time he would change his identity to fit the times. He became an Ottoman officer, served in the army in a variety of roles, and made a reputation for himself as a military leader. Having served in a variety of assignments, from conventional warfare during the Balkan Wars to diplomatic missions, to insurgency efforts against the Italian invaders of Libya, he received a command in the strategic spit of land known as Gallipoli when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers.

His Ottoman division held off a powerful Allied invasion force. It is probably no exaggeration to say Atatürk saved the Ottoman Empire—or at least bought it some time. Through personal courage, astute understanding of the terrain, and sure knowledge of his own capabilities and those of the enemy, he was able to stop the invaders and force them into a stalemate, which only ended when the British withdrew their force from Gallipoli and the Allies gave up their idea of capturing Constantinople and knocking the Ottomans out of the war with one stroke.

After the defeat of the Central Powers, Kemal reinvented himself again, this time as a Turkish nationalist, eventually adopting the name Ataturk (“Father of the Turks”). Turks sought to establish a Turkish republic, free of nationalities who wanted nothing more to do with Turkey and free of Allies intent on redrawing the map of the Middle East in their favor.

Atatürk fought the War of Independence with no money, few weapons, and a strategic situation that looked bleak. His experience as a diplomat and as a communicator served him well, helping him strengthen Turkish leadership while exploiting disharmony among the erstwhile Allies. Alone among the Central Powers, Turkey was able to renegotiate the terms of its treaty ending World War I.

This is a readable book. However, at 167 pages it only scratches the surface of Atatürk’s military career. The subtitle, “Lessons in Leadership,” is in fact not very accurate. At no point does Austin Bay actually identify leadership lessons, although they can be extrapolated from the text. Still, Atatürk is a good book for learning the military art from a different perspective.

Lt. Col. James D. Crabtree,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Jeremy Black’s latest book, Beyond the Military Revolution, attempts to consider events and developments of Western military history from a global and multicultural frame of reference. Black is a prolific author—some would say too prolific—who has a tendency to revisit well-worn paths and to wander about without a clear focus. Although focusing on a discrete “period”—the 17th century—Black does not add anything new to his well-known calls for a multicultural approach to military history. He favors an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary explanation for the series of events often described as “the military revolution” of the 16th and 17th centuries.

Readers should not expect a detailed chronological narrative of the period. Rather, Black defends his ideas on the significance of technological innovation, organization, and the relationships between war and the state and war and society during the “Western Military Revolution.” He warns about the dangers of assuming “teleology in history” and calls for a multifaceted, interdisciplinary, and multicultural approach.

Contrary to the majority of Western historians, Black does not privilege the “West” over “the rest”—even in matters pertaining to military technology and organization—with the possible exception of conceding to Western powers an advantage in naval capacity to sail and deploy around the globe. Perhaps his greatest contribution to scholarly debate is the argument that various cultural styles of warfare may represent the best possible adaptations to particular situations and may be functionally superior to more technologically advanced systems.

Given its ambitious aims and its limited success in achieving them, Beyond the Military Revolution is ultimately disappointing. Those who want a good overview of warfare in the 17th century would do well to consult specialized histories dealing with specific regions or topics. A satisfactory, comprehensive history of the period from a global perspective remains to be written.

Nonetheless, the book is worth reading for those who already possess a good general understanding of the period and who have followed the intricate controversies surrounding the twin concepts of “military revolution” and “revolution in military affairs.” Scholars in various sub-disciplines will find many areas that cry out for further study and detailed analysis.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, USAR, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Townshend’s work is a masterful retelling of the British imperial experience in Iraq. Believing a Mesopotamia controlled by the German allied Ottoman Empire to be a threat to British India, the Indian government “went to war with the army it had,” sending out an ill-prepared and poorly equipped expeditionary force to protect British interests. Enticed by the quick victory in Basra, the generals set their sights on locations farther up the Tigris River—Kut and Baghdad. In the absence of clear policy directives from civilian leadership, field commanders combined professional ambitions and muddled strategic thinking in ever riskier operations. Failing to seize Baghdad, the beleaguered British force retreated to Kut only to fall into a brutal Ottoman captivity. While British forces eventually drove the Turks from Mesopotamia, public outcry prompted government inquiries.

The book also describes how political intrigues increased as the military actions dwindled. Political factions in London, Cairo, and Delhi competed for dominance in the new Arab policy. In addition, the British struggled with the regional interests of the French, Arab nationalism, and the Sunni versus Shi’a rivalry. The northern Kurds also staged a revolt, hoping to form an independent Kurdistan, but a British punitive expedition quashed them. Thus Britain maintained an oppressive grip on the newly formed nation for strategic and financial reasons, giving rise to a country simmering with political, ethnic, and religious tensions, ripe for totalitarian leadership.

Townshend shows that U.S. involvement is the latest chapter in a century of Western involvement in the region. He does this, not by politicizing the historical narrative with editorializations and directly addressing U.S. involvement, but by explaining Britain’s first intervention in the country and allowing the readers to interpret the U.S. experience through the British imperial lens. Townshend unsparingly criticizes ambitious senior generals who duplicitously took advantage of political uncertainties to increase military operations. The resulting logistical nightmares, inadequate medical care, financial hardships, and political dithering mired the British in the Middle East and drained the Empire’s strength.

The book’s first half moves quickly as Townshend describes events in vivid detail through the diaries, letters, and dispatches of the enlisted men and officers. He brings to life the harshness of the conditions and the immense physical suffering involved in the campaign, making the narrative superbly readable. The second half, however, slows down as he focuses on political issues at the national and international level. Readers without a strong background in British imperial history may find this section more challenging to follow.

While well written, Townshend’s book, like the British campaign, suffers from a lack of maps. The three maps provided are inadequate in view of the work’s scope, and readers should have another resource such as the online USMA atlas close by. An order of battle for the British and Ottoman forces would aid the reader as well. Despite these few shortcomings, this work will appeal to readers from both political and military professions as a superb introduction to understanding the Western military experience in Iraq.

Jonathan E. Newell, Nashua, New Hampshire

Discover the epic naval story of the war that threatened to undo our nation in 1812. Riveting firsthand accounts enliven this official sea-level view of the conflict that proved American naval prowess a force to be reckoned with. Explore historic documents, letters, ephemera, and artifacts, including fascinating finds from the Navy’s most recent underwater excavation of the war’s lost ships. Featuring a colorful, diverse cast of characters—from sailors, spies, and ship’s surgeons to commodores, Navy wives, and privatesmen—and incorporating hundreds of photographs, period illustrations, and contemporary and original maps, The War of 1812 and the Rise of the U.S. Navy is a sweeping panorama of a defining moment in U.S. history and a must-read for maritime aficionados and general history buffs alike.

From the publisher.


U.S. Army Captain Kimberly N. Hampton was living her dream: flying armed helicopters in combat and commanding D Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, the armed reconnaissance aviation squadron of the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1998 she was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army. Then, driven by determination and ambition, Kimberly rapidly rose through the ranks in the almost all-male bastion of military aviation to command a combat aviation troop.

On January 2, 2004, Captain Hampton was flying an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter above Fallujah, Iraq, in support of a raid on an illicit weapons marketplace, searching for an illusive sniper on the rooftops of the city. A little past noon her helicopter was wracked by an explosion. A heat-seeking surface-to-air missile had gone into the exhaust and knocked off the helicopter’s tail boom. The helicopter crashed, killing Kimberly.

Kimberly’s Flight is the story of Captain Hampton’s exemplary life. This story is told through nearly 50 interviews and her own emails to family and friends, and is entwined with Ann Hampton’s narrative of loving and losing a child.

From the publisher.

THE SWORD OF ST. MICHAEL: The 82nd Airborne Division in World War II, Guy LoFaro, Da Capo Press, New York, 784 pages, $40.00.

The 82nd Airborne Division spent more time in combat than any other American airborne unit of World War II, and its fierce battlefield tenacity earned it the reputation of one of the finest divisions in the world. Yet no comprehensive history of the 82nd during World War II exists today. The Sword of St. Michael corrects this significant gap in the literature, offering a lively narrative and thoroughly researched history of the famous division.

Author Guy LoFaro, himself a distinguished officer of the division, interweaves the voices of soldiers at both ends of the chain of command, from Eisenhower to the lowest private. Making extensive use of primary sources, LoFaro offers a work of insightful analysis, situating the division’s exploits in a strategic and operational context.

From the publisher.
The Reserve Component Trained and Ready? Lessons of History

LTC Ralph Ribas, NG, Brigade Executive Officer, 53rd IBCT, Pinellas Park, Florida—I recently read Major General Mark MacCarley’s article “The Reserve Component Trained and Ready? Lessons of History” (Military Review, May-June 2012) and did a double take after reading the sub-head Observations from History. Historically, it was very interesting and informative, particularly as it might serve as a basic historical timeline for those who are not familiar with Reserve Components in general and their mobilization up through the current conflicts.

I principally enjoyed his discussion of how the AC/RC [Active Component and Reserve Component] relationship changed through time and the efforts the AC applied to increasing Reserve readiness up to and through the Cold War and later Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm controversy regarding the 48th Infantry Brigade, and the Bold Shift initiative, working with some really good AC officers between and during IDT weekends. Having deployed twice, I appreciated his reference to military historian Roger Thompson in describing the difference in pre-deployment training between the AC and RC “that with the proper equipment and enough time, reserve forces can fight on the same level as the regulars.”

General MacCarley’s comments in his Observations from History mentioning general unit readiness and his reference to the Government Accountability Office report dated 5 May 1992 interestingly note the difficulty of quickly deploying large RC combat units due to their readiness as it relates to the number of days available for training vs. proficiency. However, as a professional, and someone who takes great pride in being a soldier, I disagree with the “broad brush” assertion regarding the need for external assessment following extended training periods. Not that external assessments do not add value; they most certainly can. An extra pair of eyes and outside experiences absolutely have a role in increasing trainee and trainer proficiencies. That said, my peers and I (i.e., the circle I work for and with) and the junior leaders and Soldiers that I have been fortunate to lead do not need to be “compelled” to perform to standard. We do so because we are professionals. Additionally, I would argue that for the most part the majority of RC units, including some that work for him, regularly train to standard not only because they know how to, but out of professional pride. Most know what right looks like and work toward it. In my experience, the internal AARs we execute are usually more in-depth and internally critical than those executed by outside evaluators. What’s more, as RC trainers spend precious time researching and planning training, more often than not AAR’s are based on actual doctrine or performance measures than TTP or SOPs from units that do it all the time.

Is there goodness in potentially partnering or working with a “like” AC unit? Yes, but the implication that RCs in general do not already synchronize and judiciously employ our scarce resources unless there is fear of a bad assessment, respectfully, is not correct. While some may need outside motivation, I would argue that most do not need the outside pressure to succeed. We strive for success because we are professionals—it’s our responsibility to our Soldiers, ourselves, and to the Nation.
The Roman soldiers, bred in war’s alarms,
Bending with unjust loads and heavy arms,
Cheerful their toilsome marches undergo,
And pitch their sudden camp before the foe.

Virgil, quoted by Flavius Vegetius Renatus
in The Military Institutions of the Romans

Carrying off the Menorah from the Temple in Jerusalem depicted on a frieze on the Arch of Titus in the Forum Romanum, Via Sacra. Rome, Roman Forum, c. 82 C.E.